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            <date when="1921">1921</date>
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          <titlePart type="main">The <lb/>New Zealand Division<lb/>1916 - 1919</titlePart>
          <titlePart>A Popular History<lb/>Based on Official Records</titlePart>
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        <byline rend="center"><hi rend="lsc">by</hi><lb/><docAuthor><hi rend="c">Col. H. Stewart</hi></docAuthor>, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.<lb/><hi rend="i">(Late Comdg. 2nd Bn., Canterbury Regt.)</hi></byline>
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            <hi rend="c">Whitcombe and Tombs Limited</hi>
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            <hi rend="lsc">Auckland, Christchurch, Dunedin, Wellington</hi>
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          <date when="1921">1921</date>
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          <hi rend="b">Preface</hi>
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        <p>In accordance with instructions received from the New Zealand Government, this history is designed for the intelligent general reader. Technicalities have been simplified as far as possible, and the meanings of non-obvious terms have been explained. The narrative deals almost exclusively with movements and engagements. No detailed review of administrations has been attempted, and I have eschewed statistics. On the other hand, individual acts of gallantry receive an amount of notice which in a work addressed to the serious student would be disproportionate.</p>
        <p>With a small self-contained unit like the New Zealand Division it is possible to see how a complete accurate and vivid record might have been compiled by a "Historian," as distinct from a Press Correspondent, writing contemporaneously with the Division's actions. Endowed with the necessary qualifications of tact, energy, patience, sanity, technical knowledge, and a passion for accuracy, and living at Divisional headquarters, he would have been able to interview participants, down to section commanders if necessary, and thereby check statements, amplify official narratives, elucidate obscurities, catch the atmosphere of the time and describe the country at leisure from actual observation. He might have produced a picture unique for truthfulness and interest.</p>
        <p>As it was, the opportunity was overlooked. The actors are now dispersed, and the historian must fall back on written records. Such records can be supplemented by the recollections of officers and men, but owing to the unreliability of the human memory and for various other reasons this latter source of information must be used with the greatest caution. Battalion and Company Commanders writing first-hand descriptions on the morrow of an engagement know the difficulties in the way of setting out detailed truth. A year or more afterwards the task of recapturing facts is a desperate undertaking.</p>
        <p>The authorities used for this book are:—
					<list><label>(i)</label><item>The monthly War Diaries of Units, with their appendices. These are of varying value. Those of Division (G.S.) and of Brigades are generally good. Those of Battalions, in 1916 highly inadequate, improved considerably in the latter <pb xml:id="n4" n="iv"/>part of the war. None fortunately are so laconic as that of a certain English unit, whose sole reference to a highly successful advance on the Messines Ridge 7th June 1917 is limited to the words "Took part in the Battle of Messines." Many, however, written under the pressure of other work, are scrappy and inaccurate, and all are necessarily somewhat dry and colourless. I have read all the diaries of every unit in the Division, and studied extensively those of the different Armies and Corps, of which the Division from time to time formed part, together with those of flank Divisions Brigades and Battalions, without knowledge of which one's view is inevitably circumscribed and frequently wrong.</item><label>(ii)</label><item>Operation Orders, including those of Armies and Corps.</item><label>(iii)</label><item>Corps Division Brigade and Battalion Intelligence Summaries, memoranda on tactical situations, &amp;c.</item><label>(iv.)</label><item>Narratives of operations, as and when compiled by Armies) Corps<note xml:id="fn1-iv" n="1"><p>A particularly valuable resumé of its part in the Battles of Bapaume and Havrincourt-Epehy was issued by the IV. Corps.</p></note> and smaller formations.</item><label>(v)</label><item>Orders issued and messages and reports submitted during operations, and records of telephone conversations.</item><label>(vi)</label><item>N.Z.E.F. Orders and Gradation Lists, and Divisional Routine Orders.</item><label>(vii)</label><item>Recommendations for Honours and Awards.</item><label>(viii)</label><item>Reports rendered by the G.O.C., N.Z. Division, and the G.O. i/c Administration to the G.O.C., N.Z.E.F., for transmission to the New Zealand Government.</item><label>(ix)</label><item>Various, such as personal diaries, copies of private letters to New Zealand, statements on oath by repatriated prisoners of war, the Official Correspondent's despatches, &amp;c. of the histories which I have consulted, I have found Col. Buchan's volumes ("Nelson's History of the War") much the most valuable. Though frequently incorrect in details they present a well-informed and vividly expressed narrative of political tendencies and of the changing military situation and general military operations. Lt.-Col. Weston's "Three Years with the New Zealanders" gives a graphic account of a battalion's experiences in war. Lt.-Col S. S. Allen's admirable "2nd Auckland, 1918," was published after the bulk of my own book had gone to press, but I have been able to derive useful information from it for my later chapters.</item><label>(x)</label><item>Haig's Despatches.</item></list></p>
        <pb xml:id="n5" n="v"/>
        <p>In September 1919 I paid a visit to all the Division's battlefields to determine certain topographical obscurities.</p>
        <p>Exactitude was not perhaps the most conspicuous virtue of pre-war Regimental Histories. Every possible care has been taken in this narrative to ensure accuracy, but I cannot hope to have avoided altogether errors of detail. With the fallibility of the more important original sources, not overmuch reliance can be put in the most rigorously scientific methods to recover facts from them. The insecurity of the historian of previous wars and ages, dependent often as he is on second-hand authorities, has been impressed on me during these investigations with great force. For any corrections sent me at the undermentioned address I shall be grateful. I trust, however, that substantial accuracy will be found to have been attained. Certain cruces of no special importance, arising from conflicting or inadequate information, are perhaps now insoluble. In cases where marked discrepancies exist, as to captures of prisoners objectives &amp;c., I have found it a good principle to select the less favourable account. Certain diaries, it may be added, afford entertaining or exasperating illustrations of the preference shown by amour propre to camouflage rather than to confession. Apart from the actual facts I have endeavoured to convey a faithful and sober idea of the atmosphere of war in which the Division existed, of its complex machinery, its demand for strenuous and incessant labour, its hardship squalor waste, and its challenge to fortitude self-denial and gallantry.</p>
        <p>A few points of treatment may be noted. The material necessary for the complete presentation of the main outlines of the war is not yet available. As a background to the story of the Division, I have thought it essential to give concise summaries of the general operations of the time, but do not pretend to look on these as conclusive. To avoid prolixity and obscurity, the smallest infantry unit mentioned by name is the Battalion, and except on special occasions Companies are not distinguished by title or letter. These will receive due recognition in the various Regimental histories. In the nomenclature of the Territorial Battalions I have preferred to maintain generally the curious idiosyncrasy and all but invariable usage of the Division and have called the 1st Battalion Auckland Regiment "1st Auckland" rather than "the 1st Aucklands," or "Auckland" rather than "the Aucklanders." On the other hand, the Rifle Brigade Battalions are for conciseness distinguished as "the 1st Rifles," <pb xml:id="n6" n="vi"/>&amp;c., terms which were rarely if ever used in the Division.<note xml:id="fn2-vi" n="1"><p>Usually "1st Bn., etc., N.Z.R.B." Colloquially the Rifle Brigade Battalions were known as "Dinks," a term applied to them on their arrival in Egypt, 1916, and alluding to the special patronage which they enjoyed of the Governor-General of the Dominion, and to their peculiarities of drill and dress.</p></note> The New Zealand Field Artillery Brigades are numbered without further definition, and the word "English" or "British" is added in the case of Imperial artillery units. Unless when the coherence of the narrative demands otherwise, units are mentioned from right to left. Initials, except when their omission makes for ambiguity, are not repeated. Names of officers commanding battalions in battle are given only when the Battalion Commander himself is for any reason absent. In several maps contours have for the sake of clearness been omitted. The illustrations except those of persons or where stated otherwise have been selected from the official N.Z.E.F. photographs. One example of the Army aeroplane photographs is shown.</p>
        <p>Throughout my work the Historical Section of the War Cabinet allowed me free access to all the records I wanted, and I have to thank their officials, Brig.-Gen. J. E. Edmonds, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.,. Major H. C. Ferguson, C.M.G., Welsh Guards, and particularly Major C. T. Atkinson, for their courtesy and assistance. Major J. T. Treloar, O.B.E., Australian War Records, with similar readiness put all his serviceable material at my disposal.</p>
        <p>In a still greater degree I received the utmost help from <name type="person" key="name-209594">Major H. S. Westmacott</name>, Auckland Regiment, who was in charge latterly of the New Zealand War Records. The most troublesome and inconvenient demands were met by him and his staff always cheerfully and ungrudgingly.</p>
        <p>I have also to acknowledge assistance from many officers and men, and more particularly from the understated: <name type="person" key="name-208052">Lt.-Gen. Sir A. J. Godley</name>, Major-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-209146">Sir A. H. Russell</name>, <name type="person" key="name-413192">Brig.-Gen. G. N. Johnston</name>, <name type="person" key="name-418886">Brig.-Gen. C. W. Melvill</name>, Brig.-Gen. R. Young, Lt.-Col. F. Symon, Lt.-Col. J. Studholme, Lt.-Col. H. E. Barrowelough, all of whom have read the work in type and made valuable suggestions. The well-known French antiquarian, M. Léon Contil, procured for me information, un-obtainable in England, about the Butte de Polygon. I owe a special debt to <name type="person" key="name-207718">Capt. S. Cory Wright</name>, Divisional Intelligence Officer, who most unselfishly scrutinised the whole narrative with minute care, and supplemented it from his unrivalled store of precise information. On points of detail I have received help from <name type="person" key="name-209077">Brig.-Gen. G. S. Richardson</name>, <pb xml:id="n7" n="vii"/><name type="person" key="name-208857">Lt-Col. E. H. Northcroft</name>, Lt.-Col. C. H. D. Evans, <name type="person" key="name-416614">Major J. L. C. Merton</name>, Capt. V. G. Jervis, Capt. W. J. Organ, <name type="person" key="name-207303">Lt. L. C. L. Averill</name>.</p>
        <p>All these officers have given me valuable information on obscure points and helped me to avoid or eliminate inaccuracies. For such as may remain I am solely responsible. I have also to acknowledge the unwearied energy and painstaking, scholarly, care of my secretary, Sergt. R. S. Gilmour; and the excellent work done, under my general supervision, in the preparation of the maps by Messrs. E. D. Broadhead, J. L. Martin and E. Pfankuch, of the Lands and Survey Department. The task of proof-correcting has been materially lightened by the assistance of my wife and Mr. T. W. Cane. Finally: I desire to thank Mr. Louis Whitcombe and his staff for their unfailing vigilance courtesy and consideration.</p>
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          <signed>H.S.</signed>
          <address>
            <addrLine>Canterbury College, Christchurch,</addrLine>
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          <date when="1920-07-01">1st July 1920.</date>
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              <cell rend="right">
                <hi rend="sc">Page</hi>
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                <ref target="#n9">
                  <hi rend="sc">List of Illustrations</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n9">ix</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n11">
                  <hi rend="sc">List of Maps</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n11">xi</ref>
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            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n12">
                  <hi rend="sc">Foreword by <name type="person" key="name-203760">Field-Marshal Earl Haig</name>, K.T., G.C.B., O.M., Etc.</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n12">xii</ref>
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            </row>
            <row>
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                <ref target="#n13"><hi rend="sc">Foreword by Lt. General Sir <name type="person" key="name-418918">G. M. Harper</name></hi>, K.C.B., D.S.O.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n13">xiii</ref>
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            <row>
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                <hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi>
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              <cell/>
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            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n17">I</ref>
                <ref target="#n17">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Formation of the Division</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n17">1</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n40">II</ref>
                <ref target="#n40">
                  <hi rend="sc">Summer at Armentieres</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n40">20</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n88">III</ref>
                <ref target="#n88"><hi rend="sc">The Battle of the Somme</hi>, 1916</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n88">6l</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n158">IV</ref>
                <ref target="#n158">
                  <hi rend="sc">Winter on the Lys</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n158">124</ref>
              </cell>
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            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n205">V</ref>
                <ref target="#n205">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Battle of Messines</hi>
                </ref>
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              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n205">166</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n273">VI</ref>
                <ref target="#n273">
                  <hi rend="sc">Basseville</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n273">225</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n300">VII</ref>
                <ref target="#n300">
                  <hi rend="sc">Gravenstafel and the Bellevue Spur</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n300">248</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n359">VIII</ref>
                <ref target="#n359">
                  <hi rend="sc">Winter at Ypres</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n359">298</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n397">IX</ref>
                <ref target="#n397"><hi rend="sc">The German Offensive</hi>, 1918</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n397">331</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n453">X</ref>
                <ref target="#n453">
                  <hi rend="sc">From Hebuterne to Puisieux-au-Mont</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n453">381</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n492">XI</ref>
                <ref target="#n492">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Battle of Bapaume</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n492">415</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n545">XII</ref>
                <ref target="#n545">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Battle Havrincourt-Epehy</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n545">460</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n579">XIII</ref>
                <ref target="#n579">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Battle of Cambrai and the Hindenburg Line</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n579">490</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n610">XIV</ref>
                <ref target="#n610">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Second Battle of Le Cateau</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n610">517</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n638">XV</ref>
                <ref target="#n638">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Battle of the Selle River</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n638">540</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n667">XVI</ref>
                <ref target="#n667">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Battle of The Sambre</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n667">564</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n712">XVII</ref>
                <ref target="#n712">
                  <hi rend="sc">Conclusion</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n712">602</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell role="span2">
                <ref target="#n734"><hi rend="sc">Index</hi> I</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n734">620</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell role="span2">
                <ref target="#n735"><hi rend="sc">Index</hi> II</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n735">621</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell role="span2">
                <ref target="#n736"><hi rend="sc">Index</hi> III</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n736">622</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
          </table>
        </p>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n9" n="ix"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-front1-d4" type="illustrations">
        <head>
          <hi rend="b">List of Illustrations</hi>
        </head>
        <p>
          <table>
            <row>
              <cell/>
              <cell rend="right">
                <hi rend="sc">Facing<lb/>Page</hi>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP001a"><hi rend="sc">Major-General Sir <name type="person" key="name-209146">A. H. Russell</name></hi>, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n17">1</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP002a"><hi rend="sc">Lt.-General Sir <name type="person" key="name-208052">A. J. Godley</name></hi>, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n22">6</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP003a"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-413192">G. Napier Johnston</name></hi>, C.M.G., D.S.O.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n25">7</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP003b"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. F. Earl Johnston</hi>, C.B.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n25">7</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP004a"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-207491">W. G. Braithwaite</name></hi>, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n30">12</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP004b"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-209077">G. S. Richardson</name></hi>, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n30">12</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP006a"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-416430">H. T. Fulton</name></hi>, C.M.G., D.S.O.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n40">20</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP006b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Major-General Russell addressing Troops</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n40">20</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP008a">
                  <hi rend="sc">General Godley inspects Troops</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n52">30</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP008b">
                  <hi rend="sc">At a Field Ambulance</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n52">30</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP009a">
                  <hi rend="sc">An Auckland Battalion on the March</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n55">31</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP009b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Otago Mounted Rifles</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n55">31</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP010a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Trench Constructions</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n66">42</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP011a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Salvage</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n69">43</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP011b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Communication with Aeroplanes</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n69">43</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP013a">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Burial Service</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n89">62</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP013b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Transport moving towards the Line</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n89">62</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP015a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Artillery on the March</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n115">86</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP015b">
                  <hi rend="sc">An Emplacement</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n115">86</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP016a">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Gun-pit in the Somme Battle</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n118">87</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP017a"><hi rend="sc">Sergt. <name type="person" key="name-418759">D. F. Brown</name></hi>, V.C.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n129">98</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP017b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Prisoners Carrying Wounded</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n129">98</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP018a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Packing Ammunition</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n132">99</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP018b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Box Respiration</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n132">99</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP020a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Trench Mortar Ammunition</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n170">136</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP020b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Infantry in Bailleul</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n170">136</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP021a"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-130093">C. H. J. Brown</name></hi>, D.S.O.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n173">137</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP021b"><hi rend="sc">Brig -Gen. II Hart</hi>, C.B., C.M.G, D.S.O.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n173">137</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP022a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Bivouacs in Ploegsteert Wood</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n188">150</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP022a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Bivouacs in Ploegsteert Wood</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n188">150</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP023a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Victims of Enemy Aircraft</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n189">151</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP023b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Training for Messines</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n189">151</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP025a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Tunneling Coy. Exclode Captured Ammunitions</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n209">170</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP025b">
                  <hi rend="sc">And Stack Captured Timber</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n209">170</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP026a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Wulverghem-Messines Road</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n212">171</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP026b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Shells bursting on Messines</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n212">171</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP027a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Messines: Results of Bombardment</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n227">186</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP027b">
                  <hi rend="sc">The ruins of Messines</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n227">186</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP028a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Tank going into Action</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n230">187</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP028b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Messines: Wounded Prisoners</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n230">187</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP029a"><hi rend="sc">2nd Lieut. S. Frickleton</hi> V.C.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n243">200</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP029b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Captured Trophiles in Bailleul</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n243">200</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP030a">
                  <hi rend="sc">H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught Inspects Trophies</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n246">201</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP030b">
                  <hi rend="sc">And Victors</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n246">201</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP032a"><hi rend="sc">2nd Lieut. <name type="person" key="name-010935">L. W. Andrew</name></hi>, V.C.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n270">224</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP032b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Pioneer reapering Roads</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n270">224</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP033a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Inspection by the Commander-in-Chief</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n273">225</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP033a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Inspection by the Commander-in-Chief</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n284">236</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP035a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Boxing Competition</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n287">237</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP035b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Water Polo</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n287">237</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP037a">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Motor Ambulance</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n295">243</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP037b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Transport leaving for the Line</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n295">243</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP038a">
                  <hi rend="sc">General Russell inspecting Troops</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n306">254</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP038b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Waterbottles</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n306">254</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <pb xml:id="n10" n="x"/>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP039a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Entraining For "Ypres"</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n309">255</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP039b">
                  <hi rend="sc">An Early Morning scene</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n309">255</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP040a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Ypres Canal</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n318">264</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP041a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Otto Farm</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n321">265</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP041b">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Capitol</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n321">265</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP042a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Bogged</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n330">274</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP042b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Field Guns in Shellholes</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n330">274</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP043a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Funeral of Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-208407">G. A. King</name></hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n333">275</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP043b">
                  <hi rend="sc">An Anti-tank Gun</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n333">275</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP044a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Runner</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n342">284</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP044b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Signallers laying Wire from Brigade Headquarters</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n342">284</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP045a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Ypres</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n345">285</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP045b">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Pill-box</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n345">285</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP047a"><hi rend="sc">Sergt. <name type="person" key="name-416679">H. J. Nicholas</name></hi>, V.C., M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n367">306</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP047b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Hooge</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n367">306</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP048a">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Snow-covered Battlefield</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n370">307</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP048b">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Butte de Polygon</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n370">307</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP050a"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-418886">C. W. Melvill</name></hi>, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n388">324</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP050b"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. R. Young</hi>, C.B., C.M.C., D.S.O.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n388">324</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP051a">
                  <hi rend="sc">An Artillery Observation Post</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n391">325</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP051b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Gun-pits near Westhoek</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n391">325</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP052a"><hi rend="sc">Reserves, March</hi> 1918</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n404">338</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP052b"><hi rend="sc">A Front Line Trench</hi>, 1918</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n404">338</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP053a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Artillery Teams under Cover</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n407">339</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP053b">
                  <hi rend="sc">In Action near Colincamps</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n407">339</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP054a">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Stray Prisoner in Courcelles</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n416">348</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP054b"><hi rend="sc">Prisoners 30th March</hi> 1918</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n416">348</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP055a"><hi rend="sc">Part of the Material Captured 30th March</hi> 1918</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n419">349</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP055b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Captured Machine Gun in Action near La Signy Farm</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n419">349</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP057a"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-413207">A. E. Stewart</name></hi>, C.M.G., D.S.O.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n443">371</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP057b">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Main Street, Heboterne</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n443">371</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP058a">
                  <hi rend="sc">A derelict Tank before Rossignol Wood</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n460">388</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP058b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Taking Water to the Front Line (Rossignol Wood)</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n460">388</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP059a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Prime Minister of New Zealand with a Machine Gun Coy.</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n463">389</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP059b">
                  <hi rend="sc">High-Explosive</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n463">389</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP060a"><hi rend="sc">Sergt. <name type="person" key="name-209489">R. C. Travis</name></hi>, V.C., D.C.M., M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n474">400</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP060b">
                  <hi rend="sc">On the Battlefield near Puisieux</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n474">400</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP061a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Ruins of Puisieux</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n477">401</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP061b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Pioneers at Puisieux</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n477">401</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP063a">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Battery moving through Achiet-le-Petit</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n499">422</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP063b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Geévillers Church</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n499">422</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP064a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Sergt S. Forsyth, V.C.</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n502">423</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP064b"><hi rend="sc">2nd Liuet. <name type="person" key="name-208363">R. S. Judson</name></hi>, V.C., D.C.M., M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n502">423</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP065a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Bapaume</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n511">432</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP066a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Artillery moving Forward</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n514">433</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP066b">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Battery crossing the Arras-Albert Railway</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n514">433</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP068a"><hi rend="sc">Lieut. J. G. Grant</hi>, V.C.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n524">442</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP068b">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Wellington Post before Bapaume</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n524">442</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP069a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Prisoners (Battle of Bapaume)</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n527">443</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP069b">
                  <hi rend="sc">material captured (battle of bapaume)</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n527">443</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP072a">
                  <hi rend="sc">2nd Lieut. H. J. Laurent, V.C.</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n566">480</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP072b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Jäger Prisoners passing Havrincourt Wood</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n566">480</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP073a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Captured Guns turned on the German Line</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n569">481</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP073b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Reparing broken Signal Wires</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n569">481</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP076a">
                  <hi rend="sc">A German Sap</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n598">508</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP077a"><hi rend="sc">Private J. Crichton</hi>, V.C.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n601">509</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP077b">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Tunnellers' Bridge, Canal du Nord</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n601">509</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <pb xml:id="n11" n="xi"/>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP079a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Scheldt Canal and Vaucelles</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n617">524</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP080a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Guns captured near Esnes</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n620">525</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP080b">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Tricolour reappears in Beauvois</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n620">525</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP083a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Corp Commander at a Church Parade</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n637">539</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP083b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Machine Gunners in a Captured Position</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n637">539</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP084a">
                  <hi rend="sc">One of the Selle Bridges</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n640">542</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP085a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Church in Solesmes</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n643">543</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP085b">
                  <hi rend="sc">A German Post abandoned in Retreat</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n643">543</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP086a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Mobile Trench Mortars</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n650">550</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP086b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Rifleman waiting their turn to Advance</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n650">550</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP087a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Level Crossing on the Orsinval Road</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n653">551</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP087b">
                  <hi rend="sc">A Post on the Valenciennes Railway</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n653">551</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP089a"><hi rend="sc">Support Troops, 4th November</hi> 1918</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n669">566</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP089b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Cookers</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n669">566</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP090a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Inner Rampart, <name type="place" key="name-413203">Le Quesnoy</name></hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n672">567</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP090b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Another Section of the Same</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n672">567</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP091a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Sluice Gate Bridge</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n681">576</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP091b">
                  <hi rend="sc">General Russell enters <name type="place" key="name-413203">Le Quesnoy</name>, 5th November</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n681">576</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP092a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The New Zealand Flag presented to <name type="place" key="name-413203">Le Quesnoy</name></hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n684">577</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP092b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Arrival of President Poincaré</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n684">577</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP093a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Southern Forester's House</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n697">588</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP093b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Prisoners taken near <name type="place" key="name-413203">Le Quesnoy</name></hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n693">586</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP094a">
                  <hi rend="sc">A New Zealand Battery</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n696">587</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP094b">
                  <hi rend="sc">In Open Warfare</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n696">587</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP096a">
                  <hi rend="sc">First Stage on the March to German (Solesmes)</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n714">604</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP097a">
                  <hi rend="sc">H.R.H. The Prince of Wales inspects 2nd Otago</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n717">605</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP097b">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Y.M.C.A.</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n717">605</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP098a"><hi rend="sc">A Contrast—Divisional Headquarters, September</hi> 1918</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n726">614</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP098b">
                  <hi rend="sc">And January 1919 (Leverkusen)</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n726">614</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP099a">
                  <hi rend="sc">New Zealand Sentries on the Rhine</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n729">615</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP099b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Demobilisation: Transport at Mülheim</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n729">615</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
          </table>
        </p>
      </div>
      <div xml:id="t1-front1-d5" type="maps">
        <head>
          <hi rend="b">List of Maps</hi>
        </head>
        <p>
          <table>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP005a">
                  <hi rend="sc">N.W. France</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n33">13</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP007a">
                  <hi rend="sc">St. Omer and Hazebrouck</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n43">21</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP012a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Armentières and Vicinity</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n80">54</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP014a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Area of the somme battlefield</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n92">63</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP019a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Flers and Vicinity</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n145">112</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP024a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Messines and Ypres</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n194">156</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP024a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Messines</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n259">214</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP036a">
                  <hi rend="sc">La Basse-Ville</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n292">242</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP046a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Gravenstafel</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n356">296</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP049a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Polderhoek</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n373">310</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP056a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Upper Ancre</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n440">370</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP062a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Puisieux-au-Mont</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n486">410</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP065a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Bapaume</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n519">438</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP070a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Haplincourt</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n536">452</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP071a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Havrincourt</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n553">468</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP074a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Trescault Spur</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n570">482</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP075a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Hindenburg Line</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n587">498</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP079a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Scheldt Canal</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n604">512</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP081a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Beauvois-en-Cambrésts</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n621">526</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP082a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Selle River</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n634">538</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP088a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Beaudignies</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n654">552</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-FranP095a">
                  <hi rend="sc">
                    <name type="place" key="name-413203">Le Quesnoy</name>
                  </hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n703">594</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
          </table>
        </p>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n12" n="xii"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-front1-d6" type="foreword" decls="#text-1-bibl">
        <head>
          <hi rend="b">Foreword by <name type="person" key="name-203760">Field-Marshal Earl Haig</name>, of<lb/>Bemersyde, K.T., G.C.B., O.M., Etc.</hi>
        </head>
        <opener>
          <salute>G.H.Q. The Forces in Great Britain,</salute>
          <add>Horse Guards,<lb/>
						London, S.W.I.</add>
          <date when="1919-08-14">14th August, 1919</date>
        </opener>
        <p>The story of New Zealand's share in the Great War needs no introduction from anyone, but I am grateful for the opportunity to express to the people of New Zealand my high opinion of the troops they sent to fight under my command. I can assure them that my opinion is shared by everyone with whom New Zealand troops came in contact.</p>
        <p>The pages of this book will tell you of the exploits of your Division. I can only add that no Division in France built up for itself a finer reputation, whether for the gallantry of its conduct in battle or for the excellence of its behaviour out of the line. Its record does honour to the land from which it came and to the Empire for which it fought.</p>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-Franxiia">
            <graphic url="WH1-Franxiia.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-Franxiia-g"/>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <closer>
          <salute>Field-Marshal</salute>
        </closer>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n13" n="xiii"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-front1-d7" type="foreword" decls="#text-2-bibl">
        <head>
          <hi rend="b">Foreword by Lt.-General Sir <name type="person" key="name-418918">G. M. Harper</name>,<lb/> K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding IV. Corps</hi>
        </head>
        <p>After the evacuation of Gallipoli the New Zealand Division was ordered to France and arrived in April, 1916.</p>
        <p>At the time both sides were involved in trench warfare. The British, in conjunction with the French, attacked during the autumn on the Somme. The enemy was not sufficiently reduced in numbers, armament or moral, for a decision to be obtained. It was not then considered justifiable to attack at various periods on several portions of the front. Communication had not been sufficiently perfected, nor was the artillery considered adequate. In an offensive on a comparatively narrow front the enemy was naturally able to concentrate his artillery and reserves against the particular portion attacked, with comparative safety to the remainder of his front.</p>
        <p>In 1917 the British plan was more ambitious. The Arras offensive in April was succeeded by the attack on Messines Ridge, afterwards by the Ypres offensive in July, and later, in November, by the Cambrai attack supported by tanks. In each case, however, the attack definitely ceased before being undertaken elsewhere. As in the preceding year, the enemy, after suffering initial losses, was able to concentrate in such force as to make further attacks very costly.</p>
        <p>In these offensives the success of a Division depended mainly upon artillery support. If the plan had been well devised, if the artillery support was adequate, and further, if the infantry had been well trained and practised in the tasks they had to carry out, they generally took their objective with comparatively slight loss. It was, however, in the consolidation after the attack that losses were chiefly incurred. Divisions therefore suffered heavy losses from machine guns if unsuccessful in the first instance, and if successful, from artillery fire in the later stages. In either case, after a few days' fighting they had to be withdrawn to recuperate and refit. It was thus impracticable for a Division to make a prolonged sustained effort against the enemy.</p>
        <p>During this period the New Zealand Division made several gallant attacks, but for the reasons given above, they <pb xml:id="n14" n="xiv"/>were not able to make their individuality properly felt, nor impress their full fighting powers upon the enemy. Their opportunity came, however, when, in 1918, the Division joined the IV. Corps at the critical time in March, when it completely checked the enemy's advance at Beaumont-Hamel and Colincamps, and closed the gap between the IV. and V. Corps. By a brilliant stroke it drove the enemy from the commanding ground at La Signy Farm, south of Hébuterne. This enabled observation to be obtained over the enemy's lines. A period of trench warfare then ensued. During this time the New Zealanders established a complete ascendency over the enemy. By carefully considered and well executed raids they gave him no respite, and identifications of the hostile units were obtained whenever required. It was this ascendency which compelled the enemy to evacuate the ground about Rossignol Wood.</p>
        <p>In the great attack which commenced in August 1918 the New Zealand Division played a most brilliant part in the operations on the IV. Corps front. Its efforts were crowned with almost continual success. Of these the most notable were the capture of Bapaume, after having driven the enemy from Grévillers and Biefvillers; the brilliant night advance from Welsh Ridge, which, on the 1st October, led to the capture of Crèvecoeur; and subsequently the great attack on the 8th October, when the Division broke through the northern portion of the strongly organised Masnieres Line and penctrated far into the enemy's line at Esnes and Haucourt. These successes were finally crowned by the skilful attack which led to the surrender of the fortress of <name type="place" key="name-413203">Le Quesnoy</name> and the driving of the enemy through the Forest of Mormal.</p>
        <p>During the period the New Zealanders were in the IV. Corps they captured from the enemy 287 officers, 8745 other ranks, 145 guns, 1419 machine guns, and 2 tanks, besides much other material. These continued successes constituted a record which it is safe to say was unsurpassed in the final series of attacks which led to the armistice.</p>
        <p>What were the causes which conduced to these successes? Firstly, the New Zealander was endowed to a marked degree with bravery, individuality and initiative. Every man fought intelligently. If a portion of the attacking line was checked, the remainder worked their way forward, dealt with the enemy opposing the advance, or relieved the situation so that an advance was possible on the whole front. Secondly, <pb xml:id="n15" n="xv"/>the Division was kept up to strength throughout the operations. It was thus possible to retain brigades of four battalions, whereas in the British Divisions a, reduction to three had become necessary.</p>
        <p>The Division was kept up in physique as well as numbers; but numbers, endowed with intelligence and bravery, are not in themselves sufficient to ensure victory.</p>
        <p>The Division was particularly fortunate in its commander. <name type="person" key="name-209146">Major-General Sir A. H. Russell</name> was a soldier by training and by nature. Imbued with sound tactical ideas, he was able to launch the Division in attack with a sound plan and a reasonable chance of success. He thought out problems beforehand, in fact, he was always thinking ahead. He inspired those whom he served and those who served him with the utmost confidence. His staff was thoroughly efficient, as was not surprising with a commander of this calibre. The Division was also fortunate in its brigadiers and subordinate commanders, who were selected in accordance with their fighting capacity. The consequence was that throughout the Division there was mutual confidence and whole-hearted co-operation. It was this that contributed to success as much as, and even more than, the qualities of the individual fighting soldier.</p>
        <p>New Zealand may well be proud of the Division that contributed so largely to the ultimate defeat of the enemy. Its achievements were splendid, and as such, they should be recorded in history.</p>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-Fran0xva">
            <graphic url="WH1-Fran0xva.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-Fran0xva-g"/>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <closer>
          <salute rend="center">Lt.-General,<lb/>Commanding IV. Corps.</salute>
        </closer>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n16"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-front1-d8" type="frontispiece">
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP001a">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP001a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP001a-g"/>
            <head><hi rend="sc">Major-General Sir <name type="person" key="name-209146">A. H. Russell</name></hi>, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.</head>
          </figure>
        </p>
      </div>
    </front>
    <body xml:id="t1-body1">
      <head>
        <hi rend="b">The New Zealand Division</hi>
      </head>
      <pb xml:id="n17" n="1"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body1-d1" type="chapter">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Chapter I</hi>
          <lb/>
          <hi rend="sc">The Formation of the Division</hi>
        </head>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d1-d1" type="section">
          <p>It does not fall within the province of this book to describe the raising and dispatch of the original New Zealand Expeditionary Force, the formation of the New Zealand and Australian Division, which consisting predominantly of New Zealanders included an Australian infantry brigade and other Australian units, or the achievements of the composite Division in Egypt and Gallipoli. <note xml:id="fn3-1" n="1"><p>For the early history of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, the New Zealand and Australian Division, and the Australian and new Zealand Army Corps, see Waite. <hi rend="i">The New Zealanders at Gallipoli.</hi></p></note> The present narrative has for its subject the history of the New Zealand Division, whose inception dates from the early spring of 1916 with the transference of the Australian units of the old composite Division to Australian formations and the raising of fresh units to take their place and to complete the establishment of a purely New Zealand Division.</p>
          <p>This reorganization followed after a short interval the inevitable abandonment of the Peninsula in December 1915 and January 1916. The policy of evacuation had made for a necessarily piecemeal arrival in Egypt, but by the end of the first week in January the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions (less mounted troops) were concentrated at Tel-el-Kebir, and the New Zealand and Australian Division (less mounted troops) at Moascar, near Ismailia, on the <name key="name-001365" type="place">Suez Canal</name>.<note xml:id="fn4-1" n="2"><p>The 3 Australian light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade had been despatched to zeitoun in the vicinity of Cairo.</p></note> The latter neighbourhood was already familiar to the New Zealand infantry as the scene of their first experience of battle, for it was here that a year previously year had participated in the repulse of the Turkish attack on the Canal. Anzac Corps Headquarters moved from Cairo to Ismailia on 4th January. Subsequently to Lieut.-General Sir <pb xml:id="n18" n="2"/>W. R. Birdwood's assuming temporary command of the Dardanelles Army, Major-General (now Lieut.-<name type="person" key="name-208052">General) Sir A. J. Godley</name> had been in November 1915 promoted from command of the New Zealand and Australian Division to temporary command of the <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name>. He had been succeeded as Divisional commander by Brigadier-General (now <name type="person" key="name-209146">Major-General) Sir A. H. Russell</name>. While giving up command of the Division, General Godley retained control of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force as a whole.</p>
          <p>Pending the development of the renewed Turkish threat at the Canal, the role of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was defined by the Chief of the Imperial Staff as being that of the strategical reserve of the Empire. With this function in view, the depleted ranks were immediately filled up from accumulated reinforcements, and the troops, who despite the rigours of the Gallipoli campaign and its tragic dénouement were in excellent health and fine morale, embarked without delay on a vigorous course of training. The main principles governing military policy in Egypt were two. On the one hand there was the possibility of an attack on the Canal, and on the other the probability that the various Corps quartered for the moment in the country would be required for operations in some other theatre of war in the spring. To meet the Turkish attack, extensive fortifications and engineering works were in process of construction east of the Canal. It was, however, the latter principle that was to affect the New Zealand and Australian Division for the first 2 months of the year. General Headquarters and Corps emphasised the urgency of intensive training. Thus, on 17th January, the Australasian Divisions received from Corps a memorandum whose nature is indicated by the following extract:—</p>
          <quote>
							“There is little enough time in which to fit ourselves to take the field against the Germans, which may be our next move, and every moment is precious. Each officer and man must make the fullest use of his opportunity for training. Except on one, or possibly two, days in the week,, at the discretion of Divisional commanders, lunch should now be taken in the field, and troops should be clear of camp by 7.30 am., and should not return before 4 p.m., at the earliest”.</quote>
          <p>A few days later G.H.Q. issued secret instructions impressing the necessity of taking every measure to ensure complete preparation for the field.</p>
          <pb xml:id="n19" n="3"/>
          <p>The New Zealand and Australian Division had all round its quarters a practically unlimited area, admirably suited alike for barrack-square drill, musketry, field firing and tactical operations. The broken surface of the desert, the tortuous wadis, the deep unexpected hollows, the glacis or sheer declivities of the yellow sand hills, the mud villages and the palm plantations lent themselves readily for all manner of schemes. In view, too, of the possibility of having to deliver a counter-attack through the front line defences, the Division was frequently exercised in moving over the desert on a broad front and in passing through “gaps” of a size similar to those left for the purpose of counter-attack in the defence system. Night operations were practiced twice a week, with the object of training the troops to carry out close formation marches and to execute attacks over the featureless desert in the dark with confidence and facility. Many courses of instruction were held. In addition to Divisional and brigade manoeuvres, a feature was made of “staff rides,” including a series for junior officers. A first acquaintance was made in the machine gun school at Ismailia with the recently invented Lewis gun, the far-reaching potentialities of which were to win speedy recognition.</p>
          <p>Owing to shortage of equipment and to other reasons, the new artillery units, whose formation will be referred to presently, were confined to general or theoretical work; the other batteries fired practices with live shell, and occasionally in co-operation with aeroplane observers. Apart from their technical training and reorganisation, the Engineers were employed in pontoon-building on the Sweet Water Canal, near Ismailia, and on the <name key="name-001365" type="place">Suez Canal</name> at Ballah Serapeum and El Ferdan; in general camp improvements, such as pipelaying and the provision of water supply; the building of huts; the supervision of native labour in the construction of tramways and of light piers; and in the development of the field works at Abu Arak and other points in the Canal defences. On 16th January the Division was inspected by <name type="person" key="name-150298">Sir Archibald Murray</name>, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Force, who had relieved <name type="person" key="name-130071">Sir C. C. Munro</name> a week previously.</p>
          <p>On arrival in Egypt from Gallipoli, administration had been hampered by more than the usual difficulties attendant on the redistribution of large forces. The baggage sent from Anzac had not arrived, and owing to insufficiency of camp equipment the troops were at first obliged to bivouac in the <pb xml:id="n20" n="4"/>open. There was also a shortage of supplies due to the enormous congestion on the railways, so that for the first few days less than half the bread ration and no jam or bacon were procurable. The provision of an adequate water system presented grave difficulties. The Supply Units had only temporary structures formed of biscuit-boxes covered with tarpaulins to protect their most perishable commodities from the sun's rays. They surmounted all obstacles, however, just as rapidly as they circumvented the craftiness of the native dealers, who increased the weight of their bales of green feed by a judicious use of the roadside watering pipes and inserted stones in every crutch or cavity of their consignments of wood. Brick sheds with wooden roofs and Venetian ventilators were erected, and the services of native carpenters were engaged to expedite the construction of tables and benches for offices canteens and mess-rooms. Tents and marquees rose gradually in orderly formations, followed by baths canteens and cinema halls. With such amenities, with plenty of food, with undisturbed sleep and freedom from anxiety, with the unrivalled winter air of the desert, even the very strenuous training was an extraordinary relaxation after the hardships of Gallipoli. Ismailia, in addition, though less cosmopolitan than Cairo, provided diverse opportunities for amusement. The deep clear waters of Lake Timsah, reflecting the blue sky and the bare yellow hills, afforded scope for bathing and swimming. Football and athletic competitions gave relief from training and reorganisation, and mounted steeplechases were held over the sand-dunes and the network of little canals. All around were the habiliments of war—guns horses aeroplanes warships—but the trials and horrors of battle and of the trenches seemed remote and unreal.</p>
          <p>Shortly after. <name type="person" key="name-150298">Sir Archibald Murray</name> had assumed command, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in Egypt, augmented by the large forces returned from the Peninsula, was reconstituted and located, from the southern extremity of the defences northwards, as follows. The IX. Corps (Lieut.-General Hon. Sir J. Byng) with headquarters at Suez and comprising the 29th 46th and 10th (Indian) Divisions, was responsible for the area from Suez to Kabrit inclusive. The intermediate section from Kabrit to El Ferdan, both exclusive, was in charge of the <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name>. Northwards from El Ferdan to Port Said extended the XV. Corps (Lieut.-General H. S. Horne), with the 11th 13th and 31st Divisions. <pb xml:id="n21" n="5"/>In general reserve at Tel-el-Kebir was the VIII. Corps, consisting of the 42nd and 52nd divisions under Lieut.-General Sir F. J. Davies.</p>
          <p>To the defensive front allotted to the <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name> the 2 Australian Divisions began to move from Tel-el-Kebir on 24th January. The New Zealand and Australian Division remained in Corps reserve at Moascar. At the same time the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade under <name type="person" key="name-207638">Brigadier-General E. W. C. Chaytor</name>, who had succeeded General Russell, began a wearisome trek from Zeitoun to the Corps area. They bivouacked alongside the infantry at Moasear on the night of 28th/29th January, whence they reached their destination at Serapeum on the following day The Light Horse Brigades followed by rail.</p>
          <p>The fact that the New Zealand and Australian Division was thus left in reserve facilitated the complex task of reorganisation. By the beginning of 1916 there had been a remarkable expansion of the Australasian forces in Egypt owing to the piling up of sick and wounded, and particularly to the steady flow of reinforcements from the Dominions. These had been temporarily drafted into makeshift formations, training brigades, and the like but their numbers demanded some radical reorganisation. The problem now pressed for solution. It was earnestly considered at Corps Headquarters during the latter part of January and was reviewed, from all aspects. On 21st January Sir Archibald Murray wired in code to the Chief of the Imperial Staff:—</p>
          <quote>“I find there is now a very large accumulation of Australian and New Zealand reinforcements here which cannot be absorbed in existing organisations. It is essential that these should be formed into definite units, with the least possible delay, both for reasons of training and discipline. I have consulted General Birdwood, and we are of the opinion that it is possible to form immediately four new Australian brigades, four Australian Pioneer battalions, and another New Zealand brigade. The New Zealand Division<note xml:id="fn5-5" n="1"><p><hi rend="i">i.e.</hi> the New Zealand and Australian division</p></note> at present contains the 4th Australian Brigade and two dismounted Light Horse and Mounted Rifles brigades. The dismounted brigades are being replaced by the New Zealand Rifles Brigade; and the, formations, if additional to New Zealand brigade, from reinforcements in Egypt will enable a complete New Zealand Division to be formed and will release the 4th <choice><orig>Aus-<pb xml:id="n22" n="6"/>tralian</orig><reg>Australian</reg></choice> Brigade.” (The proposed Australian formations of 2 fresh Divisions to be raised in Egypt in addition to the Division to be raised in Australia are then discussed.) “I understand that General Birdwood has the confidence of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, and if these proposals are agreed to, I propose to organise at once, and it will simplify and hasten matters if General Birdwood is permitted to arrange all details in direct communication with the relative Defence Ministers.”</quote>
          <p>On reference to the Dominions the War Office was notified by Australia that she agreed to the proposals. The New Zealand Government, however, having already sent the Rifle Brigade in excess of the numbers originally contemplated, desired further information in view of the necessity that would arise of maintaining 3 infantry brigades with reinforcements arranged for only 2, and with no increase on the scale in force possible before the autumn. General Murray was therefore instructed by the War Office on 5th February to notify General Birdwood that he must await instructions with regard to the proposed New Zealand Division. On the 8th the Commander-in-Chief replied to the War Office that while quite understanding the situation as regards New Zealand, he trusted that he might be permitted to form a third infantry brigade at once, as there were sufficient men available for it in excess of the establishment of the 2 existing brigades.</p>
          <quote>
            <p>“The formation of such a brigade is necessary in any case for the purpose of training and discipline. In addition to the surplus of infantry reinforcements who are available for the formation of a third infantry brigade, there is a large number of surplus Mounted Rifles who are available and willing to come forward either for artillery or infantry brigade. Reinforcements are coming in every month at the rate of 20% in excess of establishment, and there seems little chance in the near future of absorbing this surplus in existing units. It therefore seems practically certain that we could keep up the proposed New Zealand Division to approximate strength until New Zealand can increase the present scale of reinforcements.”</p>
          </quote>
          <p>The position was thus clearly stated, and on 10th February, pending formal sanction from the Governments, the arrangements made for forming a second <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name> were put into operation. At the same time it was decided that the <pb xml:id="n23"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP002a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP002a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP002a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Lieut.-General Sir <name type="person" key="name-208052">A. J. Godley,</name></hi> K.C.B., K.C.M.G.</head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n24"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP003a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP003a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP003a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-413192">G. Napier Johnston,</name></hi> C.M.G., D.S.O.</head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP003b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP003b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP003b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen F. Earl Johnston,</hi> C.B.</head></figure><pb xml:id="n25" n="7"/>I. <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name> (General Godley) should consist, as at present constituted, of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions and the New Zealand and Australian Division, while the II. <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name> should be composed of the 3rd Division (still in Australia) and of the new 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. General Godley's Corps would continue to hold its sector of the defences, while II. Anzac would be left undisturbed at Tel-e1-Kebir to complete its reorganisation. The old Corps Staff was divided between the two Carps. The Staff of Headquarters, Australian and New Zealand Forces (General Birdwood), with that of the II. <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name>, now split off from the I. <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name> and set up offices in separate buildings. Brigadier-General C. B. B. White's appointment of B.G.G.S. on the: staff of II. Anzac was temporarily filled by Colonel C. M. Wagstaff, while the former acted as D.A. and Q.M.G. of the Australian and New Zealand Forces. General Godley's Chief Staff Officer was Colonel (now Brigadier-General) C. W. Gywnn, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.</p>
          <p>Meanwhile Generals Birdwood and Godley had been in communication with the New Zealand Government, and the latter formally notified its approval of the proposals completed to the War Office, which cabled to Headquarters Mediterranean Expeditionary force to that effect in the middle of February.</p>
          <p>The organisation of the new Division was based in the main on War Establishments, Part VII., as laid down in 1915 for the New Armies. There were some minor modifications. Thus a Cyclist Company<note xml:id="fn6-7" n="1"><p>A Cyclist Company was formed however, in New Zealand in April 1916, by voluntary transfers from the Mounted Rifles units in training at that time, and arrived in France in July of the same year: see p. 59.</p></note> and a Motor Machine Gun Battery were not raised, nor an Ammunition Sub Park, nor a Divisional Supply Column. A squadron of the former Divisional cavalry, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, now with the Mounted Brigade at Serapeum, was on 23rd February designated Divisional Mounted Troops, and the remainder of the Regiment was drafted into the newly-formed Pioneer Battalion, Their horses were sent to the new; arti1lery infantry and pioneer units. Even then a remount demand for over 1800 horses had to be rendered to complete the Division's establishment. The formation of; an Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, mooted by the War Office as early as 29th December, and now on the point of accomplishment, absorbed the Light Horses Brigades and the Now Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.</p>
          <pb xml:id="n26" n="8"/>
          <p>The problems faced in artillery expansion were complicated by the lack of trained personnel. It was even proposed at one time to adhere to the inadequate establishments laid down for British Territorial Divisions operating in Egypt. Eventually, however, it was decided not to be satisfied with half-measures, but to adopt boldly Part VII. Establishments, with the one exception that the Howitzer Brigade should consist of 3 instead of 4 batteries. Eight new 18-pounder batteries were therefore formed,<note xml:id="fn7-8" n="1"><p>The 1st Artillery Brigade had consisted of the 1st 3rd and 6th (How.) Batteries; the 2nd of the 2nd 5th and 4rh (How.) Batteries.</p></note> the 7th and 8th being added to the old 1st Brigade; the 9th and 10th being added to the old 2nd Brigade, and the 11th 12th 13th and 14th constituting the new 3rd Brigade. An additional Howitzer Battery (the 15th) completed the 4th (Howitzer) Brigade. The artillery therefore now consisted of three 18-pounder brigades of four batteries each and one howitzer brigade of three batteries. In the training of the raw artillery material the experience of the C.R.A. (<name type="person" key="name-123642">Brigadier-General Napier Johnston</name>) on the Instructional Staff of the British Army was invaluable.</p>
          <p>To bring the Engineers up to establishment, the Field Troop New Zealand Engineers was transferred from the Mounted Rifles Brigade and expanded with the addition of skilled tradesmen drawn from the infantry into a third Field Company.</p>
          <p>By the middle of January the 2nd Battalion of the New Zealand Rifles Brigade had arrived at Moascar from Alexandria, where it had acted as Lines of Communication troops in the Western Frontier campaign against the Senussi. It was followed towards the end of the month by the 1st Battalion, which had received instructive experience, seen some fighting, and suffered its first casualties at Jebel Medwa in December. The 3rd and 4th Battalions did not arrive from New Zealand till the middle of March.</p>
          <p>In the formation of the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade the same principle which governed the raising of the additional artillery batteries was followed, namely, the expansion of each of the 4 original "regiments" into 2 battalions, the 2nd Battalion.; of the regiments forming the 2nd Bridgade.<note xml:id="fn8-8" n="2"><p>The original N.Z. Infantry Brigade was formed of 4 "Regiments" drawn front the 4 military districts, Auckland Canterbury. Otago Wellington. In the "Regiment, each company was drawn from and designated by the number and title of the regiment in, the N.Z. Military Forces from whose area it was raised. Thus the Canterbury companies were the 1st (Canterbury); the 2nd (South Canterbury); the 12th (Nelson and Marlborough); the 13th (North Canterbury and Westland).</p></note> A complete cadre of officers was provided from <pb xml:id="n27" n="9"/>the original infantry brigade, with the addition of a limited number of officers from the Mounted Rifles Brigade. A certain number of non-commissioned officers was transferred from the original brigade, but the rank and file were provided almost entirely, from the reinforcements of all branches of the service and by the transfer of a certain number of men surplus in existing units. <name type="person" key="name-207491">Brigadier-General W. G. Braithwaite</name> relinquished his command of the as yet incomplete Rifle Brigade to take command of the 2nd Brigade. He was succeeded in command of the Rifle Brigade by <name type="person" key="name-416430">Lt.-Col. H. T. Fulton</name> (2nd King's Own Gurkha Rifles), commanding the 1st Battalion, who was then granted the temporary rank of Brigadier-General.</p>
          <p>A happy solution lay to hand for the formation of a Pioneer Battalion. After the August operations on the Peninsula the remainder of the original Maori contingent, together with reinforcements which had joined them, had been divided up by tribes among the 4 infantry regiments. The same course was adopted with the reinforcements which arrived at this time and here welcomed with ancient Maori ceremonial on the Egyptian desert. These now constituted the nucleus of the Pioneer Battalion, the remainder being drawn, as mentioned above, from the headquarters and the 2 surplus squadrons of the <name key="name-123629" type="organisation">Otago Mounted Rifles</name>. The appointment of battalion commander was given to Major (now Lt.-Col.) G. A. King, N.Z.S.C., who had been Staff Captain of the Mounted Brigade. Further reinforcements arrived on 15th March, consisting of 112 Maoris, 125 Niue Islanders,<note xml:id="fn9-9" n="1"><p>Climatic conditions proved too severe for the Niue Islanders of the tropical Pacific. Some of them were sent home from Egypt, the remainder from France in May. Of the Address despatched by the Chief of Niue to England in 1914 the opening words merit quotation here: "To King George V., all those in authority and the brave men who fight: I am the island of Niue, a small child that stands up to help the Kingdom of King George"</p></note> and 45 Rarotongans. In the formation of each company the 2 lending platoons were composed of Maoris or Islanders in tribes, and the other 2 of pakehas.<note xml:id="fn10-9" n="2"><p>Pakeha, Maori for "European."</p></note></p>
          <p>A machine gun corps was created by the formation of 3 machine gun companies drawn from the machine gun sections in the battalions; 2 companies from those of the original (now the 1st) Infantry Brigade, and the third from those of the Rifle Brigade. Two new field ambulances were raised by the expansion of the existing organisation and by building upon a No. 2 Field Ambulance section which had arrived from New Zealand in December. A <choice><orig>Divi-<pb xml:id="n28" n="10"/>sional</orig><reg>division</reg></choice> Sanitary Section was formed on 7th February. The Army Service Corps branch was expanded, and in addition 5 Depot Units of Supply, with field Bakery and Field Butchery, were formed as Lines of Communications Units, not incorporated in the Division. The 2 Veterinary Sections despatched from New Zealand in December 1914 were disbanded, the personnel king absorbed in 2 Mobile Veterinary Sections, one of which was attached to the Division and the other to the mounted Rifles Brigade.</p>
          <p>The expansion of old and the formation of new units not merely absorbed the excess personnel of the disbanded Otago, Mounted Rifles Regiment and all accumulated 7th 8th and 9th Reinforcements, but also drained the Mounted Rifles surplus reluctance in New Zealand as well as in Egypt. The natural reluctance of the horseman to leave his particular arm was overcome firstly by the precedent set on Gallipoli, where Mounted Rifles and light Horse had served in the open as in trenches on foot, and secondly by the reflection, not unreasonable at this stage of the evolution of tactics, that there was; a brighter prospect of seeing fighting in other branches of the service. The spirit with which all ranks transferred is given generous recognition by General Godley in an order issued on 3rd June:—</p>
          <quote>
            <p>“The G.O.C. wishes to place on record his appreciation and that of the New Zealand Government of the patriotic and public-spirited action of the many officers, n.c.os, and men of the Mounted Rifles who have voluntarily transferred, both in Egypt and in New Zealand, to the infantry and other arms when it became known that men were urgently required for these services.</p>
            <p>“That so large a number of all ranks should have readily and cheerfully responded to the call to place the interests of the Force before everything else is a most gratifying and convincing proof that the N.Z.E.E. has in it that first essential for efficiency and succecss—the true soldierly spirit.”</p>
          </quote>
          <p>Towards the end of February, while all these augmentations were in progress, the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade left the Division at Moascar to join their comrades at Tel-el-Kebir. Their movement had ken delayed by a shortage of tents and camp equipment in their new quarters, but now a battalion marched out daily, and by the evening of 28th February the 16th Battalion and the: 4th Field Ambulance, the last of the Australians of the old composite Division, had <pb xml:id="n29" n="11"/>gone. They were given a spontaneous and moving send-off by the New Zealanders who had shared with them dangers and privations on the Anzac ridges and had partaken of their open-handed hospitality at Moascar. The separation from these old comrades, though inevitable and indeed desirable from the administrative point of view in both forces, was keenly and genuinely regretted on personal grounds. On 1st March authority was given for the assumption of the title "The New Zealand Division" instead of "The New Zealand and Australian Division," and the new formations and units were taken on strength. The labour travails were over and the new Division born.</p>
          <p>Meanwhile the Turkish debacle in the Caucasus<note xml:id="fn11-11" n="1"><p>The Russians entered Erzerum on 16th February.</p></note> had compelled the Porte not merely to reduce to garrison strength its forces in Thrace Gallipoli and Western Anatolia, but even to divert the Syrian Army northwards. Thus the danger to the Canal and nodal centre of the Empire was daily receding. The Egyptian garrison was therefore reduced by the despatch of the 29th and other British Divisions to the Western Front. The first results of the German blow at Verdun, its repercussions in the political atmosphere, and the desirability of reliving a French Army on a sector of the defensive front<note xml:id="fn12-11" n="2"><p>Haig's Despatch of 29th May, 1916, parass. 1 and 10.</p></note> made it, however, increasingly obvious that there would be a further call on the troops in Egypt.</p>
          <p>The call came to the I. <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name> at the beginning of March. It was arranged thereupon that General Birdwood should reassume command of I. Anzac, and that General Godley should take that of II. Anzac. General Godley would naturally have preferred to retain his New Zealanders under his own command, but as neither of the newly-formed 4th and 5th Australian Divisions was as yet sufficiently trained to complete General Birdwood's Corps for service in France, be magnanimously insisted that the New Zealand Division should be retained by and accompany I. Anzac pending his own arrival in France with II. Anzac.</p>
          <p>Arrangements had already been made for the relief of the 2nd Australian Division in the defensive zone, and the New Zealand Division had begun to take over their area east of the Canal. In the front line 2 Australian infantry brigades were relieved by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, which was now for this purpose temporarily attached to the Division. They disposed 1 squadron at each previous <pb xml:id="n30" n="12"/>battalion headquarters, 6 squadrons in all being in the front he and I regiment at railhead. Similarly the 3rd Light Horse Brigade took over the 1st Australian Division's frontage to the south. The guns remained in situ, and were served till the arrival of the relieve New Zealand batteries by personnel detailed for transfer to the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. On the same date the 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade relieved the reserve Australian brigade at the bridgehead at ferry Post. By 8th March the movement of the Division was completed. Headquarters were at Albury Hill, the 1st Infantry Brigade at Ferry Post, the Rifle Brigade a mile east of it, the newly-formed 2nd Brigade half a mile west of Albury Hill. The 2nd Australian Division was now assembled at Moasear, making the final arrangements for entraining and embarkation.</p>
          <p>The contrast between the Canal defences now and at the time of the Turkish fiasco a year previously was most striking. Then there had been a few bridgeheads on the eastern bank, but the general situation had been described by an inspecting General, not less justly than caustically, as one in which the Canal protected the troops instead of the troops defending the Canal. Now railways and metalled roads ran eastwards into the desert, and elaborate provision had been made for the supply of water. The first line of defence was now not on the Canal, but 7 miles distant. It had been selected by Major-General Horne, afterwards in turn XV. Corps and First Army Commander in France, who had been specially sent to Egypt for the purpose. The engineering operations and the administration were carried out by the Director of Railways and the Director of Works under the control of Major-General Sir H. V. Cox, who acted as Staff Officer (ad hoe) to <name type="person" key="name-413424">Sir John Maxwell</name>.</p>
          <p>Gradually if slowly the Turks were pushing their Palestine railway system south of Beersheba, but even assuming an improbably high rate of progress it was certain that in face of transport difficulties over the sand they could bring up only a limited amount of guns and ammunition. The concealment of trenches, while not so important as on the Western front, was far more difficult in the open desert. Moreover, the scarcity of water would compel the enemy either to win a victory in two or three days or to retire. He could not sit down to a systematic bombardment and trench warfare. For these reasons, therefore, our defence positions were selected more with a view to good all-round and to effective <pb xml:id="n31"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP004a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP004a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP004a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-207491">W. G. Braithwaite,</name></hi> C.P., C.M.G., D.S.O.</head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP004b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP004b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP004b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-209077">G. S. Richardson,</name></hi> C.B., C.M.G. C.B.E.</head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n32"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP005a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP005a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP005a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">N.W. France</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n33" n="13"/>cross fire than to concealment from prolouged and intense artillery concentration. The first line included all the important points from which observed fire could be directed on the Canal and shipping. The second line ran about 4,500 yards in rear of the first, and although it surrendered many points whence an enemy could observe the Canal, it was sufficiently advanced to prevent any serious interference with traffic. The third line consisted of the strengthened Original defences. The ships allotted to the Anzac Sector under command of Capt. A. P. Davidson, R.N., were the <hi rend="i">Cornwallis</hi>, the Monitor <hi rend="i">Sir Thomas Picton</hi>, Monitor No. 15, and the French coast defence battleship <hi rend="i">Requin.</hi></p>
          <p>The front line system which the Mounted Brigade now took over was still in process of organisation. Wide and formidable entanglements were laid out in the light of most recent experience, concealed in hollows and with deceptive pockets to allure the assault on to enfilade and co-ordinated machine gun fire. The trenches themselves were not continuous, but constituted a series of fortified "localities," the garrisons of which would vary from a battalion or less up to a brigade. The primary role of these garrisons was defined to be passive defence. With a touch of imagery rare in military "Defence Schemes" they were compared to rocks round which a torrent might surge without sweeping them away. Between them were left gaps free from obstacles for the development of counter-strokes by other troops.</p>
          <p>The Mounted patrols rode out daily well in front of the position and supplemented the mostly negative information brought in by aeroplanes, Arab agents of varying reliability, and the Bikanir Camel Corps. Though the enemy strength remained meagre, nothing was left to chance as far as the defence system was concerned. Nelson Camp, Hagley Park, Sphinx Post and all the other positions were solidly entrenched and wired. The Engineers supervising the working parties had their troubles through the drifting sand with which an occasional khamseen choked the trenches. Apart from reconnoitring the positions in the line which they would occupy in the event of a strong attack, the infantry remained in support in rear, training and perfecting their organisation. They were visited on 21st March by the youthful Prince of Wales who rode round informally and watched them at drill. He was just in time to receive a haka<note xml:id="fn13-13" n="1"><p>Maori for "dance," here of welcome.</p></note> in the Maori <pb xml:id="n34" n="14"/>lines, before the Pioneers set out on the dusty march back across the Canal to Moascar.</p>
          <p>For it was now the turn of the New Zealanders to follow the 2nd and 1st Australian Divisions to France. On 23rd March, when the Chief of the Imperial Staff directed that the Division should follow immediately the 1st Australian Division, it was already concentrated at Moascar, with the exception of Divisional Headquarters which remained with the Mounted Brigade till the sector was transferred on the 30th to the 5th Australian Division from Tel-el-Kebir. The War Office pressed for expedition of despatch and chafed against the necessity of exchanging the long rifles for the short rifles firing the new ammunition used in France. It was too late, however, to modify the arrangements made with the 11th Division for the exchange.</p>
          <p>A farewell inspection of the Division was held by General Murray on 3rd April His satisfaction was indicated in the following congratulatory message from General Godley to the Divisional Commander:—</p>
          <quote>
            <p>“The Commander-in-Chief has directed me to convey to you and all ranks under your command his high appreciation of the fine turn-out and soldierly bearing of your Division at his inspection of it this afternoon. The steadiness and good marching of the troops were all that could be desired, and the staff arrangements were excellent.I need hardly tell you how proud I am to be the medium of communication of such a message to my old Division, or how pleased I was to see it acquit itself so creditably.”</p>
          </quote>
          <p>A day or two later the Division entrained for Alexandria and Port Said, where embarkation of advanced parties commenced on 5th April. Divisional Headquarters sailed on the <hi rend="i">Minnewaska</hi>, and in all 16 transports were employed. Guns and wheeled vehicles with the exception of the artillery telephone carts were left in Egypt. Many regrets were expressed by the artillery at losing their pre-war New Zealand guns which had been used on Gallipoli, nor were they ever to get such good pieces again.</p>
          <p>The following was the composition of the Division at this date.</p>
        </div>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d1-d2" type="section">
          <head>
            <hi rend="c">Headquarters</hi>
          </head>
          <list>
            <item>General Officer Commanding—Major-Gen. Sir <name type="person" key="name-209146">A. H. Russell,</name> K.C.MG. Aides-de-Camp—Lt. (Hon. Capt.) O. B. Ryrie, (A.I.F.), Lt. R. F. R. Beetham</item>
            <item>General Staff Officer, 1st Grade—Major (Temp. Lt.-Col.) <name type="person" key="name-130279">W. R. Pinwill,</name> King's Liverpool Regiment (Imperial General Staff)</item>
            <pb xml:id="n35" n="15"/>
            <item>General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade—Major <name type="person" key="name-130111">A. C. Temperley</name> (Norfolk Regiment)</item>
            <item>General Staff Officer, 3rd Grade—Capt. <name type="person" key="name-130249">W. H. Hastings</name> (92nd Punjabis)</item>
            <item>A.A. and Q.M.G.—Major (Temp. Lt.-Col.) H. G. Reid, R.A.S.C.</item>
            <item>D.A.A. and Q.M.G.—Major W. C. Morrison, N.Z.S.C.</item>
            <item>D.A.Q.M.G.—Capt. M. H. Jackson (29th Lancers)</item>
            <item>A.D.M.S.—Col. <name type="person" key="name-207389">C. M. Begg,</name> C.M.G.</item>
            <item>D.A.D.M.S.—Major A. R. D. Carbery</item>
            <item>A.D.V.S.—Lt.-Col, A. E. Young</item>
            <item>D.A.D.O.S.—Lt.-Col. H. Herbert</item>
            <item>A.P.M.—Capt. D. Kettle</item>
          </list>
        </div>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d1-d3" type="section">
          <head>
            <hi rend="c">Divisional Mounted Troops</hi>
          </head>
          <list>
            <item>1 Squadron Otago Mounted Rifles—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-130138">R. R. Grigor</name></item>
          </list>
        </div>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d1-d4" type="section">
          <head>
            <hi rend="c">Divisional Artillery</hi>
          </head>
          <list>
            <item>Commander—Lt.-Col. (Temp. Brig.-Gen.) <name type="person" key="name-413192">G. N. Johnston,</name> R.A.A.D.C.—Lt. F. S. Wilding</item>
            <item>Brigade Major—Capt. <name type="person" key="name-130098">J. M. Richmond,</name> R.N.Z.A.</item>
            <item>Staff Captain—Capt. H. J. Daltry</item>
            <item>1st Brigade N.Z.F.A.—Lt.-Col. F. Symon, C.M.G., R.N.Z.A.</item>
            <item>2nd Brigade N.Z.F.A.—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-130091">F. B. Sykes,</name> D.S.O., R.A.</item>
            <item>3rd Brigade N.Z.F.A.—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-130088">I. T. Standish,</name> D.S.O., R.N.ZA.</item>
            <item>4th (Howitzer) Brigade—Major (Temp. Lt.-Col.) <name type="person" key="name-207920">N. S. Falla,</name> D.S.O.</item>
            <item>D.A.C—Lt.-Col. M. M. Gard'ncr, R.N.Z.A.</item>
          </list>
        </div>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d1-d5" type="section">
          <head>
            <hi rend="c">Divisional Engineers</hi>
          </head>
          <list>
            <item>Officer Commanding—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-130053">G. R. Pridham,</name> R.E.</item>
            <item rend="center">Three Field Companies</item>
            <item rend="center">One Signal Company</item>
          </list>
        </div>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d1-d6" type="section">
          <head>1st <hi rend="c">New Zealand Infantry Brigade</hi></head>
          <list>
            <item>Commander—Major (Temp. Brig.-Gen.) F. E. Johnston, C.B. (North Staffordshire Regiment)</item>
            <item>Brigade Major—Major R. O. Chesney, N.Z.S.C</item>
            <item>Staff Captain—Capt. <name type="person" key="name-416664">H. M. W. Richardson,</name> N.Z.S.C</item>
            <item>1st Bn., Auckland Regiment—Lt.Col. A. Plugge, C.M.G</item>
            <item>1st Bn., Canterbury Regiment—Lt.-Col. R. Young, C.M.G., D.S.O.</item>
            <item>1st Bn., Otago Regiment—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-130134">A. B. Charters</name></item>
            <item>1st Bn., WeIlington Regiment— Lt.-Col. H. Hart, D.S.O.</item>
          </list>
        </div>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d1-d7" type="section">
          <head>
            <hi rend="c">New Zealand Rifle Brigade</hi>
          </head>
          <list>
            <item>Commander—Major (Temp. Brig.-Gen.) <name type="person" key="name-416430">H. T. Fulton,</name> D.S.O. (2nd King's Own Gurkha Rifles)</item>
            <item>Brigade Major—Capt. (Temp. Major) <name type="person" key="name-130151">T. R. Eastwood</name> (Rifle Brigade)</item>
            <item>Staff Captain—Capt. R. G. Purdy, N.Z.S.C.</item>
            <item>1st Bn., Rifle Brigade—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-416459">W. S. Austin</name></item>
            <item>2nd Bn., Rifle Brigade—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-413207">A. E. Stewart</name></item>
            <item>3rd Bn., Rifle Brigade—Lt.-Col. J. A. Cowles</item>
            <item>4th Bn., Rifle Brigade—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-418886">C. W. Melvill,</name> N.Z.S.C.</item>
          </list>
        </div>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d1-d8" type="section">
          <head>2nd <hi rend="c">New Zealand Infantry Brigade</hi></head>
          <list>
            <item>Commander—Lt.-Col. (Temp. Brig.-Gen.) <name type="person" key="name-207491">W. G. Braithwaite,</name> D.S.O. (Royal Welsh Fusiliers)</item>
            <item>Brigade Major—Major <name type="person" key="name-418761">F. H. Lampen,</name> N.Z.S.C.</item>
            <item>Staff Captain—Major E. Puttick</item>
            <item>2nd Bn., Auckland Regiment—Lt.-Col. W. W. Alderman, A.I.F. Staff</item>
            <item>2nd Bn., Canterbury Regiment—Lt.-Col. H. Stewart, M.C.</item>
            <pb xml:id="n36" n="16"/>
            <item>2nd Bn., <hi rend="i">Otaga</hi> Regiment—Lt.-Col. A. Moore, D.S.O. (Royal Dublin Fusiliers)</item>
            <item>2nd Bn., Wellington Regiment—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-031222">W. H. Cunningham</name></item>
            <item>New Zealand Pioneer Bu.,—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-208407">G. A. king,</name> N.Z.S.C.</item>
            <item rend="center">3 Machine Gun Companies</item>
            <item>New Zealand Divisional Train—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-130106">N. C. Hamilton,</name> R.A.S.C.</item>
            <item>1st New Zealand Field Ambulance—Lt.-Col. E. J. O'Neill, D.S.O.</item>
            <item>2nd New Zealand Field Ambulance—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-028671">D. N. W. Murray</name></item>
            <item>3rd New Zealand Field Ambulance—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-407933">J. Hardie Neil</name>
							<list><item>New Zealand Sanitary Section.</item><item>New Zealand Mobile Veterinary Section</item></list></item>
          </list>
          <p>In addition the following units accompanied the Division:—
						<list><item>5 Depot Units of Supply</item><item>1 Field Butchery</item><item>1 Field Bakery</item><item>1 Infantry Base Depot</item><item>Divisional Record Section</item><item>Postal Corps Details</item></list></p>
          <p>The voyage to Marseilles over a calm sea was uneventful. Transports took different courses, and some touched at Malta. In addition to the ordinary routine, emphasis was laid on gas lectures, and gas helmets were issued. Every precaution was taken against submarines. No lights were allowed on deck between sunset and reveille, and all lights below were carefully shaded and deadlights closed. The minimum of noise was enjoined after dark. All ranks worked ate and slept in lifebelts "Boat stations" were regularly practised, and beside machine and Lewis gun sentries a submarine guard was on duty throughout on each vessel. This consisted of 2 platoons, 1 in the forward-well deck, 25 men armed with loaded rifles on each side of the ship, and 1 platoon in the aft-well deck, similarly-divided. Wireless message announced the presence of submarines off Marseilles, and observers on one transport sighted or thought they sighted a periscope 800 yards astern. But all the vessels reached Marseilles, from 11th April onwards, without incident. A few units received a demonstration of welcome from the populace, but for 'the most part unobtrusively and expeditiously the New Zealand Division entrained for the British sector away in the North.</p>
          <p>Although the Corps was thus despatched to France and a Base Depot, formed at Etaples, near Boulogue, it was not proposed at first the shift the Australian or New Zealand bases from Egypt, which was for the Australian force more favourably situated than England. The War Office definitely approved this policy on 24th March. The N.Z.E.F. Heaquarters therefore remained in the Kasr-el-nil barracks in Cairo, under the control of <name type="person" key="name-130130">Col. J. J. Esson</name>, where they <pb xml:id="n37" n="17"/>had been established in January. On Col. Esson's, returning on duty to New Zealand in March he was succeeded by Col. V S. Smyth, N.Z.S.C. The Chief Staff Officer was Lt.-Col. G. T. Hall, who had during 1915 commanded the New Zealand Base Details Camp at Zeitoun In the beginning of the year Col. W. H. parkes was appointed D.D.M.S. to the Force, and Major J. Studholme became General Godley's Assistant Military, Secretary.</p>
          <p>There were at this time in England about 2000 convalescent New Zealand soldiers who had come in hospital ship from the Dardanelles. Originally-after being discharged fit these had been quartered in an Australian depot at Weymouth, but by March they had been concentrated partly in an English camp at Epsom and principally at an exclusively New Zealand depot at Hornchurch. This was at first commanded by <name type="person" key="name-130231">Major T. H. Dawson</name>, who was succeeded in April by Major C. H. J. Brown, N.Z.S.C. Throughout this early period a committee of New Zealanders under Lord Plunket, a former Governor of the Dominion, had set up various organisations for the well-being of the troops, in particular a small hospital at Walton-on-Thames, which was conducted by Major B. Myers. Administration in England was carried on by the High Commissioner's staff. The work thus imposed on Sir Thomas Mackenzie's office not only in the way of records pay and other details of administration but also in correspondence with the War Office and the New Zealand Government was excessive; and with the best will in the world the system was not conducive to military discipline or general efficiency. It was therefore decided to attach to the High Commissioner's staff a Military Representative who should undertake liaison duties with the War Office and at the same time act as Commandant of the Hornchurch depot. At the instance of the New Zeland Government a eable was accordingly sent in February to the Salonika Army asking for the release of <name type="person" key="name-209077">Brigadier-General G. S. Richardson</name> who had at the outbreak of war been acting as New Zealand Representative at the War Office and at this time held the appointment of D.A. and Q.M.G. in the XII. Corps. He arrived in England in March, and following on recommendations submitted by General Godly to the New Zealand Government, assumed the larger duties of Commandant New Zealand Troops in England in addition on to those of Military Representative for the Dominion. The appointment was subsequently defined as that of General Officer in charge <pb xml:id="n38" n="18"/>of Administration. His headquarters was at first a room in the High Commissioner's office with administrative personnel detached in 2 building in Victoria Street.</p>
          <p>This arrangement, however inconvenient, might have sufficed to deal with the handful of troops that might be expected to be in England on the assumption that the base remained in Egypt. A conference, however, on various questions connected with the Australasian forces was held at the War Office on 28th April between General Birdwood and the Heads of Departments concerned, at which also the Australian and New Zealand Military Representatives were present. To facilitate administration and effect economy in man-power by providing opportunities for speedier recovery under more favourable climatic conditions from wounds or sickness, it was then agreed that the bases for the Australasian troops in France should be transferred from Egypt to England. At the same time the position of the New Zealand High Commissioner was defined. It was decided that he should be kept informed by the Representative on all military matters affecting New Zealand, but that his office should no longer be the channel for correspondence with the War Office. Following on this interview, the New Zealand Base arrived in London early in May, and suitable accommodation was secured for all offices in Southampton Row. In the beginning of June a "Command Depot" (Major J. A. Mackenzie) was established on the edge of Salisbury Plain at Codford. This term had been introduced to distinguish the depots specially devoted to the reception of unfit men from the ordinary Infantry or General Base depots where reinforcements and fit men were in training and readiness to proceed to the front. As a training depot the War Office shortly afterwards assigned Sling Camp, also on Salisbury Plain. There the training units brought from Egypt under Colonel Smyth were concentrated. The infantry were organised in 3 reserve battalions for the respective brigades in the field. At this time, and for some little time afterwards, various Imperial officers were loaned for instructional duties.</p>
          <p>In July the Walton-on-Thames hospital was taken under military control and expanded. Major (now Lt.-Col.) B. Myers, who had supervised it for the committee, was prometed A.D.M.S. and transferred to Medical Headquarters. His place was taken by Lt.-Col. T. Mill.<note xml:id="fn14-18" n="1"><p>Succeeded in December 1917 by Col. E. J. O'Neill, D.S.O.</p></note> Walton thus became <pb xml:id="n39" n="19"/>No. 2 New Zealand General Hospital. The former 2nd Stationary Hospital (Lt.-Col. D S. Wylie) on being transferred in May to England had been designated No. 1 New Zealand General Hospita1.<note xml:id="fn15-19" n="1"><p>Lt.-Col. Wylie was succeeded in January 1918 by Col. P. S. Fenwiek. C.M.G.</p></note> It was established at Brockenhurst in the luxuriant woodland scenery of the New Forest. By July a No. 3 General Hospital (Lt.-Col. M. Ho1mes)<note xml:id="fn16-19" n="2"><p>Succeeded in turn by Col. Fenwick, (Aug. 1916) Lt Col. H. J. McLean, (Jan. 1918); Lt.-Col. G. Home, O.B.E (Nor. 1918); Major (Temp. Lt.-Col.) <name type="person" key="name-130517">H M. Buchanan,</name> (Jan. 1919).</p></note> had been organised near the Command Depot at Codford. In June Major C. H. Tewsley took over the administration of the Hornchurch Dept from Major (now Lt.-Col.) Brown to enable the latter to proceed to the command of the 2nd Auckland Battalion in France. In the course of the following month the engineers were centralised at Christchurch, the signallers at Hitchin, and the machine gunners at Grantham, where the foundations of the great British Army machine gun school were already laid. In the last week of September 1916 the Australians and New Zealanders training on and about Salisbury Plain were inspected by H.M. the King. Such were the early stages in the development of the organisation and establishments in England which were afterwards to expand to a scale not then visualised.</p>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n40" n="20"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2" type="chapter">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Chapter II</hi>
          <lb/>
          <hi rend="sc">Summer at Armentiéres</hi>
        </head>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d1" type="section">
          <p>The tedium of the 58-hour journey northwards in the trucks of the French Military train was relieved at the outset by the exquisite scenery of the Rhone Valley. The fresh green of the trees and rich grasser, the early flowers in the meadows, and the sunny woodlands, tricked out with the blossoms and pageantry of Spring, were in striking contrast with the monotony of the parched desert. The troops were in the highest spirits. With lively curiosity they eyed the riverside mansions and trim villages, and exchanged pleasantries with the fisherman on the banks and the cheering girls at the station. A detour was made round Paris. There-after the grey rain-sodden skies, bleak country and bitter winds of the north formed a more appropriate setting for the grim business that lay-in front.</p>
          <p>Divisional Headquarters had proceeded by mail train to the concentration area, of which Hazebrouck was the centre, and the advanced party reached the railhead, Steenbecque, on 13th April. The troops began to arrive there on the 15th. Divisional Headquarters and the artillery were at Blaringhem. The 1st Infantry Brigade was concentrated round Morbecque, the Rifle Brigade round Steeubecque, and the 2nd Brigade round Roquetoire. The transport personal, with the horses, had been detrained at Abbeville to be issued with wagons. They trekked the remaining 60 miles in 3 clays. For animals just landed from a 6 days' voyage and a 2 days' train journey this proved a severe trial, even with empty wagons. The transition from the warmth of Egypt also affected them, especially the mules, and one or two animals died. The artillery were in a similar way diverted to IIavre, where, with remarkable expedition, they were equipped with vehicles and guns, and despateched to the concentration area by train.</p>
          <p>Thus assembled in the last week of April, the Division passed again under the command of the I. <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name>, which in its turn formed part of the Second Army under General Plumer. The 2 Australian Division had in the middle of April taken over a sector of the front line system from Fleurbaix to Armentières. Corps Headquarters was at <pb xml:id="n41"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP006a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP006a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP006a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-416430">H. T. Fulton,</name></hi> C.M.G., D.S.O.</head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP006b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP006b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP006b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">General Russell addressing Troops</hi></head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n42"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP007a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP007a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP007a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">St. Omer and Hazebrouck</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n43" n="21"/>the picturesque village of La Motte, amid the oaks elms and beeches of the extensive Forêt de Nieppe. This concentration area was somewhat more diversified by wooded declivities than is usual in the Département du Nord. Amid the unfenced fields, intensively and untiringly cultivated by women and old men, lay the agricultural villages, each marked by its tall church spire, its red brick houses, its substantial tree-shaded chateau on the outskirts, and its slatternly farms with clay-walled byres and insanitary manure-heaps in the courtyards. In the near neighbourhood was the ancient fortress-town of Aire. From the uplands one commanded a wide view of the lowlying country as far south as Lens, where the slag-heaps and high pit-heads looked for all the world like transplanted pyramids. In these flats the British Command had staged their first costly but useful experiments in the offensive. From that direction occasionally a dull far-off rumble was audible, and in the evening, beyond the glow of the blast furnaces near Aire, the rockets and flares of the trenches described slow parabolas on the screen of the dark heavens.</p>
          <p>The continuously cold wet weather which followed the arrival of the Division necessitated the issue of a second blanket, turned all gun parks and horse lines into quagmires, and interfered gravely with training. Nor had the artillery ground available for field firing. Batteries were sent, however, to Calais for a day in turn for shoots with indirect laying at visible targets. Otherwise artillery training was limited to gun-drill and route-marching. This last formed a standing dish for the infantry, whom it was vital to accustom to the hard-metalled or pavé roads of France after the yielding sand of the desert. Parties of all ranks were sent to the different Army and Corps schools which stimulated so effectively the military education of junior officers, non-commissioned officers and specialists in every ramification of scientific warfare. On their pattern the Division was to found its own schools<note xml:id="fn17-21" n="1"><p>Grenade School, Gas School, Trench Warfare School, Physical and Bayonet Training School, Machine Gun School.</p></note> at Armentières, and the principle was later to be extended to brigades and even battalions. Every unit was now put through a gas demonstration, and the issue of the new P.H. gas masks was completed.</p>
          <p>At the same time a study had to be made of the formidable mass of pamphlets and circulars dealing with every <pb xml:id="n44" n="22"/>phase of military life in France, with which each mail flooded orderly rooms. If it was a matter for regret to find the possession of a camera so sternly forbidden, it was an occasion for rejoicing to receive, appropriately enough on 25th April, notification of the allotment of leave: to England. Carefully worked out by G.H.Q. to give the whole of the British forces a proportionate allowance in accordance with the ferry capacity, the allotment was similarly adjusted in the Division. The privilege exercised an incalculable influence on morale. In the early days of the war, individuals with a taste for attracting attention, or with the object of evoking sympathy, had crossed to London unshaven and bespattered with mud to represent the life of the trenches; now insistence was laid on smartness of appearance, as on cleanliness of person, and new uniforms were if necessary issued.</p>
          <p>During the interval which elapsed before the Division moved forward, informal visits were paid to various units by General Haig and General Plumer Now that the New Zealanders were to play a role on the principal stage of operation, under the eye and exposed to the criticism of British and Allied forces and of Generals and war correspondents, it became more than ever desirable that the saluting and general soldierly bearing of the troops should be of the highest standard, and reflect as brightly as possible their proved fighting qualities. A Divisional Order issued at the time dealt with this continually recurring question in terms of candour and common sense:—</p>
          <quote>
            <p>“The G.O.C. expects every officer and man to help in making the New Zealand Division a credit to the Dominion.</p>
            <p>“Saluting and general bearing are not really matters of discipline to be dealt with as such, but are matters of self-respect, and in so far as they are good or bad reflect credit or discredit on the Division.</p>
            <p>“Men who fail to salute when they should, arc untidy in dress, lounge about the streets, and fail to keep their eyes sufficiently open and their wits sufficiently wide awake to see when an officer is passing, may or not be good fighters, but 'they certainly make a bad impression. To be smart and alert isn't servility. It is exactly the opposite. Every officer and man of the Division should walk about as if he had £10,000 a year, and must be as jealous of our reputation as a woman of her honour.”</p>
          </quote>
          <pb xml:id="n45" n="23"/>
          <p>Various alterations were made at this time in the organisation of the Division. Experience in France had shown that much of the independence of action and movement formerly belonging to a Division had now passed to the Corps. The mounted troops, originally allotted with a view to providing the Divisional Commander with a small mobile force under his immediate control for reconnaissance and protective and escort duty, had become under the prevailing conditions of stationary warfare something of a luxury. So far from a Division moving independently, and with one or more roads allotted for its exclusive use, it seemed at this stage that movement would be by Corps marching and fighting in depth on a comparatively narrow frontage; nor was it till the closing months of the war that the evolution of tactics favoured a reversion to the original conception. General Headquarters therefore decided that the mounted troops of Divisions in a Corps should be assembled under the direct control of the Corps Commander and be organised as a Corps unit. Accordingly, the squadron of the <name key="name-123629" type="organisation">Otago Mounted Rifles</name> and the 2 squadrons of light Horse of the Australian Divisions were grouped in a composite regiment which was called the 1st Anzac Light Horse Regiment. The command was given to <name type="person" key="name-130138">Lt.-Col. R. R. Grigor</name>.<note xml:id="fn18-23" n="1"><p>p. 15.</p></note> On the same principle, pending the arrival of the New Zealand cyclist company,<note xml:id="fn19-23" n="2"><p>up. 7. 59.</p></note> a Corps Cyclist Battalion was formed by the expansion of the 2 Australian Companies.</p>
          <p>The organisation of the artillery also now underwent changes designed to promote greater efficiency in the field. The Howitzer Brigade was split up, and one howitzer battery was transferred to each of the 18-pounder brigades. In place of it, they each lost their respectively highest numbered battery, and these three batteries, namely, the 8th 10th and 14th, were formed into a reconstituted 4th Brigade of three batteries. This new organisation of three brigades, each of three 18-pounder batteries and one howitzer battery, and one brigade of three 18-pounder batteries was to hold good till the beginning of 1917.<note xml:id="fn20-23" n="3"><p>p. 140.</p></note> At the same time the Brigade Ammunition Column were absorbed into the Divisional Ammunition Column. A new development was the formation, of trench mortar batteries. One heavy and Three<note xml:id="fn21-23" n="4"><p>Lettered respectively XNZ, YNZ. ZNZ.</p></note> medium batteries were raised as an integral portion of the Divisional <pb xml:id="n46" n="24"/>Artillery. The six light trench mortar batteries, which were now made part of infantry brigades and were formed of personnel drawn from infantry units, were shortly afterwards organised into three batteries of eight guns each.</p>
          <p>It was now also that the title of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade was altered to 3rd New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade, the Brigade itself taking precedence next after instead of before the 2nd Brigade as hitherto. Motor transport was allotted to the Field Ambulance, and in accordance with the orders obtaining in France all transport vehicles of the Division were marked by the fern-leaf as the Divisional identification. Reference should be made also to the appointment of the Divisional Gas Officer and his staff, and to the formation of the Divisional Salvage Company, whose function it; was to check waste by collecting abandoned Government property in billets and areas.</p>
          <p>While 'the Division was thus being trained and organised, the first party of Maori bushmen was attached to the Forest Control in the Nieppe Forest. Here their sterling performances speedily won them a widespread reputation. In a contest held at the end of April, they actually beat the French bucherons in their own style, which consisted in felling the tree level with the ground, and trimming the small stump so as to leave a rounded top that would not hold water. In the following month they won 2 first and 2 second places in the 4 events of a competition with Australians and Canadians for which General Birdwood presented the prizes.</p>
          <p>On 1st May the Division marched forward into the reserve area of the Corps. Headquarters moved to Estaires, the 2nd Infantry Brigade to the Doulieu area, and the 3rd Brigade to Estaires and its neighbourhood. The 1st Brigade remained for the time at Morbecque. This first move with regimental transport involved for some units a march of over 20 miles, and it was manifest that while benefiting by their recent training, the infantry were not yet adequately hardened. Substantial improvement in this respect was to be effected by the formation in June of a School of Chiropody., at which non-commissioned officers were trained for work in the units. On arrival in the new area, parties of Sappers and Pioneers were at once detached for work on the Lys bridgeheads and rear lines of trenches in the neighbourhood of Sailly, where they remained till the Division went to Armentières.</p>
          <pb xml:id="n47" n="25"/>
          <p>Detailed information was received on 5th May as to the relief of the 17th Division of the 11. Corps which held the front line to the north of the 2 Australian Divisions of I. Anzac. On 9th May the 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades exchanged areas, so as to enable the former to take over the line with the 2nd Brigade. Representatives of all arms visited their "opposite numbers" in the line and received unbounded kindness and help. The artillery parties profited by a stay of several days with the British gunners. Commanding officers, company commanders, and specialists, such as intelligence personnel and signallers, remained in the trenches for a period of 24 hours in order to familiarise themselves with the methods of relief and of holding the line, the principles of artillery cooperation, the question of water supply, the location of cemeteries, and all the hundred and one points of their new business.</p>
          <p>The infantry relief was commenced on 13th May by the 1st Brigade. Moving with the usual intervals between platoons to minimise the risk of hostile shelling, they took over the l'Epinette subsector on the right. On the following day the 2nd Brigade went into the Houplines subsector, with their left flank on the river Lys. The 3rd Brigade marched up to Armentiéres to be in reserve. By noon on the 16th the relief was complete with the exception of certain artillery units, and the command of the sector passed to the New Zealand Division. Thereupon I. Anzac, having now all its 3 Divisions in the trenches, assumed responsibility for the extended line. The trenches in the reduced II. Corps sector on the north bank of the river were held at the moment by the 9th Division. The New Zealand artillery exchanged their new guns for those of the 17th Division, and had completed their relief by the 19th. Some of the gun positions were in factories on the outskirts of the town behind sliding doors, but most emplacements were hidden away under the cover of hedges walls or artificial camouflage<note xml:id="fn22-25" n="1"><p>The outgoing gunners had taken advantage of the quiet period in the spring of 1916 to brighten the vicinity of many of the guns and dugouts with carefully tended flower borders and vegetable gardens These made the battery positions very Conspicuous, and in the active period which began In July were speedily destroyed.</p></note> The batteries were divided into 3 groups, one of the three 4th Brigade batteries being attached to each group. The 4th Brigade Commander, Lt.-Col. Falla, thus left temporarily unemployed, was appointed Divisional Artillery Intelligence Officer.</p>
          <p>The German trenches lay for the most part 200 or 300 yards, but in places only some 60 yards, across NO <pb xml:id="n48" n="26"/>Man's Land. They were held by troops of the German XIX. Corps, known also as the 2nd Royal Saxon Corps, under General von: Laffert. At the end of October 1914 they had been included in the force engaged in the outflanking race northwards, when they were attacked by the British cava1ry and by the advanced guard of the III. Corps, and driven back on their present line between the Lille-Armentiéres railway and the river Douve by Messines. Von Laffert's sector was bisected by the Lys, which here forms the frontier between France and Belgium. It remained a German Corps sector till the line was broken in our Messines offensive, and is an example of the German practice of including all obstaclc like the Lys within a sector of command and rather than, as was the British wont, making a boundry of it. This frontier district had often in previous history been the scene of conflicts, and Armentières itself had more than once experienced the ravages of invading armies.</p>
          <p>The first trench system occupied by the New Zealanders in France extended for some 4 miles to the east and south-east of Armentières from Pear Tree Farm, just south of the ArmentièrsLille railway, to the river Lys, in front of its suburb Houplines. The whole of this front area was composed of low-lying flats, criss-crossed by canals and railways, in the basin of the muddy, sluggish, canalised Lys. It lay intermediate between the black country to the south and the agricultural district to the north, and reflected characteristics of both regions. In Armentières itself and the villages on the river, Sailly, Bac St. Maur, and Erquinghem, about a third of the civil population remained, and the isolated tree-surrounded brick farms two to three miles behind the trenches were still inhabited. But for the most part the fields on the enemy bank of the Lys, with their pollarded willows, lay unkempt and melancholy, crossed by bands of wire and seamed with trenches. Farm implements rusted where the retreating owner had abandoned them in the German advance. Long scrim barricades hid the exposed parts of the poplar-bordered roads from enemy observation. The German country in front, sparsely wooded and marked by occasional farms, was similarly flat till the ground rose, a mile back, in the Pérenchics ridge behind which lay Lille. The ridge dominated all the low country of the trenches. Very prominent on it was a water tower, used as an observation post. And all along <pb xml:id="n49" n="27"/>it were set the western forts of Lille, on which was lavished all the strength that German science and industry could contrive.</p>
          <p>Experience had early demonstrated the power of modern artillery to break a shallow defence position, and the efficacy, as a counter-measure, of a series of trenches in depth. Behind the front system, for the defence and maintenance of which the Division was responsible, stretched several others in a more or less complete state of organisation. The second line, known as the A.B.C. line, ran in a chain of fortified localities from the southern boundary at Charred Post to Bois Grenier, and thence north to the Ferme do la Hallerie. In the rear of its northern sector again were 2 alternative positions, also formed by a series of posts, to meet the pressure on our salient at Armentières; and with the same object an alternative defence position had been constructed from Armentières to Fleurbaix, which pivoting on the latter village joined up with the posts southwards. Behind this system lay the bridge-heads along the river Lys at Nouveau Monde and Sailly and Bac St. Maur, and extending from the Sailly defences a line ran north to Steenwerck. The whole formed the third or X.Y.Z. line.</p>
          <p>As compared with the trench warfare at Anzac, though the essentials remained the same-the immemorial ceremony of “stand-to,” the sentry system, the co-ordination of machine gun positions, the fight against vermin, the sleeping in boots and accoutrements, the incessant labour with spade and sandbag—there were, however, many marked differences. After the deep-dug saps on the Gallipoli ridges, the open trenches in these water-sodden flats, protected by breastworks built up above the ground level, seemed perilously insecure. It had yet to be realised that more elaborate trenches were impossible owing to climatic conditions, the low-lying nature of the country, and the infinitely heavier weight of artillery. Nor were they, as on Gallipoli, manned continuously throughout. Even had the supply of troops been adequate, such a policy, in view of the development of artillery, would have been not merely wasteful of man-power from everyday bombardments and exposure to physical and moral strain, but would also have involved sacrifice of life not less futile than costly against modern methods of attack. The odds in favour of an assault delivered with powerful artillery preparation were conceded, and the likelihood of the enemy's winning a temporary footing in our front line was recognised. But it was the general policy in such an eventuality to restore the <pb xml:id="n50" n="28"/>situation by counter-attack rather than seek to prevent it by an accumulation of troops in the front line. The quicker such a counter-attack could be delivered, before the enemy had time to reorganise and consolidate his gains, the better; and therefore definite plans were drawn up for this action by reserve troops in each and every part of the line. Should this immediate counter-attack fail, and the enemy' succeed in establishing a firm hold on our front line or in penetrating Deeper, it was not the principle to fritter away reserves in a series of weak efforts, but to deliver under Corps arrangements a grand counter-attack after an interval sufficient to allow the employment of adequate artillery and the maximum force of troops available.</p>
          <p>In accordance with this policy, it had already become the general practice to divide a sector into garrisoned “localities” separated by so-called “gaps” of about 200 yards or less. These gaps were carefully enfiladed from wing trenches of the localities on either flank and were also capable of being raked by fire from the support trench in rear. To effect this, all the intervening ground and the former parados, or back wall of the trench, were levelled. In order to deceive aeroplane observation, however, a dummy parados was constructed of a wooden framework covered with netting and scrim which would not interfere with the fire of the supporting troops but would at the same time throw the all-important shadow in the eye, so to speak, of the aeroplane can1era.<note xml:id="fn23-28" n="1"><p>At 3000 ft. aeroplane observes could follow an attack see bombing fights, state the general conditions of trenches and note tracks: at 2500 ft. could see men massed in trenches: at 2000 ft. wire in good light, overhead traverses and comparative width of trenches; at 1500 ft. dugout entrances, comparative depth of Trenches and men making signal; at 1000 ft. could distinguish our men from the enemy especially by the British round tin helmets.</p></note> Not less importance was laid on the maintenance of the front parapet in these gaps than in the localities, and on patrolling the and sniping from them, Machine guns and Lewis guns fired regularly from them; and from them the infantry encouraged the baleful activity of the trench mortars so as to draw a substantial proportion of hostile artillery fire on to the untenanted portions.</p>
          <p>A further point of difference was that, owing to greater room than on the confined area at Anzac, the trench systems showed far more marked complexity and depth, with support lines and reserve or subsidiary lines and all-round Strong Points. The long winding communication trenches were also capable of defence and lined with “fire-steps” at intervals <pb xml:id="n51" n="29"/>for the purpose of holding up a flank attack. Each trench line was guarded by more extensive wire entanglements than were possible at Gallipoli, and from each rear line there ran forward emergency overland routes in the open for approach when the communication trenches were under fire or for counter-attack. To facilitate movement by night, these routes were marked by pegs painted white on the side turned from the enemy. Zigzag gaps similarly marked were left in the entanglements.</p>
          <p>Again, the mass of materials, timber, iron, revetments and revetting frames, heavy beams for dugouts, stakes, sandbags, and so forth, was astounding after the poverty of the Peninsula. Unknown at Anzac were the duckwalks at the bottom of the trenches and in the dugouts where, covered with sandbags, they made a rough bunk. There were real tables and chairs in headquarters, borrowed from the deserted houses and even in the front line system there were carefully screened and protected dwelling huts of solid timber. The machine gun dugouts in particular were roofed with massive baulks. The accommodation generally, though not so luxurious as in the German lines, was of an incomparably higher level of civilisation than the primitive stone-age dwellings at Anzac. Much of the heavier material was manufactured in a sawmill on the Lys controlled by the Division, where civilians, especially women, were employed on the day shifts and part of the lighter material in the brigade workshops in Armentières. So, too, the concrete blocks used as bursters on the tops of dugouts, with a 12-inch air space, or "cushion," underneath to give protection against high-explosive, were mostly made in another factory under Divisional management.</p>
          <p>Similarly the unfailing quantity and variety of rations revealed in the strongest possible light the British capacity for organisation. These were delivered by the Train to the quartermasters' stores ill Armentières where they were made up for the different company and specialist messes in the line. After dark the transport, with the quartermaster-sergeants in attendance, took them along the exposed roads to the mouths of the saps, whence carrying parties man-hauled them or pushed them up the narrow tramways to the kitchens in the trenches. Thus, as far as hardships and privations were concerned, the balance was all in favour of France. On the other hand, there was the added and ever-dreaded danger of gas, which involved the most elaborate <pb xml:id="n52" n="30"/>precautions in the way of drill, precautionary measures and warning arrangements. Nor did life at Anzac afford preparatory warning of the weight of artillery fire oil the Western front.</p>
          <p>A very remarkable contrast arose from, the continuous development of military technique and the intensive application of science to the military art. This feature made the Gallipoli campaign appear a century behind the warfare in France. It embraced every phase of activity, whether the, meticulous care to restrict the use of telephones in the forward area to tittles of emergency and active operations, or the extensive buried cable systems, or the arrangements for storing water rations and ammunition or the wireless communication between aeroplanes and batteries, or the log-books kept for recording the progress of work, or the organisation of the battalion snipers with their telescopic rifles and amour-piercing bullets to penetrate the enemy's loopholed plates, or the trench code books, whose numbers represented particular messages, and whose key-number was periodically changed. As a particular instance, we may take that of the organisation of intelligence, as being in addition illustrative of the life in the line. Systematic and detailed reports were collated daily by all formations, ensuring continuity of observation from different parts of our positions. This information showing enemy movement, position of active batteries, and so on, was circularised to all concerned and enabled trench intelligence maps to be brought up to date. The following infantry report has been selected as typical of an ordinary quit day in the trenches. The letters and numbers refer to certain sections and subsections of subjects, thus defined for facility of collation by the staffs of higher formations:—</p>
          <quote>
            <floatingText xml:id="t1-body-d2-t1">
              <body xml:id="t1-body1-d2-t1-body">
                <head>
                  <hi rend="c">Intelligence Summary</hi>
                </head>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d1" type="section">
                  <head>
                    <hi rend="sc">Confidential</hi>
                  </head>
                  <p><hi rend="sc">Unit</hi>—3rd New Zealand Rifle Brigade</p>
                  <p><hi rend="sc">Time</hi>—Twenty-four hours ending 6 a.m., <date when="1916-07-18">18/7/16</date></p>
                  <p><hi rend="sc">Place</hi>—Brigade sector, Bois Grenier</p>
                  <p><hi rend="sc">Map Ref</hi>.—Sheet 36, 1/10,000</p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d2" type="section">
                  <head>A.(1) <hi rend="sc">Opetations</hi></head>
                  <p>Our machine guns were less active than usual. An enemy working party reported by our patrol was fired upon. Ammunition expended, 1500 rounds.</p>
                  <pb xml:id="n53"/>
                  <p>
                    <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP008a">
                      <graphic url="WH1-FranP008a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP008a-g"/>
                      <head>
                        <hi rend="sc"><name key="name-208052" type="person">General Godley</name> inspects Troops</hi>
                      </head>
                    </figure>
                    <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP008b">
                      <graphic url="WH1-FranP008b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP008b-g"/>
                      <head>
                        <hi rend="sc">At a Field Ambulance</hi>
                      </head>
                    </figure>
                    <pb xml:id="n54"/>
                    <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP009a">
                      <graphic url="WH1-FranP009a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP009a-g"/>
                      <head>
                        <hi rend="sc">An Auckland Battalion on the March</hi>
                      </head>
                    </figure>
                    <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP009b">
                      <graphic url="WH1-FranP009b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP009b-g"/>
                      <head>
                        <hi rend="sc">Otago Mounted Rifles</hi>
                      </head>
                    </figure>
                  </p>
                  <pb xml:id="n55" n="31"/>
                  <p>Our patrols operated as usual in No Man's Land. (Report on enemy's wire. See below,)</p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d3" type="section">
                  <head>A. (2) <hi rend="sc">Identification</hi></head>
                  <p>A man wearing brown cap was seen in front line at I.26.d.0.2.<note xml:id="fn24-31" n="1"><p>The large lettered squares of maps were divided into numbered squares, each of which was in turn subdivided into 4 smaller squares, a, b, c, d. The sides of these smaller, squares again were "ticked" on the decimal system. Pinpoint references were obtained by reading from the lower left-hand corner of the smaller square, first along the bottom side, and then up the left side.</p></note></p>
                  <p>(Identification from bomb—see 6.46 below.)</p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d4" type="section">
                  <head>B.(4) <hi rend="sc">Enemy Front and Support Lines</hi></head>
                  <p>(a) Wire.—Our patrols examined German wire from I.31.d.3.5 to I.31.e.7.0 and report that it is continuous and generally good. Two parties were seen at work strengthening it at I.31.c.9.2 and I.31.c.8.1. Another patrol attempted to carry out similar work from I.26.c.9.4 to I.32.a.3.4, but was unable to proceed owing to the number of enemy working and covering parties.</p>
                  <p>The enemy parties signalled to each other by a low whistle that our patrol was in the vicinity.</p>
                  <p>Five enemy parties were heard working on this front.</p>
                  <p>Fewer flares than usual were used, some of which rose from No Man's Land.</p>
                  <p>Covering parties appeared to be extended for fifteen or twenty paces.</p>
                  <p>(b) Movement and Work.—New work is visible at I.21.c.6.1/2. Gap made in parapet here by our artillery two days ago has been filled and covered up.</p>
                  <p>New work visible at I.21.c.8.4. A concrete work knocked down by our artillery has been replaced.</p>
                  <p>Very little movement visible in enemy's front line, though working parties were seen at work in rear making a new trench.</p>
                  <p>They appear to be digging very deep, as the soil is not being built up lo form a breastwork, but is being spread out.</p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d5" type="section">
                  <head>B.(6) <hi rend="sc">Snipers' Posts</hi></head>
                  <p>Station Building I.27.b.2.4 is suspected of being a snipers' post. This building enables the enemy to dominate Rue du Bois Salient.</p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d6" type="section">
                  <head>B.(18) <hi rend="sc">Enemy Activity</hi></head>
                  <p>Activity below normal.</p>
                </div>
                <pb xml:id="n56" n="32"/>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d7" type="section">
                  <head>C.(24) <hi rend="sc">Movement Behind Enemy's Lines</hi></head>
                  <p>Haymaking is proceeding as usual at about 1.28.a.0.6. At 4 p.m the usual party, consisting of 25 men, passed this point.</p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d8" type="section">
                  <head>D.(33) <hi rend="c">Searchlights</hi></head>
                  <p>Enemy searchlight was again in operation on Brigade front.</p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d9" type="section">
                  <head>F.(36) <hi rend="sc">Enemy Shelling</hi></head>
                  <p>Enemy shells fired into our sector amounted to about 70 during the day.</p>
                  <p>One shell demolished a snipers post in our lines, other-wise slight damage.</p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d10" type="section">
                  <head>G.(46) <hi rend="sc">Grenades</hi></head>
                  <p>A patrol brought in a German stick bomb marked as follows:—</p>
                  <p>
                    <table>
                      <row>
                        <cell>On body</cell>
                        <cell rend="center">L</cell>
                      </row>
                      <row>
                        <cell/>
                        <cell>Vor Gebrauch</cell>
                      </row>
                      <row>
                        <cell/>
                        <cell>Spreng Kapsol</cell>
                      </row>
                      <row>
                        <cell/>
                        <cell>Cinsetzent</cell>
                      </row>
                      <row>
                        <cell>On handle</cell>
                        <cell/>
                      </row>
                      <row>
                        <cell/>
                        <cell>Carl Spacter (burnt on)</cell>
                      </row>
                      <row>
                        <cell/>
                        <cell>35 (in ink pencil)</cell>
                      </row>
                      <row>
                        <cell/>
                        <cell>5 ½ Sek. (burnt on)</cell>
                      </row>
                      <row>
                        <cell/>
                        <cell><date when="1916-03-10">10/3/16</date> (stamped on)<note xml:id="fn25-32" n="1"><p>“Before use, insert detonator.” Specter was the maker's name, and the time of the fuse: was 51/2 seconds. The importance here attached to an ordinary stick bomb indicates recent arrival in France and ignorance of German on the part of the compiler of the report.</p></note></cell>
                      </row>
                    </table>
                  </p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d11" type="section">
                  <head>M.(88) <hi rend="sc">Enemy Ruses</hi></head>
                  <p>A periscope was seen to be thrust up inside a box which shows prominently above the parapet at 1.21.c.7.2.</p>
                  <p>Enemy are using dummy heads opposite Rue du Bois Salient.</p>
                </div>
                <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d2-d12" type="section">
                  <head>M. (98) <hi rend="sc">Miscellaneous</hi></head>
                  <p>At 6.45 a.m two pigeons were seen to fly from behind our lines across to German lines opposite Brigade sector.<note xml:id="fn26-32" n="2"><p>An ever-recurring Item in “intelligence” at this time. The majority of the birds seen it may he surmised, were not in German service.</p></note></p>
                  <closer>
                    <signed rend="sc">K. G. S. Caldwell, Lieut.,</signed>
                    <salute>For Brigadier-General Commanding 3rd N.Z. (R.)B.</salute>
                  </closer>
                </div>
              </body>
            </floatingText>
          </quote>
          <p>Even more different was life out of the line. Instead of bare hillside bivouacs above the Anzac beaches and in rest, gullies, the reserve battalions and the personal employed behind the trenches lived in comfortable billets of brick and <pb xml:id="n57" n="33"/>mortar. At the outbreak of war Armentières had been a well-built manufacturing town of some 20,000 inhabitants, and at this period was still largely intact. It was not till the spring of the following year that it was systematically razed by hostile artilltery. The few buildings that then escaped were destroyed during the German offensive in 1918, when the whole of the sector passed temporarily into enemy hands. Much of the civil administration was, in accordance with previous practice, entrusted to the Division. The Sanitary Section undertook responsibility for water supply, street cleaning, collection and destruction of all refuse and waste material, the inspection of dairies estaminets and retail shops where foodstuffs where exposed for sale, the disinfection of premises and clothing, and the supervision and evacuation of cases of infectious diseases among the civil population. During June, for example, 1,200 tons of refuse were disposed of, and the equivalent of 100 miles of streets was swept and cleaned. For the sanitary services thus rendered the Maire of the town paid 40 francs a day. But the Division did not merely efface from the streets the traces of occasional bombardment, but looked after the civil wounded and sick. The appreciation by the local authorities of the work done in this connection is evidenced in the following letter to the A.D.M.S. of the Division from the Maire:—</p>
          <quote>
            <p>“J'ai bien reeu votre estimée lettre date du 8 courant m'informant du nombre de malades et blessés civils de notre ville soignés dans les hôpitaux britanniques.</p>
            <p>“J'ai l'honneur de vous addresser I'expression de ma plus sincère gratitude, ainsi qu'au personnel médical sous vos orders, pour les soins devoués que vous avez bien voulu prodiguer à la population civile éprouveé de notre ville.</p>
            <p>“Au nom dc la population d'Armentières je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur Ie Colonel, avee mes meilleurs remereiment I'assurance de ma considération la plus distinguée.”</p>
          </quote>
          <p>Very rarely an aeroplane would drop bombs or a gas cloud would drift through the outskirts. Shelling was rather more frequent. The first heavy bombardment was at the end of May, when a 5.9-in. howitzer, firing 130 rounds with aeroplane observation, demolished the spire of Sacre Cocur church in Houplines, and other batteries put temporarily out of working order the power-plant which supplied current to the pumping-station. Many civilians, especially among the poorer classes, still remained, and there were open all kind of shops estaminets and restaurants. The separate, rooms set <pb xml:id="n58" n="34"/>aside in the "Au Boeuf" in the Rue de Lille were a favourite gathering place for officers and non-commissioned officers. Even in Houplines some comfortable billets existed, as at Lock House and the Chateau Rose, whose tower, overhanging the inky waters of the Lys, formed an admirable vantage point from which to observe at night the inferno of a bombardment, with gas or smoke waves billowing over the enemy trenches against the lurid glare of the German rockets.</p>
          <p>At Pont de Nieppe, the north-western suburb, on the high road to Bailleul, the Divisional baths were located in buildings that once formed part of a textile factor and had been used for bleaching and dyeing. These the Division rented at 1,000 francs per month, and here 1,500 men were bathed a day. Here too 40,000 garments were washed and mended a week by 200 women employed by the Division for this purpose. Practically this was the only source used for issuing underclothing, and while the men bathed, their tunics and trousers were cleaned of vermin. These baths were of inestimable value at all times, and were not least appreciated by the little parties which were sent in turn from the trenches during the activity which was to characterise July. In Armentières itself good swimming baths were installed in the Place Victor. Hugo, which 2,000 men visited a day, and in which subsequently the Division held aquatic sports.</p>
          <p>Thus there existed a variety of interests, an intermingling with civilians, and a. fair share of the amenities if not of the luxuries of peace. Some billets near gun positions came in for spasmodic shelling, but the infantryman, after his period of duty in the trenches, trudging back past Shrapnel Corner to, say, the Breuvert Factory in Barbed Wire Square felt, whether fatalist or cheery optimist, that he had for the time left the war behind him, a mental atmosphere which was unknown and impossible in the safest and most seeluded gullies of Anzac.</p>
          <p>At the outset, ill holding the line the Division followed the method which they had found practiced by the previous garrison. The right brigade subsector, about 2,000 yads in length, was held by the 1st Brigade with 2 battalions in the trenches and 2 in reserve in Armentières. The left subsector, about 4,000 yards in extent, was occupied by the 2nd Brigade with 4 battalions in the line. Its reserve was furnished by a battalion of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. The remainder of the Rifle Brigade and the 3 engineer companies constituted Divisional reserve. This inconvenient <pb xml:id="n59" n="35"/>arrangement was altered in the first week in June. The front was then divided into 2 equal brigade subsectors, each held by 2 battalions. The third battalion of each brigade was in immediate reserve in the subsidiary line., and the fourth battalion in billets in Armentières.</p>
          <p>During June, the II. <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name>, comprising the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions, was transferred from Egypt to France, and on the 20th General Godley established his headquarters at Bailleul. The New Zealand Division was at once transferred to his command,<note xml:id="fn27-35" n="1"><p>p. 11.</p></note> the 4th Australian Division replacing it in I. Anzac. For the present, however, the Division remained for both tactical and administrative purposes under General Birdwood's control till the first week in Ju1y, when I. Anzac, consisting of the 1st 2nd and 4th Australian Divisions, set out for the battlefield on the Somme. General Godley then took command of the sector. Prior to his departure General Birdwood paid a farewell visit to the New Zealand trenches, as hr had made a final tour of their positions on Gallipoli after the commencement of the evacuation. This move of the Australian troops affected the New Zealand Division in another way, as its front was now extended southwards to include the adjoining Bois Grenier subsector. Here, during a heavy hostile bombardment, a brigade of the 2nd Australian Division was relieved on 4th July; by the 3rd New Zealand Rifle Brigade. The Divisional artillery at the same time took over the battery positions supporting the new subsector.</p>
          <p>All 3 infantry brigades were now in the line, and no formed Divisional reserve was available. The Pioneers were earmarked for the inner Armentières defences, and arrangements were made to form a. composite reserve of the Engineer companies and the battalion of each brigade in the town billets. On alarm these would assemble at their respective alarm posts and report to Divisional Headquarters by telephone, or., if the wire were cut, by an officer. During the following week the front was again extended south by the inclusion of the Rue du Bois subsector, held by another Australian brigade. The Rifle Brigade side-stepped south and retaining half of the Bois Grenier subsector took over the whole of the new subsector. The northern half of the Bois Grenier subsector was added to the 1st Brigade area. At the same time the 5th Australian relieved the 4th Australian Division in the southern half of the Corps sector.</p>
          <pb xml:id="n60" n="36"/>
          <p>This extension to a long front of 8½ miles, normally occupied by 2 Divisions, threw a considerable strain both on the fighting troops and on administrative services. Thus the Field Ambulances now manned 5 advanced and 3 main dressing stations, in addition to the Divisional rest station. Each infantry brigade had now 3 battalions in the trenches and 1 in the subsidiary line. The Division was left without infantry reserves, and reliefs in the line were confined for the most part to internal battalions arrangements, companies taking turn in the front and support trenches. This unusually long period of duty in the line without a rest spell in Armentières added to the trying conditions during July, led to a rather high rate of sickness, which was further aggravated by a measles epidemic. Not least affected by the arduous nature of their duties were the machine gun companies.</p>
          <p>The Battle of the Somme commenced on 1st July. With a view to distracting the enemy.'s attention and retaining his troops in their areas, active minor operations were undertaken along the whole northern front, both previous to and after the outbreak of the storm. In this liveliness the New Zealanders played their full part. Gas and smoke were repeatedly discharged over the German positions with at least occasionally happy results, as on the night 13th/J4th August, when it was established that the enemy had manned his parapet in strength and suffered heavy casualties from the gas and the artillery bombardment which accompanied it. The 24th June dates the inception of a marked increase in artillery expenditure, which was maintained thence onwards for 18 days. During this period the expenditure of ammunition by the Divisional batteries rarely fell under 1,500 and frequently exceeded 3,000 shells a day. Not merely the battery positions and observation posts, but also the "tender spots" behind the German line, the large dumps also, as at La Crois au Bois, and the battalion or regimental headquarters as at the Ferme du Chastel and Ferme des Deux Treilles were subjected to systematic bombardment. Billets were treated with sudden short salvoes. Every night the Divisional Ammunition Column wagons, ill addition to the battery wagons, went to the gunpits. Their work was heavy, as after the expansion of the Divisional sector they supplied no less than 11 miles of front. In the air, activity similarly increased. On 26th June, in the pellucid clearness of the summer evening, 4 German balloons above Quesnoy hung <pb xml:id="n61" n="37"/>in the sky looking over our area. Above the New Zealand trenches 3 British aeroplanes circled; and hovered slowly; and then at a given signal from their leader suddenly darted off in a straight line across the sky toward they enemy balloons. Like lightning, each aeroplane dived at a balloon, and in 2 minutes 3 of these were falling in a mass of red flames, and the fourth was being lowered with frenzied haste. At the sight of the flames and the cigar-shaped streamers of smoke which hung for long in the windless air, the New Zealand sentries, not yet sophisticated, broke into exultant cheers, feeling dimly the incident to he an auspicious omen for those great operations which they knew were on foot somewhere in the near future.</p>
          <p>The instructions for activity of all arms were repeated on 9th July. The Corps Commander then laid it down "that it must be clearly understood that greater risk must be incurred and heavier casualties faced than would be profitable under conditions of trench-warfare." He desired that "all ranks should understand that they had an opportunity of materially assisting the action of our armies in the south, and that special efforts were required of them." Wire-cutting, demolition of parapets, bursts of fire on enemy billets, and raids or gas discharges or dummy raids were to take place nightly. This programme was rigidly adhered to.</p>
          <p>Of greatest importance was the series of raids now delivered on the enemy trenches in rapid succession. This species of military enterprise had originated out of the lessons taught by renewed and expensive experience., that no permanent lodgment on a small scale in an enemy's fortified system is, even if possible, worth the inevitable cost. Participants in small raids seldom stayed beyond 15 minutes in the German trenches. The objects of the raids were, while maintaining and developing the offensive spirit in one's own forces, primarily to secure identification from the enemy, to kill or capture the garrisons assaulted, destroy or bring back machine guns and mortars, and weaken his morale. Now there was the added object of retaining his troops. In the stagnant trench warfare, unproductive indeed of large movement but offering extensive scope for resourcefulness' and ingenuity, these operations were on both sides conducted with a very high degree of scientific skill and elaborate preparation.</p>
          <p>The length of trench to he assaulted was carefully selected and reconnoitered from the ground and the air, and <pb xml:id="n62" n="38"/>when opportunity permitted an exact replica was constructed well in rear for practice by the raiding party. The artillery plans for careful registration so as to avoid suspicion, for diversions, such as wire-cutting elsewhere, to detract attention from the real objective, and for protection to the raiders in the actual attack were worked out with minute thoroughness. All marks of identification were taken off the raiders, and hands and faces were blackened so as not to show in the darkness. Bayonets were specially sharpened and dulled. To light up dugouts, electric torches were often attached to the rifles, bound on with insulated tape just below the lower band. Next to the revolver, a favourite weapon was the knobkerry, carried suspended from the wrist by a stout thong running through the hole in the handle. Special signals were used to recall the raiders, and white tapes to guide them back to the gap in our own wire. To ensure success all arrangements were completed days previously; but sometimes, as also in the case of gas, when discharge depended on the direction and strength of the wind, it was not possible or desirable to settle the exact zero hour till comparatively shortly beforehand. In that case notification of the time selected would be sent over the telephone in such a form as to rouse no suspicion in the German operators sitting at their listening apparatus, and occasionally with felicitous irony, such as in the case of a raid accompanied by bombardment, “Iron rations will be delivered at…..”</p>
          <p>To meet similar action on the part of the enemy, elaborate measures were taken. Plans of our counter-action at salients and other vulnerable points were formed after careful study of maps and photographs from the enemy's point of view. Good wire entanglements, the command of No Man's Land by patrols, and a sound system of listening posts made a silent raid in the nature of a surprise all but impracticable. Wire, above all, was necessary, and wiring was one of the infantryman's most important and dangerous duties. The risks may be illustrated by a 2nd Wellington experience at the beginning' of July. Sergt. J. Courtney was in command of a wiring party when hostile machine gun fire was directed at them. Two men were killed and two wounded. Courtney ordered the remainder of the party back, he himself carrying one of the wounded men. The other walked in by himself, but in ignorance of this Courtney went out again with the stretcher-bearers to find him. He found the body of one of the dead men and brought it in. Then finally he went out <pb xml:id="n63" n="39"/>to search the ground to ensure that no one was left in No Man's Land. All this was done under continuous heavy machine gun fire, which greatly increased the difficulties of negotiating our own entanglements.</p>
          <p>Of hardly less importance was thorough and systematic patrolling. Every night the front was covered by little groups in No Man's Land, and many and diverse were their experiences amid the ditches shcllholes ruins and hedges. It was now that Pte. Richard Clark Travis, of 2nd Otago, began to win a name for marked resourcefulness and initiative. Not satisfied with night work, he repeatedly led daylight patrols close up to the enemy's wire. For 40 nights in succession, from dusk to daylight, he spent the whole time in No Man's Land. One of his characteristic actions may be briefly related. One evening, just before he moved out on his nightly mission, an enemy patrol was reported near our wire. Our sentries chanced to be raw recruits. Relieved that no worse befell them, they were allowing the Germans to withdraw undisturbed. Wrathfully Travis picked up the nearest rifle. He went unhesitatingly over the parapet through our wire (not necessarily a difficult feat at that time) and emptied his magazine into the dimly discerned forms of the retreating patrol, one of whom fell.</p>
          <p>Where our wire was good, bombardment was necessary to break it and so afforded warning. In the case of an obvious "box" barrage at any point in our trenches, unnecessary loss and demoralisation could be avoided and our infantry could escape destruction by going out into No Man's Land, where also they might be expected to deal more effectively with an attack, or by slipping to a flank. No retrograde movement was allowable, and the garrison detailed to hold the line had to fight it out to the last. The hostile bombarding guns, whose exact positions were generally known by aeroplane photographs, flash-spotting towers, sound-ranging instruments, and other technical inventions, were themselves engaged with high-explosive from the "heavies" or seige howitzers of the Army and Corps artillery set aside for counter-battery work, which was as a rule undertaken by guns employed on this purpose practically exclusively.</p>
          <p>Communications between the infantry garrison and the Divisional artillery were vital and were maintained by telephone lamp and rocket, and by close personal touch and mutual understanding between the officers of each arm. Thus, for example, the night lines of the artillery were not necessarily <pb xml:id="n64" n="40"/>within the zone allotted for day shooting, but depended largely on the representations of the infantry brigadier, who was responsible for determining the question as to which part of his front the Germans could reasonably hope to rush by night without previous bombardment. Behind the front, in suitable places, were the observation posts manned day and night by artillery personnel, whose scrutiny of the line never flagged. These posts were in factory chimneys,<note xml:id="fn28-40" n="1"><p>Some of these swayed alarmingly in any wind.</p></note> trees, rising ground, houses, and so on, all as far as practicable made proof against weather and direct hits from field artillery. Beside each was a dugout, proof against direct hits from “five-nines.” Each post was named and marked by a board bearing its name. Telephone lines, moreover, for maintenance of which the infantry was responsible, connected battalions and brigades with supporting artillery. In the same way, each front-line company was connected with its supporting battery, though in this case, owing to the proximity of hostile listening sets, the actual use of the telephone was restricted to test or actual S.O.S. messages. Brigade and battery commanders visited the line so many times weekly, and were directly represented in the trenches by a liaison officer, who acted as observation officer during the day and lived at battalion headquarters at night.</p>
          <p>In cases of intense bombardment of our lines when observation was good and no indication presented itself of an infantry advance, it was generally enough to ask for artillery retaliation. But when No Man's Land and the enemy's parapet were shrouded in mist or darkness, and when the circumstances were such that an attack appeared probable, recourse was had to the S.O.S. signals. These were a call for immediate assistance from the artillery covering the attacked or threatened sector. It was not necessary to wait till the enemy's infantry were actually seen. All our trenches were numbered or named, and each company and platoon officer and artillery forward observation officer in the front line carried a message already written out, with only his signature to he completed, “S.O.S. Trench 81,” for example, or its abbreviated name. The company signaller transmitted it “priority,” first to the supporting battery and then to Battalion Headquarters. Above the latter's telephone hung a similar form ready for completion by the insertion of the trench and signature, and on the same principle as above, the battalion commander would repeat the <pb xml:id="n65" n="41"/>S.O.S. calls first to the batteries supporting the battalion and then to the infantry Brigade Headquarters.</p>
          <p>To test efficiency of signal communications a battalion or company commander could at any time call for a test round by the message, "Test one round," followed by the number of the trench. The time between the acceptance of the message by the signal operator in the trenches and the arrival of the round in the enemy's position was not expected to exceed 30 seconds.</p>
          <p>In addition to the telephone and lamp signals as means of communication were the S.O.S. rockets. These were the same throughout a Corps front, but from time to time their nature and colour changed. They were kept on sticks or stands, ready to be fired, at the headquarters of battalions and companies, at every officer's dugout in the front line, and I convenient, spot at least on each company sector. On an attack they were fired at short intervals till the response of the artillery was unmistakable.</p>
          <p>On the appearance of a S.O.S. rocket the gunners at their observation posts would at once clamp a pointer on a graduated and orientated dial in its direction; and thus discovering the position of the locality affected communicate it independently to the batteries. The instant the call for support came to the batteries, whether from their own observers or direct from the infantry, the 18-pounders placed a shrapnel barrage as near our trenches as safety permitted at the rate of 3 rounds per gun per minute, and after 2 minutes crept forward lifting 50 yards at 1-minute intervals at the rate of 2 rounds per gun per minute to the enemy front-line trenches, where the barrage became stationary, and high-explosive was substituted wholly or in part for shrapnel. The howitzers at the same time fired each a round a minute with the object of destroying the enemy's front trench and garrison, or blocking his communications, or bombarding known headquarters. Mortars and machine guns had their action similarly defined.</p>
          <p>A like procedure was adopted in cloud gas attacks. The howitzers and trench mortars bombarded the trench from which it was emitted, and the 18-pounders, alert for a possible S.O.S. call, placed a light barrage in front of the enemy's lines to prevent his patrols from crossing No Man's Land. The working of the machine guns was tested by occasional short bursts. "With their respirators adjusted, the troops directly <pb xml:id="n66" n="42"/>affected fired their rifles at a slow rate, while those on the flanks made ready to enfilade an infantry attack.</p>
          <p>Immediately prior and subsequent to the beginning of the Somme battle the number of the British raids was increased, and the scale on which they were delivered was enlarged all along the front of the Northern. Armies. In the last week of June no fewer than 70 were delivered between Ypres and the northern fringe of the battle area. On the Divisional front one raid had already been delivered by the 2nd Brigade at the extreme northern end of the sector, opposite the village of Frelinghien, which lay down the Lys north-east of Houplines. Early in June suspicions had been aroused in the minds of the Army Staff by a new trench which had crept forward at this point some 800 yards across a German re-entrant and thence diagonally over No Man's Land towards the Lys. On an aeroplane photograph this new work looked exactly like a harbour breakwater, the main trench and the saps connecting them appearing like the wharf side and the town streets. It was accordingly called the Breakwater. It was possible that the new works were designed merely to improve the German positions. But certain indications, such as an increase in local wireless communications, appeared suggestive of hostile preparations, and it was thought probable that the enemy would try to follow up a recent success snatched against the Canadians in the Ypres salient<note xml:id="fn29-42" n="1"><p>This attack, 2nd June, was intended to interfere with the arrangements for our Somme offensive. The lost ground was recovered on 13th June.</p></note> by a similar attack on other Overseas troops for the identity of the Australians had been discovered—if only to form some estimate of their value. In this neighbourhood there was no specially important tactical feature to attract German attention, but on the other hand the enemy would have an initial advantage from the fact that there was no depth behind our line owing to the proximity of the village of Houplines, and that his right flank was protected by the river. Corps Headquarters considered that the enemy's works might be connected with some plan to capture and include in his line the ruined buildings called Hobbs' Farm, which lay just behind our front trench and which were indeed suspiciously immune from shelling.</p>
          <p>Elaborate measures were at once undertaken for strengthening the fortifications and especially the wire round the Farm. Daily progress of the Breakwater was studied on aeroplane photographs, and a raid was organised to discover
							<pb xml:id="n67"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP010a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP010a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP010a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Trench-Construction</hi></head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n68"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP011a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP011a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP011a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Salvage</hi></head></figure>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP011b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP011b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP011b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Communication with Aeroplanes</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n69" n="43"/>the strength and purpose of the new trench. The raiding party of 5 officers and 83 other ranks was composed of selected volunteers from the whole brigade, and was led by Capt. E. B. Alley, of 2nd Otago Preceded by an intense local bombardment of 20 minutes' duration and protected by a covering barrage, the assault was made during the night 16th/17th June. The party was unlucky in crossing No Man's Land, where 4 officers, including Alley himself, were wounded, and 1 man killed and 5 wounded by shell-fire. The trench was found not yet advanced enough to be garrisoned except by outpost sentries. Half a dozen Germans had already been killed in the bombardment, but the raiders had the satisfaction of bayoneting 2 others. Unfortunately Alley succumbed to his wounds in the morning. The following night a patrol went out to ascertain whether attempts were being made to repair the damage. A large enemy party was detected at work, and was swept by artillery fire. The effect of these operations and subsequent bombardments was to discourage the enemy for the time from pursuing whatever object he had in view in developing the Breakwater,<note xml:id="fn30-32" n="1"><p>p 136.</p></note> In the light of after events it appears probable that the Germans were credited with a more sinister purpose than they actually entertained.</p>
          <p>As an auspicious beginning to the raids delivered in connection with the offensive on the Somme, a highly satisfactory enterprise was carried out by the Rifle Brigade late at night on 25th June. At the same hour the 2nd Australian Division executed a not less successful raid to the south. A party of the 2nd Rifles, consisting of 3 officers and 70 other ranks, under Capt. A. J. Powley, raided the enemy trenches opposite Pont Ballot salient. As on the 16th, several Germans had already been killed in the prelude of artillery fire, but this time the enemy trenches were fully manned. Many were bombed in the darkness of their dugouts, and 29 were killed in the open trench. Nine prisoners, including a warrant officer, were brought back, together with rifles, bayonets, gas helmets, letters and papers. Two sappers attached to the party blew up a gas engine used for pumping, and destroyed the main dugout, which was fitted with electric light. 5 other ranks were wounded by the enemy retaliation, and a German bomb, which a rifleman was carrying homewards, exploded, killing him and wounding 3 others Powley was later awarded the <pb xml:id="n70" n="44"/>Military Cross in recognition of his successful leadership, and 2 of his n.c.o.s the Military Medal for marked gallantry.</p>
          <p>It was now the turn of the 1st Brigade, and on 1st July a raid was carried out by 1st Wellington on the trenches opposite Pigot's Farm. These marked the junction of the sectors held by 2 German Divisions.<note xml:id="fn31-44" n="1"><p>The 24th and 50th.</p></note> The unusually excellent account rendered by the battalion to Brigade Headquarters is reproduced.</p>
        </div>
        <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d3" type="section">
          <head>1st <hi rend="c">Bn. Wellington Regiment</hi></head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d3-d1" type="section">
            <p>Particulars of Raid carried out on the Night of lst/2nd July Reference Map 36 N.W.4 1/10,000</p>
            <list>
              <item>A raiding party under Capt. A. B. McColl, consisting of 4 officers and 77 other ranks, assaulted the enemy's trenches on the night of the 1st/2nd July at 1.17.a. 1½/5½.</item>
              <item>The night was dark and the weather fine.</item>
              <item>The scouts<note xml:id="fn32-44" n="2"><p>It should be added that the scout sergeant, R. C. Potter, guided the raiders with great skill and courage and was the first man to reach the enemy's parapets.</p></note> moved out through the sally port as soon as it was dark, and at 11.45 p.m. two returned and led out the remainder of the raiding party to selected positions in No Man's Land.</item>
              <item>The bombardment by the artillery and M.T.Ms. commenced at 12.30 a.m. Six M.T.Ms. were employed solely for cutting wire.</item>
              <item>After 20 minutes' bombardment, the artillery firing at the assaulting point lifted and formed a semi-circular barrage.</item>
              <item>The scouts went forward and found the wire had been thoroughly cut. They had only to clear the loose wire away. They were not fired on and encountered no opposition.</item>
              <item>Where the wire had been cut, a listening sap had come out to the outer edge of the wire, and the centre party had an easy method of entry to the trench along this.</item>
              <item>None of the parties met with the slightest resistance. What men were in the trench were cowed by our artillery fire and were crouching in shelters under the parapet. These were either passed up to the prisoner parties or killed if they refused to move.</item>
              <item>The raiders remained 8 minutes in the trench, and at a whistle signal withdrew. Without waiting in No Man's Land they returned direct to battalion headquarters.</item>
              <item>The artillery ceased fire at 1.24 a.m.</item>
              <pb xml:id="n71" n="45"/>
              <item>The enemy continued his bombardment until 1.45 a.m.</item>
            </list>
            <p>Telephonic communication was satisfactorily maintained throughout.</p>
            <p>Our casualties were:—</p>
            <list>
              <item>1 officer died of wounds.</item>
              <item>1 man killed.</item>
              <item>9 men wounded.</item>
            </list>
            <p>Of these, one man was killed and four others were wounded by a shell bursting when waiting in No Man's Land. One man was wounded in our trenches after the return of the parties. Four were wounded during the course of the raid.</p>
            <p>Capt. A. B. McColl reached our trenches, but returned to help our stretcher-bearers, who had got into difficulties in a ditch not far from our parapet. When getting back over the parapet he was caught by machine gun fire and severely wounded. He died before reaching the dressing station.</p>
            <p>Prisoners—Ten prisoners were brought back, two of whom were wounded.</p>
            <p>All the enemy that were in the trenches were taken prisoners or killed. It is not known how many were killed, as bombs were used and nobody took account of the dead.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body1-d2-d3-d2" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">Information Gained.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Entanglements</hi>—The entanglements were approximately 35 yards thick and about 4 feet 6 inches high. The wire, which was very strong, with heavy barbs close together, was erected on knife-rests and screw-stakes. Before the bombardment it had been in good order.</p>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Parapet</hi>—The parapet was fully 20 feet wide at the base and 6 feet wide at the top. There were no sandbags, and the trenches were revetted with lattice work. There was a very shallow "Borrow Pit," completely clear of wire, in front.</p>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Trenches</hi>—There were no dugouts under the parapet, but there were shallow shelters. At one point in the parapet there was a large bomb store with iron doors. Out of these doors three men came, a fourth remaining inside with the doors shut. These doors were blown in by an engineer when the raiders withdrew. In the front trench a pump shaft was found leading from a deep well to a pumping station some distance in rear. The shaft <pb xml:id="n72" n="46"/>was demolished by an engineer, who followed the pipe line for 10 yards to the rear but could not find a pump. The trench was about 6 feet deep. It was narrow, strongly traversed, and floored with duckboards. There was a traffic trench at the back of the parados, through which about every 20 yards there was an opening to the front line.</p>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Parados</hi>—The parados was not so high as the parapet. In it were a number of dugouts, several of which had beds. They were all very strongly constructed, with a thick solid roof supported by heavy iron girders. The floor of most of the dugouts was level with the floor of the trench, but a few were a little deeper from the trench level. In all of them it was possible to stand up. They were lighted by electricity, and the doors all faced towards the enemy's rear.</p>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Machine Guns</hi>—No machine guns or snipers' positions were found.</p>
            <p><hi rend="sc">The Enemy</hi>—An officer was taken prisoner but would not cross No Man's Land, and had to be shot. The enemy were evidently expecting to be relieved, for their packs were made up. A number of these, including one belonging to an officer, were brought away, and from them a. Corps Intelligence Officer obtained a number of useful papers. On account of the expected relief there was little in the dugouts.</p>
            <p>The trench was not heavily held.</p>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Our Artillery</hi>—Our artillery co-operation was very good. The parapet was in places much knocked about, and one dugout was considerably damaged. The parados was hit in many places, much damage having been done.</p>
            <p>There were very few dead as the results of our shelling, but what men there were had no fight left in them.</p>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Enemy's Artillery</hi>—The enemy's reply started 5 minutes after our bombardment had commenced. No. 1 Locality, Central and Port Egal Avenues and Graham's Post suffered a fair amount of damage.</p>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Miscellaneous</hi>—No steel helmets were found, but spiked helmets with Prussian and Saxon badges, a quantity of clothing, a number of books, flares, rifles, bayonets, and a pair of field glasses were brought back.</p>
            <p>The Division was not, however, to be exempt from the vicissitudes of war, and ill fortune attended the next few <pb xml:id="n73" n="47"/>ventures A raid by 2nd Wellington, directed at the trenches near the Frelinghien Brasserie, on the following night, 2nd/3rd July, at 11.30 p.m. was unsuccessful. As soon as ever our bombardment started, the enemy put down on and in front of our parapet a heavy artillery fire which by accident or design fell with special weight on a drain in No Man's Land, where our party lay prior to the moment for moving forward. None the less at the appointed time the raiders advanced to the enemy's entanglements through machine gun fire, which caused further severe casualties. There only a gap of about 6 feet had been cut, and as the raiders dribbled through this and forced their way into the trench, they were bombed in detail by the Germans, who had evacuated their front line and threw their bombs from a close support trench. The artillery plan on this occasion was while shelling the flanks and encircling the position by the customary protective box barrage, to bombard the interior of the position only for the final 10 minutes so as to give the raiders a chance to capture a number of prisoners. Though well conceived, however, this idea actually allowed the enemy time to collect smoke bombs and grenades, and was considered afterwards to have been a mistake. An enemy attempt to follow up the raiders was frustrated without difficulty. More serious, however, was the intense enfilade machine gun fire to which the withdrawal was exposed. But it was carried out with consummate steadiness and skill, and thanks to this the casualties proved less than had been with reason feared. An officer and 11 men were killed and 2 officers and 34 rank and file wounded. In addition, 5 men were missing. Where all behaved with courage, exceptional gallantry was shown by Coy.-Sergt.-Major W.E Frost, who assisted Lt, R, E. V. Riddiford to cover the withdrawal. Paying no heed to the imminent danger to his own life, Frost twice returned under heavy fire to the German lines through the enemy wire and carried back 2 seriously wounded men who, lying within a few feet of the enemy's parapet, would certainly but for his action have been killed or taken prisoners. Frost was recommended for the V.C. and awarded the D.C.M. and Medaille Militaire.<note xml:id="fn33-47" n="1"><p>Frost died on <date when="1916-08-27">27/8/16</date> as the results of wounds sustained while extricating a wounded horse from a wagon in Armentières.</p></note> Great devotion to duty was shown also by the regimental stretcher-bearers under Sergt. L. R. Nicholas who remained at their post in the front line under continuous heavy shelling for an hour and a half.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n74" n="48"/>
            <p>The Maoris were keenly anxious to emulate these achievements and revive in modern battle the traditions of their warrior stock. Fortune, however, was to be unkind. They proposed to raid the trenches opposite the locality called Pety Cury in our left brigade subsector on the night 9th/10th July. The enterprise was to be "silent" without artillery support but in combination with a dummy raid on Brune Rue to the south. With intense chagrin the Maoris found that a gap cut previously in the German wire by our artillery was now closed, and that the entanglements were too dense to permit of ingress. Attempting it again on the following night, 10th/llth July, while a diversion was carried out on a flank, they cleared a gap after some time and deployed silently inside the wire ready to rush the trench. But the German sentries had observed them, and strong German patrols crept out on either side to cut them off. The crawling forms of the enemy were, noticed just in time, and the raiders having no chance against their very superior numbers withdrew without confusion. The enemy followed them up with some deliberation over No Man's Land, wasting his bombs, till he reached within 70 yards of our trenches. Once the Maoris had clambered over our parapet, the garrison's machine guns and rifles lashed their pursuers, who could now be faintly discerned, and followed them up with fire as they retreated in disorder and with casualties to their own trenches.</p>
            <p>The following night, llth/12th July, a raid by 2nd Otago at Pont Ballot was also a failure. The wire was reported to have not been cut. On the 13th/14th, while gas was released on the 2nd Brigade subsector, a large raid by 1st Otago from the 1st Brigade trenches marked the high-water mark of our reverses. Assembled in No Man's Land, the raiders were swept by a tremendous concentration of shrapnel and machine gun fire which burst out the very instant our bombardment started. No regiment was less likely to be disheartened or deterred from a project by any form of hostile opposition than the hard-bitten soldiers of Otago. With their lines raked by fire, they pressed as far as the enemy's entanglements, and only then, after they had lost three-quarters of their strength, was the order to withdraw reluctantly given and as reluctantly obeyed. By the time that the party regained our trenches, 4 officers were killed and 4 wounded, and 50 other ranks killed and over 100 wounded. Only 6 men indeed returned unhurt out of the original muster. As in the case of the 2nd Wellington raid on 2nd/3rd July, such <pb xml:id="n75" n="49"/>was the uncanny promptitude and deadly accuracy of the enemy retaliation that it seemed certain that the Germans had acquired information through unguarded conversation either in a town estaminet—for Armentieres was not without its German agents—or over the telephone. The shelling was extended to the batteries and about midnight caused the death of Capt. J. L. H. Turner, commander of the 4th Howitzer Battery.</p>
            <p>This disaster was to some extent avenged on the night 14th/15th by a successful raid of the 4th Rifles at the Lille Road Salient. An excellent track 10 feet wide was cut through the wire by our trench mortars. The real attack was preceded half an hour previously by a dummy raid on the same spot. Intense havoc had been wrought by our artillery. The trenches were completely obliterated. The remains of several dead were so shattered that it was impossible to procure identification. The raiders lost only 1 man killed and 2 wounded. An effort by a German flank party to work round our rear was dispelled by the protecting scouts with bombs, and the enemy fled immediately.</p>
            <p>Meanwhile the drain of the deadly struggle to the south was affecting the German garrisons in the same way as it had thinned our own.<note xml:id="fn34-32" n="1"><p>p 35.</p></note> It was calculated that since the beginning of the Somme operations 9 of the enemy's battalions had been withdrawn from the Lens-Lille area. Accordingly a threat against Lille was likely to embarrass him gravely. With this end in view operations were designed to take place just to the south of the New Zealand sector on 19th and 20th July. The attack was entrusted to the XI Corps under Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. Haking and carried out at 11 a.m. on 19th July by the 61st Division and the 5th Australian Division. The result was to fall much short of expectation. To assist the enterprise by way of diversion, smoke and gas were discharged on the night of the 19th/20th on the New Zealand front, and a violent bombardment, in which the Corps “heavies” co-operated, was directed from 8 p.m. till 11 p.m. on the whole of the enemy's trenches billets and batteries. In addition, 2 raiding enterprises were carried out simultaneously by the 1st and Rifle Brigades. 1st Auckland found only dead and debris, but on their right a party of 75 men of the 1st Rifles led by Capt. J. R. Cowles was more fortunate. A few Germans had been killed by our artillery, but there remained 35 alive in the 80 yards of trench assaulted. Utterly <pb xml:id="n76" n="50"/>terrified, they would not leave their dugouts, so they were bombed and shot at leisure and afterwards counted. Numerous articles brought back, including shoulder-straps helmets and letters from the dead, yielded useful identifications. The return was made under heavy shell and machine gun fire, but thanks to Cowles' skilful dispositions, the raiders escaped with only 7 men wounded. At the same time the Germans, as we shall see, also made a raid. The ammunition expended on this night by the Divisional artillery alone in connection with these activities exceeded 12,000 rounds. Assistance was given to the 5th Australian Division in the evacuation their heavy casualties.</p>
            <p>A period of comparative quiescence now followed, due mainly to a shortage of ammunition caused by a stupendous explosion in one of the great northern depots.<note xml:id="fn35-32" n="1"><p>Audruieq.</p></note> A final raid was made on 12th August, when Capt. G. C. W. Armstrong and a party of the-3rd (Auckland City) Company of 2nd Auckland captured 2 prisoners and a machine gun with insignificant casualties. The scene was again the Breakwater, and a powerful artillery diversion was made on Frelinghien. The trenches in front of the village, which also were subjected to concentrated shelling, were reported to have been strongly manned. It so happened that at the time of the raid a German patrol was in No Man's Land. All but 1 of the patrol were killed, and he lost his way and wandered into our trenches near by. These identifications were of importance as confirming the presence of the VI. Reserve Corps on this part of the front in place of the XIX. Corps which had been transferred to the Somme.</p>
            <p>In addition to the infantry penetrations there were practised on several occasions so-called “dummy raids” when the artillery action, feigning to support an infantry assault, carried out a bombardment and box barrage for the purpose of confusing the enemy, lowering his morale, and inflicting casualties. Not the least successful perhaps was one delivered on the night 14th/15th August on the front line trenches opposite 2 projecting points in our lines called the Railway Salient and the Mushroom, while simultaneously on the right the 18th Divisional Artillery bombarded the enemy's Rue du Bois Salient. In this instance the intention was to make the enemy man his parapet between the 2 points under fire. At a given moment on the conclusion of the bombardment, 2 minutes' rapid 18-pounder fire was poured by both <pb xml:id="n77" n="51"/>artilleries into the intervening sector. “Judging by the noise heard,” observes the Corps Diary drily, “considerable casualties were caused.”</p>
            <p>If this offensive and aggressive policy did not fulfil its entire purpose, which indeed it was too much to hope for, it was none the less shown by manifold indications to have imposed an exhausting strain on German resources and to have seriously impaired German nerves. The Army Commander, ever ready to recognise merit, expressed his appreciation of the energy and devotion displayed by calling in person at the various brigade headquarters to express his satisfaction and thanks.</p>
            <p>The German raids on the Divisional sector were neither so numerous as our own (4 as against 11), nor did they achieve as substantial success. The first was launched at 1st Auckland in the l'Epinette Salient on 3rd/4th July. An effort made on the same night against the Australians on the right was repulsed by machine gun fire. The assault on the l'Epinette was accompanied by a heavy bombardment from 10 p.m. till 11.45 p.m., and after an interval from midnight to 12.45 a.m. Just prior to the commencement of the bombardment the enemy fortified his nerves by a sing-song in his trenches. On the S.O.S. call our artillery put down a barrage on the enemy parapet and in No Man's Land, but shortly after midnight the raiders rushed through it and made for our trenches. In No Man's Land they were broken up by a listening post of 5 private soldiers who threw no less than 80 Mills Bombs at their adversaries. In the end 1 of our post was killed, 1 crawled back to the trenches severely wounded, and the other 3 were taken prisoners. Examined later, the ground showed signs of a desperate struggle. The efforts of these out-numbered but undaunted men prevented all but. a, handful of the enemy from entering our trenches. At these a machine gunner threw a bomb, and I of the party was wounded and fell into our hands. The rest after a brief show of fighting fled, leaving behind them 2 mobile charges. Apart from the 3 prisoners, our casualties, all inflicted by the bombardment, were 33 men killed and 3 officers and over 60 men wounded. The Divisional artillery fired over 4000 rounds in direct connection with the attack, The German casualties were unknown, but “several were heard to squeal,” and in the grey dawn of the following morning, the sentries reported that many killed and wounded <pb xml:id="n78" n="52"/>were being taken over the enemy parapet. Under this ordeal the Aucklanders' behaviour was stolid and resolute. The commanding officer reported that he believed not a man had left his post without orders.</p>
            <p>The second attempt was made on 8th/9th July, further south on the Mushroom just beyond the Lille-Armentières railway. On the whole sector this was the point where the irregular lines of trenches as dug under fire in 1914 most nearly approached each other. Long previous to the Division's arrival mines had been exploded here on both sides. The resultant craters, developed and protruding like bulbous excrescences into No Man's Land, had given its name to the locality. Only 60 yards separated the foremost saps. The spot had already won a notoriety in the Division for unpleasantness and been the scene of episodes that stood out from the monotonous routine of trench warfare. On a quiet afternoon towards the end of May a rifle grenade was fired into our trenches with a note attached: “What time is it, Anzacs?” The appellation in itself did not necessarily imply enemy knowledge that the sector was held by New Zeaianders, since they had already obtained identifications from the Australians; and as late as the middle of June a Saxon, who was on reconnaissance and was captured by a 1st Otago patrol, thought that our trenches were held by Indians. On 2nd June the enemy placed a white board 5 feet by 4 feet on their parapet, opposite the Mushroom:—
							<list><item>English defeat at sea</item><item>7 cruisers sunk</item><item>1 damaged</item><item>11. small craft sunk</item><item>Hip Hip Hurrah!</item></list></p>
            <p>This was the first intimation received by the troops in the line of the Battle of Jutland.<note xml:id="fn36-52" n="1"><p>31st May 1916.</p></note> On receipt of the British official despatch a table was displayed by us showing the respective naval losses. This was left exposed for half an hour, and no shot was fired at it. Shortly after its removal the enemy put up a board on which was written “We beg of you to show again the table of the fleets.” At the same time 2 enemy heads were seen under brand-new “porkpic” caps. Another message was then hoisted, “Once more, will you let us see the message again?” This request was not complied with, but on 12th June a placard was displayed <pb xml:id="n79" n="53"/>by us in German, giving details of the sea-battle and the news of the Russian successes won at this time. On this a number of Germans showed themselves taking hasty glances at the notice. They consoled themselves by calling out, somewhat prematurely, that Greece had taken sides with the Fatherland. Some 10 days later the Gorman garrison practised a gas alarm, ringing their bells and blowing their syrens, and a stentorian voice shouted in good English “Gas alarm! Are you going to advance?” and a few minutes later, for his own entertainment, ordered “Advance!” Towards the end of June the Mushroom was the scene of the one and only case in the history of the Division, of desertion to the enemy. 10/2719 Pte. W. P. Nimot crept unnoticed from the Mushroom across to the German lines. He was actuated mainly by a feeling of soreness over a recently awarded punishment and by an acute dislike of shell-fire and other dangers incidental to the trenches, but German blood was in his veins. It is worthy of note that later he wrote to the High Commissioner requesting his share of the parcels despatched to New Zealand prisoners in Germany. On the same day and at the same place 1st Wellington received in exchange a German deserter.</p>
            <p>By this proximity and by its configuration the salient was marked out as a particularly vulnerable spot in our defences. In the first days of July our Engineers had destroyed a mine tunnel by a camouflet which probably caused the death of German miners and may have furnished an immediate motive for the raid. On 8th July the Mushroom was garrisoned by 1st Canterbury. A fierce bombardment was opened at 9.10 p.m. which lasted for 50 minutes. It completely destroyed the trenches and caused very heavy casualties. One 8-in. and several 5.9-in. unexploded shells were found next morning, At 10.15 p.m. 2 red rockets shot up in the German lines, and the enemy attacked. The first assault was repelled by the survivors in our trenches under Sergt. <name type="person" key="name-416641">S. G. Brister</name>. At 10.50 p.m. there was a lull. Soon after 11 p.m., however, the bombardment recommenced, and attacking on both flanks, the enemy by a prodigal use of bombs succeeded in forcing their way in. The German officer in command of the party haughtily summoned Brister to surrender, and when he refused fired at him point-blank with his revolver, wounding him in the face. Simultaneously Brister flung a bomb at the officer and was “certain that he got him.” But the garrison, losing heavily, was yard by yard forced down the <choice><orig>communi-<pb xml:id="n80" n="54"/>cation</orig><reg>communication</reg></choice> trench till they reached a block. Here they stood at bay and continued to hurl their bombs into the Mushroom.</p>
            <p>All the Canterbury officers on the spot had been killed or wounded, and the counter-attack was led forward by Lt. E. H. T. Kibblewhite, a machine gun officer, whose section was posted in rear of the Mushroom. With a mixed party of machine gunners, sappers and infantry he reoccupied the salient in half an hour from the time of the German entry. Flanking parties of the Battalion were sent into No Man's Land to cut off the raiders but without success. Our dead had not been searched nor had the dugouts been ransacked. A man who with 2 dead comrades was pinned under a wooden frame of the trench reported that the Germans had been fully occupied in carrying back their dead and wounded. The sandbags on the parapet indeed were marked with their blood-stains. They secured 3 prisoners. Our casualties were in addition 2 officers and 21 other ranks killed and 3 officers and 90 other ranks wounded. Throughout the attack our artillery bombarded the enemy's position and on his withdrawal concentrated on his communication trenches in order to harass the raiders' return. This activity, however, brought down a fresh storm of shell on our own area, preventing the rescue of the wounded. So the guns were asked to discontinue, and the remainder of the night was spent in excavating the buried, some of whom though shaken were still alive, and in repairing our trenches and opening communications. The breaches in the front line parapet were repaired by dawn.</p>
            <p>Just before midnight on the feverish night 19th/20th July, only 500 yards away from the scene of the 1st Rifles' raid,<note xml:id="fn37-55" n="1"><p>p. 49.</p></note> a large enemy party made an attempt on the Rue du Bois salient, which was at the time held by the 2nd Rifles. Our artillery fire in connection with our own 2 raids and the more ambitious operations of the XI. Corps was active on the enemy's line throughout the period, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Germans suffered casualties before reaching our trenches. The enemy bombardment was of exceptional fury, 8000 shells being flung into the area exclusive of trench mortar projectiles. The whole ground was turned over as if by a volcanic upheaval, and the local features altered so as to be unrecognisable. At the northern end of the salient, called the Dead End, the Germans effected a bare lodgment and captured 3 men out of a listening <pb xml:id="n81"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP012a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP012a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP012a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Armentières and Vicinity</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n82" n="55"/>post. They were met at the “stop,” where the sap from No Man's Land ran into the trench, and were bombed back, leaving 1 wounded and 2 dead in our hands. At the apex 2 minenwerfer bombs made an enormous crater, which was at first supposed to be a mine, and buried 2 mortars and an officer and 12 men of the 3rd Light Trench Mortar Battery. On the southern tip the attack failed. Under the tornado of shells, trenches and parapets were heaped in mingled confusion, but the riflemen set an example of fortitude and dour resistance which it would have been impossible to surpass. The enemy left behind him 12 mobile charges and a quantity of raiding material. In addition to the 3 prisoners, the total casualties sustained, including those of the machine gunners and mortar battery personnel amounted to an officer and 16 men killed and 30 men wounded. As retaliation, a specially effective bombardment was delivered on the following evening by howitzers and trench mortars against the enemy position opposite the salient.</p>
            <p>The final German effort was nipped smartly in the bud. In the early morning of 28th July a 2nd 'Wellington listening post near the Lys heard stealthy and suspicious sounds about their wire. A flare revealed a party of 20 Germans some 30 yards away. Without hesitation they were attacked with bombs and driven off, leaving behind them much equipment. So far from obtaining identifications, they betrayed their own by losing one of their party, whose body with the tell-tale numerals on the tunic was brought into our lines.</p>
            <p>Throughout this period the enemy's artillery endeavoured to keep pace with our own lavish expenditure of shell. Some days were marked by particular virulence. On 1st July, for example, possibly in retaliation for the bombing of Lille Railway Station by a number of aeroplanes on the previous evening, he shelled the great church of Notre Dame in Armentieres with a 5.9-in. naval high-velocity gun. It was new on this front and was surmised to be the one which had attained sinister notoriety at Ypres. It fired from a mounting in a railway loop beyond Perenchies. 58 rounds were fired from 7.30 a.m. to 10.6 a.m. and 18 rounds from 10.34 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. The first round was a hit, the thirty-sixth brought the spire down, and the fire was throughout extremely accurate. Our heavies retaliated, putting round for round into Comines. Two days later, in <pb xml:id="n83" n="56"/>combination with the enemy raid on l'Epinette, after Houplines had been shelled during the daylight, Armentieres was heavily bombarded after dark with high-explosive up to 10-in. and with incendiary shells. The naval gun was again active. Many houses were set on fire, the streets damaged, and several casualties inflicted both among troops and civilians. The 1st and 2nd Artillery Brigade headquarters received several direct hits. The quartermaster stores of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Headquarters were burnt to the ground. The headquarters of the 1st Field Ambulance were demolished but the patients removed without casualties. The headquarters of the 4th Rifles were not so fortunate. An 8-in. shell scored a direct hit on the building, and Major A. E. Wolstenholme, the Battalion. Second-in-Command, and Capt. F. E. Guthrie, the Regimental Medical Officer, were killed. Every gun in the Division the Corps and the Army retaliated, the Army heavies putting round for round into the village of Lambersart, which lying beyond the ridge was occupied by the Headquarters of the Division opposed to us, and the bombardment on either side was the heaviest that the New Zealanders had yet witnessed. As the following days brought no abatement of the enemy's artillery fire, it was decided not to treat patients in the 2 Ambulances in the town. This step threw a greater amount of work on the Divisional Rest Station in rear and the remaining Ambulance which had charge of it.</p>
            <p>In our artillery programme, apart from the unrehearsed revenge which a harassed battalion or company commander or on a larger scale an infantry brigadier could always summon, there were several definite prearranged and frequently varied systems of retaliation. The broad principles were that such retaliation should follow on the provocation as soon as possible, that it should be of greater volume, and delivered with bigger guns, and, if possible, be such as to connect itself in the enemy's mind with the fire which provoked it. This last principle was sometimes disputed on academic grounds, but certainly for the front line garrisons, when the foundations of their world shook under hostile bombardment, the moral tonic administered by the battering of their persecutor's own trenches was incomparably more effective than a shelling of his back areas. Thus as a rule forward areas suffered for forward areas, billets for billets, and so on. These retaliations culminated in the so called Retaliation X for the shelling of Armentières, when all <pb xml:id="n84" n="57"/>artillery brigades were called on, and the “heavies,” if the bombardment were serious, would shell Lille.</p>
            <p>Towards the middle of July this intense activity quietened down, on our side owing to the temporary shortage of ammunition, alluded to above, and on the German side through a similar shortage or a withdrawal of guns. The total ammunition expended by us during the last 10 days of the month did not exceed the average daily consumption of the first week.</p>
            <p>By this time our patrols, which included Maori patrols, completely dominated No Man's Land, where their troubles were caused, not by active opposition, but by the searchlights which played along the enemy wire and by the rustling of the grass, which, though the Germans cut it with characteristic thoroughness near their own wire, lay thick in the middle of No Man's Land. Instead of sending out patrols himself, the enemy fired “pineapple” bombs at the points likely to be crossed by us and bombed his own wire. Generally his morale was surprisingly low, and on several occasions our sentries with mingled astonishment, and contempt saw a German put his rifle on the parapet and pull the trigger without taking aim, the bullet raising a spurt of dust in No Man's Land or passing high overhead. His machine guns were active and admirably handled as usual, and it was not often that they gave their position away, as by smoke from an overheated gun drifting in the moonlight against a dark background of bushes. Only now and again strong enemy patrols ventured out, and bombing fights ensued, almost invariably to our advantage. Various devices were employed to destroy or capture these hostile patrols, and on 26th July a familiar German booby-trap was utilised with apparent success. A patrol of the 3rd "Rifles laid out wires with bombs attached, and withdrew a little distance to await results. First 1 German appeared followed by 12, but their route did not take them in the way of the trap. The L/Cpl. in charge of our patrol therefore shot the leader. His men bombed the rest of the party, and only 3 were seen to escape. Alarmed by the noise, immediately afterwards another German party approached, and one of their number becoming entangled in the trip-wire exploded the bombs. This time not a man was seen to escape. The second explosion brought, down a gust of machine gun fire and shrapnel, and our patrol on its way to make investigation was compelled to withdraw. One man, Rflmn. Woods, was wounded and unable to drag himself in, <pb xml:id="n85" n="58"/>his absence being discovered only when the patrol returned. He could not be found that night. On the following evening he was searched for by a patrol under Sergt. R. Simmers. The patrol itself was surprised and heavily bombed by the enemy who were lying in wait, 1 of our men being killed and 4 wounded. Simmers returned the bombing', drove off the enemy, and continued to advance with the 4 riflemen remaining. He located Woods, who was still alive, and returned with him and all his party and the body of the dead soldier to our trenches.</p>
            <p>During the first week in August the 18th Division came into the centre sector of the Corps front between the 5th Australian Division on the right and the New Zealanders on the left. The Rifle Brigade was relieved by troops of the new Division, and the New Zealand front was therefore contracted to its original length. In connection with this re-organisation the 4th Artillery Brigade recovered its 8th 10th and 14th batteries from the respective groups. Various British units were now coming up from the Somme fighting, and several valuable lectures were given on the terrain, the tactical methods of the opposing armies, questions of supply, and experience generally in the battle. Towards the end of the week orders were received that the Division would be relieved by the 51st (Highland Territorial) Division, from the Somme, in order to release it for a period of preparatory training for battle. The relief commenced on 13th August, and was completed on the 18th, when the command of the sector passed to the Highlanders, and the Division marched out after a continuous stay of 3 months in the line.</p>
            <p>During this period they had sustained 2500 casualties. 25 officers and 350 other ranks had been killed. 70 officers and 2000 men had been wounded, and 30 men were missing. Some of these last were in enemy hands, others had been blown to pieces by explosive or buried irretrievably in trench cataclysms. On the 14th, 2 battalions of the Rifle Brigade, marching back with the newly issued Lewis gun handcarts to the railhead at Steenwerck, were inspected informally by H.M. the King. The infantry entrained there for the concentration area at Blaringhem. They were followed by the batteries who trekked the 27-mile march with their guns via Estaires, Vieux Berquin and La Motte.</p>
            <p>On the 20th the entraimnent of the Division was commenced at Arques and St. Omer for a training area east of Abbeville where it was to pass under the command of the X. Corps of <pb xml:id="n86" n="59"/>the Fourth Army. The concentration in this new area was completed by 22nd August. Headquarters was at Hallencourt, the artillery in billets about Longpre, the 3 infantry brigade areas being Yonville Airaines and Limercourt respectively.</p>
            <p>Meanwhile the Divisional Cyclist Company<note xml:id="fn38-59" n="1"><p>p. 7.</p></note> had reached France in July. In accordance with the Army policy, which transferred this unit with the mounted squadron from the control of Divisions to that of Corps, the company was taken on the strength of II. Anzac Corps Headquarters. In the Mounted Regiment, there was 1 New Zealand and 2 Australian squadrons. In the Cyclist Battalion the balance was to be reversed, and reinforcements were drawn on to make 2 New Zealand companies. The command of the battalion was given to Major (later Lt.-Col.) C. H. S. Evans who had organised and trained the New Zealand company from its formation. At the end of August 1 platoon of the battalion was attached to the Division to be used as runners and orderlies in the forthcoming operations.</p>
            <p>The Division followed with keen interest the passing into law in New Zealand of the Military Service Act on 1st August, This measure of far-reaching political and historical importance was brought to the notice of all ranks in the following Divisional Routine Order of 13th August: “The New Zealand Government wishes the men of the New Zealand Division to feel that the Military Service Bill just passed by both Houses of Parliament represents the assurance of New Zealand both to the Motherland and to her troops in the field that the obligation to keep the ranks full will be carried out as long as men are available.”</p>
            <p>During the period under review certain changes in appointments were made which it is convenient here to summarise. On 22nd July Lt.-Col. Pinwill vacated the appointment of G.S.O.1 to take command of a battalion in his old regiment. He was succeeded by Lt.-Col. R. O'H. Livesay, D.S.O., Queen's R.W. Surrey Regiment. About the same date Major Chesney, Brigade Major, 1st Brigade, was invalided and succeeded by Capt. M. H. Jackson (29th Lancers), whose appointment as D.A.Q.M.G. was filled by Lt.-Col. Hamilton, hitherto commanding the Divisional Train. Command of the Train was assumed by Lt.-Col. J. Atkinson A.S.C. Lt.-Col. H. A. Reid succeeded Lt.-Col. A. R. Young as A.D.V.S., the latter returning sick to New Zealand.Various <pb xml:id="n87" n="60"/>changes took place in the 2nd Infantry Brigade. Major Puttick relinquished his appointment as Staff Captain to become Second-in-Command of the 4th Rifles<note xml:id="fn39-60" n="1"><p>p. 56.</p></note> His place was taken by Capt, T. M. Wilkes, N.Z.S.C., who subsequently, on Major Lampen's becoming sick, was promoted Brigade Major. In the appointment of Staff Captain he was succeeded by Capt. Richardson, who transferred from the same appointment in the 1st Brigade, where the vacant position was filled by Capt. A. S. Falconer. In the battalions Lt.-Col. C. H. J. Brown had taken over the command of 2nd Auckland from Lt.-Col. Alderman on 6th July, and on arrival in the training area in August, Lt.-Col. Moore, commanding 2nd Otago, was transferred to the British Army and was succeeded by Major (now Lt.-Col.) G. S. Smith, D.S.O.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n88" n="61"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body1-d3" type="chapter">
        <head><hi rend="c">Chapter III</hi><lb/><hi rend="sc">The Battle of the Somme</hi>, 1916</head>
        <p>The expansion of their armies and armament made it at length practicable for the British to undertake, in accordance with the general Allied policy, an offensive campaign on a large scale in the summer of 1916. It was decided that the French should co-operate and that the thrust, should be made up the valley of the Somme. In his despatch of 23rd December 1916 the British Commander-in-Chief has defined the objects of the offensive as threefold: to relieve the pressure on Verdun, where the German assault, had been designed partly to frustrate the impending blow; to assist the Allies in the other theatres of war by stopping any further transfer of German troops from the Western front; and to wear down the strength of the enemy forces. The British would have preferred a somewhat later date in the summer, which would have permitted of an increase of men and munitions and a period of further training for the new levies, but the continually increasing strain at Verdun forced their hands. It was agreed therefore that the combined attack should be launched not later than the end of June. The British share in the joint operations was committed to the Fourth Army under General Rawlinson. Arrangements were also made for a subsidiary attack on the northern flank of the selected area by troops from General Allenby's Third Army, and a skeleton Reserve Army was formed in rear under General Gough.</p>
        <p>Owing to their commanding situation and bare glacis, destitute of cover for assaulting infantry, the enemy positions which confronted the British on the watershed between the Somme and the rivers of South-Western Belgium were in themselves of immense strength and had been converted by unremitting and skilfully directed industry, and by every technical device known to modern military art, into fortifications as nearly impregnable as any in history. Against them, indeed, along a considerable part of the front, British valour was on 1st July to dash itself in vain, for not merely was the subsidiary operation abortive, but in the northern sector of the main blow, from Thiepval to Serre, the assaulting lines withered away under <pb xml:id="n89" n="62"/>the deadly combination of artillery, machine guns and wire. At the end of the day the Commander-in-Chief made up his mind perforce to cut his losses and not persevere for the moment with the attack in this sector. The 2 northern Corps of the 5 which formed General Rawl-in-son's command were handed over to General Gough. The latter's augmented Army was directed to act as a pivot on which our advance on the right could swing, and for the meantime to confine itself to a steady and methodical pressure. In the southern half of the British area, however, the first defence system, including trench lines, redoubts, woods, and villages, for a frontage of over 6 miles to a depth of a mile or more, was in our possession by 15th July. Of the second system, which ran along the southern crest of the main ridge from Guillemont through Longueval and the two Bazentins to Pozieres, some 3½ miles were captured in the middle of July. For the remainder there ensued a stern and prolonged struggle (the second phase of the battle), in which the British troops, not without being mauled in the process, satisfactorily fulfilled the main object of the offensive. As they strained forward, the role of the Reserve Army became one of more active co-operation. By the second week of September, not merely had the enemy's Second Line been won, but at certain points very considerable penetration had been effected beyond. "Practically the whole of the forward crest of the main ridge from Delville Wood to beyond Pozières was now in our hands."<note xml:id="fn40-62" n="1"><p>Despatch of 31st December, 1916, para. 25.</p></note> Meanwhile on the right the French had carried their lines by a series of brilliantly conceived and vigorously executed operations to within striking distance of Péronne.</p>
        <p>It remained now to develop in a third phase the advantages obtained at the cost of so much blood and labour. Between Morval and Le Sars, behind the last of the enemy's; original systems of defence which now faced the victorious British, there had been added since the summer several new lines on the north-eastern slopes of the main ridge. None were, however, of the elaborate nature of those already stormed. Though fresh Bavarian Divisions had been thrown in, incontestable evidence betrayed a weakening of the German morale and an acute strain on his reserves. His guns,. though enormously increased, were outweighed by the British artillery; and much was hoped from our as yet untried weapon of the tank The failure at Verdun, the collapse in <pb xml:id="n90"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP013a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP013a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP013a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">A Burial Service</hi></head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP013b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP013b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP013b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Transport moving towards the Line</hi></head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n91"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP014a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP014a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP014a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Area of the <name key="name-120183" type="place">Somme</name> Battlefield (1916)</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n92" n="63"/>Italy, the intervention of Roumania, the opening of the offensive in the Balkans, all seemed to presage the waning of Germany's star. Towards the end of August capable military opinion believed that we were approaching a stage when bold and energetic action might yield great and possibly decisive results. Consequently, as General Rawlinson now told his Corps commanders, <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name> was going “all out,” with every possible resource in men and engines of war, to bring the Battle of the Somme to a successful and immediate conclusion.</p>
        <p>For all the gigantic preparations necessary there was, in view of the lateness of the season, little time to lose. Plans mere immediately drawn up for a grand attack at the earliest possible moment, which could not well be before the middle of September, with the aim of overwhelming the enemy at the outset and following up the advantage won with the utmost rapidity and vigour. Once the enemy was driven from his prepared positions into the open, it was hoped to abandon the snail-like progress of trench warfare and employ cavalry on a large scale. The other British Armies to the north were instructed to be prepared to assist in exploiting n decisive success. Preliminary attacks were made in the beginning of September to afford suitable assault positions or to deny observation. For the main operation, arrangements were put in hand for the employment of rested Divisions with their morale at its bloom. Among these it was the privilege of the New Zealand Division to be included.</p>
        <p>The New Zealanders, meanwhile, were recuperating from their arduous work on the Lys amid the delectable wooded valleys of the lower Somme. Health improved rapidly, and at no time perhaps were more energy and keenness thrown into the training, which was itself based on the assumption of participation in a renewed offensive on the Somme. In the artonery work, therefore, it was natural that fire discipline should be a paramount feature, and that emphasis should be laid on the principles governing the close barrage. There was fortunately some fair manoeuvre ground, and the drivers, exercised in so-called "refresher " courses in field movements, speedily regained the proficiency which had been in some degree impaired by the prolonged conditions of trench warfare. Guns equipment and harness were minutely overhauled. The Engineers paid particular attention to the construction of Strong Points and to rapid wiring. Specialists in all branches intensified and widened their <pb xml:id="n93" n="64"/>theoretical knowledge and practical skon, Above all, the infantry were familiarised with the new methods of assault, and great importance was attached to the thorough appreciation by every private soldier of the principles involved and the general scheme of each practice operation. The efficacy of these new methods had been proved over and over again, and it was vital to diffuse a complete comprehension of them. The lesson was hammered in, therefore, that infantry, trained to hug the protective curtain of shrapnel, which advanced in front of them and prevented the manning of the enemy's machine guns, would have all the odds in favour of success; that the risk of casualtics caused by an occasional short burst must be faced, and that in any case these would be few compared with those to be expected on an unsueccssful attack, or in an attack driven home in the face of effective machine gun fire. So, too, stress was laid on the necessity of absolute punctuality.Experience had already shown that while an assault delivered immediately the artonery fire lifted from the objective was, humanly speaking, assured of victory, the delay of even a fraction of a minute might be fraught with disaster.</p>
        <p>By night as well as day, all over the meadowlands and the stubble of the harvest fields, battalions in fighting kit incessantly practised the advance of assault waves in extended formation, the avoidance of crowding, the progress of small columns of supporting troops in rear, and the methods of communication with co-operating aeroplanes.<note xml:id="fn41-64" n="1"><p>Contact patrol work by aerop1anes was designed to keep Headquarters of formations informed as to progress of troops, to report on the enermy's positions, the advance and movement of his immediate reserves and the state of his defences, and to transmit messages from the troops engaged. They were specially marked and carried Klaxon horns and Verey lights. On their part the infantry lit flares at specified times and places in their most advanced positions, and if they carried Klaxon horns sounded them on their own initiative. Brigades and battalions indicated their position and identity to the aeroplane by ground signal sheets and stripes and sent messages by ground signal panel arranged to represent letters. Thus, in a later development, a succession of G's meant "further bombardment required," of N's "short of ammunition," of Z's "held up by wire." The aeroplanes communicated with headquarters of Corps and Divisions by dropping marked maps and written messages. See also footnote, p. 28.</p></note> The different objectives were represented by different coloured flags, and the lifts of the creeping barrage by lines of men waving branches to indicate the fall of shrapnel, or by horsemen galloping forward in succesive "bounds " in accordance with a prearranged timetable. The planning and execution of these operations constituted invaluable training.<note xml:id="fn42-64" n="2"><p>It may be noted that during this period of training the Division formally adopted the method of wearing their felt hats with brim horizontal and crown peaked.</p></note></p>
        <p>From these scenes of carefully staged rehearsal the first troops to move up to the front were the Engineers and the Pioneer Battalion. They left on 27th August, and partly on <pb xml:id="n94" n="65"/>foot and partly by train proceeded to the neighbourhood of Fricourt. Here they were first employed under the Chief Engineer of the XV. Corps in consolidating the old German Second Line on the Bazentin Ridge and then, with a view to the forthcoming attack, in digging west of Delvone Wood the 2 communication treuches of Turk Lane and French Lane, which were to become such famous arteries of the battlefield. The next arm to follow was the artonery, who, marching by different routes through 29th and 30th August, concentrated at Bonnay. The same vile weather which was impeding the sappers in the reconstruction of the Carlton and Savoy trenches made the march a trying one for the gunners, harness and equipment being soaked in the torrential rain. From Bonnay on 5th September the artonery began to relieve the 33rd Divisional Artonery, which in. accordance with the artonery-policy of the time was not administered as a separate unit, but had been divided between the 7th and the 14th Divisional Artonery Groups. It thus came about that during the Battle of the Somme the C.R.A., New Zealand Division, had in that capacity no actual command.<note xml:id="fn43-65" n="1"><p>On the senior C.R.A. being wounded, <name type="person" key="name-123642">Brig.-Gen. Napier Johnston</name> assumed command on 1st September of the artonery eventually destined to cover the New Zealand Division's front and remained in command ton relieved on 25th September.</p></note> The 1st and 2nd Brigades were attached to the 14th Divisional Artonery, covering the left Division of the XV. Corps, and the 3rd and 4th were joined in a group under <name type="person" key="name-130088">Lt.-Col. I. T. Standish</name> and attached to the 7th Divisional Artonery, covering the centre Division. Batteries were brought forward by sections each night to Caterponar Valley and the reverse slopes by Montauban. They found the emplacements partly completed, in most cases with splinter-proof head-cover. The 8th Battery of the 4th Brigade remained for the moment in reserve. Relief was completed by 6 p.m. on 6th September. On that same day the gunners experienced a foretaste of the repeated bombardments to which they were to be exposed before they were done with "the Somme. " Their positions were searched with 8-in. shells, and one lucky hit blew up an ammunition dump and destroyed a howitzer. Before the infantry came into the line, the artonery cooperated, besides carrying out daily routine fire, in several minor attacks, in the latter stages of the capture of Gineby by the XIV. Corps on the 9th, and in the repulse of the German counter-attack.</p>
        <p>It was not ton 2nd September that the infantry began to move up from their peaceful bonets towards the realities of <pb xml:id="n95" n="66"/>war. On that date the 1st Brigade marched to Airaines, the 2nd to Cavonon, and the 3rd to <name type="place" key="name-413203">Le Quesnoy</name>. In beatltiful autumn weather, the march continued on the following day, when the 1st Brigade reached Yzeux, the 2nd Picquigny, and the 3rd Vaux-cn-Amienois. In this area, ston well in rear of the surge of battle, the brigades remamed for 4 days, and engaged in manocuvres over the country-side. The whole district, and particularly the 2nd Brigade area with its splendid remains of the Roman legions, left an abiding impression of picturesque charm and historical interest. The march was resumed on the 7th by side roads to the mean and crowded villages of the Allonvone area, and that day, as the battalions breasted slopes on the tree-shaded roads, the distant throb of the guns, now sinking, now swelling, became audible. The following afternoon they passed through the old British rear defences, the 3rd Brigade to Dernancourt, the 1st and 2nd into the butted camps about Lavievone of the XV. Corps (Lt.-General H. S. Horne). It, was on this day (8th September.) that the German Guards and other picked troops hurled themselves against the whole are of the allied line. All day long heavy artonery action was distinctly heard. In the evening the unbroken ring of gun flashes round the horizon flickered red like continuous sheet lightning, and the menacing rumble of the opposing artoneries exactly resembled thunder. On the battlefield itself the number of guns heard is more circumscribed the ear more attuned to the German batteries, and the dangers, faced and known lose their frightfulness. The Lavievone bivouacs were at just that distance when the sounds of the massed and opposing artoneries blend in indistinguishable unison, and are invested with a mysterious and awful impressiveness.<note xml:id="fn44-66" n="1"><p>In this conncxion may be quoted Mr. L. Binyon's too little-known lines:—</p><lg type="verse"><head><hi rend="c">The Distant Guns</hi></head><l>Negligently the cart track descends into the valley;</l><l>The drench of the rain has passed, and the clover breathes;</l><l>Scents are abroad; in the val1ey a mist whitens</l><l>Along the hidden river, where the evening smiles—</l><l>The trees are asleep the shadows are longer and longer,</l><l>Melting blue in the tender twilight; above.</l><l>In a pallor, barred with lilac and ashen cloud,</l><l>Delicate as a spirit, the young moon brightens.</l><l>And distantly a bell intones the hour of peace,</l><l>Where roofs of the village, gray and red, cluster</l><l>In leafy dimness. Peace, old as the world</l><l>The crickets shroning in the high wet grass</l><l>And guats clouding upon the frail wild roses</l><l>Murmur of you: but hark! Like a shudder in the air,</l><l>Ominous and alien, knocking on the farther hills</l><l>As with airy hammers, the ghosts of terrible sound—</l><l>Guns! From afar they are knocking on human hearts</l><l>Everywhere over the silent evening country,</l><l>Knocking with fear and dark presentiment. Only</l><l>The moon's beauty, where no life nor joy is,</l><l>Brightening softly and seeing nothing, has pear.</l></lg></note></p>
        <pb xml:id="n96" n="67"/>
        <p>While the 1st and 2nd Brigades remained for a day here, visited by General Godley at training or on parade, and bathing in the deep wonow-fringed waters of the swift-running Ancre, the 3rd Brigade set out on 9th September, marching past the varied scenes of astounding activity along the main road to the Moulin du Vivier and thence by the dry-weather track to Fricourt. On all the slopes tens of thousands of British troops were bivouacked under the eyes of the German balloons. The twinkling of their camp fires at night was like the lights of a great, city, and in the morning the smoke from a thousand cookhouses rose up and spread a hazc over the honsides.</p>
        <p>On the following day and night the Rifles relieved a brigade of the 55th Division towards Delvone Wood and a portion of the 1st Division on the left nearer High Wood. The lst<note xml:id="fn45-67" n="1"><p>Major (Temp. Lt.-Col.) J. G. Roache, vice Lt.-Col. Austin, woundcd 20th July.</p></note> and 4th Battalions went into the advanced trenches, and the 2nd and 3rd<note xml:id="fn46-67" n="2"><p>Major (Temp. Lt.-Col.) A. E. Winter-Events, vice Lt.-Col. Cowles, invalided to New Zealand; later in the year appointed to command it.</p></note> into the old German Second Line (Carlton and Savoy) in rear, where the dugouts were ston full of German dead. Brigade Headquarters occupied a cellar in Bazentin-le-Grand.</p>
        <p>These rear positions commanded an extensive view of the German trenches on the crest. To the right lies Longueval village and Dclvone Wood, now at length wholly in British hands. In front, just beyond Carlton trench, the road runs from Longueval to Bazentin, and across the valley to the north the scarred and pock-marked slopes rise up gently to the enemy's positions in the Crest Trench, on the ridge by High Wood. Just over that ridge is the formidable Switch Trench, connecting the German Third and Second Systems, and about three-quarters up is our own front line. Breaking the skyline further to the left are the stark trees of High Wood, from which rises ever slid again the black smoke of bursting explosive. This grimly contested wood was now a charnl house, full of sinister memories to the British, and inspiring not less horror in the mind of the German infantryman. “We are actually fighting on the Somme with the English,“ wrote a Bavarian in September. “Yon can no longer call it war; it is mere murder. We are at the focal point of the present battle in Foureaux<note xml:id="fn47-67" n="1"><p>Foureaux is the spelling of maps. The Maire of Flers assured us (Sept. 1919) that the correct spelling as given in title deeds and official documents, etc. is <hi rend="i">Fourcaults. Fooreaux</hi> no doubt, however, won persist.</p></note> (High) Wood. All my previous experience in this war, the slaughter <pb xml:id="n97" n="68"/>at Ypres, and the battle in the gravel pit at Hulluch, are the merest child's play compared with this massacre, and that is much too mild a description. I hardly think they won bring us into the fight again now, for me are in a very bad way”—the last pium desiderium is a distinctly human touch.</p>
        <p>Pending the day of attack, the Rifle Brigade improved their trenches and dug a new line through the shellholes in front, first constructing a chain of posts 100 yards apart and each 20 yards long, with flank trenches of 5 yards, then connecting these posts together and the whole with the original line.</p>
        <p>On the 10th (Sunday), after a joint service by the 2 sister battalions of each regiment, the 1st and 2nd Brigades marched up to the rear of the battle area. The 1st Brigads went to Fricourt, the 2nd to Fricourt Wood and Mametz Wood, where they lay in bivouac among the trees ton the morning of the 12th. On the llth, at 9a.m., the command of the sector passed to the New Zealand Division.</p>
        <p>Long ere now the Fourth Army plans had been crystallized. While the French would continue their pressure on the south, the Reserve Army would attack on the north in conjunction. An attempt wou1d be made to seize Morval, Les Boeufs, Flers and Gueudecourt, through which lay the nearest avenue to the open country beyond. On their capture, the cavalry, supported by the XIV. and XV. Corps, who would follow up at once in rear, would be pushed through the outposts. With n flank guard of all arms established on the general line Morval-Le Transloy, the cavalry would seize the high ground east of the Péronne road, and establish a line in country later to become familiar to the New Zealanders, from Rocquigny through Voners-au-Flos and Riencourt-les-Bapanme to Bapaume itself. They would moreover assist in rolling up the enemy's lines to the north-west by operating against his flank and rear in conjunction with the attack which would be continued against his front. The cavalry would not enter the villages, so fire would be maintained on them. Corps and Divisional Commanders, with whom it lies to feel the pulse of a battle and turn favourable opportunities to account, were admonished of the need of boldness and determination.</p>
        <p>The XV. Corps was now composed of fresh Divisions with their fighting spirit at its zenith. All 3 Divisions were to be put in the line, each on a frontage of about 1000 yards. This formation was preferable to keeping 1 Division in rear, as facilitating the more rapid advance of reserve troops with <pb xml:id="n98" n="69"/>a view to paralying the enemy defences and producing panic. On the right was the 14th, in the centre the 41st, and on the left the New Zealand Division. On its left again on the right flank of the NI. Corps, the 1st Division had been relieved by the Londoners of the 47th.</p>
        <p>In the forthcoming battle the Corps objectives were 4 in number, marked in accordance with custom in different tints on the maps and referred to by these colours; firstly the seizure of the Switch Trench with the intermediate defences on the crest (the Green Line); secondly the establishment of a Brown Line in German trenches on the far slopes; thirdly the passage of the Flers System, the capyure of Flers village and the consolidation of a Blue Line in front of it; and lastly the carrying of Gueudecourt and establishment of a protective Red Line beyond it, bending back to the north-west to the junction with the NI. Corps, whose advance would ston leave the XV. Corps in a marked salient. Flers fell within the zone of the 4lst Division, in the centre of the Corps, and Gueudecourt within that of the 14th Divisioin, on the right. In addition to monor trench elements the advance would involve the capture of 3 formidable trench systems the Switch, the Flers Line, and the Gird Line that protetated Gueudecourt. Opposite the New Zealand sector the German positions were held by Bavarians.</p>
        <p>The first 3 objectives set before the New Zealand Division, the Green, Brown, and Blue Lines, lay square to its front, but its section of the Red line, forming as it did the Corps' north-western flank ran across its front diagonally. The left of the Red Line thus coincided with the left of the Blue in the Abbey road which ran from Flers to Eaucourt I' Abbaye, and the area to be secured in the final advance was roughly triangular. For the actual Red Line, which would mark the limit of advance and cover the exposed left flank of the Corps, there was conveniently situated a strip of high ground which extended back towards a sugar factory halfway between Flers and Ligny Thonoy. Along this high ground lay the important trench called Grove Alley which connected the Flers and Gird systems, and just beyond it was a shallow valley down which the North Road led to the Factory. The ridge on the other side of the depression simi1arly had a communication trench along its crest called Goose Alley. Both Alleys were to be scenes of epic fighting, but for the present attack the high ground about Grove Alley was selected as the final objective.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n99" n="70"/>
        <p>For these operations General Russell decided to employ the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, and hold the 1st Brigade in reserve. Two battalions of the 2nd Brigade, who would duriug the interval relieve the Rifle Brigade and be in the line, would seize the Switch. Passing through them, the Rifle; Brigade would capture the remaining objectives. 1 battalion would leave the Green Line for the Brown an hour after zero, 2 battalions the Brown for the Blue Line 2 hours after zero, and 1 battalion the Blue for the attenuated Red Line 4½ hours after zero. Should the fourth objective be reached without undue difficulty, it was intended to exploit success in a northerly direction, with the cooperation of tanks. The Rifle Brigade were accordingly instructed to push out strong offensive patrols and the 2nd Brigade to be prepared to support them.</p>
        <p>Stupendous weight of artonery was behind the infantry to neutralise the advantages given by modern warfare to the defence. In addition to overwhelming heavy artonery a field gun was available for every 12 yards of enemy front opposite the New Zealanders. German newspaper critics might growl fiercely in terms like these: "Anyone would think that the object of the French and the English was simply to kill so many Germans every week or every month. They have no tactical ideas; they are simply butchering us. "Their soldiers knew, however, that no other alternative was feasible. The experience of Neuve Chapelle, Loos, and Verdun had established firmly the principle of demolishing trenches saps had machine gun emplacements, cutting communications, and in a word destroying the enemy's physical and moral powers of defence by a heavy bombardment preliminary to the operation and continued during the attack up to the time of the arrival of the infantry at each objective. The actual advance of the infantry was covered by stationary and rolling barrage of field guns. Normally the rolling barrage commencing in No Man's Land would move back steadily and evenly at a rate calculated by the infantry advance, lifting, say, 50 yards at a time and halting on certain defined lines for definite periods to enable the infantry to reorganise. The stationary barrage on the other hand remained an the position to be assaulted ton joined by the rolling barrage when it lifted at one bound to the next objective. While the heavy guns did counter-battery work, the field howitzers co-operated with the siege howitzers in bombarding objectives in advance of the stationary barrage.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n100" n="71"/>
        <p>The front held by the Division was, as we have seen, covered by the 14th Divisional Artonery and the 1st aid 2nd New Zealand Field Artonery Brigades, the other half of the Divisional artonery assisting the Division on the right. The New Zealand batteries were disposed on the northern slopes of the valley running from Caterponar Wood to Bernaifay Wood as close to the front as could possibly be arranged. Forward positions in the event of success were selected. The initial bombardment commenced on 12th September. Sunken roads and road junctions, headquarters and villages as well as trenches and battery positions were subjected to a steady fire. Particular attention was given to the Switch line and above all to its extensive wire entanglements on the smashing of which the success of the operation largely depended.</p>
        <p>On the same day (12th September) the Rifles were relieved by the 2nd Brigade and marched back for a short period of rest to Fricourt and Mametz Woods. 2nd Aucklard and 2nd Otago took over the front line, 2nd Canterbury went into support, and 2nd Wellington into reserve. Brigade headquarters was established in a tunnelled dugout built by the Pioneers in Turk Lane, just, south of Carlton Trench. The assembly trenches initiated by the Rifle Brigade were extended and further ones constructed. All other preparations were being pushed on with vigour both in front and in rear.</p>
        <p>The 14th was a squally day of rain which cleared off towards evening. Throughout the day the enemy shelled the areas of Caterponar and Marlbornugh Woods and Bazentin-le-Grand but refrained from harrassing our front trenches. During the daylight the German outposts appeared to have been withdrawn over the crest, and our infantry to their equal astonishment and gratification were able to work openly in No Man's Land, and to complete their jumping-off line and assembly trenches unmolestd. The 1st Brigade moved up to Fricourt and Mametz Woods, and after dusk the Rifle Brigade marched up from their bivouacs there to the assembly area in front of the 2 rear battalions of the 2nd Brigade. In accordance with the sound principle already laid down by the General Staff, all battalions sent to the Reserve Camp, as so-called "B Teams, " the proportion of officers non-commissioned officers and specialists, who would in the event of heavy casualties serve as a framework on which the renewed unit could be built. Parties were told off for all the heterogencous duties of the battlefield, to police the <pb xml:id="n101" n="72"/>trenches, to bury the dead, to salvage abandoned equipment, to act as ammunition carriers for trench mortar sections or machine gunners, to assist the Engineers, to carry up stores from prearranged advanced dumps-ammunition bombs water and tools, in that order of importance.</p>
        <p>After darkness the tanks, male and female, crawled forward to their assembly area by Delvone Wood. They were still in the first stage of development. Their pace was not more than on an average 33 yards per minute, or 15 yards per minute over badly shelled ground. They carried a crate of pigeons for communication with Headquarters and different coloured flags to denote to the infantry that they were out of action or had arrived at their objective. Their mission was, roughly, to move in front of the infantry, attack certain positions at which particular resistance war expected, and assist the infantry in clearing difficult places if called on. There had been, however, little opportunity of practising co-operation, and it was to be expected that they would act largely as freelances of the battlefield. The tactical experience of the officers in command was naturally not at this time equal to their gallantry. Of the 4 allotted to the Division, 1 broke down in Longueval.</p>
        <p>The hour of attack had been fixed for 6.20 a.m. on the 15th. Before midnight the troops were all in position. Each man was in light fighting order. Two gas helmets were slung over his shoulders. Over 200 rounds of ammunition were contained in his pouches and bandoliers. In his pocket he carried 2 bombs, and behind on his belt were tied the precious sandbags for consolidation. His greatcoat was left with his pack in the regimental dump, but he retained his waterproof sheet with cardigan jacket rolled inside His waterbottle was filled, and in his haversack was a day's rations and "iron" ration. Fastened down the centre of every other man's back was a shovel or pick. Each platoon carried so many smoke bombs for rendering enemy dugouts untenable and so many flares for signalling to our contact aeroplanes that, marked by white streamers and at black band under the left plane, would hover over them at prearranged hours on the following day and after dawn on the 16th.</p>
        <p>German aeroplanes had noted the tanks and reported them as heavily armoured cars; and on our left a German officer wrote in wrath and despair an unheeded report on the suspicious massing in the British trenches and the inactivity <pb xml:id="n102" n="73"/>of the German artonery. If the enemy anticipated an attack, he took no counter-measure. Opposite the New Zealand sector he proceeded with the relief of the 3rd and 4th Bavarian Divisions by the stout 6th Bavarian Division from the Argonne and the fibreless 50th from his Greuier. His mood appears to have been one of confidence, inspired by the repeated repulses of the British attacks on High Wood. A captured Brigade Order, dated 10th September and relating to the defence of High Wood and its vicinity, stated categorically that the German positions in Crest and Switch Trenches were so strong that they might be relied on to resist the fiercest attack.</p>
        <p>In the New Zealand trenches the infantry, trained to the last degree of physical fitness and with the fine edge of morale undulled by exposure to artonery fire, snatched a little sleep. The sentries on duty, without either excitement or the boyish insouciance of the English soldier, but in stern and serene clation of spirit, waited for the coming of the dawn and whatsoever fortune might bring them.</p>
        <p>By 6 a.m. they had breakfasted, and drunk their rum. A ghostly pallor was now creeping into the sky, and the Otago left could just faintly discern the silhouettes of the gaunt trees in High Wood, whose silence was unbroken by German shells. The watch hand crept slowly and as it were reluctantly toward the appointed time. The weather held out every hope of a fine day.</p>
        <p>To the second our guns broke out into thunderous uproar, and to the second the leading infantry waves of Auckland and Otago, with bayonets fixed and rifles sloped, clambered out of their assembly trenches and advanced straight up over the hummocks and between the shellholes. The 8 companies moved abreast in 4 waves about 50 yards behind each other. Each wave was made up of 8 platoons in single rank, some 3 yards separating man from man. The advance was marked by admirable direction pace and alignment. To those watching in the Carlton System the long line of sombre figures was visible for a few moments ton obscured by thick clouds of smoke and dust. Trudging up the hill, the men hugged the barrage which lifted 50 yards a minute. They twice knelt down in the shellholes to let it precede, firing as they knelt at the machine guns in Crest Trenrh. An advanced outpost line called Coffee Trench, which lay in front of the Aucklanders, was crowed in their stride. On reaching Crest Trench more Germans were found <pb xml:id="n103" n="74"/>than had been expected. On the left in front of Otago some 200 turned and ran over the open for the Switch. Many of them never reached it, for our Lewis Gun teams, waiting for the barrage to lift, raked the fugitives with fire.</p>
        <p>One machine gun on the Otago sector was, however, most troublesome Sergt. Donald Forrester Brown with another non-commissioned officer, J. Rodgers, crawled forward at the utmost risk to their lives to within 30 yards of the position and then rushed it, killing the crew aid capturing the gun. Otherwise little resistance was met with all along Crest, Trench. Sections from rear waves were detailed to “mop” it up, and the leading troops, with their zest for killing whetted, swept on without delay to the Switch 250 yards in front.</p>
        <p>Just before the Switch, the leading waves of Auckland in their eagerness overstepped the barrage and suffered casualties. The troops on the right were advancing in line, but on the left the Londoners had been delayed, after a premature start, by the peculiarly bad going in High Wood and by heavy machine gun fire. Hence there was a gap beyond the left of Otago, and the enemy machine guns and rifles enfilading down from the corner of High Wood tore some holes in the khaki line. The tanks, for which predetermined lines had been left in the barrage, so that they could reach the Switch 5 minutes before the infantry, had been delayed by the broken ground and had not yet arrived. As the storming lines lay under the final halt of the barrage on their objective, the 2 leading waves and the individuals who had pressed on in the avenues left for the tanks all wedged into 1 solid wave, which the instant the barrage lifted—almost before it had lifted—poured through the smashed entanglements towards the trench. Again Sergt Brown and his comrade rushed a gun and killed the crew. The Switch had been terribly battered and wrecked, but many of the garrison were still alive. There were also several machine guns, but such was the speed of the assault that the enemy was generally unable to use them, and those on the flank and in rear were masked by his own troops in the Switch.</p>
        <p>A letter written by a soldier, who took part in the storming of the Switch, to his relatives in New Zealand affords an interesting record of detailed adventure and emotional experience:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“On the 15th September our platoon went over in the second wave, and I could see the Germans' heads above <pb xml:id="n104" n="75"/>the trench firing at us when we got about half way across. Even when we joined the first wave I could see that our ranks were pretty thin. We lay down and watched for the third and fourth wave to join us before rushing them. The four waves combined made up about as many as one of the original waves. While we were lying down waiting for the rush, Fritz was rattling away with his machine gun for all he was worth, and for a few seconds he ripped up the ground about a yard in front of me. It gave me a bit of a fright, and I wasted no time in wriggling back a few yards. I also yelled out to the man on my left to get back, but when I looked at his face I saw that he was dead. When we stood up and started to run, their fire slackened off a lot, and soon stopped altogether. Half of them put their hands up and ran towards us; some of them took to their heels, and a few of the fools kept firing at us. We all wanted to get at them with the bayonet, but some of us were faster than others, and those behind were so anxious to do something that they started firing at the Huns, at the risk of hitting their own men in front. I jumped into the Hun trench and found that it was so deep that I could not climb out at the other side, so I pulled a dead Hun into a sitting position at the side of the trench, stood on his shoulders, and managed to climb out. When I think of it now, it seemed a horrible thing to do, and I am not quite sure whether he was dead or not, but I did not notice it in the excitement of the moment. I was chasing one fellow and almost had him, but I soon found I was not too safe, as the fellows behind were firing, so I lay down, took steady aim, and shot him. Another poor beggar came stumbling towards me with a shower of bullets flying all round him. I knew that if I let him come too near me I would stand a good chance of getting hit by one of our own bullets, as he was drawing a lot of fire, so I gave him a bullet in the chest when he was about 15 yards from me. They are the only two Huns I can claim to have put out of action, although I may have killed or wounded more that I did not see.”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>While some of the occupants made a poor fight, others stouter-hearted, threw bombs and fired rifles till our lines were atop of them, and then oil the greater part of the front, throwing down their weapons, they held up their hands, and with calculated presumption called for mercy. Mercy, <choice><orig>how-<pb xml:id="n105" n="76"/>ever,</orig><reg>however</reg></choice> was shown only to the Red Cross men and the wounded. Where further resistance was made, the enemy in the trench itself were disposed of after a little point-blank shooting and a short struggle with bombs. The dugouts were cleared similarly. On the right, where the enemy were thicker, the Aucklanders used their bayonets freely. With this weapon Pte. A. R. Johnson showed magnificent courage and agility, killing one after another of the enemy who were throwing bombs at his comrades. It was here that 2nd Lt. A. C. Cooper, already wounded, continued to fire his revolver with great effect at the German bombers. Otago found a Headquarters dugout some 100 yards down the forward slope, and its 6 occupants were bombed. By 6.50 a.m. the Switch was completely in our hands, and its captors looked down on the new country where the greenish-brown fields seemed unscarred and the villages unshattered.</p>
        <p>Be1ow them, immediately on their right, lay the houses and kitchen gardens of Flers, and in a straight line, 1000 yards beyond, one got glimpses of Guendecourt. On their left, about a mile and a quarter to the north-west of Flers, Eancourt I' Abbaye could be distinguished with the picturesque ruins of the old monastery and the 2 orchard-surrounded farms built of its masonry—all enclosed by a high wall. It lay in the III. Corps front, and from it stretched a road to Ligny Thilloy, on which glasses defected the limbers of German transport. Between these villages in the middle distance lay the solitary group of buildings of the sugar refinery at Factory Corner, close to which the Rifie Brigade would thrust the line, if all went well, later in the day. In the background, the eye travelled over gentle wooded slopes on which the roofs of Ligny Thilloy and Le Barque stood out among the trees.</p>
        <p>Close on the heels of the 2nd Brigade battalions came the leading battalion, the 4th, of the Rifle Brigade. It was extended over the whole Divisional sector with 2 companies in front, each occupying 400 yards and each in 4 waves. At the rear of each leading company followed 2 sections detailed to clear any intermediate trenches encountered before reaching the Brown Line. The support companies followed 60 yards in rear. At 7.5 a.m. the leading lines passed through the Switch, singing<note xml:id="fn48-76" n="1"><p>A quite unusual feature but reported on reliable authority.</p></note> and in high spirits, and lay down as close as possible to the curtain of fire some 300 yards beyond. There was still no sign of the tanks. When <pb xml:id="n106" n="77"/>the barrage lifted and commenced to roll forward, now at a slower rate in view of possible difficulties on this reverse slope, the riflemen followed it for their half-mile journey without experiencing any particular difficulty. By the scheduled hour of 7.50 a.m. they had captured the Brown Line. The Battalion Headquarters moved forward to a sunken road some 150 yards behind, but here came presently under heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The artillery liaison officer was killed, and several of the officers and men killed and wounded. Lt.-Col. Melvill and his staff therefore moved forward into the Brown Line itself. Consolidation and organisation for defence were at once taken on hand. Two machine guns were posted, one in the Brown Line, where it did particularly useful work against the German counter-attack launched during the afternoon, and one in a Strong Point on the left, from which it decimated a party of retreating enemy. Unfortunately, later in the morning, a tank was damaged about the centre of the line and drew heavy fire on the trench. The 4th Battalions casualties during the day were 13 officers and 254 other ranks.</p>
        <p>All this time the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Rifle Brigade had been advancing immediately behind the 4th Battalion. Till they reached the crest, each section wound its way in Indian file up over the shellholes, each platoon group being separated about 100 yards from its neighhour to minimise the dangers of artillery fire. The 2 battalions were each in depth on a 1-company frontage of 400 yards. One company of the right battalion for a time got in front of the 4th Battalion, but this was remedied without confusion. German heavy artillery laid a barrage in High Wood and along the crest, but the shells kept falling in much the same spots, and a passage through was not difficult for seasoned soldiers.<note xml:id="fn49-77" n="1"><p>The instantaneous fuse, which caused the shell fragments to fly much further, was not yet employed, and the system of "crashes " was yet to be evolved: see p. 320. The Germans never at any time used much shrapnel, and almost invariably burst it too high.</p></note> The German field guns presumably were moving back, for there was little or no shrapnel, but with characteristic tenacity an overlooked machine gun in the Switch blazed into activity for a few thrilling moments and caused some casualties before the crew were destroyed. The battalions reached their assembly position in rear of the Brown Line well up to time.</p>
        <p>Just after 8 a.m. the barrage moved forward again, though the tanks it was to cover were not up, and 20 minutes later, <pb xml:id="n107" n="78"/>in accordance with the programme, the 2 Rifle Battalions started forward, unaccompanied by a barrage, to fulfil their allotted part in the battle. Their task was first to capture the sector of the great Flers Trench System on the Divisional front, then to carry Fort Trench, which lay towards Flers village, clear the north-west corner of Flers and the line of dugouts in the Abbey Road, and lastly to dig themselves a position front the tip of the village along the rising ground beyond the Abbey Road to the North Road valley and the III. Corps boundary.</p>
        <p>On the right the 2nd Battalion did not find much difficulty in Flers Trench, where they captured over 80 prisoners, but as soon they began to move out of it, a machine gun from the hedges at the corner of the village in front caused several casualties, among whom fell Major A. J. Childs. By short rushes, however, the platoons pushed their way to Flers Support, which was found empty. From there to the Abbey Road the support companies, who now took up the struggle, met stiff fighting. Hidden in the plantations, the road had a sheer 20-feet drop, undetected by our aeroplanes and full of dugouts, and there the Germans resisted stubbornly. Part of the 1st Battalion, which followed in rear, joined in the conflict, and a platoon of the 4th which had been in battalion reserve was sent forward to assist. About 9.30 a.m. the road and plantations on the western half of the village were cleared of the enemy, and the 4th Battalion platoon returned to the Brown Line.</p>
        <p>Partly to fill a gap on their right and partly drawn by the magnetism of the village, the 2nd Battalion had swung somewhat into the area of the 41st Division on their right, to whom all Flers, except this north-western corner, had been assigned. These English troops had had less distance to cover in the initial stages of the battle, and for them the Brown Line had coincided with the Flers System where it was contiguous with the village. Thus they were among the houses and saw the Germans retiring in disorder towards Gueudecourt, while the New Zealanders, according to programme were still mastering Flers and Fort Trenches. At 8.40 a.m. an aeroplane saw a crowd of them following a tank up the main street. Ere the Germans retired, however, they released pigeons with a report of their disaster, and the congested troops of the 41st Division in the village were soon heavily shelled and lost most of their officers. Only a handful <pb xml:id="n108" n="79"/>penetrated to the Blue Line beyond, till the Brigade Major<note xml:id="fn50-79" n="1"><p>Major Gwyn Thomas.</p></note> of their left brigade, a fine fighting soldier, personally collected parties and brought them round to the north-eastern side. Owing to these casualties it was fortunate that the 2nd Rifles was in a position to give substantial assistance in filling up the gap on its right and so securing our hold on Flers. By 10 a.m. it was on the Blue Line in its own area on the New Zealand front and had its right thrown well over into the 41st Division's sector, and covering the village.</p>
        <p>On the left, with the 3rd Battalion, progress was much less marked. As no barrage accompanied this stage of the attack, it was most desirable that the wire in front of the Flers System should be found well broken. It was a matter, therefore, of grave anxiety to the 3rd Battalion troops to find themselves confronted by a practically intact barrier of rusty entanglements. Machine guns and rifles chattered from the trench beyond, and it was obvious that their hope of surmounting the barrier of Flers Trench without trouble was doomed to disappointment. No tanks were yet visible. Bombing sections, led by 2nd Lt, R. A. Bennett and others, worked up the communication trenches which ran forward from the Brown Line, and succeeded in putting one machine gun out of action, but all their effort were unable to force an entry. Other parties, utilising the dead ground on the left, made some progress under cover of supporting machine guns. The 1st Battalion coming up joined in the fighting here as they had joined in the fighting in the village, but the barrier remained unbroken. Attempts at a frontal rush to reach the wire and break it with wire-cutters were effectively checked by the stream of lead pumped from the trench.</p>
        <p>But the new British weapon was thus carly to prove its value. About 10.30 a.m. the men lying in sullen discomfiture in the shellholes, with their rifles trained on any movement in the Flers Line, became aware of 2 tanks, one of which rolled over to the left boundary by the North Road, while the other smashed the wire and stamped out the machine guns. In their wake followed a party of 10 riflemen and bombers of the 4th Battalion, who had pushed forward to add impetus to the 3rd Battalion's attack. This little party, commanded by Major Pow, coming on top of the dismay inspired by the tank actually captured 100 prisoners. The 3rd Battalion then pushed up through Flers Support to Abbey Road to join the 2nd.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n109" n="80"/>
        <p>There now remained the final task of capturing Grove Alley. This objective had been allotted to the 1st Battalion, which till now had constituted the brigade reserve. The fighting in the village and before Flers Trench, in which parties of this battalion had become involved, made reorganisation necessary. When the leading companies therefore reached Abbey Road, they paused for a time under cover of the 2nd Battalion and part of the 3rd, now on or close in rear of the Blue Line, to straighten out their units. It was about 11 a.m. Owing to the delay at the Flers System the progress of operations now lagged behind the timetable, but as there was no covering barrage this mattered little. Advantage was taken of the halt to arrange with a small party of English troops in Flers that these should establish a Strong Point in an isolated German system known as Box and Cox, 300 yards north of the village, so as to furnish a defensive flank.</p>
        <p>At about 11.30 a.m. the 2 assaulting companies moved off. On their appearance, 200 of the German troops garrisoing Grove Alley turned and fled north-eastwards towards Gueudecourt. Our advance was covered by the fire of the machine guns attached to the 2nd Battalion, which had taken up prearranged positions in Strong Points in the vicinity of the Blue Line. This checked opposition in front, but severe machine guns fire, admirably directed from the Goose Alley ridge beyond the North Road on the left, caused several casualties. Somewhat reduced in numbers by this fire, the 1st Battalion pushed steadily forward and captured the centre of the position without overmuch trouble. Particularly, fine qualities of leadership were shown by Coy.-Sergt.-Major G. H. Boles, who, when all the officers and most of the n.c.o.s of his company had been put out of action and the men began to falter under the fire, took command, organised the renmants, and led them forward to the objective. Two guns of a German field battery, one of which was in action, were assaulted by 2nd Lt. J. R. Bongard with a party of 7 men, and the crews bayoneted.</p>
        <p>Thus the final objective of the Division, except for a portion on each flank, was in our hands. It was now, however, after midday. The tanks had gone over to the right or had been destroyed. No troops were visible in the 41st Division's Red Line, and even at Box and Cox in the right rear, the party that had undertaken to form the Strong Point had been prevented from carrying out the arrangement. <pb xml:id="n110" n="81"/>The left or south end of Grove Alley, which the depleted companies were not strong enough to cover in their assault, was still occupied by the enemy. This force was hemmed in by the 1st Battalion and the 3rd, and no doubt could have been trapped. A more pressing danger, however, lay on the 1st Battalion's unguarded right flank, where large numbers of the enemy were beginning to advance from the north-east, and threatening to cut off the thin line of our troops, stretching out here "into the air. " The officer in command in the front line had to make up his mind rapidly. He decided to withdraw steadily to Box and Cox and the Blue Line. Bongard's party destroyed at least one of the field guns.</p>
        <p>Generally, in such circumstances, it is the duty of troops that reach an advanced position to hold their ground and facilitate the advance of their comrades on the flanks, but sometimes situations arise which are frankly impossible, and to stay then means useless waste of lives. On this occasion, as a matter of fact, the neighbouring troops were not in a position to effect further progress without an interval of at least some hours, and the tactical correctness of the decision to withdraw, however relnetantly made, was confirmed by the orders received shortly afterwards from Corps, that no advance beyond the Blue Line would be made that day. It was now about 2.30 p.m. The 1st Battalion troops set to work at once to consolidate their line. Of the 2 light trench mortars at their disposal 1 was destroyed by a direct hit. The other took up a defensive position. The right flank round the north-east corner of Flers was drawn further back to protect the village from this direction, and to connect up with the handful of English troops on the right. 2nd <name type="person" key="name-208606">Lt. N. L. Macky</name>, who was in command of the 1st Rifles' reserve of 2 platoons, moved forward, engaged the enemy with fire and arrested his advance. Thus, though it was impossible to maintain a hold on that last objective, the Rifle Brigade achieved further progress than the troops on either flank. In the course of the day's operations they had captured over 400 prisoners, 6 machine guns and a mitrailleuse.</p>
        <p>To meet the threatened counter-attack on the forward position, the 2nd Brigade was ordered to send up a battalion in support of the Rifle Brigade. General Braithwaite accordingly gave instructions to this effect over the telephone to his reserve battalion, 2nd Wellington, which, previously warned for such action, moved off at once with 5 machine <pb xml:id="n111" n="82"/>guns. They met a considerable barrage on the Switch and heavy shelling between there and Flers, but advancing in splendid order suffered few casualties. Passing through the western part of the village, the 2 leading companies found that the enemy's attack had been finally smashed by artillery fire and had not developed into a serious danger.<note xml:id="fn51-82" n="1"><p>This German attack presented to the New Zealand gunners perhaps their best moving target in France and even, with the possible exception of the <name key="name-123533" type="place">Lone Pine</name> and <name key="name-123499" type="place">Chunuk Bair</name> operations on Gallipoli, in the whole war. Forward observation officers, already in Flers Support, observed a force of Germans, about a battalion strong, in close formation in the open. For a moment they were mistaken for our cavalry who were expected to be seen dismounted. When their identity was realised, practically every field gun in the sector opened well-directed fire on them.</p></note> After reconnaissance of the Rifles' position they filled up a gap north of the village, where, owing to the necessary overflow into the right Division's front, the line was distinctly thin. As the infantry dug in, they were covered by the tank “H.M.S. Diehard,” commanded by a gallant young officer of the Highland Light Infantry. It had already done strenuous service, though none of its adventures so impressed its cheerful crew as the sight of passing Bavarians hurriedly adjusting their respirators, under the impression that the smoke from the exhaust pipe was some novel kind of lethal gas. It now moved forward along the road towards Factory Corner, protecting the digging parties with its broadsides and at the same time firing up the road with its forward gun.</p>
        <p>At 3.30 p.m., enemy reaction seemed to swing against the left flank, where a previous attempt had been crushed by our machine guns. Reports reached Divisional Headquarters of skirmishing lines of enemy north of High Wood and west of Flers. The 2nd Rifles moved a composite party of a company strength across from right to left to meet this new threat, and a third 2nd Wellington company was also rushed up, but this attack, too, failed to materialise.</p>
        <p>At about the same time the English troops on the right came up to a level with the New Zealanders in Box and Cox by occupying trenches further to the east, but in accordance with Corps orders and as their right flank was in the air, they withdrew again on the evening to the Blue Line. After their experience in Grove Alley, the riflemen were resolutely determined not to relinquish their grasp on Box and Cox. On the left they were now more or less linked through to the New Zealand hector of the Blue Line. If only troops were brought up to swing the right flank back further, they were confident of maintaining their advanced position. For this purpose, the last 2nd Wellington company was sent up in <pb xml:id="n112" n="83"/>the evening, and after its arrival units were largely reorganised, the forward troops of the 2nd Rifles being pulled back to support. In the protection and consolidation of this awkward right flank, conspicuously good work was done by <name type="person" key="name-208314">Capt. L. M. Inglis</name>, of the 1st Rifles, and Capt. H. E. McKinnon, of 2nd Wellington.</p>
        <p>The position in the evening was that the north-east approaches to the village were barred by the 41st Division troops on the Blue Line, and the north and north-west of the village secured by the 1st Rifles, with the three 2nd Wellington companies, 200 yards in front of the Blue Line and connected back with the 3rd Rifles and the other 2nd Wellington company, who were consolidating the Blue Line on the left of the sector. On their left, again, in the III. Corps area, the 47th Division had been very severely engaged in High Wood and been unable to take their objective in the Flers System. The 3rd Rifles, therefore, who had themselves lost nearly half of their effectives in the fight for Flers Trench, placed machine and Lewis guns to command the North Road valley. A further section of machine guns was sent forward in the evening. Blocks and bombing posts were established in Flers Trench and Flers Support, and a defensive flank was manned in a convenient sap which ran from Abbey Road to Flers Support.<note xml:id="fn52-83" n="1"><p>This was later continued to the main left communication trench forward of the Switch. Fisli Alley, which led back to the 4th Battalion in the Brown Line and thence into French Lane.</p></note></p>
        <p>About the Abbey Road, during the afternoon, conspicuous gallantry was shown by Rflmn. J. R. Walter, of the 3rd Battalion, who under direct machine gun fire and heavy shell-fire went into No Man's Land, where he dressed the wounds of 8 men and carried them into shelter.</p>
        <p>In the village of Flers itself a systematic search was made during the course of the afternoon. Many cellars and dugouts still contained Germans. Seven prisoners had been taken when a machine gun party, after surrendering, fired point-blank into the clearing party, of whom 3 were killed and 4 wounded. Thenceforward no prisoners were taken. Two machine guns were captured with a vast amount of equipment. As in the Switch and other lines, the dugouts were full of cigars, chocolate, mineral waters and food, with which the victors assuaged their hardships. No civilians were found. Previous to the battle the 400 inhabitants, who had remained in Flers under German control, had been withdrawn eastwards. The big brewery had been some time <pb xml:id="n113" n="84"/>before stripped of its machinery and converted into Baths. The church had been used as a hospital, and the schools for operations. In the evening the 41st Division was instructed by Corps to appoint an officer specially charged with the defence of the village.</p>
        <p>While these events were happening in the front of the battle, in rear there was mcessant activity on all branches of the service, above and below ground and in the air. As an instance of the work of Staffs and Signallers, it is interesting to note that for the first 24 hours of the action Divisional Headquarters dealt with 700, and the 2nd Brigade Headquarters with 400 telegrams. The formation of forward dumps, the carrying forward of munitions and food the supply of water, the extension of roads and approach trenches, the evacuation of wounded, The movement of troops and guns, the development of signal communication, all necessitated urgent and considered effort. The rear battalions of the 2nd Brigade moved up to close support as soon as the Rifle Brigade crossed the Switch. Soon after midday the 1st Brigade also marched up nearer the battle. 1st Canterbury and 1st Wellington occupied the old German Second Line in Carlton and Savoy Trenches, and the remaining battalions went forward from Fricourt Wood to Mametz Wood. Batteries were hauled up over the shellholes to new positions under the Switch, between High and Delville Woods, and to Devil's valley, some 500 yards north-east of the latter mood.</p>
        <p>In the Switch itself, 2nd Auckland and 2nd Otago, with the Engineers' assistance, had, immediately after capture, begun to consolidate a new trench some 70 yards in front, with Strong Points on either flank. They had seen enough of war to realise that the lost Switch would certainly prove a ranging mark for German guns. This assumption proved correct, for an hour and a half after capture a heavy and accurate bombardment was opened on it, which continued throughout the day and night. It was not till the afternoon that the German observers noted the new trench, which thereafter came in for its share. Men were continually being buried, and portions of the trench had to be redug. But by evening it was complete. On account of the shelling, the Switch itself was left severely alone, except for exploration in search of souvenirs. For 2 days after, dazed and ghastly pale Germans, whose pockets were being rifled on the assumption that they were dead, would suddenly come to life in its dugouts. From if the battalions brought <choice><orig>for-<pb xml:id="n114" n="85"/>ward</orig><reg>forward</reg></choice> 4 undamaged German machine guns to the new line. The capture of the Switch had cost Auckland nearly 300 and Otago 400 casualties. The left Otago Company had lost all its officers and had been reduced to 34 men. L.-Sergt. H. Bellamy and Cpl. V. W. Shirley handled these with conspicuous ability.</p>
        <p>In their new positions Otago were harassed not only by artillery fire but also by considerable enfilade machine gun fire and sniping, which came from their left, where the troops of the 47th Division, heavily engaged and, it appears, indifferently handed, had failed to reach their objective. These snipers were dealt with by the redoutable <name type="person" key="name-209489">Pte. R. C. Travis</name>, whose exploits on the Lys have already been mentioned, and who now went out voluntarily on to the open and silenced them. Every effort was made to consolidate and strengthen the position, but the uncertainty of the situation in front of High Wood and the fact that our left was seriously exposed gave grounds for anxiety. A company of 2nd Canterbury was therefore moved early, before the Germans had been cleared out of High Wood, to fill the dangerous gap on the left. Later in the day also this flank was strengthened by 10 machine guns, and in the evening 1st Canterbury was brought up from Carlton Trench into close support. During the night and the following morning 2nd Canterbury took over the Switch.</p>
        <p>It was some days before apprehensions about this exposed flank towards High Wood were finally relieved. Prisoners captured on the 16th from different Regiments stated that a strong German counter-attack was to drive in from the north-west on High Wood before dawn on the 17th. Further Strong Points and machine gun emplacements were therefore established and manned, and the 2 supporting battalions of the 2nd Brigade were moved to assembly trenches in rear the threatened attack did not actually materialise, and after the position was secured on the left, the garrison of the Switch, in order to minimise casualties from shell-fire, was reduced to a nucleus of 50 men, with numerous machine guns.<note xml:id="fn53-85" n="1"><p>Till our communication trenches passed the Switch, parties moving over the skyline inevitably attracted fire.</p></note></p>
        <p>The night of 15th/16th September was comparatively qniet. Patrols were sent out well ahead towards Grove Alley and the north Road up to the line of our own protective barrage, which was maintained along the whole front. On the 4lst Division's sector it had heen hoped that an <choice><orig>after-<pb xml:id="n115" n="86"/>noon</orig><reg>afternoon</reg></choice> bombardment of Gueudecourt and the Gird System might induce the Germans to vacate trenches and village and thus lead to peaceful penetration, but reconnaissance by patrols made it clear that the enemy was not to relinquish his hold so lightly.</p>
        <p>A resumption of the general attack by the Fourth Army had been planned for the morrow (16th September), and orders had been received on the evening by the Division from Corps for co-operation with the troops oil either flank with a view to the completion of the objectives of the 15th. At midnight further instructions were issued that in the event of success the advantages won on the XV. Corps front should, in accordance with the general tactical scheme, be exploited in a northerly direction. In that case, the 41st Division would make a distinct change of direction, swinging north-west to capture the Gird System as far as Goose Alley, and the New Zealand Division similarly inclining to the left would seize Goose Alley from the Gird to the Flers System. This second movement, however, was conditional and would not take place before 1 p.m.</p>
        <p>On receipt of the Corps orders the 1st Brigade, which had remained ready to move at 15 minutes' notice, was immediately warned for the capture of the Red Line in Grove Alley and for the possible exploitation. The 2 battalions back in Mametz Wood were set in motion at once for the area in rear of the Switch as a half-way resting place the completion of the fourth objective was given to 1st Wellington; 1st Auckland and 1st Canterbury were selected for the subsequent conditional operation, with 1st Otago in reserve. Wellington moved off at midnight and reached their assembly position west of Flers before dawn, after a most creditable march in the darkness, made difficult by lack of guides and absence of previous reconnaissance. The other 3 battalions of the brigade moved forward in the forenoon of the. 16th, through a heavy barrage of high-explosive. 1st Canterbury and 1st Auckland, as assaulting troops for the second objective, assembled to the west of Flers, and Otago, less 1 company detailed for ration-carrying, dug a new trench for themselves just in rear of the Brown Line. General Earl Johnston, with characteristic disregard of danger, established his headquarters on the forward slope of the ridge in the new Switch, but was later forced by interference from hostile artillery to seek a less exposed position. As on the 15th, the weather was <pb xml:id="n116"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP015a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP015a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP015a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Artillery on the March</hi></head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP015b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP015b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP015b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">An Emplacement</hi></head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n117"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP016a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP016a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP016a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">A Gun-Pit in the Somme Battle</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n118" n="87"/>warm and bright. The artillery, which had through the night been engaged in wire-cutting, commenced the preparatory bombardment at dawn. Just prior to the 1st Wellington attack, an attempt by 2 enemy companies against our right flank was crushed by rifle fire and that of the 4 machine guns allotted to Wellington, together with the help of a tank which was on its may to co-operate with the troops on the right.</p>
        <p>At 9.25 a.m., 1st Wellington attacked with 2 assaulting companies in 4 waves at 35 yards' distance, followed by the 2 supporting companies, each in 2 waves. Though the hostile barrage accompanying the enemy's attack was heavy, and his machine guns on either flank took their toll, the assaulting companies had little difficulty in seizing the lightly manned Grove A11ey, from just short of the Flers-Factory Corner Road to the point where it joined the Blue Line. The further section of some 400 yards on the right extending north of the road was not taken. The troops on the right had not succeeded in getting forward: and our men, had they reached it, would have almost certainly found it untenable. As it was, on this right flank enemy bombers for some 10 minutes pushed the line slightly back, till L. Cpl. E R. F Searfe and his Lewis gun section rushed up and prevented their further advance. He then followed the enemy down the trench, assisting materially in recapturing the lost ground, and continued, although wounded, to work his gun till the situation was cleared up. Pte W. S. Brown then led a small party of bombers to clear a further stretch of trench while a block was being constructed. The battalion took 22 Bavarian prisoners, but the guns destroyed by the 1st Rifles on the previous day had been pulled back under cover of darkness. The captured trench commanded an uninterrupted view of the valley along which ran the North Road to Factory Corner, and, contrary to expectations, it was not found necessary to dig a new line in front of it. Unfortunately, the 41st Division, with a longer distance to go and faced by heavier opposition, so far from being able to capture the Gird System or Gueudecourt itself, made only a little progress north of Flers. The tank accompanying them, which had rendered such good service in the German counterattack, pushed on by itself some 300 yards, when it was struck by a shell and abandoned. Thereupon a platoon of 1st Wellington's right support company was used to reinforce the right flank, while the left support company was <choice><orig>with-<pb xml:id="n119" n="88"/>drawn</orig><reg>withdrawn</reg></choice> to battalion reserve. In the early morning aeroplanes had reported Gird to be held lightly, but it was strengthened ere the 41st Division's attack developed. In view of the failure to carry Gucudecourt, the second operation was necessarily cancelled, though notification did not reach the batteries in time to prevent their delivering the barrage. As it turned out, Gucudecourt was not to be captured yet, nor this second objective to be taken till 12 days later.</p>
        <p>The 1st Brigade supporting troops destined for this second attack remained where they were till dark, when they began to relieve the Rifle Brigade. 1st Canterbury, in rear of 1st Wellington, occupied the Blue Line, now well consolidated, from Box aid Cox to the Abbey Road. Despite the heavy shelling on Flers and its neighbourhood, they also dug and occupied a new sap from Box and Cox to Grove Alley, thus linking up with 1st We1lington. 1st Auckland took over from the 2nd and 3rd Rifles the whole of the Flers Trench System, and secured their left by digging another supporting flank trench connecting Flers Trench and Flers Support. In reserve, 1st Otago relieved the 4th Rifles on the Brown Line. On relief, the 3rd Brigade moved back at dawn on the 17th into Divisional reserve; 2nd Wellington similarly returned to the 2nd Brigade area behind the Switch, having lost 3 officers and over 200 men as the price of their service.</p>
        <p>Though the full objectives of the Army had not even now been attained, the success won by the British on these 2 days none the less constituted a notable achievement. “The result of the fighting of the 15th September and following days,” wrote the Commander-in-Chief on his despatch, “was a gain more considerable than any which had attended our arms in the course of a single operation since the commencement of the of the offensive.” To the south, the strong position known as the Quadrilateral, east of Ginchy, had held up the attack on Morval and Les Boeufs, and Gucudecourt, as we have seen, was not yet captured. But 2 main lines of trenches had been stormed and the advance pushed a mile forward dong a front of over 6 miles. Westwards, the Reserve Army had seized Courcelette and Martinpuich. 3000 prisoners were captured by the Fourth Army. As far as the Division was concerned, it had taken all its objectives and captured 500 prisoners, with 15 machine guns and a mitrailleuse, and 3 mortars. Of these prisoners the 1st Brigade had taken 22, the 2nd Brigade 50, and the 3rd Brigade <pb xml:id="n120" n="89"/>nearly 450. The losses on the 15th had been approximately: Rifle Brigade, 1,200; 2nd Brigade. 800. The Division was gratified to receive a cordial te1egram of congratulation from the Commander and Staff of the Second Army. <name type="person" key="name-416632">Sir Henry Rawlinson</name>, the Fourth Army Commander, who wrote similar letters of appreciation to the other troops engaged, sent the following message to the Corps Commander:—“Please convey to all ranks New Zealand Division my congratulations and thanks for their successful attacks on the 15th and 16th September. They showed a fine fighting spirit, and admirable energy and dash.” In a covering letter, Sir Henry Horne wrote:—“The Corps Commander has great pleasure in forwarding above, and desires to add his own appreciation of their good work.”</p>
        <p>In the evening of 16th September the weather broke. Occasional showers fell on the 17th, but by midnight 17th/ 18th heavy rain set in, which continued without cessation for the rest of the night and the whole of the 18th, dying away in fitful squalls on the morning of the 19th. Now, as later on October, the weather robbed the British of the fruit of their efforts and gave a breathing space to the enemy to prop up his tottering line. Difficulties of communication and movement forced the postponement of operations. A modern army lives by its communications, and in the Battle area these were inadequate in number and undermined and pitted by shell-fire. On the New Zealand area there was but the one avenue of approach for limbers, up the Longueval-Flers valley. By day it was commanded by German observation, and by night, naturally enough, heavily shelled. Reinforcements in the camp at Fricourt were employed on the rearward roads, but those nearer to the trenches became bogs of liquid mire. The supply of rations water wire sandbags flares ammunition and other necessities from the great Thistle and Green Dumps on and in rear of the Longueval-Bazentin road presented problems of acute difficulty, and relief was felt when the Engineers reported the 6 wells in Flers safe for drinking and fitted them with windlasses. Limbers had to be replaced by pack animals. Despatch riders from Divisional headquarters, 8 miles from Flers, found the road beyond Pommiers Redoubt impassable for their motor cycles. Signal wires, always subject to breaks by shell-fire and the passage of infantry and guns, were now affected also by the weather, and though Corps took over the responsibility for maintenance up to the Bazentin ridge, an <pb xml:id="n121" n="90"/>ever increasing strain was imposed on the already overworked but uncomplaining personnel of the Divisional Signal Company.</p>
        <p>The clayey trenches became ditches, everywhere ankle-and in many places knee-deep in viscous mud which clogged every step. Cases of “trench feet” caused anxiety. The task of consolidation and drainage became a hundredfold mare onerous. None the less the consolidation of fighting and communication trenches was pushed on despite all difficulties, and the Pioneers left an abiding memorial of their stay on the Somme in the magnificently constructed continuation of Turk Lane, At the same time the Engineers made dugouts for machine gun crews and medical personnel. In Ferret Trench, near the cross-country track which led downhill from the Switch to Flers, they excavated, with the assistance of a Tunnelling Company detachment, a deep shell-proof dugout which German skill could not have bettered, and which was destined to serve as advanced brigade headquarters till the close of the Division's operations.</p>
        <p>The advance of the artonery also was seriously impeded by the deep mud. Already on the 15th the 3rd Brigade batteries had moved forward. The 1st followed on the 16th, and the 2nd after the weather had broken. The 10th Battery of the 4th Brigade, moving to Flers before dawn on the 19th, harnessed 20 horses to each gun, and even then, after many hours of labour, reached their positions with only 2 guns. At the pits conditions were almost as wretched as for the soaked, mud-bespattered infantry in the front trenches, and in several instances the depth of water put the guns temporarily out of action. The struggling animals taking up even the curtailed amount of ammunition in the 18-pounder wagon-baskets, strapped to the saddle for the field guns or in improvised canvas carriers for the howitzers, were terribly overworked.</p>
        <p>Throughout this time of ceaseless rain some half-hearted attacks, easily repulsed, were made on Capt. F. K. Turn-bull's company on the right flank of 1st Wellington in Grove Alley. Only at one moment was the situation critical. The block at the extreme right of the position was held by a Lewis gun team. A heavy burst of shelling had put the whole team out of action. At this moment, Pte. W. A. Gray, who had come forward under heavy fire with other volunteers carrying ammunition to the front line, was approaching up the trench. He took over the gun and, with <pb xml:id="n122" n="91"/>the help of 2 other men, served it for more than 12 hours, effectively preventing an attempted enemy entry. Occasional violent bombardments fell on Flers and our trenches, which were all under observation from the church tower of Le Barque and other vantage points. An intense bombardment was carried out on the evening of the 17th on all the front trenches and on the Switch, more particularly on our left sub-sector. The shelling continued from 8 p.m. to 3 a.m. on the 18th. In this bombardment Major Fleming Ross, of 1st wellington, was killed, with many others.<note xml:id="fn54-91" n="1"><p>Major <name type="person" key="name-130157">J. M. Rose,</name> M.C., commanding the 1st Machine Gun Coy.. was severely wounded on the 16th.</p></note> NO assault, however, followed.</p>
        <p>During this period the sector allotted to the Division was divided in depth into 3 areas, the forward one, north of the Switch, occupied by the brigade in the line, the inter-mediate, from the Switch inclusive to the Longueval-Bazentin Road, for the occupation of the supporting brigade, and the rear area, from the road southwards, for the reserve brigade. As each brigade went into reserve, it incorporated reinforcements from the Fricourt camp and was utilised for work on gun emplacements, roads, and the continually extending railway. During this interval, too, a beginning was made with the relief of the 47th Division in the III. Corps by the 1st Division, and the places of the 14th and 41st Divisions in the XV. Corps were taken by the 21st and 55th Divisions respectively. In preparation for the continuance of the attack on the 18th, which was to be frustrated by atrocious weather, 1st Canterbury handed over the position held at Box and Cox outside the New Zealand area to troops of the 55th Division. On the left, 1st Auckland cleared a breathing space for themselves by bombing some distance up the Flers System.</p>
        <p>This left flank was now for some days to be the main scene of the Division's activity. From the AuckIand position one looked across the level floor of the shallow narrow valley of the North Road up at the bare slopes of the ridge along which ran the long single trench that between the Gird and Flers Systems was called Goose Alley, and from Flers Trench southwards Drop Alley. At right angles to this trench the 2 lines of the Flers System extended westwards over the ridge. The high ground across the valley commanded the Gird System west of Gueudecourt, and for the forthcoming operations of the Division on the Gird System it was highly <pb xml:id="n123" n="92"/>important to win a footing on it. Tile position itself lay in the 111. Corps area, and it had been the final task of the 47th Division on the 15th to capture the 600 yards of Flers Support from the North Road to the top of the ridge at the junction of Goose Alley, and thence form a flank down Drop Alley. This aim was, as we have seen, found impossible of realisation owing to the desperate fighting in High Wood. It was now agreed: however, that prior to completing their relief they should make a further effort, and on capture of the position hand over the Flers System temporarily to the New Zealanders to facilitate the arrangements for the attack on the Gird Trenches.</p>
        <p>This renewed enterprise was carried out in the early morning of the 18th. The actual trench junction on the ridge was not won, but both the Flers System and Drop Alley were captured up to within 100 yards of this Strong Point. Before midday, in accordance with the arrangements made, 1st Otago troops relieved the London Regiments in Flers Support. The section of Flers Trench itself remained for the moment, owing to difficulty of relief, in the custody of the III. Corps. In the afternoon of the 18th a further effort made by the 47th Division to win the junction and secure touch with the troops in Drop Alley failed. That night (18th/19th September), the 2nd Brigade relieved the 1st under intensely disagreeable conditions of rain and shelling. The 1st Brigade moved back to the reserve area vacated by the Rifle Brigade, which came up to the intermediate area. 2nd Wellington took over the right of the, line, 2nd Auckland the left, and 2nd Canterbury and 2nd Otago went into support and reserve in the Flers System and the Brown Line respectively. Up to this date the Division had lost in casualties over 100 officers and 3000 other ranks.</p>
        <p>After darkness on the evening of the 19th bombing parties of 2nd Auckland, in co-operation with a III. Corps attack on the left up Flers Trench and Drop Alley, endeavoured to work up F1ers Support to the crest and seize the southernmost extremity of Goose Alley. They were supported by 2 Stokes mortars, arid the trenches beyond the objectives were barraged by the III. Corps heavies and field artillery. The English troops' attack on the left was unsuccessful, and in a determined German counter-thrust down Drop Alley the ground won on the previous morning was lost. In Flers Support 2nd Auckland made considerable ground towards the crest. In the course of their attack Pte. W. P. <choice><orig>Middle-<pb xml:id="n124" n="93"/>miss,</orig><reg>middlemiss</reg></choice> leading a bayonet charge, killed no less than 7 Germans single-handed, bringing the total number of the victims of his bombs or bayonet since our arrival in the battle to 23. The shells of the supporting artillery, however, unfortunately fell among The Auckland stormers. Numerous casualties were sustained, and the continuance of our barrage on the upper part of Flers Support made a prosecution of the attack impossible. Our line, however, had been pushed forward to within 40 yards of Goose Alley. Sergt. W. B. Gilmore, blown off his feet by a German grenade, continued to throw bombs till a block had been made and the position rendered secure. Before dawn on the 20th, 2nd Auckland took over from the British their part of Flers Trench which was held up to within much the same distance of Goose Alley. For the moment, the blocks and bombing posts were consolidated, while the hammer swung back in preparation for' a heavier blow. On the same evening of the 19th a small party of 2nd Wellington endeavoured to capture a Strong Point on the right of the line at the junction of the Flers-Factory Corner Road with Grove Alley, but as soon as our light trench mortars opened, a heavy-barrage fell plumb on the party who suffered severe losses and were forced to withdraw.</p>
        <p>On the 20th the weather cleared, and observation improved. A long string of German horse ambulances was distinctly visible on the road from Le Barque to Eaucourt L'Abbaye. Our artillery shelled the continual traffic on the Ligny Thilloy road. When they registered on the Thilloy church, a conspicuous Red Cross flag was hoisted on a house east of the village. Our aeroplanes reported great train activity in rear. Taking advantage, like our own gunners, of the better weather conditions and with the observation of balloons and aeroplanes, the German artillery shelled our trench positions and batteries with high-explosive, shrapnel, and lachrymatory gas.</p>
        <p>Meanwhile energetic preparations were in progress for a simultaneous repetition of the 2 enterprises at either flank of the line. At 8.30 p.m., 2nd Wellington, in the light of their experience on the previous evening, planned to surprise the enemy by a "silent" attack. They found him, however, in too great strength in No Man's Land, and were unable to make headway. Better fortune attended the larger attack made by 2nd Canterbury against the trench junction on the ridge and the lower end of Goose Alley. Like the 'Wellington troops on the Factory Road, 2nd Canterbury were to attack <pb xml:id="n125" n="94"/>without preparatory bombardment. On their left the 1st black Watch of the 1st Division, who had replaced the Londoners, were simultaneously to recover Drop Alley, The frontage to be assaulted by Canterbury was some 650 yards. The password was "Success." Three companies lined up on the North Road in the darkness, and guided by the wire, crossed the valley and moved stealthily up the hill, from which only an occasional flare or machine gun burst told of occupation. The attackers reached within 50 yards of the trench before being discovered. Immediately a shower of bombs was hurled into the wire, and Machine guns spat viciously. Many officers and men fell on the glacis, but the attackers fought their way in, and cleared the position. The Highlanders also successfully moved up Drop Alley and joined hands. Punctually a quarter of an hour after the attack was launched our artillery began to barrage accurately Goose Alley and the Flers Trenches beyond the points defined for the capture. The enterprise had achieved its aim, and some 20 prisoners and 4 machine gun were captured. With Engineers' assistance blocks were constructed in Flers Trench and Flers Support beyond Goose Alley.</p>
        <p>But the 13th Bavarian Reserve Regiment were too stouthearted to lose this important position without a struggle. At 10 p.m they launched a strong and resolute counter-assault up the Flers Trenches. The daring and skill of their bombers were equally high, and the little egg-shaped bombs outranged our own and dealt havoc. The handful of Black Watch bombers, who had not yet been reinforced, were driven back down Drop Alley, and the enemy swarmed round and in rear of our left flank. Others pushed us back steadily from the blocks. Assistance was sent from the reserve Canterbury company, and supplies of bombs were carried up by parties of the other battalions, but Ihe fighting continued to rage bitterly. No quarter was asked or given. Now a storm of-bombs would kill or maim the defenders, now the tide would flow once more up the bloody trenches amid the dead and mutilated and dying. In this soldiers' battle many gallant deeds were done of which no record survives. Pte. J. D. Ross led a bombing party which finally retook a sap that had changed hands repeatedly during the night and was blocked with dead. Pte. H. Anderson held one flank when all his companions became casualties, then, forced back, reported to a sergeant at another point and continued to do magnificent work. In the end, however, the enemy had won <pb xml:id="n126" n="95"/>Drop Alley and parts of the Flers Trenches, and encircling both flanks, threatened to cut off the whole force. Our men were dogtired and the Bavarians becoming increasingly aggressive.</p>
        <p>It was at this juncture that Capt. F. Starnes, the commander of the reserve Canterbury company, arrived. He at once organised the defence for further resistance. He rallied the disheartened and imbued the resolute with fresh fire. He led the counter-attack with unsurpassable determination, and to his personality and leadership eventual success was due. Just before dawn the enemy effort slackened, and his "sturmtruppen" were beaten off. The 1st Black Watch thereupon again moved up Drop Alley, which they took over as far as the junction with Flers Trench. In the morning light it was found that close on 200 dead Germans lay in and about the position, many of whom had fallen in the course of the night.</p>
        <p>With the respite brought by the dawn Canterbury toiled throughout the day with pick and shovel to improve their position and field of fire towards the Eaucourt valley, which now lay open to view. Blocks were manned by bombing posts. While thus consolidating they were surprised in the afternoon by a sudden and well-organised fresh attack. This time all 3 approaches were used by the Germans, who pressed up the 2 Flers Lines and along Goose Alley. Fresh troops, about 50 strong in each party, were employed. They were of staunch quality, and once more their bombers were formidable. But Canterbury, though the grim all-night struggle and the hard toil of consolidation had drawn heavily on their moral and physical reserves of strength, clung desperately to their hard-won gains. Forced again by the German bombers to yield fist one bay and then another, the left company at length climbed out of the saps and, facing the risk from snipers, crept along the F1ers Trench parapet, whence they-hurled bombs with deadly results at their assailants. Ultimately these turned to fly over the open, and a bayonet charge, led by Capt. Starnes, drove them with many casualties down the slope. On the hillside they left a machine gun and near1y 100 corpses.</p>
        <p>On the right, in Goose Alley, a handful of Aucklanders, under Pte. A. McClennan, coming to Canterbury's assistance, adopted with success the same tactics. Here, too, Cpl. H. J. Pattison, Pte. II. Joll, and other machine "miners displayed characteristic courage, stimulating our hard-pressed infantry and enfilading the enemy. An intrepid <pb xml:id="n127" n="96"/>Canterbury sergeant, J. Macdonald, who was killed 10 days later, led repeated bombing attacks: and rushed a German machine gun detachment, jabbing his bayonet the few fatal inches into each man in turn aid capturing the gun. Thus, the Goose Alley attack, as that in the Flers System, failed, and pursued by fire, the Germans fled down the shallow trench northwards.</p>
        <p>2nd Canterbury took into action 18 officers and 500 men. 7 officers and 80 men were killed, 4 officers were wounded and over 150 men. A half-dozen men were surrounded and made prisoners. Capt. Starnes was recommended for the V.C. and awarded an "immediate" D.S.O. No operation in which the Division took part in the battle called for such tenacity and grim determination on the part of the individual soldier. From this engagement, at least, the German infantry, gallant as it was, could not return "filled with the conviction of its superiority."<note xml:id="fn55-96" n="1"><p>Sixt von Armin's Report on Experiences of the IV. German Corps during the Sommo Battle.</p></note> The successful issue of the struggle, coining as a crown to the New Zealand assistance on the III. Corps flank, elicited the following telegrams of appreciation:—</p>
        <p>From the III. Corps Commander:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“The Lieut.-General Commanding III. Corps has requested the [XV.] Corps Commander to convey-to the New Zealand Division his appreciation of the good work done by them on the right of the III. Corps and of the assistance rendered by them to the III. Corps during the last few days.”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>From the Fourth Army Commander:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“Please congratulate the New Zealand Division from me on their excellent work in Flers Line and Drop Alley. They deserve every credit for their gallantry and perseverance.”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>From the XV. Corps Commander:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“The Corps Commander congratulates <name type="person" key="name-209146">Major-General A. H. Russell</name> and the New Zealand Division on the success gained last night, (20th/21st inst.) by the 2nd Battalion Canterbury Regiment. The repeated attacks, renewed and delivered with such energy and determination speak highly of the fine fighting qualities displayed by all ranks. The Corps Commander particularly desires to express to Lt.-Col. Stewart his high appreciation of the sound conception of the plan, and to Capt. <pb xml:id="n128" n="97"/>Starnes his admiration of his gallant and courageous leading.”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>On the night 21st/22nd September the 3rd Brigade relieved the 2nd Brigade, which moved back to support. The portion of Flers Trench west of the Divisional boundary on the North Road valley was taken over by the 1st Division. Under a spell of good weather the ground rapidly dried. Artillery activity was intensified. The New Zealand batteries that had by now moved up to south of Flers in Devil's Valley were heavily bombarded by explosives and drenched with gas and lachrymatory shell. West of Flers the gun-pits towards the North Road valley were not less exposed. Our own guns, too, were now able to bring ammunition up more freely, and their fire unceasingly burst on the German positions or harassed his communications.</p>
        <p>The destructiveness and influence on morale of the British artillery fire were described with remarkable frankness in the German Press, and exercised the rhetoric of war correspondents on either side, but their most highly coloured description does not convey a more effective picture than the temperate and truthful language of this German diary, found near Drop Alley on the 22nd:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“The enemy understands how to prevent with his terrible barrage the bringing up of building material, and even how to hinder the work itself. The consequence is that our trenches are always ready for an assault on his part. Our artillery, which does occasionally put a heavy barrage on the enemy's trenches at a great expense of ammunition, cannot cause him similar destruction. He can bring his building material up, can repair his trenches as well as build new ones, can bring up rations and ammunition, remove the wounded, &amp;c. The continual barrage on our lines of communication makes it very difficult for us to ration and relieve our troops, to supply water, ammunition, building material, and to evacuate wounded, and causes heavy losses. This and the want of protection from artillery fire and the weather, the lack of hot meals, the continual necessity (owing to aeroplanes) of lying still in the same place, the danger of being buried, the long time the wounded have to remain in the trenches, and chiefly the terrible effect of the medium and heavy artillery fire, controlled by In excellent air service, have a most demoralising effect on the troops. Only with the <pb xml:id="n129" n="98"/>greatest difficulty could the men be persuaded to stay in the trenches under these conditions.”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>The improvement of the weather and ground at last permitted the resumption of the delayed offensive. It was again to be on a grand scale, a French Army moving in co-operation, and the whole of the Fourth Army completing and extending the operations of the 15th. On the right, the XIV. Corps was commissioned to capture Morval and Les Boeufs. On the left, the III. Corps was to take some 300 yards of Flers Trench from Goose Alley, and then to establish itself on the high ground westwards, joining up at Courcelette with the Reserve Army, which would swing its right flank forward on the following day. The XV. Corps' principal task was to seize Gird Trench as far west as its junction with the Gueudecourt—Factory Corner Road and capture Gueudecourt. In the event of its fall, the 1st Indian Cavalry Division was to take Ligny Thilloy with a view to threatening the enemy westwards and in rear. The right. Division of the Corps (the 21st) was to capture the village of Gueudecourt, the centre (the 55th) to make good a sector of the Gird System west of it, and the New Zealand Division on the left to take Factory Corner and establish a line thence over the Goose Alley Spur to meet Flers Trench a little way above its junction with Goose Alley. There they would join the right of the advancing III. Corps. At a conference held on the 19th at Vivier Mill, a proposal was put forward by General Russell that his objective should be extended to include the remainder of the Gird System and Goose Alley to their point of intersection. This, however, was negatived on the grounds that the artillery necessary could not be spared without unduly weakening the barrage on the other 2 Divisional sectors where the main task of the Corps lay; and also that should the attack on Gueudecourt fail, the New Zealanders would be left in a most awkward position. The final objective of the Division, amounting to somewhat over a mile, was not an entrenched position, but the capture of high ground. The attack was fixed for the 25th, and the preparatory bombardment commenced on the 24th.</p>
        <p>The Division's attack was entrusted to the 1st. Brigade, who came into the line on the night 24th/25th. The Rifle Brigade, on relief, moved into the intermediate area. Since coming into the line on the 12th, they had sustained over 1500 casualties, of whom 10 officers and 250 men had been killed. The 1st Brigade troops were disposed, 1st <choice><orig>Canter-<pb xml:id="n130"/><hi><figure xml:id="WH1-FranP017a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP017a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP017a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Sergt. <name type="person" key="name-418759">D. F. Brown</name></hi>, V.C.</head></figure><figure xml:id="WH1-FranP017b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP017b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP017b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Prisoners carrying wounded</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n131"/><figure xml:id="WH1-FranP018a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP018a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP018a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Packing-Ammunition</hi></head></figure><figure xml:id="WH1-FranP018b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP018b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP018b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Box Respirators</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n132" n="99"/>bury</hi></orig><reg>Canterbury</reg></choice> right, 1st Auckland centre, and 1st Otago left. 1st Wellington, who had already the capture of Grove Alley to their credit, were held in reserve, west of Flers. The plan of operations was divided into 2 stages. In the first, all 3 battalions would capture Factory Corner and the North Road. Then, after half an hour's interval, 1st Otago would seize that sector of Goose Alley, which extended from the part secured by 2nd Canterbury, and now held by the 1st Division, for some 500 yards up to the Abbey Road, and co-operate with the other. 2 battalions in establishing a line of outposts along the high ground from Factory Corner to the III. Corps right in Flers Support.</p>
        <p>The assaulting companies of the 3 attacking battalions assembled in Grove Alley. The 1st Canterbury objective amounted to 500 yards, that of 1st Auckland to 750, and that of 1st Otago to 500, excluding the flank which they would form down the Abbey Road to the North Road valley. It was arranged between the 2 Corps that as soon as the New Zealanders were established in their objectives they should take over from the 1st Division the whole of Goose Alley from the Abbey Road down to its junction with the Flers System, and whatever further ground should be gained in Flers Support.</p>
        <p>The 25th dawned beautifully fine, and only a few puffs of white cloud broke the steely blue of the sky. Early in the day the enemy bombarded our trenches for 2 hours, causing several casualties, and opened a searching fire with shells of all ca1ibres on the battery positions in Devil's Valley. The gunners of one battery were forced to withdraw, but just prior to their returning to the gun-pits before zero, the bombardment fortunately slackened. In the course of the morning an enterprising feat was performed by 2nd Lt. L. S. Carmichael and a few men of the 13th Battery, which was supporting the troops on the right. They went forward to a captured group of German guns cast of Flers and fired 80 rounds of high-explosive at one of our abandoned tanks which was being used as a Strong Point in the German front line some 700 yards away. Most of the shots were direct hits. The tank was rendered useless before the party were obliged to withdraw by a concentrated relation which destroyed one of the guns and its detachment.</p>
        <p>The moment fixed for the infantry attack was 12.35 p.m. The creeping artillery barrage was excellently steady, and the infantry, leaving their trenches at the appointed time, <pb xml:id="n133" n="100"/>followed within 25 yards of the bursting shells. At the beginning of the assault, the enemy's artillery fire was not heavy, and though later it intensified with particularly marked violence on Flers, at no time were the advancing lines exposed to any considerable volume. Nor did the German infantry show their wonted resolution.</p>
        <p>As 1st Canterbury advanced on Factory Corner, about 60 of the enemy attempted to retire towards the Goose Alley ridge, but were practically exterminated by our machine guns. Considerable anxiety had been felt about the Strong Point, which had twice repulsed 2nd Wellington, at the junction of Grove Alley with the sunken Flers-Factory Corner road. It was subjected, therefore, to a severe bombardment by light trench mortars prior to the assault. Its capture was effected without difficulty. The enemy garrison was found to have suffered heavily, and 2 machine gun crews had been put out of action. The guns themselves, however, were undamaged, and were subsequently used in our line. In an intermediate trench connected with the Strong Point some: resistance was offered, but for the most part the enemy ran, not a few falling in our machine gun barrage which, as the infantry approached their goal, lifted on to Gird and Gird Support. All the battalion's objectives were Secured without trouble, and among the prisoners captured in the German headquarters at Factory Corner was a battalion staff of the same 13th Bavarian Reserve Regiment, another unit of which had disputed so obstinately with 2nd Canterbury the possession of Goose Alley. The German colonel was wounded, and while being attended to in the advanced dressing station was killed by one of his countrymen's shells. Factory Corner had been artillery headquarters, and one of the buildings also had been used as an Engineers' dump, so that the quantity of useful war material captured by 1st Canterbury was very considerable. In the centre and left, 1st Auckland and 1st Otago established the line of the Road with very few casualties.</p>
        <p>After the pause, 1st Otago, gauging their flank by a signal displayed by the English troops in the southern end of Goose Alley, stormed the spur. in an irresistible onrush. They captured 30 Bavarians and 3 machine guns. Under cover of an advanced line of skirmishers, a series of posts was then dug in by 1st Canterbury and 1st Auckland on the high ground from in front of the German cemetery at Factory Corner to <pb xml:id="n134" n="101"/>the point where Goose Alley crossed the Abbey Road.<note xml:id="fn56-101" n="1"><p>The 1st Otago left does not appear to have connected in front of Goose Alley with the new III. Corps posts in Flers Support.</p></note> Already, at a few minutes after 1 p.m., and again shortly afterwards, the Division had received reports from aeroplanes of a line of flares along this part of the ridge, showing that our furthest objectives were held in strength. Captured German officers agreed that the attack had been made with great dash. They spoke bitterly of their artillery, and said they were waging the war “on their own.” Many were frankly delighted to be taken prisoners and to be out of the “Hell on the Somme.”</p>
        <p>In the afternoon a company of 1st Wellington, in conformity with Corps arrangements, moved up to support the left of Otago, and took over from the British garrison Flers Support and the southern sector of Goose Alley. Through the day, though observation was good, only 10 hostile aeroplanes and 4 balloons had appeared in the sky, and these at different times. In the evening the Indian cavalry trotted up to Flers. On their appearance a German balloon above Le Transloy was lowered in panic haste, and the fitful enemy artillery woke into precipitate activity. The cavalry's turn, however, had not yet come. Gueudecourt still resisted capture. Elsewhere the day had been one of success for the Allied Armies. The French had attained almost all their objectives. The British had seized Les Boeufs and Morval. The early fall of Combles was assured.</p>
        <p>A certain amount of bombing exchanges took place between the Wellington sentries and the enemy in Flers Support, but on the whole the night 25th/26th September passed quietly. A gap of 500 yards on the 55th Division's flank to the right of Canterbury was filled by Liverpool troops, and thence to the other extremity-of the New Zealand sector the posts on the ridge were converted into a continuous line by dawn.</p>
        <p>The 26th was another fine day. To make up for the previous day's curious inertia the Germans sent no less than 18 balloons into the sky, but an aeroplane attack destroyed one, and the rest were lowered. Observation was exceptionally good. There was considerable movement from the north-east of Gueudecourt back to the ridge running to Ligny Thilloy, and on these excellent targets the 3rd Brigade and other batteries poured effective fire. It was tantalising to the field artillery to watch traffic on the Bapaume-Peronne Road, out <pb xml:id="n135" n="102"/>of reach. In the afternoon a German battery was seen retiring at full gallop towards Ligny Thilloy. After darkness fell, the flashes of another battery between the Butte de Warlincourt and Le Sars were observed. It was located and silenced.</p>
        <p>Shortly after midday (26th September) heavy shelling in rear of our front line and on Flers village and the Flers System seemed to presage an enemy attack and indicate an attempt to bar the advance of our supports. A brigade of German infantry was also seen advancing from Ligny Thilloy and Le Barque in the direction of Factory Corner and of the 55th Division's line on our right. As they took cover for assembly in the corn and long grass, the artillery supporting the 55th Division and the “heavies” searched the area, and on the Germans advancing into the open in extended order, the guns broke into salvoes of destruction. The attack withered away, and the fleeing remnants were annihilated by the 3rd and 4th Artillery Brigades and the English batteries. By 6 p.m. all was quiet on the right. On the left, the 1st Wellington company, in cooperation with English troops in Flers Trench, bombed some distance up Flers Support.</p>
        <p>While no movement of importance took place on the divisional front on the 26th, welcome progress was being effected elsewhere. Westwards, the Reserve Army struck before the enemy had time to recover front the blow dealt him on the 25th by the Fourth Army, and, swinging into line, seized Thiepval and the Thiepval Ridge. On the immediate right, Gueudecourt at last fell. A squadron of cavalry was sent out to the north-east of its ruins, and it was hoped that their action might lead to the evacuation of the Gird System in the neighbourhood and its peaceful occupation. This aim was not achieved, however, and the necessary full-dress attack by the 55th and New Zealand Divisions was ordered for the following day.</p>
        <p>For this operation the 4th Battalion of the Rifle Brigade was put under the tactical command of <name type="person" key="name-130049">General Earl Johnston</name> from the evening of the 26th, and took over Goose Alley and Flers Support from 1st Wellington. The remainder of the Rifle Brigade lay in the intermediate area ready to move at 15 minutes' notice. The 2nd Brigade, in reserve, were similarly to be prepared to move on 30 minutes' warning. The road from Factory Corner to Ligny Thilloy was fixed as the boundary between the 55th Division and the New Zealanders. The former would seize the Gird System thence to <choice><orig>Gueudc-<pb xml:id="n136" n="103"/>court.</orig><reg>gueudccourt</reg></choice> The New Zealand Division would capture a further sector of the system from the road to the northern end of Goose Alley, and, in addition, the rest of Goose Alley down to the Abbey Road, from which point southward the success of the 25th had put it in our possession.</p>
        <p>During the night patrols inspected the Gird entanglements, which extended on iron standards in 4 rows. Opposite the right of 1st Canterbury they were found considerably damaged, but 1st Auckland reported the wire in front of their objective to be intact. As on the 25th, the 1st Brigade policy was to employ 3 battalions. The right battalion was ordered to seize the Gird System from the road on the Divisional boundary to the parallel road running to Le Barque. The centre would capture the rest of the line to its junction with Goose Alley. The task of the left battalion was to complete the circle by forming a defensive flank from Gird Support down Goose Alley. In each case the frontage to be assaulted was about 500 yards. The enemy trenches were held by Bavarian Reserve Regiments who had relieved other units of their formation during the night. They had suffered heavy losses in the process and were much “mixed up.” They were themselves due for relief on the 27th/28th, and were looking forward to leaving the Somme. Before they left, however, they were still to feel the grit of the New Zealand soldier.</p>
        <p>Zero was fixed for 2.15 p.m., but in order to avoid observation the troops were formed up before daylight. The dispositions were the same as on the 25th. 1st Canterbury were on the right and 1st Auckland in the centre; 1st Otago, on their left, assembled 3 assaulting companies in the Abbey Road and 1 company in Goose Alley. 1st Wellington were again in reserve in Grove Alley, and were now completed by the company relieved in Flers Support by the 4th Rifles. The weather on the 27th continued fine, and observation was good. Considerable hostile movement was noted, and effectively engaged, on the ligny Thilloy slopes, where lay the last German line, and towards the roads and hollows behind Gird Support. About an hour before the assault, a party of 150 Germans, apparently relieved in the trenches and carrying full equipment, elected to make for their back area across the open. The batteries fell on them like lightning, and the survivors scattered. The German artillery, which had been active throughout the night on our rear <pb xml:id="n137" n="104"/>areas, now devoted more attention to the front trenches, and the reserve battalion in particular suffered punishment.</p>
        <p>Our preparatory destructive bombardment had started at 7 am., but there was no betraying increase of fire prior to the moment of attack. Then the "heavies" dropped ponderously and devastatingly on the position and searched back quickly for 200 yards. In accordance with programme, the attack was launched 3 minutes after zero. Directly our waves appeared, the enemy field guns opened, but their fire, though heavier than in the last operation, was still inadequate to cheek the assault. On the right, 1st Canterbury made no pause in Gird Trench, and with the 55th Division troops advancing in line, gained their objective in Gird Support with comparative case and few casualties. The left company was for a time held up by bombers and machine guns, but the opposition was beaten down by the initiative and dash of L.-Cpl. G. A. Hewitt and other Lewis gunners. Generally the enemy were demoralised. A considerable party flying eastwards were caught at 300 yards' range by our machine guns and mown down. Some 80 prisoners were captured, who said that before they knew it the New Zealanders were on them. Ten minutes prior to the attack, a battalion of a Reserve Division had started forward to reinforce the weak Bavarian garrison in the line. Only 1 company penetrated the barrage, and immediately on its arrival it was annihilated. The German losses were excessive. When the attack started, some of our old friends of the 13th Bavarian Reserve Regiment came up to reinforce, but were blotted out of existence. Gird Trench had not suffered much. Gird Support, however, which might have served as our front line, was in places only 18 inches deep, and elsewhere obliterated. A new trench was therefore dug on the reverse slope of a shallow depression beyond.</p>
        <p>The other battalions were less fortunate. The right company of 1st Auckland gained its objective. The left company met a heavy artillery barrage and machine gun fire and was held up by the uncut wire reported on the previous evening. The enemy barrage fell similarly upon the 3 companies of 1st Otago who, preserving their order despite an awkward change of direction, attacked the northern end of Goose Alley. Only a handful of these companies reached the neighbourhood of the junction of Goose and Gird, where their numbers were still further reduced by a converging enemy fire on this deadly salient in our line. As our barrage lifted <pb xml:id="n138" n="105"/>by stages up Goose Alley the remaining Otago company in its southern end bombed up 300 yards from the Abbey Road as far as the Factory Corner Eaucourt Road, where a Strong Point was made. The remainder of the sap had been blown to pieces and was little more than a track. NO news coming in of the other 3 companies, the Goose Alley company sent out patrols to clear up the situation. These were, however, held up by the machine gun fire from the junction of Gird Trench and Goose Alley. It was becoming apparent that just as the southern junction of Goose Alley with the Flers System had given trouble, so also trouble was to be given at its northern junction with Gird.</p>
        <p>As soon as the assaulting battalions moved, the reserve battalion (1st Wellington) had sent one company to Factory Corner and a second to Goose Alley to take the place of the Otago company working northwards. A call was therefore made on this latter Wellington company at 4 p.m. Bombing its way up the shallow continuation of Goose Alley, it carried the line another 400 Yards north, establishing posts to within 100 yards of the Gird junction, where men fell, struggling in vain to make further progress. Immediately after dusk a platoon of this Wellington company was sent over the open to the right to occupy Gird Trench cast of its junction with Goose Alley and establish connection with the 1st Auckland troops in it. A further Wellington company moved up to the southern part of Goose Alley.</p>
        <p>Meanwhile, for Battalion and Brigade Headquarters, the situation on the left long remained obscure. The afternoon was slightly hazy, but enemy movement from Thilloy towards the gullies and roads in front of our positions was repeatedly engaged and several times the good effect of our artillery was observed. Back at brigade headquarters, on the slopes beyond Flers, General Earl Johnston and his Staff strained their eyes to discern signs of movement beyond the spot where our waves had been lost to view. An enemy balloon broke loose and rose to an enormous height in the light-blue vault of heaven. Some German aeroplanes hovered over Ligny Thilloy unenterprisingly. But no news came from the line.</p>
        <p>Orders were therefore given in the late afternoon to 1st Wellington to clear up the position at dawn. Only 1 company of the battalion now remained for operations, but it was strengthened by 2 companies of the 4th Rifles, who, as has been noted were at the disposal of the 1st Brigade, and by 2 sections of light trench mortars. An effort was <pb xml:id="n139" n="106"/>also made to get the assistance of a tank. In the evening, 1st Wellington Headquarters moved to dugouts in the North Road. The Wellington company and one of the Rifles' companies were warned for the attack. The former were ordered to clear up Goose Alley, and the rifleman the Gird Trenches. Of the other companies of the 4th Rifles, one, as has been said, held the left of the line in Flers Support in touch with the 2nd (British) Brigade, and one was held in brigade reserve in Grove Alley.</p>
        <p>At 3 a.m. on the 28th, no definite word having been heard of the tank, the 2 companies moved off, but in addition to the darkness a heavy hostile barrage prevented the Rifles' company-from reaching the assembly area, and the operation had to be cancelled. The tank, also, for which a Wellington officer waited some uncomfortable hours at Factory Corner, “failed to materialise.” All through the night stretcher-bearers toiled back with the wounded survivors of the attack. On daylight the Rifles' company was sent to strengthen the left of Auckland, where it made some progress by bombs up Gird Support. It was now established that the 2 Gird Trenches and Goose Alley were all held to within 100 yards of their junction and there “blocked,” but that the junctions themselves were not in our possession. Wellington were therefore ordered to carry out a fresh attack to secure them.</p>
        <p>While preparations, however, were being made for this, a personal reconnaissance by Lt.-Col. Hart cleared up the actual position. It was found that the junction lay in an inconsiderable hollow about 150 yards wide, which formed the top of a shallow valley leading towards the Ligny Thilloy Road north of the point where the Gird System crossed it. This depression was not marked on the map and had not been detected on the aeroplane photographs, but, though of slight extent, its local tactical importance was considerable. It was untenable by either side without the possession of all the high ground which rose some 50 feet. on its 3 sides, and formed an incomplete lip to the saucer. Local attacks had already cleared the Gird trenches up to their points of intersection with Goose Alley, but the manning of them would have been costly, and they were commanded by our new positions. For while the Germans still held the northern and most of the western slopes, we were now firmly established on the southern and part of the western lips. Thus the objectives had in effect been gained. The further attack was cancelled, and orders were issued for the construction of <pb xml:id="n140" n="107"/>trenches to connect our 3 separate lines in Gird Support, Gird Trench, and Goose Alley.</p>
        <p>The casualties, especially of Otago, had been severe, and in the late evening <name type="person" key="name-130049">General Earl Johnston</name> asked the Division for another battalion. The 2nd Rifles was placed at his disposal to strengthen the left flank, and moved up to the support positions, 2 companies occupying Flers Trench and 2 Flers Support. But if our losses had been grievous, the Germans had been reduced by this succession of deadly blows well nigh to despair. A captured diary had a final uncompleted entry for the 27th, written just before our attack:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“No relief. Feeling of hopelessness, apathetic, everyone sleeps under heaviest fire—due to exhaustion. NO rations, no drink. The whole day heavy fire on the left. We got heavy and H.E. shells. Everything all the same to us. The best thing would be for the British to come. No one worries about us; our relief said to be cancelled. If one wants sleep, aeroplanes will not let us rest. In the present conditions, one no longer thinks. Iron rations, bread, biscuit, all eaten……”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>During the night 27th/28th September patrols were sent out during an arranged interval in our protective barrage to discover any trace of rearward movement induced by these operations and by the fall of Gueudecourt on the 26th. On the right, a patrol moved 300 yards along the Ligny Thilloy Road without gaining touch with the enemy. On the left flank, a reconnaissance penetrated within 300 yards of Eau-court 1'Abbaye. NO enemy was actual1y encountered, but just to the north of the abbey and in Gird Trench beyond were many flares, indicating the presence of strong forces. On the following day (28th) German working parties could be seen in the clear atmosphere feverishly digging trenches some 800 yards south and east of Ligny Thilloy. At various places behind his lines, north-east of Les Boeufs and at Villers-au-Flos, there were explosions and fires. The 2nd Artillery Brigade engaged large bodies of German infantry coming up to the front line north of Eaucourt I'Abbaye. In the afternoon the 1st Brigade infantry captured an officer and his batman of a battalion of the newly-arrived 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, who had come up to reconnoitre the position. This Division had occupied the trenches just south of Armentieres since 1914. Though not marked as assault troops, they had proved stubborn in defence, as the Australians had found in their attack on 19th July. They <pb xml:id="n141" n="108"/>had left the northern area in the second week of September, arrived in Bapaume 2 days previously, and were now commencing to relieve the exhausted troops in the line.</p>
        <p>On the night 28th/29th the 1st Infantry Brigade said farewell to the Somme front line trenches and marched back, 2 battalions to Savoy and Carlton Trenches, and 2 to Mametz Wood. The 2nd Brigade, who took over the line under heavy shelling, garrisoned the Gird System with 2nd Wellington on the right and 2nd Auckland on their left; 2nd Otago occupied Goose Alley, and 2nd Canterbury was placed in reserve in Grove Alley. All these units were now sadly reduced in number, and the 2nd Rifles remained on the extreme left of the line in Flers Trench and Flers Support under the command of General Braithwaite. The 4th Battalion moved back to join the rest of the brigade in the intermediate area, but its place was taken on the 29th by the 3rd Battalion:</p>
        <p>The recent progress made had brought the III. Corps within striking distance of Eaucourt I'Abbaye, and a further attack was proposed for 1st October with a view to its capture. In this attack the New Zealanders on the left flank of the XV. Corps would co-operate. The 2nd Brigade prepared its plans accordingly. On the night 30th September/1st October the 3rd Rifles relieved 2nd Wellington on the right of the line, to enable Wellington to be brought into a preparatory assembly position on the left in Goose Alley and Flers Support. Under continued sniping fire, the trenches commenced by the 1st Brigade to connect Gird Trench with Gird Support and with Goose Alley were pushed through to provide the necessary accommodation and communications. Turk lane was extended by the indefatigable Maoris. The enemy persistently shelled Goose Alley and Factory Corner, where a magnificent well, 125 feet deep with 75 feet of water, was kept night and day under his shrapnel and indirect machine gun fire. During the night the 1st and 2nd Artillery Brigades pushed their guns still further up, west of Flers.</p>
        <p>The weather was again heavy and foggy, with slight drizzling rain, which made visibility poor but screened parties working in the open. Both sides took full advantage of this, In the early morning of the 30th the light mist cleared away for a moment, and the sentries on the left of our line detected an enemy party of 2 officers and 20 men. The machine gun officer at the spot, Lt. H. M. Preston, had his guns on <pb xml:id="n142" n="109"/>the unsuspecting Germans in a twinkling. Both officers and all but 2 of the enemy were killed.</p>
        <p>In the afternoon at the same point a particularly clean piece of work was carried out in Flers Support by a party of the 2nd Rifles under <name type="person" key="name-207354">Capt. H. E. Barrowclough</name>. The 47th Division, who had again relieved the 1st Division on the III. Corps right, were holding Flers Trench west of Goose Alley. On the previous evening they had attempted, by bombing up Flers Trench and Flers Support, to extend their hold towards Eaucourt I'Abbaye, but without success. Their task would be materially lightened if the thrust up the Support Line were made by the New Zealanders. The 2nd Rifles' party therefore, in co-operation, forced a way up Flers Support for 250 yards past a German Strong Point which gave some little trouble, and then, in sheer fighting enthusiasm, pressed for another 100 yards beyond their objective towards Eaucourt l'Abbaye. The Londoners progressed equally well, and a connecting sap was dug between the 2 trenches and held as a front line. Our casualties were few.</p>
        <p>A rather more ambitious operation, designed to clear the way for the division's part in the attack to be delivered on 1st October, was allotted to 2nd Canterbury and 2nd Otago. It was the intention that they should capture the northern lip which overhung the depression at the Gird-Goose junction, and thence establish a line in front of Goose Alley down to the Abbey Road. This was, however, cancelled in view of the shortness of time available for preparations and owing to other reasons, and it was decided to take all objectives in the one enterprise.</p>
        <p>While the 2nd Brigade battalions prepared their plans at greater leisure for the morrow, the Intelligence personnel were busy ransacking the captured Gird dugouts. In the course of their investigations, Lt. H. Simmonds, of 2nd Wellington, lighted on several German papers which looked important. They were at once forwarded to Brigade Headquarters. The sequel is shown by the following extract from Divisional Routine Orders:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“The following received from XV. Corps is published for information and is to be communicated to all ranks: (1.) A German Army Order was found by the New Zealand Division in the trenches on 30th September, (II.) The Order, which was of great importance, as it showed the position of the German reserves in the neighbourhood, reached Army Headquarters a few hours after it was <pb xml:id="n143" n="110"/>picked up. (III.) The Army Commander wishes you to convey to the New Zealand Division his appreciation of the promptitude with which the Order was secured and forwarded to Army Headquarters,”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>In its next and final attack the Division was to have on its left the same troops with whom it had co-operated in its first assault 16 days previously. While the 47th Division would capture Eaucourt l'Abbaye, their right would be secured by an advance of the 2nd Brigade to a line across from the Gird-Goose junction to near the abbey. Of the 2nd Brigade troops, 2nd Auckland on the right, east of the junction, would not participate. On their left, 2nd Canterbury, coming up from reserve into the line, would act as pivot for the brigade movement. 2nd Otago, supported by 2nd Wellington, would advance in line with Canterbury on the left flank. The point of junction between the 2 Divisions was laid down in the neighbourhood of a German Strong Point, some 500 yards north-east of the abbey. This redoubt was a maze of concentric circular trenches, which stood out very prominently on the map and won it the name of The Circus. From it a newly-dug line, called Circus Trench, ran to Gird on the northern lip of the saucer, and half way, a further branch fighting trench diverged from the Circus Trench to the Abbey Road. The Circus itself resembled a knot in the long thread of an unnamed communication sap which, like Goose Alley, connected the Gird and Flers Systems. Canterbury would carry the high ground held by the enemy over the depression at the Gird-Goose junction and seize: the Circus Trench as far as the Le Barque High Wood road. Otago, followed by Wellington, would cross the intermediate branch trench and capture the rest of the Circus Trench, linking up with the right of the 47th Division. Of the long communication sap, the section from the Flers System to the Abbey Road fell within the. 47th Division's area. The capture of the part from the Road to The Circus was assigned to the New Zealanders. The northernmost sector from The Circus to Gird lay outside the scheme of attack.</p>
        <p>During the night (30th September/lst October) our for ward areas were heavily shelled. At 7 a.m., on 1st October, in fine weather, our preparatory bombardment commenced all along the positions marked for assault and elsewhere. In front, of Canterbury, 4 light trench mortars made a gap in the wire protecting Gird. Soon after midday <pb xml:id="n144" n="111"/>the 2nd Rifles' company was withdrawn from its most westerly positions in Flers Support to enable the artillery to shell the remainder of the trench towards Eaucourt l'Abbaye prior to the advance of the 47th Division.</p>
        <p>The hour of attack was 3.15 p.m. It had been decided that not merely should the positions aimed at be smothered with high-explosive, but also that the enemy's defences on the Corps front not included in the day's objectives should be subjected to an intense barrage, of which advantage was to be taken to gain useful ground for forward movement in the future. The fact, however, that the New Zealanders were the only troops of the XV. Corps actually engaged allowed the use of preponderating artillery an their front. Up to the present the Division had been supported by 88 field guns and howitzers; for the forthcoming operation, 180 field guns and howitzers were behind the attack, and the increase of "heavies" corresponded. A detachment of the Special Brigade, R.E., operated on the 2nd Canterbury sector, and installed 36 oil mortars in Gird Trench. These were fired a minute before zero. 6 were a failure, but the remaining 30 projectiles were seen to reach their objective satisfactorily, bursting about 1 second after landing and covering the German trenches with lurid flame and great rings of black smoke. The moral effect, as testified to by an English-speaking prisoner, was terrifying. Our contact aeroplanes came down at zero and hovered over the scene for 2 hours, after which one "was up" till dark. The enemy's artillery replied to our bombardment within a few minutes of zero. A large proportion of his shells was wasted on Flers and at Factory Corner. His barrage was, however, appreciably better organised than hitherto. A high-velocity gun shelled the area between Bazentin and Montauban in rear.</p>
        <p>2nd Canterbury had come into the line during the morning and occupied the south-eastern slopes overlooking the saucer depression in which the northern end of Goose Alley joined the Gird System These slopes sank gradually to the valley below, but on the other side of the saucer the ground rose steeply, with a well-defined terrace on which clustered ragged clumps of bushes. The whole surface of the once grassy slopes was now a churned-up mass of clayey shellholes. From the slopes in our possession which overlooked the hollow, 4 machine guns fired over the heads of the advancing Canterbury infantry at the enemy trenches on the crest and swept the saps and bushes on the terrace opposite. <pb xml:id="n145" n="112"/>A few minutes after the attack started a large party of Germans jumped out of Gird Support and began to run back across the open country. They were literally wiped out by our machine guns. 2nd Canterbury attacked with 3 companies, holding 1 in reserve. Of these, the task of the right company was to seize the high ground on the north about Gird Support. The centre company was ordered to occupy the slopes overlooking the saucer from the west and capture the 200 yards of Gird Trench to the point of departure of Circus Trench. The objective of the left company was Circus Trench to the Le Barque road. The right and half the centre company of Canterbury in the hollow were exposed only to a moderate amount of hostile fire and bombs from the barraged trenches immediately in Front, but on the hogsback of high open ground further west, the inner flank of Canterbury and the right of Otago were heavily raked by distant machine gun fire from Gird. Despite their losses, however, the left of Canterbury, like the center and right, completed its task after some bitter fighting. The trenches were found packed with corpses, piled in many places one over the other. One or two loathsome groups in the centre of the position lay burned and half eaten away by the oil. The huddled German dead, not a few of whom carried souvenirs of the Australian attack in July,<note xml:id="fn57-112" n="1"><p>p. 49.</p></note> looked spick and span in uniforms which made the victors appear ragged in comparison. Their physique, however, was strikingly poor, and many of them were mere boys.</p>
        <p>The whole lip of the contested depression had now once for all come into our hands. Round its far crest a new trench was dug, which was strengthened by the reserve machine guns. The continuation westwards of Gird was strongly held by Germans, who sniped at and harassed our working parties. They were effectively dealt with by Ptes. R, E. Fairbrother and L. D, McLachlan, who fired their Lewis guns over the shoulders of 2 of their comrades and inflicted many losses. The Canterbury reserve company was not sufficient to fill all the gap in the line caused by their casualties. 2nd Auckland, therefore, extended their left up Gird Support, and an Auckland company went into the line. In the afternoon, en enemy battalion was seen massing in rear, but was scattered by machine gun fire, and no attack developed. The services of a further Auckland company were called on at midnight to strong then the right flank and <pb xml:id="n146"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP019a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP019a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP019a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Flers and Vicinity</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n147" n="113"/>centre and to act as supports. A bombing counter-attack began at 11 pm down Gird, but the attackers were not of the same calibre as those with whom 2nd Canterbury had last to grapple with, at the other end of Goose Alley. They were easily held, and our light trench mortars, in the bottom of the hollow, enfilading the approaches, intimidated further efforts.</p>
        <p>Of the 4 companies of 2nd Otago, the 2 on the right had a difficult manoeuvre to perform, first advancing to their front for about 200 yards, and then executing a double change of direction towards the right. This was carried out, however, in cohesion and order, despite the fire of machine guns, which at once began to play as they moved up the slope. By the time they reached the crest, all the officers and a large proportion of the men in these 2 right companies had fallen. The survivors reached and cleared their sector of Circus Trench, but lacking the guiding control of their officers, pressed on further, overrunning their objective, and moved right up to the protective barrage. It was not till the 2nd Wellington supporting company arrived that the gap thus caused on the Otago right, and further accentuated by the Canterbury casualties, was filled. Capt. L. H. Jardine, who commanded the Wellington company and who had already shown himself possessed of rare soldierly qualities, quickly grasped the situation and disposed his men in little groups to hold the line. The remnants of the Otago companies and a Wellington Lewis gun section, which had followed them, were recalled to the proper objective, and Jardine assumed command of the whole line at this part of the front.</p>
        <p>Among the gunners of this Wellington section was Pte. K. D. Barr. He had injured his foot previously, and on the morning of the battle it was painful and swollen, so that he could not wear a boot. It was characteristic of the spirit which imbued the New Zealanders at the end of 2 weeks of fighting, that despite intense discomfort nothing would induce him to stay out of the engagement. He wrapped a sandbag round his foot and limped over the top with his comrades. By a caprice of fortune they had all been killed or wounded, and now it was left to him to carry back the precious gun to Jardine's line.</p>
        <p>Lower down the hill and consequently more sheltered than their companions on the right from the Gird machine guns, the Otago left companies attacked the branch of Circus Trench which led to the Abbey Road. As the <choice><orig>storm-<pb xml:id="n148" n="114"/>ing</orig><reg>storming</reg></choice> line pressed nearer, they were at one point checked by a machine gun. The same Sergeant Brown whose exploits in the Crest and Switch on 15th September have been noted,<note xml:id="fn58-114" n="1"><p>p. 74.</p></note> once again similarly saved the situation. Single-handed he rushed at the gun and bayoneted the crew. The checked line of skirmishers at once poured breathlessly into the trench. The garrison were killed or fled. Many of them fell victims to the fire of Lewis guns supported on strong and willing shoulders, others to Otago markmanship with the rifle. It was while sniping coolly at the flying enemy that the heroic Sergeant Brown was killed by long-range machine gun fire. His magnificent conduct throughout the Somme battle and superb daring on all occasions, when unhesitating readiness for self-sacrifice could alone overcome resistance, won the dead soldier the first Victoria Cross which the Division received in France.</p>
        <p>In the dense smoke and dust the Otago left had lost touch with the sorely reduced companies on the right, but they advanced, meeting now less opposition, towards their final objective. At the point where they expected to find the redoubt, they came on an insignificant smashed up bit of trench. Could this be the famous Circus? A heavy enemy barrage was falling on the spot and decided their uncertainties. They pressed on to a well-marked ridge some 300 yards ahead across a cutting, whence they formed a line down a road to the north of Eaucourt l'Abbaye. This particular cutting, as it happened, was not marked on the map, and the officers, realising then that they had overshot the mark, believed that they were still further westward at a cutting, which was represented on the map, on the road from Eaucourt to Le Barque.</p>
        <p>The position had obvious tactical advantages, and the companies started its consolidation and reported their location, as they-believed it to be, by runner to Battalion Headquarters. The message was at once communicated to Brigade, It was with some consternation that General Braithwaite, plotting out the map references, found his troops in a position so much “in the blue” as to invite disaster. He had no option but to order a withdrawal on The Circus. Meanwhile, however, as the smoke and dust cleared away, an opportunity offered itself for taking bearings, and the real position was discovered by the officers on the spot. They were joined by a party of the Londoners about Eaucourt, and a <choice><orig>commmuni-<pb xml:id="n149" n="115"/>cation</orig><reg>communication</reg></choice> trench had now been dug back to The Circus. Permission was therefore obtained to remain on the line occupied.</p>
        <p>The leading Wellington companies had joined in the later stages of the fighting and cleared the long German communication trench from The Circus to the Abbey Road, The other companies were sent forward in the evening to replace casualties. The 2 battalions proceeded with the consolidation, which was completed by dawn. A Strong Point was made on the Abbey Road. A hostile bombing attack during the night was repulsed. In the morning it was found that the party of Londoners had been cut off from the rest of their Division, and that Germans were still in their rear and to the east of Eaucourt L'Abbaye Arrangements were made to supply the party with food. Eaucourt itself was not finally cleared by-the English till the evening of the 3rd.</p>
        <p>In these operations the 2nd Brigade sent about 250 prisoners to the collecting station at Bernafay Wood. Of these, 2nd Canterbury had taken 50, including a battalion commander aid his staff'. The remainder were secured on the left. The Wellington losses were light. In the 2 battalions which had borne the brunt of the fighting the casualties worked out evenly: 2nd Canterbury, going into action with 19 officers and 487 men, lost 11 officers and 164 men, 6 officers and 26 men being killed; 2nd Otago attacked with 19 officers and 314 men, and lost 10 officers and 175 men, 4 officers and 33 men being killed.</p>
        <p>It had not been anticipated that the 3rd Rifles on the extreme right of the line would move, and they received only short warning that they too were required to deliver a simultaneous local attack at 3.15 p.m They were ordered to establish a line of Strong Points on high ground some 300 yards in front, in order to support a forward movement by the 21st Division, who had relieved the 55th on the right. Such hurried efforts are apt to result in failure, but the riflemen secured their objective with the loss of an officer and 15 men killed and 55 wounded. Many enemy were killed by fire and bayonet and lay in heaps in the sunken road leading to Ligny Thilloy. A counter-attack, reported by pigeon message to Division, was repulsed.</p>
        <p>During the night (Ist/2nd October) the troops of the 21st Division were relieved and, as sometimes happens during relief in an advanced portion of the battlefield, the incoming platoons of the 12th Division did not go beyond, or far beyond, the Gird System. Intimation of this was received by the <pb xml:id="n150" n="116"/>2nd Brigade Headquarters, and the 3rd Rifles were ordered to verify the information and, if their exposed position made it necessary, to withdraw. The posts were accordingly withdrawn under cover of darkness. On the following morning, however, the 12th Division moved forward to the advanced position won on the previous afternoon, and in conformity the Rifles again stalked their posts in face of enemy snipers arid reoccupied them, fortunately with but a few casualties. German snipers had filtered in nearly as far as our vacated line, but these were driven off, and the posts were connected up the following night in pouring rain. Under cover of the darkness and storm a thorough reconnaissance was made of the enemy's new positions by Sergt. A. Shearer. The outposts in front of Gird Support were occupied in the early morning (3rd October) by the Rifles' garrison. An enemy aeroplane flying low failed to locate them, and when the German guns opened it was on the now empty Gird System that their fury fell.</p>
        <p>In the evening of 1st October the 1st Rifles were put under General Braithwaite's command to strengthen his depleted forces. They moved up into the support positions, whence platoons were detailed to act as local reserves to the battalions in the line or as carrying parties. Thus no less than 3 Rifle battalions lent their support to the 2nd Brigade at this stage. The 3rd held the right flank, the 2nd the left, and the 1st lay in support.</p>
        <p>It was clear that the spell of fine weather was over. Heavy showers fell during the night, and 2nd October was a day of strong wind and tempestuous rain. Continuous shelling was directed at our whole front. Telephonic communication was destroyed between battalions and brigade and between battalions and companies, except where the hollow gave shelter to 2nd Canterbury. There was no observation, and only 1 German aeroplane appeared which was brought down near Beaulencourt.</p>
        <p>On the following night (2nd/3rd), as the 3rd Rifles toiled at the new trenches, the remainder of the Rifle Brigade took over the line. Rain was now falling in torrents, the trenches were knee-deep in mud, and relief was not competed till dawn. The 3rd Battalion extended its left, the 4th Battalion went into the centre, and the 1st took over the left in front of Eaucourt I'Abbaye from 2nd Otago arid 2nd Wellington. The 2nd Rifles were withdrawn from the Flers System to Goose and Grove Alleys, 3 companies acting as brigade reserve. <pb xml:id="n151" n="117"/>As with the 2nd Brigade, the Rifle battalions were all depleted to an average strength of 380, and on the 1st Brigade's coming forward into the intermediate area, which had now been extended to include the Flers Trench System, 1st Canterbury and 1st Wellington were put under General Fulton's tactical command.</p>
        <p>The 2nd Brigade moved back to the reserve area, and after a rest and midday meal went straight on to the tents of Fricourt Camp. The troops were exhausted by the fighting, lack of sleep, and the long march, and to put a finishing touch on their hardships, many men of Otago had lost their greatcoats, which had been dumped prior to their attack and been blown up by shell-fire.</p>
        <p>In the forward areas the conditions were now indescribably miserable for the gunners in their flooded pits and the sentries in their ditches, waist-deep with mud. The mere physical strain imposed on runners stretcher-bearers and all whose business it was to move along trenches or over the open was excessively arduous. The endurance of the infantry, however, was not to be much longer tested. In the evening (3rd October) the 41st Division commenced to relieve the forward units. The command passed on the following morning to the new Division.<note xml:id="fn59-117" n="1"><p>In accordance with custom the outgoing machine Gun Company (the 3d) remained in the line for some time after relief. At 6 a.m. (4th October) the enemy counterattacked Gird Support, The account of the action, given by the G.O.C. 122nd Infantry Brigade includes the following: passage: "The New Zealand machine Gun team was of particular assistance. All except one man of the team were hit and the machine gun was at length put out of action. This man, L.Col. [C.O.] Samson behaved with the greatest gallantry, working his gun to the end.</p></note> During the relief the enemy artillery was unusually inactive. The weather, however, still remained execrable and it was through miry trenches and slippery shellholes that the battalions wearily plodded back to the camp at Pommiers Redoubt. There they found enough tarpaulins to give overhead shelter, but the ground was a swamp.</p>
        <p>Prominent among their feelings, no doubt, was that sense of relief which found ironical expression even in the austere solemnity of battalion War Diaries. All had experienced continued privations and repeated perils. There were few that had not seen comrades stricken or blown skywards, or had not themselves been face to face with imminent death in manifold forms of horror. Some had been knocked over by concussion, some had been buried in the cataclysm of a trench, some had just in time parried a fierce bayonet thrust. Their nostrils had not yet banished the stench of putrefying corpses, their eyes the ghastly scenes in entanglements saps <pb xml:id="n152" n="118"/>and shellholes, their ears the detonations of bursting bombs, the roar of mighty projectiles rushing towards them, and the crash, deafening and soul-shattering, as these exploded all around them. The following letter, written by a private soldier immediately after the battle, recorded in an unaffected, manly way, but with unconscious dramatic feeling, incidents to which all could have found parallels in their own experience. A small bombing enterprise had been successful:</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“Just as the Lieutenant, who was the last to come back, was getting into our trench, a German machine gun away on the right got to work and just managed to pump five or six bullets into the Lieutenant's back. He lay in the trench in awful pain all the afternoon. It was impossible to get him down to the dressing station before dark. The trench was not wide enough to get a stretcher along, so that meant walking along the parapet, and that again meant the stretcher-bearers and wounded being riddled with bullets, There was an awful strafe going on all along the line all afternoon, and the village of Flers, just about half a mile at the back of us, was getting it hot and strong from the heavy German guns. As soon as it got dark, volunteers were called to carry the wounded officer down to the dressing station, a half-mile away. I was one of the party of four. We started off about 8 o'clock, and I, for one, never thought we should get to the station. First a huge she11, weighing nearly a ton, would come roaring and sereaming through the air. Of course, if one should happen to meet one, there is one consolation—one would never know anything about it. Well, these shells were dropping all round us, some going over our heads and some falling short, and once we got knocked over by a shell exploding about thirty yards away. The explosion made a hole in the ground large enough to bury a horse in. The four of us got up again, and no one was hurt. I think the officer was unconscious, he never said anything. We moved on again, and at last reached a dressing station, but it was the wrong one, of course. Ours was half a mile away on the other side of the village.</p>
          <p>“The village was in an awful state. Buildings blown down in the streets, huge trees cut down half-way up and blown down in the street. One half-tree landed in a shell-hole and looked as if it were going to be set there. The whole sky was lit up by shells exploding like continuous <pb xml:id="n153" n="119"/>lightning. Half-way through the village a gas shell exploded, and the fumes were awful. By the time we had got the officer's gas helmet on, we were nearly choking. We were not long getting our own helmets on. We arrived at the right dressing station at last, more dead than alive, and handed our man over.”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>But at the same time the exhausted troops at Pommiers Camp were grimly conscious that they had, as they might have said simply, done their job, that they had not merely performed the, tasks set themselves, but on more than one occasion rendered effective help to formations on their flanks. Commencing on a frontage of under 1000 yards, they were holding at the close a line neark 3 times as long. In the great battle of the 15th, and subsequent advance on the 16th, in which all brigades took part, in the grisly struggle of the 20th in Goose Alley, in the 1st Brigade operations of the 25th md 27th, and in the final assault by the 2nd Brigade on 1st October, they had achieved all but unbroken success, captured 5 miles of enemy front line and 5½ miles of other trenches, and fought their way forward for over 2 miles. Themselves losing under 20 prisoners, they had captured nearly 1000 Germans, with many machine guns and war material. Finally, what only soldiers can appreciate, the-brought out with them their full complement of machine and Lewis guns. On the other hand, they had sustained 7000 casualties. The bodies of 60 officers and 1500 men were left in the cemeteries or battlefield graves of the Somme.<note xml:id="fn60-119" n="1"><p>In October 1918 an opportunity was taken fo erect individual crosses and arrange for a memorial cross near Flers.</p></note></p>
        <p>In the afternoon of the 4th, Major-General J. P. du Cane, who had relieved Sir Henry Horne in command of the XV. Corps, visited the battalions to express his appreciation and say good-bye. On the departure of the Division from the battle the Commander-in-Chief sent the followillg telegram to the New Zealand Government:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“The New Zealand Divison has fought with the greatest gallantry in the Somme battle for 23 consecutive days, carrying out with complete success every task set and always doing more than was asked of it. The Division has won universal confidence and admiration. No praise can be too high for such troops.”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>In a copy sent to the Fourth Army, the Chief of the General Staff intimated that: “The Commander-in-Chief desired to add his warm congratulations to the Division on <pb xml:id="n154" n="120"/>the splendid record they had achieved.” On forwarding this letter to the Corps, the Fourth Army Commander desired that his congratulations should be conveyed to the New Zealand Division “on the well-deserved praise they have received from the Commander-in-Chief, and his admiration of their gallantry and success.”</p>
        <p>In addition, he sent later the following tribute:—</p>
        <quote>
          <floatingText xml:id="t1-body-d3-t1">
            <body xml:id="t1-body-d3-t1-body">
              <opener>
                <salute>"Fourth Army,</salute>
                <date when="1916-10-07">October 7th, 1916.</date>
              </opener>
              <p>"I desire to express to all ranks of the New Zealand Division my hearty congratulations on the excellent work done during the battle of the Somme.</p>
              <p>"On three successive occasions (15th and 25th September and 1st October) they attacked the hostile positions with the greatest gallantry and vigour, capturing in each attack every objective that had been allotted to them. More than this, they gained possession of, and held, several Strong Points in advance of and beyond the furthest objectives that had been allotted to them.</p>
              <p>"The endurance and fine fighting spirit of the Division have been beyond praise, and their successes in Flers neighbourhood will rank high amongst the best achievements of tho British Army.</p>
              <p>"The control and direction of the Division during the operations have been conducted with skill and precision, whilst the artillery support in establishing the barrage and defeating counter-attacks has been in every way most effective.</p>
              <p>"It is a matter of reget to me that this fine Division is leaving the Fourth Army, and I trust that on some future occasion it may again be my good fortune to find them under my command.</p>
              <closer>
                <signed>"<hi rend="c">H. Rawlinson</hi>, General,</signed>
                <salute>"Commanding Fourth Army."</salute>
              </closer>
            </body>
          </floatingText>
        </quote>
        <p>The efficiency of the Work of the Medical Corps was sufficiently attested in the following memorandum:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“The D.M.S., Fourth Army, and D.D.M.S., XV. Corps, desire to make known to all ranks of the N.Z.M.C. their appreciation of the work done during the recent operations. The arrangements for evacuation of wounded and the successful way in which the arrangements worked met with their special approbation. Casualty clearing stations report that the treatment of all cases evacuated to them <pb xml:id="n155" n="121"/>had reached a very high standard, and that no case had been evacuated without having received anti–tetanic serum.”</p>
        </quote>
        <p>While the artillery remained in the line, the rest of the Division constituted Corps Reserve for the attack proposed for 5th October. The weatheher, however, necessitated its postponement. On the 6th, Divisional Headquarters moved back to Hallencourt, and the 2nd and 3rd Brigades entrained for the X. Corps area in the lower Somme. The 1st Brigade left Albert on the following day for the same destination. On the 10th aid 11th the Division (less artillery) entrained to rejoin 11 Anzac.</p>
        <p>The sector held by the New Zealanders and now handed over to the 41st Division had been covered at the beginning of September by the 14th Divisional Artillery Group which comprised the 14th Divisional Artillery and the 1st and 2nd New Zealand Artillery Brigades. At the end of September the 14th Divisional Artillery was relieved by the 21st Divisiollal Artillery. The 3rd and 4th Brigades, which had heen attached to the Group covering the front of the Division on the right, were now transferred to the 21st Group. In the middle of October the 21st Divisional Artillery was rcplaccd by the 12th Divisional Artillery, which gave its name for the time being to the Group, now comprising its own brigades, the New Zealand artillery, and certain other elements. The New Zeland batteries supported the numerous attacks made throughout the month of October, and remained exposed to the enemy counter-battery activity in positions which had been pushed distinctly far forward in anticipation of a further advance. On the 5th, for example, a gun of the 3rd Battery was destroyed by a direct hit which blew up the ammunition and killed the detachment, and an 8-in. shell struck an ammunition pit of: the 15th Battery, causing the shells to explode and killing an officer and 8 men, in addition to inflicting other casualties.</p>
        <p>Towards the end of their stay the weather became definitely unpropitious, and constant rain, impeding communications, robbed the British Armies of the full advantages that their achievements might not unreasonably have been expected to yield. No cessation or slackening, however, was made in our bombardment. Day and night, fire continued on the German entrenched positions, batteries, and villages. In view of the hoped-for improvement in weather and the resumption of operations, the enemy's approaches were <choice><orig>system-<pb xml:id="n156" n="122"/>atically</orig><reg>systematically</reg></choice> shelled. Dead ground was searched by day, and all roads and tracks at irregular intervals and at constantly varied points throughout the night to prevent the bringing up of supplies and material. Indications pointed to the possibility of a counter-offensive, and cover for guns and crews had to be constructed to minimise the danger of loss of gun-power in case of a hostile preparatory bombardment. For this reason, too, the amount of ammunition at the gun positions was augmented, and as the condition of the roads made wagon transport impossible, the unfortunate animals, now in miserably poor condition, "packed" it up through the mud, making more than one trip a day. After 52 consecutive days in the battle the New Zealand gunners were relieved on 25th and 26th October by the 1st Australian Divisional Artillery. By herculean exertions a few Australian guns were actually brought up to positions after darkness on the 25th. Others were bogged on the Flers Road and hauled back to the wagou lines under cover of mist on the 26th. The brigades for the most part exchanged guns. Of those which had been replaced by the Australians and had to be dragged to the wagon lines, some sank deep in the mud, and not all the labour of men and horses could move them.</p>
        <p>In this "set-piece" warfare little scope was offered for spectacular performances by the artillery, but their records are illuminated by repeated instances of devotion to duty, as shown, for example, by gun detachments continuing to fire a barrage under a hail of shells, and of initiative, as in the handling of captured German guns close to the front trenches for sniping purposes. Throughout the battle their action exemplified the skilful application of a high standard of technique, and was extolled by the British regiments not less highly than by their New Zealand comrades. Yet it may be doubted whether any, feature of their work displayed greater qualities of resourcefulness and resolution than their never-interrupted success, despite prolonged conditions of the utmost difficulty, in bringing up their ammunition over those forlorn shelled wastes of mud and craters. The batteries had fired approximately 500,000 rounds on the Somme and sustained over 500 casualties. The Divisional Ammunition Column alone had over 70 animals killed and 8 wagons destroyed by shell-fire. The 3rd Battery had lost its gun detachments 3 times during the battle, and had 5 battery commanders casualtied in succession. The following message of appreciation was sent by the <choice><orig>Com-<pb xml:id="n157" n="123"/>mander</orig><reg>commander</reg></choice> of the 21st Divisional Artillery Group on his severing connection with the New Zealand gunners:—</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“On handing over command of this Artillery Group I wish to convey my thanks and the thanks of the 21st Divisional Artillery to the offieers, n.c.o.s, gunners, and drivers of the New Zealand Divisional Artillery for their hearty co-operation during the recent operations and far the splendid work which they have done.</p>
          <p>“The difficulties of ammunition supply, which have been great, have been overcome, and the good shooting of the batteries and the successful barrages have been spoken of in most comp1imentary terms by our infantry.</p>
          <p>“Please convey to all ranks under your command my congratulations and best wishes for their future success.”</p>
        </quote>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n158" n="124"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body1-d4" type="chapter">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Chapter IV</hi>
          <lb/>
          <hi rend="sc">Winter on the Lys</hi>
        </head>
        <p>By 12th October the Division, less its artillery, was concentrated in the rear area of 11. Anzac, Divisional Headquarters at Merris, the 1st Brigade at Estaires, the 2nd at Strazeele, and the 3rd at Outerstcene. Corps Headquarters had mean time shifted from La Motte<note xml:id="fn61-124" n="1"><p>p 21.</p></note> to the town of Bailleul. In the right of the Corps there was now the 5th Australian, and in the centre the 34th Division. The northern sector was no longer held by the 51st Division, which had relieved the New Zealanders in August, for in the following month they had been withdrawn for. a second visit to the Somme. At the moment there had been no fresh troops available to take their place. A composite formation, therefore, had been raised by withdrawing 2 Brigade Groups from the other 2 Divisions that completed the Corps. Command had been given to Major-General Franks, of the Second Army Staff, and the formation itself was designated Franks' Force. To avoid drawing on the resources of the Divisions, the Staff, together with the necessary clerks and office equipment, had been provided by the Army and Corps.</p>
        <p>Little time was to be given the newly-arrived New Zealanders to rest, refit, and assimilate the reinforcements that came overseas from Sling to make good the wastage incurred at the Somme. On 13th October they began to relieve the 5th Australian Division in the Sailly sector, on the extreme right of the Second Army. There the Division took over the Cordonnerie and Boutillerie subsectors with the 1st and 3rd Brigades. One of the Australian brigades, however, as has been seen, formed part of Franks' Force and occupied the Houplines subsector in front of Armentieres. For its relief the 2nd Brigade was detached from the Division and passed under General Franks' command. Accompanied by a medium trench mortar battery, a company of Engineers, a company-of Pioneers, a Field Ambulance, and an A.S.C. company, it went up in 'busses from Strazeele and relieved this Australian Brigade Group in the familiar trenches which it had held throughout the summer on the Lys. On the Divisional front <pb xml:id="n159" n="125"/>proper, the right touched the flank of the XI. Corps of the First Army; its left was separated from Franks' Force by the 34th Division. General Russell's headquarters was established in the township of Sailly-on-the-Lys, some 5 miles up the river and west of Armentieres. The 1st Brigade Staff occupied a cross-roads inn at Rouge de Bout, and the 3rd dugouts in the village of Fleurbaix, 3 miles south-west of Armentieres on the road to Neuve Chapelle. Among the troops relieved by the 1st Brigade were the II. Anzac Cyclist Battalion, who had been attached to the Australians and in addition to other duties had on occasion garrisoned the trenches. The 5th Australian Artillery remained temporarily in the line, but the rest of the Division now passed once for all from its original Corps to join I. Anzac on the Somme.</p>
        <p>The Sailly sector extended for 3 miles in flat pleasantly wooded country before the German positions at Fromelles and on the Aubers Ridge, which guarded the south-western approach to Lille and had looked down on the slaughter of Neuve Chapelle and the XI. Corps repulse in Ju1y. <note xml:id="fn62-125" n="1"><p>p. 49.</p></note> The front area was crossed by a network of several sluggish streams and drains running back among the hedge-rows to the Lys. The principal of these was the Laies. All were now considerably swollen by the late antumn rains, and broad tracts along their banks were little better than marshes, in which the movement of our patrols was to be much hampered till the frosts of January.</p>
        <p>Across these streams ran the continuous breastworks of the front line and the derelict close support line. This latter, though not manned, was maintained in outward repair, and in it men occasionally showed themselves; and fires were kindled in order to give the enemy the impression of occupation and to attract shelling. The real support line lay somewhat in rear, in a series of small garrison posts connected laterally by a continuous fire trench. Further again in rear were the series of defended localities, Charred, Windy, Winter's Night Posts and others, that formed the third or subsidiary line of the front system. These were joined by a rudimentary trench, which was in a few places fire-stepped and revetted.</p>
        <p>For the protection and maintenance of the whole of this system the Division was responsible, but certain of the posts formed part also of the A.B.C. or G.H.Q. second line, which fell to the charge of the Corps. The village of Fleurbaix was extensively protected by a ring of such redoubts. Mention <pb xml:id="n160" n="126"/>has previously been made of the bridgeheads on the Lys at Nouveau Monde, Sailly, and Bac St. Maur, which formed part of the X.Y.Z. or G.H.Q. third line.<note xml:id="fn63-126" n="1"><p>p. 27.</p></note></p>
        <p>In each brigade sector 2 battalions garrisoned the trenches, and 2 were in suppornt in the farms and villages in rear in accordance with the established principle of defence in depth, and to avoid unnecessary casualties, the front line was held only by, outposts with sufficient support of Lewis guns and a few machine guns to ensure the repulse of a hostile attack delivered without bombardment. Not more than 150 men all told manned 1000 yards. The garrisons of the support line were 3 times; as strong. Here there were some deep dugouts, electrically ventilated and lighted, each capable of holding a company. Several of the subsidiary line garrisons, again, could boast of a habitation in abandoned farmhouses, but generally the accommodation was inadequate The relieved Australian battalions had been of weak strength, and the first urgent task was to provide shelter for all the troops in the line. Trench kitchens too had to be made weather-proof before the winter rains set in. To effect these and similar improvements, as well as to replace by training the specialists lost on the Somme, and to familiarise themselves with their new surroundings in and in front of their trenches, the battalions remained temporarily quicscent. Towards the end of the month they were visited by the Premier of New Zealand and Sir Joseph Ward, who attended the presentation by General Plumer of decorations won on the Somme, and with him inspected the troops in reserve and the Pioneer Battalion.</p>
        <p>The artillery had not yet rejoind from the Somme, but were already on their 80-mile march northwards. On their arrival (4th November) they rested for one or two days, during which time their guns were overhauled at the Ordnance Workshop at Bailleul and the last of their debilitated horses evacuated. They then (7th November) commenced the relief of the 5th Australian Divisional Artillery. The 2nd Brigade, with a section of the D.A.C., relieved the Australian batteries detached with Franks' Forcc. On the Divisional front the Australian artillery had been divided into 2 groups, 1 of which supported each brigade subsector, and this policy was now adhered to. The 1st Brigade of the New Zealand Artillery, with the 8th Battery of the 4th Brigade formed the right group, while the 3rd Brigade and the <pb xml:id="n161" n="127"/>remainder of the 4th Brigade constituted the left group. This artillery support might be confidently expected to be adequate, while the front remained quiet. Should a general hostile attack on a large scale develop, reinforcing positions had been selected and would be occupied by batteries sent forward by Corps, while in the event of local attacks, a pre-arranged programme was drawn up, in accordance with the usual practice, to ensure the support of the artillery group covering the attacked sector by the group on either flank. Thus on the call "Co-operate Boutillerie," certain batteries both in the Cordonnerie group on the right and in the Bois Grenier group on the left would give assistance by firing on selected targets opposite the Boutillerie subsector.</p>
        <p>By the beginning of November the infantry in the line had constructed tolerable accommodation and could turn undisturbed attention to the markedly inaggressive troops of the II. Bavarian Corps opposite. <note xml:id="fn64-127" n="1"><p>The 38th Landwehr Regiment and a portion of the 5th Bavarian Division.</p></note> The first attempt to renew acquaintance was not to be crowned with success. Early in the morning of 6th November a small raiding party of 1st Wellington attempted an entry, without artillery support, into a German post known as the Tadpole. A gap in the wire had been cut on the 5th. Stealing across the 100 yards of No Man's Land, however, the party found 4 rows of knife-rests placed just outside the parapet, effectually preventing an entry. At the same hour, 34th Division troops, further on the left, forcing a way in, killed several Germans but secured no prisoners or identifications. To atone for this lack of success, the artil1ery on all 3 sectors of the Corps front took up the work and pounded the enemy's trenches for 2 half-hour periods, causing satisfactory destruction.</p>
        <p>Undiscouraged on their part, the infantry prepared for a fresh and more ambitious enterprise. This was undertaken 10 days later by the 1st Rifles. Some 250 yards opposite their front the German line formed a salient called Turks' Point. By its exposed configuration it was in itself peculiarly suitable for assault, and in addition No Man's Land lent itself to the raiders' purpose. A narrow ditch running right across from parapet to parapet afforded a good line of advance. This ditch was itself crossed at right angles by several parallel ditches, which patrols knew to afford cover and a position for assembly. To one of these, in the mists of a cold wintry-evening, Capt. G. K. Gasquoine and 50 men of "C" company, with a few sappers, were guided by <pb xml:id="n162" n="128"/>Cpl. O. A. Gillespie across the swamps of No Man's Land. All identifications as usual, were removed, and the raiders wore British tunics. As a distinguishing mark, 2 strips of white cloth were sewn by 1 end and tucked inside the collar of the coat, 1 strip in front and 1 behind. Field guns and two 6-in. howitzers and a heavy trench mortar battered the objective and vicinity for 20 minutes. Under this fire and covered by-a patrol some 10 yards in front, the assaulting party crept up to within 50 yards of the enemy wire. There they sheltered in another ditch and pulled out the free ends of the white cloth strips. On the artillery lifting, Gillcspie and other scouts examined the wire and found it demolished. There-upon the raiders pushed through it. They found the trench, however, knee-deep in water and unoccupied. Parties worked for 100 yards to right and left and down the comunication saps. One group, espying dark figures, would challenge “Shell,” with rifles and bombs ready to deal death to an enemy patrol, but to their disappointment invariably received the countersign “Hole” from some other members of their party. The most diligent search failed to discover the enemy. The solid concrete dugouts were found flooded and contained neither men nor articles which provided identification. Behind the travel-trench was a sheet of water that extended to both flanks as far as the eye could penetrate in the darkness.</p>
        <p>Much the same experience befell a 1st Canterbury party with a small detachment of Engineers on 21st November in the. trenches opposite the south-western face of the Cordon-nerie salient. They attacked also on a very dark evening of a misty day. The artillery bombarded the whole front from the salient known as the Sugar Loaf, opposite our extreme right, northwards to the Tadpole, except the objective itself, which was dealt with by trench mortars. The time laid down for the assault was 7 p.m. At 6.55 p.m. the medium trench mortars twisted and crumpled the wire into heaped-up masses, and at 7 p.m. lifted on to machine gun emplacements in the enemy line. As the raiders went forward, one of them trod on a "blind" mortar bomb, or caught the trip-wire of an enemy mine. In the explosion Capt. E. H. L. Bernau who led the party, and 12 men were wounded. The others scrambled through the wire and entered the 8-feet deep trench. They found it blocked with knife-rests and empty. Flashing their torches into the dugouts, they could discover neither within <pb xml:id="n163" n="129"/>their sandbagged walls nor elsewhere any sign of recent occupation. Only a pair of rotting human legs in dirty field-grey trousers protruded from underneath a heap of debris. A large concrete block, which appeared to cover a mine-shaft and which was strongly protected by barbed wire, was blown up by the Engineers On the same night a patrol found the area between the enemy position known as the Knucklebone and the Laies unoccupied, except by one of those itinerant German “Flareboys” who were detaild to move along empty trenches, lighting rockets and firing occasional rifle shots.</p>
        <p>These enterprises were enough to show that the enemy's line was held even more lightly than our own, From this time on till the Division left the sector, not a single night passed without raiders or patrols-for the functions merged —entering his lines, ransacking his quarters, sometimes kidnapping a sentry, sometimes meeting opposition. Nor was this enough to satisfy, the bold temperament of the snipers, who are long enseonsed themselves in his front line parapet and harassed the sentries of his support line. Not a little information was obtained on the habits and dispositions of the enemy. Following on incursions made by 1st Canterbury and the 2nd Rifles, the Corps Commander forwarded the following message of appreciation from General Plumer: “The Army Commander has read your report on the results of reconnaissances carried out by patrols of the New Zealand Division on the night of 7th/8th December. He considers that very good work was carried out by the units concerned, and that useful information has been obtained.” In this warfare of silent stalking and reconnaissance in the dark mazes of the enemy's flooded trenches the infantry became exceptionally adept, and when the 3rd Australian Division came into the area, suitably selected officers were sent to give the newly-arrived battalions lessons in the art.</p>
        <p>To bombard these waterlogged positions would have been a waste of ammunition, which moreover had been drastically curtailed by the requirements of the Somme battle and by the necessity of accumulating reserves for the spring. But trenches, parapets, machine gun emplacements, mortar positions and wire were daily bombarded by our heavy and medium trench mortars, This was indeed their haleyon period. In carrying their weighty projectiles up the muddy duckboards they had infantry assistance, but the work of building positions, moving the mortars, and firing their <pb xml:id="n164" n="130"/>300 or 400 rounds a day was excessively laborious. Into their task they. threw themselves with an energy and enthusiasm which made it a sport and relaxation. They played havoc with the German trenches. Wire duckboards debris iron timber and on rare occasions a sentry were thrown high into the air. Some projectiles landing in the swamps behind the German line sent up tall tree-shaped geysers of mud and water. The incessant work of Lt. F. J. W. Stallard and the personnel of the medium trench mortars in particular won General Russell's special thanks.</p>
        <p>Despite all this mortar activity and our nightly visitations to his lines, the attitude of the harassed enemy remained passive. While our aeroplanes bombed Fromells and the other centres of activity in rear and reconnoitred his trenches, his airmen very rarely offered themselves as targets to our machine and Lewis gunners. He made little effort to repair his trench parapets and wire. Only very rarely was a nervous patrol to be seen in No Man's Land, and such few raids as he made were not pushed home. It was from the support trenches that his flares rose, and there was a marked absence of rifle fire. The Tadpole and Turks' Point were unheld when patrols reconnoitred them on 22nd and 25th November. On the 26th and 27th his trenches were tested at other points and found empty. A patrol at Corner Fort, on the 28th, was repulsed with casualties,<note xml:id="fn65-130" n="1"><p>When this patrol was ordered to withdraw. Rflmn. N. A. Nicholson did so, but lay on the outer edge of the enemy's wire with another man to cover the movements of his companions. Hearing groans coming from the parapet, he made his way again through the entangletments; and discovered a badly wounded comrade. Having dressed his wounds, he decided that in view of their nature it was not advisable to carry the man. He therefore returned to our lines and reported the case to his company commander, who at once organised a party with a stretcher. Nicholson guided this party back, and the wounded man was safely recovered.</p></note> but on the following evening a large sector alongside proved to be unoccupied. It was highly desirable to clear up the situation and establish by extensive reconnaissance and the capture, if possible, of a prisoner, the location of those positions which the enemy actually held. At midnight, therefore. on the night 30th November/1st December the 2 brigades each sent out 6 officers' patrols simultaneously to discover the dispositions of the enemy's advanced troops and report on the position and condition of his wire in rear of his front line. These patrols were instructed not to attempt to force an entry should resistance be encountered, but to avoid aggressiveness, carry out their investigations silently and secretly, and in no case to penetrate to a depth greater than 100 yards. Uncharted points requiring exploration were carefully selected <pb xml:id="n165" n="131"/>as their objectives and were clearly defined laterally to obviate collision of parties from adjoining patrols. The commanders were given a free hand as to the length of time they would remain in the enemy's line.</p>
        <p>The night was cold and misty when the raiders set out. Of the 1st Brigade parties from 1st Auckland and 1st Wellington, 4 found the positions unoccupied and a stench of fetid water and rotting bodies. In rear. of the front trench was abysmal mud, through which some floundered as far as a shelltorn farm near the. support line. Of the other 2 parties, I was detected in the wire. It was fired on and sustained casualties. The second reached the parapet when they were challenged by a sentry, who called out what seemed to be “New Zealand,” and the sound of hurrying feet along the duckboards was followed by ineffective rifle fire.</p>
        <p>The right Rifle Brigade patrol from the 3rd Battalion found entry. barred by a 20-yard broad entanglement. The centre party from this battalion saw a glare of lights and heard a machine gun fire in the support trench 200 yards in rear. The third was checked at the intended point of entry by a 15-feet wide moat, which contained 6 feet of water and was blocked with wire. Bent, however, on introducing some newly-arrived reinforcements in the party to the interior of the Geman lines, their leader made a detour over an awkward icy-cold ditch and brought his party to the parapet at another point. Here too the trench was empty. There was no sound of life save the hammering of wire pickets in the distance. Of the 4th Battalion parties, I saw in No Man's Land an enemy patrol, which frustrated an attempt at its capture by' precipitate withdrawal. The raiders then made for the German lines. They found them occupied. The stretch of intervening trench between communication saps was wired, but at their heads were sentry posts, which were periodically visited by patrols. The centre party found the wire impassable all along its front and the sector strongly manned.</p>
        <p>The most interesting adventure befell the left patrol, which reached the enemy's parapet without difficulty. Some 30 yards away a middle-aged German of the 82nd Regiment was keeping an inadequate watch. He was suffering from a cold, and to give himself some protection from the wind he had blocked the trench with a sheet of corrugated iron. His cough betrayed him to the crouching assailants, <pb xml:id="n166" n="132"/>and they determined to capture him. As the trench in front looked dark and deep, they waited for a German flare to illuminate it before they took the plunge When the flare went up, the trench was seen to be 9-feet deep and blocked with wire. The officer decided then to work along the parapet, but after crawling a few yards found the enemy wire brought right back to the trench's edge. There was nothing left but to throw a couple of bombs at the unsuspecting German ad rush him. The bombs burst suddenly in the silence The raiders picked a hast, way over the wire, tore the sheet down, and behind it found the sentry lying dead. A second German, badly wounded, was crawling down to the communication trench. Chase was at once given by part of the patrol. Hearing the panting pursuers behind him, the German redoubled his efforts. He just managed to half enter, half fall into a deep dugout with steel doors. Inside it were 3 unwounded men. They made frantic efforts to shut the door. Ere it slammed, 2 bombs were thrown in, and the muffled explosion shook the loose earth down by the raiders' feet. Inside the dugout all 4 must have perished. Meanwhile the rest of the patrol were searching, none too gently, the dead sentry. His greatcoat was tightly buttoned against the damp cold of the night, and he wore a belt which it was found difficult to undo. At the first sound of the boumbs 9 party of Germans had moved up at once from the support trench, and their stick grenades were now falling close, but the patrol secured the necessary identifications before it withdrew.</p>
        <p>All the parties were back, without casualties, by, 3 a.m. As a result of this highly successful operation the posts held in the enemy's line were largely determined. The 5th Bavarians, opposite the 1st Brigadr, had abandoned their front line with the exception of one or two. posts in the Sugar Loaf. The Landwehr Brigade, opposite the Rifles, still garrisoned their front with sentry posts at certain places. These Strong points at the heads of communication-trenches and elsewhere were maked down for operations in the future.</p>
        <p>A few enemy were seen On the evening of 7th December by a 2nd Rifles party which penetrated the Angle. In order not to frighten the sentries away, the raiders attacked without any arti1lery or mortar preparation. As they neared, they saw 3 Germans working on the parapet, but these ran away. Somewhere a horn blew an alarm. Our party <pb xml:id="n167" n="133"/>lobbed a few bombs before them into the trench and made for the parapet. The trench was found much demolished. Bombs were thrown at the intruders from a distance, but no German could be discovered The sappers blew up a stick-grenade store, and the party returned unscathed through slight enemy retaliation, which, on our rear trenches, took the form of lachrymatory gas.</p>
        <p>These raids and nightly visitations by patrols at last goaded the Germans out of their torpor. As the light was fading away in the afternoon of 10th December, a heavy burst of machine gun and rifle fire swept the 1st Rifles parapets. At the time our men were “standing-to,” and our own Lewis guns and rifles answered immediately The flashes from the enemy trenches died away, and half an hour later everything was still quiet. The night sentries were posted, and the rest of the time "stood down" to draw their tea.</p>
        <p>All at once a heavy bombardment set in of mortar projectiles on the front trench and of shrapnel and high-explosive shells on the support. The garrison dropped their tea and ran back to the fire-bays. Every man was in position three or four minutes after the first shell landed. In No Man's Land a line of pollarded trees ran along a small ditch to our parpet near a “gap.” Alongside the “gap”' was a Lewis gun position manned by 4 private soldiers. A “rumjar” landed in the bay, severely wounding 3 of the men and knocking the No.1 Rflmn. W. H. Butler, off the fire step. The wounded gunners refused to leave their bay, and Butler, though severely shaken, instantly picked up the Lewis gun again and asked them to put up n flare. In this light he saw a party of Germans fumbling with the wire in front of the “gap.” At once he opened fire but after half a minute the gun, with characteristic obduracy, jammed. The gunner cursed it and furiously strove to set it again in action, but the leading Germans were already beginning to number through the wire. A corporal in the next bay shot one through the head. The raiders replied by a shower of bombs. One landed in the corporal's bay, sweeping the men off the fire-step, and another wounded Butler. Then Rflmn. P. H. Gifford, one of the gun team, who had already been severely hit, resumed his place on the fire-step and stood guard over his stricken comrades, continuing to fire at the approaching raiders. The Germans, however, finding their entry was to be opposed, decided that they had had enough, <pb xml:id="n168" n="134"/>and while their covering bombardment was still falling on each flank and on our support line, they turned and fled. All our machine guns and Lewis guns vindictively swept their retirement, but then ceased to allow the riflemen to pursue. Intent on revenge, these patrols followed the raiders across to their own parapet. In our own wire, opposite Butler's bay, they found a second dead German, riddled by Lewis gun fire, but were unable to capture a live prisoner. The retreat had been too hasty, and all along the trees in the wet grass lay the discarded grenades and dropped helmets of the fleeing raiders. In our own trenches 4 men had been killed and 12 wounded. Gifford, who had been a particularly skilled and fearless Lewis gunner, died of his wounds a few days later.</p>
        <p>If the Germans required a lesson in the thorough organisation and daring execution of a raid, it was given to them a week later by the 4th Rifles. Under Capt. W. W. Dove, a large party of 5 officers and 170 men, with a dozen sappers, assembled just before midnight, 17th/18th December, to attack Corner Fort The necessary gap in the wire was cut by trench mortars previously, and these, with artillery, stood by ready to give support if required. The night was peculiarly dark and foggy. At rare intervals an enemy sentry shot a foolish unnamed bullet across No Man's Land or fired a flare. The raiders were divided into 3 parties. All reached their allotted point of entry. Directly they threw their first bombs, flares shot up along the front line at the Fort and in astonishing profusion from the support line. Heavy machine gun fire opened behind the Angle, but was at once stifled by the. watching mortars in our trenches. One party floundered down a commnunication trench, waist-deep in water, amid floating duckboards. They secured no prisoners, but killed 5 Germans.</p>
        <p>The second party, under 2nd Lt. B. Mollison, found the same miserable conditions in Corner Fort, Where dummy works of canvas and wood had been sorely battered by our trench mortars. A sentry group of 4 was "done in." From a maze of trenches in rear, which formed a Strong Point, 2 machine guns opened fire, but these were bombed, and the crews were killed. A strenuous effort was made by Rflmn. J. Keys and E. M. Phelan to bring back the guns, but the entanglements and floods surrounding the position were impassable. One was destroyed. This second party also were unfortunate in not being able to secure prisoners, but <pb xml:id="n169" n="135"/>they left 20 lifeless Germans prone in the water and mud or stretched across the wire.</p>
        <p>The objective of the third party, which was led by Sergt. W. McConachy, was the support line. Unlike the front line, it was found in good condition. The walls were well revetted with birch branches, the duckwalks wired, and every 20 yards was a good 7-feet high dugout with a porch holding rifle-racks. Nearly all the occupants, however, had fled. Some 17 showed fight and paid the penalty. This party secured 9 Landwehr prisoners, some in the communication trench, others in the support line, and 1 in No Man's Land. Meanwhile the Engineers had blown up a long section of the tramway and a large pumping-plant. The half-hour allotted for the enterprise had now expired. Across No Man's Land came the strident blast of a Klaxon horn, blown in our lines as a signal of recall, and a white rocket rising from our parapet and bursting into green stars summoned the raiders home. In addition to the prisoners a mass of papers was brought back. Of the raiders, only I was killed and 4 wounded. The battalion received congratulatory messages from the Army and Corps Commanders.</p>
        <p>On 20th December, a 1st Auckland raiding party penetrated far behind the German front line, but found no sign of the enemy. Three nights later the German defence secured a solitary success, and a disastrous enterprise by the 3rd Rifles, in bright starlight, was redeemed only by individual acts of gallantry and self-sacrifice. The enemy allowed the party to get through his entanglements, when he opened up a string fire and threw masses of bombs. 2nd Lt. M. F. Walsh, cheering his men to the attack, fell mortally wounded on the parapet. An enemy machine gun was hoisted on a flank, but Cp1. H. Anderson, a very gallant non-commissioned officer, with another man, rushed at it un-hesitatingly, and flung his bomb so accurately that it killed the crew and blew the gun into the air. His promptness saved many lives. On the raiders' withdrawing, after suffering many casualties, Rflmn. J. Hansen, a stretcher-bearer. tended our wounded for nearly an hour under artillery machine gun and rifle fire, in the shellholes on the enemy parapet and between the parapet and wire, till an opportunity offered and they were brought back to our trenches. There, on its being discovered that I wounded man had been overlooked and was still in the wire, Rflmn. W. D. H. Milne volunteered to return to his rescue. He had reached <pb xml:id="n170" n="136"/>the wounded man and was bringing him hack through the enemy entanglements when he was mortally wounded.</p>
        <p>Meantime, the stay of the detached 2nd Brigade at Houplines had been comparatively uneventful. Just after its arrival, President Poincare motored to Armentieres to present medals; to the Marie and others of the civil population, but his visit was strictly private, and at his express wish no military honours were paid. Brigade headquarters was in the Rue des Jesuits in Armentieres. 2 battalions, relieved every 8 days, held the front line, I occupied the subsidiary line: and I was in billets in the town. For the most part they carried out the normal duties of a trench garrison, harassing the enemy. draining their areas, improving accommodation and trenches, and carrying up the weighty gas cylinders for installation under the front line parapet.<note xml:id="fn66-136" n="1"><p>The gas was actually emitted by personnel of the Special Brigade, R.E.</p></note> Once or twice the two opposing trenches broke into rifle fire at the flocks of geese passing overhead from the Lys swamps. On 20th Octobcr, following a dummy raid with heavy-trench mortars and in co-operation with enterprises on our flanks, a 2nd Canterbury patrol endeavoured to enter the Pont Ballot trenches, but found 2 rows of wire out of the 5 uncut. Unable to break through these, the patrol moved along for 100 yards, throwing bombs into the trench. In the right of the sector, Auckland and Canterbury relieved each other, and here, after artil1ery preparation, a raiding part of the 6th (Hauraki) comany of 2nd Auckland, under Lt, C. Hally, in the evening of 3rd November, killed 4 Bavarians and captured 2 prisoners. They stayed but 5 minutes in the enemy trenches and suffered no casualties.</p>
        <p>The left battalion sector lay next The Lys and opposite Frelinghien and the Breakwater,<note xml:id="fn67-136" n="2"><p>p. 42.</p></note> which, in the division's absence, had been completed and formed now a very strong front line. This sector was occupied alternately by 2nd Otago and 2nd Wellington. At "88," one of its "localities," the opposing lines were only 100 yards apart. Here the British had at an earlier. time dug mine galleries, which were now maintained. With a view; to guarding the gallery entrances, we still held "88," though its occupation was made costly by constant German bombardments. A well-marked 15feet high bank led from it across No Man's Land to an intricate tangle of earthworks in the enemy line known as the Chicken Run. This bank was constantly used by both our own and the <pb xml:id="n171"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP020a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP020a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP020a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Trench Mortar Ammunition</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP020b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP020b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP020b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Infantry in Bailleul</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n172"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP021a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP021a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP021a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-130093">C. H. J. Brown</name>, D. S. O.</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP021b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP021b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP021b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc"><name key="name-208165" type="person">Brig.-Gen. H. Hart</name>, C.B., C. M. G., D. S. O.</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n173" n="137"/>enemy's patrols. North of it lay swampy flats of no considerable breadth to the Lys, and on either side of it several ditches ran across No Man's Land. Owing to the conformation of the ground, the fall of the water was in the direction of our lines, and the opportunity of flooding the enemy's trenches was not neglected. Once night, after heavy rain, our Engineers built sandbag dams in 10 of the ditches in No Man's Land. In the largest of the ditches, which carried a considerable volume of water, a double dam was erected, and the water level was raised about 5 feet. Much baling and pumping of water over the enemy's parapet betrayed his difficulties, and he had recourse to a raid to destroy the obstacles. His party reached the block in the ditch, and his sappers blew up the first dam with a mobile charge. The second dam, nearer our line and just awash, escaped his notice and the distruction of the first did not lower materially the water level.</p>
        <p>2nd Otago were holding this line on the evening of 25th October, when a German party was noticed near our wire and dispersed by bombs. Half an hour later, our listening post of 2 men again saw 20 Germans making for the wire. On their being challenged, a muttered order was given, and the enemy deployed, making ready to rush the post. Before these withdrew to give warning, they shot the leader of the hostile party and threw their bombs. Our Lewis guns then opened and dispersed the raiders, and later the dead body was brought in.</p>
        <p>Otago was to be less fortunate on 15th November. For 3 days previously a slow continuous trench mortar bombardment had been directed at our wire in front of "88." A mortar bomb fell every 20 minutes, and in the end scareely a vestige of our entanglements remained In the evening of the 15th, our front line garrison heard a loud noise, as of stakes being hammered, in the enemy trenches. It was just the time for our evening meal, and the fire-bays were to some extent depleted. No special attention was paid to the unusual noise. But it was not without purpose. It was designed to drown any sound of movement made by a party of German raiders passing over their parapet and wire, and under its cover the 30 Bavarian "sturm truppen" formed up in No Man's Land undetected. Without warning, an intense and most accurate bombardment was opened by the enemy's "five-nines" and by mortars firing from the Chicken Run and from the 4 Hallots Farm, known also by <pb xml:id="n174" n="138"/>another name. The whole Otago front was affected, but the shelling on Hobbs' Farm and at the Lys were diversions, and the fire fell with special severity on the ill-fated "88." The trenches at its flanks were demolished by a quite exceptionally heavy box barrage by trench mortars, and the communication trench running forward to it was barraged at the support line. Most unfortunately the garrison of "88" did not put up its S.O.S., while the occupants of the Hobbs' Farm trenches did. Thus our artillery response fell east of Hobbs' Farm, and the "sturm truppen" traversed NO Man's Land against "88" unmoiested. Three parties attacked, the main assault coming down the northern side of the 15-feet bank. About 20 of the garrison had been casualties in the bombardment, and the remainder, caught disorganised, were unable to prevent the raiders' entry or offer effective resistance. They were overwhelmed, and many were killed by revolver shots. Two men had taken refuge, in a small bivouae. The outside one was not completely hidden, and a passing Bavarian blew his brains out over the inside man. On the noise of the revolver shots in "88" our Lewis guns on the flanks and rear opened fire, and a neighbouring section, under Pte. J. W. 0'Brien, made a gallant counter-attack. He had been wounded at the outset in the left shoulder and was unabel to use his rifle. His post on the parpet had been blown in, but till the limits of the raid were defined he had refused to leave it. He now led his comrades down the trench, hurling bombs passed to him from the rear. But it was too late. Five minutes from the moment of entry, a horn-blast signal was given in the German lines. The Bavarian officer blew his whistle, and the raiders disappeared into No Man's Land as suddenly as they had come. The raid had been admirably planned and was a distinct success for the enemy. The Germans left behind one of their number dead. A heap of unexploded mobile charges.; at a dummy entrance to our mine galleries indicated that the destruction of the last had been aimed at but frustrated by reason of the darkness, the shortness of time at the raiders' disposa1, or some other cause. One of our garrison was taken prisoner, and one missing man was buried in the trenches or killed in No Man's Land. Including the losses of a working party in the vicinity, some 20 men were killed and an officer and 30 men wounded. Our trenches suffered almost irreparable damage.</p>
        <p>In retaliation, on the following afternoon, 16th November, our heary howitzers and guns bombarded Frèlinghien and <pb xml:id="n175" n="139"/>the enemy trenches and rest billets, the German batteries answering by a desultory shelling of Armentièrcs in the evening. Our infantry too sought revenge. At dusk a small Otago raiding party reconnoitred the strong German entanglements, but were unable to discover a gap for entry. For the same reason, success was not vouchsafed to a raid maid on 18th November by the Australian company of the II. Anzae Cyclist Battalion, which was attached to the British brigade on the right sector of the Franks' Force area.</p>
        <p>On the arrival of the New Zea1and artillery from the Somme, the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade had relieved the Australian gunners that supported General Braithwaite's infantry. Shortly afterwards, in accordance with a principle now introduced prescribing a 3 months' tour of duty at Sling for the infantry brigadiers in rotation, General Braith-waite went to England. In command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade he was succeeded by. Col. V.S. Smyth. N.Z.S.C. Towards the end of November, the 3rd Australian Division, under Major-General J. Monash, who had been so long and intimately. associated with the New Zealanders on the Peninusula, arrived from its base in England and bgan to relieve Franks' Force. The new Division was, even for Australians, magnificent in physique-and morale, but this was their first experience of the trenches, and the line was handed over gradually, half-battalions moving in at a time. On completion of relief, in the first week of December, Franks' Force was broken up. The Corps front was now held by 3 Divisions, the New Zealand on the right, the 34th in the centre, and the 3rd Australian on the left, each with 2 Brigades in the line and 1 in reserve. The 2nd Infantry Brigade group rejoined the Division and acted for a month as brigade in reserve. Two battalions went to Estaires, one to Sailly, and 1 to Bac St. Maur. The 2nd Field Artillery Brigade passed under the command of the Australians, whose artillery had not yet arrived. It rejoined the Division towards the end of January.</p>
        <p>On 22nd December the Commander-in-Chief inspected the reserve troops of the, Corps. Units of the Division, now brought up to and above strength by the continual arrival of reinforcements, were drawn up on the road near Saily and <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name>, accompanied by the Corps Commander, rod slowly down the line, After the inspection the troops marched past. Subsequently General Godley issued the following order:—</p>
        <pb xml:id="n176" n="140"/>
        <quote>“The Corps Commander is directed by the Commander-in-Chief to convey to all ranks of the Corps his high apreciation of the appearance and turn-out of the troops that paraded for his inspection today. In conveying this message, the Corps Commander wishes to congratulate all concerned on the excellence of the Staff arrangements and to thank officers, n.c.o.s and men for the special effort they had evidently made to show up so favourably under such adverse weather conditions.”</quote>
        <p>After 3 weeks' rest the 2nd Infantry Brigade left their comfortable quarters at Estaires and the other villages on 23rd December and relieved the 1st Brigade in the Cordonnerie subsector on the right. Christmas was spent as a holiday so far as the duties of the various units permitted. Cordial messages from the King and the New Zealand Ministers were. communicated, and every effort was made to give the troops whether in the trenches or in the rear the good cheer associated with this season. Towards the enemy it was not yet a time for peace and goodwill. The artillery undertook a comprehensive and unusually active programme, and were favoured by. comparatively good observation. The howitzers fired at selected targets at a slow rate, each shot being carefully observed, while from 7 p.m. till midnight, at regular intervals, the 18-pounders, firing altogether with single salvoes, swept tramways and transport routes. The Germans reserved their retaliation for New Year's Day.</p>
        <p>During the month of January the 4th Artillery Brigade was completed by the arrival of the 16th (Howitzer) Battery from England. Shortly afterwards, however, in accordance with instructions which affected the whole British Army, a very drastic change was made in the organisation of the artillery. Experience on the Somme had shown the necessity of massing on an offensive front a much greater proportion of field artillery than that which actually formed part of the Divisions engaged Thus Divisional Artilleries had frequently been divorced from their Divisions. The reorganisation now brought into effect aimed at preserving a permanent relation between a Divisional commander and his own artillery, and at the same time establishing a pool of artillery at the disposal of the higher command by the formation from the Divisional artillery of independent brigades. The scheme also involved the universal adoption of the 6-gun battery. The number of the brigades was reduced to 3. Two of these, each consisting of three 6-gun 18-pounder batteries and <pb xml:id="n177" n="141"/>one 6-gun howitzer battery, were left under the immediate command of the Divisional Commander. The third, comprising the same number of batteries and guns, was placed under the control of the Army Conmander and called an “Army” Brigade. The 4th Brigade was therefore broken up. Its batteries (the 8th 10th 14th and newly-joined 16th), losing their individuality, were incorporated in the batteries of the 1st and 3rd Brigades, and its Headquarters Staff was split up among the various artillery units. Lt.-Col. Falla shortly afterwards took over the command of the D.A.C., vice Lt.-Col. Gard'ner, who received an appointment on the Corps Staff. The 2nd Brigade, detached at the time with the Australians at Armentières, was designated the “Army” Brigade. To bring it up to establishment an additional 18-pounder and howitzer battery were required, and pending its completion it was at the first opportunity withdrawn into reserve. A portion of the D.A.C. was allotted as the “Army” Brigade Ammunition Column.</p>
        <p>On the first day of the New Year a change was effected also in the organisation of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, with the object of bringing the sister territorial battalions into the one formation and facilitating administration, especially with regard to the transfer of officers. The 1st Brigade was reconstituted with the 2 Auckland and the 2 Wellington battalions, and the 2nd Brigade with the 2 Canter-bury and the 2 Otago battalions. Such severance of old associations, cemented by common experience in the trenches and on the battlefield, must inevitably cause regrets. Just previously, as we have seen, the 2nd Brigade had relieved the 1st Brigade in the Cordonnerie subsector, and now, as 1st Canterbury and 1st Otago moved up from reserve to the front area, their Wellington comrades "turned out" in Sailly to do them honour, and their band played them through. In the same month the Rifle Brigade received notification that II.R.H. the Duke of Connaught had consented to be their Colonel-in-Chief.</p>
        <p>Throughout this period the battalions of the 2 brigades in the line, during their weekly turn of duty in support, formed working parties for the necessary maintenance of the trenches and for wiring. Under cover of the dull misty weather the infantry and the Pioneers construted miles of splendid successive bands of entanglements before the subsidiary line or rear trenches of the Divisional system, and it was with no little chagrin that they read, in the spring <pb xml:id="n178" n="142"/>of 1918, of the Gcrmans forcing their way through the Portugese garrison with little opposition.</p>
        <p>For the brigade in reserve, in addition to normal military training and constant anti-gas drill in the recently issued small box respirators a comprehensive scheme of recreational training as laid down by the Army was carried out, and competitions were arranged in football, cross-country running and boxing. To organise this training, Lt.-Col. Plugge in January relinquished command, of 1st Auckland. Major (now Lt.-Col.)<name type="person" key="name-207244">S. S. Allen</name>, the next available senior officer in the regiment, was at the moment absent on duty, and the com mand of 1st Auckland temporarily devolved on his brother, Major R. C. Allen.<note xml:id="fn68-142" n="1"><p>p. 150.</p></note> The scheme of recreational training, providing for the participation of all ranks in manly exercises, was a welcome change from drill, and proved a valuable benefit to health and morale. With the same object, rest houses for officers and men, canteens, a cinema, and Theatrical troupe were organised by the Division. Musical elocutionary and literary competitions, concerts and 1ectures were also provided by the New Zealand Y.M.C.A., who began at this time to extend their beneficent activities on a large scale.</p>
        <p>In somewhat raw wintry weather, constant efforts were made to preserve the health and increase the comfort of the soldier, and in weekly administrative conferences held at Divisional Headquarters this object was borne steadily in view. In the rear areas, wherever high winds had stripped the leaking roofs of billets, the tiles were repaired, and a constant supply of fresh dry straw was procured. To prevent contamination of the floors and straw by mud, the vicinity was drained, and scrapers and duckboards were provided. In the trenches, efficient drainning was of the utmost importance, and formed one of the chief tasks of the Engineers. For this work and for garrison duties, thigh gum boots were issued, and arrangements made whereby each man in the trenches had a dry pair of socks every day. The wagon lines in wet weather were often quagmires, but the animals were protected as much as possible by the construction of brick standings and malthoid roofs. Administrative developments may be illustrated by a reference to the establishment in the Division at this time of an officers' club, a hairdressing shop, a watch repairing ship, and a printing-press. A survey of the steps taken to eliminate waste in the distribution of <pb xml:id="n179" n="143"/>equipment clothing and foodstuffs, and in the preservation and useful employment of man-power, though unsuitable for discussion here, would be of profound interest to the student of economies. The efficiency attained was reflected, to take but one example, in the outstanding position which the Division occupied in the statistical lists published regularly by the Corps to show the returns of fat and dripping sent to the base for conversion into glycerine for munitions.<note xml:id="fn69-143" n="1"><p>The II. Anzac Medical Officers' Training School, which owed its inception to Col. Begg, was a particularly useful institution, and was copied elsewhere. in the British Armies. A Divisional school of instruction in Field Santitation was opened on 8th January.</p></note></p>
        <p>About this time a very remarkable personality was associated with the Division for. some weeks, in the person of a fourth-class chaplain well above military years. Daily he might have been seen flying up in a side-car to the trenches, visiting the foremost saps, on more than one occasion narrowly escaping German explosive, and inspiring and endearing himself to all ranks alike by his indomitable fortitude that triumphed over ill-health and by his unaffected manliness and lovable character. That unassuming padre was the Right Rev. A. W. Cleary, Roman Catholic Bishop of Auckland.</p>
        <p>The first active operation of the new year was carried out by the 2nd Rifles on 7th January 2 officers and 80 men, under Capt. J. B. Bennett, accompanied by 4 sappers, made a successful raid on a strongly garrisoned point in the enemy line. known as the Lozenge. The raiders entering the trenches were. led by Lt. L,. I. Manning and 2nd Lt. D. C. Bowler. The 4th 13th and 14th Batteries supported them. Moving forward, as soon as darkness fell, across No Man's Land, they crossed one of the innumerable channels of the country by a specially made bridge. Scouts crawled up and examining the wire. found the wide gap made by our mortars still open. The raiders thereupon passed through it in 3 assaulting columns. The borrow-ditch in front of the parapet was wide and 4-feet deep, but it did not suffice to hold them back, and they plunged unhesitatingly through the icy water. The parapet had been demolished and the trench partly filled in by the effect of our mortar and artillery fire. Here and there broken rails of the tram-way line running parallel to the front trench stood up on end in air. The 3 parties at once went to their assigned objectives.</p>
        <p>Of the right column a blocking party had not gone 30 yards before they met 7 Germans. The corporal in <choice><orig>com-<pb xml:id="n180" n="144"/>mand</orig><reg>command</reg></choice> was wounded by a bomb, and the leading bayonet man killed. Hearing the bomb and a shout for assistance, the main party, who, led by Sergt. R. G. Bates, had been exploring a communication trench, hurried back and attacked the Germans with bombs. The struggle continued for 8 minutes before the enemy was overcome. 3 Germans were killed, 3 held up their hands, and 1 escaped. Beyond the block a machine gun opened fire, but it was silenced by bombs.</p>
        <p>The centre party, working down their allotted trench, found a 6-feet high concrete sentry-post dugout with a domed roof, and took the 2 occupants prisoners. Further on were 2 large concrete dugouts. with a winding stairway of wood leading uderground. The first was empty, but in the next sparks of fire issued from an iron chimney. Summoned to surrender, 3 Germans crawled out submissively. As their captors were dealing with these, 3 others emerged and tried to escape rearwards. The New Zealand rifles cracked out simultaneously, and the stumbling figures fell headlong against the trench. Terrified by these shots and the rough imperious commands of the raiders, the rest of the occupants refused to leave their shelter. Two mortar bombs were rolled in, and their demolished dwelling became their tomb. From another dugout further prisoners were taken, and 7 other. prisoners who showed fight were summarily killed. The left party found the dugouts and machine gun emplacements in their area destroyed by artillery fire, but had the satisfaction of shooting 7 and bombing 3 Germans in the open sap. In all, the raiders found 16 bodies of Germans already killed by artillery fire, and themselves killed a certain 26. 19 prisoners were captured.</p>
        <p>On the following day (8th January) the Rifle Brigade was relived in the Boutillerie subsector by the 1st Brigade The weather now turned much colder. There was a heavy fall of snow and an unusual spell of hard frost, in which temperatures were recorded lower than any experienced since 1884. Snow veiled the shellholes and showed up the Australian dead in No Man's Land still more distinctly.<note xml:id="fn70-144" n="1"><p>Many paybooks and identifications were brought in from the dead.</p></note> Even with white overalls patrolling became difficult. Enemy guns remained quiescent and enemy patrols inactive except for one brief encounter in front of the 2nd Wellington wire, when they captured one of our patrols. On 24th January the 2nd Brigade in the Cordonneric subsector <pb xml:id="n181" n="145"/>was relieved by the Rifle Brigade. They were not, however, destined to remain long in reserve, for 2 days later the 34th Division on the left of the New Zealanders was suddenly withdrawn from the line, to be held in readiness to counter an anticipated German attack. Thereupon the 3rd Australian Division extended its flank to include their left subsector in Rue de Bois, and the 2nd Brigade set out at a moment's notice on the 10-mile march from Estaires to relieve the right brigade in Bois Grenier.<note xml:id="fn71-145" n="1"><p>The infantry reliefs were conducted with exceptional rapidity. Thus 1st Canterbury. receiving warning orders at I p.m., had taken over their portion of the front line by 7 p. m.</p></note> Thus all 3 New Zealand infantry brigades were now in the line. The 3rd Artillery Brigade moved down the river to support the new subsector, and their place was taken by the 2nd (Army) Brigade from Armentières. It was the first occasion on which a New Zealand artillery brigade had carried out a double relief on the same day, and the 3rd Brigade had every reason to congratulate itself on the smoothness and expedition with which the moves were effected.</p>
        <p>Active patrolling continued. The action of a small 2nd Rifles' patrol of 14 men, under Cpl. S. F. Hanson, at the end of the month, deserves special notice. Previous reconnaissance had located a German post at the head of one of the enemy's communication trenches, and the patrol set out to capture or destroy the sentries. The frost still continued, and the ground was covered with snow. Clad in white over-alls, the patrol lay in ambush in convenient shellholes till the 3-minute preparatory light trench mortar bombard-ment ceased. Then leaving 4 men on the parapet to safe-guard their rear, they rushed the trench. The 7 sentries in the bay were killed. Close by was a large strongly-built dugout with a heavy timber door. It was fitted with bunks, in which were a dozen or more Germans. A revolver shot into its interior brought out 2 prisoners. Bombs were thrown into it, and the remainder of the occupants were presumably killed. Hanson and his men had now been 4 minutes in the trench, and before definite information could be obtained the bombs of hurrying German reinforcements began to fall about them. The leader blew his whistle, and the party withdrew. It was well that they had guarded their exit, for a few enterprising Germans had crawled along the parapet to cut them off. The covering party waited in composure for the enemy, bombed them and killed 2, and highly satisfied with their venture, the patrol returned with <pb xml:id="n182" n="146"/>their 2 prisoners and without a casualty. One of the captives was a Bavarian. The other stated that he belonged to the 11th Regiment, but bore no identifications.</p>
        <p>A 1st Wellington party, under 2nd Lt. S. G. Guthrie, M.C., was equally successful in the early morning of 3rd February in the Angle. No Man's Land was slippery with ice, and the raiders, though in white smocks and calico-covered helmets, were visible to our front line sentries all the way across the frozen ditches. The Germans, however, failed to notice them even while they lay cutting the strands of wire that had survived the previous mortar bombardment. The raid was covered by artillery, and machine guns swept the flanks of the Angle. On the raiders' rushing up the parapet they were wildly fired at by 3 sentries in a lean-to shelter protected by wire, but on a bomb being thrown, these at once surrendered to L.-Sergt. W. A. Francis.</p>
        <p>The enemy retaliated on the following night with a some-what severe gas shelling of Fleurbaix, in which we incurred 40 casualties, mostly slight, and a week later with one of his equally rare and unsuccessful raids. He selected a small salient in the 4th Rifles' line. His effort was preceded by 2 days' mortar activity on our wire, turning the white level surface into a chaotic mass of black pits, and thus giving indications of his intention. At 9.2 p.m. (8th February) an intense artillery and minenwerfer bombardment opened without warning, and our parapets were swept by machine gun and rifle fire. 5 minutes later 2 green flares shot up from the German trenches. On our front line the fire ceased, but intensified on the support line. Our troops at once stood to arms. Within 4 minutes the counter-attacking platoon and the reserve company were issued with extra bombs, and bombing squads had manned prearranged positions in the communication trenches. The S.0.S. call was sent to the artillery and the signal rocket fired, and instantaneously came the swish of our shrapnel into No Man's Land and the thud of our machine guns. The raiders scattered, A patrol, sent, into No Man's Land immediately after the bombardment, found no dead but a large number of grenades. Till morning it was not thought that the enemy had crossed our wire, but then it appeared that one or two had entered a disused gap and bombed an old mineshaft. A bag of wire-cutters and bombs had been discarded, and there were manifest traces of a hurried withdrawal. The excellence of our infantry dispositions, the <pb xml:id="n183" n="147"/>admirable rapidity with which both artillery and machine guns opened, the slight losses sustained in the bombardment, and the energy with which the gaps in the wire were at once filled by ready-made circles of loose tangled wire known as "gooseberries," all reflected the highest credit on the soldierly qualities of the defence.</p>
        <p>Four nights later a further half-hearted and abortive effort was made at the head of the "avenue" which separated the 2 battalions of the 1st Brigade. Opposite the ("avenue," on the preceding night, one of our officers had just escaped capture by a German patrol. Our machine gun fire had been rearranged to command the approaches more effectively. On this spot, shortly after dark on 12th February, a severe minenwerfer bombardment was directed, which was maintained with half-hour intervals till midnight. The hostile minenwerfer were engaged by light trench mortars and howitzers in accordance with a preconcerted programme. They persisted, however, and just before midnight the enemy's artillery co-operated in a full-throated roar, perfectly timed and startling. A listening post brought in warning of the approach of the expected raiders. The S.O.S. call was given. Some 15 Germans reached the parapet of an abandoned derelict salient and were at once bombed by a party of 1st Auckland that worked towards them from the flank. The raiders withdrew immediately, and suffered some casualties in No Man's Land from our machine gun fire. The policy of the thin line of defence once more proved its value, and despite the severity of the bombardment only a handful of lhe garrison were wounded.</p>
        <p>Since the first week in January there had been up to this time continuously frosty weather with occasional falls of snow. For days on end the ground had been covered by a white shroud. Round the guns, movement had to be restricted to avoid the making of tracks, and the difficulty of concealing positions was increased, for the blast of a firing gun melts the snow for. an area of about 15 or 20 yards, leaving a black smear in the white very noticeable to observation from the air, and on which falling snow will not lie for days. This dry, bracing cold had been most beneficial to health.</p>
        <p>With the thaw<note xml:id="fn72-147" n="1"><p>On the eve of a thaw, to avoid irreparable amage to roads, orders were issued reducing the use of transport to a minimum, lessening loads by half:, and confining traffic, to the pavé highways. On receipt of a warning telegram. “Prepare Thaw Restrictions,” the C.R.A., C.R.E., and S.S.O. (Senior Supply Officer) established 3 days' reserve forward dumps.</p></note> that set in about the middle of February the Division began its preparations for a move to a more <pb xml:id="n184" n="148"/>northerly sector, where it would be called on to undertake active operations in the spring. Already at the beginning of February representatives of a "New Army" Division, still in England, (the 57th), had for experience been living with the New Zealanders in this quiet area, where on 4 days these had the unprecedented experience of wholly escaping casualties. On 14th February, an infantry brigade of the 57th Division began a gradual relief of the Rifle battalions. A similar partial relief of the artillery followed. In the course of the instruction thus given in familiarising the new-comers with trench warfare, a 1st Canterbury patrol, accompanied by an officer and n.c.0. of the English troops, had the misfortune to be ambushed at the apex of the Bridoux Salient.</p>
        <p>After the Rifle Brigade, the relief of the 1st Brigade followed, but before they said farewell to their winter scctor, a last smashing blow was planned against the enemy. It was to take the form of a fulldress raid, with minute preparation and overwhelming artillery support. It was to be on a larger scale than the Division had hitherto undertaken or were afterwards to undertake. 2nd Auckland was entrusted with the mission. The time fixed for the raid was dawn on 21st February. The 500 raiders, who were under the command of Major A. G. Mackenzie, D.S.O., were trained intensively, first by sections, then by platoons and by companies on a replica trench system laid well in rear, cut to a depth of 6 inches and then disguised by straw from prying aeroplanes. For a fortnight previously the medium trench mortars were engaged in breaking the wire, nightly reerected by the spider-like industry of the enemy. On the previous evening the 2nd Wellington garrison bridged the ditches and creeks of No Man's Land, and with memories of the evacuation from Anzac padded the duckhoards in the front line and the communication trenches with straw, over which hessian fabric was nailed down.</p>
        <p>The plan of the Auckland raiders was to assault the front line with the Hauraki and Waikato companies in 1 wave, and the support line with the Auckland and North Auckland companies in 2 waves. Sixteen sappers were attached. The mass of artillery supporting the raid included over sixty 18-pounders, over twenty 4.5-in. howitzers, four 60-pounders, and four 6-in. howitzers. In addition to the light mortars, 1 heavy and 3 batteries of medium mortars were engaged. A special co-operating programme was arranged for the
					<pb xml:id="n185"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP022a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP022a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP022a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Bivouacs in Ploegsteert Wood</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP022b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP022b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP022b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Bivouacs in Ploegsteert Wood</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n186"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP023a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP023a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP023a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Victims Of Enemy Aircraft</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP023b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP023b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP023b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Training for "Messines"</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n187" n="149"/>machine and Lewis guns, the former barraging 300 yards beyond the find objective. Prior to zero our garrison in the vicinity was withdrawn.</p>
        <p>At 5.45 a.m. on the appointed morning, mortar projectiles fell with shattering crashes on either flank of the assaulted position. On the position itself our shrapnel lashed the parapet to force the enemy's heads down, lifting after 2½ minutes in accordance with the raiders' movernents to the support line, and. after a further 4½ minutes, to form a box barrage. The garrison were standing to arms and lined the fire-steps thickly. The storm of shell played havoc with them. The Aucklanders found the wire well cut, and all were over the parapet and among the demoralised Germans in the front trench by the time that the enemy's barrage fell in response to a multitude of red flares. As soon as ever his guns opened, our heavy howitzers broke into intense counter-battery work, depriving the enemy's fire, which lifted some 20 minutes later from our front to our support line, of much of its vigour and most of its accuracy. On the German second trench the assault was equally successful, though here a more stubborn resistance was shown by the enemy, some of whom fought with bitter fury. The raiders stayed half an hour searching the dugouts, blowing up bomb stores and machine guns, and completing their task of destruction. Then, showing great judgmmt in passing through the hostile barrage, they returned to our trenches. Nearly 200 Gcrmans had been killed by the artillery. and raiders. All officer and 43 men of the 77th and 78th Landwehr Regiments and of a freshly-arrived Bavarian regiment were made prisoners.</p>
        <p>Our losses wcrr unfortunately heavy. An officer and 17 men had been killed, and 6 officers and over 70 men wounded. In bringing back the wounded over No Man's Land the stretcher-bearers showed their wonted devotion, hut not a few of these casualties were inflicted by enemy shells after the Aucklanders had returned to their own lines. In addition, 60 men were missing. These for the most part belonged to the companies that had assaulted the support line. They had been warned of a derelict trench before the real support trench. The morning chanced to be exceptionally misty and dark. Under these unlooked-for conditions the raiders might have fared better had the hour of attack been later. As it was, in the pall of smoke and dust, and owing to the battered state of the ground, they passed over the derelict trench without noticing it, and taking the real trench for the <pb xml:id="n188" n="150"/>derelict one, pressed on beyond into our barrage., where they were killed or cut off. Nothing is easier. than to lose sense of direction under these circumstances. A wounded officer returning with some prisoners found himself going away from our line towards what appeared to be 2 overturned and derelict German field guns, whereupon the prisoners complaisantly put him right and accompanied him back to our trenches.</p>
        <p>Apart from these casualties, the raid had been a conspicuous success. 2nd Auckland received, amid other flattering messages. the congratulations of the Commander-in-Chief, and were later specially inspected by General Plummer 3000 rounds were fired by the light trench mortar batteries. Two guns burst, and all emplacements were exposed to uninterrupted shell fire, but the staunch personnel stuck to their work with their customary fortitude and determination. The rounds fired by the Divisional Artillery alone exceeded 8000.</p>
        <p>After this exploit the 1st Brigade was relieved on the following day by troops of the 57th Division. On 23rd February the artillery completed their relief in the line, and on the 25th the last remaining units of the 2nd Infantry Brigade handed over the Bois Grenier trenches, and the command of the Sailly sector passed to the new Division. The heavy and medium mortar batteries remained in the line pending the return of the 57th Division's batteries from training; similarly, while the Division moved northwards to its new sector, the 2nd (Army) Artillery Brigade remained in rest in the Fleurbaix area, completing its establishment as sections arrived from England, and supporting on occasion raids by the 57th and 3rd Australian Divisions.</p>
        <p>Just prior to the relief of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, General Braithwaite had returned to it from Sling.<note xml:id="fn73-150" n="1"><p>p. 139.</p></note> His duties in England were assumed by <name type="person" key="name-130049">General Earl Johnston</name>, and in the latter's place Lt.-Col. Brown was appointed Brigadier-General to command the 1st Brigade. Command of 2nd Auckland was assumed by <name type="person" key="name-207244">Lt.-Col. S. S. Allen</name>, the appointment of his brother, Major (now Lt.-Col.) R. C. Allen in the 1st Battalion being now confirmed.</p>
        <p>On relief by the 57th Division troops, the 3rd Brigade had marched to staging billets at Outtersteene. Thence on 22nd February, crossing the Belgian frontier, they relieved the left brigade of the 25th Division in the IX. Corps area <choice><orig>immed-<pb xml:id="n189" n="151"/>iately</orig><reg>immediately</reg></choice> north of the Lys. The 1st Brigade took over the right subsector on the 25th. On the following day the 2nd Brigade marched into reserve, and the command passed to the New Zealand Division, whose headquarters were now established at Steenwerck. The 1st and 3rd Artillery Brigades were in position by the end of the month, after. the 1st Brigade had supported a successful raid by the 3rd Australians on the trenches east of Armentières. The 25th Division went back for offensive training behind St. Omer. The sector was transferred from the IX. Corps to II. Anzae, whose line now extended from in front of Sailly to St. Yves, a distance of approximately 13 miles. The trenches were necessarily held thinly. On the right, in the Cordonnerie, Boutillerie and Bois Grenier subsectors, was the newly.-arrived 57th Division; the central subsectors, Rue de Bois, 1'Epinette and Houplines, were held by the: 3rd Australin Division; and now the New Zealanders were extending their knowledge of the Lys flats in the subsectors of Le Touquet and Ploegstecrt, on the left bank of the river.</p>
        <p>In their new positions the trenches were of the poorest description. Accommodation was hopelessly inadequate, and drainage had been neglected. The thaw made conditions doubly uncomfortable. Not merely unoccupied "gaps," but portions of the fire trenches also were under water. The communication trenches were narrow, deep in mud, and all but impassable. There was a humiliating contrast between the rnassive German entanglements and the scanty shreds of wire in front of our own trenches. The parapet was low and in bad repair, and the enemy enjoyed marked superiority in sniping. The artillery positions were in a similarly poor condition, and sections of the 4th and 13th Batteries were practically in the open. For the troops in support there were few or no villages to provide billets, but this involved no hardship, for the men were as comfortably and, from a medical point of view, more satisfactorily housed in the many hutted camps about Romarin and elsewhere.</p>
        <p>Nor was the welcome given to the Rifle Brigade in these miserable trenches an enviable one, for on the very night (22nd/23rd February) on which they entered the line they were raided by the enemy. The relief of the 4th Battalion had been delayed through the activity of enemy mortars on a section of the front trench at St. Yves Hill. When at length the 25th Division troops had quitted the area, the company commander detailed a platoon to stop the breaches <pb xml:id="n190" n="152"/>in the parapet and clear out the debris that blocked the trench. Despite the fatigue of the march, the men set to work with a will. They were, however, interfered with by minenwerfer bombs dropping at odd intervals on the spot. Cpl. J. McQuillan, of' the 3rd Light Trench Mortar Battery, despite this fire, kept his Stokes in action for 45 minutes, firing over 100 rounds. About 4 a.m., a deluge of shrapnel swept the position, and a number of mortar shells exploded in quick succession. Patience being exhausted, artillery support was invoked, which silenced the minenwerfer. The work of clearance continued. At 5.45 am., however, a perfect tornado of shells "rumjars" and "pineapples" burst afresh on the same section of the line. The working party was ordered to withdraw, and on either flank the harassed defenders manned the parapets. An ex-ceptionally heavy fog hung over the swamps, and they could discern nothing. Nor could the green Verey light of the S.O.S. signal be seen by the artillery or battalion observers, and all telephonic communication had already been cut. Thus no S.O.S. support was given.</p>
        <p>After a few minutes of fierce bombardment, the enemy's fire lifted from the front trench and fell in a circle round the doomed sector, where the mortars had obliterated wire and trench, hemming it in and hampering the approach of supports. At the same moment a body of 200 Germans rushed forward and forced an entry. The raiders' hopes of securing a large number of prisoners mere not to be realised. Only the working party was in the battered fire-bays, and the majority of them had managed to withdraw. One or two still remaincd. One of these had been wounded, and lay outstretched in the bottom of the trench. Some 40 Germans ran over him, and one in passing, taking him for dead, cut off the shoulder-strap of his greatcoat. Four others they took prisoners, but the raiders were not stout-hearted enough to push their assault home.</p>
        <p>In 5 minutes, when our men on the flanks, penetrating the box barrage, got in touch with them, they withdrew without offering resistance, leaving behind them some mobile charges and many stick grenades. Our rifle fire and bombs had killed and wounded some of the enemy, and these, except for one dead man, they took with them, together with their prisoners. One of these, RfImn. J. Emmerson, who had been wounded, escaped, but was again recaptured by a second party, some 80 strong, of the returning raiders. Near <pb xml:id="n191" n="153"/>the enemy wire, Emmerson saw another chance of making a bid for freedom. He tripped up his burly guardian, wrenched himself free, and in a flash, despite his wound, dashed back for our lines. The Germans opened fire and hit him in 2 fresh places, but struggling on finally succeeded in reaching our lines in extreme exhaustion.</p>
        <p>The documents found on the dead German were at once forwarded to the Army Intelligence Staff and established the presence on the Western front of a Division last identified in Roumania. Our casualties, in addition to these 3 prisoners, were 6 men killed and an officer and 20 other ranks wounded. Very considerable damage was done to the already wretched trenches.</p>
        <p>Nor were the 1st Brigade to be immune. Just before dawn, on 28th February, the Germans attempted a raid, accompanied by their usual shelling, on a Strong Point known as Glasgow Redoubt, in the 2nd Auckland trenches, Only half a dozen of the enemy, however, reached an empty bay. These were at once bombed out by the occupants of the next bay, and fled, leaving one of their number wounded, who died shortly afterwards. In their retreat they were pursued by fire and suffered further casualties. 10 men of 2nd Auckland lost their lives, and 15 were wounded in the bombardment. A further German attempt, on 9th March, was crushed by artillery.</p>
        <p>Snow fell again during the first week of March, rendering the tasks of working parties more arduous. Their strenuous toil, and the labours of the Engineers and Pioneers, had already made a new world of the sector. The wire was stronger, and the trenches were drained and defensible. The enemy snipers, too, were now effectively mastered by the New Zealand marksmen. It was common and inevitable experience in the Army, however, that for good or ill troops should reap what they had not sown, and the labour bestowed on the position was to benefit others. On 13th March, in view of coming events, the Corps front was extended north-wards to the road from Wnlverghem to Wytschaete. The New Zealand Division side-stepped northwards to relieve part of the 36th (Ulster) Division on the southern flank of the IX. Corps. In consequence of this move, the 57th Division took over the Rue de Bois subsector from the 3rd Australian Division to enable the latter to relieve the New Zealanders in the Le Touquet and Ploegsteert trenches. Each of the 2 southern Divisions thus now manned 4 brigade subsectors <pb xml:id="n192" n="154"/>with 2 brigades, holding 1 in reserve, while the New Zealanders occupied the 3 subsectors of St. Yves, Messines, and Wulverghem. These last were now divided into 2 brigade fronts, north and south of the river Douve. The 1st Brigade on the right in Le Touquet, wholly relieved by Australians, went into reserve. The Rifle Brigade side-stepped to the Douve, and the Wulverghem subsector north of the Douve was taken over by the 2nd Brigade, who now came into the line. In its period of reserve it had been training on the hill-slopes near Bailleul, and had been reviewed on 9th March, with the 3rd Australian Division's reserve brigade, by the Right Hon. Walter Long, Secretary for the Colonies. The artillery followed into their new positions shortly afterwards. Divisional Headquarters remained at Steenwerck.</p>
        <p>In their new area the New Zealanders were to remain, with various minor adjustments, for the 3 months preceding the Messines offensive. Half the long straggling Ploegsteert village and the northern part of the Ploegsteert Forest behind the ruins of St. Yves were still iucluded in the Divisional area. This wood had been the scene of bitter fighting in 1914. It was thin and except where blocked by wire entanglements passable for infantry everywhere. The dominating features of the country were, on the one hand, the gaunt ridge crowned by the houses and the ancient and massive church of Messines, which had been German territory since November 1914, and which now half-faced and half-enfiladed our trenches; and on the other hand, behind our own line, the beautiful treeclad hill, Rossignol, or Hill 63, so called from its height in metres. Instead of the unbroken flats, with which the Division had been familiar through the winter, the country behind the front area was markedly rolling. The hills themselves produccd their characteristic effect of exhilaration and adventure, and from Hill 63 the distant view of the great bluff of Kemmel, of the picturesque Mont des Cats, with its monastery, and of other abrupt and isolated eminences, steeped in blue haze, was instinct with romantic beauty. On the steep southern side of Hill 63, screened from German observation and inaccessible to hostile shrapnel, the Army had built on the edge of Ploegsteert Wood log-houses such as Stafford House and Limavady Lodge, used as billets for supporting battalions. And at Hyde Park Corner, where the road from Ploegsteert to Messines began to mount the south-eastern shoulder of the hill, deep shelters, known as the Catacombs, and capable of holding a <pb xml:id="n193" n="155"/>weak brigade, were opened by General Plumer in November 1916. That road, on mounting the ridge, came under enemy view, and was of little service to the New Zealanders. More useful was the road which leading from Romarin and adjoining farms, now occupied by Brigade Headquarters, turned to the north near Red Lodge and crossed the western slopes of the hill by a wayside Shrine and the "White Gates" of the ruined chateau. Here it joined a cart track that ran across the fields from the hamlet of Le Rossignol back in the direction of Neuve Eglise.</p>
        <p>The defence of Hill 63 was of the utmost importance. On its retention depended the safety of the Division's new positions and those of the Australians to the south down to the Lys, It formed the northern pivot of our defences in case of a German "break-through" about Fleurbaix. The Armentières system guarded against its being outflanked from the south, and it was from a blow northwards at our lines from the Messines Ridge up to the salient round ypres, that its secure possession was most likely to be endangered. It was known at this time that the Russian disintegration had enabled the Germans to accumulate on the Western front adequate reserves for offensive action, and it was believed that such action was actually being contemplatcd, either to forestall the threatened Allied blow or to neutralisc it When deliverd. Should an offensive be launched, this was the sector of the whole British front considered most likely to be affected. If it were delivered on a grand scale, the exposed positions in the ypres salient might be found untenable. Should they be abandoned, Hill 63 and the Neuve Eglise ridge in rear furnished a pivot connecting the present first-line system with the second line, of which Kemmel formed the corner-stone. The northern face of the hill, therefore, was already defended by successive lines of trenches and a. line of small self-contained redoubts, but a new rear line was dug and fresh wire erected by thr 1st Brigade to join the G.H.Q. system and the so-called Wulverghem Switch at the village of that name. Leading features of the defence policy were the carefully-concealed and well-protected machine gun emplacements and the shell-proof cover to protect infantry garrisons during a bombardment. On the subfeature of St. Yves Hill, lying just to the north-east of Ploegsteert Wood in the right brigade subsector, a maze of trenches afforded a striking example of the ill co-ordinated labours of successive tenants and the destructiveness of German artillery.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n194" n="156"/>
        <p>Apart from the screen afforded by Hill 63, the whole country lay open to the enemy's observation from the ridge. He looked straight down the important road from Neuve Eglise to Wulverghem, so that wheeled traffic was impossible in the daytime, and parties moving up to the trenches had to move at intervals and in single file, hugging the side of the road. A little way up froiu the village was a gum-boot store, where working parties drew gum-boots for the trenches, and any assembly here at once attracted fire. Our own observation posts on Hill 63, which lies a few feet lower than the Messines Ridge, similarly commanded an extensive view east-wards down the Douve valley and along the southern slopes of the ridge to the Warncton church spires.</p>
        <p>Behind the opposing lines the country was on either side covered with hedges and spinners, and the roads screened by trees. The centre of the Divisional area was marked by the Douve, which running eastwards falls into the Lys at Warneton. In summer it is an insignificant shallow stream, some 10 feet wide, but in the winter rains it rises and becomes a serious obstacle to military. operations, especially near the front line trenches, where it floods its banks and at times forms a sheet of water 40 feet wide. Hence at this point there alternative defensive systems, called respectively Summer and Winter Trenches, those in the flat nearest the stream not being held in the winter months. North of the Douve and directly facing Messines, the ground behind our support line sloped up to the rise of Midland Farm, which, forming a sister bulwark to Hill 63, was of considerable tactical importance and was correspondingly fortified with earthworks and concealed machine guns.</p>
        <p>Among the trees and the trenches lay the shattered farms of now exiled Belgian pcasauts. Most of their names, if ever known, had been forgotten, and they were rechristened by troops in the early days of the war with titles which reflected the humour and the realism of the soldier: Donnington Hall, Mac's Ruin, Dead Cow Farm, Stinking Farm, and so on. These were in the front line company areas; somewhat further back Battalion Headquarters were located in the shacks behind Hill 63 or up the Douve valley, at St. Quentin's Cabaret, for example, or in the concrete quarters under the shell of La Plus Douve Farm buildings.</p>
        <p>Close to La Plus Douve was Ration Farm, where after dusk the battalion limbers came down the hill from "White Gates" with rations stores. and letters. It was here that in <pb xml:id="n195"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP024a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP024a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP024a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Messines and Ypres</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n196" n="157"/>April a 5.9-in. shell exploded a dump of 100 mortar bombs, inflicting casualties and causing an enormous crater in the road. The incident was mentioned in the German communiqué, which with misplaced indignation protested against our abuse of the Red Cross flag and justified the shelling of the supposed dressing-station by the continuous movement at it and by this explosion. Actually, however, the dressing-station was a clear 300 yards away. Transport drivers and carrying parties at the farm were for some days after exposed to bursts of fire till some fresh provocation distracted the attention of the enemy artillery elsewhere.</p>
        <p>About 1000 yards down stream from these farms past our front line the larch-fringed Douve entered the German trenches at La Petite Douve Ferme, where the enemy line projected sharply into No Man's Land. This salient was the most advanced and exposed position of the Messiness defences. La Petite Douve was the objective in the autumn of 1915 of the first of these operations that came. to be known later as trench raids. Owing to the proximity of the lines about the ruins of the farm, mining operations had at an early date been started on both sides. The British, however, had allowed the Douve to flood their shaft at this particular point, but they maintained activity underground in the vicinity, and kept a careful scrutiny of German progress, which it was anticipated would break into their own abandoned works. On 10th January 1917 the expected happened. The water in our shaft dropped with a sudden rush 70 to 80 feet, and must at once have flooded the German galleries and drowned miserably the Silesian miners. Laboriously and patienty, as was his wont, the German undertook; the Sisyphan work of unwatering. He continued it for some weeks till he realised that he was vainly pumping the running water of the Douve. From this point the German lines bent back northwards to the lower slopes of the Messines Ridge, which they followed on a level some 15 yards higher than our own front line. The Steenebeek, a small tributary of the Douve from the north, flowed through No Man's Land between the opposing trenches, entering our lines a short distance before it mingled its waters with the larger stream.</p>
        <p>Towards the end of March, on 2 successive days, the Germans made attempts at the extreme flanks of our Line to secure identifications. At 4 a.m. on the 23rd the 2nd Rifles, on the right, were suddenly bombarded with a hail of mortar <pb xml:id="n197" n="158"/>bombs fired in flights of 6 or 10, swooping down 60 to the minute. The box barrage was picked out after dawn in the snow in a regular line round the position. Three parties attacked our trenches. One that reached the wire was dispersed by bombs and Lewis gun fire, the second was beaten back in No Man's Land by machine gun and rifle fire, and with the help of the 1st 12th and 13th Batteries, The third entered. an unoccupied portion where a small working party emptied their rifles at them. Two of the raiders were seen to collapse, but their companions managed to bear them away with them. The fire had been heavy on the support line, where all our casualties were incurred. 4 men were killed and an officer and 9 men wounded. Otherwise the raid was ineffective.</p>
        <p>On the following morning, at the same hour, 100 Germans attacked our left flank at the junction of 2nd Otago and the Ulster troops of the 36th Division. An unusually heavy bombardment of artillery and mortars broke all telephonic communication, but, 'the S.O.S. rocket was answered promptly and efficiently by the artillery. The Germans, advancing in single file, were raked by the flank Otago Lewis guns, which cut noticeable gaps in their line. Pressing On, however, with great determination, they reached our wire. At one point they were checked by bombs, but in another they effected an entry and captured one of the garrison. The Otago bombers on the flanks immediately counter-attacked, and after an exchange of bombs drove them out. Conspicuous gallantry was shown also by the Lewis gunners. Remaining at their posts, they did everything possible to prevent an entry and to harass the raiders throughout the bombardment. In one team of 5, for example, 3 were killed and a fourth wounded, but the remaining man worked his gun on the bloodstained sandbags with unflinching resolution. 10 men of Otago were killed and 12 wounded in the bombardment, which did material damage to the trenches. Pools of blood on the enemy side of the parapet showed that the raiders had not gone unscathed.</p>
        <p>During the day the enemy bombarded our batteries severely, 300 rounds of high-explosive being fired into the 4th and 13th Batteries' positions. A gun of the 13th Battery was damaged and 500 rounds of 18-pounder ammunition exploded. The 11th Battery suffered similarly the following day, and in the evening the damaged gun-pits were observed and no doubt photographed by a German aeroplane, which descended to within 200 feet over the guns.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n198" n="159"/>
        <p>At the end of March the weather, which had been milder and showed promise of summer, changed to heavy gales, accompanied by frost snow and hail. The 25th Division had now returned to the 11. Anzac area as Army reserve from the Tilques training grounds. Circumstances did not permit of the New Zealand Division's going out as a whole, but the different artillery and infantry brigades went in turn. In the 12 days' training for the forthcoming offensive nothing was left undone to achieve realism. The ground at the training area happened to conform with the actual position to be assaulted, and replicas of the whole German trenches and our assembly. ones were cut out a foot deep to scale. In these, battalions and brigades rehearsed the delicate operations of the assembly and attack, and attained an invaluable certainity of purpose, The final full-dress rehearsals were witnessd and criticised by the Second Army Commander and his Staff. A day was also devoted to open warfare manoeuvres. Throughout the infantry training every effort was made to illustrate practically the principles of tactics underlying the recent reorganisation of the platoon into semi-specialised sections of riflemen, Lewis gunners, bombers, and rifle-bombers. The quick and sound appreciation of situations and the initiative shown by subordinate commanders in these operations in the training area were auguries of success on the battlefield which mere not to be belied.</p>
        <p>On the last day of March, in a heavy fall of snow, the 1st Brigade relieved the Rifle Brigade in the line, and 2 days later the Rifles proceeded on the 3 days' 40-mile march to Tilques. The 1st Firld Artillery Brigade went at the same time. In place of the Rifles, a brigade of the 25th Division was lcnt to General Russell for tactical purposes and for work on the New Zealand Division's front. Shortly aftewards permission was given by Army to the Corps to employ the 25th Division brigades as line garrisons under the proviso that if required they could be withdrawn at short notice into Army reserve. This was taken advantage of to allow-the 2nd Infantry Brigade to withdraw from the line preparatory to its following the 3rd to the training area. The 3rd Artillery Brigade went also towards the end of April, and the 2nd (Army) Brigade, after a further temporary attachment to the 57th Divison, in the first week of May. On 6th April the 3rd Australian Division extended northwards to embrace the position assigned to it for the impending attack on the ridge, and the 25th Division took over the northern subsector <pb xml:id="n199" n="160"/>from the vicinity of the wulverghem-Messines road to the Wulverghem-Wytschacte road. As a result of these moves the contracted New Zealand front now held by the 1st Brigade corresponded roughly with the sector defined for the Division's assembly position.</p>
        <p>For the attack, disguised in the memoranda of the time as the Magnum Opus, preparations were already in progress. Several new lines of accommodation were in process of construction. But the area of our assembly trenches was not to be bounded by the front line. Between the front line and enemy trenches on the Messines hillside ran, as has been said, the valley of the little Steenebeek, crossed by the road from Wulverghem to Messines. On this road, between our front trench and the stream, a heavily wired German listening post had been captured and occupied by 2nd Wellington, but a large part of the valley was dead ground, not visible from any point in our trenches. With a view to securing command of observation over it and also to providing a nearer assault position, the construction of a new trench 750 yards long in No Man's Land was desirable. To dig it immediately preceding the attack would court disaster to the assembled troops. In order therefore to familiarise the enemy with it and avoid arousing untimely alertness and aggressiveness, it was resolved to construct the work in good time.</p>
        <p>The undertaking was committed to the 2nd Brigade before they left for training. The 1st Brigade garrison cut and taped 7 gaps through the wire, and a party of 2nd Brigade officers, all of whom had been constantly on patrol and knew every detail of the ground intimately, surveyed and pegged out the new trench. On the night of the 13th, covered by a party from 2nd Wellington, who were then holding the line, 500 men of 1st Otago, under command of Major J. Hargest, came up from the reserve area. Such a task required minute elaboration of detail and fine discipline. Each party knew its task. Sentries kept the trenches clear for them. They. entered the sap heads at 9 p.m. Splendidly organised and disciplined, without the least noise or confusion, each party went to its position, completed its task by 2.30 a.m. and was clear of the trenches by 3 a.m. When dawn broke. our sentries eyed a long new trench 100 to 180 yards out in No Man's Land.</p>
        <p>While Otago dug, arrangements had been made for artillery and machine gun action in case of enemy fire or interference, and the battery commander concerned was present <pb xml:id="n200" n="161"/>in the front line with the officers commanding the working and covering parties. The silent precision, however, with which the task was carried out raised no alarm in the German trenches. Not a single casualty was incurred, and the unerring judgment of the Divisional Commander, which had discounted predictions of disaster, was amply vindicated. On the following evening the trench was extended, drained to the Steenebeek and connected with our old front line by 2nd Wellington. It was later completed with travel and support trenches in rear.</p>
        <p>In face of this new line, the multiplication of communication trenches and similar works elsewhere, and all the various preparations for an attack, manifest both in our front and rear areas, the enemy began to show unmistakable signs of uneasiness. The frequent changes in the dispositions of our troops for the purpose of adjusting frontages and withdrawing brigades for training increased his anxiety to obtain identifications and possible information from prisoners.</p>
        <p>During April he attempted 7 organised raids and 5 patrol reconnaissances against the Corps front. An attempt on 30th April on the New Zealanders was crushed by our artillery before it developed, and the enemy was seen to run back over his front parapet and thence to his support line. In the beginning of May he embarked on 2 equally unsuccessful enterprises. Just before dawn on the 5th, a 4th Rifles' patrol, which happened to be out on the Steenebeek, reported a party of 60 Germans advancing along the Wulverghem-Messines road. Our S.O.S. shot up, and the Germans, casting from them their bombs and raiding gear, turned and fled. A few ran forward, but it was to drop into the shelter of the nem unoccupied trench, and there a patrol found one dead and captured another. They belonged to the 40th (Saxon) Division, and the prisoner stated that their object was to discover the character of the new trench and ascertain whether the relief movements noticed were connected with the supposed arrival of a Division from Arras, Two days later, under cover of the inevitable bombardmeat, a raid was made on our new trench. The working party in it withdrew to our front line. Three men, who chose to remain, narrowly escaped being cut off. A fighting patrol sent forward immediately afterwards found the trench clear.</p>
        <p>In the front area, apart from these enterprises and the bombardment of our new earthworks in No Man's Land, the enemy's attitude for the remainder of May was surprisingly <pb xml:id="n201" n="162"/>quiet. Nightly he tried, harassed by our machine and Lewis guns, to repair the destruction caused by our mortars to his front wire. Retaliation by his minenwerfer was rare, and the hillside seemed denuded of snipers. On the back areas, however, his increasing artillery became very active, with persistent shelling of villages, roads, transport lines, dumps, and battery positions.</p>
        <p>After dark on 6th May, an exceptionally heavy enemy bombardment, surpassing anything experienced in this area since the autumn of 1915, was opened all along the Second Army front with high-explosive and incendiary shells. The bombardment lasted intermittently throughout the night, at intervals of 3 hours reaching great intensity, particularly over intermediate and back areas of billets and camps. The Divisional casualties excceded 100, of whom 24 lost their lives; 81 horses were killed in the 1st Battery and other wagon lines. The. bombardment was designed undoubtedly to catch the troops whom the enemy had reason to believe were now assembling for the Messines attack, and the extent of the Division's losses shows how serious the effect would have been, had not our attack been in reality postponed. Several huts were burnt, a gun-boot store destroyed, and a shell falling into one of the 1st Rifles' huts destroyed the baned instruments and killed 4 of their oldest bandsmen. Another shell struck one of the huts occupied by the 1st Field Company of the Engineers, and the woodwork immediately burst into flames. Sergt.-Major J. Woodhall, assisted by Sergt. J. S. L. Deem, rushed into the burning hut and rescued a badly burnt sapper. Meanwhile Sergt. <name type="person" key="name-412898">M. H. Grigg</name> carried out the Orderly Room box containing the men's pay and secret papers. All 3 were severely burnt about the face arms and legs.</p>
        <p>In retaliation for this bombardment our heavy artillery fired 2500 rounds, but the enemy shelling was repeated the following night, when fortunately the Division's casualties were few. On the night 7th/8th the bulk of the masses of artillery now concentrating on the Second Army front opened on selected targets in the enemy's hinterland at an intense rate for 5 minutes at 8.45 p.m. and again at 11 p.m. Salutary punishment was inflicted. Strings of ambulance wagons were observed on the roads on the following day, and the lesson was effective.</p>
        <p>In the battle of the trench warfare type opportunity for maneuver is denied, and there is no sudden clash of the <pb xml:id="n202" n="163"/>opposing arms. The positions of the defence are impregnable to infantry without prolonged artillery preparation. 1t is easy to say that the battle is not, properly speaking, initiated with the swarming of the attacking infantry out of their assembly trenches It is more difficult to fix a date marking a definite commencement. Plans mature, preparations develop, counter-measures are taken gradually. For our present purpose we may note that while the general policy had been long determined and definite preparations in hand weeks before the beginning of May, the 2lst of that month saw the initiation of the systematic preparatory bombardment of the enemy's trenches. On that date, therefore, it is convenient to break the thread of the story. The further activities of the opposing forces up to the time of the actual infantry attack may be reserved for a general paragraph dealing with the initial phases of' the battle, which is the subject of the succeeding chapter.</p>
        <p>Certain developments of organisation and changes in appointments may be here briefly reviewed. An additional (Divisional) machine gun company was raised from reinforcements in England towards the end of 1916, and joined the division in February. in the beginning of 1917 an improvised working battalion was formed from surplus personnel in the units of the Division. The Signal Company establishment was augmented in accordance with G.H.Q. instructions, in view of the increasing importance attached to artillery communications. The Sanitary Section was struck off the strength of the Division and constituted an Army Troops unit, administered by Corps. A light Railways Operating Company was formed in England from men temporarily unfit. It arrived in France in February and was attached to the Second Army. Of greater importance was the formation in England of a 4th Infantry-Brigade from the surplus reinforcements sent monthly-from New Zealand. It was raised at the urgent request of the War Office, anxious to throw the maximum man-power into the field, on the distinct understanding that its formation would not involve the provision of additional reinforcements from New Zealand, and that its personnel should be utilised, if required, as drafts for the Division. In the selection of commanders to form the nucleus of the new units, an opportunity was afforded of promoting officers who had done good service in the field. Lt.-Col. H. Hart was appointed to command the new brigade with the rank of Brigadier-General, the command of 1st Wellington falling <pb xml:id="n203" n="164"/>thereupon to Major (now Lt.-Col.) C. F. D. Cook. His Brigade Major was major <name type="person" key="name-130151">T. R. Eastwood</name> who, after doing such good service in the same capacity in the Rifle Brigade, had been forced to relinquish the appointment by sickness, from which he had now recovered. The Brigade Staff Captain was Major H. S. N. Robinson, N.Z.S.C. The battalions were commanded as follows:—
					<list><item>3rd Batt. Auckland Regt.—Lt.-Col. D. Blair, M C.</item><item>3rd Batt Wellington Regt,—Lt Col. W. H. Fletcher</item><item>3rd Batt. Canterbury Regt.—Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-011537">R. A. Row</name></item><item>3rd Batt. Otago Regt.-Lt. Col. <name key="name-418760" type="person">D. Colquhoun</name></item></list>Additional units to complete the Brigade Group were formed, including a 4th Machine Gun Company and a 4th Field Am-bulance (Major H. J. Mclean). Drafts began to be posted at the end of March, and to meet the increased demands for officers likely to be made in the future, a special party of over 100 n.c.o.s and men was selected from the Division and sent to England for training in Cadet colleges. The new brigade trained at Codford. It had the honour of being inspected, with other New Zealand troops, by H. M. the King on 1st May, when the Prime Minister of New Zealand and Sir Joseph Ward were present,, and on 10th May by Field-Marshal Viscount French. It proceeded overseas shortly afterwards and arrived at Bailleul at the end of the month. in the spring, also, the 2 composite reserve battalions at Sling of the 4 territorial infantry reginment were expanded into an organisation of four battalions, each unit forming a 4th (Reserve) Battalion to the regiment in the field.</p>
        <p>In October, Col. Begg was promoted to be D.D.M.S. of II. Anzac, and in his appointment as A.D.M.S., New Zealand Division, was succeeded by Lt.-Col. (now Col.) <name type="person" key="name-208556">D. J. McGavin</name>. Lt.-Col. E. J. O'Neill succeeded the latter in command of the New Zealand Stationary Hospital which, leaving Salonica in March 1916 had arrived at Havre in June and been established in Amiens in July. Major (now Lt.-Col.) M. Holmes took over command of No. 1 Field Ambulance. The Divisional Staff sustained a serious loss prior to the Messines operation, when Major Temperley left it for promotion on the Staff of a British Division. He was succeeded as G.S.O. 2 by Captain L. A. Newnham, Middlesex Reginment. In the G.S.O. 3 appointment several changes have to be recorded. Captain Hastings was; promoted to fill the Brigade Major's appointment in the Rifle Brigade when Major Eastwood <pb xml:id="n204" n="165"/>vacated it through sickness, and his place was taken by <name type="person" key="name-207863">Major J. E. Duigan</name>, N.Z.S.C., who had been in command of the Tunnelling Company.<note xml:id="fn74-165" n="1"><p>p. 168</p></note> On Major Duigan's receiving a Staff appointment in the British Army, he was succeeded by Major N. B. W W, Thoms, N.Z.S.C. Major H. E. A very, D.S.O., N.Z.S.C., was appointed D.A.Q.M.G. in place of <name type="person" key="name-130106">Lt.-Col. N. C. Hamilton</name>, D.S.O., who rejoined the British Army. <name type="person" key="name-207718">Lt. S. Cory Wright</name> assumed the duties of Divisional Intelligence Officer in February. On the Brigade Staffs, Capt. T. R. Jackson (General List, British Army) had replaced Capt. M. H. Jackson, who had been wounded on the Somme, and was in turn succeeded as Brigade Major in the 1st Brigade by Major Thorns. The vacant G.S.O. 3 post was now filled by Major W. I. K. Jennings, N.Z.S.C. in the 2nd Brigade, Capt. Richardson and Capt. Wilks had exchanged appointments on the Somme. in the 3rd Brigade, Major Hastings was recalled to India in March. After an interregnum, Capt, R. G. Purdy exchanged his appointment for that of Brigade Major, and was succeeded in the appointment of Staff Captain by <name type="person" key="name-418620">Capt. G. C. Dailey</name>.</p>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n205" n="166"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body1-d5" type="chapter">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Chapter V</hi>
          <lb/>
          <hi rend="sc">The Battle of Messines</hi>
        </head>
        <p>From the first strategic developments of the war the British Cabinet had regarded as their particular charge the defences which protected the coast line and the approaches to the Channel. The German drive on Calais in the First Battle of Ypres and the second attack in 1915 had been. providentially as it were, frustrated, but the menace of a further thrust was ever present. As it was, the enemy had secured nearly all the ground of tactical importance; and especially in the Ypres salient, commanded as it was by the low ridges to the east, where the German lines hung like an arrested wave ready to topple over and deluge the ruined city, the positions of the British were far from satisfactory. Costly to hold, the feasibility of their continued defence against a third German attack did not present itself as assured to sound military judgment.<note xml:id="fn75-166" n="1"><p>1 p. 155.</p></note></p>
        <p>Early in 1916 the General Staff had weighed the difficultties involved in the capture of the ypres ridges and decided that at that stage an attempt would be premature. In the vicinity of the Channel ports, moreover, failure might be attended by momentous consequences. Various preliminary measures, however, and in particular the construction of railways, were taken in hand with a view to the possibility of action at a later date. The development of the submarine campaign from Zeebrugge and Ostend and its crippling effect on the general British effort accentuated attention on the northern sector. A successful attack from this point would rob the enemy of these bases and might not only cut off his troops on the coast, but also comprormise his whole position on his right flank. The new armies had been tested in the Somme Battle with satisfactory result, and the postponed operations appeared now feasible. In the Allied conference, therefore, held in November 1916, it was agreed that the main role of the British field forces in 1917 should be an offensive on a large scale in Flanders.</p>
        <p>Previous to the main enterprise, however, it was proposed that an attack should be delivered against the salient south of Arras, in which the Germans were now confined by our <pb xml:id="n206" n="167"/>advance on the Somme. From this earlier operation no great strategical results could be looked for without undue optimism, but besides wiping out the salient it promised useful attrition on the German forces. It might be expected also to preoccupy the enemy's attention ere he realised its conclusion. and thus enable the initial blow of the main attack, the preparations for which could not be concealed, to be delivered before he anticipated it.</p>
        <p>The Allies had with reason hoped that the combined offensive planned for all fronts in 1917, the British part in which has been indicated above, would yield decisive and final success. Fate willed, however, otherwise. On the Eastern front, any prospect of effective cooperation was dissipated by the Russian revolution and its aftermath, which were, as events proved, to strengthen the failing powers of the Central Empires and to exert an incalculable influence on the prolongation of the struggle. As the general Allied policy was thus upset, so too in the first months of the new year the British plans underwent considerable alterations. They were largely modified by the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg or Siegfried line, and they were vitally affected by a new plan of attack laid down for the french Army by General NivelIe and accepted by the Allied Governments. To his bold conception of a great break-through from the Aisne heights at the southern pivot of the Hindenburg line, with the capture of Iaon as the first day's objective, all other proposals of operations on the Western front were subordmated. As a preparatory nmeasure to it the British font was extended. General Haig's attack at Arras was to be proceeded with at an earlier date than at first contemplated, and with the additional object of attracting hostile forces from the french front. nor was this all. The main offensive task of the British was altered from the original plans to the more subsidiary role of co-operation in exploiting the gains to be won by the French. Only in the event of these advantages failing to accure within a reasonable period would the original proposal of the attack in the north hold good. The work of preparation in Flanders was therefore somewhat restricted owing to the demands for the necessary labour in the south.</p>
        <p>In pursuance of these plans the Battle of Arras was fought in the beginning of April by the Third and First British Armies, the former now commanded by by the same General Horne under whom as Corps Commander the <choice><orig>Divi-<pb xml:id="n207" n="168"/>sion</orig><reg>Division</reg></choice> had won its first laurels on the Somme. Subsidiary operations:, were conducted at the same time by the Fourth and Fifth Armies threatening the llindenburg Line. In the vast preliminary underground operations at Arras substantial assistance was given by a detachment of the New Zealand Pioneers, who were despatched thither at the end of 1916, and by the New Zealand Tunnelling Company. This latter unit, formed in New Zealand in October 1915, went to the Arras neighbourhood on arrival in France in march 1916. The company was originally commanded by-major <name type="person" key="name-207863">J. E. Duigan</name>, N.Z.S.C., and later, on his accepting a Staff appointment, by Capt. (now Major) H. Vickerman. They: left an abiding mark of their work in the New Zealand placenames given to the subterranean caves and galleries which they opened up, such as "Nelson," "Blenheim," and "New Plymouth," and the following letters written prior to the Battle of arras indicate th appreciation with which their services were regarded:—</p>
        <quote>
          <floatingText xml:id="t1-body-d5-t1">
            <body xml:id="t1-body-d5-t1-body">
              <opener>
                <salute>To Commander Third Army.</salute>
              </opener>
              <p>I wish to bring to the Army Commander's notice the excellent work done by the New Zealand Engineers Tunnelling Company during the past twelve months. First under Major Duigan and now under Captain Vickerman the work of the company has been excellent. Not only have the men worked extremely hard and well, but the: excellent relations that have been maintained with the various Divisions show a first-class organisation. I attach a copy of a report I have received from the G.O.C. 3rd Division which expresses clearly the opinion held by the Divisions in the line of the Ncw Zealand Tunnelling Company.</p>
              <closer>
                <signed>A. Haldane,</signed>
                <salute>Lieut.-General, Commanding VI. Corps.</salute>
              </closer>
            </body>
          </floatingText>
          <floatingText xml:id="t1-body-d5-t2">
            <body xml:id="t1-body-d5-t2-body">
              <opener>
                <salute>To VI. Corps.</salute>
              </opener>
              <p>I wish to bring to the notice of the Corps Commander the excellent work and willing help of the N.Z.E. Tunnelling Company in all their undertakings with the 3rd Division. All work has been punctually and thoroughly carried out to my entire satisfaction without a hitch or difficulty of any kind.</p>
              <closer>
                <signed>C. J. Deverel,</signed>
                <salute>Major-General, Commanding 3rd Division.</salute>
              </closer>
            </body>
          </floatingText>
        </quote>
        <p>The fruits of the first phase of the Arras operations were substantial, and <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name> would probably have been <pb xml:id="n208" n="169"/>well content to have stopped the offensive at that point. But it was part of the general policy to maintain the pressure while Nivelle's grand attack by 4 French Armies burst out on the Aisne. The French struck on 16th April. Their dream of a break-through was shattered by the Germen machine guns. It became speedily apparent that the day of rapid and extensive operations in open country was not yet. On 5th May. with the capture of the long platcau north of the Aisne traversed by the Chemin des Dames, the F'rench effort was brought to a conclusion. The Fabian policy of the limited offensive pursued by methodical progress was again endorsed, and Petain succeeded Nive1le.<note xml:id="fn76-169" n="1"><p>On the inner history of the French offensive and on the causes of Nivelle failure much light is thrown in an article by M. Paul Painlevé, who was at the!, Minister of War. His statements are sunrnarised in <hi rend="i">The Times</hi>, 1st Nov. 1919.</p></note></p>
        <p>The French attack failing in its main objects, Haig's armies were thus released for the originally planned and now delayed attack in the northern theatre. for the purpose of diversion minor operations were continued by the British southern Armics.</p>
        <p>Before the princjpal blow could be delivered in Flanders, it was essential to capture the strongly fortified, if not impregnable, ridge which leaving the southern tip of the Ypres salient stretched south-east past Wytschacte and Messines to the Douve valley. From it the enemy commanded unique observation over the whole, of the British lines about ypres, and from it they were in a position to strike at the flank of any attack originating within the salient, further north. It was with the object of removing at once this observation and this menace to the right flank of the main operation that the Battle of Messines was fought. It is not, merely connected with but is an integral part of the tremendous Third Battle of Ypres.</p>
        <p>While some of the assaulting Divisions were faced by outliers and subsidiary ridges, the New Zealanders lay directly against the main bastion, separated from it only by the shallow valley down which the Steenobeek streamlet ran luggishly-to join the Douve. Thc Steencbook was half ehoked in places by debris or shattered culverts, and had formed small swamps. It was, however, narrow and shallow, measuring from bank to bank some 5 feet. Its bed was soft and muddy, and torn coils of wire had been strung along it by earlier garrisons. Constant reconnaissance had proved that while it ]might prove an obstacle to tanks it would not <pb xml:id="n209" n="170"/>stop assaulting infantry. At the foot of the ridge and again on the crest the 2 front system of German defences were clearly visible. On the top of the ridge, along which the armentieres-Ypres road ran through Messines towards Wytschacte, the skyline was broken by the roofs of the village of Messines and the medieval masonry of its church. Information obtained from civilian records, refugees, and the survivors of the 1914 fighting was circulated concerning the deep cellars. under the institution Royale<note xml:id="fn77-170" n="1"><p>A Roman Catholic Orphanage for girls. At an earlier date the Mother Superior had tcheerfully rsstented to and witnessed from bombardmen our her institution.</p></note> and other features of military importance in the village. From Hill 63 partial observation was obtained of the tree-bordered ]road known as Huns' Walk, that ran from Messines eastwards towards the hamlet of Gapaard and the town of Comines, the base of all German traffic in the area immediately north of the Ly's. Two miles to the east on the reverse slopes of the ridge this road crossed the first of the enemy 2 trench systems that ran from the Lys across the base of the Messines-Wytschaete salient towards his lines at Ypres. This first system, which lay just beyond Gapaard and the village of Oosttaverne, further to the north opposite Wytschaete, was called the Oosttaverne Line A mile further bacl was the Warneton line.For The moment the Oosttaverne Line was to be the limit of our objective.</p>
        <p>In addition to the German earthworks on the ridge, concrete abounded everywhere—machine gun emplacement, observation posts and dugouts, and in particular the defence relied on a number of very substantial Strong Points, smalll fortresses of heavily reinforced concrete, each of which conained 2 or 3 machine guns and a garrison-varying from I5 to 40 soldiers. Half-way-up the hill in front of the New Zealanders were the cellared. ruins of an old inn, “Au Bon Fermier Cabaret,” at the point where. the country road from Le Rossignol and Stinking Farm in our lines meets the main Armenticres-Ypres road from plogsteert village and Hydc Park Corner. Further to the north at the Ieft flank of the Division the road from Wulverghem, bordered by shell-strieken; tree-stumps, ran straight up the hill to the northern end of the village, and half-way up the slopes it also was joined by a sunken road which led from Birthday Farm on the left. At this junction stood the shattered remains of a mill, the Moulin de l 'Hospice, set on a high knoll and surrounded by a trench, Birthday <pb xml:id="n210"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP025a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP025a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP025a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">The Tunnelling Coy. explode Captured Ammunition</hi></head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP025b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP025b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP025b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">And Stack Captured Timber</hi></head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n211"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP026a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP026a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP026a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">The Wulverghem-Messines Road</hi></head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP026b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP026b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP026b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Shells Bursting on Messines</hi></head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n212" n="171"/>Farm was just included within the left boundary of the Division's area. The inn, the mill, and the farm, no less than the La Petite Douve Ferme defences, might be expected to form centres of resistance, and specially detailed troops would be required to deal with each.</p>
        <p>Pending the Delivery-of Nivelle's attack on the Aisne, the labour and material available for the Flanders offensive was only such as could be obtained on the spot; but the preprations which had bcen undertaken since the end of 1916 mere developed steadily as far as the means at hand permitted.</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“A large railway programme had been commenced and as soon as it was possible to divert larger supplies northwards, work was pushed on with remarkable speed. Great progress was made with road construction, and certain roads were selected for extension as soon as our objectives could be gained. Forward dumps of material were made for this purpose, and in the days following the 7th June roads were carried forward with great rapidity to Messines, Wytschaete, and Oosttaverne, across country so completely destroyed by shell-fire that it was difficult to trace where the original road had run.</p>
        </quote>
        <quote>
          <p>“A special problem arose in connection with the water supply. Pipe lines were taken well forward from existing lakes, from catch-pits constructed on the Kemmel HiIIs, and from sterilising barges on the Lys. Provision was made for the rapid extension of these lines. By the 15th June they had reached Messines, Wytschaete, and the Dammstrasse, and were supplying water at the rate of between 450,000 and 600,000 gallons daily.”<note xml:id="fn78-171" n="1"><p>Official Despatch.</p></note></p>
        </quote>
        <p>All the while underground there were being actively pursued operations and counter-operations which were to give a special character to the eventual attack.</p>
        <quote>
          <p>“The inception of a deep mining offensive on the Second Army front dated from July, 1915, but the proposal to conduct offelisive mining on a grand scale was not definitely adopted till January, 1916. From that date onwards, as the necessary labour became available, deep mining for offensive purposes gradually developed, in spite of great difficulties from water-bearing strata and active counter-mining by the enemy.</p>
        </quote>
        <quote>
          <p>“In all, twenty-four mines were constructed, four of which were outside the front ultimately selected forour offensive, while one other was lost as the result of a mine <pb xml:id="n213" n="172"/>blown up by the enemy. Many of these mines; had been completed for twelve months prior to our offensive, and constant and anxious work was needed to ensure their safety. The enemy also had a deep mining system, and was aware of his danger.”<note xml:id="fn79-172" n="1"><p>Official Despatch.</p></note></p>
        </quote>
        <p>The final progress of the general preparations above ground was expedited by uniformly fine weather. A certain amount of the personnel necessary for the purpose was supplied by the various labour companies, but the bulk was drawn from the infantry. During May the network of broad and narrow gange railways and trench tramways was developed by extensive ramifieations. Ammunition stations, sidings, and forward dumps multiplied. An infinite number of new gun positions was constructed by the New Zealand gunners for the incoming artillery, and heavy and field guns were steadily brought into the area and formed into different groups. In addition to a stupendous mass of field artillery the 11. Anzac armament included a 15in, howitzer, a 12-in, and a 9.2-in. gun, over fifty 60-pounders, six 12-in. howitzers, over thirty 9.2-in., the same number of 8-in., and over a hundred 6-in. howitzers.<note xml:id="fn80-172" n="2"><p>Four of the new 6 in. trench mortars were also included.</p></note> As early as the middle of May some of the batteries were in forward emplacements under skilfully erected camouflage which merged with the natural grass and foliage, and by midnight 2nd/3rd June all pieces were in their Magnum Opus positions, and the tress which blocked the line of fire had been levelled. Long ere then, too, forward positions had been selected and prepared for guns of all calibres to occupy as soon as the crest was carried. A vast effort, amply repaid, was spent in the extension of the tramway of light railway systems to the battery positions.</p>
        <p>The general preparatory bombardment may be dated from 21st May, though already 10 days previously orders had been given for our artillery activity to increase gradually till the end of the month. A systematic study of the enemy's defences by means of direct observation, air photographs, prisoners' statements and other means of information enabled a methodical progressive destruction to be carried out of each feature in turn of his fortifications. The heavy howitzers and long-range guns undertook counter-battery work with balloon and aeroplane observation and made preliminary registrations to cover the approaches and bridges over the Lys and <pb xml:id="n214" n="173"/>the Ypres-Comines canal. Comines Houthem wameton Basseville and other villages were subjected to periodical bombardments. All wire visible from ground observation was dealt with by light and medium howitzers, with non-delay fuses and with the closest co-operation of the air service. On the visible wire before the 2 front systems the 18-pounders and trench mortars dealt continual and increasing havoc. Divisions vied in the expenditure of mortar ammunition. On the morning of 3rd June the New Zealand heavy mortars fired no less than 227 rounds and the medium mortars 1950 rounds, a total which may be expected to compare favourably with that achieved by any similar unit in the war. The strong concrete emplacements uncovered on the hillside were first engaged by the heavy howitzers and heavy mortars, and after the concrete was broken the work of destruction was continued by the 6-in. and 4.5-in. howitzers. With the destruction effected in his front line by our mortars the enemy was unable to keep pace. He withdrew the bulk of his garrison to the support line, leaving only such sentry posts as had concrete shelter.</p>
        <p>As at the Somme, night firing was employed to prevent the repair of the enemy's defences and to interfere with his communications, and the roads on which no ground observation was possible were also harassed by day. In barraging the roads, a short sharp bombardment was put down at a selected point so as to cause a halt in a column of transport approaching that point. The road in rear was then searched up and down with shrapnel for a space of 1000 yards lo catch the blocked column. One of the ingenious features of the artillery policy was to drill the enemy into using certain roads and forming blocks of transport at certain points which he considered safe. These points were left to be dealt with on the nights immediately preceding the attack. Gas was discharged or projected frequently on the La Petite Douve Ferme defences and elsewhere.</p>
        <p>Messines itself had been shelled repeatedly and with special violence on 17th and 24th May, when enormous pieces of timber and debris were flung high into the sky, and the whole crest veiled in clouds of smoke that made observation impossible. On 30th may it was again subjected to a concentrated bombardment by Army and Corps heavies both in the morning and evening, and similarly on the “U,” “V” and “W” days, preceding the “Z” day of the attack. On these days practice barrages and bombardments were fired by <pb xml:id="n215" n="174"/>the Corps or Army artillery, partly to force the enemy to disclose his batteries and partly to test our barrage. On 5th June an opportunity was given to effect final improvement in technical points by an Army practice barrage, under cover of which, as we shall see, the 2nd Rifles executed a daring raid in broad daylight.</p>
        <p>In the successive bombardments and barrages on Messines the machine guns co-operated actively, firing from localities appreciably distant from their battle positions. On these and on the dugouts in their vicinity, designed to hold spare personnel, reserve ammunition and belt-filling machines, they devoted much labour, which it was very important to disguise. They avoided breaking new soil or piling new earth on the parapets, and all their work was carried out by night, the results being screened before dawn.</p>
        <p>This deadly bombardment and counter-battery work, which the enemy endeavonred to hinder with smoke screens, grew in intensity during the 10 days preceding the assault. “Harassing fire” was now directed nightly on railway junctions, unloading points, and all known transport halting places and approaches, special arrangements being made to ensure that there should be no pause between the night firing and the activity which began with daylight. Even now, however, the full weight of artillery was not revealed. Not more than half the total number of guns in action had been disclosed at any one time till “U” day, and even then only three-quarters were to be in action simultaneously till the attack should be launched on “Z” day. For the final 3 days of preparation, the counter-battery work took precedence of the bombardment of the trenches and achieved marked successes. The enemy's field guns were largely' destroyed or forced to withdraw to fresh position in rear, the heavies behind the Comines Canal and a considerable proportion of the field guns behind Warneton. As a result his retaliation in the latter period of the artillery conflict was marked by an absence of field guns, and the actual out-break of the battle many of these were in process of moving eastwards. During the last few days before the attack the German counter-battery work also decreased and became erratic. Information was afterwards vouchsafed by a prisoner that on the night 6th/7th June no fewer than 11 guns including 4 heavies were “knocked out” in a single artillery group.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n216" n="175"/>
        <p>During the earlier part of May, as has been seen,<note xml:id="fn81-175" n="1"><p>p. 161.</p></note> the enemy had endeavoured with limited success to acquire information with regard to the frequent changes of our dispositions and the amount of work in our back areas. The vast preparations later becoming daily more visible could leave him in no doubt, but his infantry remained interprising arid aggressive. On the other hand his artillery activity developed. His retaliation to our bombardments at the outset was mostly confined to field guns, but by 20th May his batteries, like his garrisons, had been reinforced, particularly with his useful 5.9-in. howitzers, and while leaving the forward infantry positions completely unmolested, he became increasingly active with gas and explosive on roads and batteries. The evening sky was continually lit up by the glare of our burning dumps, Neuve Eglise and the other villages in rear were violently bombarded from Warneton and from Frelinghein and the German positions south of the Lys, and distant Bailleul was shelled on 3rd and 5th June in the morning and afternoon with heavy long-range guns. The German counter-battery work was directed specially on the batteries on and behind Hill 63. On 5th June English gunners attached to the 1st Brigade Group received unwelcome attention. Their positions were in an open field, and the artificial camouflage, erected over the guns, instead of concealing them, actually attracted notice in aeroplane photographs. The camouflage caught fire, and 13,000 shells and 5 guns were destroyed. It was at this time that a gallant action was performed by Lt. C. T. Gillespie, of the 7th Battery, assisted by Fitter H. Selby and Gunner L. D. Belton. A shell struck a pile of boxed ammunition at the gun-pit, and the boxes caught fire. Gillespie, with these 2 men, taking no heed of the bursting explosive and shrapnel, separated the burning boxes and extinguished the fire.</p>
        <p>Though the British held marked ascendancy in the sky, every effort was made by the Germans to utilise their air service at high altitudes, which our squadrons could not patrol, for bombing and reconnaissance. And in the early morning and again in the evening, after our aeroplanes went home, they repeatedly hovered over our line. Thus on 4th June 2 aeroplanes reconnoitred the batteries of the 1st Brigade for some time till chased off by shrapnel. They flew at a height of 300 feet, and the observers could be seen taking photographs. On a Sunday afternoon in April, when the <pb xml:id="n217" n="176"/>streets were crowded with soldiers and civilians, a bomb fell on Baileul from a height of 12,000 feet, causing several casualties. Early in the morning of 5th June 3 bombs were dropped on the great Duke of York Siding near the same town, setting an ammunition train on fire. The train and the siding dumps burnt all day, and the railway line and the houses in the vicinity were damaged by the series of explosions.</p>
        <p>In the general preparations the New Zealand Division played their full part. The expenditure of shells rose steadily.<note xml:id="fn82-176" n="1"><p>Between noon 31st May and noon '7th June the artillery attached to the Division fired 126,200 rounds of 18-pounder and 33,700 rounds of 4.5 in. howitzer ammunition.</p></note> The multifarious tasks that fell to the Engineers Pioneers and Infantry included the laying of an elaborate buried cable system,<note xml:id="fn83-176" n="2"><p>In cable-burying the 11. Anz: ac Cyclist Battalion rendered conspicuously useful service.</p></note> the excavation of advanced headquarters dugouts for battalion and brigade headquarters, the construction of signal dugouts, relay-posts for runners and stretcher-bearers, regimental aid posts and advanced dressing stations, the tunnelling of new catacombs in Hill 63 for the accommodation of the Divisional reserves, the formation of forward dumps, the screening of approaches, the clearing of obstacles behind our front line, the thinning of the thick hedgerows in No Man's Land, the preparation of portable bridges over the Douve and Steenebeek. Above all, the infantary were engaged in the completion and draining of the assembly trenches and the arrangements for rapid egress from them. The sector bore many names reminiscent of former Canadian occupation, and now, like the Tunnellers at Arras, the New Zealand battalions christened the new works in memory-of their homes. Thus to Medicine Hat Trail and Calgary and Toronto Avenues were added Otira Otago and Auckland Trenches, and the congeries of names significantly reflected the co-operation of 2 widely separated Dominions in the Empire's cause.</p>
        <p>Nightly reconnaissances were made of the enemy line by patrols who examined the wire and trenches and occasionally captured a prisoner from his posts. The work done by the 2nd Rifles in this connection merits special mention. On the might of 16th May a small party under L–Cpl, E. E. Islip could find no Germans. Two night later another party, under 2nd Lt, R.P. vaughan and including Islip, visited La Petite Douve Ferrme just after midnight. Nearing the position, they <pb xml:id="n218" n="177"/>crouched in a shellhole in front of the enemy parapet Generally the trench was known to be damaged, but opposite the shellhole was a concrete shelter with 2 loopholes. A hissing bomb came flying out of one of these and wounded a member of the patrol. The others immediately scrambled out of the shellhole and charged the trench. There were a dozen Germans in the dugout. When called on to put up their hands they made no move to come out and showed fight. Two bombs were thrown in to make sure. One exploded. All the occupants were killed save 1, and he was wounded To save his life he must get rid of the second bomb, He stooped down for it, secured it, and crawled painfully and hastily up the steps, with one hand holding his side and the other gripping the bomb. Ere he could fling it from him, it exploded. It blew the German to pieces, killed Islip and wounded Vaughan and 3 of his party. As the raiders carried back their casualties, rifle and machine gun fire was opened on them, and 1 further man was wounded.</p>
        <p>Under cover of artillery the 2nd Rifles carried out a further enterprise on the night 21st/22nd May on the north edge of the Farm. Some way off, 2 Germans were seen running in from a listening post, but the trenches were found battered and empty. The dugout bombed on the 18th/19th had in the meantime been damaged by our mortars, and the entrance was found blocked by debris. Finally, on the afternoon of "X" day (5th June), the same battalion made a very thorough reconnaissance of the Farm, under cover of the now perfected Army practice barrage. The party, including a few sappers, was commanded by Lt. L. I. Manning. Grenades and rifle fire were directed from the support trench in rear, but the position itself was found deserted. The enemy's most advanced defences had been rendered by our mortars and artillery untenable.<note xml:id="fn84-177" n="1"><p>At midnight, Ist/2nd June, a Stokes (light trench mortar) gas bomb bombardment was carried out on the Farm by the Special Bde, R.E. It appears probable that its reputation caused us to attach overmuch importance to the Farm.</p></note> 2 dugouts of the 3 which were found to have survived bombardment and were still habitable were now blown up by our party with ammonal. The enterprise was highly successful but was marred by an accident at its close. Three of the party, engrossed in private investigations, did not return with the others, and Manning, disregarding the snipers, went straightway back for them. On his return journey, being short of wind after the double trip, the flung himself for a minute's rest into the shelter of a shellhole, and Capt. S. A. Atkinson, <pb xml:id="n219" n="178"/>watching from our parapet, thought he had fallen wounded. With true spirit of comradeship he ran out to help him and was killed by an unlucky shot through the throat. The others returned safely.</p>
        <p>Mention should also be made of a particularly valuable reconnaissance over the enemy front system carried out on the evening of 1st June by Major J. Hargest, the Second in Command of 1st 0tago, who was rapidly coming into prominence as one of the finest soldiers in the Division. In company with a n.c.o. he explored the German front line and went nearly 200 yards up the communication trench to near the support line, when the enemy's night sentries taking up their posts in the front line behind him made it necessary to withdraw.</p>
        <p>In the preliminary instructions issued to the troops, the purpose of the forthcoming attack was veiled as an effort undertaken to compel the enemy to withdraw his reserves from the main battle front at Arras. The aim of the Second Army was to seize the whole 6 miles' length of the ridge from its southern base at St. Yves to its junction with the hills of the salient beyond Wytschaete, to capture as many as possible of the enemy's guns in the vicinity of osttaverne and to the north-east of Messines, to consolidate a line which would secure possession of the ridge, and to establish a forward position on which counter-attacks could be met at a safe distance from the crest. The requisite amount of elbow room would be given by the capture of the 0osttaverne Line, and this accordingly was fixed as the final objective. To secure all the fruits of a surprise attack and to effect the capture of guns it was imperative that the attack should be pushed through in 1 day. The troops available for the operations were, from right to left, 11. Anzac, the IX. Corps and the X. Corps. In reserve was the XIV. Corps, which had in the Battle of the Somme been on the right of the XV.</p>
        <p>Under General Godley's command at the beginning of may were the 57th, the 3rd Australian, the New Zealand and the: 25th Divisions. The Corps was reinforced in the middle of the month by the 4th Australian Division from I. Anzac, then forming part of the Fifth Army. The Divisions earrnarked for the attack lay approximately-in their assembly areas. On the right, from St. Yves to the Douve, the 3rd Australian Division held a frontage of some 2000 yards. The New Zealanders, in the centre, from the Douve to just <pb xml:id="n220" n="179"/>north of the Wulverghem-Messines road occupied some 1500 yards. On the left, where 11. Anzac were divided from the IX. Corps at the Wulverghem-wytschaete road, the frontage allotted to the 25th Division was still narrower, in view of the greater distance that lay between them and the crest. On the Corps front south of the Lys the 57th Division had extended their positions<note xml:id="fn85-179" n="1"><p>p. 153</p></note> to the north to include the subsectors of 1'Epinette and Houplines just south of the river, and now held a frontage of 18,000 yards, formerly garrisoned by 3 Divisions, each with 2 strong brigades in the line. Towards the end of May, to relieve the Second Army and 11. Anzac of responsibilities outside the active area, the 57th Division sector right up to the Lys was transferred to the XI. Corps of the First Army. The defensive front of the Corps, as contrasted with the offensive front on which the 3 Divisions were preparing their spring on Messines, was thus restricted lo the short sector from the Lys to St. Yves, held by the 3rd Australians Division. To relieve its garrison a separate force of 2 battalions of the already extended 57th Division was brought up on 3rd June north of the lys and attached for tactical purpose to the 3rd Australians.</p>
        <p>The tasks laid down for the Corps were the taking of Messines, the capture of as many guns as possible within the area of its further advance, and the consolidation of the southern part of the new British line, which would run from St. Yves across the slopes of the ridge to meet the Oosttaverne trenches cast of Messines and thence along them to the Corps' northern boundary. The furthermost objective in the Objective system, roughly, 1 mile forward of the crest, was known as the Green line. The position defined as the reserve line of occupation some 500 yards east of Messines on the eastern and southern slopes back to the Douve was designated the Black Line. The 3 Divisions, the 3rd Australian on the right, the New Zealand in the centre and the 25th on the left, would advance abreast to the Black Line, the New Zealand Division occupying Messines. The capture of the Green Line was allotted to the 4th Australian Division, which would pass through the New Zealand and 25th Divisions. The troops entrusted with the establishment of the Black Line were ordered on reaching it to push out patrols, to capture the enemy guns and establish posts on a Black Dotted line some 300 yards in front, which would act first as a stepping-stone to the Green Line and then after the <pb xml:id="n221" n="180"/>4th Australians' advance as a support position to it. While the seizure of the Oosttaverne trenches was committed mainly to the 4th Australians, the occupation of a small triangle of country in front of the 3rd Australians on the Black Line. necessary to round off the right flank from the Green Line back to the projection of the newly won ground about St. Yves, would be carried out by one of the 3rd Australian Dvision's battalions.</p>
        <p>The assaulting positions of the 3rd Australians and the New Zealanders lay in a line, and no difficulty faced the Staff in synchronising their advance. At the left boundary of the New Zealand, however, an awkward problem presented itself. Here the German trenches bulged out westwards over the Steenebeek valley and up the rising ground on its right bank, where they inlcluded the ruins of a large farm called Ontario, from which point they turned again northwards along the IX. Corp's' front. As a result of this, the 25th Division's trenches lay 600-800 yards echeloned in rear of the remainder of the Corps' front. So too the German support positions in the upper Steenebeek valley, opposite the 25th Division, enfiladed the passage of the New Zealanders across No Man's land. To bring all assaulting troops into line, it might have been thought feasible to launch the 25th Division and the northern troops some minutes before the 2 Overseas Divisions, but in that case the enemy barrage would have time to come down on the front line and catch the Australians and New Zealanders in their assembly trenches. It was vital that all along the front as many of the attacking troops as possible should have crossed into the enemy's country before his protective curtain of fire fell. The advance, therefore, must start simultaneously.</p>
        <p>This point once settled, arrangements were made that the left flank of the New Zealanders' line, placed so awkwardly in front of the 25th Division at the outset of the attack, should be protected and guided by an enfilade barrage, which would be gradually followed up by the ereeping frontal barrage of the 25th Division. Smoke clouds could also, if necessary, be discharged on the slopes of the upper Steenebeek valley, and Ontario Farm would be hurled sky-high by means of our mines which lay under it. The New Zealand left as it advanced would be swung back along the boundary line to ensure a flank defence; and the halts were so arranged that the 25th Division would catch up just short of the Ypres road running along the crest. and thereafter <pb xml:id="n222" n="181"/>would continue in line. A corresponding manoeuvre was to take place at a later stage on the boundary between the 25th Division and the IX. Corps.</p>
        <p>On this rapid crossing of No Man's Land ere the German barrage fell, great emphasis was laid in the Divisional plans, and it was largely with this end in view that the numerous lines of assembly trenches had been constructed. For the same reason the first New Zealand objective was fixed, not at the German front line, where delay might cause congestion in No Man's Land, but at the support line. And the front line trenches had been so battered that serious resistance in them need not be anticipated.</p>
        <p>The role allotted to the Division was the storming of Messines, the consolidation of the Black Line within the New Zealanders' boundaries, the establishment of a series of Strong Points on the Black Dotted Line, and the capture of any enemy guns within their area. These objectives fell naturally into 3 phases, firstly the capture of the trenches on the west slope and of the village with the ring of trenches immediately surrounding it, secondly the capture and consolidation of the Black Line, and thirdly the establishment of the Strong Points on the Black Dotted Line and the capture of the guns. The first phase, including as it did the capture of the 2 front systems of defence (the Blue and Brown Lines) and the village, bristled with difficulties and necessitated the employment of 2 brigades which would advance side by side. The second and third phases in the comparatively open country might be left to 1 brigade. For the capture of the crest and the village 2 battalion in each brigade sector would advance side by side and carry the first and second trench systems, and 1 strengthened battalion in each sector would divide the village between them. Half of each battalion would pass through the village to its further ring of defences and half remain to deal with the garrison. In the capture of each successive objective the "leap-frog" principle of advance was to be observed. Separate units were told off for the capture and consolidation of definite positions, and through them would pass fresh troops destined for further objectives.</p>
        <p>The 3rd and 2nd Brigades were ordered to carry out the first phase and the 1st Brigade the second and third. Brigade and battalion plans were scrutinised at conferences at Divisional headquarters, which at the end of April had moved to Westhof Farm, near Neuve Eglise. There, on 24th May, <pb xml:id="n223" n="182"/><name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name> visited General Russell to express his approval and confidence.</p>
        <p>Of the 20 tanks put at the disposal of the Corps, 12 had been allotted to the Division. Their routes and tasks were carefully defined, and special bridges were constructed for their use over the Douve. In addition to the medium and heavy howitzers and guns of the Corps, the Division was directly supported by nineteen 18-pounder batteries and six 4.5-in. howitzer batteries. A field gun was available for every 7 yards of enemy front. The 2nd (Army) Artillery Brigade supported the 25th Division's attack. Special arrangements were made to give the artillery transport increased mobility.</p>
        <p>Not the least interesting provision for facilitating the advance of the infantry was the formation of barrages by the machine guns, of which 144 were arranged along the Corps' front to sweep a line 500 yards in front of the advancing bayonets. The New Zealand attack was supported by 56 machine guns, divided for tactical purposes into 3 groups. Each assaulting brigade retained 8 of their guns for direct co-operation. The remainder, with those of the Divisional Company<note xml:id="fn86-182" n="1"><p>p. 163.</p></note> and of the newly arrived 4th Infantry Brigade, were employed under Divisional control. Like the artillery, the machine guns would maintain their normal harassing fire on communications throughout the final night, but at zero they would put down stationary and creeping barrages, lifting by 100 yards at a time as far as the crest of the ridge. On the capture of the trenches on the crest, 2 groups would move forward to the ridge to deal with any hostile attack on the Black Line, and later advance again to support the 4th Australians' attack on the Green Line with similar standing and creeping barrages.</p>
        <p>From 1st June the New Zealand lines were held thinly by 1 battalion at a time, and though the area and especia1ly the communication trenches were periodically shelled in retaliation for our bombardments. the troops, well disposed in depth, suffered few casualties. Two battalions were in support on and behind Hill 63. The reserves of officers and specialists forming the “B Teams” that would not be put into the battle had been sent to the Corps Reinforcement Camp at Morbecqur. The 1st Infantry Brigade was now on its way back from Tilques, and the bulk of the other 2 brigades were enjoying a few days' rest in concentration areas immediately in rear. They were somewhat <pb xml:id="n224" n="183"/>harassed by the high-velocity naval guns from the Lille defences, but though sleep was thus broken the fine weather and the respite from the shell-fire of the trenches were keenly appreciated, and it was with assurance and optimism that all looked forward to the forthcoming venture. Each platoon and section was fully conversant with the role it would be called on to play and had studied the trenches and the terrain of the ridge on the great relief clay model, as large as a tennis court, whose erection exemplified the minute elaboration of the preparations for the battle. On 3rd June the 1st Infantry Brigade relieved the 2nd Brigade in the line.</p>
        <p>On the afternoon of the 6th a company of 1st Canterbury were having tea on the slopes of Hill 63 when 3 shells fell without warning in the crowd round the dixies, and 30 men were wounded or killed. No misadventure, how ever, befell the small advance parties of the assaulting brigades that took over the line from 2nd Auckland.</p>
        <p>In the late evening their fellows left the concentration areas, and marched up to the trenches by specially pegged and marked overland routes which were employed to avoid congestion and shelling on the main roads. A thunderstorm had cleared the sultry air, and the night was cool and fresh. All over the Army front innumerable platoons of the different Divisions were moving at 200 yards' distance from each other. No match was struck to light pipe or cigarette, and high overhead aeroplanes guarded the sky. On the right an Australian brigade was heavily gas shelled. Gas and lachrymatory shells fell also with their characteristic soft explosions in the New Zealand area, especially about Hill 63, where Advanced Divisional Headquaters were obliged to wear gas respirators for 6 hours prior to zero. The infantry suffered less. Few duties are more laborious than groping one's way up dark saps in respirators, but with order and precision the troops filed into the trenches, and thanks to good gas discipline suffered but few casua1ties.<note xml:id="fn87-183" n="1"><p>The German gas shelling was favoured by a gentle steady easterly wind, owing to which our own proposed gas attack had to be cancelled.</p></note> The machine gunners, who had moved to their positions on the previous evening and remained under cover during the day, now completed their emplacements or finally cleared their lines of fire.</p>
        <p>Every possible precaution was taken to avoid confusion and disguise the assembly. Telephone communication was absolutely forbidden, and all the code messages reporting completion of assembly, such as that of the Rifle Brigade: <pb xml:id="n225" n="184"/>“Working Party will report as ordered at 9 a.m. tomorrow” were sent by runner. Watches were for a last time synchronised with the standard time communicated to Corps from the Eiffel Tower and brought to brigade headquarters by a Divisional Staff Officer. By 2 a.m. (7th June) everyone was in his place in the numbered firebays. The right was in close touch with the extreme: left wing of the Australians, which was accommodated north of the Douve to avoid crossing the river in No Man's Land. The liaison officers and n.c.o.s were with flank formations. The Divisional reserves, consisting of the Engineer Field Companies and the Pioneer Battalion, were in the galleries under Hill 63 or in back areas. Shortly afterwards tanks crept up to behind our support line. Underground the tunnellers waited, watch in hand, for the appointed second. The elaborate mechanism was now fully wound up, and the moment of the culminating point of the battle, so long and laboriously prepared for, was fast approaching, when the bayonets of the infantry would complete the work of the artillery and other arms.</p>
        <p>In these congested trenches a bombardment would cause destruction and demoralisation. Arrangements had been made, therefore, that enemy shelling of our trenches should be frustrated by prompt and overwhelming counter-battery work. Should such bombardment arise within 30 minutes of zero, a S.O.S. signal would not be answered by our field artillery, in order that there might be no danger of our infantry mistaking retaliatory action for the opening of the barrage. Though our batteries, however, received the usual attention, our forward areas were left unmolested by artillery fire, and shortly after midnight the enemy gas shelling ceased. Fully anticipating our attack, the German Command did not expect it for some days yet, and his intention was to relieve with fresh troops the Divisions on the ridge, sorely tried by our unceasing bombardment. That very night, indeed, reliefs were being carried out on the silent hillside. Opposite the 25th Division the trenches were crowded with incoming and outgoing Saxons and Bavarians. in Messines the infantry-exchanges had been completed, and troops of the 40th Division (Saxons) and the 3rd Bavarian Division held the line opposite the New Zealand front. The machine gun reliefs, however, were still in progress and were to be caught in the storm.</p>
        <p>Up to the moment of attack our own artillery and machine guns maintained their normal activity without either <pb xml:id="n226" n="185"/>slackening or intensifying. It was a fine night, lit up in the earlier hours by a full moon. Before the trenches, patrols covered No Man's Land with special vigilance; others examined the bridges over the Steenebeek, and where necessary repaired them, or laid guiding tapes from the bridges to the top of our parapets, or placed duckboards across the front trenches as bridges for the troops in rear. By 3 a.m. the parties in No Man's Land had withdrawn to the trenches, and at that hour the stormers silently fixed bayonets.</p>
        <p>The moment of assault was fixed at 10 minutes past 3. The moon had now sunk below the horizon. The morning was dark and misty, but the first streaks of dawn just enabled close objects to be discerned. A minute or two before zero, some machine guns anticipated the barrage, but were fortunately not taken seriously by the enemy. Within a few seconds of the proper time the mines were sprung at Factory Farm, just beyond the right of the Australians, and at Anton's Farm Road, in the centre of their position. On the other flank of the New Zealanders one at Ontario farm, in reality of lesser dimensions but appearing owing to its proximity even more stupendous, caused the bottom of their trenches to heave and rock, and the volcano of jagged crimsonred flames lit up the forms of our infantary. moving over the parapet.</p>
        <p>Ten seconds after the explosion of the mines and the opening roar of our artillery and machine gun barrages, the dark hillside under Messines was illuminated by the white rockets and white flares bursting into 2 green stars of the German S.O.S., and the observes on Hill 63 witnessed an astonishingly beautiful display-of fireworks stretching away north as far as the eye could see. There were the unseen enemy, now all too certain that the awaited British attack had in the end surprised them.</p>
        <p>The German guns had been located by their activity-during our barrage feints. The effect of the deluge of gas and high-explosive with which they were drenched at the moment of zero by our heavies was instantaneous. They at once ceased the sporadic shelling of the batteries that had continued through the night, but it was not till 10 minutes later that their barrage fell about No Man's Land. Even then it was thin and irregular, and it was directed at now empty front lines. For, moving forward with the rapidity and ease born of frequent practice at Tilques, all 8 battalions of our 2 assaulting brigades were clear of' our <pb xml:id="n227" n="186"/>trenches in 7 minutes. Later the hostile barrage extended to the 1st Brigade trenches in rear without inflicting serious casualties. It descended with more weight on the 25th Division. The Douve chanced to mark a boundary between 2 different German Armies, the Fourth on the north and the Sixth on the south, and the Australians, who faced the latter, were hampered by a second heavy barrage of gas.</p>
        <p>In view of the tiers of trenches on the hillside it had been decided to put standing barrages on them from the outset rather than devote part of the artillery to cover the infantry across the 200 yards' breadth of No Man's Land. It was from the German front line onwards that the creeping 18-pounder barrage advanced up the hill, protecting with its mighty shield the assaulting waves. Up to this date no barrage had been more scientifically planned, nor was one even later to be more admirably executed, and it was spoken of long afterwards by the infantry, ever sufficiently severe critics, with enthusiasm. Carefully calculated on the probable pace of the waves and their varying progress as they would be faced by difficulties of ground or points of resistance, It rolled up majestically to the support line, lifting 100 yards every 2 minutes. From there uphill to the trenches on the crest, It stretched forth Its destructive hand more slowly, taking 3 minutes to the 100 yards. Through Messines, in view of the difficulties of mopping up, 11 minutes clapsed from every 100 yards' lift. Once over the hill and in the open country It again hastened Its stride. The 18-pounder standing barrage waited for It and then lifted to the next trench. A standing 4.5-in. howitzer barrage fell 300 yards ahead of the infantry. The standing barrages of the medium and heavy howitzers were established on successive trenches and Strong Points within the limits of safety (400 yards) for the advancing waves.</p>
        <p>Till the last possible minute every-part of the area through which the infantry had to pass was kept under fire. During the lifts there was no perceptible pause. A system of alternate guns lifting 10 seconds before the remainder, as well as other technical devices, gave the advancing barrage unbroken continuity. Normally each gun fired 2 rounds a minute, but when the barrage reached definite Strong Points and trenches, it dwelt on these, quickening its rate to 3 rounds a minute, for 2 or' 3 minutes prior to bounding forward. On the diapason of the artillery the whip-like crack of the machine gun bullets overchard broke in fiercely. <pb xml:id="n228"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP027a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP027a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP027a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Messines: Result of Bombardment</hi></head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP027b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP027b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP027b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">The Ruins of Messines</hi></head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n229"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP028a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP028a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP028a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Tank Going into Action</hi></head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP028b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP028b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP028b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Messines: Wounded Prisoners</hi></head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n230" n="187"/>As with the artillery, arrangements were made to avoid any cessation of fire. Only half the machine guns fired at each 100 yards' lift, the remainder relaying and “oiling up,” so that their roar also was continuous.</p>
        <p>For purposes of facilitating intelligence work, the German trenches had been give names beginning with the letter of the map square in which they were located. The New Zealand attack fell mainly in the square U and partly in the square 0, and the trenches of the front line system (the Blue Line) were from south to north know as the Ulna Ulcer Uhlan, and Oyster Trenches and Supports. Towards these the 2 battalions in each brigade now moved abreast, accompanied by their machine gun detachments. In the Rifle Brigade to the south were the 1st Battalion<note xml:id="fn88-187" n="1"><p>Major (temp. Lt.-Col.) J. G. Roache, vice Lt.-Col. Austin, wounded 21st March.</p></note> on the right and the 3rd Battalion on the left, the latter being strengthened by 2 platoons of the 2nd Battalion,<note xml:id="fn89-187" n="2"><p>Major R. St. J. Beere, vice Lt. Col. <name type="person" key="name-413207">A. E. Stewart</name>, sick.</p></note> which was in brigade reserve. In the 2nd Brigade, 1st Canterbury<note xml:id="fn90-187" n="3"><p>Major A. D. Sitt, vice Lt.-Co1. Young, on liaison duty.</p></note> was on the right and 1st Otago on the left.</p>
        <p>In the darkness the men moved steadily and rapidly over the Steenebeek with their rifles carried at the high port across their breasts. The German barrage had not yet fallen, but a few shells dropped in No Man's Land, and by an unlucky mischance 2 of these destroyed the machine gun crews attached to the 1st and 4th Rifles. There was no confusion, no trace of excitement. Officers and n.c.o.s quietly adjusted distances. The 2 platoons of the 1st Rifles detailed to take La Petite Douve Ferme met resistance from isolated groups in the ruins and the sap in rear, but speedily overcame it.</p>
        <p>The main attack scrambled through the front line without making a pause and pushed on to the support line, dropping parties to clear up any occupants. As the left company of the 1st Rifles approached Ulna Support, Cpl. H. J. Jeffrey suddenly found himself facing an enemy dugout. He was alone, and a German crouched behind a machine gun which was trained on the Australians in the valley. Jeffrey immediately rushed the gunner, who fled into the dugout. Jeffrey followed, and flinging a bomb into it called on the inmates to surrender. Eight men came out with their hands up. Among them was an officer. Behind his men he made as <pb xml:id="n231" n="188"/>though to draw his revolver Jeffrey lunged at him with his bayonet, and the officer succeeded in escaping. 4 more Germans emerged, and the whole 12 were added to another party of prisoners going to the rear. In the dugout Jeffrey's bomb had killed 5 and wounded another. Their victor rejoined his platoon. In the support line here 40 prisoners and 2 further guns were taken. The 3rd Rifles and 1st Canterbury, in the centre of the line, seized their first objectives without noteworthy incident. On the left, the 2 leading companies of 1st Otago took the German front system with ease, and each sent a party forward to the Moulin de 1'Hospice and to Birthday Farm. The Mill, which was expected to give trouble, was surrounded before its machine guns could come into action and fell with little resistance. It yielded 2 machine guns and 20 prisoners. On its capture the 2 light trench mortars which accompanied the storming parties moved to the left flank to cover Sloping Roof Farm, and when the attack should have passed that point to proceed on to the crest. In the second Strong Point at Birthday Farm on the extreme left, the barrage had not passed an instant before a machine gun came into action. Our men had repeatedly practised the tactics to meet such an emergency. A handful of snipers dropped into the shellholes to hold the attention of the machine gunners, and bombers and rifle bombers started to rush from shellhole to shellhole round the flanks, but ere they got to the Farm the work was done for them. A lucky and somewhat dilatory shell, for the barrage was now ahead, shrieked low over their heads and crashed into the Farm. 30 prisoners and 3 machine guns were captured in and about it. Here too the mortars were not required, and they moved forward up the left flank. On the battered and blocked line of dirt timber wire-netting concrete and dead, which was all that remained of the once splendid trenches of the front system, the whole attack had poured to swiftly that the Germans had no opportunity to resist. They were bombed in their dugouts or bayoneted within 2 yards of them. There was still remarkably little hostile artillery fire. The absence of machine gun fire, too, was noticeable. It had been calculated that there were at least 10 heavy machine guns besides light machine guns in the front line system and behind it opposite each of our brigades, but, as we have seen, the assault surprised the process of their relief, and a captured machine gun officer admitted that at the moment of attack his section was in- <pb xml:id="n232" n="189"/>operative. Within 16 minutes and up to schedule time the front system (the Blue Line) was securely ours.</p>
        <p>In the support line of the front system, the 2 leading companies of each battalion stayed, and after a brief pause further companies passed through them and up the hill towards the second system (the Brown Line). The ascent was extraordinary difficult. Vast 15-feet-deep craters with sheer sides covered the whole slope. Scarcely a foot of level ground remained amid the shellholes. The dawn too had hardly broken, and the darkness was accentuated by the smoke of the shells, but the officers checked direction with their compasses, and in every case the companies reached their objectives practically correct.</p>
        <p>On the Rifle Brigade front the right company of the 1st Battalion found a machine gun emplacement 200 yards below the Brown Line wire, with a machine gun and ammunition, but the personnel had fled. Pressing forward and jumping into the trenches the moment the barrage lifted, the company accounted for the garrison, of whom they took 30 prisoners. Their objective, Ulcer Reserve, lay about 100 yards further east than the rest of the Brown Line. The left company were fired at from a hedge while still 200 yards from their goal, but rushed the hedge and bayoneted the Germans in the roughly fortified shellholes beyond, taking also a handful of prisoners. In their sector of trench were 2 concrete dug-outs. One, containing explosives, they later blew up. From a loophole in the other a rifle fired down the sap. Dodging behind the debris, the riflemen, surrounded it, and the 6 occupants surrendered. In all, the 1st Battalion captured over 70 prisoners and 4 machine guns.</p>
        <p>The 3rd Battalion companies, with the 2 platoons attached from the 2nd Battalion, reached the neighbourhood of the Brown Line without opposition, but here they came under intense fire from a well-posted machine gun on the edge of Messines. The officer commanding the company opposite the gun was killed. Men fell rapidly, and the line was checked. Then L.-Cpl. Samuel Frickleton, although already slightly wounded, called on his section to follow him and dashed through our barrage with his men. Flinging his bombs at the gun crew, he rushed and bayoneted the survivors and then, still working within our barrage with the utmost sang-froid, attacked a second gun some 20 yards away. He killed the 3 men serving the gun and then destroyed the remainder of the crew and others, numbering <pb xml:id="n233" n="190"/>in all 9, who were still in the dugout. The infantry at once swept on to the trench. Frickleton, who was later severely wounded, was awarded the V.C. for the magnificent courage and leadership which prevented many casualties and ensured success. In this gallant action. Cpl. A. V. Eade was also prominent. He carried one of the machine guns forward to engage another gun further on, but was killed while getting the gun into action. Another member of the party, Rflmn. C. J. Maubon, a few minutes later when a machine gun opened fire from the ruins of the inner wall of the Institution Royale, rushed up within the shells of our barrage, bombed the gunner and destroyed the gun. The 3rd Battalion captured in the Blue and Brown systems nearly 100 prisoners and 3 machine guns. Their casualties in the actual advance were 21 killed and 75 wounded. Only 9 officers remained to supervise consolidation. Major A. Digby-Smith had been severely wounded in the face by shrapnel in No Man's Land, and suffered in addition from the effects of gas poisoning, but 'continued to lead his company till consolidation was well under way.</p>
        <p>Mcanwhile along the farm road dividing the 2 brigades a 1st Canterbury party had carried the group of houses at the Au Bon Fermier Cabaret. Light trench mortars accompanied them to assist in beating down the resistance expected at this Strong Point, but the Germans, driven back from the sandbagged entrances, threw up the sponge. From the cellars Canterbury collected 17 prisoners and 3 machine guns, and the light trench mortars, in accordance with the pre-arranged plan, moved over to the left flank. In the further advance on the Brown Line trouble was given by an enemy machine gun. Two Lewis gunners, L.-Cpl. G. A. Hewitt and Pte. R. T. Garlick, however, pushed through our barrage and engaged it. The Germans presently made signs of surrender, and Hewitt and Garlick went forward to take them prisoners. As soon as the 2 men emerged into the open, the machine gunners opened fire and wounded both. But the Germans reckoned without the determination of their opponents. Making light of their wounds, Hewitt and Garlick crawled up a sap and bombed the gun, killing the whole crew of 6. Then rushing the emplacement they captured the gun and 11 prisoners in the adjoining dugout.</p>
        <p>The Otago company detailed to seize the crest trench on the right of the battalion's sector of the Brown Line gained their objective without difficulty, Pte. C. A. Fitzpatrick <pb xml:id="n234" n="191"/>showing marked gallantry in rushing a machine gun, bayoneting 5 of the crew and capturing the remaining man and the gun. On its left 2 platoons of the remaining company, pending the arrival of the 25th Division fulfilled their function of safeguarding the flank by occupation of a communication trench which ran diagonally down hill in the direction of Birthday Farm. 1st Otago captured 2 field guns, 3 trench mortars and 9 machine guns, and 6 officers and 150 men. By the evening, shelled erratically but heavily, the battalion had lost 11 officers and over 200 men, of whom 3 officers and 30 men had been killed.</p>
        <p>It was now close on 4 a.m. Except on the left, where it was part of the policy to wait till the 25th Division was in line, the second system of trenches (the Brown Line) had fallen, like the first (the Blue Line), up to timetable. The day was now rapidly becoming lighter, and the artillery forward observation officers were already on the foremost positions won, eager to find targets for their guns. The infantry lost not a minute in beginning consolidation. In the front line trench system they dug themselves in some 70 yards above the German defences. On the crest in front of the Rifle Brigade the protective barrage stood somewhat close in, and hence the new trenches were perforce constructed rather closer to the old than was desirable.<note xml:id="fn91-191" n="1"><p>p. 84.</p></note> Before Messines the 2nd Brigade sited their trenches below the German ones, for otherwise they would have been too near the outskirts of the village, which was certain to be shelled, and in addition the German wire, which was still despite the bombardment in fair condition, now served their own purposes. 1st Otago was for a time harassed by machine guns from the ruins of Swayne's Farm on the Wytschacte road, but forth-with a tank came up and, manocuvring with some difficulty past a large shellhole, crashed into the wall. The wall crumbled before it in a cloud of reddish dust. The roof fell in. The garrison of 30 came out and surrendered.</p>
        <p>As soon as the capture of the Brown Line was reported, the 2 machine gun groups, whose part it was to cover further advance, began to move up the hill. Other little parties of Battalion Headquarters and Brigade intelligence personnel and signallers were also picking their way about the slopes in search of suitable headquarters. As these were found, the signallers set out in the shellholes the ground <pb xml:id="n235" n="192"/>Sheets and the 12-feet long strips which indicated their position to the aeroplanes.</p>
        <p>The portion of the ridge on which the frontier village of Messines is built is flat, and the ground falls gradually away to the south-east and west. The natural strength of the position was recognised in ancient times and was improved by a fortified enceinte, traces of which still remained in a depression on the western outskirts, now filled with barbed wire. In his scheme of defence of the ridge the German had designed Messines, the southern corner-post of “the Wytschaete bend,” to be a fortress capable of all-round resistance. On the north and north-east as well as on the west he had surrounded it with well-constructed and heavily-wired trenches.</p>
        <p>A permanent commander (Capt. Thomas) had been appointed for its outer and inner defences. The former consisted of the whole trench system round the town, the latter were based on 5 completed concrete works commanding the lines of the streets and on others still in course of construction. Should the outer defences be broken, the town was to be defended by sectors. Each of the 5 concrete dugouts was a self-contained Strong Point, and as such was to be held to the last until the town should be retaken. Of the 200 odd houses the majority were small cottages with ground floors only, but some were substantially built with 2 floors. Nearly every cellar was converted into a concrete shell-proof dugout. The stronger were used as offices and telephone ex-changes and for accommodation. In addition to troops of the reserve battalion, Capt. Thomas could call on certain Pioneers and other forces as an emergency garrison, and these as a distinguishing mark carried a white band on the left arm.<note xml:id="fn92-192" n="2"><p>The German Defence Orders were captured and are held as a New Zealand war trophy.</p></note></p>
        <p>For the storming of these outer defences of Messines on the north south and east (the Yellow Line.) and the capture of the village itself, General Fulton employed the 4th Rifles and General Braithwaite 2nd Canterbury. Each battalion was strengthened by a company from the battalion in brigade reserve. The vi1lage was divided equally between the 2 battalions and each had subdivided their half into definite company platoon and section areas, and issued to each man taking part in the operation a detailed map with all the information available about cellars and suspected Strong Points. 2nd Canterbury on the left would seize Oxonian Trench, which extending from the Wytschaete road <pb xml:id="n236" n="193"/>to Huns' Walk defended the village on the north and north-east from an attack down the ridge. To them was assigned also the capture of a trench line east of the village on the southern side of Huns' Walk from the road to the commencement of the great Unbearable Trench, which was a “switch” between the Messines defences and the Oosttaverne Line. The 4th Rifles would take the southern half of the village and the less strongly developed trenches that continued the circle to the south and south-west round the village back to the Brown Line.</p>
        <p>These 2 battalions pressed close behind the leading troops of their brigades. The 4th Rifles, following the 3rd Battalion, was on a 3-company frontage. The right company, in conjunction with a 1st Battalion company, was to take a half-finished trench beyond the Brown Line on the open ground south of the village, and so straighten up the position with the advanced right flank of the 1st Rifles.<note xml:id="fn93-193" n="1"><p>p. 189</p></note> The centre and left companies had their task in clearing the village. In rear came the remaining 4th Battalion company, which passing through the village would complete the capture of the Yellow Line on the left of the brigade sector due east of the village, and the attached company of the reserve battalion. 2nd Canterbury extended over the whole of the 2nd Brigade area on a 2-company frontage. The first wave was composed of the assaulting platoons that would capture Oxonian Trench. Behind them followed the troops detailed to clear the northern half of Messines, and finally came the supporting platoons of the leading companies. Slightly echeloned in rear of the left companies moved the 2nd Otago company, which would be used, as the 25th Division came abreast, to take the trench known as October Support beyond the Wytschaete road north of the village.</p>
        <p>On the capture of the Brown Line an interval of 10 minutes clapscd to allow of the deployment of the 2 assaulting battalions. When the barrage lifted anew, a company of the 1st Rifles and on its left the right company of the 4th Battalion on the open ground south went forward to clear the half-finished trench and straighten up the line. Simultaneously the main assault entered the dust-filled village. In front of the 4th Battalion a few disorganised parties of Germans were visible, who sniping through doorways and shattered windows or throwing bombs from behind walls made some show of resistance. No covering fire was possible <pb xml:id="n237" n="194"/>from the machine gun attached to the 4th Battalion, for it had been early destroyed, but the close following up of the barrage and the unfaltering precision with which cach party moved to its allotted objective overcame the opposition of the snipers and prevented the enemy from getting his numerous machine guns into action. On the whole, much less fighting was encountered than had been looked for, and only here and there, where the Germans largely outnumbered their assailants, did they show stubbornness. Each party cleared the cellars in its area, and when the enemy showed reluctance to leave them drove him out by smoke bombs or destroyed him by light trench mortar bombs. Nor was much difficulty experienced in taking the trenches to the east, where a strong post was pushed well down Unbearable Trench. Capt. Thomas and his Staff in the massive concrete dugouts under the Institution Royale fell into the Rifles' hands. Splendid feats of arms were performed by 2 n.c.o.s, Sergt. J. W. Penrose and L-Sergt. J. E. Thomson, both of whom fell. With Dunthorne<note xml:id="fn94-194" n="3"><p>p. 207.</p></note> they were recommended for the V.C.</p>
        <p>2nd Canterbury met somewhat more opposition both in the village itself and in Oxonian Trench. The leading platoons following close behind the barrage took no part in the systematic mopping-up but pressed steadily through the ruins. The right company was for a time checked by trenches in a small cemetery near the Yellow Line, but when the support platoons came forward, the whole strengthened attack dashed forward with irresistible êlan, and the enemy fled. In these trenches a number were killed and 50 prisoners captured. Enemy machine guns in Oxonian Trench failed to hold up the left front company for long, and a post was established in the communication trench, Oxonian Row, which led up from the north-east. Of the left supporting company part was earmarked to clear the northern fringe of the village. The remainder wormed their way round the protective flank barrage, which here was falling a little short, and scized the northern sector of Oxonian Trench. Like the other trenches round the village, Oxonian was meant to repulse an attack from the outside, and its massive entanglements gave no assistance against an interior attack from Messines. Thus by the scheduled time of 5 a.m. the Yellow Line was in our hands and Messines was, if not cleared completely in its northern half, closely invested. Shortly afterwards the <choice><orig>con-<pb xml:id="n238" n="195"/>tact</orig><reg>contact</reg></choice> aeroplanes dropped maps at Corps and duplicates at Division showing a line of our flares all along its perimeter.</p>
        <p>In the village itself, especially in its northern half, fighting was to smoulder for some short time yet. It was packed with machine guns. 5 were captured just preparing to come into action, and another 5 were rushed from neighbouring vantage points. 2 which fired across the open square it was impossible to rush, and these gave trouble till silenced by rifle grenades. Another gun was posted at a dressing station in violation of the decencies of war but in a commanding position which made approach peculiarly hazardous. None the less, F. White, a Canterbury private, led a party against it, capturing the gun and killing the sacrilegious gunners. He had already earlier in the morning shown conspicuous gallantry. Single-handed he had cleared an enemy dugout and brought up to the light of day no less than 18 prisoners, and elsewhere in the village killed a plucky and aggressive sniper with a welldirected bomb. Nothing could daunt this gallant soldier, who in less strenuous days was the company barber. Turning now against another of the troublesome machine guns he rushed it, bayoneting 5 of the crew, and bringing back the sixth with the gun. Wounded at the end of the day, he was later rewarded by a D.C.M. Actions like his bear fruit. The last centres of resistance fell one after the other, and official confirmation of the capture of the whole village reached Division at 7 a.m. The 4th Rifles captured a field gun for anti-tank defence, 3 machine guns and over 60 prisoners. 2nd Canterbury, faced by large numbers, secured a correspondingly greater haul of prisoners, together with 20 machine guns, 2 trench mortars, 3 anti-tank guns and 4 searchlights.<note xml:id="fn95-195" n="1"><p>No satisfactory evidence supports the improbable statement that the wells in Messines were poisoned with arsenic. The chemical analysis made appears to have been faulty.</p></note> As at the Strong Points on the western slopes, so too in the village the light trench mortars had been unable to create opportunities for action. On its capture they took up positions covering Unbearable and Oxonian. The bulk of the brigade reserve machine guns were now also pushed forward to obtain direct fire on suitable targets on the reverse slope. The smoke, dust, and dull light to some extent blinded them, but they scattered enemy parties in the hollows to the north-east. Four German machine guns, taken east of the village with an abundant supply of ammunition, were brought into <pb xml:id="n239" n="196"/>action by New Zealand machine gunners under Lt. A. J. M. Manson, who, though wounded, remained with his section.</p>
        <p>Meanwhile on the left flank the 25th Division had over-come all difficulties about the Steenebeek valley and pressed up towards the crest, the enfilade barrage which protected the New Zealanders' left flank lifting off before them as they came. When they drew abreast of the diagonal sap in which the 1st Otago troops refused the New Zealand left, the frontal barrage covering these also lifted forward, and Otago rose from their trenches and, in conformity with the 25th Division, swept up to extend in a straight line the position held on the ridge. Through them presently moved the 2nd Otago company attached to 2nd Canterbury. This company passing the now innocuous Swayne's Farm,<note xml:id="fn96-196" n="1"><p>25th Division troops seem to have made doubly sure of this (?) Farm by a subsequent "capture." A succession of small concrete Strong Points, or "pill-boxes" on the Wytchaete road made identification difficult.</p></note> from which the tank had drawn the sting, crossed the Wytschaete road and captured October Support a few minutes after 5 a.m. 200 yards in front of the trench a new line was dug across the position, and the machine guns of the battalions in rear rapidly took up posts in it.</p>
        <p>While the assaulting troops of the 2 leading brigades were thus rounding off their tasks, the reserve battalions, the 2nd Rifles and 2nd Otago, were engaged in consolidating their positions on the western slopes. The 2nd Rifles, who had captured some 15 prisoners with a machine gun and trench mortar overlooked by the leading battalions, dug in between the first and second German systems. As they consolidated, a machine gun opened fire from the outskirts of the village, but a party rushed forward and put its crew out of action. 2nd Otago lay somewhat further down the hill under the shelter of an embankment in the Steenebeek valley. Both battalions were ready at a moment's notice to assist their comrades in Messines or move to any point threatened. Averse to employing more troops than ware necessary, the infantry brigadiers ware none the less clearly decided that it was far better to use all their effectives and reach the last objectives than to fail to reach them and have troops intact. In accordance with this principle, a company of 2nd Otago was sent forward early in the morning to assist 2nd Canterbury in mopping up Messines and consolidating the trenches in front. As the morning advanced, the rest of the battalion was also largely called on for the consolidation of the new line dug beyond Oxonian Trench. The deep, admirably sited <pb xml:id="n240" n="197"/>trenches in the valley had given effective shelter, but in the exposed positions east of the village 2nd Otago bore their share of casualties and at the close of the day had lost 24 killed and over 100 wounded.</p>
        <p>The first act was thus brought to a triumphal conclusion, and the stage was set for the appearance of the 1st Brigade. The position of the Black Line selected for consolidation east of the ridge was on an average some 600 yards in front of the trenches which had been captured and were now being redug by the 2 leading brigades. From the point of junction with the 3rd Australians near Bethleem Farm it followed the contour of the hill over Unbearable Trench and Huns' Walk to the northern boundary, where it swung back slightly westwards along the head of a shallow valley. The line passed just in front of a little wayside shrine, the Chapelle du Voleur, on Huns' Walk, and of the mound of a former windmill called the Blauwen Molen. Further north, just before it bent westwards, it included the fortified buildings at Fanny's Farm.</p>
        <p>The two 1st Brigade assaulting battalions left their assembly trenches shortly before 4 a.m. 1st Auckland moved on the right and 1st Wellington on the left. 2 light trench mortars accompanied the former and 3 the latter. Advancing side by side in small columns through the empty front line over the Steenebeek and up the hill, they swerved right and left to avoid confusion or shelling in Messines. The 2nd Brigade paid a tribute to their perfect formation. Just before 5 a.m. they reached the rear of the Brown Line.</p>
        <p>At this moment the curtain of fire encircling Messines was still halted in suspense, the furthest are of the circle waiting for the barrage with the following troops on either side to draw up level and join it in making once more a straight line across the whole Divisional front. On the north we have already marked the approach of the barrage in the advance of the 2nd Otago company over the Wytschaete road. On the southern edge of the village the guns lifted at 5 a.m., and the expectant lines of 1st Auckland immediately followed. Across their front ran the upper section of a wellwired trench called Ungodly. This was unheld, and the company detailed to take it at once established 4 posts in front. Another company passed through them to advance to the Black Line. They knew that they would cross the road from Messines to Basseville. It ran across their front and would be helpful in checking direction. In the smoke <pb xml:id="n241" n="198"/>and dust their eyes were strained towards it. Before they discerned the road itself, they saw a sight that thrilled their pulses. Through the battle fog appeared a crowd of Germans on a bank intent on dragging something away. In a flash the men realised what that something was. With a cheer and shouts of "Guns" the line broke from its steady walk into a panting run. The straining gunners redoubled their efforts, and a German machine gun from a niche in the bank opened fire. Down in a shellhole dropped the Lewis gunners on our flank and poured in a hot covering fire which silenced the machine gun, while the infantry streamed forward to the road. They jumped down from the near bank. They jabbed their bayonets into the panic-stricken Germans. The 2 guns and the machine gun were captured, and the greater part of the enemy were killed or taken prisoner. Exultantly this right company then pressed on without further adventure to the Black line. The leading company on the left meantime had skirted above Ungodly and taken Unbearable and the shrine without much difficulty. Both companies without delay proceeded to dig themselves in.</p>
        <p>North of the village 1st Wellington had followed close on the 2nd Otago company and in their eagerness not to miss the barrage were in October Support but a second or two behind them. Wellington attacked with 3 companies abreast, the right company swinging out to connect with Auckland once it had rounded Messines. A special platoon under 2nd Lt. A. R. Blennerhassett, detailed to storm Blauwen Molen and the sap leading to it, had a few minutes' sharp fighting at the Mill, but the enemy was rushed by Cpl. J. Fernandez and his men with a determination that ensured the minimum of casualties. It had been an artillery headquarters, and the dugouts were full of Germans, whom they bombed. 3 machine guns, an officer and 26 prisoners were captured, Pte. R. Alexander taking a machine gun and its entire crew single-handed. The right Wellington company did not meet with much opposition, and 2 machine guns and 25 prisoners fell to them. In this company Sergt. R. Corkill commanded the platoon on the right of the battalion sector. He led his men to the objective with great dash and judgment. He was hit in the right eye by a sniper. Though in great pain he remained on duty while touch was gained with Auckland on the right and consolidation well advanced, and he refused to be taken to the aid post till he had collapsed from pain and exhaustion.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n242" n="199"/>
        <p>Against the centre company a stiff resistance was shown in their task of clearing up a battalion headquarters and attacking stoutly-held enemy posts in the shellholes. A platoon of this company under. Lt. R. Wood fought with magnificent courage. Here as elsewhere on the brigade front the enemy barrage was not severe, but the German snipers were marksmen and took heavy toll. Shortly after a charge at and the capture of a machine gun, Woods himself was wounded and his platoon reduced to 12 men, but Sergt. M. Beck, L.-Cpl. C. W. Hansen and the remainder charged the Germans with desperate fury. Unhesitating gallantry on the part of a handful of men in close quarters not infrequently annuls a disadvantage of numbers. It was so to prove in this case. Beck and his men killed a round 50 of the Germans and were mortified to see others escape. To the remaining platoons of the centre company it fell to clear Fanny's Farm and the trench guarding it, where less stubborn resistance was overcome. The total prisoners of this company amounted to 100, and they also shot many of the enemy.</p>
        <p>The Wellington company on the left who pushed up the communication trench leading from October Support to Fanny's Farm had also to fight their way. One man in this company, Pte. J. A. Lee, was prominent for fearless gallantry. He tackled single-handed a machine gun near the Wytschaete road and captured the 4 gunners, and later, when the centre company was held up by an enemy post, he worked to its rear and rushed it successfully. In all this struggle the Stokes mortars gave valuable assistance, and here they ejected a machine gun from a concrete emplacement near the Wytschaete road, and silenced with 4 shells another troublesome one at the trench junction near Fanny's Farm. The left company secured 2 machine guns and 40 prisoners. The battalion in all captured 7 machine guns and nearly 200 prisoners, including 5 officers. On this battalion area perhaps more than elsewhere the Germans showed bitter resistance, but generally speaking their morale was high. In later examination the prisoners denounced the lack of support given by their artillery, many stating emphatically that the infantry was sacrificed to save the guns.</p>
        <p>The attacking troops were to be on the Black Line at 20 minutes past 5. At 20 minutes past 5 consolidation was being begun, and pigeons were winging their way back with the news of success to the Division lofts at Westhof <pb xml:id="n243" n="200"/>Farm. As soon as word was received of the capture of Messines, the forward group of the barraging machine guns had come on with remarkable quickness, They were led by the Divisional Machine Gun Officer, Major R. D. Hardic. Wounded in the eye and having every reason to believe that he had lost its use, this splendid officer disdained to leave his men for treatment, but continued with a skill equal to his fortitude to direct their fire and remained with them through-out the action. On reaching the intermediate position allotted on the eastern slope the machine gunners found it right on the line of the enemy barrage, and so, skilfully led by Lts. B. Palmes and P. C. Ashby, pushed further forward to their final objective, arriving in rear of the Black Line some 10 minutes after the infantry. Heavy casualties had been sustained in their advance, and on this new line 2 guns were destroyed. A third gun, with, <name type="person" key="name-130280">Lt. A. H. Preston</name>, M.C., a conspicuously fine officer, and 2 of its crew were buried. The other members of the team, under heavy shell-fire, contrived to extricate them, and Cpl. H. M. Hopper, using artificial respiration, succeeded in bringing round the 2 men. The gun was recovered and again brought into action. All efforts failed to resuscitate Preston. In the task of consolidation, in which the reserve companies lent a hand, water was soon reached, and the sides of the trenches fell in, but the shelling was not yet intense, and the men were in extraordinarily high spirits. In the morning General Brown paid a visit to his troops all down the inchoate line.</p>
        <p>Equally satisfactory progress had been made by both the 3rd Australians and the 25th Division. The latter, indeed, on the north dug so far ahead of their objective that they were 300 yards in front of 1st Wellington. The IX. Corps had seized the German lines to an equal depth, but as their point of departure had been more to the westward their foremost troops were still considerably in rear. It was part of the plan that they should at this juncture advance into line with II. Anzac. During the 3 hours in which they carried out this manoeuvre, and while the left wing of the 25th Division swung up with them, the 3rd Australians and the New Zealanders pressed on with their consolidation. 300 yards to the east of the line of digging infantry a protective barrage was maintained, and the Oosttaverne Line was solidly bombarded. It was at this stage that the New Zealand Division tanks returned to their rendezvous. There had been 6 guns of an anti-tank battery along the crest, but they <pb xml:id="n244"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP029a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP029a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP029a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc"><name key="name-418961" type="person">2nd Lieut. S. Frickleton</name>, V.C,</hi><lb/>[<hi rend="i">Photo Swaine</hi></head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP029b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP029b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP029b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Captured Trophies in Bailleul</hi></head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n245"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP030a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP030a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP030a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">H.R.H, The Duke of Connaught inspects trophies</hi></head></figure>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP030b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP030b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP030b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">And Victors</hi><lb/>(Generals <name key="name-405559" type="person">Plumer</name> and <name key="name-208052" type="person">Godley</name> in background. Note fernleaf on General Russell's armband.)</head></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n246" n="201"/>had been irretrievably damaged by the bombardment and did not come into action. The torn ground, however, had proved impassable to most of the tanks. Others were more fortunate but could not keep pace with the swiftly mounting infantry, who seized the crest without their assistance. A few had reached the ridge, and as at Swayne's Farm, had proved highly useful, though the 2nd Brigade signallers piled expletives on one which had destroyed their wires.</p>
        <p>Mcanwhile the 2nd Auckland companies. who had followed the 2 leading battalions of the 1st Brigade had been halted since 5 a.m. at the Moulin de 1'Hospice. Up to this point their casualties had been inconsiderable. At 6.40 a.m. 2 companies started forward to get into position behind the continuous Black Line for the execution of the third phase of the Division's action, the establishment of a Black Dotted Line of posts in front of the Black Line, the capture of the guns and the consolidation of 5 specially selected Strong Points. At the appointed time, 8.40 a.m., the protective barrage lifted and began to creep forward 100 yards every 3 minutes to cast of the Black Dotted Line followed closely by the patrols. On the right a 1st Auckland platoon pushed a post 200 yards down Unbearable Trench. The other 4 Strong Points were established further north, each by a platoon of one of the two 2nd Auckland companies. The other company was retained for the moment behind the Black Line. The withdrawal of the German batteries beyond Warneton frustrated any hopes of large captures of artillery, but the platoon on the extreme left captured a field gun. Two of these posts were heavily shelled after noon by our own or the enemy's artillery and had to withdraw temporarily for a short distance.</p>
        <p>An hour's protective barrage was put down in front of the posts to cover consolidation. It was not kept on the same line all the time, but throughout swept forwards and backwards up to a depth of 1000 yards, so that the ground in front was completely searched and all enemy movement frustrated. The forward observation officers on the crest were able to some extent to direct it on suitable targets. On its conclusion, patrols of the other company of 2nd Auckland, who had rested behind the Black Line, moved out to reconnoiter the ground as far as the Green Line. All troops operating east of the line of posts had been instructed to do everything in their power to facilitate the advance of the 4th Australians, and it was in this spirit that these patrols <pb xml:id="n247" n="202"/>carried out their mission. With fine audacity they went right up to within 100 yards of the Green Line, where they found the wire destroyed. The runners despatched back to Brigade Headquarters with the results of this reconnaissance appear one and all to have fallen victims to enemy fire, but the good news was told by word of mouth to the Australians as they passed through the Black Line. During this long but unavoidable pause of several hours, necessary to co-ordinate movement on the whole battlefront, 3 New Zealand and Australian cavalry patrols from the II. Anzac Mounted Regiment, in addition to the Aucklanders, pushed well forward to keep in touch with the enemy. They formed, however, too conspicuous a target to German artillery and machine guns, and were forced to withdraw with the loss of most of their horses.</p>
        <p>It was now after midday. In the early morning (7.40 a.m.) the enemy trenches east of Ploegsteert Wood beyond the Douve had been reported by aeroplane to be full of troops, and the fire of a portion of our artillery had been diverted to that quarter, but opposite the Corps front as yet no reaction had been felt. Shortly after noon, however, the enemy had been able to collect and bring forward reserves. Their attack was launched an hour afterwards along the whole of the Corps front and extended also to the north. It was prepared and supported by a marked intensity of hostile shelling all along the ridge, clearly visible to the balloon observers and to the powerful glasses on Kemmel. Our barrage was forth-with ordered down in front of the Black Dotted Line. The strength of the enemy's effectives is not yet known, but 10 successive waves were reported. The 2 remaining companies of 2nd Auckland, held in addition to 2nd Wellington<note xml:id="fn97-202" n="1"><p>Major <name type="person" key="name-416570">C. H. Weston</name>, vice Lt. Col. Cunningham, “B”  Teams.</p></note> as brigade reserve and engaged in digging communication trenches, were ordered forward to strengthen the defence, and 2nd Wellington was warned for the same movement. The Germans, however, did not get far beyond the Oosttaverne trenches. The thick lines of skirmishers offered unhoped for targets to the New Zealand machine gunners behind the Black, line and under their fire and the tremendous artillery barrage the attack, as the observers reported, “crumpled up.” An aeroplane reconnoitring the position of our posts on the Black Dotted Line at 2 p.m. saw nothing of the attack, and shortly afterwards an artillery forward observation officer in one of the trees at Bethleem Farm was able <pb xml:id="n248" n="203"/>to report our infantry moving about freely. The losses of the enemy were probably considerable.</p>
        <p>On the definite crushing of this attack all the available guns turned again to their interrupted task of bombarding the Green Line and its entanglements. In the morning an aeroplane had passed along it from Ploegsteert to its northern boundary and reported that at this time it held no concentration of troops. By the afternoon, however, the garrison had been largely increased. The original time fixed for the Australian advance had been extended some days previously by the Army Staff to a time which would be determined on the actual day by the progress of events. At 10.30 a.m. Corps were informed that the new zero would be exactly 12 hours after the opening of the attack. It was thus not till close on 3 p.m. that the protective barrage reestablished itself in front of the Black Dotted Line to cover the deployment of the 4th Australians. The gentle easterly breeze did not mitigate appreciably the sultriness of the afternoon.</p>
        <p>At 3.10 p.m. the 4th Australians advanced simultaneously with Divisions of the other Corps on the north. The artillery covering the New Zealand and 25th Divisions supported them, and they were accompanied by tanks. Northwards the assault was successful, but east of Messines the machine-like precision with which the earlier stage of the battle was conducted did not characterise either the assault on the Green Line or the holding of the portion taken. Information came in vague and fragmentary, and mounted patrols were again pushed out in the afternoon to supplement it. Between 8 and 9 p.m. the enemy put down a strong barrage, which included 8-in. shell and extended to the New Zealand positions. He followed it up with a series of determined local attacks by the 1st Guards Reserve Division. Under the pressure portions of the Australian line which had reached the Oosttaverne trenches but had not yet consolidated were driven in. There followed not a little confusion in the forward areas and uncertainty at Headquarters due to varying and inconsistent reports-now that all was well, now that the forward troops were retiring and the situation critical. The New Zealand batteries and machine guns answered the S.O.S. signal with the utmost vigour, one machine gun group firing no less than 21,000 rounds. No enemy were observed from the Black Line, and the hourly reports received by the Division from its own brigades made it clear that <pb xml:id="n249" n="204"/>the New Zealand positions were secure. General Russell and his Staff were imperturbable. Some commanders on the Corps front, however, fearful of the safety of the Black Line, took the extreme step of shortening the barrage, which entailed an unfortunate amount of casualties among those Australians who remained stubbornly in the Oosttaverne System. Notification of these instruction to the artillery was communicated to Corps Headquarters, who at once took strong action. The barrages both of field and heavy guns were peremptorily ordered to be advanced again east of the Green Line; further, they were to be accentuated at 3 a.m., at which hour the Australians were instructed to reoccupy the positions. The remainder of the night was fairly quiet. The Australians carried out the necessary reformations, and the whole of the Oosttaverne Line was in their possession by the early fore-noon of the 8th.<note xml:id="fn98-204" n="1"><p>The disadvantages arising from the independent command of the 4th Australians in front of the New Zealanders and the 25th Division are of a somewhat technical nature and need not be discussed here.</p></note></p>
        <p>Meantime in rear of the ridge the administrative and technical troops had been working at full pressure. As the last of the New Zeeland infantry moved forward, they were followed by all available men of the Cyclist Battalion, who were employed to make a rough track for the mounted troops past Boyle's Farm and over No Man's Land up the ridge. By extraordinary exertions the tangles of wire were removed and the shellholes levelled in half an hour, and at 7.30 a.m. the II. Anzac Mounted Regiment patrols, moving at a smart trot along the winding path and cheered by the happy wounded, had passed on their errand of reconnaissance over the hill. The Divisional reserves were engaged in the opening up of communication trenches, the provision of water supply, the construction of mule tracks to Messines for the use of the Packmule Company formed by Division from the regimental transports, the extension of the tramway system, and the consolidation of mutually supporting Strong Points in rear of the new trenches. Where these Strong Points were invisible to the enemy they were extensively wired, but on the forward slopes low trip-wire only was erected, to obviate attracting attention and shelling. At all hours of the day and night, carrying parties with "Yukon" packs braved the enemy shelling to take forward ammunition water food and everything required by the troops in front. Nothing that the transport officers and battalion quartermasters could do to ensure the well-being of their fighting comrades was left <pb xml:id="n250" n="205"/>undone, and in the fiercest night of shelling only 1 company failed to receive abundant rations and a hot meal. On the first evening the limbers came as far as our old front line; thereafter they ventured right up to the Moulin de l'Hospice. The travelling kitchens were brought up to the Steenebeek valley. The medical staff worked with untiring and inextinguishable devotion in alleviating the sufferings of the wounded, and the chaplains gave Christian burial to the fallen. While engaged in these last solemn rites of the battlefield a shell killed the Rev. J. J. McMenamin, a man of the highest character, unsurpassable courage, and kindly disposition, who showed to perfection that shrewd judgment, tempered by charity, of men and things characteristic of the best type of Roman Catholic priest. On the shell-swept battlefields many lives were saved and unforgettable examples of energy resourcefulness and fearlessness shown by Capt. J. G. Crawford, of the Medical Corps, the Rev. S. Parr, and many others.</p>
        <p>Throughout this time the activity of our artillery never slackened. Continuously and regularly the railways and tramways brought loads of shells to the batteries, thus freeing the roads of ammunition limbers and thereby avoiding those blocks in traffic which had so often hindered movement at the Somme. Soon after the capture of the Black Line a battery of an English brigade attached to the Divisional artillery moved with inspiring élan to the neighbourhood of Messines to render close support to the Australian attack. Other batteries pushed forward to positions previously selected and prepared on Hill 63 or north of the Douve in the shallow hollows about Stinking Farm, and were in action by the evening. On the following day further batteries were to move to the Steenebeek valley. For the first few hours of the battle our gun-positions were practically immune from hostile shelling, but about 9 a.m. fire from Deulemont and Warneton began to fall heavily on Hill 63. No damage was done to the guns, but a dump of 3000 rounds of 18-pounder ammunition was destroyed. On the subsequent days of the battle the gunners were to be seriously inconvenienced by the German observation balloons.</p>
        <p>For military students the victory of Messines will remain a classic example of the battle undertaken with limited objectives, characterised by prolonged and recondite preparations, by minute elaboration of detail, and exact definition of tasks. They will not readily exhaust the skill with which <pb xml:id="n251" n="206"/>The Division's Work in the Battle each piece of mechanism fitted in with the whole. In the result, the Staff work both of the General and Administrative branches proved of surpassing excellence. The battle had been a gauge of the enemy's ability to stop the British advance under conditions as favourable to him as any army could hope for, with every advantage of ground and preparation. The victory won by General Plumer was complete.</p>
        <p>The work of the Division was stamped with the same thoroughness. But Staff work, however excellent in itself, cannot win battles, and the ultimate factor of success is the fighting spirit of the troops. To its high pitch each brigadier has left on record grateful testimony. “I attribute our success,” writes one, “to the careful and methodical preparations which were made during the weeks preceding the attack, but above all I attribute it to the magnificent leading of all officers and non-commissioned officers and to the in-comparable bravery of our men.” This was no perfunctory compliment, but the deliberate judgment of one who weighed every word with care.</p>
        <p>All objectives were taken up to time without confusion. Of the prisoners taken, 438, including 11 officers, passed through the Divisional cage.<note xml:id="fn99-206" n="1"><p>The Corps captures amounted to 25 officers and 1600 other ranks.</p></note> A 5.9-in. howitzer, 10 field guns, 39 machine guns, and 13 trench mortars were captured, with a large amount of war material. As typical of the many messages of congratulation received, the following tribute from General Godley may be quoted:—“Please convey to all ranks of my old Division my sincerest thanks and heartiest congratulations on their successful capture of Messines, which adds another page to their already brilliant record and of which New Zealand will be proud to hear.”</p>
        <p>The rapidity and sureness of touch with which the Division carried out its tasks were reflected in the lightness of the losses suffered in the attack itself. It had been calculated that the cost of casualties which would be incurred in the capture of the Blue and Brown Lines would be about 30 per cent., and in the Yellow Line about 60 per cent. of the troops engaged. Actually, as instances have shown, the numbers fell much below this estimate. One result of this was that in the forward positions there was considerable congestion of our men. About 4.40 a.m. on the 7th a barrage was placed on the ridge by the German guns and howitzers about Warneton and by the enfilading group of batteries at Quesnoy and Deulemont, south of the Lys. This fire increased considerably about 6 am., <pb xml:id="n252" n="207"/>and in the afternoon had become severe. A single example may suffice to illustrate the conditions. Rflmn. A. Dunthorne, a stretcher-bearer of the 4th Rifles, noticed that an enemy salvo had buried a handful of his comrades. He at once rushed along the trench, and amid thickly falling shells toiled to recover them. He had dug out 2 of the 3 buried men, when another salvo again completely buried them and severely shook and dazed Dunthorne himself. Although the salvoes continued to fall deafeningly on the trench, he worked on and eventually succeeded in extricating and saving the lives of all 3 men. Recommended for the V.C., he received a D.C.M.</p>
        <p>Owing to this German fire it became a matter of urgency to minimise losses by withdrawing all but the proportion of troops actually needed for the security of the position, Once the necessary garrison is provided for, the denser an infantry line is, the greater the casualties and demoralisation, and the heavier the labour of taking up supplies and carrying back wounded. Thus the reserve battalion companies attached to the 4th Rifles and 2nd Canterbury, and the working parties sent forward by the reserve battalions rejoined their units in the Steenebeek valley during the evening or night, and 2 companies also of the 4th Rifles were withdrawn to our old front line for salvage purposes and for assistance in the removal of the wounded or burial of the dead.<note xml:id="fn100-207" n="1"><p>In View of the uncertainty of the situation after the evening counter-attack, these 2 companies were again sent forward up the hill. It may be noted that some criticism was directed against Corps Headquarters for retaining the whole of the Division east of the Steenebeek during the night 7th/8th. The fault, however, if fault it was, lay with the Army Staff, whose orders yielded to no argument or protest.</p></note> During the morning of the 8th the enemy bombardment recommenced. On the useful shell-trap of Messines village, which the troops knew to avoid and which was shortly afterwards put out of bounds, the German gunners squandered enormous quantities of ammunition.</p>
        <p>It was in the course of this shelling during the forenoon that General Brown war killed while talking to General Russell near the Moulin de 1'Hospice. Lt.-Col. (now Brig-Gen.) Melvill took over the command of the 1st Brigade, and Major E. Puttick temporarily that of the 4th Rifles, which was later assumed by Major (now Lt.-Col.) J. G. Roache. In General Brown's death the Division lost a splendid New Zealander and a brilliant soldier, whose quiet unassuming manner veiled both intense determination and knowledge of his profession.</p>
        <p>On the Green Line being securely established on the morning of the 8th, the situation permitted of a further <pb xml:id="n253" n="208"/>thinning of the New Zealand troops on the forward slopes. Orders were issued for the infantry to be disposed in depth, the 1st Brigade taking over the area in front of Messines, the 2nd Brigade moving into support in the German systems on the hillside, and the Rifle Brigade withdrawing 2 battalions to the old British lines and 2 to Hill 63. The various reliefs due to be completed by the evening were delayed by heavy shelling. For some time this was thought to be a prelude to a further infantry attack, and 2 Rifle Brigade battalions were ordered to stand by. The new dispositions were not completely effected till the morning of the 9th, and these relief movements of the 1st Brigade, combined with lateral adjustments of the 4th Australians under a particularly violent storm of shell-fire, created some alarm in the 25th Division that the troops were retiring. A strong patrol, under Lt. A. G. Melles, of 2nd Wellington, did much to clear up the situation.</p>
        <p>After relief, the 1st Brigade front, in support of the Australians, was held by 1st Auckland on the right and 2nd Wellington on the left in the Black Line. 2nd Auckland and 1st Wellington took over the areas held by the 4th Rifles and 2nd Canterbury respectively. During the night (8th/9th June) half the machine guns on the Black Line were withdrawn, and others in the forward area were relieved by the 4th Brigade guns which had supported the preparatory barrage. A fine feat of consolidation was carried out during the darkness by 3 companies of 2nd Otago. The German communication trenches were too badly damaged to be serviceable. Working in, reliefs, Otago dug a 5½-feet-deep communication trench a distance of over 1000 yards up the ridge connecting our old front line in the valley with October Support.</p>
        <p>At 9 a.m. on the 9th the 4th Australian Division assumed command of the whole ridge on their front, as far back as Messines inclusive, and the New Zealand Division, less its artillery, withdrew into Corps reserve. For the time being, the 1st Infantry Brigade and the 56 forward machine guns remained on the ridge, passing under command of the 4th Australian Division, but they were relieved by the Australians in the evening mid night 9th/l0th June, and thereon marched back to Neuve Eglise. The casualties, light at first, had mounted up. Thus 1st Wellington in the 3 days and nights had lost 2 officers and over 70 men killed and 11 officers and over 300 men wounded. The total losses of the <pb xml:id="n254" n="209"/>Division in the battle amounted to 3700, the heaviest burden being borne, as was to be expected, by the 1st Infantry Brigade.</p>
        <p>With the transfer of command, Divisional Headquarters had moved to Baillcul and the 2nd Infantry Brigade to a rearward area. The Rifle Brigade remained oil Hill 63, mending roads and burying cable. On the 10th they were placed at the tactical disposal of the 4th Australian Division, but moved to Nieppe on the following day and passed again under General Russell's command. The artillery remained in the line supporting the Australians. The 2nd (Army) Brigade on the capture of the Green Line had been attached to a 3rd Australian Division group on the right flank to equalise the number of field batteries along the new front.</p>
        <p>One of the results of the Messines victory was to compromise the enemy position on the defensive front of the Corps from St. Yves southwards to the Lys; and the gravity of the German situation was still further accentuated when, on the afternoon of the 9th, the 2 Australian Divisions began to push strong patrols eastwards. During the night 10th/11th the Australians established a hold on the Uncertain System about La Potterie Farm, which continued the Oosttaverne Line south beyond the original area of the battlefield. Here their posts were now half a mile east of the final objective of the 7th. The Corps were determined to pursue the enemy disintegration, and issued orders on the 11th that patrols should be pushed out energetically all along the front to keep touch with the enemy, and that outposts should be established as far forward as possible. The II. Anzac Mounted Regiment were engaged for the same purpose and showed not less enterprise than the infantry. Coming under shell-fire their patrols dismounted, sent their horses to the rear and pushed forward on foot. The remainder of the regiment attached to the 3rd Australian Division succeeded during the night in establishing a line of posts cast of La Potterie Farm.</p>
        <p>While continuing this policy of infiltration by strong patrols, General Godley resolved on still more aggressive measures, aiming at the clearance of all the low ground north of the river as far as the village of Basseville. Owing to the sharp turn to the north which the Lys makes at Armentières, this area was in the shape of a long narrow inverted triangle, with its apex pointing south at Frélinghien. It was covered with plantations which sheltered substantial farm houses. <pb xml:id="n255" n="210"/>The eastern side of the triangle was formed by the 30-yard broad Lys. Above the river's scrub-covered left bank the ground rose very slightly towards the Armetières-Warneton railway, which lay roughly parallel with the river. Still well within the narrowing confines of the apex flowed the small muddy stream of the Warnave which, running also roughly parallel with the Lys and the railway, joined the river at the village of Pont Rouge Half-way down stream from Frélinghien to Basseville North of the point where this book cut our front line, the Corps planned that one Division should drive out 1500 yards eastwards and establish a position in front of a series of farms, Loophole Farm, Les Trois Tilleuls, La Truie and Sunken Farms, and thence to the Douve, while another Division should similarly advance north of the Douve and capture Gapaard. The whole frontage involved amounted to some 6000 yards, and in the event of success the apex of the triangle held by the enemy must prove untenable.</p>
        <p>Little alteration of gun positions was necessary, and much of the preparatory destructive bombardment had been done, but further wire-cutting in particular was essential, and the relief of the Australian Divisions was deemed desirable. It would not be possible in any case to carry out the operation before 12th June, and to give the troops much wanted rest it was suggested to the Army that, it should be undertaken on the 14th. The Corps proposal was approved and the co-operation of the other troops arranged further to the north.</p>
        <p>All this defensive sector had been taken over on 10th June from the 57th Division battalions<note xml:id="fn101-210" n="1"><p>p. 179.</p></note> by the 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which had formed part of Corps reserve during the Messines battle. They had been placed under the tactical command of the 3rd Australian Division. For the proposed operation it was arranged that rested troops should relieve the Australian on the 12th. The 25th Division would go into the line north of the Douve, relieving the 4th Australians, and the New Zealander would take over from the 3rd Australians the right sector, including the advanced posts north-east of St. Yves and the original British line as far as the Warnave. The 4th Brigade, passing now for the first time under the tactical command of the Division, would be confined to the trenches south of the Warnave, where the success of the main operation would facilitate the capture of the enemy's front line system right down to the <pb xml:id="n256" n="211"/>Lys and the establishment of a Strong Point at Pont Rouge. The greater part of the heavy artillery was detailed to the New Zealand sector, where the defences were more highly organised. The preliminary bombardment began on 12th June. Field artillery, whose howitzers used the new instantaneous fuse, and mortars dealt with the wire and the front trench system. Approaches bridges roads and billets were subjected to increasingly active fire. Divisional Headquarters moved forward to Steenwerck, and on the 12th the relieving troops marched up again under the shadow of Hill 63.</p>
        <p>Action developed, however, earlier than had been looked for. Prior to the relief on the 12th, a 4th Brigade party had been detailed to bury the dead on the old battlefield, and some time later the snipers in our front line were astonished to see a group of individuals, obviously our own men, with spades on their shoulders moving leisurely in the open about the German positions. On investigation it was found that the burial party had missed their way and borne too much to the south. The 4th Brigade was at once ordered to investigate the situation. Crossing No Man's Land, their patrols occupied without serious opposition the larger portion of the German front line as far south as the railway. Like the 57th Division troops the 4th Brigade garrisoned the line with 2 battalions. Of these, Auckland on the south were more harassed by snipers than Canterbury, and it was clear that the Germans were not yet prepared to relinquish their less exposed positions further distant from our new salient at Messines. The vacated trenches were found to be incomparably superior to the British ones and to be blocked with wire and full of booby-traps. North of the Douve corresponding progress brought the line just west of Gapaard.</p>
        <p>Thus the sharp re-entrant from the posts about La Potterie Farm was rounded off, and it was a much greater extent of the old German front system than had been anticipated that was taken over in the late evening (12th June) by 2nd Canterbury<note xml:id="fn102-211" n="1"><p>Major <name type="person" key="name-416636">G. C. Griffiths</name>, vice Lt. Col <name key="name-209340" type="person">H Stewart</name>, wounded 7th June.</p></note> and 1st Otago. There had been no time to make communication trenches, and observation balloons overlooked all the approaches. The relief of the front line therefore was delayed till dusk. The 2 support battalions marched up to the Catacombs on Hill 63. Brigade Head-quarters moved into a deep dugout in Ploegsteert Wood. The Rifle Brigade were not to take over the rest of the line north of the Warnave till the following evening.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n257" n="212"/>
        <p>As soon as Canterbury and Otago had completed their relief, strenuous efforts were made to strengthen the trenches, and patrols were sent forward in the direction of Flattened Farm, Knoll 30, and Les Trois Tilleuls Farm. The Germans, however, were resolved not to be pushed. The worn Bavarian garrisons were being relieved by Prussians who had come from rest in the Lens area and had seen little fighting during the year. Our patrols came under hot rifle fire. The whole of the vacated positions occupied by us were heavily shelled, and the Otago trenches about La Potterie Farm in particular were swept by machine guns in Sunken Farm.</p>
        <p>On the 13th the 4th Brigade bit still deeper into the crumbling defences, and by the evening the whole front line system north of the Armentières-Warneton railway was in our hands, together with a large section of the Le Touquet earthworks between the railway and the river. Evidence pointed strongly to. further German withdrawal, and it appeared feasible that the tasks set the New Zealanders in the proposed operation might be won after nightfall by active patrol work, which would avoid the set-piece attack under a barrage, with its inevitably higher casualty roll. Enemy rearguards might be looked for, but the enterprise and initiative of platoon commanders and a policy of mutual support and covering fire would, it was hoped, enable small bodies of hardy fighters to move forward from point to point till the final objective was reached.</p>
        <p>Orders to this effect were at once issued to the 2nd Brigade, already in position, and to the 3rd Brigade, who were to take over that evening the remainder of the 4th Brigade line north of the Warnave. The heavy arti1lery was instructed to continue the bombardment of Les Trois Tilleuls, La Truie, and Sunken Farms until 6 p.m., and then to increase their range so as not to shoot within an area 500 yards east of that line and of the old German second system southwards.</p>
        <p>In the evening (13th June) the 4th Rifles relieved the rest of 3rd Canterbury, and the 4th Brigade sector was, in accordance with plans, contracted to a 1-battalion frontage south of the Warnave.</p>
        <p>It had been General Braithwaite's intention to hold the line with the 2 battalions, 2nd Canterbury and 1st Otago, who had suffered most on the Messines ridge, and to carry out the attack with 1st Canterbury and 2nd Otago. The rapid development of events, however, precluded this, and the 2 tired battalions were called on for a further effort. The <pb xml:id="n258" n="213"/>4th Rifles, on their part, had not had time or opportunity for reconnoitring the position by daylight. None the less at nightfall the 3 battalions started out with alacrity on their enterprise. Each was supported by machine guns, and 2nd Canterbury had 4 light trench mortars. No sooner had the troops left their trenches than they were overtaken by an unforeseen mischance of war. Seven enemy aeroplanes flew low overhead and sent a wireless call to the German batteries. An intense bombardment at once followed. The assistance of our heavies was invoked, and shortly afterwards they succeeded in silencing the enemy guns, but not before considerable casualties and confusion had been caused in the attacking troops, especially of the 2nd Brigade, on whom the storm fell with particular violence.</p>
        <p>The 4th Rifles pushed on into the darkness, and their parties, led with great skill by Lts, E. A. Winchester and D. C. Armstrong and 2nd Lts. W. J. Organ and A. Bongard, established outposts in the unknown country beyond Loop Hole Farm and Les Trois Tilleuls. One or two posts fell back temporarily under heavy artillery fire but were speedily re-established. An invaluable reconnaissance by Sergt. H. J. Mitchell located the enemy's outposts, and in the early morning of the 14th a patrol under Cpl. T. Wilson coming into contact with an enemy party effected a skilful surprise attack which forced the Germans to withdraw. Wilson then established a line of snipers' posts and succeeded during the day in killing about 12 of the enemy in front of Basseville.</p>
        <p>The 2nd Brigade was not to be so fortunate. The heavy shelling which swept their area disorganised and delayed their advance. In the pitch-dark night the number of hedges trees spinneys and copses was baffling and bewildering. The enemy forces proved to be appreciably stronger than had been expected. The 1st Otago parties returned with their mission unfulfilled. 2nd Canterbury made considerable progress. One company, strengthened by 2 platoons of the reserve company, occupied Flattened Farm. Pressing on towards La Truie Farm and the important Unchained Trench, which commanded the ground towards the railway, they were met by very heavy rifle and machine gun fire directed from a strong concrete emplacement. On it the light trench mortars poured in a brief hurricane of fire, and the infantry rushing forward seized it and occupied the trench. The other companies, too, succeeded with extraordinary good fortune in reaching Un-chained Trench, which chanced to be held thinly. It was <pb xml:id="n259" n="214"/>cleared of the enemy and linked up with our possessions about La Potterie. 150 yards in front, however, there were the ruins of an inn at the point where the St. Yves road joined the road from Basseville to Messines. It was called the Au Chasseur Cabaret. From its concrete works a. volume of machine gun and rifle fire poured towards Unchained Trench.</p>
        <p>The Deulemont and Qnesnoy batteries had been, as it happened, that night drenched with gas discharged by the XI. Corps from the old New Zealand sector at Houplines, and in any case could not shoot so near the German positions. Thus the checked patrols were not faced with artillery fire. Though fully recognising the strength of the enemy position, they were determined, as they said after-wards, “to give it a go.” The tough resistance already en-countered made it certain that the La Truie and Sunken Farms, still 400 or 500 yards away, were inaccessible to troops unsupported by artillery. That gloomy cabaret immediately in front, however, was a more likely proposition. In the darkness and fighting the platoons had become much mixed, but <name type="person" key="name-416617">Capt. M. J. Morrison</name> organised the troops on the spot aid led them to the attack. The German machine gun fire, however, was too heavy, and the attackers, suffering heavy casualties, could not reach the inn. The dawn was now brightening the sky over Basseville. Disdaining to with-draw on Unchained Trench, the survivors gathered in shell-holes in close proximity to the cabaret and dug a series of small trenches on a low rise (Knoll 30), by a former German observation post. This knoll, commanding the low ground towards the river and Warneton, was of the utmost tactical value, but so long as the enemy held the Cabaret we were unable to derive full advantage from its occupation. Were we to secure the Cabaret as well and be enabled to develop our lines on the knoll, we would dominate the German positions in the flats. The enemy was fully aware of his danger.</p>
        <p>In this night attack the 2nd Canterbury casualties were heavy, 75 being sustained in a single company. Though they had failed in their full task, they had appreciably advanced their line, and in their capture of Unchained Trench, however much “a lucky fluke,” they had performed a note-worthy achievement. Throughout the 14th their foremost posts were in a very exposed position, and the enemy in the Cabaret made the task of consolidation and the supply of water and rations extremely difficult. On account of the <pb xml:id="n260"/>
						<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP031a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP031a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP031a-g"/></figure>
						<pb xml:id="n261" n="215"/>unexpected opposition encountered by the 2nd Brigade in the northern subsector it was necessary to fall back on the original plan of an attack supported by artillery.</p>
        <p>It had been hoped that the 2 rested battalions of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Canterbury and 2nd Otago, would be available for carrying out this attack at dawn on the 15th. Army arrangements, however, involving a simultaneous advance by the 25th Division and other troops to the north, laid down the zero hour for the evening of the 14th. Brigade plans had no alternative but to conform. In the absence of communication and assembly trenches it was impossible to bring forward fresh troops, and once again therefore it was necessary to employ the 2 worn battalions in the line, whom it had never been intended to use, and who had already been severely tried on the previous evening. One modification it was possible to make. In view of the casualties which 2nd Canterbury had sustained, the capture of Sunken Farm was now allotted to 1st Otago, who were instructed also to cooperate with the 25th Division in seizing Ferme de la Croix on the Douve. To the fresh call made on them the 2 South Island battalions were to make a splendid response.</p>
        <p>No tanks were available, but the artillery assistance was overpowering. The New Zealand Division alone was supported by thirty-two 18-pounders and nine 4.5-in. howitzers; and a 12-in., a 9.2-in., and a 6-in. howitzer were added to the Corps heavy artillery of 7th June. For the most advanced Rifle Brigade posts established on the previous evening, the margin of safety afforded in the proposed heavy artillery bombardment was inadequate. They were temporarily with-drawn. The nearer bridges over the Lys up-stream from Pont Rouge were kept under fire by the field guns, and the more distant below Pont Rouge by the heavies. The Warneton trench system and the batteries at Deulemont and Warneton were severely bombarded. A great fire was already blazing in Deulemont. At somewhat short notice the battery commanders worked out the barrage lines, and at 7.30 p.m, the guns opened. Under this covering fire the 2nd Brigade assaulting lines moved out to attack, and the Rifles reoccupied their posts.</p>
        <p>1st Otago this time made no mistake. A platoon under 2nd <name type="person" key="name-031200">Lt. A. R. Cockerell</name> carried Sunken Farm and dug in 50 yards cast of it. Another party reached Ferme de la Croix on the Douve simultaneously with the 25th Division <pb xml:id="n262" n="216"/>troops, and others again established a line of posts over half a mile in advance of the Potterie System. The slight losses were mostly due to machine gun fire. 2 men were killed and over 30 wounded.</p>
        <p>2nd Canterbury encountered more serious resistance. The concrete shelters in the ruins of the Au Chasseur Cabaret which had foiled their efforts in the early hours of the morning were a tough nut to crack, and a frontal assault threatened to be costly. While strong bombing parties were therefore pushed up the communication trenches leading directly towards the stronghold, others crept up from the flanks along the ditch on the Basseville road and along a disused sap bearing towards the blind side of the Cabaret. As soon as our barrage opened the German machine gunners in the loop-holed concrete structure itself and in a communication trench to the south swept the approaches with a traversing stream of lead. Our light trench mortars flung their projectiles at the ruins, and the moment they exhausted their ammunition the bombing parties rushed towards the dark outlines of the building, The garrison of this enemy Strong Point and of the dugouts under the metalled road which led from it to St. but mustered close on 150. They put up a stubborn fight, but the 3 machine gun crews were killed. In a further short struggle several Germans were bayoneted and 27 captured. The enemy survivors retreated down the road towards Basseville. As they ran they were seen by the flanking party that had attacked the inn from the north and by the other Canterbury company advancing on the south towards La Truie Farm. At close range their machine guns and Lewis guns mowed down the fugitives. La Truie Farm also was vigorously defended and did not fall at the first thrust. At 9.30 p.m. the contact aeroplane dropped a message at Divisional headquarters that flares had been seen east of the other farms, but that they were doubtful about La Truie Farm. Shortly afterwards, however, it wax surrounded, the garrison killed, and a fourth machine gun captured.</p>
        <p>Canterbury, thus in possession of all their objectives, were not to be left in undisputed ownership. The enemy was determined to recover the Cabaret and with it the all-important knoll. Forces seen massing in a Sugar Refinery near Basseville, in front of the Rifle Brigade, were dealt with by 18-pounders, and no assault developed. Further to the north, however, an organised counter-attack was delivered almost immediately against 2nd Canterbury by troops of the 22nd Reserve <choice><orig>Divi-<pb xml:id="n263" n="217"/>sion</orig><reg>Division</reg></choice>. These pressed back along the Messines road and poured up the main communication trench, Unchained Avenue, running to the inn from the east. For 3 nights on end Canterbury had been engaged in arduous consolidation or bitter fighting and had foregone sleep. During the whole of the present attack they had been exposed not only to fire from their immediate front but to a heavy machine gun barrage from the railway. They once more proved, however, the sterling fighting qualities of the New Zealand soldier. Assisted by the indomitable machine gunners, they drove back their assailants with rifle fire and bombs, and on a further enemy machine gun beyond La Truie Farm opening fire to support the counter-attack, they rushed it, killed the crew, and put the gun (making the fifth) out of action. Their General left on record his admiration of these men. “Throughout these operations,” he wrote, “they fought with the tenacity and valour which they have always displayed.”</p>
        <p>Nor had 3rd Auckland, on the 4th Brigade sector south of the Warnave, been idle. On the previous evening they had pushed their way still further among the Strong Points opposite Frélinghien, and now, covered effectively by the trench mortars, they occupied the enemy's support and reserve line along the whole front down to the Lys. For these operations the troops concerned received tributes of appreciation from the Army and Corps Commanders.</p>
        <p>After their failure on the Cabaret the Germans attempted no further reaction, and our artillery intensity slackened before midnight. The 25th Division, to the north, had been not less successful and had captured Gapaard and a howitzer. Seventy prisoners lay behind the wire of the Corps cage. Along the whole Army front posts had been successfully pushed forward and the line brought up against the Warneton System.</p>
        <p>In the early daylight of 15th June, after considerable hostile shelling throughout the night, Cockerell's platoon in front of Sunken Farm killed 2 German snipers and drove a third from his position. Throughout the day the enemy's reorganised and regrouped batteries bombarded our new line of posts, particularly in the centre of the Divisional front and in the Potterie System. When evening fell lie betrayed marked nervousness. His S.O.S. went up repeatedly, and heavy shelling searched the Douve valley. About 10 p.m., in response to a call from our infantry, the artillery retaliated with an intense barrage on his forward positions and with <pb xml:id="n264" n="218"/>15 minutes' concentrated and effective bombardment of his batteries. After his shelling ceased, 1st Canterbury and 2nd Otago at last took over the 2nd Brigade front, and the 2nd Rifles relieved the 4th Battalion. On the 16th the New Zealand batteries began to move to the Ploegsteert area immediately in rear of the infantry.</p>
        <p>South of the Warnave, 3rd Wellington<note xml:id="fn103-218" n="1"><p>Major J. R. Short, vice Lt.-Col. Fletcher, wounded 14th June.</p></note> had relieved 3rd Auckland and were pushing out posts three-quarters of a mile in front. An achievement of one of their patrols well illustrates the spirit of initiative that animated the Division and the good fortune that waits on the braw. On the 15th, in the early afternoon, Lt. T. L. Ward a sergeant and a private crossed the Lys by a plank over a partly destroyed pontoon bridge. Leaving the sergeant to guard the bridge, Ward and the private went along the road into Frélinghien. The place seemed deserted, and in search of adventure they turned, revolvers in hand, through an archway into a factory. In a cellar they found 3 Bavarian pioneers asleep, took them prisoners and came back unchallenged. The Bavarians thoroughly appreciated the humour of the situation. Frélinghien, they pointed out, was held in strength, and the bridge guarded by a machine gun detachment, whose sentries must have been asleep. An attempt to repeat the enterprise on the following evening found the enemy keenly alert along the river.</p>
        <p>Active patrolling continued along the slopes between the river and the railway. On the night 17th/18th L.-Cpl. P. Moffitt, of the 2nd Rifles, and a small party reconnoitred the ground on a front of 1500 yards to a depth of 900 yards beyond our outposts and penetrated Pont Rouge, where they established touch with the enemy. It was now manifest that the Germans had evacuated all the north bank of the Lys as far as Basseville, except for posts in Pont Rouge and else-where close to the river. By the morning of the 18th our posts were established on the railway along the whole Divisional front. Along the Douve also posts mere pushed well forward towards Warneton. Already by the 17th, however, conditions were reverting to the normal atmosphere of trench warfare. A large part of our heavy artillery was under orders to move or was already on the move towards Ypres. On his lost positions the German maintained persistent but erratic shell-fire. Reassured now that our main attack was not being developed eastwards, the enemy's batteries, already <pb xml:id="n265" n="219"/>withdrawn prior to our advance against Messines so as to escape capture, were by this time obviously settled down and reorganised into groups. Ploegsteert Wood and our batteries on Hill 63 were repeatedly and violently bombarded by gas and high-explosive. On 2 successive days, for example, the 11th Battery was heavily shelled, lives being lost and guns damaged. The handful of German snipers and a group of machine puns on the railway about Basseville were less aggressive than the enemy airmen. Many of our squadrons, which had been at the disposal of the Second Army, had been withdrawn into reserve in view of employment elsewhere, and the Germans, now with reinforced aircraft, profited by their temporary and local mastery of the air. Emulating the British practice of low flying at a height which rendered them immune from anti-aircraft gun fire, they swooped down on our trenches firing their machine gulls at the men in the sap or shellholes, and directing artillery fire. On occasion as many as 18 hovered over our lines at one time, defying the machine and Lewis gun efforts to turn them They penetrated also inland, repeatedly burning our balloons and bombing Bailleul and back villages.</p>
        <p>After the establishment of the posts on the nights of 13th/14th and 14th/l5th, June preparations were made for joining them in a continuous front trench and for constructing a support trench some 400 yards in rear and a subsidiary line some 900 yards in rear of the support. The lines were taped by Lt. C. W. Salmon, D.C.M., during the night 15th/l6th, and work was begun in earnest the following evening. In order. to augment the necessary personnel for labour on the spot, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the Rifle Brigade relieved on the 18th the 2nd Battalion in the line. On the 18th also the 1st Brigade took over the line between La Truie Farm and the Douve from the 2nd Brigade, who withdrew into reserve, 2nd Wellington relieving 1st Canterbury on the right and 1st Auckland<note xml:id="fn104-219" n="1"><p>Major E. H. Orr, vice Lt.-Col. R. C. Allen, wounded 7th June.</p></note> relieving 2nd Otago on the left. In the combined operations at Messines and before Basseville 12 officers and 250 men of the 2nd Brigade had paid the supreme price. 44 officers and 1100 men had been wounded. 50 men were for the moment unaccounted for. The heaviest casualties had been sustained by 2nd Canterbury, who had lost 16 officers and nearly 500 men.</p>
        <p>Opposite our new line of trenches the enemy held Warneton and the Warneton Line strongly, but at this time had <pb xml:id="n266" n="220"/>only weak forces in Basseville, in the Sugar Refinery and in the other buildings on the Lys. On 19th June the New Zealand patrols pushed further afield. The dugouts in the abandoned lines showed traces of hasty evacuation. The concrete shelters had been blown up and the wooden bridges over the Lys destroyed. The Rifle Brigade parties were fired at from the Sugar Refinery, but the roofless houses of Pont Rouge were apparently deserted, and in Basseville the 2nd Wellington snipers had Red Indian fighting with German machine gunners. On the following day (20th June) 1st Brigade patrols entered the Refinery. Indications such as fires and explosions in his back country pointed to the possibility of a withdrawal from Warneton, but till this supposition could he established there was no intention at the moment of undertaking a further advance, which would, without a corresponding movement both northwards and also to the south of the Lys, have merely involved thrusting our troops against the enemy guns. Patrols were pushed out to the railway, which here bent eastwards towards warneton, not as permanent posts, but for reconnaissance and observation.</p>
        <p>As events turned out, indeed, the Germans so far from withdrawing were preparing to assert their hold on Basseville and the zone in front of the Warneton Line. The snipers' activity on the railway became more marked. In the wide No Man's Land between Sunken Farm and Ferme de la Croix on the Douve. was a slight ridge some 450 yards west of the railway embankment. Its reverse slope was dead ground from our lines. Here, in accordance with the enemy's new policy which favoured a series of isolated trenches in preference to a continuous line, his infantry began to entrench a row of strongly wired posts which, while not forming a marked forward line, would cover Basseville, be connected with the Warneton trenches, and act as an outlying bulwark of that system. To raid this suspected line of consolidation and destroy his covering and working parties, 2 patrols, each composed of a platoon, were sent shortly after midnight, 21st/22nd June, by the two 1st Brigade battalions in the line, 2nd Wellington and 1st Auckland.</p>
        <p>The weather was cold and unsettled. The way was paved for the operation by a 5 minutes' intense fire by 4 brigades of artillery. The light trench mortars had brought up ammunition and guns forward of our posts and now bombarded the machine gun emplacements on the railway. To Raids on Basseville and the German Outposts <pb xml:id="n267" n="221"/>this fire the enemy made no reply till half an hour later, when 2 green flares were at once answered by heavy shelling of our posts and support trench. The 2nd Wellington patrol, about 40 strong, was led by the same Lt. A. G. Melles whose admirable reconnaissance on 8th June has been noted above. They now entered Basseville, and in fierce close fighting among the buildings and hedges killed some 20 of the enemy. Prominent among the bombers was Cpl. J. D. Fraser, who, though wounded, continued to lead his men with dash and determination, and killed a powerful opponent in a hand-to-hand encounter. The enemy fought grimly. On the way home the patrol caught 2 prisoners, but these refused to cross the railway and were shot. 1 man of the patrol was killed, another wounded and missing, and 16 wounded. Melles showed remarkable qualities of leadership throughout. The other patrol lost its way in the darkness.</p>
        <p>In consequence of this lack of success against the posts in the shellholss, it was decided to act on a larger scale and with a barrage on the following night (22nd/23rd June). Zero was fixed at 1 a.m. on the 23rd. The purpose of the enterprise, as on the previous evening, was to prevent the enemy from holding an outpost line between our posts and the railway. There was no idea of occupying the enemy's positions or thrusting our line eastwards. one company of 2nd Wellington attacked on the right, and a company and a half of 1st Auckland on the left. The enemy expected the attack, and his barrage fell at once and inflicted heavy casualties. On our artillery opening, the patrols went forward and confirmed the evidence of the air photographs that the enemy had not yet connected his posts in a continuous line. A 2nd Wellington party came across several Germans in shellholes and under the hedge near the railway. Of them these killed about 17. Another Wellington patrol pushed into Basseville, but found it now occupied strongly. In the centre of Auckland the enemy were holding his wired shellholes in some force, but the area was cleared except along a well-defined bank south of the Douve from Ferme de la Croix to the railway. Here a machine gun concrete dugout and strong wired positions near the Douve proved unassailable. Here, also, for some 50 yards, the railway line was not reached It was estimated that at least 100 of the enemy were killed. 9 prisoners were captured. 1st Auckland lost about 20 men killed and 2nd Wellington 7 men killed. Almost 100 <pb xml:id="n268" n="222"/>men in all were wounded. A further advanced post was dug by 1st Auckland nearer the railway, and it was hoped that this area had definitely passed from German control.</p>
        <p>In retaliation, on the following day the enemy artillery shelled intermittently throughout the hours of daylight, and at 10 p.m. began an unusually heavy bombardment with high-explosive and gas shells over the whole sector from Hyde Park Corner and Ploegsteert Wood forward to our support line. The left area particularly suffered, and it was fortunate that the relief of the 1st Brigade battalions in the line by 2nd Auckland and 1st wellington had been completed just previously. A certain number of casualties was caused by the gas.</p>
        <p>In the 4th Brigade area 3rd Otago had come into the line on the 22nd for their first experience of the trenches, and on the 24th the 4th and 2nd Battalions of the Rifle Brigade relieved the 3rd and 1st. On the: 26th, representatives of all units of the Corps were reviewed in Bailleul by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, who inspected the trophies captured in the Battle of Messines. At this function the Rifle Brigade were particularly strongly represented to meet their Colonel-in-Chief.<note xml:id="fn105-222" n="1"><p><gap reason="illegible"/></p></note></p>
        <p>The enemy artillery still maintained continuous activity on all our back areas. Hill 63 was nightly shelled. Transport and relief, unwary enough to be caught at Hyde Park Corner after dark, underwent unenviable experiences. The last phase of the battle, however was now over. Our own artillery had already been denuded of siege batteries despatched to the Fifth Army now in the north. Apart from such heavies as remained, the front was covered by the New Zealand guns and by 2 brigades of the 3rd Australian Division, all of whom had for weeks past borne the strain of ardnous exertions and incessant hostile shelling, their casualties, as at the Somme, proving to be heavier before and after an operation than during it. In order to rest the exhausted personnel, the covering field artillery was now reduced on each Divisional front in the Corps to 2 brigades. The Australian batteries, therefore, and the 2nd (Army) Brigade went into reserve. Thenceforward the remaining brigades, whose allotment of ammunition had already been reduced, adopted a less aggressive attitude in order not to provoke the enemy at a time when we had no marked superiority of guns.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n269" n="223"/>
        <p>The Germans rapidly followed suit, and the end of the month became much quieter. Patrol activity, indeed, was maintained both by night and day, and the New Zealand infantry attained their usual complete and unchallenged mastery of No Man's Land.<note xml:id="fn106-223" n="1"><p>The Germans scored a success on 26th. June. Capt. G. A. Avey, M.C., and Lt. R. Tennant, on a daylight patrol, ran into a strong enemy post. Tennant was killed and Avey taken prisoner. After repeated escapes from his prison camp and recaptures Avey was repatriated to England in December 1918.</p></note> The adventures of these patrols comprise many instances of inspiring courage and fortitude. One example may be quoted. L.-Cpl. G. H. Nielson and Pte. E. Grieve, of 3rd Otago, were at a bridge over the Lys studying the loopholed houses in Frélinghien across the river, when they were fired on by 6 rifles and 2 machine guns from one of the buildings. The corporal was severely wounded in the thigh, and the private pulled him back into a shallow sap. The bitterness of Lt. ward's exploit<note xml:id="fn107-223" n="2"><p>p. 218.</p></note> may have rankled in German memories, for not merely did the enemy fire a volley of rifle grenades and sweep the parapet with machine guns, but actually called on his field artillery to shell the 2 men in the sap. All this diversified fire, however, could not shake Grieve's resolution. Half-pulling, half-carrying the semi-conscious corporal, he did not rest till he brought him into a place of safety.</p>
        <p>Towards the end of June the weather was again cool and unsettled, with days of continuous rain or violent thunder-storms. The decreased activity of the enemy's guns, however, enabled rapid progress to be made with the consolidation of the different fire positions, the construction of communication trenches, and the crection of entanglements. It was a point of honour to leave the position complete ere. the forthcoming relief by the 4th Australians, and the Pioneers and every available men of the support battalions were employed from dark till dawn. The relief of the 1st and 3rd. Brigades in the line by the Australians was effected on the night 29th/30th June. The rear companies went out by daylight and the front line companies at dusk.</p>
        <p>The 4th Brigade and the Pioneers remained temporarily in the line and were attached to the Australians. 3rd Canterbury relieved 3rd Otago on the 30th. The 2nd Brigade also came under Australian command for tactical purposes, and remained in the forward area supplying parties for road-making and cable-burying under Corps arrangements. The 1st Infantry Brigade marched out to De Seule, and the Rifle <pb xml:id="n270" n="224"/>Brigade to the Berquin area. Divisional Headquarters moved back from Steenwerck to Vieux Berquin. The artillery were relieved at the same time. At the end of the move the 3rd Brigade lost, Lt.-Col. Standish, who went to England to supervise training in the New Zealand Artillery Depot He was succeeded by Lt.-Col. Falla, whose work during the recent operations in command of the D.A.C. had been so signally successful. In his place Major (later Lt.-Col.) H. C. Glendining assumed command of the D.A.C.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n271"/>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP032a">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP032a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP032a-g"/>
            <head><hi rend="sc">2nd Lieut. <name key="name-010935" type="person">L. W. Andrew</name></hi>, V.C. [<hi rend="i">Photo Wilkinson</hi></head>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP032b">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP032b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP032b-g"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">Pioneers repairing Roads</hi>
            </head>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <pb xml:id="n272"/>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP033a">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP033a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP033a-g"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">Inspection by the Commander-in-Chief</hi>
            </head>
          </figure>
        </p>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n273" n="225"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body1-d6" type="chapter">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Chapter VI</hi>
          <lb/>
          <hi rend="sc">Basseville</hi>
        </head>
        <p>In pleasant summer weather the respite from the line speedily reinvigorated all ranks. A Divisional gymkhana, and athletic boxing and swimming competitions were interspersed with training in open warfare. On 4th July, in the Bailleul square, representatives of the Division were introduced to H.M. the King, and troops of the 2nd Infantry Brigade lining the Neuve Eglise road cheered him and the Prince of Wales as they drove past on a tour through the Corps area. It was during this period that the enemy's development of night bombing by aeroplanes first made itself appreciably felt. On the British side this feature of aggressive policy in the air had been long established and was a particularly prominent factor in the preparations for the Battle of Messines, but hitherto it had not been actively favoured by the Germans the night of 6th/7th July, however, nearly 100 bombs were dropped on Bailleul alone, inflicting many casualties, especially in the tents of a Casualty Clearing Station near the railway. Other. bombs fell elsewhere in the back areas, and of these 1 struck the 1st Wellington transport lines, causing the destruction of over 20 animals. The continued bombing and shelling of Bailleul forced Corps Headquarters to move to the less exposed village of Flégtre.</p>
        <p>During this interval of “rest” an interesting experience was given to the Rifle Brigade. With the Pioneer Battalion, a company. of Engineers, and a company of the Divisional Train, they were attached for over a. work to the First French Army in the north on the work of constructing gun positions and making roads. In fighting, other troops might with greater. or smaller claims challenge the New Zealand record, but in the use of pick and shovel the “Diggers”<note xml:id="fn108-225" n="1"><p>A eoubriquet of disputed origin, applied also to the Australians.</p></note> were incontestably unsurpassed. General Anthoine, who was later to give his satisfaction tangible expression in a number of decorations, wrote the following letter to <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name>:—“Now that the New Zealand troops are preparing to leave the First French Army, I wish to point out the fine attitude of these men whom you have put at my disposal. Infantry battalions, Pioneers, and Engineers have rivalled <pb xml:id="n274" n="226"/>one another in hard work and fille behavior. I thank you very heartily for the valuable help they have given to the First Army. I should be grateful if you would let them know my satisfaction.” On 12th July the 2nd Brigade completed its task of cable-burying in the forward area about Hill 63 and Messines, and rejoined the Division at the village of Doulieu, which had been one of their staging billets on their first march up to the Armentières trenches a year before.</p>
        <p>Two or three days previously the 1st and 3rd Artillery Brigades had reoccupied their old positions about P1oegsteert.<note xml:id="fn109-226" n="1"><p>On 10th July the 2nd (Army) Bde, set out to join the 1st Div. Art. near Nieuport.</p></note> On 18th July the infantry began to move forward to relieve the 4th Australian Division. The relief was completed by the 20th, when the 4th New Zealand Brigade, still garrisoning with 1 battalion the right subsector on the Lys, reverted to General Russell's tactical command. The centre was now occupied by the 2nd Brigade with 2nd Otago and 1st Canterbury, and the 1st Brigade took over the left sector on the Douve with 2nd Wellington and 1st Auckland. Each of these 2 brigades held a battalion in close support at Hill 63 and a reserve battalion in huts further in rear. Divisional Headquarters returned to Steenwerck. A few days later the 3rd Brigade replaced an Australian brigade as Divisional reserve.</p>
        <p>By this time the storm clouds about Ypres had banked up solidly. The activity of aeroplanes and guns was already marked, and all the countless preparation for the continuance of the battle, to which Messines had been the overture, were approaching completion. A tremendous concentration of troops was gathering in the Ypres flats. South of Arras the Third Army (General Byng) had extended their front over the Fourth and Fifth, Armies' area, relieving them for the Flanders offensive. The Fifth Army (General Cough) held the northern part of the old Second Army sector. on its left General Anthoine's Army had relieved the Belgians, and still further north General Rawlinson's Fourth Army occupied the former French sector by the sea. The spear point of the Allied attack was to be the Fifth Army, whose thrust-would be covered on the north by an advance of the right wing of the French. At a later stage the Second Army and the Fourth Army were to be used on the flanks to exploit success.</p>
        <p>The purpose of these preparations could not be hid from the Germans, whose Press indeed discussed the forthcoming <pb xml:id="n275" n="227"/>attack at length. Nevertheless it was possible for Haig to take various measures with the object of dissipating the enemy's reserves and artillery and to feint elsewhere, especially in accordance with time-worn British strategy in the direction of Lille, already menaced from the north by our new positions east of Messines. For this reason local attacks were continued, occasionally on a considerable scale, by the Third and First Armies throughout June in the Lens area, and orders were issued for the Second Army to co-operate directly in the Flanders attack by a limited advance on the right flank. The movement, in itself of comparatively little tactical importance, would nevertheless have the effect of stimulating German anxiety for Lille and their communications and of diverting part of the enemy's guns from the troops storming the Ypres ridges northwards. A demonstration would be made threatening a further offensive on the Warneton Line, and a passage of the river Lys would be feinted as a northern counterpart to the converging movement on Lille from the south. The remainder of the Second Army, including the 3rd Australian Division in the left of the II. Anzac line, would advance simultaneously with General Gough's main attack. The New Zealanders, however, on the extreme right flank of the Second Army, would move one or two days previously in order to carry out this feint and incidentally seize ground about Basseville which would secure the Australians' right flank.</p>
        <p>During the month II. Anzac had lost to the Fourth and Fifth Armies the bulk of its siege batteries and other heavy pieces, but there was still a formidable weight of artillery to support the proposed operations. In addition to six brigades of 18-pounders and thirty-six light howitzers, it marshalled twelve 60-pounders, one 15-in., four 12-in., six 8-in., and thirty-two 6-in. howitzers. Wire-cutting, counter-battery work and trench bombardment were begun in the middle of July, and from the 20th onwards the artillery programme was accentuated. Night firing was especially intensified. While a quarter of the ammunition allotted for harassing fire was used in daylight, three-quarters were expended in the hours of darkness. One or other of the rear towns or villages, Comines Deulemont or Quesnoy, was daily subjected to a devastating bombardment. With a view to "drilling" the enemy, practice bombardments and barrages were carried out nightly at an hour previous to and also at the exact hour fixed for the attack. The enemy guns <choice><orig>re-<pb xml:id="n276" n="228"/>taliated</orig><reg>retaliated</reg></choice> with heavy shelling both on our forward trench system and on Ploegsteert and the back areas. The 4th (Howitzer) and the 11th and 12th Batteries were punished severely, several of their guns being destroyed. Extensive use was made by the enemy of his newly-introduced "mustard" gas.</p>
        <p>During the interval that the Division was in reserve, the enemy had again established himself in the shellholes and ditches in front of the railway line north-east of Basseville from which he had been evicted at the end of June. He had heavily wired the hedges. The strength of his position was definitely established by a 2nd Wellington patrol which had a severe bombing fight over his wire on the evening of 21st July, and it was manifest that an attack in this quarter would now ret1uire substantial artillery assistance. While this was arranged for, the other necessary preliminaries were expedited. Assembly trenches were dug, posts pushed forward and dumps prepared.</p>
        <p>A certain reorganisation of the troops, too, was necessary in connection with the general redistribution of the forces for the Ypres attack, and with the consequent extension of the Division's front northwards which was to follow later.<note xml:id="fn110-228" n="1"><p>p. 242.</p></note> The initial stage was effected on the night 23rd/24th July, when the 4th Brigade took over the right battalion sector of the 2nd Brigade area. Here 3rd Canterbury relieved 2nd Otago. The Divisional front was now held by 3 brigades, those on the flanks with 2 battalions and the centre with 1 battalion in the line. On the following night 3rd Otago relieved 3rd Wellington on the Lys.</p>
        <p>Owing to the German withdrawal across the Lys, there now existed between the river and our posts on the railway a wide No Man's Land which, lowlying and exposed to German fire, it was not in our interests to occupy. In the course of the active patrolling carried out over this extensive area by 3rd Otago, one party had a midnight encounter on the river somewhat out of the ordinary. They were in the rushes above the towpath when they observed 4 Germans warily enter a boat on the opposite side of the river. The boat began to push of furtively. Our patrol loosened the pins of its bombs and flung them, and as a direct result of their action or owing to panic-stricken movements of the crew, the boat overturned and sank. Not all the Germans had been killed, for the silence that followed <pb xml:id="n277" n="229"/>the explosion of the bombs was broken by the sound of frantic splashes of an inexpert swimmer. The patrol could not see him, but they whipped the water with rifle fire, and the splashings ceased.</p>
        <p>This energetic patrolling, not only towards the Lys and the 1 remaining bridge opposite Frélinghien but over the whole New Zealand front, in itself heralded the approach of the Division's more aggressive role. This embraced 3 tasks. In the first place, to make the feint against Lille they would establish one or two forward posts commanding the river and dig on its banks isolated trenches intended, not for occupation, but to convey the impression of being designed to cover the construction of bridges and the crossing of the river. Secondly, they aimed at the capture and occupation of Basseville. Lastly, they proposed to raid the enemy's posts north-east of the village among the hedgerows and to advance their line in this neighbourhood. The Allied attack in the north, originally fixed for 25th July, was for various reasons postponed to the 28th. The preliminary operations of the New Zealanders were so timed that their first and second tasks should be carried out on the night 26th/27th and the third operation on the following night. The construction of the posts was assigned to the 4th and 2nd Brigades on the right and in the centre of the line; the capture of Basseville and the clearance of the hedgerows to the 1st Brigade on the left.</p>
        <p>The 26th was a warm sunny day. The evening was unusually clear. After dusk, however, without attracting attention, 3rd Otago on the extreme right dug 4 short trenches on the river bank opposite Frélinghien and northwards to Pont Rouge, and laid, as if for the purpose of directing a night attack, white and noticeable tapes across No Man's Land down to the Frélinghien bridge and the water's edge. On their left, one of the three 3rd Canterbury parties carrying out similar work was equally undisturbed, but the other 2 were to have adventures. One party down stream from Pont Rouge was absorbed in its work when the sentry became aware of a hostile patrol approaching in single file from the direction of Basseville. When the Germans were within 15 yards, 2 flares happened to go up across the river and revealed our working party. The leading German challenged. The Canterbury sergeant at once fired a bullet, and the German fell. The rest of our party opened fire with rifles and grenades, and the enemy <pb xml:id="n278" n="230"/>ran, some silently, others calling out “Mercy, English.” Another large group of Germans blundered right into the third Canterbury party still further down stream, but were dispersed with casualties. In addition to the construction of these dummy trenches and the laying of the tapes, 2 posts were established by 3rd Canterbury in Pont Rouge. In the centre sector similar short trenches were dug and lengths of tape extended by 1st Canterbury. A forward post was also established near La Grande Haie Farm to cover the right flank of the 1st Brigade after their capture of Basseville and to prevent the Germans from crossing the river and taking them in rear. These operations on the right and centre of the front were carried out without artillery, and no casualties were incurred by any of our parties.</p>
        <p>For the main operation, the attack on Basseville, on the 1st Brigade front, the commander of 2nd Wellington had selected the Hawkes Bay company (<name type="person" key="name-415846">Capt. W. H. McLean</name>). It had been sent out for 10 days' training and had come into the support line on the evening of 25th July. During the 26th its trenches were heavily shelled, and the company lost 4 men killed and 11 wounded. After darkness it completed final arrangements and moved into its assembly positions for the assault at 2 a.m. For nights past, as has been noted, the enemy had been drilled by a preliminary bombardment and by a practice bombardment and barrage at the actual time selected for the attack. The first bombardment took place as usual, and with the second and the barrage Wellington left their trenches. Their left flank would be exposed to enemy fire from beyond the Douve and their right to fire from beyond the Lys, and in front, beyond their objective, the Warneton Line bristled with machine guns. To cover the Wellington advance, therefore, it had been arranged that Australian shrapnel should sweep down the Douve, and that in addition to the support of the New Zealand artillery the machine guns should provide a creeping barrage up to the Warneton Line, in front of Warneton, and sweep the Uncut Trench System that faced Basseville south of the Lys. When this machine gun barrage should reach the Warneton Line, the fire of the bulk of the guns would remain there, but a few would search forward to catch fugitives or supports before rejoining the others in their fire on the trench itself.</p>
        <p>The Wellington company was divided into 3 parties. One platoon (2nd Lt. J. S. Hanna) made across the swamps for the ruined Sugar Refinery that stood somewhat detached <pb xml:id="n279" n="231"/>at the south edge of the village. At the outset of the bombardment its garrison of 40 Bavarians had taken refuge in the cellar, and it was captured with ease. Into the cellar incendiary bombs were thrown, causing an explosion of ammunition and effectively destroying the garrison, not one of whom emerged. A post was then dug beyond the Refinery. When day came, it would be in touch with the new 1st Canterbury post on its right.</p>
        <p>The second platoon was commanded by a fine fighting n.c.o., Sergt. <name type="person" key="name-031232">C. N. Devery</name>. His mission was to clear the village itself. He divided his men into groups of bombers and riflemen on one side and systematically gunners and rifle grenadiers on the other, and systematically dealt with house after house in the straggling. main street. A considerable amount of resistance was offered, but in the end the village was cleared by sheer fighting power, and 2 posts proceeded to dig in east of it, in a position to command the river crossings at the partially wrecked wooden bridges used by the Germans. On the cobbled street or about the buildings mere counted 30 German dead.</p>
        <p>On the northern extremity of the village, but detached from it, as the Refinery at its other end, was a second factory on the road towards Warneton. Here the third platoon (2nd Lt. W. G. Gibbs) had a brief and hot encounter, and killed 10 Germans in the open. The others fled towards Warneton, pursued by Lewis gun fire. A post here completed the ring round the captured village, and the whole chain was linked up by an intermediate post with our front line to the north. By dawn the posts were dug 4½ feet deep. A section was left in each. To avoid shelling in the daylight, the remainder of the company was withdrawn to the front line. It was most unlikely that the enemy would attack during the day, and at dusk the posts would be doubly manned to meet any counter-stroke in the night.</p>
        <p>The expectation of a quiet day proved optimistic. Two hours after the attack, the enemy barrage fell heavily round Basseville and grew in intensity, cutting off the approach of supports. Sergt. Devery's 2 posts in the centre were twice attacked by small bodies approaching down the river bank from Warneton. These were driven off by the men's rifles and Lewis guns. Shortly after daylight, however, a resolute attack was launched by a force then estimated at 250 strong, and later identified as a whole support battalion of the 16th Division. A large detached party moved down the <pb xml:id="n280" n="232"/>railway on the Wellington left and worked round the northernmost post. They had almost. surrounded it. The post moved out to meet them, but the enemy's pressure was overpowering, and to avoid capture our men mere forced to withdraw towards the railway. Their retirement was covered by a Lewis gunner, Pte. M. Vestey, who remained alone in the sap. A German platoon from straight opposite tried to rush him, but he dispersed them with casualties. He then turned his attention to the more dangerous party working down the railway from the north along the ditch under the embankment. He forced them to take cover. Seizing the opportunity offered by their check, he ran to the railway line with his gun Here in s shallow shellhole on the permanent way he once again brought his gun into action. The enemy by this time were advancing in force, and rifles and machine guns blazed at the lonely and intrepid figure on the railway. But only when his last magazine of ammunition was expended did Vestey withdraw. As he dashed for the shelter of the embankment a great gust of fire swept the railway, but he escaped unscathed. “By his coolness and gallantry,” says the official record, “he undoubtedly saved the lives of his comrades besides holding up the counter-attack most effectively for some time, and inflicting many casualties on the enemy.”</p>
        <p>Through this withdrawal of the post on the left Sergt. Devery's posts, already harassed by machine guns from a 2-storied estaminet 100 yards north of the factory on the Warneton road, were now in turn exposed to intense enfilade fire They were obliged to give ground and move nearer the village. They were determined to die rather than be driven further. Presently an unlooked-for misfortune was added to their trials. Conceivably the occupants of some overlooked cellar, seeing the turn of fortune, resolved to make a bid for freedom. More probably a party of Germans, creeping along the river bank, whose steep declivity had not been fully recognised by us and was not commanded by our posts, succeeded in entering Basseville undetected<note xml:id="fn111-232" n="1"><p>The notebook of an officer captured on 31st July contained a diagram of dispositions referring probably to this attack. Two strong forces were on either flank, a skirmishing party in the centre.</p></note> At any rate, the posts facing the attacking enemy from Warneton became now exposed also to sniping and machine gun fire which was directed with deadly effect from the roofs and windows of the village in their rear. The posts kept their vow and fought to the last. In the end every man was killed or <pb xml:id="n281" n="233"/>grievously wounded except Devery himself, who had been the spirit of resistance throughout, and 1 private. By careful stalking they succeeded in making their way through the outskirts of the village and through the hostile barrage luck to our line. The southernmost post, now completely in the air, was also compelled to withdraw. By 6 a.m. Basseville was again in the enemy's hands. His signal flares of triumph shot up, and his barrage ceased.</p>
        <p>For some reason the Wellington posts were without S.O.S rockets, and it was some time before it was realised that an attack accompanied the bombardment. By the time the call for a protective barrage reached the artillery, it was too late. One of the machine gun groups, too, considering its task completed, had already withdrawn. As soon, however, as word came of his men's straits, McLean led a counter-attack of 2 platoons up to the railway through the barrage; but it was clear that the moment for their action had passed, and he showed good judgment in not persevering further in a forlorn hope.</p>
        <p>The company had lost 4 men killed, 25 wounded, and 9 missing. Despite the ultimate failure, the performance was an extraordinarily gallant feat. It had been believed that the Basseville garrison did not total more than 2 platoons, but, as was corroborated by prisoners' statements, the village was actually held by 2 companies, whose combined effectives numbered at least 200 rifles. This garrison had been completely disposed of by the 130 attackers. They had killed half of them, captured 12, as well as 2 machine guns, and routed the remainder. Even when outflanked, the 44 men in the posts had put up a magnificent fight against over-heavy odds. McLean was awarded the M.C., and Devery and Vestey the D.C.M. As it was, however, the bitter fact remained that Basseville, if taken, had been lost.</p>
        <p>But it was not intended to leave the enemy in enjoyment of his success, and plans were at once formed for a fresh enterprise. In the meantime the final stage in the operation, the clearing up of the shellholes to the north, was of necessity postponed; and the 1st Canterbury post on the right, which had remained in an exposed position during the 27th, was withdrawn in the evening.</p>
        <p>The extent to which the enemy was alarmed by these activities and the feint of crossing the river is not yet known, but the desired symptoms of nervousness were immediately forthcoming. On the following day (28th July) flights of his. <pb xml:id="n282" n="234"/>aeroplanes carried out a prolonged reconnaissance, and our whole area was shelled furiously throughout the afternoon and evening. Just before dusk hostile artillery undertook a violent bombardment of Armentières. At about 9.40 p.m. the shelling on the New Zealand trenches concentrated with special intensity on the left sector of the 1st Brigade held by 1st Auckland. In the right sector at the moment 2nd Wellington was being relieved by 1st Wellington, and the communication trenches were crowded, but fortunately the fire passed just beyond them, falling on the forward posts by the Douve. Telephone lines were at once cut, but our S.O.S. was answered promptly by the batteries and the machine guns. The so-called “normal” rate laid down for machine gun fire at this time was 3000 rounds per gun per hour, but on a S.O.S. call each gun fired 250 rounds a minute for 10 minutes, followed by 20 minutes' “normal” fire. Through this stream of lead and shrapnel 60 German raiders, under cover of their own barrage, made a valiant effort to reach the Auckland posts, garrisoned by the 15th (North Auckland) company. They were successful in driving 1 advanced section back with flammenwerfer. Another moved to its flank to escape the bombardment. The third held firm.</p>
        <p>The withdrawal of 1 post was, as often happens in war, magnified into a disaster. The reserve company, which had stood to arms on the first alarm, was sent forward to re-establish the situation. They remained up in front, till shortly after midnight, when the posts were all back in position, and then returned to the support line. Auckland, suffering some 60 casualties, got off lightly, considering the violence of the shelling, which continued intermittently till 5.30 a.m. A few men were found to be missing. The Germans left 9 dead and a wounded prisoner in our hands.</p>
        <p>At about the same hour retribution was being exacted on the other flank of the Division. There a 3rd Canterbury patrol was lying in wait at a moated farm in front of their lines for one of the German patrols whose tracks in the long grass showed clearly in our aeroplane photographs. They were not to wait in vain. A party of 15 approached them. They opened fire and killed 8, all well-built, soldierly-looking Bavarians.</p>
        <p>Rain fell heavily the next day (29th July). An even gentle wind blew over the German lines, and a very large concentration of gas bombs was projected after dark on Frélinghien under highly favourable conditions which allowed <pb xml:id="n283" n="235"/>the fumes to hang for a considerable time about the billets and dugouts. In the evening 2nd Auckland relieved 1st Auckland by the Douve, and 1st Otago moved into the 1st Canterbury position in the centre of the line.</p>
        <p>All the while preparations were being pushed on for the renewed attempt at Basseville. The main attack in the north had again been postponed owing to "a succession of days of low visibility combined with the difficulties experienced by our Allies in getting their guns into position."<note xml:id="fn112-235" n="1"><p>Official Despatch.</p></note> The new date was to be 31st July. As the German anxiety about an advance in the Lys valley was already manifest, and as any local attack now would meet strong resistance and prove costly, General Plumer himself decided that the New Zealanders' co-operation on the extreme right flank of the Second Army's subsidiary attack should not predate the general advance but be simultaneous with it. The feint of crossing the Lys had already been carried out, but the role now allotted to the Division was again, as on the 27th, three-fold: the capture and holding of Basseville, the clearance of the hedge system 500 yards to the north of the village combined with an advance of our posts, and the raiding of the enemy's position between our front and the railway on the extreme left towards the Douve.</p>
        <p>The 1st Brigade area, from which the attack would debouch, was now held on the right opposite Basseville by 1st Wellington and on the left up to the Douve by 2nd Auckland, in touch with the Australians. It was arranged, however, that the greater part of the attack should be carried out by the other 2 battalions, who had completed their plans and were more conversant with the terrain. 2nd Wellington, therefore, would complete the enterprise undertaken on the 27th, and capture and hold Basseville. The second operation, the clearing of the hedge system in the centre of the line, was also entrusted to 2nd Wellington. The raid in the northern area was allotted to 1st Auckland. The captured positions would be consolidated by the battalions garrisoning the line. During the day there had been rain, and in the greasy trenches it was no light matter to carry up barbed wire and tools for consolidation, ammunition, mortar bombs, rations and water. The assembly of the incoming troops was similarly laborious. The night, however, was comparatively quiet.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n284" n="236"/>
        <p>At 3.50 am., 31st July, a roar of artillery fire along the whole 15 miles of the Allied front inaugurated the effort to win the coast, with the Passchendaele ridge as the first main objective. The field artillery, directly assisting the New Zealanders was divided into 2 groups. The right group supported the attack on Basseville by a barrage delivered by a gun to every 47 yards of front. Judged by the usual standard this was somewhat thin, but its deadly effect was to be testified to by the prisoners. On the open ground northwards to the Douve the left group had a gun available for every 23 yards. Howitzers bombarded the Strong Points and machine emplacements south of the Douve and in the Warneton Line. Barrages were also provided by machine guns, organised like the artillery into 2 groups. The right, supporting the attack on the village, searched the southern bank of the Lys and its trenches, and the treacherous dead ground on the northern bank. The left, protecting the assault on the hedges and the railway, swept the Warneton Line, the open ground to the east, mid the Douve valley. Admirably planned, these artillery and machine gun barrages were to prove of invaluable assistance.</p>
        <p>The renewed 2nd Wellington attack on Basseville was carried out by the Wellington West Coast company (Capt. McKinncn), assisted by 2 platoons of the Taranaki company, and a handful of Hawkes Bay men who had penetrated the village 4 mornings previously and now volunteered to act as guides. Officers and men were equally eager to avenge their misfortune. In the meantime the German defence had not been idle. Round the west edge of the village they had fortified a series of shellholes, and here stubborn resistance was offered by fresh troops who had just come into the line. The leading Wellington platoon seized the Refinery. Two platoons followed it and worked up the village, one on each side of the main street. The fourth platoon made for the northern factory. The south part of the village and the 2 factories fell easily. The houses of the main street were cleared by bombs and bayonets in half an hour. The dugouts were left full of dead. Beyond the town a few snipers lurked in ditches or behind hedges, but these were killed or fled along the river bank in the direction of Warneton into these grey running figures rifles and Lewis guns poured their lead, and many fell to run no further. In an hour's time the whole vicinity was cleared and consolidation already in progress.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n285"/>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP034a">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP034a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP034a-g"/>
            <head><hi rend="sc">Inspection by the commander-in-Chief</hi><lb/>(<name key="name-015658" type="person">Right Hon. W. Churchill</name> in mufti)</head>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <pb xml:id="n286"/>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP035a">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP035a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP035a-g"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">Boxing Competition</hi>
            </head>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP035b">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP035b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP035b-g"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">Water Polo</hi>
            </head>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <pb xml:id="n287" n="237"/>
        <p>Special arrangements had been made to deal with the estaminet on the Warneton road which had proved so trouble-some to Devery's men on the 27th, and 2 sections under L.-Cpl. Leslie Wilton Andrew were detailed expressly for the destruction of its occupants. As they moved forward, pushing close behind the barrage, they threatened a smachine gun post on the railway line to the north 'which was holding up our troops on the left. Diverging towards it they captured it, killing several Germans, and then dashing after the barrage picked it up afresh, pushed right into it for their proper objective, and ran towards the estaminet. In it a machine gun fired continuously. Its assailants made a detour round one side. Crouching and worming their way through a patch of thistles, they crept within striking distance of their prey. They flung a shower of bombs and rushed. Some of the Germans fled towards the river, in the wake of our barrage. The others were killed and the gun captured. While the rest of our party withdrew with the gun, Andrew himself and Pte. L. R. Ritchie undertook a reconnaissance towards Warneton as far as our standing barrage permitted. 300 yards along the road, on the very threshold of the village, was a wayside inn, In Der Rooster Cabaret: and in its cellars some of the hunted Germans sought refuge. A machine gun post was in an open trench beside it. The post was rushed, the cellars and adjoining dugouts were thoroughly bombed, and only then did the 2 men turn their faces towards our line. For his leadership and gallantry Andrew was awarded the Victoria Cross.</p>
        <p>In the centre meanwhile the Ruahine company on Wellington's left front (Capt. M. Urquhart) had experienced bitter fighting. The general plan of the left machine gun group was on similar lines to that carried out in the former attack. Opening at 400 yards to the west of the Warneton Line, they lifted 100 yards every minute till they reached the trenches. After dwelling on them for a few minutes, 16 guns searched forward 100 yards per minute to the outskirts of Warneton to their extreme range. Here they were ordered to maintain a protective barrage till shortly after 4.30 a.m., when they would shorten their fire to unite with that of the remainder of their group on the trenches. 4 machine guns enfiladed down the Douve valley for 10 minutes and then lifted to the outskirts of Warneton.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n288" n="238"/>
        <p>The Ruahine company attacked with 2 platoons, Keeping a third in reserve. The fourth platoon was used to dig an advanced company headquarters. The task of the right party under Lt. H. R. Biss was to establish a post on the railway line. As they neared it they came under heavy fire from 2 machine guns in the embankment. Several of the party fell, arid the remainder were forced to take cover in the shellholes. They worked their way forward from one shellhole to another as far as the edge of a glacis. devoid of a vestige of cover. No further progress was possible, and fire was exchanged with the Germans on the railway. It was at this moment that L. Cpl. Andrew's men approached on their way towards the estaminet. Lt. Biss' party saw them, and the Germans saw them, and wavered. Biss observed them looking behind—a tell-tale sign. In an instant he shouted to his men strung out in the shellholes to follow, and the whole party rose to their feet and dashed at the embankment. Their determination was not to be in vain, and while Andrew's men dealt with the one gun, they captured the other, killing its crew. Biss, who had been wounded in the charge, stayed to see consolidation well under way and then reported the events of the morning to his company and battalion commanders before making his way to the dressing station.</p>
        <p>The second platoon (2nd Lt. C. S. Brown) had the difficult task of clearing the hedgerows. After a 5 minutes' bombardment by the light trench mortars and under cover of close Lewis gun arid machine gun fire from the flanks, the platoon left its trenches. It was divided into 3 parties. Two of these were practically annihilated by the Prussians' rifle fire from behind the hedge. Brown himself was wounded. The third party was led by Sergt. S. C. Foot, one of those splendid n.c.o.s that the type of manhood in the Division produced in inexhaustible profusion. It reached its objective but was fired at from the railway and on each flank and obliged to fall back. The Germans had just relieved the former garrison and had been in the position for only 3 hours. They were not less uneasy than the party that had confronted Biss, and the loss of the machine guns down the railway line decided them. They began to steal away. Foot was not the man to be content to let them go so lightly. He immediately sent one of his men, Pte. A. Stumbles, to work round one flank, and he himself ran to the other. Both were expert marksmen. They steadied their breath and fired coolly. In a few seconds 8 Germans pitched forward, each <pb xml:id="n289" n="239"/>with a bullet in his head. The other 24 held up their hands and surrendered. One of the prisoners was an officer, and he vouchsafed the information that the company headquarters was in a concrete dugout not far away. Foot and his men hurried there to capture the company commander. They found, however, only his servant, a young lad of 18. The commander himself had found urgent business at battalion headquarters at the beginning of our bombardment. The rest of the hedge system was cleared without difficulty and a machine gun captured. The advanced posts were established and consolidated with the help of the support company.</p>
        <p>The 1st Auckland<note xml:id="fn113-239" n="1"><p>Now commanded by Lt.-Col. Alderman rejoined from Sling, pp. 60, 219.</p></note> raiders by the Douve were drawn from the 15th (North Auckland) company (<name type="person" key="name-207672">Capt. J. G. Coates</name>), which had its own revenge to seek for its trials of a few nights previously. They had since been taken out of the line for a night's rest. They attacked in 4 parties, and were followed as a second wave by a party of 2nd Auckland, who were made responsible for the construction and garrisoning of the new posts. The Germans had strongly organised their shellholes, roofed them with timber and matting and on top spread a 6-in. layer of earth to provide some protection from splinters. Over the earth thistles and grasses had been strewn, and in the long grass the positions proved most difficult to locate. A small hole gave entrance to each at the rear, and loopholes commanded the approach. In these shellholes the right party had a brief encounter on its objective, but the bulk of the garrison ran, and those who remained and fought were killed. One was taken prisoner. The second party's experience was similar. They killed nearly 50 and captured a prisoner and a machine gun. The third party was also successful in inflicting casualties. The platoon on the left, faced by intense fire from 3 machine guns and by a heavy mortar bombardment, were unable to make much progress. This check prevented the 2 parties in the centre from reaching the embankment, but the raid had achieved its purpose. Some 80 Germans were killed, 12 were taken prisoners, and 2 machine guns captured.</p>
        <p>Under cover of these operations a forward series of posts, about 500 yards in front of our main position, was consolidated by parties of the 2nd Auckland garrison on a line with the new 2nd Wellington posts on their right. These last were now in process of being cut forward at intervals from a long <pb xml:id="n290" n="240"/>drain which lay in front of Basseville across the Warneton road. The 2 Taranaki platoons were digging in near the Refinery as immediate supports and as wardens of the Lys crossings. The post safeguarding the right flank, which 1st Canterbury had put out on the 27th, was now re-established by 1st Otago. At 5.30 a.m. our contact aeroplanes looked clown on a line of flares along the whole length of the allotted objective.</p>
        <p>The Germans lost no time in directing intense shelling on Basseville and our new line to the east and north of it. Machine guns from the In Der Rooster Cabaret and from positions south of the river swept and enfiladed the advanced posts and the approaches from our old front line to Basseville. Under cover of continuous bombardment 3 efforts were made at the recapture of the village, one in the early morning, one in the afternoon, and one in the evening. All were repulsed.</p>
        <p>Shortly after dawn the first counter-attack was delivered at the centre of our line by local reserves from Warneton approaching between the river and road. They were observed concentrating at the In Der Rooster Cabaret. The mistake of the 27th was not repeated on this occasion. The S.O.S. green Verey lights, and rifle grenade signals, bursting into 2 red and 2 white balls, were at once fired and taken up by the rocket-post sentries in rear, whose gold and silver rain rockets had scarce died away when shrapnel and machine gun fire lashed the attackers. A few came on with great tenacity but fell to the Lewis guns and rifles of the posts.</p>
        <p>The afternoon attack aimed at the post on the right. All our officers here had been killed or wounded, but the command of the post was in very competent hands. The light trench mortar officer, Lt. R. K. Nichol, who had covered the attack on the hedgerows, had moved his guns to Basseville to assist in its defence. Shortly afterwards his mortars had been put out of action by shell-fire, and Nichol readily obtained the company commander's permission to take command of the infantry post. About 50 Germans assembled in the dead ground under the river bank, and sneaked along it, endeavouring to come in behind our front line. Nichol. collected about 10 men and was reinforced by a small 1st Wellington party under Sergt. W. A. Wasley. Biding his opportunity he charged the enemy. With a cheer and a volley of bombs the little party demoralised the surprised Germans. 13 were bayoneted and 20 shot, and the rest fled.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n291" n="241"/>
        <p>The attack in the evening was a repetition of the morning one, delivered with larger effectives and pushed home with a determination to which our men paid generous tribute. Rain had set in, and in the heavy drizzle the observation posts saw the Germans again massing at the Cabaret. Throughout the operations Wellington had used their rifles with masterly confidence and effect. They were now to give a final exhibition of their skill. Decimated by the barrage, groups of Germans pressed on to within 100 yards of our posts, where Lewis guns and rifles vied with one another in picking them off. The attack dwindled away, and we remained in complete possesion of our objectives. In the late evening the posts were taken over by 1st Wellington in pouring rain which had already reduced trenches and posts to muddy ditches and greatly impeded work and movement.</p>
        <p>In these operations 1st Auckland lost only 2 men killed and some 20 other casualties. The 2nd Wellington losses were inevitably heavier. An officer and 26 other ranks were killed or died of wounds, and 4 officers and 100 other ranks wounded. They had, however, the satisfaction of triumphing over their previous ill-fortune by an operation abounding, as the former one did also, in incidents of courage and self-sacrifice, but crowned with success. It was indeed one of the most brilliant minor operations which the Division executed. While all ranks insisted on laying stress on the magnificent co-operation of the artillery and machine guns, 2nd Wellington had full reason to be proud of their own courage skill and success. One further instance of devotion to duty may be quoted in the conduct of Pte. J. E. Ryan, a company runner. The other runners in the company were killed or wounded, arid Ryan was for 20 hours incessantly engaged in making his way under fire from his company commander back to battalion headquarters or forward to the posts east of Basseville. Dangers and exertions alike he accepted with coolness and cheerfulness, and not yet satisfied with his arduous duty, when in the evening the relieving company wanted guides, Ryan was the first man to volunteer.</p>
        <p>In their captured material 2nd Wellington included 5 machine guns and 2 trench mortars, and took an officer, a warrant officer and 40 men prisoners. Capt. McKinnon was awarded a bar to his M.C., Capt. Urquhart a M.C., and Ryan and Foot D.C.Ms. The regimental doctor, Capt. H. M. Goldstein, and Urquhart's sergeant-major. W. McKean, <choice><orig>re-<pb xml:id="n292" n="242"/>ceived</orig><reg>received</reg></choice> for conspicuously fine work a M.C. and a D.C.M respectively.</p>
        <p>Immediately across the Douve the 3rd Australians had been equally successful in capturing the enemy's line of posts along the road from Warneton to Gapaard. In the north, the left wing of the Second Army had pushed astride the Ypres-Comines canal, and Hollebeke and Klein Zillebeke were after 3 years' interval once more in British hands. Still farther north the grand offensive of the Fifth Army was falling short of expectations.</p>
        <p>After the failure of his counter-attacks on the New Zealand front the enemy resigned himself to the loss of Basseville and confined his activities to heavy shelling, under which the 1st Wellington posts suffered severe1y.<note xml:id="fn114-242" n="1"><p>Among other casualties to be deplored was the death of Major A. E. Horwood, M.C., R.N.Z.A., commander of the 7th Battery.</p></note> No infantry attack developed, however, and no opportunity was given to test our strong machine gun protective barrage covering the approaches from Warneton. On the evening of 1st August, as a further<note xml:id="fn115-242" n="2"><p>p. 228.</p></note> step to the approaching prolongation of the Division's front northwards, the 2nd Brigade took over from the 1st Brigade their right battalion front, including Basseville. In the following evening the trenches on the south bank of the Douve were handed over by the 1st Brigade to the Rifle Brigade, and during the night 3rd/4th the Rifle Brigade relieved a battalion of the 3rd Australian Division north of the Douve. In the interval which had elapsed since their last visit to the trenches the Rifle Brigade had lost General Fulton, who had gone to Sling for his period of duty. General Earl Johnston, whom he relieved there, took over on rejoining the Division, the command not of his old 1st Brigade, now commanded by General Melvill,<note xml:id="fn116-242" n="3"><p>p. 207.</p></note> but of the Rifle Brigade. These changes of areas prepared the way for an extension of the Corps front a mile northwards on 8th August, when the 4th Australians relieved the remainder of the 3rd and took over the southern extremity of the IX. Corps line.</p>
        <p>The Divisional front was now held by 3 brigades, the 4th on the Lys, the 2nd round Basseville, and the 3rd astride the Douve. Each brigade had 2 battalions in the line. The 1st Brigade was in Divisional reserve. Strenuous efforts were at once made to strengthen the defences and <choice><orig>organisa-<pb xml:id="n293"/><hi><figure xml:id="WH1-FranP036a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP036a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP036a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">La Basse Ville</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n294"/><figure xml:id="WH1-FranP037a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP037a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP037a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">A Motor Ambulance</hi></head></figure><figure xml:id="WH1-FranP037b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP037b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP037b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Transport leaving for the Line</hi></head></figure></hi><pb xml:id="n295" n="243"/>tion</orig><reg>organisation</reg></choice> of the whole area.<note xml:id="fn117-143" n="1"><p>A change of command in the Engineers may be noted here. <name key="name-130053" type="person">Lt.-Col. Pridham</name> in July was recalled to the British Army and succeeded as C.R.E. by Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-412767">H. L. Bingay</name>, R.E.</p></note> Wire was the first essential, for it was an established principle that the heaviest counter-attack is likely to fail if the defence is well-wired, whereas the feeblest counter-attack has a chance if wire is poor or. non-existent. The posts in front of Basseville, the front line, and the support line were swathed with entanglements. Much of the wire was erected by the Pioneers, who under intensely disagreeable conditions showed all their wonted cheerfulness and unsurpassed ability at work of this nature. In one night, for example, they put up 800 yards of “double-apron” wire north-east of Basseville.</p>
        <p>The infantry were fully occupied in building a continuous front line and communication trenches. This front line itself was covered by detached posts and by groups thrown as far forward as the river Lys and including Basseville. The main line of defence, however, was the support line. Owing to the flat and low-lying nature of the country it was not possible to make habitable “bivvies” in either the support or the front line, and the troops garrisoning them were withdrawn, after a 4 days' tour of duty, to the more comfortable dugouts of the subsidiary line. Much work was necessary throughout, and especially north of the Douve on the new battalion sector which ran up to Steignast Farm, east of Messines. Here there were no communication trenches and practically no fire trenches. The front line posts themselves lay in converted shellholes on high ground about an isolated windmill on the road from Warneton to Gapaard, and formed a marked salient with the enemy on 3 sides. These posts and the rear trenches generally were alike waist-deep in mud.</p>
        <p>While visiting these outposts in the early morning of 7th August, General Earl Johnston was killed instantaneously. by a sniper's bullet. Trained in the British Army, a. rnan of commanding presence and wide experience, he had rendered invaluable services to the New Zealand Force since its formation in New Zealand, and throughout its campaigns in Egypt Gallipoli and France, His death was felt moreover as a personal loss by all who were aware of his manly character and robust straightforwardness.<note xml:id="fn118-143" n="2"><p>An excellent memoir appears in the Stonyhurst Magazine, Vol. XIV. No. 213.</p></note> He was succeeded in command of the Rifle Brigade by Lt.-Col. (now Brig.-General) R. Young. The command of 1st Canterbury was bestowed on Lt.-Col. King, whose vacated appointment <pb xml:id="n296" n="244"/>in the Pioneer Battalion was filled by Major (now Lt.-Col.) <name type="person" key="name-130923">C. G. Saxby</name>, D.S.O. General Young was not to hold his new post for long. Two days later, near the spot where his predecessor had met his death, he was seriously wounded by a sniper. The command of the brigade was given temporarily to <name type="person" key="name-413207">Lt.-Col. A. E. Stewart</name> of the 2nd Rifles.</p>
        <p>The work of consolidation was very much hampered by the wretched weather conditions of the first part of August, which were at the moment affecting so disastrously <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name>'s plans further north. Day after day rain fell continuously. The sector, already largely water-logged, became a muddy and deplorable swamp, worse than “the Somme.” The conditions in the trenches were miserable. Carrying parties and stretcher-bearers preferred to risk enemy fire and did much of their work in the open. Thus when an exploding 5.9-in. shell fell on the 2nd Canterbury front line at dawn on 15th August and grievously wounded Capt. Morrison, whose fine work at the Au Chasseur Cabaret was noted in the preceding chapter, his stretcher-bearers carried him overland to the dressing station, where he died. All the way the little party was escorted by 2 German aeroplanes, who flying at a low height refrained from firing. Forethought and care could not prevent the men in the trenches from living and sleeping in wet clothes. The rate of sickness increased correspondingly.</p>
        <p>In addition to this wastage many casualties were caused by the German artillery, which maintained abnormal activity. Armentières Nieppe and Ploegsteert, and all our back areas, were continuously and heavily shelled. The last remaining civilians, who had endured so much, were at last constrained to evacuate their reeling houses. The baths at Nieppe were destroyed by shell-fire, and the Division temporarily deprived of their immense benefit to comfort health and morale. On our posts and front areas, commanded by the towering observation. posts in the Warneton buildings, the shelling raged persistently, and in the first fortnight in August from this cause alone the Division lost the equivalent of a battalion. Gas fell for the most part in the back areas and about the batteries and round Hyde Park Corner and Hill 63, compelling on several occasions the wearing of respirators by reliefs marching up to the trenches or by men working at the quartermasters' stores or wagon lines some miles in rear.</p>
        <p>The enemy aeroplanes continued by day to harass the forward troops and battery positions and by night to bomb <pb xml:id="n297" n="245"/>the rear villages, considerably increasing the frequency of their visits and widening the radius of their operations. On 9th August the 2nd Infantry Brigade Headquarters lost several horses, and on the 11th the 1st Machine Gun Company and 2nd Wellington stables were wrecked and nearly 100 animals destroyed. Our own guns were even more aggressive than the German. Warneton Deulemont and other villages were reduced to heaps of ruined roofless walls, gaps in which revealed the more substantial concrete dugouts which they screened. Co-operation was given to the attacks in the north, particularly to that of 16th August on Langemarck, by artillery and machine gun barrages and violent counter-battery activity. Frélinghien also was on that date drenched in gas and liquid oil.</p>
        <p>While about Basseville both artilleries remained active, there was now little infantry fighting. Both sides were engrossed in consolidation. A single effort at a raid by the Germans was summarily repulsed. Our patrols, however, were continually active towards Warneton, along the Lys and down the Douve valley, where some encounters took place with enemy parties. Over the Lys the enemy made no attempt to throw bridges or force a crossing, and aggressive sniping by our patrols denied him the right of moving freely in front of his own lines on the southern bank. Towards the end of the month a notable achievement was performed by a 3rd Wellington<note xml:id="fn119-245" n="1"><p>Major (now Lt.-Col.) Weston had taken over command from Major Short on 19th August.</p></note> party under the leadership of Sergt. S. S. Pennefather. In the afternoon Pennefather had swum across the Lys and reconnoitred the enemy positions. Crossing again in the evening for further exploration he found 2 rafts hidden among the rushes below the enemy bank. One he cut adrift, the other he converted, by means of German signalling wire, into a ferry. When darkness fell, he led a party of 7 men to the river. 4 were left on the tow rope to guard the passage and cover the return. The other 3 he took with him. Penetrating into the enemy's country the party heard talking, and speed a group of Germans in a shellhole. They crept towards it but were noticed, and the enemy threw stick-bombs and opened rifle fire. Pennefather received a serious wound in the wrist, but in the excitement of the moment scarcely felt the pain. He and his men flung their bombs and rushed. Four dim figures rose up from the shellhole, making off into the darkness. <pb xml:id="n298" n="246"/>Two were killed; the others escaped. In the bottom of the shellhole was found a fifth badly wounded German. No papers were on the dead, so the party collected the enemy rifles and lifted their wounded prisoner to carry him to our lines. He died, however, on the way. The party recrossed the river on the ferry without further misadventure. For this enterprise Pennefather received the coveted D.C.M.</p>
        <p>In the intensity of the enemy's artillery fire there was a marked decrease in the last 10 days of the month, due to the withdrawal of guns for his defence ill the north. The number of active positions recorded by Sound Rangers and Flash Spotters dropped very suddenly, and the result was reflected in the Corps casualty roll:—
	</p><p>
        <table><row><cell>Week</cell><cell>ending</cell><cell rend="right">August 2</cell><cell rend="right">1329</cell><cell>total</cell><cell>casualties</cell></row><row><cell>Week</cell><cell>ending</cell><cell rend="right">August 9</cell><cell rend="right">919</cell><cell>total</cell><cell>casualties</cell></row><row><cell>Week</cell><cell>ending</cell><cell rend="right">August 16</cell><cell rend="right">752</cell><cell>total</cell><cell>casualties</cell></row><row><cell>Week</cell><cell>ending</cell><cell rend="right">August 23</cell><cell rend="right">631</cell><cell>total</cell><cell>casualties</cell></row><row><cell>Week</cell><cell>ending</cell><cell rend="right">August 30</cell><cell rend="right">212</cell><cell>total</cell><cell>casualties</cell></row></table>
      </p>
<p>With his reduced groups, however, counter-battery work was continued persistently even in the latter part of the month, and several New Zealand guns were destroyed, but in the trenches and forward area conditions were becoming normal as early as 17th August, when the 2nd Brigade was relieved in the centre of the line by the 1st Brigade and withdrew into reserve. On the 21st it began to move to the La Motte area. The rest of the Division was not to be long in following it. Arrangements were already under way for the 8th Division to take over the right and centre subsectors and for the 3rd Australians to occupy the Rifle Brigade subsector on the Douve. The latter move began on the 22nd. Owing to the proximity and activity of the enemy opposite the Windmill on the Warneton-Gapaard road, the Rifle Brigade had experienced the utmost difficulty in the construction of their front line, but the ground was of particular tactical importance, and it was essential that our grip of it should be strengthened. By untiring efforts the work had been completed. The posts were now connected with each other and the whole with the support line, and movement under cover was possible throughout the entire subsector.</p>
        <p>During the 21 days that the Rifle Brigade had been in the line it had sustained casualties not less heavy than those of a serious engagement. 5 officers had been killed, 14 <pb xml:id="n299" n="247"/>wounded, and 1 was missing,<note xml:id="fn120-247" n="1"><p>Captain W. A. Gray, M.C., 3rd Battalion, captured after being wounded 6th August.</p></note> and the casualties among other ranks amounted to 60 killed, 350 wounded, and 2 missing. On relief by the Australians the brigade moved to the La Crèche area in tactical support to the 57th Division, who were holding the familiar trenches about Fleurbaix. The 8th Division completed the reliefs of the 1st Brigade on the 27th and of the 4th Brigade on the 31st. As these 2 brigades were withdrawn, they marched back to the Corps rear area. After their 3 months in the trenches the 4th Brigade, burdened with full packs, blankets, steel helmets, and other accoutrements, were severely tried by the 17-mile march.</p>
        <p>From these staging billets the Division, less the artillery and the Rifle Brigade, proceeded by train at the end of the month to the Second Army reserve area at Lumbres in the Aa valley west of St. Omer. Units were accompanied by their travelling kitchens and water carts, but the remainder of the transport trekked by road. The last of the artillery moved out of the line on 6th September and rested for a few days in the neighbourhood of Morbecque, whence they presently rejoined the Division. The rifle Brigade was left in the forward area for work on cable communications under the orders of the Second army. At the end of August the 4th Australian Division was relieved by IX. Corps troops and transferred to I. Anzac. Thereupon II. Anzac Headquarters handed over the command of their sector to the VIII. Corps and moved to Lumbres.</p>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n300" n="248"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body1-d7" type="chapter">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Chapter VII</hi>
          <lb/>
          <hi rend="sc">Gravenstafel and the Bellevue Spur</hi>
        </head>
        <p>The tactical skill shown by the British infantry at Arras and Messines, and especially the devastating effects of the British artillery, led to various modifications in the German principles of defence. These had hitherto been based on the contesting of every yard of ground. The enemy had filled his trenches with troops and machine guns. On the other hand, once driven from a position he had rarely made a serious effort to retake it. This close succession of strongly-manned trenches in the forward zone had in the end proved equally wasteful and ineffective. The Flanders battle saw the introduction of tactics designed mainly to neutralise our artillery preparation.</p>
        <p>The main features of the new policy were the comparative lightness of the front-zone garrison, increased depth of defences, and the maintenance of powerful reserves used for counter-attack. These last were stationed close behind the battle and were employed both to effect immediate local reaction and also, after a somewhat longer interval but before the assaulting troops could reorganisc and consolidate, to launch previously prepared counter-strokes on a large scale. This policy of “elastic” defence was likely to yield limited areas of ground, but it promised to conserve manpower and prove expensive to the attack. Entanglements were used lavishly, and a notable feature was the construction of concrete Flock-houses or machine gun posts arranged chequerwise or in echelon for mutual support. These had already been encountered at Messines and were at once necessitated by and well adapted to the waterlogged marshes of Flanders, where the construction of deep dugouts was generally impossible. Upon them, by reason partly of their shape, partly of the unpleasant nature of their contents, the unerring humour of the English soldier had bestowed the name of “pillboxes.” </p>
        <p>The policy was worked out in practice with considerable technical ability, and at the outset caused no little perplexity <pb xml:id="n301" n="249"/>to our attacking infantry and Staff. Gradually, however, the necessary modifications in our infantry artillery and machine gun tactics were evolved, and all the lessons gained by experience were communicated to the formations resting and training behind the line.</p>
        <p>The enemy's defence was at once more mobile and indeterminate, and left the attack more ignorant of his dispositions and probable counter-action. Assaulting troops could no longer be certain where they would meet the enemy's advanced troops, whether in front of or behind or in his trench systems, nor could they tell on what portion of the front his previously prepared, as distinct from his local, counter-stroke would fall. In order to be able to fight the enemy wherever encountered between our starting point and objective, and to have fresh and organised troops in hand to meet counter-attacks wherever they might fall, it was necessary that our own formations should be more flexible, under closer control and capable of greater freedom of manoeuvre, than the old “waves.”</p>
        <p>A solution was found in a formation of small columns or “worms.” These were covered by one or two lines designed to draw the enemy's fire, engage him, locate his defences, and generally discharge the functions of an advanced guard protecting a main body. By this screen freedom of manoeuvre was secured for the attacking columns. Similarly, the “moppers-up” following behind the columns now dealt with areas instead of trench lines. Musketry and ground reconnaissance regained values somewhat obscured in recent battles, and the handling of reserves to meet enemy counter-attacks was of paramount importance. Fighting was assuming a much more open nature. Trench warfare and trench-to-trench assaults were becoming things of the past.</p>
        <p>It was on these new features of attack that the New Zealanders in the Lumbres area now concentrated their. attention. A certain amount of training was done in open manoeuvre and wood fighting, but for the most part all arms studied the principle and rehearsed the practice of the new methods of advance over areas defended by scattered concrete fortresses. In their spare hours the New Zealanders gave much assistance in harvesting the crops.</p>
        <p>During this period of training an impressive and memorable review of the 1st 2nd and 4th Infantry Brigades and other units of the Division was held in beautiful weather by <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name>, accompanied by the Right Hon. Winston <pb xml:id="n302" n="250"/>Churchill. The troops were first inspected in line of battalions in close column of companies, and then marched past with splendid steadiness in columns of platoons in line.</p>
        <p>Meanwhile the 3rd Brigade battalions were engaged under I. Anzac and the X. Corps in burying cable in the rear areas of the Ypres battlefield. The Cyclist Battalion was employed on similar tasks. Working frequently under shell-fire and in gas respirators they completed all tasks set them with despatch and thoroughness. Lt.-General Morland, of the X. Corps, wrote to General Godley:—</p>
        <quote>"It is difficult for me adequately to express to you my gratitude for the splendid work of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade, and the II. Anzac Cyclists in burying cable on my Corps front during the last 3 weeks. Their achievement in digging over 13,000 yards of cable trench, laying the cable and banking it from 3 to 4 feet is an extraordinary one. The keenness that they displayed is universally admired, and their skill is acknowledged to be an example to any troops. Will you please tell these gallant men how much, while I deplore the casualties they suffered, I appreciate both their valuable work and their soldierly spirit."</quote>
        <p>A similar tribute was paid by the very able chief of the Second Army Staff, Major-General C. H. Harington, and the Army Commander found the in the insistent pressure of work following the battle of 20th September to issue the following order:—</p>
        <quote>"The Army Commander wishes to place oil record his appreciation of the work done by the 3rd New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade in burying cable to assist in yesterday's operations. The success of the operations was in a great, measure due to the good communications established, to attain which results the 3rd New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade played such an important part."</quote>
        <p>In the momentous operations, known as the Third Battle of Ypres, the comparative success of the initial engagement on 31st July had not been maintained in the second attack, delivered, after a delay due to unpropitious weather, on 16th August. Especially on the southern flank, where the road from Ypres to Menin crossed the ridge, meagre results had been effected at heavy cost. It was thought that more progress might he achieved by an extension of the attack further to the south. The Fifth Army already had its hands <pb xml:id="n303" n="251"/>full, so this area about the Menin Road was transferred in the beginning of September to the Second Army, and General Plumer was ordered to carry the crest-line in a self-contained operation. It was too strong a position to win in a blind rush, and the Second Army attack was delayed till 20th September to allow time for the satisfactory completion of characteristically thorough preparations, which included the extensive burying of cable by the Rifle Brigade mentioned above. The result was a substantial victory. To the north the Fifth Army achieved no less welcome success. The advance was resumed on 26th September, when 1. Anzac carried the remainder of <name key="name-140475" type="work">Polygon Wood</name>, and English Divisions captured Zonnebeke and pushed out along the Ypres-Wieltje-Passchen-dacle mad towards Gravenstafel Ridge. This road was soon to be printed indelibly on the minds of the New Zealanders.</p>
        <p>For the Division was already on the march from the Lumbres training area towards Ypres. The artillery had moved forward previously to the Hazebrouck area. On 24th September General Godley had received warning that II. Anzac would relieve the V. Corps in the northern sector of the extended Second Army front and would carry out operations in the near future. On this occasion there were to be no long rehearsals as at Messines. Six days only were available in which the Corps would march up to Ypres, relieve the troops in the line, and plan and carry out an offensive in an area and on a front that were unknown both to the Corps Staff and to the Divisions. The 49th and 66th Divisions were added to the New Zealand Division and 3rd Australian Division under General Godley's command to bring the Corps up to adequate strength. The 2 English Divisions were for the time left in rest and training, but the 3rd Australians and the New Zealanders had been warned for an immediate movement towards Ypres. On 25th September Divisional Headquarters moved to Hazebrouck, and the 1st and 2nd Brigade Groups to Renescure. The 4th Brigade, who were further west in the training area, marched up into the vacated billets about Lumbres. On the 26th the 1st and 2nd Brigade reached Wallon Cappel and the 4th Brigade Renescure. The weather was swelteringly hot, the hard roads dusty, and though the troops were in splendid fettle they were severely tested by these long marches of 20 miles and over a day. Divisional Headquarters and the 1st and 2nd Brigades moved on the following day (27th September) to Watou, some 5 miles west of Poperinghe, and <pb xml:id="n304" n="252"/>the 4th Brigade reached a staging area north of Hazebrouck. On the 28th II. Anzac, with Headquarters just north of Poperinghe, took over from the V. Corps the command of the latter's 2 Divisions in the line, the 3rd Division on the right and the 59th on the left, on the front between Zonnebeke and St. Julien, east and north-east of Ypres. The Second Army then once again extended its area northwards to include this new sector.</p>
        <p>Arrangements had been made to relieve the 3rd Division by the 3rd Australian Division and the 59th Division by the New Zealanders. On the right of the new Corps sector was I. Anzac (General Birdwood), on the left in the Fifth Army was the XVIII. Corps. The 2nd Brigade was sent up on lorries from Watou at short notice on the 28th to be in support to the 59th Division as a preparatory step to the taking over of the whole Divisional front. 2nd Canterbury<note xml:id="fn121-252" n="1"><p>Major (temp. Lt.Col) <name type="person" key="name-026966">O. H. Mead.</name> vice Lt.-Col. Griffiths, on duty to England.</p></note> and 2nd Otago went into the old German front line. trenches at Wieltje, and the two 1st Battalions into a reserve area north of Ypres In the same evening sections of the lst<note xml:id="fn122-252" n="2"><p>Lt.-Col. J. A. Ballard, R.F.A., vice Lt.-Col. Symon, on duty to England.</p></note> and 3rd Artillery Brigades, now also concentrated in the Poperinghe area, trekked up to commence the relief of the 42nd Divisional Artillery on the right Division sector, taking over their guns. Throughout the night our batteries were heavily shelled.</p>
        <p>The infantry reliefs in the left Division sector began the following evening (29th September). 2nd Canterbury and 2nd Otago went into the front trenches, some 4 miles in front of the original British line, of the left brigade of the 59th Division, and on the following night (30th September/ 1st October) 1st Canterbury and 1st Otago took over the forward posts on the right subsector in bright moonlight and under fitful bursts of machine gun fire. At the same time 2nd Wellington moved forward to the old German front line. The 2nd Brigade, with all 4 battalions in the line, passed temporarily under command of the 59th Division. The Australians were moving into the right Division sector simultaneously, and on the nights 30th September/1st October and 1st/2nd October the New Zealand gunners, relived by the 3rd Australian Divisional Artillery, moved northwards into the St. Jean sector in support to and to the great satisfaction of-their infantry.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n305" n="253"/>
        <p>Throughout the short period spent by the gunners in the positions now handed over to the Australians they had been heavily shelled, and 4 howitzers of the 15th Battery had been destroyed. In the northern sector no time was wasted in reconnoitring and occupying new advanced positions from which in the forthcoming operation barrages might be placed beyond the furthest objectives and the enemy's most distant batteries be engaged. A section of each battery was in action in new forward positions by dawn on 1st October and the remainder by the following morning. The batteries of both brigades were formed into a group under the temporary command of Lt.-Col. Falla, General Napier Johnston taking command of the large group covering the whole front in which the New Zealand group was included. The New Zealand guns were the most advanced and, except for necessary registration, carried out no firing.</p>
        <p>On 1st October the command of the St. Jean sector was taken over by the New Zealanders. On the same day the 4th Brigade, which had meantime arrived at Watou, and the remainder of the 1st Brigade moved up by traffic-encumbered roads to the reserve positions in the old front lines and northern outskirts of Ypres. The 4th Brigade lay on the right, the 1st on the left. Each disposed 2 battalions in the old British and German front lines as reserves to the 2nd Brigade. Both rear Brigade headquarters were located at Wieltje. Forward divisional headquarters was established on the Yser canal bank north of Ypres.</p>
        <p>The area taken over by II. Anzac from the V. Corps was in the shape of a corridor about 17 miles long. Some 2 miles broad across its front, it contracted towards the rear to under a mile. In this confined area road communications were highly inadequate. Westwards of Poperinghe there was but one good road to Watou, and this lay wholly in the area of the XVIII. Corps on the left. Towards the battlefront the only serviceable route was the main road to Ypres through Vlamertinghe. Poperinghe formed not only the base for all the communications of II. Anzac, but also the centre for most of the XVIII. Corps traffic to the north and part of the traffic of I. Anzac to the south. On this meagre line of communications it was no inconsiderable task to cope with the! continual movement of relieving troops and the unceasing stream of motor lorries and transport loaded with material for the forward area. East of Ypres the tracks were deplorable, and all available labour was employed on their <pb xml:id="n306" n="254"/>maintenance and improvement. Every augmentation of technical troops, however, in the front zone involved a corresponding increase in the traffic on the already congested approaches in rear. In the case of the roads generally, as also in that of the light and broad gauge railways, the conflicting interests of construction and supply needed to be reconciled with the utmost care. The actual front line of the Corps lay roughly along the road from Zonnebeke to Langemarck, falling just short of the road on the extreme right but gradually drawing further eastwards from it as one went towards the north. On the right the Corps was separated from I. Anzac by a line which was at the moment just south of the Ypres-Roulers railway, but was shortly afterwards marked by the railway itself. The left boundary coincided with the Army Boundary on a line drawn roughly parallel to and some 1200 yards to the north of the road running from Wieltje to Gravenstafel.</p>
        <p>As a result of the 2 successful attacks on 20th and 26th September the British front in the battle now constituted a marked salient. Its right rested on the high ground about the Menin Road, whence it trended north-east in front of <name key="name-140475" type="work">Polygon Wood</name>. In the neighbourhood of Zonnebeke it began to curve inwards but lay still well to the east of St. Julien and Langemarck, whence it bent back with a decided sharpness to the point of junction with the French in front of Houthoulst Forest. With the Fifth Army thus in complete possession of the Langemack Ridge and the Second Army firmly established on the southern extremity of the main Passchendaele Ridge, the way was now open for a direct attack from the I. Anzac position in the centre on the Broodseinde portion of the main ridge east of Zonnebeke, and for the outflanking of the enemy's position in the Houthoulst Forest. This third phase of the battle would be conducted by a series of bounds, each bound constituting a separate operation and following on its predecessor after an interval of several days. In view of the advanced season, preparations were being pushed forward with the utmost rapidity for the resumption of our offensive on 4th October.</p>
        <p>The heights at Broodseinde, the objective of the first operation, would be seized by I. Anzac in the centre of the Second Army line. Their right flank would be covered by operations on the southern curve of the salient, their left by all advance of II. Anzac. Further to the north the Fifth Army would conform by striking out along their sector up <pb xml:id="n307"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP038a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP038a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP038a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc"><name key="name-209146" type="person">General Russell</name> inspecting 1st Canterbury</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP038b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP038b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP038b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Water Bottles</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n308"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP039a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP039a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP039a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Entraining for "Ypkes"</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP039b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP039b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP039b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">An Early Morning Scene</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n309" n="255"/>to and beyond Poelcapelle. The whole front affected amounted to some 7 miles. The necessary alterations of troops had been rapidly effected, and the fresh Divisions such as the New Zealanders were now familiarising themselves with their assaulting positions.</p>
        <p>From the main ridge, on whose plateau in front of II. Anzac lay the shattered houses of Passchendaele, various small subsidiary spurs run out north-westwards, separated from each other by the headwaters of the sluggish streams characteristic of this part of Flanders. Two such spurs faced the New Zealand Division, one immediately confronting their trenches, the other in ochelon northwards behind it. The nearer and more southerly one of these rose just over the small stream of the Hanebeek, which lay immediately beyond our front line. It was called the Gravenstafel Spur. Soon after it projected from the Passchendaele Ridge its even crest was broken by an isolated almost imperceptible rise called Abraham Heights; thereafter it fell gradually towards the ruins of Gravenstafel and Korek, and beyond them to the plains. As the Hanebeek drained the slopes which faced the New Zealanders, so its reverse slopes to the north were drained by another stream which in its upper part was called the Ravebeek but presently, after receiving some small tributary channels, the Stroombeek. On the other side of its valley, standing further back and further to the north from the New Zealand lines, was the second spur which jutted out from the main Passchendaele ridge. This was the Bellevue Spur. These 2 low hills were to be the scenes of the New Zealanders' engagements in the final stages of the Ypres Battle. The Gravenstafel Spur was to be carried in the forthcoming attack. The turn of the Bellevue Spur would come later.</p>
        <p>Through constant artillery fire and bad weather both the Hanebeek and the Ravebeek-Stroombeek had lost all semblance of running streams. Their channels were marked by broad quagmires that were pockmarked by deep shellholes full of mud and water. Their crossing might be difficult even to infantry and was insuperable to tanks. Soon after the Gravenstafel road passed it, the course of the Hanebeek turned westwards through our positions, and similarly the Stroombeek, between the Gravenstafel and Bellevue ridges, rounded the former spur in a north-westerly direction and percolated, rather than flowed, into the XVIII. Corps area on the left.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n310" n="256"/>
        <p>The country, dismal and war-scarred to a degree exceeding even the desolation of the Somme, could with difficulty be imagined to have ever served the purpose of peaceful civilization. Here and there were stunted remains of copses: here and there levelled heaps of bricks and stones on the spurs and in the valleys told of farms and villages. Thus, between our posts and the Hanebeek, one could with difficulty trace the ruins of Dochy Farm and Riverside. On the edge of the stream groups of pillboxes represented the scattered buildings of Otto Farm, and up the hillside untidy heaps amid the shellholes marked the sites of Boethoek, Van Meulen and Wimbledon. Further to the north-west, where the ridge fell away from Gravenstafel village to the flats towards the Stroombeek, were the ruins of the little hamlet of Boetlcer. In the Stroombeek valley there had been substantial farmers' houses. Waterloo Farm and Calgary Grange lay on the reverse slopes of the Gravenstafel Spur; and just over the Stroombeek, where it entered the area of the troops on the north, was Kronprinz Farm. From it a country road ran back, beyond the Division's left boundary, to Albatross Farm and to a nest of dugouts called Winzig, which directly faced the 48th Division on our left. In the vicinity of most of these houses and at all points of importance the Germans had constructed numerous pillboxes. The last local feature of importance was the road which roughly divided the Divisional sector and ran north-east from Wieltje over the Gravenstafel Spur down into the Ravebeek valley, whence it mounted the Bellevue Spur towards the main ridge a little north of Passchendaele.</p>
        <p>For the next attack the Corps' final objective corresponded approximately with the old British line in 1914, It ran from near the intersection of the Ypres-Roulers railway with the great enemy Zonnebeke-Staden system, along the eastern slopes of the Gravenstafel Spur to Kronprinz Farm. The 3rd Australian Division would carry out the attack on the right and the New Zealanders on the left. A brigade from each of the 49th and 66th Divisions was brought up into Corps reserve. The ground was, as we have seen, unsuitable for the employment of tanks, but the Corps had adequate artillery.</p>
        <p>The frontage of the Division was some 2000 yards and the depth of its proposed advance over the ridge about 1000 yards. The furthest objective line was called the Blue Line. Just beyond the Gravenstafel crest on the forward slopes overlooking the Stroombeek valley a support position was <pb xml:id="n311" n="257"/>marked on the map as the Blue Dotted Line. The first objective (the Red Line), which fell just short of Gravenstafel village, lay on the near side of the hill. General Russell's plan was to attack with 2 brigades, the 4th on the right against Abraham Heights and the 1st on the left over the lower slopes beyond Korek. The frontage of the 4th Brigade, which was faced by the more difficult task, was some 800, that of the 1st Brigade some 1200 yards.</p>
        <p>It was agreed that each assaulting brigade should use 2 battalions to reach the Red Line, and "leap-frog" them with 2 others who would pass over the crest and down the further side to the Blue. The 2nd Brigade, at present holding the line, would be withdrawn into Divisional reserve prior to operations. The Rifle Brigade, which arrived at Poperinghe from Vieux Berquin on 3rd October, was employed under Corps direction on cable-burying, road construction, and the digging of emplacements for the heavy artillery. Their machine gun company, however, was taken over by the Division for co-operation in the forthcoming attack.</p>
        <p>In the first days of October, though the nights turned noticeably colder, the days were still warm and the weather favourable. The British guns remained normally active. In every phase of the Ypres Battle our artillery programme was altered to mystify the enemy as to the moment of launching the next blow. The previous attack had been preceded by a 24-hours' intense bombardment. For the forthcoming operation severe preliminary bombardment was dispensed with, and the hurricane fire reserved for zero. Two-thirds of the ammunition allotted for harassing fire on roads and approaches were expended by night, and special precautions were taken to avoid any slackening at dawn. On misty days, when night conditions were reproduced, the amount of ammunition fired by day was correspondingly increased. Practice barrages were carried out daily. The enemy artillery fire, particularly on the roads, was little less active than our own. Long-range pieces shelled Poperinghe. On either side the use of bombing aeroplanes for dispersing and harassing the great congestion of troops and material in the battle area became an increasingly marked feature of the struggle. The Engineers toiled at the construction of duck-board-tracks across the waste of shellholes and at the repair of the cratered roads. In the line of fortified shellholes the 2nd Brigade carried out active patrolling about the Hanebeek swamps and at Dochy Farm, where they found and killed a <pb xml:id="n312" n="258"/>small party of Germans. Early in the morning of 1st October a strong German patrol attacked a 1st Canterbury advanced post in a shellhole. The post was held by a Lewis gun team under <name type="person" key="name-416642">L.-Cpl. R. H. Halligan</name>. After a few rounds the gun jammed, and Halligan and his 3 men leaving the shellhole attacked the enemy with bombs, killing 4 and driving the remainder to flight. From the dead important identifications were secured. At the beginning of our evening barrage on the 2nd two or three elderly Prussians wandered into our lines.</p>
        <p>On the evening of 2nd October, under good weather conditions, the 4th and 1st Brigades moved up from Ypres to take over the trenches. Each brigade disposed 2 battalions in the front line in considerable depth, 2 companies being echeloned back for a distance of 500 yards and the rear 2 companies for a further distance of 500 to 800 yards. The 2 supporting battalions took over the old British and German front lines. The 4th Brigade front was held by 3rd Auckland on the right and 3rd Otago on the left, with 3rd Canterbury and 3rd Wellington in support. Each of these supporting battalions left half their personnel behind to move forward on the following day. The 1st Brigade took over the front positions with 1st Wellington<note xml:id="fn123-258" n="1"><p>Major H. Holderness, vice Lt.-Col. Cook, invalided.</p></note> on the right and 1st Auckland on the left, and placed in support behind the former battalion 2nd Auckland, and behind the latter 2nd Wellington. The 2nd Brigade Machine Gun Company remained in the line. Two battalions (1st Canterbury and 1st Otago) of the 2nd Brigade were left in the forward area as reserve troops for the 4th and 1st Brigades respectively in case of counter-attack. The remainder of the 2nd Brigade moved back into Divisional Reserve.</p>
        <p>3rd October was again a fine date and favoured reconnaissance of our approaches to the line and of the German country. The enemy's artillery was comparatively inactive, responding but feebly to our practice barrage. The last touches were put to our plans and preparations, and dumps were moved forward without molestations. In the absence of regular and continuous trenches it was necessary that the assembly of the assaulting troops should be done on taped lines. During the afternoon stakes were placed along the lines selected, and as soon as darkness fell tapes were laid out parallel to the objective to ensure proper direction at the outset. They were placed also along the routes of <pb xml:id="n313" n="259"/>approach to all the different lines on which the troops would deploy. The front line of tapes was laid some 200 yards behind the outposts, party to secure immunity from observation, partly to provide a satisfactorily straight “jumping-off” line, and partly to enable the barrage, which it was the practice to start 150 yards in front of the infantry, to fall across the whole of No man's land and deal with machine gun posts that might have, as the phrase was, “cuddled up” to our line. Some 40 yards behind was the tape line for the supporting companies, and some 1000 yards in rear was the first tape line of the supporting battalions. The outposts for the moment remained out before the taped lines to give protection against enemy patrols, while the supporting com-panies and the rear battalions moved up in the darkness to their positions. Little opportunity had been given for elaborate study, or prolonged conferences, but such was the rapid appreciation and understanding of the plans by the men that everyone knew the general points of his task. This was the first engagement of the 4th Brigade as a corporate unit, and all ranks were bent on rivalling in the classic battle-ground of ypres the achievements of the older bridges at Gallipoli, the Somme Messines, and elsewhere. Not the mud and cheerless conditions nor the intermittent shelling nor previous experience of battle could shake the hearts of the attacking soldiers.</p>
        <p>The weather just held up. It was a dark night but exceptionally quiet lulled by the absence of a preparatory bombardment,. the enemy calculated on our not pet being ready to deliver the next stroke, and he had himself every reason for avoiding heavy artillery activity. For he was, on his part, moving troops up over the Hanebeek for a dawn attack. A Reserve Division had been brought up to thrust astride the Ypres-Roulers railway, and a Guards Division lay ready to follow it and consolidate the positions won. The attack was to be extended southwards by other divisions, and the filial objectives included Zonuebeke and <name key="name-140475" type="work">Polygon Wood</name>. His men were therefore silently deploying out opposite our own, and it was vital to him not to have there assembly disorganised by the British artillery.</p>
        <p>The New Zealand companies were guided forward to their positions without noise or confusion. A platoon from each battalion in the posts was extended at 25 yards' interval to show the alignment. During this assembly the enemy, masking his own designs by a maintenance of normal machine gun <pb xml:id="n314" n="260"/>activity, caused several casualties. Our own movements, however, passed completely unnoticed, and the guiding platoons rejoined their companies. The men were not overloaded. The battalions for the Red Line carried 120 rounds of ammunition and the attackers of the Blue Line 170, One Mills grenade had been found sufficient for the present form of fighting. The men were heated, however, by the march and by the construction of their shallow trenches. Now, as they knelt down on the oozy soil in such protection as these shelters and shellholes afforded, a, clammy drizzle began to fall, and a strong westerly wind chilled them to the hone. Shortly before zero the forward posts quietly withdrew into battalion reserve.</p>
        <p>Everything remained normal on the New Zealand front On the right, opposite the Australians, the Germans appeared nervous and repeatedly fired flares bursting into clusters of yellow lights. 'There at 5.30 a.m. his guns opened a strong bombardment which gradually worked down on the New Zealand front. The shells fell in the unoccupied area just in rear of the support companies, aid casualties were few; but there was a general feeling of relief when at 6 a.m. precisely our own guns opened.</p>
        <p>It was still dark and misty, but the drizzle had temporarily ceased. The intensity of the barrage, specially designed to deal with the new defence tactics of the Germans, satisfied the most exacting. Exclusive of the heavy and medium howitzers the Division was supported by a hundred and eighty 18-pounders and sixty 4.5-in howitzers. Super-heavy guns and howitzers engaged special points, and there were 4 distinct artillery barrages in addition to a machine gun barrage, to take the assaulting columns forward, break up counter-attacks, and protect the infantry on the captured objectives. They covered a depth of 1000 yards. Nearest the advancing lines was the creeping shrapnel barrage of the field guns; beyond it a stationary curtaill of fire was provided by the light howitzers and a proportion of the field guns. At increasing distances from the advancing infantry a third barrage was given by the 6-in. howitzers and a fourth by 60-pounders, 8-in. and 9.2-in. howitzers.</p>
        <p>A vivid picture is given of the work of the guns in the following letter of a New Zealand artilleryman:—</p>
        <quote>“Those who heard it say it was tremendous, the din, but we in the pit heard it not at all, or only in a subconscious way, to be remembered afterwards, heard nothing but the <pb xml:id="n315" n="261"/>vicious whanging of our own guns, nothing but the jerk of the breach as it opened and the snap as it closed again, nothing but the clang of falling "empties" and the rattle of the live shells as the No.4 jammed them on, nothing but the ticking of the watch covering the interval between the rounds and the No.1's voice: 'Thirty more left! Elevate five minutes! Drop one hundred!' then the watch's ticking again till he opened his mouth once more, and before the 'Fire!' had hardly left it, the spiteful tonguing of the gun, her rattle! and quiver as she settled down, and the hiss of the buffer coming home.</quote>
        <quote>“Normally our old 'B' gun is the pick of the bunch, but the whang she got the day before had put her on edge, and she behaved not nearly as sweetly as usual. Still, we were lucky to have her going at all, for that was more than we thought possible at first. The firing lever slipped occasionally, and No. 3 swore bitterly; the 'bubble' deeper, tricks, ad his curses became deeper, the range-drum jumped at each shot like a nervous maid, and the trail stuck like a mule in the Flanders mud. But when the buffer on the run-up stopped within a few inches of home each time, I, too, felt that language was needed As the rang, lengthened and her nose pointed further skyward the brute got worse, and between sticking trail and sticking buffer, the sweat came down in streams, blinding my eyes and tasting salt to my tongue; but we got there with the last, neither skipped nor lagged behind. Of the two, that last is the greater crime, for a late shot in the lifting barrage often means death to many of our fellows.”</quote>
        <p>The shrapnel of the creeping barrage lashed the appointed line 150 yards in front of the foremost tape except opposite a small re-entrant on the left brigade subsector, where it fell 50 yards westward. At this point, with a long first bound it picked up the rest of the barrage, which then rolled forward slowly in a straight line all along the Dvisional front, lifting 60 yards every 3 minutes with certain pauses up towards the Red Line. The object of the frequent practice barrages had been to mystify the enemy as to the delivery of the actual attack, and it had been calculated that the artillery barrage in itself might riot betray the movement of our infantry. In order, therefore, to preserve the effect of surprise as long as possible, the 3 groups of 60 machine guns detailed for barrage <pb xml:id="n316" n="262"/>work did not open fire with the artillery but waited for 5 minutes. The Germans, however, were not to be deceived. In a few moments their machine gun barrage opened, with special intensity on our left flank. Four minutes after zero a heavy machine gun barrage was placed on the Zonnebeke-Langemarck Road, and a few moments later on the same spot there fell an artillery barrage which tore gapsin the 2nd Wellington lines then crossing it. This barrage remained heavy for some 30 minutes, after which it became more scattered. Throughout the attack the assaulting Battalions were not greatly harassed by hostile artillery fire. In response to variously-colored lights fired from the pillboxes the German guns continually shortened range as our advance progressed. Their barrage, however, was-in-managed and fell always just in real of our leading battalions.</p>
        <p>Meanwhile these units allotted for the capture of the Red Line were pressing 'down towards the reedy channel of the Hanebeek. Each battalion was on a 2-conmpany frontage. They moved in sections in single file covered by a, screen in extended order like beaters. The formation, in itself suitable for dealing with the enemy pillboxes, was also adapted to the nature of the ground, where the little ridges between the lips of the shell-craters provided the sole tracks for advance. The assaulting infantry had not gone more than 200 yards when they came on the first lines of the enemy which were to have carried out the attack anticipated some 10 minutes by our own. Another 200 yards in rear was the second, but both lines had been decimated by our artillery fire. On the 1st Auckland front alone were about 500 corpses, and generally along the whole line every shellhole held 1 to 4 dead Germans, Few wore steel helmets, and only here and there was a bayonet fixed. Some of the survivors fought pluckily with rifle fire, but when it came to bayonet work and close quarters, neither physically nor morally were they a match for their' assailants. In the I. Anzac dressing stations and casualty clearing stations the proportion of prisoners suffering from bayonet wounds was noted as unusua1ly high. The majority of the Germans surrendered readily.</p>
        <p>More determined resistance was offered to the 4th Brigade by the occupants of the pillboxes, whose morale had not suffered from our artillery. Duchy Farm and Riverside were occupied with ease, but about 100 yards from the Hanebeek and the pillboxes about Otto Farm heavy machine gun and rifle fire broke on the advancing lines. These works <pb xml:id="n317" n="263"/>also, however, were ]lot lo give much trouble. As 3rd Auckland rushed forward towards the group of the Farm pillboxes in their sector, the garrison of 15 came out with hands up, leaving 4 dead and 4 machine guns. ln the larger group on the other side of tin; Farm a 3rd Otago party, led with consummate gallantry by Pte. D Mackenzie mopped up 35 prisoners and 4machine guns.</p>
        <p>It was know that the Hanebeek was a quagmire of shell-holes full of water. The barrage had been arranged, therefore, to halt here so as to cover the crossing. As it was, the men picked their way through the shellholes without overmuch difficulty, and the rear. waves coming up and halting here for our curtain of fire to lift suffered somewhat heavily from the enemy barrage which was naturally placed at this spot. More-over, a sickly grey daylight was now in the sky. The leading troops became din targets for the machine guns on the bare terraces of' the Gravenstafel hill, and when the barrage at length lifted, they lost no time in pressing closely (some 40 yards) after it.</p>
        <p>On the right, 3rd Auckland beat down by rifle and Lewis gun fire opposition at pillboxes on the sites of various ruined farms, and captured their garrisons and 3 machine guns. On their left 3rd Otapo pushed past the important works at Van Meulen, leaving then to he dealt with by a specially appointed party, who captured here a machine gun and 50 prisoners. As the battalions made steadily up-hill for the Red line, the shells of our heavier guns and howitzers were now passing high over head on to the reverse slopes, but the 18-pounder fire fell in a sheer unbroken curtain in front. Near the wed, smoke shells, fired by the left hand gun of each batter, fell suddenly amid the shrapnel and continued for 5 minutes. At that pre-arranged signal the infantry-knew that the protective barrage was being formed and that they were on the Red Line. Both battalions reached it up to time-table.</p>
        <p>Here the barrage halted 150 yards in front for an hour, and battalions pushed out strong parties to clear dugouts and pillboxes in their immediate front. The enemy machine gunners and infantry who did not at once surrender were shot. These pillboxes were particularly close to 3rd Auckland, whose parties here captured 8 machine gum. Opposite 3rd Otago the protective barrage was placed beyond Gravenstafel, and n company cleared the pillboxes and other concrete shelters by the ruins and captured 100 prisoners. All the <pb xml:id="n318" n="264"/>forward parties, on completing their mission of clearing the area up to the “Red Protector,” where our covering barrage continued, withdrew to the Red Line to help in the consolidation already under way. 3rd Otago in all captured 200 prisoners and 8 machine guns, and 3rd Auckland a, corresponding number of prisoners and 15 machine guns.</p>
        <p>On the lower slopes northwards and on the flats towards the Stroombeek the 1st Brigade had similarly reached their objective. In this area the battalions detailed for the capture of the first objective were 1st Wellington on the right and 1st Auckland on the left. 1st Wellington, like the two 4th Brigade battalions, had to cross the Hanebeek just before it turned sharply-westwards.</p>
        <p>Beyond the Hanebeelk 1st Auckland diverged, as me shall see, too far north, and the left Wellington company-keeping in touch with them had stiff fighting at the pillboxes at Boetleer, which had resisted the Fifth Army's right wing on 26th September and were now included in the Auckland objectives. The whole brigade front was thus covered by Wellington who, with splendid examples of bravery shown by Capt. J. Keir, Lt. E. L. Malone and 2nd Lt. L, M. Dixon, overcame the resistance offered at Boetleer and elsewhere. Rapid progress was time and again thwarted by German machine guns. Against one, Sergt. K. A. Goldingham bidding one of his men engage the gull with rifle grenades, rushed alone from the flank and bayoneted the crew of 4. Pte. D. Jones, when his company was checked, dashed forward alone under heavy shell-fire slid killed the whole gun crew and other enemy, in all 12 men, single-handed. Pte. T. Geange, a Lewis gunner, whose gun was out of action, was in a section which with another was held up by an enemy machine pun. For a time no one could see its position. At last locating it, Geange rushed forward against the post, armed only with his revolver. His fine example led another man to follow him. Both were wounded, the second man dying later, but their bold action provided a chance for the rest of the section to dash forward, and the gun was immediately captured and the crew killed. By similar gallant feats or 1 the part of individuals and by skilful concerted movements 1st Wellington pushed on steadily to the Red Line, successfully clearing the entire brigade area. On the crest the right company were met by heavy machine gun fire from 2 dugouts in front of the ruins of Korek. These were about 120 yards beyond the Red Line, but it was essential to silence their fire in order to push on consolidation <pb xml:id="n319"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP040a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP040a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP040a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">The ypres Canal</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n320"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP041a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP041a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP041a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Otto Farm</hi><lb/>[<hi rend="i">Photo by Capt. <name type="person" key="name-207718">S. Cory Wright</name></hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP041b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP041b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP041b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">The Capitol</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n321" n="265"/>without interruption. 3rd Otago were similarly inconvenienced, and parties from both battalions, led by Sergt. F. E. Chappell and others, pressed on into our own barrage and rushing towards the pillboxes threw bomb after bomb into the entrances. Of these pillboxes one was of considerable size. It appeared to be full of Germans, and to be a place of importance. The Wellington n.c.o., Cpl. A, Paterson, who captured it, entered its doorway to reconnoiter. The outer chamber was a scene of horror. It literally dripped and ran with the blood of 30 dead Germans who lay mangled and mutilated by our bombs. There was an inner recess where a German officer and some men, most of whom were wounded, had take refuge. Ah Paterson entered, the officer set fire to a mass of papers with some incendiary material. The flames seized the wood-work and fittings, which at once leapt into u blaze. Paterson was forced to withdraw, arid the Germans alive or dead were incinerated. The dugout burned all the morning.</p>
        <p>1st Auckland on the left beyond the Hanebeek were faced from the outset with heavy fighting. Under a blast of machine gun fire from Aviatik Farm and the shellholes the first Line of the attack withered away. Most effective help was given by the light trench mortars. Unfortunately one of these was destroyed early in the morning, but the other, admirably handled, came time after time to the assistance of the infantry. Some 200 yards in front of the tape. Line, at. Dear House and Aviatik farm, were groups of pillboxes. Auckland's right was held up for a few moments by machine gun fire from dear House, but the leading platoon surrounded the pillbox and captured guns and crews. Similarly, after a shower of bombs, Aviatik Farm fell to 2nd Lt. C. F. Sea-ward's platoon, and the successful attackers were able to pick up the barrage before the Red Line.</p>
        <p>In a line with these concrete structures was a further group at Winzig, just off the Auckland front on the extreme right. of the XVIII. Corps. machine guns from here played on Auckland's left and threatened to arrest progress. Partly attracted by the magnetism which fire exerts over brave troops, and with a view to protecting their flank, partly perhaps owing to the confusion in the darkness or to a desire to maintain touch with the troops on the left, themselves swinging towards the north, 1st Auckland gradually diver&amp; on to the front of the 48th Division, where they captured in turn Winzig, Albatross Farm, aid Winchester, with over 200 <pb xml:id="n322" n="266"/>prisoniers, and carried the Red Line in front. The 48th Division troops had suffered heavy casualties under the distant machine gun fire, which also harassed Auckland, from the Bellevue Spur down the Stroombeek valley. They were not at the moment able to fill the line. Auckland therefore stayed where they were. A troublesome machine gun in front, was silenced by the remaining light trench mortar, and the infantry consolidated with their usual rapidity. The original Auckland objective was captured by the left company of 1st Wellington.</p>
        <p>Thus there was for a time a considerable gap in the centre of the Red Line, and the two 1st Wellington companies were faced with the manifestly impossible task of consolidating the whole front. This gap was filled first by the Wellington company in support and later in the day also by the reserve company. By 10 a.m, however, the right Auckland Company had moved into the New Zealand area to already constructed trenches. Along the whole of the Red Line, as soon as the immediate front was cleared, every man worked with a will at consolidation. Down in the Stroom-beek flats 1st Auckland soon struck water, but on the slopes the other battalions found good soil, and by the time that the barrage moved forward, though the line was riot yet connected, the different posts were 4 or 5 fret under cover.</p>
        <p>While this consolidation was in progress, the remaining battalions of the 2 brigades, which with their attached sections of machine guns had left their assembly positions at zero, passed through the Red Line in splendid order and assembled under the barrage on the Red Protector. From south to north this line was formed by 3rd Canterbury and 3rd Wellington in the 4th Brigade area, and 2nd Auckland arid 2nd Wellington on the 1st. Brigade front. Their assembly was; complete a few minutes after 8 a.m. It was their task to develop the advance over Abraham Heights and the continuation of the crest northwards down the eastern slopes, On these they would establish first the intermediate objective (the Blue Dotted Line), and then the final objective: (the Blue Line). The light trench mortars which had co-operated in the attack on the Red Line now joined these battalions, and the machine guns took up positions in front of the Red Line to move with the infantry to the: crest and the Blue Dotted Line, where they could cover our advance down the far slopes by engaging enemy machine guns on the Bellevue Spur over the Ravebeek.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n323" n="267"/>
        <p>At 8.10 a.m. the barrage lifted to move forward by bounds of 50 yards every 4 minutes. It maintained irreproachable density and accuracy. The troops at once met resistance in the shellholes, and as soon as ever the extended wave of beaters crossed the crest, machine gun fire beat against them in a steady driving hail from the main ridge and from Bellevue Spur. A pre-arranged smoke screen was formed by our artillery. Along they commanding positions, and this and the dull light to same extent blinded the Germans' observation, but their machine pulls took a toll of casualties. The hostile artillery fell mostly on the western slopes of the spur and on the Hanebeek valley.</p>
        <p>As the troops pressed down the eastern face towards the Ravebook, centers of resistance had to be overcome all along the line. On the extreme right 3rd Canterbury was held up temporarily by 2 pillboxes in Berlin Wood. These resisted a slap-dash attempt to rush them by bombs, but fell before a little model set-piece attack by 2 platoons. A machine gun and 17 Germans were taken. The total captures of this battalion were 8 machine guns and 86 prisoners. When nearing the crest, 3rd Wellington similarly met obstinate fighting about 2 well-conceaded pillboxes which had not been marked on the map. A frontal assault was frustrated, but 2nd Lt. F. C, Cornwall directed the survivors into 2 parties, which worked from shellhole to shellhole round each Hank and bombed the enemy position from the rear. There was another check for 20 minutes round a group of pillboxes on the site of the farm known as Berlin, but the ubiquitous light trench mortars delivered a short hurricane bombardment, and the place was rushed. On the north side of the Gravenstafel road, a joint attack by 3rd Wellington and 2nd Auckland captured a German Battalion Headquarters in the group of pillboxes at Waterloo which were a work later to witness such tragic scenes. 3rd Wellington secured 8 maachine guns and 150 prisoners. By 9.30 a.m. the moppers-up of both 4th Brigade battalions had cleared all the nests, and their front troops were in full possession of the Blue Dotted and Blue Lines.</p>
        <p>In the 1st Brigade sector 2nd Auckland and 2nd Wellington breasted the slopes at Korek and reached their final objectives with equal punctuality. The former battalion on the right hail to cross an intense machine gun barrage on the lower slopes of the spur and last all its senior officers. The infantry pressed forward through the danger zone as speedily as the barrage would allow, and trench mortar personnel, <pb xml:id="n324" n="268"/>Slinging their weapons like Lewis guns, advanced scarcely less quickly. On the 2nd Auckland front in particular, the one mortar's co-operation with the infantry was again invaluable through the rapidity with which the team came into action and the demoralising effect of their bombs on the German machine gunners.</p>
        <p>On approaching the pillboxes amid the chaotic jumble of brick eaps that had been Korek, our lines were checked by deadly machine gun fire at close range. The Germaus were here in force. Within a few minutes the mortar placed a barrage all round the spot, and the garrison of 80 came out and surrendered. As our screen neared the Blue Line, another enemy machine gun fired short rapid bursts. The mortar dropped a few rounds about it, and the crew came forward with their hands up. Just beyond the objective a third gun came into action. Five rounds were fired at it. The Germans waved a rag in token of surrender the mortar ceased fire., Then the enemy, instead of coming forward, began to run back. A few well-placed shots shepherded them, and they turned and came in. The group of ruins at Calgary Grange fell to a combined attack of Aucklanders and Wellingtons. In their advance 2nd Auckland captured altogether 9 machine guns and 200 prisoners.</p>
        <p>In the low country on the extreme left 2nd Wellington, though troubled by distant machine gun fire, met at first comparatively little fighting. Like 1st Auckland on' the Red Line, but to much lesser extent, 2nd Wellington also encroached on the XVIII. Corps front, but the 3 platoons which so erred were, on their arrival at the Blue Line, at once brought across to the New Zealand area. Only when the Wellington screen was approaching the Stroombeek did they encounter signs that their further progress would be obstinately resisted. On the far bank the featureless waste was broken by a group cofindefined concrete blockhouses well hidden in the ruins of Kronprinz Farm. They were covered by a wired trench in front, ad here the Germans defended themselves with resolution. The platoon commander was wounded, bat under the same Sergt. Foot, who had distinguished himself at Basseville<note xml:id="fn124-268" n="1"><p>p 238.</p></note> and whose work now won a bar to his D.C.M., our men gradually forced their way nearer and nearer, and at length rose with a: ell anti went in with the bayonet. Not less than 7 machine guns arid 39 prisoners were captured here, and the saps were left full of dead.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n325" n="269"/>
        <p>Marked gallantry won D.C.M.s for Sergts. M Ward and C. E. Meazies. The one led his company forward with splendid leadership after all the company officers had become casualties. The other was a Lewis gun sergeant. Wounded early in the day he refused to withdraw, During consolidation he placed a captured machine gun in position, visiting his men under heavy machine gun fire and himself kept in action one of his guns when its crew were destroyed.</p>
        <p>The dugouts at Kronprinz Farm had formed a battalion headquarters, and the papers and plans captured in the orderly room-yielded valuable information. The total captures claimed by 2nd Wellington were 10 machine guns and 213 prisoners.</p>
        <p>At Kronprinz Farm the left flank of the Division was joined by the 48th Division, whose line northwards fell somewhat short of the final objective. On the right flank, the 3rd Australians after severe fighting had seized the whole of their Blue Line well up to schedule time. Observers in the contact aeroplanes, patrolling with great difficulty in the high wind and rain, marked on their map the line of our red flares all along the II. Anzac objective.</p>
        <p>To cover the consolidation the various barrages continued for varying periods after the capture of the Blue Line. The shrapnel curtain fell 200 yards in front on the Ravebeek and on the road which ran along its valley at the foot of the Bellevue Spur past the ruins of Peter Pan and Yetta Houses, towards Adler Farm. 200 yards further on, our 4.5-in. howitzers and some 18-ponders bombarded the trench elements along the lower. slope which were swept also by our machine guns. The 6-in. howitzers' line was 800 yards, and that of the heavier pieces, 8-in. and 9.2-in. howitzers and 60-ponders, 1000 yards away from the Blue Line, on the pillboxes on the top of Bellevue Spur. The smoke screen was similarly retained for nearly 2 hours. The heavier and more distinct barrages remained stationary for a quarter of an hour and then progressed along the eastern slopes of Bellevue Spur for 45 minutes, reopening fire later at definite times and for definite periods. The machine pun barrage ceased as the howitzers lifted, but the near shrapnel curtain maintained its protection for a further period of 3 hours, when it also gradually died away.</p>
        <p>By that time not only the troops oil the Red, but those also on the Blue Line were under cover. Our foremost trenches were not greatly harassed by enemy artillery, which <pb xml:id="n326" n="270"/>played rather on the reverse slopes of the Gravenstafel Spur and on the batteries. The 1st Artillery Brigade guns in particular were severely punished, 5 being put out of action. Throughout the day our batteries were also shelled by a high-velocity naval gun which did considerable damage and inflicted many casualties. On the forward slopes it was the activity of the enemy's snipers and machine guns which accelerated the task of consolidation. The Bellevue Spur pillboxes looked clown commandingly across the whole valley back to Korek. The Blue Line was constructed like the Red as a continuous trench and not merely as a line of posts. It was consolidated and held in such a manner and in such strength as to ensure the repulse of counter-attacks before it, and to secure a good starting-point for the next stage of our attack. 300 yards in rear of the Blue Line on the forward slopes beyond the crest, a line of shellhole posts was constructed on the' Blue Dotted Line which would gradually be connected and act as support positions. On this line some battalions had kept their leading companies leap-frogging the supporting companies through to the Blue; others, having made both it and the Blue successive objectives for the same troops, occupied it with their reserves. Behind the crest the Red Line, with a fine field of fire along its length, was now continuous and capable of a stout defense as a reserve position. As soon as the Blue Line battalions had passed through them, parties of 1st Wellington commenced communication trenches forward over the crest. With the additional task of consolidating the Red Line on 1st Auckland's front, they were unable at the time to accomplish much. By dusk, however, the garrisons of both Red and Blue Lines in particular could he well satisfied with their positions. Between the 3 lines, posts were arranged chequerwise at suitable places.</p>
        <p>The Battle of Broodseinde was a signal success for the British arms. It is true that the Armies' objectives were not fully secured, aid that certain portions of the ground won as at Polderhoek Chateau on the extreme right flank of the attack, were regained by German counter-strokes. It was, too, a disappointment that the plans formed for immediate exploitation of our success had to be abandoned, owing to a check on the Fifth Army's left, though it appears doubtful whether much further progress would have been actually realised. It was in conformity with these plans that 2nd <pb xml:id="n327" n="271"/>Wellington pushed out towards Adler Farm and established posts which were later withdrawn. On the other hand, in the centre of the Second Army front, General Bird-wood's Australians and some British troops had thrust the line well over the main Passchendaele-Broodseindec ridge, 9000 yards of which were now held in front of Noordemdhoek Molenaar-elsthoek and Broodseinde Unusually heavy casualties had been inflicted on the enemy, and over 5000 prisoilers captured.</p>
        <p>Of these the New Zealand Division provided no less than 1159, draw from 4 different Divisions,<note xml:id="fn125-271" n="1"><p>The majority of these were from the 20th Gorman Division, which this day lost two thirds of its effectives. This Division included the notories 77th Infantry Regiment, which in 1914 was responsible for the atrocities at Malines: see also p. 367.</p></note> In the day's operations it captured also 60 machine guns and a large quantity of war material, which included some maps and documents of the highest value for our Intelligence Staff'. The Gravenstafel Spur gave excellent observation on to the north end of the Passchendaele Ridge and formed a strong buttress on which to bend the line back from the ridge, should the General Staff consider it advisable to break off the battle. The first essay in the new methods of warfare went even more smoothly than was expected, and the value of the training at Lumbres was proved.</p>
        <p>Though heavy, the price paid for these successes could not, in view of the magnitude of the results, be regarded as excessive. The 1st Brigade lost 12 officers and 180 men killed, with 700 other casualties. 1st Auckland paid severely for trespassing into the Stroombeek valley and under machine gun fire from Yetta Houses suffered more heavily than the other battalions. By the time of their relief 7 officers, including Major A. G. Mahan, were killed and 4 wounded; over 50 other ranks were killed and 200 wounded. In the 4th Brigade over 600 had been wounded; 10 officers and 120 men had hen killed. The severest losses in the brigade had fallen on 3rd Wellington. The artillery had come off cheap, losing 2 officers and 6 men killed and 4 officers and 19 men wounded.</p>
        <p>Two reasons accounted for the heavy German casualties. In the first place, captured documents showed that the High Command had reviewed their new policy of elastic defense, which had been practised throughout the whole of the Ypres operations, and condemned it as not merely costly and entailing an enormous strain on reserves, but also tactically unsatisfactory. They had revolved to revert to their former principle of holding the front line in strength with not less <pb xml:id="n328" n="272"/>than half a regiment in the foremost trenches in its sector. In some units on the battlefield this plan had actually been put into practice. In the second place, our artillery fell with dire havoc among the unprotected troops lying in assembly for the attack which our own assault anticipated by so brief an interval. Prisoners differed as to whether the exact time fixed was 6.10 or 6.20 a.m., but all accounts agree that the enemy forces were deployed on their lines ready to advance when our barrage fell on them and annihilated them.</p>
        <p>The coincidence of the 2 attacks, the enemy's losses, and the successful British advance entailed confusion in his plans and a disorganisation both among his artillery and infantry which ensured quiescence for the next few days. His shelling was continued, but was light and scattered. All along the Second Army front, in different local counter-attacks, the lack of cohesion, no less than the mixture of units for thickening up the line, clearly betrayed his straits.</p>
        <p>No grand counter-attack developed on the New Zealand front. Some isolated attempts were indeed made, but on receipt of early warning, given by S.O.S. signals or the long blown streamers of the smoke bombs dropped by our special counter-attack aeroplane, were at once checked by our artillery. Thus, shortly after midday on 4th October, some 200 of the enemy assaulted east of Kronprinz Farm. The '2nd Wellington sentries fired the red-over-green-over-yellow S.O.S. rockets, and our batteries smote the attack ere it developed. About 4.30 p.m., again, enemy advancing from Passchendaele were scattered by our artillery and machine gun barrage. To provide against eventualities the reserve company was moved forward, and 1st Otago was brought up to near the brigade headquarters in Capricorn Keep. Later in the afternoon about 300 enemy were seen assembling in shellhole positions at Peter Pan and along the lower slopes of Bellevue. The artillery barrage invoked could not have been placed more happily. It smashed up the attack completely. The 2nd Auckland sentries on the Blue Line could observe the dead lying where they fell and the wounded crawling laboriously back up the hill. Further small attacks after dark were repulsed with artillery, machine gun, Lewis gun, and rifle fire, and served only to swell the enemy's-casualty roll.</p>
        <p>Dry weather had prevailed during the earlier part of the day, and the evacuation of wounded proceeded smoothly. Early in the afternoon, however, heavy rain set in and <pb xml:id="n329" n="273"/>speedily converted the whole area into a quaking morass. It had not been found possible to push the dumps as far forward as had been intended. Over the almost impassable surface the mules became bogged, and one was actually-drowned in the Hanebeek. The labours of the carrying parties were correspondingly aggravated. Under these disadvantages the last of our wounded, with a few exceptions still in the aid posts, were carried back to the dressing stations, aid food and munitions were brought to the wet, tired, muddied but cheerful men in front. The movement forward of guns and heavy material proved of surpassing difficulty. At the earliest possible moment the Engineers and Pioneers were set to work on the construction of a tramway system, the repair of the Gravenstafel road, the lying of mule tracks, and the extension of duckboard tracks for the infantry. It was necessary, too, to provide landmarks in the featureless waste of mud and shellholes. Every 25 yards a line of posts painted white on our side blazed the track beyond the point whew the duckboards ended, and notice-boat&amp;, giving the names of all farm sites and places of importance shown on map, were to prove invaluable. Throughout the night rain fell intermittently. Without opposition the infantry patrolled the miasmatic pools of the Ravebeek and Stroombeek and the ruins of Fleet Cottage.</p>
        <p>The 5th dawned grey and dismal, and chilly rain fell all but continuously during the day. The mud and water in the forward trenches reached almost to the men's knew. The enemy's artillery activity was desultory, and evidence pointed strongly to a withdrawal of his guns as a result of our advance or county-battery work. On the Bellevue Spur stretcher-bearers with a Red Cross fag were moving about the saps collecting their casualties.</p>
        <p>Advantage was taken of this quietness to complete the dispositions of our forward troops, arranged with a view to minimising losses, ensuring depth of defense and facilitating the approaching relief by the 49th Division. Troops from the Blue took over the Red Line, and the bulk of the support battalions, thus relieved, consolidate new positions further in rear. The 1st Auckland d companies still in the XVIII. Corps area moved back hi the late evening (5th Octobers) to behind 2nd Auckland on the Red Line. Shortly after-wards a brigade of the 49th Division came to relieve both forward brigades on the New Zealand sector. That evening the 2nd Brigade traveled back by lorries to the Winnezeele <pb xml:id="n330" n="274"/>area beyond Watou The 1st and 4th Brigades on completing their relief moved to the old British and German front line and thence on 6th October to the northern outskirts of Ypres. On the latter date the 4th Brigade left by lorries for the reserve area at Eeeke. The 1st Brigade remained in the battle area, with headquarters at Poperinghe, to take over from the Rifle Brigade the duties of the working brigade engaged under Corps control. On the 6th the command of the sector passed to the incoming Division, and General Russell's Headquarters moved back to Watou. The artillery remained in the line, and the New Zealand C.R.A. continued to command the field artillery on the 49th Divisional front. The Engineers Pionerrs and various medical unit were also left under the G.O.C. 49th Division. At the same time in the southern half of the Corps sector the 3rd, Australians made may for the 66th Division.</p>
        <p>Long ere now 'it had become but too clear that the strategic aims of the Ypres offensive mere incapable of realisation. Delayed at the outset, the Allied attack had encountered improved methods of resistance ably planned and practised hp a brave and skilful enemy and, above all, had been attended by uniformly unfavorable weather, which making each blow disjointed neutralised the finest qualities of the attacking armies. It was already a matter of uncertainty whether even the completion of the immediate tactical objective, the capture of the remainder of the ridge, would be possible before winter put a stop to operations. Added to these difficulties in the field, general policy was thrown out of par by one of those divergent plans which, receiving sanction in high quarters, periodically allured optimistic minds with its promise of rapid victory. It was now seriously contemplated to weaken the Franco-British sector by the despatch of troops for the purpose of exploiting the Italian success against Austria. Even after this scheme was hamstrung, the whole question of preserving an aggressive policy at Ypres had gravely to he weighed. Continuance of wet weather would make the task gigantic, and the German reserves released from Russia were accumulating beyond the Rhine. It was possible now for <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name> to break off the battle in a fairly r-satisfactory position. On the other hand, the continuance of pressure in the north would assist the forthcoming French blow on the Aisne. The capture of the ridge would to some extent tranquilise public opinion, <pb xml:id="n331"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP042a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP042a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP042a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Bogged</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP042b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP042b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP042b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Field Guns in Shellholes</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n332"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP043a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP043a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP043a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Funeral of Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-208407">G. A. King</name></hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP043b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP043b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP043b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">An Anti-tank Gun</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n333" n="275"/>Secure the position already won, rob the enemy of his observation over. Our lines and gun positions, and yield a fuller command over the German country about Roulers and Thourout. Moreover, the enemy losses had been severe. Indications pointed to a sensible decline in his morale. For the moment his artillery was considerably disorganised.</p>
        <p>In the end it was decided to persevere aid deliver the nest blow 9th October. The state of confusion in the enemy forces appeared to offer a considerable chance of exploitation of success. Arrangements were therefore made for the concentration of cavalry, including the I. and II. Anzac Mounted Regiments, in forward areas, and for the rapid entrainment of 1ightly equipped infantry brigades of reserve Divisions, should an opportunity occur for pursuit. this connection certain of the New Zealand troops in the reserve area moved to positions of closer proximity to the railway, and the Corps Staff prepared a timetable for 2 brigades of the New Zealanders and of the 3rd Australians, which would enable them to be entrained at short notice and detrained at Hell Fire Comer east of Ypres to press the German retreat.</p>
        <p>But from 5th October the weather continued unfavorable, hindering dike the work of consolidation and the advance of the guns, and making the ground still more unsuitable for movement. The exploitation scheme. was cancelled and in stead a further deliberate stroke was ordered forth 12th. On the II., Anzac front this would be delivered as on the 4th by the 3rd Australians and the New Zealanders who relieve the 66th and 49th Divisions after their. attack on the 9th. For the New Zealand attack General Russell selected the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, the latter of whom had, as has been noted, handed over its tasks under the Corps Engineers to the 1st Brigade. The 4th Brigade would be used as Divisional reserve.</p>
        <p>The main purpose of the attack deliver on the 9th was to swing up the Allied left. In the extreme north the French anti the British XIV. Corps carried all before them up to their final objectives in the outskirts of the Houthoulst Forest, and the line was driven well eastwards north of Poelcapelle. South of that point success was considerably less marked. The XVIII. Corps on the left of II. Anzac made little progress. South of the railway I. Anzac, who formed the pivot of the main attack, captured Nieuwemolen and their first objective on the main ridge. On the Anzac front the objective of the 66th <pb xml:id="n334" n="276"/>and 49th Divisions had been the Bellevue Spur and the high ground that lay opposite Bellevue, south of the Ravebeek. Part of the troops, delayed by the miserable conditions of a 4-mile march through quagmires in rain and inky-black darkness, did not reach their assembly in time. The 66th Division on the right carried Keerselaarhoek and made good progress, but becoming exposed to enfilade fire from Bellevue, which the 49th did not succeed in capturing, were ultimately obliged to fall back. In the evening the troops lay on their first objective some 500 yards in advance of their starting point. The southern Division's right rested on the railway east of Keerselaarhoek on the lower slope5: of the main ridge. Thence the position ran north past a mutilated copse, known as Augustus wood, down the slope to the Ravebeek. The 49th Division met them in the valley at Marsh Bottom and continued the line along the bottom of the Bellevue slopes above the Ravebeek just beyond the farm ruins at Peter hi and Yetta Houses to the XVIII. Corps boundary east of Adler Farm. Small pockets mere established further up the Bellevue slopes on the western edge of Wolf Copse, Wolf Farm and a cemetery on the northern boundary. Casualties had been heavy, and conditions imposed extreme hardship.</p>
        <p>The relief, if it could be called a relief, of the exhausted troops began on 10th October. The 3rd Australians moved into the right sector, and the New Zealanders, filing over the Gravenstafel ridge, crossed the Ravebeek-Stroombeek valley to the general line Marsh Bottom—Peter Pan—Yetta Houses. Somewhat severe shelling was experienced on the march-up. One or two advanced posts of the 49th Division lay only 150 yards from the German lilies on Bellevue Spur, but in view of the forthcoming attack and the necessary barrage arrangements, no advantage was to be gained by taking over a series of isolated half-determined posts on the heights. As it was, the front line was much confused, and the 4th Rifles, for instance, relieved elements of no less than 6 battalions. The 2nd Brigade took over the right subsector, establishing their headquarters at the Capitol, a redoubt west of the Hanebeek valley. The Rifle Brigade in the left subsector made their headquarters well forward at Korek. Each brigade was disposed in great depth on a 1-battalion frontage. 2nd Otago, with 2 companies of 2nd Canterbury, held the 2nd Brigade front, and the 4th Rifles the northern area. The command of the whole Divisional sector passed on the following <pb xml:id="n335" n="277"/>morning (11th October), and Divisional Headquarte took up their former position on the Yser Canal. Engineers Pioneers and medical units together with the artillery of the outgoing Division remained in the line, and an infantry brigade was placed at General Russell's disposal pending the arrival of the reserve (4th) New Zealand brigade.</p>
        <p>In the artillery preparation for the attack on the 12th the prominent factors were intense counter-battery work and the so-called "isolating" fire directed on advanced enemy Strong Points. As the German artillery constantly shifted their positions, no effort was spared first to locate active batteries in the morning, and then to destroy them in the afternoon. The enemy's communication trenches were blocked by knocking in lenghts of 10 yards. It was necessary to bombard by heavy artillery his wire entanglements, machine gun emplacements, pillboxes, telephone exchanges and observation posts, but it is interesting to note a growing insistence, at this time, on the principle that terrain should not he reduced to such crater condition as might unduly hamper our movement and communication after the attack. Practice assault barrages were fired, and series of shrapnel and gas barrages, preceded by high-explosive storms, were passed over the hostile shellhole system and dugouts for the purpose of inflicting losses and reducing morale. Bivouacs hutments and likely places of assembly were bombarded by day and night with sudden short violent bursts of concentrated fire.</p>
        <p>The fulfillment of all these tasks demanded enormous supplies of ammunition. In the case of the majority of the gun positions, the state of the forward roads was such as to preclude the use of mechanical transport. Pack animals were largely employed. Conditions were so adverse that the Staff sanctioned and gave authority for a reduction of rates of fire, should the task of replenishing dumps be found insoluble. Rut the artillery, knowing how much the infantry depended on their efforts, worked with an energy and enthusiasm to which no finer tribute can be paid than the mere statement of the for that no pun had to diminish its rate of fire for shortage of ammunition.</p>
        <p>Even more serious, however, than the ammunition question was the problem of moving the guns forward. A gun was considered to be in action when it was prepared to open fire on S.O.S. lines either by map or registration, and had 200 rounds dumped at its position. It was now laid down <pb xml:id="n336" n="278"/>that not more one third of the guns should be out of action at any one time, owing to moving forward; and in the shortness of the time available, this provision, should in itself, added to the gunners' position were prepared beforehand, mid ammunition was taken forward and protected from the rain During the night 9th/10th October one or two sections were hauled forward with the utmost difficulty It took 5 hours of daylight on the 10th to bring forward a single gun of the 1st Battery and another of the. 13th. In the afternoon 2 howitzers of the 15th were bogged beyond St. Julien and the teams and men trying to extricate them were subjected to heavy shelling. The locality was bombarded through, the night, and coming forward again before draw on the 11th the gunners found the road blocked with dead horses, dead men and destroyed vehicles,. By almost superhuman efforts the howitzers were dragged to the new pit by 7.30 a.m., and by the afternoon eight 18-pounders and 4.5-in. howitzers were well forward, but with a lamentable deficiency of stable platforms. The heavies were faced with even greater difficulties.</p>
        <p>The object of the Forthcoming attack on 12th October was to renew and extend the effort of the 9th. The Fifth Army would again push forward on the left of the battle front. The whole of the Second Amy attack would he delivered by Australians and NewZealanders Its aim was to strengthen our hold on the mail ridge by-the capture of Passchendaele village and of the Goudberg Spur to the north. The main attack on the Second Army front would be carried out by II. Anzac. As their northern flank would be safeguarded by the XVIII. Corps advancing some 2000 yards, so on the south a brigade of I. Anzac would secure their right by connecting the new line with the positions already won over the crest of the main ridge southwards. The II. Anzac plan allotted the capture of Passchendaele to the 3rd Australians and that of the Goudberg Spur to the New Zealanders the furtbest depth of advance was some 2500 yards. On the New Zealand sector each brigade frontage was about 750 yards. Each of the 2 attacking brigades was given full disposal of its machine gun company. The other 3 companies; were employed for barrage work. The artillery and machine gun barrages were arranged or lines similar to those adopted on the 4th the and the artillery received instruction to be prepared to move batteries forward, after the final objective was gained, with a view to barraging the enemy,'s country from 1000 to <pb xml:id="n337" n="279"/>2000 yards beyond Passchendaele. The Division had the direct support of a hundred and forty-four 18-pounders and forty-eight 4.5in. howitzers.</p>
        <p>Owing to the failure on the 9th the Divisional plans previously drawn up had to be largely recast. The shortness of the time available for preparations and reconnaissance, and the indefiniteness of the information obtained from the relieved Division added to the Staff's difficulties. Hurried measures had to be taken for the selection of headquarters: md medical posts and station, the extinction of signal communication, planked roadway and duckboard tracks, the bridging of streams ad morasses, and the taping of approach routes. In particular, there was insufficient time to deal with the fields of barbed wire on the Bellevue Spur. Their formidable nature was even now insufficiently realised by the outgoing Division. The trenches themselves, forming part of the once strong Zonnebeke-Staden line, had been destroyed by. our artillery., but since the 9th the entanglements, especially round the Strong Points and pi11boxes, had been assiduously strengthened They were closely reconnoitered on the night of the relief (l0th/llth October) by a 2nd Otngo patrol under Sergt. Travis and their strength could be gauged from the Gravenstafel ridge. The 2nd Infantry Brigade Head-quarters secured some assistance from the heavy artillery, but the damage done was small. For all these reasons a postponement of the attack would have been welcomed, but the decision did not rest with the Division or with the Corps. The Army's orders had been issued, and Divisions were but pawns in the tremendous game played over these Flanders swamps and ridges.</p>
        <p>In the early morning of the 11th the enemy artillery shelled the forward areas with some intensity.<note xml:id="fn126-279" n="1"><p>Among the killed was Major <name type="person" key="name-416667">W. H. Meddings</name>, N.Z.S.C., 2nd Canterbury.</p></note> Thereafter the day passed quietly enough. Final conferences were held, and liaison was established with the 3rd Australians on the right and with the 9th Division (XVIII. Corps) on the left. Every possible effort also was made to clear the forward aim of the British wounded who had fallen on the 9th and still lay famished and untended on the battlefield. Their stretcher cases crowded the regimental aid posts. Many more lay in the shellholes in front. All wounded found were fed, and as far as preparations for the attack could permit were carried back to the dressing stations. Those that could not be brought back were dressed in the muddy shellholes. On the morning <pb xml:id="n338" n="280"/>of the 12th many of these unfortunate men were still lying upon the battlefield, and not a few had meantime died of exposure in the wet arid cold weather.</p>
        <p>The forming-up lines were taped well in rear of our posts to ensure that the leading waves should start level and in line with the 9th Division troops on their left, and that the creeping barrage should open on all points held by the enemy close to our positions. The principles that governed the siting of the foremost tape line were, on the one hand, that it should be not less than 150 bards from the opening barrage line, and on the other, not more than would allow the infantry to close up under the barrage before it lifted. In the evening (11th October) the 4th Brigade detrained at Ypres and relieved the reserve brigade of the 49th Division, placing its 2 foremost battalions in the old British and German front lines on either side of the Wieltjc-Gravenstafel road.</p>
        <p>The afternoon and evening of the 11th were cold and bleak. The skies were an unrelieved grey, and the desolate landscape of mud, marsh, shellholes and bald ridge took on an even more inhospitable and forbidding appearance. At dusk the assaulting brigades struggled up to their positions. Shelling was normal, and the troops were spared the gas which incommoded the Australians, but the ground, respecial1y in the valleys, was extremely heavy and in many places flooded. At every-step men sank over their ankles and frequently up to their knees the mud. It was not difficult to understand horn the English troops on the 9th had failed to reach their positions in time. In such country, even on prepared tracks, a mile an hour was good progress for formed troops, but over the mud of the forward area it was necessary to allow a period of 4 hours for each mile. At 2 a.m. a drizzle started and added to their discomfort. Five crossings made of cocoa-nut matting had been laid over the Ravebeek by the 1st Field Company of the New Zealand Engineers. Much assisted by these, the leading troops reached their positions well up to time, with the second battalion closed up on the heels of the leading one on the eastern bank.</p>
        <p>In an attack on a comparatively narrow front, experience had shown the advantages of giving each of a series of objectives to a single battalion. This principle was now adhered to. On the north, from front to rear, the Rifle Brigade battalions were the 4th the 2nd<note xml:id="fn127-280" n="1"><p>Capt. W. G. Bishop, vice Lt.-Col. Pow, "B" Teams.</p></note> the 3rd and the 1st. The 2nd Battalion was to seize the first objective (the Red Line) <pb xml:id="n339" n="281"/>beyond the Bellevue. defences; the 3rd Battalion the next objective (the Blue Line.) at the point where the spur abutted on the main ridge, from the Ravebeek on the south over to the upper valley of the Paddebeek on the north; and the 1st Battalion the final objectives (the Green Dotted and Green Lines) on the Goudberg Spur. The 4th Battalion, holding the line, was marked as brigade reserve and, by a somewhat unusual manoeuver, was follow each assaulting battalion to its goal. Eventual1y it, was intended to form a support in rear of the final objective: and assist in swashing a counter-attack.</p>
        <p>The 2nd Brigade on the right aimed equally at taking each objective with 1 battalion and leap-frogging the next through, but adopted a different of its reserve The leading battalion 2nd otago would be used to carry the Red line; the next, lst Otago. would pass through them to the Blue Line; and leap-frogging them in turn would come 1st Canterbury charged with the capture.of the final objective. 1st Canterbury was strengthened by 1 company of the reserve battalion,2nd Canterbury. Of the other 2nd Canterbury companies, 2 were temporarily lent to 2nd Otago and 1 to 1st Otago as local reserves These 3 companies, however, were to be employed only in the went of necessity, aid it was intended that on the Otago battalions' taking their objectives the should pass again under Lt.-Col. Mead's orders and consolidate a line about Meetcheele. There they would help 1st Canterbury to break up any counter-attack on the 2nd Brigade front, or, if necessary, support the Australians with 1 company in the capture of Passchendaele.</p>
        <p>The Rifle Brigade had benefited neither by the training nor rest which had fallen to the others at Lumbers. For the last 6 weeks it had been constantly exposed to shell-fire, to marches averaging 7 miles a day, and to the arduous conditions accompanying night work in forward areas. After digging over 50,000 yards of cable 7 feet deep, they were not in a state to make a sustained effort or to undergo a prolonged strain. The 2nd Brigade were considerably fresher. Nevertheless it was remembered afterwards that the feeling of buoyant confidence, which usually inspired the New Zealanders on the eve of an attack, was on this occasion lower pitched. They were insensibly affected by their exposure to miserable weather in undrained shellholes, the <pb xml:id="n340" n="282"/>sight of the unbroken wire, and the knowledge of the previous failure. None the less, every man steeled his heart and, checking dispiriting speculation, grimly determined to do his duty.</p>
        <p>Winter time had been introduced on 8th October, arid the zero hour for the next action of the battle on Fridays, 12th October, was 5.25 a.m. Throughout the night the enemy's. nervousness and apprehension of an attack had been shown by a multitude of flares, and about 5 a.m. he opened a fairly heavy bombardment of the assembly area, occasioning unfortune casualties. It was a particularly unkind blow of fortune that these were heavy in the Stokes trench mortar personnel, and that the small amount of ammunition which it had beem found possible to bring forward was now destroyed. As the troops waited under the rain, there were few whose: thought in these last moment did not revert to the barbed wire and the pillboxes, and whose prayers were not fervent for an overwhelming barrage, sufficient of itself to blast a passage through the thicket of wire, or to spread such an efficient shield before them that they could cut their way through by hand with the minimum of aimed hostile fire.</p>
        <p>But when at length the guns opened, it was at once apparent that the infantry must rely on their own efforts. Faced by insuperable difficulties a not inconsiderable proportion of the artillery had been unable to each forward positions. Other guns had been knocked out by the enemy's, artillery, and time had not permitted of their being replaced<note xml:id="fn128-282" n="1"><p>On the 11th the C.R.A. had reported that effective artillery support could not be depended upon.</p></note> The general absence of stable platforms and the oozy morass of the guns' positions, into which the trails sank after a few rounds, effected their accuracy, and the consequent necessity of frequent relaying diminished the density of the fire. Not only was the barrage weak and "patchy," but there was a limited amount of short shooting, which was scarcely avoidable under the circumstances and which fell as far back as cur support lines. As the barrage moved up the hill towards the pillboxes, where above all it was vital to increase in strength, it became on the contrary still more ragged and could 11srdly be distinguished at all by the observers at Korek. On the Bellevue Spur the howitzers flung their projectiles in profusion, but without that shattering destruetiveness which it was their function to accomplish, for in the semi-liquid mud a large proportion of the shells buried <choice><orig>them-<pb xml:id="n341" n="283"/>selves</orig><reg>themselves</reg></choice> deep, failing to explode, or on explosion serldiling up harmless geysers that added mud showers to the descending rain.</p>
        <p>As soon as the British guns opened, the enemy artillery-fell again, without marked increase, on the forward assembly lines and back to Waterloo. On the western slopes of Graven-stafel it was somewhat heavier, and the rear battalions suffered. Much more serious to the leading troops were the enemy machine gun barrages which their crews, effectively protected against our weak artillery fire, placed forthwith along the front of the hillside. In addition to these barrages the upper valley of the Ravebeek was swept by fire from the trenches by Crest Farm oil the main ridge in front of Passechendaele The hill slopes were also covered by immediately effective enfilade fire from the Source Trench system which continued the Bellevue defences northwards on the high ground into the XVIII. Corps area. Special evidence is given of the admirable order. alignment distances anti intervals, in which the assaulting battalions, despite the fire and the nature of the shell-torn country, advanced to the attack. Men dropped steadily, but at the outset the progress was satisfactory. Shortly after leaving the starting point, part of the 2nd Rifles were held up by an enemy Strong Point, but a gallant act by C.S.M. J. W. Voyle, who unaccompanied worked to the flank and killing 3 Germans captured 2 and a machine gun, enable the advance to proceed. The first wounded brought back word that all was going well.</p>
        <p>About 6 a.m. a strong wind set up, and the drizzle turned to heavy rain which, after a brief respite in the morning, was to fall continuously throughout the day and add to the miseries of defeat and wounds. Owing to this heavy rain and mist. observation from the rear was difficult even after full daylight. As the leading riflemen drew further up the lower slopes, the intensity of the machine gun fire grew heavier. On these cratered and sodden hillside.: a quick rush forward or a charge at the deadly guns was utterly impossible. Under the stream of lead the attack must either he wiped out or effect slow progress by bounds from shellhole to shellhole The number of machine guns the pillboxes along the crest seemed tom be reinforced and particular severe grazing fire was directed at the Rifles from a forward position half-way up the ridge opposite the 2nd Brigade on the right.</p>
        <p>As the pace slackened and the forward ranks grew thinner, the rear battalions pressed up to fill the gaps in front of them. <pb xml:id="n342" n="284"/>Thus the storming line was no longer composed of the original battalion but received accretions from the troops following. The different units became speedily intermingled, and it was a composite party of the 2nd 3rd and 4th Rifles, together with some Scotsmen of the 9th Division, that Sergt. A. K. Coley of the 4th Battalion led to the capture of the cemetery on the extreme left. Here, after stark fighting, the party killed 20 Germans and captured 3 prisoners and 3 machine guns. They dug themselves in on this position, of great tactical importance for both Divisions, and established posts 150 yards eastwards.</p>
        <p>In the centre also of the Rifle Brigade attack, elements penetrated beyond Wolf Farm and to the edge of Wolf Copse. Parties of Germans could now he seen retreating without arms over the sky line. The machine gun fire, however, so far from slackening, accentuated as our barrage passed beyond the crest, and all attempts to force a way through the wire instantly brought down annihilating fire from the inaccessible pillboxes beyond. No better fortune appeared to attend the 2nd Brigade on the right struggling up from Marsh Bottom, for in the pillbox which raked their own advance the riflemen could observe a strong party of Germans firing at the Otago men in the wire about the Gravenstafel road.</p>
        <p>The Rifles' casualties were already heavy. In the 3rd Battalion, Lt.-Col. Winter-Evans and practically the whole of his Headquarters had fallen. About 8 a.m. Lt.-Col. Puttick arrived at Wolf Farm. Grasping the situation, he ordered the troops of the 3 leading battalions to dig in. The 1st Battalion was not yet engaged, but where the others had failed it was thought costly and futile to throw it in also. When it should come up, it would be better policy for it to dig a support position in rear. From 9 a.m. the enemy infantry regained courage, and during the rest of the morning formed parties, some with light machine guns, were observed advancing back over the crest all along the ridge. These were discerned also by the artillery and infantry observers at Korek, and gun fire directed on them. Two enemy machine guns were planted on the roofs of the pillboxes on the summit, and many men were visible both on the top of the concrete and in the neighbouring saps.</p>
        <p>Any movement on the unsheltered face of the hill brought instant and deadly fire, and the Rifle battalions sustained further severe losses as they dug themselves in among the <pb xml:id="n343"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP044a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP044a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP044a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">The Runner</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP044b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP044b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP044b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Signallers laying Wire from Brigade H. Q.</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n344"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP045a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP045a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP045a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Ypres</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP045b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP045b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP045b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">A Pillbox</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n345" n="285"/>shellholes from the cemetery along the hillside down towards Marsh Bottom. On their right, between them and the 2nd Brigade, there had been from the outset a gap, due partly to flooded and impassable marshes, partly to an effort to swing past or outflank a pillbox. Into this gap Puttick had pushed 2 of his platoons with a view to bringing Lewis gun and rifle fire on the enemy machine guns which harassed the 2nd Brigade. Their action lessened the intensity of the German fire but could not develop sufficient volume to silence it and allow the Otago infantry to advance. Nor were their numbers adequate to bridge the full extent of the gap. Over the whole front, indeed, it was doubtful if the Rifles' line mustered now more than 500 bayonets. As they scrambled from crater to crater, splashed by shell-bursts and floundering over the slippery and treacherous slope, the semi-liquid mud had not merely plastered the troops from head to foot, but had also clogged rifles and Lewis guns. Now that they were checked, their first thought was to clean their weapons and render then serviceable to meet a counter-attack or kill any of the enemy that exposed themselves in the crest saps.</p>
        <p>The 1st Battalion, meantime, unconscious that the leading troops were held up, crossed the Stroombeek under distant snipers' fire. As they approached the Peter Pan—Yetta Houses line, molestation from snipers and machine gun fire became acute, and it was obvious that all was not well in front. On finding the 3 leading battalions arrested, they dug, as Puttick suggested, a support line 150 yards in rear of the road which ran from Wolf Farm to the cemetery.</p>
        <p>Astride the Gravenstafel road and in Marsh Bottom the 2nd Brigade, after heroic efforts, were similarly baffled. 2nd Otago had speedily found that the enemy was holding his front system in considerable strength. Under a torrent of rifle and machine gun fire they pressed on to the entanglements. They found them here 25 yards, here 50 yards wide, and altogether unbreached. Only where the sunken Gravenstafel road ran up the hill was there a lane. It proved a veritable lane of death, for the men who, on seeing their comrades foiled by the wire barrier, made in desperation and knowledge of their peril for the open passage on the road, were one and all mown down by the cunningly-sited machine guns which commanded this trap from either side. Rifle grenades and Lewis guns were used with effect on the machine guns in the shellholes outside the blockhouses, and under this covering protection 2nd Otago fought desperately to break through <pb xml:id="n346" n="286"/>the wire and reach the pillboxes before the barrage, such as it was, lifted from them. Among these brave men Major W. W. PT. Turner showed surpassing bravery. He cut his way through the first belt of wire before being riddled with bullets. The two 2nd Canterbury companies attached to the battalion were soon involved, and both <name type="person" key="name-416610">Capt. E. J. Fawcett</name> and Capt. C. R. Rawlings, who commanded them, were severely wounded in endeavoring to work round the flanks.</p>
        <p>1st Otago, who followed, were not destined to see the Blue Line. They pushed into the gap left by the heavy casualties, and with the survivors of the leading troops, officers and men tried to crawl under the wire. Several succeeded in cutting a passage through the first band of entanglements and a few also through the second belt, just beyond which were the pillboxes, surrounded for the most part by an interior ring of wire. 2nd Lt. J. J. Bishop and 2nd <name type="person" key="name-130567">Lt. N. F. Watson</name> actually reached the aperture of one pillbox and were in the act of throwing a bomb inside it when they were killed. In the left company of 1st Otago every officer was killed or wounded, and out of 140 only 28 men remained. With these Sergt E. C. H. Jacobs showed undaunted initiative by endeavouring to work round towards the north and assault the pillboxes from a flank where it was thought possible that the wire might permit of progress. He and his men reached Wolf Copse but there, like the Rifle Brigade, found further advance completely arrested. The reserve company of 1st Otago suffered as severely. All the officers but one were killed or wounded. In helping him Sergt. T. A. Bunbury showed qualities of leadership, that on a, happier field would have been likely to yield complete success.</p>
        <p>On the right company front in the marshes down by the Ravebeek, where our lines joined those of the Australians, were 2 pillboxes that were equally active with those on the hill but less completely fortified by entanglements. As it was, the obstacles of wire mud and enemy fire were formidable enough to daunt the stoutest-hearted. Here, however, the gallantry and readiness for self-sacrifice which strewed the slopes above with the bodies of brave men mere to show what, even without artillery support, a New Zealand attack could accomplish under the most adverse conditions and against the greatest odds. 2nd. Lt. A. R. Cockerelled his platoon from one muddied crater to another against these blockhouses and the trench connecting them, half the party alternately <pb xml:id="n347" n="287"/>covering the advance of the other with rifle grenades. Under this fire some of the Germans in the trench sought the shelter of the concrete. The others surrendered. While the embrasures in the pillboxes commanded their approach, the attackers were bound to lose heavily, but at last,, holding the garrison in front with Lewis guns fire, Cocker ell himself and a handful worked round the rear arid secured the entrances. Threatened with annihilation by bombs the trapped occupants, some 80 in all, did not hesitate to surrender. They were sent to the rear. Cockerell himself after hand to hard fighting, in which he hail bayoneted several Germans, had by miraculous good fortune come through unscratched, but of his platoon only one man was low left. Him he dispatched to battalion headquarters at Waterloo for urgent reinforce-ments, but saw him killed on the way. Fortunately some Australians now appeared, and with them Cockerell garrisoned the pillboxes. Of the condition in the Ravebeek valley some idea is given by the fact that 5 of the Australians sent hick with messages to Otago headquarters were shot in the attempt. This feat of arms, which under any circumstances would have been brilliant, stood out of this calamitous day all the more conspicuously. Cockerell's initiative leadership and courage won him an "immediate" D.S.O.</p>
        <p>While he was thus storming the pillboxes in the swamps, 1st Canterbury had crossed the Ravebeek and joined the other 2 battalions hillside Shortly after the attack opened, an unlucky shell had burst disastrously on their Headquarters then moving up the road. Lt.-Col. King and the Regimental Sergeant-Major were killed, and the Adjutant anti nearly all the rest of the Staff wounded. Later in the day a detachment of his old Pioneers came up for King's body. On his death Major D. Dobson, M.C., had assumed command, but was almost immediately afterwards wounded by a sniper, and command fell to a subaltern (Lt. A. C. C. Hunter), until Major Stitt came up from the rear. Undiscouraged by the failure of the other battalions, 1st Canterbury in turn faced the machine guns and made for the wire. The bravery arid determination of their efforts as of the leading troops, said the official report, were magnificent They were also in vain. The Bellevue snipers and machine guns picket off any man that exposed himself, showing marked quickness in distinguishing officers.</p>
        <p>Every unit in the 2nd Brigade had now flung itself at the enemy position. In the end here, as on the Rifle Brigade <pb xml:id="n348" n="288"/>subsector, the company commanders ordered their men to dig in where they lay, close under the wire oil the ridge, and about Laamkeek in the Ravebeek flats. Runners were sent back with reports on the situation to Waterloo where all 4 battalions had their headquarters. Throughout the day communications mere to be at all times difficult owing to weather mud and hostile fire. It was found impossible to establish forward brigade stations, and the only medium of communication with the attacking companies was b runners, whose casualties exceeded on this day the even normally high rate inevitable through the nature of their duties. On this occasion the runners brought back the penciled and muddied message-forms safely. Lt.-Col. Smith went forward to try to reorganise the attack, but on reaching the hill-side was quickly satisfied that nothing which courage and self-sacrifice could accomplish had been left undone, and that further efforts at the moment were predestined to failure. Snipers made his return to Waterloo difficult mud dangerous, rind Lt.-Col, Charters, who with his intelligence officer attempted later to make an independent reconnaissance, was forced to abandon the attempt after his companion had been wounded.</p>
        <p>Some of the barraging machine gun units, whose duty it was after the capture of the first objective to provide covering fire for the further advance from the Bellevue Spur, had by now come forward. Although puzzled by the volume of hostile fire, they had continued to push well up the slopes before they grasped that the Kew Zealander' habitual success, taken for granted an this occasion also, had not been realised.<note xml:id="fn129-188" n="1"><p>In much the same way 2nd 1.t. A. Bonpard's signal party. who were laying lines to the proposed Rifle Brigade forward station, rwchrd the front liue and uere extricated only with rliffiarlltp and thanks to Rongard's coolness and skill.</p></note> The remainder were reorganised in time on the forward slopes of the Gravenstafel ridge, whence they fired on to the Bellevue defense over the heads of our infantry.</p>
        <p>Some time elapsed before new of the check reached the 2nd Brigade headquarters. The Brigade Major, Major Richardson, was sent forward without delay to discuss the position personall with the commanding officers at Waterloo. He had scarcely arrived and been acquainted with the general blackness of the situation when a message came through for him on the telephone. It was of disconcerting tenor. There arise occasions in war when a General has to steel his heart and in view of the larger situation call on exhausted and weakened troops for renewed efforts against, what locally-seems impossible. He does not know their particular difficulties, but <pb xml:id="n349" n="289"/>he knows of the progress effected elsewhere, with its possibilities of reaction in their favour, and it is his function to discount the effect local failure may have exercised on morale, and turn reverse into success by further stern pressure, Such was the situation now. While the New Zealanders were completely held up, the right wing of the 3rd Australians had crossed their first objective successfully and penetrated to their second; and on the northern flank, elements of the 9th Division had actually reached their final objective north of Goudberg Copse. The Corps ordered therefore the suspension of the attack for the moment and its renewal at 3 p.m. Divisional Headquarters had accordingly arranged for the barrage to be brought back to the Red Line and issued instructions in compliance with Corps orders. Two battalions of the reserve brigade were to move to the western slopes of Gravenstafel Spur, now comparatively free from shelling, and the 2 leading brigades were to take instant measures to reorganise with a view to renewing the attack in the afternoon. The final objective for the day was limited to the original second line (the Blue). The advance on the Goudberg Spur must be postponed. It was suggested that the pillboxes might be carried by an attack from the north-west by the Rifle Brigade, while a holding attack was delivered from the south-west by 2 companies of the 2nd Brigade, the whole of the remainder pressing forward with 2 battalions abreast on each side of the Gravenstafel road.</p>
        <p>Had the plane offered the slightest prospect of success, none would have welcomed it more cheerily or striven more whole-heartedly for its realisation than the experienced soldiers who now, with the more limited but more intimate knowledge of “the men on the spot,” discussed the position in the candle-lit dugout at Waterloo. They were unanimous, however, in urging its abandonment. Casualties were heavy, particularly in officers, and the troops were exhausted. The wire was still unbroken, and on the one hand our men were too near it to permit of bombardment, while on the other it was impossible to bring the intermingled units back for reorganisation in daylight under full view of the enemy snipers and machine gunners. Their first representations in this direction were disregarded. All possible measurer, of reorganisation were proceeded with. The 4 battalion commanders, fully satisfied of the hopelessness of the task, made ready to accompany their men and share their fate in the certain extinction of the brigade. Similar measures were taken by the Rifle Brigade.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n350" n="290"/>
        <p>By the early afternoon, however, although in the north the Guards and English county Divisions reached their objectives, the general situation on the right wing of the battle was profoundly modified. The left of the 9th Divisions had made little progress, and the small parties of Scotsmen on the right flank who had penetrated to their final objective were captured or killed or. obliged to fall back. On the south the left brigade of the Australians, faced by much the same obstacles as the New Zealanders, had been similarly checked. The right brigade had swept on triumphantly to the second objective below Crest Farm, but becoming exposed by our failure at Bellevue Spur to extremely heavy enfilade 2nd reverse fire from that direction, and with their right flank also in the air, owing to a check to the I. Anzac brigade, were forced to withdraw. Under these altered circumstances,, the renewal of the attack by the New Zealand brigades was definitely abandoned; as was another project, for some time entertained, of utilising the Rifle Brigade alone in a turning movement from the north-west.</p>
        <p>The decision to cancel the attack was arrived at too late to interfere with the artillery programme, and at 3 p.nl. the barrage recommenced. It was now considerably latter than it was the morning, but had little effect on the well-protected machine guns. It was all but well-protected machine guns. It was all but inevitable that some of the of the 18 pounders and howitzers should fire short, and shell landed with devastating effect on a rifle Brigade forward post of 18 men in the centre of the position. The survivors were withdrawn to the main line As it happened, however this barrage fell on 3 parties of Germans assembling for a counter-attack. Two suffered severely, and refused to face the open. The third, in the northern sector, was to some extent protected by the dead and broken ground used to corer their assembly and succeeded in rushing one of our forward ports east of the cemetery. Any. further advance that may have been interested was checked by Lewis gun and rifle fire.</p>
        <p>Thus amid unceasing rain, continual machine gun fire and desultory shelling the curtain falls on the ill-fated attack on Bellevue. It was the Division's one failure on a large scale. And it is difficult to describe the troops' mortification and chagrin. It would be incorrect to say that their losses arid hardships did not for the moment affect their spirits, but officers and men dike of the battered brigades were generally anxious and expressed a wish to make another attempt, after renewed bombardment of the wire, to atone for their <pb xml:id="n351" n="291"/>non-success and to complete their work before the Division should be relieved. After experiences like those just undergone, none but troops of the finest calibre are capable of such determination. Their wish, however, was not to be realised. But if the sense of failure rankled, there was no secret shame arising from any suspicion that where they had failed other troops might have succeeded, or that they had fallen one iota short of their most exacting conception of duty. They had indeed done everything possible and impossible. They had poured out their blood like water. The bodies of 40 officers and 600 men lay in swathes about the wire and along the Gravenstafel road. The 2nd Brigade had lost 1500 men, the 3rd Brigade 1200. About 20 wounded who had fallen in shellholes beyond the first belt of wire were taken prisoners. The artillery alone had again suffered lightly. 100 Germans were captured, including a battalion commander.</p>
        <p>As the obstacles were overwhelming, so the causes of failure are easy of analysis. Among the circumstances under which the attack was launched, notice has been made of the absence of adequate reconnaissance, the lack of time to make preparation, and the troops' physical exhaustion and want of assurance of success. These factors, however, were not to influence appreciably the course of events. Nor was the morale of the enemy infantry such that, had close quarers been reached, success could have been doubted. Some fled, the remainder made no effort to emerge from their trenches and pillboxes, assume the offensive and drive downhill their tired assailants, clinging by their eyebrows, as it mere, under the wire. The attempted counter-attacks were not pushed home. The reasons for our failure lay rather in the inevitable weakness of our artillery barrage, the nature of the ground, the strength of the machine gun resistance from the pillboxes, and above all in the unbroken wire entanglements. In the earlier stages of the Ypres battle the greater distance of our objectives and the severity of our preliminary bombardment had caused the enemy in conformity with his general change of tactics to withdraw his heavy. machine guns further in rear.<note xml:id="fn130-291" n="1"><p>p. 248.</p></note> Mainly on account of the failure of this new policy and also because our later attacks were marked by comparative shortness of objective and by a decrease in the intensity and duration of our artillery preparation, he had reverted to his former practice of a stronger system of defense generally in his forward area and of massing machine guns in <pb xml:id="n352" n="292"/>and close behind the front line. On this occasion both machine guns and pillboxes had been practically undamaged by our artillery. Neither the deep mud, however, nor the pillboxes, nor the machine guns, nor weakness of supporting artillery would even conjointly, as Cockerell's attack in the marshes demonstrated, have held our attack. The direct cause of failure was the wide unbroken entanglements against which infantry resourcefulness and fortitude broke in vain.<note xml:id="fn131-292" n="1"><p>The following extracts from the private diary of a senior and experienced officer are of interest:—
							<list><item>October 11th—We all hope for the best tomorrow, but I do not feel as confident as usual. Things are being rushed too much. The weather is rotten, the roads very bad, and the objectives have not been properly bombarded. However, we will hope for the best.</item><item>October 12th—Today has been a very bad day for us. We were hung up a very short way from the starting point. The situation is not yet very clear, but it is almost certain our men came up against a lot of pillboxes, concrete and ferroconcrete constructions, very strong and with machine guns. No guns can smash them up except with much concentrated fire. They are very small and strong and hard to hit. They are arranged chequerwise and form a very stiff obstacle. My opinion is that the senior general who direct these operations are not conversant with the conditions, mud, cold, rain and no shelter for the men. Finally, the Germans are not so played out as they make out. All our attacks recently luck preparations, and the whole history of the war is that when through preparation is not made, we fall.… You cannot afford to take liberties with the Germans. Exhausted men struggling through mud cannot compete against dry men with machine guns in ferroconcrete boxes waiting for them.</item></list></p></note></p>
        <p>In the evening the difficult task of reorganisation was carried out with a remarkable precision and orderliness which reflected the highest credit on subordinate officers and the many n.e.o.s who now commanded platoons and companies. As in view of a future attack it would be necessary to bombard the ridge anew, the bulk of our troops were withdrawn to the lower slopes of the hill a short distance in advance of the line from which they had started at dawn. A series of posts was retained further up the slopes. A firm hold was maintained especially on the cemetery, whence the line ran through Wolf Farm to Peter Pan. Each brigade distributed 2 battalions in the front area as far back as the Stroombeek, the line running, from right to left, 1st Otago, 2nd Otago, 1st Rifles, 2nd Rifles. The 2nd Brigade posted the 2 Canterbury battalions on either side of the Wieltje road on the forward slopes of Gravenstafel Spur. The Rifle Brigade held the northern declivities beyond Korek with 1 battalion and placed the other in reserve nearer the Hanebeek. The 4th Brigade battalions withdrew again from the western slopes of the Gravenstafel ridge to the rear. Shortly after 10 p.m. the redistribution of troops in the battle area was complete. The line was now held continuously except for the gap between the 2 brigades. It war filled on the following day by 2 companies of 2nd Canterbury.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n353" n="293"/>
        <p>The night was dark and squally, without a break in the continuous rain. The appalling conditions restricted infantry hostility on both sides. Our untiring artillery began to shell Bellevue Spur, but otherwise the night was quiet and no S.O.S. was asked for Rations and water were taken forward without much molestation from machine gun fire. The enemy was also engrossed in reorganising his defences and removing his wounded.</p>
        <p>This last problem involved on our side extraordinary difficulties. Even before the attack, dressing stations and regimental aid posts as well as the battlefield itself were crowded with the wounded of the 49th Division. Our own casualties very speedily added to this congestion. No duckboard track existed forward of Gravenstafel Spur, and in the broken state of the country, made still more difficult by the wretched weather, 6 and sometimes 8 men mere required for a single stretcher-case. During 12th October, 400 men of the 4th Brigade had been detailed to clear the aid posts but were able to evacuate only a portion, whose places were at once refilled. Every possible shelter was given to the wounded. When the regimental aid post at Kronprinz Farm was already over-crowded, further stretcher-cases were brought into the 2 dugouts, each 12 feet by 10 feet, which formed 2 battalion headquarters. By the evening these 2 rooms held no less than 56 men, consisting of the staffs of the 2 battalion headquarters, doctors and medical orderlies, and wounded. Outside dozens of stretcher-case lay in the cold driving rain and hail. Without sleep and snatching food at odd moment the regimental medical officers toiled unremittingly and uncomplainingly. Even more lamentable were the conditions at Waterloo. Both places were spasmodically shelled, and it was worse than useless to bring further hundreds of wounded men off the battlefield to already congested localities from which for the moment it was impossible to evacuate them. In the Medical Corps casualties were abnormally heavy, 13 trained men being killed and over 70 being wounded in the 4 Ambulances.</p>
        <p>On the 13th the brigades employed every available man of their support battalions who, through themselves worn with strain and want of sleep, repeatedly while light lasted traversed the unimaginable 3-mile journey back to the dressing-station at Spree Farm. They made also urgent representations for additional assistance in carrying down the wounded. As a result, 1200 men of the 4th Brigade and parties of Army <pb xml:id="n354" n="294"/>Service Corps and artillery personnel were despatched to the forward area, but even then the Division alone was not equal to clearing the field. Assistance was invoked from Corps who ordered the 49th Division to place their reserve brigade at the New Zealanders' disposal. A battalion of this brigade came into the forward battle area.</p>
        <p>On the stricken hill-slopes themselves there was throughout the day an informal truce. Our stretcher-bearers worked without interruption right up to the wire which had been lapped by the furthest wave of our attack. The enemy also continued to remove his own wounded. Snipers on both sides dealt instantly with any one not carrying a stretcher, but the bearers did their work without molestation, and the German marksmen and gunners who looked down on the rows of our 200 stretcher cases at Waterloo fired no shot there. By the afternoon of the 14th all surviving wounded had been evacuated.</p>
        <p>On the same day II. Anzac received notice that it would be presently relieved by the Canadian Corps. It was decided that pending relief the 3rd Australian and New Zealand Divisions should stay in the line.<note xml:id="fn132-294" n="1"><p>A brigade of the 49th Division moved on the 15th into tactical support to the numerically weaker 3rd Australians.</p></note> Immediate steps were taken to relieve the 2nd and 3rd Brigades by the 4th Brigade. 3rd Auckland and 3rd Otago moved up during the afternoon by small parties to behind Gravenstafel Spur, and by 10.30 p.m. were holding the front line with the other battalions of the brigade in support positions north and cast of the Hanebeek. The 2nd Brigade went into support west of the Hanebeek, the 3rd Brigade into reserve in and about the old British and German front lines. Half their machine gun companies remained to strengthen the forward defences.</p>
        <p>On 15th October a spell of good weather set in, and with it our artillery commenced systematic bombardment and wire-cutting on all Strong Points, especially on Bellevue Spur and the slopes about Mectchecle that connected it with the main ridge. Passchendaelc itself, which overlooked so many of our artillery positions, was given over to destruction by the heavies, and kept by night and day under the fire of the lesser howitzers and 18-pounders to prevent alike repair and observation. Vigorous counter-battery work, gas shelling, and harassing fire on the German approaches were again in full swing on the whole front. While the heavies bombarded the actual dugouts on the Bellevue Spur and its wire, the <pb xml:id="n355" n="295"/>Divisional artillery had the special charge of "isolating" the occupants of the pillboxes. It was their function to keep the occupied areas under continual bursts of shell-fire, deluge them with gas, and cut off communications. In view of the proximity of our forward posts to the zone bombarded by the heavies, they were at first withdrawn half an hour before dawn and then re-established at dusk. The positions were specially marked to be readily recognisable, and every precaution was taken to conceal this movement from the enemy, whose erratic shelling showed that he was still ignorant of their actual locations. Eventually, however, in Marsh Bottom and the Ravebeek valley the forward posts were maintained continuously, as being less exposed to danger from our heavier than had been anticipated, and as occupying a much drier site than the "day" positions further down the valley, where in the most solid ground water was struck at less than 2 feet below the surface.</p>
        <p>On the 16th the Rifle Brigade entrained for Lumbres and the 2nd Brigade moved back to the reserve area. The latter was relieved in the support zone by the 1st Brigade, now released from Corps employment. In response to our artillery activity that of the enemy was every day increasingly aggressive. His guns had naturally not been disorganised by our abortive action on the 12th to the same extent as in previous attacks. Hence the artillery duel was more quickly resumed. He strove untiringly to destroy our batteries and prevent our guns being moved forward. Our heavies about Spree Farm were subjected to violent shelling, and three 9.2-in. howitzers were destroyed. The infantry positions on Gravenstafel Ridge and further east suffered considerably, but there was now little machine gun or rifle fire. Behind the Ridge, our battery positions, tracks and cross-roads were periodically shelled with high-explosive and mustard gas. The German air service was extremely active. Many large flights crossed mid recrossed our lines. Bombing aeroplanes repeatedly visited Abraham Heights and Waterloo, and low-flying planes harassed the troops in the shellholes and on the roads, and reconnected our positions at dusk and dawn and throughout the day. Our own artillery remained active, but patrols found the wire on Bellevue still practically intact.</p>
        <p>The sector passed on the 18th from II. Anzac to the Canadian Corps, who assumed for the time command of such portions of the II. Anzac Divisions as remained in the area. <pb xml:id="n356" n="296"/>II. Anzac Headquarters moved back to Hazebrouck. On the following evening the 1st Infantry Brigade took over the forward area from the 4th Brigade, which went into support. The Canadian advanced guards were now all about Ypres, and the withdrawal of the Division followed apace. The 2nd Brigade went to Lumbres on 21st October. The 4th Brigade, which in the second phase of the Division's operation's, from the 11th to the 22nd, had sustained 400 casualties, followed it on the 22nd.A proportion of the transport accompanied units by rail. The remainder was formed into transport groups and went by road. The command of the Divisional sector passed to the 3rd Canadian Division on the 23rd, and that night the 1st Brigade was relieved in the line and moved back into support. On the 24th it passed into reserve, and on the 25th entrained at Ypres and Dickebusch for Lumbres. With the exception of the artillery and 1 company of Field Engineers employed by Corps, the whole of the Division was now already concentrated in or on the way to the training area. It is noteworthy that, despite all obstacles, on no occasion had any task set the Engineers been left uncompleted.</p>
        <p>The failure of the 12th October definitely crushed any lingering hopes of carrying the remainder of the ridge before the winter. The capture of Passchendaele, however, and the adjacent part of the ridge northwards would relieve the artillery from direct observation, and a maintenance of activity here was desirable in view of the impending French offensive on the Aisne and of the intended British surprise attack in the vicinity of Cambrai, for which preparations were already afoot. The next general blow in the Ypres front was delivered on the 26th. The objectives now set the Canadians were less ambitious than those of the 12th. Their right flank was successful, but their left was again checked on the Bellevue Spur. Fresh troops attacked it in the afternoon and carried it. On the left of the splendid Canadian achievements, the Fifth Army made some progress against disheartening difficulties. After an interval of 4 days the Canadians made their next bound. They gained nearly all their Objectives, capturing the Crest Farm positions and reaching the outskirts of Passchendaele. Its ruins, and pillboxes with the greater part of the Goudberg Spur fell on 6th November, 3 weeks after the Australians and New Zealanders had aimed at their capture, together with the occupation of the whole of the intervening ground, in a single operation. Further efforts to extend our hold on the main <pb xml:id="n357"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP046a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP046a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP046a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Gravenstafel</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n358" n="297"/>ridge achieved little success, and the greatest and bloodiest battle in history died away.<note xml:id="fn133-297" n="1"><p>For the co-operation of the New Zealand artillery with the Canadians see foot-note, p. 298.</p></note></p>
        <p>Despite every effort, despite colossal expenditure of lives and munitions, neither the coast line with its promise of strategic possibilities nor even the whole ridge had been secured. The number of British casualties had been unprecedented. The enemy had justifications for his paeans of satisfaction. On the other hand, the strong fibre of the British stock withstood the strain, and morale and determination remained generally unimpoverished. Assurance was theirs that failure was due not to inferior generalship or equipment or fighting qualities, but to the mud and weather and unpropitious elements. Moreover, though on the surface Germany appeared unshaken, though no tangible gains, commensurate with our losses, rewarded the British effort, yet a profounder scrutiny of the enemy's position and a larger outlook made for confidence. In addition to the efforts of our Allies elsewhere and to the disintegrating effects on the civil population of the blockade and our propaganda, the enemy's field forces were being ceaselessly exposed by the British armies to a grinding process of attrition. Germany fought magnificently, but her man-power and her spiritual and material resources were being sapped and drained with a cumulative effect, which was not to be fully alleviated by the release of her troops from Russia. Ypres of 1917, and the Somme of 1916, were not isolated self-contained episodes with little or no hearing on the subsequent evolution of the drama. Directly and powerfully their influence was to be felt in the dénouement of 1918.</p>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n359" n="298"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body1-d8" type="chapter">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Chapter VIII</hi>
          <lb/>
          <hi rend="sc">Winter at Ypres</hi>
        </head>
        <p>Warning notice was received from the Army on 4th November that the Corps would presently relieve I. Anzac in the area south of the Ypres-Roulers railway which had formed the boundary between the 2 Corps in the attack on Passchendaele. On General Birdwood's right the X. Corps were being withdrawn to rest, and part of their line also was added to the new front. The 3rd Australian Division was marked for transference to I. Anzac, leaving the Corps composed of the 49th 66th and New Zealand Divisions, with various Corps troops. On 8th November, after a period of training and rest marked by cold and wet weather, the first 2 Divisions set out towards Ypres to relieve the 2nd and 1st Australians on the right and left of the I. Anzac front respectively. Corps Headquarters moved from Hazebrouck to the village of Abeele, south-west of Poperinghe.</p>
        <p>The New Zealanders began to entrain 4 days later, and on the 13th the 4th Brigade marched up to the left subsector of the 21st Division in that part of the X. Corps area which was now included in the II. Anzac front. The Rifle Brigade followed into the right subsector the next evening, and on 16th November the command of the whole Divisional front passed to the New Zealanders. Divisional Headquarters were established in the hutted Anzac Camp at Chateau Segard, about. 2 miles south-west of Ypres, and the headquarters of the 2 brigades in the trenches occupied deep dugouts in Hooge Crater. The 2nd Brigade was held in support. The 1st was placed under Corps control as working troops, to be used at the moment mainly for cable-burying. The artillery brigades, after supporting the Canadian attacks, had only on the night 2nd/3rd November been withdrawn from their positions behind Gravenstafel to the vicinity of Hazebrouck.<note xml:id="fn134-298" n="1"><p>The assistance given. by the New Zealand batteries to the Canadians is acknowledged in the following letter from the C.R.A., 3rd Canadian Division. “Now that the New Zealand Artillery are leaving my command, I wish to place on record my appreciation of the high standard of efficiency maintained by them while they were assisting to cover the offensive operations of the 3rd Canadian Division, In spite of the difficulties of bad weather and almost impassable roads, they kept their guns in action and their ammunition dumps filled with a regularity which would have been impossible without a high standard of discipline energy and efficiency. I should be glad if you would convey my thanks to all officers, n.c.o.s, gunners and drivers of the N.Z. Divisional Artillery for their gallant and faithful work in trying circumstances.” On the night 31st Oct./1st Nov. the 15th Battery lost 20 horses from aeroplane bombs.</p></note> There they remained for the time, but <choice><orig>Div-<pb xml:id="n360" n="299"/>isional</orig><reg>Divisional</reg></choice> Artillery Headquarters accompanied the Division and assumed control of the 3 English (Army) brigades which covered the Divisional sector.</p>
        <p>The northern limit of the Corps front was at the pillboxes called Tiber, 1000 yards south of Passchendaele and a mile south-east of Marsh Bottom, where a month previously the New Zealanders had suffered their tragic reverse. Thence it extended for 4½ miles south along the vital key position of Broodseinde Ridge and in front of <name key="name-140475" type="work">Polygon Wood</name> to the stream of the Reutelbeek which, rising on the slopes of the main ridge north of the Menin Road, flowed, or rather oozed, first eastwards and then south-eastwards to the Lys at Menin. Of this front the Division occupied the right sector of about a mile and a half. Their line was marked in the north by a pronounced salient at the In de Ster Cabaret between the ruins of Noordemhoek and Reutel. Beyond Reutel it trended back south-westwards, falling to the marshes of a stream that rose in the <name key="name-140475" type="work">Polygon Wood</name> and was called the Polygonebeek. This stream joined the Reutelbeek in extensive flats about 500 yards in front of our positions. From the south bank of the Polygonebeek the line, still bending to the south-west, mounted the forward slopes of Cameron Covert, which we held with a series of posts, and then descended again towards the Reutelbeek. Here at its southern boundary it joined the IX. Corps trenches at a point less than a mile short of the famous and terrible Menin Road.</p>
        <p>In front of the Division the Germans held a line of posts in and about the copses known from north to south as Joiners' Wood, Journal Wood, Judge Copse, and largest, if not most important, of all, Juniper Wood. They had advanced positions also in the outskirts and cemetery of Reutel. Their main defences, however, lay along the high ground 1000 yards further east at Becelacre. Owing to the western trend of our line south of the Reutelbeek they enfiladed our positions at Cameron Covert and Reutel. The whole country recalled memories of the unequal but stubbornly contested struggle of 1914, when the sacrifices of the old Army made Cameron Covert, Black Watch Corner, Hooge, Westhoek, Polygon and Glencorse Woods for ever consecrated ground. It was further hallowed by magnificent instances of Australian gallantry in its recent recapture in September.</p>
        <p>Polygon Wood, with its racehorse training track, lay about a mile behind the front line. On the north-eastern edge of the destroyed wood was a very prominent artificial <pb xml:id="n361" n="300"/>mound called the Butte de Polygon, originally constructed in connection with the musketry training of the Belgian infantry in the Ypres barracks and now honeycombed with German dugouts.<note xml:id="fn135-300" n="1"><p>Apparently disused since about 1870. Lately purchased by the Australian Government and converted after the Armistice, by the labour of	German prisoners, into a memorial of the 5th Australian Division.</p></note> Just west of <name key="name-140475" type="work">Polygon Wood</name> the ground fell away to a smaller copse whose name, Nonneboschen, or the Nuns' Wood, fold of long abandoned convents of which no trace now survived. Between these woods and the Westhoek Ridge, whose outliers dominated the flats beyond Ypres, rose the head waters of a sister stream to that same Hanebeck which the New Zealanders forded to capture Abraham Heights, called by the same name,<note xml:id="fn136-300" n="2"><p>In the case of both streams the maps are inconsistent in spelling.</p></note> and eventually mingling its waters with the other in the neighbourhood of St. Julien.</p>
        <p>Never a picturesque country, it now presented an aspect of desolation that seemed devoid of affinity with either man or nature. Every yard was a yawning shellhole. The trees were lopped by explosive, and of the young saplings in the spinneys not a single trace survived. The basins of the Hanebeek and other streams, choked by the walls of shell craters and by dead mules, were noisome and repellent morasses. Derelict and abandoned limbers littered the sides of the corduroy roads, and innumerable ugly tanks, knocked out by artillery or bogged in the mud, were strewn over the wastes. Only when snow mantled the landscape did it present to one looking eastwards from the Westhoek Ridge a mournful beauty of its own. In winter nights of hard frost and full moon, the Butte, scintillating with a million diamonds, evoked memory of snowy ranges thousands of miles away Over the whole battlefield shells and war material of all descriptions lay in profusion, and one of the most pressing duties that faced the Corps was the organisation of a definite salvage scheme. Reserve units were systematically employed, and the Division alone saved several hundred thousand pounds' worth of Government property. The need of economy, indeed, accentuated as it was by the shortage of shipping was now being inculcated with increasing emphasis in every branch of the administrative services. Much could be effected by a thorough system of salvage, and the appeal for individual effort, painted on the Corps motor lorries “What have you salved today?” was but one method of driving the principle home.</p>
        <p>Patrols at once reconnoitred No Man's Land and the enemy positions. As a rule they met no Germans and <pb xml:id="n362" n="301"/>returned safely, but on 21st November a 3rd Auckland patrol came within close range of machine guns, and several men were hit. Fortunately most of the wounds were light, but one man was seriously disabled. Unable to move, he was carried by Pte. K. Campbell, himself wounded, all the 300 yards back to our lines. The general attitude of the enemy's infantry was not aggressive, but his artillery activity was still above normal. On the very evening on which the Division assumed command, a wireless message was intercepted which gave indications of a German gas bombardment to be delivered at midnight along the Corps front. Time allowed adequate warning to be given, and more damage was caused by explosive shells in the back areas than by the gas bombardment, which lasted from 11 p.m. till 1.30 a.m. Two nights later there was an encounter between an enemy patrol and a 3rd Wellington post a little south of the In de Ster Cabaret. Our sentries had just been exchanged, and the men relieved were sitting, quietly smoking, at the rear of the dugout. It was about 9.30 p.m., and the night was quiet. Suddenly by the light of a flare one of the smokers saw, about 15 yards away, a strong German patrol, with their unmistakable caps and helmets. He at once jumped up to snatch his rifle. A bomb exploded harmlessly at his feet. The other men in the shelter ran out, and the whole party opened rapid rifle fire which dispersed the enemy.</p>
        <p>Similar patrol enterprises and local raids by the enemy must be expected here as elsewhere, and the probability of their occurrence occasioned no misgiving. Serious consideration, however, had to be paid to the possibility of an attack on a large scale on this all-important sector of the front. Our communications and gun positions were exposed and congested, and our defence lines far from being satisfactorily organised. The enemy possessed concealed ground for assembly of counter-attacking. Divisions and had a mass of artillery already in position and registered. It was well within the range of possibility that he might launch a surprise offensive on the whole or part of the Corps front, extending also to the areas of the neighbouring Corps. Such an attack might have a limited objective in the recovery of the high ground from the Menin Road at Clapham Junction along Broodseinde to Passchendaele, or as a preliminary to a renewed effort to capture the coastal ports, might aim at deener penetration and at the defeat of the troops committed to the defence of the Ypres salient. On the north of the <pb xml:id="n363" n="302"/>Corps sector the loss of the Broodseinde Ridge would make our positions at Passchendaele untenable. Owing to their situation, however, the New Zealanders were more concerned with the southern portion of the Corps line. A local attack here was possible on the In de Ster Cabaret, whose possession would give the enemy a footing on the plateau and yield observation, but the acute danger was at the extreme south. There owing to the failures in the Ypres battle<note xml:id="fn137-302" n="1"><p>p 270</p></note> our lines swung, as we have seen, sharply back, and there the capture of the high ground southwards in the IX. Corps area between the Reutelbeek and Clapham Junction would immediately threaten our positions and communications.</p>
        <p>To meet such hostile action the general policy had already been laid down in the beginning of November, but the Australian had had little opportunity for translating the paper scheme into wire and trenches. The necessary work was now vigorously taken in hand. The Army defence system had been defined immediately east of Ypres. Beyond it the Corps zone was planned in depth with the object of providing supporting points to stop or localise a breach of the Divisional defences in front, and of affording a line to cover the assembly of Corps and Divisional reserves, or, at the worst, should the Reutel-Broodseinde-Passchendaele Ridge fall, of furnishing a fresh line of defence. Further in front, the sitting and consolidation of the defensive systems of the Division in the line were pushed on with the utmost possible despatch. They comprised 3 lines of trenches. The front line was in the nature of an outpost system. It consisted at first of groups of shellhole posts placed at selected points as inconspicuously as possible with enfilade machine gun and Lewis gun fire covering the gaps. These posts were intended to be linked together eventually to facilitate lateral movement and mask the localities actually held. Some 200 to 400 yards in rear a support line was sited with continuous lateral communication and with organised localities covering the gaps of the front line. About half a mile behind the support trench the third Divisional line was organised as a reserve position. The whole scheme, in which could be traced "open warfare" principles of defence, was based on a policy of depth, with successive lines of trenches, supplemented by the liberal employment of groups of machine and Lewis guns echeloned in rear of each other, the object being to effect economy of man-power <pb xml:id="n364" n="303"/>by an organisation of sufficient flexibility to ensure the repulse of all hostile attacks. In view of the awkward situation south-wards, where the enemy were in a position of great advantage for an attack on the IX. Corps from the south-east up the spurs which ran parallel to the Menin Road, the Divisional reserve line and the Corps system were specially sited to secure the left flank of the neighbouring Corps. Close reserve troops also were earmarked to refuse this flank, if need be, or to execute an immediate counter-attack in a southerly direction outside the II. Anzac area. Unfortunately the high ground at this southern Boundary was narrow, and the Corps and Divisional systems overlapped. Towards the end of February, after the Division was withdrawn, the enemy did seriously propose a limited offensive here, but it was frustrated by violent artillery counter-preparation.</p>
        <p>In addition to depth of lines and impenetrability of wire, successful defence against a surprise attack depended on the morale and vigilance of the troops; on their training and confidence in their weapons, particularly rifles, Lewis guns, and machine guns; on the initiative and leadership of subordinative commanders, especially in the execution of local counter-attacks and provision of mutual support; and finally on the excellence of the arrangements made for the rapid deployment of local reserves. Accommodation was arranged east of Ypres for at least 6 battalions of each Division holding the line. It was a point of honour with Divisions that they should hold their defensive system against heavy and continuous attack without inconveniencing Corps by an appeal for assistance which might upset the plans of the Higher Command. The same principle applied in a less degree to the smaller units. Troops were therefore so disposed in the forward areas that a proportion was always available for immediate counter-attack on the front line, a platoon in each company, a company in each battalion, and a battalion in each brigade. These were kept stationed not further back than the reserve line, and were held entirely distinct from the garrisons of the support line who would not leave their positions for this purpose. The company and platoon counter-attacked on their own initiative, and the battalion in brigade reserve under orders GP the brigadier, either with or without artillery preparation, according to circumstances. The reserve brigade at the disposal of Division was used in case of need for deliberate counter-attack after artillery preparation and under an artillery barrage.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n365" n="304"/>
        <p>Specially designed to form the framework of this system of defence was the tactical organisation of the Divisional machine guns. They too were so arranged in depth as to provide 3 belts of fire covering the area from No Man's Land right back to the Corps system. In the protection of the front line the infantry were assisted primarily by their Lewis guns, but also by the direct fire of "silent" machine guns, carefully concealed in or about the front line, and opening only in an emergency, and by indirect fire from machine guns further in rear, which formed a barrage across the front and engaged special1y important approaches Close cooperation was arranged between machine guns and Lewis guns, both for the repulse of an infantry assault and against enemy aircraft. To prevent reconnaissance and aggressiveness on the part of the German airmen over our foremost positions, a line of Lewis gum was placed between 100 and 500 yards from the front line and not more than 500 yards apart. In rear was a second line of machine and Lewis guns not more than 800 yards apart, and from 500 to 1500 yards from the front line. The policy of anti-aircraft defence aimed at engaging aeroplanes flying under 3000 feet with direct fire when seen to be within range, and barraging a definite area by night when direct fire could not be used. Lewis or Hotchkiss guns were similarly mounted to protect battery positions, transport lines and back areas. On more than one occasion the New Zealand light trench mortars also were used with conspicuous success. Only a week after the Division went into the trenches, one of the mortars blew off the wing of a low flying hostile aeroplane and forced a crippled descent into the German lines. 2 of the 3 field artillery brigades were emplaced primarily with a view to defence of the front ad support trenches, while the positions of 1 brigade were sited to cover the divisional reserve line. At this period the heavies were employed almost exclusively on counter-battery work.</p>
        <p>In their defence policy the Division had not merely to face the possibility of an enemy attack at some time in the future on the IX. Corps area beyond their right flank Owing to the sharp reentrant of our line at this point they were also already actually exposed to continuous and pressing discomfort caused by enfilade fire from the south. Just beyond the Divisional boundary a well-marked spur ran eastward like a finger. From the edge of the general plateau down to the flats. On the north its sides drained into the <pb xml:id="n366" n="305"/>Reutelbeek, and on the south to the corresponding valley of the Scherriabeek. These 2 streams divided by the spur wound round its eastern end and united in the flats. Beyond the Scherriabeek the ground rose again to Gheluvelt on the Menin Road. The British line had been arrested at the edge of the plateau, and the spur remained in German possession. From it the enemy not only enfiladed our forward trenches about Cameron Covert and Reutel, but fully commanded and incessantly harassed the whole of our approaches to this sector of the front. On it were perched the piled ruins of Polderhoek Chateau and groups of pillboxes which occupied sites of the attached buildings and the shattered trees of the once luxuriant and beautiful pleasances. The Ypres Battle had seen 3 assaults delivered on the spur, and the Chateau bad been temporarily won, but only to be lost again to German counter-attacks.</p>
        <p>For the satisfactory occupation of the Division's sector, it was highly desirable that a fresh effort should be made to capture the Polderhoek Spur. A combined attack on it and on Gheluvelt had been contemplated as one of various local operations designed to continue our offensive during the winter, to add depth to our defence along the Army front, and to facilitate the initial phases of a resumed offensive on a large scale in the spring. Eventually, however, the scope of the operation was confined to the Polderhoek Spur alone. The area affected was about 400 yards wide, and all advance of some 600 yards would carry the line as far down its forward slope as was necessary to deprive the enemy of his commanding and enfilading position. Further examination also showed that, owing to the height of the spur and general configuration of the ground, the new lines proposed about the Chateau would not to a like degree be exposed to similar enfilade fire from the Gheluvelt Spur on the south. Though the Chateau lay opposite the IX. Corps front, it was the II. Anzac troops who specially suffered, and it was fitting that they should strike the blow for its capture. The Corps therefore submitted a proposal to the Army that the New Zealanders, immediately affected, should carry out the attack and, on the conclusion of the, operation, hand over the territory won to the IX. Corps.</p>
        <p>Two alternative lines of attack offered themselves. The Chateau might he carried from the flank and rear by troops advancing from the Anzac positions across the Reutelbeek, or, secondly, a frontal assault could be delivered straight <pb xml:id="n367" n="306"/>down the spur from the IX. Corps position on the plateau. The former alternative was naturally at first considered, as involving no change of dispositions, but various factors compelled its abandonment. Deadly fire would rake the Reutelbeek valley from the direction of Becelacre and the positions in Juniper Wood. There would also be difficulty in slewing our own guns round from the north to obtain a barrage which at the best would have to be in enfilade. There was no satisfactory assembly position, and above all the Reutelbeek itself was practically unfordable. The deep, all but continuous shellholes which replaced its stream formed an obstacle from 20 to 30 feet wide, and from the left bank stretched an extensive black morass of soft mud, into which patrols sank to their knees within 100 yards from our advanced posts in Cameron Covert. For these reasons recourse was had to the second alternative, which offered several advantages. Assembly trenches were available directly opposite and in close proximity to the Chateau. A frontal barrage could he obtained. The IX. Corps heavies could carry out the preparatory bombardment, and the telltale registration by a large number of new guns could he avoided.</p>
        <p>These proposals mere sanctioned by the Army. The New Zealand attack was entrusted to the 2nd Brigade, and on the evening of 25th November during a snow-storm 2nd Canterbury, with a section of machine guns, took over from the IX. Corps troops the front opposite the Chateau from the Scherriabeek to the Reutelbeek. The command of the sector and the artillery brigade covering it was assumed by the New Zealand Division on the following day. The necessary additional assembly trenches could fortunately be disguised as a continuation of the support system already in process of energetic construction on the New Zealand front north of the Reutelbeek and these were dug in the sandy soil without delay.</p>
        <p>The first heavy artillery concentration shoot on the Chateau and the pillboxes about it was carried out on 28th November. To avoid enemy retaliation, the bulk of our garrison, both opposite the Chateau itself and north of the Reutelbeek, was withdrawn before daylight. Several hits were scored on the ruins, and the 4th Brigade observers to the north could see large numbers of Germans rush out of the cellars into the open to escape the concussion caused by our super-heavies' shells. Enemy stretcher-bearers under the <pb xml:id="n368"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP047a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP047a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP047a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Sergt. <name type="person" key="name-416679">H. J. Nicholas</name>, V.C., M.M.</hi> [<hi rend="i">Photo H. H. Clifford</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP047b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP047b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP047b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Hooge</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n369"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP048a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP048a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP048a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">A Snow-covered Battlefield</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP048b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP048b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP048b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">The Butte de Polygon, Sept. 1919</hi><lb/>[<hi rend="i">Photo Capt. <name type="person" key="name-207718">S. Cory Wright</name></hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n370" n="307"/>Red Cross flag were busy all the afternoon carrying the wounded down towards Red Cross wagons visible on the Becelacre road. An artillery demonstration was also made on the German system north of Becelacre. The hostile batteries retaliated heavily, particularly in the vicinity of the Butte and at Cameron Covert, where our vacated posts were completely “blown in” On the 29th enemy howitzers destroyed a pillbox which formed the Canterbury regimental aid post and was assumed to be battalion headquarters, inflicting casualties. Our bombardments were repeated on the 30th. The destruction of the wire entanglements strung among the tree-stumps was also taken in hard by howitzers using instantaneous fuses, and the success of their work was established by Canterbury patrols. Our single duckboard approach, known as "E" track, was improved and extended. Engineering material and ammunition were stealthily accumulated in the trenches. The garrison of the Chateau was confident aggressive. Both on the '26th and 30th they attempted small raids which were completely repulsed. They had, however, no suspicion of the impending attack and exposed themselves injudiciously about the spur to our snipers.</p>
        <p>The date of the attack was fixed for 3rd December. Two battalions, 1st Canterbury (Lt.-Col. Mead<note xml:id="fn138-307" n="1"><p>vice Lt.-Col. King, killed 12th Oct. Lt.-Col. Stewart had meantime resumed command of 2nd Canterbury. See also p. 330</p></note>) and 1st Otago (Major W. F. Tracey, M.C.<note xml:id="fn139-307" n="2"><p>vice Lt.-Col. Charters at advanced brigade headquarters with General Braithwaite.</p></note>) were considered adequate for the task, and their companies were in addition reduced to the strength of 100 all ranks. The selected personnel, who included a large proportion of reinforcements without previous experience of battle, rehearsed the operation behind Ypres on ground laid out to scale, with the buildings and pillboxes numbered as on the map and represented by heaps of material. Parties were also sent up to reconnoitre and observe the ground from the 2nd Canterbury lines and from Cameron Covert. The leading waves of the attacking companies moved into the line on the evening of 1st December, and the remainder of the battalions on the following day. The support companies took over the front line. The attacking companies were placed in the rear trenches to familiarise them with their assembly positions, avoid daylight movement and secure them a night's rest. On relief, 2nd Canterbury, who had fulfilled their part and would not be called on further, moved out of the line. The role of reserve was given to 2nd Otago.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n371" n="308"/>
        <p>It had been a matter of consideration whether the enterprise should be carried out in combination with the attack to, be delivered east of Passchendaele by Corps to the north. The tactical objects in view, however, bore no correlation, and in addition the zero hours selected were different. For whereas the II. and VIII. Corps proposed to attack at dawn, the New Zealand assault was fixed for noon. In the end, therefore, it was decided that the 2 operations should be executed independently. It was hoped that the obvious disadvantages of a daylight attack would be more than neutralised by the surprise effect of an assault delivered at a moment when the enemy would least anticipate it, and when he might be expected to be taking shelter underground from the daily heavy artillery storm with which he was now being familiarised at this hour. Extensive smoke barrages would be employed to blind his troops on the Becelacre positions and on the Gheluvelt Spur, and they would in addition be subjected to a heavy concentration of gas and the fire of field artillery, 6-in. howitzers, machine guns and trench mortars. An immediate preliminary bombardment might, on account of their proximity to the targets, be dangerous to the congested troops in our line, and at the same time would reduce the potent effect of surprise. It was therefore dispensed with. At one and the same moment the barraging guns would open and the infantry would rush to the assault.</p>
        <p>Three field artillery brigades were allotted for co-operation. One barrage of 18-pounders would immediately precede the infantry; 150 yards in front of it would be another fired by 18-pounders and 4.5-in. howitzers. Our artillery activity would embrace either flank. On the right, field artillery of the IX. Corps would extend the covering barrage southwards and weep Gheluvelt, the railway line, the Menin Road, and the Scherriabeek valley. Opposite the New Zealanders' proper front to the north of the Reutelbeek, the enemy's occupied shellholes and emplacements would be similarly kept under fire. From that direction 2 machine gun barrages were arranged to deal with the German trenches and approaches and with the loopholes on the northern side of the Chateau. In addition to light mortars, 5 of the new 6-in. medium trench mortars were also placed in position at Reutel to neutralise, by gas shells, machine guns operating from the vicinity of Juniper Wood; and personnel of the 2nd and 3rd Rifles, who now garrisoned the Divisional <pb xml:id="n372" n="309"/>sector, toiled to carry up the massy projectiles 2½ miles through the mud.</p>
        <p>The actual plan of attack was simple. It would be made by 2 companies in each battalion advancing abreast in 2 waves. The first wave would carry the line to an intermediate objective beyond the Chateau, and the second, following 50 yards behind, would then “leap-frog” through, and push on to a final objective, some 300 yards further, sufficiently far down the eastern slope to give observation of the flats. After the assaulting troops crossed No Man's Land, the support company waiting in the trenches on each battalion front would occupy the present front line to meet counterattacks. The reserve company would be kept well in rear to relieve the victors in the captured line. Eight machine guns co-operated directly in the attack. Of these, 2 were in position in the front trench, 2 in the support line, and 2 were allotted to each battalion for the purpose of providing covering fire during consolidation and of engaging enemy counter-thrusts. The Chateau itself fell within the area of 1st Otago on the left, but 1st Canterbury were faced with a series of strong pillboxes, including those at the stables and at the Manager's House which was suspected to be connected by a tunnel with the Chateau.<note xml:id="fn140-309" n="1"><p>Subsequent investigation showed that no such tunnels existed.</p></note>For coping with these, 1st Canterbury were given the assistance of 2 light trench mortars. From the outset of the attack, Canterbury would form a defensive flank on the south overlooking the Scherriabeek valley and facing Gheluvelt. Definite parties had been allotted to and practised in the attack and mopping-up of each pillbox and dugout. To others was assigned the duty of taking up posts at each angle of the Chateau and of watching for concealed outlets, while the eviction of the enemy was in progress.</p>
        <p>At the beginning of December the weather was bright and frosty with a cold biting wind, against which, however, the trenches gave protection. The right boundary of our front line, on the small rise which formed the lip of the plateau, was marked by a conspicuous tower-like pillbox called Jericho. Beyond it the ground began to fall to the Scherriabeek. The left flank was similarly delimited by another old German shelter in the cellar of a demolished house, known as Joppa. Behind this rise the ground fell gradually towards a desolate expanse of shellholes, broken only by the cluster of dreary pillboxes at Veldhoek. Through them the duckboard track <pb xml:id="n373" n="310"/>ran past battalion headquarters at the pillbox known as the Tower and led up the slopes of the main ridge to the Menin Road. The Road itself lay, scarcely distinguishable, to the south. It ran diagonally away from our sector towards Gheluvelt, so that at Veldhoek it was only 500 yards distant, but at the front line was separated from our trenches by the Scherriabeek valley and a full 1000 yards of battered country.</p>
        <p>In the trenches every precaution was taken to avoid a premature betrayal of the surprise. When enemy aeroplanes patrolled over Jericho in the morning of 3rd December, our men lay still in the bottom of the saps or took cover under the corrugated iron of their rough shelters. No exposure over the parapet or loud talking was permitted. The Chateau itself, where incautious Germans still fell victims to our snipers, was only some 200 yards distant, and there were enemy shellhole positions still nearer. For this reason our artillery barrage was arranged to fall close to our own front line. The attacking waves assembled in the support line, leaving in the front trench a few Lewis gunners and snipers till close on zero to maintain "normality." Each man was in the lightest possible fighting order. His greatcoat was dumped under a guard in the assembly trench, but he carried his waterproof, and in addition to his fighting kit and invaluable leather jerkin, he took with him in his mess tin a soup square and a tin of solidified alcohol.</p>
        <p>The precaution taken to assemble the troops in the support line proved a wise one, for even there on the opening of the barrage 1 battery dropped unwelcome shells, causing heavy casualties among the attackers just emerging into the open, especially in the left company of Otago. Undismayed, however, the first wave pushed on, crossed our front line, and were rapidly among the wilderness of tree stumps where the wire was found demolished. Our hopes of catching the enemy off his guard were doomed to disappointment. The fear of our heavies' daily forenoon bombardment had not driven the garrison into underground refuge. His pillboxes were occupied as usual, and his sentries were normally vigilant. Almost as soon as our artillery opened, his machine guns cracked vociferously, both from the pillboxes about the Chateau and from the Gheluvelt Ridge. A few moments later his artillery put down an intense barrage on the duck-board track and about Veldhoek, but the proximity of the opposing trenches, which had in part compelled the abandonment of our preliminary heavy bombardment so too now <pb xml:id="n374"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP049a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP049a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP049a-g"/></figure><pb xml:id="n375" n="311"/>prevented his shelling our assembly position with appreciable weight.</p>
        <p>The right 1st Canterbury company was faced at the outset by a ruined pillbox and dugout, from which a machine gun poured a stream of lead that threatened to hold up the line. Seeing the check, the company commander, Capt. G. H. Gray, rushed the position with a handful of his men and captured the gun and 8 prisoners. The work of this 12th (Nelson) company was of an extremely high order. They, more than the others, were exposed to the blast of machine gun fire from the Gheluvelt Ridge. For in that direction our plans had miscarried. A strong west wind dissipated and rendered useless our protective smoke barrage, and all our artillery activity was powerless to subdue the well-posted and well-protected Gheluvelt machine guns. Their fire indeed became steadily more intense. None the less, though the Nelson company suffered severely from this enfilade fire and were met by strong opposition in front, they continued to fight their way forward. As they advanced, they threw out sections to form the defensive flank and deal with the enemy on the southern slopes. Nor were these little posts ineffective. Their rifles and Lewis guns inflicted heavy casualties, and one Lewis gun had the satisfaction of engaging and putting out of action an enemy machine gun.</p>
        <p>It was but fitting that the good work of the company should be crowned by a heroic action which was recognised by the award of a Victoria Cross. An enemy Strong Point garrisoned by 16 Germans with a machine gun offered stubborn resistance. The section commander and several of the men attacking it were killed. Then Pte. <name type="person" key="name-416679">Henry James Nicholas</name>, M M., rushed forward, followed at about 25 yards by the remainder of the section. A moment's hesitation would have cost him his life, but he was on the parapet before the Germans realised it. Firing point-blank at the German platoon commander he shot him dead, and then instantly leapt down among the remainder. Those nearest him he bayoneted. At the others further up the sap he flung with deadly effect his own bombs and the German bombs lying about him. He thus killed the whole of the garrison, except 4. These were wounded, and these he took prisoners. The machine gun remained in our hands. After winning the V.C., Nicholas, who was in every respect a particularly fine soldier and man, remained with his company till his death,<note xml:id="fn141-311" n="1"><p>p. 551.</p></note>setting <pb xml:id="n376" n="312"/>always an invaluable example of steadfastness and faithfulness.</p>
        <p>Shortly beyond this point, however, the dwindling numbers of the company were definitely held up by an exceedingly strong pillbox, which equally frustrated the attempts of the left Canterbury company. First 2 sections, and then a full platoon were sent up from the support company to assist, but were unable to make impression. To take their place in the weakened line about Jericho the reserve company was now brought up through a heavy barrage at Veldhoek.</p>
        <p>Meantime on the left 1st Otago received valuable support from the Rifle Brigade machine guns, which repeatedly dispersed hostile parties on the Becelaere road. The medium mortars, too, fired no less than 850 rounds, drawing on themselves intense retaliation by shells of all calibres, which destroyed 1 mortar and damaged another. Nor were Otago raked to the same extent as Canterbury by the devastating flank fire from Gheluvelt. They made at first good progress and captured a pillbox, but from the Chateau came an overwhelming barrage of machine gun fire, which effectively held them up on the same line as Canterbury, about 150 yards short of their first objective. As with Canterbury, supports were sent up, their places in our old front line being taken by the reserve company. Neither individual nor concerted attempts at outflanking the enemy positions availed anything. Three of our machine guns had been put out of action and heavy casualties inflicted on the personnel.</p>
        <p>Both battalions had now lost half of their effectives, including many officers and senior n.c.o.s, and once progress was arrested, the lack of battle experience on the part of many of the men was not without result. The strength of the undamaged pillboxes and the tremendous volume of fire which beat against the confined area of assault had proved insuperable. Only some 30 prisoners had been taken. The decimated stormers had no alternative but to dig in. For the moment at least there was no hope of taking their objective or even securing the Chateau, but the ground actually won was of great value, yielding as it did full command of the Scherriabeek valley. Thanks to this advantage of observation, the concentration of an enemy force after midday in the upper part of the valley between Polderhoek and Gheluvelt was immediately detected. A light trench mortar was moved to Jericho, rapid fire was opened, and the enemy fled, discarding rifles and equipment. Full requital was now exacted <pb xml:id="n377" n="313"/>by the Nelson company, and few of the retreating Germans reached Gheluvelt. The enemy attack never developed, and the German stretcher-bearers coming down from the Menin Road under the Red Cross flag were busy at the spot for some hours afterwards.</p>
        <p>In the evening strong enemy reinforcements came up to the Chateau, some of whom were caught by our Lewis guns. General Braithwaite had urged a further effort after dark, and suggested an enveloping movement from the Reutelbeek slopes, but the arrival of these reinforcements, together with the continued alertness of the enemy and the activity of his machine guns did not favour surprise. Moreover, even after darkness fell, the situation about the left flank was still uncertain. Again, the only troops available for a repetition of the attack were the reserve companies and some elements of the support companies, whose advance would leave our positions unguarded against any possible awkward development on the left. Later in the night this position towards the Reutelbeek was cleared up, largely through fearless reconnaissance by Pte. G. Gilbert, M.M., but a full moon now rode in the sky, and the advantage of the darkness was lost. Our wounded lay thick where they had fallen, but the terrible experiences on the Bellevue Spur were not to be repeated. During the night the stretcher-bearers, with their usual devoted courage, searched the shellholes among the trees, still under heavy machine gun fire, and cleared the whole area by dawn.</p>
        <p>In the morning of 4th December enemy forces mustering on the eastern and south-eastern declivities of the spur were driven back in disorder by our artillery towards Becelaere, and a very heavy toll was taken by our snipers on individuals about the Chateau, who appeared astonishingly unconscious of our proximity. Throughout the day hostile artillery raged on our new positions and on the approaches from Veldhoek. After dark the assaulting troops were relieved by the other companies, and the work of consolidation was completed. A strong line was constructed with characteristic energy and thoroughness by a company of the Maori Pioneers under Major P. H. Buck, D.S.O. The garrison connected the advanced posts into a continuous line, and deepened to a proper depth 2 communication trenches to our old position, commenced the previous evening. Patrols worked to within 50 yards of the Chateau and saw a German relief in progress.</p>
        <p>At dawn on the 5th a party of about 80 Germans, who <pb xml:id="n378" n="314"/>had assembled during the night, endeavoured to surprise our left flank. Penetrating to within 30 yards of our position, they bombed and destroyed the Lewis gun there, but the Otago section commander lost not a moment in replacing it with another. Under its fire and that of the infantry rifles the attackers lost at least half their numbers. When our men were later questioned as to why they had not put up the S.O.S. signal, they admitted that they had not thought of it. They had, they said, been too busy with their rifles and bombs to remember about a S.O.S. signal. Despite the reverse they had experienced on the 3rd, there was evidently plenty of fighting spirit left in. these men.</p>
        <p>Following on these repeated repulses of his infantry counter-attacks, the enemy had recourse to his artillery, and with balloon observation in the beautifully clear frosty air carried out a systematic bombardment of the whole area, causing grievous damage to our trenches and inflicting casualties. This bombardment, as was later confirmed by prisoners, was intended to be followed by an attack about 5 p.m. But our guns, which in response to messages for counter-battery work had already been extremely active throughout the day, now redoubled their rate of fire and crushed the assembling enemy before the attack could develop. Thereupon the volume of the German artillery fire waned. Our blocked trenches were then cleared and repaired, and the wounded were evacuated.</p>
        <p>In the evening the position was handed over to IX. Corps troops, and the 2nd Brigade battalions withdrew to reserve. The advance won, though of distinct advantage to the local garrison, would not effect an appreciable improvement with regard to the exposed slopes of Cameron Covert, Reutel, and <name key="name-140475" type="work">Polygon Wood</name>, where protection from the Polderhoek fire would have to be won by the labour of the spade. Nor were the IX. Corps long to look down from the spur on the Scherriabeek valley. The ground captured was recovered by the Germans 9 days afterwards.</p>
        <p>On the Divisional front north of the Reutelbeek the system of holding the line with 2 brigades had been modified toward the end of November, with a view to presevation of man-power and to a frequent rotation of reliefs. It was now held by 1 brigade, reinforced with 1 battalion from the Corps working brigade. Headquarters were transferred from Hooge Crater to the Butte, to which buried cable was extended without delay. Shortly afterwards, however, <pb xml:id="n379" n="315"/>the Corps front was reorganised on a 2-Division basis, and the 66th Division was withdrawn to form a Corps reserve. This readjustment involved at the beginning of December an extension of the Divisional front to the north for a further 500 yards east of Molenaarelsthoek, and the reversion to a garrison of 2 brigades. Of these, I held the short southern flank in Cameron Covert between the Reutelbeek and the Polygonebeek with 1 battalion, maintaining 3 in reserve. The other brigade held the northern subsectors of Reutel Judge and Noordemdhoek with 3 battalions in the line. A brigade would pass 6 days in the subsector on the left, 6 days in the right subsector, where the former support battalion would hold the line, and 6 days in reserve.</p>
        <p>The artillery zones were correspondingly readjusted. The 1st and 3rd Field Artillery Brigades had come into the line a few days previously, replacing 2 of the English brigades. They had been followed by the 2nd (Army) Brigade, which had been relieved by French artillery on 20th November, after a long sojourn under constant counter-battery work from the German large-calibre guns in the sand-dunes on the-coast.<note xml:id="fn142-315" n="1"><p>p. 226.</p></note>In the first days of January the remaining English brigade was to be withdrawn and the front covered by purely New Zealand artillery, With artillery support an attempted enemy raid before dawn on Christmas Day, aiming at the demolition of one of our pillboxes, was repulsed. A 2nd Otago patrol under Pte. H. Boreham engaged the raiders outside our parapet with bombs, pursued them and captured a loquacious and informative prisoner. In the following afternoon too (26th December) the batteries co-operated with 1st Canterbury's fire and bombs in crushing a further assault. Preceded by a heavy and prolonged bombardment, this attack had as its object the recapture of a remarkable square crater which had been excavated by the Germans for the construction of a large pillbox, and had been included in our line some days previously. An attempt to enter a 4th Rifles' post at Joiners' Avenue on the night lst/2nd January was easily driven off, Cpl. A. Adamson greatly distinguishing himself. The body of a dead raider was found in No Man's Land.</p>
        <p>Up to the end of 1917 the elaboration of our defensive arrangements had been subordinated to preparations for a resumption of the offensive. By that time, however, it had become apparent that the Russian collapse was to be followed. <pb xml:id="n380" n="316"/>by a German drive on the Western front in the spring. The augmentation of the German forces, together with our unsatisfactory position with regard to man-power and the probability that America would not be able in the near future to put large forces in the field, involved the consequence that for a period of 5 or 6 months the enemy would be in numerical preponderance on the Western front. This situation vitally affected the British policy. At an Army conference held on 9th December General Rawlinson<note xml:id="fn143-316" n="1"><p>p. 327.</p></note>intimated to his Corps commanders that the resumption of the Flanders offensive was no longer feasible, and that our immediate future policy was the strengthening and, where necessary, the revision of our defence systems with a view to making them capable of withstanding a heavy and sustained hostile attack. The carrying out of this policy formed the basis of the Division's activities for the remainder of their stay on the Ypres ridges. Jt was the first occasion since its arrival in France that a defence scheme was drawn up in real and serious anticipation of an enemy attack on a large scale.</p>
        <p>In view of the reduction of material caused by the submarine campaign and of labour by the loss of manpower in the Battle of Ypres, the necessary economy in the construction of defences could best be achieved by a continuity of policy and by resisting the temptation to multiply unnecessarily the lines of trenches in the forward areas. It was laid down as a general policy that Divisions in the line should construct and maintain not more than 3 lines. The New Zealanders had taken over their area under the disadvantages of battle conditions. The trenches had been either shellhole posts or untraversed and unrevetted ditches. Tracks and tramways had not been developed, and above all there was a woeful lack of wire. A systematic policy of construction had been drawn up immediately on our entering the line. Divisional H.Q. had undertaken to employ reserves in the extension of tramways and duckboard tracks, in the construction and wiring of the reserve line, and of a switch portion of the reserve line, and in the opening of such communication trenches in rear of the support line as were necessary. The brigades in the trenches would wire and improve the 2 front lines and maintain all communication trenches forward of the second.</p>
        <p>Owing to the strongly marked flank position of the sector there had been a tendency for all lines of communication <pb xml:id="n381" n="317"/>constructed during the battle to run parallel to the refused southern flank, and the lack of communications running at right angles was already felt. To communication trenches, however, in view of the vast amount of more important work, no great attention would be paid. Only on the forward slopes, where the enemy enjoyed direct observation, would they be constructed, and there wide and unrevetted and as inconspicuous as possible. Behind the crest, duckboard tracks must suffice, with room left for deployment in case of shellfire at the points where they passed through our entanglements. Later, as labour would become available, it was proposed that protection against splinters should be afforded by sinking these tracks and constructing banks alongside. Of the other work undertaken, priority of importance was assigned to wiring, drainage, the construction of localities, and the accommodation of troops, in that order. Wire was, indeed, in view of the possibility of an enemy counter-attack, absolutely essential. As it was, odd German ration-carriers and patrols, losing their way in No Man's Land, frequently penetrated within our area, to be made not unwilling prisoners.</p>
        <p>By the end of December immense improvement had been effected in all respects. North of the Polygonebeek the front line was protected by 2 rows of nearly continuous "double-apron" wire, and substantial progress had been made in the erection of 3 continuous belts before the support and reserve lines. Posts and occupied pillboxes, converted to our own use by alterations in the concrete, were protected by wire on their front flanks and rear. In addition entanglements were erected running diagonally to the enemy lines of advance in such a way as to break up his troops, lead them on to our garrisons, but interfere as little as possible with the deployment of our own counter-attacking troops. In the same proportion as this work developed, it received increasing attention from the enemy's artillery. Considerable maintenance parties had to be set aside for the exclusive purpose of repairing the gaps in the wire caused by his shells.</p>
        <p>In the trenches the improvements were no less marked. An advance of the line in the middle of December reduced the sharpness of the In de Ster Cabaret salient and allowed wider observation of the approaches from Becelaere. The front line was strengthened by traverses, and was made continuous, and drained forward into several shallow gullies which fell towards the enemy. Its "localities" were revetted <pb xml:id="n382" n="318"/>by material brought up with great exertion over ice or mud by the support battalions. As a result of well-directed and assiduous labour in the support line, the strong Papanui Switch, and the reserve line, as well as in the Corps system, the series of blue-coloured trenches in being' rapidly extended across the Engineers' maps. Only on the Cameron Covert slopes south of the Polygonebeek, where the enormous marshes of the overflowing Reutelbeek and Polygonebeek made an impassable No Man's Land of nearly 800 yards, was the front line left in the post system; and here too a strongly wired support line guarded against irruption from Polderhoek. All this solid work was in the end to prove useless owing to a necessary withdrawal from this area in the spring.<note xml:id="fn144-318" n="1"><p>p. 978.</p></note></p>
        <p>Behind the Divisional system multifarious tasks were allotted to technical troops and the reserve infantry brigades. The light railway was with splendid and successful audacity brought up to within half a mile of the Butte, alleviating the labours of and reducing distances for carrying and working parties. Tunnellers increased existing underground accommodation in the great shell-proof electrically-lit underground dugouts. Additional hutments were constructed east of Ypres to bring units near their work, and in rear of Ypres the draining of camps, the erection of Nissen huts, baths, and drying stores for gumboots, the repair of roads, the construction of stables and horsestandings,<note xml:id="fn145-318" n="2"><p>Bricks rubble and debris could be taken from destroyed towns and villages only for certain specified services. Uninhabited houses in good order or slightly damaged could not be used.</p></note>the building of protective walls against aeroplane bombs, and a thousand other tasks claimed continuous attention.The Train companies were utilised to the fullest extent in conveyance of engineer stores and road material.</p>
        <p>The artillery, too, had to make much necessary provision for the winter in the construction of platforms and cover for the guns, and of shellproof protection for battery commanders' and observation posts, as well as for personnel and ammunition, which near the guns was stacked in small dumps about 25 yards apart and separated by traverses. Certain guns were brought far forward and concealed under the brow of the crest to deal with enemy tanks. Elaborate arrangements were made for the defence of the sector by artillery in depth covering narrowing zones. Reserve positions were constructed for the heavy artillery in case of a withdrawal. The consumption of material by a single New Zealand Field Company <pb xml:id="n383" n="319"/>allotted to the supervision of this task indicates the scale on which these defensive measures were executed. In a single fortnight they used nearly 800 trucks of material, comprising fascines, sleepers, slabs, concrete blocks, cement, shingle, sand, reinforcing rods, sandbags, duckwalks, and iron dugout segments. Their work elicited warm commendation from Army and Corps Commanders.</p>
        <p>All this work was pushed on under generally adverse conditions. In December a series of snow-storms and frosts made the labour of digging the hard earth at once costly in tools and excessively arduous. On the icy duckboard tracks carrying and working parties, moving in single file, slipped and stumbled, and splinters from the enemy's high-explosive shells flew incredible distances. Even more difficult were conditions during the period of rainy weather, which starting in January lasted with scarcely a break till the first week in February.<note xml:id="fn146-319" n="1"><p>On the edge of the Ypres Moat, where the two famous white swans, impervious to the cold, still remained, some N.Z. Engineers had built themselves, during the frost, bivouacs on a small island. They woke one morning to find themselves, owing to the unexpected thaw, marooned. They were rescued by means of the pontoons,</p></note> Parapets fell in, despite carefully made berms, and drains became choked. Under cover of fog or occasional sleety storms, trenches were drained into No Man's Land. Thus L.-Cpl. W. G. Bowers of the 3rd Rifles in broad daylight and in full view of the enemy's positions 150 yards distant worked for an hour and a half on 16th January in No Man's Land in front of Judge subsector. Many bays, however, remained waist-deep in mud, and by the middle of January large tracts lay under water. In the muddy wastes of the Reutelbeek patrols endured extreme hardships. For preserving the health of the troops in the line, minute arrangements were made by provision of gum-boots, of hot food and hot drinks, and of camphor treatment as a precaution against "trench feet."</p>
        <p>Following on a decrease of our own harassing fire in January the violence of the enemy's shelling also abated, and his groups at Waterdamhoek Dadizeele and Terhand, though maintaining activity on our wire and the Butte and his old pillboxes, paid more particular attention to the roads and tracks and battery positions further in rear. On Christmas Day they had carried out well-organised and particularly severe counter-battery work.<note xml:id="fn147-319" n="2"><p>Contrast p.140.</p></note> There was an inevitably steady and accumulating roll of casualties in the front trenches, but our losses were still more severe on the unsheltered tracks and at thedumps.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n384" n="320"/>
        <p>About the beginning of February the enemy began definitely to imitate our policy of an irregular series of sharp brief "shell-storms" on cross-roads and other known centres of activity. Rations for the front line troops were for this reason not infrequently delayed. In one of these concentrated local bombardments as early as December, the 2nd Otago limbers were caught at the transport-head at Wattle Dump. Twenty 5.9-in. shells were hurled at the dump in a few minutes, and in addition to other casualties in men and animals, Otago lost 3 company-quartermaster-sergeants of whom 1 was killed and 2 wounded. On these rear tracks many valuable lives were lost. Major V. Rogers, D.S.O., O.C. 5th Battery, was killed on Jabber Track near Railway Wood. <name type="person" key="name-416629">Capt. L. S. Serpell</name>, M.C., the Regimental Medical Officer of 1st Canterbury, with the orderly-room sergeant and other members of the Headquarters staff were killed at Jargon Cross Roads, a place of particularly evil associations, behind Glencorse Wood. Near Wattle Dump Major R. D. Hardie, D.S.O., Divisional Machine Gun Officer, was severely wounded.</p>
        <p>To these rear areas, and the battery positions, and especially to the wagon lines and camps west of Ypres, Gothas also paid continual attention. In clear frosty nights the sky was often asound with the low-pitched drone of enemy aircraft and stabbed with the shafts of our searchlights. The Division, however, never again experienced such misfortune from the air as it had suffered in the autumn,<note xml:id="fn148-320" n="1"><p>p. 245.</p></note>and the casualties in men and animals that were incurred in January and were to be incurred in March were due, not to bombs, but to high-velocity long-range guns.<note xml:id="fn149-320" n="2"><p>2 On 10th Jan. the artillery brigades and the D.A.C. lost 40 men killed and wounded and 18 horses killed.</p></note> About this time the use of aircraft and balloons for propaganda purposes was stimulated on both sides, and on several occasions the insidious "Gazette des Ardennes" and pedantic and ineffective declamations in laboured English fell about our batteries and trenches.</p>
        <p>In view of our preponderating artillery, the Germans in their front system refrained from organising their shellhole posts into a continuous line.<note xml:id="fn150-320" n="3"><p>pp. 220, 248.</p></note> Their wire was generally formidable, but gaps existed, and through these from time to time individual Germans, failing in the dark to locate the isolated posts, wandered into No Man's Land and were <pb xml:id="n385" n="321"/>rounded up before our lines. Towards the end of January opportunities given the 2nd Brigade of inflicting heavier losses were taken advantage of with avidity. The evening of the 19th was lit by clear moonlight, and relieving Germans coming too far forward were discovered by Lewis gunners and snipers who poured in fire which loud groans indicated to be effective. Two nights later the enemy repeated his mistake, and a whole platoon with their packs up moved right across the front of one of the 2nd Otago posts at Rentel. Our sentries opened fire, and the Germans dispersed. A patrol was immediately sent out and shot one man whom they found crouching behind a mound. His identifications were brought in together with a dozen boxes of explosives and a machine gun, which the party had dropped in No Man's Land.</p>
        <p>Later in the night the Germans sought revenge in the same vicinity. A sharp trench mortar bombardment prepared the way for their infantry. Otago stood at once to arms and had not long to wait before 4 enemy parties, about 100 strong in all, appeared in No Man's Land. Our S.O.S. rocket was fired, and before it burnt out the artillery shrapnel fell on the invaders. They threw a shower of bombs, but most fell short, and the affair was over in a few minutes. The barrage, the deadly machine gun fire, and the weapons of the garrison were too much for the Germans to face. Only 1 man got through our wire and none into the trench. A patrol sent out later found 7 dead in front of our entanglements and great pools of blood where wounded men had fallen.</p>
        <p>As a result of these successes 2nd Otago forgot cold and mud and wet. Their sentries waited with their rifles trained on the enemy parapet, and the unwary German who exposed himself either in the trench system or by running from a pillbox on its bombardment by our howitzers could deem himself fortunate if he saw the Fatherland from the windows of a Red Cross train. Otago's patience was to be well rewarded ere they left the trenches. On a bright, moonlight night their rifles and Lewis guns secured many victims in a relieving company of the enemy. A raid by about 20 Germans on the 1st Rifles' position on the evening of 2nd February was dealt with equally drastically. The Germans had succeeded in rushing a listening post and wounding all 4 occupants. They then bombed our front line and opened fire with revolvers. Cpl. J. G. Hart's section repelled them, and <pb xml:id="n386" n="322"/>under cover of his men's fire Hart dashed forward, bombed the enemy and prevented them from obtaining any identifications from our wounded men in the listening post. Four enemy dead were left entangled in our wire.</p>
        <p>At the end of January the Army redistributed the Corps areas. The II Anzac front was "side-stepped" southwards to include the positions hitherto held by the IX. Corps, beyond whom in turn, it may be noted, lay I. Anzac (now the Australian Corps<note xml:id="fn151-322" n="1"><p>p. 328.</p></note>), guarding Messines. The 20th and 37th Divisions, formerly under the IX. Corps, now passed under General Godley's command. Early in February this extended line was reduced by the transfer of half the left sector of the old front to the VIII. Corps on the north. The new Corps front was reconstructed on a 2-Division basis. On the south the 20th Division troops replaced the New Zealand garrison in Cameron Covert, and the New Zealanders similarly sidestepped north, up to the new Corps boundary, taking over the Broodseinde Ridge from the 66th Division, for whom the 49th had made way in the middle of January. Relieved thus partly by the VIII. Corps and partly by the New Zealanders, the 66th Division was withdrawn for transfer to the Fifth Army.</p>
        <p>The New Zealand Division, which had originally been on the right of the Corps front, now found itself on the left flunk. This readjustment involved a redistribution of infantry brigade frontages. The right brigade front now comprised the Reutel and Judge subsectors. Noordhemhoek, hitherto held with Reutel and Judge, was now attached to Broodseinde as the charge of the left brigade. Each brigade occupied the line with 2 battalions, holding 1 in close support, and 1 in deep dugouts in reserve. The front system taken over on the Broodseinde Ridge was still only a line of posts just beyond the crest. The shallowness of our position left us; with but an insecure hold on this all-important high ground. Without delay our posts were advanced some little distance, and work was started on the construction of a continuous line, preparatory to our pushing still further forward down the slope to give us greater depth and to command wider observation over the Keiberg valley. The continuous line would then serve as a support position near the crest. The northern brigade staff lived in grandiose pillboxes, known as. Potsdam, on the Ypres-Roulers railway. The staff of the right brigade shared the Butte dugouts with its left battalion H.Q.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n387" n="323"/>
        <p>Towards the end of the previous year, shortly after the Polderhoek operations, General Braithwaite had been compelled by a breakdown in health, overtaxed by volcanic energy, to say farewell to his brigade and to sever long and fruitful association with the New Zealand forces. The qualities of enthusiasm and mastery over detail which he had shown as General Godley's Chief of Staff in New Zealand and on Gallipoli stamped also his command of fighting troops. Never sparing himself, he demanded a high standard of duty from his subordinates, and appreciated results rather than the effort which made for them. A professional soldier, adjutant in turn of a regular battalion in the British Army and of Sandhurst, he was intolerant of slackness or indecision, and could rend an offender with blunt expression of dissatisfaction. Hardly less marked characteristics were an intense pride in his brigade, a keen sense of humour a faculty for the creation of bon-mots, speedily retailed with relish throughout the Division, a warmness of heart, and an untiring activity in promoting the advancement and interests of all under his command. Few men were better known throughout the Force. Not seeking popularity he achieved it, and genuine affection survived his departure.</p>
        <p>After an interval the vacated appointment was given in the first week of February to General Hart, whose 4th Brigade had, as we shall see, ceased to exist. Their new brigadier, however, was not to command the South Island battalions for long. In the second week of February they went in due course of relief into the right subsector of the line, with brigade headquarters at the Butte. Always a magnet for hostile gas as for high-explosive, special measures were adopted by the brigade gas officer to ensure that its anti-gas defences were satisfactory. On the windless night of 18th/19th February it was heavily bombarded with mustard gas shells. The gas alarms were blown, the weighted blankets at the doorways lowered on their rollers, and all other precautions taken. No ill effects were noticed that night, but on the following day, when the heat of the sun melted the frozen ground, the gas gradually and imperceptibly filtered through the open doorway and filled the Butte. The whole Headquarters of the brigade and of 2nd Canterbury, who chanced to be the left battalion in the line, were poisoned and had to be evacuated. The total casualties amounted to 14 officers and over 160 men, fortunately only a few cases proving fatal.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n388" n="324"/>
        <p>General Hart's evacuation was followed by a reshuffling of commands. General Fulton had returned to the Rifle Brigade from Sling in November. He had been succeeded in the English appointment by General Young, now happily recovered from his wound. In December the latter was in turn succeeded by General Melvill, and on returning to France had taken command of the 1st Brigade. He was now transferred to the 2nd Brigade, and General Melvill was recalled to his old command. The duties at Sling could wait for General Hart's convalescence.</p>
        <p>Neither Ayrton Fans nor Vermoral Sprayers could cleanse the polluted Butte, and General Young occupied fresh headquarters in dugouts further back at Westhoek. Some little time afterwards Capt. Falconer was appointed Brigade Major of the 2nd Brigade in place of Major Richardson. The appointment of Staff Captain held by Capt. H. Holderness, who had succeeded Capt. Wilkes in September on the latter's proceeding to England for a course of training with the R.F.C., was now filled by Major J. E. Barton, N.Z.S.C.</p>
        <p>In General Young's 2nd Brigade, 2nd Canterbury held at the moment the northern Judge subsector. Reutel was garrisoned by 1st Otago, whose advanced posts lay on the fringe of Juniper Wood. The shattered wood itself extended over the miry slopes falling towards the Polygonebeek, and continued in a straggling plantation down the Reutelbeek valley. Through its northern extremity near the Otago line had run a German defence system, and here a pillbox by the enemy trench and a disabled British tank, which the enemy had included in his defences, still formed one of his advanced Strong Points. A well-defined track led back from the tank to the pillbox. Amid the mangled tree-stumps both stood out conspicuously to direct observation and were prominent also in aeroplane photographs. They had long been marked for a raid when the ground should have recovered from the rains.</p>
        <p>As early as 17th January the 6th Battery had fired 40 rounds in the afternoon at the tank and adjoining sector of the old trench, now largely destroyed, which ran from the pillbox toward the Reutelbeek. Immediately afterwards, under cover of a mist, which succeeded a heavy fall of snow turning at midday to rain, a 2nd Rifles patrol of 4 men under Sergt. W. B. Bowles, went out to investigate results. Under distant machine gun fire from the Polderhoek Spur and direct rifle fire from a post 50 yards down the German trench the <pb xml:id="n389"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP050a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP050a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP050a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name type="person" key="name-418886">C. W. Melvill</name>, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP050b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP050b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP050b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Brig.-Gen. <name key="name-130136" type="person">R. Young</name>, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n390"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP051a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP051a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP051a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">An Artillery Observation Post</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP051b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP051b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP051b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Gunpits Near Westhoek</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n391" n="325"/>patrol reconnoitred and entered the Strong Point. The shooting had been splendidly accurate. The sides of the tank were smashed. Twelve dead Germans were found inside with a number of dead and dying in the slush outside. It was impossible to bring back any of the wounded, but shoulder-straps and discs yielded the necessary identifications, and with these and a machine gun the patrol returned safely.</p>
        <p>The Strong Point was again bombarded on 26th January, and a daylight patrol of 2nd Otago found the dead still lying there. The entanglements round the tank were broken, and there was but a little crescent, wire round the pillbox. The latter itself was undamaged, and a ladder beside it suggested that its roof was still used for observation. As the patrol felt its way nearer, they were spied by a sentry in the trench. He gave a loud shout of alarm. Twenty Germans doubled out from the pillbox. The patrol withdrew under their fire. At the same time 7 flares bursting into 2 green lights were shot up from behind the pillbox or through a hole in its roof, and shortly afterwards 2 enemy aeroplanes flew over the position.</p>
        <p>By the middle of February the ground, although still wet, presented reasonably firm going. A Division freshly arrived from Russia and adept in methods of fraternisation was believed to be opposite the Corps front. A suitable welcome had been given in a concentrated bombardment fired by the Corps artillery at the beginning of the month. To establish its definite location identifications were wanted, and the Strong Point at the tank was selected for the purpose. It was arranged that 1st Otago should raid it a few days after relieving their sister battalion on 15th February.</p>
        <p>2nd Otago, however, were not to leave the line without a trophy of their own. Some 50 yards from their front line, between the wood and the brick heaps that marked the site of Reutel, a German post was pushed out in Reutel Cemetery on the night of 14th/15th February. Fresh earth and snipers' plates were noticed in the morning by an Otago observer, Pte. A. Macdonald. He pointed them out to Sergt. B. W. Crosker, and the two determined that the enemy should pay for his presumption. They crawled out from the Otago trenches in full view of the Germans and reconnoitred the new post. They found it held by 5 occupants. They shot the n.c.o. in command and brought back the other 4 as prisoners. These proved to be Bavarians, the Division from the East having taken over a sector further north. The <pb xml:id="n392" n="326"/>Rifle Brigade on the left, too, were not inactive, and a 3rd Battalion patrol, under Sergt. J. W. Clayson, actually penetrated over 900 yards into the enemy's territory. A German party sought to intercept their return, but was beaten off by covering Lewis guns.</p>
        <p>On coming into the line 1st Otago scouts lost no time in reconnoitring the Strong Point and established the fact that the tank was occupied at night, A party of 30 raiders, under 2nd Lt. W. O'Connell, was selected from the 4th (Otago) Company. They were given special training at the brigade school.</p>
        <p>The raid was carried out at 3.30 a.m. on 21st February. With a view to diverting the enemy's attention and causing him losses, his trenches and dugouts at other neighbouring points were bombarded by 18-pounders, 4.5-in. howitzers, and medium trench mortars. Light mortars provided the barrage for the raid. By 3.30 a.m., O'Connell and his men were crouching in shell holes some 30 yards in front of our parapet. As the light mortars opened, they moved forward in separate parties. It was not their purpose to attack frontally from the north but to work round from the west. Rain had fallen heavily during the night, and No Man's Land was a squelching quagmire. Through this the parties pushed to within 130 yards of the bursting mortar bombs and then knelt, waiting for the barrage to cease.</p>
        <p>The moment the mortars' fire died away they splashed forward over the slippery ground, leaving a Lewis gun to safeguard their flank towards the Polygonebeek. The tank was soon surrounded and its 6 occupants accounted for. Two were killed and the others, who again proved to be Bavarians, were captured. The track to the pillbox, some 70 yards distant, was a mere bog full of treacherous shellholes. Struggling through the deep mud its attackers were only 30 yards away when the specified 7 minutes allotted for the enterprise expired, and the green recall flare shot into the sky. Before withdrawing, the disappointed section flung its bombs in a salvo at the pillbox. Only one member of the whole party was slightly wounded through a splinter from one of our light trench mortar bombs.</p>
        <p>During the following evening (22nd February) the 2nd Brigade front was taken over by troops of the 49th Division. On the same night the Rifle Brigade executed, without casualties, the carefully prepared plan for strengthening the left of the Divisional sector by advancing their lines a further <pb xml:id="n393" n="327"/>distance of 200 yards beyond the crest, so as to overlook satisfactorily the Keiberg valley. They were relieved the following evening. On the 24th the 49th Division assumed responsibility for the sector. The New Zealanders' casualties for the winter months had amounted to 3000, of whom 19 officers and over 450 men had lost their lives.<note xml:id="fn152-327" n="1"><p>As given in monthly states:—</p>
							<p><table><row role="label" rend="center"><cell><hi rend="c">Killed</hi></cell><cell><hi rend="c">Wounded</hi></cell><cell><hi rend="c">Missing</hi></cell></row><row><cell/><cell>Off.</cell><cell>O. Rs.</cell><cell>Off.</cell><cell>O. Rs.</cell><cell>Off.</cell><cell>O. Rs.</cell></row><row><cell>November</cell><cell rend="right">3</cell><cell rend="right">128</cell><cell rend="right">21</cell><cell rend="right">474</cell><cell>—</cell><cell rend="right">4</cell></row><row><cell>December<note xml:id="tfn1" n="*"><p>Includes attack on Polderhoek Chateau.</p></note></cell><cell rend="right">11</cell><cell rend="right">110</cell><cell rend="right">40</cell><cell rend="right">953</cell><cell>—</cell><cell rend="right">84</cell></row><row><cell>January</cell><cell rend="right">2</cell><cell rend="right">97</cell><cell rend="right">14</cell><cell rend="right">489</cell><cell>—</cell><cell rend="right">1</cell></row><row><cell>February</cell><cell rend="right">3</cell><cell rend="right">98</cell><cell rend="right">33</cell><cell rend="right">345</cell><cell>—</cell><cell>—</cell></row><row><cell>Total</cell><cell rend="right">19</cell><cell rend="right">433</cell><cell rend="right">108</cell><cell rend="right">2261</cell><cell>—</cell><cell rend="right">89</cell></row></table></p>
        </note> The comparatively high wastage was chiefly due to the great numbers of troops employed on working and carrying in the forward areas, and to the lack of communication trenches and shell-proof cover at the beginning of the period.</p>
        <p>By the evening of 24th February the relieved units of the Division had been conveyed by train into the Corps reserve area about Staple, west of Hazebrouck, with Divisional headquarters at Renescure. The 1st Infantry Brigade, the 1st and 3rd Field Companies, and the Pioneer Battalion were left in the forward area for employment on the Corps defence system. The 2nd (Army) Brigade was relieved on 25th February and ceased to be controlled by the Division. The other 2 artillery brigades remained in the line, the 1st Brigade coming under the orders of the 49th Division on the left, and the 3rd Brigade, after a short interval at the wagon lines, under those of the 37th Division, who had previously relieved the 20th Division astride the Menin Road.</p>
        <p>Certain important features of organisation must be here briefly summarised. On General Plumer's going to Italy in November, General Rawlinson handed over the Fourth Army area to the XV. Corps and assumed command of the Second Army. His Fourth Army Headquarters ceased to exist as an independent unit and was absorbed in Second Army Headquarters. In December the Second Army was designated the Fourth Army and retained that name under General Birdwood's temporary command, which followed General Rawlinson's appointment to Versailles in February. In March General Plumer returned from Italy and restored its former title.</p>
        <p>By the end of 1917 all the Australian Divisions had been transferred to I. Anzac, and Australasia in II. Anzac was represented only by the 1 Division of New Zealanders, <pb xml:id="n394" n="328"/>the Corps Mounted Regiment, and the Cyclist Battalion. On 1st January the former Corps was redesignated the Australian Corps and the latter the XXII. Corps. To replace the Australian Cyclist Company,<note xml:id="fn153-328" n="1"><p>p. 59.</p></note> a third New Zealand company was formed from men of long infantry service in the Division, and the battalion, now completely a New Zealand unit, changed its name with the Corps and became the XXII. Corps Cyclist Battalion.<note xml:id="fn154-328" n="2"><p>p. 601.</p></note></p>
        <p>In the New Zealand Force itself an important reorganisation was now necessary, for it, had become apparent that the maintenance of 4 infantry brigades exposed to the wastage of battle was no longer feasible. The formation of the 4th Brigade had been sanctioned by the New Zealand Government with express reservations.<note xml:id="fn155-328" n="3"><p>p. 163.</p></note> By this time the unexpected strain of 3 years' warfare under modern conditions was felt by all the combatants. The British authorities had been constrained to disband formations and adopt the Continental organisation of 3 instead of 4 battalions in an infantry brigade. It was possible for the New Zealand administration to follow the same policy and maintain 4 brigades of 3 battalions, which the uninterrupted flow of reinforcements was adequate to keep up to establishment strength. On the grounds, however, of efficiency and simplicity of organisation it was preferable to adhere to the normal 3-brigades establishment, although the New Zealand brigades, unlike the corresponding British units, would consist each of the unreduced number of 4 battalions.</p>
        <p>The 4th Brigade therefore with its affiliated units, relieved in the line by the 1st Brigade in January and thenceforward utilised as Corps employment troops, ceased to exist as from 7th February, and its personnel was drawn on to bring the "Division up to strength. It was not the policy to increase the Division beyond establishment, and there consequently remained a considerable surplus. This was formed into a New Zealand Entrenching Group of 3 battalions. Command of the group, originally given to <name type="person" key="name-413207">Lt.-Col. A. E. Stewart</name>, was shortly afterwards taken by Lt.-Col. G. Mitchell, D.S.O. The battalions were organised as follows:—</p>
        <p>1st N.Z. (Inf. Brigade) Entrenching Bn., Capt. G. Dittmer, M.C. 2nd N.Z. (Inf. Brigade) Entrenching Bn., <name type="person" key="name-416613">Capt. J. F. Tonkin</name>.</p>
        <p>3rd N.Z. (Rifle Brigade) Entrenching Bn., Capt, S. J. E. Closey, M.C.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n395" n="329"/>
        <p>The Group became a reservoir for the Division, receiving from the New Zealand Reinforcement Wing at Corps Headquarters drafts not merely of infantry but of all branches of the service, as certified to be trained satisfactorily. It thus largely superseded the Etaples Base. It was also available for employment under Corps.<note xml:id="fn156-329" n="1"><p>The Group followed the Division to (tip TV. Corps area in the spring, 1918, was reorganised into 2 battalions at the end of August, and disbanded in October.</p></note></p>
        <p>Up to this time the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps had consisted of a Mounted Section in Palestine, the 1st 2nd 3rd and 4th Companies allotted to the respective infantry brigades, the 5th (Divisional) Company and the 6th (Reserve) Company at Grantham.<note xml:id="fn157-329" n="2"><p>p. 19.</p></note> On arrival at the Staple training area a Divisional Machine Gun Battalion was formed. The 5 companies in France were now reorganised into 4 companies (Auckland Canterbury Otago and Wellington), and their administration passed from brigade commanders. Lt.-Col. Blair was given command of the new battalion. In September the Pakeha Company of the Pioneer Battalion, in which all the Europeans had been previously incorporated, had been disbanded, and the unit, now consisting wholly of Maoris, had been designated the New Zealand Maori (Pioneer) Battalion. In February the heavy and 3 medium trench mortar batteries were reorganised into two 6-in, Newton batteries.</p>
        <p>In addition to the changes of appointments mentioned in the course of the narrative, certain others have still to be recorded. On the Divisional "G" Staff all 3 appointments had changed hands. Lt.-Col. Livesay, whose work was G.S.O.l had been marked by consummate finish and qualities at once brilliant and solid, now left the Division, with which he had been associated since before the Battle of the Somme, for duties with the American Army. He was succeeded by Lt.-Col. II. M. Wilson, D.S.O., (British) Rifle Brigade. Capt. Newnham, G.S.O.2, had been wounded in October and succeeded by Major Eastwood, the vacant appointment of Brigade Major in the 4th Brigade being filled by Major R. Logan, N.Z.S.C Major Jennings, G.S.O.3, had become Brigade Major of the 1st Brigade in place of Major Thorns, wounded at Gravenstafel, and his post was filled first by Major Barton and subsequently by Major D. E. Bremner, N.Z.S.C.<note xml:id="fn158-329" n="3"><p>p. 324.</p></note> <name type="person" key="name-416669">Major W. L. Robinson</name>, N.Z.S.C, had been appointed D.A.A.G. vice Major Chesney in. August, In the <pb xml:id="n396" n="330"/>artillery, Major Daltry relinquished in December the appointment of Staff Captain for work of national importance in England and was succeeded by <name type="person" key="name-209331">Capt. W. G. Stevens</name>, R.N.Z.A. Lt.-Col. Symon returned to his brigade in December.<note xml:id="fn159-330" n="1"><p>p. 252. footnote.</p></note> In March, on Lt.-Col. Sykes' rejoining the British Army, Lt.-Col. Falla assumed command of the 2nd (Army) Brigade, being succeeded in the 3rd Brigade by Major (now Lt.-Col.) K. S. McQuarrie, M.C.</p>
        <p>On the infantry brigade Staffs Capt. Falconer's<note xml:id="fn160-330" n="2"><p>p. 324.</p></note> vacated appointment as Staff Captain in the 1st Brigade was filled by Capt. D. S. Chisholm, who had previously succeeded Major H. S. N. Robinson in the same capacity in the 4th Brigade. In the battalions, Lt.-Col. Cunningham exchanged command of 2nd Wellington in January for that of the reserve battalion and was succeeded by Major (now Lt.-Col.) J. L. Short. On the breaking up of the 4th Brigade, Lt.-Col. Row assumed command of 1st Canterbury, held temporarily by Lt.-Col. Mead. Through ill-health, Lt.-Col. Smith relinquished command of 2nd Otago in November to take command of the reserve battalion, and was succeeded first by Major (now Lt.-Col.) <name type="person" key="name-418772">J. B. McClymont</name>, and on the latter's evacuation through sickness by Lt.-Col. Colquhoun, of the disbanded 3rd Battalion. In the Rifle Brigade the 3rd Battalion was now commanded by Lt.-Col. E. Puttick, in succession to Lt.-Col. Winter-Evans,<note xml:id="fn161-330" n="3"><p>p. 284.</p></note> and the 4th Battalion by Lt.-Col. R. St. J. Beere (Reserve Battalion), who exchanged duties with Lt.-Col. Roache in December. Lt.-Col. G Craig was now in command of No. 1 Field Ambulance vice Lt.-Col. Holmes, who had been invalided in September. Mention should be made, too, of the specially selected party of 12 officers and 25 other ranks who left the Division during this period for a secret mission which eventually took them over the Mesopotamian frontier into the wilds of Persia and the Caucasus and to the shores of the Caspian.</p>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n397" n="331"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body1-d9" type="chapter">
        <head><hi rend="c">Chapter IX</hi><lb/><hi rend="sc">The German Offensive</hi>, 1918</head>
        <p>The collapse of Russia had not merely saved, the Central Powers from defeat in 1917, but held out to them a promise of positive success in 1918, with the realisation of their most ambitious hopes. The German Command was quick to appreciate the wholly changed situation. Masses of men and artillery had been released and the latter reinforced by vast quantities of captured armament. Once again Germany had recovered numerical superiority and that initiative which sne had lost since Verdun. Cards had been dealt her such as she had not dared to hope for. She had little hesitation as to how she would play thorn. It was on the Western front, and not in the subsidiary theatres of war on the Mediterranean and in the East, that the main issue of the war would be decided. An additional reason for an early offensive in France lay in America's intervention. The submarine campaign promised no effective hindrance to the crossing of American reinforcements, and it was apparent that did Germany not attack speedily, she would once again be outnumbered in the field and thrown back on the defensive by her enemies. Within her own borders, moreover, the Allied blockade and propaganda were not sterile, and there was doubt and uncertainty, even in high quarters. For these reasons it was imperative for Germany to strike with all her might while the golden opportunity lasted. Conscious of their strength, the generals at a secret session of the Reichstag in February promised the elated deputies a complete victory in the autumn.</p>
        <p>Their plans were boldly conceived. When General Rawlinson met his Corps Commanders in December and reviewed the possible alternatives open to the enemy, he had directed particular attention to the Cambrai front. As the point of junction between the French and British Armies, and as familiar to the enemy through former occupation, it might be expected to appear specially attractive. On the other hand, Rawlinson pointed out that no objectives of far-reaching tactical importance such as the central ridges about Arras or Ypres seemed to be within reasonable grasp. The German plan, however, was more ambitious than their opponents <pb xml:id="n398" n="332"/>believed. Its aim was final and decisive success by complete defeat of the Allied Armies. The attack was designed first to separate them. by an overwhelming blow at this very point of junction, which in February 1918 was 30 miles further south of Cambrai than in December, then to roll the British Army right back on the coast and immobilise it there, and finally to turn on the French. Before America could put her levies in the field the Germans hoped that the catastrophes of the Armies and the demoralisation of the civil populations would compel the Allied Governments to accept a strong peace. Ludendorff's Staff appears to have believed that the close of the first day's fighting would see the British across the Somme, and the second day in general retreat down its lower valley. On the third day the pivot of the British line at Arras would fall, and before fresh reserves from the south could restore the situation, Haig's troops would be isolated and in disastrous retreat towards a precarious bridgehead on the Channel.</p>
        <p>The German Staff had profited by the British tactics of secret assembly, absence of prolonged preparatory bombardment, and other features of our surprise attack at Cambrai, and had developed and perfected them by practice in Russia and Italy. Hitherto, with the partial exception of the Cambrai. operation, the offensives on the Western front had been limited by the highly technical but rigid barrage, carried forward by which the assaulting infantry advanced with little or no impetus of its own. It was the weakness of these-tactics that they restricted the personal influence of commanders. Condemning them as narrow and sterile, Luden-dorff replaced them by others calculated to yield more decisive results. Commanders, he laid down, were to command. Free play must be allowed for the fullest independence and tactical skill of subordinate leaders. The foremost infantry were to advance as long as possible and should be reinforced'. or "leap-frogged through" only when it became absolutely necessary. Attacking Divisions must be prepared not merely to pass the enemy artillery positions, but to press on the offensive for many miles and for several days. A feature which was to exercise immense importance was the insistence on the principle that reserves should not be thrown into the battle at points where the attack had been held up by centres of resistance and where unnecessary sacrifice was involved. They were to be used at points where the attack was still in movement, with a view to breaking down the enemy's <choice><orig>re-<pb xml:id="n399" n="333"/>sistance</orig><reg>resistance</reg></choice> in the neighbouring sector by rolling it up from flank and rear. Hardly less important than this principle of infiltration was the novel application of machine guns, hitherto mainly regarded as defensive weapons, to the attack. The very framework of the new policy was the bold use of the light machine gun in the van of the advancing infantry and its employment on the basis of what had been conceived as infantry, rather than of machine gun, tactics.</p>
        <p>Throughout the winter months the enemy's preponderance of forces enabled him to release a large number of his Divisions from trench duties. They were assiduously and intensively trained in the use of signal flares to indicate breaches in our line, in other features of the new methods of attack and in open warfare movements. They attained a very great technical proficiency. Their morale was of the highest. By the middle of March 46 fresh German Divisions were accumulated on the Western front, making a total of 192. Of these more than half lay opposite the British sector, and on the eve of the battle over 70 were massed against the Fifth and Third Armies. On the opening day of the attack, designated in felicitous encouragement to his soldiers as Michael's Day,<note xml:id="fn162-333" n="1"><p>"Miclianl" was a favourite German personification of the nation's armed manhood, of somewhat wider significance than, find without the characteristic irony of the English "Tommy,"</p></note> Ludendorff was to hurl against a front of 50 miles a force of splendidly trained soldiers, approximately equal in numbers to the entire population of New Zealand.</p>
        <p>In anticipation of the German attack, the British Command in December had deliberately exchanged its offensive for a defensive policy. The change was reflected in the proportion of raids delivered by either side. Hitherto the number of the British raids had largely exceeded that of the German. Now twice as many were carried out on the British front by the enemy as by us, though the balance of successes was conspicuously in our favour. Immense efforts to improve defences were made along the whole line of 125 miles, extended since January down to the Oise, where Gough's Fifth Army, released from Flanders, replaced the French.</p>
        <p>In gauging the point where the attack would be launched, the British Command had to consider 3 main possible courses of action open to the enemy. In the first place, the old attempt might be renewed in Flanders with the object of securing the Channel ports, immediately threatening England and severing direct communication with France. Again, an <pb xml:id="n400" n="334"/>attack might be delivered in the central sector about Bethune with the primary purpose of breaking lateral communication, and with a secondary aim similar to, but on a larger scale than an operation in Flanders. Thirdly, they must consider the possibilities of that offensive in the south which Rawlinson had discussed, and which would have as its goal the separation of the French and British Armies with the capture of the railway centre at Amiens as a first objective. In the north and centre, where our hold of the Ypres and central ridges about Arras was shallow, little or no territory could be yielded, but in this southern portion of the line the area of the old battlefields might, if necessity constrained, be given up without serious consequences. Here also it was easier to bring up French reinforcements. Till indication of the enemy's plan developed, <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name> disposed his forces in accordance with these factors.</p>
        <p>At the beginning of the year hostile activity continued, notably at Ypres. The enemy's ammunition and supply dumps had been augmented, and rail and road communications had been improved along the whole front. By the end of February, however, indications pointed unmistakably to the probability that the enemy's initial attempt would be made in the southern sector. While therefore the northern Armies were left sufficiently strong to meet emergencies, more than half the British effectives, together with the whole of the cavalry, were now at the disposal of the Fifth and Third Armies. Plans were drawn up with special regard to the reinforcement of this front by reserve Divisions from the rest of the British area. Owing to the great bend in the Allied line south of the Oise the German concentration menaced in almost equal degree the French front on the Aisne. Detailed arrangements, therefore, were made with the French for mutual support should the need arise.</p>
        <p>Though the threatened fronts were strengthened as much as possible, the defence could not be regarded as thoroughly satisfactory. On the north, General Byng's Third Army, consisting from right to left of the V., IV., VI., and XVII. Corps, disposed 1 Division to nearly 3 miles of front, while General Gough's Fifth Army on the south, composed from right to left of the III., XVIII., XIX., and VII. Corps, had only 1 Division to 4 miles. On the other hand, it was hoped that the southernmost 10 miles on the Fifth Army front would be protected by the Oise marshes. Special measures were taken to construct a strong bridgehead at Péronne to <pb xml:id="n401" n="335"/>cover the Somme crossings. In his defensive preparations Haig was hampered by the War Office's decision to retain large forces in England as a safeguard against the doubtful threat of invasion. Three zones of defence were, however, under construction. The third and final zone was in skeleton only. Nor was labour available to construct systems further in rear than on the average 4 to 5 miles behind the forward line of outposts. The 2 front systems were, however, strongly fortified, and the Staff, underestimating the German danger, believed them adequate to withstand the shock.</p>
        <p>Against these thinly held and inadequately organised defences the German attack burst with unexpected power after a few hours of violently severe bombardment on the morning of 21st March. At least 60 Divisions were employed on a front of slightly over 50 miles. The British Intelligence Staff had predicted the launching of the attack on 20th or 21st March. Strenuous artillery counter-preparation had been carried out, and the garrisons of the different systems were all at their posts. Covered by a dense fog, the, enemy troops were enabled to reach within a few yards of our positions before they came under infantry fire. Our S.O.S. signals were masked in the fog, all communications were cut, and information of the attack reached our artillery and machine gun commanders late. The protective barrages were in consequence; delayed, and in frequent instances came down in rear of the assaulting Germans. In any case, all fire was largely masked by the fog. The swamps of the Oise, which it had been hoped would protect the extreme right flank, proved owing to unusually dry weather no serious obstacle.</p>
        <p>In accordance with their new tactics the Germans drove with special strength on certain selected points and forced their way into our positions by sheer weight of numbers. Obstinate resistance inflicted extremely heavy losses and prevented that immediate and deep break-through on which Ludendorff had counted, but by the evening of the 21st the enemy had crossed the foremost defensive zone and penetrated into the second, before which the British Command had hoped definitely to arrest his progress. His furthest point of penetration was between 4 and 5 miles on the thinly-manned extreme right south-west of St. Quentin, and here, on the 22nd, the outnumbered and hard-pressed III. Corps, which had exhausted all local reserves, was thrown back behind its third and final defensive zone. The centre opposite St. Quentin was ordered to conform by withdrawing to the east <pb xml:id="n402" n="336"/>bank of the Somme. The 2 northern Corps of the Fifth Army remained for the night east of the river, holding the important Péronne bridgehead and the third zone northwards to the Army boundary. The Third Army, repeatedly repulsing attacks, still clung desperately to its position in the rear trenches of the second belt, but during the night its right and centre were also brought back to the third zone.</p>
        <p>On the morning of the 23rd, reluctant to accept battle with tired troops in the undeveloped Péronne bridgehead, General Gough took the "momentous" decision to abandon it and fall back west of the Somme. Thus his northern (VII.) Corps, crossing the river and retiring further, exposed the flank of the withdrawing V. Corps of the Third Army, and created a gap between the Armies. This gap the Germans exploited with remarkable swiftness, forcing the V. Corps back to the ridges immediately south-east of Bapaume. By the evening of the 23rd Ludendorff had advanced only 9 miles, reaching the objectives originally planned for the 21st, and our line was not yet broken. The British, however, had lost, besides other heavy casualties, 25,000 prisoners and 400 guns. The men, who had fought magnificently, were now exhausted, and over a large part of the front they were now behind all existing defence systems. British reserves alone could not. save the situation, and on the 23rd arrangements were made with the French, for the moment released from anxiety about Champagne, to take over the Fifth Army front south of the Somme.</p>
        <p>At the junction of the Fifth and Third Armies the enemy pressure still continued on the 24th. Measures were taken to strengthen the VII. Corps, and the V. and IV. Corps on its left were ordered to fall back to a line across the old Somme battlefield west of Bapaume. This general line was taken up by midnight 24th/25th, but the withdrawal involved a loss of touch between the V. and IV. Corps which was eventually to affect the movements of the New Zealand Division. On the rest of the Fifth Army front the Somme was still held for some 8 miles south of Péronne, but beyond that point the enemy had made rapid progress and was in a position to threaten Noyon, which, with Nesle, fell into his hands on the following day.</p>
        <p>The further developments south of the Somme, the attempt to sever the French and British Armies by an attack from Nesle, the advance of the Germans beyond Roye, the stand by General Carey's mixed force in the outer Amiens defences, <pb xml:id="n403" n="337"/>the intervention of French reserves, the supersession of General Gongh by General Rawlinson, the British resumption of command as far south as the Luce valley, the belated German effort at the Paris-Amiens railway, the final establishment of a stable Allied front in the first days of April, and with it the close of the German offensive on the Somme—all these are subject, matter of a larger history which can be studied nowhere better, despite inevitable reticences, than in the Commander-in-Chief's admirably lucid Despatch. It was with the right wing and the centre of the Third Army north of the river that the New Zealanders were summoned to play their part.</p>
        <p>By the evening of the first day it was clear that the German attack involved practically the whole of Ludendorff's mass of manoeuvre. It was therefore "at once necessary and possible" to collect reserve Divisions from the rest of the front and hurry them to the Sommo. In view of the vital importance of the First Army's position in the centre, its greater proximity to the battlefield and the distinct possibility of its becoming implicated, reinforcements were drawn principally from General Plumer's Second Army further north. Among the troops so called on was the New Zealand Division.</p>
        <p>Their period of rest and training in the Staple area was favoured by exceptionally fine weather, under which health and general fitness rapidly recovered from the strain of the winter. A comprehensive scheme of recreational training utilised the men's characteristic fondness of and aptitude for sports and competitions, with the object of promoting physical vigour, developing the fighting spirit, stimulating mental as well as physical alertness and restoring the vitality inevitably affected by a long period in the trenches. In the general military training it is interesting to note that stress was laid on the use of infantry weapons in combination with machine guns and light mortars, and on the development of the initiative and power of leadership of section and platoon commanders, especially as regards use of ground, direction and control of fire, and quickness of decision in dealing with all the varied situations which arise in battle. Rehearsals were made of deliberate fire-covered withdrawals from advanced positions both by day and by night, and of taking over in obscure situations defences held by a mixture of various and disorganised units. Suggestive, too, was the insistence given to emphasising in talks to the men the marked superiority, now long and indisputably established, of the New Zealand <pb xml:id="n404" n="338"/>soldier over the enemy in any kind of fighting. It had been intended that each infantry brigade should have a training period of 4 weeks, 1 brigade at a time remaining in the forward area for work on the Corps defence system. Musketry was practised on the ranges at Moulle beyond St. Omer. By the middle of March rest and training had reforged the Division into a weapon of sterling quality.</p>
        <p>In view of the expected offensive, arrangements had been made for rapid movement in case of emergency to the Ypres ridges. On 21st March, however, when the German attack broke out on the Somme, orders were received that the Division would pass from Corps into Army reserve and be held ready to entrain for the south after midnight 22nd/23rd March. Provision was made for the relief of the artillery from the line and for the concentration in the Divisional area of the 4 battalions training on the rifle ranges at Moulle. On the 22nd the Division was marked for transfer to the Third Army and ordered to commence entrainment on the afternoon of the 24th. On that date the various units in the Staple area marched to the stations at Cassel and Caestrc. The Rifle Brigade<note xml:id="fn163-338" n="1"><p>Lt. Col. <name type="person" key="name-413207">A. E. Stewart</name>, Vice Brig. Gen. Fulton, on leave.</p></note> group, with the Headquarters and 2 companies of the Engineers and with the Pioneer Battalion, all then in the forward area at Ypres, concentrated at Hopoutrc, near Poperinghe. The artillery, completing their relief behind Westhoek Ridge on 23rd March, entrained on the 25th at Caestre Godewaersvelde and IIopoutre. The rate of entraining was somewhat retarded owing to the destruction of a railway bridge near St. Pol by hostile action, and consequent disorganisation of the railway system. Caestre was bombed by aeroplanes, but no hitch marred the general arrangements. The Division for the remainder of its history was not again to form part of the XXII. Corps.</p>
        <p>By this time the British Staff anticipated an extension of the attack to the northern flank about Arras. It was at first intended, therefore, that the Division should on arrival in the Third Army area come under the command of the XVII. Corps on General Byng's left, The time for this German move, however, had not yet come, and owing to urgent need of further reserves on the Fifth Army front this order was changed on the 24th. The Division was then diverted further south to the Bray area on the Somme, where it would be in general reserve and be prepared to move at 4 hours' notice. It was allotted meantime to the VII. Corps <pb xml:id="n405"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP052a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP052a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP052a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Reserves, March 1918</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP052b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP052b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP052b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">A Front Line Trench, 1918</hi></head></figure>
					<pb xml:id="n406"/>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP053a"><graphic url="WH1-FranP053a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP053a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Artillery Teams under Cover</hi></head></figure>
					<figure xml:id="WH1-FranP053b"><graphic url="WH1-FranP053b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP053b-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">In Action near Colincamps</hi></head></figure><pb xml:id="n407" n="339"/>on the left of the Fifth Army, and General Russell on arrival established his headquarters with the VII. Corps Commander at Corbie.</p>
        <p>By the evening of the 24th, however, the immediate danger on the VII. Corps front had been averted by vigorous counterattacks delivered by the fresh Divisions sent to its support. Accordingly in the early morning of the 25th the New Zealanders were earmarked as G.H.Q. reserves and their destined concentration area moved further north up the Ancre valley to Mericourt 1'Abbé, Morlancourt and Dernancourt, places familiar to most New Zealanders who had participated in the Somme Battle of 1916. The railway line east of Amiens had been cut by bombs. It was arranged therefore that the troops should detrain at various stations between Amiens and Picquigny. Thence they would be brought forward, if practicable by busses, as far as Pont Noyclles, some 6 miles from Amiens on the Albert road, where they would be within easy reach of their destination. Divisional Headquarters moved during the afternoon to Ribemont on the Ancre. On this day (25th March) General Byng assumed command of all troops north of the Somme, and the Division thus passed, as originally projected, under the control of the Third Army.</p>
        <p>A more important change in organisation was being made elsewhere. By this time the gravity of the situation overpowered reluctance to face the delicate problems involved in the creation of that one supreme command of both French and British Armies on the Western front for which the Advisory Council at Versailles had been a makeshift. Clemenceau and Pétain, Lord Milner, Sir Henry Wilson, and Haig met that day at Doullens and took the preliminary measures for the appointment of Foch as Generalissimo of the Allied forces.</p>
        <p>On this day of the 25th, while this momentous decision was being arrived at in Doullens, and while the New Zealand trains were emptying their personnel in the disorganised stations west of Amiens, the German pressure on the right wing of the Third Army had not been relaxed. The VII. Corps had disputed the north bank of the Somme with gallantry and success, but to their north the V. Corps Divisions, out of touch with each other, had begun to fall back independently towards the Ancre. The seriousness of the situation may be gauged by the following message issued by Corps Headquarters at 5.45 p.m. to the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division, which during the day had beaten off a succession of attacks:—</p>
        <pb xml:id="n408" n="340"/>
        <quote>“If you are forced back over the Ancre you must secure the crossings between Authuille and Beaucourt. Send back parties if possible to make sure of these crossings beforehand. The 2nd Division is being forced back at Beaumont-Hamel and is practically non-existent. The 2nd Division have been asked to hold the crossings between Hamel and Beaucourt, but G.O.C. does not think this will be possible. It is very important that your left flank should not be turned. Cyclists are being sent to hold the crossings between Aveluy and Beaucourt, but these will not arrive for some time. Retain your hold on the Pozières-Thiepval ridge if you possibly can.”</quote>
        <p>The northern troops of the V. Corps, however, fell back and crossed the Ancre at Beaumont-Hamel. On their left beyond the gap the IV. Corps right was similarly being forced westwards. The 42nd and 62nd Divisions, which had been released by General Home and for 2 days had been attached to other Corps of the Third Army, were now sent to the IV. Corps with the hope that under their cover the exhausted front line Divisions could be withdrawn at nightfall and reassembled, first at Puisieux-au-Mont and Bucquoy, and later at Hébuterne Gommecourt and Fonquevillers. The insistent drive of the Germans proved, however, too powerful, and the Third Army was obliged to withdraw its centre as well as its right to the Ancre.</p>
        <p>Orders were thereupon issued for the V. Corps to hold the western bank of the Ancre, from Albert (inclusive) up to Hamel (inclusive). The 12th Division would be withdrawn from the VII. Corps for this purpose and come under the orders of the V. Corps, whose exhausted Divisions would then reform on the line Bouzincourt-Engelbelmer. On the right the VII. Corps were to withdraw at once to the line Bray Albert, conforming with the V. Corps and securing the retirement of the Fifth Army south of the Somme. The IV. Corps on the left would similarly fall back from its positions east of Logeast Wood and Achiet-le-Petit to the line PuisieuxBucquoy-Ablainzeville-Boyelles, where its left would be in touch with the VI. Corps. Meantime the personnel of the Third Army Musketry School was placed at the disposal of the IV. Corps, who with it and fragments of the 19th and 25th Divisions strove desperately to cover the Ancre crossings in the gap on its southern flank.</p>
        <p>In this gap hostile patrols had already crossed the river north of Miraumont and were rapidly moving towards Serre, <pb xml:id="n409" n="341"/>of sinister memory,<note xml:id="fn164-341" n="1"><p>p. 61. Serre was attacked again by us on 11th November 1916 without success. It was evacuated by the enemy on 24th January 1917 in the preliminary stages of his withdrawal.</p></note> and Puisieux. During the night (25th/26th March) they were to reach these villages, and advance parties to push beyond under cover of smoke barrages into Hébuterne and Colin camps. On the following morning (the 26th) Logeast Wood and Achiet-le-Petit were to be in German hands, and an aeroplane was to look down on strong parties moving towards Beaumont-Hamel, whose capture illuminated so signally the record of the last days of the Somme Battle in 1916.</p>
        <p>Elsewhere on the Third Army front the position on the 25th was satisfactory, but this ever-widening gap between the V. and IV. Corps was fraught with menacing possibilities. To fill it, a further call was made on the jealously guarded reserves. At 10 p.m. General Russell received orders from the Third Army to move with all speed by Hédauville and establish a line between Hamel and Puisieux. At the former place the New Zealand right would overlap the 12th Division of the V. Corps, and at the latter their left secure touch with the 62nd Division of the IV. Corps. The New Zealand Division itself was allotted to the IV. Corps (<name type="person" key="name-418918">Lt.-Gen. Sir G. M. Harper</name>, K.C.B., D.S.O.). At the same time the 4th Australian Brigade, so long associated with the New Zealanders on Gallipoli, was detached from its Division, now also in the rear of the battle, and allotted to the 62nd Division with orders to secure Hébuterne and extend the IV. Corps flank southwards.</p>
        <p>At this hour (10 p.m., 25th March) the bulk of the New Zealand troops was still west of Amiens. The tremendous strain on transport had made it impossible to provide an adequate number of lorries. Packs blankets and greatcoats had to be left under guard at the detraining stations. Ammunition up to 220 rounds a man had been issued, and to the machine and Lewds gun teams as much as they could carry. In light fighting order the leading troops had set out briskly towards the front, along dusty roads congested with military transport and with labour units, stragglers, and refugees streaming westwards. As yet only the 3 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, with portions of 1st Auckland and of 1st and 2nd Canterbury and the Machine Gun Battalion Headquarters, had reached their destination in the deserted Ribemont area. To such troops as had arrived and were now sleeping in their equipment, orders were hurriedly issued to march <choice><orig>immedi-<pb xml:id="n410" n="342"/>ately</orig><reg>immediately</reg></choice> and independently to Hédauville. Arrangements were made with the lorry-regulating station at Pont Noyelles to divert thither the other units as they came forward. Brigadiers and officers commanding battalions were summoned forthwith to Hédauville. In the early morning' of the 26th some of the outlying New Zealand units on the Ancre just escaped the enemy advance. To Ville-sous-Corbie, for example, a certain amount of equipment had been brought forward in lorries on the previous day. It was too bulky to be packed on the first line transport. A small portion was loaded on a lorry happening to pass through the village just prior to its capture. The rest fell into German hands.</p>
        <p>Divisional Headquarters reached Hédauville at 1.30 a.m. (Tuesday, 26th March). Part of the Machine Gun Battalion had already arrived. In the early hours of the morning it was followed by the 1st Rifles, who had marched the 10-mile journey from Pont Noyelles in the dark. The infantry brigadiers on horseback or by motor arrived shortly afterwards, and at a conference held before dawn the general plan of action was settled. The unfortunate delay in concentration, due to the absence of lorries, would make it necessary to send battalions forward, as soon as they arrived, in improvised brigades, irrespective of the brigades to which they properly belonged. The 1st Rifles were to move at 6 a.m., and passing Mailly-Maillet<note xml:id="fn165-342" n="1"><p>Corps Headquarters had moved the previous day from this village to Marieux.</p></note> would occupy an outpost position on the Engelbelmer-Auchonvillers ridge in order to get in touch with the V. Corps left and secure the right flank of the main New Zealand advance towards Hamel and Serre. The main operation would be carried out by the 1st and 2nd Brigade battalions, whose arrival might be looked for in the early forenoon. No cavalry patrols were available. Information was most fragmentary, but it was hoped that General Young's "2nd Brigade" on the right would occupy Hamel, gaining touch there with the left of the V. Corps, and thence take up a line just to the west of the deep ravines about Beaumont-Hamel. On the left,. General Melvill's "1st Brigade" would primarily secure a line about the road which runs northwards from Bcaumont-Hamel to Hébuterne, and then swing its left further east to Serre, extending it to secure touch with the IV. Corps right, still believed to be in Puisieux. In conjunction with this second movement the "2nd Brigade," pivoting on Hamel, would similarly swing its left forward east of Beaumont-Hamel. In accordance with <pb xml:id="n411" n="343"/>instructions issued by Corps at 2 a.m., the troops were ordered to push the enemy back over this ground should he be encountered. If he were met in greatly superior numbers, his advance was to be cheeked, and the brigades were to manoeuvre so as to gain and hold as a second line the important high ground from Colincamps to Hébuterne. For this purpose the "3rd Brigade" would on their arrival extend northwards the outpost position held by their 1st Battalion.</p>
        <p>Little time was given the 1st Rifles for elaborate preparations, and it was already 6.30 a.m. before their leading companies, with 2 sections of machine guns, moved from Hédauville up the open slopes north-east towards Mailly-Maillet. The cultivated fields, the villages and the woods made Picardy appear "a very pleasant country" after the wastes of Ypres. The Rifles were protected by a company as an advanced guard. This screen, moving to the east of Mailly-Maillet at 10 a.m., soon came in contact with the enemy. With Lewis gun and rifle fire its centre platoon drove back German patrols seen 500 yards east of Auchon-villers Wood. The left platoon pushed along the northern slopes from Auchonvillers up the road which leads to Hébuterne. About 1000 yards north of Auchonvillers this road meets the road from Serre to Mailly-Maillet, and at the crossroads stood a refinery for the manufacture of sugar from the beet grown in the neighbourhood. The left platoon found the enemy already in considerable force on the sunken Hébuterne road, south of the refinery, and moving forward with entire assurance. Lining the open ditches they hotly engaged him and arrested his progress.</p>
        <p>Fresh enemy forces, about 2 companies strong, now appeared north of the refinery on the road to Hébuterne, and close on 11 a.m. other considerable bodies were seen marching straight westwards along the road from Serre. Two advanced sections, under Rflmn. A. L. Sturmey and C. A. Tucker, held their ground against an overwhelmingly superior force, till the latter reached within 20 yards, then falling back skilfully on to the main platoon position. Sturmey alone killed 14 Germans, including 2 officers, and Tucker's Lewis gun section accounted for at least 90. But against the German numbers the thin screen could hardly have held its ground. At an opportune moment, however, the left platoon of the 2 companies detailed to occupy the outpost position came along the crest. The platoon commander, 2nd Lt. H. A. Mackenzie, had not<choice><orig>pre- <pb xml:id="n412" n="344"/>viously</orig><reg>previously</reg></choice> been under fire, but he handled his men with great skill and dash, and the situation was temporarily saved.</p>
        <p>By 11 a.m. the 2 companies of the 1st Eifles occupied the Auehonvillers ridge, the remaining company being held in reserve while the position was consolidated. Patrols, immediately pushed out, found the villages of Mertinsart and Mesnil to the south-east in possession of troops of the 12th Division. Elements of the 2nd Division were located astride the road from Hamel to Auchonvillers. The position of these troops was reported correctly by the 2nd Division to the V. Corps, but they were in no condition now to withstand further pressure.</p>
        <p>During all this time the 2 Rifle platoons on our extreme left, fighting with great determination, held up every effort of the superior enemy to advance from the sunken road. Their flank, however, was absolutely in the air, and the pressure from enemy moving southwards from the unoccupied country about Hébuterne became severe. Heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the commanding ground to the north was increasingly and ominously enfilade. Half the reserve company were therefore sent forward shortly after 1 p.m., and with the remnants of some British troops prolonged and swung back the left flank to a knoll of apple trees south-west of the refinery. Somewhat later the remainder of the advancd guard company, whose work was now accomplished, together with the other half of the reserve company, were collected and also sent to this left flank. By this time, however, the "2nd Brigade" had come up and were moving through, and the Rifles' task was fulfilled. It only remained for them to swing up, after the "1st Brigade's" advance, the left flank from Apple Tree Knoll.</p>
        <p>Meanwhile, from 6 a.m., further troops had begun to arrive at Hédauville. These were 1st and 2nd Auckland, 1st and 2nd Canterbury,<note xml:id="fn166-344" n="1"><p>Lt.-Col. Mead, vice Lt.-Col. H. Stewart, in command of Brigade Transport and "B Teams."</p></note> and 3 companies of the 2nd Rifles<note xml:id="fn167-344" n="2"><p>Major J. Pow, D.S.O., vice Lt.-Col. <name type="person" key="name-413207">A. E. Stewart</name>, acting as Brigadier.</p></note>, together with 2 machine gun companies, all of whom had overcome the difficulties of a march in the dark over unknown roads, where traffic-control personnel was non-existent. During the forenoon 3 companies of the 8th Battalion Tank Corps. amounting to 150 men with 60 Lewis guns, were attached to the Division. 1 company was allotted to the "2nd Brigade," and 2 to the "1st Brigade" on the exposed flank. Arrangements were made with the V. Corps for the 2nd <pb xml:id="n413" n="345"/>Divisional Artillery, or such of it as remained, to cover the New Zealand front pending the arrival of the New Zealand batteries.</p>
        <p>With the shortest possible pause for the receipt of orders, for a meal, for the issue of shovels and picks, the insertion of detonators in grenades, and other hurried preparations, General Young's "brigade," consisting of the 1st and 2nd Canterbury Battalions and a machine gun company, moved out of Hédauville at noon to occupy the line of the ridge overlooking the Ancre from Hamel northwards. Behind a protective screen the platoons moved at 100 yards' distance, 2nd Canterbury leading the way. On arrival at Mailly-Maillet, in consequence of the enemy forces in the sunken road, a 2nd Canterbury company was detached to occupy a position near the Apple Trees and so protect the left flank during subsequent advance.</p>
        <p>Deploying from the village shortly after 2 p.m., 1st Canterbury on the right and 2nd Canterbury on the left passed through the 1st Rifles' outpost line and moved forward to their objective. 1st Canterbury met some slight shell-fire, but with only a few casualties reached a line west of Hamel. The village itself they found held by elements of the 63rd and 12th Divisions, with whom they established touch. From their new positions they looked down on the Ancre valley about Thiepval. It was full of enemy movement. Directly opposite their front, however, it was manifest that the Germans had not yet crossed the river.</p>
        <p>Further north, vigorously exploiting the gap between the V. and IV. Corps, the 4th German Division had by now passed Beaumont-Hamel, and occupied in strength a rise beyond it on the north-west, crowned by a single tree and called One Tree Hill. Already on the western outskirts of Auchonvillers 2nd Canterbury had met machine gun and artillery fire, which, though slight, had compelled deployment into section formations. East of the village artillery fire was distinctly more heavy, and from One Tree Hill on their left and from the ridges in front toward Beaumont-Hamel machine gun fire became troublesome. Our own machine guns, however, taken off the limbers behind Mailly-Maillet, had been rushed up to the high ground and were providing strong covering fire. The enemy immediately confronting us was not present in force, and our objective near the Beaumont-Hamel ravines was reached without heavy opposition. In the evening a German machine gun post was rushed by 2nd Lieut. J. <pb xml:id="n414" n="346"/>Sinclair with his company sergeant-major, <name type="person" key="name-416607">D. M. G. Mackay</name>, and L.-Cpl. M. I. Anderson. Shooting and bombing the team they captured 2 prisoners and brought back the gun. It was disconcerting to find that the enemy had already passed the line which the brigade was to occupy when conforming with the second movement of the "1st Brigade" further north towards Serrc. Till the "1st Brigade" came up, any movement on the left flank would be at best premature. For the moment the Canterbury Battalions turned their attention to consolidating the positions won.</p>
        <p>In and about the left of our line were handfuls of very weary troops of all brigades of the 2nd Division, about 80 men in all. These were withdrawn in the evening. General Young's "brigade" had been just in time to forestall the enemy in occupation of what had been the 1916 British front line before the Battle of the Sommc. Crossing about Beaumont-Hamel the enemy had penetrated part of the old trench systems, but was not yet in sufficient strength to prevent the South Islanders from taking up their position. Numerous hostile parties were visible, but there was no indication of an impending organised attack. Only 1 small German patrol, about 12 in number, blundered on our outposts southwest of Beaumont-Hamel. In addition to the casualties inflicted on the enemy, 1 man and a light machine gun were captured. The Germans moved about with surprising audacity, and our machine guns and snipers secured many targets. Further in rear and out of range, considerable formed bodies were marching westwards, whom our artillery was not yet in position to engage. The 1916 trenches were still in fairly good order, with valuable belts in places of our old wire.</p>
        <p>During the forenoon the IV. Corps Divisions north of the gap had fallen back behind Puisieux and now held a line in the old 1916 German trenches from Star Wood through Box and Fork Woods to the east of Bucquoy. Nearer at hand the position had improved. A battery of the 2nd Divisional Artillery galloping into action during the morning had, over open sights, silenced the German machine guns in Colincamps Cemetery, and the village had been later cleared by 14 of our new light fast tanks, the so-called whippets, which now for the first time proved their value. This was not yet. known, however, at Mailly-Maillet. What was known was that the Australian Brigade was not expected to reach Hébuterne till the late afternoon, and that on all the featureless terrain of <pb xml:id="n415" n="347"/>gentle ridge and valley, where little cover other than the old trench systems was available against the German machine guns, the enemy were already in strength well to the west of Serre. They held the road which ran along the high ground from Auchonvillers past the refinery towards Hébuterne, and were in force on the crest about the ruins of the large tree-encircled La Signy Farm, which lay just east of the road, midway between the 2 villages. Here the Germans had penetrated about a mile into our old 1916 trenches. It was already more than doubtful if General Melvill's "brigade" could reach Serre, and the position on the left flank towards Colincamps and Hébuterne was thoroughly unsatisfactory.</p>
        <p>General Melvill's force, composed of the 1st and 2nd Auckland Battalions, the 2nd Rifles, and a machine gun company, had followed at a short interval the "2nd Brigade" to Mailly-Maillet. On General Melvill's arrival the situation was put before him, and he saw at once that a modification of his plan was necessary. It was still hoped, indeed, that despite meagre artillery support it might be possible to reach Serre and establish touch with the Divisions on the north at Puisieux, but arrangements were now made to swing our left flank considerably back so as to drive in the enemy from the vicinity of Colincamps. As a result of necessary deliberations, the “1st Brigade” attack astride the Serre Road did not develop till 5.30 p.m. 1st Auckland then advanced on the south of the Serre Road, the 2nd Rifles on the north, and 2nd Auckland followed in support. As 1st Auckland reached the northern end of the 1st Rifles' outpost line at the orchard on the Auchonvillers ridge, an enemy aeroplane flew low over their heads, and a certain amount of artillery fire followed. More serious were the enemy machine guns, which at once opened. Throwing off their fatigue in presence of the enemy, the 2 attacking 1st Auckland companies thrust forward vigorously along their 1500 yards' front. At the price of fairly heavy casualties they drove the Germans back out of the sunken road, capturing 3 machine guns. They then pushed some 300 yards beyond, where their right lay slightly behind the left flank of 2nd Canterbury. Serre was obviously out of the question. On the left also, where violent resistance was encountered, the 1st Auckland line lay for the time behind that of the 2nd Rifles, A stream of machine gun fire continued throughout the evening from the Serre Road, but after dark the left company advanced east along the road a further <pb xml:id="n416" n="348"/>300 yards. There they stormed a Strong Point, capturing 8 machine guns and 40 prisoners, and gaming touch with the 2nd Rifles. Particularly gallant work was done by Capt. H. R. Vercoe.</p>
        <p>North of the Serre Road the 2nd Rifles advanced abreast with 1st Auckland, with the object of reaching the Serheb Road, which runs north-west from Serre. Two companies were in the front line, while another company acted as a left flank guard towards the north. The explosions of a blazing ammunition dump between the refinery and the Hébuterne Road forced a detour, but the billowing smoke screened our advance from a machine gun at the cross-roads and from 2 others in a trench parallel to the Serre Road and adjoining it on the north.</p>
        <p>On the riflemen emerging from the smoke the machine guns opened fire. The leading platoon of the right company (Capt. W. J. Organ), on reaching the Hébuterne Road, paused a minute to assemble under cover of the road bank, and then, led by L.-Cpl. R. Ellmers and Rflmn. E. H. Dodd, dashed into the trench. 2 guns and 2 wounded prisoners were captured. The remaining 40 Germans retreated to trenches south of the Serre Road, whence in turn they were evicted by our snipers, leaving 5 unwounded prisoners in our hands. We captured also the Orderly Room records of one battalion, with a narrative of its actions since 21st March, and casualty rolls which showed that up to the 26th the unit had suffered 50% casualties. Pushing forward after the final advance of 1st Auckland, 2nd Lt. P. W. Parry actually reached a trench 1000 yards east of the refinery at the southern extremity of an important and commanding hedgerow which ran south from La Signy Farm and of which more will be said hereafter. Thence the company's line swung round north-westwards to the point (Euston Junction) where the road from Colincamps joined the Hébuterne Road. Further advance was barred, not so much by heavy cross machine gun fire from One Tree Hill southwards and from La Signy Farm northwards, as by the fact that the company was already far in advance of its flanks. Two attempts by the enemy to rush our trenches were checked. In the evening, after dispositions were made for the night, a German motor car crept up quietly and without lights on the Serre Road and stopped somewhat short of our furthest post. A lieutenant jumped out and walked up the road alone. Sergt. G. F. Webster and his 3 men in the post all fired at him, and killed him.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n417"/>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP054a">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP054a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP054a-g"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">A Stray Prisoner In Courcelles</hi>
            </head>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP054b">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP054b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP054b-g"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">Prisoners, 30th March 1918</hi>
            </head>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <pb xml:id="n418"/>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP055a">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP055a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP055a-g"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">Part of The Material Captured 30Th March 1918</hi>
            </head>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <p>
          <figure xml:id="WH1-FranP055b">
            <graphic url="WH1-FranP055b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-FranP055b-g"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">Captured Machine Gun In Action Near La Signy Farm</hi>
            </head>
          </figure>
        </p>
        <pb xml:id="n419" n="349"/>
        <p>Meanwhile the left company, somewhat less enterprisingly handled, had cleared the Hébuterne Road up to Euston Junction. From that point the flank guard took up a position along the Colincamps Road. In all, the 2nd Rifles captured 37 prisoners and 4 machine guns. They had lost 9 men killed and 35 wounded, all except 2 of the casualties being caused by machine gun fire. Invaluable assistance was given on this left flank by the light tanks which had cleared Colincamps during the morning.</p>
        <p>By nightfall, as a result of these operations, in which the Division had sustained altogether 150 casualties, mostly walking cases, our foremost troops occupied a strong and practically continuous line from just west of Hamel to north of the Serre Road. The southern portion of the gap between the V. and IV. Corps was definitely closed. On the “2nd Brigade” front observation was particularly good. North of the Serre Road the enemy held the high ground and overlooked us, but the time was not yet ripe for further action, and General Russell issued orders forbidding an attack till the general situation cleared itself. Consolidation was pushed on unmolested, and touch maintained by patrols with the enemy in front.</p>
        <p>If, however, the establishment of the “2nd” and “1st Brigade” line in the evening of the 26th gave no cause at the moment for apprehension about the Division's right flank, the position was very different with regard to the gap about Hébuterne. Late in the afternoon the 4th Australian Brigade attached to the 62nd Division had passed through the village and formed a line round its eastern edge. But between them and the New Zealand left above Euston Junction, the northern portion of the gap, amounting to about a mile and a half, was still unfilled, and the company swung back towards Colincamps barely saved the 2nd Rifles from envelopment. It was vital to fill this gap with the least possible delay. During the afternoon further troops of the Division had marched into Hédauville. These comprised the Pioneer Battalion, 2 companies of Engineers, a company of the Machine Gun Battalion, a light trench mortar battery, and further infantry battalions. The 3rd Rifles (less 1 company) arrived at 3 p.m. from Pont Noyelles, and 2nd Wellington at 5 p.m. from Amiens. 2nd Otago followed at 7.30 p.m., and 1st Wellington<note xml:id="fn168-349" n="1"><p>Major W. F. Narbey, vice Lt.-Col. Cook, sick.</p></note> and 1st Otago<note xml:id="fn169-318" n="2"><p>Major Hargest, vice Lt.-Col. Charters, wounded (gas) in February.</p></note> at 9 p.m. The Divisional <pb xml:id="n420" n="350"/>Artillery, the remaining 3rd Rifles company, the 4th Rifles, a company of the Machine Gun Battalion, a company of the Engineers, and 2 light trench mortar batteries were still on the march.</p>
        <p>The whole concentration of the isolated units from their different detraining stations had been characterised no less by masterly Staff work on the part of the Division than by the splendid response made by the men. As a rule the marching of the Division was not above criticism. The troops had been 2 nights without sleep and were tired and footsore, but at this critical juncture there was not a man but put forth his sternest effort on the forced march. Most battalions covered over 20 miles, and among them they had not lost half a dozen men. Thus, to take a single instance, 1st Otago, after travelling all night and day, detrained on the evening of the 25th at Hangest, 11 miles down the Somme valley from Amiens. Marching through Picquigny, it rested for the night in derelict lorries on the roadside. At 6.30 a.m. on the 26th it was again on the move and tramped steadily a further 16 miles through Amiens, Pont Noyelles, Franvillers to Hédauville. Not a man fell out the whole way. The 2nd Field Company of the Engineers, marching with full packs 23 miles between 11 a.m. and 10 p.m., similarly did not lose a single man.</p>
        <p>As soon as the gap between the New Zealand line and the Australians was reported to the Division, the more rested troops, comprising the 3 companies of the 3rd Rifles, 2nd Wellington and 2nd Otago, with a machine gun company, were formed into a composite brigade under <name type="person" key="name-413207">Lt.-Col. A. E. Stewart</name>, with orders to extend the line northwards up the Hébuterne Road. The Divisional reserves were now reduced to 1st Wellington and 1st Otago till the 4th Rifles arrived about midnight.</p>
        <p>At 1 a.m. on the 27th this force marched through Mailly-Maillet and reached Colincamps at 4 a.m. Here, in much the same way as the 1st Rifles had covered the Canterburys at Auchonvillers, 2nd Otago was thrown out in a screen east of the village and behind the left of the 2nd Rifles on the road to Euston Junction to protect the advance of 2nd Wellington and the 3rd Rifles. While Otago moved into position, these rested in the shelter of the buildings for some 10 minutes, and then with the first glimmer of dawn moved forward. They were covered by advanced and flank guards. 2nd <choice><orig>Wel-<pb xml:id="n421" n="351"/>lington</orig><reg>wellington</reg></choice> was on the right and the 3rd Rifles on the left towards Hébuterne.</p>
        <p>There was no shelling, but machine gun fire was at once encountered, and the troops deployed into skirmishing order. On the north the 3rd Rifles advancing rapidly pushed back the German advanced posts, and by 6.30 a.m. gained touch with the Australians south of Hébuterne. The splendid dash with which the Rifles moved had its due reward. The enemy, in considerably superior numbers, were apparently taken by surprise. They at once decamped, leaving behind them much equipment and entrenching material. Only at 1 point did they attempt resistance. They called on a section of riflemen commanded by L.-Cpl. J. N. O'Bonnell to surrender. O'Donnell's reply was an immediate charge with the bayonet, which drove the enemy back with heavy losses. From the position won, L.-Cpl. W. G. Bowers made a notable single-handed effort. He pushed forward alone down a sap to locate 2 enemy believed to be wounded. Instead of these he encountered 12 Germans, armed and unhurt. He at once attacked them. He was wounded but succeeded in capturing 2 prisoners and dispersing the remainder. 2nd Wellington ran right in the teeth of the machine guns firing from near La Signy Farm, and after securing 42 prisoners and a machine gun, in whose capture Capt. Melles, 2nd Lt. J. T. Thomas, and 3 platoons of the Wellington West Coast company did particularly fine work, they were obliged to dig in 400 yards short of the Hébuterne Road, which formed their objective. Touch was, however, maintained with the 3rd Rifles on the left and secured with the 2nd Rifles on the right at Euston. By 9 a.m. there was no gap left for German infiltration, and any further hostile advance would be purchased at a heavy price.</p>
        <p>Meanwhile on the “2nd” and “1st Brigade” fronts the night had passed quietly except for an assault on the British troops south of Hamel, which was repulsed by a counter-attack. Beyond them again, owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding, the VII. Corps had abandoned the Bray Line. The German vanguards were pressing towards Albert and reaching positions from which they were to turn the left flank of the Fifth Army on the following day. But no effort had been made against the New Zealand front. Advantage was taken of the enemy's inactivity to reorganise the brigades and restore units to their proper formations. 2nd Auckland relieved the 2nd Rifles north of the Serre Road. During or <pb xml:id="n422" n="352"/>shortly after the relief Auckland appears to have pulled back from the very marked salient about the hedgerow where the 2nd Rifles had established their outposts on the previous evening. The complacent announcement in German "intelligence," captured later on 30th March, of the peaceful recovery of this important high ground completely mystified the Divisional Staff, who did not at the time know that it had ever been in our possession. It was regained only at the cost of hard fighting.<note xml:id="fn170-352" n="1"><p>pp. 361 sqq.</p></note> On relief, the 2nd Rifles was brought into General Melvill's reserve at Mailly-Maillet as a preliminary step to its replacement by 1st Wellington, when it was to move first as Divisional reserve to Courcelles and later as Rifle Brigade reserve behind its own brigade front at Colincamps. In the early morning (27th March) 1st Otago relieved the 1st Rifles on their 3000 yards' support line behind the Canterburys. It was proposed that on relief the 1st Rifles should go to Colincamps as Divisional reserve, but in view of the enemy pressure about Hamel they were temporarily detained as brigade reserve by General Young at Engelbelmer.</p>
        <p>With dawn on the 27th the enemy endeavoured to resume his advance and extend the Serre gap southwards. After the rude checks of the previous evening, infiltration methods were abandoned in favour of violent assaults. His artillery was moved up and was to be consistently active throughout the day on Mailly-Maillet Courcelles Hédauville and Colincamps. For all their recent marching and fighting the Germans were not yet exhausted. Attack followed attack, for beaten back at one point the enemy's infantry was remorselessly launched at another. At 6 a.m., while the 3rd Rifles were driving the Germans before them south of Hébuterne, strong enemy forces mustering about the Serre Road were scattered by our artillery fire. It was not till noon that the enemy's first infantry effort developed. It was accompanied by heavy artillery and machine gun fire and directed at the 2nd Auckland positions north of the Serre Road. In the bombardment, 2 Auckland officers and 3 men were killed. The attack was beaten off by the 15th (North Auckland) Company, which, despite severe casualties, remained unshaken by 2 further attempts later in the afternoon. 1st Auckland put a company as reserve at its sister battalion's service, but this assistance was not required. The only gain made by the Germans was a short stretch of communication trench, which <pb xml:id="n423" n="353"/>was recaptured after dark. In the course of those attacks about the Serre Road, concentrations of the enemy massing in the old British trenches were severely punished by the 2nd Divisional Artillery.</p>
        <p>A somewhat heavier blow was delivered shortly afterwards on the 1st and 2nd Canterbury lines in the south. About 9 a.m. the enemy had begun to shell our front lines, at first lightly, but by noon his bombardment was of considerable weight and extended as far back as Mailly-Maillet. Half an hour afterwards his infantry, which had assembled in the quarries and deep ravines south of Beaumont-Hamel, advanced in small groups over the open and up old communication trenches towards the Canterbury positions. The attack penetrated within bombing distance but was successfully repulsed by rifle and machine gun fire, and the enemy retired to his trenches, leaving 30 dead and 2 light machine guns in No Man's Land. In the afternoon General Young extended his right to assist the English brigade on that flank in restoring a somewhat obscure situation.</p>
        <p>The next attack was launched on the other flank at Hébuterne in the afternoon. Very large bodies of hostile infantry had been observed in the morning in close formation about a grove of poplars a mile down the Puisieux Road.<note xml:id="fn171-353" n="1"><p>See Map No. 12.</p></note> They had been thrown into utter disorganisation by our machine gunners. Now from the same direction a battalion endeavoured to envelop Hébuterne. The greater weight of the blow fell on the Australians, but New Zealand rifles and Lewis guns co-operated in its repulse. Some time afterwards odd men could be seen crawling back on the ridge in a manner strikingly reminiscent of the Turks' retreat over Chunuk Bair,<note xml:id="fn172-353" n="2"><p>10th August 1915.</p></note> and, like the Turks, they were harassed by machine gun fire. A later attempt in the afternoon was similarly beaten back, though not without difficulty. During these afternoon attacks some forward guns of the "Wellington Machine Gun Company had a quarter of an hour's crowded experiences. One gun stopped dead, at a few yards' range, an ugly attempt to rush it. A second was forced to withdraw 50 yards to avoid being enveloped. A third was attacked by a strong and determined party. Ten of these were killed, but the team itself had casualties, and the firer was wounded. The gun was captured by the enemy. Then a party of 2nd Wellington came to the assistance of the survivors, and together they counter-attacked, recaptured <pb xml:id="n424" n="354"/>the lost gun, took in addition a light machine gun from the Germans and killed or put to flight their assailants.</p>
        <p>Foiled at each flank as on the Serre Road, the enemy struck at 7 p.m. at the 2nd Wellington position, 1500 yards long, midway between the refinery and Hébuterne. Here he scored his only success. The reserve company counterattacked, killing about 80 and capturing 5 machine guns, but could not restore the situation over the whole battalion front. The left company had been forced back 500 yards from the Hébuterne Road. During their withdrawal, one machine gun team on the northern flank was left much exposed. Prudence dictated their falling back some little distance to conform, but prudence in war can be a positive defect. A Rifles' n.c.o., Cpl. J. Bean, came over from the 3rd Battalion line and promised that “if the team would stick it out, he with his Lewis gun team and platoon would do so also.” It was agreed to “stick it out.” When later in the evening heavy rifle fire ensued from 150 yards in front, this team opened fire to let the enemy know the way was barred. In their uncertainty as to the general position in front, however, they fired high, and when subsequently a party of 40 men passed along 100 yards before the gun position, they could not in the uncertain moonlight distinguish whether they were friend or foe. The party moved away to the left and were presently lost to view. Dean not merely kept his word nobly, but later in the night himself led a section forward and rushed an enemy machine gun which was enfilading his flank, killing the crew and putting the gun out of action. In the course of the day 2nd Wellington had lost 4 officers and 70 men casualtied.</p>
        <p>Into the gap caused by Wellington's withdrawal the Germans swarmed, occupying securely the line of the road and pushing some posts west of it. The 3rd Rifles, however, swung back and strengthened their right flank with their last company, which now arrived opportunely on the battlefield.</p>
        <p>Similar attacks elsewhere on the Corps front were mostly frustrated. At Rossignol Wood, however, which lying between Hébuterne and Bucquoy was later to become so familiar to the New Zealanders, the enemy penetrated into its eastern outskirts, and further north he captured Ablainzeville and Ayette. Beyond the right boundary, Hamel, which had been definitely assigned to the V. Corps, was lost, and the 2nd Brigade reinforced their right flank and extended it southwards to assist the hard-pressed troops in this quarter <pb xml:id="n425" n="355"/>In all his attacks the enemy had incurred heavy losses, and additional casualties were inflicted throughout the day on large bodies of his troops in rear. Our machine gunners, indeed, were thoroughly and keenly enjoying themselves. During the afternoon German artillery teams attempting to bring up ammunition to a battery west of Serre were dispersed with casualties. A pair of guns engaged 2 companies of the enemy in column of route at a range of 700 yards, literally mowing them down, so that stretcher-bearers were busy moving in the vicinity for 3 hours afterwards. Another body of the enemy in mass formation, about 700 strong, was engaged at somewhat longer range. With the second burst of fire about 50 were seen to fall. A long burst was therefore fired plumb into the mass; great numbers fell, the remainder breaking and taking cover in shellholes and undulations. In this one instance 300 casualties at a conservative estimate were inflicted, and the ground was observed to be littered with bodies. At another point in the battlefield, 12 enemy machine gun crews attempted to move over the open towards their front trenches. Bursts were fired on each of the teams, some of which were entirely knocked out. The survivors abandoned their guns and ran back. In repeated attempts made to recover the guns many more casualties were inflicted. Enemy prisoners later testified to the powerful effect of our machine guns in checking their attacks. Such admirable targets could not be expected to continue, and every opportunity was sought to make hay while the sun shone.</p>
        <p>In the forenoon of the 27th the anxiously awaited New Zealand batteries, which had detrained west of Amiens on the previous day, began to arrive, and by noon four 18-pounder batteries and a 4.5-in. howitzer battery had concentrated at Hédauville. Their officers rode off at once to reconnoitre positions about Mailly-Maillet, and the guns went into action without delay. Practically all batteries were in position by nightfall. The 2nd Divisional Artillery was then withdrawn.</p>
        <p>The considerable movement opposite the New Zealand front, testified to alike by ground and air observation, and the use of smoke screens, covering the deployment of machine gun companies, made it appear very probable that the enemy would renew his attacks in the morning of the 28th. The utmost advantage was therefore taken of the lull that followed the enemy check. A reserve line of trenches was decided on by Corps, and on the Divisional sector <pb xml:id="n426" n="356"/>every man available, Engineers, Pioneers, and all 3 light trench mortar batteries, for whom Stokes ammunition became available only on the 28th, were employed on its construction. This so-called Purple Line ran in rear of Mailly-Maillet Colin camps and Hébuterne. Its northern portion was the more important, and on it work was primarily concentrated. The line was designed in the first instance to hold 2 infantry battalions and a machine gun company. Orders were given that it should be completed by 5 a.m. on the 28th. 2nd Otago was withdrawn from its former outpost line in front of Colincamps into Divisional reserve to garrison this portion, assist in its construction, and secure touch with the second Australian position behind Hébuterne. Here the battalion stayed till the 29th, when it exchanged places with the 1st Rifles at Engelbelmer. thus completing the reorganisation of the brigades. The Engineers were already beginning their resourceful explorations of the great catacombs under Mailly-Maillet, which had formed a refuge for the inhabitants in 1870 and now promised to afford shell-proof cover for reserve battalions. In the evening (27th March) Divisional Headquarters moved from Hédauville to a more central position at Bus-les-Artois.</p>
        <p>During the night (27th/28th March) the 1st and 2nd Brigades improved their positions. The batteries fired bursts on likely concentration areas about Serre. The expected general attack did not materialise. As soon as dawn broke our artillery registered all along the front, and during the day did some splendid shooting, which no one enjoyed more than the infantry in the line. The vigour and efficacy of the fire was proved by the markedly more cautious attitude of the enemy across the Ancre. For the most part only small groups were visible except on 1 occasion when 2 brigades moved to the Ancre from the neighbourhood of Serre. The New Zealand batteries swept the area for over an hour, and the German columns were not seen again. Though the enemy artillery was decidedly heavier, the whole situation on the Corps front was more stable, and General Harper took the opportunity of thanking his troops in the following message: "The Corps Commander congratulates the 42nd, 62nd, and New Zealand Divisions and the 4th Australian Brigade on their magnificent behaviour during the last few days' fighting. Numerous heavy attacks by the enemy have been completely repulsed with heavy loss and the capture of prisoners and machine guns. He heartily thanks the <pb xml:id="n427" n="357"/>troops for their courage and endurance and is confident that they will continue to hold the line against all attacks."</p>
        <p>2nd Wellington had found it impossible to retrieve the gap on their left. They were relieved during the night by the 4th Rifles, the last infantry battalion to reach Hédauville. With the morning (28th March) the New Zealand infantry prepared to strike back. The first enterprise was undertaken by the newly arrived 4th Rifles with the object of filling the gap on the Hébuterne Road. They had every reason for immediate action. Apart from their lack of touch with the 3rd Rifles, their position was commanded by enemy observation from his line about the Road, and was swept by the direct fire of a large number of machine guns already in position. At 5 a.m. a platoon of the right company advanced against machine gun fire and reached some old gun-pits west of the Road. Its commander, 2nd Lt. G. Malcolm, was killed during the operation after gallant hand-to-hand fighting against heavy odds. Two hours later a bombing section of the left company drove the enemy back 50 yards along a sap which afforded direct approach from the Road to our lino, and killed a number of Germans equal to their own strength. With these efforts the 4th Battalion advance was momentarily checked.</p>
        <p>The left company of the 3rd<note xml:id="fn173-357" n="1"><p>Major (now Lt.-Col.) P. H. Bell, vice Lt.-Col. Puttick, wounded on 27th.</p></note> Battalion immediately south of the Australian positions at Hébuterne now took up the action. Beside the Road, 500 yards south of the nearest houses of Hébuterne, were large quarries secured by the Germans on the 26th. Shortly before noon the left company of the 3rd Rifles, under Capt. H. C. Meikle, attacked these and captured them with slight loss. The enemy offered no resistance, but retired hurriedly, leaving a large quantity of arms and equipment. The position won was of the utmost value, commanding observation up to 3000 yards to the southeast. Among the German dead it was interesting to find individuals not only of the 4th Division, but also of that 20th Division, which the New Zealanders had battered so cruelly at Gravenstafel.<note xml:id="fn174-357" n="2"><p>2 p. 271.</p></note> The 20th and 4th Divisions had alternated with each other as front line and support troops since the opening of the offensive on 21st March.</p>
        <p>After the non-success of the morning attacks, which left the line still well to the west of the high ground at the Hébuterne <pb xml:id="n428" n="358"/>Road, the Rifle Brigade somewhat hurriedly planned a fresh attempt on a larger scale for the afternoon. The 4th Battalion were again to make a bid for the Road with the object of depriving the enemy of its commanding position and of establishing touch with the 3rd Battalion. The latter would conform by extending its line southwards. The sky had been overcast all day, and as the men moved out at 4 p.m. heavy rain was beginning to fall. The 3rd Rifles reached their objective after some resistance. The 4th Battalion attack was launched by 2 companies under the covering fire of the 1st Brigade batteries. It at once encountered intense machine gun opposition. Of the left company, the 2 northern platoons reached the Road with 2 officers and 12 other ranks. They were fiercely resisted by a party of 50 Germans, but drove them off, capturing 6 machine guns and 2 Lewis guns, and establishing touch with the 3rd Battalion, The 2 remaining platoons, however, were definitely held up, and thus the left platoons were exposed on their southern flank and isolated from the remainder of their unit. They safeguarded themselves for the moment by digging a flank trench, but sharp fighting was to ensue on the days following before this gap was filled.</p>
        <p>The right company, covered by enfilade fire from the 2nd Auckland Lewis guns, reached the line of the Road from Euston Junction for 100 yards northwards, repaying 2nd Auckland by materially improving the situation on their left. Further north, also, where the enemy was in considerable strength, they did not quite reach their objective, but pushed a post close up to some prominent stacks of timber beside the Road. Though the aim of the operation was not completely achieved, the post at the "Woodstaeks" would be a thorn in the flesh of the enemy at La Signy Farm and would facilitate a further attempt.</p>
        <p>No effort was made by the enemy this day against the well-established line of the 2nd Brigade, but against 2nd Auckland repeated strong bombing attacks were launched from La Signy Farm and down the Serre Road. Two of these in particular were pushed with great determination in the afternoon, after heavy artillery and machine gun fire. They were all repulsed with slight loss to the garrison and severe casualties to the attackers. In one of these a New Zealand machine gun was captured, but the gun team obtaining bombs pursued the Germans, recovered the gun and killed most of the raiders. A last attempt was made by the enemy <pb xml:id="n429" n="359"/>at 10 p.m., under cover of a particularly heavy machine gun barrage, when some of his troops moved over the open as well as up the saps. They were beaten off and left several dead in our hands. Further north the Germans penetrated deeper into Rossignol Wood. These local attacks and other operations of a larger nature elsewhere, similarly repulsed, were undertaken in conjunction with the grand attack at Arras and on the Scarpe, whereby Ludendorff sought to punch out the narrowing salient into which his advance southward was now confined. His decisive failure on the whole battlefield was a severe blow to German ambitions.</p>
        <p>The artillery supporting the Division was now reorganised, and <name type="person" key="name-123642">General Napier Johnston</name> assumed command of the brigades covering the front. In addition to the 1st and 3rd Brigades these consisted of the 25th Divisional Artillery, 1 "Army" brigade, and 3 R.G.A. brigades with a 60-pounder battery. Our harassing fire became continually more active. During the day (28th) there had also been a marked increase in enemy artillery as well as machine gun fire. The 1st Canterbury trenches had been pounded from close range. In the evening an unlucky 5.9-in, shell secured a direct hit on the cellar which was the Rifle Brigade headquarters in Colincamps. The whole place was wrecked, and the occupants completely buried. Major Purdy was killed, and Capt. Dailey, with the signal and intelligence officers, was wounded. General Fulton, who had arrived back on the 27th, succumbed later to the effects of concussion. General Fulton was the third and last of the New Zealand brigadiers to fall in action. A New Zealander by birth, he had held a commission in the Indian Army. Brusque, masterful, punctilious with regard to details, conscientious and capable, with some marked antipathies, among which was included a particularly keen dislike of strong language, he had ever been keenly sensitive to his men's sufferings and casualties. He had been associated for almost his entire service during the war with the Rifle Brigade, first as battalion commander and then as brigadier. Its interests were intensely dear to him, and it was largely due to his unflagging effort that the Rifles early attained an efficiency not surpassed by either of the other brigades. The casualties in the Colincamps headquarters amounted in all to 2 officers killed and 3 wounded and 9 men killed and 11 wounded. Lt.-Col. (now Brig.-General) <name type="person" key="name-413207">A. E. Stewart</name> assumed command of the brigade. Major Logan (later succeeded by Major P. W. Skelly, N.Z.S.C.) became Brigade <pb xml:id="n430" n="360"/>Major, Lt. (now Capt.) E. Zeisler was appointed Staff Captain. On the following morning Brigade Headquarters moved from their very unhealthy position in Colincamps to the schoolroom at Courcelles.</p>
        <p>The situation on the right of the New Zealanders was improved during the night 28th/29th by the 2nd Division's taking over the elements of its own troops and of the 12th Division, and assuming command of the sector from west of Hamel southwards. Capt. C. G. Hayter, too, of the machine gun company attached to the 2nd Brigade, gave the tired 2nd Division machine gunners assistance in digging in their guns and forming dumps of ammunition and rations. Some personnel also was left to strengthen the teams and ensure the guns' being kept in a fighting condition. On our own front, posts had been pushed out wherever possible 100 yards into No Man's Land. Orders wore issued, however, by a higher authority that all communication trenches leading out from our line towards the enemy were to be filled in for at least 50 yards, and the posts therefore were subsequently withdrawn.</p>
        <p>In the early morning of the 29th the 4th Rifle companies made a fresh effort to connect their positions and close the gap in our line between La Signy Farm and Hébuterne. Very bitter fighting ensued with superior enemy forces, on whom heavy casualties were inflicted. A bombing section cleared 200 yards of trench towards a communication sap which ran to the Red Hut at the junction of the La Signy Farm track with the Hébuterne Road. No substantial improvement, however, was effected. Further south, another bombing attack delivered by the enemy against 2nd Auckland was again repulsed. The rest of the day passed quietly.</p>
        <p>The Corps was now in process of losing its exhausted 19th 25th 41st and 51st Divisions, and the 37th Division was marching up to take their place. Rain, which had fallen almost continuously since the 28th, streamed in a steady downpour during the night 29th/30th. There was no enemy action on the Divisional front, and the 2nd Rifles<note xml:id="fn175-318" n="2"><p>Major Pow, vice Lt.-Col. (now Brig.-Gen.) <name type="person" key="name-413207">A. E. Stewart</name>.</p></note> relieved the 3rd between the Quarries and Hébuterne undisturbed. To the north the German completed his capture of Rossignol Wood. There was little or no shelling, but as o