With the MachineGunners in Franceand Palestine
Lieutenant-Colonel D. B. Blair, D.S.O., M.C.
in France and Palestine
by
MajorJ. H. Luxford
N.Z.M.G.C.
Zealand Machine Corps in
the Great World War
1914-1918
MCMXXIII
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To the memory of those gallant officers, non-commissioned officers and men of The New Zealand Marhine Gun Corps who lost their lines in the service of their country I humbly dedicate this book
While the introduction of new weapons or the development of existing weapons cannot revolutionise tactics, they can and do profoundly modify them. In the tactics of the late War the influence of the machine gun is clearly marked: and it can be claimed that the hopes, based on the use of machine guns by their advocates, have been fully realised.
Besides being an important factor in field operations, they became the dominant factor in defence. Of course, nothing can take the place of the determination and devotion of our infantry; without them battles cannot be won. But the machine gun was the best friend of those who manned the trenches at Gallipoli or in France; in the hands of the enemy they were the most deadly obstacle to our success (as at Bellevue).
Scattered along the front line or disposed in depth the machine guns were literally "life-savers"; they reduced to a large extent the numbers of men required to defend a position exposed to artillery; their very presence inspired the infantry with confidence.
The officers and men of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps have reason to be proud of their record. As in other armies they were looked upon as a corps d'elite; and as such they and their guns became the object of very special attention from the opposing artillery; the discovery and recording of their positions a matter of the keenest observation.
The machine gun has been called the Queen of the Battlefield; in the hands of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps this proud title has been more than justified.
The saving of man power was one of the most important results of the employment of machine guns in the late War. New Zealand, with its limited resources of men, will find a plentiful supply of machine guns, with a well-trained personnel, invaluable for local land defence.
Russell.
Paihia,
14th March, 1923.
Headquarters,
N.Z. Defence Forces,
Wellington,
New Zealand.
Starting with the advantage of instruction by such musketry experts as Captains Wallingford, Rose, and Henderson, the New Zealand Machine Gunners, from the first, accepted the doctrine that their work must be of the highest possible standard, and that no difficulty, however insurmountable it might appear, must be allowed to prevent them from giving their comrades the full support of their guns.
This doctrine soon became a tradition which was fully maintained when the Machine Gun Sections were formed into Squadrons and Companies of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps, and all ranks of the Mounted Rifles and of the Infantry know, far better than this short history can tell, how much they owe to the efficiency and to the devoted gallantry of their comrades of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps.
Chaytor,
Major-General,
Major J. H. Luxford.
Major L. M. Inglis, M.C
Major L. C. Chaytor, M.C
In writing this historical record of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps, I have had the two-fold task of tracing the operations of the Corps in France and in Sinai and Palestine. A General History of the New Zealand Forces in these campaigns has already been written and published. I have endeavoured in this account to follow the chronology of the General Histories, but to supplement them by giving in greater detail the part the Corps took in the many operations of the campaigns. The narrative is divided into two parts; the first deals with the work of the Machine Gun Companies that served the New Zealand Division in France, and the second deals with the work of the Machine Gun Squadron that served the Anzac Mounted Division in Sinai and Palestine.
Before entering upon the task of describing the exploits of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps, it is perhaps advisable to briefly refer to the Corps' principal weapon, and the organisation of the units that handled it, because it is assumed that some readers will be without this technical knowledge.
It is not an exaggeration to state that the machine gun was the weapon that played the most conspicuous part in the Great War; to it must be allotted the premier place among the death-dealing instruments of modern warfare.
For many years the scientists endeavoured to design a weapon with an automatic action, so that in the hands of one man it could do the work of many men with rifles. A number of weapons were introduced—the American Gatling Gun with ten barrels, and the French Mitrailleuse with twenty-five barrels; but they were found awkward, cumbersome and ineffective.
In 1883, however, Sir Hiram Maxim invented the true automatic gun, which has since borne his name. Although the modern machine gun is a very different weapon to the original, the principle on which it works is exactly the same, namely, the utilisation of the recoil caused by each discharge to extract the empty cartridge from and reload and fire the
The machine gun was used in the South African War and the many minor campaigns in which, during the twenty years that preceded the Great War, the British forces were engaged.
The potentialities of the gun were not fully appreciated, nor were its tactical uses properly studied and developed, until after the outbreak of the Great War. The reason of this omission on the part of the British General Staff is probably explained by the fact that the gun had so often failed in critical moments, and was looked upon as unreliable. The fault did not lie with the gun itself, but with the gunners, who had not been sufficiently trained to master the mechanism of such a delicate piece of machinery.
The Germans, however, before the war had realised the potentialities of the gun, and had made great progress in the development of its uses. Their gunners were specially selected and trained men, organised into companies. The company comprising six guns was an easily handled unit, and the whole of its personnel were experts on the gun.
On the other hand, the British Army left its machine guns in sections, divided up among and forming part of the battalions of infantry and regiments of cavalry. A section comprised two guns under a subaltern; there was only one section to a battalion or a regiment. Working as part of a battalion or a regiment the section had very little scope.
The British General Staff realised during the first year of the war that the superiority of the Germans in the number of machine guns and in the tactical handling of them had caused increased casualties to the Allied forces, and had hampered their offensive and defensive operations.
It then set to work to take away that superiority. The task was at once facilitated by the introduction of the Light Vickers gun towards the end of 1915. Prior to this the Maxim had been used; a gun that had reached a state of mechanical reliability in the hands of a thoroughly trained gunner, but had two very serious disadvantages, the weight, and the difficulty of speedily remedying stoppages caused by mechanical defects. The Light Vickers was only half the weight of the Maxim; its mechanism could be mastered by a gunner in a
The first step to gain superiority over the Germans was the establishment of a suitable formation, as it was realised that the study and development of the gun and its tactics could not be efficiently carried out if the section remained merely an infinitesimal unit in a battalion or regiment. The solution was found in the creation of the Machine Gun Corps, comprising companies for service with infantry and squadrons for service with cavalry.
The Company and the Squadron became self-contained units, and were placed on the same footing as a battalion or a regiment
At first three, and later four, companies were allotted to an infantry division, and the same number of squadrons to a cavalry or mounted division, which meant each brigade had a whole company or squadron, and the divisional commander was left with one in reserve. As a general rule the same company or squadron was always attached to a brigade, but for special operations the machine guns were frequently worked independently.
The creation of the Corps was a success from the commencement; the self-contained units were highly mobile, and could without difficulty or delay be moved about to conform with the tactical situation. Officers and men quickly accustomed themselves to the new formation; co-ordinate training brought about a marvellous development, while a fine esprit de corps, the greatest essential in the attainment of military efficiency, spread among all ranks.
It is interesting to note the difference between the old order and the new; under the old order a division of infantry had twenty-four machine guns, divided up in pairs, among the twelve battalions; it was difficult to co-ordinate their working; even when they were brigaded the lack of a permanent administration impaired efficiency. Under the new order the division had sixty-four machine guns, divided among four companies, each company was self-contained and independently mobile, concentrated and well co-ordinated work became practicable;
Early in 1918 a further alteration was made in the organisation of the Corps by the establishment of the machine gun battalion, to comprise the four companies of a division, with an independent headquarters. It was considered that the battalion formation would aid the administrative work, and would also facilitate closer co-ordination in the tactical handling of the guns. Although the battalion formation remained until the end of the war and was fully tested, there is not a consensus of opinion among the most experienced machine gun officers that it was an unqualified success.
After the creation of the Corps was decided upon towards the end of 1915, the General Staff's next step towards gaining superiority over the Germans was the extension of machine gun training. A central depot was established at Grantham, England, through which all reinforcements to the companies in France had to pass; General Headquarters Schools were established in the war zones for the purpose of instruction and experiment. A wing was established at Grantham in July, 1916, for training the reinforcements for the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps.
The New Zealand forces before the war had been extremely fortunate in having three of the ablest machine gun instructors
The units of the Corps took their places in the Divisions to which they had been allotted in the early spring of 1916. When the machine gunners were in the battalions and regiments nobody took any notice of them; now they had their individuality stamped upon them by a new badge, that at a short distance resembled the crossed swords of a general. The battalions did not take kindly to the companies to begin with; they looked down upon them in much the same way as the older boys of a school look down upon the unfortunate new boy at the beginning of a term.
Brigadiers and battalion commanders were apt to brush aside the views of the youthful company commander nervously expressed at a brigadiers' conference; but then the Corps was only in its infancy, and had yet to prove itself. The German gunners had to be beaten it their own game.
Gradually the gunners did prove themselves; they put their guns to all kinds of uses; the companies in France, unable to observe the well-entrenched enemy, harassed his communications by night as well as by day; the gunner showed the infantryman that his gun could do the same work as the artillery. Then, as efficiency increased, the machine gun was used to supplement the creeping barrage, also to cover advanced posts with indirect overhead fire, falling barely a hundred yards ahead. At first the infantry objected to the guns firing over them; they did not realise that it could be done with safety; even battalion commanders complained. Soon, however, they not only got used to it, but learned to welcome the sound of the familiar crackle immediately an S.O.S. signal was sent up.
The British machine gun, its uses and its tactics developed wonderfully, and completely overshadowed the German machine guns from June, 1917, until the end of the war. The object of the General Staff was fully achieved.
The writing of this book has been to me a pleasant undertaking. With the return to the rush and bustle of civilian life, the great events through which we passed are apt to become mere episodes. An historical account, compiled from official records, will help us to retrace our steps, and will keep before us the incidents and friendships of those eventful years.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the writer was not one who served throughout the whole period of the war, also that his knowledge is confined to the work of the companies in France, and does not extend to the work of the squadrons in Sinai and Palestine. If the members of the squadrons feel that their portion of the book does not fully deal with the splendid part they played in the campaign in the Holy Land, they will be good enough to remember that the history is based on official records, and that during the war, commanding officers looked upon the forwarding in each month of "The War Diary" as an unnecessary nuisance. I must concede, however, to the squadron commanders that their War Diaries were excellently kept; I cannot concede the same to all the company commanders, or even to the New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion Headquarters.
It is to be hoped that the account which I have compiled will be complete, and will show and illustrate the way in which the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps worked from its inception to attain efficiency, and how it used that efficiency, if only in a small degree, to contribute to the Final Victory that should mean so much to mankind and civilisation.
I feel under a deep debt of gratitude to the many officers and men who have assisted me in my task. Lieut.-
The officers is charge of Historical War Records and Base Records (
Lieut.-
I wish also to express my thanks to
Luxford.
"Croydon,"
Remuera, Auckland, N.Z.
4th October, 1922.
The History of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps
Introduction
The reorganisation of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, after its evacuation from Gallipoli, and the events which necessitated the steps that were then taken, do not come within the scope of this work. Lieut.-Col. Stewart, in the first chapter of "The New Zealand Division," has dealt with these matters very carefully and minutely. It should be understood by those who are desirous of fully comprehending the part played in the Great War by the soldiers of the Dominion of New Zealand that the histories of the individual units of the Expeditionary Force are merely supplemental to the main official histories. Lieut.-Col. Stewart, in the preface to "The History of the New Zealand Division," specially mentions that he has left the work of units smaller than battalions to receive due recognition in the Regimental Histories. This was necessary to avoid "prolixity and obscurity" in the main history.
In the reorganisation of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, which took place in January, February and March, 1916, it became necessary to form a Machine Gun Corps, in accordance with the decision of the General Staff to increase the establishment of machine guns and to organise the personnel into a corps.
The New Zealand Machine Gun Corps was accordingly formed, to comprise three companies for service with the Division and one squadron for service with the Brigade of Mounted Rifles. A nucleus of personnel was immediately available from the sections of the battalions and regiments.
The composition of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps at the time the New Zealand Division left for France was as follows:—
- 1st New Zealand Machine Gun Company, serving 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade:
- Officer Commanding: Major J. M. Rose, M.C, N.Z.S.C.
- Second-in-Command: Vacant.
- Section Officers:
Lieut. T. H. Watson T. H. Watson Lieut. E. H. T. Kibblewhite E. H. T. Kibblewhite Tingey, N.Z.P.S. N. Z. P. S. Tingey Lieut. A. R. Curtis A. R. Curtis Lieut. W. J. Reid W. J. Reid
- 2nd New Zealand Machine Gun Company, serving 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade.
- Officer Commanding: 2nd Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) J. B. Parks (
Essex Regt .). - Second-in-Command:
Capt. J. W. D. McKnight J. W. D. McKnight - Section Officers:
Lieut. J. B. Mawson J. B. Mawson Lieut. E. McLean E. McLean Lieut. H. H. Hayhurst H. H. Hayhurst Lieut. A. B. Fordyce A. B. Fordyce Lieut. A. J. M. Manson A. J. M. Manson Lieut. R. H. Buchanan R. H. Buchanan Lieut. C. M. Smith C. M. Smith
- Officer Commanding: 2nd Lieut. (Temp. Capt.) J. B. Parks (
- 3rd New Zealand Machine Gun Company, serving 3rd New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade.
- Officer Commanding:
Capt. J. H. Luxford J. H. Luxford - Second-in-Command:
Lieut. A. C. Finlayson A. C. Finlayson - Section Officers:
Lieut. R. G. Gallien R. G. Gallien Lieut. J. A. D. Hopkirk J. A. D. Hopkirk Lieut. C. S. Geddis C. S. Geddis Lieut. C. G. Hayter C. G. Hayter Lieut. L. S. Cimino L. S. Cimino Lieut. K. D. Ambrose K. D. Ambrose Lieut. W. R. Proffitt W. R. Proffitt Lieut. P. D. Russell P. D. Russell
- Officer Commanding:
PartI
The Companies of the Corps
ChapterI
The Companies Leave Egypt for France
On the 5th April, 1916, the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the Corps entrained for Alexandria, while the 1st Company entrained for Port Said, and on arrival at their destinations embarked for Marseilles in different transports, so that full advantage could be taken of the machine guns on the ships in the event of attack by enemy submarines. 1st Company embarked on
The usual rumours spread about the ships of submarines being in the vicinity, but the whole transportation was carried out without mishap. The troops on board the Alaunia for a few brief moments believed the rumours had foundation; the machine guns were given orders to fire half a belt as a test, because it was feared that the salt air and water had interfered with their mechanism. Notice of the shoot had not been given to the troops, so that the sudden rattle of ten guns opening fire allowed of no other explanation than an attack by a hostile submarine. The alarm bore good results, for many a soldier who in his bravado thought it infra dig to punctiliously carry out the order that required him to have
The Companies disembarked at Marseilles, and soon commenced the long tedious railway journey of three days and nights to the Hazebrouck Area, a journey which must remain a lasting memory to those who undertook it. The sudden change of seeing the beautiful Rhone Valley, the carefully cultivated fields and the abundant growth of early spring after the sands of the desert, brought all back in thought to their own land, and gave a feeling of having passed from the wilderness to the promised land. Few, if any, thought how soon they would long to once more turn back to the desert and leave behind them the mud and slush of Flanders and Picardy.
Tedious though the journey was, the wonderful demonstrations of the French population at the stations through which the trains passed, the gradual change from peace to war as they proceeded north of Paris, and seeing the huge back area organisations of the British Armies kept up a lively interest among both officers and men.
The Companies detrained in the Hazebrouck Area at Morbecque and Steenbecque on 20th April, 1916, and at once marched to the villages in which their respective billets had been allotted, and very little time was lost by all ranks to quickly make themselves comfortable, and to rest after the long train journey. The 1st Company's Headquarters were at Morbecque, the 2nd Company's at Blaringhem, and the 3rd Company's at Steenbecque (being later moved to Thiennes).
Sufficient has already been written and published in novel form about the many humorous adventures that befell our soldiers when they first arrived in France, owing to misunderstandings of language and custom, without the necessity of introducing a number of such adventures into an official history.
The officers and men of the Machine Gun Corps did not escape these adventures, but, unfortunately, some of the very choice faux pas they made were not sent in with the reports of the companies. One amusing incident will bear repeating. The itchy feeling that came over the men of one company paille (straw)." Madame's eyebrows opened widely—in apparent surprise, but she signified she would obtain exactly what "Monsieur le Capitaine" required. At midday (three hours later) enquiry was made to ascertain whether the paille had arrived, but Madame only drew a long face and endeavoured to explain the difficulty she was experiencing to comply with "such an order." About 4 p.m. Madame appeared at Headquarters, wreathed in smiles, to inform Monsieur le Capitaine that "it had arrived." The O.C. went out to see the straw distributed, but there was no well filled wagon of straw in sight, only a large-sized man—a baker—accompanied by four barrow loads of steaming bread fresh from die oven. Madame had confused paille with pain, quite convincing the O.C. Company that Madame did not understand her own language. The men of the company, however, greatly appreciated the mistake at the evening meal an hour later.
The wheeled transport of the Corps was left behind in Egypt, but the horses arrived in France a few days after the Companies. The horses were detrained at Abbeville, about 60 miles from the Hazebrouck area, where the transport officers were given orders to draw the necessary wagons and equipment to complete the establishment The transports of the Corps trekked across to the Divisional area and reached their respective Companies on the 27th April
Leaving the wheeled transport behind in Egypt caused a great deal of extra work to the Companies, who had to handle the whole of their large equipment, which ordinarily remained in the wagons. All ranks were extremely happy to be rejoined by the transport, and very soon the Companies were in proper working order, employing their tune in overhauling guns and equipment, mastering the intricacies of the new P.H. gas helmet, and the Laws of War in France, which had to be gleaned from the masses of instructions that were issued to commanding officers for promulgation to their troops.
On 30th April General Plumer (commanding Second
Orders finally came for the Division to move closer to the line, preparatory to taking over a sector of the trenches, and on 1st May, 1916, the 2nd and 3rd Companies moved forward with their respective Brigades to the Corps Reserve Area, the 1st Company remaining at Morbecque.
ChapterII
The Companies in the Line
Period from
th May,1916,
to18
th August, 1916
The sector of trenches taken over by the New Zealand Division extended from the River Lys in the north to a place known as Pear Tree Farm in the south, a very short distance from the Lille-Armentières railway; the length of the line was about four miles. The sector was divided into two subsectors—the Houplines on the north and the L'Epinette on the south. The 1st Company relieved the 51st (British) Machine Gun Company in L'Epinette subsector on the 13th May, and the 2nd Company relieved the 52nd Company on the 14th May. The 1st Company suffered casualties on the first day in the line—
The sector had been occupied by British forces since the tide of the German invasion had been stemmed in 1914. Although a great deal of work had been continuously carried out in the improvement of the trenches, the winter that had just passed had left them in a state that called for urgent attention. The gunners rejoiced that they were exempt from duty in the large working parties that nightly went forward to dig revet and lay down the indispensable duck-walks.
The services of the engineers were given to improve the machine gun emplacements, and to build new ones in concrete
Before a month had passed, the whole sector was satisfactorily cleaned up and renovated, and both infantrymen and machine gunners m the fine were able to live in comparative comfort.
The town of Armentières-although barely a mile and a Most of the officers of the Corps who were in the Armentières Sector will have vivid recollections of the excellent dinner given by Lieut.
Each of the Companies had a permanent Headquarters in the town, also quartermaster's stores, to which supplies were brought to be prepared for distribution among the gun teams in the line. The Division quickly accustomed itself to its surroundings, and settled down to a well ordered routine.
The low lying country surrounding Armentières, with water close to the surface did not permit of deeply dug trenches; in fact, the word "trenches" is a misnomer; they should be called "breastworks."
The 3rd Company relieved the 2nd Company in the Houp-lines Sector on the 23rd May, and remained there until the 2nd June, when the 2nd Company again took over the sector, and the 3rd Company went back into reserve in Armentieres.
The O.C. 3rd Company was detailed to report on the machine gun defences of the town of Armentières and found them in a very bad state, as they had been overlooked for a considerable period. The 3rd Company was thereupon employed in putting the emplacements in order, and as the garrison company, was trained and practised in taking over and manning the defences in case of alarm.
The Companies changed over several times as the Brigades relieved each other, until about the end of June, when the Divisional front was extended, necessitating the three Brigades and Companies being in the line at the same time.
Sufficient machine guns were placed in the front line trenches to enable them in case of attack to open fire along lines so set that the continuous belts of fire would be formed
When the gunners began night firing as a regular thing, they were naturally very anxious to know what effect it had on the enemy. They realised how unpleasant the enemy machine gun fire was, although it was spasmodic, and not co-ordinated. The gunners were highly delighted when a German prisoner captured towards the end of May made a statement that our night firing machine guns caused a great deal of confusion, and that a number of casualties had been inflicted on troops coming up to the trenches.
The extension of the divisional front, and the increased activity that was ordered for the purpose of harassing the enemy as much as possible during the period immediately preceding and after the opening of the Battle of the Somme, threw upon the machine gunners, as well as the other arms, a tremendous strain. Indirect fire was carried out by the Companies by-day as well as by night; practically all the guns that were not in fixed positions in the front and support lines were used for the purpose.
In the early part of July the 1st Company had a trying time. On the 3rd July a number of guns were engaged carrying out their firing programmes, when at about 10 p.m. the enemy opened a heavy bombardment on L'Epinette with 5.9's and minnenwerfer. A raiding party came over against our trenches, and the machine gun under 2nd Lieut. W. Benzies was cut off. By a stroke of good fortune the raiders missed the emplacement, so Benzies ordered the gunners to remove the gun and equipment to the rear. While getting the gun back, Private White, who was carrying it, ran against a German. White, although handicapped by the weight of the gun, managed to let off a bomb, which wounded the German and himself. White's action was very gallant, for he must have known that he would suffer as badly as the Hun. His action
During the night of the 8th July the enemy made a determined raid against the Mushroom, which was held by the 1st Canterburys. An intense bombardment preceded the raid, which inflicted serious casualties—the two infantry officers in charge of the Mushroom were both killed.
The 3rd Company relieved the 5th Australian Machine Gun Company in the Bois Grenier Sector on the 4th July; unfortunately the relief was in progress when the heavy enemy bombardment of Armentières commenced, which caused much inconvenience; but the relief was accomplished without casualties. The 3rd (Rifle) Brigade also moved into the Bois Grenier Sector, thus extending the Divisional front to an aggregate length of eight miles.
The activity of the Companies did not abate for nearly three weeks during which period a number of raids took place, eleven by our forces, and four by the Germans. The machine guns were used to support the later raids with overhead indirect fire, and rendered valuable assistance to the raiding forces by the barrages they brought down on both flanks of the raid and in the support trenches behind the trench that was being raided.
The front line machine guns had numerous calls upon them during the active period in July, to which they effectively responded. Firing a machine gun from an enclosed The Vickers Machine GunAn excellent photograph taken when the working of the gun was being explained to Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward.3rd Company, N.Z.M.G. Corps Major J. H. Luxford commanding. Photograph taken at Armentières, June, 1916.The upper portion of this building was badly knocked about with shell fire.
Throughout the first three months of the new corps' fighting life, its personnel worked hard to increase its efficiency, both in the fighting and administrative branches. The Company organisations worked smoothly, supplies of rations and ammunition, and replaced equipment were regularly and expeditiously brought forward. The many advantages of the new organisation were realised and used to the fullest extent.
The second week of August saw the Companies out of the line after practically three months continuous work, and moving with their Brigades to the Blaringhem Area for concentration prior to departing to Picardy to prepare for the resumption of the great Somme offensive on the 15th September, 1916.
Armentieres was left with many regrets. In spite of the arduous line work the Companies had had in its vicinity, both officers and men had found time for making acquaintances and associations. In the brief periods out of the line they had taken advantage of the many comforts and attractions the town was able to offer.
During the first six weeks the Division was in Armentieres the Company out of the line conducted a machine gun school, to enable as many infantrymen as possible to be trained in the working of the gun. It is perhaps to be regretted that this scheme was not continued, for there were several occasions in the writer's knowledge when an infantryman who had learned the elementary principles of the gun could have continued working it after its crew had become casualties.
The work of the training depot at Grantham had proceeded, and by this time fully trained gunners were coming forward with the reinforcements. Officers and men were chosen from the infantry reinforcements that arrived in England from New Zealand for training as machine gunners at Grantham, and by this means the Companies with the Division were kept up to strength.
A very well-equipped and stalled machine gun school was opened in Camiers in April, 1916, to which officers and n.c.o.'s were sent for instruction. This school maintained a
Many members of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps will have pleasant recollections of the courteous and efficient manner in which they received instruction at this very excellent school.
ChapterIII
The Journey to the Somme
Period
nd August,1916,
to13th
September,1916
The movement of the New Zealand Division to the Lower Somme Area was completed by the 22nd August, and all ranks were informed that a solid period of training was ahead of them, to fit them for the part they would be called upon to play in the great Somme Offensive.
It is probable that if the troops of the Division had been asked, they would have unanimously declared that the most delightful period they experienced in France was the fortnight's training among the glorious wooded valleys of Picardy in the autumn days of 1916. Beautiful weather was experienced most of the period; the air on the hills seemed so clear and pure after the variated stenches that permeated the trenches of low-lying Flanders. Truly does Lieut.-Col. Stewart say in his History, "Health improved rapidly, and at no time were more energy and keenness thrown into the training."
Something got into the blood; the inexplainable something that nature so often supplies to support her sons in times of crisis; and surely the ordeal through which the Division was so soon to go for twenty-three days was a crisis that justified a something greater than merely human support.
The Companies of the Corps became full strength, and deficiencies in equipment having been satisfactorily explained to D.A.D.O.S. Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services—the chief ordnance officer of a Division. This officer is usually spoken of as "Dados."
The officers commanding the Machine Gun Companies had the privilege of witnessing a practice attack by the tanks early in September, while this new and terrible weapon of attack was still veiled in the greatest of secrecy. It was a thrilling sight, and was witnessed by most of the Army and Corps Commanders, and by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.
It is perhaps regrettable that Lieut.-Col. Stewart omitted in his History to refer to the revival of "Oratorical exhortation to troops before battle," which formed part of the preparation of the Division for the Somme offensive; but it is excusable when the stupendous undertaking of his work is realised.
Just prior to the Division leaving its pleasant surroundings for the great battle, each Brigade was lectured en bloc by Major Campbell, upon the art of bayonet fighting. To address 4000 soldiers in an open field was no light task, as those who have had experience in open-air speaking can testify; but Major Campbell knew his subject, and he knew how to speak in the open, and he knew his audience. Not a man in the three Brigades of the Division who had his faculties could have missed a word that was said in a memorable address, which lasted longer than half an hour. "Bayonet fighting" may have been his subject, but "killing Huns" and "seeing blood run" was his message to the troops. He prefaced his remarks by saying: "No Hun is good unless he is dead; it is therefore our bounden duty to make as many 'good Huns' as possible." The eloquent Major then exhorted the New Zealanders to pledge themselves "to see Hun blood run" and to keep it running, and at all times to use the thrust that would ensure the creation of another "Good Hun." He gave many illustrations during the exhortation of the best places for quick killing, and finally, after he had completely imbued his listeners with the fervent desire to at once get to work to make good Huns at the point of the bayonet, he asked if anybody had any questions. No questions were asked, and Major Campbell said he had only once been asked a question at the close of his address, and that was by a nervous looking individual. The question was, "Please, sir, can you tell me how I can get transferred to the Army Service Corps?"
The 3rd September brought to a close the happy days
When the Division again moved forward it found itself proceeding along the main roads that served the Battle Area. The most thrilling spectacle was the Main Amiens-Albert Road, with four continuous streams of traffic upon it, so perfectly controlled that the slower moving columns did not hold back the faster.
On the 8th September the officers commanding the Machine Gun Companies made a reconnaisance of the battle front with the commanding officers of the Brigades. Fortunately the storm had somewhat abated at this time, but the wreckage had not been cleared away. There had been several German counter-attacks during the early hours of the morning, accompanied by the usual heavy artillery fire; the attacks had been repulsed, but the toll the artillery had exacted in our trenches showed the ghastly slaughter that attended even a comparatively small operation, under modern conditions.
The 3rd Company relieved the 1st (British) Company on the 9th September, and remained in the line for several days. On being relieved by the 2nd Company it returned to Fricourt. where the 3rd Brigade was bivouacked. The 1st Company was also at Fricourt, but the 2nd Company remained in the line. The 1st and 3rd Companies, during the few days that elapsed before the Great Attack, were kept busy at the guns and overhauling the belts of ammunition. The commanding officers completed and issued their orders, and on the evening of the 14th September the 3rd Company moved up to the line in readiness for the attack that had been timed to begin at 6.20 a.m. on the morning of the 15th. The 1st Company moved to Mametz Wood, where it remained as Divisional Reserve until it went forward with the 1st Brigade on the 16th to continue the attack.
ChapterIV
The Battle of the Somme,
Period
th September,1916,
to 4th October,1916
The first Battle of the Somme opened on 1st July, 1916, when the Fourth Army assaulted the strongly defended enemy lines, in accordance with a scheme designed to relieve the enemy pressure against the French at Verdun, to prevent enemy forces being transferred to other theatres of war, and to wear down the enemy strength. The initial stages of the offensive were marked with success, except on the northern portion, where the marvellously conceived defences between Thiepval and Serre defied our boldest efforts. Steady pressure was maintained on the southern portion, gradually enabling the wedge to penetrate nearer and nearer towards Bapaume, until by the end of August it was considered that decisive results were within our reach.
Plans were quickly prepared to attain these results before the winter rains came down to hamper operations. The scheme was ambitious. It meant breaking through the enemy's last line of defence and rolling up his flank to the north-west; thus imperilling his whole line. The 15th September was fixed for the opening of the renewed offensive, which is generally referred to as the third phase of the first Battle of the Somme.
The role of the Division was to advance on a front of 1000 yards to a depth of approximately 2000 yards, and then to swing to the north-west to extend its right flank about 1000 yards beyond the Village of Flers, where it would join up with the left flank of the 41st Division. The 47th Division, attacking on our left, was to join up with our left flank. The object of this advance was to deprive the enemy first of the important High Wood Ridge, and secondly of two important trench systems—the Switch and the Flers. The Division's attack was divided into four phases: The first phase was
The fourth phase was the swinging to the north-west from where Grove Alley crossed Abbey Road, capturing Grove Alley and establishing a new line beyond it between Abbey Road and Ligny Road, to be known as the "Red line," by 1st Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade.
The sketch plan See map facing page 58.
The 2nd Machine Gun Company co-operated with the 2nd Brigade in the first phase of the attack, and the 3rd Machine Gun Company co-operated with the Rifle Brigade in the second, third and fourth phases.
Capt. Parks kept the guns of the 2nd Company assembled behind the original front line for quick movement after the 2nd Brigade captured its objective, as it was decided not to send any guns forward with the assaulting battalions. It seems that the decision to keep the 2nd Company unemployed during the first phase was unsound. With bold handling, the guns of 2nd Company could have been pushed ahead of Switch Line during its consolidation, and inflicted heavy casualties on the large enemy movement that was observed after the crest line had been passed.
The dispositions of the guns of the 3rd Company were:—
- Two guns under 2nd
Lieut. H. T. Morton H. T. Morton - Two guns under 2nd
Lieut. A. H. Preston A. H. Preston - Two guns under
Lieut. C. S. Geddis C. S. Geddis - Two guns under 2nd
Lieut. H. J. Worsley H. J. Worsley - Eight guns under
Lieut. C. G. Hayter C. G. Hayter
The gun sections moved off with the Battalions when the anxiously awaited zero hour arrived, and the reserve guns of the 3rd Company moved up in front of Seaforth Trench—slightly to the rear of our front line. These guns were to be moved forward of Switch Trench at 7.30 a.m. to take up positions from which they could employ covering fire to assist the 2nd and 3rd Battalions in the third phase of the attack when they would be without the assistance of the creeping artillery barrage. While moving forward, the reserve guns were caught in the enemy barrage that came down between our original front line and the Switch Trench, causing heavy casualties, and one gun was blown to pieces. 2nd
When the Switch Line had been captured, Capt. Parks (2nd Company) received orders to send forward six guns to assist in its consolidation. The six guns went forward at 7 a.m., and succeeded in reaching the Switch Line with few casualties. It was decided to form three strong posts in the Switch, with two guns in each, and the gunners quickly got to work, and in a comparatively short time had their guns in position.
At 3 p.m., when the left flank was threatened by the German counter-attack, a section of four guns went forward from the reserve guns to strengthen the left flank of the
The first objective having been taken and the guns of the 2nd Company being employed in its consolidation, the guns of the 3rd Company began their work.
2nd Lieut. Worsley moved his guns forward with the reserve platoon of the 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, with very few casualties, and when the Brown line was captured took one gun forward of its left flank, where a strong post was made. This gun was able to open fire at once and inflict heavy casualties upon a large number of Germans who were falling back. It was then mounted in a defensive position in the strong post, and was not again called upon to fire that day. Worsley then went to his second gun, which he had ordered to report to Capt. W. W. Dove, commanding the Infantry Company near the centre of the line, and moved it into a position that gave it a wide field of fire. The placing of this gun was skilful, and it was able to do good work in the afternoon, when the enemy launched his counter-attack against the forward left Divisional flank.
2nd
Sergt.
After the reserve guns of the 3rd Company were reorganised in Turk Lane, orders were issued by Brigade to move four guns up to positions from which they could employ overhead fire to protect the flanks in the event of counterattack.
The 2nd Wellington Battalion came up in the afternoon to strengthen the Rifle Brigade Battalion on the right flank, which was extended to cover the gap caused by reason of the 41st Division's heavy casualties preventing it from holding the whole of its front.
Four guns of the 2nd Company under
The wisdom displayed in the placing of the front line guns was fully demonstrated the following morning at about 9 a.m., when two enemy companies assaulted the position. Mawson's six guns, together with Preston's 3rd Company guns, opened fire at point blank range, and the attack melted away. This was an excellent example of the wonderful fire power of two sections of machine guns, for while giving every credit to the excellent infantry rifle fire, it would have been impossible to have so suddenly and effectively crushed this attack without the help of the guns.
The dispositions of the Companies during the night of 15th/16th September were as follows:—
- 3rd Company.—Five guns in Blue line; two guns in Brown line; three guns (and one German gun) forward of Brown line, laid to bring down overhead fire to protect the Division's flanks; four guns in Brigade reserve (two guns having been destroyed).
- 2nd Company.—Six guns in Blue line; ten guns in the Switch. Capt. Parks, commanding 2nd Company, was wounded early in the morning of the 15th, and
Capt. J. W. D. McKnight J. W. D. McKnight
About 150,000 rounds of ammunition were expended by the two Companies during the day.
The officers with the guns took advantage during the night of the 15th/16th to replenish ammunition supplies and to adjust their guns. A new source of supply was suddenly thought of; the disabled tanks carried large quantities of well selected ammunition already belted; these tanks were raided by the gunners, and all fear of ammunition shortage was removed. Spare parts and even guns were taken from the tanks, thus enabling several of the guns that were showing the effects of the previous twelve hours strenuous work to
The work of a private soldier (who probably became one of the best known in the Corps) on the 15th and 16th September was very praiseworthy.
The attack was again resumed on the morning of the 16th September; the 1st Brigade, which had moved up during the previous night, being detailed to carry out the Division's allotted task. The 1st Wellington Battalion attacked at 9.25 a.m. on the 16th to capture and consolidate the Red line, described, in the fourth phase of the previous day's attack. Col. Stewart in "The New Zealand Division" (page 81) has described the reason why the 1st Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade withdrew from this line after capturing it. The 1st Wellington succeeded in accomplishing its task, assisted by the guns of the 2nd and 3rd Companies in Blue line and rear positions, delivering a heavy covering fire.
At 2 a.m. on the morning of the 16th, four guns of the 1st Company, under
At 10 a.m. the reserve guns were moved forward, and suffered heavy casualties, but were able to reach the point which had been selected by Major Rose near Flers, to await the further operations that were expected to follow the attack. The army scheme on the 16th was to make a further advance in the event of the first attack succeeding, which would endeavour to break through the last enemy trench system and leave open the way to Bapaume. The remaining Battalions of the 1st Brigade and the rest of the 1st Machine Gun Company were kept in readiness to go through the 1st Wellingtons if the further advance was ordered, but the failure of the 41st Division to secure its objective prevented the further advance from eventuating at this time.
Lieut. Kibblewhite's guns that went forward with the 1st Wellingtons were busily engaged during the morning and afternoon. The gunners frequently brought fire to bear on parties of enemy infantry with deadly results.
L.-Corp. Albert Lee was moving his gun forward at about 11 a.m., when he noticed a large enemy party retreating along the Flers Road. He quickly got his No. 2 to fix the tripod, and a few moments later opened fire. He had an easy target, and exacted the full toll. This was only one of many similar episodes, and it illustrates the tremendous fire power of the machine gun—a fire that is so intense and can be brought to bear with such suddenness that one gun at a range of 200 yards will practically wipe out a close formation of twentyfive to fifty men in ten to fifteen seconds. Kibblewhite displayed great leadership, and his guns gave valuable support and help to the 1st Wellingtons. At about 2 p.m., as he was taking his guns forward, he ordered one gun into action against an enemy gun that was causing casualties to the infantry. Just as his gun opened fire he was killed by a burst of enemy machine gun fire.
The 1st Company had the misfortune on the 16th to lose its Commanding Officer, Major J. M. Rose, M.C., who was severely wounded. Early in the afternoon, Major Rose was making a personal reconnaissance close to Flers to select a
Fortunately, Major Rose did survive, but the Corps was unable to again have the benefit of his skill and personally in the field.
On the night of the 16th/17th September the 1st Brigade took over the Divisional front, and the 1st Company relieved the 3rd Company. The guns of the 2nd Company were withdrawn, and rejoined their Company, then in support behind Switch Trench.
The guns of the 1st Company were organised in depth, and a section of four guns came under the control of each of the three Battalion Commanders in the line, the remaining section, under Lieut. R. B. Caws, being kept as a reserve section in Fat Trench. The 3rd Company moved back on relief to form part of the Divisional Reserve, where it was able to reorganise.
During the night 16th/17th the section under
When Sergt.
On the morning of the 17th September, Capt. Hardie established his Company Headquarters with the reserve guns in Fat Trench, and during the day made a personal reconnaissance of all the guns of the Company, and coordinated their working. Communications were established with the Battalions and Brigade. The work of the
The weather broke on the 17th September, and the gunners of the 1st Company, in their improvised emplacements, which soon became sloppy quagmires, found it very difficult to keep ammunition belts and guns dry.
The gunners kept their guns in working order, in spite of the conditions, which reflected great credit on the training and instructions they had received from their officers and n.c.o.'s. The guns were employed to assist in repulsing the enemy attacks that were made on the 17th and 18th in the vicinity of the Divisional right flank.
During the night of the 18th/19th September the 2nd Company relieved the 1st Company. This relief occupied the whole night, owing to the difficulty of movement over the morass of sodden clay, accentuated by the heavy loads the gunners had to carry to get the whole of their guns, ammunition and equipment along with them.
The 1st Company on relief took the 3rd Company's place in reserve, the latter Company moving up to the intermediate area in support. The 3rd Company, while in reserve, received reinforcements, and with the guns it salved from tanks, was back to full establishment.
The 2nd Company had three very trying days and nights in the forward area, manning the defensive positions and taking part in the various attacks and counter-attacks. The work of the guns on the left flank on the night of the 20th and the afternoon of the 21st was of a high order, and rendered valuable assistance to the hardly wrought and fatigued 2nd Canterbury Battalion, who had during that period performed a task that stands out as one of the greatest epics in the history of the Division in France.
The 2nd Canterburys were ordered to make a silent attack on Goose Alley, to improve our front line and to give us Major J. M. Rose, M.C.Major R. D. Hardie, D.S.O.Sergl. L. P. Magee, D.C.M.Major C. G. Hayter, M.C.
After Manson left Flers Trench, and was scrambling with his gun teams up the slope towards Goose Alley, a party of Germans was encountered. In a few seconds this party was scattered by a shower of well-directed bombs. Manson had been ordered to form a post near the junction of Flers Trench and the Alley. After some difficulty he reached the junction, and at once ordered his guns to dig in. The infantry had by this time cleared the Alley, and were working down it to the left, to join up with the Black Watch.
The enemy, however, worked back into the Alley from Flers Trench, and well down the trench itself beyond the Alley, creating the grotesque but uncomfortable position of
In the early morning Capt. Starnes led the brilliant attack that cleared the enemy from Flers Trench and firmly established our hold on Goose Alley.
The Alley, however, was far too valuable to the enemy to allow us to hold it unchallenged. Later in the morning he launched a determined counter-attack, which drove in our flanks. As this attack opened, Lieut. Mawson and Private McLeish were down one of the back saps collecting German ammunition to use in a machine gun that had been found in the Alley. On hearing the bombing, Mawson and McLeish looked out from the sap, and observed the enemy crowding past a breach in the parapet on the right that had been made by one of our own shells. The only weapons available were discarded German rifles, with which they tried to pick off the enemy as they passed the breach. Being unsuccessful in the attempt, Mawson hurried back to his two guns. He found one knocked out of action. The other gun was still intact, working feverishly against the enemy in the open, but practically isolated. Only two of the gun team were left—Privates Joll and Kinnimont—the latter working the gun single-handed, while the former kept the enemy on the flank off with bombs. Unfortunately, Joll received a nasty wound in the arm, leaving Kinnimont without protection. He fired his last belt before he abandoned the position, and succeeded in saving his gun. The gallant work of these two gunners held the enemy sufficiently to enable the infantry to deliver a quick counterattack, which restored the line. The heaps of German dead in front of the old gun position bore vivid testimony of the execution Kinnimont and Joll had wrought.
Manson's gunners on the left found themselves in an awkward predicament when the enemy attack was launched. Lieut. M. Steele (1st Company) had come up to Manson about half an hour previously with Sergt. A. Young and Private O'Leary to make a reconnaissance of the position, as it was intended that the 1st Company should relieve the 2nd Company that evening. The enemy bombed up towards the position, to which infantry replied pluckily and effectively until bombs ran out. The machine guns were mounted, but
The charging gunners and infantrymen then came under fire of our artillery, and were compelled to stop. Lieut. Steele now gave a display of short distance sniping, bagging fifteen Germans as they were running back. A machine gun was turned on him, but tie managed to knock out three of the team; then he ran out of ammunition, so made his way back, but was wounded before reaching Goose Alley.
When the Canterburys' counter-attack had restored the line, the machine guns became disposed along it in defensive positions, until relief next morning at 1 a.m. After relief, Manson and Mawson took their worn-out gun teams back to rest. Both these officers were recommended for honours for the exceptional ability they displayed in the handling of their guns and for their bravery and devotion to duty. Sergt. Anderson, Corp. Battison and Privates Joll and Kinnimont were all recommended for the D.C.M. for their gallant conduct and devotion to duty.
The 3rd Company relieved the 2nd Company on the night 21st/22nd September, the 2nd Company returning to the intermediate area. The 1st Company remained in reserve, pending it taking part with the 1st Brigade in the next grand attack. The work of the 3rd Company on the Divisional front proper during the next two days and nights consisted mainly in improving its positions and maintaining harassing fire behind the enemy's lines.
A number of the Company's guns, however, were moved to positions in the left Division's sector to assist the 2nd Battalion Munster Fusiliers. Two guns under Corp. H. W. Price and Corp. R. Latham were in an exposed trench during a heavy bombardment which was followed by a series of Andrews was killed by a stray bullet near Fleurbaix the following Christmas.
The 1st Company relieved the 3rd Company on the night 24th/25th September, preparatory to co-operating with 1st Brigade in its attack on the 25th. The 3rd Company on relief went back to the intermediate area, and the 2nd Company, for the first time since the 15th September, went back to Divisional Reserve.
The weather since the 20th had cleared, and the clay had hardened up by the 24th, which facilitated the change round. Perhaps the clay of the battlefields of the Somme was most obnoxious in the intermediate stage between slush and hardness; the stage at which it resembled and acquired the characteristics of a gluey substance which made movement a succession of vigorous "leg pulling," each pull when accomplished being accompanied by a heavy load of the substance stuck to the bottom of the lower extremities. The writer of this History still has the tin hat he wore at the Somme,
The progress of the offensive, though steady, had been slow, and the final objectives set for the 15th still remained unaccomplished. The break in the weather had hampered operations and given the enemy an opportunity to reorganise after the shattering blows he had received.
The conditions following the favourable change of the weather made possible a renewal of the offensive, and on 25th September the Fourth Army and a French Army were ordered to complete and extend the objectives that should have been reached on the 15th.
The Division's front at this time was approximately along Grove Alley. Its rôle in the renewed offensive operation was to attack and establish a line from in front of Factory Corner along the high ground round to Flers Support Trench beyond Operations of October 26th and 30th, 1917.Bellevue, Meetcheele and Slopes North of Passchendaele. An air photograph taken on 17th October, 1917.Condition of Ground about Ravebeck, in front of Bellevue.Taken on 17th October, 1917, showing what the New Zealanders had to contend with.
Zero hour was 12.35 p.m.; as the heavy barrage belched forth at the instant the three Battalions were over the top—1st Canterbury on the right, 1st Auckland in the centre, and 1st Otago on the left, and advancing towards the objective. The dash of the infantry was brilliant. All opposition was crushed in their stride, the objective was secured, and the new line established on "schedule time."
The machine gun scheme for the attack was to cover the advance, and after the objectives were taken to send forward guns to help in the consolidation of the new line. Two guns were sent forward with the 1st Canterburys to assist the consolidation, and four guns were kept as a reserve in Abbey Road, near Flers. The remaining ten guns were allotted the main task of covering die infantry.
Positions were prepared for four guns (under Lieut. Tingey) in Flers Trench, and for she guns (under Lieut R. B. Caws) in Grove Alley support. The guns were taken to their positions during the early hours of the morning of the 25th, and remained there until Zero hour. At Zero the guns from Flers Trench opened rapid fire and swept the Sunken Road to Factory Corner, and also searched Grove Alley. Just after Zero about fifty Germans were observed attempting to retire to Abbey Road over Grove Alley. Two guns traversed their fire accordingly, and succeeded in wiping out the party. The Grove Alley support guns concentrated on Factory Corner, and as the infantry approached, lifted their fire to form a barrage behind it. A party of twenty Germans made a dash from the Factory to the rear, and were caught in the barrage.
After the objectives had been taken the guns kept up a covering fire, while the infantry established the line of strong posts, and immediately afterwards four guns were taken forward to help in the defence of the new line.
During the afternoon of the 25th the gunners were heavily shelled, but fortunately escaped with few casualties.
The 1st Company remained in its defensive position throughout the 26th until 2.15 p.m. on the 27th, when a further operation was undertaken by the Division, which employed the 1st Brigade, 1st Machine Gun Company, 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, and 1st Section of the 3rd Company. The 1st Company guns did a small amount of firing from their defensive positions during the intervening period.
The Division's objective for the attack of the 27th was the capture of the Gird Trenches, left of the Ligny-Thilloy Road, to the point where Goose Alley joined the Gird, a width of about 1000 yards; also the capture of the remainder of Goose Alley, north of Abbey Road. The capture of the objective would turn the New Zealand front into a right angled salient—the apex of which would be the junction of Goose Alley with the Gird Support. See map facing page 58.
As on the 25th, 1st Canterbury was on the right, with one half of the Gird as its objective, 1st Auckland in the centre, with the other half of the Gird as its objective, while 1st Otago was on the left, to swing north-westwards, with Goose Alley as its objective, thereby joining with the left flank of the 1st Aucklands. 1st Wellington and two companies of the 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade became Brigade Reserve, the remaining Rifle Brigade Companies and 3rd Machine Gun Company Section holding the line on the left flank of the attack.
The dispositions of the guns of the 1st Company were the same as on the 25th. The enemy seemed to have some warning of the attack, for when the bombardment preceding the attack opened, a number of enemy retired, making easy targets for the machine guns in the front line.
Two guns under
Sergt.
After the Canterburys had secured their objective, their forward Company Commander (Major Stitt) sent word to Marris to bring his guns forward to the new line. While the gunners were digging the new positions for the guns, Marris observed a wounded German officer lying out about fifty yards ahead. Despite the fact that he was subjected to heavy enemy machine gun fire, Marris ran out to the German, and succeeded in bringing him back to safety and captivity.
2nd
The other guns of the 1st Company were excellently worked, and maintained their barrage throughout the attack. When the objectives were taken the four reserve guns were sent forward to strengthen the line near the apex, at the junction of Goose Alley and the Gird Support.
The work of the 1st Company on the 25th and 27th was of a very high order, and the handling of the guns brought very warm praises from the infantry.
The effect of the barrage which covered the making of the strong points on the afternoon of the 25th was graphically described by an infantry officer. He said: "The whole ground in front of the German line was a seething mass, the ground was whipped and slashed about to a much greater extent than would have been expected, even from shrapnel."
The 2nd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade came forward in the afternoon, with one section from the 3rd Company, as an additional reserve for the 1st Brigade, but were not used.
The 2nd Company relieved the 1st Company during the night of 28th/29th September, the latter Company returning to Divisional Reserve.
The weather had again broken, and discomfort and inconvenience were the result.
The 2nd Brigade made preparations to co-operate with an attack by the Corps on the Division's left, which would have for its objective the capture of Eaucourt L'Abbaye and the elimination of the salient on the Division's front. This attack was fixed for 1st October. The 3rd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade and one section of the 3rd Machine Gun Company took over the right sector of the Divisional front to hold during the operation.
The guns of the 2nd Company and of the section of the 3rd Company did little firing on the 29th, owing to the foggy weather.
The attack on 1st October commenced at 3.15 p.m., and was one in which the gunners of the 2nd Company had several ideal targets, that were thoroughly dealt with.
The dispositions of the guns of the 2nd Company were as follows:—
- Six guns were kept for covering fire.
- Four guns were allotted to 2nd Canterburys.
- Three guns were allotted to 2nd Otagos.
- Three guns were in reserve.
The guns that went forward with the attack were extremely fortunate. They had few casualties, and inflicted much damage to the enemy. As the guns were taken forward parties of enemy were frequently seen moving across the open. The gunners were ever on the alert and quickly brought their guns into action.
The section of guns from the 3rd Company remained with the 3rd Battalion in the right sector and co-operated with the Battalion when it made its impromptu advance on the afternoon of the 1st.
After this operation had been completed the 3rd Company lost a very gallant n.c.o.; Sergt.
The night 1st/2nd October was one of shell and storm, the guns of the 2nd Company and of the section of the 3rd Company remained set on the S.O.S. lines, but were not called upon to fire. The 2nd October brought no change in conditions, except that the elements of nature grew worse. The 2nd Company was withdrawn from the line on the night 2nd/3rd October, and the 3rd Company took its place. This relief was perhaps the most difficult of all. Getting the guns and equipment forward to the point at which the 2nd Company's guides were waiting—a distance of 3000 yards—took over five hours; the guides were not trained guides, bat only men detailed for the duty; the barren waste of shell-holed sodden clay had no land marks, so in the darkness and storm the sections had to grope and stumble to their positions. The 3rd Company's guns finally reached their positions, and the 2nd Company's guns were taken back just before dawn on the morning of the 3rd October, thus bringing to a close their labours on the Somme.
The 3rd Company remained in the line until the morning of the 4th October, when it was relieved by the 122nd (British) Company. The front line guns remained with the British Company's guns for several hours after they had come up. After the 3rd Rifle Brigade had been relieved the enemy launched an attack against Gird Support, which the front line guns of the 3rd Company took part in repulsing. L.-Corp.
A heavy mist hung about during the morning of the 4th October, which enabled the transport of the 3rd Company to go up into Flers to bring back the Company's guns and equipment. In spite of the number of guns this Company had had destroyed by shell fire, it came out of the Battle of the
All the Companies were now back from the line, and on the 5th and 6th of October entrained for the lower Somme Area, marching, after detraining, to the billets they occupied during the pleasant days of August, when they underwent the special training that assisted them to so conspicuously perform their part in the Battle of the Somme.
It is fitting to place on record in this narrative the excellent manner in which the transports of the Companies brought up supplies and ammunition during the operations. This work was done at night, and frequently necessitated the journey to Flers along the awful Longueval-Flers Road, a road that was constantly under fire from the enemy artillery. Those who were on this road during the first week in October can never efface from memory the ghastly spectacle it presented; the whole length of the exposed portion was littered with smashed up waggons, dead drivers and horses, the peculiar feature being that so many of the dead were nude. A new track had been made to one side of the original road; this track was piled up in the same way. Still another track had been formed. The drivers and the Transport Officers never once failed to get the supplies forward, winning the eternal gratitude of the companies in the line.
Back in the Lower Somme Area the companies were soon refreshed, equipment overhauled and replenished, and the personnel reorganised. A few days later the whole Division again went north, to take over the extreme right of the 2nd Army front.
There were many acts of individual gallantry among the officers and men of the Corps during the Somme offensive, some of which it is possible to place on record, but of many of which it is unfortunate that no particulars are now available.
Evidence of many a brave act was lost, no doubt, when its author passed to the Great Beyond; such is inevitable in war; but those acts which are on record should be given a place in history, the reader remembering always the many other acts which it is impossible to record.
From the N.Z. Official War History, Vol. III
Flers and Vicinity [Copyright
ChapterV
Back in Flanders
Period
th October,1916,
to6
th June, 1917
The Division relieved the 5th Australian Division on 13th and 14th October in the Sailly Sector, just below the Bois Grenier Sector, the Division's right in July. The 1st and 3rd Brigades, with their respective Machine Gun Companies, went into the line, the 1st into the Cordonnerie subsector and the 3rd into the Boutillerie subsector. The 2nd Brigade and 2nd Machine Gun Company became detached from the Division, going up to the old Houplines Sector, which they had first occupied after their arrival in France.
The 2nd Company came back with the 2nd Brigade to the Division early in December, and after three weeks rest in Divisional Reserve at Estaires, went into the line; the withdrawal of the 4th Division necessitating the Division again taking over the Bois Grenier Sector.
After the withdrawal of the Division from the Somme, Capt.
It is not necessary to dwell at length on the work of the companies during the winter months. The defence of the line had been organised in depth, on comparatively short frontages. The Companies kept two sections in the line and two in reserve, which were changed round every week.
Winter conditions in Northern France called for extra care of the machine guns, owing to the danger of the water in the casing freezing. Besides the prescribed solution, the firing of occasional short bursts kept the water liquid, and
The period under review remained very normal, except for the raids undertaken by the Division, with which the machine guns co-operated. The creeping machine gun barrage was now coming into prominence, and the gunners did a lot of useful work in their daylight shoots, commencing on the enemy front line, and gradually lifting back.
About the beginning of 1917 it was decided to employ machine guns to deal with enemy aeroplanes flying low over our trenches. The new dial sight for aeroplane shooting had been introduced and issued, also the special mounting that enabled the gun to fire into the air. Steel-piercing bullets and tracer bullets The tracer bullet when fired was followed by a short stream of illuminated substance that enabled the gunner to watch its flight and to adjust the direction of his fire. This bullet was only used when firing against aircraft.
Although the anti-aircraft guns were frequently called upon and undoubtedly hampered the enemy airmen, only one 'plane was brought down by the gunners of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps. Airmen seemed to hate machine gun fire as much as anyone else, and frequently upon one or two guns opening fire the prying airman changed direction homewards.
In the second and third weeks of February, 1917, the Division moved north, taking over the famous Ploegsteert Wood Sector; the Divisional front extending from the River Lys (immediately north of the Houplines Sector) to St. Yves, a distance of about four miles. The 1st Company moved into the right subsector (" On the
The left subsector took in on its left flank the high ground on which were the ruins of the St. Yves Post Office. A gun position was established on the high ground among the ruins
Ghastly Slaughter caused by Enemy Airmen to 1st Company's Transport.Captured Light German Machine Gun in action against Enemy.Lieut.-Col. J. B. Parks, M.C.Major A. C. Finlayson.Major L. S. Cimino.
The 1st Company remained in the Le Touquet Sector until the 15th March, when it was relieved by the 11th Australian Company, and went back into Divisional Reserve with the 1st Brigade. On this date the Division relinquished the
By this time it was known that the Division was again to take part in offensive operations in the early summer, the main objective of which would be the capture of the Village of Messines, situated on the high ridge overlooking the new Divisional front, and directly opposite Hill 63, one of the most important points in the Second Army front.
The new Divisional Machine Gun Company joined the Division on 12th February, and took over the
- O.C. Company:
Capt R. D. Hardie R. D. Hardie - Second-in-Command:
Capt. L. C. Chaytor L. C. Chaytor - Section Officers:
Lieut. J. B. Mawson J. B. Mawson Lieut. C. M. Smith C. M. Smith Lieut. A. H. Preston A. H. Preston Lieut. E. J. McGregor E. J. McGregor 2nd Lieut. A. B. Fordyce A. B. Fordyce Lieut. R. E. Bibby R. E. Bibby Lieut. R. B. Davies R. B. Davies Lieut. C. E. H. Naylor C. E. H. Naylor
The company came to France thoroughly equipped and trained. Its work was solid from the commencement, and the firing programmes that its sections carried out prior to the Messines offensive were of a high order.
During the month of April each company went back to the Tilques Area to go through a period of special training. The ground selected for training resembled the scene of the real operations, and the training consisted of practising the actual part the Division would be allotted in the offensive.
About twelve days were occupied by each Brigade and Machine Gun Company in its training programme; the gunners had had continuous trench duty since the middle of October, 1916, and benefited greatly from the training.
Upon the companies again returning into line their work was heavy; the activity of our artillery, as well as that of the enemy, had become greatly increased; the machine guns were kept busy to prevent the enemy repairing the trenches and wire that our artillery had damaged; they also took part in the many practise barrages that were undertaken during the weeks preceding the attack.
The Companies of the Corps were at last to be co-ordinately grouped to assist in the creeping barrage that was to protect the advancing infantry. The positions from which the guns would deliver the barrage were selected, and the gunners worked very hard forming firing emplacements and ammunition stores. Although the employment of the overhead machine gun barrage was not extensively used in France until the beginning of
The 1st Company's transport had the misfortune to lose a number of its horses in the heavy enemy bombardment on the evening of the 6th May. The effect of the bombardment and of our retaliation on the following night is described in "The New Zealand Division" (page 162).
It is interesting to note the phenomenal luck that had attended the horses of the 3rd Company. From the lime the horses landed in France to the commencement of the Battle
When it is remembered that the horses of this Company were actively employed throughout the whole period taking rations and supplies to the gunners in the line, including the perilous work in the Somme Battle, their immunity from casualty is the more remarkable.
The companies were back in concentration area for a few days prior to the 7th June, the date of the attack. During this time, however, parties of gunners went forward at night to complete the barrage gun emplacements.
The new machine gun company that was formed to serve the 4th Brigade joined up with the Division to take part in the formidable machine gun scheme that had been planned to co-operate in the offensive.
The 4th New Zealand Machine Gun Company was formed in May, 1917, at Grantham.
- Officer Commanding:
Capt. L. M. Inglis L. M. Inglis - Second-in-Command (temp.): 2nd Lieut. Hosking.
- Section Officers: 2nd
Lieut. D. O. Williams D. O. Williams Lieut. C. F. Forsdick C. F. Forsdick Lieut. B. P. Hopkins B. P. Hopkins - Transport Officer: 2nd
Lieut. E. D. McRae E. D. McRae
Capt. Inglis was extremely fortunate in having such a keen set of young officers—all of whom (with one exception) had been promoted to commissioned rank in the field. Most of the n.c.o.'s and leading gun numbers were old hands, who
All the companies in France had horses for their transport work, but the new company was supplied with mules—a lot of real "hairies." At first some of them had to be roped and thrown before they could be groomed. However, under the care of 2nd
The reinforcement drafts at Grantham, from which the rank and file were drawn for the new company, had had a considerable amount of elementary and individual machine gun training; most of the time before embarkation was therefore devoted to welding the component parts of the company into a smooth working unit.
The company proceeded from the training depôt at Grantham to Southampton, and sailed from that port on 28th May for
One section, under 2nd
The remainder of the company moved to the concentration area, and the officers reconnoitred the positions they would occupy at the opening of the attack.
The appointment of an Army Corps Machine Gun Officer had been authorised some time previously, marking a further advance in the progress of the Corps, and making possible the concentration and co-ordination of the machine guns of the Army Corps in both, offensive and defensive operations. The Machine Gun Officer attached to II A.N.Z.A.C. at this time was Lieut.-
ChapterVI
The Battle of Messines
"No operation of the war was more deliberate than that which led to the occupation of the Messines Ridge by General Plumer's Army, which opened the Summer Campaign of 1917 on the Flander's front as a preliminary to
The Messines Ridge had been held by the enemy since the end of 1914; it commanded the Ypres salient and gave the enemy perfect observation of the British trench system, as well as of a great depth of the back areas and villages.
The ridge, with its two chief points at Messines and Wytschaete, lies midway between Ypres and Armentieres. It had been converted into a veritable fortress. For two years the Germans, in anticipation of our possible offensive, had developed the natural defences of the position; the villages, the woods, the farms, the hamlets were bristling with defensive ingenuities.
The object of the offensive was to deprive the enemy of the ridge which commanded the Ypres salient, which would enable the British to strike later at Ypres. The front of the attack extended from Mt. Sorrell in the north to St. Yves in the south—a distance of about nine miles.
The Division's task in the offensive was to advance on a front of 1500 yards to a position 500 yards beyond Messines. The Division's right flank was, at the opening of the attack, the River Douve, and its left flank a point just north of Wulverghem-Messines Road. The 3rd Australian Division was on our right, and the 25th Division on our left. The length of the Division's advance was about 2000 yards, ending
The 4th Australian Division was then to advance through the Black line and the line of forward posts that were to be established ahead of it, to capture and consolidate a line to be called "the Green line."
The first phase of the battle comprised the taking and consolidating of the two front line systems of the enemy trenches, which were to be called the "Blue" and "Brown" lines; the capture of the Village of Messines and the capture and consolidation of a line beyond the village to be called the "Yellow" line. The first phase was to be carried out by the 2nd Brigade and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade.
The second phase comprised the advance to and consolidating a line 500 yards east of the village, to be called the "Black" line, and then the pushing forward of small parties to establish a line of strong posts 300 yards farther on to be called the Black dotted line. The 1st Brigade was selected to carry out the second phase.
The third phase already mentioned was the advance by the 4th Australian Division to capture and consolidate a line 1000 yards beyond the Black dotted line, to be called the "Green" line.
The map of the Messines Battle Area, opposite page 76, will help the reader to readily follow the three phases of the attack.
The machine gun organisation was very comprehensively arranged, and the whole five companies of the Corps were employed on the New Zealand divisional front. The task of the Machine Gun Companies was divided into two separate operations; one was to create a formidable creeping barrage to protect the advancing infantry and to keep them covered after they had consolidated their objectives, and the other was to provide the Battalion Commanders with guns and personnel to assist in the consolidation of the captured objectives. The 4th Company and the Divisional Company and two sections from each of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Companies were allotted to the barrage work, and the remaining sections of the three companies were left with their brigades to assist the assaulting battalions.
The barrage guns were divided into three groups: No. 1 group was on the right and comprised sixteen guns under
No. 2 group was in the centre, and comprised twelve guns under
No. 3 group was under
The barrage guns went forward to their positions during the night 5th/6th June, and remained under cover during the day. After dark on the night of the 6th the gunners at once began the important task of mounting and laying the guns for opening at Zero hour. The map (facing page 68) shows the positions and work of all the barrage machine guns on the Army Corps front during the first phase.
The remaining sections of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Companies moved into the line on the evening of 6th June and experienced the inconvenience of having to move along the thickly congested trenches, carrying guns and equipment, wearing their gas masks. The enemy kept up a very steady gas shell bombardment during the whole evening, which caused much inconvenience, but the Companies of the Corps had practically no casualties. Although the small box respirators were extremely efficient, the blistering heat upon the covered face on a hot summer's night was agonising.
The eight remaining guns of the 1st Company were detailed to advance with the reserve company of the 1st Brigade and after the Black line had been captured to establish a line of guns that could form a belt of fire in front of it.
Four guns of the 2nd Company were allotted to the 1st Canterbury Battalion and four guns to the 1st Otago Battalion. The sections were to advance with the last wave of the battalions to which they had been allotted until the final objective of the first phase had been captured, when they would help in its consolidation and afterwards from their positions assist in covering the advance of the 1st Brigade towards the Black line.
One gun of the 3rd Company was allotted to each battalion of the 3rd Brigade to move forward to assist in consolidation and the remaining four guns were kept as Brigade Reserve.
The hours of waiting preceding Zero hour were uncanny, the enemy shelling gradually slackened off, and at times a deathly silence came over the whole battle front. The attack which had been planned for so long, the preparations for which had been watched and followed from the beginning, and seen to reach maturity was about to take place. Did the enemy suspect that the threatened blow was about to be delivered, would a murdering devastating fire suddenly descend on our thickly filled trenches and destroy the most brilliantly conceived and prepared operation of the campaign in France? No wonder tension almost reached breaking point during those long-drawn-out hours on the night of the 6th June. Slowly but surely the watches ticked away the seconds, minutes and hours until at last the Zero hour was heralded with the greatest thunderbolt the world had ever heard. The greatest concentration of artillery ever known in one second belched forth, the string of mines carefully prepared through long and strenuous months were fired, the earth quaked, but no human ear could measure the volume of noise. The sight the spectacle presented can hardly be described, the myriad lightning flashes of the roaring guns behind, the huge geysers of flame from the exploding mines, and the thousands of coloured rockets fired from the German lines in every direction to warn their waiting artillery that the dreaded day had arrived too soon, impressed a picture on the eyes of our forces, grand, glorious but awful, and across the darkened stretch of no mans' land, our first waves began to move. The great attack had commenced.
The machine guns of the three barrage groups opened on Zero, although it must be recorded that the guns of No. 1 group opened about a minute too soon, owing to the commander's watch not being properly synchronised. The guns continued firing until forty-five minutes after Zero, during which time they had gradually lifted forward their fire at the rate of 100 yards every two minutes until it was falling 500 yards beyond the Brown line, which was captured at that
The second phase of the machine gun barrage was the moving forward of No. 3 group (less the section of the 4th Company) and No. 1 group on to the Messines Ridge to take up positions which would enable the guns to bring a standing barrage down 500 yards beyond the Black line. The guns of No. 2 group remained in position and became Divisional Reserve. the guns for the second phase were not to be in position until three and a half hours after Zero. In the meantime a number of gunners were organised to carry ammunition up to form a forward reserve. Corp. W. N. Thorn displayed great gallantry and leadership with his party, which took forward 10,000 rounds of ammunition to the third barrage position without a casualty.
At 6.30 a.m. the two groups moved their guns forward towards the second barrage positions, which were reached with slight casualties at 7.30 a.m. By this time the enemy shelling had increased, and it was found that the positions selected were enemy barrage lines.
The guns of No. 3 group reached the third phase positions at 9 a.m., and those of No. 1 group at about 9.30 a.m. The gun teams were heavily shelled, and had great difficulty in digging in. The positions were finally completed by 10 a.m., and the guns laid ready to open fire to cover the advance of the 4th Australian Division to the Green line, the final objective for the day. This attack was timed to begin at 3.10 p.m. During the five hours the gunners had to wait they were able to build up a large supply of ammunition. No praise is too great for the n.c.o.'s (especially Corp. J. Fisher) and men who went backwards and forwards through the enemy barrage, some as many as six times, to get the ammunition forward.
At midday
The position taken up by the guns of the two groups was on the reverse slope of the Messines Ridge, from which the whole countryside beyond the German line was visible, a view that had been obstructed since the first month of the war by the formidable Messines Ridge, which now was ours.
At 3.10 p.m. the last phase began, and the barrage guns opened fire, forming a curtain beyond the Green line. From their elevated position the gunners could observe their fire, and cheered loudly when they observed a large body of retreating Germans receiving the full effect of it.
At 3.30 p.m. the Green line was captured, and the guns ceased fire, remaining ready to open in the event of the counter-attack developing. The guns remained in position until the 9th and 10th, when they were relieved by the 4th Company, and went back to rest. After ceasing fire at 3.30 p.m. on the 7th, there were many calls upon the guns by the infantry, and the results of the observed fire on the evening of the 7th, when the enemy collected to deliver his grand counter-attack, were phenomenal. Although the gunners cannot claim the whole honour of smashing the counter-attack so completely that it withered away before it reached our advanced lines, they can nevertheless say that their fire played a large part in producing the wonderful success.
Before dealing further with the barrage guns and the lessons learned during the attack, we will follow the action of the guns that were retained to assist the infantry battalions.
The two sections of the 1st Company allotted to the 1st Brigade moved forward and reached the Black line at 5.30 a.m. with very slight casualties. The guns were quickly dug in and an advanced Headquarters established. Telephone communication was opened between the guns and Headquarters, but as the day cleared visual signalling was carried on. Sergt. A. W. Brown was responsible for the 1st Company's communications, and deserves great praise for the manner in which he kept them up throughout the day.
The two sections of the 2nd Company detailed to assist the assaulting battalions of the 2nd Brigade moved forward across No Man's Land and entered the German front trenches close in the wake of the infantry.
Capt. Parks decided to keep his sections close up to the infantry, and justified his action by the extraordinary achievement of suffering no casualties during the forward movement. When the Blue line was captured, the guns were placed "in action," but did not fire. When the Brown line was captured, the guns went forward, and took up positions until the Purple line was captured, when two guns were taken forward to it. Immediately Messines was captured by the Canterburys, Capt. Parks pushed six guns beyond the village to bring direct fire to bear down the reverse slopes of the ridge, but the poor visibility prevented the guns firing for some time. At 6.15 a.m., when the atmosphere had cleared, the guns were able to engage a number of good targets with effect. Four captured guns were manned and brought into action, as a large quantity of German gun ammunition was handy. The spare parts of these guns had been destroyed, but fortunately there were no breakages. The guns were co-ordinately placed in the consolidation of the Yellow line and were able to join with the other guns when the enemy made his counter-attack.
The guns of the 3rd Company that were allotted to the 3rd Brigade were unfortunate. The gun attached to the 1st Battalion was smashed by a direct hit at Zero, and the whole gun crew were either killed or wounded. The gun team attached to the 4th Battalion was similarly knocked out of action when it reached the German front line. The guns attached to the 2nd and 3rd Battalions reached their objectives without casualties, and were placed in strong points selected by the Battalion Commanders. These guns were not called upon to fire. The reserve section remained at Brigade Head-quarters and was not brought into action.
The 4th Company took over the forward positions on the
The work of the Corps during the Battle of Messines was very effective, and won high praise. The barrage had been well prepared and well carried out. Perhaps the quick response to the S.O.S. calls and the deadly havoc the responses caused was the most commendable work of the Corps, and did most to help establish the confidence of the infantry in the machine gun and the gunners.
The Companies of the Corps, with the exception of the Divisional Company, were not able to rest for long. The 4th Company relieved the 6th Motor Machine Gun Company in the
Throughout the day of the 14th the gunners maintained their positions, but were moved forward to again assist the advance planned for the 15th. The 2nd Company had heavy casualties on the 15th in consequence of the heavy enemy shelling, but maintained their positions. The situation having become more settled on the 16th, a defensive scheme was prepared, and after approval by Brigade, the guns were moved to the new positions.
The 1st Company relieved the 2nd Company on the night of the 18th/19th June, thus enabling the 2nd Company to go back for a complete rest.
The 3rd Company was again brought into the line on 17th June, and remained with the 1st Company until the 30th June, when they were relieved by the 4th Australian Company. The 3rd Company while in the line carried out extensive firing programmes, and was busily engaged against low-flying enemy aircraft. The improvised emplacements were gradually
The 1st July saw all the Companies of the Corps (except the 4th Company) out of the line, ready to enjoy two or three weeks of well-earned rest.
The machine gun defence scheme formulated was somewhat unusual and novel, but justified, for three reasons:—
- The River Lys ran along the whole of No Man's Land on the Brigade front, forming a natural obstacle. To cross the river the enemy would be completely exposed to our fire for an appreciable time.
- The network of old British and German trenches in the forward area provided numberless covered approaches, and rendered almost ineffective the ordinarily used belts of fire.
- The amount of field artillery supporting the Brigade was very small, owing to its presence being required elsewhere. This meant that the whole of the machine guns had to be sited to give effective support to the front line at the outset of a hostile attack. To
pre- serve preserve
The gunners did the whole of the work required to construct the new positions for the defensive scheme, and successfully concealed them and their approaches, which generally ran under cover of hedges or consisted of duckwalks carried on piles along existing drains. Alternative positions were also prepared, and the four groups were connected to Headquarters by telephone.
An exceptional amount of indirect fire was carried out, both by day and night during 4th Company's tour of duty in this sector. The readjustment of the enemy's line across the Lys had left him without covered communications to his forward positions. Many vulnerable targets including transport roads, dumps, light railways, lengths of trench in enfilade, and even some of his field batteries were within reach of the Company's guns.
The firing of the Company on Laundry Wood, near Frelinghem, provides a good exmaple of the effectiveness of concentrated machine gun fire. This wood was occupied at one stage by enemy light trench mortars, firing gas shells. Fourteen of the Company's guns that were within range of the wood simultaneously opened on it when the mortars began firing. The same process was repeated the following night, and after that no more trouble was experienced from Laundry Wood.
One section discovered an excellent night-firing position in a ditch behind a hedge, well out in the unoccupied river flats towards Frelinghem, from which harassing fire could be delivered. One very dark night, when Sergt.
Stewart found a new position for his gun about a hundred yards away. Every time he commenced firing the enemy would shell the old position.
The period in the
Before leaving the labours of 4th Company in
Before passing on to the next chapter, it is advisable to consider the main lessons learnt at Messines in connection with the working of the machine gun barrage. To enable this consideration the report made by
From the N.Z. Official War History. Vol. II] [
Copyright
Lessons Learnt at Messines
Being a copy of Major Hardie's Report to D.H.Q.
- The co-ordination between barrage guns and groups was most satisfactory. There was, however, a slight lack of co-ordination between group commanders of barrage guns and guns operating with Brigades.
It is not considered that it would be preferable for Brigades to control all the machine guns covering their front. Barrage guns are best controlled by D.M.G.O. through group commanders in close co-operation with Brigades. Brigades should control only those guns going forward with the infantry and those co-operating immediately with the infantry. Brigade schemes should be known to all barrage group commanders to ensure complete co-operation.
In the Messines offensive it was found that some group commanders were ignorant of the Brigade scheme for guns operating with the infantry, and after the advance certain consolidating guns were detailed to take up positions which were occupied by barrage guns. This was soon rectified, but it would not have occurred had group commanders been in complete touch with Brigade schemes.
The machine gun scheme for both Brigade and barrage guns should be known to all machine gun officers.
- The retention of a large number of guns for barrage purposes in a small area for a long period is not advisable unless the operation demands it. The decision should rest with the D.M.G.O.
The general rule for barrage guns should be to withdraw after their job has been carried out and the position is consolidated with the Brigade guns in position. A few guns might be left—say one-third: This however should rest with the D. M.G.O., and should depend on the situation. The guns left should be sufficient to put up a barrage and assist the Brigade guns in case of a counter-attack.
The casualties to
personneland guns which occurred amongst the barrage groups in the recent offensive, after their job had been successfully carried out, renders it inadvisable to keep barrage guns in position for a long period. The barrage guns could have been withdrawn after thirty-six hours.
ChapterVII
La Basseville—Before and After
Period
st July to1
st October,1917.
The Companies of the Corps (with the exception of the 4th Company, which continued in the
Although Major Hardie nominally remained in command of the Divisional Company, he became stationed at Divisional Headquarters, and the immediate command of the Company devolved upon
The 1st, 2nd and the 5th (Divisional) Companies moved into the line on the 18th and 19th July, and at once began active firing programmes, which were continued in co-operation with the artillery in preparation of the new offensive to be commenced at Ypres. The Division again occupied the line in front of Ploegsteert Wood, and to create a diversion was allotted the task of attacking and capturing the Village of La Basseville. The 1st Brigade had been allotted the task of the assault, and a machine gun barrage was arranged to cover the advance.
The attack on La Basseville, which was the right flank of the 3rd Battle of Ypres, was delivered firstly to improve our line, and secondly as a feint to delude the enemy into the idea that we were about to cross the Lys. This delusion was to entice the enemy to concentrate large forces of troops
The Division was very poorly supported by the artillery, which, with the exception of a few batteries of 18 pounders and an odd 4.5 and 6in. howitzer, had gone north to assist in the preparations for the opening of the main battle.
This meant that the attack on La Basseville was an almost purely machine gun show.
The handling of the machine gun scheme was undertaken by G.O.C. 1st Brigade, instead of being co-ordinated in the normal manner by the D.M.G.O. At a conference held the day before the attack the Brigadier gave it as his opinion that after the village had been captured the enemy might be expected to counter-attack up to as late as 6 a.m., but if he failed to counter-attack by that time, nothing need be feared until the evening.
Two barrage groups of twelve guns each were formed; the left group under
At 2.35 a.m. the barrage guns ceased fire, remaining laid on their S.O.S. lines. The guns remained in position until 4.40 a.m., and were then withdrawn to Advanced Machine Gun Headquarters.
At 6.30 a.m., when the enemy began his unexpected counter-attack, which took back from us the gains we had won, the barrage guns were again sent forward, and continued in action until late in the afternoon, when they were finally withdrawn.
During the Messines offensive it was thought that the barrage guns had been kept too long in position after objectives had been gained, and that needless casualties had been sustained. It is probably correct that the guns remained too long in position at Messines, but it is certainly correct that the barrage guns should not have been withdrawn two and a half hours after Zero at La Basseville. The operation at
The first attempt upon La Basseville unfortunately did not succeed. It was captured and then lost, but on 31st July at the same hour as the great Third Battle of Ypres commenced, the Division again repeated the attack and won and held the village.
This operation was again dependent upon the support of machine guns. Major Hardie decided to employ forty-four guns to provide a creeping barrage to cover the advance and to protect the objective line after it was captured. Owing to the approaches from Warneton being suitable for an enemy counter-attack a larger number of guns were concentrated in that direction. The barrage guns were divided into two groups, the right group under
The 3rd Company, which had been in rest since 1st July, came up to the line on the afternoon of 30th to form part of the right group. Major
Zero hour was 3.50 a.m. on the 31st; the guns at once opened and for forty-eight hours from that time undertook what was probably the heaviest firing ever performed by the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps. No fewer than 600,000 rounds were fired in that period.
The infantry was very successful, and won the final objective in a brilliantly performed operation. After the gains were consolidated the guns ceased, but were soon answering an S.O.S. call. Throughout the day and the night that followed it, the warning flares from the front line burst in the Machine Gun Scheme, La Basseville,st July, 1917
The enemy artillery was very active, but its effort to silence the machine guns never succeeded. From the group positions, in old disused German trenches, the regular line of the enemy shells were seen to burst and gradually get nearer; at one stage they were only fifty yards from the right group; then, as if the hand of Providence had intervened, the shelling would cease. The most anxious time was when three low-flying enemy 'planes swept above the guns; it seemed certain that disaster would follow. The guns were all in action in response to an S.O.S. call, and most of them were boiling, throwing up the give-away column of steam. Soon afterwards the enemy put down a heavy barrage, but again failed to reach the groups. The large number of disused trenches in the vicinity had undoubtedly confused the airmen. The left group was worried for a while by shells of an 8-inch howitzer, which caused one gun to shift its position, but as most of the shells were "duds" no harm was done. At one stage eleven consecutive shells failed to explode. After daylight on 1st August the enemy gave up his attempts to dislodge our troops from the newly won line, and in consequence the guns had a very quiet day. The groups withdrew during the afternoon of 2nd August, and the various sections returned to their respective companies. The situation at this time had become clear, and the enemy was apparently resigned to the new line it had been forced to take up in consequence of the New Zealanders' attack.
It is interesting to record the eulogies on the machine gun work at La Basseville by the infantry, Major Urquhart and
Two enemy machine gunners, when questioned, stated that our machine gun barrage was so severe that they had been unable to get their gun into action. The infantry followed the barrage so quickly that they had no chance of stopping them. A very useful piece of information these prisoners gave was that the lifting of the machine gun barrage was not at once noticeable by troops taking cover; the lifting of an artillery barrage is at once noticed, because of the bursting shells, but
About six weeks after the capture of La Basseville, Major Hardie met The Staff Officers of the
The Division now took the defensive, and extended their front towards the north by relieving the 3rd Australian Division beyond the Douve. The 4th Brigade and the 4th Company remained on the right sector (
The infantry and machine gunners, assisted by the engineers and pioneers, worked strenuously to get the front into a proper state of defence. The conditions during August became deplorable, owing to the stormy weather and heavy enemy shelling. The enemy artillery was in great strength, and in consequence of what was happening in the north, and not knowing whether some further move was contemplated in the south, the enemy became in such a state of nervous tension that for no apparent reason our positions were constantly subjected to hurricane bombardments. The machine gun defence was arranged in depth with groups of guns morale of the Division. The demonstration on the 16th August, however, restored the Division, and gradually thereafter the conditions improved, and the enemy quietened down.
Zero hour on the 16th was fixed for 4.45 p.m. The machine
All the Companies of the Corps were away from the line by the 31st August, and on the move to the friendly back areas, where peace and quiet reigned for four happy weeks, while the Division prepared itself to deliver a further blow against the enemy.
While the other Companies were having their unenviable ordeal in the line, the 1st Company suffered a severe loss. About 2 a.m. on the morning of the 11th August the enemy night flying 'planes made a bombing attack against our back areas. Five bombs fell in the 1st Company's transport lines, two of which landed on stables, killing one man and fifty-two animals. Five men were wounded. This reduced the transport of the 1st Company to one horse and two mules. The ghastly spectacle the daylight revealed of mangled animals, twisted and contorted, was as horrible as is possible to be seen. See photographs facing page 60.
Before passing on to the resting days of September, reference should be made to the splendid way in which the rank and file stuck to their job during the trying month of August. When the barrage guns were being taken back after their work at La Basseville had finished, the 3rd Company transport came along to Canpac Dump to load up the equipment; while one section was loading up, a number of shells fell near the dump, bringing down several trees across the road to the front and the rear of the waiting limbers. Sergt. W. Watkins gallantly organised a party to clear the obstruction, which he accomplished in spite of the continued shelling and enabled the limbers to get clear.
Corp. G. Fisher, of the Divisional Company, rendered valuable assistance when the guns of his Company were being taken out through Ploegsteert Wood on the 5th August, and were caught by the enemy shelling; with complete disregard for his own safety he returned through the shelled area and directed the gun teams along a route that brought them safely to the waiting transport.
During the time the 3rd Company was experiencing its difficulties, the casualties among the officers were heavy,
The 1st. 2nd, 4th and Divisional Companies went back to the Lumbres area, where they remained until the 25th September, when they commenced their return march to the Ypres area, preparatory to again resuming offensive operations. The 3rd Company undertook the Second Army antiaircraft defences, and so enjoyed the work that it would have been happy to have continued it "for the duration." This Company was recalled to the Division on the 30th September, and after two days forced march rejoined the other Companies of the Corps at Goldfish Château, near Ypres.
The month's rest had worked wonders, and throughout there was a feeling of delight at the prospect of once more making an attempt to break the enemy lines and enable that mythical but much-vaunted force—"the Army of Pursuit"—to pass through.
ChapterVIII
Gravenstafel and Passchendaele
Period
th October,1917,
to23
rd October,1917
The British Armies round Ypres had been steadily pushing forward since the attack had opened on 31st July, although the operations towards the end of September had yielded small results at a heavy cost. The summer was now on the wane, and the prosecution of the offensive became urgent. The formidable Passchendaele Ridge still lay ahead of our troops, and to help bring it nearer the attack of the 4th October was delivered.
The New Zealand Division was given a front of 2000 yards on which to attack, finishing on a line approximately 1000 yards away. The advance meant the capture of the crest of Gravenstafel ridge and establishing a line well down its forward slope.
The attack was divided into two phases, the first phase being the advance to and capture of a line called the "Red line," just beyond the Village of Gravenstafel, and the second phase the advance to and capture of a line called the "Blue line," about 500 yards east of Gravenstafel. See Gravenstafel Map facing page 100.
The 1st Brigade and 4th Brigade were detailed for the attack, with the 2nd Brigade as Divisional Reserve. The 3rd (Rifle) Brigade was at this time detached from the Division. Owing to the wide Divisional front, the two assaulting Brigades attacked alongside each other, and both employed two battalions for the first and the final objectives. The five Companies of the Corps were all employed, the 2nd, 3rd and Divisional Companies and one section of the 1st and 4th Companies were detailed for barrage work, and the remaining sections of the 1st and 4th Companies became attached to their respective brigades to move forward with the attack, so that they could assist in the consolidation.
Major Hardie had the machine gun programme prepared, and the necessary orders issued at about 3 p.m. on 2nd
The barrage guns were divided into three groups called "A" group under
The groups moved forward after dusk, and quickly reached the selected positions, which had been thoroughly reconnoitred; each gun position had been marked and firing posts laid out. By midnight all the groups had dug their gun emplacements, had their ammunition up, belts filled and guns mounted and laid ready for the Zero hour, six hours later.
Major Luxford, commanding "C" group, inspected his positions a short while before dusk on the evening of the 3rd October, and observed that the line he had selected, running from Fokker Farm along in front of the Zonnebeke Road showed the effects of recent heavy enemy shelling, indicating that the enemy had chosen the spot for barrage purposes.
He decided to change his position, moving it forward 200 yards, almost to the lines from which the infantry would attack. This change of position entailed an immense amount of work; the whole of the firing tables that had been carefully worked out and checked had to be done over afresh in a congested pillbox. However, the section officers worked with a will, and by midnight all the necessary changes had been completed.
The drizzling rain that fell after midnight, and the bleak cold made the long waiting hours drag wearily and uncomfortably away. Fortunately, the enemy was not active, only occasional bursts of high explosive disturbing the quiet night.
While Lieut. W. Moore, of the 3rd Company, was visiting his gun teams, about 2 a.m., he was severely wounded, and subsequently succumbed to his injuries.
The Companies, however, suffered exceedingly few casualties throughout the night.
Zero arrived at 6 a.m., and ten minutes later the "A" and "B" groups opened, increasing range at the slow rate of one hundred yards in six minutes. The swampy nature of the ground made the infantry movement very slow, and in anticipation of this the protective barrages only advanced at half the normal rate.
The guns of "A" and "B" groups maintained their rate of fire until 8.10 a.m., at which time the battalions were ready to move forward to the final objective. As "A" and "B" groups ceased, "C" group opened and maintained rapid fire, lifting gradually until a range of 400 yards beyond the Blue line was reached, when the fire became stationary. At 9.10 a.m. "C" group ceased, but remained laid ready to open directly the S.O.S. was seen. By this time eight guns from "A" group and the whole of "B" group were moved forward to take up positions to cover the Blue line. The remaining twelve guns of "A" group were kept in their original positions, passing to Divisional Reserve. At 9 a.m. the "A" and "B" groups had completed their move forward and established their new positions, and had guns mounted and laid in readiness to deal with any enemy attack against the Blue line. The three groups were now co-ordinately arranged to cover the whole Divisional front. There were three S.O.S. calls on the 4th, and three during the early hours of the morning of the 5th, which were instantly responded to, and won high praise from the infantry.
During the night the pack transport brought forward heavy supplies of ammunition, which gave each gun a reserve of 6000 rounds by dawn on the morning of the 5th.
The expenditure during the twenty-four hours had been very heavy, nearly 600,000 rounds having been fired by the Machine Gun Scheme, Gravenstafel,th October, 1917
The barrage guns were relieved by dawn on the morning of the 6th October, and were soon "embussed" for calmer regions.
The 4th Company (less the section detailed for barrage work) had actively supported the 4th Brigade. On 2nd October it moved into the line to relieve the 2nd Company, unfortunately suffering casualties during the relief. Lieut. T. Brewer was wounded, two other ranks killed, and nine wounded. In view of the closeness of the renewal of the offensive it was considered inadvisable to take over the whole of the forward gun positions. Only two gun positions in two strong points on the flanks of Hill 37 were occupied, and the main machine gun defence was provided by the establishment of a ten-gun indirect S.O.S. barrage group. None of these guns were, however, called upon.
To support the 4th Brigade attack, Capt. Inglis detailed one section under 2nd Lieut. Forsdick and one section under 2nd
The sections assembled with the reserve companies of the respective battalions to which they were attached at 1 a.m. on the morning of the 4th October, and spent the remainder of the night in shell holes without incident. During the enemy shelling that preceded Zero hour a shell landed amongst a gun team of 2nd Lieut. Williams's section, rendering the whole team casualties. At Zero the two sections advanced with the reserve companies of the final objective battalions, the gun teams moving in single file, without loss. The softness of the ground localised the burst of the H.E. shells, and undoubtedly
The two sections passed beyond the newly won Red line and re-formed behind the protective barrage preparatory to advancing to the Blue line; on resuming the advance the sections suffered a number of casualties from the heavy machine gun and rifle fire to which they were exposed. 2nd Lieut. Forsdick was wounded before the Blue line was reached, but Sergt. Mintrom took command of the section, which he handled with great ability and gallantry, subsequently being awarded the M.M. for his conduct. The sections passed beyond the Blue line and quickly dug emplacements for the guns. By 10 a.m. the guns were mounted and were busily engaged against the hostile fire coming from the direction of
The 4th Company was relieved on the 6th October, and the 1st Company on the 7th, and both companies went back to rest and were rejoined by the sections that had been detached for barrage work. It is unfortunate that it is impossible to give details of the action of the two sections of the 1st Company that went forward with the 1st Brigade, but the records are too meagre to give a sufficient clue to enable the writer to even conjecture what took place. It may be a good reminder to those who read this history and who may serve in "The Next Great War," if the 1st Company's report of its doings on the memorable 4th October is set out in extenso. It will help them to remember that official histories cannot do justice to gallant acts, or even with accuracy recount happenings, unless the commanders' reports and diaries
"4th October. Attacked 6 a.m. with success; casualties 25 per cent. Counter-attacks defeated."
However, it is to be hoped that the very excellent work the 1st Company at all times performed and the gallant conduct of its officers and men will not be depreciated on account of the rigid economy of War Diary paper that was exercised during the month of October, 1917.
Fortunately it is possible to record the splendid work performed by Sergt.
The Companies were not to enjoy their rest for long, and by the 11th October they were again in readiness to take part in the disastrous operation of the 12th—the one operation in France in which the New Zealand Division failed to accomplish its task.
The Divisional Company was the first to return to the forward zone, arriving at St. Jean just before midday on 10th October. Arrangements were immediately made to relieve The Divisional Company really relieved two British Companies, but owing to the heavy casualties they had suffered only eight gun teams were left instead of thirty-two.,
The other Companies came back to the forward zone on the 10th and 11th October. The 2nd Company relieved the 148th Company in the line, fortunately accomplishing the relief without casualties.
The Machine Gun Companies shared with the other units of the Division in the inconveniences and hardships of the hasty and imperfect preparations that preceded the ill-fated attack on Belle Vue Spur.
In the first instance it was decided that the Divisional objective should be a line well beyond the village of Pass-chendaele; the orders for this attack, including the machine gun scheme, were all completed on 10th October. The Division on the left subsequently considered it impossible to advance sufficiently to protect the Divisional flank—causing a complete modification of the plans that had been made. New orders were feverishly prepared and issued. After the completion of the second set of orders the Division on the right found or considered it could not carry out its original task, which meant another modification of our plans.
It was not until 2 p.m. on the 11th October that Major Hardie was able to complete his orders for the machine gun scheme—being the third set of orders he had been forced to prepare. Thus barely thirteen hours were left to the Company Commanders to get ready for the operation.
The 1st, 4th and the Divisional Companies were retained for barrage work, and the 2nd and 3rd Companies were allotted to their respective Brigades for consolidation purposes. Capt. R. B. Caws had by this time taken over the
The officers of the barrage groups made the necessary reconnaisance of their positions, and throughout the 11th October the transport officers and drivers worked with indefatigable energy to get forward the ammunition required for the operation. The fiendish weather had performed its devilish task to perfection; the shell-torn areas that lay between the front, and the roads that had been pushed forward had become a seething mass of almost liquid mud. Wheeled transport was quite impossible, which necessitated the use of pack horses. In spite of all difficulties the transport did its job as it always did, and there was no shortage of ammunition during the following day.
The work of the barrage guns was much the same as on the 4th, covering the first phase, then moving forward to new positions to cover the second and third phases, from which they could place a protective barrage in front of the final objective. Only thirty-eight guns were used for the barrage, being divided into three groups—namely, "A" group under
"A" and "B" groups were to open fire at Zero, but, owing to the fact that the 4th Company had been hurried up to the line from Eecke on the 11th, leaving insufficient time to prepare the gun positions and get up the necessary ammunition, it was decided to cancel "B" group from the first phase. "A" group was therefore left by itself to cover the first phase, while "B" and "C" groups advanced behind the 2nd and 3rd Brigades as they moved forward to the attack until the groups reached positions from which they could cover the second and third phases, and put up the protective barrage in front of the final objective after it was captured.
"A" group opened fire six minutes after Zero, and continued until 8.25 a.m., at which time it ceased, and at once advanced to its next position and fired its second barrage.
The transport officer of the Divisional Company (Lieut. Knowles) had brought forward seventeen pack mules with ammunition, and at 6.25 a.m. commenced to get it to Waterloo, a point beyond Gravenstafel, to establish a dump. Knowles got most of the ammunition dumped at the proper place, six mules being killed and two men wounded. The drivers behaved with great gallantry during the perilous journey, part of which was under direct machine gun fire. Private Lorgelly was wounded on his way forward, but carried on, also taking charge of another mule whose driver was badly wounded. Lorgelly reached the dump and discharged the loads of both mules, and not until he had taken them back to safety did he have his wound attended to.
It became apparent that all was not well in front, so Capt. Chaytor decided to send a party forward to investigate, before moving the group to the third position. He had not by this time received Fordyce's report. 2nd Lieuts. Ciochetto and
In view of the situation which had arisen, Capt. Chaytor cancelled his orders to move the group to the third position, and decided to stick where he was, with the guns laid to open on a line beyond the first objective. This decision proved a very wise one, and undoubtedly saved many useless casualties that would have occurred in moving forward. As it was the guns
"B" and "C" groups reached their positions about two hours after Zero, and opened fire, but soon observed that the attack was sticking at the Red line, and remained laid on S.O.S. lines. "B" group withdrew from its position on the morning of 13th, and returned to Kansas Camp, to which place the 4th Company's cookers had been brought, welcoming the tired gunners with a hot meal at 9 a.m.
"C" group was very active throughout the afternoon of the 12th, and also through the night. This group (all of the 1st Company) suffered 65 casualties on the 12th, including Lieut. Tansey. In spite of the heavy casualties, all the guns remained in the line until the 16th, when they were withdrawn. Although no casualties were suffered on the last two days, the gunners were completely exhausted. The terrible conditions under which they had to stick to their posts for four days and nights, and the nerve-wracking experience of the 12th, left the remnants of the 1st Company broken and worn out. Perhaps the most graphic illustration of the condition of the Company is contained in the entry in the War Diary for 17th October. Reference has been previously made to the fact that it was impossible to give details of the action of the 1st Company on the 4th October owing to the meagre report the O.C. made of it. The report of the 17th October is really much more meagre; it contains two words, but those words mean much; they are, "Company slept."
The work of Sergt. W. Woods (1st Company) during the 12th October is worthy of special mention. When the line was held up opposite Belle Vue Spur he made a personal reconnaissance to ascertain what had happened to the guns of his Company that had gone forward with the attacking infantry. He located six guns, the officers in command of which had been either killed or wounded. Woods, with a keen appreciation of the situation, realised that these guns should dig in and engage the enemy guns that were causing such frightful casualties among the infantry. He organised the
The work of this n.c.o. was recognised by an award of the D.C.M., and he was soon afterwards promoted to commissioned rank. Woods was known throughout the Corps as "the walking tank," owing to the tremendous loads he was able to carry.
The 3rd Company attached four guns to each of the two battalions that attacked, four guns were kept as Brigade reserve and four guns remained behind at the transport lines. The eight guns were moved forward at Zero, and when the infantry were held up in front of the first objective they were brought into action. One gun was knocked out of action, but a reserve gun soon took its place. During the afternoon the guns were fired frequently against the machine guns on Belle Vue Spur. In spite of the heavy casualties that the infantry was suffering, and especially the carriers attached to the guns, the sections miraculously escaped with four casualties—two killed and two wounded. Later in the afternoon defensive positions were prepared, and the guns were placed in them, remaining until relieved at 9 p.m. on the 14th.
Twelve guns of the 2nd Company went forward with the reserve companies of the Battalion of the 2nd Brigade, suffering heavy casualties. 2nd Lieut. P. Mclntyre was killed and 2nd Lieut. Black wounded. Mclntyre was a Main Body man, who was wounded on Gallipoli. He returned to New Zealand and was employed as a machine gun instructor for some time, later being given a commission and returning to the front. One section was practically wiped out, but the remaining guns were got forward, and helped the infantry when they were held up. Defensive positions were maintained until the 14th, when the Company was relieved by the 4th Company.
T/Capt. A. R. Curtis, M.C. and Bar.
Major J. W. D. McKnight.
Sergt. S. L. Emerson, D.C.M.
Major A. C. Himrian.
The Companies made various reliefs until 22nd October, when the Division left the Ypres sector to recuperate and rest.
A very graphic description of the action of the 4th Company preceding and during the attack of 12th October and the holding of the line afterwards appears in the following letter, written by Capt. Inglis:—
"The Company was in billets at Eecke on 11th October. The Company had been warned to hold itself in readiness to move with the 4th Brigade to a position in Divisional reserve on the 11th October, but on the morning of that day orders were received for the
personnelto entrain at Cæstre in the afternoon, while the transport was to march by road to positions between Ypres and Wieltje, and the Company was required to advance with the attacking Brigades on the following morning. No operation orders were available through the 4th Brigade, but I was to receive them from the Divisional M.G. Officer. The transport was thereupon ordered to march at once, while Lieut. L. A. Hill, a groom and myself proceeded by road as fast as possible to report to Major Hardie and do any necessary reconnaissance, leaving the Company to follow (under) by train. The position was so obscure that we were unable to obtain final orders till late in the afternoon, when I set to work to fix my gun positions, get out company operation orders and work out the shooting (three creeping barrages from successive positions) and sent Hill and the groom back to meet the Company (detraining at Vlamertinghe) and the transport to guide them to X Camp. The transport arrived first, so that we were able to have a hot meal ready for the men, who turned up just shortly before dark. Orders were communicated to the sections by candle and torch light. Capt. C. S. Geddis C. S. Geddis "In the afternoon, 3rd Otago Battalion of our own Brigade arrived at Wieltje, and Lieut.-Col. Colquhoun, when I made application to him, at once detailed a platoon to assist us as carriers. This was essential, for the whole of the transport was required to get bulk ammunition forward during the night for our use next day, and the guns and gear, with ammunition and water for the first barrage had to be carried by hand up No. 5 track and then over several hundred yards of deep liquid mud to the assembly position near Calgary Grange.
Owing to the pitch blackness of the night and the difficulty of locating positions once off the duckwalk track, I pushed on ahead of the Company with Lieut Hill and two men per section (to act as guides to their guns) to locate and tape off the assembly position. On fixing the assembly position I decided that a safer course than to allow each guide to lead his section over the indescribable 700 yards from the end of the duckwalk, would be to form a chain of guides back to that point. This was done. After a considerable wait on the position I began to get anxious as to what had become of the Company, as there was no sign of their arrival, and the enemy's artillery was becoming decidedly active. Leaving Hill to pick them up if they should arrive in the meantime, I retraced my steps down the chain of guides to the end of the duckwalk track and was dismayed to find there was no sign of my first guide (Private Robertshawe). I discovered from a carrying party that the Company had come up nearly an hour before, and that Robertshawe had led them off into the sea of mud. In the darkness they had missed the next connecting file, about fifty yards away. After a long and fruitless search I returned to find Hill still alone, and Zero hour very close, being only able to trust that my section officers, having full orders, must have taken up approximate assembly positions, and that we would pick the guns up after Zero during the advance. The sections, after a nightmare labouring through deep mud with heavy loads, had actually taken up a position somewhat nearer Korek than the intended one, and Hill and myself joined them on the first barrage position after the attack commenced. "In the meantime, the transport had been performing their allotted tasks of getting up 140,000 rounds of bulk ammunition to Gravenstafel Crossroads. To use the limbers was impossible, as the only available road was blocked with traffic and debris.
, the ever resourceful transport officer, 'found' thirty-eight pack-saddles, and turned his men and animals to with a will. Under his personal direction the apparently impossible task of getting up the whole of the necessary S.A.A. was performed. The attack commenced as the last rounds were being dumped at Gravenstafel. Lieut. E. D. McRae E. D. McRae "A drizzle had set in during the night, and the conditions
at the commencement of the attack were enough to discourage the stoutest hearts. The men, already exhausted by their efforts of the night (when on their way up they had dragged themselves and their heavy loads of guns and ammunition through deep mud in pitch darkness and under continual shell fire) now moved forward as soon as the artillery opened, toiling and splashing through the horrible morass of the Stroombeek up to the opposite slope to their barrage position ahead of Krönprinz Farm. The crossing of this valley was effected under a storm of hostile shell fire, and the mud was largely responsible for the lightness of casualties at this stage, for the projectiles buried themselves before exploding. At the conclusion of the barrage, German machine gun bullets were still coming thick over the low crest by Yetta Houses, and a reconnaissance disclosed the fact that the attack was held up far short of the position from which the Company's second barrage was to be fired. The guns were therefore dug in in one line along the crest of the spur just south of Yetta Houses, where they remained, ready to make a further advance or deal with any counter-attack which might develop. Just after 3 p.m. fire was opened on a counter-attack on the left of the divisional sector, but no S.O.S. was asked for during the night. The rain had now set in steadily, and the conditions were appalling. The greatest difficulty was experienced in keeping the belts fit for firing, and the guns and ammunition from sinking in the mud. The plight of the wounded was particularly pitiful. Sergt. C. B. Stewart and Corp. Collins took parties back to dumps and brought up supplies of bulk ammunition sufficient for any emergency. Much of the work of these parties was carried out ploughing slowly through heavy mud, with their loads under direct machine gun fire."The attack being finally abandoned, and the appalling weather conditions restricting infantry activity on either side, the Company was withdrawn in the late afternoon of the 13th to reserve positions with the remainder of the 4th Brigade, and on the following day again moved up to take over the forward machine gun defence of the whole divisional sector, continuing in these positions until the New Zealand Division was relieved. Most of the work during this time consisted of maintaining defensive positions in holes in the mud under
frequent heavy shell fire and under weather conditions that imposed excessive and continuous hardship on the personnel."The casualties were heavy. 2nd Lieuts. Williams, Carswell and Farrell were gassed (shells), and unfitted for further service, 2nd Lieut. P. Howden, who had joined the Company shortly before it left
Le Bizet sector, died of his injuries. A conscientious officer, he had rapidly learnt the lessons of active service, and was at the time of his death a valued and trusted leader. Sergt.A. H. McKane , who was severely gassed, was a n.c.o. of repeatedly proved courage, and possessing fine qualities of leadership."Sergt. Allan North, M.M., was perhaps the most outstanding example of unselfish devotion to duty, continuing cheerfulness and contempt of danger during the whole of the period. The section to which he belonged (under the command of 2nd Lieut. L. A. Hill) was in probably the most trying position in the sector—near Marsh Bottom—and was subjected for a week to almost continuous shelling, without adequate shelter from either fire or weather. North's bearing and spirit were spoken of in terms of the highest admiration, both by his officer and by the men of the section.
"On the final relief of the Company the men were completely exhausted. I followed the tail of the Company down the duckwalk track, armed with two water bottles of rum, which I used to revive numbers who had fallen out on the way back to X Camp, where a night's sleep (punctuated by aeroplane bombs), good hot food, and a general clean up prepared them for the next stage of their journey back to a well-earned rest in billets far behind the line."
The attack of the 12th October, so full of glorious gallantry by the infantry, was not one in which the Companies of the Corps were able to achieve results. The gunners, however, suffered with the infantry, in the awful toll that darkened so many homes in far-off New Zealand.
Although for once the New Zealanders failed to accomplish their allotted tasks, no praise is too great for the gallant troops who only failed to accomplish the impossible.
The Companies entrained on 23rd October, and were soon moving away from the battle area to rest and reorganise in the peaceful country near Boulogne.
From the N.Z. Official War History, Vol. III
Gravenstafel
ChapterIX
Winter at Ypres
Period
nd October,1917,
to1
st March,1918
Although the weather conditions were far from perfect after the Companies left the battle area, they were comfortably billeted in the villages near Boulogne to which they proceeded, and were soon restored to health and vigour.
The shortages that had occurred were replaced, and the reinforcements completed establishments. Active training was soon begun by all the Companies, and by the beginning of November it was difficult to imagine that they had such a little while previously undergone the terrible hardships referred to in the last chapter.
General Russell paid a visit to each of the Companies, and delivered instructive and interesting addresses to the officers.
The 3rd and 4th Companies were the first on the move, back to the line, marching off from the resting area on 11th November, and after a two days' march and one day's train journey, reached Poperinghe on the 13th.
The new Divisional front lay in front of Polygon Wood, extending for about one and a half miles from just beyond Cameron Covert in the south to Inder Ster Cabaret in the north. The sector was divided into two sub-sectors; the left sub-sector was taken over by the 4th Brigade, and the right sub-sector by the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade.
On the 14th November the 4th Company relieved the 62nd (British) Company in the left sub-sector, placing the whole sixteen guns in the line. The relief took place during the daytime, and was accomplished by 2.30 p.m. The enemy artillery fire was very heavy, especially against the tracks leading
The 3rd Company relieved the 15th (British) Company in the right sub-sector, without suffering any casualties. Fourteen guns were placed in the line and two were kept in reserve.
Immediately the Division took over the sector, active preparations were begun to organise its defence in view of the probability of an enemy attack on a large scale. The sector was of the highest importance, and, realising this, no stone was left unturned to do all that was possible for successfully resisting any attack that might be made. The proper placing of the machine guns was of great importance; the whole of the 3rd and 4th Companies' guns in the line were co-ordinately arranged to provide three belts of fire from No Man's Land back to the Army Corps system. To supplement the machine gun defence eight guns of the Divisional Company were taken on 19th November to positions near Jetty Wood, where they were placed in two groups. These groups were laid on S.O.S. lines to barrage forward of our front line, with one gun enfilading the enemy line in front of Polderhoek Château. Capt. Chaytor established an Advanced Headquarters with these two groups, which were in communication with the infantry companies in the line.
The enemy low-flying aircraft became active, and a number of guns were mounted during the day for anti-aircraft work. These guns were kept very busy nearly every day, and succeeded in turning a number of 'planes.
The guns near the front line were kept silent and well concealed, no movement being made near the positions by day. The other guns of the 3rd and 4th Companies were actively engaged by day and night, firing on positions at which movement was reported.
When the Divisional guns came into the line on 19th November, four guns of the 4th Company were grouped to barrage in front of the northern boundary of the sector. All the guns employed for the barrage work were so placed that
From where the Divisional Company's guns were placed, observation of enemy positions was possible, enabling many targets to be engaged by day. Probably at no time during the period the Division was in France did the Germans expose themselves to such an extent, as they did during November and December, 1917, except in offensive operations.
In the early morning of 21st November a covered cart was observed on the spur near the Château, with several small parties of Germans. Two guns quickly opened, the cart was got away, but several men were seen to fall.
At 2.15 p.m. on the 24th November a large party of Germans with full packs up were observed moving back, apparently having been relieved from a position behind the Château. Four guns quickly opened on the party, which dispersed. Stretcher bearers carrying a Red Cross flag appeared on the spot soon after, and removed a number of bodies.
Twice on the 25th enemy parties were observed and fired upon, but the gunners were unable to say whether any casualties occurred. So much movement was seen from time to time in the vicinity of the Château that the whole eight guns were laid on it during the hours of daylight. On 26th November, at 10.30 a.m., eight men were seen to leave the Château; two guns fired, either wounding or killing the whole party. A little later a ration party was seen crossing the ridge to the north of the Château. Only one gun opened, but the party was able to reach shelter before the gun could get range. Several other parties were effectually fired upon, and later stretcher bearers with the Red Cross flag were again seen collecting the wounded or removing the dead.
As the telephone communication had been completed between the barrage guns and the infantry companies, a number of trial S.O.S. calls were made, to test the barrage. One group opened fire fifteen seconds after the call was made.
On 24th November, at 4.45 pm., the barrage guns put up a test barrage for twelve minutes, expending 12,000 rounds. This brought heavy artillery retaliation, which was directed against the group positions. Although the retaliatory shelling was near its object, no casualties were suffered, an extremely
Preparations for the capture of Polderhoek Châtetau had been proceeding for some days, and towards the end of November the whole of the machine guns, except those in the forward line increased their activity and co-operated in the artillery bombardments.
The attack on the Château was peculiar, for the ground lay to the south of the Divisional sector. The 2nd Brigade, which was entrusted with the attack, took over the line from which it would assault on the night on the lst/2nd December.
The machine gun scheme was to employ all the guns on the Divisional front proper to enfilade behind the objective, and for those who had observation to engage all enemy targets. A barrage group under Capt. R. B. Caws was specially detailed to cover the attack with frontal fire, and for this purpose eight guns were withdrawn from each of the Divisional and 3rd Companies. Eight guns of the 2nd Company were attached to the assaulting companies, to be pushed forward of the final objective while the new line was being made.
The attack only partially succeeded, and the Château still remained in enemy hands. The guns opened at Zero and were kept actively engaged throughout the afternoon. The guns on the Divisional front proper had a field day; frequently they were able to successfully deal with enemy infantry that were sent forward to reinforce the front garrisons. Capt. Caws's barrage guns rendered very valuable assistance to the 1st Otago Battalion, playing havoc among the bodies of enemy infantry that came along the Becelaere Road. A feature of the operation from the machine gunner's point of view was the excellent communication that was maintained between the D.M.G.O. and the various gun positions. Major Hardie (D.M.G.O.) established his battle Headquarters with Capt. Chaytor's guns at Jetty Wood, and from the top of a pill box was able to view the whole operation. This enabled Major Hardie to control and direct the gun groups firing
At 4 o'clock the D.M.G.O. sent a message through that the enemy were concentrating for a counter-attack near a
The guns of the 2nd Company that went forward with the attack suffered severe casualties, one section being practically wiped out. Lieuts. P. G Ashby, M.C., and B.
The 1st Company had an off month during December so far as active operations were concerned, except that two sections were sent for ten days to reinforce the 2nd Company, owing to the casualties it had sustained during the attack against the Château. The 1st Company had two sections employed on anti-aircraft defences at various dumps, and after the two sections that went to the 2nd Company returned on 18th December a training and recreational programme was carried out.
The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and Divisional Companies remained in the line and continued active harassing fire.
Christmas Day arrived, but although the enemy seemed anxious to be quiet, the gunners kept up their activities. The intelligence report of one Company for the Great Festive Day, will serve to illustrate what took place: "25/12/17. Enemy artillery and machine gun fire was nil, and day and night were extremely quiet. He evidently wanted a quiet Christmas, but our machine guns were active throughout. At 2 p.m.
On 26th December the enemy attempted to recapture a square crater on the 2nd Brigade front, which the 1st Canterbury Battalion had occupied upon the Germans evacuating it a few days previously. The crater was an excavation for the erection of a large pill box. A heavy bombardment preceded the attack, which was launched at 4.15 p.m. Two guns of the 4th Company under Lieut. C. V. Marks, in position in the front line, a short distance from the right of the crater, opened on the assaulting Germans and were instrumental in crushing the attack.
During the operation Sergt.
The 2nd Company was relieved on 30th December, and it is observed in the War Diary of the Company for that day: "Men were given their Xmas dinner. Menu: Turkey stuffed, carrots, potatoes, onions, plum pudding and wine." When the printed forms on which, the War Diaries are written are looked at, one finds a reference to Field Service Regulations Part II, as to what the Diary shall contain; whether or not the regulations provide for the insertion of a Christmas dinner menu in the War Diary, it is indeed refreshing to find it there, and it may be used in the next war as a precedent for a similar meal to be provided.
The old year was duly heralded out and the New Year welcomed in to the accompaniment of five minutes concentrated fire by our artillery and machine guns, and many wondered whether in twelve months' time the War of Attrition would still be waging, or whether the Great Victory would have then crowned the glorious work of Britain and her valiant allies.
1918
The old year passed out and the New Year came in, the year that was destined to see the cessation of hostilities and the final triumph of the Allied Arms. The 3rd, 4th and Divisional Companies were in the line on New Year's Day, and the 1st and 2nd Companies were at rest in the rear areas. The Companies in the line had been putting a lot of work into their gun positions, which were by this time quite serviceable and habitable. The barrage guns were kept very active at night with harassing fire, and by day watching for and dealing with enemy parties. The enemy was now paying a great deal of attention to our machine guns, whose incessant night firing was causing great confusion and inconvenience. A number of organised enemy artillery shoots were launched to search our gun positions, which fortunately with one exception, were not found. Polderhoek Château still remained the favourite object of observation, and seldom a day passed that the watching gunners did not secure several Huns. January was not a severe month from a climatic point of view; the thaw, however, came very early, causing many regrets as the carefully made positions "fell in."
On 3rd January, Major R. D. Hardie, D.S.O., the D.M.G.O., was wounded, near the Butte. His wounds were very serious and caused the loss of a leg. Frequent reference has been made in this book to Major Hardie's splendid work, but it is impossible to do justice to the many acts performed by this gallant officer, who so materially advanced the welfare of the Corps, and whose guidance did so much towards the great efficiency it so quickly attained. Major Hardie had the naturally ideal soldierly instinct, a quick judgment and a quiet impressive method of imparting to his officers what he required of them. His loss was deplored by all ranks.
Enemy aircraft were busy about our lines throughout January and February, giving our anti-aircraft guns a large amount of firing. On the day that Major Hardie was wounded a heavy enemy bombardment took place under the direction of an airman. Twenty machine guns on anti-aircraft mountings, poured a heavy fire against the 'plane, which turned it homewards. Just as it seemed getting beyond range it suddenly burst into flames, and fell behind the German lines. This was the one and only 'plane that the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps claims was brought down by its guns.
On the 19th January information was sent to the Companies that an enemy relief was expected to take place soon after dusk. All the available guns in the line co-ordinated a harassing scheme, keeping every known approach under fire throughout the night; over 100,000 rounds were expended. The guns also responded when the enemy launched his ill-fated raid on the night of the 22nd January, and assisted in the salutory lesson the enemy was taught that night. The 24th January was a perfect day, more like spring than midwinter, and in consequence there was splendid visibility. The ever watchful gunners picked up two good targets that day, one being transport wagons; the drivers were hit and the horses bolted; another was a party of twelve Huns with packs up. Seven of these fell, but the remainder managed to reach cover.
A special machine gun instruction was issued on 2nd February, as follows: "Two bombardments will be carried out by the artillery of XXII Corps, commencing at 12 noon and 4 p.m., respectively, with a view to harassing the 31st Division (German), which has recently transferred to this sector from the Russian front. The machine guns will co-operate in the second bombardment. Accordingly the 3rd and Divisional Companies got ready to welcome the newcomers, and at 4 p.m. they put up forty minutes hurricane fire. The following report from the War Diary is descriptive:—
"It was decided by Headquarters to-day that we should give the Bosche a good 'strafe,' as the division opposite us had just come across from the Russian front, and it would be as well for it to become inured to the gentleness of the Western front gradually."
The 4th Company did not return to the line after the 18th
In the preface to this History mention was made that to ensure greater efficiency in the tactical handling and co-ordination of machine guns it was decided to form the four companies of a division into a machine gun battalion; in accordance with this decision the New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion came into being at the end of February, 1918.
The Companies were all out of the line by the 25th February, and for the first time since the inception of the Corps they became concentrated together at Hondeghem, in the Renescure Area.
ChapterX
The Machine Gun Battalion
Peroid
st March
to
th March,1918
The Disbandment of the 4th Company left four companies in the Division, which on the 1st March were concentrated at Hondeghem, and came under the command of Lieut.-
The strenuous winter months in the line had undoubtedly reduced the efficiency of the Companies, and active training was at once organised, with the object of smartening the men up. The reduction of efficiency showed itself in the lack of heartiness and energy which was inevitable from three months of the trying conditions that obtained in front of Polygon Wood. The training in splendid weather worked a magical change, and by the end of a week the heartiness and energy displayed by all ranks left nothing to be desired.
General Russell inspected the Battalion in full marching order on 12th March, and complimented Lieut.-Col. Blair on the splendid showing it made. The transport was carefully inspected. This was the first time that the whole transport of the Companies had been paraded together, and its size, equal to the transport of an infantry brigade, greatly surprised the Divisional Commander. By this time transport officers had learnt their job, and inspections did not cause the same alarm and apprehension as twelve to eighteen months previously.
When the Machine Gun Corps was formed, very few of its officers had had any experience in the care and management of horses and transport equipment. The abnormal conditions of warfare in France prevented the section officers from gaining any knowledge of this important duty, and the whole of the responsibility fell upon the transport officers, who themselves were lacking in experience.
During 1916 the condition of the transport was very adversely commented upon, but in 1917 a decided improvement took place. The transport difficulty was the inevitable result of the pre-war failure to seriously tackle machine gun training.
After the Armistice (25th November, 1918) a conference was held at General Headquarters by the senior machine gun officers of the British Army, at which the transport question was discussed. There was a concensus of opinion that horse-mastership should be taught more thoroughly to all machine gun officers, because the section commander in open warfare may be away from his company, and must be responsible for the care of his transport. It was stated that the average section officer knew practically nothing of horse mastership. The conference recommended that drivers should be trained in tactical driving in the same way as artillery drivers—galloping into action over rough ground, driving by day and night, use of ground and covered approaches, and knowing how to read a map. Also that the whole training of the transport must be on similar lines to the field artillery transport, and not remain on an R.A.S.C. basis. A further recommendation was that in peace, when ample time is available for training, section officers, under their company commanders, should have
About a week after the formation of the Battalion, the "smartening up" training was discontinued, and tactical practices in co-operation with the infantry were undertaken, also firing exercises. The firing exercises, however, could not be continued, because the owner of the land on which the range was erected obtained a "clearance certificate," which entitled him to eject the troops training to help drive back the Hun from Sacred France, and put in their place the tillers of the soil.
Shortly after General Russell's inspection word was received that the Corps Commander intended visiting the Battalion. Accordingly, on 23rd March, Lieut.-esprit de corps had sufficiently developed to enable "the youngest unit in the N.Z.E.F." to give a praiseworthy account of itself in the near future.
At this time word had come through of the German offensive in the south, which necessitated the Division cutting short its period of rest and training to proceed to the threatened area to help turn back the last gamble the Hun would make to win the victory that would enable him to spread his Creed of Kultur upon the whole world—civilised and uncivilised.
During the Battalion's stay at Hondeghem, it was privileged to attend three lectures given by Captain Bles, R.W.F., on "The Battle of Verdun," "The Battle of the Somme," and "Strategy." Although the lectures were voluntary, they were fully attended and closely followed by all. The lecturer dealt not only with the actual battles, but also with their strategical reasons. Probably there is nothing better for the rank and file than to understand why certain operations have been undertaken. The man of the ranks moves as he is ordered, and he fights to the death. He knows that an attack is made and continued until successful, often at a terrible sacrifice; he Officers of 5th (Divisional) Company, Grantham. December, 1916.Standing—Lieuts. R. E. Bibby, G. E. H. Naylor, E. J. McGregor, L. Allan, A. G. Davies, A. B. Fordyce.Sitting—Lieuts. C. M. Smith, J. B. Mawson, M.C., Capt. R. D. Hardie, Capt. L. C. Chaytor, Lieut. A. H. Preston, M.C.Transport Officers and Sergeants of the Machine Gun Battalion receiving orders from the Battalion Transport Officer,
ChapterXI
The German Offensive
Period
th March,1918,
to16
th August,1918
The long expected German offensive opened on 21st March, and although the ambitious plan of the German General Staff had not fully materialised, the British Line had been seriously thrown back, and was in imminent danger of being broken. Within a few days the names of villages and towns that New Zealanders had been so familiar with during the first Battle of the Somme, became the scene of active operations. Up to the present the New Zealand Division had only experienced offensive operations in France, and was eager to illustrate to our friend the enemy that its élan and fighting prowess were equally effective in defence, and would quickly change the defensive into offensive, Thus on the 25th March the New Zealand Division proceeded south to help check the German advance by filling in the dangerous gap between the IV Corps and the V Corps, which was supposed to extend between Hamel in the south and Puisieuxau-mont in the north, a distance of approximately three miles.
To enable the reader to follow the operation of the Battalion a locality plan has been inserted. The general idea of the Divisional scheme was to push the 2nd Brigade forward with its right flank at Hamel, swinging its left flank forward of Beaumont Hamel along the road to Hébuterne, and then to endeavour to thrust the line east of Serre in the hope of securing touch with the right flank of the IV Corps, which was thought to be in Puisieux. Both Brigades were composite, owing to the irregular arrival of the battalions from the detraining stations.
The Battalion Headquarters and Canterbury Company, together with a Company of the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, entrained at Cæstre on 24th March, and proceeded in From the N.Z. Official War History, Vol. II]
The Upper Ancreviâ Calais-Boulogne and Abbeville to three miles west of Amiens, where it was found that the railway line had been destroyed by enemy aircraft bombs. The troops detrained at 2.30 a.m. on the 25th. Mechanical transport was requisitioned, and Battalion Headquarters and Canterbury Company pushed on through the retreating civilian inhabitants viâ Villers-Bretonneux to Cerisy and Chipilly, on the Somme. Here Lieut.-Col. Blair found the position obscure. A regiment of Hussars retiring across the Somme could not give any connected version of how the line was held in front, save that the rearguards were falling back unbroken, according to orders, and in conformity with the flanks. Shortly after noon a motor cyclist orderly arrived from Divisional Headquarters at Pont Noyelles, with orders to fill a gap in the line up the Ancre Valley. Battalion Headquarters and Canterbury Company immediately continued their march to Ville sur Corbie. The Canterbury Company went into billets at this village, but Battalion Headquarters moved on and became established at Ribemont sur Ancre at 5 p.m.
The Auckland Company detrained at Ailly sur Somme at 2 a.m. on 25th March and "embussed" to Dernancourt, arriving there at 5 p.m. The Wellington Company detrained at Ailly sur Somme at 8 p.m. on 25th March, and at once proceeded to Dernancourt, only to be ordered to continue the journey to Hedauville, which place was reached at 3 a.m. On the 26th, Battalion Headquarters and the Canterbury and Auckland Companies had their slumbers rudely disturbed shortly after midnight by the receipt of urgent orders to proceed at once to Hedauville. By 6 a.m. on the 26th the Battalion, less the Otago Company, were concentrated in this village.
The Otago Company was the last to entrain for the Somme. By the time its turn came along there was a shortage of rolling stock, which delayed the departure of the Company for nearly a whole day; the gunners being forced to kick their heels in Cæstre in cold, drizzling weather. The Company proceeded by train to Picquigny, in the Somme Valley, where all heavy baggage was dumped. At Picquigny, information was received that a directing station for the New Zealand personnel, guns and S.A.A. towards Pont Noyelles were requisitioned, and the transport (under Lieut. C. V. Mark) was ordered to follow as quickly as possible.
The Company reached Noyelles during the afternoon of 26th March. The motor lorries were immediately sent back to Picquigny, and the Company was directed by
There was little time for rest after the Battalion reached Hedauville, as the Divisional operation began soon after daylight. The Auckland Company was at once detailed to cooperate with the 1st Brigade, the Wellington Company with the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, and the Canterbury Company with the 2nd Brigade.
The Auckland and Canterbury Companies moved forward with the 1st and 2nd Brigades, and were soon able to render valuable assistance, frequently coming into action against parties of enemy from ten to thirty strong with deadly effect. Two sections of the Canterbury Company formed the vanguard of the advanced guard for the New Zealand Division, being attached to the 1st Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, which Battalion had temporarily become part of the 1st Brigade. The two Canterbury sections were distributed over a frontage of nearly five miles, the left section being under the command of Lieut. R. Buchanan, and the right section under the command of
The advanced guard guns were withdrawn as the 2nd Brigade passed through with the Auckland Company, and returned to the Canterbury Company in the left sector with the 1st Brigade.
The handling of the sections of both Companies was excellent, the section officers keeping in close touch with the infantry, and organising covering fire from time to time to facilitate the advance.
The new Divisional front on the night of the 26th was not as planned in the operation, and the left flank rested near Colincamps, still unjoined and exposed. The new position was consolidated during the evening, and the machine guns kept busy throughout the night on the enemy positions. At 1 a.m. the Wellington Company moved forward with the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade in its advance to extend the line on the left flank.
Major Chaytor allotted No. 1 Section (under Lieut. M. Steele) to the right battalion, No. 4 Section (under
The advance by the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade was rapid, and by 9 a.m. had successfully filled the dangerous gap on the Divisional northern flank, linking up with the Australians and securing the important ridge between La Signy Farm and Hébuterne. Our line now extended from a little south of Hébuterne to Hamel.
The Wellington Company took up positions that enabled it to cover the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade front and at the same time take advantage of observed enemy movement. The section officers worked their sections in conformity with the Battalions.
At 10.30 a.m. an enemy battalion was observed at 1800 yards range moving from near Hébuterne. The guns at once opened and quickly found range, playing havoc among the enemy, who scattered in all directions. About 12 noon there was a great deal of enemy movement on the new Divisional front that gave the gunners of the Wellington Company their great opportunity to demonstrate to the infantry the terrible fire power of their weapons. At one point a battalion in column of route formation was engaged by four guns at 1800 yards range, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing the battalion to deploy. A little later two enemy companies in mass formation advanced against our lines. With a clear field of fire, two guns at 700 yards range poured in a murderous fire, literally mowing down the enemy. Stretcher bearers were working at this point for three hours after. The next target was two columns of enemy infantry advancing in column of route that were observed at about 1600 yards from a gun position commanded by Corp.
At 2 p.m., under cover of artillery fire, parties of the enemy advanced through old communication trenches to attempt to rush three of the Wellington Company's guns (No. 2 Section, under
It may be well at this juncture to briefly point out two important lessons that the last incident illustrates. First, machine gun commanders should never be in advanced positions in open warfare without an adequate infantry escort. The gun commander has the right to obtain that protection,
At 2.30 p.m. the enemy again attempted to attack the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade's positions, this time taking the precaution to advance in open order. The advance was observed as it came over the ridge at about 1200 yards. In a flash the Wellington guns opened, many of the enemy falling, while the remainder broke for cover. For some time after odd men were observed trying to crawl back behind the ridge.
At 4 p.m. the right battalion's left flank was forced back by the enemy, and one of the Wellington guns was ordered to withdraw. Unfortunately the whole team became casualties, but
In the evening the West Coast Company was forced back about 500 yards from the Hébuterne Road. A gun of the 4th Section of the Wellington Company was left exposed, and the commander was told by the infantry that his position was almost surrounded; help was offered by the infantry to assist the team to break through with the gun and so avoid capture. A hurried consultation was being held between the gunners when Corp. J. Dean of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade came up and asked the gun commander what he intended doing, at the same time stating that if the team would "stick it out," he with his party of a Lewis gun team and nearly a platoon of riflemen would do likewise; and naturally it was agreed to "stick it out." About midnight a heavy rifle fire opened about 150 yards in front of the gun position, to which the gun quickly responded. The gun commander did not know where our own troops were, the withdrawal having taken place after dark, and rather than endanger our own men he fired his gun high,
During the early morning of 27th March Battalion Headquarters moved up to Courcelles, and Otago Company was ordered to establish a second line of machine gun defence across the Divisional front. The line was known as the Purple line, or the Divisional Reserve line, and ran from Beausart through Colincamps to the Quarries.
On this line Otago Company constructed solidly dug and carefully camouflaged emplacements for all its guns, as well as many alternative positions, to provide for any sudden change in the situation. Owing to the very extended front the Company was required to cover, the guns were sited in sub-sections with long fields of fire and the tasks of all sub-sections were carefully co-ordinated. The gun wagons and horses were distributed in positions close to their guns in readiness for any readjustment of the Company, as it was at that stage very doubtful whether the hostile advance on the flanks had been definitely stopped. The ammunition wagons were concentrated under the transport officer for all supply work and for the establishment of dumps. The Otago Company maintained their positions until relieved as later detailed.
The enemy was determined to capture a New Zealand gun, and on the 28th at 3 p.m. he succeeded, but again only for a brief period was he permitted to hold the coveted trophy. The whole gun team was surrounded, and after a short struggle the gun taken, the enemy retiring along the sap they had come up. To have the gun taken without its team was too bitter a pill, and the bombs which should have been in the position were quickly obtained. Up the sap the gunners rushed, quickly catching the enemy party, and showering it with bombs. Like all operations where the enemy is suddenly surprised, this impromptu "counter-attack" succeeded; the lost gun was recovered, and several Huns qualified for the "wooden" instead of the "Iron" Cross.
Throughout the 28th all the Companies kept busy, engaging numerous targets, but on the 29th were much quieter, owing to the enemy taking cover when within machine gun
At 11 a.m. on 29th a large working party was observed on Redan Ridge. Range finders reported the range to be 2500 yards. A section opened fire. Casualties were observed, and the whole working party scattered.
With such activity by the guns of the Companies from fixed positions, it was considered advisable to effect a change, especially as the enemy was making serious efforts to silence the guns.
During the 29th the section officers reconnoitred new positions, which were taken up during the evening.
A carefully prepared scheme was arranged for the machine guns to support the 1st Brigade's advance to capture La Signy Farm on the 30th. All guns able to do so opened at 2 p.m. as the infantry moved forward, putting up a protective barrage. Some of the forward guns were confined to selected enemy communication trenches, and others went forward with the infantry. One forward gun kept a communication trench under fire—searching up and down until the infantry came close to it, and then ceased fire. A large enemy party had apparently tried to move back along this trench, for when it was captured sixty newly dead Germans were found in it.
At one point when the infantry were held up by four German guns, one of our guns was quietly brought up, mounted in the open, and effectively silenced the four enemy guns in a few seconds. Great judgment was displayed by the gun commander in bringing his gun forward and mounting it without being observed; he took advantage of the broken ground and mounted the gun behind a small mound that almost completely obscured a sight of the gun being obtained from the front.
The attack on the 30th was successful, and the 31st saw the Division holding a well selected and defined line. Enemy movement became almost negligible—depriving the gunners of the splendid targets they had become accustomed to, and necessitating the return to indirect harassing fire.
Since leaving the Polygon Sector around Ypres at the end The changed conditions of warfare naturally altered the employment of the guns. The fear of the General Staff was that machine gunners would not be trained to meet the new conditions if open warfare tactics were neglected by specialising too much on barrage work.
Conditions began to settle down to the well-known trench warfare; positions were improved, and the Divisional front was shortened to make it a normal two brigade front.
Before proceeding, it is fitting to record what our Intelligence was able to ascertain from the enemy about the Machine Gun Battalion. A captured German officer's diary contained the following entry for 27th March:—"Crossed old front line by Croiselles ——. Our flank is in the air. Held up by cleverly concealed machine guns. Many casualties. Have to start trench warfare again as English are very strong."
The following is an extract from notes on the examination of prisoners:—"The 24th Division came into line on 27th March and launched a battalion attack. The direction of the advance was due west towards windmill north of Colincamps; the attack broke down under our (New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion) machine gun fire."
Prisoners also said that the losses in the attack were very bad, about 50 per cent, casualties appeared to have been caused.
The 1st April saw the Divisional front defined and secure. The Canterbury Company was well established on the right—Auckland Company in the centre, and Wellington Company on the left. Otago Company remained in the Divisional personnel of the Battalion, withdrawn proportionately from the Companies in the Line. Otago Company relieved the Auckland Company in the centre, the latter Company taking over the Divisional Reserve line. During these four days the Battalion only lost two men killed and two men wounded.
The quiet period was rudely disturbed at 5 a.m. on the 5th, when the enemy opened the heaviest concentrated bombardment that the New Zealand Division experienced through-out the whole war. The extent of the bombardment was on a frontage of about three miles to a depth of three miles—shells of all calibres were used, including many gas shells. The Headquarters of the Canterbury, Wellington and Auckland Companies were hit, and several gun positions were blown up. Lieut. J. Penniket and four gunners were wounded at one position, and the gun destroyed. Immediately information of the loss of the gun was reported, Lieut. J. Black, with Sergt. Christie and two gunners, took a gun forward to replace Penniket's gun, and succeeded in getting to the position through the heavy barrage without mishap. This prompt act was rewarded later in the day, when the gun was able to perform much useful execution to the attacking Germans. At 8.30 a.m. the Wellington Company, on the left sector, caught the advancing enemy with a perfect hurricane of fire, inflicting casualties estimated at half of the total attacking force; and also harassed the remnants of the force as it retired. The guns of the Otago Company also played a conspicuous part against the enemy attack—the guns in the front line and in commanding positions in the support line delivered a heavy fire at ranges from 1800 yards to 50 yards. Particularly heavy casualties were inflicted by two guns under
At 4.30 p.m. Black was rewarded for the perilous journey he had undertaken to replace Penniket's gun. A force, comprising approximately one company, made an attempt against a portion of our line. Black's gun with a slight enfilade raked the attackers, leaving seventy to eighty dead and dying in front of our line.
At this time our front line defences were protected by a large number of captured machine guns, which our gunners manned in addition to their own. About forty guns had been captured in the vicinity of La Signy Farm, and most of these were taken over by the Companies.
The best proof of the effective work of the Companies of the Battalion is obtained from the enemy. A captured officer was questioned as to the failure of the attack, and replied that the main cause was the intensity of the machine gun barrage.
Several prisoners of the 26th Würtemberg Division said that the artillery barrage did not seriously hurt the attacking troops, as it was over them, both in the assembly trench and when advancing, but the enfilade machine guns caused the many casualties that prevented the attack succeeding. A captured diary also confirmed the effectiveness of the work of our gunners. When referring to the attack of the 5th April it reads:—"At 10 a.m. we attack. Many comrades find a hero's death, others writhe in their wounds. Principally it was due to machine gun fire from the right and left flanks.
The losses are very great. Many wounded are lying in the open. Thank God, we are relieved here."
The Battalion was extremely fortunate when we consider that the whole of the four Companies was working in the intensely shelled area. Lieut. J. Penniket and twenty-five other ranks were wounded—none were killed.
The weather was very bad on the 6th, and the gunners were hampered at their positions by rain and mud. Unfortunately, Lieut.
The conditions in the line remained normal throughout April, and the Battalion's casualties were small. The enemy had become very inaggressive, and in consequence our guns did not get many targets by day. They continued their night work, and also did a lot of work to the gun positions. The Divisional baths came as a great relief to the gunners, parties leaving the line daily to get bathed and refitted with clean underwear.
The Divisional front was altered on the nights of 24th and 25th April by the right sector being taken over by a brigade of the 12th Division, and the New Zealand Division taking over a brigade sector to the immediate north, which brought the Village of Hébuterne under our care. It was now decided to change the Companies of the Battalion to enable one Company to withdraw from the line and to form a Mobile Reserve at Bus-en-Artois. Canterbury Company was relieved in the right sector and took over the Divisional Reserve line. The Wellington Company relieved the 4th Australian Company in front of Hebuterne, Auckland Company maintained its position, and Otago Company moved back to form a Mobile Reserve.
On 1st May information was received that an enemy relief was taking place between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. The guns of the Wellington and Auckland Companies were ordered to carry
On 4th May the guns of the Battalion co-operated with the artillery to assist the 1st Brigade to advance our line in front of Hébuterne, to strengthen the position. The barrage worked very smoothly, and no casualties were sustained by the gunners. The infantry reported that an enemy machine gun from near the edge of Rossignol Wood had been causing a lot of annoyance. Several gunners were told off to keep the spot under observation, and succeeded in locating the troublesome gun. A gun was pushed forward at dusk and laid on the located spot. Our attack opened at 8.30 p.m., and immediately the enemy machine gun was seen to fire, our waiting gun quickly silenced it, and so saved the infantry from its deadly enfilade fire.
On 5th May the Otago Company relieved the Canterbury Company, which then became Mobile Reserve.
The Companies were changed round during the month, to give each a turn in Mobile Reseve to rest and undergo a course of training. Conditions had returned to normal trench warfare, except perhaps for the occasional heavy enemy shelling. The health of the men remained good, and they were very keen to again have the pleasure of exacting a heavy toll upon the assaulting Huns, but the Hun had received his lesson, and the New Zealand line remained intact. On 7th June the New Zealand Division was relieved, and by 8 p.m. on the 8th the Battalion's Headquarters had been established at Bois du Warnimont. Auckland Company was at Orville, Otago Company at Château de la Haie Switch, and the Canterbury and Wellington Companies with Battalion Headquarters.
The Division remained out of the line for three weeks, during which time the Battalion underwent a strenuous syllabus of training. The practising of the manning of battle stations was given first place in the training, so that if the enemy should penetrate our forward lines, he would be met
One Brigade and one Machine Gun Company were always kept at this line during the Divisional training.
The Battalion was visited by Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward on 30th June. Our two statesmen were very interested in the Battalion and its guns, which they inspected carefully. Afterwards both Sir Joseph and Mr. Massey addressed the Battalion upon non-political matters, and were also photographed with it.
When the Companies of the Battalion moved back from the line,
Practically the whole of the schemes were adopted, and the necessary work was carried out by Chinese labour units working under the directions of the Royal Engineers. Major Inglis rejoined his Company when it again returned to the line.
The 1st July brought an end to the period of rest, the Division on that day commencing to take over the sector between Hébuterne in the south and Biez Wood in the north.
The machine gun defence of the sector had been carefully arranged. Two Companies were allotted to the two Brigade sub-sectors, with one Company in support, and one Company in Divisional Reserve. In accordance with the general scheme of machine gun defence all the guns of the Companies were placed to bring down a barrage in front of our forward positions at the opening of the enemy attack, and if the attack penetrated to then form belts of fire between the successive lines. The salient near Rossignol Wood was strongly covered by twenty-one guns, placed to enfilade forward of both flanks.
The 57th Machine Gun Battalion was relieved in the sector, the whole relief being completed by midnight on the 2nd July without casualties. Otago Company took over the right sub-sector and Wellington the left, Canterbury Company
The Battalion Listens to Political Leaders.Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward addressing Machine Gunners in France.The Battalion. General Richardson, Sir Joseph Ward, Mr. Massey and General Russell in the foreground.(The Sir Joseph is holding has no ammunition in it).
The Companies became very active with the artillery and mortars, in preparation of the Divisional operations to improve the unsatisfactory position of the forward line. The first operation was the advancing of our line a further 500 yards east of Hébuterne on a frontage of about 1500 yards by two Battalions of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. Zero hour was fixed for 3 p.m., and the guns of the three Companies in the line opened with the artillery.
The machine guns were not used to supplement the barrage, but to keep all the enemy's flank trenches under fire and to harass his communications. Fire was maintained for thirty minutes, during which time 98,000 rounds were expended.
The guns were not moved at once, in consequence of the successful advance. About 9.45 p.m. word was sent to the O.C. Otago Company that the enemy appeared to be collecting in Hawk Trench for a counter-attack. Two guns were sent forward to an advanced position from which direct fire against Hawk Trench could be obtained; 4000 rounds of direct fire were delivered into the trench by these two guns, while the remainder of the Company kept on the alert in case the counter-attack should develop.
During the operation only one casualty (a gunner gassed) was sustained by the Battalion.
The 16th gave the gunners some targets, the chief being an enemy carrying party of forty men.
The 17th and 18th were marked by heavy enemy shelling, causing several casualties, among them being 2nd Lieuts. W. Thomas and
An instance of the sterling fighting qualities of the machine gunners was furnished during the heavy minnenwerfer bombardment that took place on 17th July. When Lieut.
As Sherwood feared an enemy raid would accompany the bombardment, he kept both guns manned, and distributed his men to avoid casualties. He remained with his leading gun numbers (Privates Blacklock and
The machine guns co-operated in the operations that finally resulted in the evacuation of Rossignol Wood and the strengthening of our line. The successful advance beyond Rossignol Wood necessitated a change of the machine gun positions. Accordingly on the 30th July, after a careful reconnaissance, most of the old positions were vacated and new positions taken up nearer to the front line, in conformity with the ground won from the enemy.
July was warm and wet. In the early part of the month an epidemic of influenza broke out and accounted for much sickness, but in the last ten days of the month the virulence of the disease and number of cases rapidly diminished. Apart from the epidemic, the health of the Battalion was excellent. During July a new scheme of signal communication was inaugurated; a section of the Divisional Signal Company under 2nd
On 1st August, Auckland and Wellington Companies were in the forward sectors, Otago Company in support, and Canterbury Company back as Divisional Mobile Reserve. Battalion Headquarters was still at Couin, and the transport was centralised at Bus, in the Couin Valley, with the Reserve personnel, had an excellent canvas camp constructed with splinter-proof banks round all tents, bivouacs and horse lines. Fortunately the bomb defences of the camp were never tested, but their necessity was shown on a number of occasions when the enemy night flying 'planes dropped bombs close enough to cause a certain amount of consternation.
A very thorough sanitary system was arranged by
The new Divisional canteen scheme came into operation in August, under which all stores were purchased by O.C. Divisional Canteens, and issued to units proportionately. This meant a much more liberal supply to the Battalion than had been possible before, and permitted special commodities being issued to Companies to augment the ordinary Army ration.
One of the most gratifying events in August was the excellent report made by the A.D.V.S. (Chief Divisional Veterinary Officer) upon the Battalion's transport. The report made very complimentary remarks upon the arrangement of the horse lines, the cleanliness of the animals and the general efficiency of the transport officers and men.
The Companies in the line carried out extensive firing programmes against the roads and tracks used by the enemy during the early part of August, as well as a large amount of anti-aircraft work. Aeroplane photographs, which were issued to the officers in the line at frequent intervals, disclosed the tracks and roads most used by the enemy; and determined the following night's shooting. The examinations of prisoners taken during this period generally revealed that the night firing guns had been very effective.
In the day time all the available gunners were employed
The Companies of the Battalion were changed round on 3rd August; Otago Company went up from support and relieved Wellington Company, Canterbury took Otago's place in support, and Wellington on relief became Divisional Mobile Reserve.
Otago Company was at this time temporarily commanded by
By this time the American Army was almost ready to take its place alongside the Armies of France and Britain; but before it did so, its officers and men were given a final period of training with various British and French units in the line.
Towards the end of July five officers and 114 other ranks from the 313th and 317th U.S. Machine Gun Battalions joined the New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion for instruction, and on 4th August the whole of the 313th Battalion became attached to our Battalion. Otago Company (less one section) was withdrawn from the right subsector, so that each of the American Companies could have a three days' tour of duty in the forward defences. The American Company was smaller than the British, only comprising twelve guns and 160 officers and men. The American gunners adapted themselves to their new and trying duties in a most remarkable way, and soon established a warm friendship with our men.
The American Battalion Commander and his staff received their baptism of fire while making an inspection of the Divisional sector with Lieut.-Col. Blair. Every portion was visited and many explanations were given. After returning to Battalion Headquarters the party summed up their impressions with the words "most illuminating."
After the 8th August conditions in the sector began to change and a feeling manifested itself that the enemy was about to make a graceful retirement if he could. The gunners increased their activity at night against the channels of communication, hoping that if the retirement was being arranged there would be a few less Huns to take part in it
It was not, however, until about 7.30 a.m. on the 14th August that it was definitely known that the withdrawal had commenced, nor was it certain to what extent the withdrawal would be made.
The infantry patrols were at once pushed forward, covered by a section of the Canterbury Company. The whole Divisional front was moving by midday, but with the exception of two sections of the Auckland Company under
On the 16th the Canterbury Company passed from the support line through Auckland and Otago Companies, and took up positions in the newly acquired territory to cover the advanced infantry battalions. This Company was only
It now became clear that the enemy had lost the initiative; the Allied Armies had regained it, and intended to push home the advantage, in the hope that before the winter hampered operations the tottering fabric of the once great German Armies would be finally crushed, and peace would once more spread its wings over the war-weary world.
ChapterXII
The Advance to Bapaume
Period20
th August,1918,
to15
th September,1918
Time appeared to be the essence of the operation. The enemy had made a successful withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in 1917, but was not to be allowed to repeat the performance; the morale of the German Army had been rudely shaken by the failure of the grand offensive and by the costly attempts that had been made to exploit the initial successes that attended the operation. If the enemy could be manœuvred into battle before he could make good his withdrawal the rout must commence.
The Third Army, to which the New Zealand Division was attached, had formulated its plans quickly, and on the 18th eight guns of the Auckland Company were moved well forward to the left Divisional flank to prepare a barrage position from which to cover the advance of the 37th Division against the slopes east of Bucquoy. On the 20th the Otago and Wellington Companies moved to battle stations at Souastre Fork and Château de la Haie respectively, with fighting limbers, all ready to quickly move forward.
At 4.55 a.m. on the 21st August the Third Army opened its offensive, the chief movement being north of our Divisional front. The Auckland Company's barrage worked with splendid precision as the 37th Division attacked, and won very high praise. The Canterbury Company, together with the remaining guns of the Auckland Company, were organised to cover the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade's attack against a line immediately beyond Puisieux.
The operations on the 21st were completely successful, and in consequence the Otago Company moved forward to assist in the further advance. A section of this Company under 2nd
So successful were the initial operations that the Division was ordered on the 23rd to exploit the success towards Bapaume, and to advance with the intention of preventing the destruction of road and railway communications. The Companies of the Battalion became detached, Auckland Company going to 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, Wellington Company to 1st Brigade, and Canterbury Company to 2nd Brigade, while Otago Company became Divisional Reserve, remaining at advanced Divisional Headquarters.
The Canterbury Company came in for some heavy work during the 23rd, while the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade carried out its operation, and several gunners showed great enterprise and initiative, taking full advantage of cover, and also of the many targets that appeared.
The 3rd (Rifle) Brigade having fulfilled its task, was withdrawn with the Canterbury Company near to Bucquoy to await developments. The advance had now passed beyond the New Zealand Division and had proceeded in a southeasterly direction towards Bapaume. The line of the IV Corps on the night of the 23rd ran through Bihucourt beyond Irles, resistance having become very stiff towards Loupart Wood. The whole Army had been successful, and the New Zealand Division was again called upon to help clear away the obstacle of Loupart Wood. The 1st Brigade received orders soon after midnight on the night 23rd/24th, and was soon on the move towards an assembly area near the road running parallel to and about half a mile beyond the Albert-Arras Railway. The 2nd Brigade followed after the 1st Brigade, to be in readiness to push on if the first attack succeeded.
The Division's scheme was divided into two stages—the first being the advance of the 1st Brigade to a line 500 yards beyond Loupart Wood and Grevillers, which meant the capture of both the wood and the village. This was the task of the 1st Brigade. The second stage was an advance to the high ground beyond Bapaume by the 2nd Brigade.
The 1st Brigade attacked at 4.15 a.m. with a section of guns from the Wellington Company attached to the two assaulting Battalions. The remaining two sections were quickly moved forward to positions from which to cover the attack with direct overhead fire.
The sections with the Battalions were frequently in action during the day, the gunners working their guns very boldly. At one stage of the advance
The attack had not been successful enough to enable the 2nd Brigade to pass through beyond Bapaume, as was originally intended. This Brigade had to assist the 1st Brigade on the left flank near Biefvillers. The guns of the Wellington Company took up positions to cover Grevillers and the south-eastern edge of Loupart Wood, and the Canterbury guns covered Biefvillers and the northern flank of the Division, the scheme adopted being the establishment of a series of battery positions, each section forming a battery. The guns remained on the defensive throughout the night.
No respite was to be given the enemy, who had fought so desperately to hold up the advance beyond Bapaume. A renewal of the attack was ordered for the morning of the 25th. A direct frontal attack against Bapaume was to be avoided, and two encircling movements were planned. The 2nd Brigade was to thrust round the northern edge of the town, and the 1st Brigade, co-operating with the 63rd Division, was to attack to the south of the town, it being hoped
The attack by the 2nd Brigade finally succeeded in pushing a little beyond the town in the north, but the attack in the south did not advance very far, and the 1st Brigade spent most of the day in active patrol work. The Wellington Company sections covered the patrols through the day, one section engaging a party of about fifty Germans, causing a number of casualties.
When two German tanks, followed by a considerable force of infantry attacked the 1st Brigade, a pair of the Wellington Company's guns displayed a fine example of fire discipline. The officer in charge of the guns, knowing that nothing could be gained by engaging the tanks, held his fire until the enemy infantry presented a favourable target. He then opened, and wiped out the whole of the infantry; one tank on the flank was captured, and the one near to our guns, just as it was setting to work to knock them out, fell over the bank of a sunken road. The tank's six-pounder gun buried its nose about a foot into the opposite bank, leaving the tank crew with no alternative than to surrender.
The 3rd (Rifle) Brigade began to move up at about 7 p.m. to deploy along the Arras-Bapaume Road preparatory to continuing the advance on the following day, the Auckland Company coming forward with it, with one section attached to each Battalion.
The Battalion transport had been gradually moving forward, and on the 26th moved to Irles, establishing lines near the village. The spare personnel and drivers quickly threw up protective banks along the lines. Only one horse became a casualty during the forward move.
The Auckland Company's guns on the 26th were used by the Battalion Commanders to consolidate the positions gained and also to cover the infantry when the second attack was made at 6 p.m. During the respite on the 27th and 28th the Otago Company was brought up, and with the Wellington Company organised the defence in depth between Biefvillers and Grevillers.
A change came over the front on the 29th by the
The Otago Company came forward on the 29th through Bapaume, and disposed its guns to command the approaches from Bancourt and Fremicourt and to cover the Division's right flank.
It was decided to make a substantial forward move on the 30th, and all the available guns co-operated with the Otago Company to harass the enemy. The attack opened at 5 a.m., and every machine gun at once began its work, the majority of the guns firing upon the trenches protecting the forward villages in the hope of beating down the enemy machine gun fire that was expected from them.
The guns throughout the 30th and 31st had many excellent targets, and took a heavy toll of Germans, especially when the enemy counter-attack at 5 a.m. on the 31st was cut up.
On 1st September Battalion Headquarters was established at Grevillers, and the Canterbury Company and the Wellington Company prepared to assist the 2nd Brigade in its attack against the broad crest overlooking Haplincourt. Auckland Company was withdrawn into Divisional Reserve with the Otago Company.
The two Companies in the line were disposed into barrage groups to supplement the artillery barrage. The 2nd Brigade obtained its objective, and Canterbury Company was taken up to assist in the consolidation.
The morning of the 3rd September revealed vast coils of smoke arising from behind the enemy lines, the burning dumps foretelling further withdrawal. Patrols pushed forward quickly, and reported that Haplincourt was clear. The 2nd Brigade, throwing out advanced guards, followed the enemy in the direction of Bertincourt and Ruyaulcourt, the Canterbury Company's gun teams, with their heavy loads, keeping up with the rapidly moving infantry. The two forward sections frequently came into action. About 1 p.m. the infantry were troubled by an enemy battery; two guns under 2nd Lieut. Bartlett worked forward and engaged the battery with direct
The infantry continued the advance, and at dusk the Divisional front extended along a line between and beyond Velu and Bertincourt with patrols pushing forward towards Ruyaulcourt.
The Otago Company came forward on the afternoon of the 3rd September and disposed its guns in depth in defensive positions—two guns in each.
The 2nd Brigade continued its advance at 7 a.m. on the 4th, using two sections of the Canterbury Company in the van of the advance to deal with enemy parties. Later in the day the guns were employed to engage the enemy field guns firing from the edge of Havrincourt Wood. The guns were splendidly handled; they were carefully advanced to covered positions from which they delivered direct fire against the field artillery, and materially assisted in the complete silencing of it. The work of the two Canterbury sections illustrates eloquently how machine guns carefully handled in the open can successfully engage artillery at a range of from 1400 yards to 2000 yards. The machine gun is a very small target, even when firing in the open, but is indistinguishable when firing from behind a small rise. By employing short rapid bursts—expending at the rate of 100 to 150 rounds per minute—there is no "give away" steam. Although the Canterbury gunners were actively engaged firing in the open the whole day, they only suffered two casualties.
Not only did the Canterbury guns play havoc with the enemy artillerymen in front of Havrincourt Wood. A little after 1 p.m. the enemy were observed advancing in open order towards Neuville-Bourjouval, the capture of which was part of the task allotted to the 42nd Division on the New Zealand Division's right. The right section of the Canterbury Company turned their guns southwards and joined with the artillery in decimating the advancing Germans.
The remaining sections of the Canterbury Company moved up as the advance proceeded on the 4th, disposed to form defensive positions; and during the 5th, which was spent in consolidating, kept up a continuous harassing fire against all observed enemy movement.
The New Zealand Division's line had by nightfall been successfully consolidated about 600 yards in front of Havrincourt Wood, down past Neuville-Bourjouval, which the 42nd Division had succeeded in capturing.
During the night of the 5th/6th there was heavy enemy shelling, which gradually died down towards daylight Infantry patrols quickly reported that the enemy had withdrawn from the positions on the right Divisional front, and the 1st Otago Battalion was quickly on the move—flanking Havrincourt Wood. Again the Canterbury Company had a great day of rapid "action" against enemy parties and artillery, as it advanced with the infantry; and also of engaging enemy machine guns with direct fire. So successful had the advance on the flank of the wood been that everything seemed to point to its envelopment without the necessity of the terrible sacrifice that would he necessary to force its passage. The enemy, however, made a graceful withdrawal from the wood daring the afternoon, and the 2nd Canterbury were through to the eastern side of it by 10 p.m.
The Canterbury Company covered the new line during the night, and the Wellington Company was brought up to strengthen the support positions. Ahead of the New Zealand Division's line lay the formidable Trescault Ridge, already in a state of defence—the first outpost of the well-known Hindenburg Line. The 7th September was a day of adjustment—getting everything in order for the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade to take over during the night.
The Canterbury Company had experienced a heavy week, but had thrived on the hard work it had been called upon to perform. The gunners were in excellent health and spirits throughout the advance, and justly felt as they were relieved by the Auckland Company during the night of the 7th/8th September that they had added lustre to the reputation of the New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion.
Different conditions met the Auckland Company as it settled down. No longer was the Division faced with an enemy disorganised and demoralised—eager to carry out the orders of the Higher Command—namely "retire according to plan"—but an enemy well entrenched in a naturally strong position, ready to defy our further advance, except at great
Five gun positions of the Auckland Company were heavily shelled during the 8th, three men being wounded and one gun destroyed. New positions were quickly established, and a gun brought forward to replace the one knocked out.
Constant pressure on the enemy was the predominating order, and a new attack was planned for the 9th. The main attack was to be undertaken by the V Corps on the right of the New Zealand Division, but to be supported by the Division protecting the left flank of the attack. This protection was given by the right Battalion advancing and capturing African Trench and the communication trench back to Dead Man's Corner, and by the centre Battalion forming a defensive flank back from Dead Man's Corner to our line in front of Havrincourt Wood, the left Battalion of the Division standing fast.
To assist the 2nd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, one section of Auckland Company was sent forward with the right Battalion to assist in consolidation, two sections were grouped together to give a creeping barrage, and one section grouped to barrage localities on the centre and left which were known to be held by the enemy in force.
The creeping barrage was successfully accomplished, and the harassing section kept a steady fire upon the selected localities. After the time in which the infantry should have reached their objective had passed, the creeping barrage and harassing fire sections laid on S.O.S. lines to cover the high ground overlooking our left flank, from which it was anticipated the enemy would counter-attack.
Zero hour was 4 a.m., when it was still pitch dark. The right Battalion mistook African support trench for African Trench, and did not discover the mistake until after daylight. The flanks of the leading company were in the air, and the final objective could not be reached. The machine guns were then pushed forward and established two strong posts to protect the flanks, with two guns in each. The post protecting the right flank was in the vicinity of Queen's Cross, against which the enemy made repeated attempts throughout the day. Probably no two guns in the Machine Gun Corps were so
The three sections covering the left defensive flank were heavily engaged during the afternoon and evening, especially when at 7 p.m. the enemy made his final effort to win back the ground he lost. This final effort was a failure, frustrated by the wonderful gallantry and steadfastness of the infantry and the devastating fire of the machine guns and artillery.
The whole Auckland Company, exposed to the heavy enemy shelling and machine gun fire throughout the day, miraculously escaped without a single casualty. The two attacking Battalions unfortunately lost forty killed and one hundred and thirty-four wounded. No wonder is it that the Machine Gun Corps lost the title (properly earned upon Gallipoli) of "the Suicide Club."
The 10th September saw our line firmly established, with the machine guns disposed in a co-ordinated defensive position. Preparations were again afoot for another operation, and on the 11th Wellington and Otago Companies came up to take part in the attack that was scheduled for the next morning. The role of the New Zealand Division on the 12th September was to attack with three battalions of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade on a front of about 2500 yards, with African Trench on the right as the first objective, and the high Trescault Crest to "Charing Cross" on the left as the final objective. The Division was on the right of the main attack—exactly opposite to its position on 9th September.
A machine gun barrage group was formed by Wellington and Otago Companies and one section of Auckland Company; the remaining three sections of Auckland Company were allotted to the attacking battalions for the purpose of holding the first and second objectives during and after consolidation.
Zero hour at 5.25 a.m. resembled the Zero hours of 1916 and 1917; a strongly entrenched and held position had to be assaulted, and every available gun was brought up to support and protect the infantry.
The barrage group opened at Zero, placing a standing barrage along the first objective and then lifting back to search areas beyond the objectives. Owing to the desperate nature
The fight of the infantry to secure the final objective is excellently narrated in the "New Zealand Division." For the machine gunners there is little to tell; their job was to watch for calls for help and to respond; it cannot be denied that throughout the strenuous day and the night that followed it, their response was prompt and effective.
General Hart decided, in view of the uncertainty in the situation in front, to retain the barrage group laid to barrage ahead of the final objective; by 10 p.m., however, the position became settled, and Otago Company was withdrawn. Early next morning Auckland Company withdrew, leaving Wellington Company to organise the machine gun defence of the line and to provide support for the several infantry attacks that took place during the day. The gunners of this Company had very few chances to engage targets on the 13th with direct fire, owing to the Germans being very careful to keep to their trenches.
The New Zealand Division had had a long, continuous tour of duty, and was due for a well-earned rest. On the 14th September the relief of the Division by the Sth Division commenced. Wellington Company was relieved during the night 14th/15th September and rejoined the Battalion the next morning. The Division was soon well away from the battle zone, and before nightfall on the 15th the Machine Gun Battalion reached Bihucourt, where it remained for two pleasant weeks.
An important conference took place at Favreuil while the Division was resting, to discuss the lessons learnt in the recent offensive operations in the handling of field artillery and the tactical co-operation of the machine guns with the infantry. The Brigadiers were unanimous that the Brigades were much better served under the old Brigade Company system than
Mr. Massey sympathetically hears a Gunner's Tale of Hardship. His Private Secretary takes a note of the case, so that attention will be given to it on Mr. Massey's return to New Zealand.Belt-filling Machine at Work.Machine Gun taking advantage of natural cover. This Gun is about to open fire.No. 4 Section Wellington Company just after it had finished firing at Huns near Bapaume. (Lieut. C. V. Ciochetto at the gun in the foreground).
It has been previously pointed out that there was not a consensus of opinion among the most experienced machine gun officers that the Machine Gun Battalion formation was an unqualified success, so far as the tactical handling of the guns was concerned. The machine gun and its tactics developed wonderfully during the war, and each year new schemes were put into operation. The battalion formation was given a lengthy trial, and it seems that its chief failure was the non-realisation of its true tactical handling—as a battalion. It is conceivable that many occasions arose when the machine guns should have been fought as a battalion, and others when it would have been possible only to employ them in sections acting with infantry battalions or even companies. Tactical situations differ, and decisions must be guided by the conditions of the moment.
It is interesting to note the view of the Higher Command at this time upon the handling of the Machine Gun Battalion. On 29th September, 1918, the Third Army issued an order which stated "that it was again necessary to emphasise that the officer commanding a Machine Gun Battalion is a fighting commander who directs and controls his units in the same manner as any other commander of a formation—with the exception that his operations are dependent on and subsidiary to those of the infantry. His one aim is to assist the infantry in reaching the objective and maintaining it there; he must therefore not be tied to Divisional Headquarters during battle, but forward with his troops, with his report centre at or in the vicinity of one of the infantry Brigade Headquarters which is actually conducting the operations, where he is on the main line of divisional signal communication and from which he can handle his Machine Gun Battalion tactically in accordance with the plan of the Divisional Commander. In this position he can by the use of his reserves influence the fight, that is to say, according to the situation he must be able to—
- Concentrate in order to obtain superiority of fire where required;
- Arrange for flank penetrations;
- Harass the enemy when in retreat;
- Reorganise in depth for a further advance;
- Occupy ground gained so as to consolidate in depth;
- Relieve tired troops with fresh ones.
- Keep a reserve as long as possible, so as to be able to influence the fire fight.
In short, the Machine Gun Battalion is, and must work as a fighting formation and not as a pool for supplying machine gun units to other formations. The Headquarters of the Machine Gun Companies and sections should similarly be located at or in the vicinity of Infantry Brigade, Battalion or Company Headquarters with which the Machine Gun Company is working for the time being."
Referring to the control of the Machine Gun Battalion and the method of co-operation with the infantry the same order states:—"The Divisional Commander explains his plan of operations to the Machine Gun Commander, and issues definite orders as to what he requires the Machine Gun Battalion to do. It is for the Machine Gun Battalion Commander to decide how to carry out these orders, and to settle the distribution of the battalion best suited for attaining the object in view. Machine Gun Companies should not normally be placed under the orders of the infantry brigades, still less of infantry battalions. The Machine Gun Battalion Commander will detail such portion of his command as he considers suitable to work with each attacking brigade. The machine guns so detailed should be considered as affiliated to the infantry brigade for the time being, and the commander of the machine guns must keep in the closest touch with the infantry brigade commander, must know his plans, and must decide the best method and distribution for carrying out the orders he has received from the Machine Gun Battalion Commander and for supporting the infantry brigade. He will detail sections of the machine guns under his command to the various tasks required. These tasks may involve certain machine gun sections working with certain battalions, and while so doing the section will be regarded as affiliated temporarily to those
The above order is an excellent exposition upon the cooperation of machine guns with infantry and irrespective of the future formation of the machine gun unit is recommended to the study of all machine gun officers.
If the Divisional and Brigade Commanders had realised the true tactical significance of the machine gun battalion formation it is probable that much of the opposition to it would have disappeared. It is submitted that on active service the machine gun battalion is the true formation, although it is conceded that the present establishment is most suited for training in peace time. The tremendous influence the machine gun has upon the fire fight renders it absolutely necessary that the whole of the Divisional guns be under a separate command, so that the reserves may be employed solely in conformity with the tactical situation. If companies or sections form part of brigades or battalions they are very often in places where they are not required and cannot be brought into action without such delay as may very easily render their assistance useless. The main feature of the battalion formation is that the officers become trained in handling the battalion as a fighting unit. Machine gun work is a specialised branch of the service, and to promote efficiency it is advisable to have a formation that will give machine gun officers the chance of passing through the regimental ranks, without the necessity of going back to the infantry.
ChapterXIII
The Battle of Cambrai and the Hindenburg Line
Period
th September,1918,
to15
th October,1918
After the Division went into rest on 14th September, a number of important "local" actions had been fought, in preparation of the momentous, the all-important attack on the "breast plate" of the Hindenburg Line.
"The extended preliminaries, though they had raised by their success the spirit of the British Armies to a mood in which doubt of victory had no place, had none the less taken toll of the numbers and of the reserves. The successes had been won at a loss trifling in proportion to the results, but, in the most victorious fighting, losses mount up, especially in battles where the machine gun has to be beaten down. Was it possible, with numbers dwindling, and with men who had been pushing for seven weeks, to break through a line which in face of all the world had been exalted as a line that could not be broken."
The Allied General Staff determined to strike at once. It felt confident the troops of Britain, France and America could finish the main task in the same way as they had completed the necessary preliminaries.
The IV Corps, to which the New Zealand Divison still belonged, had advanced its front beyond the Trescault Ridge; the formidable obstacle that the Division had partially succeeded in capturing on 12th September. The main attack on the 27th had been to the north of IV Corps, and on the 28th the 42nd Division had advanced beyond Couillet Valley, with patrols pushing towards Welsh Ridge.
The New Zealand Division began to move forward to be in readiness to exploit the success of the 42nd Division. The Companies of the Battalion split up on the 28th, to become attached to the infantry brigades. Wellington Company joined 1st Brigade, Otago Company 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, and
The plans for the Division's operation were to push through from the 42nd Division's front in a south-easterly direction, beyond La Vacquerie on the right and Bon Avis Ridge on the left, to the canal between Crêvecœur and Vaucelles, then across the canal to establish posts to deny the enemy observation of the river bed. The 1st Brigade was given the left sector and the 2nd Brigade the right sector.
Owing to the failure of the 42nd Division to effect the capture of Welsh Ridge, the Division's task was greater, but there was no time for regrets, as the two Brigades came forward after dusk to assemble for the attack between the high banks of the Surrey Road. As it was anticipated that a deep advance would be made, it was decided that both Wellington and Canterbury Companies should give a complete section to each Battalion, and not take part in the barrage.
There was very little work for the gunners to do, as our attack made such rapid progress, their chief concern was getting their guns and equipment forward quickly enough. The attack opened at 3.30 a.m. on the morning of the 29th, and by daylight the 1st Brigade on the left was over Bon Avis Ridge and approaching the canal near Crêvecœur.
The advance of the 2nd Brigade had not been so rapid, and it was not until 1 p.m., after very heavy fighting, that it reached the forward slopes of the ridge that ran down to the canal. The enemy machine gun fire was so intense across the forward slopes that further advance was impossible for the day.
The guns of the Wellington Company were quickly in action after the 1st Brigade had made its rapid advance. From the forward line of the Brigade observation was possible far beyond the canal; the whole countryside was seething with enemy movement Such a chance was not to be missed, and with great boldness the guns of the Wellington Company pushed forward beyond the line of the Brigade, to take full advantage of the occasion. At first the targets comprised transport lorries, later limbered waggons, and still later field guns in action. Never before had the machine gunners such a day; frequently one gun with a few bursts, traversing
Lieut. A. W. Brown found a well made concrete dugout about 200 yards from Lateau Wood, from which he could see five enemy field guns in action. He lost no time in bringing a gun up to the dugout and completely silenced the field guns at the comparatively short range of 1000 yards. Not one of the enemy gunners was left.
The Canterbury Company did not have the same opportunity as the Wellington Company, but nevertheless its gunners played havoc on large bodies of German infantry on the forward slopes of the ridge.
Towards dusk the guns took up defensive positions, where they remained throughout the night. Early on the morning of the 30th the 2nd Brigade advanced its line to the western banks of the canal, and the guns of the Canterbury Company were brought up and grouped to cover the canal bridges. Throughout the day both Companies improved their positions and kept active against enemy movement, getting good observation and inflicting casualties.
The canal still lay ahead of the Division, and to effect its crossing the 1st Brigade undertook an operation on 1st October. The scheme of the operation was to cross the canal in VI Corps sector (immediately north), where a bridgehead had been established beyond the canal, and to attack Crêvecœur south-eastwards. The 3rd Division on its left was to attack simultaneously. To cover the operation, Otago Company came forward, to augment the fire of Wellington and Canterbury Companies—one section of Wellington Company under Lieut. C. H. Marks was attached to the 2nd Wellington Battalion, that had been given the task of capturing the village.
The attack opened at 6 a.m., the guns of the three Companies carrying out a co-ordinated harassing fire scheme on the enemy positions across the canal. The village was captured by 8 a.m., and by noon our lines ran solidly all round the eastern outskirts, thus establishing a bridgehead on the
During the day the Otago Company successfully engaged a number of enemy parties, but apart from this the day was spent in co-ordinating the Otago and Wellington guns to barrage in front of the newly won positions. Marks kept his section in the forward line, disposed along it in defensive positions. The next three days saw no change in our positions from a movement point of view. New gun positions were reconnoitred, and a number of guns moved forward. On 3rd October three sections of Canterbury Company were relieved by an English Company, and Otago Company relieved Wellington Company, the latter going back to Divisional Reserve with Auckland Company. During this relief
General Hart, commanding 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, was of opinion that it was necessary to hold Crêvecœur in strength, as our grasp on that position was of vital importance to enable an advance to be made from the line of the Escaut. He anticipated that if any hostile counter-attack was made before our next forward move, the main blow would be delivered at Crêvecœur. Major Inglis was therefore ordered to dispose Otago Company with two sections round the front and flanks of the village, so that they could fire against any enemy attack at its outset. Two sections under Lieuts.
These guns did excellent work with observed fire. The
Unfortunately, on the 4th October the Battalion's Adjutant, Lieut. A. B. Fordyce, while making a reconnaisance of the forward positions, was wounded. Fordyce had served as a gunner on Gallipoli and with the Corps since its inception. His work as Adjutant to the Battalion had been admired and appreciated by all ranks. He was succeeded by
Immediately the line became settled, Otago Company and the one section of Canterbury began the old trench warfare scheme of keeping all enemy approaches harassed by machine gun fire, and frequently by day inflicted casualties on parties of Germans.
The 5th October brought signs of enemy withdrawal from his positions across the canal, and in a short time the 2nd Canterbury Battalion was across the canal at Vaucelles. The high ground about Cheneaux Wood was cleared, and with the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade also moving forward, the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line was approached. A defensive flank was formed along the spur to the south of Cheneaux Wood, the section of the Canterbury Company being moved forward to assist in its consolidation. As the 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade moved across the canal opposite Les Rues des Vignes and advanced towards Masnieres-Beaurevoir Line, the Otago Company opened covering fire, which did not cease until the new gains had been consolidated.
The work of Sergt.
Private J. Donaldson, one of Taylor's party, performed a very gallant act. During some heavy shelling a comrade was pinned down by the débris of a fallen wall, and his leg shattered. To free the unfortunate man, Donaldson had to amputate the shattered leg with a jack-knife. This was done under heavy shell fire. Seeing that his comrade must have medical attention at once, Donaldson carried him to an aid post 400 yards away, through an absolute inferno of shell fire, and then at once returned to his gun team. It is
The Battalion suffered its first "hate" casualties on the 5th October. A party of gunners of the Wellington Company, then in Divisional Reserve, were on their way to the baths, when someone caught a trip wire which was attached to six stick bombs. The enemy booby trap exploded, wounding twelve men.
Events were now beginning to move with great rapidity, the enemy had been severely shaken in the south by the French and American Armies, and in the north the British had more than deprived him of the successes he gained in March. It became very urgent that further operations be undertaken before the enemy could recover his weakened morale and before the winter impeded us.
The New Zealand Division prepared its portion of the general scheme, which would begin on 8th October, our final exploitation objective being the establishment of a line from beyond the village of Esnes towards Wambaix, when we would join up with the 3rd Division after it captured the latter village.
The whole Battalion was brought into the operation, two Companies to take part in the creeping barrage, and two Companies to move forward with the assaulting Brigades. Auckland and Wellington Companies were allotted the barrage work, the Auckland guns covering the left Brigade to extreme range, twelve guns of the Wellington Company barraging the southern outskirts of the village of Lesdain, and four guns the northern outskirts. Canterbury Company was attached to the right Brigade (2nd Brigade) and Otago Company to the left Brigade (3rd Rifle Brigade).
The transport of the barrage Companies was moved up in anticipation of these Companies being called upon to push through, if it were possible, to further exploit the results of the projected attack.
At 4.30 a.m. the Division opened its attack, and the barrage guns carried out their programme without a hitch, expending 140,000 rounds. The Otago and Canterbury guns moved forward, and as daylight came they were continuously
The whole of the forward guns were boldly handled, being pushed well forward, and silencing enemy field and machine guns. The 8th October stands out as a red letter day of success in the history of the New Zealand Division. It reached and held its exploitation objective line.
The nature of the ground over which the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade advanced gave the gunners of the Otago Company a fine chance to afford valuable assistance to the Brigade. East from Crêvecœur there ran in the direction of the attack a pear-shaped ridge, from which good observation of the country far to both flanks could be obtained. During the first stage of the attack the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade was to push out along this ridge about 1500 yards ahead of the 2nd Brigade on the right, and of the British Division on the left. A splendid opportunity was thus presented for delivering machine gun fire from commanding positions along the flanks of the Brigade. The orders issued to the gun section commanders were that they should advance by bounds, dropping guns in pairs at certain commanding positions along the sides of the main ridge, so as to take full advantage of targets presenting themselves on the lower ground on the flanks, and at the same time be so distributed as to provide an adequate machine gun defence in depth at each stage of the advance.
The accuracy with which the section officers found the pre-arranged positions was most commendable.
Pack horses and limbers with filled belts and bulk ammunition were sent forward to the gun positions as the advance progressed. The Company Sergt.-Major (J. Rowney) was responsible for the work of despatching the pack horses and limbers, and completed it without a hitch. This n.c.o.'s work, which was continuous from the formation of the Corps, was always marked by its excellence.
No. 1 Section (tinder
No. 2 Section (under
No. 3 Section (under 2nd Lieut. G. A. Booth) and No. 4 Section (under
No. 4 Section had much excellent shooting at the enemy retiring in front of the 2nd Brigade advance. At 7.15 a.m. a large party of enemy, estimated at 250, left a trench to retire. Two of Kernohan's guns opened in enfilade, inflicting about seventy casualties. The rest of the enemy got back to the shelter of the trench, which was kept under a steady enfilade fire until captured by 2nd Brigade troops. The other two guns of the section were under the command of Sergt. W. Rugg. This n.c.o. was severely wounded in the thigh at the outset of the attack, but carried on in command of the sub-section
At 7.45 a.m. two six-horse limbers, accompanied by horsemen, attempted to reach enemy guns that were in position on the right flank. Kernohan, after getting the range by reference to the map, ordered his gun to open fire at 2700 yards as the party crossed the Esnes-Walincourt Road. Two horses were brought down and the limbers were driven back at a gallop without being able to reach their guns.
The Otago guns were able at 5 p.m. to help smash the enemy counter-attack against the 3rd Division on the left. The guns were well forward, and so in an ideal position to deliver the most deadly of all fire, the direct enfilade fire. As the lines of the enemy were seen to advance, the artillery and the Otago guns opened, but it can truthfully be claimed that the well directed fire of the machine guns wiped out most of the lines of Germans advancing in short rushes towards their objective. After the infantry had completed the consolidation of the new line the Otago and Canterbury guns took up defensive positions which had been arranged between the Brigadiers and the Company Commanders.
Next day saw a continuance of our progress. Auckland Company moved up to provide a barrage for the infantry, and at Zero hour opened fire with the artillery, but the enemy had stolen away. A large wastage of British ammunition was the only advantage the enemy gained.
This unexpected move left the infantry an easy task in reaching its objective—the Le Cateau-Cambrai Railway Line. To enable the forward move of the Division to proceed, a new line was consolidated about half a mile beyond the railway line, and Canterbury Company was disposed for its defence.
Otago Company concentrated at Esnes, and with Wellington Company became Divisional Reserve; while Auckland Company remained in readiness to quickly move to support the infantry when it advanced.
After dusk on the 9th, patrols reported that Fontaine-au-Pire and Beauvois had been evacuated, and accordingly the 2nd Brigade resumed its advance. The enemy was encountered west of Bethancourt, occupying some old practice trenches. A section of guns from the Canterbury Company
Auckland Company moved up during the day to Jeune Bois, and Wellington Company joined the 1st Brigade as it left on its way to pass through the 2nd Brigade to endeavour to reach the Selle River and establish bridgeheads beyond it.
As the 1st Brigade passed through the 2nd Brigade, Canterbury Company returned to Beauvois to rest—Wellington Company was now advancing with its pack transport.
The 1st Brigade continued its advance unchecked; patrols reached the River Selle about 1 a.m., and soon after parties of the infantry were across the river, but the enemy was still in force on the eastern side. Daylight revealed this fact very forcibly—our positions on the western side were subjected to heavy shelling and machine gun fire.
An amusing but touching episode befell
Auckland Company reached the forward area about 8.30 a.m. and at once co-operated with Wellington Company in trying to silence the machine guns across the river.
A new attack was arranged for 5.30 a.m. on the morning of the 12th October, and the main objective was the Belle Vue Station across the river. On the previous 12th October the New Zealand Division was called upon to attack the Belle Vue Ridge at Passchendaele; a most extraordinary coincidence that the attack twelve months later should be upon a place bearing the same name.
Wellington and Auckland Companies were detailed to form a creeping barrage in conjunction with the artillery to
With its task accomplished, the Division was relieved during the night of the 12th/13th October by the 42nd Division, but the Wellington Company remained in the line until the following day, when it rejoined the Battalion concentrated at Esnes, for reorganisation and rest. The weather was good, and in a day or two the Battalion was cleaned up and thoroughly refreshed. The prospective visit of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales gave the gunners an incentive to make themselves more attractive than usual. The visit materialised on 15th October, and was appreciated with great enthusiasm by all ranks.
ChapterXIV
The Battle of the Selle River
Period
th October,1918,
to3rd
November,1918
With the exception of the Auckland Company, the Battalion rested until 22nd October, during which time phenomenal progress had been made by the Allied Armies. North and south of the Third Army Area the German line had been driven in; if only the pressure could be maintained the collapse of the once Great Army would not be long delayed. To enable the Third Army to deliver its thrust an operation by IV Corps was necessary to push our line beyond the River Selle. The 42nd Division accordingly prepared to carry out the task, and to assist it the Auckland Company left the Battalion on 18th October to join 42nd Machine Gun Battalion. On 20th October the 42nd Division, after hard fighting, obtained its final objective. Auckland Company took up positions from which a barrage could be sustained during the operation along the flank of the attack; this barrage worked splendidly and won high praise from the Battalion Commander whose flank was protected. Directly the final objective was captured, and the exposed flank line consolidated, Auckland Company was withdrawn to Viesly, when it became part of Divisional Reserve.
The grand attack by the First, Third and Fifth Armies along a front of fifteen miles to a line running from Mormal Forest to Valenciennes was fixed for 23rd October. IV Corps divided its task into two phases, the first being the capture of the village of Beaurain and the establishment of a line east of the village with the left flank resting on the village of Romeries and facing the village of Vertigneul. This phase was to be carried out by 5th and 42nd Divisions. The second phase was the capture of the watershed between the St. Georges and Ecaillon Rivers by the 37th and the New
On the 22nd October Canterbury Company became attached to 2nd Brigade and moved with it from Beauvois beyond the Selle River, south-east of Solesmes. Canterbury Company divided its sections among the 2nd Brigade Battalions, the gunners jubilating greatly because the Company's fighting limbers were with them. No longer were they required to carry their guns, equipment and ammunition. Throughout the many engagements in which the gunners had taken part, none had permitted of real open warfare tactics, and now they were all eagerness to demonstrate what they had been so long and carefully instructed in—coming into action from the limbers.
Auckland Company also moved up with the 2nd Brigade, to give covering fire to the attacking troops.
The 42nd Division, through which the New Zealand had to pass, completed the capture of its objective by 8 a.m. on the 23rd, with the leading battalions of the 2nd Brigade well up and in position to continue the advance at 8.40 a.m. Auckland Company quickly formed its barrage positions and opened with the artillery as the assaulting infantry jumped forward.
The two sections of the Canterbury Company had not long to wait before they were given an opportunity of showing the infantry what they could do. The enemy, making a hurried, disorderly retreat from Romieres and Vertigneul, was sighted, and the limbers quickly rushed to a forward position, from which after a speedy "action" a devastating fire opened on the retreating enemy.
After the first objective had been captured, Auckland Company came forward to join with Canterbury Company in its shock tactics. The guns of both Companies were very boldly handled, the limbers frequently being galloped forward
Commanding the Machine Gun SquadronThe Road down to Ghoranich Crossing over Jordan River.Gunners going down into Jordan Valley.
By 2.15 p.m. the Division's main objective was reached, but the right flank was unprotected, owing to the 37th Division being held up in Solesmes. Two sections of the Auckland Company were sent forward at 5 p.m. to assist the infantry in the protection of the dangerous flank.
The enterprising infantry did not stop at the final objective, but sent forward a Company, which succeeded by 9 p.m. in capturing the village of Beaudignies and the bridges on the north and south sides of it.
Canterbury Company and two sections of Auckland Company quickly prepared defensive positions after the final objective was gained and laid their guns to cover the right flank in case of an enemy attempt during the night.
As the attack proceeded, Otago Company moved forward with the supporting Brigade, while Battalion Headquarters came up to Solesmes. 2nd Lieut. Ward (Canterbury Company) was wounded during the day.
During the night the support Companies of the advanced Battalions made a further advance, and at daylight had established themselves along the sunken road that runs from Beaudignies to Ghissignies. The enemy were in force beyond our line, and no further progress could be made until the 37th Division on the right came into line. As dawn broke, Auckland Company was withdrawn to Solesmes and Canterbury Company was in readiness to cover the 2nd Brigade when it resumed the advance. Daylight revealed much enemy movement within easy machine gun range, and the gunners began the day by inflicting heavy casualties.
The 24th saw the line further advanced approximately 1000 yards beyond Beaudignies, with the flank divisions abreast.
Otago Company moved up during the afternoon, and at dusk relieved Canterbury Company, which at once went back to billets in Neuville. Otago Company placed eight guns in position and kept eight guns in reserve. Wellington Company was still at Solesmes, but in readiness to move at one hour's notice.
The old fortress town of
The 25th October saw little movement by the Division until late in the afternoon, when the 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, on the left of the line, advanced to capture the railway line north-west of
By 10 a.m. there were evident signs of an enemy counterattack; his artillery and machine guns increased their fire. Otago guns were kept in readiness and promptly opened when the S.O.S. signals went up. The enemy's attempt was finally broken by 11 a.m., and with the exception of sudden bursts of vicious shelling, the infantry were left alone to consolidate their gains.
The machine guns at once became active with harassing indirect fire, and spent the next few days and nights keeping the roads behind the enemy's line under fire.
The great advance had now reached its limits, and pending the resumption of the offensive the whole line was organised for defence. The Companies came under Lieut.-
The Companies maintained their positions until 3rd November, when they prepared for the next and final operation of the Division in France. During the intervening days and nights the forward guns remained very active and twice co-operated with the artillery in an organised shoot over the enemy's positions. Our low flying 'planes went over the enemy lines and drew fire from the enemy machine guns, to locate their positions. The effect of the organised shoots and the constant harassing fire of the guns greatly reduced the enemy's activity and brought a lull before the final storm opened on the 4th November.
On 31st October the forward guns assisted a raid by the 1st Brigade, sending forward two gunners with the raiders for the special task of dealing with any enemy machine guns that were captured. The two gunners, the only two that actually accompanied a raiding party in the campaign in France, destroyed one enemy gun and brought back two with them when they returned to our lines.
ChapterXV
The Final Battle of the War
Period
th November,1918,
to11
th November,1918
The final operation in which the New Zealand Division took part was fixed to begin at 5.30 a.m. on 4th November. The scheme of the attack was a general advance by the First, Third and Fourth Armies along a front of about thirty miles, between the River Sambre in the south and Valenciennes in the north. The objective of the attack was the centres of communication that served the enemy forces operating against the French and American Armies, which, if gained, would cut off the German avenue of escape.
The task set the New Zealand Division can be readily understood with the assistance of the map that appears opposite to page 170. The front line immediately prior to the opening of the attack extended from the level crossing on the left to the "E" of Ghissignies on the right and the line of the advance ran due east from these two points. The Division's task was divided into five phases, as follows:—
- First Phase (to commence at 5.30 a.m.): The capture by the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade of the Blue line.
- Second Phase (to commence at 7.29 a.m.): The capture of the Blue Dotted line south of
Le Quesnoy by the 3rd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. On the north of the town the 1st Auckland Battalion would pass through the Blue line, partly beyond the Divisional flank, at 7.51 a.m., and establish itself on the Blue Dotted line forming a flank facingLe Quesnoy as it progressed. - Third Phase (to commence at 8.56 a.m.): The capture of the Green line by two Battalions of the 1st Brigade on the left and the 3rd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade on the right. This phase would complete the
invest- ment investment Le Quesnoy by the 1st Brigade joining up with the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade at the cross roads just east of the lake marked on the map "Etang au Mayeur." On reaching Green line the 1st Brigade would extend along the whole Divisional front in preparation for the fourth phase. - Fourth Phase (to commence at 10. 20 a.m.): The capture of the Red line by the 1st Brigade.
- Fifth Phase: Exploitation 3000 yards eastwards by the 2nd Brigade.
The distance to Red line from the front line occupied at Zero, was approximately four and a half miles.
The fiendish dogs of modern warfare had already destroyed many of the finest gems of ancient architecture; not even the most sacred had been spared; and so in the final stages of the Great World War it was decided to save this historic old town from destruction, and achieve its capture by the enveloping movement of the New Zealand Division just described.
The Machine Gun Battalion was ordered to support the attack with covering fire to be co-ordinated by the O.C. Battalion in consultation with the Infantry Brigadiers. Major Parks was temporarily in command of the Battalion at this time.
Auckland and Otago Companies, with two sections of Canterbury Company, were detailed to provide the covering fire for the first phase. The remaining sections of Canterbury Company were attached to 2nd Brigade and Wellington Company to 1st Brigade.
On the evening of 3rd November Otago Company concentrated its guns in preparation for its work the following day, and Auckland Company and the two sections of Canterbury Company moved up for the same purpose. It was decided to use the Otago and Auckland Companies to put down barrages along the southern and northern outskirts of the town
The dispositions of the Battalion were complete soon after dark on the night of 3rd November; the barrage guns were in position, two sections of Canterbury Company had joined 2nd Brigade, and Wellington Company was with 1st Brigade. The night was very normal; our artillery did not increase its activity at all before Zero, and nothing happened to warn the enemy of the ambitious scheme the early morning would disclose—the scheme that was to sound the death-knell of "German Hopes."
There was no possibility of mistaking the hour of the attack; in one second the waiting guns belched forth, and the New Zealand Division leapt forward to the assault for the last time.
The creeping barrage machine guns maintained intense fire throughout the first phase, in spite of the heavy shelling that came down round about the positions. Fortunately there were no direct hits, and the excellently constructed emplacements and shelters prevented serious casualties.
The infantry encountered very severe opposition in its fight towards the Blue line, but with great gallantry performed its task in the scheduled time.
Auckland Company and the two sections of Canterbury Company immediately after the completion of the first phase withdrew from the barrage positions and proceeded to and became attached to the 1st and 2nd Brigades respectively. A section from Otago Company then moved to Blue line to be in readiness to go forward with 3rd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade in its advance to Green line. Reynolds led his section to cross the
Before this section reached Blue line it had the unpleasant experience of being mistaken in the smoke and mist for Germans by one of our tanks, and being peppered by its six-pounder guns. Fortunately no casualties resulted before an infuriated gunner was able to let the crew of the tank know the section's nationality.
The remaining sections of Otago Company, on the completion of the first phase, switched their fire on to the southern ramparts of the town, and also enfiladed some of its streets. As the enemy machine guns on the walls were causing a great deal of annoyance, a section under 2nd
Wellington Company advanced with the 1st Brigade, sending one section with the 1st Auckland Battalion to assist in the establishment of the Blue Dotted line facing
As the 1st Brigade continued its advance to the Green line and Red line the three remaining sections of Wellington Company pushed to the front of the advance, assisted by infantry carrying parties. It was unfortunate that the limbers did not accompany the guns, as it was found that they could have been used to great advantage. Nevertheless, with the invaluable help of the infantry carriers, guns and ammunition were got forward, and the splendid handling against enemy machine guns and strong posts helped the infantry to advance without serious interruption until the Red line was reached and consolidated. The guns of the Company were then disposed in defensive positions.
Auckland Company was not further called upon during the day, but advanced forward with the supports to the 1st Brigade, and in the evening returned to Ramponeau, where it stayed during the night.
After the fall of
Very gallant work was performed during the day by two n.c.o.'s who had served throughout the existence of the Corps—Sergt.
During the day 2nd Lieut. Sands and
Among the casualties was Corp.
Canterbury Company, after completing its task in the first phase, did not come into action that day, but moved with the 2nd Brigade during the evening to Herbignies, preparatory to the commencement of the fifth phase at dawn the following morning. This phase was extended to an advance of four miles on a front of 3000 yards beyond the Red line instead of the advance of 3000 yards originally contemplated.
The enemy positions did not now require the careful artillery attention preparatory to an advance that the Division had
Canterbury Company sent two sections forward with 2nd Otago Battalion on the right of the advance and two sections with 1st Canterbury Battalion on the left. Auckland Company left Ramponeau in the early morning, joining up with the support Battalions of the 2nd Brigade to be in readiness in case of emergency.
The advancing sections of Canterbury Company had a very arduous day—more through movement than action, especially the left sections. When the infantry were temporarily held up at the Northern Forrester's House, two guns were worked forward and kept the position under intense fire while two infantry companies manœuvred round it. The accurate volume of fire completely kept down the enemy fire, and enabled the infantry to carry the position with small losses.
The work of pushing through the Forest de Mormal with its thick undergrowth was extremely difficult, and the gunners had to be content with merely keeping up with the infantry; it being completely impossible to use the guns.
The excellent result of the work of the Canterbury Company was recognised by the award of a bar to Lieut. Curtis's Military Cross, and the award of a Military Cross to Capt. G. W. Horn. Horn had proved himself a very capable machine gun officer throughout the campaign, and one who had a very keen conception of his duty.
Auckland Company was not called upon during the 5th, and in the evening marched back to Villereau, where it spent the night.
On the 6th November the whole Battalion concentrated at
From the N.Z. Official War History, Vol. II]
[Copyright
ChapterXVI
After the Armistice
Period
th November,1918
to Disbandment
The Battalion was preparing to leave
The cessation of hostilities did not mean a cessation of discipline and work. The Battalion was kept in full training, and special attention was paid to the smart appearance of the gunners. During the stay in Beauvois organised competitions in hockey, rugby and association were carried out between the Companies of the Battalion and also between the Battalion and other units.
On 20th November the Battalion hockey team defeated 1st Wellington Battalion by eight goals to six. On 22nd November Wellington Company Rugby team defeated Canterbury Company by eight points to three; the following day Wellington Company defeated Otago Company by sixteen points to nine. On 23rd, Wellington Company Soccer team defeated Auckland Company by three goals to one, and Canterbury drew with Otago, one goal each.
The Battalion Rugby team was selected on 25th November as follows:—
Full-back:Corp.A. R. Cameron .Three-quarters:Lieut. M. Steele, Pte. D. Fairbrother, Pte. W. Morrow.Five-eighths:Lieut. C. E. Taylor C. E. Taylor Half:Lieut. Tomline.Wing Forward:Sergt. D. Sellars.Forwards:Pte. C. A. Munro C. A. Munro A. W. A. Richardson , Sergt.L. McGee , Pte. A. Cornwall, Pte. D. Stormont, Pte. F. Beatson.- Emergencies.—
Forwards:Pte. N. Chadwick, Pte. J. Hammersley.Backs:Sergt. D. Holland, Pte. H. Gasparich.
The Battalion Rugby team was unable to win fame, owing to the march into Germany commencing too soon. In the two matches it played it showed itself at least equal if not better than any other XV in the Division.
The night before the Battalion departed from Beauvois a smoke concert was held in the Battalion Recreation Room followed by a "Buck Dance." The excellent dancing performed by the makeshift "Does" won undying admiration from the many "Bucks."
Before the Battalion left Beauvois the gunners were warned of the danger of the latest Hun Fright fulness, perhaps the most barbaric that even the preachers of Kultur ever concocted—boxes containing tubes of deadly microbes. The following order was issued to all ranks:—
"It has been reported that in certain districts the enemy has left behind wooden boxes bearing the inscription 'Vorsicht Infectiose Materiall' (Danger Infectious Matter). These boxes contain cultures of very deadly microbes. It is very dangerous to open them. All such boxes should be despatched at once to No. 13 Mobile Laboratory, Caudry, attached to No. 3 C.C.S."
The march of the Battalion into Germany commenced on the 28th November; Solesmes was reached the same day. From Solesmes the march proceeded as follows:—
- 29th November: To Maresches.
- 30th November: To Le Louviou.
- 3rd December: To Louvroil. Lieut.-
Col. D. B. Blair D. B. Blair en routeto New Zealand to assist in demobilisation.Major J. W. D. McKnight J. W. D. McKnight - 4th December: To Jeumont.
- 5th December: To Gozee.
- 7th December: To Couillet—a suburb of Charleroi, in which excellent accommodation was provided for both officers and men. Baths were requisitioned, enabling the whole Battalion to "pass through water."
- 8th December: To Jemeppe.
- 9th December: To St. Servais—a suburb of Namur.
- 11th December: To Vezin Area, where billets were scattered over four villages. Major Parks returned from leave and assumed command of the Battalion.
- 12th December: To Couthin Area.
- 13th December: To Amay-Flone Area, three whole companies being billeted in the Flone Ore Factory, in which baths were also provided. Four days of real rest were given the Battalion, which were fully appreciated.
- 17th December: To Angleur Area.
- 18th December: To Pepinster.
- 19th December: To Andrimont Area, at which place preparations for entrainment into Germany were made.
- 21st December: The Battalion was divided into four groups to move to Herbesthal for entrainment, in accordance with the following Battalion Order:—
New Zealand Machine Gun BattalionOrder No. 146 20/12/1919
Liege Sheet 7 1/10.000
- Move: The New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion will march from billets in the Andrimont Area to the entraining station at Herbesthal on December 21st.
- Groups: The Battalion will march in groups, as under, and the senior officer in each group will command the column.
- Group No. 1: Transport and loading parties, Battalion Headquarters—Auckland and Canterbury Companies.
- Group No. 2:
Personnel,Battalion Headquarters—Auckland and Canterbury Companies.- Group No. 3: Transport and loading parties—Otago and Wellington Companies.
- Group No. 4:
Personnel,Otago and Wellington Companies and Traffic Control.
- Order of March: Order of march for each group will be as above.
- Starting Point: Starting point will be Railway Crossing at 5 K 80 25.
- Times: The Battalion will pass the starting point at times as under:
- No. 1 Group—0700 hours (7 a.m.).
- No. 2 Group—0900 hours (9 a.m.).
- No. 3 Group—1000 hours (10 a.m.).
- No. 4 Group—1200 hours (noon).
- Route: Limbourg—Heggin—Lantzenberg.
- Synchronising of Watches: Watches will be synchronised at Battalion Headquarters at 1700 hours (5 p.m.), 20th inst.
Sgd. E. McRae , Lieut., for Capt.,
Adjutant N.Z.M.G. Battalion.
The entrainment was carried out smoothly, and the whole Battalion was in comfortable quarters in Mulheim (Cologne) before midnight.
The Machine Gun Battalion remained (with the New Zealand Division as part of the Army of Occupation) in Mulheim. Auckland and Canterbury Companies were billeted in the Windmuhlen Strasse School, and Otago and Wellington Companies in the Lanferberg School. Beds were acquired and as much as possible was done to make the gunners comfortable. The afternoons were free for all ranks not on duty, thus affording opportunities for seeing places of interest in and around Cologne.
The Higher Command decreed against undue familiarity between the Army of Occupation and the inhabitants. The following order was issued to all ranks the day after reaching Germany:—
"Cases have come to notice of troops fraternising with the inhabitants of the occupied territory. Any man seen walking with a German woman will be arrested. Steps will be taken to ensure that this order is thoroughly understood by all ranks."
In conformity with the General Scheme the Battalion began its educational courses on 22nd December, under the guidance of Lieut. W. R. King, who was appointed Battalion
The first batch of homegoers left the Battalion on 24th December, when thirty-six n.c.o.'s and men of the 1914-1915 class proceeded to England for demobilisation. Thereafter throughout the following months homeward drafts left the Battalion until at last the whole of the New Zealand Division was back in England patiently awaiting its return to far-off New Zealand.
PartII
The New Zealand Machine Gun Squadron
ChapterI
The General Situation on Egyptian Front
From the commencement of the war the greatest importance had been attached to the defence of Egypt, which meant the safety of the Suez Canal. Turco-German intrigues had stirred up a great deal of foment on the western borders of Egypt, which was successfully quelled in the brilliantly executed campaign against the Senussi; a campaign in which two battalions of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade took part with distinction. On the Eastern Frontier, however, Djemal Pasha's Egyptian Army still remained, menacing the security of the Suez Canal—which the Kaiser once described as "the jugular vein of the British Empire." It is true that the Turks had undertaken no serious attempt on the Canal since the February, 1915 fiasco, but this was owing to the heavy calls made upon the Turkish Armies at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia and in Armenia, where the Russians had made such wonderful progress.
The beginning of 1916 brought relief to the sorely pressed Turkish forces—Gallipoli was evacuated; soon after General Townshend surrendered at Kut; the Russian advance in Armenia was checked; the Turkish Egyptian Army began to grow, and to become a real danger to Egypt. A German staff arrived to control operations, which it hoped would strike the death blow to British prestige in the East.
Squadron Camp at Marsaiid.Captured Machine Gun in Action near La Signy Farm.Machine Gunners in a Captured Position
"The work on the stationary defences was backward. Difficulties of water supply on the east bank were increased by shortage of piping. Labour troubles had delayed the progress of roads and railways. Guns had still to be emplaced, and no part of the front defence line was actually occupied by troops. Nevertheless, as there were no signs of an imminent advance on the part of the enemy, the question of the stationary defences caused me no serious anxiety, though everything possible was done to hasten on their completion. The organisation of the offensive defence, which time has proved to be paramount, was, however, a pressing matter, hitherto untouched. Practically nothing had been done towards the organisation of the mobile forces. The collection of a large number of riding and transport camels had to be undertaken at once, and a plan of campaign to be devised. Moreover, time was short, for it was plain that any offensive on a large scale by the enemy must be commenced before the middle of March. For the force under my command the only possible line of advance was along the northern line from Kantarah towards Katieh and El Arish, and the task was at once taken up of examining the possibilities of an offensive on this line, and solving the problem of maintaining a considerable force at Katieh during the summer months."
Accordingly the plans matured and were soon in operation. The scheme did not permit of a quick advance, because it had been determined to copy the same plan as Lord Kitchener had followed at Khartoum—the construction of a railroad between the advancing troops and the ever-receding base.
It should be borne clearly in mind that the campaign that eventually freed Palestine from the Turk was not begun with that definite object in view. As previously stated, its first and paramount object was the protection of the Suez Canal; its second object was to retain as many Turks as possible on the Egyptian Front to assist further proposed operations in Armenia and Mesopotamia by threatening an invasion of Palestine.
ChapterII
Formation of the Squadron
The New Zealand Mounted Brigade left Salhia on the evening of 23rd April, 1916, on its march to Kantara and Romani. During April, May and June the Brigade had a strenuous time at patrol work in the intensely hot weather, and fought its first mounted action at Salmana. In the last week in June the Brigade returned to rest at Hill 70, until the beginning of August, when the active operations which were destined to free the Holy Land from the tyranny of the Crescent commenced in earnest. It was during this period of rest that the formation of the New Zealand Machine Gun Squadron was commenced and completed.
* * * * *
On 15th July the formation of the Squadron commenced, in accordance with the new establishment of Cavalry Brigades. 2nd Lieut. (Temp. Capt.)
Lieut. G. F. Yerex G. F. Yerex - 2nd Lieuts.
T. McCarrol andA. C. Hinman (A.M.R.). - 2nd Lieuts.
G. G. Harper , D.C.M., and L. A. Craven (C.M.R.). Lieut. R. F. Chapman R. F. Chapman Lieut. D. E. Batchelar D. E. Batchelar
The work of forming a camp, posting n.c.o.'s and men to the sections, appointing specialists and drawing horses and equipment to complete establishment was accomplished on 24th July, by which date the training of the Squadron was in full swing. There were not sufficient Light Vickers Guns for the Squadron, which had to be content with six Light Vickers
On 31st July, when the Squadron had settled itself down to its new conditions, and was working like a well-tried and old-established unit, it received orders to be in readiness to move at short notice with the Brigade to drive back the enemy desert force that was advancing towards Romani.
In the following chapters the reader will observe a great difference between the work of the mounted machine guns and that of the companies in France. In the open warfare campaign in Sinai and Palestine the method of attack differed very slightly, if at all, to the principles laid down in the prewar training manuals. The mounted machine-gun section was as mobile as other mounted units. In open warfare the attack generally develops quickly, and the successful employment of machine guns depends on the speed with which they are brought into action and the initiative displayed by the section officers in handling them.
Once the mounted troops leave their horses to go forward to the attack their job is similar to the infantry, but in the campaign in Sinai and Palestine they did not have the same artillery support; indeed, at times there was no artillery at all to help them; but the excellently-handled machine guns filled the breach, and much of the success of the operations of our mounted troops was to a large measure due to the covering fire given by the guns of the mounted machine-gun squadron.
The machine guns in the desert warfare were not used from well-entrenched positions, on set objectives, like the guns in France: the gunners had to advance their guns from time
During the campaign, for the most part waged on heavy sand and under a tropical sun, necessitating many long marches, our splendid mounted machine-gun squadron never failed the troops it worked with, and earned the reputation of being the most efficient unit in the N.Z. Mounted Brigade.
ChapterIII
The Battle of Romani
About the middle of July, 1916, an air reconnaisance revealed a large-scaled enemy advance in the direction of Romani, which was at that time the British railhead. Immediately this news was received there began an arduous time for the Anzac Mounted Division. It was decided to induce the Turk to attack us in position, where we would have the protection of the infantry, and also a mobile mounted force with which to strike at his flank, to cut at his communications, and so surround him.
The mounted patrols from the Light Horse Brigades working from Romani harassed the enemy day by day, and gradually drew him on. These tactics were so skilfully carried out that every move of the Turk was known to us.
On the night of 3rd August the enemy commenced his general advance, and by morning began to work round the right flank of the 52nd Division, in an endeavour to capture the camps at Romani and the railway line. The New Zealand Mounted Brigade (with the Machine Gun Squadron) moved towards Romani at 6 a.m., but owing to the Turkish attack proving so strong and reaching so close to the railway, it was ordered to move to Canterbury Hill (near to Mount Royston) to join with the Yeomanry in an attack against the Mount.
The scheme of attack against the Mount was to attack it frontally with the Auckland and Canterbury Regiments and on the southern flank with the Yeomanry. The Brigade was in readiness to deliver the attack by midday, and, leaving their horses behind, the troopers were soon moving across the open ground towards their objective under heavy enemy rifle fire.
A section of machine guns was ordered to support the Auckland Regiment. It went forward, over the heavy sand, at the gallop, but after proceeding several hundred yards met with severe enemy enfilade machine-gun fire. Owing to a
Two sections advanced to support the Canterbury Regiment, while three sections remained in reserve under O.C. Squadron. The attacking sections made good use of the small amount of natural cover and succeeded in getting their guns into action with a minimum of delay.
The Turks were manning the sand ridges ahead, but a large number had advanced down the forward slopes into what they imagined were well-concealed positions.
The section officers, with the aid of their scouts, located these forward Turks and directed the fire of their guns on to them. The ranges were only from 500 to 1000 yards: on the sand surface the gunners had no difficulty in observing their fire, and quickly got on to the target.
Under the covering fire of the machine guns the regiments suffered surprisingly few casualties, and by 5 p.m. the persistent attack of all arms caused a break in the enemy line.
A few of the enemy on the forward slopes endeavoured to get back, but were quickly cut down by the gunners: the remainder surrendered. The enemy on the reverse slopes made a speedy retirement, and were soon out of range from the forward guns. Capt. Harper now brought up his reserve guns. Advancing at the gallop, he led the reserve sections through the then existing front line and made for a high hill. This hill was safely reached, and in addition to affording excellent cover for his horses, gave a commanding view of the retreating enemy.
The six guns were brought into action at once and took a heavy toll. The remaining sections decided to copy the reserve sections: their horses were called up, and they galloped to a ridge to the left of Capt. Harper. From this ridge they opened fire and continued successfully until the retreating Turks were out of range.
By 6.30 p.m. the hills of Romani and Royston were completely cleared of the enemy. The squadron then received orders to discontinue the advance, and shortly afterwards marched back to Pelusium to bivouac for the night.
The gunners were very grateful to reach the bivouac area;
The Squadron was astir very early next morning, and after drawing ammunition and refilling belts, marched off with the Brigade to the high ground about a mile south of Katia. The enemy was reported to be holding the Katia Oasis, and plans were made to clear it Two sections (four guns) were despatched to each of the three Regiments before the attack commenced.
The first phase of the attack was a rapid charge against the oasis, which started shortly after 2.30 p.m. The charge was a wonderful sight, the troopers bending low in the saddles, not knowing when a murderous fire would open from the softly swaying palms, raced towards their objective; but the enemy was not there, and the troopers left their horses, to advance against the prepared positions beyond. The gun sections were able to keep up with the galloping troopers in the charge, and at once prepared to assist them as they extended out to advance against the enemy lines. The guns on the right of the attack moved to an elevated position, in which they remained throughout the day without serious molestation. They were able to deliver useful covering fire in the evening to protect the Canterbury Regiment's withdrawal.
The guns on the left had a busy time; they pushed forward with the troopers and observed a strong enemy force collecting among some palm trees on the left flank. A heavy concentrated fire in a few minutes dispersed the force with heavy casualties. The guns found frequent targets during the day. As night fell the Squadron returned to Bir Et Maler, where it bivouacked for the night.
On the 6th the Squadron moved at 6 a.m. to a point about a mile south of Ummugba, where it came under shell fire. The Brigade was only called upon to make a demonstration that day while a flank attack by another Brigade was in progress. One section of guns went into action against enemy positions at a range of 1800 yards, which it kept under fire tor several hours. At 7 p.m. the Squadron inarched to Bir Er Rhaba for the night, where it remained until the 8th, inconvenienced by shell fire, but sustaining no casualties.
Preparations were made throughout 8th August for the attack on Bir El Abd, a point about twenty miles east of Romani. The Squadron marched with the Brigade to Bir El Dababis on the evening of the 8th, to be in readiness for the attack the following day. The Brigade and Squadron left Bir El Dababis at 6 a.m. on the 9th, and succeeded in advancing to within a mile and a half of Bir El Abd before the enemy opposition necessitated the troopers to dismount. The three Regiments were now in alignment—Auckland on the right, Canterbury in the centre, and 5th Australian Light Horse on the left. The 3rd Australian Brigade had failed to come up on the right of the Auckland Regiment, which left its right flank exposed. Two sections of the Squadron (four guns) were sent to help the Aucklands, one section to help the Canterburys, and one section to help 5th Australian Light Horse. The remaining two sections were kept in reserve at Brigade Headquarters.
Some concern was occasioned owing to the ridge that ran forward of Bir El Abd being strongly held by the enemy. From this ridge the Turks could command the whole of the Brigade's advance. To neutralise the enemy fire from the ridge,
During the afternoon the enemy artillery increased their activity, which was followed shortly after by a violent counter-attack with three fresh battalions. The brigades on either flank were compelled to give ground, but the New Zealand
The Brigade now had to withdraw, and the machine gunners, who had fought so valiantly throughout the afternoon, were called upon to cover the withdrawal, and succeeded in fighting a model textbook rearguard action. The led horses were brought up to the gun teams, and gradually the guns dropped back by sections to successive covering positions, until the retirement was complete.
In this rearguard action the gunners inflicted terrible casualties upon the Turks, and successfully held them up until the troopers were back to their horses. The most trying time the gunners had was finally extricating themselves. On the left flank 2nd
The bold decision of 2nd Lieut. Harper to hold his dangerous position in order to cover the Canterbury Regiment's withdrawal, with the slight chance of successfully fighting his guns back to safety, was an outstanding example of self-sacrifice.
Harper was brought back with his section and succeeded in reaching Cairo, but succumbed to his wounds on 13th August. This gallant officer had served from the commencement of the war; he was the first number one of his gun section, and for his conspicuous conduct at Hill 60 on Gallipoli was awarded the D.C.M.
During the withdrawal 2nd-
By 7 p.m. the Squadron had safely concentrated, and thereupon it proceeded to Oghratina, by way of Hod El Dababis. The action, which had been fought in a temperature of 112 degrees, on a short water ration, and in loose, deep sand, was one of the most trying in which the Squadron took part.
The Turk had been given a rude shock, which left him unable to withstand the fresh troops that were soon bringing pressure to bear, and caused his immediate retreat to El Arish, 20 miles further east.
The Squadron did not get in active touch with the enemy during August, although it accompanied the Brigade on the reconnaissances to Salmana and El Galss.
On the 25th August the Squadron returned to Hod Amara to rest, recuperate, and replace casualties in men, horses, and equipment. During these operations all ranks had a strenuous time, as they were in touch with the enemy all day and spent most of the night riding back for rations and water, sometimes twenty miles in one night. In this camp the only duties outside ordinary routine were the maintenance of antiaircraft guns to deal with the increased activity of the German airmen.
Throughout the whole campaign the protection of the horses from aeroplane attack was the cause of a great deal of anxiety. As a rule the desert was devoid of cover. The only effective means of preventing serious casualties was the See photograph opposite page 224.
The Brigade left Hod Amara on 11th September to proceed to Bir et Maler, leaving the Squadron and Mounted Field Ambulance to become attached to 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
A number of lessons were learnt by the Squadron in the operations from the 4th to the 9th August. The chief point noticed was that the Maxim guns were too heavy for desert warfare; the weight told severely on the pack horses and also on the men when going into or out of action, especially in the deep sand. The Maxims seemed more liable to stoppages than the Vickers guns.
The sand interfered with the working of some of the guns to a small extent, especially in the windy weather. Sand, however, was not a serious source of trouble if the guns were kept free from superfluous oil.
No indirect harassing fire was employed by the Squadron on account of the difficulty of replacing ammunition. Open warfare in the desert is one of movement, and the large expenditure of ammunition by the Companies of the Corps in the trenches in France would not be justified in Sinai. The Squadron's gunners had ample opportunities of carrying out the much more interesting work of engaging the enemy with direct observed fire. Sand is probably the best surface from a machine gunner's point of view; he can observe his fire perfectly and quickly range upon his target.
During the operations there was a lack of co-operation between the machine gun sections and the troops with which they were working. The regimental officers showed a tendency to regard the work of the machine guns as something separate and distinct, and did not always trouble to notify the section officers when a withdrawal was ordered.
The Squadron received orders on 15th September to join 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade in the operation by the Division against Mazar; the following day it marched to Bir
Salmana, and thence to the Divisional rendezvous area on the 17th. When the attack against Mazar opened on the 18th the Squadron marched forward until it reached a point two miles west of the village, and here it remained in readiness, but was not sent into action. Next morning at five o'clock the Squadron became detached from the Australians, and started on an independent march to Hod Amara. The long journey was safely accomplished, but both men and horses were tired out with the rapid long distance movement of the previous days. After resting for a day, the Squadron proceeded to Bir Et Maler to rejoin the Brigade.
The Squadron remained at Bir Et Maler until 23rd October, during which time Major Pardoe, D.S.O., Senior Machine Gun Instructor at the Imperial School of Instruction, Zeitoun, inspected the Squadron, piece by piece, and delivered a number of lectures to both officers and men.
The Brigade received orders to move to the front for outpost duty on 23rd October, and in conformity with the Regiments the Squadron left Bir Et Maler at 8 a.m.
The new Brigade area at Bir Moseifig was reached on 27th, after a pleasant march through Bir Et Abd and Hod El Ge-eila. The Squadron formed a bivouac camp and constructed and manned the anti-aircraft defences, but did not take over any outposts until 15th November. On 14th November the Squadron marched to Bir El Mazar. After the new camp was formed all the Squadron officers made a reconnaissance of the outpost line, to enable a machine gun defence scheme to be prepared. Before nightfall the whole line had been reconnoitred and gun positions selected. The guns were taken forward during the evening, and by morning the emplacements had been dug and sandbagged. Between the 16th and 20th parties of officers and n.c.o.'s searched the surrounding country in front of the outpost lines and prepared very accurate range charts for the guns.
The Squadron withdrew from outpost duty on 25th November and proceeded to a camp at El Mustagidda. Active training was at once undertaken in preparation of the largescaled offensive operations that weft now possible.
ChapterIV
El Arish and Magdhaba
The General Staff had been seriously handicapped in the prosecution of the offensive against the Turks, owing to the eternal water problem. It is interesting to note the different requirements of the Commanders in Chief on the Egyptian and Western fronts.
The failure of the enemy in his attack in August had finally sealed his hopes for the conquest of Egypt; his line was now withdrawn round El Arish.
The enemy remained in the same position for the most part until the end of 1916, while the British lines of communication were being improved and the indispensable railroad was gradually creeping nearer and nearer towards the forward zone.
"During the year the force has gradually pushed across the Sinai Desert, fighting when necessary, organising and constructing incessantly in the heavy sand and hot sun.… Our success at Romani was undoubtedly a contributing factor to this advance, but the main factor was work, intense and unremitting. To regain this peninsula, the true frontier of Egypt, hundreds of miles of road and railway have been built, hundreds of miles of water piping have been laid, filters capable of supplying 1,500,000 gallons of water a day and reservoirs have been installed, and tons of stone transported
The General Staff was anxious to give battle to the enemy and inflict a decisive defeat upon his desert force before he should withdraw across the frontier into Palestine.
On 20th December, when our preparations were complete, our airmen reported that the enemy was in full retreat towards the frontier, thus depriving the General Staff of its desire. To inflict as much damage as possible, the Anzac Mounted Division and the Imperial Camel Corps were at once sent to take El Arish and Masaiid. El Arish is an old historical town of great strategical importance, described in one history as being the inevitable jumping-off place, either for an invasion of Turkey from Egypt or vice versa.
As our mounted troops advanced, the enemy evacuated El Arish and retired south-east up the Wadi-el-Arish Water-course to the strongly fortified town of Magdhaba, about twenty-three miles away, thence retreating with their main force towards El Auja, on the frontier, where the strategic railway from Beersheba had its terminus. From the reports from the airmen it was deducted that the enemy would hold Magdhaba with a large rearguard force, estimated at 2000 strong.
The Squadron left El Arish at midnight on 21st December, proceeding with the Brigade in the wonderful night march that brought it to Magdhaba in the early morning. The stronghold was surrounded with much difficulty, and the regiments of troopers in extended order began to close in against the defences.
Two sections of guns supported each regiment and two
The enemy appeared determined to hold on, but slowly and surely the cordon tightened until the gallant troopers were ready to deliver the final assault By this time the machine guns had worked forward, ready to support the assault over the open ground. At the given signal the troopers leapt forward in a brilliant charge, and the gunners opened a heavy covering fire, which caught a large number of Turks who ran back. The end quickly came. Just as the troopers were approaching the final trenches the Turks threw up the sponge and surrendered.
Immediately the position had been made secure the N.Z. Mounted Brigade, less the Auckland Regiment, commenced the return march to Bir el Masmi, a distance of twenty-three miles. This march will never be forgotten by any of the troops. Marching in fours and having to keep close touch, so as not to lose the way, the fine, powdery dust caused by the continuous stream of horses rose in clouds that almost choked both man and beast. This was the third night in succession without sleep, and the dust seemed to glue the eyelids together and make it impossible to keep awake. Many and varied were the experiences of that ride: it was quite a common thing for a horse and its rider to fall into a hole or over a bank.
Bir el Masmi was a very welcome sight next morning, and the Squadron remained there until the 27th and then moved to Masaiid, three miles west of El Arish. The operation to Maghdaba took the troops off the sand for the first time for twelve months.
It is interesting to remember that Napoleon's fiag once floated over El Arish 120 years before it was captured by our troops. Napoleon's task was not unlike General Murray's.
His dream was to reach Gaza, and thence to march to Constantinople by way of Damascus and Allepo. Napoleon's further dream was to proceed back to France from Constantinople through Vienna, after having crushed the Hapsburg Dynasty.
Auckland No. 1 Subsection.
Auckland No. 2 Subsection.
Wellington No. 1 Subsection.
Canterbury No. 1 Subsection.
Canterbury No. 2 Subsection.
Wellington No. 2 Subsection.
ChapterV
Into Palestine: Rafa
Sinai was not yet clear of the Turk; he still retained a foot-hold at Rafa with a strongly entrenched position at Magruntein, held by a force estimated at 2000. The General Staff decided to strike at this point to endeavour to surround and capture the garrison in the way that had been so successful at Magdhaba.
The Brigade's portion of the operation was the capture of Rafa. The Squadron participated in the thirty mile night ride, and in the early morning sent two guns to the Auckland Regiment, four guns to the Canterbury Regiment, keeping six guns as a mobile reserve under Capt.
The attack was one of the most successfully executed operations in the campaign, the whole objective being attained in the very nick of time—just before the large enemy rein-forcements were able to throw their weight into the scales; but the reinforcements were not only too late, but the main body advancing from Shellal was driven off by the 5th Australian Light Horse, after suffering heavy casualties from the bombs and machine guns of our airmen.
The machine gunners were fully engaged throughout the day, and the splendid handling of the mobile reserve guns under Capt. Harper won high praise.
As the Brigade moved round to the right flank of the line of attack, a good target of trendies and enemy parties was noticed by Capt. Harper. One section was sent forward to deal with the target. The officer in command of the
It was seen that a strongly-held enemy redoubt was interfering with the advance. The six guns were then ordered to engage the redoubt, and after about ten minutes gained complete superiority of fire. Four of the guns then maintained a rapid fire upon the redoubt until it fell to the attacking troopers. As the troopers began their assault on the redoubt one subsection had to cease fire because it did not have sufficient clearance to cover the advance. The officer in charge of these guns left two men "to look after" them,
After the fall of the redoubt four guns pushed ahead to the forward line, from which they raked the enemy positions, which were holding up the Australians and the Camel Corps. The positions were by this time almost surrounded, and shortly afterwards were captured: this brought about the fall of the Magruntein fortifications.
The four guns with the Canterbury Regiment supported the right flank with covering fire. As the attack progressed, the guns were moved up, first to an old trench, and then to a sunken road, from which positions they were able to sustain overhead covering fire until the troopers were ready to make their final assault. The fire lifted as the troopers dashed forward—reaching their objective with few casualties. The excellent gun positions along the sunken road were maintained, because they were such that if our men had been compelled to withdraw they could have been properly covered.
The covering fire of the Squadron was of a very high order, and in a decisive manner beat down the enemy rifle and machine gun fire, and as the battery supporting the attack of the Brigade had run out of ammunition the final attack of the Brigade depended entirely on the covering fire of the Squadron's guns. The lack of co-operation between the regiments and the guns, that was so noticeable in the August operations, had completely disappeared, to the mutual advantage of both. The very light casualties sustained by the regiments were largely due to the co-operation that was maintained with the gunners.
The Squadron expended 40,000 rounds of ammunition—which exceeded the amount laid down to be carried by a Squadron. The ammunition pack animals could not be brought up to the gun positions to replenish supplies, which necessitated extra work for the ammunition carriers; had the ordinary regimental supplies also been brought up, the guns could have been used to greater advantage, as the fear of a shortage curtailed the volume of fire.
The idea of keeping a larger number of guns as a reserve under the Squadron Commander was found very satisfactory, and, except when the regiments were sent off on independent missions, it was considered that the whole Squadron should remain under its own Commander. The Lewis guns, which now had been added to the regimental establishment, released the machine guns for covering fire. Keeping the Squadron under its own Commander during an operation enabled guns to be sent when and where they were most needed, instead of being attached to the regiments where they might not be required as much as at some other part.
In the long advance over open ground exposed to heavy fire, the Maxim guns were again found to be very awkward, owing to their great weight, and consequently the Light Vickers Guns were used to a greater extent.
The Squadron was withdrawn for the night to Sheikh Zawaiid, and next day returned to the old camp near El Arish, where it remained until 22nd February. During the period in camp, Lieut. Yerex rejoined the Auckland Regiment, and
ChapterVI
The First Battle of Gaza
It has been said that when the Turks lost Sinai, Djemal Pasha, with increased concern for the safety of his Syrian Army, was ready to abandon Gaza to its fate without a struggle, and to concentrate on Jerusalem and its defences. Von Kressenstein, the German Military Adviser, insisted on making a stand at Gaza, which resolutely held could be made practically impregnable against the forces that General Murray had at his disposal.
After the Battle of Rafa the rapidity of the railway's progress had been the outstanding feature of the operations, which induced the enemy to withdraw some six miles along the old caravan route towards Gaza. Our mounted troops kept the enemy under continuous observation, and on the 28th February, after the Turkish withdrawal, entered Khan Yunus unopposed. On 5th March our airmen discovered that the enemy had made a further withdrawal, which brought him back distributed along a line between Gaza and Tel el Sheria, on the Turkish Central Railway, with a small garrison holding Beersheba. The new situation resulting on the Turkish withdrawal was complex, but it was finally decided to continue the advance along the coast, instead of making an attempt against Beersheba. General Murray, referring to this decision in his despatch, says: "I decided against making an attempt on Beersheba, since by doing so I should be drawing my line of communications parallel to the enemy's front, and there was no technical advantage to be gained by linking up the military railway with the Central Palestine Railway, either at Beersheba or Tel el Sheria."
The first battle of Gaza was fought, but it failed to achieve the whole of the objectives General Murray had in view. The objects of the attack were "Firstly to seize the line of the Wadi Ghuzze to cover the advance of the railway; coup de main and to cut off its garrison." At the moment success was about to crown our endeavours, a mystifying order for withdrawal was sent out. It seems quite clear that had the order for withdrawal not been given that the town of Gaza would have been captured on the 26th, but in view of the general situation it is not so certain that we would have retained our hold. The following extract of the official despatch at least explains the action of the Commander in Chief:—
"The majority of the mounted troops had been unable to water their horses during the day, and it appeared that unless Gaza was captured during the day, they would have to withdraw west of the Wadi Ghuzze in order to water their animals. Strong columns of the enemy with guns were moving to the relief of Gaza from the north, north-east and south-east. It was at this moment that the loss of two hours of daylight made itself particularly felt, since had two more hours of daylight now been available, there is no doubt that the infantry would have been able to consolidate the positions they had won, and for arrangements to have been made by which the 54th Division could have effected a junction with the 53rd. It is perhaps possible that if General Dobell had at this stage pushed forward his reserve Division to support the 53rd, the result would have been different, but the difficulty of supplying water to men and horses would have been immense and impossible to realise by those who were not on the spot."
The decision to withdraw was come to between Generals Chetwode and Dobell, the former withdrawing his mounted troops "in order to prevent their envelopment by the enemy." Summing up the first battle of Gaza, the Commander in Chief states that "my primary and secondary objects were completely attained, but the failure to attain the third object—the capture of Gaza—owing to the delay caused by the fog on the 26th and the waterless nature of the country round Gaza, prevented a most successful operation from being a complete disaster to the enemy."
It would be impossible to endeavour in the present work to make a criticism of the first battle of Gaza; the writer
The work of the machine gunners in the operations on the 26th was very arduous, although the nature of the attack did not permit them to render the same valuable assistance as la the attacks referred to in the previous chapters of this book.
The Squadron, accompanied by three limbers carrying 48,000 rounds of reserve ammunition, left Deir El Belah at 3.30 a.m. on 26th, reaching Beit Dardis at 9.30 a.m., where it watered and fed, and remained in readiness to move at an instant's notice. At 2.30 p.m. the Brigade moved round towards the coast, and after a fast ride came into action north of Gaza. Two sections (four guns) were sent with the Wellington Regiment on the right flank, and two sections on the left flank with the Canterbury Regiment—the remaining two sections being kept in reserve.
Excellent communication between the Squadron Headquarters and the forward sections was maintained until the withdrawal, by visual signalling. The sections with the Wellington Regiment experienced great difficulty from the numerous cactus hedges, and only had one good target throughout the day, which was so successfully dealt with at a range of 100 yards that the gunners felt well rewarded for their efforts. The sections with the Canterbury Regiment had similar obstacles to overcome, but found numerous snipers among the hedges, who were playing havoc among the advancing troops. The gunners thereupon began the work of spotting snipers and dealing with them. Although a large amount of ammunition was expended, the results attained quite justified the expenditure.
On the much-discussed order for withdrawal reaching the Squadron, the forward guns returned, and the Squadron at 6.30 p.m. made its way to the Brigade Rendezvous, east of the Ali Muster Redoubt. The Wellington Regiment captured two field guns during the day, which the Squadron's limber horses went forward to salve and to deliver at Divisional Headquarters. D.H.Q. sent the guns with the Squadron's
The Brigade was assembled by 11.30 p.m., and then proceeded by night march to Deir El Belah, arriving there at 6 a.m. the following morning.
Deir El Belah remained the Squadron's Headquarters until 17th April, when it proceeded with the Brigade to take its part in the second unsuccessful battle of Gaza.
ChapterVII
The Second Battle of Gaza
During the period between 26th March and 17th April, the day on which the second battle began, the enemy transformed his position round Gaza into a veritable stronghold, and collected many reinforcements. The enemy strength increased to five divisions of infantry and two divisions of cavalry, while our forces remained the same—three infantry and two cavalry divisions (the 52nd Infantry Division was not used in the first battle). Great care was taken to make the second battle a success, and to prevent any attack taking place before the whole of the preparations were completed. The railway advanced to Deir El Belah, and the new station was completed on 5th April. General Dobell's Headquarters became established in this town, and General Murray established his advanced Headquarters at Khan Yunus.
The plan of the attack was to capture and occupy the Sheikh Abbas-Mansura Ridge, south of Gaza, in the first stage, and to consolidate while the heavy artillery and tanks were brought forward; then the final assault on the town after a heavy bombardment, in which two monitors and a French battleship would co-operate.
The Turkish trench system extended for about seven miles south-east of Gaza to Atawineh Ridge, and from there to Tel El Sharia was a strong line of posts. The strength and length of the Turkish positions made a cavalry marching movement impossible until a breach was made big enough for the cavalry to be pushed through.
The dispositions of the British forces at the opening of the attack were three infantry divisions on the left and the two cavalry divisions protecting their right flank.
The Brigade moved eastwards at 9 a.m. on 17th, the day the battle opened, towards Beersheba, the Squadron forming
A certain amount of success had attended the valiant attempts by the infantry, who had captured the Sheikh Abbas positions.
The Mounted Division on the Anzac left had made a dismounted attack on the Atawineh position with some success, and to assist the Yeomanry to push the attack home the Wellington Regiment and two sections of machine guns from the Squadron were sent into action at 11 a.m. on the 19th, after an all-night ride from El Shellal. The Wellington Regiment's objective was a spur known as Sausage Ridge, the attainment of which would lessen the pressure against the Yeomanry.
The section of guns delivered a strong covering fire, and the Wellingtons made a good advance. At 12 noon there was a dangerous gap between the Wellingtons and the Yeomanry, which the Canterbury Regiment was ordered to close. Two sections went forward with the Canterburys and did specially fine work. Unfortunately the section commanded by 2nd Lieut. L. A. Craven suffered severely as it was advancing, from a direct hit by a 5.9 shell. The snapshot reproduced, facing page 208, was taken a few moments after the shell exploded among Craven's section.
With bold handling the guns were pushed forward, engaging many enemy targets at ranges from 1000 to 1600 yards, and inflicting heavy casualties. Craven's work was of particularly high order; he personally reconnoitred the positions for the guns, which enabled them to play such havoc among the enemy. About 3 p.m. he observed a large enemy party advancing through a field in heavy crop. Holding fire until 2nd Lieut. Craven returned to New Zealand, but subsequently succumbed to his injuries.
An incident occurred during the attack which illustrates the feelings of the mounted men towards their horses. Trooper H. C. Green and his horse were caught by a shell; Green's leg was blown off and his horse badly smashed. An officer went at once to Green's assistance; his first words were, "Shoot my horse first, sir, and end his misery." Green died a short while after.
During this attack Capt. Hinman had a very anxious time with the horses. The country was devoid of cover, and the only way of protecting them was to divide them up into small groups, well apart, and hope for the best. The air craft and 5.9's paid them particular attention all day, but, fortunately, only a dozen or so were hit.
The Brigade and Squadron commenced to withdraw about 7 p.m., and at 10.30 p.m. was on its way to Tel El Jemmi to bivouac for the night.
The Turkish defence had proved too strong for the infantry, and in consequence the third day of the battle, bringing the British casualties up to approximately 14,000, left our positions very little improved. The infantry were ordered to consolidate their gains preparatory to renewing the attack on the following day, but in view of the strongly expressed opinions of the Infantry Divisional Commanders "that the attack ordered for the following morning did not offer sufficient prospect of success to justify the very heavy casualties which such an operation would involve," General Murray abandoned the proposal, leaving the Turkish forces triumphantly in possession of its formidable Gaza-Beersheba line.
The disastrous setback at Gaza brought a complete change in the policy of the "Eastern Force," practically amounting to an acceptance of trench warfare. The Turks had just
With the change of policy came a change in important commands,
A long period must now be quickly passed over, the period during which General Allenby prepared the plans that enabled the strong enemy barrier to be broken, and the crusade to be pushed to a successful issue.
During this period the Squadron moved with the Brigade on numerous reconnaisances, covering most of the country in the Beersheba area, over which they were to operate in the "Big Push."
Gas helmets were issued, and all ranks were trained in their use. Fortunately, the very hot climate prevented the use of gas, and our mounted troops were spared its unpleasantness.
Enemy aircraft continued to pay marked attention to our troops: no opportunity was lost to bomb and machine-gun them. However, the excellently-placed observation posts neutralised the enemy's enterprise.
ChapterVIII
Allenby's Drive Opens
For six months the situation on the Palestine front had not changed, and the Turk, determined to stop our advance had spared no effort to make his line impregnable. Not only did the Turk hope to stop our advance, but also to drive us back across the frontier, into the waterless wastes of Sinai. The active patrolling that was carried on during the stationary period accustomed the enemy to the movement of our mounted forces, and deceived him as to our intentions. The enemy General Staff made up their minds that our renewed offensive would be against Gaza, with a probable landing north of the town to envelop it, but new blood was in the field, and with it new ideas. General Allenby decided to strike against Beersheba—the enemy's exposed left flank, and to roll up his line towards Gaza.
The new operations were fixed to begin on 31st October, 1917. The Squadron was stationed at El Fukhari at the beginning of October; it left there for Esani on 24th. On 28th it proceeded with the Brigade to Khalassa, the following day to Asluj, and at 5.30 p.m. on the 30th it moved out to the attack on Beersheba.
The night march over the mountain was successfully accomplished. The pack horses with the guns and equipment stood the arduous work splendidly. By 8 a.m. the following day the Brigade had reached Bir Salim and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade had reached Bir El Hamman. The line between these two places was the Anzac Division's first objective.
The Division's next objective was the line from Tel El Sakaty to Tel El Saba and the cutting of the Beersheba-Hebron Motor Road.
At 9 a.m. the 2nd Light Horse Brigade began its advance towards Tel El Sakaty, and the New Zealand Mounted Bri-
The horses of the Squadron and Auckland Regiment were attacked by two enemy 'planes about 4.30 p.m., but as they were flying very low the concentrated fire of the reserve guns and the Hotchkiss and Rifles made them change their direction. Unfortunately, an Australian machine-gun section received their bombs. Fourteen horse-holders were killed or wounded and thirty-six horses killed.
On 1st November, 2nd Lieuts. Edridge and Cobb, with two guns each, accompanied two regiments on a reconnaissance east of Tel El Saba, and towards the Caves of Kh. El LeKiyeh, coming into action with success against enemy cavalry patrols and machine guns. On 4th November the Squadron marched with the Brigade to Wadi El Sultan and took over the line from 5th Australian Brigade, placing ten guns in defensive positions. Four guns on Ras El Nagb came under heavy shell and rifle fire, but were able to carry out a large amount of firing against small bodies of enemy infantry at from 600 to 1000 yards, inflicting casualties. Late in the afternoon of the 4th the enemy made an attack on the position, but it was practically wiped out by the Squadron's guns. During this attack one of the guns was hit through the water jacket, but was repaired and continued firing. On the enemy threatening our left flank, the two guns in reserve were sent with two Squadrons of the Wellington Regiment to strengthen the position. These guns came into action immediately at ranges from 1000 to 1500 yards. The heavy enemy enfilade shelling forced these two guns and the Squadrons to a position on the reverse slope of the hill. The enemy attack was not continued, but the whole Squadron remained in the line all night, and its horses were taken back to Beersheba for watering. Some of the horses had been without water for sixty hours. During the following morning the guns found many good targets, and kept up an active firing programme until 12.30 p.m., when they were relieved by a Squadron from the Imperial Camel Corps. After relief the Squadron remained near the line in reserve until 10th November, when it returned to Beersheba.
The country in which the Squadron was now operating was very rocky and mountainous, and the rock splinters from shell fire were as dangerous as the shrapnel itself. Owing
During the period that the New Zealand Mounted Brigade was round Beersheba great events were happening further north. On 7th November the Turks evacuated Gaza and began their hurried retreat northwards under heavy pressure. The Brigade left Beersheba at 4 p.m. on 11th on a forced march to Hamemeh, on the coast, about fifteen miles north of Gaza. The journey of nearly sixty miles viâ Irgeig and Sharia was accomplished at 10 p.m. on the 12th. The Anzac Division, which had been split up temporarily after the capture of Beersheba, became complete again on the arrival of the Brigade at Hamemeh. On the 13th the Squadron moved northwards along the Jaffa Road with the Brigade to Khurbet Sukereir, and on the following day to Et Themadat, coming in touch with the enemy about midday, when an immediate attack was decided upon.
Canterbury Regiment deployed to the right, Wellington to the centre, and Auckland to the left, and the attack proceeded. Before the attack opened, 2nd Lieut. Edridge, with two guns, joined the advance guard Squadron of the Wellington Regiment, and 2nd Lieut. Cobb and
As the 9th Squadron of the Wellington Regiment advanced, Lieut. Russell's guns delivered a covering fire. When the Squadron made good its advance, Russell advanced his guns on foot about 800 yards, and took up a position on its left flank. From this position splendid targets were obtained at 300 yards range; especially a body of Turks massed to launch a counter-attack. After smashing up the massed Lieut. L. A. Craven's Section getting a direct hit by 5.9 Shell at Second Battle of Gaza.Major E. G. Fraser.Squadron Officers at El Arish, December, 1916.Squadron Mess, Tel el Fara, May, 1917.Squadron Officers, 1st September. 1917.
The six guns with the Auckland Regiment had a very strenuous time, and rendered valuable assistance to the Wellington Regiment with flanking fire, as they worked round the position. The Auckland advance was made over undulating grass country, devoid of trees or scrub, and they soon came under enemy machine-gun fire. 2nd-Lieut. Kelly's section immediately got into action, engaging the enemy guns at 1100 yards; the other two sections, under 2nd-Lieuts. Picot and Armstrong, worked further round to the left. Picot soon got into position and enfiladed the enemy opposing the Wellington Regiment advance while Armstrong, after moving still further forward, also got his guns into action. Up to this time most of the opposition had come from the Wellington front, but, almost without warning, a strong enemy attack was launched from concealed positions straight at the Auckland front. Picot immediately switched his guns round, being now on the right of the line attacked. Armstrong rushed his guns further out to the left, and this enabled him to cross-fire with Picot over the Auckland front, and they both poured enfilade fire into the lines of the charging enemy. Lieut. Kelly had in the meantime brought his guns to the centre of the line between Picot and Armstrong, and met the enemy with point-blank frontal fire. The fire of the six guns, ably supported by the Hotchkiss and Rifles, beat back the enemy when about 25 yards from the guns. Several gunners were knocked out by hand grenades, and four guns were
The enemy attack was covered by machine guns in entrenched and concealed positions, and as the Squadron's guns were all right out in the open the gunners suffered heavy casualties.
One of the most outstanding examples of personal bravery during the critical moments, and which did so much to save the situation, was that of Sergt. M. P. Malone. His officer (2nd Lieut. Armstrong) was wounded just as the section began to get into position to meet the counter-attack. Malone got the section into action under heavy fire with determination and dash, when the enemy were almost overwhelming the position. He stood his ground, picking off the nearest Turks with his revolver. The spare gunners followed Malone's example, and with the rapid fire that was soon pouring out of the machine guns the enemy faltered and then fled back, but were mercilessly cut about by the guns of this and the other sections.
Capt. Hinman kept up supplies of ammunition and water for the forward gunners by limbers and pack horses. The work of some of the pack leaders, galloping backwards and forwards over machine-gun-swept ground in full view of the enemy, was very fine and called forth great praise from the gunners and other troops. Unfortunately, both Picot and Armstrong were wounded in the afternoon, so Capt. Hinman took over the command of their sections.
At dusk the guns on the left flank dug in; two damaged guns were made serviceable by using parts of other damaged guns. The Squadron throughout the day expended over 30,000 rounds of ammunition, and eight gunners were killed and sixteen wounded, in addition to 2nd-Lieuts. Picot and Armstrong.
A short review of the operation can best be made by an extract from Col. Powles' History:—
"Thus ended a brilliant battle, in which the Brigade had attacked and captured a strong natural position held by an enemy in superior numbers, and this enemy force was backed up by a well-concealed battery and held trenches with the aid
of numerous machine guns. The enemy force was estimated at 1500 men, with 18 machine guns and a battery of artillery. The Auckland and Wellington Regiments combined would not have numbered more than 1000, and of these some 200 were in charge of the led horses, but the rapidity of the movements of the two regiments, combined with a splendid cooperation, a co-operation which continued all day and existed between each troop in each squadron and between each squadron in either regiment, and between the two regiments. The day's action brought into play the full attacking powers of the mounted arm against an enemy in position. There was the mounted advance to the first fire position by one regiment and then its systematic capture of enemy trenches on foot as infantry with rifle and bayonet and Hotchkiss and machine guns, and its rapid reinforcing on horseback of the successive positions when captured."
The effect of the success of the operation caused an enemy withdrawal during the night, which was followed up by the Canterbury Regiment and a section of guns under 2nd Lieut. Edridge.
The battlefield was cleaned up during the morning of the 15th, and in the afternoon the remainder of the Brigade and the Squadron marched to Ayun Kara to bivouac, while the Canterbury Regiment took up an outpost line further on.
The day following, 16th November, the town of Jaffa surrendered. The Squadron passed through Jaffa on the 18th and took over a new area at Sarona, a few miles further north, in which to bivouac.
ChapterIX
The Capture of Jerusalem
While the New Zealand Brigade had been advancing along the coast to Jaffa, the rest of the Army had been making steady progress towards Jerusalem, which the enemy, for strategical and political reasons, meant to hold at all costs. In order to draw the enemy forces away from Jerusalem, and so relieve the pressure, it was decided to send the Brigade across the River Auja, with the apparent intention of continuing the offensive northwards. On 24th November the Brigade received orders to cross the river and to clear the enemy for a space of two miles northwards.
The Canterbury Regiment, with two sections of machine guns, moved out from Sarona at 1 p.m., and crossed the ford at the mouth of the Auja and proceeded to the attack. The village of Sheikh Muannis was captured with little opposition. The two sections were only able to employ a small amount of long range shooting. The Wellington Regiment then went through the Canterburys and captured Khurbet Hadrah. After the infantry moved up to hold the new line three squadrons (two from Auckland Regiment and one from Wellington Regiment), each accompanied by a section of machine guns, took up an outpost line ahead of the infantry.
At 3 a.m. on 25th the section under
Emerson then took command of the section and succeeded in getting it back to a position on the left of an infantry post, where he gave orders to dig in.
A short while after daybreak the enemy shelled this position very heavily, causing a number of casualties. Sergt. Emerson, with splendid devotion to duty, got the wounded dressed and evacuated. At 8 a.m. the Squadron Commander ( Emerson subsequently died from malaria.
Capt. Harper's wounds were very serious and prevented him from again taking his place at the head of his Squadron. The loss of this officer, whose great courage and leadership had been outstanding features from the time he served in the ranks until he had risen to his responsible command, and had turned his Squadron into what was generally termed "the most efficient unit in the Brigade," was a very grievous blow to the Corps.
The section with the outpost Squadron at Sheikh Muannis withdrew to the ford and gave covering fire from its northern side while the Squadrons crossed, until the reserve sections were sent forward to cover the crossing from the southern side. These sections took up a defensive line along the river, and when the crossing had been effected inflicted heavy casualties upon the advancing enemy at ranges from 1200 to 2000 yards.
The Canterbury Regiment had crossed the river on the 25th and taken up a position on the hills to the north of the ford. As the Auckland and Wellington Regiments withdrew to cross the river the 1st Squadron Canterbury Regiment held back the enemy while the crossing was being effected, and
About 11 p.m. the 61st Essex Regiment took over the line, and the gunners withdrew to support positions, where they remained all night.
On the 1st December the Squadron returned to Sarona. From the 4th to 10th the Squadron undertook trench duties, when it was relieved by an infantry company and returned to Ayun Kara.
The day after the relief came the gladdening news that Jerusalem had fallen.
The Squadron moved to Esdud on the 13th December, and remained in rest until January 20th, during which time it had shifted to its old bivouac near Ayun Kara.
Capt. Hinman became O.C. Squadron in the place of Capt. Harper.
ChapterX
The Journey to Jericho
After the fall of Jerusalem the Turks, with German assistance, made a determined attempt to regain the city before the end of the year, but as a result of the three days' battle from December 27th to the 29th, they were totally defeated, with a loss of about 1000 killed and 600 captured, as well as some seven miles of ground won in the masterly counter stroke delivered by General Allenby as soon as the Turkish attack had been spent. These new territorial gains included positions of great strategical importance, providing four strong points between the enemy and Jerusalem instead of the one existing before the Turkish attack. During the next two months our line was carried farther northwards for several miles, and was pushed eastwards on 19th February by a more serious advance towards Jericho. Realising the danger of this threat to their communications on both sides of the Jordan, the Turks offered a fierce resistance in the difficult country among the mountain ridges through which our troops had to move.
The Squadron accompanied the Brigade on its march from Ayun Kara across Central Palestine to take part in the new operations against Jericho, reaching Bethlehem on 17th February. The Wellington Regiment, with a section of machine guns, had reached Bethlehem some days before the rest of the Brigade, and had moved on to Ihn Obeid, about six miles due east of the town. An extract from Lieut.-au fait with the situation:—
"The weather on the plains had been wet, but the change to the heights of Judea was felt very much. Here the weather was cold, even in daytime, and very cold at night. Opportunity was taken to send parties to Jerusalem and the padres
proved invaluable as guides, for they were all enthusiastic students of the Holy Land, and were well conversant with Jerusalem and its site, from constant study. "Operations began on 19th February, and by nightfall the first phase had been successfully carried out. Daylight on the 20th found the Division strung out in single file extending over some eight miles of rough mountain track. The head of this singularly narrow column had reached about a mile east of the great El Muntar Hill, and had run into a Turkish outpost. The infantry on the left away on the main road were attacking Jebel Ektief, where the Turk was putting up a very strong resistance.
"During the night the Wellington Regiment had proceeded down the Wadi en Nar and had reached a valley to the east of the Great El Muntar Hill (the hill of the scapegoat of the Old Testament), and now formed the advanced guard to the New Zealand Brigade, behind which came the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade. All night the men had been clambering over the rocky tracks, leading their horses. The route followed was practically a goat track only, though marked on the map 'Ancient Road,' No wheels were taken. No supplies but such as could be carried by man and horse, and the only ammunition taken was a small camel train of light active animals, each carrying two boxes of small arms ammunition. No artillery accompanied the Division, but they were sent down the main road to Jericho, to follow the infantry advance. To deploy for the attack, a column in single file of eight miles in length cannot be done in a few minutes, and it was some hours before the New Zealanders thoroughly got to work.
"El Muntar, the great hill which the Division crossed, is 1723 feet above sea level, and 1250 feet above this flat-bottomed valley in which the head of the column had been held up by the Turkish position on the far side of it. This descent of 1250 feet is all within a space of three miles, down which the track zig-zagged in full view of the enemy, and the sight of eight miles of horses slowly defiling down this hill must have had a great part in the ultimate abandonment of a very strong position which the Turks held with superior numbers and armament.
"This position lay across the 'Ancient Road,' with its left flank on the high hill, Point 306 (Tubk el Kaneiterah), and its right flank on the hill 288 (Jebel el Kulimum). Between these the road runs, and to get at the enemy our troops had to descend into a flat, open valley. It must be remembered that, in addition to holding these hills strongly with infantry and machine guns the enemy had five well placed guns in position farther back at Neby Musa (the alleged Tomb of Moses), and from there shelled the valley in front of his position."
The Canterbury Regiment, with two sections of machine guns, moved out on foot at 3 a.m. to attack Hill 288, and later the Wellington Regiment attacked Hill 306, assisted by two machine sections.
Both hills were taken soon after noon. The machine gun sections had a heavy day, but succeeded in rendering valuable assistance to the attacking force. The enemy positions being considerably higher, had a distinct advantage over our guns, but by constant firing against the enemy lining the ridges the hostile rifle and machine gun fire was kept down. As the Canterbury Regiment was pressing forward its attack on the right, two sections of guns were brought up, which came into action against the enemy's positions at 2000 yards. When the Auckland Regiment advanced to Hill 288 to assist Canterbury Regiment all the available guns concentrated a covering fire that crept forward with the advance until the hill was captured.
Immediately the attack succeeded, the guns were rushed forward to engage the retreating Turks, but the broken nature of the country afforded them good cover, and very few hits were obtained. The Brigade pushed out an outpost line in the evening, with two machine gun sections covering the approaches to Neby Musa. The night passed quietly, and at 5 a.m. next morning the 10th Squadron Canterbury Regiment, with a section of guns, advanced on foot to and occupied Neby Musa without opposition just as the advanced guards of the 60th Infantry Division arrived there. The remainder of the Squadron moved with the Brigade at 5.30 a.m. along the Ancient Road, reaching the Jordan Valley without encountering any enemy resistance. The enemy had made a
The Squadron returned next day to Bethlehem, leaving one section with the Auckland Regiment, which became detached from the Brigade to act as Corps Cavalry for XXth Corps.
During the next month the Squadron remained in the vicinity of Jerusalem, spending its spare time in sight seeing and making itself acquainted with Biblical History.
ChapterXI
Across the Jordan Into the Land of Moab
On the 12th March a large-scaled attack on the coastal area took place by East Anglian, South Anglian and Indian troops. The advance on an eleven-mile front was very successful, bringing the line, with the positions already won, astride the Jerusalem-Nablus Road. In the Jordan Valley the British right wing was also carried forward to conform with the same advance, securing the high ground crossing the road from Nablus to Jericho, three miles north of the Wadi Auja and ten miles above Jericho. General Allenby now had the right bank of the Jordan in his possession down to the Dead Sea, and decided to make an attempt against the Hedjaz railway line.
The Turks had apparently feared some such attempt, and to delay it they blew up the concrete bridge that crossed the Jordan at El Ghoraniyeh. The bridge (which had been built by the Germans some years before the war) carried the road that ran from Jerusalem through Jericho to Es Salt and Amman, on the Hedjaz railway. After blowing up the bridge the Turks entrenched themselves on the eastern bank of the Jordan to await developments.
The enemy did not have long to wait. The infantry managed to effect a crossing at Makhadet-Hajlah, four miles below the destroyed bridge, and a pontoon was finally completed on 22nd March. The enemy was in strength across the river, and succeeded in preventing the infantry from properly securing the bridgehead.
The Auckland Regiment was near Jericho on 21st March, where it was joined by two sections of guns that had been detailed to accompany the Regiment on a projected operation. The pontoon bridge having been finished, and considered safe for mounted troops to cross, it was decided to risk a shock action by the Auckland Regiment on the morning of the 23rd.
At early dawn the Regiment and the sections of guns crossed the pontoon bridge safely, and at 7.30 a.m. commenced what finished up as one of the finest cavalry exploits of the whole war.
The plan of the operation was to clear the enemy from the vicinity of the bridge, and to make a dash northwards to attack the garrison defending the destroyed bridge at El Ghoraniyeh from the rear. By defeating this garrison the crossing would be secured, and engineers were in readiness to repair the bridge.
It does not come within the scope of this work to detail the wonderful ride of the Auckland Regiment, which carried all before it in a manner hardly expected in old-time fiction. Sergt. Nicol, in his "Story of Two Campaigns," has given a graphic description of the operation, which could not be surpassed.
The two sections kept close up with the Regiment in their wild ride, but did not get into action until Ghoraniyeh Crossing was reached. Here they took up positions covering the bridgehead and searched the enemy positions intermittently until dark, when they withdrew inside the outpost line.
The next day the Brigade crossed the Jordan at 7 a.m. to attack Shunet Nimrin. The Wellington Regiment led as advanced guard, with two sections (four guns), but as the opposition was so slight the guns were not used. The sections with the Auckland Regiment rejoined the Squadron later in the day, and marched to Wadi Jeria, to bivouac for the night.
For three days the forward march was made against slight opposition, but under climatic conditions of the severest nature; heavy thunderstorms constantly broke, with a temperature very little above freezing point. The Division had now reached the high tableland 4000 feet above the Jordan Valley.
By this time Es Salt had been captured, and an early attack by the Anzac Division was ordered, to intercept the garrison that had made good its escape from Es Salt, and in order to hasten the capture of Amman and the cutting of the Hedjaz railway. Owing to the condition of the Division, the attack against Amman was postponed until the 27th.
At 7.45 a.m. on the 27th the Brigade left Ain Es Sir with the Auckland Regiment as advanced guard.
The Brigade was on the Divisional right flank with the Camel Corps in the centre and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade on the left. The heavy rains had made the cultivated land over which the Brigade advanced very muddy, impeding movement to a marked degree. The Brigade was detailed to advance to a line between railway line and the Wadi Amman, about three miles from the town.
The Squadron was now divided into six subsections of two guns each and numbered one to six.
No.'s 1 and 6 subsections became attached to the Auckland Regiment, and came into action at 1800 yards against the enemy lining the ridges in sangers. They then gave covering fire for the further advance. The Canterbury Regiment came in on the left of the Auckland Regiment with No.'s 2 and 5 subsections attached. These guns obtained targets at 1200 yards and 900 yards respectively, inflicting many casualties. No. 4 subsection, acting independently, came into action on the Canterbury front and obtained good enfilade shooting at enemy sangers at 900 yards. No. 3 subsection left with a Squadron of the Wellington Regiment to act as covering party to the demolition party that had been despatched to blow up the railway line, but were not called upon to fire.
The Brigade made good progress, and after breaking an enemy counter-attack, dug in for the night, the gunners taking up forward positions, which they strengthened by erecting stone sangers.
A general attack was ordered for 1.30 p.m. on the 28th, but before it was launched a heavy enemy attack fell against the Camel Corps on the right of the Auckland Regiment. No.'s 1 and 6 subsections, from their positions, were able to bring a devastating flanking fire that raked the advancing enemy infantry, which greatly assisted in the complete repulse of the attack. The Camel Corps on the left of the Canterbury Regiment, attacked at 1.30 p.m. and succeeded in advancing about 500 yards. No.'s 2 and 4 subsections co-operated in the operation with a heavy enfilade fire along the enemy sangers.
There was no forward movement attempted on the 29th, and the gun subsections contented themselves with sniping,
On the 30th the Division made its final attempt to complete the capture of Amman, but failed, only after inflicting heavy casualties and rudely shaking the morale of the enemy forces.
A description of the positions to be attacked appears in Lieut.-Col. Powles' History, which is now reproduced:—
"On the south and east, Amman is dominated by the great Hill 3039, against which the New Zealanders were striving.… The town itself was entirely hidden from all but the New Zealanders on the hill.… The enemy held a very strong position, somewhat in the shape of a shamrock, with the ridge leading to the main and highest position representing the stem of the leaf. The main position, marked 'A' on the sketch, was of great strength, and consisted of two lines of trenches or sangers in tiers dominating the approach along the ridge, with a third trench 'D' on higher ground behind, and a further position 300 yards further back on the northern point of the hill. On either flank, as one approached 'A' were subsidiary positions, marked 'B' and 'C,' covering the advance of the ridge. To capture this formidable position without any artillery support (as there were no guns available) the following plan was adopted:—The position 'A' was to be the main objective, and was to be silently and swiftly approached by a force passing along the ridge between 'B' and 'C,' which were to be merely contained by small parties in case they became active. 'A' having become captured, it was considered 'B' and 'C' would be compelled to surrender."
At midnight the whole Squadron (except No. 4 subsection) were withdrawn from their line positions and concentrated at the Auckland Regiment's Headquarters, under the command of Major Hinman, O.C. Squadron. At 1.30 a.m. (30th) Major Hinman, with Nos. 1 and 5 subsections, moved forward to where the assaulting troops were assembling. Nos. 2, 3 and 6 subsections took up positions in the old ruins to be in readiness to cover any retirement. Major Hinman connected these positions with telephone communication to his advanced Headquarters. When the first objective was taken, Nos. 1 and 5 subsections pushed forward to consolidate the
From the N.Z. Official War History, Vol. III]
Amman
It was extremely difficult to select gun positions in the dark, but nevertheless the ten guns of the Squadron and the three captured guns were all placed in positions that, at daybreak, were found to be quite satisfactory. Digging-in was impossible, so stone sangers were hastily built around each gun position. These positions, in common with the mounted troopers' positions, were subjected to unceasing shell-fire throughout the seventeen hours the Brigade held the line.
No. 5 sub-section was placed on the extreme right to cover that flank; Nos. 1 and 3 sub-sections on the right centre with the Canterbury Regiment and Camel Corps troops; No. 6 sub-section (with two captured guns extra) on the left centre, and No. 2 sub-section on the extreme left flank with the Auckland Regiment.
A very heavy bombardment was followed at 9 a.m. by a strong counter-attack directed chiefly against the front held by the Canterbury Regiment and the Camel Corps.
No. 1, 3, and 5 sub-sections met the attack with frontal, and No. 6 sub-section with enfilade fire. The enemy managed to get within 30 yards of the sangers; but the withering fire from the four guns of No. 6 sub-section, firing right across the line of attack, completely broke it up. As the shattered remnants of the attacking force retired the gunners inflicted further casualties upon them.
By this time the guns had almost exhausted their supplies of ammunition. Parties were organised at once to bring up new supplies. Some particularly fine work was done by these parties, and a good reserve was built up, and belts were re-filled. Trooper Barrett's work was particularly meritorious in this respect. Unfortunately, he was killed in the course of one of his expeditions.
The Squadron's casualties were very heavy, and among the wounded were Lieuts. Edridge and Picot. The evacuation of the wounded was very difficult.
Major Hinman kept in close touch with all the guns, and,
A second counter-attack was launched, but again it failed. Lieut. Harris (in command of No. 6 sub-section) was given another opportunity. The guns of his section repeated their earlier performance; they poured a hurricane of fire among the Turks swarming towards the crest, which cut them down in hundreds.
Orders were received for an evacuation of the position, so the gunners destroyed the remaining captured gun, got their wounded evacuated, and buried the dead. At 8.15 p.m. No.'s 3 and 6 withdrew to positions in the rear, and No.'s 5, 1 and 2 followed ten minutes later, leaving the Hotchkiss guns to protect the line. When it was seen that no enemy action threatened, the guns were returned to the concentration point to which the horses were brought. The Squadron then withdrew with the Brigade to Ain Es Sir, being joined by No. 4 subsection en rôute. This subsection had remained in its original position to help cover the Camel Corps front, and had a good day's shooting.
The Squadron arrived at Ain Es Sir at 4 a.m. on 31st. At 2 p.m. the enemy were reported advancing on the outpost line, and the Squadron stood to arms. No.'s 2 and 4 subsections were sent to strengthen the Canterbury Regiment in the outpost line, and No.'s 5 and 6 to the Auckland Regiment.
The Brigade, acting as rearguard for the force, retired down the Wadi Sir at 7.30 a.m. on 1st April. At 9.30 a.m. the enemy attacked the Wellington Regiment, then rearguard for the Brigade. No.'s 2 and 4 subsections were ordered to take up positions on two small spurs—No. 4 taking the north spur about 200 yards to the rear. At about 2000 yards range No. 4 subsection opened fire against enemy cavalry, which immediately retired, after suffering casualties. Even at this great range the gunners quickly observed their fire and secured hits. Soon after this No. 4 subsection and the rearguard made a withdrawal, covered by No. 2 subsection. No. 4 subsection reached Hill No. 1500 to cover No. 2's withdrawal.
The 180th Brigade of 60th Division, having picketed the heights, the two subsections were withdrawn with the First Shell at Gaza lands near the Squadron.The Squadron scatters to avoid Enemy Airman's Bombs.Machine Gun Corps Draft passing over a Bridge across the Rhine.Enemy slaughter on Beyrout Road caused by the guns of 2nd New Zealand Machine Gun Squadron.
Next day the Squadron crossed the Jordan by El Ghoraniyeh, and went into bivouac in the area that was destined to become its new home throughout the long summer months. The gunners, together with the whole of the Desert Forces, experienced a very trying time in the Jordan Valley between April and September. The valley, 1000 feet below sea level, with a temperature of 110 degrees in the shade at midday, was considered by the Turks to be untenable by white troops during the summer months, but in spite of this, it was held. The Squadron suffered from the inevitable malaria, the total evacuations to hospital during the six months being just equal to the Squadron's strength—viz., 230, all ranks. During these months the Squadron took part in two further attacks across the Jordan River, and helped to repulse a combined German and Turkish attack on the Auja River. It also manned the machine gun defences in the line of posts between the Auja and the Jordan, in which Major Hinman had over forty guns under his supervision.
On 2nd August the New Zealand Section of the Imperial Camel Corps became a new Machine Gun Squadron, called 2nd New Zealand Machine Gun Squadron, under the command of Major Davis. Major Davis returned to the Mounted Brigade on 12th August, and
ChapterXII
The Final Offensive
There was a comparative lull on the Palestine front until 18th September, 1918, when General Allenby began his first move in the final and triumphant advance which in less than six weeks was to burst right through the enemy's defences, utterly destroy the three Turco-German Armies opposed to him, and complete the conquest of Syria.
All doubts as to the fighting qualities of General Allenby's new troops were soon set at rest. The young battalions of Indian infantry, as well as the older regiments of Indian cavalry, and the other newer units of this strangely assorted army, now including the troops of the Legion d'Orient, the Tirailleurs Algeriena, the 1st Battalion Cape Corps, the 38th and 39th (Jewish) Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, as well as the Italian detachment, earned the Commander-in-Chief's praises in many gallant fights. With all these reinforcements General Allenby possessed a considerable superiority over the enemy in numbers—especially in mounted troops, whose part it was to provide what was probably the most signal example in the whole war of the value of "the White Arm" in sweeping operations on a big scale.
Superiority in strength was essential to success in any attempt to destroy the Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Turkish Armies under the Supreme Command of General Liman von Sanders, computed at 23,000 rifles, 3000 sabres, and 340 guns, with a total ration strength of 104,000, which faced General Allenby's troops in powerful positions along a line stretching from the sea across the Nablus-Jerusalem Road to the Jordan Valley, above the Wadi El Auja, a line held through most of the summer months.
In addition to these forces, which were all enclosed in a rectangle forty-five miles in length and only twelve miles in
When General Allenby, whose total force in the fighting line consisted of 13,000 sabres, 50,000 rifles and 540 guns, planned the great campaign in September the centre of his front was only eighteen miles north of Jerusalem, with its right about ten miles north of Jericho, and its left on the coast, only eight miles north of Jaffa. The Turks on their left were still barring our path from the west bank of the Jordan in the direction of the Hedjaz railway, and regarded as impregnable their positions in the centre among the precipitous hills of Ephraim, with numerous guns largely served by Austrians and-Germans. On their right wing, guarding the Plain of Sharon across the ten miles from Jiljulieh (the ancient Gilgal) to the sea they had constructed two series of deep and elaborate defensive systems, connected by continuous fire trenches, each system being 3000 yards in depth. It was along this coastal plain that General Allenby decided to deliver his main blow when he opened his campaign on 18th September, while he deceived the Turks into the belief that he would make another attempt to advance, as they fully anticipated, east of the Jordan. His plan, however, was first to overwhelm the Sevenths and Eighth Turkish Armies, and so isolate the Fourth Army in the Jordan Valley, at the same time pushing his cavalry through as far as El Ajule and Beisan, the two vital points in their communications, and seizing both before they could make good their escape.
It was all-important that these points, forty-five and sixty miles distant, should be reached at the earliest possible moment, before the enemy could man the passes, and it was only possible to get there in time along the coastal plain. Among the hills astride the Jerusalem-Nablus Road the operations in March had proved that in face of determined opposition no more than five miles a day could be reckoned on. Hence the plain along the coast, Napoleon's own route in his Syrian Campaign, was the only possible one for the rapid and decisive advance necessary to the success of General Allenby's ambitious plan.
The main difficulty lay in concealing two cavalry divisions which had to be withdrawn for the purpose from the Jordan Valley, and in concentrating secretly a large force of all arms on the coastal plain before the advance could begin. That this secrecy was maintained to the last, General Allenby attributed to the supremacy which had been obtained by the Royal Air Force. The process of wearing down the enemy's strength in the air had been continuous throughout the summer. See "The Great World War," vol. VIII, 301-304.
The Anzac Division was left out of the coastal attack, to remain in the Jordan Valley with General Chaytor's forces, to assist in the series of demonstrations arranged with the object of persuading the enemy that the impending attack would take place east of the Jordan.
The only New Zealand Unit forming part of the Army making the coastal attack was the 2nd New Zealand Machine Gun Squadron, which was attached to a brigade comprising a French Regiment of Cavalry and the 14th and 15th Light Horse Regiments.
The 2nd Squadron spent some very useful weeks at Surafeud, in which it was able to get its organisation and equipment complete. It was inspected by G.O.C. Desert Mounted Corps on 7th September and on 14th took part in the Divisional Field Day.
Preparatory to the opening of the offensive the 2nd Squadron moved out with its Brigade to the Agricultural College at Jaffa on the night 17th September, and next night proceeded to Mureblis.
So carefully were all the plans for the offensive prepared, that a burst through resulted when the attack was launched, and the whole elaborate scheme worked like a miracle. The cavalry moved up in the early hours of the morning; under cover of an intense bombardment, in which two destroyers assisted, the infantry advanced so successfully that a way was soon open for the cavalry. By noon the leading cavalry troops were eighteen miles north of the original front line, and after a brief rest continued at the same rapid rate.
The 2nd Squadron moved off at 6 a.m. on 19th, and after watering in the River Auja, went through the breach made
On 21st a move was made at 5 a.m. along the Nablus Road, arriving north-west of Nablus at noon, when the Brigade was held up for three hours by small bodies of the enemy. No.'s 1 and 6 subsections, attached to 14th Light Horse Regiment, came into action on the south side of the road, about 2000 yards from Nablus, engaging bodies of the enemy with effect and covering the advance of the French Regiment into the town. Nablus was captured at 3 p.m., the 2nd Squadron passing through it soon after and camping for the night at Belaha.
Next day Bglaha was left at 8 a.m. and a march was made through Nablus, Samaria and Ramin to Jenin, which was reached at 7 p.m. without any opposition. A stay was made at Jenin until 25th, and the 2nd Squadron was visited first by G.O.C. Australian Mounted Division, and leter by G.O.C. Mounted Desert Corps. On the 25th the 2nd Squadron passed through El Fule and Nazareth to Keer Kenna, arriving the following day at Tiberias.
By this time the enemy had received a heavy blow. General Allenby's victorious forces were soon reaping the fruits
In its short career the 2nd Squadron won fame for the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps, but still more remains to be written about the old Squadron, which was left with the New Zealand Mounted Brigade in the Jordan Valley when the great coastal attack opened. It has previously been pointed out that every effort was made to deceive the enemy into the belief that the great offensive would be delivered from the Jordan Valley, and to assist this effort a large force was placed at General Chaytor's disposal for the purpose of making demonstrations.
On 18th September Major A. C. Hinman, Commanding 1st Squadron (by which name the old Squadron will be designated from now on), attended a conference of Commanding Officers to discuss the plans for the part the Jordan Valley Force would play in the great offensive. A forward dump was established, to which all surplus gear was carted.
On 19th No.'s 1 and 2 subsections, under 2nd Lieut. J. Busby and
The remainder of the Brigade then advanced and concentrated east of Mussallabeh, moving later to KH. Fusail. At 11.30 p.m. a conference of Commanding Officers was held, at which orders were given to continue the advance towards Jisr Ed Damieh, with the Auckland Regiment and No.'s 3 and 5 subsections forming the advance guard. The intention of General Chaytor was that the Auckland Regiment capture Jisr Ed Damieh bridge and crossings, and that the Wellington Regiment with No.'s 1 and 2 subsections capture El Makhruk and Tel El Mazar, and also cut off any enemy attempting to get east of the Jordan. The Canterbury Regiment was kept in support.
The Wellington Regiment occupied Makhruk after firing
The Auckland Regiment was held up about a mile from Jisr Ed Damieh by a considerable force of enemy, and was subjected to heavy artillery fire. The enemy then tried to work round the Auckland right flank, but a company of B.W.I.'s and one squadron of Canterbury Regiment hastened to this flank. After some deploying and reconnoitring, the whole force charged under cover of No.'s 3 and 5 subsections' guns, and took the position. The guns were then rapidly moved forward to command the bridges over the Jordan, and subjected the retreating enemy to a merciless fire, taking a heavy toll. No. 5 subsection found range at 1200 yards, and with good observation had an ideal chance to demonstrate the usefulness of the machine gun against confined positions. Among the heavy casualties inflicted were dozens of pack horses. No. 3 subsection covered the bridge with indirect fire. When the bridge was cleared two squadrons of the Canterbury Regiment, with No. 6 subsection, crossed the river to make a reconnaissance, under cover of No. 5 sub-section's guns.
No casualties occurred in the 1st Squadron on 22nd, and 10,000 rounds of ammunition were fired. In the evening, rations came up from Kh Fusail.
The situation west of the Jordan being cleared up, orders were issued to the Brigade to concentrate at Jisf Ed Damieh preparatory to advancing on Es Salt. At noon on 23rd the Canterbury Regiment, with No.'s 4 and 6 subsections, began the advance, which continued without opposition until Damieh was eight miles behind. A force of approximately 200 Turks was then encountered, but by careful manœuvring and out-flanking, this force was surrounded and captured. Es Salt was entered at 4.15 p.m. No. 6 subsection moved round the town, and came into action west of it to cover the Nimrin-Es Salt Road, along which enemy transport and artillery was
Next day at 1 p.m. the whole Brigade moved along the Amman Road to Sweileh, where it remained for the night. On the 25th the Brigade left Sweileh at 6 a.m. The Wellington Regiment, with No.'s 1 and 2 Subsections, formed the advanced guard. The enemy was encountered at 8 a.m., holding a line west of Wadi Amman in entrenched positions. No. 2 subsection successfully engaged enemy sniping posts at 1075 yards, and later in the day inflicted casualties on the enemy as they withdrew from their positions. No. 1 subsection came into action on the left flank of 2nd Squadron Wellington Regiment, bringing enfilade fire to bear on a redoubt and on to enemy reinforcements coming up in a feeble attempt at a counter-attack, that was completely cut up. No.'s 3 and 5 subsections, attached to the Auckland Regiment, engaged enemy machine guns at 1500 yards. When the Wellington Regiment advanced, these enemy guns were completely silenced by No.'s 3 and 5 subsections, which enabled the Wellingtons to continue without casualties. These sub-sections gave covering fire a little later as the 3rd and 4th Squadrons Auckland Regiment launched an attack, which successfully ended with the surrender of the garrison. At noon No. 6 subsection covered the attack of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade on the right flank, and with the excellent observation that was possible, kept up its fire until the Australians had almost reached their objective trench. This excellent handling of the section kept the enemy crouched up in their trenches, and the Australians advanced practically unmolested by enemy fire. When the Australians captured the position this subsection caught many retreating Turks with their fire.
No. 6 subsections, operating on the right, engaged several enemy machine guns during its advance and succeeded in knocking out the crew of one gun before they got into action. The subsection later got possession of this gun as they advanced. They gave excellent covering fire during the advance of the Canterbury Regiment.
At 3.30 p.m. a general attack was ordered, and all guns concentrated on the enemy positions until masked by the attacking troops, when they rushed forward to consolidate the positions and further cover the advance, which ended in the fall of Amman to the New Zealanders.
The transport came up as far as Sweileh in the evening. Early next morning the subsections that had been attached to the Regiments rejoined the 1st Squadron, which marched to the Amman Station in the afternoon.
With the fall of Amman the 1st Squadron's active labours in the Great War practically closed.
On 3rd October the Brigade began its march back to the Jordan Valley, and on the 8th left the valley for its old camping ground at Richon le Zion, which it reached on the 14th. The 1st Squadron remained at Richon until after the Armistice, that came into operation at noon on 31st October.
The movements during the September operations were through malarial-infected country, and the fever took its toll of the Squadron; 49 were evacuated in September and 105 in October. Owing to the long distances to the hospitals, coupled with the effect of moving from 1000ft. below sea-level to 3000ft. above, many of the men developed pneumonia, and succumbed. During all the campaign the sufferings of the wounded during evacuation were terrible. Often it was necessary for the wounded to be taken five to ten miles on horse or camel, and then twenty to thirty miles by motor, before they reached a hospital.
ChapterXIII
The Armistice
After the fall of Amman the enemy made a very rapid retreat along the Hedjaz railway, but fortunately was cut off by the Arab Forces under the King of Hedjaz, which dealt a number of heavy blows.
The Anzac Division (the Australian Brigades) followed up the retreating Turks, thus blocking their last chance of escape when they were held up by the Arab Forces. The Turkish Commander had no alternative but to surrender, and on 29th submitted to the inevitable.
On the 26th September General Allenby pressed his coastal attack onwards to prevent the enemy reorganising his scattered forces, which were still in sufficient numbers to offer resistance if properly assembled.
Damascus was soon captured, and the broken enemy forces continued their wild flight northwards. Although the retiring force was estimated at about 17,000, it had now become ineffective. They were merely "a mass of individuals, without transport and without any of the accessories required to enable it to act on the defensive."
Beirout, which was already in the hands of ships of the French Navy, was reached on 8th October.
Onwards the successful British Forces swept, both in Palestine and Mesopotamia. Turkey was defeated.
Turkish plenipotentiaries arrived in Mudros before the end of the month, and on the 30th Vice-Admiral Calthorpe, on behalf of the Allied Governments, signed the Armistice, which came into operation at noon on the following day.
Appendix A
List of Honours
N.B.—Ranks are given as at demobilisation, and not as at date of award. The narrative is a reproduction from the London Gazette.
Distinguished Service Order
Lieut.-Col.
, N.Z.S.C., M.C.D. B. Blair
(Before transfer to Machine Gun Corps).
Capt.
, M.C.R. P. Harper
For distinguished services in the field in connection with military operations culminating in the capture of Jerusalem.
MajorR. D. Hardie .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. Although wounded in the eye during an advance, he led his men through a heavy barrage into their positions, and continued with great skill and courage to direct the fire of his guns, remaining with them throughout the action, although he had every reason to suppose he had lost an eye. By his devotion to duty he set a splendid example to his men.
Major
W. I. K. Jennings
For distinguished service in connection with operations in France and Flanders.
Military Cross And Bar
Lieut.A. R. Curtis .
M.C. For:—Conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty between 28th September and 10th October, 1918, in operations in the vicinity of 1'Escault Canal, Lesdain and Esnes. He handled his gun sections boldly and offensively, and inflicted many casualties on the enemy. He repeatedly went forward of the infantry to make personal reconnaissances, and was the first to locate four heavy guns, which were subsequently secured by our infantry. His work throughout was of a very high order, and his cheerfulness and gallantry set a great example to his men.
Bar For:—He with his section of Vickers guns was attached to one of the battalions in the advance. Under very heavy enemy barrage he man-hauled his limbers off the road through the scrub, until he reached the sound portion of the road, several hundred yards ahead. On the objective being reached he skilfully disposed his guns to cover an open flank, and silenced some enemy machine guns. Throughout he displayed marked courage and ability.
Military Cross
Lieut.P. C. Ashby .
For gallant conduct in the field and for devotion to duty.
Lieut.-Col.D. B. Blair .
(Before transfer to Machine Gun Corps).
Lieut.S. C. Beasley .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in an attack. He led four machine guns forward through a heavy barrage, and although suffering heavy casualties among his teams, succeeded in bringing all his guns into action in support of the advancing infantry. He maintained communication about the forward situation, which was of. great value, and was cool, capable and determined throughout.
Lieut.R. E. Bibby .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. During a critical moment in an advance he personally reconnoitred his position, leading his machine guns and men forward into action under very heavy fire, and rendered valuable assistance to the infantry.
Lieut.R. H. Buchanan .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. When under a heavy fire of rifles and machine guns, he pushed his guns forward and skilfully placed them so that they were enabled to inflict very severe losses on the enemy and prevent an attack, thereby enabling the infantry to deploy into position at a critical moment.
Lieut.A. W. Brown , D.C.M.
For gallant conduct and devotion to duty.
Lieut.W. K. Cameron .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He made many reconnaissances under heavy shell and machine gun fire, and by his initiative and skill pushed his guns boldly and intelligently forward into positions that gave material assistance to the infantry battalion with which he was co-operating.
Capt.R. B. Caws .
For distinguished service in connection with military operations.
MajorL. C. Chaytor .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in an attack. He led his machine gun forward through a heavy barrage, choosing their positions with great skill. By his sound judgment under fire he got his guns quickly into action and saved his teams many casualties. He set a splendid example to his men.
Lieut.C. V. Ciochetto .
For gallant conduct and devotion to duty,
Lieut. W. Cobb.
For conspicuous gallantry and good work near Amman on 25th September, 1918. He made a personal reconnaissance under rifle and machine gun fire to help an attack by troops on the right, and at the critical moment pushed his guns forward and brought enfilade fire to bear on the position, thus greatly assisting in the capture of six machine guns and one hundred prisoners.
Lieut.L. A. Craven .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He took his guns into action over exposed ground under heavy shell fire, and although suffering heavy casualties, his great coolness and presence of mind enabled him to hold off the enemy's attack under very trying conditions. He himself was badly wounded during the operations.
Lieut. J. Duncan.
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty near Dumar on 30th September, 1918. With great skill he worked his guns forward to the edge of a pass which was packed with retreating enemy troops and transport. From the range of one hundred yards he inflicted heavy casualties, which resulted in blocking the road for further passage of the enemy, and the capture of many waggons, machine guns and a train which was on the line which ran through the pass.
Lieut. J. Flanagan.
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in an attack. He led four machine guns through a heavy barrage, and frequently brought them into action in support of the advancing infantry. When one of his guns was put out of action he promptly substituted a captured enemy gun, and with this he engaged and silenced an enemy machine gun which was holding up the advance. He set his men a splendid example of courage and confidence throughout.
.Lieut. Colin Hally Colin Hally
For acts of gallantry in the field. He organised and led a successful raid on the enemy trenches, displaying great courage and determination throughout.
MajorR. P. Harper .
For gallant conduct and devotion to duty.
Lieut. C. Harris.
For acts of gallantry and devotion to duty in the field. He rushed his own and two captured guns into a forward position, and completely drove off an enemy counter-attack, inflicting severe losses on them when they were retiring. By his resource and initiative in getting all four guns into action with only a few men averted a breakage in our line.
MajorC. G. Hayter .
For distinguished and gallant service in connection with operations in France and Flanders.
Capt.J. A. D. Hopkirk .
For acts of gallantry in the field. On the night 3rd/4th November, 1918, near
Capt.G. W. Horn .
For distinguished service in connection with operations in France and Flanders.
MajorL. M. Inglis .
(While with 3rd (Rifle) Brigade).
Lieut.E. H. T. Kibblewhite .
For conspicuous bravery. (See defence of the Mushroom, page 32).
Lieut.A. J. M. Manson .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He showed great skill in successfully bringing into action four captured enemy guns, together with his own four guns. Later he displayed great gallantry in taking his section through the enemy's barrage and bringing them into action. The following day, although bruised and completely buried by the enemy shell fire, he displayed complete contempt of danger, placing his guns in a forward position. He had been severely wounded early in the operations, and his example had a splendid effect on the spirits of his men.
Lieut.J. B. Mawson .
For acts of galantry in the field. He fought his machine guns throughout the operations at the Somme with great courage and determination. Later he took part in a charge which routed the enemy.
Lieut.F. H. Mintroon , M.M.
For conspicuous gallantry and initiative east of
Capt.R. F. Mckenzie .
For distinguished services in the field in connection with military operations, culminating in the capture of Jerusalem.
Lieut. B. Palmes.
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. During an advance he took his guns through a hostile barrage to a forward position, from which he inflicted considerable casualties upon the retreating enemy. His energy and resource were of the greatest value to the assaulting infantry. He set a splendid example to all ranks.
Lieut.-Col.J. B. Parks .
For distinguished service in the field.
Lieut.E. H. Picot .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He handled his guns with great boldness and determination in the advanced guard, and brought heavy covering fire on the enemy's first position until it fell. He then rushed forward with the first wave, and personally captured a machine gun and its crew of six men.
Lieut.A. H. Preston .
For conspicuous gallantry in action. He handled his machine guns under heavy fire with great courage and ability. He set a fine example to his men, and greatly assisted the final success of operations.
MajorJ. M. Rose , N.Z.S.C.
(Before transfer to Machine Gun Corps).
Lieut.G. H. Tomline .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. When the infantry having been checked in their advance by heavy fire, he boldly pushed his guns forward and silenced the enemy's guns, which enabled the infantry to advance and capture high ground dominating the position. Again, the enemy having captured one of his guns, he led a bombing party which recaptured it.
Lieut.R. A. Young .
For gallant conduct and devotion to duty.
Distinguished Conduct Medal And Bar
Corpl.M. T. Mcgregor .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty when as gun commander he kept his gun in action until the last moment, when he was shot through the chest at close quarters, and his gun was overwhelmed by numbers, but later recaptured by the spare men of the team and some infantry. His coolness and courage greatly assisted to break up the enemy attack, whilst his gallantry was an inspiration to all ranks.
Christmas Day, 1918, in Germany.
Major Finlayson and Officers of Wellington company.
Battalion Headquarters and Company Commanders, Germany, 1919.
Distinguished Conduct Medal
Sergt.-MajorJ. A. Barr .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. Although badly wounded, he refused to leave the field until he had given every possible assistance to his officer in getting his section away after it had suffered heavily from shell fire. His pluck and devotion deserve the highest praise.
Corpl.G. H. Battersby .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, when, regardless of the heavy fire he was under, he skilfully handled his machine gun as to inflict heavy losses on the enemy at 1000 yards range, then massing for attack. Later he accounted for five enemy machine guns which attempted to come into action on his immediate front, and his contempt of danger was most marked all day.
Lieut.A. W. Brown .
For acts of gallantry in the field. He established and maintained communications and frequently repaired wires under heavy fire.
Sergt.-MajorC. S. Bruce .
For consistent good work and devotion to duty during operations in Gallipoli, Sinai, Palestine and Syria. His courage and leadership has been outstanding at all times.
Sergt.Donald Campbell .
For gallantry and devotion to duty at Amman on 30th March, 1918, when his machine gun having been damaged by hostile fire he quickly repaired it in action and opened fire again. He has at all times set a remarkably good example to his men.
Sergt.S. L. Emerson .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. On his officer becoming a casualty during the attack on an outpost, he took charge of his section and withdrew it to the main infantry position, after all his gunners had become casualties and one gun had been put out of action until all the troops had been withdrawn from the ridge.
Sergt.-Major G. Fisher.
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. When his officer was killed during the advance he took command of a battery of machine guns, personally reconnoitring the positions under heavy shell fire, and moving the guns forward into action. He displayed great initiative, coolness and resource under heavy fire, and by his capable leadership kept his guns in action and set a splendid example to his men.
Lieut. D. Fletcher.
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. When his section commander had become a casualty he assumed command and displayed great coolness and initiative under very heavy machine gun fire and bombing counterattack by the enemy. He and one other man were the only two unwounded in the team, but they kept the gun in action until both were wounded and until the infantry were compelled to withdraw, when they withdrew their gun and reopened fire, then reorganised his section with marked ability, obtained fresh guns and remained on duty all day, sending back clear and valuable reports. By his personal courage and leadership he rendered very valuable service. He has previously done fine work.
Lieut.G. G. Harper .
(Before transfer to the Machine Gun Corps).
Sergt.L. P. Mcgee .
For distinguished and conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He was in charge of a train of pack animals carrying ammunition and supplies
Sergt.M. P. Malone .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. When his officer was wounded early in the attack he took command of his section and pushed forward and covered the advance with his fire. When the enemy counter-attacked he rushed his guns forward to a ridge under intense fire, and completely broke the leading waves of the attack and inflicted heavy casualties on the remainder as they retired. He set a splendid example of courage and initiative.
Lieut.H. W. Price .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He took part in important operations, and handled his machine guns with great skill—often under very heavy shelling. He showed splendid qualities of leadership, and set an excellent example of cheerfulness and determination to his men.
PrivateF. A. Stade .
For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. During the advance on Biefvillers on 24th August, 1918, he led his pack mule through heavy shell and machine gun fire to replenish the ammunition of his subsection at a critical period. Again at Havrincourt Wood on 3rd September he brought up his pack mules three times through heavy shell fire with ammunition, retiring each time to replenish his load. His gallant conduct was most marked on each occasion.
Lieut.F. W. Watson .
(Before transfer to Machine Gun Corps).
Military Medal And Bar
Military Medal
Awarded for acts of gallantry in the field—
Mentioned In Commander-in-Chief's Despatches
For gallant conduct and devotion to duty
Meritorious Service Medal
Awarded in recognition of valuable services rendered.
French Croix De Guerre
Belgian Croix De Guerre
Order Of The Nile (4
thClass)
Brought to the Notice of the Secretary of State
For valuable services rendered.
Staff Sergt.
Meritorious Home Service
Appendix B