History of New Zealand. Vol. II.

Front Cover

Spine

Back Cover

Title Page

History of New Zealand. Vol. ii.

History of New Zealand. by G. W. Rusden. In Three Volumes. Volume ii. London :Chapman and Hall,Limited.Melbourne and Sydney: George Robertson.1883. [The right of Translation and Reproduction is reserved.] Sungan: Clay and Taylor, Printers. New Zealand.

Chapter x. Colonial Office Requires Information.

Materials for forming an opinion of the gravity of the situation were gradually supplied to the English Government. The Duke of Newcastle, until July, 1860, seemed unconscious. Parliament slumbered. Not since April, 1854, had New Zealand papers been presented. In July, 1860, they were again laid on the table. The Duke wrote that he could not “hold out any hope that it would be possible to increase permanently the present military force;” sent out four silver-headed sticks “to be given by the Governor to chiefs,”

Colonel Browne gave one forthwith to Hori Kingi Anaua of Wanganui (Despatch; 21st August, 1860).

and started on a tour with the Prince of Wales to the United States, leaving Sir G.Cornewall Lewis and Mr. Chichester Fortescue to sign documents until his return. The former of the two brought a judgment to bear which the Duke had wanted. He saw danger. Mr Richmond's celebrated but (as he called it) able and interesting memorandum shocked him as it had shocked Sir W. Denison. Her Majesty's Government had very carefully considered the case, and were not prepared to meet Mr. Richmond's wishes. “A policy which requires the continual presence of a large force carries, in most cases, its condemnation on its face.”

Mr. Richmond did not even hint at the propriety of investing the Home Government with larger powers for dealing with the native question, nor at sharing the expenses of war. Sir G. C. Lewis alluded “to these circumstances, not of course as relieving the Home Government from the duty of supporting the colony against a pressing danger, but because they must materially affect the disposition of the British Government and people to undertake that indefinite expenditure of blood and treasure to which Mr. Richmond invites them.” On the 27th August, Mr. Fortescue referred to the complimentary addresses from provincial bodies to the Governor, and to Bishop Selwyn's protest against the address from Hawke's Bay, and while seeing no reason to question the justice of the proceedings towards Te Rangitake, asked for information upon the important question now brought forward, “namely, of an alleged right, distinct from one of property, existing in the chief of the tribe to assent to or forbid the sale of any land belonging to members of the tribe, in cases where all the owners are willing to sell, and how far such a right has been or ought to be recognized by the Crown.” The reader has already been informed that the right of Te Rangitake and his followers did not depend only on his “mana,” but included, besides the common tribal heritage and occupation of domiciles, special occupation, by tribal arrangement, of separate portions of the Waitara block. Many facts, however, were not officially reported to England for several years, and the legal significance of occupation by tribal arrangement was not laid down by the Courts until 1869, in the Rangitikei-Manawati case; but it is possible that if Governor Browne had made it known the Government in England would have forbidden the prosecution of the war. Some occupation was known to Mr. Richmond, but he denounced it as an encroachment on the proper owners. Mr. Fortescue declared that it was the desire of the Government to observe faithfully the letter and the spirit of the Waitangi treaty, and asked for full information whether —apart from the treaty there were reasons in favour of recognizing Te Rangitake's alleged rights, and whether, as appeared “to be the truth, they do not justify the claims of Te Rangitake upon the present occasion.”

In reply to this query, Colonel Browne sent (4th December, 1860) a despatch compiled for him by Mr. F. D. Bell on seignorial right. With its enclosures it occupied nearly a hundred pages of a Parliamentary blue-book. It very erroneously declared that in the course he was pursuing, the Governor was adhering to the policy of Hobson, Fitzroy, and Grey. Fitzroy had distinctly recognized those Ngatiawa rights which Browne was denying to Te Rangitake; and Fitzroy was reviled for so doing by the very men who now applauded Colonel Browne for using force to compel land sales. He made many false deductions. Mr. Richmond supplied a characteristic minute, which was appended to the despatch, as the opinion of the Ministers. As to Maori land it contended “it would be foolish to seek precedents for the regulation of dealings with Europeans in the usages of a period when there were no Europeans in the country.” The inquiry must be whether the right of veto had been recognized or asserted since the settlement. “If not, no such right can be supposed to exist.” Yet by the treaty of Waitangi, in 1840, the Queen “confirms and guarantees to the chiefs and tribes of New Zealand, and to the respective families and individuals thereof, the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and other properties which they may individually or collectively possess, so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession.” In their own generation the Ministry were indeed wise to refuse to look back so far. But whatever they might refuse to do, the Secretary of State should have remembered, or ascertained, that Mr. Spain had recorded the fact that Rauparaha had power to forbid a sale of land near Otaki.

P. P. 1846. Vol. xxx. p. 102.

Mr. Richmond concluded with his usual formula. To have admitted Te Rangitake's claim would have been “the dereliction of a plain duty, and an act of weakness unattended by any advantage beyond the postponement of a difficulty, which must soon have recurred in an aggravated form.” With singular contortion of reasoning power, he declared that recognition of Rangitake's claims would have been “unjust to the native proprietors,” and that “it would have been an abandonment of the principles laid down and acted upon by successive Governors for the settlement of the Ngatiawa claims in Taranaki.” If the Secretary of State had referred to Captain Fitzroy's despatches in 1844, he would have found that an entirely contrary course was then adopted; that justice was done and peace was maintained. There was a settler who made an earnest appeal to the Governor before the troops were marched into the field. He asked for a complete public and impartial investigation of the title. “Over the whole block rides the tribal or public interest… were the whole tribe consenting the title would of course be clear… but Teira, so far from having the whole tribe, has only an inconsiderable fraction in his favour, while against him is arrayed the great majority with the principal chief at their head.” We learn from Mr. Swainson

‘New Zealand and the War’ (p. 97), by William Swainson, formerly Attorney-General for New Zealand. London: 1862.

that it was “not until nearly a year after the war commenced that it was publicly known that such an appeal had been addressed to the Governor.” Such were the arts by which the Ministerial position was maintained.

War was meanwhile proceeding at Taranaki. On the 6th July the Governor wrote that though his injunction against attacking Te Rangitake's bush pah had reference to the probable effect of combining the Maoris against British authority, he was “well convinced that any attempt to destroy the pah (which was almost inaccessible) would prove abortive.” Meanwhile, a band of the Waikatos went as volunteers to join their countrymen. A pah, Puketakauere, was built within a mile of the English camp at Waitara. There was a skirmish on the 23rd June. Colonel Gold having employed Mr. Whiteley the missionary to spy the state of the pah (as a guest on the previous Sunday), authorized Major Nelson with 348 men of all ranks to attack it on the 27th June. Browne reported: “After a severe and gallant conflict he was obliged to retire with a loss of 30 killed and 34 wounded.… This reverse is likely to have a prejudicial effect upon our relations with the Maori race generally, and it is not easy to foretell the consequences.” The Governor sent more troops-almost denuding Auckland— and wrote to England for reinforcements. He warned Colonel Gold to deal effectively with the enemy, “as the Maoris invariably construe even escape into victory.” Colonel Gold's strength at the time was composed of 1188 of regular forces, and 573

militia and volunteers; but he found them insufficient. There must be immediate reinforcements. Every available soldier throughout Australia was required. Heavy guns were indispensable,-the artillery in hand being quite ineffective against the Maori fortifications. Puketakauere was indeed a notable discouragement to those who believed, with Busby, in 1837, that a hundred soldiers would be more than a match for the combined forces of all New Zealand. The pah was on a ridge between two fern-covered gullies. Major Nelson's forces were in three divisions, one of which was to cut off the retreat of the Maoris towards the Waitara river. The artillery opened fire from the north-west about 400 yards from the pah, but no breach was made which justified an assault. Suddenly, from the fern, unseen Maoris poured a fire on the main body of the troops. Major Nelson ordered an advance towards a ditch and bank, from whence, in extended order, the natives were firing. The advance was made “in a most continued and gallant manner until the men reached a deep ravine with an entrenchment behind which they found it impossible to pass, it being defended by two if not more large bodies of Maoris, who were almost entirely concealed behind it, and another entrenchment in rear, as well as the very high fern. Here a desperate and destructive fire was opened upon us and gallantly returned. Our skirmishers being far fewer in number and exposed in a much greater degree than the enemy, I deemed it desirable to direct them to join the main body; and our ammunition being nearly expended I withdrew the whole of the men and returned to camp in regular order.” A civilian wrote:

‘History of Taranaki,’ p 208. B. Wells. New Zealand: 1878.

“So much pressed were the British at last, that it was only by a timely discharge of canister shot that a retreat was effected.… So hasty was the retreat that many of the dead and wounded were left on the field, and quantities of ammunition were shot out of the carts into the fern to facilitate the flight.”

The troops returned to their camp an hour before noon. The Maoris were believed to have been far more numerous than the English. It was said that those who were deployed in rear of the troops were Ngatiawa, brought by Te Rangitake to aid the men of Waikato in the pah. The latter also sallied forth, and from the fern and rifle-pits poured their fire upon the soldiers. After an interval of a day the Maoris went forward and buried the English dead within a mile of the English camp, and the soldiery began to entertain more respect for their foes than was felt by the settlers who lusted for the land. Two days before the attack on Puketakauere, the Maori king died. One of his last acts was to write to his old friend Sir William Martin, and beg him to be kind to the Maoris. Colonel Browne, as if uncon scious that his own views had become of no significance, reported that he knew not the intention of the king party, but if they would abandon their movement, he was prepared to meet their wishes.

The son of Potatau, called at the time Matutaera, but who subsequently took the name Tawhiao, was chosen king. Colonel Browne had in April written to Bishop Selwyn, Sir William Martin, and Mr. Swainson, asking their opinions as to the measures to be proposed to the Maori chiefs at the meeting he had convened. They sent him a joint paper on the points on which they agreed, with separate papers on other points. One passage in the Bishop's paper declaring that “rights of ownership of land whether in one or many joint proprietors were not alienable without the consent of the tribe” -must have been wormwood to Colonel Browne. One of the joint recommendations was that there should be a council of advice, appointed by and responsible only to the Crown, in native affairs. When the meeting of tribes, convened by the Governor, took place, he told the chiefs that the treaty of Waitangi would be inviolately maintained by himself and all his successors; but in order to rouse the suspicions of the powerful Ngapuhi and others, he affirmed that the king natives desired to “assume authority” over other New Zealand tribes, and contemplated” the forcible subjection of those tribes who refuse to recognize their authority.” Nevertheless much of the address was kindly. The Governor desired to obtain the views of the tribes as to the king movement-and to govern wisely. His speech was long. But having sent reinforcements to Taranaki and received satisfactory assurances from the chiefs at Kohimarama, he wrote on the 14th July to Colonel Gold: “You will now have upwards of 2000 men of all ranks and a large force of artillery under your command, and you will, I trust, be able to strike a vigorous and effective blow on the rebel forces, either on the north or south of New Plymouth.”

The ill-success of the campaign had meanwhile induced Major-General Pratt, Commander of the Forces in Australia, to take the field, and Colonel Browne (27th July) wrote to him that the Maoris were brave and formidable, and “boasted with some truth that since our first arrival in the colony the British troops have gained no decided advantage over them, though our arms have always been immeasurably superior, and our numbers often in excess of theirs.… Finally, I beg the favour of your protection and kindness to the friendly natives, more particularly for the chiefs Mahau, Aperahama, Ihaia (the murderer), and Teira, and their men… faithful allies.… It is, however, quite true that all Maoris will communicate intelligence to the enemy; so far from considering such conduct shameful, they look upon it as right and chivalrous.”… Mr. Parris possessed his confidence and that of the Government, and he begged the General to consult him.

The great meeting at Kohimārama (on the Melanesian mission grounds) commenced on the 10th July, 1860. Two hundred and fifty chiefs had been invited from all quarters. About half that number attended. The Governor read his address in English. McLean read a translation in Maori. There was deep attention. The chiefs were then presented to his Excellency by McLean; the Governor departed; the chiefs returned to the conference. The districts most fully represented were the Bay of Islands, Kaipara, Auckland, the Bay of Plenty, Wairarapa, and the west coast from Wellington to Wanganui. There were some members of the Ngatiawa tribe, but the Thames, Waikato, Taupo, Upper Wanganui, and Taranaki tribes were barely represented. For a few days the orators generally advocated loyalty and peace. The haste with which the Governor had made war was animadverted on by all except the Ngapuhi. It was resolved to send written replies to the Governor's speech. They may be seen in the Parliamentary blue-books. Many of them expressed regret that the Maoris did not see Colonel Browne as they used to see his predecessor. Some did not allude to the Taranaki war. The Ngapuhi addresses, two in number, breathed thorough loyalty to the Queen, and hostility to the Maori king movement and Te Rangitake. The Ngatiawa were less devoted. England had failed in duty in many respects. Land Commissioners believed three witnesses, but would not listen to a host who contradicted them. Maoris were not permitted to lease land to Pakehas; which was unjust. The Governor ought not to have sent abroad for soldiers to attack Te Rangitake, who only sought help from the Waikatos in New Zealand. The two first Governors had done no good; Governor Grey did much good; of the fourth Governor they did not know the thoughts except that he was in haste to fight Te Rangitake, which was alarming. The majority of the tribes expressed staunch loyalty, and some at the same time urged that peace should be made with Te Rangitake.

In the second week of the conference, the Governor sent several messages. One (16th July) was accompanied by “rules for the proper administration of justice,” which he said had been carefully prepared by the friend of the Maoris, the late Chief Justice. Another (18th July) asked the opinion of the chiefs as to “the difficulties and complications of the ownership of land,” and promised co-operation “in any system they might recommend, provided it would really attain the desired end.” A third (19th July) declared that McLean was instructed to explain the Taranaki events to the chiefs, in accordance with their wish. The administration of justice, and land questions, were discussed, but relegated to deliberation by the tribes at their homes. McLean spoke for four hours, detailing the Government view of Te Rangitake's claim, to an intent auditory. Still the chiefs seemed to hope that peace would be made. In the third week the Governor sent a message suggesting juries de medietate linguæ, and asked for the views of the chiefs. Some received the suggestion favourably, but no resolution was arrived at. The Governor and his wife dined with the chiefs in the hall at Kohimarama in the third week, and gained popularity by doing so. After an adjournment of a few days, the chiefs, on reassembling, prayed that the native conference might be held periodically. Some said that if it had been thought of sooner, there would have been no Maori king,-no Taranaki war. Again they discussed the latter question, and finally decided that Hohepa Tamaihengia should visit Te Rangitake and explain the feelings of the conference. On the 10th August, resolutions were formally carried-disapproving the Maori king movement, justifying the Governor, condemning Te Rangitake and his allies; highly praising the idea of holding the conference (or Runanga), and complimenting Mr. McLean. Three chiefs recorded their protest against the condemnation of Te Rangitake. On the 11th August, the Governor closed the conference with a complimentary speech, promising to convene them in the following year. He did not tell them of the urgency with which he had pressed upon General Pratt that military success must be at once obtained. Mr. Smith, Assistant Native Secretary, reported that the experiment had been so far successful, and might be made effective, under judicious management, for removing most of the difficulties attending native affairs. He called special attention to the conspicuous abilities of Tamihana Te Rauparaha and another Otaki chieftain, as well as to the important declarations of Waka Nene and Wiremu Nera, that they were ready to prove by deeds their loyalty to the Queen. Mr. Smith thought such announcements would have a good effect throughout the island.

To complete the papers to be presented to the General Assembly, the Governor on the 20th July had asked Mr. McLean whether the sellers of the Waitara block were justified in selling to the Government, and whether Rangitake had any right to interfere. McLean answered the first question affirmatively, and the second in the negative. When this statement was made public, Archdeacon Hadfield wrote in a newspaper that Mr. McLean had himself informed the Archdeacon that he (McLean) had not investigated Te Rangitake's title, and that a chief, Matene Te Whiwhi, averred that McLean expressed his regret that the Governor had been so hasty as to eject Te Rangitake by force without further investigation. McLean's defence was equivocal. He had initiated the investigation, though it was completed by an officer of the department, under McLean's instructions. He had told the Bishop of Wellington that he was “impressed with the belief that Te Rangitake's claim was unfounded.” “It is quite possible that I may have said that I had not personally instituted an inquiry on the spot immediately previous to the breaking out of hostilities.” “I may have said that the cession by Te Teira would not be sufficient alone, unless he were joined, as he has been, by other influential claimants.” It was the chief Matene who complained of the hastiness of the Government, and McLean had only admitted that such was the general opinion among the natives, which McLean combated in his conversation. His state of health had “made it impossible” for McLean to make personal inquiry as to Teira's title. On the 30th July, the Governor opened the General Assembly at Auckland. He arraigned Te Rangitake for forbidding a sale of land “to which he neither asserted nor possessed any title;” a daring untruth which his more astute advisers must have propounded with misgiving, and which must have been heard with astonishment. The speech alluded to the conference at Kohimarama, from which the Governor expected good results. The two Houses cordially echoed the speech, and the Taranaki war formed the subject of protracted debates. On the 30th August, by eleven votes against three, the Governor's proceedings were approved by the Council; but one of the dissentients was Mr. Swainson. On the 16th August, the representatives resolved, after various proposed amendments, and nights' and days' debates: “That in the opinion of this House, the interference of Te Rangitake at Waitara, and his resort to force to prevent the survey of land there, rendered the measures adopted by his Excellency the Governor indispensable for the due maintenance of Her Majesty's sovereignty, and that the welfare of both races of Her Majesty's subjects peremptorily requires a vigorous prosecution of the war to a successful termination.”

Little did Colonel Browne and his advisers expect that in three short years the Government of New Zealand would be forced to confess that Bishop Selwyn and the Archdeacon were wise, and that the claim of Te Rangitake was righteous. But Governor Browne, in reporting the resolution of the 16th August, did scant justice to the representatives. He stated that some leaders of the Opposition were absent from the division, being unwilling to commit themselves definitely against the war, but he did not state that there had been divisions in which the Government majority was less than on the final vote. The Opposition waited to see what the Ministry would do. Mr. Richmond, on the 3rd August, moved for leave to bring in a “Native Offenders Bill,” and in doing so treated of the Taranaki war. He would, in future, move for a Committee to report upon the expediency of a change in the existing mode of extinguishing the native title, and would afterwards make proposals for the civil government of the natives. His own arguments and those of Mr. Forsaith, Dr. Featherston, and others who opposed or supported him, have been quoted already, so far as it is necessary to cite them. The eloquent appeal of Dr. Featherston on behalf of the Maori people, unrepresented in the House, provoked applause, but did not persuade the representatives to mete out the justice demanded. Yet Dr. Featherston, believing the war to be unjust and unholy, saw that retreat was dangerous, while success was shocking. Mr. Carleton moved for a Committee of Inquiry into the causes which led to the war. He was one of those who opposed the Native Offenders Bill. He laughed at Mr. Richmond's idea that the District Commissioner was himself a Court capable of determining the Waitara dispute:—”a Court that was at once judge, jury, and plaintiff.”… “A District Commissioner (to borrow Mr. Richmond's words) to have power to declare a native claim ‘a bag of wind !’ He (Mr. Carleton) knew more of classics than of law, and remembered what happened to those who were entrusted by Æolus with the bags of wind. They let the wind out and raised a storm that wrecked them. We too were in a storm, and had yet to weather it.” Mr. Carleton, in moving (August, 1860) for a Committee of Inquiry, declared that “the Government case had completely broken down.” Te Rangitake's eloquent and forcible letter completely cut away the plea that he had no right to the Waitara land. The Government professed a willingness for inquiry, but they and their supporters thwarted it. Amendments were moved, and finally inquiry was forbidden. Amongst Mr. Carleton's supporters were Mr. Fitzherbert, Mr. Forsaith, Dr. Featherston, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Fox. The amendment (carried by Mr. Sewell) was that Archdeacon Hadfield and Donald McLean should be examined at the bar of the House. Their opinions differed as to Te Rangitake's rights. The Governor triumphantly reported that the justice of his measures was asserted in the last division by 19 votes against 4; but it was impossible to gather from his despatch that in preliminary debates the majority was narrower, and that some members confessed with what reluctance they sanctioned an unjust war which, when entered upon, they felt it dangerous to the reputation of the Government to abandon. Of the discussions, at the close of which the New Zealand members virtually followed the Governor in submitting to the Ministry, it is just to furnish a short narrative.

Mr. Forsaith sadly admitted that no retreat could be made, but affirmed that the Ministry had “completely failed in disproving the assertion that in advising the course that led to the war they had been over-hasty and inconsiderate.” Mr. Fitzherbert “contended for justice to the Maoris.” He deprecated the “offensive and hostile expressions used by the Native Minister” (Mr.C. W. Richmond). There had not been sufficient investigation before the purchase was concluded. Mr. Williamson (Superintendent of the Auckland Province), while declaring his intention to oppose Mr. Carleton's motion, “could not acquit the honourable gentlemen at the head of affairs of having imprudently and too hastily advised the steps which led to active hostilities.”…” He thought they ought not to have given the advice which it appears they did.” Yet Mr. Williamson, while of opinion that the purchase from Teira was valid, hoped that the war would not be prosecuted to the bitter end, but that by the aid of friendly chiefs it might be brought to a close. Mr. J. C. Richmond denied that the war was “for a plot of land,” but admitted that the “case of Ihaia was not a nice one for the Governor to take up, for Ihaia's hands were deep in blood.” But the war must be prosecuted, and he charged the Commander of the Forces with “signal and unprecedented incapability.” Mr. Fitzgerald, objecting to the appointment of a Select Committee, moved that evidence be taken at the bar of the House.” He thought the Ministry had exercised every necessary “precaution before advising his Excellency.” Mr. Fox, who had pro formâ seconded Mr. Carleton's motion, supported Mr. Fitzgerald's amendment. He arraigned Governor Fitzroy's vacillating policy, and charged Governor Grey with feebleness and an injurious desire to govern the Maoris by means of “personal influence.” Governor Browne had “taken too little pains to ingratiate himself with the natives.” He had given way to “pressure from without.” When he remembered that the Native Minister was member for Taranaki, and the petition from the Taranaki Provincial Council urging the Governor to obtain land by coercion, on the ground that the natives were too weak to resist, he thought such sentiments “unworthy of a British community—only worthy those whom his Excellency's advisers had styled ‘hoary cannibals living in a state of beastly communism.’… All compulsion was contrary to the treaty of Waitangi.… The dispute should have been disposed of by other means before an appeal was made to arms.… If the purchase was completed why were not the title-deeds laid on the table?”… Mr.C. W. Richmond interjected that “the purchase-deed was not usually made out till after the money had been paid. In this case it had been thought prudent to make it out sooner… because in the state of disorder it was quite possible that some of the claimants might have been killed.” Then, said Mr. Fox, “the deed was executed before the purchase was completed.” “No,” replied Mr. Richmond; “it had been completed since the beginning of the war.” But, retorted Fox, “the honourable member has told us that one of the boundaries was not yet drawn.… The interruptions made the case worse.”… “With an incomplete purchase, hurriedly effected, and without any foresight of the consequences, the colony had been plunged into war. He felt bound as a member of the House, as a man and as a citizen, to vote for an inquiry.” Dr. Monro taunted Mr. Fox for his new-born zeal for the treaty of Waitangi. Did he, when a servant of the New Zealand Company, abandon his employers because they termed the treaty a “device to amuse naked savages” ? Dr. Monro wished to see “the subjugation of the rebels accomplished in the first instance.” They could think afterwards of schemes for dealing with native questions. Mr. Brown advocated inquiry.

Mr. Sewell (who had ceased to be a Minister in 1859) thought a general inquiry useless, but as Archdeacon Hadfield's name had been made use of, considered that he and Mr. McLean might be examined. Mr. J. C. Richmond violently assailed Te Rangitake. In coupling the name of Parris with that of Ihaia, Te Rangitake proved that, as he recklessly murdered character, he would “not scruple at anything to attain his ends.” As to Mr. Fox's attack on the petition of the Taranaki Council, though Mr. J. C. Richmond had no hand in framing it, he was “willing to adopt its opinions.”… The “petition has no humbug about it; it plainly states all the wishes of the petitioners.” As for the treaty of Waitangi, “it was at an end as far as these tribes were concerned by their act,” when they marched in armed parties at Taranaki, in defiance of the Governor's proclamation, when the natives were quarrelling. Mr. Daldy, a member of Mr. Fox's brief administration in 1856, advocated inquiry. Mr.C. W. Richmond declared that the Ministry assumed a neutral position as to the motion for inquiry, but asked the House in “common justice “to consider the position of the Governor in guiding “the great machine of representative government.” The line taken by some members raised in his “mind some serious reflections as to the fitness of Parliamentary Government for a country in the position of New Zealand.” Mr. Dillon Bell deprecated animadversions upon the Governor; Mr. Brandon supported the motion for inquiry; and Colonel Haultain regretted the attack which had been made by Mr. J. C. Richmond on the Commander of the Forces, who had received special instructions (not to attack Te Rangitake on his own ground). Mr. Sewell, when the result of the debate seemed doubtful, (as a friend of his recent colleagues) moved that Archdeacon Hadield and Mr. Donald McLean be heard at the bar of the House. Mr. Forsaith traversed the allegation that the Government had been forced into the war. They had taken a position that forced it. He thought a Committee of Inquiry should be chosen by ballot. It was pitiable to watch the impotent attempts of the Native Minister to extricate himself from the dilemma he was placed in by Mr. Fox as to the purchase-deed. Mr. King (one of the Provincial Council at Taranaki which petitioned the Assembly to permit Maoris to sell, whether they formed “a majority or only a large minority of claimants,” and asked the Government to compel “an equitable division of the Maori common land,”) stepped forward to take his share of responsibility for the petition. Mr. Clark, confessing his ignorance of Maori language and usages, looked upon the “war, however we may grieve over it, as one of necessity.” Mr. Fitzgerald's amendment was lost by 15 votes against 18. Mr. Carleton's motion was lost by 14 votes against 19. Mr. Sewell's amendment was carried by 18 votes against 12. The Archdeacon, examined by Mr. Fitzherbert, was cross-examined by Mr.C. W. Richmond and others. Mr. McLean, examined by Messrs C. W. and J. C. Richmond, was cross-examined by Mr. Fox. Their opinions have been sufficiently set forth in these pages. Afterwards Mr. Stafford carried, by 19 votes against 4, the resolution already quoted, which supported “the measures adopted by his Excellency” at Taranaki. The division was taken on a proposition made by Mr. Carleton to omit the words declaring those measures indispensable, and to retain those which asserted that “a vigorous prosecution of the war” was required.

Mr. Dillon Bell's speech showed how grinding was the pressure of events upon men's minds. He voted for Mr. Stafford's motion, but “thought it extremely probable we should find some of those now in arms against us could show a good title to some of Teira's block.” He had thought so before, and the evidence of the Archdeacon and Mr. McLean confirmed the opinion. Yet Mr. Bell (not ignorant of the Maori character) would decline to hear their claims unless “they choose to come in as peaceful citizens.” Had he been entitled to advise the Governor in March, 1859, he would have warned him that he was “getting into an almost insuperable difficulty” at Waitara; but he was indignant with Te Rangitake for “rejecting with contumacious insolence” the Governor's offer of a safe-conduct. Though the resolution ought to have stated that the steps taken were justifiable, not “indispensable,” Mr. Bell would vote for it. He had many friends amongst the Maoris, but it was true mercy to teach them to submit to law by a war which he viewed “with most real grief.”

Dr. Featherston inveighed, not against the Governor, but against the Ministry “who had so wantonly, so recklessly provoked “war. If with 3000 soldiers the position at Taranaki was barely tenable, how many would be required if the tribes in general should rise against injustice? “I cannot help saying, that unless some unlooked-for success be shortly achieved, the question which this House will have to consider will be (if indeed it is not its duty at once to decide it), whether you are prepared to sacrifice the whole colony, or to sacrifice those who have plunged us into this wretched, this miserable war.”

Mr.C. W. Richmond denied that he had brought pressure to bear upon the Governor. He thought only “two or three Europeans in Taranaki knew” beforehand that Teira intended to offer the Waitara block to the Governor, and his own “presence was accidental.” Forgetting his urgent note to Mr. Parris,

Quoted previously, vol. i. p. 623.

or drawing a distinction between letters to him and to ordinary persons, Mr. Richmond declared: “After the offer was made and accepted, I never corresponded with any New Plymouth settlers upon the subject.… Could the Governor recede from the engagement he had made? His Excellency thought not, and we agreed with him. And I now declare, in view of all the calamities we are witnessing, that I should under the like circumstances give the same advice again.… We believed, and I still believe, that the force at command was, if properly handled, quite sufficient to overawe, or, if need were, to strike a decided blow at Te Rangitake, which would have terminated the war.”

Mr. Fox hoped that the Native Minister would be able to show that “he and some of his constituents were not the authors of the war.”

The difficulty of analyzing the contemporary statements about New Zealand affairs is shown in the fact that though Mr. Fox so vigorously inculpated the Ministry in 1860, he used very different language in 1876. Addressing the Royal Colonial Institute (23rd May) in London, he said: “I am bold to affirm that the colonists were not in any case responsible for the wars (in New Zealand).”— ‘Proceedings, Royal Colonial Institute, 1875–6.’

“It was the general desire of the honourable member and his constituents at Taranaki, to which he pointed as the key to this war.”

Mr. Weld, who had become a member of the Government in July, recurred to the argument that a Maori ought not to be allowed to prefer “a claim with arms in his hands.” He defended Mr.C. W. Richmond against Mr. Fox's imputations.

Mr. Fitzherbert defended Te Rangitake, and averred that the marked contrast between the conduct of the Government at Taranaki and elsewhere showed “sinister influence exerted when it was hoped to be likely to favour the constituents and immediate dependents of the Native Minister.” Subsequent speakers declined to relieve the Ministry of the burden which was sought to be placed upon the Governor. Mr. Carter said: “The Ministry entered on this war on their own responsibility, and unprepared for it.” Mr. Stafford, confident of a majority, did not repudiate the imputation. “The time had come (he said), if ever, when in mercy to the natives the law must be upheld; this was the influence by which his Excellency and his advisers had been actuated.” By the passing of Stafford's resolution war to the knife was declared; and it has been necessary to describe fully the proceedings which sanctioned it. Colonel Browne accounted for the small number of members who voted, by saying that perhaps some Opposition leaders did not wish “to commit themselves too definitely against the war;” that some Government supporters “did not take the trouble to attend;” and some members “recognized the justice of the war, but objected to a portion of the words of the resolution.” Thus it came to pass that less than a majority of the House committed it to war;

The extracts in the text were transmitted with his despatches by the Governor. They were contained in a newspaper, favourable to Mr. Richmond; the ‘New Zealander.’

and that the votes of representatives from the Middle Island overbore those of members from the north. A double curse followed. The dwellers in the north suffered for the crimes of the southern members. Unconscious of the common tenure of Maori land, or incapable of comprehending it, Colonel Browne reiterated his assertion that Te Rangitake had no claim on the Waitara block—” that the title of the vendors had been carefully investigated and proved good,”—and that “other claimants cited by Archdeacon Hadfield had been stimulated to put forward groundless claims by the agitation carried on by Europeans.” His advisers were at his side

As Colonel Browne's friends have denied that he was so weak as to have been influenced by others to abandon his previous determination about coercing Maoris to sell land, it may be well to show that one of the ablest men in New Zealand thought at the time that he was so influenced. In 1858, in opposing Mr. Richmond's views on the Native Territorial Rights Bill, Colonel Browne cited the late Chief Justice Martin as one “whose experience and intimate acquaintance with the Maoris cause him to be recognized as an undisputed authority in everything relating to them” (P. P. 1860, vol. xlvii. p. 18). In September, 1859, before he was completely enmeshed, Colonel Browne wrote: “The Europeans covet these lands, and are determined to enter in and possess them—Recte si possint, si non quocunque modo” (ibid. p. 78). In the same paper he sighed for a council of advice (on Maori matters) containing Bishop Selwyn and Mr. Martin. In December, 1860, be aspersed Hadfield, and disputed with the late Chief Justice as to the true construction of the treaty of Waitangi, and of Maori terms and usages. Only a mental paroxysm could account for such a conversion, except on the supposition that outside influences had overborne the Governor. Archdeacon Henry Williams wrote thus— privately—to England: “Another Maori war, wantonly brought on by the Governor in the forcing of a disputed claim of land.… I stand aloof, not being yet brought into collision.… Where war will terminate no one can surmise.… Hadfield, tainted with the familiar term of traitor given to any one who may differ from them… The language used by the Europeans towards the natives is extremely vile, and I am prepared to expect sad work.” Again (July, 1860) the same keen observer wrote: “The country is involved in war through the folly of our self-willed Ministers, men of no experience in native matters… The Bishop and the missionaries are most fearfully abused as traitors and busy-bodies… Hadfield is in sad disgrace with the Government, having ventured to protest against this war. The Governor is a good man, but exceedingly weak, unable to resist his Ministers. The war is very popular, in the hopes of smashing the people altogether.” Time has accustomed the colonists to hear of, if not acknowledge, the injustice of the war. In 1881, Mr. Swanson (member for Newton) said in Parliament: “It was nothing but an attempt to rob Te Rangitake of his land; one of the most unjust things ever done; and it was proved to be unjust, and the land had to be given back to him. Why, the very ‘Gazettes’ were falsified. The Maori was on one side, and the English on the other, and there were falsehoods on the face of it. The English said, ‘The land is Teira's, but I will not allow it to be sold.’ What was on the Maori side? The land was Teira's, but it is no more his property than the property of the rest of us, and I will not allow it to be sold — which made all the difference. … A great majority of the representatives from Auckland were for peace, and were even in favour of having the matter talked over with Te Rangitake, but they were hounded down as traitors, and I say it is unjust and untrue to say that the northern people got up that war.… If it had not been for the southern men we never should have spent either blood or money over it. That is how it was, and every northern man knows it.”— ‘New Zealand,’ Hansard, 5th September, 1881.

when, he added, that Te Rangitake's letters to Archdeacon Hadfield “set forth no definite claim,” and that the Archdeacon would “better have fulfilled the duty of a loyal subject of the Queen if he had communicated them to me as the writer desired, instead of reserving them for use when he could appear in the character of an accuser.” But those eloquent letters produced no generous feeling towards their writer, though their non-production was made a ground of complaint against the Archdeacon. Neither had Colonel Browne heeded the earnest letter which Te Rangitake wrote to him before the rape of the Waitara. Recently he had described Hadfield as “more thoroughly acquainted with the Maoris than any European in the country,” and had urged that a council on advice on native affairs, which contained Bishop Selwyn and Sir W. Martin, would be so strong that calumny could not injure it. In reporting the debate he was so swayed by Mr. Richmond that half of his despatch (which, “to secure accuracy,” was “shown to his advisers”) was an indictment of the Archdeacon. Mr. Richmond, denying that the Governor had been influenced by him, rejoiced in the advice he had given, and boasted that if the thing were again to be done he would gladly give the word for war.

The Governor and his advisers relied upon their Kohimarama conference. They intended to hold another in 1861, and to obtain its deliberate opinion whether such conferences should be permanent institutions. The questions of “tribal title, ultimate individualization of native title, and the constitution of tribunals to determine Maori disputes amongst themselves about territorial rights,” were, as Mr. Richmond informed the House, to be referred to the conference of 1861. But other members were less sanguine than he in expecting that by such means the king movement could be extinguished. He introduced a Native Offenders Bill, giving enormous powers to the Governor in proclaiming districts within which it should be unlawful to hold communication with the Maoris. There was excitement in Waikato while the Assembly discussed the Bill. Though the second reading was passed, the measure was afterwards shelved.

Bishop Selwyn, Hadfield, Maunsell, and others protested against the power of outlawing districts. It seemed to them that the Bill enabled the Governor to determine what was law, to decide who had offended, to ban any combination of natives, and to construe into an unlawful purpose any proceeding of the natives not specially described in the Bill. They asked that no British subject should be subject to penalty or disability “without being brought to answer by due process of law.” Stafford angrily accused the Bishop of leading his name to inflame passions and retard peace. The correspondence, perhaps, strengthened the Opposition in strangling Mr. Richmond's Bill.

A Bill to create a Council to assist in managing native affairs was reserved by the Governor for the Royal pleasure. The Council was to be appointed by the Crown. But its functions were to advise on all matters on which the Government might consult it, to assist in drafting laws, and to “act in special cases in an administrative capacity at the instance of the Governor in Council.” Mr. Fox moved resolutions expressing regret that the Imperial Government had brought in a Bill removing native affairs from control of the New Zealand Legislature, and a Joint Committee of both Houses recommended that there should be a Council of advice on native affairs, appointed by the Crown, and consulted on all occasions by the local government, which should nevertheless exercise discretion as to accepting the advice of the Council. The Bill framed on this recommendation was amended at a Free Conference between the Houses; and on the motion of Mr. Sewell it was resolved to defer passing the Bill until the precise views of the Governor were ascertained, the House being desirous that the ordinary control of native affairs should be placed under responsible Ministers, “subject to the provisions of the Bill, and to the proper constitutional action of the Supreme Head of the Executive.”

Thus challenged, the Governor accepted the resolution, with the proviso that the “constitutional action” should “have the same interpretation as regarded native affairs as in reference to other Imperial subjects.”

The Bill introduced in the Imperial Parliament came to an untimely end. Mr. Fitzgerald, the rhapsodist of Godley, and editor of a Canterbury newspaper, at once assailed the Bill as curtailing colonial privileges. It contained every vice, and was called for by no necessity. It would make matters worse instead of better during the war. He denied that there had ever been a disposition to starve the native department, or to exhibit any narrow jealousy of the natives.

Mr. Fortescue, in August, 1860, told the Governor that the Bill had been withdrawn. Influential colonists opposed it as an invasion of their privileges, and other persons were hostile because they feared that English interference might imply correlative responsibility in war. Mr. Fortescue added that the Ministry considered it “their duty not merely to maintain the nominal authority of the Governor in native affairs, but as far as they properly can (under the New Zealand Constitution Act) to furnish him with the means of effectively exercising that authority.” Mr. Fortescue had (perhaps unconsciously) truthfully defined the authority which remained with the Governor. That gentleman himself incidentally described his wavering and weaponless condition. His local Native Council Bill suffered so much change in the House that it was only at his earnest entreaty that Donald McLean consented to sit in the Council if the Bill should receive the Royal assent in England. Mr. F. Dillon Bell was to be Secretary, and Lieutenant Nugent, 58th Regiment, was to be member of the Council. To the Governor's “great regret” Sir W. Martin declined a seat on the Council proposed to be constituted. In sending the mangled Bill to England the Governor admitted that the relations between himself and his responsible advisers were unsatisfactory. “I believe,” he said, “there has been little or no difference of opinion between myself and Mr. Richmond; but the responsibility has rested on me, while, with the exception of £7000 a-year (the appropriation of which I cannot alter without the consent of my advisers), the power of the purse, which is all but absolute, has been altogether in the hands of Ministers. This has been an unequal and unsatisfactory division.” His conversion to Mr. Richmond's ideas, which he had once so sternly condemned, was too sincere to allow him to perceive whither he was being led. He lost no opportunity of praising his tempter. He sent copies of Richmond's speeches, with high commendations, to England. The Ministry was in danger during the session, but it was on the burning question of provincial finances. In committee on resolutions (moved by Mr. Richmond on native policy) the disposal of proceeds of land sales was involved. Forthwith a more vigorous sense possessed the members than when justice to Maoris was in question. Mr. Fox protested against “any tampering with the compact of 1856.” The Ministerial phalanx lost a few members. The division was 17 against 17. The chairman voted against the Government. On another occasion they were in danger: and even on the war they had advised, their position was insecure.

It was during the session of 1860 that the House of Representatives appointed a Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances under which Mr. Fenton's mission in 1857 was undertaken, “to introduce institutions of civil government” in the Waikato district. So far as their labours elicited facts occurring in 1857 and 1858, and distributed doubtful blame between the Native Secretary, Mr.C. W. Richmond and others, it has been convenient to state the results in preceding pages. But they sat often and long. They gave an Arawa chief, Wiremu Maihe Rangikaheke (a clever debater, of eager manner, and with an European cast of countenance), a message inviting the attendance of Te Waharoa the king-maker. McLean, who had in 1857 jealously rebuffed that chief when on a visit to Auckland, disapproved of the invitation, and induced Rangikaheke to disregard the Committee. Before doing so, he told Sewell, the chairman of the Committee, that he did not approve of summoning Waharoa; but, on being examined, he declared that when he intercepted Rangikaheke he was not aware that the chief was the bearer of a letter from the Committee. He professed to be anxious for Te Waharoa's presence, and undertook to procure it, if possible, by other messengers. He failed. But the king-maker wrote thus (24th January, 1861) in reply to the chairman's invitation. The deeds done at Taranaki repelled him; and perhaps he remembered the stealthy capture of Rauparaha. “Salutations to you, the chairman of the Governor's Runanga. I have received your letter which was written in October, inviting me to Auckland. Here is a waiata (song):—

‘Continue to strive in vain; By you I will not be rent in sunder: Like the tree of the forest I will maintain a bold front. 'Twas I that loosed you from this belt, And now—behold the boundary which divides us: I am the centre of Raukawa.’

Friend, what is the use of our talking after the evil has taken place? Had you, indeed, written when the evil was small, it would have been well, and I would have gone; but now that the evil has grown to the height, what is the good? Behold the kindling of a fire. When it is small it can be put out; but when it has spread it cannot be extinguished. So, when the tide is low the creek can be crossed, but not when the tide has swollen to the full. So with the night; by day men travel, but they go not about by night. Witness the words of our Lord Jesus Christ (John ii. 9, 10). You ask me to make my thoughts known. Hearken; if any chief goes before the Governor, and supports the ‘mana’ of the Maori, and our right to hold our land,—such are my thoughts. These are the causes of the setting up of the king. If you see a chief whose words seem hard when he visits the Governor, or is present at Pakeha or Maori inquiries—he is my friend. Or if you see a chief who declares that his own ‘mana’ is over his own piece of land, know that such is my thought. I have heard that Rangikaheke and Waata Kukutai have been before the Pakeha Runanga, and told their opinions. Lo! that is it; hearken to them. It was one of those thoughts that set up the Maori king. I cannot, however, tell you all the causes. They are many. Let the portion I communicate be small. One thing I will tell you: the Governor's words are as wool, but within, at his heart, he is a ravening wolf.—From your slave, W. T. W. T. te Waharoa.”

Knowing well how the Governor's mild professions were outraged by the forcible seizure of the tribal lands; and perhaps (in the undoubting conviction of a mind to which tribal tenure had been familiar from youth), incapable of believing that any one could be ignorant that the rape of the Waitara was lawless and wrong, Waharoa used plain language. It alarmed the Governor's advisers. They began to find that brave language in the House would not carry on the war. By appealing to excited passions, and perverting the case so as to make it seem that the honour of the Queen was pledged to do dishonourable deeds, they had secured majorities, in which members from the undistracted Middle Island were prominent. But majorities without means were worthless. British blood and British treasure were demanded. General Pratt, in August, 1860, reported that the military position was difficult. The Maoris crept up in small parties, inflicted damage, and escaped with impunity. “With the assistance of my advisers,” the Governor wrote, “I have been able to comply with all General Pratt's demands, and to assure him that this Government will spare nothing to enable him to carry on the war vigorously, and bring it to a successful conclusion.” At the same time, he wrote: “I sent Mr. McLean to aid in reassuring the friendly natives, who appear to have lost confidence in us.” General Pratt was urged to remove the women and children from the settlement; and, when relieved from impediments, to inflict severe punishment on the enemy, who always “construed escape into victory,” and who generally escaped. Friendly natives, including Ihaia, were to be paid.

Thus instructed, the General returned to Taranaki, where Major Nelson had obtained sixty-eight pounders, with which he could, from the Waitara camp, breach the Puketakauere pah, and avenge his repulse. In a few days General Pratt reported that the Maoris at the south suddenly retired from their entrenchments, and abandoned the Puketakauere pah. Neither Mr. McLean nor the friendly natives could explain these movements. The General was anxious to fight, but could find no enemy. Yet the settlers were all crowded in a space of thirty acres at Taranaki; and McLean reported that only two persons, the Rev. Mr. Brown and a Maori disciple, could go as far south as Omata without being shot. In September the General advanced upon empty pahs; but when approaching the forest the troops were fired upon from an ambuscade. Colonel Browne lamented (18th September) that no serious impression had been made, and urged the General to harass the enemy by guerilla attacks in their planting season, then beginning. The difficulty would be great; but unless the war could be put an end to at once it might be continued indefinitely.

It was much easier to give such advice than to act upon it. Gliding through the forest which enclosed the open country near the sea, the Maori had the advantage of the encumbered soldier. Silence was golden in such a case, and the mute Maori heard with pleasure the rattle of the Pakeha accoutrements, or the angry exclamation of the soldier as he struggled through the tangled thicket. The General was not content to receive such advice silently. He described the situation which he had found on the 3rd August. Settlers were driven in, cattle seized, property and houses destroyed. An attack on the town was threatened. The troops were divided. Outposts threatened by the enemy could not be abandoned; and their garrisons reduced the number of men available for general action. The enemy passing through the forest could at any time unite his forces. The inhabitants would not be deported as the General wished. He had only prevailed on 112 women and 282 children to go, and he could not resort to actual force. He had hoped to make an example at Puketakauere, by cutting off the retreat of the rebels before taking the pah, and regretted its evacuation. He found it impossible to prevent the retreat of the Maoris from any place they did not wish to defend. During a few weeks he had destroyed between twenty and thirty undefended pahs, large numbers of “whāarĕ,” or habitations, and much provisions. The plan proposed to him by Colonel Browne, of harassing the Maoris by constant attacks, was impracticable. He did not dread an increase of the numbers of the Maoris. If they would defend an accessible position, or accept battle in the open country, he was satisfied that he could obtain good results. Colonel Browne did not press his views on the General, but wished the Secretary of State to observe that, when he flung down the gage of battle in March, he had every reason to suppose that the available force (more numerous than the Maoris) was more than sufficient to put down opposition. He was beset with reports that Auckland would be attacked. A chief at the Thames was said to have planned an expedition against it. Friendly natives warned him, and Tamati Ngapora told him (27th September, 1860) that the out-numbered Maoris laughed at the idea of being beaten by the soldiers, who fought bravely in Pakeha fashion, marching so close together that one bullet would kill two of them, and suffering at the hands of a few enemies in consequence. Colonel Browne complained of “insufficient funds, circumscribed powers, and inadequate assistance.” “Reinforcements from England were anxiously looked for.”

A terrible alarm came upon Auckland in October. Eriata, a Maori, was found dead at Patamahoe, about thirty miles from Auckland. The natives thought he had been shot by an Englishman. A meeting was called, and it was ascertained (the Governor wrote) that at a given signal all the Europeans present were to be murdered. Archdeacon Maunsell was in the neighbourhood, and McLean went to the meeting. After the Archdeacon had spoken, McLean was able to allay the excitement. Ihaka was conspicuous for his friendliness. He was the chief of the dead man's tribe. But another meeting was held a few days later. A war-party of 100 Maoris went thither. Ihaka with two followers met them, in a peculiar attitude, interpreted to mean—”Here we are, what do you want with us? We are prepared.” A war dance ensued; fierce speeches were made; the production of the supposed murderer was demanded, then an examination, and, in case of proven guilt, the surrender of the culprit to the Maoris. Ihaka and Mohi replied that the previous inquiry was sufficient. Mohi, at the end of his oration, broke a stick, throwing one piece on the ground, in token that the matter had been concluded. “Let there be no evil” (he said) was old Potatau's advice. Tamati Ngapora (uncle of the king) pacified the war-party, and invited them to a feast, which ended the proceedings.

A few days afterwards two Europeans assaulted Ihaka, as he was labouring for peace, and the chief assured the Governor that if his blood had been shed his followers could not have been restrained. Two days later Browne held conference with Tamati Ngapora and Takerei, who had become an adviser of the Maori king. The former alleged that a Maori, who had fought at Taranaki, had been sought for by the police at Auckland. His arrest would have been a sufficient cause of war. (Parenthetically, the Governor told the Secretary of State, “the man was not arrested because I feared reprisals on our out settlers, and a magistrate who declared his intention to arrest him was fortunately unable to put it into force.”) After four hours the conference broke up with little result.

Two days later (31st October) came tidings that the kingmaker was on his way to the scene of the supposed murder with 400 men. Alarm ran like wildfire through Auckland. Europeans at Otahuhu, nine miles from Auckland, hurriedly at night implored protection. Browne instructed Colonel Kenny to call out the militia, and do what he could. Later, at midnight, Ihaka visited Browne, to say that the king-maker had informed him and Tamati Ngapora that no aggression of which they might disapprove should be committed. Browne countermanded the order for sending soldiers to Otahuhu. But all was not over. The Maori-king natives mustered at Ngaruawahia. The resolute Rewi, the Ngatimaniapoto chief, was, fortunately, absent at Taranaki. From Ngaruawahia more than 300 warriors went down the Waikato river in their war-canoes, under the young king Matutaera and Te Waharoa the king-maker. At Paetai they had a war-dance. A letter from Ihaka, to say that the death of Eriata had been duly considered, did not restrain the young men of the party. They disregarded Matutaera, who returned homewards with his mother. The king-maker remained with them to prevent mischief, but could not induce them to abandon their journey. At Tuakau, about thirty-five miles from Auckland, Bishop Selwyn and Archdeacon Maunsell met them. Though his advice was reviled by Mr. Richmond and his colleagues, the Bishop was ever daring to do good and to make peace. Long conference took place. Some wild spirits brooked no delay, and with two canoes pursued their journey. The Archdeacon told the king-maker, who sent a letter after them in haste: “Come back, and come back in peace.” Whakapaukai obeyed the missive; and Mr. Gorst remarks that the Europeans owed their salvation on this occasion to Te Waharoa, the Waikato rebel. It was known afterwards, that by journeying on foot, the Bishop had carried a message to friendly chiefs, who undertook to bar the war-party from passing through their territory. When the Bishop died, the settler, at whose house the Bishop arrived soon after sunrise, dripping from the fording of a creek, told the story. Pirimona was the name of a gallant Maori who shared the Bishop's troubles. The Bishop himself recorded the fact that the brother of the Maori supposed to have been murdered, when convinced that the supposition was untrue, mounted guard at the house of a settler to defend him from attack.

‘Life of Bishop Selwyn,’ by Rev. H. W. Tucker. (London, 1877.) Vol. ii. p. 169.

In reporting the alarms caused by the death of Eriata, the Governor called attention to the fact that peace and life depended on the exertions of a few chiefs, of whom only one received a stipend of £50 a year. “This brings prominently to light what I have so often stated, that it is only by means of employing the chiefs, giving them Crown grants, and attaching them to the Government, that we can hope to keep the country tranquil. The means placed at Sir George Grey's disposal enabled him to do this without difficulty, and I perceive that he is following the same plan at the Cape of Good Hope.” The Duke of Newcastle (Jan. 1861) entirely concurred with the Governor that “the government of the natives should be carried on through the chiefs, and that it would be a wise policy to secure to the British Government their services by grants of land or money, or of such other advantages as are calculated to retain their attachment.” The contradictions in human nature were never more exemplified than by such an interchange of sentiment between a Governor fresh from the pillage of Rangitake, and a Secretary of State who sanctioned the robbery, and thus caused a war which cost thousands of lives and millions of treasure. Sir William Martin prepared a thoughtful pamphlet on the Taranaki question. Maori land tenure, the facts connected with and the dispute about the Waitara block, the proceedings of the Government and their probable consequences, were handled with judicial gravity and humane earnestness. The injustice of the Native Offenders Bill was touched upon, and the writer declared that simple justice only was needed in dealing with the Maoris.

Nets were spread widely to create offences under the Richmond-cum-Whitaker Native Offenders Bill. Any district might be proclaimed under it. Any visitor, any purchaser or seller within it, any holder of “any communication or correspondence whatever, directly or indirectly,” with a Maori in it, &c. &c., or any person aiding or abetting any person in such offences, was to be deemed guilty. Tribes might be proclaimed under the measure. A first offence entailed a fine of £100 at the discretion of two Justices like the coveters at Taranaki. A second offence entailed hard labour with imprisonment; a third constituted felony, and drew down penal servitude for not less than three years. No investigation as to the causes of proclamation was provided for. Letters from Sir William Martin, written to procure peace, might have subjected him to the discipline of a gaol under the control of the Attorney-General. But it was only on general grounds that Sir William Martin argued against the atrocious provisions of the measure.

Those who are curious as to details may read the pamphlet in the New Zealand blue-books of 1861. The Governor's advisers determined to reply to it. “Notes by the Governor on Sir William Martin's pamphlet” were officially promulgated. The public knew that Richmond and his colleagues prepared them, and from a revised edition the Governor's name was withdrawn. As the ‘Notes’ contained critical disquisitions on the Maori language, Colonel Browne must have been glad to be relieved from the imputation of authorship. There were higher grounds on which the Ministry sinned grievously in thus abusing his name, for the ‘Notes’ teemed with daring assumptions capable of disproof. Mr. Richmond's eagerness in the cause removed all doubt as to the moving spirit in the ‘Notes,’ for he wrote a separate ‘Memorandum,’ in which whole sentences were word by word the same as in the ‘Notes.’ His education, costly as it was to the State, was rapidly proceeding. In August, 1860, he told the House of Representatives: “I know nothing about ‘mana,’ and I don't care to know anything.” In December he crossed swords with Sir W. Martin about the true meaning of the “tino rangatiratanga” guaranteed by the treaty of Waitangi. “Rangatiratanga” must be held to mean “ownership,” and not full “chiefship,” as Sir W. Martin had contended.

The best Maori scholars of course agreed with Sir William Martin.

The special spleen nursed against Te Rangitake by Mr. Richmond found vent in a sentence which called him “an essential savage varnished over with the thinnest coating of Scripture phrases.”

The Native Offenders Bill, which had been undefended in the ‘Notes,’ was lauded by its author in the ‘Memorandum,’ but Sir W. Martin's strictures upon it were unrefuted. Mr. Richmond averred that its “penalties were more for Europeans than for natives.” He was compelled to admit that Sir W. Martin's pamphlet was “the fullest, the calmest, and most able exposition of the views” of friends of the Maoris; but, warming with controversy, he concluded that the late Chief Justice “had allowed the blind spirit of controversy to master a naturally impartial mind.” Some natural sparks resulted from the conflict of truth with error. The Governor and his prompters had asserted that Teira's claim to the land he professed to sell had been “carefully investigated,” and found good. The ‘Notes’ of the Governor and the ‘Revised Copy’ were constrained to confess to a very different condition of affairs. “The title of the sellers (Teira, &c.) to part of the block is certain. The Government contends that their title to the whole is probable.”

Sir William Martin rent this sophistry to shreds by declaring that military force was not placed in the hands of a Governor to enable him to seize by force that to which as a land-buyer he had not acquired a title. “It is not lawful for the Executive Government to use force in a purely civil question without the authority of a competent judicial tribunal. In this case no such authority has been obtained; no such tribunal has been resorted to. If there was no existing tribunal, the duty of the Government was to establish one.… To acquire the Waitara land immediately was not a necessity. To do justice to the Queen's subjects was a necessity.”

The ‘Notes’ and ‘Revised Copy’ dolefully complained that it was “one of the most serious embarrassments against which the Government have to contend, that publications such as those which the Bishop of New Zealand, the Bishop of Wellington, Archdeacon Hadfield, and now Sir William Martin, have put forth, lead the natives to believe that the Governor has initiated a new course of policy which will end in wresting their lands from them, and subverting the rights they possess under the treaty of Waitangi.” Mr. Richmond's ‘Revised Notes’

1 ‘Revised Copy. Notes on Sir William Martin's pamphlet, entitled ‘The Taranaki Question.’ Published for the New Zealand Government. Auckland: January, 1861.

added that such publications were embarrassing, “even when circulated by persons whom it may not be worth while to notice. Sanctioned by the high authority of Sir W. Martin they really become a public danger.” It was not the deed but the shame of exposure which confounded Mr. Richmond. (When one of the Governor's despatches declared, 29th March, 1859)—Should the purchase be completed, “it will probably lead to the acquisition of all the land south of the Waitara river, which is essentially necessary for the consolidation of the province as well as for the settlers”—Mr. Richmond might well fear that unless Sir William Martin could be silenced, the wrong-doing of the Ministry would be made clear; and he fought with desperate wildness. He had written with regard to the pahs on the block at Waitara that Te Rangitake had been joined by natives who had “encroached with their cultivations upon the proper owners.” (At a later date he wrote: “Everybody knew there were pahs.… Bell and I wrote an explanation showing that Te Rangitake's small pah was put up by consent of the selling party.”) Nevertheless the case put by Sir William Martin compelled him to urge in the ‘Revised Notes:’ “As regards the cultivations of Te Rangitake himself, neither he nor any of his people had cultivations on the block. No pah was burnt by the soldiers.” Yet, in 1863, an English officer, Lieutenant Bates, 65th Regiment, found a witness to the burning of the pah in the person of Mr. Carrington, who was for twenty-two years surveyor at Taranaki; and another officer, Bulkeley, and a private, Houltham, both of the 65th Regiment, testified in writing that they were present at the destruction of the pahs in March, 1860. It would be tedious to trace all the tortuous windings of Mr. Richmond. How he dreaded the practised lance of the judicial knight was shown when the ‘Revised Notes’ were published by the Government. The Governor immediately promulgated a notice which, while “recognizing the right of free discussion,” declared that there were occasions when its exercise was dangerous, and he felt it his duty to state that “such an occasion now exists in this colony.” A copy of the notice was sent to Sir W. Martin. His ‘Remarks’ on the ‘Notes’ and on Mr. Richmond's ‘Memorandum’ were privately printed; but, in deference to the Governor's wish, Sir W. Martin wrote that he “abstained for the present from giving publicity within the colony to the following pages.” In the ‘Remarks’ he refuted the assertion that Te Rangitake had broken faith with the Government by settling on the south bank of the Waitara. How little the statement, if true, would have assisted the contention of the Government, Sir W. Martin proved by pointing out that Teira, who was among those who re-migrated in 1848 under Te Rangitake, was recognized by the Government as having purchaseable claims where all rights were denied to his leader. With bitter truth Sir W. Martin pointed out that Governor Browne himself in 1855 described Fitzroy's recognition at Taranaki of all absentee Ngatiawas, as a “just decision.”

Richmond denied that in law or in fact the law had anything to do with Maori territorial rights. They stood on treaty of which the Crown was “the sole interpreter,” and the Governor was “justified in enforcing his jurisdiction in the only practical mode, viz. by military occupation.”

Sir W. Martin cuttingly answered: “I have argued that the people of Waitara, being subjects of the Crown, have not been dealt with as subjects of the Crown. Mr. Richmond answers by saying they are not subjects of the Crown; they have had all they are entitled to.” Martin quoted the Waitangi treaty which guaranteed to them “all the rights and privileges of British subjects,” and said those rights” must mean at any rate the opposite of despotism.” Mr. Richmond had overlooked the fact that if the treaty were, as his argument implied, “a treaty in the ordinary sense, then the right of interpreting and enforcing it must belong not to one party but to both equally; that the natives are at liberty to resort to force in support of their view as much as the Governor in support of his; and that they cannot be charged with rebellion if they do so. However little the theoretical value of Mr. Richmond's doctrine may be, it is a significant and remarkable fact that such a doctrine has been put forth. It is remarkable as bearing on the position which I have maintained, that the natives at the Waitara, being British subjects, have not been treated as British subjects.” What was it that Mr. Richmond “called by the name of the Crown” in the Waitara land-purchase? “The Governor judging in this particular case is simply and in fact Mr. Parris.… The majesty of the Royal word and the largeness of the national undertaking issue in the decision of an Assistant Land Purchase Commissioner.” It must be conceded that in their own generation the Government were wise in endeavouring, by an ad misericordiam appeal, to silence the eloquence which they had no power to control, and against which they were unable to contend.

The Duke of Newcastle dared not to rebuke the wisdom by which he refused to be guided. In March, 1861, he told the Governor: “It is an advantage to me to be in the possession of the views of so eminent a person as Sir W. Martin, accompanied by your own comments and criticisms, and those of your Ministers where you or they feel compelled to differ with him.” But the advantage on which he congratulated himself bore no fruit. Sir W. Martin could prove that all Governors had solemnly pledged themselves to obey the treaty of Waitangi; that Fitzroy had in the Queen's name recognized in all their integrity the admitted rights of Te Rangitake at Waitara; that as a chief, as a member of the tribe, and as an occupier, those rights were irrefragably concentred in him;—but the proofs were lost on the barren intelligence of the Secretary of State, who equalled the Governor in folly. He approved of the “proclamation issued (by the Governor) for the purpose of inducing loyal subjects to refrain from publishing opinions which may tend to impugn the justice and legality of the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government during the present juncture of affairs in New Zealand.” Yet a lurking homage was paid to Sir W. Martin. With regard to the letter in which Sir W. Martin consented to withhold his ‘Remarks’ from publicity in the colony, the Duke wrote (27th May, 1861): “Although I should much regret that anything should be published by so high an authority as Sir W. Martin, which might tend still further to disturb the minds of the New Zealanders, I feel satisfied that he has only been influenced in the matter by a sincere desire to take that course which would prove for the ultimate benefit of the colony.”

When Colonel Browne notified to England Martin's consent to withhold the publication of his ‘Remarks,’ he deplored the effect of such arguments as Martin's. Disaffection was spreading; there was a “sad prospect before us of that struggle of races which it has been the constant and earnest aim of every Government in New Zealand to avert. (He did not wish to accuse Sir W. Martin.) I and my advisers have ever endeavoured to do justice to his motives.” With wonderful folly he referred to the protests of Selwyn and Martin against Earl Grey's iniquitous Instructions (of 1846) as a similar error; although in 1859 he had extolled Sir W. Martin as holding “the enviable distinction of being universally respected by all parties and both races,” and being the man whose character and wisdom would silence calumny if his advice were accepted on Maori affairs. Nor did the Governor's mental contortions end here. He informed the Duke of Newcastle (January, 1861), that Mr. C. O. Davis, the Interpreter, who resigned office when he found it untenable under the growing interference of the Governor's advisers, had published “at Maori expense” portions of Sir W. Martin's pamphlet; that “those most competent to form an opinion consider the publication likely to do an incalculable amount of mischief; (and) under these circumstances I have issued the public notification (restraining the exercise of ‘the right of free discussion’).” Soon afterwards (March, 1861) he wrote: “I have always wished to communicate with Waharoa (the king-maker), but owing to the conduct of Mr. C. O. Davis, as described by himself to Mr. Clarke, I have never been able to do so.” Yet when Waharoa sought in 1857 to lay the Maori grievances before the Governor he was not allowed to see him; and not till then did that chief call upon the Maoris to elect their king; and even in 1860, Donald McLean, then high in the Governor's confidence, intrigued to prevent Waharoa from appearing before the Select Committee on Waikato affairs.

Colonel Browne's first martial success was to comfort him soon after he had piteously entreated the Secretary of State to send more men from England. In October, 1860, General Pratt marched beyond Tataraimaka; and, after sap and steady firing with howitzers and mortars, took three pahs near the Kaihihi river, with casualties of only five wounded, amongst whom was Captain Pasley, R.E., serving on the staff and acting as engineer in the trenches.

Captain (now General Charles) Pasley had held a civil appointment in Victoria, but, when danger invited, placed himself at the disposal of the Commander of the Forces.

The losses of the enemy were unknown. The advance of a large body of Waikatos to aid Te Rangitake was reported. A friendly native went to the camp of the latter. A Waikato chief asked if he had come for safety or as a spy. He replied that he had come of his own accord. He heard warlike and confident speeches, and returned with news that the plan of the Waikatos was to occupy different positions round the settlement and on the north of the Waitara river. On the 1st November, two Waikato chiefs wrote boastfully to Mr. Parris: “Friend, I have heard your word. Come to fight me—that is very good. Come inland that we may meet. Fish fight at sea. Come inland, and let us stand on our feet. Make haste, make haste; do not prolong it. That is all I have to say to you—make haste.— From Wetini Taiporutu. From Porokoru. From the chiefs of Ngatihaua and Waikato.” On the 5th November, the General was apprised that a body of Waikatos were to be at Mahoetahi (eight miles from Taranaki on the Devon Road to Waitara) early on the 6th. Communication by signals from Waitara to Taranaki enabled the General to arrange that troops should start from both places so as to arrive simultaneously at Mahoetahi. He led 683 troops from Taranaki at 4 a.m., and at 8 a.m. found the Waikatos in possession of the pah, then in a dilapidated state. From their post, as well as from the fern and a swamp, the Waikatos fired. Guns were brought into position, bayonets were fixed, and the pah was stormed—”the enemy still retaining for a short time hold of a portion of the pah, and keeping up a most galling fire from the fern and swamp.” Colonel Mould arrived with a column of 300 men from Waitara, in the rear of the Maoris, at this juncture, and threw rounds of spherical case from a howitzer, to dislodge the Maoris from the swamp, to which when almost surrounded they resorted. “The enemy finding himself thus hemmed in, and under a most murderous cross-fire, after an action that lasted two hours, turned and fled with much loss.” Shot and shell burst over and amongst the fugitives. The retreat was rapid and the rout complete. The General thought the Maori loss from 80 to 100. “I never saw,” he wrote, “a more powerful or gigantic set of men than these tribes, whilst their power of concealment was most marvellous; indeed, when close upon them, we only knew of their whereabouts by the smoke from their guns.” Of the English four were killed, and 15 wounded. The General reported that 27 Maoris were found dead. They were buried by the English; the friendly natives rendering no assistance. The boastful Wetini was among the slain, and the General thought Porokoru was killed also, but he lived to fight in after years at Waikato. Wetini was honourably buried at Taranaki. The number of the Waikatos engaged was unknown, but it was supposed to be about a sixth of that of the English. Very few were unwounded. Wetini's brother carried off a bayonet sticking in his body, and preserved it as a trophy. For two miles the road was stained with blood, and dead bodies were found by the pursuers. The General loudly commended the troops, and the Governor declared that such a timely success was matter for sincere congratulation. A Taranaki newspaper was jubilant. The day was a red-letter day in the annals of the province. “A shell had a most beautiful effect. The natives rose out of the swamp like birds, and were shot down and bayoneted, as they would not surrender.” Great was the grief of the Waikato and the Ngatihaua. The king-maker had vainly endeavoured to dissuade his kinsman, Wetini, from the expedition. When a letter from Te Rangitake asked what was the use of sending him “a disembodied flag,” and why no men went to support him, the dashing Wetini could abstain no longer but rushed to the fray. The king-maker prophetically said to him at last, almost in anger, “Then go and stop there.” For months the “tangi,” or wailing for the dead, was repeated at Tamahere by the Ngatihaua. Rewi, the Ngatimaniapoto chief, was accused of failure to support the popular chief. He declared that Wetini would not listen to advice; that he had sent messenger after messenger to keep Wetini back from the snare; that his last messenger was killed in the trap at Mahoetahi, and that no more could have been done. But the Ngatihaua refused to be comforted. They urged the king-maker to vengeance.

Reprisals at Auckland were apprehended, and additional troops were collected there; but it was to Waitara that the Maori war-parties were sent. Colonel Browne was not ignorant of the feeling which was spreading among the tribes. Two months after the battle of Mahoetahi he found that sympathy with the Waitara chief was extending in the province of Wellington. In an intercepted letter was found a boast that of the Ngatiruanui, Taranaki, Ngatiawa, and Waikato only 63 had fallen (of whom 36 died at Mahoetahi), while 1500 Pakehas had been killed,— showing that bulletins of all countries are untrustworthy. At Hawke's Bay there was in November, 1860, a great Runanga or assembly of the Ngatikahungunu; and a chief, Renata, made an oration of which the Governor sent a translation to England. The burden of the complaint was that the Governor plunged into war, and would not let the law decide whether Te Rangitake or Teira was wrong. “I indeed,” said Renata, “will not be as the lick-platter Assembly of the Governor; my words are proper and plain, forasmuch as that Runanga has done wrong.” He declared that the murder of Katatore was of the darkest kind, and that the Governor, who was friendly to Ihaia, was become his accomplice. He denounced the statement that Ihaia was a chief of importance. He was of low rank at Waitara. Te Rangitake alone was their great man, and known by all tribes. Governor Browne contemned Renata's speech as “evidently the result of European advice.” Renata in a published letter (February, 1861) justified his position, and replied to arguments of the Superintendent of Hawke's Bay.

In the end of December, General Pratt marched to attack the Waikato posted near Kairau at Matarikoriko. He had about 1000 men, two 24-pounder howitzers, one 12-pounder, and two mortars. He proceeded at half-past six in the morning to throw up an entrenched camp about 900 yards from the pah. Unmolested till nine o'clock, at that hour the troops were fired upon from a line of Maori rifle-pits, running along a deep ravine between the pah and the camp, and extending over 600 yards. From rifle-pits and high fern heavy firing continued till six in the evening, and was returned by the English. No firing took place on the following day (30th December), and when the General was about to resume operations on the 31st the Maoris had evacuated the pah. A Maori letter was found there in which a Waikato chief urged the combatants, Rewi and others, to spare the women and children. The English casualties were three men killed and 22 wounded. As usual the loss of the Maoris was unknown. The General considered it must have been great to induce the abandonment of so strong a position situate in a dense forest. Pleased with this success over “the vaunting Waikatos,” as he called them in his despatch, General Pratt pushed forward redoubts in the face of an innocuous fire from rifle-pits. A letter from one of his allies had been found (in the pah captured on the 31st December), warning the Waikato of the intended attack, and the General thought of trying the writer by martial law, but the Governor dissuaded him. He could not afford to make enemies, and it was well known that a species of Maori honour caused men to warn an enemy of an intended attack. Some of the Taranaki militia and volunteers failed to attend parade when called on to accompany the troops, and the General wrote, that to command success he must have 5000 men exclusive of garrisons, and be empowered to invade the Waikato country before moving southwards to Taranaki. He had no great confidence in the militia, and wished the senior officer of the regular troops to take command in all cases of mixed service. The Governor could not agree to under-rate the local forces, but offered to give brevet rank in the militia to officers of the army when required. With fire and sword at their doors and their throats, the Taranaki settlers were resolved to keep the terms of their honour precise. Meantime the gallantry of his foes worked upon the General's consciousness. They made vain diversions at the south of Taranaki. At the north, pushing forward in front of Huirangi, which had been Te Rangitake's head-quarters in November, the English found their Redoubt No. 3 daringly assaulted on the 23rd January. At half-past three a.m. a storming party crept up through the fern, and in the darkness made a lodgment in the ditch of the redoubt. They had a support in rear, and skirmishers were around. Colonel Leslie of the 40th Regiment thus described the attack: “The plan appeared to be to keep down the fire of our men on the parapets by their support and skirmishers, while the storming party scaled the left face of the redoubt. The force under my command was under arms previous to the attack, and quickly replied to the fire of the enemy, who in the most determined and desperate manner rushed up the sides of the parapet, and in some instances seized hold of the men's bayonets, while others crept round to the rear of the redoubt, and fired through the gabions which had been placed to fill up the entrances to the work, and one of the Royal Engineers was in this manner killed while coming out of his tent. A perfect storm of bullets was poured on us from all sides for a considerable time, and I called for assistance from Colonel Wyatt, 65th Regiment, commanding No. 1 Redoubt (at Kairau), for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from our ditch, as I had no hand-grenades.” Two companies of the 65th and one of the 12th arrived. Charged by the new arrivals in gallant manner, the Maoris retired under heavy fire from the parapets and from the guns of the Royal and Naval Artillery. Thirty-four were found dead, and six wounded were left behind. Of the English, twelve were wounded and four killed. The bodies of the chiefs were taken to Taranaki for interment. Many were so mangled by the grenades that they could not be identified. General Pratt wrote: “I trust that the severe losses this manly and high-spirited people are continually receiving will teach them how unavailing are their efforts against Her Majesty's supremacy, and will lead soon to a termination of this unhappy internecine war.”

The wild spirits of youthful Ngatihaua, Ngatiraukawa, and other tribes had inspired respect in their foes; but their wiser elders desired an honourable peace. Tamati Ngapora and Patara were vainly discussing its terms with the Assistant Native Secretary on the day on which the English bayonets were grasped by the Maori storming party. Soon afterwards (2nd February, 1861) Tamati Ngapora and Aihipene, with other chiefs of the north, conferred at Government House with the Governor, the Attorney-General (Whitaker), the Native Secre tary (McLean), the Assistant Native Secretary (Smith), and the Land Claims Commissioner, Mr. Dillon Bell. The burly and good-humoured Aihipene presented the terms proposed. If they were accepted, the chief, Mokena, would be sent at once to bring back the Waikato from the seat of war. “1st. The piece of land at Waitara, let it be left aside or set apart, to be afterwards arranged or settled by a Court or Whakawhakanga. 2nd. Do not hold to, or bear in remembrance, the causes of evil, whether as regards men, the land, or killing, or property; let these be all unloosened, all forgiven.” Browne said such terms were inadmissible. Aihipene said they were the Maori idea. Would the Governor state what he wished? English law must be recognized in future; compensation must be given for the waste of Taranaki; punishment inflicted for the murders at Omata in 1860. Aihipene replied that these must be questions for settlement, but he would not presume to anticipate the mode. The proper course was to make peace first, and settle differences afterwards. This the Governor would not agree to, and the chiefs said they had nothing else to offer. The Governor said the chiefs must understand that he did not confuse the murders at Omata with the conduct of Te Rangitake or of the Waikato. Aihipene said the Waikato must be consulted about Te Rangitake and the Ngatiawa. Colonel Browne asked if the chiefs could bind the Waikato or Ngatiawa. They had no authority, and he pointed out that it was absurd to ask him to cease from war when they could not bind their tribes. Tamati Ngapora spoke. The work was that of the Governor and Te Rangitake, though others suffered. Let them put an end to it. The Governor was anxious for peace, but asked what was the use of a short rest, after which war might again break out? Tamati Ngapora put the Governor's stick on the table, struck the end, and said, “Where will the vibration stop? Not at the first six inches, not till it reached the other end.” (Meaning that it was inevitable that other tribes would sympathize with Te Rangitake.) The Governor rejoiced that the vibration had crossed the ocean to England. The chiefs remained silent. The Governor said he was going to consult the Ngapuhi, and would gladly consider terms of peace on his return from the north. Old Patuone (Waka Nene's brother) said the insurrection was like an abscess, and could not be healed till the core was taken out. As to the Omata murders, Paratene ti Kopara was the actual murderer; and as he had been killed since, according to Maori usage atonement was already made. McLean said others were accused. Taraia (a Thames chief) asked who were the Governor's friends whom he desired to consult? Tamati Ngapora represented Waikato, Patuone the Ngapuhi, Ngatitoa was represented by Hohepa Tamaihengia, the Thames people by himself. Why not make terms at once? The chiefs approved, and Aihipene said if the Governor agreed that there should be peace, the word would go forth and the insurrection would not spread. The Governor said that the paper which had just been read would give no security for peace. War must be continued till more reasonable proposals reached him. He was answered by Ihaka (Waikato), that points of difference could not be arranged while blood was flowing. He retorted, let Waikato return from Taranaki, and the blood of Waikato would cease to flow. While he was in the north, “let the chiefs work again at their own thoughts and those which he had indicated.”

Colonel Browne told the Duke of Newcastle that it was with great regret he was obliged to refuse such an appeal as that made by the Waikato chief, Tamati Ngapora, “whose desire for peace was undoubted.” He visited the Bay of Islands and Mongonui, accompanied by Patuone, Ihaka, and Taraia. The Ngapuhi and Rarawa tribes received him loyally. On his return to Auckland he received a letter from the resident magistrate at the Bay of Plenty, narrating an interview, at Tauranga, with the king-maker, who justified the Maoris. Maoris sold their land blindfold for nominal sums; it was then cut up and sold for full value. “Have we not a better right to this advanced price than the Pakeha?” A Pakeha had told him that the Queen would claim all the waste lands as demesne lands of the Crown, and confine the Maoris to their cultivations. “This statement was confirmed by a Roman Catholic priest. I reasoned with myself: ‘This land was given to my ancestors by Providence. We have retained it from generation to generation. Surely because it is unoccupied now, it is no reason why it should always remain so. I hope the day will yet come when our descendants will not have more than they really require. If I have been correctly informed, even a few years ago there were in England large tracts of unoccupied lands. No other nation on that account attempted to seize them. Why then should they attempt to claim our unoccupied lands?’” Thence arose opposition to land-sales. The Pakehas would not assist in creating a native council and native magistrates to settle Maori disputes. He visited Auckland, but was not allowed to see the Governor on the subject. “I determined to take at my own risk what my Pakeha friends denied me?” (Mr. Fenton afterwards did mischief: he widened the breach by setting up assessors without reference to the wishes of the tribes. But the king-maker did not approve of the Waikato war-party.) “I did all in my power to dissuade Wetini from going to Taranaki. Our contention was great. He cursed me, went to Taranaki, and has fallen.” The magistrate could obtain no hint from the king-maker as to future movements. “All his conversation related to the past.” With this narrative the Governor sent to England the king-maker's letter (declining to attend a Committee as a witness) which has already been quoted.

At Taranaki it was reported that Mr. King, who had so recently in the Assembly at Auckland justified the position of the Government and the demands of the settlers, fell a victim in February. The rebels, it was said, had murdered him. The volunteers who sallied forth were too late to save him, but they saw his murderers at a distance. General Pratt pushed the war into the forest in February, only to find that the enemy retired to another line of defence. From rifle-pits and fern, when least expected, the advancing troops were fired at. After one of these skirmishes, in which two English were killed and ten wounded, General Pratt found the Maori position formidable, and that mortars were indispensable. On the 6th March the Governor transmitted to England a statement by McLean, that “The great mass of the native population of the Northern Island may be considered to be in a state of disaffection.” They were unabashed by reverses, and confident that they could restrain the growth of the English settlements. They even hoped for assistance from the French. Their skill in selecting their points of attack and defence in their ferns and forests counterbalanced, in their opinion, the English larger resources and better equipment. The threats, curses, and opprobrious epithets used by Europeans, confirmed (McLean said) the worst suspicions of the natives. The evil genius of the time had ceased to hold office as Native Minister.

He still held office as Treasurer, and as Commissioner of Customs.

Mr. Richmond had given place (November, 1860) to Mr. Weld, who concurred with McLean's remarks—the ominous conclusion of which (5th February, 1861) was “that the English settlements in New Zealand are at present in a more dangerous and precarious state than they have been at any period since the foundation of the colony.” To such a pass had Colonel Browne, under advice, reduced the colony in the short space of one year. When this statement reached the Duke of Newcastle (13th May, 1861), he briefly acknowledged it; and immediately appointed Sir George Grey to relieve Governor Browne. Meantime, the loyalty still left among the Maoris was encouraged. Old Waka Nene wrote to the Queen that his love continued firm, and Colonel Browne transmitted the letter with a hope than an answer and a present might be sent to the “excellent chief.” On the 26th June, Her Majesty “most graciously” acknowledged the letter, and sent a silver cup to be presented to Waka Nene “as a mark of her friendship,” and in recognition of his valuable services. But after the futile conference between the chiefs and the Governor on the 2nd February, warfare continued at Taranaki. Ever planning ambuscades in the abundant fern, and ever forced to retire, the Maoris refused to afford the General the comfort of a general action in which rifles, howitzers, and shells were to be opposed to muskets and fowling-pieces. The Maori forces were entrenched at Te Arei close to the historic Pukerangiora, where the Waikato had, nearly thirty years previously, warred against the Ngatiawa, whom in 1860 they befriended. From block house to block-house the General advanced from Kairau to Huirangi, and thence towards Te Arei. With help of friendly natives he constructed 1200 yards of sap and three redoubts in a fortnight. At night on more than one occasion, in spite of sentinels, the Maoris removed the sap-roller, until an explosion blew one of them to atoms. The General was astounded at hearing that the money he paid to friendly natives for cutting materials for his gabions and sap-rollers was shared by them with the enemy, who assisted in the work partly to obtain money, but partly because in this way, and by carrying off the sap-rollers at night, the wily Rewi and his friends scrutinized the English devices. As the sap was pushed through the forest it was found that, to countervail inferiority of weapons, the Maoris skilfully availed themselves of every vantage-ground. Their rifle-pits curved in front of Te Arei, from the Waitara river to a thick forest on the right of the advancing troops. “They had also dug trenches around their pah, and the whole ridge of hills in front of the advancing force had tiers of pits, one over the other, from which the enemy fired as from so many little batteries. It was most annoying to the British to be able to see nothing of the rebels but their smoke and fire, and yet to be so near them as to hear their taunts.”

‘History of Taranaki.’ B. Wells. 1878: New Zealand.

The troops constructed another redoubt, and the sap was, on the 10th March, pushed close to Te Arei, when Te Waharoa, the king-maker, stepped into the arena. While Sir William Martin was pleading with Governor Browne for justice, he and Bishop Selwyn laboured to induce Te Waharoa to divert his countrymen from war. The sap was close to the pah (in which Hapurona was the ostensible commander), when, on the 11th March, Te Waharoa wrote thence to the General:

“Salutation to you, O chief of this war! Hear what I have to say. Let there be a truce for three days, Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, that I may consider the state of affairs here concerning those with whom you have been fighting, namely, the men from Waikato and those under Te Rangitake.… If you consent, issue orders to your soldiers that they may leave off the sap during these three days. If you object to my proposal, write to me that I may know.… After the three days you and your opponents can recommence fighting. This is all. Friend, you may put faith in what I say. What I say will be put in force by my tribe.—From Wi Tamihana te Waharoa.”

The General granted truce for the two days remaining when he received the letter, desiring the Maoris to cease fortifying. On Thursday morning active operations would be resumed. From Pukerangiora the king-maker retorted (12th March): “I see you do not put faith in what I say. Listen to me; I will not deceive you; a promise like this of mine is not of the earth, but comes from above. It is not right that I should break faith with you.… I am rather inclined to think that you deceived me: your soldiers have come down to-day into your rifle-pits and fired at us. On that account I am led to suppose that you are deceiving me, and that you have no control over your people.…” The General explained that the firing was by mistake, because the white flag, where hoisted on the palisading, was unseen from the foremost (No. 8) Redoubt. He complained also that the Maoris (always in want of ammunition) had been “collecting our bullets; what have you to say about that?” On the 13th, the Native Commissioner (Mr. G. D. Hay) met the king-maker, who proposed that the Waikato should go home, that Te Rangitake should go to undisputed land, the English withdraw to Waitaki, and the Waitara block be undisturbed till some final decision could be arrived at by law. There was no appreciable difference between these terms and those rejected by the Governor at Auckland. Mr. Hay said they were inadmissible. “Then,” said the king-maker, “let the troops remain, while you and I go to Auckland; I by land, you by sea. Meet me at Tuakau.” He was told that he had better go in the ship himself. “Shall I go and be treated like Rauparaha?” he replied. The General vainly offered a “guarantee for his personal safety.” Mr. Hay went to the General at No. 7 Redoubt. On his return the chief said: “You are harsh and difficult to deal with. Hear my third offer. Let us remain here in peace. Entreat the Governor to come down here.” Other chiefs supported him, and Rangitake was said to acquiesce in the first of the proposals. The General would only consent that the Maoris should retire, and that the English should occupy Pukerangiora, while the king-maker went in a war-steamer to Auckland with Mr. Hay. Again two shots were fired at the Maoris, and again they were told they were fired by mistake. The king-maker said he was tired of writing to Mr. Hay. “I will write to the Governor and to my Bishop, that they may be aware of my arrival here, and how much I tried to treat with the General.” Another day's truce was granted. Mr. Hay urged the General's terms. The king-maker said that neither the General nor Mr. Hay seemed inclined to treat on the terms he proposed, and wrote letters to the Governor, to Sir William Martin, and to the Bishop, requesting the General to forward them, and desiring that there might be peace until the Governor should reply. The General promised to forward the letters, and said that meantime active operations would be recommenced. The Governor was inclined to go to Taranaki, but on consulting his Executive Council it was decided otherwise. Mr. Richmond was still Treasurer, and the Ministry feared that Colonel Browne's nature was too full of the milk of human kindness for their purposes. They sent McLean. They still averred that if Te Rangitake would prove his individual claim to any portion of the Waitara block it would be returned to him. But as they resisted Bishop Selwyn's importunity that the case should be submitted to a law-court, their averment was idle. They feared that no judicial tribunal would refuse to recognize those tribal rights which they were conspiring to destroy.

An important change in the ownership of the Waitara block had meantime been effected by the king-maker's visit. In general tribal meetings, as amongst ancient Germans, resolutions of great moment could be passed in emergencies. In conference between the Ngatiawa and Waikato, Te Waharoa had spoken of the cause of quarrel being Rangitake's. The chief of Waitara said, “No, it is yours.” “Look at a man,” said the king-maker; “his head is head; his hands, hands; and his legs, legs. You are the head; Waikato is only the legs.” “No; you are the head.” “No; you.” “Very well,” retorted Te Rangitake, “I am the head; Waitara is mine; the quarrel is mine. There! I give Waitara to you.” On further question he said he disclaimed further voice in disposal of the land. The Ngatiawa fighting general Hapurona, Epiha and Rewi as leaders of the Waikato and Ngatimaniapoto allies, publicly assented, and the kingmaker, accepting the gift, declared his award. “Waikato! back to Waikato. Ngatiawa! away to Mataitawa. Ngatiruanui! return to your homes. Let the soldiers return to Taranaki. As for the Waitara, leave it for the law to protect.” Thus empowered by the Maoris, the king-maker had proposed his terms to Mr. Hay, and had made earnest request that there might be no more fighting. The General meanwhile knew nothing of the tribal resolution. On the Friday the Maori white flag still flew under the king-maker's order. The English recommenced to dig in the sap, and were unmolested. The Maori pah was fired at, and the king-maker then said to the fighting chiefs: “Now do as you list.” The war-flag was hoisted, and for three days firing was kept up; the king-maker himself abstaining from fighting. The Maoris alleged that only one of them was wounded during this period; but the English believed that their mortars did much execution in the rifle-pits. The English lost a lieutenant of artillery. He was in the act of laying a cohorn mortar at the head of the sap when, from a precipice, a Maori marksman fired, and a bullet glancing from McNaughten's hand, entered his heart. On Monday McLean arrived, and wrote that he had been sent by the Governor, and would see Te Waharoa as soon as a flag of truce was hoisted. The firing was continued nevertheless, two Englishmen being killed, and four wounded. On Tuesday Maori flags of truce were hoisted, and the king-maker appointed Te Waionaha as the place of meeting, whither McLean went, accompanied by English and Maori friends. A hundred of the enemy welcomed him cordially. The proposals made to General Pratt were renewed. McLean (ignorant as the General of the tribal meeting) spoke at great length. He offered safe-conduct to Te Waharoa if he would, with others, return to Auckland to draw up a full statement of all differences. The king-maker said the proposal was fair, but that his followers could not forget that Pomare and Rauparaha had been foully seized. They would not object to meet near Auckland, however. Epiha, the Waikato chief, asked for information as to reference to the Secretary of State, and McLean expatiated on the European mode of arbitration. The conference arrived at no determination. Mr. McLean wished for further interviews. The king-maker “neither objected nor assented. He would sit still for a month or two to afford the Governor an opportunity of making peace. If it was not used, he would be prepared for further action.” What the kingmaker's thoughts were can only be guessed. He asked McLean to be friendly to the Ngatiawa, and at his request the Maori chief who had accompanied McLean from Auckland visited the Maori encampment, where discussion continued in the night. At half-past six on Wednesday morning, with all the Waikato warriors, the king-maker left Waitara, firing shots, as was the custom, over the graves of their dead; and McLean regretted that he had “no further interview with this intelligent chief.” On Thursday the 21st he met 300 Ngatiawa, and conversed with Te Rangitake and Hapurona. It was decided that hostilities should cease; that McLean should ask the Governor to visit Taranaki; that the Maoris should keep the white flag flying on their fortifications, and have access to their cultivations, peach-groves, and graves. Te Rangitake expressed a hope that the Governor would not be hard upon the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui tribes. McLean—heartily aided by General Pratt—thought peace could now be honourably made.

The Governor having arrived upon the scene went to the General's camp, accompanied by the Attorney-General, by Mr. Weld the Native Minister, by Waka Nene, Tamati Ngapora, and others. For three days discussions were held. On the 30th March several chiefs visited Te Rangitake's pah, three miles from the English advanced posts. Throughout these days Te Rangitake's men had brought presents of vegetables and fruit to the English soldiers. On the 2nd April the chief sent word that he was content with the terms suggested. If the Governor would first visit him, he would then visit the General's head-quarters. This was thought humiliating, and the Governor declined to pay the first visit. He went to the camp of the 65th Regiment, within a mile of Rangitake's temporary encampment, and was visited by Hapurona and others. On the 3rd the Governor proposed written terms. By the first he virtually abandoned the whole contention under which he had waged war with Sir W. Martin in words, and the Maoris with arms. He admitted that further examination of the title at Waitara was needed. 1. The investigation of the title to and the survey of the land at Waitara to be continued and completed without interruption. 2. Every man to be permitted to state his claims without interference, and my decision, or the decision of such persons as I shall appoint, to be conclusive. 3. All the land in possession of Her Majesty's forces belonging to those who have borne arms against Her Majesty, to be disposed of by me as I think fit. 4. All arms belonging to the Government to be returned. 5. All plunder taken from settlers to be restored. 6. The Ngatiawa who have borne arms against the Government must submit to the Queen, and not resort to force for the redress of grievances, real or imaginary. The Governor announced that he would divide the land, which he meant to dispose amongst its former owners, reserving sites of block-houses and redoubts, and right of making roads. He had not used force, he said, to acquire land, but vindicate the law. Mr. Weld, in a pamphlet published in 1869, urged that Te Rangitake was thus put in a position to receive back “any portion of the Waitara block to which he could prove a claim;” but it will be observed that from first to last the New Zealand Government refused to recognize any rights of chieftainship in Rangitake, and that the claim Mr. Weld was willing to recognize was the individual usufructuary right. Of the well-known paramount tribal right the Government took no heed. Hapurona visited the English camp, but Te Rangitake distrustfully sent word that he had had “ominous dreams,” and stayed away. Hapurona required time to consider the terms. After a few days, during which Rangitake wrote to the Governor but did not visit him, Hapurona acceded to the terms; and Browne, on the 7th April, gave Rangitake a short time to consider, adding, “If not settled in these days I have nothing more to say to you.” Rangitake retired from the scene with Rewi, the Ngatimaniapoto chief, and wrote to the Governor on the 8th April, telling him not to be grieved at his going to Waikato. He was going to hear the words of the tribes who had suffered for him. “Yes, I have consented to the peace. I sent my daughter to see you, but she did not see you.

Mr. Weld said in the House afterwards: “Rangitake sent his daughter to make peace. As, however, no acceptance of the terms of submission proposed by the Governor was proffered, and as the reception of Rangitake's daughter would, according to native custom, have concluded peace, leaving terms to be considered afterwards, it was impossible to receive her. Ungallant therefore as it may appear, she was necessarily allowed to return in dudgeon.”

That settles the arrangement of the cessation of firing between the soldiers and the Maoris. Let the arrangement of what has to be said regarding Waitara be done there. No more. At Mangere we shall see each other.”

To such an impotent conclusion had Mr. Richmond's war been brought. The Governor told the Secretary of State that “although no investigation has taken place it is certain that little or none of the land occupied by the troops which I propose to dispose of belongs to Te Rangitake.” When he returned to Auckland he heard that the claims of the Waitara chief had been surrendered to the king-maker. He also found the authority of Sir W. Martin quoted to the effect that the quarrel “had been a land quarrel.” To disprove such an assertion, he ordered that Mr. Bell (if he would accept the office) with three chiefs, one selected by Ngatiawa chiefs, should divide the land held by the troops, and that grants should be issued to each separate Maori owner “before any purchase is made on behalf of Her Majesty.” By this means, he said, he hoped “to break up the influence of the land-league which was the real strength of the insurrection.” He was apparently unable to perceive that his secret hope confessed the truth of Sir William Martin's assertion. The spirit of a soldier was at work in his mind, aiding the temptations of his advisers. He conspired for future violence while he breathed peace in public. He reported the terms of submission at Waitara to the Secretary of State on the 7th April. On the 13th he demanded 5000 soldiers “besides all garrisons” in order “to make a successful attack upon the Waikato tribes and their allies in their own country.…” On the 1st May he wrote, with strange forgetfulness of his previous despatch: “Should we be unhappily forced to resume active operations the consequences will fall heavily and deservedly on the tribes who have rebelled against Her Majesty with the avowed object of declaring themselves independent of a rule which has never been exerted except for their good.” (On the 12th April) he had required entire submission of the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui, restoration of plunder, or compensation, free passage, and protection for all persons. The murderers would be prosecuted when captured. Mr. McLean reported on the 1st May that the Taranaki natives, by a deputy, had agreed to the terms, but the Ngatiruanui had kept aloof and must be further chastised.

Sir William Martin now made an attempt to prevent the ills he foreboded if the Government should act violently against the king movement, which in its inception they had favoured when they sent Mr. Fenton to Waikato, and corresponded with Tamati Ngapora. On the 3rd May he sent a minute to the Assistant Native Secretary. A display of, or resort to, force would rouse determined resistance. He argued that the so-called king movement was one which the “Government should rather welcome as a god-send than attempt to crush as an enemy.” Through it institutions adapted to Maori needs might be established. The king-maker had lately exemplified what the movement meant. He stuck in the ground two sticks. “One,” he said, “is the Maori king; the other the Governor.” He placed a third stick resting on them horizontally. “This,” he said, “is the law of God and the Queen.” Then he traced on the ground a circle enclosing the two sticks. “That circle is the Queen, the fence to protect all.”

Sir William Martin agreed with the Select Committee that to meet the movement with force was unwise, and that the Government ought to strive to guide it. The Assistant Native Secretary was not wise enough to support Sir William Martin, and the Governor and his Ministers were now too deep in blood to go back. One hundred and seventy chiefs of Napier sent a petition to the Queen to deny that the Maoris were fighting against her authority. “Mother, do not listen to the false reports which perhaps are sent to you. They are false. Know then, that the quarrel relates to the land only. We think it desirable that you should appoint a Judge for this quarrel, that it may be put an end to.” Mr. Weld

Amongst the signatures was that of Karaitiana Takamoana, who afterwards was elected to represent the Maori eastern electoral district in the New Zealand Parliament. Other names also showed that Mr. Weld erred in undervaluing the petition.

disparaged the petition, and the Governor forwarded it without comment. The Duke of Newcastle merely directed that the chiefs should be informed that the memorial had been laid before the Queen. On the 4th March the Governor issued a notice, renewing his assurance that he did not wish to deprive Maoris of their lands, and that he would maintain the treaty of Waitangi. On the 1st May, 1861, he told the Secretary of State that he was anxious to disabuse the natives of the erroneous idea suggested by Sir W. Martin and others “that the present is a land quarrel.” It was only in September, 1859, that he had argued that if such a man as Sir W. Martin were on a council of advice in Maori affairs things would go well. Yet Colonel Browne seems to have had qualms of conscience. On the 6th May he asked the advice of the Judges of the Supreme Court as to the establishment of a Court to dispose of questions relating to land over which Maori title was unextinguished Could the Supreme Court undertake the duty? If not, how could an efficient Court be constituted? The Judges did not keep him in suspense. On the 9th May they replied that the Supreme Court was not well adapted generally for such a purpose, though sufficient to deal with incidental cases. A Court might be constituted by formation of a land jury, selected by lot or otherwise from members of various tribes in previously defined districts, nominated by such tribes as competent to act in such capacity, to be presided over by a European (not being an agent for the Crown for the purchase of land) conversant with the Maori language, and assisted if necessary by a native assessor with merely ministerial duties. Every word of the recommendation was a censure on the course adopted by the Governor at Waitara. In every aspect Mr. Parris' commission and proceedings were flagrantly opposite to the views of the three Judges. It will be seen that the Ministry carefully prevented inquiry, by such a court as that suggested, at the Waitara.

The Maoris watched the Governor's proceedings with attention. On the 10th January the War Department informed the Colonial Office that General Cameron had been appointed as general officer at New Zealand, in room of General Pratt, who left New Zealand in April to assume command in Australia. Field operations would have soon been entered upon if Governor Browne had remained in office. In a military despatch (3rd May, 1861) he wrote that he had conversed with Tamati Ngapora, and found him altogether peaceable. Nevertheless he must extract terms from the Waikato tribes. He would allow them reasonable time to deliberate, and “if the answers are not satisfactory I shall send them specific terms, and if they are not accepted shall leave the General to adopt such measures as he may think proper.” As a pupil of Whitaker and Richmond, the Governor had made much progress since the days when he wrote that the Europeans coveted to seize, rightly or wrongly, the heritage of the Maoris, and when he contradicted the assertion of Richmond that the Maoris needed no protection against the designs of colonial ministries and parliaments. He sent a lengthy despatch (7th May, 1861), which was not presented to the Assembly with others of the period, and which bears internal evidence that it was prompted if not written under control. It was grounded upon correspondence between Bishop Selwyn and Mr. Stafford. When, with regard to the Native Offenders Bill, the Bishop and clergy protested in August, 1860, against subjecting Maoris to penalties or disabilities, “without being brought to answer by due process of law,” Mr. Stafford replied that the Government recognized “to the fullest extent all lawful rights of the chief and tribe which have been recognized by former Governments or have ever been understood to exist.” The Bishop at once entreated that the Ngatiawa tribal rights at the Waitara might be made the “subject of a judicial inquiry.” Stafford equivocated. Rebellion must be punished. Te Rangitake and those “confederated with him to resist the extension of European settlement in Taranaki, cannot be permitted to dispossess the Government by force of arms of land to which the native settlers have apparently shown a complete title.” Stafford perhaps thought such a reply capable of deceiving a Secretary of State, but was not so foolish as to believe that Teira had shown a complete title to the homesteads and cultivated grounds of his tribesmen. In 1861 the Bishop resumed the discussion. Peace having been attained a judicial inquiry might be held. Mr. Stafford (3rd May) replied that the Government hoped to establish a Native Land Title Tribunal, but that with respect to the Waitara the Governor had “already made arrangements… and there was every reason to believe that they will be successful if only they are not interfered with.” He denied the right of the clergy or Bishop to “interfere between Her Majesty's Government and her native subjects.” The Bishop replied (5th May) that he and his brethren claimed the privilege, allowed by law to every man, of “laying petitions before the Crown and the Legislature.” When others express opinions and support a “policy which we believe to be unjust, we should be guilty of betraying the native race, who resigned their independence upon our advice, if we did not claim for them all the rights and privileges of British subjects, as guaranteed to them by the treaty of Waitangi.” The Bishop regretted that as the Government deemed it “unwise and dangerous to delay the settlement” of the Waitara question until a Title Tribunal could be created, the Government had not foreseen such difficulties before war was declared at Taranaki “upon an unproved assumption.” Mr. Stafford retorted (20th May) with some warmth. He did not believe that war was thus made. “I advised the Governor on the matter in question, and… I will continue to give that advice which it is my duty to afford.” He repeated the vain assertion that the Governor and his advisers intended to uphold and obey the treaty of Waitangi. When the Governor sent the correspondence to England he was so fatuous as to urge that the Bishop seemed to “ignore the guarantees in the treaty of Waitangi, which have been frequently repeated publicly and privately, and more particularly in my speech to the natives assembled at the last conference.” His advisers had degraded him to their own level. They wilfully violated the treaty in act, while they paid lip-homage to it with their mouths. Which of them prompted the subtle equivocations of the Governor's despatch of 7th May cannot be told. They seem like echoes of Whitaker, but may have been the result of consultation by many. The Governor was made to say that it would be “unjust as well as extremely unwise either to defer the final settlement of any proprietary claims which may exist upon the block sold by Teira and his friends, or to submit them after what has occurred to any investigation except that of the officers of the Crown, and it would be acting still more unjustly to Teira and all the natives who have remained loyal to the Queen during the insurrection, if I allowed the questions again raised by the Bishop as to their right to sell their own land,

Till one sees such words recorded it is difficult to believe either that the Governor could have remained in such utter ignorance of tribal rights, or that the Ministry who were not ignorant of them could dare to instigate the writing of such a despatch. They must have felt that a fair inquiry would prove the injustice done, and they desired to conceal it, if not from the Governor, from the public.

and as to the authority and jurisdiction of the Crown, to be now made the subject of an ex post facto inquiry.” Te Rangitake or any other Maori might put forward proprietary claims to special portions of the block; but any right to veto; any Maori tribal right (though guaranteed by treaty) it was “impossible” to entertain. Though the Governor thus lent himself to Mr. Richmond's eagerness to “accelerate the extinction of the native title,”

Speech of Mr. Richmond, 18th May, 1858.

he declared that there was no reason to apprehend injustice. He was carefully considering with a view to constitute a Commission “to divide the land occupied by the troops among the former owners, in accordance with the terms of peace.” These lands adjoined the Waitara block, and “no question of ownership raised in one case” would fail to “come out in the other.” He was satisfied there would be no “serious difficulty in ascertaining the rightful owners.” He was consulting the Judges as to forming an impartial tribunal for native titles generally; “but I cannot permit the special question, out of which an insurrection has unhappily occurred, to be raised once more at the Waitara. The Bishop desires that these very questions shall still be submitted to a judicial inquiry: which really means that Te Rangitake, who has not accepted the terms of peace, shall be permitted to set them aside and place once more before the Ngatiawa tribes, under European advice, the temptation to renew vague and unsubstantial claims which have already caused the sacrifice of so many lives.… I can hardly conceive an act of greater cruelty and weakness than that of throwing away all that has been gained by substituting for the peaceful determination of those proprietary rights a ‘judicial inquiry’ into pretensions which were disposed of by Governor Fitzroy in 1844, have been resisted since by every Government, and have at length been abandoned by the insurgents themselves.” On this audacious statement it will suffice to remark that the natives were satisfied with Fitzroy's award, that the Taranaki settlers had always conspired against it with more or less success, that neither Te Rangitake nor his friends had abandoned their claims under it, and that, it was not until Colonel Browne conspired with the Taranaki settlers and his advisers to defeat Fitzroy's award that insurrection occurred, when troops were sent to dispossess Te Rangitake. But the Ministry had persuaded Colonel Browne that no question touching Te Rangitake's desolated home, if there were one, could fail to arise elsewhere, and the Secretary of State was so informed by the Queen's representative. The “guarantees in the treaty of Waitangi,” which the Governor told the Secretary of State (25th May, 1861) he had “frequently repeated publicly and privately,” were, as regarded Waitara, deliberately violated. A Board, appointed by himself, had unanimously informed him that there was no such thing as individual right to land, independent of the tribal right. All tribal rights were guaranteed by the treaty. All that was asked by Te Rangitake's friends was that the tribal and other claims at the Waitara should be remitted to “a judicial inquiry.” Yet, driven by his wily and perverse advisers, Governor Browne declared that he could not permit the special questions at the Waitara to be so remitted. There were no individual rights,

Donald McLean's evidence before the Board (in 1856) was: “I do not think that any native has a clear individual title to land in the Northern Island.”

and the Governor would recognize none but individual rights, and he would submit no question about the Waitara block to investigation by any one but an “officer of the Crown.” His advisers were wise in not producing such a despatch when it was written. They did, however, produce the pre-arrranged restrictions, which precluded Judge Johnston from making the inquiry at the Waitara a reality.

Judge Johnson was asked to become a Commissioner to determine differences among native claimants, on the understanding that “any question as to the title of the Ngatiawa tribe collectively would not be within his jurisdiction.” Judge Johnston's acceptance of the task of determining Maori titles, “excluding all claims founded upon any general tribal right,” affords a clue to his opinion as to the significance of thus debarring an inquirer from considering the essence of the subject of inquiry. “If the necessity of the appointment involved the necessity for my expressing, even by implication, or indeed of coming to a definite opinion as to the policy of your Excellency respecting the war, or the propriety of the terms of peace, or of the propriety of excluding claims founded upon a right or a supposed right of the Ngatiawa tribe over the lands in question, I should certainly deem it my duty respectfully to decline the office of Commissioner.”

N.Z.P.P. 1861; E. No. 1, B.

Having thus effectually guarded against any compliance with the treaty of Waitangi, the Ministry hoped to derive some credit from the name of the Commissioner, who was empowered for the sake of appearance to associate with himself Maori “chiefs, not exceeding three,” as assessors. Unless the assessors could control themselves under torture, their countenances must have fed fat the malevolence of their torturers when the following clause in their commission was translated to them: “Provided always that no claim, or pretended claim, of a general tribal right, over the whole or any part of the said land on behalf of the whole Ngatiawa tribe, shall be received, entertained, or investigated under this Commission.” The reader, remembering that Judge Johnston was empowered to deal with the land occupied by the troops outside of the block called “Teira's,” and that Colonel Browne, under advice, told the Secretary of State (7th May, 1861, despatch 71, Native): “The lands in question join the block sold by Teira and his friends; there has been no question of ownership raised in the one case that will not clearly come out in the other”—will perceive the degradation to which the Queen's representative was reduced by Stafford, Whitaker, and Richmond. Te Rangitake's rights as chieftain, and his own and the general tribal rights, were maintained by himself from 1839 until 1860. Bishop Selwyn, Sir W. Martin, Hadfield, and others, distinctly raised the question of those rights, and entreated that they might be judicially examined. The Ministry barred Judge Johnston from entertaining them in his inquiries outside of Teira's block, and insolently used the pen of the Governor to say that no question of ownership had been raised within that block which would not “clearly come out” beyond it. It is the satisfaction of history to prove, when fraud has been for a season successful, that the web it has woven has left traces of the falsehood of the weavers. The reader, who remembers Mr. Richmond's ‘Memorandum,’ which was sent to Sir W. Denison, will not doubt that Judge Johnston's functions were circumscribed because the Ministry knew their position to be untenable. In 1860 Mr. Richmond said: “The issue has been carefully chosen—the particular question being as favourable a one of its class as could have been selected.” In 1861 it was found necessary, in order to screen “the particular question” from the eye of the law, to exclude from an inquiry as to Maori ownership that tribal title on which all Maori ownership depended.

The time was approaching when the Governor, so unworthily imposed upon, was to show that though deluded he was not intentionally dishonest. The path into which he was beguiled he would frankly follow. He had been told that Te Rangitake had no tribal rights and only wished to destroy the Queen's supremacy, and that even if the chief had any rights the Governor's duty was to despise them and make war for the “mana” of the Queen, and he had done so. He determined to prosecute it. On the day (25th May, 1861) on which he complained to the Secretary of State that Bishop Selwyn appeared “to ignore the guarantees in the treaty of Waitangi, frequently repeated publicly and privately” by the Governor, Colonel Browne committed his views to paper. He would first establish the Queen's supremacy. Afterwards he would find out the Maori views at a native conference, and be guided by them as far as possible. Civilization was unattainable until their “communal title” could be destroyed. He would give salaries to native chiefs, who should be organs of communication with the Government; divide native territory into districts, with a European officer in each; establish schools; pass an Act enabling the Crown to issue grants in commutation of native tenure; and “make bush roads through the heart of the native districts.” He would establish a tribunal, to decide land disputes, suggested by the Judges. In addition to the terms offered at Taranaki, conditions were held out to the Waikato; after discussion, and modifications made by the Governor in Council on remonstrance by Mr. McLean. A manifesto to the Waikato tribes was issued. It charged the Maoris with violating the treaty of Waitangi by setting up a king. It required unconditional submission to the Queen, restitution of all plunder, and compensation for all losses. Mr. Smith, the Assistant Native Secretary, explained it for three hours to Tamati Ngapora, in order that the chieftain, the uncle of the king, might expound it to a Runanga about to be held at Ngaruawahia. Though Ngapora undertook to submit the manifesto to the chiefs it was plain that he had no hope of a favourable reception for it. Even as it stood it had been modified in deference to McLean's objections. This was on the 25th May. On the 29th the Governor received a letter from a Wairarapa chief (Wellington province), stating that some of the chiefs, loyal at Kohimarama, were departing from their word and joining the king movement.

On the 1st June the Government heard that Te Rangitake was making an armed progress in Waikato, at the head of more than 400 men, on his way to Ngaruawahia, where great preparations were made for his reception. The chiefs, it was said, had resolved “rather to die as chiefs than live as slaves to the Europeans.” On the 4th June the Governor opened the first session of the third Parliament of New Zealand. He narrated briefly the steps he had taken, and alluded to recent discoveries of gold in the colony. Both Houses echoed his speech. Ominous reports were made in July that the natives were collecting gunpowder. Browne wrote: “I am informed that Maori women purchase powder in Auckland or its neighbourhood, and carry it away on their backs concealed in blankets.” McLean believed that American whaling vessels largely supplied it on the coast. Though the Ministry tided over the address, notice was given of a motion for inquiry into the state of the colony. Stafford and his colleagues met it by proposing resolutions binding the House to the Governor's manifesto to the Waikato. With an amendment, carried by a friendly member who considered the war an Imperial one, the House adopted the resolutions (19th June). Mr. Weld, in the debate, alluding to the king-maker, said: “I would not speak without an amount of respect for the man. In his own mind he may be right, and looking from his point of view there is nothing to be said against the position he takes, but if we are to be carried away by any maudlin sentiment about which the world now raves, we really entail the ruin of that race itself, no less than the partial rain of this colony for many years.” But all colonists were not blind followers of the Ministry, and many who desired war did not wish to enter upon it without more men from England. A deputation of representatives of the province of Wellington in the Assembly (Mr. Fox, Dr. Featherston, Mr. Fitzherbert, and three others) waited upon the Governor to warn him that distrust was spreading, that the Maoris were becoming convinced that he was determined to attack them separately in detail, and that many who had held aloof from the Taranaki dispute as a personal matter between Te Rangitake and the Governor would now, if war were undertaken (as they heard was probable) against the Waikatos, feel compelled to make common cause with their countrymen; and that the forces in New Zealand were inadequate to protect the colonists against a general insurrection. Governor Browne might be unwise, but he was bold. He thought it likely that the invasion of the Waikato country would cause a general rising, but he would carry out his resolution, and “insist upon the terms he had proposed to the Waikatos.”

Settlers must suffer, but must, as at Taranaki, build and defend block-houses. War was not made with rose-water. Auckland from its position was most exposed, but Colonel Browne did not believe that for some time there “had been imminent danger even there.” Having pleaded in vain for Wellington, Wanganui, and Wairarapa, the members foreboded from the Governor's demeanour the destruction of the fruits of 20 years of colonization. They presented a report of their interview on the 20th June. It does not appear that the Ministry objected to the strange procedure. The paper appears as “laid on the table by Mr. Fox, and ordered to be printed.” The recognized leader of the Opposition gave notice of a motion of want of confidence, and the Governor understood that if there should be a change of Ministry, the new men would not hold themselves bound by the manifesto to the Waikato tribes. He thereupon communicated with the House (25th June) independently of his advisers. He reminded it of its resolutions of the 19th June; “1. That the establishment within these islands of a sovereign authority, independent of the British Crown, is incompatible with the security of the colonists, the civilization of the natives, and the welfare of both races. 2. That if, unhappily, negotiations should fail, this House, relying on the best practicable provision being made for the protection of life and property, is of opinion that it is the duty of the colony to second the measures taken by the Imperial Government for the assertion of Her Majesty's sovereignty, and securing a lasting peace.” Colonel Browne wanted a more clear definition of the colonial assistance thus offered. His advisers enabled him to tell the Secretary of State that they agreed with the course he took. Some members objected that the Governor could not constitutionally address the House except under advice; but an address was unanimously adopted, pledging the House to “assent to organization and maintenance of militia to defend the several settlements, and to approve of the acceptance by the Colonial Government of advances from the commissariat chest for defraying the requisite expenditure on the conditions prescribed by the Secretary of State (January, 1861), viz.—”that all such advances will be repaid from colonial funds, so far as the Imperial Government shall require repayment.” These conditions had been imposed in consequence of the loose manner in which Colonel Browne had left the question of repayments “for future adjustment between the mother country and the colony,” when he was inveigled into the Taranaki war. The Assistant Commissary-General had pointed out that advances for militia purposes, such as the Governor required, were at variance with War Office regulations; and after lengthy correspondence the Governor obtained the money, but postponed the question of repayment—Mr. Richmond “respectfully submitting that the colony was entitled to the ultimate refund of its advances, and that his Excellency should, on behalf of the colony, claim such refund.” Now, when a larger war was being prepared, in dire need of money, but undismayed by danger, and thirsting for control of Maori lands and people, the pledge (qualified in their address “to the extent of the limited resources of the colony”) required by the Secretary of State was given by the representatives, who, in their turn, reminded the Governor that it would be more costly to provide a militia than to obtain more soldiers. The Governor could not refrain from calling the attention of the Secretary of State to the able and manly speech of Mr.C. W. Richmond, the Treasurer, which placed “the whole subject in its true light.” At the very time when this matter was considered in the House, General Cameron was representing that the militia force was inadequately available. Its members could only be called out for service within limited districts. He knew of no other country with such narrow limitations as a circle of 15 miles radius. He had wished to inspect the force. Obtaining no satisfaction, after repeated requests, and finding that the policy of the Ministry was to make a quarrel and leave the soldiery to fight it out, he urged, on the 1st July, that he must fully inform the authorities in England. “It was his duty to direct their attention to the fact that at this critical juncture, when every settlement in this island is threatened with attack, the militia has not been called out at any of them except at Taranaki, where, according to Major Herbert's report, not more than 100 militiamen can be considered fit for duty.” He had commenced preparations for attacking the Waikato when instructed to do so. Such an expedition should not be undertaken with much less than 3000 men, and he wished to know, whether, in case of hostilities, garrison duties could be performed by militia, as barely 2500 troops were available for field service. Mr. Stafford furnished in reply a vague memorandum of a kind with which he had for many weeks set aside the Governor's importunity.

Governor Browne. “From the 22nd March, I have constantly urged the subject verbally” (July, 1861). P. P. 1862; vol. xxxvii. p. 66.

It was lengthy, and evaded a reply to the General's requests.

The Governor, in the midst of these troubles, wrote a strange despatch in July, 1861. Maoris believed that the Queen was not unfriendly to them, and hoped that Browne's proceedings might be disapproved of. Their loyalty to the throne had survived, despite their wrongs at Waitara. The pernicious suggestion that there was any variance between his and the Queen's intentions did (in Colonel Browne's opinion) infinite mischief. Even Sir William Martin had said that “a temporary estrangement from the Colonial Government would be followed by a strong and abiding attachment to the Government of England.” To crush these hopes Browne requested that a Royal Proclamation of the Queen's will might be sent by the earliest opportunity, in order to undeceive the Maoris. With strange blindness, while averring to the Maoris that the Taranaki quarrel did not relate to land, he suggested that it should be announced, in Her Majesty's name, that confiscation of land should be held in terrorem against all who might take up arms against the Queen. However just his intentions might be, his acts ministered to covetousness at Taranaki, and the Maori mind was well aware of their tendency. The situation was deemed so critical that both Houses sat in secret Committee, and resolved (5th July) that more troops were necessary—that there was no doubt that a large majority of the natives in the North Island were adherents of the native king, and that authentic information established the fact that in the event of offensive operations against the Waikatos, they would act on the defensive, while attacks would be made in force elsewhere by their allies. Troops must be obtained. Effectually to put down the rebellion would be the course most humane, most beneficial to the Maoris, and the cheapest for the Imperial Government.

These secret resolutions were printed by order of the House of Commons. P. P. 1862; vol. xxxvii. p. 76.

On the following day the Governor procured the concurrence of his Executive Council with these views,— General Cameron, who was a member, limiting his assent to the propounded military necessity. The Governor also wrote a long despatch (6th July), requiring force enough to “subdue the Maoris—once and for all.”

In acknowledging (to the new Governor, Sir G. Grey) a despatch from Colonel Browne, enclosing an opinion from Sir W. Martin at this period— the Duke of Newcastle deprecated “allowing a sanguinary war to spring up,” and hoped “with Sir W. Martin, that just and effective government by giving the natives what they are blindly feeling after, would eventually throw the king movement into the shade” (22nd September, 1861).

With it he transmitted the reply of the king-maker, Te Waharoa, to the Governor's manifesto to Waikato.

The Maori Runanga replied briefly. The chiefs deprecated (7th June) strife. Let the Governor “be slow to wrath, swift to hear.… This is our intention. We are not going to rise up to fight.… Let our warfare be of the lips alone. If such be the course it will be a long path; our days will be many while engaged in such warfare. Let it not be converted into a battle fought with hands. That is a bad road—a short one:— our days will not be many while engaged with the edge of the sword.… Let us not be committed to the short path; let us take the circuitous one; though circuitous its windings are upon firm land. There were proverbs—Not by the straight path, or meagre fare for the traveller. Let us take the winding course, or abundance, the portion of the stayer at home. It is for you to interpret these proverbs. There are more to come.” The king-maker wrote separately. Commencing with dark hints and rhythmic strains, he said: “My song refers to those who are double-hearted, whose lips are given to this side and their heart to the other side.” Why was there invidious distinction between the races? “I thought that the currents of every river flowed into the mouth of ‘Te Parata’ (the unfathomable profound of ocean), where no distinction is made, nor is it said ‘You are salt water, and that is fresh water— remain you away—from a preference for the salt water only.’ In like manner, as the currents from the various islands flow into the mouth of Te Parata, so also all the kingdoms of the different nations rest upon God, as the waters rest upon the mouth of Te Parata. When this work is arrived at we are rebuked. Now, when I worship God I am not rebuked. This great name of God which is spoken of to me, why is this free to me, while of the name of king I am told, ‘It is sacred, mention it not’? Let the Pakeha look to Deuteronomy, chap. xvii. verse 15. Was not the Queen English, Nicholas Russian, Buonaparte French, Pomare Tahitian, each from his own people?” With unhappy logic he asked: “How was it that the Americans were permitted to separate themselves? Why are they not brought under the protecting shadow of the Queen?—for that people are of the same race as the English. Whereas I, of this island, am of a different race, not nearly connected. ‘My only bond with you is in Christ’” (Ephes. ii. 13). If all countries were united the standing aloof by the Maori might be blameable; but they were not. “Friends, do not be offended. Let me make known my thoughts on the great matter which has furnished a cause of dispute.” The treaty of Waitangi did not justify the anger of the Pakeha. One chief could deal with his own, but not with the things of another chief. The great boon of Christianity was accepted gladly by Maoris. “I say, O friends, that the things of God are for us all. God did not make night and day for you only. No; summer and winter are for all; the rain and the wind, food and life, are for us all. Were these things indeed made for you only? I had supposed they were for all. If some were dogs and others were men it might be right to be angry with the dogs, and wrong to be angry with the men. My friends, do you grudge us a king, as if it were a name greater than that of God? If it were so that God forbade us, then we would give it up; but He forbids not, and while only our fellow-men are angry we will not relinquish it.” He denounced the haste with which Colonel Browne plunged into war at Taranaki. He gave no warning. He had not said to the Maoris, “Friends, I intend to fight at Taranaki.…” The wrong-doer, who became unjustly angry, was the Pakeha. Te Rangitake, who was wronged, had done no evil. Why was not the case submitted to judgment? Why was the evidence of one man taken, when the Governor might have called the neighbours together to learn the truth? “Friends, wherein is our friend the Governor right, whom you believe in? Te Rangitake, the man of calm thought, is misjudged by you; and the Governor who hasted to anger is supported and praised. Hence are my thoughts perplexed, for James said, ‘Be slow to wrath, swift to hear.’ As it is, the precept in Proverbs, chap. xvi. verse 32, has not been carried out.” Had Te Waharoa been angry there would have been some excuse, but the wise Pakeha should not become passionate like a child. Te Rangitake having been invited by Te Whero Whero to return to Waitara, it was just that the Waikato should sympathize with the assaulted chief when he called to Waikato for help. Allies—connected by blood-relationships, appealed to, and averse by Potatau's desire from land-selling—the Waikatos were bound to aid Te Rangitake. As to the charge of murdering; look at the death of Katatore. “He was waylaid and died by Ihaia. That was a foul murder. You looked on and made friends with Ihaia. That which we regard as a murder you set at nought; and you call that a murder which we deny to be one.” The Governor had not warned his own unarmed people to remove out of the way when he declared war. He should have done so. “Had he even said to the Ngatiruanui,—Friends, do not kill the settlers, it would to some extent have been a little clearer. Enough on the subject of the murders.” Restitution of property was demanded by the Governor. But Rangitake's “pah was burnt with fire; the place of worship was burnt; and a box containing Testaments,—all was consumed; goods, clothes, —all were consumed. The cattle were eaten by the soldiers; and the horses, 100 in number, were sold by auction by the soldiers. It was this that disquieted the heart of Te Rangitake —his church being burnt with fire. Had the Governor given word not to burn his church, and to leave his goods and animals alone, he would have thought also to spare the property of the Pakeha. This was the cause.… The Governor first commenced the road, and Te Rangitake merely followed upon it.” … From your loving friend Wi Tamihana Te Waharoa.”

With the decision of the runanga the king-maker sent a letter to the Governor, explaining that he had set up Potatau, in 1857, to put an end to land feuds, “to put down troubles, to hold the land of the slave, and to judge the offences of the chiefs. I do not desire to cast the Queen from this island, but from my own land. I am the person to overlook it. Enough.” He called to mind that he was converted to Christianity at the Rotorua war in 1836, and had ever afterwards laboured with the missionaries for peace, and to stay the river of blood which war made to flow in the land. But the Governor was unconvinced. He told the Secretary of State that he must have more troops to subdue the Maoris at once, or the Northern part of the colony must be abandoned to “Maori law, of which the aptest symbol is the tomahawk.”

The Governor's language perhaps caused the immediate downfall of the Stafford Ministry. On the same day (3rd July) that the House agreed to the repayment of Imperial advances for militia purposes, Mr. Fox moved a direct vote of want of confidence in the Ministry. After more than one adjournment the motion was carried by 24 votes against 23. It was remarked that Otago and Wellington furnished much strength to the majority. It was not, however, by reason of their policy on native affairs alone that the Ministry had fallen. On provincial questions there had always been discontent. The new Ministry contained many well-known names. Mr. Fox was Attorney-General and Colonial Secretary; Dr. Featherston, Mr. Reader Wood, and Mr. Mantell became the Governor's advisers. The part taken by Mr. Fox and Dr. Featherston in discussing the Taranaki war, obtained for the new Ministers the name of the peace-at-any-price Ministry.” They took office on the 12th July. Their predecessors were resolved that the treatment of Maori interests should undergo no change. It was moved that the Governor's “memorandum on native affairs be translated into Maori, and sent to the principal chiefs in the island.” The Fox Ministry would have contended in vain against the motion, and it was universally accepted. Thus the men who had opposed injustice at Taranaki were chained to the car of the new war which the Governor had determined upon at Waikato; and the opportunity for a change of colonial policy was lost. Governor Browne, with pardonable exultation, told the Secretary of State that his views in reference to war… “and to the future management of the native race,” had “been accepted and approved by all parties in the House.” Mr. Richmond meanwhile was not content with the negative triumph deducible from the Governor's proceedings. He aimed at actual control. On the 1st August, before the Fox Ministry were fairly settled in their places, he moved a direct vote of want of confidence. On a division he obtained 25 votes against 26. Mr. Fox strengthened his Ministry on the 2nd August by the accession of Mr. Sewell and Mr. Crosbie Ward. Although Sewell had been Richmond's colleague in the Stafford Ministry Richmond was still unsatisfied. On the 8th August he furnished what the Governor called (in a despatch dated the 9th August) a “valuable memorandum” on the king movement. The purport of it was to deny that any terms could be found for peaceful dealings with the Maori king's followers. But resolute as he was to support a warlike course he was equally determined to deny that he was responsible for the Waitara quarrel. Dr. Featherston had moved in June for certain correspondence between Bishop Selwyn and Mr. Parris. In debate he alluded to the sinister influence exercised by Mr. Richmond over the Executive in relation to the Waitara. A petition from Mr. Abraham, a barrister, confirmed his suspicions. Mr. Abraham had claims at Waitara recognized by the New Zealand Company, but the company resigned their charter in the year of his arrival in the colony. He looked to the Crown for satisfaction of his claims. Mr. Richmond, as Provincial Attorney at Taranaki, advised, in 1854, that such claims as those of Mr. Abraham should be deemed “unavailable and extinguished” unless exchanged for Government scrip; but the regulations framed upon this advice were disallowed by the Government on memorial from various claimants. The Land Orders and Scrip Act of 1856 commuted claims at Taranaki by obliging claimants to accept (in lieu of 50 acre lots) one acre of town land, or 12 of suburban, or 50 acres of rural land. An amending Act (in 1858) made further changes, and was proclaimed in 1859, having been reserved for the Royal assent. While the Bill which thus became law was in progress, Mr. Carrington, as agent for claimants at the Waitara block under the New Zealand Company's original (alleged) purchase from the natives, threatened to memorialize the Colonial and Imperial Governments against the provisions of the Bill, and at an interview with Mr. Richmond was induced to withdraw his opposition by promise of increased compensation; viz. 37 ½ acres of suburban, or 75 acres of rural land, instead of the quantities proposed by the Bill of 1856. Mr. Richmond obtained Mr. Carrington's written consent to these terms. Mr. Abraham averred that Mr. Richmond undertook that the Government would make efforts to acquire the Waitara land, but Mr. Carrington's recollection (in 1861) was that Mr. Richmond had said at the interview in 1858: “You cannot expect the province to go to the expense of obtaining the Waitara land, and then hand it over to you and your friends.” Richmond was then Native Minister, and the attempt to obtain the block by purchase from Teira commenced in 1859. Coupling these facts with his recollection of the petition of the Taranaki Provincial Council in 1858, and Mr. Parris's letter alluding to Mr. Turton's “peremptory plan for acquiring the Waitara district,” Dr. Featherston declared that his suspicions were justified. Mr. Weld moved for a Committee to report on the charge thus made in debate. At first he placed on the Committee four of his own friends, and three of Dr. Featherston's, but subsequently the Speaker and the Chairman of Committees were added on his own motion, and a tenth member was added on the motion of a supporter of the Fox Ministry. In the inquiry Mr. Richmond denied that he had brought undue pressure to bear on the Governor, or had advised specially the purchase of the Waitara block. Dr. Featherston cited as his justification, Major Nugent's despatch in 1855 (with Te Rangitake's complaint against Mr. Turton); Governor Browne's statement in 1855, that the feud had been aggravated by the injudicious zeal of Mr. Turton, who had “revived the old suspicion that the Europeans would not rest till they had slain and taken possession;” with various other facts already told. Mr. Richmond cross-examined witnesses, and Mr. Parris vainly strove to explain away his written allusion to Mr. Turton's “peremptory plan.” Mr. Turton wrote a long letter to exculpate himself, and denied that the Waitara block was “coveted” by the settlers, because “no man could covet his own property,” and they had properly bought it from the New Zealand Company. To prove his consistency he quoted from his diary in 1855 a statement that “the full justice of the case would require that Rangitake's people should be at once removed away beyond the original surveyor's line at Titirangi.” Mr. Parris, the inculpator of this would-be remover of hundreds of Maoris, was called upon in 1860 by the Governor to state whether he had told the Bishop, in 1838, that “he was sorely beset to enter into a conspiracy to deprive Rangitake of his much-coveted land at Waitara”—Dr. Featherston having stated at a public meeting at Wellington that he had seen a letter from Mr. Parris to the Bishop to that effect. Parris had no copy of his letter, and the Bishop declined to produce it without the writer's permission. It appeared that the letter was no private one, but written at the request of about twenty natives who desired to have a minister established among them. The charge against Mr. Turton was only incidental, but couched in plain words,—that he desired “to exterminate the natives from the Waitara in accordance with his peremptory plan for the acquirement of that delightful and much-coveted district.” The letter was produced with Parris's consent, together with correspondence between Richmond and Parris in 1859 and 1860 about the Waitara block. In 1859 Mr. Richmond wrote: “I concur with you in thinking that there is no occasion, under the Native Reserves Act, to obtain the consent of every native who signs a deed whereby a reserve is made.… The Governor is very anxious about the completion of the purchase from Teira. I am sure you will press the matter as fast as appears prudent.… The Governor feels he is pledged to effect the purchase.” The Committee examined Mr. Richmond, Mr. Parris, Mr. Carrington, Dr. Featherston, Mr. McLean, and Mr. Weld (their chairman).

Mr. Richmond denied having' brought undue pressure to bear on the Governor. The Governor wrote a letter to relieve him from the charge. Mr. Richmond cited a ministerial memorandum signed by himself in May, 1860, asserting that the proceedings at Taranaki “were not at any stage urged upon the Governor, or so much as suggested to him by his responsible Ministers.” He denounced the revelation of “secret thoughts and feelings expressed by Mr. Parris in confidence under the seal of privacy to his spiritual teacher,” and averred that “the true meaning of Mr. Parris's passionate and involved expressions had been utterly perverted.” In examination Mr. Parris said he was blamed by the settlers at Taranaki for having warned Te Rangitake of the ambush prepared for him at the pah evacuated by Ihaia, and admitted that his letter to the Bishop was not private, though he did not suppose the Bishop had a right to show it to any one. The Chairman of Committees asked for leave to acquaint the Bishop with the charge made by Mr. Richmond of improperly disclosing the contents of Parris's letter, but did not obtain it. Parris in reply to Dr. Featherston said that in discussions with Te Rangitake the latter generally used the expression: “I will not consent to divide the land, because my father's dying words and instructions were to hold it.” Parris quoted these words in a letter to Mr. Richmond on the 16th February, 1860. This date is significant, when it is remembered that Parris was replying to Mr. Richmond's official letter of 25th January, ordering him to survey the disputed block, and if resistance should be offered, to call in the aid of the military; that on the 17th March fire was opened upon Te Rangitake's pah, and that Richmond, in a memorandum addressed to Colonel Browne on the 20th March, used these ominous words: “The occasion has been carefully chosen—the particular question being as favourable a one of its class as could have been selected.”

It may seem strange that this pregnant sentence escaped Dr. Featherston's notice if already published in New Zealand. In March, 1861, it was printed by order of the House of Commons; having been sent by Colonel Browne to Sir W. Denison when applying for troops with which to crush Te Rangitake, and having been transmitted to England by Sir W. Denison. If it had been presented to Mr. Weld's Committee it would probably have failed to influence them. Exposure of Mr. Richmond did not seem calculated to do good in times so excited. Mr. Weld proposed: “That there is no ground whatever for any imputation that undue pressure has been brought to bear in the Executive by Mr.C. W. Richmond on the Waitara question, and that this Committee considers his vindication complete.” An amendment to insert the words “without imputing blame to Dr. Featherston” after the word “Committee” was carried by 6 votes to 4, and was protested against by the minority as beyond the scope of the Committee. The report of the Committee was adopted by the House, but cannot be respected as historically true. Men's minds are so strangely warped by the turmoil of action, that not only his friends but even Mr. Richmond himself may have conscientiously believed in his defence.

While the Governor prepared for war, the Maoris were not idle. The king-maker visited the Eastern tribes to learn their powers and encourage their devotion. The English sent the Rev. Mr Wilson to persuade him to meet the Governor, and it seenend he was about to do so, when Porokorn (When General Pratt thought he had kiled at Mahoetahi) decelared, with others, that, if the project were carried out, king-marker wold be killed by the Maoris on his return. It was useless for him to protest that his counsels could not be changed. He yieded to the will of the tride. English troops were pushed forward to the border of the debateable land, and the spark which would kindle the elements of war might hourly be expected. Yet oe more hope remained or peace. The Goveror had written in febuary, 1961, that he had found the Ngapuhi “Less well affected than when he last visited them.” His despatch was received on the 20th May, and on the 25th the Duke of Newcastle relieved Colonel Browne from his office. With studied courtesy and acknowledgment of past services he hoped that the Governor wold not feel it as a slight if the Engligsh Government at so critical a time a of spreading disaffection, availed itself of the “remarkable authority attaching to the name and character” of Sir Grorge Grey, and re-appointed him in New Zealeand. Future employment was opened to Colonel Browne; and he obtained it at Tasmainia. Men breathed freely in New Zealand. All bad dreaded the war into which Coloel Browne was anxious to plung at Wikato with the force at his disposal. Those who did ot wish to spare the Maoris wanted more troops and ammunition before recommencing the strife. The Secret Committee of both House had asked for them, and the Governor seconded the request. They, indeed, would have waited for them. The soldier Governor dod not shrink form proviking battle with the force at hand. His and Genreal Cameron's various applications for men were afterwards compendiously answered by the Duke of Newcastle in a despatch to Sir George Gray, declaring that “the Imperial Government had done enough by sending out 6000 men, and that the colon can and ought to do the rest.”

Chapter xi. Governor Browne's Departure.

Governor Browne gracefully accepted the despatch recalling him. He promised his successor loyal assistance, and declared that the appointment of Sir George Grey, “who has so much personal influence with the Maoris, and is so deservedly beloved by them, affords the best hope of a peaceful solution of the present difficulty.” He communicated the tidings by letter to Waka Nene. He received complimentary addresses from friendly Maoris and from public bodies. The Taranaki settlers thanked him almost unanimously for his proceedings in that province, though they were still cooped up in their fortified town. Amongst the Maori addresses was one from Tamati Ngapora, the uncle of the Maori king, known in after years as Manuhiri (or the guest). Ngapora declared that his heart was “relieved because the threats against Waikato had not been fulfilled.”

Sir George Grey arrived in Auckland on the 26th September, 1861, and his predecessor conferred with him before sailing away on the 2nd October. On the 3rd, Grey assumed office. His chief adviser was Fox, his bitter opponent during his previous term of office in New Zealand. His consultations with his Ministers were long and anxious. His relations with the men who formed it were changed since he had wielded the Governor's powers in a Crown colony. The Constitution Act of 1852 had in a mangled manner been brought into operation, and, contrary to British constitutional usage, the local responsible Ministers could assume office without resorting to their constituents for approval. Sir G. Grey had kept the office of Land Purchase Commissioner distinct from that of Native Secretary. Governor Browne by merging them had bred suspicions in the Maori mind, and the Ministry informed his successor that they lay at the root of existing troubles. The Government was looked upon as a gigantic land-broker. In May, 1861, McLean had resigned the Native Secretaryship, but the effect of the past combination was not effaced. The loss from the Taranaki war, so lightly entered upon and so fruitless, was thus furnished to Sir G. Grey:—The British extraordinary expenditure had been £500,000; colonial expenditure on military objects, £193,000; cost of removing and aiding women and children, £29,000; losses of settlers, £150,000;—total, £872,000. Colonel Browne had sent troops to the front to enter upon a war at Waikato; and Mr. Carter, a member of the House, had openly stated that on the outbreak of war the probable cost of removing and maintaining for one year women and children exiled from threatened positions of the Auckland, Wellington, and Hawke's Bay provinces, together with the destruction of property there, would be £1,312,000. General Cameron reported the expense of maintaining the 6000 troops in New Zealand to be £437,715 for the year 1861; —the increase on account of war being £337,715. To enter on a Waikato war would raise the military expenditure to nearly a million sterling in the year. The ordinary revenue of the colony was only £282,000 a year. The colonial war-liability already amounted to £350,000, and was increasing at the rate of £80,000 per annum. Sir George Grey in conveying this information urged as a reason for avoiding war, if possible, that not only on Europeans, but on Maoris, miseries would be entailed. He was already endeavouring to devise a policy with his Ministers. On the 2nd November he warned the English Government of the peculiar condition of the Waikato district. Throughout the Taranaki war, while the Waikato warriors were in the field afar, all Europeans, civil, military, or private persons in the district were unmolested. A Mr. Armitage resided in it, leasing land from a chief (contrary to the colonial law), warning pedestrians not to cross it, exacting a fine of one shilling for trespass, and notifying that he would personally levy it from Maori and European alike. Maori chiefs in other places administered for themselves a rough imitation of English law, levying distress in the immediate vicinity of the so-called Maori king. The king-maker had founded a school, and was seen on the 17th October engaged with his son in ploughing the school land, from the produce of which the children were to be supported. Mr. Gorst, a Fellow of St. John's, Cambridge, who had been previously in the district, had been recently sent by the Colonial Government to inspect certain schools there. Well might it occur to Sir George Grey that it would be better to endeavour to establish law and order by peaceful means than to carry slaughter into such a district.

Mr. Gorst in his book, ‘The Maori King,’ has given a remarkable picture of what he saw, and draws the sad conclusion that the quarrel with the Maoris might by prudence have been avoided. His narrative well deserves perusal. He knew the king-maker, heard him state his intentions before his peacemaking journey to Taranaki, and observed that they were punctually fulfilled in spite of misrepresentations by Europeans. After the arrival of Sir G. Grey, when Mr. Gorst was appointed Commissioner and magistrate at Waikato, he endured the condolences of the king-maker for becoming so mean a thing as an officer of the Government. On one subject Sir George Grey took the responsibility of “delaying the execution” of the Duke of Newcastle's commands; viz. to tell the Otaki natives that their professions of loyalty to the Queen would have “made a more favourable impression (in England) if they had not been accompanied by the disloyal ceremony of hoisting the so-called Maori king's flag, in which the greater part of the natives of Otaki appear to have taken part.” Sir G. Grey thought it needful to make “a fair inquiry as to whether the natives of Otaki,” who signed the petition to the Queen, “had been in any way concerned in hoisting the Maori king's flag.” He thought them loyally disposed. “If I were,” he said, “to communicate the answer I am directed to give them I should rouse a feeling of hopeless desperation in the minds of large numbers of natives who are still well-disposed.”

Despatch; 10th October, 1861.

On the 2nd November Sir George Grey gave an outline of the policy he hoped to pursue. Not to renew military operations, but to introduce institutions suited to the circumstances of the Maoris, formed the principal features. To secure as many friends as possible, and thus reduce the number of pro- bableprobable enemies in case of war, was another object. Already he had drawn up a scheme with which, in the main, his responsible advisers concurred. The northern island was to be divided into about 20 districts, and subdivided into hundreds. Native magistrates and police-officers were to be paid. The runanga of each district was to be composed of the Civil Commissioner and twelve persons. The runangas of the hundreds were to select representatives for the district runanga, and the Governor would generally appoint them, giving preference to those acquainted with the English language. The district runangas were to be charged with many functions of legislative character; viz. suppression of nuisances and preventing drunkenness. Hospitals, gaols, and schools were to be under them; and they were to provide for the adjustment of land disputes, tribal or individual. When boundaries were settled native owners might dispose of land, not exceeding one farm in each case, to a European purchaser approved by the Government, on the recommendation of the runanga. The Ministry drew up a careful commentary on each proposal, but in the main concurred. Fines and fees and a house or land-tax were to provide ways and means.

On the 4th of November the Governor, rapid as of old, was ready to start for the Bay of Islands to proffer his new institutions to the Ngapuhi, to whose great chief, Waka Nene, he had already presented a silver cup forwarded by the Queen in compliance with Colonel Browne's application for some mark of favour. The General, the Commodore, and the Prime Minister accompanied him. The reception of the Governor and of his new policy was enthusiastic. Many questions were asked about the salaries to be received by the native functionaries, and it was carried by acclamation that the scheme was excellent. With the Ngapuhi tribe, still swayed by Waka Nene, and ever faithful to the Qeeen under the Waitangi treaty, it was not difficult to maintain friendly relations. To them Sir George Grey was still their old friend, conversant with their traditions and commanding their affections. It was otherwise at Waikato. Te Whero Whero, his especial friend, had passed away; and the advisers of the king were poisoned against Europeans. The greed of the Taranaki settlers, which had culminated in the Waitara land quarrel, had aroused suspicions which even Sir George Grey's reputation could not lull. On that reputation also was the stain which made Te Waharoa say when invited to a conference at Auckland: “Shall I go and be treated like Rauparaha?” While from various quarters came loving congratulations upon his return to Maoria, from Waikato no sign of friendship was shown. The chieftains held aloof, and watched. When propositions were made for a deputation from Waikato to the Governor, in compliance with an invitation from Tamati Ngapora, a chief rose and said that he had been warned by a letter from Auckland that Sir George Grey was luring them to a trap:—that at the Cape of Good Hope he had invited Kaffir chiefs to a conference and had made them prisoners. It would be better for Sir George Grey to visit Waikato. The joint efforts of Bishop Selwyn and Tamati Ngapora were thus frustrated. Mr. Fox, who afterwards wrote a book called ‘The War in New Zealand,’ declares that when Tamati Ngapora returned from his visit to the king's people, he was reticent and formal, and it was “evident that his visit to Waikato had done him no good.” His interview with the Governor was protracted and nugatory. The king-maker wrote a letter in November. In a Maori vessel, forbidden by the runanga to carry spirits, had been found three kegs of spirits, put on board by a Frenchman. The runanga seized the spirits, and the king-maker reported and justified the fact. The spirits were retained untouched. Sir George Grey sent Mr. Gorst to explain that such misdeeds would be prevented under his new institutions. The king-maker's tribe assembled at Arikirua to discuss the matter, and thought that laws made by the runanga, confirmed by the king, and approved by the Governor, ought to be obeyed. But they could not give up their king or his flag. A second meeting at Tamahere was less docile, though the king-maker admirably expounded the Governor's plans. Mr. Gorst went to Ngaruwahia, where the king's counsellors discussed but postponed the subject till the 12th December, when a great meeting was to be held at Taupiri, and Sir George Grey's presence was expected. In these events the Governor saw further proof of the need of law.

On the 30th November he wrote that he did not deem it right to carry out his predecessor's determination to compel obedience to the manifesto of the 21st May, 1861. Such terms could not be enforced. The attempt to enforce them would supply a bond of union against British authority. There was no such paramount authority among the Maoris as to enable a chief to ensure obedience to conditions. The terms offered by Governor Browne at Waitara in April, 1861, had been accepted by certain chiefs; but when a Commissioner had gone thither to carry them out, the chief who had formerly agreed to them could not assist. It rested, he said, with the people. The collective title could not be dealt with except by the tribe. The Commissioner, amid threats of violence, was obliged to leave. Moreover, Governor Browne's Waikato terms were inapplicable to the district, and it was better to withdraw from than to enforce them. Sir George Grey also thought it unwise to call together a conference like that at Kohimarama in 1860, which Governor Browne and his advisers had made it a cardinal point to repeat in 1861. Many chiefs had formerly held aloof. Its decisions would not be binding. It was better for the Governor to propose institutions and to trust to their being adopted in detail by various tribes. He could not prophesy that war could thus be avoided, but no other course was equally promising. The difficulty was to induce confidence in the Government, and as yet it had not been secured. His Ministry had promptly supplied him with a memorandum on the subject of ministerial advice upon native affairs. Governor Browne's plan of receiving advice and reserving his discretion in adopting it had worked badly. To obtain responsible government it had been yielded to, but was not liked, by the Assembly. The Native Department, unsupported by the representatives, was incapable of good.

Sir George Grey, who had in former days been censured for imputed opposition to representative government, met his Ministers in their desire to do away with the double government, which had been so unprosperous in the hands of Colonel Browne. He resolved to consult them on native affairs as on other subjects. He had transmitted their memorandum on the 9th October, and on the 30th November he asked the assent of the Secretary of State to his proposal to treat all affairs alike. If serious differences should arise between himself and his Ministers, he could in all cases resort to other advisers, and appeal to the General Assembly. If local government could be introduced into native districts, few serious questions were likely to arise between the Maoris and the Legislature. It was also advisable to show confidence in the General Assembly. The responsibility thrown upon it would be a protection against rash dealings, which might involve it in war. Aid would not be expected from England to enforce injustice.

To commend his proposals to the English Government, Sir George Grey sent a memorandum, showing that if his native institutions should succeed, they would entail a special cost of about £50,000 a year, and would abolish an expenditure of £629,000, of which £129,000 fell upon the colony. His Ministers undertook to recommend the plan to the General Assembly, and to stake their own position upon it. They drew up a paper to be circulated among the Maoris. It embodied the Governor's proposals, pointed out the blessings of schools, and of resident physicians, and declared that the heart of the Queen would be glad when she heard that the two races were living like brothers in a prosperous land.

The strange medley of affairs arising from the old hospitality of the Maoris, in spite of the confusion into which they had been plunged by the Waitara war, was exemplified in December, 1861. Mr. Crawford, a Wellington functionary, wished to examine the geological formation of the Wanganui district. He went thither, and with three Europeans ascended the river in a canoe. Six Maoris formed the crew. Their chief was Topia Turoa, who will be heard of hereafter as a daring defier of Sir G. Grey, and an ally in the field, in after days, against Te Kooti. Mr. Crawford passed Pipiriki, but near Tangarakau was told that he could not be allowed to proceed. The land there had been handed to the Maori king, and as the English were at war with him, his permission would be necessary. The result was the return of the party to Wanganui, under the care of the king's friend Turoa.

Crawford's ‘Recollections,’ &c. 1880.

Sir George Grey commended (8th December) to the Secretary of State a mission to Waikato, which Mr. Gorst was about to undertake, and the Duke of Newcastle in reply, saw “no difficulty, if the Maoris desire it, in requiring the assent of one of their chiefs, whether Matutaera or any other person, to the laws passed by the runanga. Such an assent is no more inconsistent with the sovereignty of Her Majesty than the assent of the Superintendent of a province to laws passed by the Provincial Council.” The humours at the Colonial Office were hardly reconcilable. In 1860, the Duke sanctioned an act of rapine in order to crush the pretensions of Maori chiefs. In 1862, he was willing to recognize their power of veto. In December, the Governor made an expedition to the Lower Waikato. The Maoris sent a war-canoe to convey him and his suite to Kohanga. A triumphal arch, decorated with the Queen's name, was passed on the way to the settlement through lines of Maoris. The school children sang ‘God save the Queen.’ Preliminary interviews with chiefs were held for two or three days. On the 16th, more than 700 natives assembled to hear the Governor at Taupiri; 250 of them were said to be followers of the king. His speech was gravely listened to by all. He made it practical by the appointment of Waatu Kukutai as head magistrate of the Taupiri Hundred with a salary. The meeting broke up at two o'clock, to reassemble at three, by request of the Maoris. There was much converse between the Governor and Tipene and Herewini, spokesmen of the king-party. On the 17th there was another meeting. Five tribes were there. Above the Governor's seat was an “exquisitely tattooed” image, clothed with a mat of finest texture. A “stone axe of great antiquity hung by its hand.” The Governor spoke. Each Maori approved. The principal chief said, pointing to the figure: “Governor Grey, that is our ancestor. We, all these five tribes, take our origin from him. He is our ‘mana’; he is our ancestor. We give him to you; we give you also his mat, and his battle-axe. We cannot give you more.” The Governor answered: “I accept, and will keep your ancestor with me.” The new institutions were accepted in the Lower Waikato, and glowing accounts were published at Auckland. On the 18th, two large canoes, manned by forty chosen young men, took the Governor and his suite to Maungatawhiri, whence he returned by land to Auckland.

But Sir George Grey was not misled as to the views of the Upper Waikato, or king-party. Writing on the 7th January, he told the Secretary of State that they “showed an entire distrust and want of confidence in the Government.” He had met, had questioned, and been questioned by prominent champions, and this was his verdict. Mr. Gorst details much of the colloquy. The Maori advocates wanted to extract from Sir G. Grey whether he was opposed to the king; Colonel Browne having declared it a duty to do away with him. Sir George wanted to know how far they wished to force their king upon other tribes. They first answered evasively, that they knew of no tribes which rejected him, but added, they would not attack them if there were any such. Tipene admitted also, that where the king's mana did not extend, land sales would not be prevented. If a man had pledged his land to the king, and altered his mind, “he will not be allowed to sell his land; but we shall not assail and kill him; we shall not do as you Pakehas do.” Of the property of which Colonel Browne had demanded restitution, Tipene said: “My name for that is ‘spoils,’ lawfully taken in war.” When the Governor asked about the land of the Europeans on which the Maoris had gone, Tipene replied: “Is there no Maori land at Waitara in possession of the Pakeha?” The Tataraimaka land and the Waitara land he spoke of in one category. The English held Waitara, the Maoris had a right to hold the land from which they had driven the settlers. The status quo post bellum seemed to him to satisfy the ends of peace; but he said it was well, when the Governor said the titles at Waitara would be investigated. As to Tataraimaka, the Governor shook his head. He had been ashamed of the deeds of the Ngatiruanui when he heard of them. Killing women and children was unworthy of Maoris. He had not inquired into the matter; but if he were, like Tipene, a friend, he would advise them to restore what they could, and make compensation. Tipene figuratively urged that the same terms of peace should extend to all who were allies in war, and asked if the Governor's questions were ended. “Gov.—Yes. Tipene.—Then I will ask a question. Are you opposed to my king? Gov.—I do not care about him; but I think it is a thing that will lead to trouble. It will be stopped by such means as I have adopted, and will die out. Tipene.—If the king is brought to nought by your plans, well and good. You say, What is the king to you? We say, It is a thing of importance to us, and we say so because we have seen the good of it. Quarrels of Maoris amongst them- selvesthemselves have diminished.… So I ask you, Are you altogether opposed to my king?—that you may say whether you are so or not. Gov.—If you ask me as a friend, I tell you I think it a very bad thing.” Tipene was unable to extract more from Sir G. Grey, though specially sent to do so by his friends at Ngaruawahia. They wished to know whether the Governor intended to use his army to coerce them, as his predecessor had threatened. Tipene concluded by saying: “Proceed cautiously in working out your plans. The only thing that remains dark is the king. Your own plan is to unite us all.”

Each side had misgivings. Those of the Maoris were strengthened by the formation of a road towards Waikato. The Auckland province had in former years commenced to cut a road through the Hunua forest to the Waikato river. It was almost impassable in winter, and the work was not carried to the proposed terminus. Two miles were untouched. Mr. Gorst declared that the Colonial Government stopped the work during the Taranaki war, in order to avoid giving offence to the Waikato tribes. Sir G. Grey announced his intention to resume it, and the soldiers, then idly quartered about Auckland, were employed in the work of cutting and metalling a military road. Mr. Gorst, an eye-witness, avers that this determination increased the respect which the Maoris entertained for the Governor, but convinced them that he, like his predecessor, though with more wisdom, contemplated war.

Mr. Fox had been with the Governor at Taupiri, and proceeded thence, with Mr. Gorst, in a canoe up the Waikato river towards Ngaruawahia. The Governor empowered him to offer to settle the Waitara dispute by means of a mixed commission, of one European and two Maoris chosen by the Governor, and the same number of like persons chosen by Te Rangitake and his friends. Before Mr. Fox reached Ngaruawahia, the chiefs had left it. Mr. Gorst is of opinion that they did so because the tidings of the military road to the Waikato river convinced them that negotiation was useless. As Mr. Fox could not see the king-maker at Ngaruawahia, he rode through the forest to Hangatiki, where the king was supposed to be visiting the chiefs of Ngatimaniapoto, of whom the redoubtable Rewi was leader. He was honourably received on Saturday, and Rewi appointed Monday for conference. The royal guard-house was close to Mr. Fox's lodging, and its commander (who had visited Europe in an Austrian frigate, the ‘Novara’) spoke English, French, German, and Italian by turns to the visitors, and spoke Maori to his soldiers. On Sunday he carried prayer-books in a bag, and distributed them to the men. Te Rangitake was a guest of Rewi. Mr. Fox met him, and, according to Mr. Gorst, Te Rangitake coolly denied his identity. Mr. Fox's diary is silent on the point. On Monday the great meeting-house was crowded with listeners. Rewi, Te Rangitake, Reihana, and other Ngatimaniapoto chiefs, were present. None of the king-maker's people, the Ngatihaua, were there. The king did not attend. Mr. Fox explained the new institutions, and proposed the settlement of the Waitara dispute by arbitration. An inferior chief, Aporo, replied. He asked whether Governor Browne had not been wrong, and Te Rangitake right, at Taranaki. Mr. Fox soliloquized in English: “Why, that is exactly what I always said in the Assembly.” A Maori understood and translated the remark to the assembly. The orator asked: “How then can a trial take place unless the guilty Colonel Browne be present?” Finally, it was said that the matters were too important to be rashly decided. Waikato would take time to consider. Mr. Fox was not permitted to see the king, but he informed the king-maker by letter of the proposed arbitration. The answer (dated 21st January) followed him to Auckland. It expressed regret that the writer had not seen Mr. Fox, but thought a meeting would have been of little use. Governor Grey's persistence in stationing soldiers at Te la excited suspicion, and the king-maker would not, under such circumstances, consent to an investigation at Waitara.

Before returning to Auckland, Mr. Fox went to Rewi's settlement at Kihikihi, where many chiefs had assembled to visit the king. That personage quitted Kihikihi as Mr. Fox entered it. By this time word had been brought that the soldiers were already at work on the military road to Maungatawhiri. Tribes were gathering at Rangiriri, eager to attack the troops. The king had sent a message ordering them to be patient, and, when he arrived at Rangiriri himself moderate counsels prevailed. As the road was on the Queen's land, it was held that Maoris could not justly interfere with it. If it should be extended to Maori territory, then there would be the requisite “tă-kĕ,” or ground for war, and all Waikato would rise. They made comparisons between the Governor and his predecessor. The latter blundered blindly, and all could see his purpose. Governor Grey made silent preparations, and only struck when he was ready. His promptitude was conspicuous. Two days after leaving Kohanga he wrote to General Cameron about the road to Waikato, and within a week more than 2000 soldiers were at work, with an advanced post at Pokeno, not far from the Waikato river. At Kihikihi, Rewi, meanwhile, was entertaining and arguing with Mr. Fox in what Mr. Gorst called a clever and unsparing manner. At an entertainment, Te Rangitake and Mr. Fox ate from the same basket, and discussed the Waitara dispute—the chief declaring that the troops ought to be removed from the place, so that the question might be left to the law. After dinner Te Heu Heu inveighed against the Pakehas in an oration which offended all who were inclined to accept the new institutions. Some Taupo chiefs on the following day asked for a separate interview, and expressed their contentment with the Governor's propositions. Mr. Fox had often desired a “face to face” interview with the Maori leaders. As regarded the king-maker and the king he had been foiled. With Rewi and Te Rangitake he had made no progress.

Sir George Grey knew the expediency of seeming to be bent on justice. The old disputes about Crown grants to natives furnished an occasion to him. The law officers had contended that after the coming into operation of the New Constitution (1852) there was a legal obstruction to fulfilment of promises to the natives. Sir George Grey had urged, in 1851, that power should be vested in the Governor to grant lands to Maoris. It had not been so vested. He now urged that, if needful, the Constitution Act should be amended. He sent voluminous papers on the subject, amongst which was this characteristic minute by himself: “My advice to Ministers would be to have all these Crown grants issued without delay. I do not doubt that they would be valid, but if any doubts were hereafter raised as to their validity, then I would have an Act passed confirming and making good these grants. I think it of the utmost importance that they should be issued at once.” He urged in two despatches that Parliament should be asked to apply an immediate remedy for so dangerous an evil; and his Ministers who saw his despatches did not dissent, though they preferred local legislation. The Duke of Newcastle replied that he learned with extreme regret “that for no better reason than a supposed legal difficulty, which, if it exist at all, ought in common fairness to have been removed long ago, a large number of natives have failed to obtain the fulfilment of explicit promises by which they had been induced to surrender their lands to the Colonial Government.” He would not shrink from asking Parliament for redress, but as it appeared that the Colonial Government were willing, on the Governor's advice, to grant it, he thought it better to rely upon their dealings than to submit to Parliament a measure indicating a suspicion that the colonial authorities were indisposed “to deal honestly with their Maori creditors.”

Mr. Gorst, in February, was busy as a magistrate at Otawhao in the Upper Waikato district; and at Taupiri the new institutions were accepted to the extent of electing the village runangas, though the district runanga was not called into existence. At Te Kohekohe another runanga was formed and Wiremu Te Wheoro was made head magistrate. Intelligent, loyal, and respected even by the king's adherents, he was unable to overcome the reluctance of his tribe to oppose the national party. A hot-headed Ngatimaniapoto chief, Patene, marched to Otawhao to expel Mr. Gorst from the mission station. The king's runanga had passed an abstract resolution to forbid Queen's magistrates in the king's territory, but they had not appointed Patene to enforce it. He arrived with thirty armed men. The children of the mission school perched themselves upon a fence to watch. Europeans, including ladies, stood by. Patene read an address signed by more than 2000 partisans of the king, and ordered Mr. Gorst to leave. Mr. Gorst refused. Mr. Morgan, the missionary, was not told to go. Finding Mr. Gorst obstinate, and not knowing how far the king would abet his proceedings, Patene drew off his army. The king's council not only did not abet him, but wrote to Rewi enjoining him to keep better order and prevent violence. They passed a law, however, forbidding, under heavy penalties, any resort to Mr. Gorst's Court, and it was so loyally obeyed, that, during six months, only one native suitor appeared there, and he was fined for doing so. Patene, indignant because the king's advisers had not abetted him in the expulsion of Mr. Gorst, declared that he would not permit others to maltreat him. The conflict between native and European jurisdictions resulted, as might have been expected, in favour of the former. Hona, a chief of a small “hapu,” or section of the Waikato tribe, had been an unpaid assessor under Mr. Fenton. Subsequently he attached himself to the king. His tribe had a dispute with a neighbouring tribe about an eel-weir. His more powerful antagonists secured their blood-relations, the Ngatimaniapoto, as judges, and won their cause. Hona renounced his allegiance, and sought and obtained the protection of the Government. He received a salary. When, to eke out the native revenue, the king's runanga ordered a poll-tax of £1 yearly on all Europeans living in native territory, and it was about to be levied on a trader under Hona's protection, Hona threatened to resist, but when an armed party appeared to levy it under a chief who said he would take either the money or its value in goods from the trader, Hona recommended payment. In later time, when war broke out, Hona went over to the king. But submission to the king was not undeviating. The village runangas made laws for themselves, and their administration depended much on the character of the principal chief and the respect shown to him. The king-maker was a conspicuous example. Mr. Gorst never heard a complaint of injustice from any European residing amongst the Ngatihaua. But the counsel of the wise was not accepted everywhere. When the king's runanga, at the king-maker's suggestion, passed an ordinance displeasing to Rewi, he would not obey it, and the king's council sorrowfully admitted that it could not enforce its decrees. It was suspicion of Europeans that furnished the bond of union, and but for the injustice at Waitara, the king movement would perhaps have died of inanition. For his king, as the Maori champion against the Pakeha, Rewi was ever ready to run risk. The king-maker, who sought to provide a paternal government and shrunk from war, lost influence as Rewi gained it, when the hot spirits of the tribes thirsted to be led against the common foe. Fines, fees, and donations scantily supplied the king's exchequer. A strange instance of the medley of affairs was shown in carrying the mails. The king would not allow the Queen's subjects to carry it through his territory; but two of his followers bore it, and were paid by the Colonial Government. The king in church, said Amen to the prayer for the Queen, and when, during the Taranaki war, it was proposed to pray for the king instead of the Queen (the Waikato being in the field), it was resolved not to alter the Prayer-book; in spite of the murmurers who objected to a prayer that she might vanquish her enemies.

On both sides there were provokers of violence. Sir George Grey more than once reported that the Maoris bitterly resented the insults cast upon them. “In the attacks thus made in some newspapers upon the natives, and upon all acts of fairness performed towards them, consists at present the greatest difficulty in this country.” The Duke of Newcastle could only suggest counter-statements by the Governor, and “reminding the editors of the dangerous consequences of their language.” Power to suspend an offending organ was in such case absolutely necessary to prove to the Maori the justice of the Queen, and to the printer the power of the Government. But the Duke of Newcastle was neither wise enough to forecast the future, nor resolute enough to meet a danger if he could have foreseen it. Part of Sir George Grey's policy was the acquisition of friends amongst the tribes. On the 25th January, 1862, Mr. T. H. Smith, Commissioner for the Rotorua district, reported the acceptance by the Arawa tribes of the new institutions. In after years their warlike devotion attested the value of their adhesion. The resident magistrate at Taupo adopted the new system in March. For a time it seemed that its acceptance was about to destroy confidence in the king movement. Mr. Armstrong, the resident magistrate at Lower Waikato, reported the palpable decay of the king's influence, and the probability of a complete organization of the district.

At Hawke's Bay and at Wellington the Governor in person received loyal assurances from the Maoris. At the former place a real or supposed plot was made known to him. A battle-axe, sent round to chiefs by the Ngatiraukawa tribe during the Tarauaki war, as a symbol, on appeal to which they were to rise and destroy the Europeans, was handed to the Governor as a public proof of renunciation of all hostility. Soon afterwards, at Otaki, symbols of similar import were given up to him. Till then he had not known that Rewi's hostility had taken so matured a form. Its public exposure and abandonment by the recipients of the symbols was deemed a proof that Grey's return had rallied the loyalty of his old acquaintances. He had no sooner reported these things, and the gratifying progress made by the troops under General Cameron in forming the military road to the Waikato river, than he was warned of a new difficulty. The Duke of Newcastle was dissatisfied. He wanted to know why the colony was not heavily taxed to meet its requirements. He was willing to sanction the surrender of native affairs to the General Assembly. All militia and volunteer expenses must, however, be locally borne. The contribution of £5 per man for cost of troops must be continued, and a large Imperial force was not to be maintained in the colony. The Duke would sanction Sir G. Grey's new scheme for governing New Zealand with limitations. The Colonial Government must furnish not less than £26,000 towards it. The Imperial Government would not supply more than the amount due from the colonists as military contribution —calculated at the rate of £5 a head for every soldier employed. The arrangement was to expire in December, 1864, and was to be subject to any general measure which the Home Government might adopt with regard to maintaining Imperial troops in the colonies. Sir George Grey replied that the General Assembly was about to meet in July (1862), when the Duke's objections would be brought before it, and suggested that affairs might be favourably influenced if his proposals should be approved at an early date, it being unlikely that the Maoris would abandon their confederacy while a possibility existed that the proposals might at any moment be countermanded from England. Meantime the language used in the newspapers irritated and was complained of by friendly natives. The Governor told General Cameron that it had great effect in strengthening the suspicions of the king's followers that the English were bent on their extermination. Sir George Grey himself made peace, in June, between two tribes friendly to the English, which were fighting about a piece of land at the north of Auckland. The foes were entrenched about 200 yards apart. He persuaded them to strike their colours simultaneously. Each leader was to choose two persons, Maori or European. The four chosen were to name a fifth, Maori or European. If they could not agree to do so, the Governor was to name him. The decision of a majority of the five was to be final. Each pah was to be allowed to fall to ruin, so that neither side might boast of destroying the pah of the other. The arbitration was to be held at Auckland. Sir George Grey was within the entrenchments of Tirirau, one of the disputants, when his “flag was hauled down,” and his “assembled chiefs and followers went down upon their knees, and, in the form prescribed in the native Church of England Prayer-book, went through a service of thanksgiving for the mercy of God in protecting them from the perils of war, and in restoring the blessings of peace to them,—their whole demeanour evincing the most devout thankfulness.”

A dispute about digging for gold was auspiciously put an end to by Sir George Grey in the same month. Numbers of Europeans were crowding to search for gold on lands the property of Maoris at Coromandel, and threatening to seize the land by force. The Maori king was called upon to take charge of it. Collisions were expected. The Governor travelled rapidly from the south of the island, and persuaded the chiefs to receive an annual payment for the right to search within defined boundaries. The war-party of the Maori king was foiled, and retired from Hauraki whither it had marched. The Governor found fault with Tawhiao for alarming the country by his movements, and the king's runanga published his letter with a reply, saying that no harm had been done, and there could therefore be nothing to punish.

Before the General Assembly met, the military road was completed to Pokeno, and cordial thanks were given to the General and the soldiers for their skill and alacrity. It would be an imputation on Grey's intelligence to suppose that he was unconscious that the work had aroused the just suspicions of the Maoris. To the Assembly which he convened at Wellington in July, 1862, the Governor commended the consideration of the new institutions for Maori government, and the better organization of militia and volunteer forces. He said: “I have hitherto had no occasion, and hope that I shall have none hereafter, to employ the military forces in any active field operations.” The first cloud which threatened his relations to the General now darkened the horizon. General Cameron, without warning to the Colonial Government, had reported that the annual training of the militia was neglected. The discontinuance had occurred under Governor Browne, in 1861, and was attributed by Mr. Fox and his colleagues to the impossibility of enforcing the training without driving away the population to the gold-fields of Australia, and those recently discovered in the Middle Island. They hoped to legislate on the subject. Appreciating their difficulties, and shrinking from the risk of a war of races, the Governor wrote that he was endeavouring to persuade the local government to create a permanent armed police force of Europeans and Maoris, who would ultimately take a principal part of the colonial military duty; a plan of which in due time the Secretary of State approved.

Mr. Fox brought before the House a resolution disclaiming exclusive responsibility for controlling Maori affairs, and liability for the principal cost of suppressing insurrections; recognizing the duty of cheerful co-operation, to the extent of the colonial ability, with the Imperial Government; but declaring that “(reserving to the Governor both the initiation and decision of questions where Imperial interests are concerned), the ordinary conduct of native affairs should be placed under the administra-of responsible Ministers.” The House was evenly divided. Twenty-two supported, and the same number opposed, Mr. Fox. The Speaker's vote kept the question open, and the dissatisfied Ministry resigned. Mr. Stafford and Mr. Fitzgerald severally declined to take office, and on the 5th August Mr. Domett formed a Ministry, with Messrs. T. B. Gillies, Mantell, and Bell, as colleagues in the House of Representatives; Mr. H. J. Tancred and Mr. T. Russell being members of the Executive Council without office.

The facility with which these and previous changes were made without any ratification by constituencies furnishes an expressive commentary upon the indecent manner in which the Secretary of State launched local government into existence in New Zealand, without legal or constitutional sanction, and without the usual safeguard which attends responsibility.

The Domett Ministry was considered favourable to the doctrine that the Imperial Government, and not the colony, should be responsible for native affairs. But at this juncture the Governor received the sanction of the Home Government to the placing of native affairs under the control of the Assembly. The House considered the subject, and on the 19th August agreed to the following resolutions by a majority of nine: “That in the opinion of this House the relations between his Excellency the Governor and his responsible advisers should rest upon the following basis: 1. That Ministers should, in conformity with the Royal Instruction, advise the Governor in native affairs (as well as in colonial affairs) whenever his Excellency desires to obtain such advice, and should also tender advice on all occasions of importance, when they deem it their duty in the interests of the colony to do so. 2. That Ministers should, at his Excellency's request, undertake the administration of native affairs, reserving to his Excellency the decision in all matters of native policy. 3. That as the decision in all matters of native policy is with his Excellency, the advice of Ministers shall not be held to bind the colony to any liability, past or future, in connection with native affairs, beyond the amount authorized, or to be authorized, by the House of Representatives.” (Similar resolutions were subsequently moved in the Legislative Council, but, after debate, were withdrawn.)

Sir George Grey reported that he had consented to act in the spirit of these resolutions until further instructions might reach him. He did so, because he was satisfied that, whatever the theoretical relations might be, practically, while he was in New Zealand, the result would be the same. He hoped that when existing difficulties were brought to a close the Assembly would assume responsibility for native affairs, at the desire of the Secretary of State. The House having thus crystallized its intentions, proved its carelessness about the men whose duty it might be to obey them, by acquiescing in the remodelling of the Ministry. Mr. Gillies immediately vacated and Mr Sewell occupied the post of Attorney-General. Mr. Mantell similarly gave way to Mr. Crosbie Ward in the Post Office, but remained in the Executive Council. Mr. Bell vacated the Treasury for the returning Mr. Reader Wood: and the chief result was that Mr. Domett succeeded Mr. Fox, and Mr. F. Dillon Bell held office as Secretary for Native Affairs. The Fox Ministry was in office without. Mr. Fox. When Mr. Fox retired, the Governor expressly recorded his high sense of the cordial and generous support invariably afforded by his old accuser; and on the remodelling of the Ministry by Mr. Domett, the Governor told the Secretary of State that the “policy of the Government in all its main features closely resembled that of the previous Government.” The House passed a measure for raising a loan to meet past liabilities, and future exigencies in native affairs; and while it was yet in session, peremptory instructions from the Imperial Treasury commanded the Deputy Commissary-General to make no more payments by loan or otherwise for any colonial need whatever. The working pay of military parties on the road to Waikato was stopped. Taranaki militia pay, and rations, as previously provided by the Imperial Exchequer, were thenceforth to cease. Immediate re-imbursement of past payments was temporarily waived by the Treasury, and the waiver was to constitute “the aid to be afforded from Imperial resources.” Sir George Grey deplored the unexpected suddenness of the decision, which was the more unfortunate as the Assembly had just voted a sum to defray all advances from the military chest, previously made for militia and similar charges.

The Legislative Council addressed the Queen. On the plea that the colonists had not exercised real control they urged that the expense of war ought to fall on the Home Government. The government of the Maoris could not justly be handed over to the colonists at such a crisis. After establishment of peace they would be willing to undertake it. The address was lengthy. The representatives sent similar remonstrances. They declared also that the step taken by Sir George Grey of demitting Maori control to the Assembly was taken without their concurrence, and that the condition of the colony forbade them to close with the Duke of Newcastle's offer of acceptance of such a policy. They, too, thought themselves justified in asserting that the Imperial Government had originated the war. They took upon themselves to criticize the conduct of it “by inefficient and incompetent commanders,” whom there was no local authority to remove. They prayed for material aid, and would, as far as their “means would allow,” bear burdens. They would relieve the English Government of the anxiety of Maori management, “if the power is given and the help continued to us that will make our efforts hopeful.” They “respectfully declined” the Duke of Newcastle's proposal, not as shrinking unworthily from proper burdens, “but because we seem to discover in the despatches an intention to withdraw from engagements to which the British nation is honourably bound, and to transfer to the colony liabilities and burdens which belong properly to the Empire.” It was fit that such equivocating words should be addressed to the Minister who had disgraced the English name in 1860, by approving the rape of the Waitara. It would have been too galling for another man to defend so base a position. The culprit himself could not express his meaning without writing a despatch as long as an evening lecture. He approved of Sir George Grey's conduct, and added: “I congratulate myself on the circumstance that the Government of New Zealand is in the hands of an officer whose personal character will secure him a due influence in the affairs of the colony, independently of the terms in which the General Assembly may recognize his authority.” He was able to refer to the constant jealousy and encroachment by the Colonial Government upon the Governor's powers relating to the native race, and, as far as he could without condemning his own conduct in 1860, he strove to throw the onus of causing the war upon the local Ministry. “I need hardly inform the framers of these memorials that the slow progress of land sales under the auspices of the Native Department, and therefore under the control of the Imperial Government, was an object of complaint to the settlers, and that these complaints were particularly urgent in New Plymouth, and referred especially to the land in the neighbourhood of the Waitara. The decision to complete, by force if necessary, the purchase of that land was adopted at the advice not of the Native Department, but of the Executive Council, and the proclamation of martial law was transmitted to the officer in command under the signature of the chief responsible Minister. It was under this pressure, with this advice and through this agency, that Governor Browne took the steps that led to the war—steps which, although I thought it my duty to sanction them, were in a direction opposite to that which a purely Imperial policy would have dictated. It is in this state of facts that the two legislative bodies of New Zealand, without alleging that Colonel Browne's acts were unwise, or that they were dictated by any Imperial policy or instructions, without denying that they arose, on the contrary, from a desire to promote colonial interests in a way which the colonists themselves demanded, and by proceedings which the responsible Ministers formally advised, do not hesitate to repudiate all responsibility in the matter, and to charge the Home Government with the authorship of their sufferings.”

In accusing the colonists justly, the Duke was convicting himself. He, knowing that justice and good faith, towards the treaty of Waitangi as well as to Imperial interests, were opposed to the dealings at Waitara, had nevertheless sanctioned them. The brave and true advice of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Stanley of old time was discarded; and now, when evil had resulted, the accomplices in crime vented diplomatic recriminations against each other. The Duke animadverted on the reluctance of the militia to serve beyond their own districts, and the desire of the colonists to throw on the Imperial Exchequer the cost of constructing roads. He declared that England would not, as seemed to be desired, “recognize the obligation of supporting the burden to which Great Britain is now subject until the authority of the law is re-established.” He pointed out that it was notorious, and admitted by the representatives, that the allegiance of the natives had never been more than nominal. He urged that a New Zealand legislator (Mr. Fitzgerald) had stated that he knew of “no race at any period of the world's history which had made in so short a period so great a stride,”— and he claimed some credit for the Imperial Trusteeship, which before the year 1856 was real and effective in producing such a result, though it was mainly brought about by ministers of religion. He did not expect the colonists to exact more thorough allegiance from the Maoris than had hitherto been rendered, but would recognize no indefinite obligation on the Imperial Government to coerce the natives. In conclusion, he told the Governor that the consent of the colonists was not needed to make effectual the resignation by the Home Government of control. It was complete by the act of the Home Government. If the Governor should resume or retain control of the Native Department it would not be in obedience to instructions, but “at request of his responsible Ministers or under some pressing necessity occasioned by their action or inaction, for the consequences of which therefore the Home Government would not be responsible.” Of course the Governor would exercise negative power if Imperial rights should be invaded, or the faith of the Crown under the Waitangi treaty were jeopardized, or injustice were attempted. He might have to appeal from his advisers to the Assembly, or from the Assembly to the constituencies, and he would, as to employment of the Queen's forces, be responsible, with the officer in command. The maintenance of those troops in New Zealand entitled the Home Government to a potential voice in requiring justice and liberality to the Maoris. The control of the army would ensure attention to the words of a Governor who had been selected as the fittest adviser and administrator for the colony. The idle compliments with which the despatch concluded were swept into insignificance by the whirlwind which occurred in New Zealand. The Home Government had not been able to comprehend the gravity of the situation. They had sent Sir George Grey as the worthiest man for a particular office, and they gave him a half-hearted support. He was to walk as the Duke of Newcastle desired, although, as shown by his own despatches, the Duke himself was incapable of walking in the road which he knew to be right.

In the scheme proposed by the Governor soon after his arrival, military men were specially asked for as Civil Commissioners. Strong reasons were given, and some others ought to have been patent to a functionary who perceived that many colonists lusted lawlessly for the lands of the Maoris. But the Duke allowed the request to slumber for more than three months in Downing Street, before he replied: “I doubt whether under present military regulations, an officer can be detached from his regi- mentregiment to serve as Commissioner in a native district; but in case this should prove practicable, Her Majesty's Government can only assent on the understanding that the whole pay of the officer shall be defrayed by the colony.” Sir George Grey urged that serious consequences might arise from inability to do what he wished, and that the desired arrangement had been allowed ever since he had been in the service of the Crown. “I assure your Grace,” he added, “that a most serious crisis is impending here, and that I require all the aid and support, physical and moral, that can be given me.” Thus adjured, the Duke consulted the War Office, and, fifteen months after Grey had made his request, the Commander-in-Chief forwarded to General Cameron a discretionary power to allow the employment of officers. Such tardy compliance, at such a crisis, was of course too late. Had the Lord Derby of 1845 been at Downing Street, no such provocation of evil would have increased the Governor's troubles.

The Duke is entitled to credit for promptitude on one point. The New Zealand Ministry desired to carry roads through lands over which the native title was not extinguished. In November, 1862, the Attorney-General, Sewell, gave a formal opinion that the Crown in spite of the Waitangi Treaty could, in conformity with “the essential conditions of sovereignty,” seize upon Maori lands required for roads. He saw technical objections to grasping them under local enactment, because the powers of the General Assembly did not enure until Maori lands had been ceded to the Crown. He could find no express authority for his advice, but referred generally to Books I. II. and III. of Vattel. Mr. F. D. Fenton, assistant law officer, knew something of Maori laws, and Maori temperaments. Without delay (28th November)

P. P. 1863; vol. xxxviii. p. 109.

he interposed. He could “not avoid the conclusion that (Sewell's) opinion was erroneous in law.” He explained his reasons, and suggested that the matter, serious as it might prove, should be reconsidered. Mr. Sewell retired on the 1st January, 1863, without giving a further opinion. Mr. Whitaker took office as Attorney-General without ministerial responsibility. His opinion, as might have been expected, agreed with that of Sewell. He who saw no objection to the pillage of the principal chief, and the denial of tribal rights at Waitara, was not the man to shrink from robbing unnamed Maoris, whose lands would be seized in order to make a road from Taranaki to Tataraimaka. “It may be objected,” he said (21st February), “that this would be contrary to the treaty of Waitangi. To this I answer that a positive enactment of the legislature would prevail over the terms of the treaty if there were any conflict.” But he urged that a right to make roads, as essential to sovereignty, must be implied to have been ceded to the Queen. That a man called a lawyer could honestly think that the terms of a treaty could be cancelled by one of the contracting parties without consultation of the other can hardly be believed. On the contrary and credible assumption, the student may learn the rough and dishonest measures which Mr. Whitaker was ever ready to apply to the Maoris. Sir George Grey, like Mr. Fenton, saw imminent dangers. He told the Duke of Newcastle in December, 1862, when transmitting Sewell's opinion, that the natives would probably “resist by force of arms.” In forwarding Whitaker's he drew attention to the subject as “most important” (24th February). The Duke of Newcastle's susceptibility as to the honour of the Crown was not so weak as to be overborne by the robber-logic of Mr. Whitaker, or by the abstruse generalities of Sewell. He had in March

P. P. 1863; vol. xxxviii. p. 145.

dealt with the latter. He would “hesitate to admit as a matter of strict law that Her Majesty had the power, without any legislative sanction, of appropriating for any purpose the acknowledged property of any of her subjects. But even if it were true that the peculiar legal condition of New Zealand authorized the application of this arbitrary principle, I am of opinion that the question cannot be dealt with as one of strict law.” Policy as well as justice required that the expectations which the Maoris had been allowed to form, as to the good faith of the Crown and the treaty of Waitangi, should be loyally respected by the Government. Regretting the want of roads to accommodate the Taranaki community, he did not think their advantage should be purchased by the re-imposition of the burdens of a war on which, thus originating, “Her Majesty's troops ought not to be employed. I need hardly add that I shall view with more than regret the adoption by your Government of the course which appears to be indicated in the enclosures to your despatch.”

The receipt of Mr. Whitaker's opinion only caused the Duke to say (May, 1863) that his despatch in March had explained his views fully. It is a pleasure to extract from musty folios something creditable to the Duke of Newcastle; but the pleasure is alloyed by the reflection that if he had been as firm in 1859 and 1860, he might have prevented war. Perhaps apprehension rather than wisdom had changed him. In June, 1861, he had told Sir George Grey not to waver. “It would be better to prolong the war with all its evils than to end it without producing in the native mind such a conviction of our strength as may render peace not temporary and precarious but well grounded and lasting.” In May, 1862, he could “hold out no hopes of the continuance of a large body of troops in New Zealand;” and his words became harder by degrees. In August, 1862, he was stirred by the War Office (on complaint by General Cameron) to express surprise at the shortcomings of the Colonial Government in maintaining militia. He grumbled at the Governor for his reluctance to part with the soldiers sent from New South Wales and Victoria. The apathy of the colonists was inexcusable. “I must plainly tell you that unless all cause of complaint is speedily removed, a large portion of the troops now stationed in New Zealand will be recalled without delay. It is my duty to call for an immediate report.” Like the offended servant in the comedy, the Duke when rated by his colleagues vented his spleen on his subordinate. Sir George Grey at once asked for copies of the letters which caused the rebuke and that the Duke would support an officer serving under him by insisting that in future all such documents should be supplied. He had furnished reports, had reduced expenditure, and could only regret that it was thought necessary to censure himself and his Government so severely and so frequently. Events, he hoped, would modify the opinions in England. For himself he was sure that to make roads and encourage peace was wiser than to force one race to take up arms against the other. He still hoped Her Majesty's Government would see reason to approve of what he had done.

The Assembly had conferred upon the Governor power to deal with native reserves, and issue grants. The Civil List grant for native purposes had been raised from £7000 to £26,000. The grant of £5 for each soldier in the colony had been secured by law; and the yearly grant of £7000 for native schools was retained. A Loan Act for half a million sterling had been passed. A special colonial defence force had been authorized by enactment. The Militia Act of 1858 had been amended, and a penalty of £5 for failure of attendance had been enacted. An amended Native Districts Regulation Act enabled the Governor to cause seizure of spirits removed to certain districts, and thus one complaint made by the king-maker was obviated. The Native Circuit Courts Act of 1858 was amended. A Native Lands Act had been passed, not exactly in the form desired by the Governor, but accepted by him as the soundest which the Assembly would pass. He had desired to introduce, gradually, direct dealings in land between European and Maori, to an extent not exceeding one farm for one European, such transactions being dependent on personal occupation by the European under penalties enforced by the Government. The native runanga was to concur in the sale to make it valid.

Unfortunately the Fox Ministry shrunk from what they called the stringency of these terms upon the European. The Domett Ministry shared the objections of their predecessors, and the Bill was introduced in a form which recognized the right of a Maori to deal with his land after the native ownership had been ascertained by Courts to be established for the purpose. The resolutions of the House (19th August) as to the relations between the Governor and his advisers having left the decision in matters of native policy to the Governor, the Ministry felt that it was unfair to proceed with the Bill without his approval. On the 24th August they said they would withdraw it if he could not approve it, but were willing to introduce modifications at his request. He replied (25 August), that understanding from them that the principle of the measure was that natives should be allowed to have as good a title to their lands as Europeans, and to obtain the value by sale or letting, he agreed to it. Again, in September, he was urged to allow it to be said in the Council that the measure was acceptable to him, in order to ensure its passing. He answered: “I have always thought and still think that the plan I proposed for the recognition of the title of the natives to their lands, and for the gradual occupation of the country, by European proprietors agreeable to the natives of the district, was best adapted to the circumstances of the country, and most likely to produce permanently beneficial results. At the same time, as there appears no hope of my succeeding in convincing a majority of the Assembly that my views are the soundest and best, I think the recognition of the title of the natives to their lands a matter of such importance, that I will, as I have before stated, accept the Bill in the form in which it passed the House of Representatives for transmission to the Imperial Government; and I think, upon the whole, it can be so worked as to produce beneficial results at this crisis.”

Mr. Sewell, the Attorney-General, objected so strongly to the recognition of Maori title, that he remonstrated against the Bill while it was before the Legislative Council of which he was a member. The reply of his colleagues may be seen, by the curious, in blue-books. The Native Minister, Mr. F. D. Bell, drew up a commentary on the Bill and its progress, in which he took credit for the moderation of the Governor's advisers, who could command a majority of three to one in favour of their original measure. Thus the Governor, while rebuked by the Secretary of State for not doing more, was congratulated by his advisers upon being allowed to do so much. It was a great advance towards justice to provide a Court to “ascertain and declare who according to native custom are the proprietors of any native lands, and the estate or interest held by them therein.”

By slow degrees the prayers of Sir William Martin, Bishop Selwyn, and Te Waharoa, had prevailed in a measure. But the nature of the Court was peculiar. “It shall be lawful for the Governor from time to time by Commission or Order in Council to constitute a Court or Courts for the purpose of ascertaining, &c.” Under such a provision, a wise Governor bent upon doing good might do it. But an unwise one could commit any act of folly or injustice. No enduring Court was created. An upright Judge in one case might never be re-employed. A pliant tool might calculate upon being re-hired. The Courts were to be occasional, and the judiciary the mere creature of the Executive at pleasure. Under such an Act, Colonel Browne, when once moved to conspire with the land-lusters of Taranaki, might have concocted a Court which would have dealt with Te Rangitake as Parris stirred byC. W. Richmond's private letters had dealt.

The lands south of Taranaki were still void of the settlers driven from them by the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki tribes during the war of 1860, and were ostensibly held by the natives in right of reconquest, which was considered in itself a sufficient reason for giving vitality to the Native Lands Act only by authority of the Governor. Whether the Bill would have been beneficial if no war had broken out in 1863, it is impossible to say. In fact its provisions were not largely used. Nominally trusted by all, the Governor was nevertheless suspected. The nominee Legislative Council feared that he or his advisers sought to impair their independence by creation of new members. An address was sent to the Queen praying that their number might be limited to three-fourths of that of the other House. The Councillors had reason for their fears. Mr. Fox had presented, and Sir G. Grey had transmitted, a memorandum urging that power ought to be given to add to the number of the Council before the next Session. In his opinion the Governor ought to have power to increase the Council from time to time by an additional number of ten members. The Duke of Newcastle's reply was inconsequential (26th March, 1862): “Having fully considered the recommendation and the grounds upon which it is made, I think it best, while withdrawing the limitation of the number of the Council, to refrain from imposing any restriction when none has been imposed by the Legislature. I shall therefore advise Her Majesty simply to repeal by an additional Instruction the limit which is now placed on the extension of the Legislative Council, and that Instruction will be transmitted to you as soon as the necessary forms will admit of its completion.” On the pretence of reluctance to impose restrictions the Duke was willing by the removal of a restriction upon the Governor to subject a whole branch of the Legislature to the caprice of the local Executive.

Other difficulties existed at the time. The General reported secretly to England what he ought, if he touched it at all, to have brought before the New Zealand Government. The Maoris after the wrong done at Waitara, were slow to trust the local government. The seizure of Rauparaha by Grey in old time was now deservedly a stumbling-block in his way. The Assembly, while resolving that the Governor must be responsible for native affairs, would not legislate in the manner which seemed to him fittest to inspire the natives with confidence about their lands. The Duke of Newcastle, though he had in 1846 contested Nottingham against the active opposition of his own father, would give no blank charter to a Governor who was under his authority.

Emboldened by success in arms, the proud Maori race had learned rashness; while greed and obstinacy prevented many colonists from becoming just, generous, or wise. Confessedly critical, the position presented hideous possibilities. While admiring the noble qualities of the Maoris, Sir George Grey knew the atrocious savagery of their modes of warfare, to which they might recur in sudden raids on the settlers if a national rising should be provoked. Torture, mutilation, and cannibalism were the ancient demons of war; and women and children were their victims. It is just to those who supported Mr. Fitzgerald to record the gallant attempt made by him to procure for the Maori race some representation in the Legislature. He carried a resolution recognizing the right of all Her Majesty's subjects, of whatever race, to a full and equal enjoyment of civil and political privileges. He moved that such recognition “necessitated the personal aid of one or more native chiefs in the administration of the government of the colony,—the presence of members of the Maori nobility in the Legislative Council,— and a fair representation in this House of a race which constitutes one-third of the population of the colony.” There were seventeen Ayes and twenty Noes. Supporting Mr. Fitzgerald were Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Dillon Bell, Mr. Brandon, Mr. Carter, Mr. Fitzherbert, Mr. Fox, Mr. Gillies, Mr. G. Graham, Mr. Mantell, Mr. Moorhouse, Mr. Renall, Mr. C. J. Taylor, Mr. Waring Taylor, Mr. Watt, Mr. John Williamson, and Mr. Wood. There were two Richmonds (not Mr.C. W. Richmond), and Mr. Weld, among the victorious twenty, who thus rendered impossible what seemed to them a wild experiment, but was in a few years to be accepted as a plain necessity. It is more grateful to record the names of Mr. Fitzgerald's supporters than those which were enrolled against him.

Suspicions at Waikato were meanwhile strengthened. It was foreseen that a road to Waikato would enable the English to throw troops into the district and endanger Ngaruawahia. Rewi and the war faction began to predominate. The king-maker vainly urged the runanga to accept the proposal of the Government to investigate fairly the Waitara dispute. Rewi commanded a majority. When the military road to Te Ia on the Waikato was completed, and the Queen's Redoubt at the terminus made capable of holding 1000 men, Sir George Grey caused a branch road to be made to the bank of the Maungatawhiri, and timber was conveyed thither to form a landing-stage. Dreading the construction of a bridge, the Maoris were scarcely appeased by being told that the Governor did not mean to build a bridge till the next year, when he hoped their opposition would be withdrawn. Another proposed road excited them more violently. Wiremu Nera and his people had agreed to make a road from Raglan, on the west coast, near Whaingaroa harbour, to Watawata on the Waipa river, not many miles above its junction with the Waikato at Ngaruawahia. Troops landed at Raglan could by such a road take the Maori capital in rear while it was assailed in front by forces arriving by the military road to Te Ia, and by steamers on the Waikato river. Maori claims to land were put forward, and Maori eloquence was vainly used, to deter Wiremu Nera from his project.

War meetings were held, and when a day was fixed for cutting down trees upon the line an armed band went from Rewi's settlement at Kihikihi to stop the work by force. They received a stern message from the king-maker. Wiremu Nera had been his father's comrade, and whoever assailed him must fight the Ngatihaua and their chief. The road question must be settled by Wiremu Nera's tribe and his own. The interlopers retired. The king-maker appealed to Wiremu Nera to desist from a scheme which would place Waikato at the Governor's mercy. The king's sister, Te Paea, who was said to have more of Te Whero Whero's disposition than had descended to her royal brother, with her own hands pulled up the stakes with which the road had been marked out. Thus adjured, and confronted by the opposition of nearly all Waikato, Wiremu Nera agreed to begin his road-making at Raglan, on Queen's territory. His men were satisfied with payment by the Government, and the uproar ceased. Mr. Gorst meantime was troubled at Te Awamutu. Bishop Selwyn and the Church Missionary Society had 200 acres of land at Otawhao, close to the spot. They gave it up to the Government. There were 800 other acres which the Maoris had granted for an industrial school and hospital during Sir George Grey's former government. They were less trustful now, and said that the grant had lapsed by ten years' neglect to use it. The war-party failed to induce the king to take violent measures. It was decided not to drive Mr. Gorst away; but as his magisterial functions had been foiled by preventing a resort to them, so now it was resolved to prevent the erection of the school-buildings by forbidding sales of timber. When in spite of the prohibition two trees were sold, Rewi's friends wished to take them back, but the majority declined to commit an act which might be called theft. More timber was obtained, and the school prospered. The Government provided a teacher of reading, writing, and arithmetic. The trades of the carpenter, blacksmith, wheelwright, shoemaker, tailor, and printer were taught. Agriculture and pastoral pursuits were not neglected. Te Oriori, a leading chief, patronized the school. The king-maker, and even Rewi, visited the institution so strangely established in the heart of the king's territory.

The Maori councillors revolved the state of affairs while “the English Committee” was making laws in 1862. On the 2nd September, Waharoa issued a curt summons “from the whole runanga” to the tribes, to assemble at Peria on the 21st October. An account by a Maori declares that “the cause of the runanga was to lay down laws for the good of this island.” Mr. Gorst says it was called to discuss the Waitara question. Rewi has publicly stated that he and Te Rangitake consented that there should be “a careful investigation” of the Waitara dispute, but that at Peria the Maoris decided otherwise. The meeting was full of dramatic incident. Bishop Selwyn attended.

In 1861 the Bishop was hooted by the settlers at Taranaki. As the crowd followed him he turned round to speak. They began to turn away. He called out: “It is more English-like to look me in the face and tell me your grievances.” Colloquy ensued, in which the Bishop's biographer declares that he was good-humoured and triumphant. Amongst the hooting mob were three Provincial Councillors. He went amongst the Ngatiruanui, and was told by a Maori that he ought not to travel through their country. He would be looked upon as a spy. He answered: “I am like wheat. The Pakeha at Taranaki were the upper-stone grinding me there, and now you grind me here.” He paused till a deputation invited him to proceed, and he marvelled at the kindness he experienced in the district so recently ravaged by the soldiery and settlers.

The preliminary proceedings were closed on the 23rd October with evening prayer. On the following day the king-maker, who presided, announced the subjects to be discussed, and fixed in the ground two sticks, one for the “Ayes,” the other for the “Noes.” 1st. Maungatāwhĭrĭ (i. e. the Governor's dreaded road, bridge, and steamer). 2nd. Whaingaroa (i. e. the road from Raglan). 3rd. Native land disputes. After animated speeches the chiefs voted by depositing small sticks by the mark for the Noes. The decision was—Waikato is closed. Discussion on the land question was postponed. The Bishop asked when Waitara and Tataraimaka would be touched upon. Te Waharoa said his personal desires had been overruled, and those subjects would not be dealt with. It was resolved that disputes should be inquired into and judged by law. There was a debate about debts and Pakehas. It was determined that existing debts should be paid, and that resident Europeans should not be molested. On the 26th, Te Waharoa preached a sermon on the text: “Behold, how good and joyful a thing it is, brethren, to dwell together in unity.” He expatiated on the glorious results of banding the Maoris together under one king, as contrasted with the former ravages of inter-tribal wars. The Maoris, gathered from far, from Tauranga and Napier on the east, and Wanganui and Taranaki on the west, were warmed by his eloquence. To counteract it, Bishop Selwyn preached in the afternoon in Maori, inculcating from the same text a wider unity than that enjoined by Waharoa. On the following day the Bishop asked for audience on three subjects: Let there be one law. Let Waitara be investigated. Let Tataraimaka be re-occupied by its Pakeha proprietors. He was heard. In their own figurative manner he pressed his views upon the chiefs. Solemnly at the close he appealed to the king, to the king- makerking-maker, and to all the tribes, to consent to the good plans for peace. Opposition speeches were made. Some votes were given against the Bishop's proposals. Hauraki (Thames) Maoris seated themselves in the middle, and were claimed by the Bishop's friends. The Nestor of the Hauraki men replied: “No, we are sitting in the centre:” pointing to the two sticks, he added, “there is death here, and death there.” An old man went up to the Bishop, and thrice repeated: “Do you consent that the king shall stand?” “I consent to there being one law, whether by the Queen, the Governor, or Matutaera; whether carried out by a Pakeha or Maori runanga. I consent to there being one law for us all. This is what I consent to.” This reply was deemed unsatisfactory. The old man pointed out that the Bishop called their king only Matutaera, and gave as his own verdict: “Let there be one law, but let the authority be divided into two.”

In the ensuing discussion the king-maker acknowledged a change of opinion, caused by the deceitfulness of the Ministers, the occupation of Te Ia, and the Governor's letter to Matutaera (on the occasion of the march towards Coromandel) threatening that the king would be punished by-and-by. The Bishop repudiated all intention of deceit. Voters came forward for the Bishop. Kihirini, an old chief of Middle Waikato, sat by the Bishop, and said he would have voted for him but for the occupation of Te Ia. The Ngatikahungunu tribe began to speak, and their chief, a friend of the Bishop, advised him that as he had opened the subject, the Maoris would get on better by themselves. The Bishop (called Pihopa Herewini) left with the conviction—That the king's friends were more friendly than before. That their tenacity for their king was unabated. That the east coast tribes were most vigorous in opposition to the Pakeha. That all acknowledged the necessity of one law. That the difficulty was to reconcile unity of law with duality of “mana.” That it would not be impossible to bring about a compromise, on the basis approved by the Secretary of State, that Matutaera and his Council might make laws to be presented to the Governor for confirmation, like the laws of the New Zealand provinces. That there was absolutely no trace of hostility of race, and no unanimity even on the subject of division of races. But though the Bishop obtained no vote of approval, he had won friends, and persuaded the king-maker to make a final effort for peace. After the Peria meeting the king-maker went to Kihikihi and formally asked Rewi and Te Rangitake to agree to the investigation of the Waitara title as proposed by the Governor. Rangitake refused, and the Ngatimaniapoto supported him. The king-maker asked that Tataraimaka should be restored to its European owners. The Ngatimaniapoto refused even this. In sorrow the king-maker retired. To quarrel with his countrymen could not promote the Maori nationality, which he had at heart, and he saw no alternative but submission. The times were out of joint, and would not be set right by him. Yet he ever rebuked the violent by his example. Mr. Gorst reported in March, 1862, that when the king's military guard, established by Rewi's influence, had to be supplied in turn by the Ngatihaua, the king-maker took down men and ploughs, broke up and planted land with potatoes, and said that was the soldiering his tribe could do.

In November, General Cameron represented to Sir George Grey the smallness of his force. It was diminishing in number by reason of drafts of invalids. He had only 2681 effective men to guard Auckland and the long line of communication with the advanced posts. There were more than 700 soldiers at Taranaki, 352 at Wanganui, 274 at Wellington, 271 at Napier, 91 at Otago. This representation was forwarded to England by Sir George Grey on the 27th November, simultaneously with a despatch in reply to the Secretary of State's censure, founded upon General Cameron's complaints that the militia were not duly trained. The Duke of Newcastle had said: “With such a fact before me, I have a right to assume that there are more soldiers in the colony than are required.” Grey deprecated so severe a reprimand, published before he had seen General Cameron's complaint. By such a course a man's “character might be irretrievably ruined, even before he has been accused.” In February, 1863, the Duke ineptly replied, that he wished to blame not Grey but his advisers, and considered that he was thereby strengthening Grey in dealing with his Ministers and the Legislature.

In December, a chief traversed the country from Wanganui to Waikato and Auckland. Everywhere he canvassed the condition of the country with the chiefs, and everywhere he found a disposition to maintain the “mana” of the kinG. Grey sent the chief's diary to the Secretary of State; and receiving information of a scheme to massacre the English settlers if he should send a steamer to the Waikato river, he resolved to act. Early on the 1st January, 1863, he started for the Waikato. He met Te Wheoro at Drury, arranged that a canoe should be ready at daylight the next morning at Maungatawhiri, and with a crew of 20 Maoris, some of whom were chiefs and the king's friends, was wafted up the Waikato and landed at Paetai before midnight, being received with hearty welcome. At seven o'clock in the morning 200 natives were assembled. Among them were devoted partisans of the king; but all took off their hats, saluted him as their father, and declared that if he had never left the country the king would not have been heard of. They prepared horses to escort him to Taupiri. Having arrived there early in the day, he pushed on to Ngaruawahia unattended. The king was at Hangatiki. Te Waharoa was at Peria. Te Paea, the king's sister, and a few chiefs were at Ngaruawahia. As the Governor walked about, gazing on the tomb of Te Whero Whero, and the flagstaff of the king, he was recognized and surrounded by the Maoris. They did not say—Come, let us kill him. They called him their father and protector, and many wept tears of joy—with the Maori facility which the custom of “tangi” created. He thanked them and returned to Taupiri. Messengers informed the king, Te Waharoa, and others, of the presence of the Governor. The king was an unskilful horseman, and at Rangiaohia sent a certificate, signed by a missionary and a catechist, to the effect that he could travel no further. The king-maker rapidly reached Ngaruawahia. Other chiefs attended: but Rewi and his partisans were conspicuously absent. The chiefs assembled at their capital were told that they could see the Governor, if they wished, at Taupiri. They proceeded thither, and seated on the ground awaited his appearance. The king-maker rushed forward, seized his hand, welcomed him to Waikato, and amid uncovered heads escorted him to the seat prepared for him. “Welcome our old friend! Welcome the Governor! Welcome our father, the friend of Potatau! Welcome, parent of the people!” Such were the cries with which a race denounced as unmitigated savages greeted a Governor who had put himself in their power. Taati of Rangiaohia and the king-maker made orations. The latter said that the king movement had been in the minds of the Maoris long before form and shape were given to it. Under it good laws, approved by the Governor, might be passed. He spoke of Governor Browne as— “ko te mea hohoro ki te riri”—one who was hasty to be angry. He asked, as Tipene had asked, whether Grey was still opposed to the king. Grey replied that he continually studied how to pull him down. “I shall not fight against him with the sword, but I shall dig round him till he falls of his own accord.” It was an unhappy speech, and was never forgotten. It confirmed the worst suspicions of those already distrustful. The chiefs deprecated the introduction of a steamer on the Waikato river. The Governor said they should put one there for themselves; but so useful a thing ought not to be wanted; and, failing other means, he must place one there. He invited them to send a deputation to Auckland to discuss all matters. As the evening closed in he became ill, and the assembly was concluded with loud cheers for the Governor. The king-maker returned to Ngaruawahia, where it was resolved to invite the Governor to visit all the chiefs in the district. He, meanwhile, hurried back to Auckland, postponing his tour till a fitter time—which never arrived. As his canoe passed down by Paetai, Maoris galloped on the river-bank with letters from the king-maker and others, urging him, if health would permit, to visit all the people. He did not visit them, and thus was lost almost the last opportunity of peace.

In January, 1863. Grey, in writing about the want of naval assistance in New Zealand, and the necessity for a steamer at the control of the Governor, said: “My own health has completely broken down from the fatigue and exposure I was subjected to last winter, owing to its having been rendered necessary for me to make overland journeys at an unfavourable season—the use of an efficient steamer not having been accorded to me. So thoroughly is this the case, that I doubt if I shall ever again be able to undergo the fatigues which are necessarily incident to my position here. It is impossible, especially when in ill-health, to repress a sort of feeling of hopelessness at being thus left in a position of great difficulty whilst powerful steamers have been and are found for all the ordinary duties of visiting the ports of Australia and Van Diemen's Land, where no difficulties exist or have existed.”

Unless, however, he was sincere—and his threat to place a steamer on the Waikato casts doubt upon his professions—his journey must have ended in disappointment. The king-maker and Taati, true to their professions, wrote letters to the Ngatiruanui, urging them to abandon the Tataraimaka block. But Rewi and other chiefs wrote letters of an opposite character, promising (what the king-maker denied) the help of the Waikato if war should ensue from the retention of the Tataraimaka lands.

On the 3rd February, 1863, Mr. Parris wrote from Taranaki: “I am of opinion that Tataraimaka ought to be taken possession of without a renewal of hostilities if carefully managed, by stationing not less than 100 troops there.” The blunders of 1859 ought to have prevented the Ministry from putting any faith in this statement, which was accompanied by another to the effect that the Ngatiruanui tribe kept their district closed, not only against Europeans but against natives serving the Queen. The Governor himself could hardly be deceived, for on the 9th and 14th February he forwarded to England hostile Maori letters which were sent to him by friendly chiefs, to warn him of danger. One, dated in December, 1862 (sent to Tauranga from Taranaki), urged immediate war if the steamer should be placed on the Waikato river. “Fire upon her at once…. If we see that the Governor takes forcible possession of Waireka and Tataraimaka we will slay him at once.”

About this time H.M.S. ‘Orpheus’ was wrecked at the Manukau, and three Maoris were conspicuous for their daring gallantry in saving the lives of the English.

In the end of February the Governor went to Taranaki. He had no sooner gone thither than troubles arose about timber carried on rafts from Maungatawhiri for construction of police-barracks at Te Kohe-kohe where Te Wheoro loyally served the Queen. The king's runanga debated a whole night, and instructed Te Wheoro that Waikato would take back the timber to the Queen's land. An armed band arrived to carry the threat into execution. Te Wheoro was staunch, although Tamati Ngapora and others urged him to give way. Argument lasted for two days. Then the orators left the army to work. The Kohe-kohe Maoris watched the timber. After waiting all day for an opportunity, the army proceeded to throw the timber into the river. Twelve Maori women and eight men dragged it back as quickly as it was thrown in. The sharp edges drew blood from the excited strugglers, but no blows were struck. The weary army abandoned its unwarlike work. Only six pieces of wood had floated away, and they were afterwards recovered. The Governor, at Taranaki, advised the stoppage of the pensions of Tamati Ngapora and his abettors, increased the salaries of Te Wheoro and others, and gave £5 a year to each of the gallant Maori women, and a watch to each of the eight men. To Tamati Ngapora he offered an inquiry, and stopped his pension until a satisfactory explanation could be given. Ngapora was not one of those who could be bought, and the attempt was one of Fouché's blunders. The war-party of Ngaruawahia took stronger measures. They sent more men under Wi Kumete to remove the timber by force. Mr. Gorst met them at Rangiriri. Wi Kumete showed him some spirits which he had captured from a canoe importing them in defiance of the Maori law. Undeterred by Mr. Gorst's remonstrances Wi Kumete went to Te Kohe-kohe, threw the timber into the river, bound it in rafts, and sent a message to the officer in command at the Queen's Redoubt. If provided with safe-conduct the Maoris would land the timber at Te la; if not they would let the rafts drift on the river. Kumete received permission to land the timber unmolested; kept spectators off with ropes and stakes, and a guard of his own soldiers; landed the timber; returned triumphantly to Te Kohe-kohe, and suggested that Mr. Gorst and all his surroundings at Te Awamutu should be removed in like manner. The Maoris had put up a post at Maungatawhiri on the Queen's land, with a notice: “This is the Pakeha boundary. The water belongs to the Maoris.” Mr. Gorst had pulled up the post, but Kumete re-erected it, and declared that Mr. Gorst's conduct demanded his expulsion.

Mr. Fitzgerald, in a letter to Mr. Adderley, charged Sir George Grey with wrongly striving to build a bullet-proof redoubt at Kohe-kohe under the name of a court-house. Sir George Grey's denial of the charge as untrue contained ample proof that it was reasonable. The despatch (April, 1865) to Mr. Cardwell, introduced his responsible advisers upon the scene. In May, 1862 (Fox, Premier), they recommended that a court-house should be built. Tawhiao forbade it. In June, 1862, the same advisers advised that “a barrack for the accommodation of a native police force should be added to the court-house about to be built.” Sir George Grey thought that Te Wheoro the friend of the English “ought to be allowed to protect himself from violence in his own village, and that preparations should be made to resist the rebellion which I feared was about to break out, and I therefore acquiesced in the advice tendered to me.” All this might be true, and yet Mr. Fitzgerald's

Mr. Fitzgerald erred in attributing to Mr. Domett the advice to erect a police station at Kohe-kohe, and Sir G. Grey took occasion in a separate despatch (No. 60; 7th May, 1865) to correct the error which was undeniable though not important.

charge might be irrefutable. As it was perfectly well known to Sir George Grey and his advisers that the erection of any stronghold within the king's territory was tantamount to an act of war, the explanation to the Secretary of State did not convey the whole truth. When Kumete re-erected the boundary-mark pulled down by Mr. Gorst he showed the significance attached by the Maoris to the proceedings of the Government. The expulsion of Mr. Gorst was undertaken by the pertinacious Rewi; and though the narrative somewhat overlaps the course of events at Taranaki, it may be told in connection with the contest at Kohe-kohe.

In addition to the school at Te Awamutu there was an official newspaper

The ‘Maori Gazette’ had existed previously, and had been discontinued by Sir G. Grey, but was re-established by him when private enterprise threatened to publish one.

devoted to countervail a Maori newspaper published by the king party at Ngaruawahia. The latter bore the evil name, ‘The Hokioi,’ a mythical invisible bird known only by its scream; the omen of war or other scourge. Patara, cousin of the king, was the editor. The Governor's paper was called “The Pihoihoi Mokemoke,” the solitary lark.

Pihoihoi is rendered as the “ground lark” in Bishop Williams' ‘Maori Dictionary.’ I know not why the title of the paper has been translated as “the sparrow sitting on the house-top”—in some narratives.

An article on the evils of the king's government gave great offence by alluding to a gross but unpunished crime. If Matutaera had power to punish he was to blame for neglect. If he had not power, but pretended to have it, he was guilty of false pretences.

One effect produced by the article was to cause suggestions that the ‘Pihoihoi’ should be destroyed and Mr. Gorst be driven away. At a time when the Maori mind was seething with apprehensions about the great river, Rewi sent eighty armed Ngatimaniapoto under Aporo, the orator who had confronted Mr. Fox, to destroy the Pakeha newspaper. He himself, with Te Rangitake, held aloof, about 300 yards from the school-buildings. Mr. Gorst was absent when the band arrived on the 24th March. Within the enclosure they had prayers, were stirred by a speech from Aporo, and then broke open the building in spite of the resistance of Pineaha, the Maori native teacher. Everything belonging to the printing-office was seized, and placed on two drays brought for the purpose. Taati and Te Oriori hearing of the outrage, hurried to the spot from Rangiaohia, and asked if Te Whero Whero's words, “Be kind to the Pakeha,” were forgotten. Matutaera's were the same. Hone Ropeha replied that he would trample on the king's words. Taati called for writing materials and took down the words. At dusk Taati returned to Rangiaohia, telling the schoolboys to inform him if further violence should be offered. The invaders camped in the printing-house and on the road, and set a guard. Mr. Gorst returned at eight o'clock in the evening. The late fellow of St. John's was in a situation which might curdle the blood of some men. Mrs. Gorst was at this remote dwelling, already in the power of a man whom Mr.C. W. Richmond had called “an essential savage, varnished over with the thinnest coating of Scripture phrases,”—for Te Rangitake, whose pah had been ravaged by the English, was on the spot with the fierce Rewi. But Mr. Gorst was bold in his bearing. In the morning chiefs arrived from Rangiaohia, and all day discussion lasted. Rewi was blamed for his conduct. Mr. Gorst was sent for, and Aporo told him to leave Awamutu. He declined. Rewi was unyielding, and all that the Rangiaohia friends could procure was a respite for Mr. Gorst until orders from Sir George Grey might arrive. Taati and Te Oriori entered the house to ensure the safety of Mr. Gorst and his family, while Rewi's guards surrounded it. Then through the intervention of a missionary, it was agreed that Mr. Gorst should ask the Governor's permission to leave Te Awamutu, Rewi surlily saying that if the Governor allowed Mr. Gorst to remain he should die. Mr. Gorst agreed in writing to ask for leave to go, and Rewi wrote to Sir George Grey: “If you say that he is to stay he shall die. Enough. Write speedily to remove him in three weeks.” The Maori schoolboys heightened the effect of the picture by asking Te Oriori to give them guns with which they said they could protect themselves against the Ngatimaniapoto. On the 26th March, Mr. Gorst was officially instructed by Mr. F. Dillon Bell, the Native Minister, to remove with his family and other Europeans, if he should be of opinion that remaining at Te Awamutu would be attended with any danger to life. Mr. Bell went to Taranaki, and sent thence instructions of a similar nature from the Governor. The king-maker arrived at Rangiaohia. His tribe disapproved of Rewi's proceedings. He told Mr. Gorst, nevertheless, that Rewi was obdurate, and the Europeans had better leave. The king-maker personally approved of the school, but Sir George Grey had said he would dig round the king, and when the king-maker looked to see where the digging was going on, he thought Mr. Gorst and the school were some of the spades. Yet he would not abet violence. Rather he warned Mr. Gorst about Rewi. Mr. Gorst said if the king could not control Rewi, the Governor's words were true, and the king had already fallen. “I think,” he wrote, “the chiefs winced a little at this, but Te Waharoa does not lose his temper in argument. It was pitiable to see a man of so noble a character with so base a part to play.” Having obtained permission to leave, if needful, Mr. Gorst endeavoured to maintain himself in his post. The Governor renewed the Native Minister's instructions, but took no notice of Rewi's letter to himself. Rewi was told that the Governor could not understand his proceedings, but did not wish Mr. Gorst to fall by his blade. He had no more to say. Rewi replied it was well that the Governor had said Mr. Gorst should go. But he was unwilling to abandon his post. He went to Ngaruawahia on the 13th April. He wrote his narrative from the printing-office of the ‘Hokioi,’ the Maori newspaper. On the 14th there was a meeting at which he remonstrated with the runanga. He was told that the Governor's words about digging round the king, the Kohe-kohe building plans, the pulling up of the boundary-post at Te Ia, the court-house at Awamutu, and the articles of the ‘Pihoihoi,’ were reasons why he should leave Waikato. He retorted that nothing could justify expulsion from his own land, and asked who would drive him away. “Who join in the deed?” he said. “All Waikato.” “Who are all Waikato? “Herewini pointed down the river, waved his wand round the horizon, and said, “From Tongariro to the sea all have agreed.” Mr. Gorst denied that Matutaera or Waharoa had consented. On the 15th, Matutaera wrote his decision as follows: “I said to Rewi,—O Rewi! leave these days to me; bring back all the property; let none be lost. I do not say that Mr. Gorst shall stay. He must go.” On the 17th, the printing-press was returned, and Mr. Gorst was at Auckland a few days afterwards, some of the scholars following him. The Rev. A. Purchas, medical commissioner, superintended the despatch of the school property, the premises being left in the care of two native teachers, one of whom, Pineaha, had risked his life in resisting the assault on the printing-office. The king-maker wrote a sorrowful letter, regretting Mr. Gorst's expulsion without a cause The king's sister, Te Paea, undertook to guard the premises against intrusion, and Rewi promised to respect her pledge. As to general policy Rewi was now in the ascendant; and the king and king-maker vainly deplored the rage for war which coursed through the violent Ngatimaniapoto. An armed band of 200 of them marched to the Taranaki district on the 18th April. A letter from Patara (editor of the ‘Hokioi’) to Tamati Ngapora (27th April), lamented the expulsion of Mr. Gorst and the contempt of the Ngatimaniapoto for the king's authority. Rewi even demanded that Te Ia should be given over to him to work his will upon, but this the runanga had successfully opposed. Strife was at the doors of all dwellers in the Northern Island. Until the day on which Governor Browne's seizure of the Waitara was approved by the Duke of Newcastle the Maori race venerated the justice of the Queen. Not even Sir George Grey could restore their confidence. His own seizure of Rauparaha by night was never forgotten, and bred distrust in spite of his general popularity. He went to Taranaki on the 4th March to deal with the difficulties arising from the recent war. He had waited until his military road to Waikato was completed, because if there were war, Auckland without that road was deemed indefensible. He professed to labour for peace while preparing for war. He resumed without opposition the Omata (12th March) and Tataraimaka (4th April) blocks at Taranaki. He instituted inquiries about Waitara which should have preceded the occupation of Tataraimaka.

Lieutenant Bates, of the 65th Regiment, Native Interpreter to the Forces, reported (10th April), on the authority of Mr. Carrington, who had been surveyor in the province for twenty-two years, that far from being under the control of Teira in 1859, the block had contained two pahs inhabited by two hundred residents, and by thirty-five of Te Rangitake's followers; and that when the block was forcibly seized in 1860, the pahs and cultivations had been destroyed by the Queen's forces and their native allies. Mr. Dillon Bell, the Native Minister, declared (11th April) that these amazing statements

Mr. Bell assisted Mr. Richmond in his fruitless endeavour to confute Sir W. Martin's arguments, and framed Colonel Browne's elaborate despatch of 4th December, 1860, in justification of the seizure of the Waitara block.

were directly contrary to what he had always believed, and that Mr. Parris still thought them exaggerated. Sir George Grey (12th April) asked Mr. Bell whether, even if there were a flaw in the title of Te Rangitake's people, it was wise, or becoming, or a proper subject on which to risk a war, by expelling from their homes a number of Maoris who had occupied them for years in peace. Mr. Bell consulted Teira, and the old murderer Ihaia, on the 16th April, and they admitted that it was by tribal arrangement that Te Rangitake had settled on the south bank of the Waitara after the return from Waikanae. Teira, when challenged by Mr. Bell for not mentioning the fact to Governor Browne, alleged that when he offered the land in 1859, he did not intend to include the pahs. He had the audacity to complain that the balance of the purchase-money was unpaid. Mr. Bell replied that the deed prepared made no reference to the reserve of the pahs, and that it was Teira's duty to have spoken of them. “Teira and Ihaia, after a few moments' silence, said: ‘If we could answer that, we would do so. As it is we are silent.’” It had come to this then. Mr.C. W. Richmond's and Mr. Bell's assurances (with Donald McLean's culpable acquiescence) that Teira's title had been investigated and found good, had deceived Colonel Browne, plunged the two races into a bitter war, and were now confuted out of Teira's mouth at the first touch of the unprejudiced Lieutenant Bates, and Bell himself became an instrument in eliciting the truth against which he had formerly contended. The Governor (19th April) wrote, that these admissions made it more difficult than ever for the Government to insist that the purchase of the block should be maintained at all risk, and that a reserve of 200 acres for the Maoris should at once be made round the old native villages. The Ministry consented. As to the admissions, the facts appeared to have been overlooked throughout the discussions on the Waitara purchase in consequence of the raising of the larger question of alleged seignorial and tribal rights. “It is difficult to conceive,” they added, “that if these facts had come out clearly at the time of the sale, the practice universally followed, as far as Ministers are aware, in all purchases of land in New Zealand from the foundation of the colony, viz. that of reserving the pahs of resident natives, together with their cultivations and burial-places, would not have been adhered to in this particular instance.”

A heavier indictment could hardly have been framed against the Government of 1860. The facts now called new were urged by the king-maker in reply to the manifesto of the Governor in May, 1861; and in 1860 Mr.C. W. Richmond, acknowledging that there were some of Rangitake's people on the land, had called them encroachers.

Sir George Grey (22nd April) thanked his Ministers for their acquiescence as to the reserves. He prepared a summary of the existing condition of affairs, and recommended that the purchase should be abandoned, and a notice at once issued in the following terms: “The Governor directs it to be notified, that from facts now come to light, and not before known to him, he does not think that the purchase of the block of land at Waitara is either a desirable one, or such as the Government should make; that his Excellency therefore abandons the intention of making this purchase, and forfeits the deposit of £100 which the Government has made on this land.” He told his Ministers, in conclusion: “That the country was in such a state that he felt by no means confident that this act would quiet the minds of many of the Maoris. On the contrary, he thinks it may now be impossible to avoid some collision with them; but he believes it would at once win many over to the side of the Government; that it is a proper act, and that, if a contest must come, the closest scrutiny either in England or in the colony would result in an admission that every possible precaution had been taken to prevent the horrors of war.” Unhappily his contemplated restitution of the Waitara had been deferred until he had given offence at Tataraimaka. Nevertheless, if his Ministers had been prompt, the restitution might have averted war if they and the Governor honestly desired to avert it. But at this crisis they consumed more than a week in drawing up objections to the Governor's proposal. The facts appeared indisputable, having been voluntarily communicated to the Native Minister by Teira himself. “Ministers conclude with his Excellency that the (Stafford) Government was not aware of them.” They would not, with the facts before them, recommend a similar purchase; but they reflected on the support given to Mr.C. W. Richmond in the House, and they shrunk from doing justice. They feared to damage Teira's position, and dreaded lest an act of right should seem like concession to intimidation. The rod of the Assembly was over them. They consented to renounce the pahs and reserves around them, but shrunk from abandoning the remainder of the land. “Nevertheless, considering the great complexity of the whole case, the difficulty of the Governor's position, the critical state of the colony, and the aggravation of all these evils which might be produced by the opposition of the Ministry to any course which the Governor might feel compelled to adopt,” they would leave the decision with his Excellency, and assist him in carrying it out. On the evening of the 30th April they handed their tardy reply to the Governor. He answered on the 2nd May. The Ministry had said that the Native Minister was of opinion that the proprietary right of the sellers to the greater part of the block would be found valid. Sir George Grey anxious (he said) to make no mistake, asked at once for the evidence taken by Mr. Parris. The Native Minister replied that there was none except in the published letters and reports. “I ask in vain for evidence,” said the Governor, “and none can be produced.” On the 4th May, he again urged the open abandonment of the block. Precious time was lost in conferences. Mr. Bell went to consult with Teira and some of Te Rangitake's friends on the 24th May, and while doing so heard, by express message from the Governor, of murders committed on that day by Maoris at the south of Taranaki, where the Governor had already taken possession of the Tataraimaka block. At a later date (April, 1864) there was found in a captured pah

‘History of Taranaki,’ p. 239. B. Wells. 1878.

a letter from Te Rangitake to other chiefs, saying: “If what the Governor says about Waitara is satisfactory there will be no difficulty about Tataraimaka. The sufficiency of what the Governor says must be this,—the giving back of Waitara into our hands, and then it will be right about Tataraimaka.” The letter was dated 1st February, 1863. How far the writer could have influenced his countrymen may be a matter of conjecture. It is not certain that if the Ministry had joined in the manly giving up of the Waitara the reclamation of Tataraimaka could have occurred without provoking war. It is certain that their obstructions tended to make war unavoidable. One Ministry directly brought about the war of 1860.

Mr. Weld, sensitive as to imputations against his absent friend, Governor Browne, wrote to a newspaper (18th May, 1863) denying strongly that in the negotiations between Governor Browne and Hapurona, in 1861 (after the king-maker had withdrawn the Waikato forces from Taranaki), any promise was given that if the Maoris were withdrawn the soldiers should be withdrawn also from the Waitara. Mr. Weld averred that he with Mr. Whitaker was present during the negotiations, and that the promise was only that a claim put forward peacefully should be investigated. But the investigation asked for by the Maoris, by Bishop Selwyn, and Sir William Martin, was a legal one, and an inquiry by Parris or a similar functionary could not adequately satisfy their demand. The vigour with which honourable men vindicated the proceedings at Waitara only furnished proof that judgment is blinded when feelings are roused. The value of Parris as an investigator was shown by Lieutenant Bates' easy discoveries.

Another indirectly ensured that of 1863. Sir George Grey cannot be acquitted of a blunder, for although the Ministry delayed the notification of the abandonment of the Waitara block, it can scarcely be contended that it was out of his power to postpone the resumption of the land at Tataraimaka. To follow the negotiations is a melancholy task, like that of tracing the body of a wounded friend by his blood.

On the 5th May (the day after the murders) the Governor received a warning written on 29th April by a gentleman well versed in Maori customs. Ambuscades were being laid to the south of Taranaki. The reclamation of Tataraimaka was “whakama,” or “Maori shame,” while the English held Waitara. Something must be done to redeem the Maori honour. “We of course know,” the writer said, “that we are only taking that which is our own; but they argue that those places are theirs by conquest, that they had a right to hold them, and that they were determined to do so, so long as we hold Waitara.” This phrase must have run like iron through the blood of those who had delayed the abandonment of the block. The Governor's despatches tell his own remorse. Reporting the murders he said (5th May): “I fear that I cannot now prevent war by acting in the manner I believe justice required in regard to the land at the Waitara. I take great blame to myself for having spent so long a time in trying to get my responsible advisers to agree in some general plan of proceeding.

Mr. Fox disingenuously concealed the delays caused by the Ministry. Fresh from the post of Premier in New Zealand, he said in his book, ‘The War in New Zealand’ (1866): “By one of those unfortunate errors which are apt to befall those who are too much given to diplomacy, Sir George Grey, for some unexplained reason” (having decided to give up Waitara and retake Tataraimaka) “reversed the process; without even giving a hint of his intention to surrender Waitara, he sent soldiers to occupy Tataraimaka.” Yet Mr. Fox had before him (when he wrote these words containing something more than “an unfortunate error”) the Parliamentary Papers, English and Colonial, quoted in the text, and cited in 1864 by Mr. Gorst in his book ‘The Maori King.’

I think, seeing the urgency of the case, I ought, perhaps, to have acted at once without, or even against, their advice; but I hoped from day to day to receive their decision; and I was anxious, in a question which concerned the future of both races, to carry as much support with me as possible; indeed, I could not derive its full advantage from what I proposed to do unless I did so.” He had thought the violent natives anxious to hurry into war while the English were unprepared; but had hoped for a few days' continuance of peace. He had one hope left,—” that the shocking nature of the wholly unprovoked murders may strike with shame and terror the better-disposed natives, and prevent them from confounding the troubles which must result from these murders with the disputes which have arisen regarding the land at the Waitara.”

On the evening of the 5th May, the Ministers earnestly consulted with Sir George Grey. Then, too late, they agreed to withdraw the troops from Waitara; to hold a meeting of the Ngatiawa at the place, and proclaim the abandonment of the block, and an amnesty for all offences connected with it. On the 6th, Sir George Grey had an interview with native chiefs (amongst whom was Horiana the daughter of Te Rangitake), and paved the way for their reconciliation with the friends of Ihaia. On the 7th, Lieutenant Bates met other chiefs, including Teira. He was told by Ihaia that the recent murders were “the act of the whole island for Waitara.” For seven long hours Lieutenant Bates prolonged his conference, and reported it to the Governor. On the 8th, the Governor in a brief minute declared his “decided opinion that the Government should forthwith announce in terms which the natives cannot misunderstand—that from facts recently come to their knowledge, they will not proceed further in the purchase of the land at the Waitara—that the Government does not claim that block of land, or assert any right of property in it.” Teira ought to be liberally treated. “The Governor would earnestly press that no time should be lost in taking positive steps in these matters.”

The Ministry had learned the value of promptitude. They replied on the 8th in a minute, concluding thus:—” It is evident from the despatch of the Duke of Newcastle, received yesterday, that the Imperial Government still maintain the opinion that the Waitara was ‘a settlers' war.’ It is in vain for Ministers any longer (in the midst of difficulties which require instant action) to contend against this view: it only remains for them to avoid the possibility of any war being renewed on any grounds that would admit of that assumption as to its character and origin, which would be the case were war to be renewed at Waitara. Independently of this consideration, the imminent danger of a general insurrection, if any fighting whatever takes place at the Waitara; the exposed position of the other settlements of the North Island, to which Ministers must mainly look; and the necessity of now employing a large body of troops to the south of New Plymouth, make it absolutely necessary to withdraw from any risk of a collision at the Waitara. This can only be done (notwithstanding the risk mentioned by Lieutenant Bates of the land being placed under the Maori king's authority) by the adoption of the Governor's proposal in his minute of to-day, and Ministers therefore concur in that proposal.” He hardly gives at all who gives too late. Had they, on the 22nd April, agreed to the immediate issue of the notice put before them by the Governor all might have been well. It was almost impossible that, in face of so dramatic and unforced an act, the Maoris would have directed an outbreak without previous and protracted discussions. In their cry of distress the Ministers revealed the motives of their final concession. The need of English forces to wage war, and the imminent danger to other settlements, extorted from them what no appeal to their sense of justice could procure. Their consent was hardly in his hands, when on the same day Sir G. Grey met a number of chiefs, of whom Ihaia was one. They had agreed to a re-union of the tribe at Waitara. The Governor announced the abandonment of all claim to the block. He renounced the purchase, as he believed Governor Browne would have renounced it, had the fact been before him, that to complete it more than 200 residents would have to be evicted. Nevertheless, in order to keep faith with Teira, the money promised would be paid, though not for the land. The land would revert to whatever its former ownership had been. The chiefs declared his words to be good. One wanted to know whether judgment in favour of Te Rangitake was implied. The Governor said he gave judgment for neither party. The invariable rule was not to turn off any residents in buying land. “Let all who lived there come back in peace if they choose.” Ihaia said: “We will receive the laws from your mouth. We fought for the Governor when he told us to fight, and we yield when the Governor tells us to yield.” He and Mahau declared they would never join the Maori king. The Governor said: “Come to me when any danger threatens, and I will take care of you.” The conference turned upon the important question of a general rising, in case the recent murders at Oakura should be punished. The Governor said retribution would overtake the murderers, and if the Waitara natives were disturbed they should see what measures he would take for their safety. The chiefs said: “We are now saved,” and despatched a messenger with the Governor's words to Mataitawa, where the Maoris, interested in the Tataraimaka block, were assembled. There were more discussions between the Governor and his Ministers, and nocturnal meetings with them and the General, before the troops were withdrawn on the 13th May. On the 11th May, by proclamation, the claim of the Government to the Waitara block was renounced, with the advice and consent of the Executive Council.

The resumption of Tataraimaka remains to be told. On the 12th March, forces under Colonel Warre, 57th Regiment, occupied without opposition the Omata block, amidst indications of goodwill on the part of the Maoris. On the 4th April, the Tataraimaka block was similarly occupied, and when Sir George Grey left it, on the 6th April, natives formerly hostile were arranging for sales of potatoes to the troops. Then followed messages to and fro among the Maoris as thickly as they were flying between the Governor and his Ministers at the same time about the Waitara. Te Rangitake wrote to tell Rewi of the seizure of the Tataraimaka lands. Rewi wrote to the men at Taranaki: “Fight these people, but in fighting them, fight in a civilized manner, and do not torture them.” The Native Minister reported that ambuscades had been made by the Taranaki natives. Tamati Hone on the 28th April ordered the natives in ambush to retire, and was obeyed. Friendly chiefs reported that the Governor, the General, and principal men were to be attacked. Traffic was nevertheless continued. Meanwhile it became known that Rewi had told the Taranaki men to fight. Mr. Gorst heard that Rewi alone was responsible for the order. Sir George Grey at a later date came to the conclusion that three chiefs concerted the message, that one of them lived near Rangiriri, and that as soon as the message was despatched those defensive works were commenced at Rangiriri which were to cost the English many lives.

The statement in the text about his letter was made by Rewi in public in the author's hearing.

Howsoever the order had been given or supported it was plain that war was at the door. The tardy renunciation of the block at Waitara had made nugatory, for the existing emergency, an act which in itself was laudable as a tribute to justice. No Englishman except the much-reviled Fitzroy seemed to touch the Waitara question without crime or blunder. The lust and rapine which gleamed from the covetous eyes of the Taranaki settlers were reflected continually in malignant phrases already quoted in the text from Provincial Councils, the Richmonds, Atkinsons, and others. Donald McLean would not risk his position in a contest with the Native Minister whom, after abandoning Sir William Martin's counsels, Colonel Browne delighted to honour. Parris bowed down before the same idol. Private letters from one so active and powerful asC. W. Richmond, were irresistible. Parris had exhausted his virtue in protesting against “the peremptory plan” of Mr. Turton to rob Te Rangitake, and became a ready tool in carrying out the more peremptory plan of Mr. Richmond, declared to be “carefully chosen.” Sir George Grey instead of obtaining the consent of his Ministers to the restoration of the Waitara block; and, at the least, making its restitution contemporaneous with the resumption of Tataraimaka, occupied the latter before investigating the facts connected with the former. His Ministers were “amazed,” on the 11th April, at the proof of the crime committed under Colonel Browne; and yet it was not until the 30th April that after much discussion they consented, with reservations, that justice might be done if the Governor should choose to do it. To the Governor's proposed proclamation (22nd April) they would by no means consent. The Oakura murders and a despatch from England converted them, and they did on the 8th May what they had refused to do when it might have been useful. Mr. Fox's insinuation that the delay in the abandonment of the Waitara arose from “one of those unfortunate errors which are apt to befall those who are too much given to diplomacy”—and Mr. Fox's silence about the protracted contention between the Governor and his unwilling Ministers—proved the contagiousness of error in the matter. He had nothing to do with the case, but he could not write about it except in a manner calculated to deceive.

He succeeded in part. In the ‘Life of Bishop Selwyn’ (London: 1879) the author says that Sir George Grey, “when he heard of the murder, said: “Now I must give up the Waitara.” The accepted untruth has made it necessary to record the dates in the text with minuteness.

But the consequences of the blunders of 1863 require to be told.

The reader will remember that Mr. Gorst's life was supposed to be in danger at the hands of Rewi in April, and that the Governor and his advisers had before them the erection of the Maori boundary-post at Maungatawhiri, the casting of timber into the river at Kohe-kohe, the expulsion of Mr. Gorst, the resumption of Tataraimaka, and the abandonment of Waitara. On the 4th May, a small party of men were escorting a military prisoner to Taranaki for trial. Lieutenant Trajett and Assistant-Surgeon Hope of the 57th, going to town on private business, travelled with them, making the party eight in number. At Oakura, between the Tataraimaka and Omata blocks they were fired on from an ambush, and at the first volley all but one or two were dead or mortally wounded. Then their heads were brutally cut with tomahawks. When resuming the Tataraimaka block the Governor had found, on consulting the General, that it would cost nearly £20,000 a year to hold it against hostile Maoris. As there were only twenty English owners of the 4000 acres composing it, he persuaded his Ministry to agree to purchase their rights. Mr. Brown, the Superintendent of the province, undertook (21st April) to propose, but not to support, a Bill to authorize the purchase. Taranaki maintained its impracticable character, and the Provincial Council rejected the Bill. At a time of such imminent public danger Mr. Brown argued that no coercion ought to be attempted “till it was shown that the owners either refuse to sell by arbitration, or ask a price for their land greater than it would be worth if it could be occupied in security.” In other words, the wrongs done by Governor Browne, and imputed by Mr. Fox to the instigation of Mr.C. W. Richmond and the Taranaki settlers, were to be maintained, and the sufferings they entailed were to be redressed by the General Government; and the Provincial Council was to withhold reasonable assistance. A petition to the Queen from the inhabitants at Taranaki declaring the compensation voted for them inadequate, was drawn up in March. Sir George Grey transmitted it to England on the 16th May, with a minute by his Ministers which showed that out of £200,000 voted for the general good at Taranaki, £120,000 were apportioned for compensation, £80,000 were retained for purposes of reinstatement of the province, and the province was enabled by local enactment, assented to by the Governor, to raise £50,000 by loan to meet claims for losses which the apportioned sum of £120,000 might be insufficient to meet. In a minute by the Governor at Taranaki (March, 1863), consenting to the arrangement of the loan, he said: “The great difficulty in my way is that the language of some few of the settlers has been such, in their efforts to force on a war, and in my opinion still continues to be such, that I fear it may be thought if the Government adopts the course I recommend that it will be believed by the persons I have alluded to that we have conceded this point of compensation in consequence of the system of intimidation pursued towards myself and the Government, and that this fancied success may lead to increased efforts to force me into a war with the natives. Still I would do what is right, and meet firmly the evil I anticipate.” It will have been observed that in consenting to Grey's policy about Waitara the Ministry referred to a despatch from the Duke of Newcastle as the turning-point which made it hopeless for them to contend any longer against the view that the Taranaki war had been a settlers' war. In the turmoil of events, while yet at Taranaki they found time to deal with the subject of colonial responsibility, discussed at great length by the Duke of Newcastle, as already related. “The Imperial Government acknowledged no indefinite obligation” to pacify the country, as seemed to be locally demanded. A diminution of the Imperial forces was to be expected, and the important step of placing the management of native affairs under the control of the General Assembly was sanctioned. The Treasurer, Mr. Reader Wood, was with a colleague at Auckland, and shrunk from paying over the large unpaid portion of the £120,000. In view of the additional forces asked for, and the probability of war, they thought they would not please the Assembly, nor comply with the Loan Act, “nor with financial prudence, if they were to assent to the distribution of any portion of the fund at the present time, by way of compensation to the Taranaki settlers.” Though Mr. Domett and Mr. Bell agreed with the Governor, they would not take the responsibility of over-ruling their colleagues, and the sum in question, £90,000, was not paid. It was agreed in June to pay interest upon it to the distressed Taranaki settlers until the Assembly could consider the subject. The Taranaki Provincial Council had in the mean time passed their own Loan Act for the sum of £50,000.

The Duke of Newcastle in a separate despatch expressed confidence in the vigour, ability, and public spirit of Sir George Grey, and explained that he had not meant in any past censures to impair his power of usefulness. It was with the Colonial Government and Legislature that he found fault. On the 14th May, with almost a certainty of a great war before them, the Ministry drew up a paper on the conduct of the Native Department. They referred to the resolutions of the representatives in August, 1862, on administration of native affairs. They declared that the most important business was the personal communication between the natives and the Governor, that to it the natives looked for guidance, and that while Sir George Grey was in the country the system must continue. Responsibility must thus be divided, the Governor being answerable to the Crown, and the Ministers to the Assembly. The position was admittedly anomalous, and practicable only where confidence was mutual between Governor and Ministers. Sir George Grey, on the 16th May, highly complimented his Ministers, especially Mr. Bell, on their ability, zeal, and cordiality. He reminded them, however, that when, in order to meet the supposed wish of the General Assembly, he had handed over responsibility for native affairs, the Assembly repudiated the arrangement, which had not been made by their desire. Nevertheless the Native Department had remained under the control of the Ministers; and “he had consequently never been able to act in native matters with that vigour and promptitude which he believed essential to successful administration.” If such had been the case under Mr. Bell, what might have been the result with a Native Minister less able and less acquainted with native affairs? Feeling strongly “the great evils resulting to both races from the present system, in which all power rests really in the hands of his Ministers, whilst responsibility rests upon himself, and that there can consequently be no rapidity of decision or vigour of action in native affairs in this most important crisis of the history of the colony, the Governor begs Ministers to accede to the advice of Her Majesty's Government by acting on the principle that the administration of native affairs should remain as it now is with them, and that the Governor will be generally bound to give effect to the policy which they recommend for his adoption and for which they will be responsible.” The plan would “simply give Ministers who have now all the real power the means of using that power vigorously and promptly, whilst their rapidity of decision and action must necessarily be quickened by the sense of the great responsibility that will rest upon them.” He would assist them to the best of his power. The Ministers admitted the accuracy of the Governor's reference to the resolutions of the House, and, learning that in his opinion the system worked badly, expressed their readiness to concur until the next session with any agreement whatever to remedy the evils of the crisis. But they considered themselves precluded by the resolutions from accepting the position in which the Duke of Newcastle wished to place them. If in peace the Assembly refused to take the direction of affairs it could not be supposed they would do so when war was imminent. Sir George Grey (20th May) did not think the resolutions precluded the Ministry from assuming responsibility. The Assembly would treat with generosity all assuming responsibility at such a crisis. “Ministers must allow some latitude of expression to the Governor at the present moment when life, property, wives, children—all that men hold dear—are in imminent peril over a large extent of country.” He had hoped that the Ministers would have suggested some plea. As they had thrown the task upon him, and as he believed not a moment was to be lost, he would urge that to the administration of native affairs should be added the “control of militia and volunteers, of the local forces of every kind, of the funds voted for public purposes, of the Post Office; in fact of nearly every Government establishment in the country. At the present instant, which he believes to be one of as great public peril as he has ever known, the Governor thinks that whoever is to govern the country should be armed with every power which the State confers on those who rule it.” In such a crisis those powers should be increased. Men must rise equal to emergencies. “The Ministry can in a moment assume these powers; they virtually have them now. They are the con- stitutionalconstitutional depositories of them, and the Colonial Secretary (Mr. Domett) is the person upon whom properly the chief direction and responsibility should rest. If Ministers will not assume what the Governor believes to be their duty, and exercise these powers, and take that responsibility which goes hand in hand with power, then the Governor thinks they should under present circumstances relinquish them to him until the Assembly meets. The Governor thinks that Ministers will excuse him for pressing this advice upon them; but his doing so at this critical time is a necessity of the position of responsibility in which the General Assembly and Ministers have, against his will, placed him.” The Ministers then at Taranaki postponed till a more convenient season their reply to this appeal. They had to consult their colleagues in Auckland. It was impossible, Domett wrote, “to convey to his Excellency at that moment any expression of the opinion of Ministers as a body.” But while avoiding what he called “the theoretical question of responsibility,” he submitted to his colleagues a long minute (23rd May) on the crisis. It did not rise to the height of the argument; and contains so little pith that hardly a passage can be quoted as significant. He recommended that a proper proportion of militia should be called into active service in the Northern Island. The Taranaki militia, 500 in number, cost £36,500 a year; and while the Otago gold-fields courted labourers, the militia pay (2s. 6d. per day with rations), could not be reduced, but perhaps would require augmentation: but the House of Representatives “had not voted one penny to meet the expenses attending a state of war.” Active operations by the military were required to convince the Maoris that it was their interest to be at peace, but everybody said that many more troops than were in the colony would be required to secure “chance of success.” It would be a bad example to abandon the Tataraimaka block, but if preservation of other settlements required the sacrifice, a bad example could not be helped. In such a manner did Mr. Domett rise to the emergency. Mr. Bell thought the force in the country insufficient for offensive operations, and the calling out of the militia useless. The Governor replied on the following day. Ministers appeared to think that the necessity to call out the militia and volunteers depended on whether aggressive movements were to be made or a defensive position maintained. He could not concur in his opinion as regarded Auckland. An aggressive movement would probably create a general rising, and certain settlements ought to be made secure before making any aggressive movement. He submitted that it was needful, not to determine what should be done for the defence of the colony in event of a general rising, but forthwith to take such active measures as might probably prevent such rising, and place the colony in a thorough state of preparation, thus encouraging friends, disheartening enemies, and placing Europeans in security. He was bound to express this opinion, for he had asked for large reinforcements, and would find it difficult to justify his having done so unless the colony by corresponding efforts showed its sense of the impending danger.

At a later date, in Auckland, after numerous conferences, the Ministry addressed themselves to the question which the rejection by the Duke of Newcastle of the resolutions of the General Assembly had created. In ordinary times there would be but one course open, viz. to convene the Assembly. But imminent war gave no time for debates. Ministers could not attend to departmental duties and prepare measures for the Assembly in such a crisis. Waiving the permanent settlement of the principle of responsibility, Ministers would temporarily accept the following position. The Governor had recently told the Executive Council—that the Taranaki question could not be settled while Waikato was the centre of disaffection, and Auckland was in danger of invasion; that, by concert with the General, the Governor's attempt to arrange affairs at Taranaki was tentative; and that, in case of interference by the Waikatos at Taranaki, Auckland was not to be jeopardized, but the forces were to return thither, and, after the Waikato tribes had been brought to terms, affairs at Taranaki were to be put in order. The Governor's plan was to make the southern bend of the Waikato river a line of defence, with military posts on the north bank and armed steamers on the water; to guard the line between the bend of the river and the Hauraki Gulf with fortified posts, and the Gulf by a steamer; afterwards to throw forward military posts and occupy Paetai and Ngaruawahia, where another steamer was to be stationed. Hostile natives residing within the line of defence were to be banished, lands of hostile Waikatos were to be confiscated, portions being given to military settlers, and the remainder sold to defray the expenses of the war. Militia and volunteers were everywhere to be called out, and confiscation was to follow hostility at other settlements.

The minute (24th June, 1863) declared—Ministers cordially concur in these plans of his Excellency, and they are willing to take upon themselves the responsibility for their adoption, on the understanding that they will be carried out as a whole, the colonial funds bearing all the expense of militia and volunteers. They thought notice should at once be given, that lands of natives taking arms against the Queen would be forfeited, and they anticipated the approval of the Assembly of the whole scheme. Sir George Grey pointed out that the Ministers had left untouched the general question of responsibility, and the relations of the Governor to his advisers. He forbore to press it at such a time, thanked them for their hearty co-operation, and hoped that the General Assembly would be called together as early as the public good permitted, in order that he might be legally invested with powers which he was temporarily forced to assume under heavy responsibility. These documents were laid before the Assembly on the 19th October, and, if translated for the Maoris, must have shown them that, while professing peaceful desires, the Governor and his advisers were intent upon war.

With the concurrence of his advisers, the Governor had applied in May for reinforcements. A general rising was apprehended. Though a battalion of the 18th Regiment was expected, 3000 more soldiers were needed, and, in accordance with opinions of officers who had served in India, two regiments of Sikhs and one European regiment were asked for from India. The Ministry would propose that the colony should bear the cost of the whole of the pay of the Sikhs. Meantime, the Maoris were not idle. The curse of past delay weakened among them the effect of the renunciation of the Waitara purchase. A chief declared: “When Governor Grey heard his men were killed at Oakura, his heart misgave him, and he said, ‘Now I must give up Waitara.’”

Such a conclusion was natural in the mind of any one ignorant of the correspondence between the Governor and his Ministers. Mr. Fitzgerald in the end of 1864, in published letters, upbraided Sir G. Grey for having taken no steps for eighteen months to redeem his promise to inquire into the affairs of the Waitara purchase. Sir G. Grey replied that from “the moment of my arrival in the colony I did my best … to persuade the natives… but no persuasion on my part or that of others could induce them to agree to such an inquiry.” But the inquiry on the spot, made by Lieutenant Bates, might have been made in 1861 as easily as in 1863, and a timely abandonment of a false position might have averted further trouble. As to the resumption of Tataraimaka, Sir George Grey said he would under like circumstances “do it again,”—that Mr. Fitzgerald neither understood Englishmen nor barbarous men; and that to have done otherwise would have encouraged barbarians to attempt the conquest of new homesteads— the capture of more booty (Despatch, April, 1865). Sir George Grey is entitled to his explanation for what it is worth, but it entirely disregards the important element of time.

Governor Grey meanwhile laboured to prevent friendly tribes from falling from allegiance; and Rewi and his friends stirred them by letters to contrary conduct. In Waikato there was confusion. All Europeans were compelled to leave. The Maori newspaper, the ‘Hokioi,’ had been discontinued. Rewi wished to make a descent upon Te Ia and the adjacent settlers. Te Paea the king's sister, Patara, and other chiefs, were able to prevent him. The king-maker and Te Oriori openly condemned him. The Ngatihaua and central Waikato tribes advocated peace. Some only, among the Lower Waikato tribes, joined Rewi in demanding war. The Ngatihaua eventually assembled in arms to enforce peace. On the west coast, between Taranaki and Wanganui, it was rumoured that the Maoris were hostile to the Government. Between Wanganui and Wellington they were friendly. Renata, a chief at Hawke's Bay on the east coast, said: “We can see clearly the error of our native tribes in slaying the Pakehas at Tataraimaka; but, at the same time, we cannot lose sight of the error of the Governor in not making known his decision about Waitara at the proper time. Waitara was the source of evil. The root and source should have been made clear before following up the branches (Tataraimaka).” The tribes on the Thames and at Rotorua condemned the murders and sympathized with the Governor. The Ngapuhi, under old Waka Nene, were staunch as ever to their Queen. The Civil Commissioner, Mr. Clarke, reported that during forty years' residence in New Zealand he had never known such a burst of loyalty and good will from the Ngapuhi as was manifested after the Taranaki murders.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 4th of June, the Governor left Taranaki in H.M.S. ‘Eclipse.’ At nine o'clock on the night of the 3rd, General Cameron had marched by land to a concerted attack on the rebels at the Katikara river. The ‘Eclipse,’ on her voyage, took part in the action. Protected by the fire from the ‘Eclipse,’ and of Armstrong guns served by the Royal Artillery, the men of the 57th, 65th, and 70th Regiments (the land force being 771 in number) crossed the river gallantly in spite of heavy fire from rifle-pits and redoubt. The General witnessed the desperate resistance of the enemy, and the rush of the soldiers as they entered the work and shot or bayoneted all the Maoris left within. Twenty-eight were found dead in the redoubt. The English loss was three killed and eight wounded. The flight was precipitate, and the ‘Eclipse’ threw shells on the fugitives as they ran. The General praised all the officers and civilians engaged, and could not refrain from mentioning Major Whitmore, his former Assistant Military Secretary, who had settled in the colony, but, happening to arrive at Taranaki the day before the action, insisted on accompanying the troops into the field.

It was essential to ascertain how the Oakura massacre was regarded by the Maori king. Mr. Rogan, an officer of the Native Department, essayed the dangerous task of carrying a letter. After repeated stoppages he reached Ngaruawahia, where, though he did not see the king, he ascertained the opinions of others. The king-maker boldly declared that the Tataraimaka murders were wrong. Rewi said the deed was not murder, but the re-establishment of a righteous war. It was rumoured that there was vehement altercation between them. It was said that Rewi wished to attack the villages near Auckland—nay Auckland itself—while the Governor and General Cameron were at Taranaki. But Rewi has averred that his advice was, that Sir George Grey should be met fairly if he respected the boundary at Maungatawhiri, and that if he crossed it he “should be met roughly.” Mr. Gorst declares that the king-maker went down the river to visit Waata Kukutai, the Queen's magistrate, thinking the time had arrived for all who loved peace to combine to ensure it. “The members of the Government, however, in Auckland, did not like Te Waharoa. Few Europeans knew him personally, and it was the fashion to believe him insincere. No encouragement was on this occasion held out to him, nor were any negotiations entered into. He was left to struggle unaided against the flood of confusion which the acts of Government had let loose.” Such was the verdict of an intelligent eye-witness, himself recently expelled by Rewi from Te Awamutu, and consequently free from unreasonable bias towards the Maoris. But amongst the colonists the rumours of a contemplated attack upon Auckland were revived. At Auckland there was such a sense of impending danger as is felt in the lull which precedes the bursting of a storm. The plans of the Governor and his advisers were not calculated to dispel alarm. With them, indeed, was the choice of good or evil. The Maori king was unpledged to violence, and Rewi was too astute to commit himself to war without support. Moreover, it was always the desire of a Maori to evade the responsibility of a quarrel until his antagonist had put himself in the wrong by some act which could be construed as a ta-ke, or just cause of war.

Neri went to Auckland and talked to the Governor about the Maori king. The Governor told him that if he remained an hour in Auckland he should be put to gaol. Aporo, the ring-leader of the attack on the printing-press, went to Auckland on private business. He was arrested in the Native Office and committed on a charge of felony. Mr. Gorst, his former victim, tells the tale with shame. There was never, he says, any animus furandi, yet the Auckland jury, enemies of his tribe, hating him for his political opinions, found the undefended prisoner guilty, and he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for theft. Mr. Gorst says: “It was expected, and I am sorry to say hoped, by many that either the dismissal of Neri or the seizure of Aporo would so enrage the Waikatos that they would attack us; but they remained steady to their original resolution that the Pakeha should begin the war.” He who was called savage did not allow himself to be provoked by the lawless acts of him who was called civilized. Many in Waikato had never approved the attack on Te Awamutu, and they declined to seem to justify it by making common cause with Aporo. But, prophetic in their thoughts, the Maoris removed to a more distant resting-place the bones of their ancestors, buried at Onehunga, near Auckland. Nevertheless, on the 16th June, the wise and well-informed Archdeacon Maunsell, while sending Maori letters written in alarm, told the Governor that he had received indisputable information that at that date the Maori king and Te Waharoa were desirous of peace. On the 9th July the Governor called on all Maoris living in the Manukau district and thence to the Waikato frontier to swear allegiance to the Queen and to surrender their arms. Those obeying would be protected, those refusing were warned to retire beyond Maungatawhiri under pain of ejection if they did not comply with the Governor's orders. He justified this step by saying it was impossible to leave a disaffected population in rear of the General's forces. Mr. Gorst, Major Speedy, Mr. Armitage, and Mr. Halse were among the persons directed to seize fire-arms and to administer the oath of allegiance in all the Maori villages from Auckland to the Queen's Redoubt on the borders of the Waikato territory, where the Maori boundary existed. On the way to Mangere Mr. Halse met Tamati Ngapora, the king's councillor. After a friendly meal at a missionary's house, the Governor's hostile notice was read to the chief. He listened gravely and asked that it might be read a second time. After a short silence he said to the missionary: “Is the day of harvest close at hand?” Yes. “Why were not the wrongs of Waikato first discussed?” Mr. Halse said he could not discuss that question. Ngapora said: “If I have any influence there will be no fighting. I have dear friends amongst the Pakeha and amongst the Maoris. Why are they to be slain? I will not cease to urge that there be investigation.” He crossed the Manukau waters to his abode at Mangere. On the morning Mr. Halse followed him and read the Governor's notice to the Maoris assembled. One by one, after intervals of significant silence, they intimated that they chose exile rather than submission to the Governor's demands. Ngapora reclined upon the ground. When the views of all the others had been made known he sat up and said: “Last night I made known the notice without attempting to influence the decision of the people. You have now heard their words. I have nothing to add to what I said last night. We are one tribe and cannot be separated.” He reclined again and there was general silence. Almost without exception the Maoris abandoned their homes in distrust. In the surprise which overwhelmed them they took some thought for the places which they held in veneration. When Mr. Halse, after distributing notices on his way, reached Pukahi, the chief Mohi had just gone with Bishop Selwyn to point out a burial-ground, and entrust it, with the native church, to the Bishop's care. When Mohi returned, Mr. Halse announced the object of his visit. “He asked for a copy of the notice. I gave him one and he read it aloud to the people present. Repeating the decision of his people to go to the Waikato he went into his house, where Bishop Selwyn was seated.” Another chief, Ihaka, was ill, and the exiles paused at Kirikiri. Mr. Gorst considered that the decree of banishment was harshly enforced, and that much property was seized by the colonial forces and by the settlers. Bishop Selwyn, as usual, was active in doing good and restraining evil. At Kirikiri Mr. Gorst, in company with Bell, saw Mohi and the ailing Ihaka. Mohi declared that he had ever been opposed to Rewi's warlike projects, but that as the Governor had passed the Rubicon (Maungatawhiri), he must join his people and live or die with them. That night peremptory instructions arrived from Auckland, under which Ihaka and the infirm, with women and children, were seized. In some manner, never explained, Mohi with the able-bodied joined his brethren in arms. Sir George Grey informed the Assembly that he believed Ihaka to be deeply involved in a scheme to attack Auckland.

Tamati Ngapora's retirement was dramatic. He was conducting the service at Mangere in his Maori church when word was brought that left no doubt as to the danger of remaining within the Governor's reach. Gravely and silently he put down his book, and when he gained the outer air swiftly shook the dust of Mangere from his feet and with his people flitted to Waikato. He was too wary to remain within reach of the captor of Rauparaha. His Maori book was found in the church where he left it, and a thoughtful Pakeha secured it with the hope that it might in happier days revert to its owner. The hope was gratified after many years. mr. Armitage, who went to Tuakau to serve the notices, was an old resident at Waikato. One chief professed willingness to take the oath of allegiance, but another by threats prevented Armitage from administering it. Armitage wrote: “I have sent notices to several king natives at the Onewhero and Takihakahi to leave that part of the river. I have done so for my own personal safety in passing to and fro between the Ia and Cameron.”

On the 15th July another notification, under the Governor's hand, appeared at Auckland, after the General had entered upon active war by crossing the recognized boundary. It imputed a desire for war to the Maoris. It declared that “for the protection of all” military posts will be established at Waikato. “I now call on all well-disposed natives to aid the Lieutenant-General to establish and maintain these posts and to preserve peace and order. Those who remain peaceably at their own villages in Waikato, or move into such districts as may be pointed out by the Government, will be protected in their persons, property, and land. Those who wage war against Her Majesty, or remain in arms, threatening the lives of her peaceable subjects, must take the consequences of their acts, and they must understand that they will forfeit the right to the possession of their lands guaranteed to them by the treaty of Waitangi, which lands will be occupied by a population capable of protecting for the future the quiet and unoffending from the violence with which they are now so constantly threatened.” Dated the 11th July, and carried in Maori language to various places, the notification emanated from the Colonial Secretary's Office on the 15th. The Governor's averments could not disguise the fact that he and not the Maoris had committed acts of violence. The threat of confiscation of land supplied the reason. The king-maker wrote to ask the Governor why he had not followed the Maori example. All the Europeans in Waikato had been sent away in safety with all their property. “Why has the property of the Maoris been plundered?—and why have Ihaka and the women and children been taken prisoners?” Before his letter was received blood had been shed.

After the known decisions of the Maori king's council about the Waikato district, the crossing of the Maungatawhiri and the notification of the Governor were accepted as a declaration of war. On the 12th July, General Cameron crossed the Maungatawhiri with 380 men; encamped at Koheroa, and commenced building a redoubt to command the river and secure his communications. The cutter of H.M.S. ‘Harrier’ and other boats had been carried overland to assist in descending the Maungatawhiri from the termination of the new road. About 30 Maori canoes were destroyed on the assumption that war had begun. The Bishop and the good Archdeacon Maunsell volunteered to minister the offices of religion to the army, and were permitted to do so. They hoped to mitigate the horrors of war, and to extend their ministrations to the Maoris. Mr. Meredith and his son, settlers near Drury, were found dead, and no one doubted that the Maoris had killed them on the 15th July. Gloom if not panic overshadowed Auckland and the rural settlers. On the 16th, Colonel Murray proceeded at daylight to arrest as many Maoris as he could. He captured thirteen men, seven women, and eight children near Drury, but the main body of the villagers escaped. The conduct of the troops under heavy rain elicited the admiration of the Colonel commanding. On the 17th the officer in command at Koheroa observed the Maoris collecting on hills in front. Detachments of the 12th, 14th, and 70th, in all 500 men, at once proceeded in skirmishing order to the attack. Firing on both sides ensued, and from recently-constructed rifle-pits the natives were driven in spite of great obstinacy, until finally they escaped across the Maramarua river by swimming or in canoes. General Cameron, who was in front, thought the Maoris engaged to be 300. More than twenty were found dead. About twelve of the 14th Regiment were wounded, half of them dangerously. On the same day Captain Ring, marching with a convoy from the Queen's Redoubt at Maungatawhiri to Drury, was fired upon. Four soldiers were killed and ten wounded before the remnant of the party could find shelter at the house of one Mr. Martyn, till reinforcements arrived. Some of the enemy were seen to fall. The simultaneous movements in front and rear of the General were received as proof that a raid upon Auckland had been maturely planned by the Maoris. They also showed that ambush and sudden surprise were tactics relied upon. There was more skirmishing on the 22nd. Captain Ring reported: “I lost one man killed, whose rifle and bayonet were taken possession of by the natives, though not without serious loss to them. … I remained in the entrenched position till close on sunset, keeping a steady fire on the enemy, who were endeavouring to obtain the body and ammunition of the private who was killed.” Reinforcements arrived, the Maoris drew off, and the body of their dead comrade was recovered by the English.

Wisely had the Maori king's friends decided that no steamer should ply on the waters of the Waikato. With equal wisdom had Governor Grey determined otherwise. Captain J. C. Mayne, of H.M.S. ‘Eclipse,’ took the ‘Avon’ steamer in tow at Onehunga, on the 16th July, and after some days' detention at the Manukau bar crossed the Waikato bar with the ‘Avon’ on the 25th; and on the 27th, after various groundings, anchored her at the Bluff, near the junction of the Waikato and Maungatawhiri. Everything had thus been done which the Waikato tribes had opposed. Maoris had been driven from their pillaged homes. The Waikato frontier had been crossed. A war-steamer had been placed on the river. Not to fight would have been an abject acceptance of slavery, if not of reputation as cowards. The genius of the Maori race was abhorrent of both conditions. Better death with honour than peace with shame. It was reported and believed that among the Maoris who fell at Koheroa were many who were loyal to the Queen until her forces passed the Maungatawhiri. They then said: “Injustice is being done, and we must cast in our lot with our countrymen.” Again, therefore, as at Taranaki, an overt act of violence in the name of the Queen provoked war, and Sir George Grey and his advisers deserve the credit or the shame. And now the long-suffering of the king-maker was exhausted. He, too, yielded to the national feeling, and announced his intentions to his old friend, Archdeacon Brown, on the 25th July:

“Salutations. Friend, hearken. The reasons were many that induced me to consent to view the work between the Waikato and the Governor. This is a word of mine to let you know my views. I shall spare neither unarmed people nor property. Do not suppose that the Waikatos are wrong and the Governor right. No; I consider that he is wrong. The faults that I have seen are—1st, I said to him, Leave these years to me, do not go to Tataraimaka; leave me to talk to the Ngatiruanui; do not persist, that tribe is still hostile. It was Governor Browne who taught them. That hot-tempered Governor said that all the land over which he had trod should be his, i. e. Waitara. The Taranakis then said with regard to Tataraimaka, Very good; and we also will hold the land over which our feet have trod. Governor Grey, however, did not agree to my proposal. 2nd, The Governor persisting in Mr. Gorst staying as a magistrate in the midst of the Maoris. I said to Mr. Gorst, Go back, the Maoris do not want you. But the Governor still persisted in sending Mr. Gorst. Now it appears that it was for the purpose of provoking a war that he persisted. 3rd, The taking up of the post at Maungatawhiri. 4th, The unwarrantable conduct of the soldiers in driving the Maoris off their own land at Pokeno. 5th, The ‘ma-te’ (defeat or) death of the Waikatos you have heard and know. The law discriminates in cases of crime and does not include the many. These are the wrongs that I have seen. Father, listen. I have consented to attack the whole of the town. If they prove the strongest well and good. If the Maoris prove the strongest this is how it will be—the unarmed people will not be left. Enough,—you hear what I say.

“From your son, “Wiremu Tamihana te Waharoa.”

The Governor transmitted this warning to the Duke of Newcastle, who was “shocked and disappointed” by it. Had he been sufficiently shocked at the crime of his own countrymen at Waitara he would not have needed to blush for Te Waharoa. Archdeacon Browne explained that the threat of sparing neither unarmed people nor property was not to be taken literally, and Te Waharoa's subsequent career justified the explanation. The officer in command at Wanganui forwarded letters to show that on the 17th July the Waikato had provided for simultaneous attacks on Taranaki and Te Kahakaha, and that onslaughts on Wellington and Napier had been ordered. Rumour was multiplied upon rumour. Under these dangers the inhabitants at Auckland bestirred themselves to the Governor's satisfaction. On the 1st August he reported that about 3000 were under arms and in active service.

The Government promptly removed all doubt whether they intended to respect the treaty of Waitangi. The ‘Gazette’ of the 5th August promulgated conditions on which land in the Waikato country, never purchased under the provisions of the treaty, would be granted to volunteer militia, and military settlements would be formed on confiscated land. The Attorney-General, Whitaker,

Mr. Gillies, the first Attorney in the Domett Ministry, was succeeded by Mr. Sewell after a few days. Sewell held office from August, 1863, to the end of the year, and then Whitaker, not in the Cabinet, becaine Attorney-General.

who had been Richmond's partner in seizing the small Waitara block, could now gloat with satisfaction on the prospect of confiscating a whole territory with the help of Sir George Grey; and thus, in Mr. Richmond's phrase, accelerating the extinction of the native title. The Governor justified his conduct as necessary to convince other tribes that they could not escape that punishment which their love of their land would make them feel. It was reserved for a Secretary of State, Mr. Cardwell, to recommend the far more just and effective alternative of cession rather than confiscation. It ought to have been clear to any honest man that joint tribal rights could not be forfeited by the act of a few, or even of many. But plunder was required. There were gathered in the Middle Island thousands of gold-miners, a restless and unsettled class. Many of them, the Ministers thought, “were tired of the digger's life, and only required inducement of liberal terms to settle in the Northern Island.” Thus an eager band of fighting men might be found. The Maori love of ancestral homes and the earth-hunger of a Teutonic horde might be fastened intensely on the same spot. The wild animal of the forest and the European trained hound might quarrel over the same bone. Va victis! Scrambling for the “damned earth, the common whore of mankind, that puts odds among the rout of nations,” the Pakeha already outnumbered the Maori, and the end was certain. Forty thousand men, presumably fit to fight, had poured into Otago from England and Australia in two years. From them what an army might be made! The Maori would vainly strive to put 1000 men into the field. To people the Waikato district the Ministry proposed to raise in Australia and Otago 5000 men fit for the work of settling upon and holding the confiscated lands. After thus seizing upon Waikato, a similar plan would be adopted at Taranaki. Their advice was dated on the 31st July, and on the 3rd August the Governor promulgated regulations under which land in the Waikato district would be granted to volunteer militia settlers. In graduated scale, lands were granted according to rank; a private having 50 acres of farm, and one allotment of town land. Each settlement was to comprise 100 town and 100 farm allotments. There were stipulations for continuous service for three years, after which ordinary militia service was to be exacted from the new corps. Separate regulations invited military and naval settlers, and settlers generally. Agents were to be sent to Australia to enrol volunteers under agreement. Meanwhile some colonists were not content to rely wholly on the Government. On the publication of the Duke of Newcastle's despatch, which caused so much discussion between the Governor and his advisers, a public meeting was held at Christchurch in August, 1863, to consider the state of the Northern Island. Mr. Fitzgerald moved a resolution in favour of an immediate meeting of the General Assembly. Mr. Weld, confessing the difficulty of speaking after a man who had “earned by common consent the title of the orator of New Zealand,” moved an amendment. He denounced Governor Fitzroy for having almost fraternized with the red-handed murderers of the Wairau, and for incompetency at Kororarika. He had no praise for Sir George Grey except for the “establishment of native assessors.” Under Colonel Wynyard he declared that the “degradation of the Government went still lower.” Colonel Browne was the “first Governor who ever took the stand which should have been taken from the beginning.” Loud cheers greeted this melancholy mistake, and the speaker proceeded to denounce Te Rangitake in the popular manner. “Led by a man like General Cameron,” the troops, volunteers, and militia, would “never be foiled.” He advocated confiscation of lands of insurgents. His amendments were approved, and it was resolved: “That regard being had to the failure of the recent temporizing policy… the urgency of the present crisis in the Northern Island will warrant the Government, pending the meeting of the General Assembly as may be necessary, to ensure a speedy and decisive termination of the native war, and obtain material guarantees for the future maintenance of order amongst the insurgent tribes.” The material guarantees were to be found in confiscation of land, but Mr. Weld disclaimed such sweeping seizures as would render the chiefs utterly landless. Mr. E. J. Wakefield, who had left the colony during Fitzroy's Government, was at the Christchurch meeting, and as might have been expected urged the “absolute extinction of the native rebellion.” Not finding his views sufficiently promulgated he printed a pamphlet which could scarcely receive less attention than it deserved.

While the English were invading, and preparing for confiscation of, the land of the Maoris, the latter were not idle. The tocsin sent to the tribes was an ancient war-song; the same with which the Waikato chiefs had urged the Taranaki natives to action.

“Red plume, red plume, Plume of the kaka! Rehearse it a Kawhia. Cartridge, one, three, four, O Matamata! Lay hold, and bring the strong Eight-stranded cord That cannot be unfastened. Grasp firm your weapons! Strike! Fire!”

Transmitting it to England on the 31st August, the Governor said there was proof that it had been widely circulated from Wellington northwards throughout the tribes. With it a letter urged them, now that “The law of God was completed and the law of man to be done, to clear out their yard and the Waikatos would clear out theirs (i. e. you clear off the Pakehas from your part, and we will clear them from ours”).

At Waikanae and at Otaki, Dr. Featherston, Superintendent of the province of Wellington, met the Maoris at their request. He was notable for having opposed in the Assembly the grasping policy of Mr.C. W. Richmond at Waitara, and could claim to be heard as a well-wisher to the natives. He dissuaded them from making common cause with Rewi, whom he accused of instigating the Tataraimaka murders. They admitted having received a letter from the Maori king urging them to take up arms. They condemned the Tataraimaka murders, but would not repudiate their king. If the militia were kept away from their districts there would be no disturbance. But they looked with suspicion on the Governor's movements as a prelude to confiscation of lands. Let troops be kept away. They thanked Dr. Featherston for his visit, and some of them supplied him with reports of their speeches. Heremia said: “If the Governor attacks our king, we shall be evil; don't say this is a murder.”

The Duke of Newcastle's response to the application for more soldiers was anxiously looked for. Meanwhile the local forces were industriously organized. In October Auckland was deemed safe. Trees near the great military road were cut down. The available local forces exceeded 3000. At Wellington and Wairarapa there were 777 militia and 419 volunteers. At Hawke's Bay, under Major Whitmore, commander of the local forces in the province, there were 600 militia, 71 rifle volunteers, 79 cavalry. At Taranaki the whole male population was armed: 605 militia, 214 volunteers. At Wanganui, of a total force of 552, 321 were rifle volunteers. The total in the Northern Island consisted of 9629 armed militia and volunteers, including 375 men of the Colonial Defence Force. The flotilla consisted of the ‘Avon’ on the Waikato, the ‘Pioneer’ in Manukau, and the ‘Sandfly’ on the Thames. Two smaller steamers were being built in Sydney. Mr. Russell, the Minister for Colonial Defence, was warmly commended by the Governor for his services. Desultory warfare continued in August and September. General Cameron reported (15th August) that the Maoris were collecting in considerable force at Mĕrĕ-mĕrĕ on the right bank of the Waikato river. Farm-houses were attacked between Auckland and Maungatawhiri, where the Hunua forest afforded shelter for the prowling Maoris. Waata Kukutai and Wiremu te Wheoro were found most valuable allies to the General. On the 25th August, 25 men of the 40th regiment were engaged in cutting down trees on the Great South Road. Their arms were piled by the road-side under charge of a sentry. Suddenly Maoris dashed to the arms, seized them and commenced firing at the soldiers. A convoy was approaching under Captain Cook of the 40th regiment, and its advance-guard immediately engaged the marauders. As the main body arrived and other help was sent from posts along the road, the Maoris, after more than an hours' skirmishing, were lost in the woods. Two soldiers had been shot before relief arrived; only one was wounded afterwards. The enemy secured the arms they had seized, but they left one of their number dead. On the 7th September, the volunteers desecrated a native burial-ground at Papakura. Bodies which had been buried long before the war were exhumed for contumely, and graves were rifled in search of green-stone relics.

“The act is a disgrace to our cause… if it be not publicly censured by the authorities the Government of New Zealand will be irretrievably disgraced. If the natives had thus desecrated one of our burial-grounds! The bodies were not even the bodies of enemies” (MS. by Swainson, the first Attorney-General).

On the 8th September, Maoris surrounded the Razorback stockade in the Hunua forest, and skirmishing ensued. On the 7th, they surprised a pah at Cameron Town, and captured stores awaiting transport to Te Ia. Captain Swift with 50 men started in pursuit, and General Cameron sent 150 under Colonel Murray to support him. After marching some miles Captain Swift's party heard Maoris talking in the bush, and prepared an ambuscade for them by extending on both sides of the track. As the Maoris did not move, bayonets were fixed and the soldiers advanced. At a turn in the track they were met by a volley in which Captain Swift fell. Lieutenant Butler asked the wounded officer if he should charge. He said, yes; and in the charge Lieutenant Butler fell, wounded. Colour-Sergeant McKenna took charge, and firing was kept up for an hour. Three English were killed and five wounded before the sergeant made good his retreat into the bush, where the men lay concealed during the night. In the morning as they made their way back they met Colonel Murray and his men. Captain Swift had died in the evening. Sergeant McKenna's coolness and courage were duly commended by the General. Mr. Armitage, the resident magistrate, who had expelled Maoris from their homes in July, was killed, with four others, on the 7th September, while transporting supplies. On the 14th the Pukekohe stockade was attacked. Aid was sent from other posts, and the Maoris were driven off; but two English were killed and five severely wounded. In all these cases the numbers of the Maoris were unknown. At Pukekohe they left six dead on the field. The Maori leaders were evidently adapting their warfare to the peculiar qualities of their countrymen, and the nature of their weapons. To dart like a bat from the darkness on the unprepared, and disappear as suddenly, suited them better than to gather hundreds to defend a fortified position. The fighting was not confined to the Auckland district. At Taranaki, in September and October, there were numerous skirmishes. On the 2nd October the Maoris attacked the Poutoko Redoubt, a few miles south of Taranaki. Colonel Warre reported that they were in great strength, but were driven back gallantly by the soldiers and volunteers, 300 in number. Nine English were wounded. One action took place of which the importance was hardly known at the time. Major Lyon commanded at the Galloway Redoubt at the Wairoa river, which runs into the Tamaki Strait, about 20 miles from Auckland, and was therefore in the General's rear. The Maoris opened fire upon the stockade on the 15th September with slight effect. An attack upon a Maori settlement was made on the 17th. Across the stream at early dawn a detachment of the 18th Regiment poured concentrated fire upon the whārĕs. They did not know that within them was a band of Maoris, who had come to join the fighting; and who, under the volleys poured upon the huts, fell like sheep. The troops, unable to cross the stream, withdrew, unconscious of what they had done. Major Lyon, who made a circuit by a bridge, found the settlement deserted. “The whares,” he said, “were riddled with shot, blood in profusion both inside and out. They were unmistakably taken by surprise.” In after years a Maori who was present told how extensive was the slaughter unwittingly inflicted by the 18th, who exercised themselves in firing at the huts without knowing how they were occupied. As the wounded and dead were carried away before Major Lyon reached the spot, Otau, he also was ignorant of the severity of the blow inflicted.

Mr. Fox, in his ‘War in New Zealand,’ censured the Governor and the General for not promptly following up the Koheroa success. From July to October no forward movement was made. But men were being enrolled in Australia. Mr. Gorst went to Sydney with Mr. Dillon Bell, the Native Minister, to assist in raising the Waikato regiments; and troops were expected from India. It was not until October that the Governor's measures received approval either from the Secretary of State or from the New Zealand Assembly. The request for troops was complied with in England. Sikhs were not shipped, but two European regiments were ordered from India. The Duke of Newcastle was loth to acknowledge that he had sanctioned an injustice at Waitara in 1860, and elaborately contended that no wrong was intended or done to Te Rangitake by employment of the military to enforce the survey. Yet he admitted that the new facts brought to light by Grey were strange, and thought (as Dillon Bell had said) that if Colonel Browne and his Ministers had known those facts they would not have made the purchase, which in the Duke's opinion would then have been unjustifiable. He did not blame Sir George Grey for the delay in abandoning the purchase, though it would have been better if its abandonment had been simultaneous with the reoccupation of Tataraimaka. He thought the Governor right in not shrinking from the abandonment of the block after the massacre at Tataraimaka. He accepted the present revelations as confirming the doubts he expressed in November, 1860, as to the propriety of forcibly setting aside Te Rangitake's claims. He did not recall the fact that in spite of his doubts he told Colonel Browne, in the same despatch, that the chief's disloyal conduct had left no alternative but an appeal to arms. On the whole, he seemed more ready to upbraid Governor Grey for doing right than Governor Browne for doing wrong. Sir George Grey communicated the despatch to his advisers, who (it was alleged by inadvertence) printed it, without consulting him, and gave copies to members of the Assembly then in session (October, 1863). He sent to England a careful memorandum in support of his views, citing numerous Maori letters. “I regret,” he added, “that several misunderstandings connected with the whole of this subject have arisen from the difficulty of the natives making themselves thoroughly understood by foreign authorities, from the figurative nature of their language, from the few persons who understand it well, and from the consequent misinterpretations, omissions, or misprints, which from time to time take place in even the most important documents. I am well aware how great a difficulty and disadvantage your Grace must labour under from this cause alone.”

As an instance he quoted a document, printed for the General Assembly and sent to England, in which the natives were made to speak of their desire “to retain possession of the law handed down to them from their ancestors and father.” On referring to the Maori original Sir George Grey found that the word “land,” not “law,” had been used.

It was not likely that the enemies of Te Rangitake would be slow to avail themselves of the Duke's despatch, and in the course of the session there was a passage of arms between them and the Governor. The General Assembly met on the 19th October, 1863. The Governor told them that from England and from the Australian colonies prompt aid had been promised and given. The admirable manner in which the colonial forces had encountered danger and hardship was duly commented on; and the Assembly was recommended to accept the responsibility for native affairs placed upon it by Her Majesty's decision. This recommendation the Representatives ambiguously “received with an anxious desire to settle the question on a satisfactory basis.”

Chapter xii. State of the Maoris.

The early history of New Zealand is a story of the relations between the Maoris and the English. They form the current which carried with it the hopes and the fears of the visitors, the suspicions and resentment of the tribes. A faithful narrative, in order to depict the fortunes of the colony, must busy itself mainly with the administration of native affairs. On the eve of the struggle—provoked so often and so long by the cupidity of a section of the English, and courted by the wilder and more savage among the Maoris—it is good to ascertain the relative forces which could be brought into the field. Though the Maoris were outnumbered by the invaders of their soil they claim first notice. In 1858 they were estimated at 56,049, of whom 31,667 were males and 24,303 were females. In the North Island there were nearly 30,000 males and nearly 23,000 females. The total Maori population in the Middle Island was 2283, in Stewart's Island and Ruapuke 200, at the Chatham Islands 510. In 1864 the number was known to be much diminished. Dr. Thomson, the historian of 1859, had after careful inquiry on the spot added his mournful testimony to the rapid decrease of the Maoris. Inattention to the sick; infanticide; sterility; new habits; new diseases; intermarriage with relations—were the causes he assigned. All but the first and second had fallen upon the race after their intercourse with the Europeans. Four thousand were victims to the outbreak of measles in the North Island in 1854. The musket was supposed to have destroyed 20,000 lives in tribal wars. After contact with Europeans a practice of steeping decaying grain, and making it apparently fit for food, was believed by many persons to have been fatal to thousands. Dr. Thomson attributed the decay of the race principally to marriage of blood-connections. Yet about a score of generations after colonizing the islands with 1000 souls, the Maoris had multiplied to more than 100,000, and it was after intrusion of foreigners that in twenty years they declined from that number to less than 60,000. Mr. Maning assigns a more potent cause for a decrease so sudden as to outrun all possible rate attainable by reason of intermarriage of blood-connections. He observed that a second plague followed the use of the musket, and swept away more victims than the first. The ancient weapons were powerless against the inmates of pahs built on precipitous hill-tops; and in selecting safe situations, the Maoris had chosen healthy ones. Day and night free air coursed over habitations placed beyond reach of exhalations from marshes. Troops of the dwellers therein descended to their cultivation fields, with club or spear in one hand, and an agricultural implement in the other. The women followed. In the evening the women led the way home, and the men kept that which was the post of danger in case of attack.

When the crops were growing the tribe or hapu would often wander to some fortified elevation near a river or sea, and obtain variety of food by fishing. Their growing crops were deemed safe even from enemies. When the musket became the principal weapon a change came over the scene. To avoid the toil and loss of time incurred in the long procession from hill-top to field, and the carrying of fuel, provisions and water, the Maoris, relying on their new weapon, transferred their “whares” or abodes from the airy eminence to the damp fields below. They built their oven-like houses in mere swamps, spongy even in summer-time. With rushes rotting underneath them; in low dens, heated like ovens at night and dripping with damp in the day, drinking noxious exhalations in unventilated artificial caves, they were cut off in thousands. They would take no advice. They could not see the devouring enemy, and would not believe Europeans who warned them.

“Twenty years ago, a hapu, in number just forty persons, removed their ‘kainga’ (village or head-quarters) from a dry healthy position to the edge of a ‘raupo’ (bulrush) swamp. I happened to be at the place a short time after the removal, and with me there was a medical gentleman who was travelling through the country. In creeping into one of the houses, the chief's, through the low door, I was obliged to put both my hands to the ground; they both sank into the swampy soil, making holes which immediately filled with water. The chief and his family were lying on the ground on rushes, and a fire was burning, which made the little den, not in the highest place more than five feet high, feel like an oven. I called the attention of my friend to the state of this place called a ‘house.’ He merely said, ‘Men cannot live here.’ Eight years from that day the whole hapu were extinct, but, as I remember, two persons were shot for bewitching them and causing their deaths.”

‘Old New Zealand.’

The drinking of ardent spirits, the bane of European countries, claimed its victims. The king-maker and his friends endeavoured to bar the poison from their territories, but the dissolute and debauched evaded the prohibition. Europeans did not always assist Waharoa's efforts. Bishop Selwyn confessed the shame with which he sometimes saw the demoralizing effect of remitting the chivalrous chief to scenes and company likely to lead to his ruin. It was not possible that an imaginative and thoughtful race should see these things without despair. It was natural that a daring race should say—” Rather let us die in battle for our country than pine away, the slaves of the Pakeha.” Proud also and boastful,—admitted by speakers in the Assembly to have been undefeated if not successful in the Taranaki war—they might in some cases be fooled by the idea that they could drive the Pakeha into the sea, in spite of their having only fowling-pieces or muskets to oppose to rifles, rockets, Armstrong guns, and powerful mortars, and of ammunition being difficult to procure for the weapons they possessed. The superstition which doomed sorcerers to destruction because the dwellers in a marsh had died, was prompted to some deed of daring before the swarms of immigrating Englishmen might make all daring vain. But the English were already swarming. The early massacre at Wairau and the failure of the company's schemes had arrested immigration in old time; but it had been resumed. It is difficult even for misgovernment to arrest the material advancement of a young community. The resolution of the individual Englishman, who, though he grumbles with or without cause, yet works to make himself a home, had conquered natural obstacles; and farms, agricultural and pastoral, had been pushed by slow degrees farther and farther from the several provincial capitals. Taranaki was an exception. In a memorial (April, 1863) the settlers bitterly complained that after 1844 no more than 70,000 acres had been secured by purchase. Even from these they had been driven; and the settlement was, in the Assembly and elsewhere, spoken of as for the time destroyed. But at the Middle Island the tide of immigration had been such that in 1863 more English stood on Maori land than there had ever been Maoris. On the 31st December, 1860, the whites were estimated at 83,919 in the islands. In December, 1861, they were deemed to be 99,021. In December, 1862, there were 125,812. In December, 1863, there were 164,048. And still the yellow slave of commerce drew shoals of gold-seekers to Otago.

In June, 1861, after various minor discoveries, the first redundant gold-field had been found by one Gabriel Read at Tuapeka. The first escort from “Gabriel's Gulley,” as the thronging miners christened the place, took away 5056 ounces of gold. Not only from the Northern Island and other parts of New Zealand crowds rushed to the spot. The Australian colonies caught the infection; the restless element at the populous gold-fields in Victoria cast itself loose from a soil to which it had never intended to attach itself, and exhausted all available means of procuring conveyance to Otago. For a short time it seemed that the adventurers had been drawn thither by a will-o'-the-wisp. They were too numerous for the known gold-bearing situations. The weather was colder than any they had encountered in Australia. A panic disturbed them and they began to fly. The Superintendent of the province issued a proclamation in September, 1861, warning intending miners not to make matters worse by rash immigration. In midwinter (July) there had been a retreat so rapid that only 7000 persons were supposed to be left at the mines. More than 16,000 returned to Australia. At the end of that month two men produced, in Dunedin, 1047 ounces of gold, and offered to divulge the spot where they had found this treasure if the Government would guarantee them a reward of £2000 if within three months 16,000 ounces should be brought down by the escort. The bargain was made; and the Dunstan Gold Fields on the Clutha river were no sooner made known than the vagrant crowd returned. Before the end of the year 70,000 ounces of gold were obtained from the neighbourhood of the Clutha river. More fields were found at the valley of the Cardrona, and in the gorges of the Arrow river. At the Shotover river some miners were found at work by a Maori, Haeroa, and a half-caste, natives of the North Island. On the west bank of the river was a point which the miners yearned to examine; but they shrunk from the foaming torrent between. The Maoris plunged in and reached the coveted shore. A dog which attempted to follow them was swept to a rocky point below. One of them went to assist the dog, and observed gold in the crevices of the rocks. Before nightfall the two swimmers had scraped together 300 ounces of gold. The small province of Southland, under influences which had magnified Otago, increased its population from 1876 in 1861, to 8085 in 1864. In the Middle Island, which thus opened its maw to receive the coming thousands, there was no risk of Maori attacks. Never in that island, except at the Wairau in 1843, had there been collision between the two races; and the Maori champions then were Rauparaha and Rangihaeata, whose ordinary residences were in the North Island. The fertile plains of which the New Zealand Company had endeavoured to rob them with the policeman's staff was now the rich possession of a new province—Marlborough—carved in 1859 out of the original province of Nelson. The population of Marlborough had risen from 2299 in 1861, to 5519 in 1864. At Nelson, after the loss of Marlborough, the Europeans had increased from 9952 in 1861, to 11,910 in 1864. In Canterbury progress had been steady. The population had risen from 8967 in 1858, to 32,276 in 1864. At Wellington in the same period it had advanced from 11,753 to 14,987. Hawke's Bay in the same time had grown from 1514 to 3770. About 4000 Europeans were cooped up in Taranaki. Auckland, the capital, had steadily advanced. Though not so populous as the gold-producing Otago, its numbers had increased from 24,420 in 1861, to 42,132 in 1864. Everywhere except at Taranaki enclosures and agriculture had rapidly increased. The total of acres enclosed was 409,763 in 1861, and in 1864 it was 1,072,383. Including sown grasses the acres under crop had been 226,219 in 1861; they were 382,655 in 1864. But all this progress availed the war-party nothing, so long as the Maori sat in his king's gate. Yet the decay of the Maoris might have satisfied their enemies. There were not 50,000 of them, while the Europeans were more than three times as many. But nearly all the Maoris were in the North Island, in which they formed nearly two-fifths of the whole population. Many tribes were friendly, but it was not known how many would join the standard of the Maori king. That there would be, as in fact there were, large numbers of the natives fighting on the side of the English might be hoped, but could not be predicted with certainty. The causes which had so rapidly created a numerical preponderance of Europeans in the islands involved momentous financial considerations. Armies must be paid for, and wages had risen. Any highly-paid occupation absorbs labour to itself, and employers in danger of being deserted have to compete in price with temptations offered elsewhere. This maxim, true everywhere, is strained to the extremest verge when the glittering bait of gold, for mere grubbing, is the distracting magnet. The greed of the gambler is associated with honourable toil, and the measure of wages is unsettled by the quality of hope. The man who of all men in New Zealand had the most subtle brain for comprehending problems in political economy at this time passed away. The mover of so many puppets in his prime, he had become, like Swift, capable only of wondering at his former achievements. Secluded in ill-health, Gibbon Wakefield, long absent from the scenes of his activity, died at Wellington in 1862.

The Ministry, in a careful document, laid before Sir George Grey at Taranaki, in May, 1863, had urged that the pay of the militia there (2s. 6d. a day with rations) was not too high, because “the ordinary wages of labour of the simplest kind, such as working on roads, was 8s. a day at that time at Nelson and Canterbury.” Under such circumstances the cost of an army was an apparition which might well disturb even a bold financier. Already two Waikato regiments had been raised in Australia. A third was in course of formation. Before the meeting of the Assembly the Ministers drew up a voluminous description of their plans (5th October, 1863). Roads were to be made. The road from Auckland to Taupo was to pass through the heart of Waikato. About 1000 miles of roadways were proposed. The war was to be the last. “No opportunity of renewing it with any chance of success must be left.” Twenty thousand men would be required. Half of them would be wanted “from Waikato Mouth and Raglan to Tauranga and Thames.” The rest were to be located in bands of 1000 or 2000 at Taranaki and elsewhere. Two thousand were to go to Wanganui, where Dr. Featherston had been adjured by the chiefs to let no soldiers appear. They were to be imported to work on the roads, but to be armed with Enfield rifles. They would cost the country about £1,500,000 if they worked for nine months in the year on the roads. They would cost somewhat less if paid as militia. The scheme, with sundry accompaniments, would cost about £4,000,000. The money ought not to be raised by immediate taxation. It must be borrowed. Confiscated lands would be sufficient security. It was an ancient Maori custom for a chief to gloat over conquest of lands. The Romans gave away territories beforehand.

That there was a treaty of Waitangi in existence was a parchment bug-bear. The recollection of it had faded. It was not wanted to interfere, like Banquo's ghost, with the feast. There were, in the Waikato and Thames district, 2,292,000 acres; at Taranaki, 500,000 acres, = 2,792,000 acres. Let them be seized. Let the natives, if any be left at Waikato after the war, have 500,000 acres of their own lands. One hundred thousand acres would suffice for the Taranaki Maoris. Military settlers would have 500,000 at Waikato, and 200,000 at Taranaki. There would remain 1,492,000 acres to be sold, and they would realize more than £2,000,000. Increasing revenue would yield profits in the long run, even without taking into account the influx of prosperity attendant on expenditure of so many millions sterling. They hoped for a guarantee from the Imperial Government for, at least, £3,800,000 out of the £4,000,000. “It may be objected that these plans are based solely on the idea of force; and it is true that physical power is the main element of the conception.” But the Ministry could only rear moral sway on a basis of physical power. “The axe and the fire are wanted,” they said, “before the plough and the seed-corn.” Mr. Domett signed the paper on behalf of his colleagues. It was laid on the table of the House. It must have intensified the hostility of the Maoris. It may have been one of the early causes of a general feeling which by degrees spread amongst Her Majesty's regular forces, that the war was sought, not as a necessary act of justice, but as a means of spoliation, and a stimulant of the expenditure which enriches traders. Debt never had horrors for the colonists. Under Mr. Stafford, in 1856 and 1860, the Assembly had raised £650,000; under Mr. Domett, in 1862, £500,000 more. The Provincial Governments had raised for various purposes no less than £2,454,239. Mr. Domett and his colleagues hoped, in 1863, to drown the new debt by spoliation; for they valued the land of which they intended to rob the Maoris at little less than the proposed loan. The Representatives lost no time in devoting themselves to the amendment of the Colonial Defence Force Act of 1862. They postponed their acceptance of responsibility for native affairs.

Several fresh members were added to the Council. Among them was Major G. S. Whitmore. When the Council met there was no representative of the Government in it. Mr. Swainson, the Attorney-General of former days, called attention to the fact by moving (22nd October), “That this Council do not proceed to any business of serious importance until there be a representative of the Government in the Council, and that it do now adjourn.” Subsequently, a member informed the Council that in consequence of pending changes in the Ministry, no representative of the Government had been appointed in the Council, but that, as soon as changes had been completed, no time would be lost in making an appointment. Mr. Swainson was not silenced by this promise. He gave notice of a motion, casting grave censure on the Government for neglecting to secure the presence of one of their number in the Council. On the 29th, the Council was informed that the Ministry had resigned. Mr. Swainson withdrew his motion; and on the 2nd November, Mr. Whitaker announced that Mr. Fox had formed a Ministry, of which Mr. Whitaker was Premier and Attorney-General, representing the Government in the Council. An old colleague of Mr.C. W. Richmond, and a traitor to the treaty of Waitangi, he had found convenient colleagues. Mr. Reader Wood as Treasurer, and Mr. Thomas Russell as Minister of Defence, retained their offices in the new Ministry, which was considered a war Ministry, and by its conduct justified the belief.

An Act was passed to enable Provincial Legislatures to pass laws authorizing the compulsory taking of land for works of a public nature. This was a repetition of the scheme arrested in 1862 by the warning of Mr. Fenton, the reference to England, and the exceptional prudence of the Duke of Newcastle. Mr. Whitaker called no special attention to it. It was to remove doubts which had been suggested. Mr. Cardwell saw the contemplated injustice, and declined to advise allowance of the Bill unless native lands were excepted from its operation.

P. P. Despatch; 26th May, 1864. Vol xli. 1864.

A Bill was passed by the Representatives to raise £3,000,000 sterling by loan, for the vigorous prosecution of the war. Mr. Fox took charge of the Colonial Defence Bill introduced by Mr. Domett, and on the 5th November carried the second reading of a Suppression of Rebellion Bill by the large majority of 26 against 10. Amongst the minority was the name of a new adventurer in New Zealand politics. Mr. Julius Vogel, having kept a small shop at a rural township in Australia, had taken flight with the migration to Otago. Having talent for intrigue, and sufficient literary ability for the local press, he obtained a position in the Provincial Government, and was elected to the Assembly for the district of Dunedin and suburbs north. Those who saw him enter the House would probably have repelled with scorn the idea that he would afterwards become their leader. Mr. Weld was not present at the commencement of the session, but took an early opportunity to protest against the Suppression of Rebellion Bill as “quite unnecessary and unconstitutional.” It was a singular spectacle. The admirer of Mr.C. W. Richmond, the supporter of the rape of the Waitara, was compelled to denounce the injustice and harshness of Mr. Fox, by whom that rape had been opposed. Mr. Whitaker shone with baleful but consistent lustre. In 1860, as in 1863, he was Minister, and urged on each occasion the measures which were alternately shrunk from by Mr. Fox and Air. Weld.

After amendment by the Legislative Council, the Suppression of Rebellion Bill was passed. The same fate attended a Defence Bill. The Defence Bill of the former year had elicited an opinion from the law officers (Sir W. Atherton and Sir Roundell Palmer) in England as to the powers of the Legislative Council. They were “of opinion, that if in a Bill introduced into the House of Representatives and passed through that House, a certain tax or duty has been imposed upon a Crown grant, or an instrument in the nature of a Crown grant, it is competent to the Legislative Council, without any breach of the privileges of the House of Representatives, to make the efficacy for any given purpose of another class of instruments, intended to affect native lands under the provision of the same Bill, dependent upon their assuming the form of Crown grants, or of those instruments in the nature of Crown grants, on which the tax or duty has been so imposed by the House of Representatives.” They said it was never supposed in England that the privilege of the Commons as to originating taxation was attended with such a consequence as that the Commons could, by imposing a tax or duty on an instrument, exclude the other House from the power of originating or amending Bills relating to such instruments. But the suppositions known to jurists are not those of clutchers at unconstitutional control; and elsewhere as well as in New Zealand, members of parliament have contended, not for what custom or law could justify, but for all that could by argument or intimidation be extorted.

The Suppression of Rebellion Bill might have seemed sufficient violation of justice for one session. The Governor in Council, with Whitaker and Fox, might issue orders for the arrest of all “suspected” persons, and try them by court-martial. Death or penal servitude gleamed ominously amid the words of the Act. Nothing done under it was to be questionable in the Supreme Court, and to prevent the law so dear to Englishmen from being recurred to by a Maori, it was to be sufficient for the Governor to declare that anything done had been done in accordance with the Orders made under the Act. The bulwark of the Habeas Corpus statute was destroyed by a clause declaring that a writ under it should be satisfactorily met by a return that the body sought was held under the local Act. Indemnity was given for all unlawful things already done, The reader who gasps for freedom is doubtfully consoled only by the clause which limited the duration of the disgraceful Act to the end of the next session of the Assembly. But something more than the taking of life has been shown to be at the bottom of Maori troubles. As at Taranaki, so at Waikato, Mr. Whitaker's mind was bent upon acquiring land. The land for which the settler lusted, the land to which the Maoris clung, was to be acquired, not by troublesome bargains, but by confiscation. For this purpose “The New Zealand Settlements Bill, 1863,” was introduced. Its preamble declared that, for prevention of rebellion, and to maintain “law and order throughout the colony,” settlers must be procured “able to protect themselves and preserve the peace of the country.” To obtain land for them the Governor in Council might declare any district in which “any native tribe, or section of a tribe (after 1st January, 1863), or any considerable number thereof, had been engaged in rebellion,” a district within the provisions of the Act. Within such district the Governor in Council might from time to time seize upon lands for settlement. Compensation might be awarded to owners, excepting such as had levied war after 1st January, 1863, or those who had comforted such warring owners, or “counselled, advised, induced, enticed, persuaded, or conspired with any person” to levy war, or who had been ‘concerned in any outrage against person or property,” or who, after proclamation in the Government Gazette, failed to surrender their arms. As suspected owners might be hanged under the Suppression of Rebellion Act, the compensation provided by the Settlements Act could be kept down to a low rate; but the astute Whitaker devised a mode of defeating the operation of the compensation clause. It was provided that no claim should be entertained unless preferred in writing to the Colonial Secretary within six months (if the claimant were residing in the colony) after proclamation of his land by the Governor under the Act. Under restrictions which all men knew to be destructive of the principle of compensation, the proud Maori might obtain such compensation as the robbers of his country might choose to award him through new Compensation Courts. The Governor in Council was to appoint the Judges of the Compensation Court, and in flagrant violation of principles which had become part of the life of Eng- landEngland, it was enacted that he should also have power at any time to remove any Judge. Thus an upright Judge could be got rid of, if his decisions should thwart the wills of Whitaker and Fox.

The New Zealand Settlements Act was a fit complement to that for suppression of rebellion. Robbery was to be sanctioned by law. It devolved upon Mr. Whitaker to prepare an official defence of the prostitution of the power of a Government for the purpose of pillage. In a paper to be submitted to an English Secretary of State, he said, that as, for the most part, Maoris possessed “little personal property,” the “permanent loss of their lauded possessions” was that which they would feel the most. Of love of country his black-letter intelligence took no heed. Comment cannot heighten the criminality of his advice. The following sentences gibbet their writer: “It will be observed that the provisions of the Act may be made to include lands belonging to persons who have not justly forfeited their rights by rebellion. In order to carry out the scheme this is absolutely necessary.… The New Zealand native tenure of land is, for the most part, in fact with little or no exception, tribal; and if the principle were admitted that the loyalty or neutrality of a few individuals would preserve the lands of the tribe, the Act would, for the most part, be a dead letter, and that in districts in which it is most required, and in which its operation would be perfectly just.” He who runs may read in these words an absolute condemnation of that Act by which Colonel Browne, abetted by Whitaker and others, attempted to set aside in 1860, with a high hand, that tribal tenure of the existence of which Whitaker was aware, and which he was fain to plead as an excuse for wholesale robbery in 1863.

Sir George Grey did not reprobate his adviser's immorality. Professing his trust that he could infuse some spirit of equity into the administration of the Acts, he recommended their allowance. If the weak Duke of Newcastle had remained at the helm they might have been simply allowed. But the good Sir William Martin drew up a paper “on the proposal to take native lands under an Act of the Assembly,” and sent it to Mr. Fox, with a request that it might be transmitted to the Secretary of State. Mr. Fox complied, and sent his own comments. He was unshaken in his resolution to abandon the sentiments he had professed in 1860. If the North Island was to be held by the English, confiscation must take place. There was nothing unjust or “unusual in the history of national conflicts” in it, and it was “in conformity with the customs of the Maoris themselves.”… To allow “natives, rebel or others, to retain possession of immense tracts of land, that they neither use nor allow others to use, and which maintains them in a state of isolation from the European race and its progressive civilization,” was “most prejudicial to the natives,” and contributed “to the rapid decay and extinction of the race.” Sir George Grey, for reasons which he did not state, avoided comment on Mr. Fox's paper. He equivocally justified the invasion of the Waikato territory, which Sir W. Martin's paper seemed to condemn, but hinted that Sir W. Martin's views “would probably agree with” his own on the point. In recommending the Acts for allowance by Her Majesty, he declared his own belief that generosity in dealing with rebels had been more successful than severity in the past. It is but just to Mr. Sewell to record that, in a letter to Lord Lyttleton

‘The New Zealand Native Rebellion.’ Letter to Lord Lyttleton. Auckland: 1804. Printed for the Author.

(December, 1863), he animadverted severely upon the Suppression of Rebellion and the Settlements Bills. The first purported to make that law which is in itself a “violation of all law.” The second had all the vices of the worst ex post, facto legislation, and was a breach of Imperial and moral obligations.

An Assembly with an over-weening sense of its importance, was likely to resent Sir George Grey's decision to renounce as unjust the Waitara purchase which the Representatives had condoned. It had endorsed Richmond's and Governor Browne's repeated and positive assertions that Teira's title had been fully proved and found good. On the 28th October a petition from Teira and his friends was presented by Mr. Atkinson. It expressed loyalty to the Queen, and a desire that the Waitara block might be taken by the Pakehas. On the 11th November, Mr. Stafford moved for correspondence about the return of Te Rangitake to Waitara in 1848. Mr. Weld, as an admirer of Mr.C. W. Richmond, obtained on the 24th an order for other papers relating to Waitara. On the 17th November, Mr. Fitzgerald obtained leave to introduce a Bill to constitute a High Court of Inquiry on the events at Waitara. On the 25th November, the storm, such as it was, broke on the Governor's head. A recent success at Rangiriri under General Cameron diminished its force. At a crisis where, if ever, united councils were needed, it was more important with some members to adhere to an old injustice than to give loyal support to the representative of the Queen. On Mr. Weld's motion it was resolved: “That this House having supported the measures taken by his Excellency the late Governor of New Zealand to repress the armed interference of Te Rangitake

It is convenient to state once for all, that in this work the Maori name of Te Rangitake is used in the text; though the documents quoted often call him Wiremu Kingi.

at Waitara, because, as set forth in its resolution of August 6th, 1860, in the opinion of this House such measures were indispensable for the due maintenance of Her Majesty's authority, considers that the renewed and definite recognition by his Grace the Duke of Newcastle in his despatch of August 25th, 1863, of the justice of exerting military force against Te Rangitake and his allies, has happily rendered it unnecessary for this House to controvert or supplement statements made by his Excellency Sir George Grey in his despatches on the Waitara question.” A second resolution declared that good faith required that Teira should be protected, and investigation made of title to the block. The Governor was requested on the 1st December to transmit the resolutions to the Secretary of State. The insolence of the first resolution did not provoke him to a rash rejoinder, and the courtesy of Mr. Weld's speech was such as to justify moderation in reply. On the 2nd December, Sir G. Grey informed the House by message that his statements had been “made advisedly, and after long consideration,” and that he was satisfied of their entire accuracy. He trusted, therefore, that the House would inform him which of those statements it was prepared to controvert, and the grounds on which it did so, in order that he might have an opportunity of showing the accuracy of his statements, when transmitting to England the resolutions of the House.

On the 3rd December, Mr. Fox moved for a Select Committee to report on the Governor's message. Mr. Weld moved an amendment in which a long citation from the Duke of Newcastle's despatch was adroitly put forward as sufficient answer to the Governor. The debate was adjourned. On the 5th, Mr. Weld was allowed to withdraw his amendment in favour of one moved by Mr. Gillies, viz.: “That this House, in supporting the measures of Governor Browne, did so on the ground that the quarrel between the Governor and Te Rangitake was clearly not as to title to land, but as to whether the course taken by him was justifiable, and the resort to arms by him and his allies in defence of that course compatible with the Queen's sovereignty. That, on the other hand, it appears to this House that the tenor of his Excellency's despatches on the Waitara question leads to the inference that the quarrel was one as to land and not as to jurisdiction and sovereignty. That this House adheres to its former opinions, and controverts the accuracy of the various statements by which it appears that his Excellency has been led to take an opposite view, and especially those statements which are referred to in the Duke of New-castle's despatch of 25th August, 1863.” In reply, the Governor transmitted copies of the statements alluded to in the despatch, and requested the House to be good enough to inform him whether they were the statements alluded to by the House; and if not, which were the statements controverted by the House, and on what grounds they controverted them.

The House read Mr. Fitzgerald's Waitara Inquiry Bill a second time on the day on which the Governor's message was received, and a third time on the following day. Mr. Fox, before the passing of the Bill, laid on the table the Governor's reply to the despatch of the Duke of Newcastle, which had furnished so rankling a subject for debate. Appended to the Governor's despatch was a memorandum, “which” (he had said) “if your Grace thinks fit to read, will, I am sure, satisfy you.” It was irrefragable, both as to the wrong-headed conclusions of Colonel Browne's advisers, and the equally perverse decisions of the Duke of Newcastle.

How prone the Representatives had been in 1860 as well as in 1863 to make assertions incapable of proof was now shown by Mr. Stafford's conduct. Unable to refute Sir George Grey he was obliged to move, and the House passed without a division, a resolution (11th December): “That this House did not, by its resolutions of the 25th November last, desire to express any opinion as to the accuracy or otherwise of the three statements specified in the enclosure to the Governor's message, inasmuch as those statements do not appear to affect the question of the justice of exerting military force against Te Rangitake and his allies; but this House does controvert the statements on the part of the natives as to the cause of the quarrel.” The field of argument which could not be maintained with the Governor was abandoned, and the challenge to the natives was not likely to be accepted when they were already engaged in the bloody arbitrament of war.

Mr. Dillon Bell assailed Sir George Grey in the House. He denied that the fact of Te Rangitake's residence on the Waitara block could have been “not before known” to Sir George Grey. Mr. Bell lamely pleaded that he in 1860 thought that Te Rangitake's dwellings had been respected, and Donald McLean made a similar untrustworthy averment.

Concernment with the Waitara seemed to deprive public men of precaution in the floundering statements they made from time to time. McLean, who was Chief Commissioner of Land Purchase, was asked at the Bar (in August, 1860), “Has Te Rangitake ever made a claim of proprietary right?” and replied, “He has never made such a claim to my knowledge.” Mr. Bell, who prepared Governor Browne's voluminous despatch on the subject, included McLean's evidence in the despatch (4th December, 1860), which asserted that Te Rangitake had “failed then and failed ever since in establishing a proprietary right” on the block (which was purchased without any reservation of dwellings, &c., though such reservations were admitted by Bell himself to have been invariable previously). When Sir W. Martin's pamphlet exposed the fact that there were two pahs on the block, Dillon Bell assisted Mr. Richmond in drawing up ‘Notes’ in reply. They admitted the existence of the pahs, but denied Te Rangitake's proprietary or tribal title to his home, constructed (they said) by permission of others. In April, 1863, Bell joined in a ministerial statement that it was difficult to conceive that if the facts had come out clearly at the time of the sale “the practice of reservation universally followed… would not have been adhered to in this particular instance.” In December, 1863, Bell and McLean professed that in 1860 they believed the pahs had been respected.

Colonel Browne was privately appealed to, and wrote to Mr. Stafford that he was aware in 1860 that Te Rangitake had a residence on the block. Such a confession was all that was required to convict him of bad faith in signing the despatch (4th December, 1860), which was framed to persuade the Secretary of State that Te Rangitake's claim was only seignorial, and that he had put forward none other. On the charge that the discovery of Lieutenant Bates could have afforded him no information, Sir George Grey informed the Secretary of State (19th December, 1863) that he had been hospitably entertained at the Waitara in 1850, but he did not know, and it would have been sad to think, that such was the site bought by Colonel Browne—to screen whom, he added, “I ought therefore to mention that though I am quite satisfied from authority I cannot doubt that, although my predecessor's despatch (on which reliance seemed to be placed in England) was really written by Mr. Bell, he was at the time he wrote it entirely ignorant of the circumstances connected with the Waitara purchase which have recently been brought under your Grace's notice.” In conveying (5th January, 1864) a full narrative of the transactions in Parliament, the Governor added: “When I received the closing resolutions from both Houses, and felt that the only answer I could return was, that after the most careful consideration of the subject my conviction was that the natives were in the main right in their allegations regarding the Waitara purchase, I feared if this reply was published at the present time, when a rebellion is raging, it might have produced weighty consequences as regards the native race, and might have very much embarrassed the Colonial Ministry who did not at all agree upon this subject. I therefore thought I should act best by requesting my Ministers to advise me as to the nature of the reply I should return, and in accordance with their advice I assented to their simply making a statement in each House to the effect that they had advised me that in their opinion it was not necessary for me to reply to the resolutions.” A more lame and impotent conclusion was probably never arrived at by a representative of the Queen under advice. The subterfuges and misrepresentations of McLean and Parris, the wily seductions of Whitaker and Richmond, the bold contempt of truth in Governor Browne's prompted despatches, were pointed out by the honest examination of Lieutenant Bates, but exposure was arrested by the aversion of the General Assembly to confess the wrong it had sanctioned in 1860. It remained for a judicial inquiry in a later year (1866) to scatter finally to the winds the flimsy pretext that the title of Teira enabled him to sell to Colonel Browne the “carefully chosen” seed-plot of war. By a singular retribution that inquiry was instituted (while Mr. Stafford was Premier) with no intention to analyze the rights of Te Rangitake, which were found irrefragable. Perverse to the last, the Ministry, by privately compounding the matter before the Court, evaded the delivery of a formal judgment; but happily the facts became known under the hands of the Judges in official reports to the Government. As late as 1869 a further judicial inquiry (on the Rangitikei-Manawatu case) proved that even if Te Rangitake had had no tribal claims to the south of the Waitara previously, his occupation there by tribal arrangement constituted himself and his companions “owners according to Maori usage and custom.” It may be admitted that until the scales of justice were applied, Colonel Browne and his advisers could not know how grossly the treaty of Waitangi was violated by his act at the Waitara. But their ignorance confers no moral relief; for the prayer of Te Waharoa, of Bishop Selwyn, of Sir W. Martin, and Archdeacon Hadfield, was that the law might be resorted to, and their prayer was roughly refused.

One of Colonel Browne's advisers had in 1863 quitted the political arena. Mr.C. W. Richmond had become a Judge of the Supreme Court. But he was unable to keep aloof from the Waitara question in which he had such bad eminence. In October he asked his old colleague, Stafford, to make known to one or both Houses his willingness to submit to any further investigation. He wrote to Sir George Grey: “I have taken this step in consequence of certain statements in your Excellency's recently-published despatch announcing your determination to relinquish the position assumed by your Excellency's predecessor in reference to the Waitara purchase.” As to the new evidence elicited, and doubts whether Governor Browne knew the true facts of the case—whether indeed they had been concealed or kept back from him—Mr. Richmond said: “I see no reason to suppose that your Excellency's suspicions point particularly to myself… nevertheless I find that it has appeared to others as well as to myself that your Excellency's surmises may be deemed to point at or include myself, as I then held the position of Minister for Native Affairs.” Therefore he courted inquiry and volunteered explanation in the colony or to the Imperial Government. He was not accused. By coming forward at such a time he seemed to accuse himself. Prima est hœc ultio, quod, se judice, nemo nocens absolvitur.

Juvenal, lib, xiii.

The Governor sent the letter to England, where its receipt was simply acknowledged. To prove that Governor Browne, or Mr.C. W. Richmond, or both, had been deceived, was of little use. The wrong they had done was past recall, and no one accused them of other than official wrong-doing. The historian must inculpate them with mingled regret for the culprits and for their countrymen, and pity for their fellow-creatures whom they wronged. Resolutions carried in the Legislative Council (4th December, 1863) were similar to the resolution of the Representatives, with the exception that the Council thought it “happily unnecessary further to discuss the Waitara question,” and did not speak of controverting the Governor's statements. When the Governor's last despatch on the subject was laid before the Council, an attempt was made by Mr. Swainson to express the regret of the Council that a document which might have influenced their decision was unknown to them when asked to vote on the 4th December. Mr. Whitaker opposed Mr. Swainson, whose motion was lost by 6 votes against 4. Mr. Gilfillan, who had supported Mr. Swainson, was immediately permitted, however, to quash the Waitara Inquiry Commission Bill, by shelving it in Committee for three months. Members may have seen an incongruity in inquiring about the justice of the Waitara war of 1860, while the war of 1863, its direct result, was being prosecuted with vigour. In the North Island nearly all males were enrolled. On the 5th November, it was resolved that the provisions of the Militia Act should be strictly carried out in the Middle Island, till the whole male population between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five, not exempted by law, were organized and drilled.

The ambiguous manner in which the Representatives had received the invitation to manage native affairs was removed on the 6th November. The change was brought about by military success. The Governor having received sanction from England (and in a qualified sense from the Assembly), and more than 2000 armed men having been raised in Australia under Colonel Pitt for the Waikato regiments, the General advanced towards the stronghold where the Maoris were assembled at Mĕrĕ-mĕrĕ. Skirmishing bodies were abroad, and on the 23rd an officer commanding the English outposts at Mauku (near Manukau and far in rear of General Cameron) was compelled by a large body of natives to retire with loss of an officer and five men killed. Reinforcements arrived, but the enemy escaped. Rewi and his guerillas had the reputation of instigating the numerous raids made at this period in the Hunua forest (between Auckland and the Waikato river) through which the unclothed Maori glided with an ease unattainable by encumbered soldiers. On the 29th October, General Cameron, with Commander Wiseman, reconnoitred Mere-mere. Two 40-pounder Armstrong guns had been previously landed at Whangamarino to command the landing-place at Mere-mere. That stronghold was on a low ridge which approached the Waikato river. Traversed rifle-pits occupied the descent of the ridge to the river. Swamps almost encircled the ridge, and the Whangamarino and Maramarua rivers, or creeks, were available to the east for the possible retreat always aimed at by Maoris in their plans of fortification. The swamps were more water-laden than usual. The Maori flag floated in a pah where the ridge was 130 feet high. Every slope and projection from the ridge to the swamps was traversed with rifle-pits. Growth of scrub-pine and scrub, from six to ten feet high, was interspersed with the surrounding swamps. There was a horse-track leading by a spur of the ridge towards Rangiriri about twelve miles higher up on the right bank of the Waikato river, but swamps and curving hollows with swampy bottoms made all tracks sinuous. The General and Commodore found no convenient place for the landing of troops. The Maoris fired at the steamer, the ‘Pioneer.’ By immense exertion they had dragged a gun from the west coast to the Waikato. The resistance to be expected from the nature of the defences led the General to proceed up the river as far as Rangiriri in search of a point at which troops might be landed to turn the enemy's position, while attention was occupied in front by the steamer and gunboats. A point six miles above Mere-mere was selected. Secretly, at half-past two o'clock on the morning of the 31st August, the ‘Pioneer’ and ‘Avon,’ with four gunboats, transported a force nearly 700 strong to the place. No opposition was made, and the troops took up what the General called a commanding position about 400 yards from the bank of the river. He intended to take up an additional force on the following night, and a breastwork was constructed to defend the camp, which was left under command of Colonel Mould. What the General supposed the Maoris were doing while he was sending hundreds of soldiers to the north of them, his despatches do not tell. He does say that, while he was busy with his preparations, the officer in command at Whangamarino reported that the natives were escaping in canoes by the Whangamarino and Maramarua rivers. He embarked at once in the ‘Pioneer,’ and found that Mere-mere was abandoned.

Mr. Fox in his narrative bewails the catastrophe. “Our troops appear to have been able to do nothing except look on from a distance.… It was a great disappointment to everybody.” Nevertheless, though the Maoris left only empty rifle-pits behind them, they seemed to have admitted their inability to cope with the troops, and Mr. Fox lost no time in moving (6th November) a resolution pledging the Representatives to accept the control of native affairs. It was far more absolute and binding than the proposition which he failed to carry in the previous year, and which led to his retirement. But he carried the stronger resolution without division. The cause of the change in the opinions of the House may be read in the terms of the resolution. Imperial troops had won colonial affection. Having considered the Duke of Newcastle's fixed determination not to control native affairs, the House recognized with the deepest gratitude the great interest always taken by the Queen in “the welfare of all races of her subjects, and the thoroughly efficient aid which Her Majesty's Imperial Government is now affording for the suppression of the rebellion unhappily existing, and the establishment of law and order in the colony. And, relying on the cordial co-operation of the Imperial Government for the future, cheerfully accepts the responsibility thus placed upon the colonists, and at the same time records its firm determination to use its best endeavours to secure a sound and lasting peace, to do justice impartially to both races of Her Majesty's subjects, and to promote the civilization and welfare of all classes of the inhabitants of these islands.” The Council on the 9th November adopted similar resolutions. It must be confessed that the vain efforts which the House made soon afterwards to strangle the truth with regard to the seizure of land at Waitara formed an unhappy commentary on these professions. The address was promptly transmitted to England and acknowledged with great pleasure by the Secretary of State. The pledge to accept responsibility was no sooner made than it was repented, and by some sought to be evaded. In many contemporary writings and speeches it was spoken of as a “fatal acquiescence.”

The session did not close without a notable triumph for the war-party. The Maoris after evacuating Mere-mere occupied Rangiriri, higher up the river than their former position. The Waikare lake was there separated only by a narrow belt from the river, and numerous swamps and ana-branches facilitated the use of canoes. The Maoris had constructed their main line of entrenchment “across the isthmus which divided the river from the lake.” The line had a double ditch and high parapet, and was “strengthened in the centre by a square redoubt of very formidable construction. Behind the left centre of the main line, and at right angles to it, there was an entrenched line of rifle-pits parallel to the Waikato river, and obstructing the advance of troops from that direction.”

General Cameron's despatch; 24th November, 1863.

The General reconnoitred on the 18th, and resolved to land a force above the position “with a view of turning and gaining possession of a ridge 500 yards behind the main entrenchment, and thus intercepting the retreat of the enemy.” Three hundred of the 40th Regiment were embarked in the ‘Pioneer’ and ‘Avon.’ They were to land at a selected point on a preconcerted signal. The wind and currents delayed their movements. The number of the Maoris was thought to be between 400 and 500. The total British force was about 1300. The enemy's position was shelled till nearly five o'clock. Armstrong 12-pounders on land aided the fire from gunboats. The General was weary of waiting for the preconcerted signal of the landing of the men of the 40th Regiment sent to the rear by water, and he ordered an assault, which was gallantly executed. The entrenchment was scaled, the line of rifle-pits facing the Waikato was forced, and the Maoris were driven to their centre redoubt, which they “defended with desperate resolution,” behind a parapet 21 feet high. At this time the General saw that the 40th had occupied the ridge in the rear, and were pouring a heavy fire on a body of the enemy who fled by the Waikare swamp. Two assaults on the centre redoubt were made separately by 36 of the Royal Artillery, and by 90 seamen, armed in each case with revolvers. Both were driven back with loss; and hand-grenades were vainly thrown into the work to dislodge the besieged. It was then growing dark, and satisfied with his position, in which he said “the troops almost completely enveloped the enemy,” the General resolved to wait till daylight. The force under the Commodore endeavoured to prevent an escape to the Waikare lake. Shortly after daylight the Maoris hoisted a flag of surrender. One hundred and eighty-three men and two women became prisoners of war. The General was unable to ascertain what had been the original force, or what was the loss of the natives. “Their wounded must have been removed in the night, as there were none among the prisoners.” Thirty-six dead Maoris were found and buried, and it was believed that numbers were drowned or shot at the Waikare swamp. The General's despatches gave a return of 39 English killed, and 89 wounded. Amongst the dead was Captain Mercer who led the Royal Artillery in their desperate assault on the redoubt. When he fell in a position exposed to the fire of Maoris and of English, Te Oriori risked his own life in carrying him to a place of safety within the pah. It had been supposed that the king and the king-maker were in the camp; but they were not among the prisoners. A native afterwards said that the king-maker and others escaped between the Waikare swamp and the river to the south of the redoubt, in which case they must have passed almost through the English lines. A letter from the king-maker on the 4th December, asserted that 36 escaped by swimming across the Waikare lake. Many, including women, were drowned. Among the prisoners were many important chiefs.

Mr. Gundry, interpreter, in his report to the Native Minister, mentioned a fact which found no place in the General's despatches, but which marks the true nobility of English soldiery. Far from thirsting for the blood of the gallant foes who had rent their ranks so fearfully the evening before, they respected the courage with which, under a storm of shot and shell, that small band of men had defended their ramparts. The simple narrative of the interpreter must make every Englishman proud of his countrymen. “A Maori came forward with a white flag, when the soldiers sprang in amongst them, and commenced shaking hands with the Maoris. Soon after, the General came, and ordered them to give up their arms and he would treat them well as prisoners because of their brave conduct.… Te Wheoro accompanied the General from Mere-mere to Rangiriri, and was very useful as a guide.” On the morning of the surrender the king-maker approached with a large party of Maoris with a flag of truce. The interpreter found the leader inclined to surrender, but his followers unwilling. The king-maker sent his “mere,” a weapon of green-stone, but the General could not tell whether it was in token of peace. General Cameron wrote: “I hope the prisoners will be treated generously, for every one must admire the gallant manner in which they defended their position to the last.” The captives proposed to make peace, but the General told them the Governor only could arrange it. They wrote to the king-maker to urge the tribes to make peace, and abandon the “mana” of the island. One of the chiefs who had escaped wrote to the Governor soliciting the release of the prisoners. “Let it suffice for you—the men who are dead. Return to us those who live.” He was told by Mr. Fox that the Governor could make no terms till their arms were laid down. The chiefs wrote again to the Governor. He answered (6th December): “Your letter has reached me. Sons, my words to you are these. The General must go uninterrupted to Ngaruawahia; the flag of the Queen must be hoisted there. Then I will talk to you.”

On the 3rd December, Wiremu te Wheoro went from the General to Ngaruawahia. As he approached he was greeted with firing on both sides of the road. He reached the house of Matutaera, and the chiefs said, “Come and see your fallen tribe and your broken canoe.” In like figurative words he addressed them and recommended peace. The king-maker was sent for from Tamahere. There was a council. They said, “If we give up the guns we shall perhaps be made prisoners.” The Ngatimaniapoto were about to cut down the flagstaff. “Waikato would not allow them. The quarrel was great. Both sides fired without aiming. Then Tamati Ngapora, Mohi te Ahiatengu, Patara te Tuhi, and the king-maker, gave the flagstaff to me, Wiremu te Wheoro, with these words: ‘Wiremu, we give over this flagstaff to you, with those buried here and at Ngaruawahia, for you to give over to the General and to the Governor. Especially let not the remains of the dead be ill-treated by the soldiers.’”

The atrocities committed by the volunteers at Papakura had made their mark.

It cannot be asserted that this act of submission would, if wisely received, have terminated wars in New Zealand. It is plain that it was not wisely availed of by the Governor and his advisers. At Rangiriri was found a proclamation by the Maori king, dated 3rd October. It called for one-fifth of the tribes of the island to assemble as warriors at Ngaruawahia. It commanded them not to despoil the slain of their clothes; but “guns, powder, bullets, copper caps, cartouch-boxes, watches, money, rings, hats,—these take.” Such spoil was to be “brought to one heap,” and marked with the name of the depositor and the king's seal. The arms and ammunition would be given back to the captor, the other property was to be “left alone till the end, when his own will be restored to each man.” How far this summons had been obeyed no European could tell. The General had crossed the Waikato frontier more than two months before it was issued.

To the letter from the captive chiefs the king-maker replied ambiguously on the 4th December. He was unable to fulfil their word, to make peace. “We have not yet taken breath, both on account of your (ma-te) misfortune, and on account of the enemy constantly driving us from place to place. We are quite out of breath. What we have done, since you left, is to think over your word and continually retire; as the steamer moves this way we move also.” The steamer ‘Pioneer’ moved with an important freight. The General, the Commodore, and 500 men were with her. The Governor detained the English mail for twenty-four hours, to announce the occupation of Ngaruawahia on the 8th December, and the establishment of head-quarters at the rebel capital. The Maoris had evacuated it, taking with them the bones of Potatau, their first king. In a few days the success of the Thames expeditionary force, 900 strong, was assured by establishing military posts from the firth of the Thames to the river Waikato. Near Paparata Colonel Carey built a redoubt on a hill, which, commanding a view of the Queen's Redoubt at Te Ia, of the Waikare lake and of the firth of the Thames, enabled him to establish a system of telegraphs. An exploit of Captain Jackson, of the Forest Rangers, at Paparata, attracted attention in December. Smoke was observed on Sunday morning, and a stealthy advance was made. The voice of a Maori leading the devotions was heard, and the approach of the Rangers was unnoticed. At thirty yards' distance a volley was poured upon the congregation, and the assailants rushed up to finish their work with revolvers. “The panic was intense. One man stood upright, without making an effort to escape or defend himself, and was shot down. Another was wounded in the shoulder by Smith; the native fired at him in return, but missed; he then clubbed his double-barrelled gun, and struck at Smith, who parried the blow and closed with the native. Although the Maori was wounded, he would have proved match enough in this hand-to-hand struggle, but for Ensign Westrupp, who came to the relief of his man, and shot the native in the head; he fell, but again rose to his legs, when another man blew his brains out. This was the only instance of resistance, except a few shots which did no harm. Four of the Maoris were left dead on the field, and several wounded men were carried away, principally by the women of the party. There was an order given not to fire at any of the women.” Such was the account in a newspaper, which regretted that the fugitives were not followed and punished more severely; but “on the whole (thought) a highly successful affair had occurred to enliven the monotony of the war, and this time it is entirely by civilians.” It transpired that women had not been spared, and the commander admitted that one woman was wounded. The Rev. R. Taylor in his ‘New Zealand, past, present, and future,’ singled out Jackson's Sunday performance as one which ought to make the colonists blush.

The readiness of the Maoris to discuss their plans showed how utterly they had been defeated. They had intended to operate, in guerilla bands, upon the rear of the General's forces. From the Thames to Manukau, and especially in the Hunua forest, they had hoped to harass their invaders. They had not believed that supplies for a large invading force could be depended upon, but were disappointed. The destruction of the war-party at the Wairoa river, in September, had signally foiled their schemes on the General's left rear, and when the redoubt was constructed near Paparata, and the road through the Hunua forest to Maungatawhiri was held by efficient detachments armed with rifles, the inefficiently-armed Maoris were powerless for offence. The Parliament unanimously thanked the General, the Commodore, and Major-General Galloway, the commander of the colonial forces.

Major-General Galloway, recently promoted from the command of the 70th Regiment, had, at Governor Grey's request, consented to remain for a time in the colony to command the militia and volunteers (Despatch; 10th August, 1863).

A serious question had occasioned much debate in both Houses. The remoteness of Auckland from many populous parts of the Middle Island had always obstructed members in attending the General Assembly, and was an obstacle to communication with the General Government. It was resolved in the Lower House that the seat of Government should be transferred to a suitable locality in Cook's Straits, the selection of the site being left to an impartial tribunal. After opposition the motion was carried. On the 25th, in spite of vigorous efforts by Mr. Stafford, it was resolved, by 24 votes against 17, to ask the Governor to seek the aid of the Australian Governments in selecting impartial Commissioners to choose the site. The Governor expressed his willingness to comply with the address, but further debate was raised on the question of providing funds, which were nevertheless voted, on the 4th December, by 23 votes against 11. A similar motion was carried in the Legislative Council by 11 votes against 8; Mr. Whitaker, the Premier, being in the minority, although his colleague, Mr. Fox, had voted with the majority in the House of Representatives. The early project of Gibbon Wakefield's friends was thus resumed after many years, for it would hardly be doubted that Wellington would be chosen as the most suitable position in the Straits. To compel a removal from Auckland, the Representatives resolved that if proper accommodation should not have been made at the seat of Government, it would be expedient that the Assembly should hold its next sitting at Christchurch.

During the session a subject which had in former years aroused the Legislature of the colony of Victoria was brought before the Assembly. As in Victoria, so in New Zealand, the gold-fields drew crowds of harpies from the criminal classes in Tasmania, the last gathering-ground for English convicts in the south-eastern group of Australian colonies. After discussion, disallowance, and difference, the Victorian Convicts Prevention Act found a home in the statute-book. In Otago the vultures which prey upon their honester fellow-creatures hovered so thickly that Major Richardson, the Superintendent, emitted a piteous cry. Criminals of desperate character were setting in like a tide, which, if not arrested, would “inevitably make the province one vast penal settlement.” In 1861 and 1862 the Provincial Council passed ordinances to prevent influx of criminals. They were severally disallowed by the Governor, the opinion of the Judges being taken as to their repugnance to law and to the Constitution. A similar Bill was passed by the House of Representatives in 1863; was carried, by a majority of four on its second reading, in the Council; but was, on the motion of Mr. Swainson, ordered to be “read a third time this day six months.” The Ministry urged that an Imperial Act should be passed, either to meet the evil, or to empower the Assembly to do that of which, in the opinion of the Judges, they were then incapable. Mr. Cardwell replied that as the Government “did not advise the disallowance of the Act passed to prevent the entrance into Victoria of persons formerly sentenced to transportation in the United Kingdom, but whose sentences had expired, so neither would they now advise the disallowance of a similar Act if passed by the New Zealand Legislature. They would, however, see the passing of such an Act with regret, and they certainly would not advise that Parliament should be invited to pass a law for the express purpose of enabling a Colonial Legislature to enact a provision so little in accordance with Imperial policy, and which, in the opinion of their own Judges, is not called for by any proved necessity.” On the 14th December the session closed. The Governor gave the Royal assent to the Suppression of Rebellion Act, the New Zealand Settlement Act, and a Loan Act for three millions sterling. The members were dismissed in triumph to their homes, with the Governor's thanks for their liberality, and an assurance that the unusual powers granted to the Executive in a time of great public danger should be used so as to encroach as little as possible on the ordinary domain of law. They had provided in their Loan Act for a reduction of interest on so much of the loan as the Imperial Government might guarantee, and Mr. Reader Wood, the Treasurer, sailed in January to advocate the interests of the colony in England. Among the Acts reserved for the Queen's pleasure was one “to enable Provincial Legislatures to pass laws authorizing the compulsory taking of land for works of a public nature.” Mr. Whitaker was determined to effect the object in which he had previously been thwarted by the decision of the Secretary of State. By the Constitution of New Zealand, as in Australia, power was reserved to the Crown to disallow a Bill (although assented to by the Governor) within two years after the receipt of the Bill by the Secretary of State. Mr. Whitaker, at the close of the session, protested against the exercise of this power of disallowance with regard to the Rebellion and Settlement Act. His main plea was that native land tenure “was with little or no exception tribal,” and if lands of a tribe could be preserved because loyal occupants were incapable of eviction, the Act would be for the most part a dead letter. Already 3000 men had taken military service with the hope of obtaining land, and it was intended to enrol 20,000. Difficulties in the way of confiscation would be intolerable. Such was Mr. Whitaker's argument in 1864. A more elastic construer of rights and powers can hardly have held office as Her Majesty's Attorney-General amongst the numerous dependencies of the Crown, nor one who, under the guise of quiet simplicity, affected to be ignorant of guile until concealment became no longer possible. The tribal rights he had advised the ignorant Governor Browne to reject as baseless, at Waitara, could scarcely be denied before the learned Governor Grey. Their existence was therefore made a plea for a larger measure of confiscation than any but special enactment could permit, though it could not justify. Some of those who supported the ministerial measures had misgivings. Mr. Weld protested against them as unconstitutional and tyrannical. Mr. J. C. L. Richardson, who became a Minister at a later period, recorded the fact “that the doubtful supporters of the Ministry of Mr. Fox gave a hesitating and timid adhesion to the Bills,” savouring, as they did, of the “darkest periods of English legislation.”

Printed address to electors of Dunedin and suburbs north, by Major Richardson.

Sir George Grey told the Secretary of State that, of the two modes of dealing with subjects after rebellion, generosity would generally be found most successful; and that, in New Zealand, generosity has so far prospered that former enemies, who might have inflicted serious injury in 1863, had not only refrained from joining the rebels, but had volunteered to aid the English. But the same policy could not now be relied upon. The belief of large numbers of Maoris that a new principle was to be established in procuring land, and dealing with the natives generally, had bred distrust in the Government, and the successes at Taranaki in 1860 had em-boldened the young men of the tribes which had acquired arms and ammunition in great quantities. It was needful now to inflict punishment by taking land. But, recognizing the wisdom of a large generosity to the defeated, he would not carry the system too far. Magnanimity was not a virtue which abounded in New Zealand Ministries, and the want of it was to breed endless confusion. Yet a warning was received in January. In November, 1863, the Duke of Newcastle, while acquiescing generally in the seizure of lands from rebels, deprecated such wholesale confiscations as would lead the Maoris to believe that land-grasping was the motive for war. Even friendly tribes might thus be shaken in their allegiance, and wider and more desperate struggles might ensue. Her Majesty's Government would view with gravest apprehension a policy which might intensify the spirit of disaffection.

Timely words were lost on the dull surface of Mr. Whitaker's sensibility. He had little to say except that he had no apprehension that confiscation could not be confined within proper limits, and that the General Assembly would disapprove undue extension. The careful ‘Observations on the proposal to take native lands under an Act of the Assembly,’ drawn up by Sir William Martin in November, 1863, were sent by Sir George Grey in January, 1864, to the Secretary of State with the ‘Memorandum’ by Mr. Fox, already mentioned as contending for confiscation on the grounds of necessity, of justice, and the interests of the Maoris, who were possessed of too much land for their own good. It is noteworthy that Fox took up a different position from that of Whitaker. Whether he hoped to be believed may be doubted. He wrote: “The Government proposes to confiscate (that is, to take without compensation) no lands except those of which the owners have been engaged in open rebellion, or actually aiding and abetting it by overt acts.” He denied the existence of that for which Whitaker pleaded as absolutely essential. He concluded his paper with a declaration that “Mere technical difficulties (if there be any, such as govern feudal liability to forfeiture, or the necessity of conferring political franchise, which is alleged to be a condition precedent to the right to enforce submission to law), however interesting as abstract questions for discussion, cannot be entertained by a Government on which the responsibility rests of saving to the British Crown a dependency in imminent peril, and preventing for the future the renewal of a similar crisis.”

As Mr. Fox had the effrontery, in 1879, to publish a letter in which he declared that his influence was not exerted to bring about confiscation of Maori lands, it is well that his advice in 1863 should be recorded in his own words.

To Sir William Martin's remonstrance that the Government ought to discriminate between the various sections of the Waikato tribes—the loyal and disloyal—Mr. Fox replied not a word. Sweeping confiscation was the long-coveted remedy for the woes of colonists who deplored the recognition of Maori rights by the Queen. They would undo by proclamation what she had sanctioned by solemn treaty. Whitaker's reasoning,— that the rebellious could not be properly punished if the rights of the loyal were respected,—furnishes an explanation of the silence of Fox. Sir William Martin's paper, written by him with a “feeling of sorrow, if not of shame,” remained unanswered by the Ministry, and received unworthy treatment at the hands of Sir George Grey. He, who well knew that the crossing of the Maungatawhiri was a declaration, and an act, of war, was not ashamed to urge that it was an act of self-protection. He could not answer Sir W. Martin, and he was too prudent to resort to the hollow immorality of Mr. Fox. He insidiously said (with regard to the invasion of Waikato): “I say this, not in answer to Sir W. Martin's views, which would probably agree with my own on this point, but because I fear that his remarks might, as they stand, be misunderstood by persons at a distance.” He did his best to cause them to be misunderstood, lest the injustice of confiscating the goods of loyal subjects should be perceived in England, and the Waikato campaign should be marred. One thing he had the grace to avoid. He did not adopt the ethics of Whitaker and Fox; nor did he comment upon them. Anise and cummin his advisers could supply. The weightier matters of righteousness and mercy were beyond their ken. The law they worshipped was not like the ancient Themis, offspring of heaven and earth. It was altogether of the earth, earthy, and was centred in a craving for Maori land. The law to which Sir William Martin appealed, whose “seat is in the bosom of God, whose voice the harmony of the world, to which”

Hooker.

all things in heaven and earth do homage, “the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest not exempted from her power; both angels and men and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy”—such a law was unfitted for the designs of the heirs of the rapacious crew whom Lord Stanley had abashed, when, for the credit of the English name, he conveyed to New Zealand the commands of the Queen. They ruled, however, in New Zealand in 1864, and the majority of the increasing population, ignorant (as Sir W. Martin admitted) of Maori history and rights, and therefore comparatively guiltless, were hurried by their leaders into acts of crime.

Contrast the excuses of Whitaker and Fox with the straightforward common sense of Acting-Governor Shortland, when “taking payment in land” was urged upon him. “I do not at all approve of the system of taking payment in land from the natives for acts of aggression on British subjects, being of opinion that it would tend to encourage a frequent repetition of similar offences (against Maoris) and to render the lower class of settlers more and more abusive towards the natives” (Despatch to Lord Stanley, No. 53; 15th June, 1843).

The Governor's disingenuousness did not improve his position, which was, without doubt, difficult. Mr. Fox had been his ancient enemy, and had gone to England to assail him in former years. There was still some animosity.

The Ministry in various ways showed jealousy of the Governor's ability and knowledge of Maori character. It was revealed in characteristic and trivial ways, which made the course of affairs a maze of pettiness, encumbering hundreds of pages in the New Zealand blue-books. A few specimens are necessary to explain the state of affairs. It will be remembered that the rebels had been told that the Governor could only talk to them when the Queen's flag had been hoisted at the rebel capital. When the General reported the occupation of Ngaruawahia on the 8th December, his Ministers urged Grey to go thither with them and promulgate terms of peace. Those terms were discussed at great length. Surrender of arms, oath of allegiance, confiscation of all the land of rebels, followed by restitution to each man of a limited portion, so that his family might not starve,—prosecution of all murderers—were the main points. The Ministry insisted on going with the Governor. He thought it better to go alone. They would not yield, and he did not go with them. A notice, 16th December, was sent to the chiefs telling them that their reluctance to give up arms lest they should be made prisoners (as reported by Te Wheoro), was needless, for that none of them should be molested, except actual murderers. No act of war would be punished. If they wanted to know more of the Governor's intentions, he would receive a deputation in Auckland, treat it kindly, and allow it to return in peace. They must decide quickly, for the General would not stay his advance. Mr. Fox, in his account of the war, condemns the Governor for inability to make up his mind about going to Ngaruawahia; but a memorandum furnished by Sir G. Grey to his Ministers on the 18th December, at their request, explains his proceedings in a different manner. For a Governor, with the General and his Ministers, to make overtures and fail, would injure his position in the eyes of Europeans and of Maoris. The natives ought to make overtures to him. Either the Governor ought to be with the General, making no overtures to the natives, but on the spot if they should choose to make them to him;—or, if his advisers preferred another course, they might be with the General ready to receive overtures. On the 19th December, Mr. Whitaker summed up a reply in the words: “Most of the cogent reasons given by his Excellency against his going with some of his Ministers appear to them equally cogent against either party going without the other.” Mr. Fox declares that it was unfortunate that the Governor

Mr. Fitzgerald urged that proper efforts were not made to arrange terms when the General reached Ngaruawahia, and that the further advance of the army compelled the Maoris “to fight with the courage of despair.” Sir G. Grey denounced this statement as “untrue” (Despatch 46; 7th April, 1865); and arrayed many dates to controvert it; but the bickerings between Sir G. Grey and his advisers tend to confirm Mr. Fitzgerald's opinion.

did not go with his Ministry, and that his refusal led to his being charged by the natives with breach of faith and responsibility for further war. He even says that the king-maker positively asserted, that if the Governor had gone to Ngaruawahia peace would have been made. But the king-maker's letter which Mr. Fox quotes makes no such assertion. It declares, on the contrary, that if the war had been allowed to stop at Rangiriri—if the proposals of the prisoners had been accepted by the English—there would have been peace. But neither the Governor nor his Ministry agreed to the captives' suggestions, though the king-maker wrote at the time that it was not proper for him to carry on war while his imprisoned friends were proposing peace.

As early as in December, 1863, there was a feeling that the Governor might be unwilling to confiscate lands so sweepingly as his Ministers might demand. On the 17th, he showed them a draft of a despatch to the Secretary of State, asking whether it was wished that he should assent to any advice from his responsible advisers; or whether the English Government proposed to issue any instructions. Pending the receipt of instructions he would act on his own judgment. Judging from the tone of the press, some persons desired—not that land should be confiscated as an example and check upon rebellion,—”but that a magnificent and extensive territory might be thrown open to any amount of prosperous colonization.” Mr. Whitaker and his colleagues demurred to the despatch, and reserved their rights “as Ministers responsible to the General Assembly and the colony.” After exchange of minutes, in the course of which Mr. Whitaker “feared that the conclusion was inevitable that the views of the Governor and his Ministers differed essentially as to the practice of responsible government,” the document was not sent to England, and Mr. Cardwell in due time furnished the Governor with instructions on the subject matter of the cancelled despatch.

The ceremony of handing the king's flagstaff to Te Wheoro bore no fruit. The wrangling of the Ministry with the Governor neutralized the tender of submission.

The advance of the Queen's troops made peace impossible. It was ascertained afterwards that the Maoris on no occasion had more than 2000 men in arms throughout the island. They had never more than 600 men assembled at one place during the war, and they were too wary to oppose them in the open field to far larger numbers aided by superior weapons. Rifle-pits and concealment were their defences. Thus they might hope that their assailants might be brought within the short range of their guns. Retreat from fortress to fortress was their plan of operation as General Cameron marched forward. To the General, meanwhile, looking round for strategic advantages, and heedless of national rights, it occurred that it would be wise to conquer the Tauranga district on the east coast. The Maoris to the east of the harbour were comparatively friendly. On the west the Ministry said they were decided enemies. Some had been to the war; some were preparing to go. Their crops were ready to be gathered. The loss of them would be a heavy blow. Writing on the 19th January, the Ministry said it was already publicly known that the expedition was contemplated, and to delay it would be considered a proof of weakness. The Governor yielded with professed reluctance, feeling that “under the present form of government” he ought to comply with the demands of his advisers. Again, therefore, an expedition was undertaken which could only be accepted as a token that the Government raised quarrels in order to seize upon lands.

It was believed that in 1863 as in 1860 the warlike youth of Tauranga had swelled the ranks of men in arms against the Queen. It was also true that the king-maker had much influ- enceinfluence over the Maoris between the east coast and the waters of the Thames. Nevertheless, though the man who looked only from a military standpoint might be excused for favouring such a marauding expedition, the Civil Government, charged with equal care of both races, in recommending the expedition, were worse than pirates, for pirates have not sworn to do right to those whom they rob. The Civil Commissioner at Tauranga had furnished a return of the warriors supposed to have gone to the Waikato district to help the king. From the east side of Tauranga, 30 out of an adult population of 212; from the west, out of 542 no less than 260 were said to have gone. Over them the king-maker's influence was great. Mr. Whitaker drew up (19th January) short instructions for the Colonel (Carey) in command. One sentence was: “The crops and cattle and other property of the natives on the west side should be taken possession of and the crops gathered in.” Mr. T. H. Smith, the Civil Commissioner, waited on Colonel Carey on the 22nd. Before doing so he had intimated to the Maoris in conformity with the exact words of a memorandum from Mr. Fox (the Native Minister), “that the object of the expedition is to act as a check on the movements of the Waikato sympathizers, but that unless forced upon them, active hostilities are not contemplated, and in any case will be only carried on against open rebels.” Shocked at the variance between these words and the instructions given to Colonel Carey, Mr. Smith by words, and in writing, entreated him to stay his hand till the Government could be consulted. Ruthlessly to seize the property of the innocent would rouse peaceful tribes to take arms against the Queen. Colonel Carey waited while Mr. Smith's appeal was sent to Mr. Fox. On the 25th, two letters from Auckland were sent to Mr. Smith. The Governor wrote privately: “Colonel Carey sent me a copy of your letter to him regarding the error I had fallen into, in issuing such instructions as I did for treating all the natives on the western side of the harbour of Tauranga as enemies, seizing their crops, cattle, &c. I feel very much obliged to you for the fearless and honourable way in which you did your duty on this occasion, thereby preventing me from being the cause of bringing much misery upon many innocent people.” The other letter, from Fox, was sevenfold more lengthy, and upbraided Mr. Smith for circulating the former instructions among the natives. If the Government had desired their circulation Mr. Smith would have been told. “As you have acted entirely without instruction, the responsibility must rest solely with yourself.” Mr. Smith's humane conduct appeared inconsistent with his verbal statements to Ministers in Auckland about the hostility of the tribes, and he was ordered to explain it. Sir George Grey (25th January) took prompt measures. He thanked Colonel Carey for staying his hand as to ravages, and told him to undertake no aggressive movement. If possible he was to intercept armed parties passing by the Tauranga route to join the natives in arms in the interior. Most civilians are as unfit to control military events as children are to be trusted with gunpowder; and when thwarted in mischief will like children complain. Mr. Smith furnished a satisfactory explanation, but Fox and Whitaker were discontented. They roundly rated the just officer for interfering to save the property of the innocent. At a later date (3rd February) in a memorandum on responsible government they complained of the Governor's “correspondence with their subordinate officer Mr. Smith.”

On the course to be adopted with regard to the Maori prisoners, Mr. Dillon Bell had, on the 1st December, 1863, moved in the House that it was important that the policy of the Government should be announced. The Ministry were unprepared to make any statement and the motion lapsed, although seconded by Mr. Weld in a few words in which he expressed his opinion that though technically the prisoners were rebels, morally they were not, and ought to be treated neither with maudlin philanthropy nor with “vengeance and hostility.” The Ministry soon showed that they were incapable of generous discrimination. Retained for some weeks on board of H.M.S. ‘Curaçoa,’ the Rangiriri prisoners were after the 24th December confined in the hulk ‘Marion,’ moored under the guns of a man-of-war in the Auckland harbour. Sir George Grey, on the 29th February, 1864, urged the Ministry to release on parole Te Oriori, a chief who had on numerous occasions acted nobly towards the English, and who was believed to have been wounded at Rangiriri while placing Captain Mercer in a place of safety. He had also been friendly to Mr. Gorst at Awamutu, when that gentleman's life was in danger. Looking to the rank and generosity of Te Oriori, Sir George Grey thought that his release would produce an excellect effect upon the natives. After many days Mr. Fox declared that the Ministry objected to Te Oriori's release. Mr. Fox was about to visit Kaipara, and on his return “Ministers would be prepared to take the case of all the prisoners into consideration.” It was not until the 7th April that Fox could be brought to make any proposition; and then in reply “to his Excellency's request more than once repeated” the ministerial junto said, they considered the trial of the prisoners ought to take place, if at all, under the Suppression of Rebellion Act of the recent session. But as that Act had not received Royal allowance they feared to use it lest after trial the disallowance of the Act should bring about serious complications.

Mr. Fox's condition of mind was strange. He opposed the Waitara war in 1860 as unjust. He advocated the advance into Waikato territory in 1863, knowing that it would be accepted by the Maoris as a declaration of war. He passed the Suppression of Rebellion Bill subsequently, and then desired to try the prisoners of war who surrendered at Rangiriri under an Act passed after General Cameron had carried war into their territory. Not the injustice but “complications” in case of disallowance of his unjust Bill alarmed him.

“But as his Excellency has pressed so strongly (that the course to be adopted should be considered), Ministers are prepared to surrender their own views, and acquiesce in that of his Excellency.” Let the prisoners, therefore, be tried by a military tribunal under the Act not yet allowed. Sir George Grey replied that he was not pressing that “the prisoners should be all brought to trial, but that some decision should be come to as to their future disposition.” Uncertainty was producing a bad effect upon the natives generally, many of whom thought that all the prisoners were to be put to death. Some might be tried, and others released on conditions. Moreover, he wished the trials to take place before the ordinary tribunals, and not before Courts composed of military officers. Mr. Whitaker then (19th April, 1864) took up the argument. Ministers were of opinion that all the prisoners should be tried, “and that none should at present be released,” and that the most convenient mode would be under the Suppression of Rebellion Act. Militia officers might be mingled with military in the composition of the Court. Sir George Grey pointed out that already the imprisonment had lasted five months. Arms had been taken, houses and crops destroyed. The prisoners had lost the means of life. Their lands were deemed forfeit, and, though it was contemplated to give back small portions, without implements or stock the restitution would be of little worth. “In addition to these punishments it is now proposed to bring all these prisoners, without reference to degrees of guilt, or services, or conduct (prior to the disturbances), to trial before military courts for high treason, and then the trial being over to determine what their ultimate disposal shall be, keeping them however in safe custody until peace is established. The Governor much regrets that his Ministers should have rejected his earnest solicitations in favour of the chief Te Oriori. He believes that many lives would have been saved by a compliance with his request.… The course pursued in this matter has driven many natives to desperation, and has filled others, who have as yet taken no part in the rebellion, with distrust.” No captive New Zealand chief generously treated would break conditions on which he might obtain his liberty. On the whole, believing that what his responsible advisers proposed surpassed in severity any punishment which Great Britain had inflicted in like cases, he would not take upon himself the responsibility of giving effect to their advice. He appealed to them to consider his position. In England the Crown was not active in giving the absolute orders to suppress riot or rebellion. Some functionary was held responsible. In New Zealand, the Governor was compelled to issue orders to the military and naval authorities. Ostensibly the orders were his, really they were those of Ministers. Yet no doubt he would be held responsible by the Home Government if any act of his should “appear to the Government and people of England unnecessarily severe or unjust, or to have a tendency to prolong, without sufficient object, a civil war.” If he remembered at this juncture his acceptance of the resolutions of the House in August, 1862, on the ground that practically while he was in New Zealand the result would be the same, his reflections must have been bitter. Mr. Whitaker replied that the objection to release any prisoner on parole was insuperable; that Te Oriori had claims for consideration, but was infirm of purpose, and could not therefore be trusted; and that Ministers had not such an exalted opinion of the parole of a New Zealand chief as the Governor had. With taunting truth the arrest and long imprisonment of Rauparaha by Sir George Grey, in 1846, was now thrown in his teeth by the men who had used his influence in obtaining troops and his administrative ability in the commencement of the war, and would make him their slave when they were presumptuous of success. As for the general question of responsibility, there were differences between the English and Colonial Government; “but if his Excellency means that responsibility for the acts of the Government in New Zealand rests with him, and not with Ministers, they feel it to be their duty respectfully to express their dissent from that view.”

A dreary correspondence of this kind was protracted for months. In vain Sir George Grey furnished a report from the interpreter serving with the forces (28th April, 1864) showing that Rewi though anxious to make peace was deterred by the treatment of the prisoners,—and distinctly complained that they had been led to believe that on giving up their arms they would be permitted to live freely within the lines of the troops. This rumour Mr. Whitaker said was not to be disregarded, but too much weight should not be attached to it. Friendly chiefs piteously entreated, but in vain, that the captives might be allowed to leave the hulk and live on shore. Sir George Grey (29th April) said that he feared the recent slaughter at Orakau, including women, might with justice be traced to the unexplained detention of the prisoners, especially of Te Oriori. He felt a serious responsibility, and dreaded a recurrence of such events. “He has done his utmost at all times to promote the views of his Ministers, and wished to show that on a point where he felt so strongly, a responsibility really rested on him, which gave him a strong claim on their consideration, which he hopes they will yet recognize.” He might as well have appealed to the timbers of the hulk in which the prisoners were immured. Mr. Whitaker, professing a desire to be compliant, regretted the difference which had arisen, but would not consent to release any one of the prisoners. Mr. Fox asserted that they were very comfortable and in excellent health in the hulk; but the principal medical officer in the colony, and the sanitary officer for the troops, reported otherwise, and that the seeds of disease were being sown in the captives by reason of the unfitness of their prison. A special request was made to Mr. Fox in May for straw mattresses, in order that these prisoners of war might not be compelled to sleep upon hard boards. (In the same month the surgeon in charge reported that Te Oriori and six others should at once be removed to the shore, where with “exercise and other hygienic measures they will be allowed a fair chance of renovating their shattered constitutions.”) It was not until nearly a month after this request was made to the hard-hearted Minister that it became known to the Governor. Mr. Fox, when reminded of this concealment, roundly told Sir George Grey (June, 1864) that the Ministry only were responsible, and that it was not customary to lay before the Governor reports on “other prisoners in the various gaols of the colony.” On the 4th June, the first winter month, the sanitary officer of the troops reported that “None of the prisoners had anything to lie upon save the deck of the ship.” Such being the conduct of his Ministers it was well that Sir George Grey referred the question of principle to the Secretary of State. On the 6th April he had narrated the facts up to that date. On the 7th May he had asked that, if it were deemed necessary, he might receive commands on the subject. He wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, but that nobleman did not receive his letter. Early in 1864 the Duke's health failed, and he retired. He was succeeded in April by Mr. Cardwell. It would have been well for humanity, and might have restored the feeble statesman, if he had retired earlier, and left to the firmer grasp of Mr. Cardwell the reins which he had held to so little purpose. As it was, he died in a few months. The evil effects of his sanction of the Waitara rapine could neither die nor be forgotten.

Mr. Cardwell's decision as to the captives may be told here. To Sir George Grey's first recapitulation of his difficulties he replied (June, 1864) that he was led to conjecture that if the Ministry had concurred in a definite and generous course, evils and loss of life might have been avoided. “On this I think it necessary to observe, that while I fully recognize the general right and duty of the Colonial Government to deal with matters of native policy, properly so called, I consider that while active operations are being carried on under the conduct of Her Majesty's officers, and in the main by Her Majesty's military and naval forces, it is for the Governor personally as representative of the Imperial Government to decide upon the fate of persons who are taken prisoners in the course of these military operations. And although, before adopting any such decision, I should wish you to obtain the advice, and if possible the concurrence, of the Ministers, I do not consider that concurrence indispensable. But, subject always to the positive law of the colony, I hold you entitled to determine, and I look to you for determining, whether such prisoners or any of them shall be released on parole or otherwise, or whether they shall be kept under such control as may legally be applied to them as prisoners of war, or whether they shall be handed over to the civil authorities to be dealt with as criminals. I shall therefore be fully prepared to support you, in case you should have thought it necessary, with or without the consent of your Ministers, so to deal with these prisoners as, in your opinion, the public interests may have required.” At a later date (26th July) Mr. Cardwell treated the subject at greater length. Adverting to Sir George Grey's statement that the Governor would be held responsible in England if needless severity were used, Mr. Cardwell said: “You appear to me rightly to interpret your position in the observations you have addressed to your Ministers.” On the 26th May, he had written: “I entirely anticipate that your Ministers will be animated by a just sense of the exertions and sacrifices which have already been made by the mother country, and that on colonial grounds they will be as anxious as you can be yourself to terminate the present hostilities. But it is my duty to say to you plainly that, if unfortunately their opinion should be different from your own as to the terms of peace, Her Majesty's Government expect you to act upon your own judgment, and to state to your Ministers explicitly that an army of 10,000 English troops has been placed at your disposal for objects of great Imperial, and not for the attainment of any mere local, object; that your responsibility to the Crown is paramount, and that you will not continue the expenditure of blood and treasure longer than is absolutely necessary for the establishment of a just and enduring peace.” Of these words he now reminded the Governor. As to the wisdom of releasing Te Oriori, only presence on the spot could justify an opinion. Mr. Cardwell gave none. “What I do feel it my duty to say to you plainly is, that the aid of the mother country in men and money is given to the colony on the understanding that the military measures which have unhappily become necessary shall be directed by you in concert with the distinguished General in command. I shall be perfectly ready to support you in any measures which, not breaking any positive law of the colony, and after consulting with the General, you may have thought it necessary to take.” The Whitaker Ministry would not consent to the publication of these despatches in the usual prompt manner. They doubtless deplored the events which had placed in the Colonial office so clear a judgment as that of Mr. Cardwell. On the general policy to be pursued he was equally decided, and a remarkable despatch (26th April, 1864) will demand special consideration.

At the resumption of warlike operations, the state of the tribes may be summarily stated thus: Dr. Featherston, Superintendent at Wellington, visited the west coast, and found Wi Tako friendly to the English, although not severed from loyalty to the Maori king. The capture of Rangiriri was commented on with evident knowledge of the scene of operations. The chiefs “were highly pleased at the fraternizing of the soldiers with the natives at Rangiriri, with the compliment paid them by General Cameron, and the kind treatment (as they believed) the prisoners were receiving.” Dr. Featherston temporarily adjusted a dispute about land between the Ngatiapa and the Rangitane and Ngatiraukawa tribes. At the discussions the natives showed “calmness and moderation.” For a time, as far north as Wanganui, the west coast was, in February, 1864, deemed safe. In March, Colonel Warre, commanding at Taranaki, captured without loss the rebel positions at Kaitake, near Oakura, and at Au Au. “The beautiful practice of the Armstrong guns set fire to a whā-rĕ” at the very hour fixed for an advance, and availing themselves of the “fortunate accident,” under cover of the smoke assaulting parties entered the works, from which the Maoris rapidly escaped, having wounded only two soldiers by a sustained fire. In April, having employed flying columns to destroy the Maori crops and cultivations, Colonel Warre reported that “every acre of cultivation was cleared within twenty miles to the south of Taranaki.” In the same month, Captain Lloyd, 57th Regiment, with a reconnoitring party of about 100 men, in the act of destroying a Maori plantation, was surprised by an ambuscade at Te Ahuahu. He and six others were killed in the retreat, and twelve were wounded. The heads of Captain Lloyd and five others were cut off and carried away. There was a rumour that this atrocity was provoked by the taking of the head of a Maori by a European for scientific purposes; but on investigation the occurrence was not proved. At the end of the month a large body of Maoris, after dancing their war-dance, attacked a redoubt at Sentry Hill. Captain Shortt, 57th Regiment, had ordered his men to sit concealed till told to fire. When the Maoris approached they were met by heavy volleys and shells from a cohorn. They fled, leaving more than thirty dead and many wounded. Only one soldier was wounded. Colonel Warre reported that the confidence shaken by the death of Captain Lloyd was entirely restored. “Our vengeance has been at least five-fold; and to show how we appreciated the desperate gallantry of the natives I sent to offer to return them their dead, but they had not the courage to send for them, and they were buried near the redoubt.”

It was noticed that in the advance of the Maoris they had halted strangely, and the reason was afterwards discovered. Sir William Martin's prediction had proved true. The faith of the perfidious Pakeha was discarded. A new creed had been coined to stir the tribes to battle and murder. The sword of the Lord and of Gideon was in their hands to smite the Pakeha and all unfaithful to the Maori king. The great day of deliverance was to be in December, 1864. The followers of the new religion were to be called Paimarire. It was called Hau Hau from the use of that sound in its ritual. It was said that when Captain Lloyd was slain, the infuriated Maoris had reverted to their national atrocity of cannibalism; and that the blood of some of the victims was drunk in savage triumph. Then the heads were buried. In a few days they were dug up, and a mad or knavish Maori, Te Ua, declared that the Angel Gabriel had communicated to him a new religion, of which the officer's head was to be a notable symbol. When false reports were daily mingled with truth, when Maoris were maddened by the burning of their homes, and were more willing to die than to submit, the new faith was hailed as an excitement like the dram of the drunkard. Emissaries were sent to distant tribes to pave the way for it. Mr. Fox insisted that the king-maker was a convert. Letters attributed to him were produced with the concluding word Paimarire. Te Oriori, however, assured Sir George Grey that some of them were not written by the king-maker; and in December, 1864, a Maori averred that he was opposed to the Paimarire. The man, Te Ua, was not alone in his crazy confidence. There were other mad prophets. One of them, Hepaniah, officiated at the attack on the Sentry Hill redoubt. He professed to be invulnerable. On a moonlight night, with wild gestures, and singing a psalm, he walked to the parapet of the redoubt and sat down. A serjeant and a few men went out to capture him. The prophet threw a stone at the serjeant, hitting him on the throat, and then—ran away. The surprised men fired a volley. The prophet sat down and resumed his psalm. After another volley he retreated. Having thus confirmed the faith of his followers, if not his own, he led them to assail Captain Shortt in the redoubt. In their advance they relied on the incantations of the prophet, and a man, like the hero of the night adventure, moved in front of the main body. When grape and musketry poured deadly hail among them, at first they stood calmly, and their strange leader again sung and waved his arms. A rifle-bullet dispelled the charm, and when nearly two score had fallen the Maoris fled. The brother prophets declared that Hepaniah had offended the Angel Gabriel, and one of them, Matene, went southwards to make fresh converts, and attack the settlement at Wanganui, which so recently was thought by Dr. Featherston to be safe. Matene applied to the Wanganui natives for permission to pass down the river. It was refused. The prophet was willing to wait two months, but Hemi Nape, Mete Kingi, and others, tired of negotiations, challenged him to battle on the island of Moutoa, in the river Wanganui. There was apprehension in the English settlement, where the real force of the rebels was unknown. It was supposed that some of the Waikato natives had joined them. In the settlement there was a garrison of 300 soldiers. Matene accepted the challenge sent to him. Neither army was to surprise the other. The time appointed was daybreak on the 14th May. The island was about 300 yards long, 20 wide, and about 15 high. At daybreak Hemi Napi was posted at the place where the Hau Haus were to land. Mete Kingi followed with the reserve. The advance party was in three bands: ten men were commanded by Kereti, nine by Hemi and Riwai, fifteen by Aperaniko and Haimona. The river was low, and the friends of the English on the left bank could wade easily to and from the island. From the right bank the Hau Hau fanatics had to move in canoes, from which they were allowed to land without opposition. They also formed advance companies with a reserve in the rear. There were not 150 of them, and many were boys. The Wanganui army was nearly 300 strong. When the Hau Haus had formed their battle-array within twenty yards of their enemies, they commenced their incantations, and continued them for two hours. Like Hepaniah they thought themselves invulnerable, and believed that their enemies would be nerveless. A Hau Hau fired a shot. The forces slowly advanced, and when within ten yards of each other fired volleys with mutual effect. Kereti's fall dispirited his friends. When Hemi and Riwai were also killed, the army fled in terror, and some crossed to the river-bank. Haimona reaching the end of the island, shouted, “I will go no further,” rallied a few less superstitious than the rest, poured a volley into his pursuers, was joined by Mete Kingi with the reserve, and drove the enemy with loss to the end of the island whence a few escaped in a boat, the swimmers being shot in the river. Matene, wounded thus, reached the bank, but was followed by a swimmer, Te Moro, who tomahawked him on land. Forty were left dead on Moutoa: many sank in the river. Among the friends of the English twelve were killed, and thirty wounded. The Wanganui settlers breathed freely, and in due time the Provincial Government erected in the market-place a monument “to the memory of those brave men who fell at Moutoa in defence of law and order against fanaticism and barbarism.”

Meantime, rumours of the intended attack had brought Dr. Featherston with a band of the Colonial Defence Force, to Wanganui. Landing there the day after the battle, he found the settlers enthusiastic in praise of the heroism of their allies. On the 17th, Hori Kingi and others proceeded up the river in canoes. Dr. Featherston followed, lamenting that some settlers grudged the supply of arms and ammunition to the friendly chiefs. The voyage was prolonged by repeated (tangi) wailing for the killed, in which the chiefs indulged. The victorious natives were found at Ranana. They wanted ammunition and guns. Hori Kingi wanted something else. He besought Dr. Featherston to release the prisoners, or at least Te Raimona. “We have fought for the Queen and to protect the Pakeha. We have killed in battle many of our nearest relations and friends. We have taken others prisoners. Have we not done enough? Must we surrender them to be sent to Auckland, or Wellington—to gaol? But if they must be surrendered, whatever you say shall be done. Cannot Te Raimona be given up to us? He is nearly related to every chief of the river.” Dr. Featherston replied that he was bound to insist on the prisoners being handed over to him. As the fleet of canoes, with 150 armed men, passed the place where Te Raimona lay, Hori Kingi said: “Featherston, my heart is very dark about my children, especially Te Raimona. This is the first time I have passed this place without calling; the hearts of all the chiefs and their people are dark… many of our people prayed this morning that they might be excused from joining in this expedition. You have said they are the Queen's prisoners and must be surrendered to her. We come to surrender them. But still our hearts are sad.…” At this appeal the man overcame the official in Dr. Featherston. “To understand and appreciate its pathos (he wrote) every word must have been heard and the speaker seen.” He promised that if Hori Kingi and other chiefs would write to the Governor he would support their prayer for a pardon. The old chief's eyes glistened with delight; he sprang up, hailed the five canoes in advance to stop, and gave them in a few figurative words what appeared a mere hint of what Dr. Featherston had said. “But this was quite sufficient; the gloom which had hung over them instantly disappeared; a cry of joy burst from the whole of them, and off they started, plying their paddles with tenfold vigour, and there was no longer silence, but the usual cries and songs resounded from every canoe.”

There were discussions with Pehi, a chief friendly to the Maori king. He had dissuaded the prophet Matene and the “mad dogs” who were with him, but he was urgent against the surrender of the prisoners. They were surrendered. In Wanganui there was public grief when Hemi Napi and a brother chief were buried. The garrison, the civilians, and many settlers were in the funeral procession, and the general sympathy deeply affected the Maoris. Dr. Featherston reported that “kingism was doomed, and that there was never so little prospect of the peace of the west coast being disturbed.” Hori Kingi's eloquence was not spent in vain. Sir George Grey, with the concurrence of his Ministry, handed over all the prisoners to the friendly natives on parole. The light and darkness of Maori life were never more strangely exemplified. At the pah where Te Raimona was delivered to Dr. Featherston, Matene's men had dug two large ovens in which to cook the foes, at whose intercession the Hau Hau prisoners were now to be released. Dr. Featherston's influence did much to ensure peace. Wi Tako Ngatata, who had leaned to the Maori king, would not ally himself to the “mad Hau Hau prophets.” “My kind of kingism,” he said, “would never have ended thus. It was calculated to bring forth good fruits only. I have nothing to be ashamed of when I meet the tribes. I was faithful to kingism till it died, and I had no hand in its death.” In a clear and distinct voice, on the 3rd June, 1864, he took the oath of allegiance, and his subsequent exertions mainly contributed to suppress disaffection in the southern parts of the island.

Captain Lloyd's head was supposed to have been lost in the river at Moutoa. In June, the interpreter to the troops at Wanganui (Mr. Broughton) heard that it was at Waitotara in the hands of Te Ua. He went alone to ask for it, and saw 100 armed men led by Hapurona, Te Rangitake's fighting chief. Te Ua gave to him a head which officers of the 57th Regiment believed to be that of their late comrade. Mr. Fox, meanwhile, was warmly welcomed at Kaipara by a tribe, which in ancient times had suffered much at the hands of the Waikato, and some amongst whom gloated over the defeat of their former foes. He encouraged their triumph.

Must not the prophecy of Sir William Martin have run like iron into the hearts of any who were capable of remorse for provoking the war? Eighteen years had passed since he had said that the confiscation and seizure of land proposed by Earl Grey would, if adopted, make Maoris think the English a nation of liars, and cause them to abandon the faith they had accepted, and which the givers so unworthily departed from. The deed done at Waitara had justified the fears, and the wild orgies of the new sect convinced the most sceptical of the wisdom, of the good man whom Colonel Browne, and Mr. Richmond, and at a later date Fox and Whitaker, refused to regard. In 1864, the Government forces took possession of various places in the Waitara district. A strongly-fortified pah, Manutahi, was abandoned after trifling resistance, and Te Arei at Pukerangiora, which the General had approached by sap, in 1861, fell into Colonel Warre's hands in October, without a struggle. He was piloted by the friendly natives, and the enemy were few in number. Neither Rewi, nor Te Rangitake, nor Hapurona were there. Rewi and the men of Ngatimaniapoto had serious work at their own homes. Colonel Warre scoured the country, destroyed villages wherever he could find them, and having driven men, women, and children from their homes to fastnesses or wilds in the interior, formed a redoubt at Te Arei, with a strong garrison.

The attitude of the Ngatikahungunu tribe, whose territory extended on the east coast from Wellington to Napier, was an object of concern to the Government. There were feuds between the tribes on the Wairoa river. Major Whitmore, Civil Commissioner at Napier, urged them to be reconciled and accept one law for all. As to the Maori king, he did not complain of their sympathy with the idea of native union; but let them not add flames to war. In Waikato the English were at war merely because Englishmen had been murdered. Let not the east coast tribes interfere. The Maoris were at the time troubled by cases of adultery, and wished Major Whitmore to help them to a law of divorce, but he was unable to give them comfort. At the meeting no less than 600 Maoris were guests. Major Whitmore reported that it was possible to keep on good terms with the Ngatikahungunu, but that men had gone to the war at Waikato from the Ngatiporou at the East Cape and from the rugged Uriwera territory. The Bishop of Waiapu (William Williams) reported much ferment in February at Poverty Bay on the subject of land confiscations. The natives wanted to see the Governor. Meanwhile, the war at Waikato, and the intended devastation at Tauranga, which was frustrated for a time by the Civil Commissioner's prudence, occupied attention. Having occupied Ngaruawahia without opposition in December, 1863, General Cameron, after a few weeks, advanced along the Waipa river to Te Rore.

The Maoris were entrenched at Paterangi, situate in a country where, in what was called the great Waikato plain, low ridges and mounds are surrounded or intersected by swamps and winding valleys with swampy hollows. High fern intermingling with flax and low manukau scrub gave cover to scouting parties. A few miles to the south-east were Te Awamutu, whence Mr. Gorst had been expelled, Kihi Kihi (Rewi's chief residence), and Rangiaohia, all situate in one of the richest parts of the Waikato champaign. Thence large quantities of wheat had been sent to Auckland in years gone by, ministering to the wants of the colonists, and supplying the Maoris with means to procure fire-arms. The Paterangi works of the Maoris were unusually intricate. Line upon line of zigzag rifle-pits intersected the slopes of fern-covered ridges. The General bombarded from a distance, but made no impression, and his Maori allies advised him not to attempt to storm. The Bishop, writing from the camp at Te Rore on the 4th February to a son. said that the Maoris had “so strengthened their position by earthworks that the General is obliged to proceed cautiously and systematically. The popular idea of ‘rushing’ seems to have been abandoned since Rangiriri.” On the 11th February, about 50 soldiers were fired at on their way to bathe in the Mangapiko river. Colonel Waddy sent reinforcements, and the Maoris only escaped destruction in consequence of the uneven and fern-covered nature of the ground. The General witnessed the skirmish, and highly praised the officers engaged. Lieutenant- ColonelLieutenant-Colonel Havelock reported that the action cost the Maoris 28 men killed, and two wounded prisoners. Of the English, six were killed, and a few wounded. The hero of the assault upon the Maoris engaged in religious service at Paparata was lauded for his activity on this occasion, when those whom he attacked were not principally women and children. As regarded the inclusion of women in the horrors of war, the General, with the aid of the Forest Rangers, was about to do a deed which contributed to forfeit for Bishop Selwyn his place in Maori affections. The Bishop hoped, by accompanying the troops, to soften the rigours of war, and to administer consolation to the wounded without regard to the side on which they had fought. But the Waikato tribes would not believe that man to be their friend who marched with their enemies.

Writing to a brother Bishop, Selwyn said in 1863: “I have now one simple missiouary idea before me, that of watching over the remnant that is left. Our native work is a remnant in two senses,—the remnant of a decaying people and the remnant of a decaying faith. The works of which you hear are not the works of heathens; they are the works of baptized men whose love has grown cold from causes common to all churches of neophytes from Laodicea downwards.”

He was fired at as he rode from post to post, but as of yore at Kororarika he went about the field of battle to succour the wounded. On one occasion he was with an officer carrying a wounded enemy to the camp, and meeting two soldiers received their help. As he carried the relieving soldier's rifle, he was reproached for having acted in so warlike a manner.

Wiremu Nera strove to induce the tribes to make peace. He found the king-maker at Maungatautari, willing to remain quiet if not attacked. Others were more warlike. But at Paterangi neither the Ngatimaniapoto, under Rewi, nor the Ngatiraukawa, nor any others, would listen to persuasion. One chief stood up and said, “Welcome, welcome, son. Peace shall not be made. If we are to die we will die in Waikato.” Unable to influence his brethren, Wiremu Nera returned to the General and provided him with guides. One service rendered to the General by the friendly Maoris was in deterring him from assaulting the intricate lines of Paterangi. Within them the Maoris, provided with potatoes for immediate wants, longed to be attacked. Their chief depot for food was at Rangiaohia, and thither the General proceeded at midnight on the 20th February with a force of about 1100 men, to surprise the encampment, and annihilate the Maori commissariat. Colonel Waddy, with about 600, remained at Te Rore in front of Paterangi. At daybreak the General pushed on from Te Awamutu to Rangiaohia. “The few natives who were found in the place,” he said, “were quickly dispersed, and the greater part escaped, but a few of them taking shelter in a whā-rĕ made a desperate resistance until the Forest Rangers and a company of the 65th Regiment surrounded the whā-rĕ, which was set on fire, and the defenders either killed or taken prisoners.” This was the official method of telling, or concealing, that women and children were burned to death. For the credit of General Cameron it may be hoped that when he thus wrote, four days after the occurrence, he did not know the truth which was subsequently notorious.

Of what avail was it to preach peace to the Maoris, and tell them to be merciful, when a British force, commanded by a General, and accompanied by a Bishop, burnt women and children in a Maori house? Was it to be wondered at that a great grief came upon the Bishop when he heard that a plot was laid by the enemy to take his life? The successful General returned to Te Awamutu with 21 women and children who were not burned. He had fluttered the Maoris effectually. Though their men of war were at Paterangi and Maungatautari, their principal food stores, such as they were, were at Rangiaohia. That food was now destroyed, though the General did not think it worth his while to mention the fact in reporting his exploits. The grief of the Maoris at Paterangi was intense. They had expected the General to fight according to Maori principles with the foe ready to meet him. They had not dreamed that heavy guns and a large body of troops would be turned aside against women and children. Their rage at being outwitted by the flank-movement which left them idle, and destroyed their food and plantations, was exaggerated by the burning of their wives and children. Gathering their ammunition together they evacuated Paterangi, and were seen moving to Rangiaohia on the morning of the 22nd February, at which time also Colonel Waddy and his forces found Paterangi empty. The General marched against a band of Maoris between Rangiaohia and Te Awamutu in the afternoon of the 22nd, and thought that at least 30 of them were killed. But for the fern it would seem strange that all were not destroyed; for only by concealment could a Maori hope to see an enemy within the range which his fire-arms could cover, while rifles laid the Maori low at long ranges. The main body fled through a swamp towards Maungatautari, where a pah was in course of construction. On the 21st eight, and on the 22nd twenty-one, English were included in the returns of killed and wounded. The General's camp at Te Awamutu was but a short distance from Rewi's Kihikihi settlement, and both were near Orakau, soon to be rendered famous in New Zealand story by deeds which extorted admiration from enemies.

Two documents written at this period may be referred to with advantage. Mr.