<name key="name-427058" type="work">The Official History of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade</name>

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The Official History of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade (The Earl of Liverpool's Own) Covering the period of service with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Great War from 1915 to 1919. Compiled byLieut.-Col. W. S. Austin, D.S.O. Wellington: L. T. Watkins Ltd., 115 Taranaki Street 1924

To the Memory of Fallen Comrades

Preface.

In the pages of this work is set forth the story of a Brigade which served as part of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Great War. As a regimental history it is not as exhaustive as could be wished, the official records, from which for the most part it has been compiled, being astonishingly meagre as to material of moment. That a general call for personal accounts of specially-interesting incidents with which to supplement the recorded information met with a less ready response than could be desired, must be ascribed to a diffidence that shrinks from the recounting of any deed, the full story of which must unavoidably contain reference to a writer's own share therein.

Mention is made from time to time of bold leading and collective and individual acts of daring. Instances of this kind, it must be borne in mind, are such as have been placed on definite record in the field from the accounts of witnesses, these last being for the most part officers and non-commissioned officers commanding larger or smaller bodies of men. A little reflection will show how probable it is that these observers have themselves been worthy of special honour, but that such notice has been impossible because their own actions had not been similarly witnessed. In this connection, too, one could wish to speak definitely of the many who, unmarked, perished in the very act of heroism; but the individual is lost in the great host who sealed their devotion with their lives, and whose sacrifice has earned for them an enduring place in the grateful hearts of their countrymen.

One is constrained to mention here, also, what might not be apparent to the ordinary reader, but what all who have seen service will gladly enough acknowledge, namely, that often the exceptionally meritorious work of a body of men has been recognized by special mention of the leader only, and many an officer is proud to wear a decoration conferred in appreciation of some achievement of his command. Again, the compiler of a regimental history feels that scant justice can be done to those officers and men whose work was largely unspectacular, but none the less important. Some attempt has been made to indicate the difficulties constantly encountered and gallantly overcome by signallers, runners, stretcher-bearers and transport drivers; but practically nothing has been said of the devotion of the medical officers and the chaplains, or of the labours of the quartermasters, cooks, sockmen, pioneers, shoemakers, tailors and men of the sanitary sections, upon whose faithfulness the well-being of their comrades so intimately depended.

As to the general plan of the account, it may be explained that though the work of the individual soldier of whatever rank has been so inadequately treated, an effort has been made to set out as completely as possible the story of the Brigade as a whole. It may, perhaps, be thought that much unnecessary detail has been introduced, both in the body of the work and in the various appendices. It must be remembered, however, that unlike the territorial units of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force which were in existence long before the outbreak of the Great War, and which continue in being now that peace is again with us, the whole life of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade was compressed within the period from 1st May, 1915, to 1st February, 1919; and in these circumstances the historian may be pardoned if he is unable to refrain from retailing much that might otherwise have been passed over without mention.

The bare story of the Brigade would have been lacking in perspective, and therefore shorn of much of its interest, if it had been told without a proper setting. For this reason connective passages have been inserted in such a way as to show how our movements and actions fitted in with the general scheme of things, and to give a clear view of the moving scenes over comparatively wide sections of the battlefront. In accordance with this plan many of the chapters have been arranged in the order of the subdivisions of the official despatches, each of which is devoted to the account of some particular phase of the general operations, or of a series of actions grouped as one major battle. It is hoped that to the general reader the passages introduced, and in particular that which tells in the briefest manner the story of the war on the British Front up to the time of our first going into the line at Armentieres, will not be without value in this respect. To our own men some of these will serve as reminders that many of the spots with which they became all too familiar had already been hallowed by the glorious deeds of the old British regiments that had stemmed the tide of advancing hordes at the price of virtual extermination. Compilation of passages of this kind has in the main been based upon the official despatches of the General Officers Commanding in Chief of the British Forces in Egypt and on the Western Front, though various other sources have been drawn upon where more localized detail has appeared to be necessary. Of these, Nelson's "History of the War," by John Buchan, has been of special value for this purpose, and I am indebted to the author and publishers for permission to incorporate certain extracts that seemed to me to be particularly apt and illuminating. In developing the setting of some of the actions in which the New Zealand Rifle Brigade participated, but which of necessity were told in few words in the official despatches, I have sometimes found our own records either deficient or conflicting as regards the formations operating beyond the flanks of the Division. Where such has been the case I have taken advantage of the labours of Colonel H. StewartH. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., who, in collecting information for his volume "The New Zealanders in France," diligently searched the records of the War Office in London.

There is one aspect of the story of the Brigade that has been passed over with not more than an occasional word. I refer to routine life in training-camps and elsewhere, life, that is, apart from the grim duties, the weary toiling, and the stark bloodshed. The lighter side is of no mean importance, and one could wish that space could be found for the telling. It is impossible to estimate, for instance, the uplifting power of humour in the midst of most trying conditions, but there can be little doubt that as a contributing factor to ultimate success it ranked with that characteristic feature of the New Zealanders, a never-failing belief in the righteousness of the Empire's cause and a steady confidence in our ability to win through. But one British soldier is very much like another, and while for the moment this seemingly insignificant part of our story remains untold, the reader may gain some slight idea of it by referring to Ian Hay's "The First Hundred Thou-sandThousand," and to Captain Bairnsfather's succession of "Fragments from France." Hay's description of soldiering in camp, in billets and in the line, might in almost all respects be adopted as fitting our own case. This is so even down to the references to those odd fellows, known in soldiers' language as the "bad hats," who, when not actually in the trenches, displayed a special genius for getting into mischief, but who, in almost every instance, acquitted themselves magnificently under fire. In one respect, however, there was a most marked difference. While the English soldier sang more or less heartily on the march, our own men were invariably silent. During the earliest days in camp this method of shortening the route usually found a place, but as training progressed, singing on the march as steadily diminished, and at the front it was absolutely unknown. Like the reluctance attached to the formality of saluting, the New Zealanders' silence on the march appears to be still an unsolved mystery.

As to Bairnsfather's "Fragments," these are by no means the pure absurdities they might to the uninitiated appear to be. They are in fact but very slightly overdrawn, and of all the episodes and situations so delightfully recorded, there is scarcely one that might not have been taken from an actual occurrence within our own experience. Two characteristics in particular are well brought out—the grumbling or "grousing" in which it is the soldier's special privilege to indulge, and cheerfulness and humour triumphant when the misery of the conditions had reached its utmost limit. In common with others, our men had their complaints to make, but it is to their credit that these were seldom voiced when the Brigade was in the line. The least satisfied, indeed, were to be found in the base camps rather than in the trenches, and of these the greatest grumblers were the men who had never been within sound of the guns.

As esprit de corps, a matter of vital importance in military life, is too intangible a thing to make itself apparent in a mere formal chronicle, one may be pardoned for mentioning here that this feature was nowhere more fully developed than in the New Zealand Rifle Brigade. The number of reinforcements received approximated 10,000, replacing a wastage averaging 60 per week; yet the excellent spirit, strongly evident from the commencement of our activities, was maintained un-abatedunabated until the end. It was, indeed, a matter of astonishment even to ourselves, that in every ease a man joining up with the Brigade in the trenches but yesterday was an out-and-out Rifleman to-day; and it is told of a certain officer coming over from another Brigade to take command of one of our battalions, that almost before his first action was concluded he issued instructions to the effect that the regimental tailor was to come up to headquarters immediately for the purpose of altering his buttons and badges without delay. Mention might also be made of the fact that the remarkable esprit de corps was able to stand the test of the appointment to positions in their own battalions of non-commissioned officers promoted in the field to commissioned rank; and how faithfully and well these same junior officers continued to strive to uphold the good name of the Brigade may be seen from the casualty lists of the latter part of the war, when so many of the erstwhile sergeants with brilliant records fell while leading their respective commands in the thick of the fight.

It is hoped that the appendices to the history will be found of some value. In most cases they have been inserted with the object of making the work in a measure self-contained. In this class are the Diary of the War, taken from "The Times;" an account of the 3rd Field Ambulance, for which I am indebted to Lieut.-Col. J. Hardie NeilJ. Hardie Neil, D.S.O., telling of that part of our military experiences of which the ordinary records take little cognizance; a note on the Reserve Battalion; and a somewhat bare outline of the doings of the "Hush Hush Brigade," to which detachments of our officers and men so mysteriously departed at the beginning of 1918, this sketch being compiled in the main from a report furnished for the purposes of our History by Captain S. T. SeddonS. T. Seddon, M.C., of the Auckland Regiment. The notes on the Imperial Rifle Brigade consist of adapted extracts from the handbook written during the war by Captain H. G. ParkynH. G. Parkyn for the use of officers of the parent Brigade in preparing lecturettes for their companies. The list of recipients of honours and awards, and the roll of officers, non-commissioned officers and men who made the extreme sacrifice, were specially compiled, from official documents, under the supervision of the officer in charge of the War Records Branch of the New Zealand Military Headquarters. An abridgment of the first draft of the chapter on the Senussi Campaign was supplied for inclusion in Vol. IV of the Official History of New Zealand's Effort in the Great War.

Throughout the work every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, but the possibility of error in details is recognized, and it is requested that where such should be discovered a note of correction may be forwarded to the Secretary, New Zealand Rifle Brigade Trustees, care of Military Headquarters, Wellington, so that the copy kept for record purposes may be amended. It may be explained here that in the case of officers holding acting or temporary rank, the substantive rank is used where their names are mentioned. To be strictly official, both, of course, should be stated, but for the sake of convenience and uniformity the simpler method has been adopted. Convenience must be pleaded also as the reason for the omission of reference to decorations, except in special cases, such, for example, as the first or last mention of a name.

For the general illustrations various sources have been drawn upon in addition to the incomplete New Zealand collection of official war-photographs; and as the object in view was simply the provision of an informative series, no thought has been given to artistic considerations. The Revd. A. G. Parham, M.C., formerly chaplain in the composite formation of Berks, Bucks and Dorset Yeomanry serving with the Western Frontier Force, readily granted permission to use certain of his copyright photographs; and to him, as to all others who have placed the Brigade under an obligation for favours of this kind, thanks are here returned. The page-charts giving the order of battle in some of the more important engagements are, it need hardly be explained, purely diagrammatic. Of the maps, all of which were prepared by Rifleman W. G. Harding from adaptations of war-maps in use at the front, some are drawn to a large scale to display the main features of certain battlefields, while the others cover all the sections of Egypt, France and Flanders in which the Brigade was stationed at any time, whether resting, training, digging or fighting.

To all who have in any way assisted in the compilation of this History, I tender my sincere thanks.

W. S. A.

Wellington, New Zealand.

Forewords

1. By the Commander of the New Zealand Division, Major-General Sir A. H. Russell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

To the fact that Lord Liverpool, Governor-General of New Zealand during the period of the Great War, was himself a Rifleman, the 3rd Brigade of the New Zealand Division, formed early in 1915, owes its distinguishing title. Many of our territorial units were already affiliated with regiments of the British Army: and in like manner, recognized and accepted by the Regular Rifle Brigade as a family connection, somewhat distant it may be, our own Brigade formed yet another link between the New Zealand Expeditionary Force and that Army by whose side it was already fighting.

Reaching Egypt before the close of the year, the Brigade, after an interesting experience with the Western Frontier Force engaged in the campaign against the Senussi, was joined by the war-seasoned veterans from Gallipoli, whose laurels gained at the historic landing and in the attack on Chunuk Bair were at once an object of envy to the newcomers and a spur to their ambition. Differences in drill, in dress, in title, had, even before they left New Zealand, given rise to that indefinable feeling that they were something apart, in a measure distinguished from the territorial regiments. The older soldiers, with whom they were now in contact, were quick to mark peculiarities, and henceforth they were even more than Riflemen—they were the Dinks!

They were to prove the value of their esprit de corps in France. The almost uniform success of their raids on the Armentieres front must be ascribed to something more than mere luck, large though the element of chance may be in these risky enterprises. But it was on the Somme in 1916 that the Brigade was to win its spurs. To it was entrusted what appeared to the Staff to be the most important share in the operations of September 15th. Doubts were expressed by the Higher Command as to the wisdom of using comparatively inexperienced troops for so difficult a task. The contention that their eagerness to win a solid reputation would carry the Riflemen far was justified by the result. A brilliantly-executed attack was crowned with success. Henceforth the mana of the Brigade was assured, and its distinction was to rest on surer grounds than differences in drill and title.

Throughout the ensuing two long years of fighting on various parts of the Western Front the prestige of the Brigade was maintained undimmed. Whether patiently holding on through the miseries of stationary trench-warfare, the monotony of which was relieved only by dashing patrolling and raiding excursions; whether participating in set actions such as Messines, and even ill-fated Passchendaele; or whether detailed for long-drawn-out tasks with pick and shovel, the troops of the Brigade could ever be relied upon to accomplish all that it was in the power of men to achieve. They were the first into the breach caused by the German spring offensive on the Somme in March. 1918, and bore with conspicuous success the brunt of the counter-attack a week later. They took a no mean share in turning the tide when our offensive opened later in the year, and finally, by the capture of Le Quesnoy, more spectacular if not more solid than its previous exploits, completed the fighting record of a Brigade which had worthily upheld the traditions of its namesake of the Regulars.

The name of General Harry FultonHarry Fulton is inseparably linked with that of the New-Zealand Rifle Brigade. Largely responsible for its early training, he was associated with it till he fell in action at Colincamps in 1918. In a sense the Brigade was his child, and indeed he cared for it as a father. His youthful Brigade Major, Robert Purdy, will likewise long be remembered keen, able and fearless, he was killed by the same shell which mortally wounded his chief. The double loss was a severe blow.

The distinguishing marks of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, though somewhat superficial, were important enough in their place, and the tradition established, confined though it was to the period of the Great War, is of no small value. In an age of standardization the importance of uniformity is not to be gainsaid; but it is to be hoped that in our search for it we shall not fail to give due consideration to the encouragement of individuality of regiments, and that in the future organization of the Defence Force of New Zealand a place may be found for a Rifle Brigade.

2. By the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, His Excellency the Earl of Liverpool, P.C., G.C.M.G., G.B.E., M.V.O.

As an old Rifleman, I am very glad to have the opportunity of writing a few prefatory lines regarding the New Zealand Rifle Brigade.

The initiation of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade amongst the Forces of the Crown was in some respects not dissimilar to that of the Imperial regiment. The latter was raised in 1800 from drafts found from other regiments, and was known successively as The Rifle Corps, The Rifle Regiment, and The Rifle Brigade. Raised in 1915, the New Zealand regiment was formed of officers and men drawn from all parts of the country rather than from any particular territorial district, and absorbed the greater portion of the Samoan Expeditionary Force as well as some of the officers and non-commissioned officers transferred from the 3rd and 4th Reinforcements. It first saw the light as The Trentham Regiment, but was afterwards renamed The New Zealand Rifle Brigade. Both the Imperial regiment and that formed in New Zealand are, if we exclude those regiments incorporated with the British Army on the disbandment of the East India Company's Forces, the youngest amongst the infantry units of their own lands.

The record of the Imperial regiment shows that wherever there was something required of the Army during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there the regiment was to be found; that of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, short though it be, speaks of general efficiency and the performance of a succession of gallant deeds in whatever quarter of the globe it was called upon to serve during the Great War.

It would be futile in this short note to attempt any detailed reference to the many officers and men of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade who contributed so splendidly to the annals of the regiment. Alas, the senior officer died on the field of battle! The regiment was indeed fortunate in its sponsor, for Colonel Fulton, a New Zealander of conspicuous ability, was a Gurkha Rifleman of long experience and imbued with all the best traditions of the Rifle Brigade. He served his country well.

I earnestly trust that this young regiment may have a long and useful career, and that it will become even more closely associated with the sister regiment of Great Britain. In that both have the same Colonel-in-Chief, who watches closely over their interests, they are thus far linked together by a common bond; and I know that should occasion arise both will again be found winning fresh laurels as they fight side by side in the Empire's cause.

Introductory Note: The Outbreak of the Great War, and New Zealand's Offer.

On the 28th June, 1914, the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated at Serajevo by a Serbian. Subsequent events showed that Germany had long been preparing for a war that should give her predominance in Europe and preeminence as a world-power; and the shooting of the Archduke, an event which took place while the British fleet was still in Kiel Harbour on its friendly visit to Germany, was eagerly seized upon as a pretext for the commencement of hostilities. Within a week the Kaiser held his famous War Council at Potsdam, and on the 23rd of July. Austria, Germany's "brilliant second." handed to Serbia an impossible Note, followed five days later by a declaration of war. Russia, the champion of her smaller ally, was drawn in; Belgium, whose only offence was that she stood in the way of the march on Paris, had her articles of neutrality contemptuously treated as "a scrap of paper;" France entered the lists, and Great Britain, despite the mightiest efforts of diplomacy to avoid conflict, was compelled by the claims of right as against might to take her due share in the struggle, and, on the 4th of August, 1914, declared war against Germany.

New Zealand in the meantime had not been idle. As early as July 31st, while the statesmen of Great Britain were still striving for peace, yet fearing that all their endeavours might prove to be fruitless, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, in Parliament assembled, voiced the determination of the people of this country to support the Empire to the uttermost, and if such necessity should arise, to take upon themselves a full share of the burden of the war. This was no empty statement. Preliminary arrangements were at once made for the preparation of an expeditionary force for service in Europe or elsewhere, if such assistance were required by the Imperial Government, and immediately after Great Britain's declara-tiondeclaration of war the definite offer of a suitable contingent was made.

The first occasion on which the Colonies contributed military aid for an Imperial enterprise was in Cromwell's Expedition to Jamaica, in 1653-4. On that occasion the Barbadoes furnished 4000 men from its militia of white apprentices on the plantations. The next instance came in the Carthagena Expedition of 1740, when the American Colonies supplied a force of 4000 men. After that the American Colonies helped consistently in the conquest of Canada, until the final victory of Amherst in 1760. During that period the first two American regiments were placed on the British establishment, and in 1758 were created the "Royal Americans," which are still with us as the King's Royal Rifle Corps. Then the American Colonies were lost, and everyone thought that the British Empire had come to an end. Immediately afterwards followed the war in which our losses in the West Indies compelled us to raise a regiment of African negroes, still with us as the West Indian Regiment. During the 19th century the Empire was consolidated. The Canadians helped gallantly to defend their country from American invasion from 1812 to 1814. The Cape Colonists joined in the fights against the Kaffirs, and the New Zealand Colonists in the wars against the Maoris.

Then came the war in Egypt, and for the first time Australia offered a battalion for that service. In the South African War practically all the Colonies sent contingents. And finally, in the present war, not only has every part of the Empire given us freely of its men, but the descendants of the Peninsula veterans in South America have sent their sons, whose native tongue was Spanish and who knew not a word of English, to fight for the Old Country.—(Hon. J. W. FortescueJ. W. Fortescue at the Royal Institution, London, 21/2/'19.)

Advice was sought regarding the composition of this body, and on August 7th notification was sent to the effect that New Zealand was prepared to supply at once an expeditionary force exceeding in strength that suggested by the Home authorities; and this was followed by the intimation that New Zealand proposed to assume all financial responsibility for that force, including the cost of its transportation to the theatre of war.

As originally constituted, the New Zealand Expeditionary Force thus placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government consisted of the Headquarters Staff of a Division, a Mounted Rifles Brigade, a Battery of Field Artillery, a section of a Field Artillery Brigade Ammunition Column, a section of a Divisional Ammuntion Column, headquarters and two sections of a Signalling Company, an Infantry Brigade, a Company of a Divisional Train, a Field Ambulance, and an Independent Mounted Rifles Regiment.

For various reasons, mainly because of the presence of powerful, enemy cruisers in the South Pacific, the departure of the force was postponed from time to time. This delay enabled the New Zealand military authorities to augment its quota of artillery, which was now brought up to a complete Field Artillery Brigade and a whole Field Artillery Brigade Ammunition Column, and, in addition, a Howitzer Battery of four guns, which was to follow with the Second Reinforcements. The Expeditionary Force, with its First Reinforcements, finally got away on the 16th October. These troops disembarked at Egyptian ports and went into camp near Cairo for a period of special training.

No sooner had the mobilization of volunteers for the Main Body commenced than New Zealand was called upon to face an additional task. This was the immediate despatch of a special force for the capture of the German possessions in Samoa. The response was so prompt and the preparations so rapidly conducted that the Samoan Expeditionary Force, a self-contained organization of all arms, including three companies of infantry, and numbering in all 55 officers and 1358 other ranks, was able to set out on its mission on August 15th.

The British Expeditionary Force commenced to land in France on August 7th, and the disembarkation of the first four Divisions was completed on the 16th.

and a fortnight later Samoa was in our hands. Towards the end of March, 1915, these troops were replaced by a relief force of men over the ordinary age limit, and on their return to New Zealand they were in the main held for absorption into either the reinforcements then in camp or those special battalions the formation of which was at that time under consideration, and which were destined to become the first two units of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade.

Reinforcements for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force were sent to Egypt at intervals of about two months, and in order of despatch the New Zealand Rifle Brigade ranks with the Seventh, in company with which it sailed almost exactly twelve months after the departure of the Main Body.

Contents

Chapter Page I. From New Zealand to Egypt. Part 1. Preparation 1 Part 2. Departure for Egypt 16 II. The Senussi Campaign. Part 1. General 24 Part 2. The 2nd Battalion on the Line of Communications 27 Part 3. The 1st Battalion at Mersa Matruh 30 III. On the Suez Canal. Part 1. Brigade Headquarters and the 1st and 2nd Battalions 55 Part 2. The 3rd and 4th Battalions 59 Part 3. The Brigade Complete 63 IV. In the Battle Zone of the Flanders Front. Part 1. Movements 69 Part 2. The Fighting on the Flanders Front from the Outbreak of War till May, 1916 77 V. Armentieres. Part 1. In the Trenches 87 Part 2. Training for the Somme 110 VI. The Battle of the Somme, 1916. Part 1. The Earlier Fighting 113 Part 2. The Third Phase: New Zealanders Engaged. Section 1—General 117 Section 2—The Advance Beyond Flers, September 15th 122 Section 3—General Attack Renewed, September 25th 137 Section 4—Further Progress of the Battle 146 VII. From Fleurbaix to Ploegsteert. Part 1. The Boutillerie Sector 148 Part 2. The Cordonnerie Sector 168 Part 3. The Ploegsteert Sector 174 VIII. The Battle of Messines. Part 1. Before the Battle 184 Part 2. The Place of the Battle of Messines in the General Scheme of Operations 190 Part 3. The Battle 193 IX. After Messines. Part 1. The Advance in the Ploegsteert Sector 214 Part 2. With the French First Army in Northern Belgium 220 Part 3. The Warneton Sector 223 X. The Third Battle of Ypres. Part 1. Digging in the Ypres Salient 227 Part 2. Progress of the British Offensive Operations 230 Part 3. Passchendaele, October 12th 235 Part 4. Concluding Stage of the Third Battle of Ypres 248 XI. The Ypres Salient. Part 1. After Passchendaele 250 Part 2. Stationary Trench Warfare 251 Part 3. In Corps Reserve 268 XII. The Ancre, 1918. Part 1. The German Thrust at Amiens 271 Part 2. The New Zealand Rifle Brigade into the Gap 275 Part 3. Straightening the Line 288 Part 4. The German Attack, April 5th 300 Part 5. Stationary Trench Warfare 310 XIII The Beginning of the Advance to Victory 327 XIV. The Battle of Bapaume. Part 1. The General Situation 342 Part 2. Puisieux-au-Mont, August 21st 345 Part 3. Miraumont, August 23rd 352 Part 4. Bapaume, August 26th to 29th 355 Part 5. Fremicourt, August 30th to September 1st 365 XV. The Battle of the Scarpe 374 XVI The Battle of Havrincourt and Epehy. Part 1. Treseault Spur, September 9th 377 Part 2. Treseault Spur, September 12th 384 XVII The Battle of Cambrai and the Hindenburg Line. Part 1. The General Attack 396 Part 2. Crevecoeur, October 5th 399 XVIII From Crevecoeur to Le Quesnoy (The Battle of Le Cateau and the Battle of the Selle River). Part 1. Lesdain and Beyond, October 8th 404 Part 2. The Advance to the Selle Rive 415 Part 3. The Battle of the Selle Biver 417 XIX. Le Quesnoy and the Armistice (The Battle of the Sambre). Part 1. Minor Operations 421 Part 2. The Capture of Le Quesnoy, November 4th, 1918 435 Part 3. Concluding Stage 465 XX. To the Rhine. Part 1. After Le Quesnoy 468 Part 2. The March to Germany 472 Part 3. The End 478

Appendices

Appendix Page I. Honours and Awards 481 II. The Honoured Dead 490 III. The New Zealand Rifle Brigade Training Battalion 525 IV. Dress Regulations of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, 1918 533 V. The Dunsterforce Expedition 536 VI. The Third Field Ambulance 542 VII. "Digger" and "Dink" 568 VIII. Cheerfulness at Warneton 570 IX. Notes on Marlborough's Campaigns, 1708-1710 572 X. The Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own) 575 XI. Diary of the War 581

List of Maps, Etc.

Map No. 1. Northern Egypt End of Volume. Map No 2. Matruh End of Volume. Map No 3. Flanders End of Volume. Map No 4. The Somme End of Volume. Map No 5. Flers End of Volume. Map No 6. Messines End of Volume. Map No 7. Passchendaele End of Volume. Map No 8. Hebuterne to Puisieux-au-Mont End of Volume. Map No 9. Trescault Spur End of Volume. Map No 10. Le Quesnoy End of Volume. Map No 11. The Advance to Victory End of Volume.

Miscellaneous:— Page Sketch Map of a Battalion Sector, L'Epinette, Armentieres 96 Aeroplane Photograph of British and German Trench Systems, Pont Ballot, Armentieres 97 Aeroplane Photograph of Le Quesnoy and Neighbourhood 432 Order of Battle:— Somme, September 15, 1916 123 Messines, June 7, 1917 199 Passchendaele, October 12, 1917 239 Colincamps, March, 1918 297 Colincamps, April 5, 1918 303 Puisieux-au-Mont, August 21, 1918 346 Bapaume, August 26, 1918 356 Trescault Spur, September 9, 1918 380 Trescault Spur, September 12, 1918 386 Lesdain and Beyond, October 8, 1918 408 Le Quesnoy, November 4, 1918 446

List of Illustrations

Following page Brigadier-General H. T. Fulton, C.M.G., D.S.O. Frontispiece Trentham Camp, 1915 16 Rangiotu Camp, 1915 16 The Officers of a Battalion 16 The Non-Commissioned Officers of a Battalion 16 Major-General Sir A. H. Russell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. 16 Field Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, K.G., K.T. 16 Colonel the Earl of Liverpool, P.C., G.C.M.G. 16 El Dabaa 32 Bedouin Prisoners 32 Disembarking at Mersa Matruh 32 The Compound at Force Headquarters, Matruh 48 Representative South Africans, Sikhs and New Zealanders, Matruh 48 Camel Transport 48 A Field Dressing Station at Halazin 48 A Mobile Column Returning to Matruh 64 The First Graves 64 Gafaar Pasha a Prisoner 64 Colonel (Maj.-Gen. Sir) E. W. C. Chaytor, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B. 64 Brigadier-General W. G. Braithwaite, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. 64 Lieut.-Col. W. S. Austin, D.S.O. 64 Lieut.-Col. J. A. Cowles 128 Major W. KayW. Kay, O.B.E. 128 A Trench on the Somme 128 Night, 14th/15th September, 1916 128 A Relic of the Somme—One of the First Tanks 128 A Lewis Gun in the Front Line 160 A Trench Mortar Shoot 160 An 18-pounder 160 Howitzers 160 A 9.2-inch Gun 160 Battalion Transport 160 Field-Kitchens (Cookers) 160 The Water Cart 160 A Y.M.C.A. Canteen 160 The Veteran Sergeant-Major 160 Winter on the Western Front 160 In Ploegsteert Wood 192 Anti-Aircraft Guns 192 General Fulton Studies Messines 192 Ruins of Messines 192 The Plank Road Follows the Advance 208 The Colonel-in-Chief Inspects a Detachment at Bailleul 208 Lieut.-Col. J. G. Roache, D.S.O. 208 Lieut.-Col. R. St. J. Beere, D.S.O. 208 Lieut.-Col. A. Winter-EvansA. Winter-Evans, D.S.O. 208 Lieut.-Col. (Maj.-Gen.) C. W. Melvill, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. 208 Sergeant (Lieut.) Samuel Frickleton, V.C. 208 A Trench in the Warneton Sector 224 A Company Headquarters in the Front Line 224 Brigadier-General F. Earl Johnston, C.B. 224 Colonel (Brig.-Gen.) R. Young, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. 224 Bogged in the Passchendaele Mud 240 A Passchendaele "Pill-Box" 240 Lieut.-Col. E. Puttick, D.S.O. 240 Lieut.-Col. P. H. Bell, D.S.O. 240 Major W. G. Bishop 240 German Prisoners Carrying Wounded 240 The Runner Sets Out 240 Signallers Laying Telephone Wire 240 A Plank Road in the Ypres Salient 256 Dead Mule Gully 256 An Anti-Tank Gun near the Menin Road 256 The Menin Road Under Snow 256 The Ancient Cloth Hall of Ypres 256 And Its Ruins 256 Band and "Bivvies" near Ypres 256 "The Counter-Attack" 256 Brigadier-General A. E. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O. 288 Lieut.-Col. J. Pow, D.S.O. 288 Lieut.-Col. L. H. Jardine, D.S.O., M.C. 288 A Captured German Machine-Gun in Use near La Signy Farm 288 Another Part of the Front Line near the Farm 288 A "Whippet" 288 A Derelict Tank 288 Digging the Purple Line 320 Trophies from the German Trenches East of Hebuterne 320 The Padre's Free Canteen in a Forward Trench 320 A Burial Party 320 Brigadier-General H. Hart, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. 352 Prisoners from Puisieux 352 A German Observation-Post, Bapaume 320 Lieut.-Col. N. F. Shepherd, D.S.O. 384 Major J. Murphy J. Murphy 384 Sergeant (2nd-Lieut.) Harry John Laurent, V.C. 384 Lieut.-Col. R. C. Allen, D.S.O. 411 Major G. W. Cockroft 411 Towing a Captured Tank 411 A Ruined Factory—smashed, not bombarded 411 The Front Line Before Le Quesnoy 448 A Reserve Company on the Railway, November 4th 448 The Inner Ramparts of Le Quesnoy 448 The Ramparts at Another Point 448 Major H. E. Barrowclough, D.S.O., M.C. 448 The 4th Battalion in the Square of Le Quesnoy 448 Prisoners from About Le Quesnoy 448 The New Zealand Flag Presented to Le Quesnoy 448 The First Stage of the March to Germany 480 The Hohenzollern Bridge over the Rhine 480 H.R.H. the Prince of Wales at Brigade Headquarters 480 The Longueval Memorial on the Flers Battlefield 480 The Memorial at Le Quesnoy 480 The Cross of Sacrifice 524 The Stone of Remembrance 524 A Regimental Medical Officer Attending to the Wounded 560 A Field Ambulance 560 The Interior of a Dressing Station (1) and (2) 560 A Stationary Hospital 560

The Illustrations "A Trench on the Somme," "Night, 14th/15th September, 1916," "A Relic of the Somme—One of the First Tanks" (following page 128), and "Winter on the Western Front" (facing page 161), reproduced from "Sir Douglas Haig's Great Push," are wrongly attributed to Hutchinson. The originals are the property of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum; Crown copyright reserved. The views have been inserted by permission.

Brigadier-General H. T. Fulton, C.M.G., D.S.O. Frontispiece.

The New Zealand Rifle Brigade.

Chapter I. From New Zealand To Egypt.

Part 1.—Preparation.

Formation—Preliminary training of officers and non-conimissioned officers—Men march in—Posting—Training—Fatigues— Complete establishment—The first move—Rangiotu Camp—Advance parties—Musketry, leave, manœuvres, inspections— Hospitality—Changes in title.

The regiment afterwards known as the New Zealand Rifle Brigade came into being officially on May 1st, 1915, nine months after the outbreak of the Great War. February had seen the fruitless attempts of the Allied fleet to force the Dardanelles, and it was recognized that to ensure success there must be preparatory or coincident land operations. Plans were therefore laid for a landing on Gallipoli on April 25th by a military force the material for which, in the shape of the Imperial and Colonial troops then in Egypt, lay ready to hand, for it was clear that after the defeat of the Turks on the Canal at the beginning of the month there was little fear of any serious attack from this quarter for some time to come. Now, the casualties suffered by the New Zealand regiments in the Canal fighting had been practically negligible, while three bodies of reinforcements were already in Egypt, a fourth was almost ready to sail, and a fifth was in active training.

In the circumstances it was considered by the Imperial Government that the Dominion could best satisfy its desire further to assist in the great effort by sending out an entirely new regiment of infantry, quite apart from the original main body, supplying this, as well as the older force, with the required stream of reinforcements. The intention was to begin the mobilization and training of two battalions at once, and when these should be well established, to follow with a further two units at a convenient interval. The offer was accepted by the War Office on April 16th, the eve of the departure of the Fourth Reinforcements.

Thus began the evolution of a body of citizen-soldiers known first as the Trentham Infantry Regiment and later as the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, and destined to participate in the achievements and share in the glories of the invincible New Zealand Division.

Lieut.-Col. H. T. FultonH. T. Fulton, D.S.O. (Major in the 2nd King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles), who in the South African War had served with the New Zealand contingents, had recently returned with troops from Samoa, and on April 8th assumed command of the Fourth Reinforcements. On April 16th he embarked with them, but on the following day was withdrawn to take charge of the new regiment. Certain other selected officers and non-commissioned officers of the Fourths were also held back to carry on under his command.

Following the plan first adopted in connection with the training of the Fifth Reinforcements, officers and non-commissioned officers for the new regiment were brought in for special preliminary instruction some time before the arrival of the rank and file, and all but a few of the former marched into Trentham Camp, Wellington, on April 28th. The training, which included the most elementary parts of infantry drill, supplemented by a course of special lectures, commenced at once under the general direction of Lieut.-Col. Fulton and the immediate supervision of Lieut. A. CheaterA. Cheater, of the Permanent Staff. Presently experienced officers, notably Lieuts. Burn, Purdy and Wilkes, all of the N.Z.S.C., but now on the strength of the regiment, took over the instruction of the non-commissioned officers, the remainder continuing under Lieut. Cheater. At the commencement of the period of training the weather conditions were fairly good, but towards the end fog and rain somewhat interfered with the work.

On May 29th and 30th, 2,207 men reported in camp. Of these, 540 came from the Auckland military district, 631 from Wellington, 534 from Canterbury, and 502 from Otago. The weather was now miserably wet and cold, and the general conditions were most discouraging for civilians just entering upon a period of military life. However, they were speedily allotted to companies, provided with "knife, fork, spoon, plate, mug," and marched off for their first meal in camp. Arms and equipment were issued, the men sworn in, and the long and tedious process of making up the rolls and filling in the many forms commenced.

Hitherto the method of posting in the Main Body and its reinforcements had been to keep officers and men together according to the territorial district from which they came. Thus in the Main Body there were four regiments—Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago; and within these regiments the companies comprised as far as possible the men from the various territorial regiments. Similarly each infantry reinforcement consisted of four companies, A, B, C, D, made up of men from Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury, and Otago, respectively. In the new regiment this system was not adopted, but every opportunity was given for friends, at the first posting, to keep together; and later, by means of transfers, this privilege was extended.

It had been decided that there should be two battalions, the 1st to be commanded by Lieut.-Col. Fulton, and the 2nd by Lieut.-Col. A. E. StewartA. E. Stewart, late Commanding Officer of the 14th (South Otago) Regiment. Lieut.-Col. Fulton, however, still retained command of the regiment as a whole, and the immediate control of the 1st Battalion presently devolved upon Major W. S. AustinW. S. Austin, late Second-in-Command of the 13th (North Canterbury and Westland) Regiment, who reported on transfer from the 5th Reinforcements of the Canterbury Regiment on 9th June.

In the regimental numbers assigned to officers and men the prefixes 23/ and 24/ distinguished members of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, respectively. Similarly, when the 3rd and 4th Battalions were established, the prefix-numbers 25/ and 26/ were used. This exceedingly satisfactory arrangement was continued for a considerable time in connection with reinforcements for the Brigade, but finally, owing to the difficulty experienced at the front in ensuring that men so numbered in New Zealand should be posted to their corresponding units, especially after heavy engagements, the system of using the distinguishing bar-numbers was dropped altogether in the reinforcement camps.

For the accommodation of officers and men of the new battalions, the erection of a number of large huts, the first group of those buildings that were to transform Trentham from a tented field into a small town of houses and streets, had been commenced, but these were far from finished by the time they were required. To make matters worse, the workmen engaged in their construction were themselves occupying a goodly proportion of the accommodation, so that when the men arrived and settled down the quarters available were unduly crowded. These hutments were the first erected in the camp, and though they were more weatherproof than tents, they were not as comfortable as men accustomed to the latter might think. The shell was of corrugated iron, unlined, and unpleasant down-draughts gave the impression that they were as open as sieves.

Owing to the bad weather and the amount of movement about the huts, the surroundings began to assume the appearance of a sea of mud; and during the first five or six days practically the whole force was employed in making temporary drains, carrying stones for paths, and generally rendering more habitable the vicinity of their new homes. The officers worked hard in their endeavour to complete the uninteresting task of checking the rolls and filling up the many necessary forms.

By this time those concerned were beginning to realize the fact, which later experience confirmed, that the work of the unskilled labourer bulked surprisingly large in military life, and that to possess the pen of a ready writer sometimes appeared to be more important than to know and to apply all the rules and teachings of the military manuals. The man in the ranks was unconsciously being prepared to accept without surprise or comment the title of "Digger," while the officer was learning the significance of the term "a paper war."

King's Birthday was devoted to physical exercises and camp sports, and general training commenced in earnest on the 4th June, with a break on the 7th for anti-typhoid inoculation.

It may be said at once that, under the watchful eye of Lieut.-Col. Fulton, the training throughout was efficient and thorough to a degree, and eventually reached an unusually high standard of excellence. To this result there were many contributory factors. Amongst the foremost of these was the fact that the commander was an Imperial officer who had had considerable experience in the management and direction of Colonial as well as of British and Indian regular troops in actual warfare. He was able, therefore, to exercise the finest discrimination, and while enforcing the strictest discipline, and exacting from all ranks under his command the fullest measure of thought and work and care, he was able to modify his methods in accordance with his knowledge of the possibilities and limitations of the civilian who had just thrown down his tools to take up arms in the service of his country. Added to this, we had amongst the officers and non-commissioned officers several members of the New Zealand Permanent Staff, not merely as instructors, but as integral parts of the unit, and the benefit we derived from their special training was enhanced by the particular zeal arising from their intimate connection with the regiment. We had a further advantage in the presence of a number of officers and non-commissioned officers transferred from the Fourth and Fifth Reinforcements and from the force lately returned from Samoa; for these, having been through the mill in camp and abroad, not only possessed a definite knowledge of the work required but were already experienced in the handling of recruits. Lastly, there was esprit de corps, by no means the least important factor. The spirit of the regiment rapidly developed, was maintained throughout the period of training, and reached its highest pitch under fire. There was no cleavage between men of different districts. We were many companies but one regiment, whose honour as a whole was, and still remains, very precious to us. There may be some who, after the fact, hold that New Zealand was too small to supply and maintain a regiment entirely separate and distinct from those already in existence. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the distinction led to a very honest spirit of emulation which was in no inconsiderable degree beneficial to the Expeditionary Force in general. As in the case of old-established British regiments, this commendable rivalry occasionally engendered a feeling of antagonism; but, happily, all signs of animosity disappeared when we rubbed shoulders with our comrades of the other regi-mentsregiments in the trenches of Flanders; and perhaps the least that can be said of us is embodied in the word of praise from the Corps Commander after the Somme engagements of 1916: "Yon have justified your existence."

At the end of May the officers of the regiment established a mess, a building for that purpose having been specially erected. There was nothing pretentious about the outfit, the gear being purchased with an eye to its use on active service, and there was no useless expenditure upon ornamental or luxurious accessories. The regiment gained not a little through its officers being thus brought into close contact with one another off the parade-ground. On the 18th June the comfort and well-being of the officers was still further improved through their being able to move from damp tents to the more cheerful living-quarters in the cubicles of the hutments that had been for some time under construction for their use.

In the earlier stages of training our two greatest drawbacks were the unfavourable nature of the weather and the ever-recurring demands for large fatigue parties for work on the camp as a whole. The first of these was, of course, unavoidable; but to the harassed platoon, company and battalion officers, whose interests were centred on the welfare and progress of their own commands, the matter of working-parties did not always appear to be well-regulated. Indeed, right through our career, at home and at the front, this was a never- ending source of "grouse," and the opinion is generally held that for work of a non-military character more use might have been made of volunteers found physically unfit for ordinary military service.

From the moment the men first marched into camp steps were taken to ensure that the regimental and battalion head- quarters should be as complete as possible. Captain P. H. BellP. H. Bell, who had been acting as Adjutant to the Regiment from the beginning, now continued in that capacity in the 1st Battalion. Captain R. St. J. Beere was appointed Second-in-Command and Lieut. A. H. Burn AdjutantA. H. Burn Adjutant of the 2nd, and each battalion had its own orderly-room and necessary clerks. Captains G. E. Simeon and W. E. Christie, Quartermasters respectively of the 1st and 2nd, were given adequate staffs, and all clothing, equipment, rations, etc., were issued through them instead of being drawn direct from the Camp Quartermaster. The detail, on the regulation scale, of butchers, cooks, tailors, shoemakers, and so forth, was provided for, and military police, signal, transport, sanitary and pioneer sections were told oft permanently. The stretcher-bearer sections were organized into a regimental brass band, and the buglers combined into a drum and bugle band; and in each case part of the training time was devoted to music practice and part to drill and the more immediate work for which the personnel had been detailed. Both bands, the former under the leadership of Sergeant (afterwards Hon. Lieut.) P. E. Cole, and the latter under the instruction of Sergeant J. LeeJ. Lee, made rapid progress in their training and soon became the pride of the regiment. Later, each battalion bad its own brass band, and it is impossible fully to gauge the beneficial influence of these upon the morale of the men. Many a weary mile in our in- numerable marches from billet to billet in France was shortened by their cheering strains; and after a relief from the trenches for a brief rest in camp or bivouac, the daily programmes played by the battalion bands were of inestimable value in helping to remove that "fed-up" feeling, and in driving away the unpleasant memories of experiences in the line. During our first six months in the trenches at Armentieres the bandsmen in their capacity of stretcher-bearers suffered many casualties, and as this entailed a double loss it was decided, before the Brigade went to the Somme in 1916, to keep the bandsmen out of action and appoint special company and battalion stretcher-bearers.

The first uniform dress was the unsightly but useful suit of denims, which from an economical point of view served its purpose well. With this was worn the well-known felt hat technically known as the "smasher." The head of the hat was creased longitudinally in accordance with the custom then in vogue in the New Zealand camps. On the 19th June the ordinary issue of khaki uniforms and forage caps was made, but these were for use only on ceremonial occasions and when going on leave. The distinguishing badge was a patch or "blaze" of black melton cloth on the puggaree of the hat, one on each side, and in the centre of the cap-band. In each case the blaze was a square of one and a half inch side, that of the 1st Battalion being placed diamond-wise, and that of the 2nd Battalion lying horizontally; while the personnel of regimental tal headquarters wore a blaze in the form of an eight-pointed star, representing the diamond and the square superimposed. Rifle Brigade buttons and "Liverpool" badges were first worn on August 31st.

Throughout June and the earlier part of July the training continued with vigour. Owing to the bad state of the camp grounds the battalions did a good deal of work further afield, and in the frequent and carefully-supervised route marches they began to excel. The somewhat congested state of the camp area, added to the long-continued bad weather, was however, telling on the health of the men. Roads and drains were being improved as rapidly as possible, but evil-smelling mud still abounded, and although baths and drying-rooms were being pushed to completion, their commencement had been unduly late. So rapidly had sickness increased that the grandstand of the adjoining racecourse was pressed into service as a temporary hospital. At last came the decision to evacuate the camp of all troops except the Sixth Reinforcements, several cases of illness having been diagnosed as cerebro-spinal meningitis. Orders came for our move at only six hours' notice, and the regiment had its first experience of shifting quarters with practically no preliminary preparation. Operations had to be pushed on with speed, and were looked upon as a very serious business. In later days, when changing billets and relieving in the trenches were so oft-repeated as to work almost automatically, we were to look back with some amusement on this our first move. However, in the circumstances, all went extremely well. At an early hour on the morning of the 10th of July the regiment had entrained in pouring rain, and by 7 a.m. had started from Trentham for Rangiotu, near Palmerston North. Instructions were received en route to detrain at Palmerston North, the 1st Battalion to occupy the buildings in the Show Grounds and the 2nd Battalion those at Awapuni Racecourse, until the bad weather abated. We found our new quarters fairly comfortable, and by degrees succeeded in drying our clothes. On the first morning in the Show Grounds, in place of the distressing "Rouse" by the bugles, we had the band on duty at reveille with more inspiring airs. So heavy had been the rain that no training was possible except on the roads, but not an hour was lost that could profitably be employed, however elementary the nature of the work.

On the 12th of July, Capt. E. Puttick, O.C. "B" Company, 1st Battalion, was appointed temporary Camp-Quartermaster, and on the same day went with Lieut.-Col. Fulton to Rangiotu, a farming settlement on the Foxton road, some nine miles from Palmerston North, to make arrangements for establishing the camp there. It was decided to pitch a temporary camp about a mile and a half from the site of the permanent one. On the following day an advance party of 600 men commenced work and had everything ready for occupation on the 15th July, on which date the two battalions moved out from Palmerston to their new quarters. Situated close beside the road and the railway line, the camp was quite convenient as a temporary home, and the decision to occupy it for the time being proved to be very wise, as it gave ample time for the drawing up of plans for the establishment of a permanent camp so laid out as to ensure the maximum of health and comfort for the troops. The training-grounds were almost unlimited in area; the grassy sandhills and dry river-flats remained practically unaffected by the rains, and left nothing to be desired in the way of diversity; and taken altogether the conditions were almost ideal. In these new circumstances, and aided by an improvement in the weather, all ranks rapidly regained their health and vigour. As a precautionary measure, "gargle parades" were ordered for four days. These parades were held by whole battalions on the roadside at some distance from the camp, and though the proceedings seemed odd enough the treatment must have been of value, for cases of meningitis were practically unknown at Rangiotu.

By the end of July the lines of the permanent camp had been completely pegged and everything was ready for the move, which took place on August 14th, heavy rain having delayed the transfer. Marquees, tents, floors, indeed everything in the camp, even to a cookhouse intact, were conveyed by hand a distance of over a mile, and in a very little time our new canvas town was completely erected. The site had been inspected by the military and medical authorities and had met with general approval. The camping-ground was extensive, and Lieut.-Col. Fulton's plan was to occupy the whole area at once, providing for two large spaces, each for one battalion, and allowing for very wide roadways separating the various company blocks. This was supported by the medical officers as preferable to camping in a small space and shifting camp periodically. In order to avoid cutting up the ground, no wheeled vehicle was allowed in the camp; all stores, etc., had to be brought in by hand until tramways were constructed from the special railway siding to the cookhouses and quarter- masters' stores.

In the meantime, Lieut.-Col. Fulton having gone on sick leave, owing to trouble from an old wound, Lieut.-Col. R. W. TateR. W. Tate, commanding the Wellington District, assumed command on July 24th and continued in charge until August 23rd. when Lieut.-Col. Fulton returned.

At the beginning of September a supply of transport horses and harness arrived in camp, and the special training of drivers and grooms was taken in hand by Lieut. Wilson, R.N.Z.A., who reported for this duty on the 6th. We had had the vehicles for some time, and it was not long before the transport section of each battalion was able to carry out the practical tests with a considerable degree of efficiency. As in the subsequent history of the regiment, little reference is made to these sections, it may be stated that in later days we learned to look with pride on our men of the transport. Their turn-out did not always compare most favourably in appearance with that of their brothers-in-arms of some English regiments, but in the greatest of all their duties—the supply of rations—they never once failed. No matter what the state of the weather, the condition of the roads, the length or number of the journeys, or the intensity of the shell-fire, they always "got there," never counting the cost in the faithful service of their comrades. To mention here only one instance of such devotion to duty, it is recorded that on April 5th, 1918, when the Germans made their big attack on our newly-established line in front of Colincamps, the water-carts of one battalion actually passed through the enemy barrage and took supplies practically to the front line itself.

The Advance Party of the Brigade, consisting of 50 other ranks of the 1st Battalion under Lieut. R. O. BrydonR. O. Brydon, and a like number of the 2nd under Lieut. T. M. WilkesT. M. Wilkes, left for Egypt on September 18th.

Practically the only disadvantage connected with the Rangiotu Camp as compared with Trentham was the lack of facilities for carrying out the regulation musketry course. The only existing rifle-ranges within fairly easy reach were those at Palmerston North and Wangaimi, on both of which accommodation was limited. For this reason it was decided to send off the 2nd Battalion on the seven days' final leave on August 20th and place both ranges at the disposal of the 1st Battalion, the companies of which left for final leave as they completed the course. The preliminary grouping practices were carried out on a very useful temporary range we constructed for the purpose in the vicinity of the camp, and the first company marched out to the range at Palmerston North on August 17th. On the return of the companies of the 2nd Battalion from their final leave they were put through their musketry in a similar manner. Notwithstanding the drawbacks, the standard attained by both units in this branch of training was very high.

Shortly after the completion of the musketry course and the final leave, the two battalions went out in turn to the sandhills in the neighbourhood of Bainesse, near the West Coast, for continuous training in attack and defence, outpost work and field firing, and in the short period at their disposal gained considerable practical experience in working over unknown country, patrolling; bivouacking, field-cooking, supplying rations and ammunition, writing orders and reports, etc. On return to Rangiotu, more intensive training was carried out with the object of emphasizing the lessons learned in this general work, and the rapid setting-out of the various forms of bivouac-camps was practised.

It should be mentioned that the facilities for entrenching work at Rangiotu were utilized to the full. The use of the entrenching-tool in throwing up temporary cover was constantly practised; the varied nature of the country gave excellent opportunities for instruction in the proper siting of trenches; and laying out and digging, both by night and by day, formed a very important part in the general scheme of training.

On September 28th the regiment was inspected by the Honorary Colonel. His Excellency the Earl of Liverpool, who, after complimenting all ranks on the smartness of their appearance and their steadiness on parade, referred to the traditions of the Imperial Rifle Brigade, and exhorted the officers and men to emulate the deeds of that famous regiment and strive to excel in every respect, both in camp and on the field. He was pleased to say he felt confident that when the time came for this young Brigade to participate in active operations alongside British regiments, their conduct would be such as to redound to their own honour and add lustre to the fair name of their country.

The final official inspection was held on October 5th, a few days before embarkation, when Colonel Gibbon. Chief of the General Staff, took the parade.

Throughout the stay of the regiment at Rangiotu much kindness was received at the hands of the citizens of Palmerston North, Wanganui and Foxton, and of the people of the district generally. Their patriotic societies sent regularly gifts of fruit, puddings and other dainties, to relieve the monotony of the regulation rations, and the concerts given in camp by parties from town were as heartily appreciated as they were excellent in quality.

We were glad to know that the efforts of the Regimental Band to give some pleasure in return, by playing programmes and taking part in concerts in several of the neighbouring towns, met with marked signs of approval. Grants from patriotic societies, together with the receipts from five special concerts and a subsidy from the Trentham Camp Commandant, were sufficient to enable the band to leave New Zealand free of debt. When the instruments were destroyed by shell-fire just two years later, the riddled remains were forwarded to the Mayor of Palmerston North as mementoes.

The band's final concert in New Zealand was given, at the invitation of the Wellington Patriotic Society, on the eve of departure overseas. This was held in the Town Hall, and Lieut. Cole conducted with the baton presented by His Excellency the Honorary Colonel at the afternoon parade and subsequently carried safely through the whole of the campaign.

This may be a fitting place in which to set out in detail the changes made in the designation of the regiment from time to time.

Nicknames are referred to in Appendix VII.

They were many. In the earliest days, while preparation were being made for its mobilization, it was spoken of vaguely as "The New Battalions," On May 27th, 1915, it received the title "The Trentham Regiment" (Earl of Liverpool's Own) as from May 1st, and at the same time His Excellency the Governor became its Honorary Colonel.

Extract from New Zealand Gazette, 27th May, 1915:—

Wellington,

19th May, 1915.

His Excellency the Governor has been pleased to approve that the special infantry battalions now mobilised at Trentham Camp be designated "The Trentham Regiment" (The Earl of Liverpool's Own), and with effect from May 1st, 1915.

(Signed) J Allen, Minister of Defence.

Department of Defence,

Wellington,

19th May, 1915.

His Excellency the Governor has been pleased to approve of The Right Honourable Arthur William de Brito Savile, Earl of Liverpool, G.C.M.G., M.V.O., Lieut.-Colonel 8th (City of London) Battalion, the London Regiment (Post Office Rifles), Reserve of Officers, the Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own), Honorary Colonel, 11th Regiment (Taranaki Rifles), as Colonel of "The Trentham Regiment" (The Earl of Liverpool's Own), New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and with effect from 1st May, 1915.

(Signed) J. Allen, Minister of Defence.

Both the Commanding Officer and the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment were Rifle Brigade officers, and it soon became evident that it was their desire to have it transformed into a Rifle Regiment with the dress and drill modified accordingly. Samples of Rifle Brigade buttons were procured from India about the middle of May, and negotiations were entered into with the object of obtaining sanction to use as a regimental badge the crest and motto of the Earl of Liverpool—a lion rampant supporting a man-of-war's pennant proper; motto "Soyes Ferme."

From August 18th till 30th, the title was given in Regimental orders as "The Trentham Infantry Brigade" (Earl of Liverpool's Own), and in Brigade orders of the latter date it was laid down that in future the correct nomenclature would be "The Trentham Rifle Brigade" (Earl of Liverpool's Own). On the following day the wearing of Rifle Brigade buttons and the "Liverpool" badge was ordered.

In the middle of September, 1915, the mobilization of the 3rd and 4th Battalions commenced, and in Brigade orders of the 28th the following correspondence was published for general information:—

From His Excellency the Governor,

To Field Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own).

Wellington, N.Z.,

September 23rd, 1915.

The newly-raised Regiment, the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, shortly proceeding to the Dardanelles, consisting of four battalions, tender to your Royal Highness, as Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade, their resolution to do their utmost to emulate the glorious record of the Imperial Regiment with whom they hope they may be associated on service.

(Signed) Liverpool. Honorary Colonel, New Zealand Rifle Brigade.

From Field-Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own). To Colonel His Excellency the Earl of Liverpool, New Zealand Rifle Brigade. September 24th, 1915.

As Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade, I warmly appreciate your message from New Zealand comrades, and wish them all luck and success.

(Signed) Arthur.

The change of title from "Trentham Rifle Brigade" to "New Zealand Rifle Brigade" will be noted. The alteration in name, however, did not appear in the New Zealand Gazette till October 7th, 1915, when the following announcement was made:—

New Zealand Gazette No, 115, of 7th October, 1915.

Abolition of the Designation of "Trentham Regiment" (Earl of Liverpool's Own), and its formation into a Rifle Brigade.

Department of Defence, Wellington,

5th October, 1915.

His Excellency the Governor has been pleased to abolish the designation of the "Trentham Regiment" (Earl of Liverpool's Own), as published in the New Zealand Gazette of 27th May, 1915. and to approve of its formation into a Brigade to be designated as under:—

"The New Zealand Rifle Brigade—Earl of Liverpool's Own."

Dated 1st October, 1915. (Signed) J. Allen, Minister of Defence.

On the organization of the New Zealand Division in Egypt at the end of February, 1916, the New Zealand Rifle Brigade became the 3rd Brigade of the Division, and New Zealand Expeditionary Force Orders, dated April 22nd, laid down that in accordance with War Office instructions, it would in future be known as the "3rd New Zealand (Rifles) Brigade." Later the word "Rifle" was substituted for "Rifles." Thus, as a regiment it remained "The New Zealand Rifle Brigade." but as part of the Division "The 3rd New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade."

The following appeared in N.Z.E.F. Orders of 15th January, 1917:—

"241.—Colonel-in-Chief, New Zealand Rifle Brigade.

"His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to appoint Field Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught and Strathearn, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., Col. G. Gds and A.S.C., and Col.-in-Chief 6th Dns., High. L.I., R. Dub. Fus., and Rifle Brigade, Personal A.D.C. to the King, to be Colonel-in-Chief to the New Zealand Rifle Brigade."

Slight modifications in dress were made from time to time; indeed, so frequently were changes ordered that they became a source of no little irritation. The Dress Regulations as they finally stood are set out in Appendix IV.

As to drill, every effort was made to attain perfection by hard training along the lines in vogue in the different Imperial Rifle Regiments, but owing to the fact that "regimental quiffs" varied so greatly, and that there was no official Rifle Brigade drill manual extant, some difficulty was experienced in securing rigid uniformity.

Part 2.—Departure for Egypt.

Embarkation—At sea—Albany—The convoy divides—1st Battalion via Fremantle to Suez—Aerodrome Camp, Heliopolis— 2nd Battalion, via Colombo, arrives, and is warned for service in the field—2nd Battalion to Dabaa—Command, Col. Chaytor— Command, Lieut.-Col. Fulton—Unrest in Cairo—1st Battalion to Mersa Matruh.

On the morning of 8th October, 1915, the two battalions entrained for Wellington, and on arival at the port at mid-day marched with kit-bags and sea-kits to the troopships. After the men had been told off to their quarters and kits stowed away, they were granted leave till 10.30 p.m. This being their last evening ashore before departure, it might have been expected that there would be some trouble in the city; but the men were put on their honour, and all reports agreed that the behaviour was excellent.

Troops were taken off their ships at six o'clock next morning, and at 7 a.m. the official embarkation with checking of the rolls took place. At 1 p.m. they were marched off the ships and paraded for a farewell march through the town at 2.30 p.m. The parade comprised the two battalions of the Rifle Brigade, with the Honorary Colonel. His Excellency the Earl of Liverpool, Governor of New Zealand, at the head, and also the 7th Reinforcements under Major R. St. J. Beere. The quick swinging march of the Rifle Battalions with their arms at the trail was new to the great crowds that had assembled to watch the parade. The troops, having returned to the docks, re-embarked, and the troopships moved into the stream and anchored at 5 p.m.

At 6 a.m. on the 10th of October, 1915, the transports sailed from Wellington, the convoy consisting of:—

1. "Maunganui" (Transport No. 30), with Brigade Headquarters; 1st Battalion; 2nd Field Artillery Brigade; Divisional Ammunition Column, and Ambulance and other details. 2. "Tahiti" (Transport No. 31), with 2nd Battalion, and A.S.C. and Divisional Signalling Coy details. 3. "Aparima" (Transport No. 32), with 7th Reinforcement Mounted Rifles, and Divisional Train and Ambulance details.

Trentham Camp. 1915.

Rangiotu Camp, 1915.

The Officers of a Battalion.

The Non-Commissioned Officers of a Battalion.

Field Marshal H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught, K.G: K.T. Colonel-in-Chief of the N.Z.R.B.

Major-General Sir A. H. Russell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Commander of the N.Z. Division.

Colonel the Earl of Liverpool, P.C., G.C.M.G., Honorary Colonel of the N.Z.R.B.

4. "Navua" (Transport No. 33), with 7th Reinforcement Mounted Rifles, and Artillery, Infantry and Ambulance details. 5. "Warrimoo" (Transport No. 34), with 7th Reinforcement Infantry and Ambulance details.

There was no escort of warships.

The sea journey on the whole was interesting but uneventful. Food and quarters were good, and the daily inspections by the Master, accompanied by the O.C. Ship, revealed a state of order and cleanliness very creditable indeed to all ranks. All available deck-space was made use of for such drill as could be carried out, this training being supplemented by lecturettes given at frequent intervals by officers and non-commissioned officers. Signallers had excellent practical work sending and receiving messages from ship to ship. Boxing tournaments were frequent, and impromptu concerts beguiled many a tedious evening, and revealed much talent that was carefully noted for future use in arranging company and battalion concerts in camp and billets in the more strenuous days to come. On the "Maunganui," the ship's disused printingpress was commandeered, and a weird and wonderful magazine, called "The Periscope," was produced. It was an eightpaged paper, printed with decrepit type and faded ink, on such sheets of absorbent paper as could be spared from the battalion orderly-room; a poor thing, doubtless, but nevertheless prized as being entirely our own. At Fremantle, by means of judicious purchases, the type-founts were augmented and a supply of paper and ink laid in, and as a result there blossomed forth, before we reached our destination, a second number of the magazine, somewhat thin in bulk, yet resplendent in its crimson binding and gold lettering. An endeavour had been made to secure a green cover, as more fitting for a Rifle Brigade paper, but the resources of Fremantle proved to be limited.

At 5 p.m. on the 19th October we reached Albany, our first port of call, the weather on the way across having been, with the exception of two rather rough days in the Australian Bight, decidedly good. We were greatly interested in the picturesque appearance of King George's Sound and the harbour of Albany. Naturally enough, disappointment was felt on learning that owing to some irregularities on the part of troops (not from our own country) that had been ashore some time previously, the military authorities could not grant permission for general leave, and we had to content ourselves with a route march to town next day, from 8.30 to 10 a.m. The march proved to be a pleasant break to the monotony of life on board ship. The "Willochra," with sick and wounded for New Zealand, being in port, an interchange of visits was carried out, and old acquaintanceships renewed.

At Albany the convoy divided, the "Tahiti," with the 2nd Battalion, sailing in company with the "Navua" and "Aparima," for Suez via Colombo. The "Maunganui" and the "Warrimoo," on the other hand, called at Fremantle, where the 1st Battalion and troops of the 7th Reinforcements went ashore for a route march and three hours' general leave. These two transports sailed from Fremantle at 8 p.m. on 23rd October, and by the 25th the weather had become sufficiently hot for awnings to be spread. The Line was crossed on November 4th, and four days later Cape Gardafui, the north-eastern point of Africa, was sighted. The passage of the dreaded Red Sea, much less distressing, however, than was anticipated, was completed by 7.15 a.m. on the 14th, at which hour the "Maunganui" dropped anchor at Suez. Reveille had been sounded at 4 a.m., and by 7 a.m. the troops were drawn up ready to disembark. However, orders were received to the effect that we were not to go ashore until the following day, and we were able to contemplate at leisure our strange and interesting surroundings. Away to the north-east was enemy country, the fawn-coloured desert sloping to the bare hills on the horizon. Nearer at hand were the weird sights and sounds of an Eastern port, with its gangs of noisy and gesticulating coolies, whose tendency to adopt "go-slow" tactics was met by prompt and energetic application of the big stick. The activities and cries of the vendors of fruit in the boats alongside, the calls for "Backsheesh! Backsheesh!" and the exploits of the native divers, all excited our interest and curiosity; but we were brought back to the realities of our mission when a number of New Zealanders came aboard to look up friends and acquaintances, and recounted some of their experiences on Gallipoli.

On November 15th the 1st Battalion disembarked from the "Maunganui" and entrained for Aerodrome Camp, near Cairo. The operation of transferring the troops, waggons, gear and stores from the ship to the trains was by no means simple. We had our plans worked out down to the smallest detail, but these, it appeared, did not coincide with those of the local entraining officer, and considerable friction resulted until Captain Purdy, who had been detailed for the special duty, prevailed upon the regular official to leave us to own our devices. Thereafter the entraining proceeded with precision and expedition, and the feats of our carrying and loading parties were quite evidently a source of wonderment to both the English soldiers and the native labourers.

The open trucks of the troop-trains were altogether comfortless, and the jolting stops and starts astonishingly disconcerting; but the novelty of the experience and the interest attaching to the mysterious land through which we moved served to divert the mind from the contemplation of troubles that in other circumstances might have been sufficiently annoying. From Suez northwards the line ran close to the Canal, along which were numerous posts garrisoned mainly by Indian troops, the first we had seen on definite active service. At Ismailia we turned westward, and presently passed from the barren and monotonous desert to the fertile delta land, intersected by its innumerable irrigation ditches, the broad fields of growing crops and clumps of waving palms affording a veritable feast for the eye. At every stop, whether by day or by night, crowds of natives, carrying baskets of oranges and hardboiled eggs, besieged the train and hawked their wares with strange new cries. "Eggs-a-cook! Eggs-a-cook!" was fairly easily interpreted, but the meaning of "Orranghees! Orranghees! Verra nice! Verra sweet! Verra clean! Orranghees! Orranghees! Two forra half!" was more difficult of comprehension. Experience, however, is the best of teachers, and we soon learned that the mysterious "half" was half a piastre, the equivalent of a penny farthing. Our education advanced a further step during the following day, when the newspaper boys overran the camp bawling "'Mbaberr! 'Mbaberr! 'Mbaberr tomorra! Egyptian 'mbaberr! Timees! Verra good news!" and we discovered that this country was so up-to-date as to publish the morning paper on the previous afternoon.

After a journey of seven hours, the last of the three trains by which the battalion moved reached Helmieh Siding, some two miles from camp, half-an-hour before midnight. The Regimental Band had accompanied the 1st Battalion from New Zealand, and now marched a detachment across the desert to the camp, playing, in the darkness, "Left, Right," a tune repeated by one of our bands just three years later as it led the march of its battalion across the Rhine, again during the night.

Aerodrome Camp was part of a large base camp situated quite close to the modern portion of the town of Heliopolis, which is practically a suburb of Cairo, though distant some six miles from the centre of that city. Our area was close to that of the Australian Light Horse, whose officers kindly extended hospitality to those of the 1st Battalion until the latter were able to complete arrangements for their own mess. The pushful native caterers and refuse contractors were early on the scene on business intent, and Battalion Headquarters were pestered by guides and hawkers bent on securing passes to enable them to ply their nefarious trades and callings within the lines.

On the first day in camp the companies drilled from 10 a.m. till noon, and in the afternoon the battalion had an interesting route march through Heliopolis and Zeitoun. Lieut.-Col. Fulton and Brigade Headquarters arrived from Suez late in the evening.

On the 17th the 1st Battalion officers opened their own mess. The native caterer was anxious to please, but the curious French-Egyptian dishes did not meet with an enthusiastic reception. By degrees we instructed him in the peculiarities of our requirements and brought to his notice certain joints cooked in the British fashion in a company kitchen. With due thought for his finer feelings, we hinted delicately that his chickens were really pigeons and his eggs the product of the same bird. Proceeding diplomatically, yet firmly and with patience, we at last secured a very passable mess; but we were grieved to notice that as the table improved, the snowy robes of the great six-foot native waiters as surely changed from their pristine whiteness to an indescribable dun-colour, and patchy withal. It is interesting to record that the caterer's name was Morgan, that one of his ancestors was a Welshman, and that he claimed to have been guide to sundry crowned heads of Europe in the palmier tourist days. He also dealt in scarabs and other interesting curios, as did countless other natives. We knew that these baubles were genuine, for had we not the vendors' solemn declaration to that effect, and, in addition, full particulars of the tomb or temple or ruin from which each was obtained? In view of such affirmation, could the sceptic have the hardihood to suggest that the cunning craftsmen of Birmingham had been more intimately concerned in the production than had the long-vanished subjects of the Pharaohs?

It will be remembered that the 2nd Battalion in the "Tahiti" left the convoy at Albany. They reached Colombo on November 1st, and after a pleasant break ashore sailed again for Suez, at which port they disembarked on the 18th, and moved by rail to Aerodrome Camp. On the following evening this battalion was warned to be ready to go forward at a moment's notice for active service with the Western Frontier Force. The 1st Battalion was to have been vaccinated on the way from New Zealand, but apparently through some oversight the necessary supplies of vaccine had not been put on board. On the morning of the 19th vaccination had been carried out, and all ranks of the 1st Battalion were disgusted to find that but for this it would have been their good fortune to move instead of the 2nd, who had been through the ordeal of vaccination on the troopship.

Both battalions had brought from New Zealand full equipment for their transport sections,—waggons, harness, tools and spare parts, but no animals. Horses and chargers for the Brigade were drawn at the Aerodrome Camp on the 21st November.

On the evening of the 22nd, the 2nd Battalion left by rail for Alexandria, to join the Western Frontier Force on the line of communications in the direction of Dabaa.

Colonel E. W. C. ChaytorE. W. C. Chaytor, C.B., assumed command of the Brigade on the 23rd, and Major M. M. Gard'nerM. M. Gard'ner, R.N.Z.A., took over the duties of Brigade Major from Capt. P. H. BellP. H. Bell. On the 26th, Lieut.-Col. Fulton returned from Alexandria, where he had been attending to the despatch of the 2nd Battalion, and resumed command of the 1st Battalion. Capt. Purdy, Acting-Adjutant, returned to his company, and Capt. P. H. BellP. H. Bell returned to the battalion as Adjutant.

On December 3rd, a New Zealand and Australian Reserve Brigade was formed of details from the camp at Gizeh, the command to be taken over by the Brigadier of the New Zealand

Rifle Brigade in addition to his ordinary duties. The units of which it was composed were the New Zealand and the 4th, 6th and 7th Australian Training Battalions, and its special duty was the defence of Cairo in case of emergency.

On the 5th of December, Colonel Chaytor returned to A.N.Z.A.C. to command the Mounted Rifle Brigade. Lieut.-Col. Fulton assumed command of the N.Z.R.B., and of the N.Z. and A. Reserve Brigade, and Major Austin resumed command of the 1st Battalion, N.Z.R.B.

At about this time there were fears of a possible native rising, and on the 10th Brigade Headquarters received the revised scheme for the defence of Cairo if this trouble should eventuate. Orders in accordance with the plan were issued to the 1st Battalion and to the units of the Reserve Brigade, and their commanding officers instructed to reconnoitre their areas in preparation for any possible development.

The 1st Battalion received warning on the evening of December 15th that it would replace the 2/5th Devons at the Citadel of Cairo, and all preparations for the relief were well forward when, at 8 p.m. on the 16th, the orders were cancelled and replaced by fresh instructions to be ready to leave at short notice for service with the Western Frontier Force at Mersa Matruh. Orders for the move were received at mid-day on the 18th, and by 6 p.m. the complete battalion, strength 30 officers and 968 other ranks, had left for Alexandria.

During the 1st Battalion's five weeks' stay at the Aerodrome Camp much useful training was done. As it was the winter season, the heat was not unduly oppressive. The midday hours were hot, but as a rule the parades were held in the morning and evening, with a long interval in the middle of the day and early afternoon. Trench-digging by day and by night formed an important part of the work, and night advances and attacks were frequently practised. Even the process of entraining with order and speed was rehearsed on the desert, car and truck spaces being marked out on the sand.

Here we had our first experience, so often repeated in later days, of sending men for training for a short period at an Army School of Instruction, 2 officers and 40 other ranks for a course in bombing, and 2 officers and 20 other ranks for signalling being detailed on November 22nd. The Machine Gun Section also was detached for special training at the school, returning to battalion on 4th December.

Route marches, gradually increasing in length, had a fine effect in hardening the men after their long sea voyage. These, too, were made interesting as far as possible. Often they were planned so that halts should take place near a New Zealand or an Australian hospital. The band would play outside the building, and the men were given an opportunity to meet friends and acquaintances within. Amongst the interesting points visited in this way were the finer portions of Heliopolis and Zeitoun, Napoleon's Towers on the Suez Road, Old Heliopolis, the Virgin's Well, and the companion obelisk to Cleopatra's Needle, still standing at Matarieh. As often as the Regimental Band could be spared it was sent to the various hospitals, and to the Esbekieh Gardens and the New Zealand Y.M.C.A. establishment in Cairo; and the many expressions of thanks received indicated a keen appreciation of services gladly rendered. The temporary effects of vaccination somewhat interfered with the work, but eventually when the battalion marched out of camp for their first taste of active service all ranks were in a better state of fitness than they had ever been.

Chapter II. The Senussi Campaign.

Part 1.—General. The Senussi sect—Senussi unrest—Enemy influence—Commencement of hostilities—Enemy strength—Western Frontier Force.

The Senussi sect may be described as the Puritans of the Moslems. The doctrine of its founder, Sidi Mohammed ben Ali es Senussi, who was born in Algeria in 1787 and completed his education at Mecca, was the Koranic Law in its original simplicity as delivered by the Prophet. He rapidly gained a religious following throughout the north of Africa from Tunis to Egypt, and even in Arabia, and from one end to the other of this great stretch of country he established zawias or monasteries for the propagation of the pure principles of the faith. He eventually settled in the Benghazi district, or Cyrenaica, the area just beyond Egypt's western frontier. Sidi Mohammed died in 1859 and was succeeded by his son Mohammed el Mahdi, whose reputation for sanctity and power extended throughout the whole of northern Africa, the Soudan and Arabia, and was not unknown in Europe. On the death of Mohammed el Mahdi in 1902, his nephew, Ahmed el Sherif, a grandson of the founder, was elected to the headship of the sect, his own eldest son, Sidi Mohammed Idris, being then a minor. The new ruler was known as Sayed Ahmed, or more commonly as The Senussi.

Though begun as an ascetic religious confraternity, the Senussi brotherhood has expanded and developed from a loose association of tribes to a dynastic entity with a mercantile and political influence not less important than that of any other people in Northern Africa. The rise of The Senussi to temporal power came with the war waged between Italy and Turkey in Tripoli, which lies just to the west of Cyrenaica. Through the influence of Enver Pasha. Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces in Tripoli. The Senussi was induced to cooperate with the Turks against the Italians. On the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Tripoli and Cyrenaica he considered himself the virtual ruler of these districts, and, as such, continued the struggle with Italy. In his efforts he had the assistance of several Turkish officers who remained behind after the declaration of peace.

Sayed Ahmed was not personally anti-British. He had established friendly relations with Egypt, and his cousin and agent, who lived at Alexandria, was held in high regard by Europeans and Egyptians alike. The Senussi's disapproval of the Mahdist movement in Eastern Soudan won for him the approval of the Sirdar, Sir Reginald Wingate. General surprise, therefore, not unmixed with some consternation, was felt when it was announced in November, 1915, that it had been necessary to withdraw the Egyptian garrisons from western frontier posts, and when it was learned that shortly afterwards Western Egypt was invaded by a considerable force of Arabs, Turks and Berbers, under Saved Ahmed, augmented by some thousands of Egyptian Bedouin. The danger of an invasion of Egypt from Syria had been foreseen, but the menace from the Senussi movement was much more serious than the Turkish attempt from the Sinai Peninsula to cross the Canal, for trouble on the Western Frontier might easily lead to serious religious and internal disorders.

The invasion is directly traceable to Turco-German influence. Signs that pressure on The Senussi to move against Egypt was beginning to take effect were first apparent in May, 1915. During the previous month Gaafar Pasha, described as "a Germanized Turk of considerable ability," had arrived in Cyrenaica with large supplies of arms and ammunition. There he joined Nury Bey, the half-brother of Enver Pasha, leader of the Turkish party in Cyrenaica. Later, a number of Turks and Germans gained access to the country by means of disguise. In June the French captured in the Eastern Mediterranean a sailing-boat flying the Greek flag, provided with false papers, and carrying a party of Turks whose luggage consisted of valuable presents for Sayed Ahmed. From the German Kaiser was sent, in a handsome embossed casket, a letter to The Senussi couched in the usual bombastic terms, extolling his own virtues as the protector of Islam and inciting to war against "the infidels." This was followed by another from the same source, asking Sayed Ahmed to declare a Holy War in Egypt.

On November 5th, 1915, H.M. auxiliary cruiser "Tara" was torpedoed off Sollum by the German submarine U35. On the following day an enemy submarine shelled the Egyptian post at Sollum, and of the two small coastguard cruisers in the harbour, one, the "Abbas," was sunk at her moorings, and the other, the "Noor el Bahr," badly damaged. On November 7th the British horse-transport "Moorina" was sunk off the Cyrenaican coast. The camp at Sollum was sniped on November 15th; on the 17th the zawia at Barrani, fifty miles within the frontier, was occupied by the Senussi regulars; and next day the coatstguard barracks at the same station, were attacked.

The garrisons of Sollum were withdrawn to Matruh, but not without the loss of 12 native officers, two cadets, and 120 of other ranks, all of the Egyptian Coastguard Camel Corps. These treacherously seceded to the enemy, taking with them 176 camels.

The available enemy force at the commencement of hostilities was probably not less than 20,000. It had a nucleus of Turkish troops and a number of Turkish, German and Arab officers. The main formation consisted of the Senussi Regulars, or muhafzia, thirteen companies of well-disciplined men, numbering in all 3,370. These wore a uniform of khaki faced with red or green, and puttees, while the irregulars, who varied in number from time to time, were attired in the characteristic native dress. In the event of a successful advance into Egypt the total strength would have rapidly increased. The Senussi were known to possess nine mountain-guns, ten mitrailleuses, and six field-guns, all captured from the Italians; but they were reported to have had other field pieces as well as machineguns landed from German submarines. Of guns of an older pattern, they had the two Egyptian Army 9 cm. Krupp guns abandoned at Sollum, and two Turkish Mantelli 8.7 cm. movable fortress guns. They were well supplied with Turkish, German and Italian rifles, and had abundance of ammunition. The force contained a considerable number of mounted troops, and the supply of camels for transport was practically unlimited. The Commander-in-Chief was Nury Pasha, but Gaafar Pasha was usually in immediate command of any operating column.

Orders for the formation of a Western Frontier Force were issued on November 20th, 1915, and Major-General A. Wallace, C.B., was appointed to the command.

The original composition of the force was as under:—

Mounted Brigade.

Brigadier-General Tyndale Biscoe, Commanding.

3 Composite Yeomanry Regiments from the 2nd Mounted Division, and comprising details from more than twenty different regiments.

1 Composite Regiment of Australian Light Horse, made up of details from Australian Light Horse Brigades.

Notts. Battery of Royal Horse Artillery (Territorial Force) and Ammunition Column.

Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General Lord Lucan, Commanding.

1 Battalion 1/6th Royal Scots (Territorials).

1 Battalion 2/7th Middlesex Regiment (Territorials).

1 Battalion 2/8th Middlesex Regiment (Territorials).

1 Battalion 15th Sikhs.

1 Squadron Royal Flying Corps.

Divisional Train from the 1st Australian Division.

A detachment from the Egyptian Army Military Works Department took the place of the Royal Engineers, none of the latter being available.

The composition of the force was constantly changing, and it was not till the middle of February, 1916, that it became really fixed.

Part 2.—The 2nd Battalion On The Line Of Communications.

Lieut.-Col. A. E. Stewart in command—Troops—Dispositions—A monotonous service—Return to Alexandria—Move to Moascar.

The 2nd Battalion arrived at Quamaria Camp, Alexandria, on the night of 22/23rd November. On the following day Lieut.-Col. A. E. StewartA. E. Stewart was appointed to command the Line of Communications from Alexandria westward towards Mersa Matruh.

In addition to the 2/N.Z.R.B., Lieut.-Col. Stewart had under his command the following details:—A squadron of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division (afterwards sent to Matruh); 150 men of the Bikaner Camel Corps, with an Egyptian

Army Machine Gun Section; an armoured train, manned by a detachment of the 1/10th Gurkha Rifles, with two 12½ pounders of the Egyptian Army Artillery and two searchlights; and, for a time, a company of the 15th Sikhs.

The Mariut Railway, a broad-gauge line approximately 100 miles in length, runs westward along the Mediterranean coast. A narrow-gauge line had been partially constructed from rail-head at El Dabaa to Bir Fuka, some 30 miles further on, but at this time the rails had been removed. A motorable road, the remains of an ancient Roman highway, runs from El Dabaa right on to Sollum on the western frontier, and passes through Matruh, which is about 90 miles west of El Dabaa.

Lieut.-Col. Stewart established his headquarters at El Dabaa, and by the 25th November the 2nd Battalion, now under the immediate command of Major R. St. J. Beere, was disposed along the line from Alexandria to the rail-head.

Posts were established at the following points:—Sidi Mergheb (near Alexandria), Amria, Hawaria, El Ghirbaniat. El Roweisat, El Alamein, El Gazel, Jemeima, Abd El Kader. Ikingi Mariut, Bahig, El Hammam, El Omeiyid, Sidi Abd El Rahman, and El Dabaa.

The spelling of place-names varies. "G" and "J," for instance, are practically interchangeable, and the "Q" of the ordinary Egyptian survey maps is on the War Office maps written either "G" or "K," according to the local pronunciation. Thus we have Gemaima or Jemeima, Baqqush or Baggush, Majid or Merjid, or even Mergid.

These were either at railway stations or in the vicinity of the larger native villages, and the garrisons varied in strength from one officer and 24 other ranks at less importers points, to 12 officers and 300 other ranks at rail-head.

The garrisons immediately set to work to put their posts into a state of defence, and to lay in supplies of food, water and ammunition. The materials used for walls and breastworks consisted either of loose and quarried rock or of sandbags, according to the nature of the country. An admirable rivalry sprang up amongst the various garrisons, which stimulated the men to extraordinary exertions, and in a few days each post became a veritable stronghold.

As time wore on, however, the men's enthusiasm waned. They had come out west full of hopes of an early conflict with the invaders, but they were disappointed to find nothing more exciting to relieve the monotony than the ordinary patrolling into the desert, the capture of an occasional suspected spy, the stopping and bringing in of suspicious-looking caravans, and the passing of mounted troops, artillery and transport bound for Matruh. Even the novelty of the conditions and the natural curiosity regarding the country and its inhabitants began to pall, and especially so when sand-colic became prevalent. Perhaps the most exciting incident was that experienced by the garrison of a newly-established post at the village of Hammam. In the dusk of the evening of the first day on duty, streams of men and beasts of burden appeared to be converging on the post from all points of the horizon. Later on, camp-fires gleamed on every side, and the officer in command of the post came to the conclusion that the end of all things was at hand. After standing to arms all night, the men of the little garrison were somewhat relieved in the morning to find that the sudden growth of population in the neighbourhood was merely the accompaniment to the holding of the periodic and peaceful market, warning of which had not reached the post.

At the beginning of December the company of 15th Sikh was sent westward to establish posts at the wells of Gerab, Baggush and Jerawala, on the road to Matruh. The garrisons of these, however, were withdrawn by the middle of the month, and later on the Sikhs rejoined their regiment, which had gone to Matruh by sea.

Definite reports were received from time to time of concentrations of Bedouin in the vicinity of the Line of Communications, but no attacks thereon eventuated. The most important of these camps was that of Saved Harun, located near Baggush, but this, as will be seen, was dealt with by a column from Matruh at the end of December.

There was much satisfaction when, on December 19th, the battalion was warned that it would probably be relieved within the next few days. On that date, Lieut.-Col. Ferguson-Davie, of the 54th Sikhs, took over command of the Line of Communications, and on the 28th the various posts were relieved by troops of the 54th Division. The 2/N.Z.R.B., on relief, went by rail to Quamaria Camp, Alexandria, to rest and refit. Having now returned to Brigade, the battalion was inspected by the Brigadier on 1st January, 1916, and again on the 14th. The battalion took over from the 2nd Composite Regiment of Infantry the defence of the Mariut Canal from the 12th to the 17th January, "D" Company, under Capt. A. Digby-SmithA. Digby-Smith, being despatched to hold all railway and traffic bridges over the Canal. The battalion was relieved of this duty by the 1st Battalion of the South African Brigade, and on the 18th January moved from Alexandria to Ismailia, and was quartered at Moascar Camp.

Part 3.—The 1st Battalion At Mersa Matruh.

From Alexandria to Mersa Matruh by sea—Mersa Matruh— Earlier engagements of the Western Frontier Force—1st Battalion's baptism of fire, the fight at Wadi Majid, Christmas Day, 1915—On column to Bir Zarka—Church parade—Command, Lieut.-Col. Fulton — Duties, rest, training — Halazin fight — Arrivals and departures—Inspection by General Maxwell—On column towards Sollum—Um Rakham—Return to Matruh—Note on completion of campaign—Return to Alexandria—Move to Moascar.

On the arrival of the 1st Battalion at Gabarri Camp siding, Alexandria, on the night of 18th/19th December, it was found that no transport had been detailed to move the baggage, and that at the camp only a few tents had been pitched for us. These difficulties were eventually surmounted, however, but the men were not settled down before 4 a.m. Again, on going to Western Frontier Force Headquarters to report during the forenoon, as instructed, the commanding officer found the rooms empty, and no information appeared to be available, except that apparently the whole of the staff had moved to Mersa Matruh. The Embarkation Officer, who had been sufficiently busy elsewhere, came at about noon with instructions to the effect that part of the Battalion was to be sent away by sea in the evening, and by 4.30 p.m. "B" and "C" Companies had left for Matruh in H.M.S. "Clematis" and two or three trawlers. At 5 p.m. on the following day, "A" Company embarked on the "Missir," and about the same time on the 21st, "D" Company (less one platoon) and Battalion Headquarters (less Machine Gun, Transport, Signal and Stretcher-bearer Sections) departed on the "Noor El Bahr."

The gunboat and the tiny traders and trawlers were packed to their full capacity, and there was barely room to turn. As in each case the journey was made at night, it had few interesting features beyond those attaching to the sights of the harbour of Alexandria as we passed out in the early evening, and to the unusual nature of the country that came into view with the dawn of the following day as we approached Mersa Matruh. There was, of course, the ever-present possibility of an encounter with a submarine. The "Clematis," indeed, received en route a wireless message that a U-boat had been sighted off Matruh, but no untoward incident marred the voyage.

Mersa Matruh

Strictly speaking, Mersa Matruh is the name of the harbour, Mersa meaning "anchorage."

is a village lying near the shore of a little bay about a mile and a half long from east to west, and half a mile broad. The harbour and anchorage are good, completely sheltered from seawards by rocks which extend from each side of the bay, and may be used by steamers up to 1,000 tons. It is the first landing-place west of Alexandria, from which city it is distant about 200 miles. There is no wharf, but for military purposes an anchored barge was made use of as an improvised landing-stage. A fort stands on a rocky ridge and overlooks both the harbour and the open water of the Mediterranean. The shores of the harbour are of snow- white sand. The village lies beyond an outcrop of limestone and in the neighbourhood of a tiny oasis. Its population in pre-war days numbered about 200, mainly Greeks and Italians. The camps of the various units of the Frontier Force located here were spread out between the shore and a low, sandy, limestone ridge, some 1500 yards inland, along the crest of which ran part of the outpost line. To the east of the bay, on the hard sand between the harbour and a lagoon, stood canvas aeroplane hangars.

Owing to the precarious state of the lines of communication, all frontier and desert posts must to a great extent be self-contained and self-supporting. Mersa Matruh, which was selected as the British advanced base for the operations against the Senussi Moslems and their supporters, was no exception, for though it had two lines of communication, neither of these was secure. El Dabaa, at the head of the railway from Alexandria, was nearly 90 miles away, and the connecting road was too long and too exposed for use as a means of supply. Dur-ingDuring our stay at Matruh, the road was used only by motor vehicles and mounted troops, and that only occasionally. The main line of communication was by sea, but Alexandria, the nearest port to the eastward, was very far away, and interruption through storms or submarine attacks was an ever- present possibility.

To meet the contingencies due to its isolation, and to ensure efficient all-round defence, a chain of outposts numbering 13 in all was constructed to cover the harbour, village and encampments. From the western entrance of the harbour, where No. 1 outpost was situated, this line ran southwards to the limestone ridge, and then eastwards along its crest to the El Dabaa road, where it turned again towards the coast, ending at No. 13 outpost, some 400 yards from the Coastguard Station at the entrance. The whole system was further protected by barbed wire entanglements. Each outpost consisted of a sangar of rough rock walls enclosing an area of some 200 square yards, in which place were shelters improvised from the very scanty material obtainable. The complete outer system was admirably sited, and formed a typical example of fortification capable of withstanding attacks by an enemy who depends mainly on the rifle. Surrounding the Force Headquarters, the ordnance and supply depots, and the main encampment, was an inner line of defence consisting of smaller rock and sandbag posts. This line also was heavily wired. The necessary patrolling beyond the outposts was carried out mainly by the mounted troops, while an aeroplane made periodical reconnoitring flights far out across the desert. A gunboat was usually present in the harbour, the equipment of the fort on the headland was augmented, and a Krupp gun was placed in the outpost line itself.

The supply of water for a large force was a difficult matter. In the village there were some six wells, and at Bir Farag

A bir, or ber, is an underground cistern cut in the rock and filled by rainfall. A well fed by an underground spring, such as those at Matruh, is called a "sania," but the use of the word "bir" as part of a place-name is an indication of the presence of a water-source of any kind.

, on the eastern outskirts, a group of two or three others, but the yield was limited, and the greater part of our drinking water was canal-water brought from Alexandria by sea. Occasionally, owing to shipping interruptions, the daily

El Dabaa. Copyright, Rev. A. G. Parham, M.C.

Bedouin Prisoners.Copyright, Rev. A. G. Parham, M.C. Face p. 32.

Disembarking at Mersa Matruh.Copyright. Rev. A. G. Parham, M.C.

The Compound at Force Headquarters, Matruh. N.Z.R.B. Camp in the distance. ration, already sufficiently meagre, was cut down, but the installation of a condenser subsequently effected a general improvement. For animals, brackish water was obtained from hessis, which were holes dug in the sands of the beach.

The country inland is rocky, but interspersed with patches of a peculiar hard, brown, clayey soil, said to produce the finest barley in the world. Such roads as exist in the neighbourhood have been made by simply removing the loose stones from the surface of the ground. The coastal strip is subject to occasional heavy rainstorms, as we learned from bitter experience. The camp of the 1st Battalion was twice flooded out, and on one expedition in particular we found that, after rain, marching was exceedingly difficult, and the strength and patience of the men were tried almost to breaking point by the repeated calls to extricate cars and transport waggons from the mud. Wild vegetation is scarce, and beyond a few dry flower-stems and roots of scrubby thorns sufficient to boil a mess-tin of water, the country produces no fuel.

Scattered over the countryside are many evidences of past occupation by a considerable population. One finds here and there fragments of sculptured pillars, dating back to Græco- Roman times; while large mounds of red pottery refuse mark the sites of kilns belonging to a still more ancient period. Antiquarians had quite recently been at work at various points in the district, and they were reported to have made many valuable finds, including some beautiful statues and vases discovered in the caves of a neighbouring wadi. Matruh is the ancient Parætonium, and was one of Cleopatra's favourite pleasure resorts; and during the stay of the 1st Battalion at the station the remains of her villa were found and partially uncovered. If legend is to be believed, it was at Mersa Matruh that Alexander the Great landed on his way to the Oasis of Siwa to consult the oracle there before founding the town of Alexandria.

General Wallace transferred his headquarters from Alexandria to Matruh on December 7th, 1915, and four days later had his first encounter with Senussi forces. From five to six miles south of Matruh is a tableland some 300 feet high, dropping to the coastal strip in a steep escarpment. The outline of the plateau is irregular, and ten miles to the west of the station it is only two miles from the sea. Intersecting the escarp-mentescarpment at right angles are numerous dry, rocky watercourses, miles in length, and having extremely steep sides. In one or other of these deep gullies, known as "wadis," the enemy would establish his temporary stronghold. He had been located at Wadi Senaab, eight miles to the westward, and on December 11th a column moved out to attack him. The Yeomanry, aided by a squadron of Australian Light Horse, inflicted over a hundred casualties and cleared the wadi, the British losses being slight. The force, which included the Sikhs, camped on the ground won, and spent the following day rounding up prisoners.

Being reinforced by the Royal Scots, the column started again on the 13th for a spot twelve miles further west, to engage the enemy, but in crossing Wadi Shaifa was itself attacked by a force of 1,200. The enemy was defeated, leaving 180 dead. He was pursued till dark, when the column returned to Matruh.

The Senussi forces began to concentrate again, this time in the vicinity of Jebel Medwa, a prominent hill some eight miles to the south-west of Matruh. From air reconnaissance and other sources the enemy strength here was estimated to have reached in the course of a week the number of about 5,000 men, of whom more than half were muhafzia, or regular soldiers, with four guns and some machine-guns, the whole being under the command of Gaafar Pasha. It had become evident that the force at the disposal of General Wallace was not sufficiently strong in numbers both to hold Matruh and at the same time to bring the enemy to a decisive engagement, and it was in response to a request for reinforcements that the 1st Battalion of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade had been despatched from Cairo, together with a battery of the Honourable Artillery Company and two four-inch naval guns.

We were warned on December 23rd of an impending operation in which we were to take part. The adjutant, quarter- master, machine-gun officer, transport officer, and signalling officer were still at Alexandria, and upon the shoulders of Capt. Purdy, the acting-adjutant, there now fell a very great deal of extra work. Having no transport with us, we were instructed to make the best arrangements possible with the l/6th Royal Scots and the 2/7th Middlesex for the loan of horses and vehicles. These arrangements proved somewhat vexatious and unsatisfactory, but we were finally helped out of our difficulty through the kind offices of Major Francis, commanding the Australian Train. The only chargers obtainable were those for the commanding officer and the adjutant. These were neither ornamental nor useful, Capt. Purdy's horse being particularly impossible, and both were, without regret, abandoned to the grooms long before the engagement was over. Fortunately the machine-gun officer with the personnel of his section arrived at Matruh on the eve of the battle, but his work next day was greatly hampered by the many defects that became apparent in the borrowed limber-teams as they negotiated the steep slopes of the rough wadi-country.

Definite orders for the morrow's operations were not received until about noon on Christmas Eve, and the companies being engaged at construction work on the outpost line, these orders were not communicated to the men until evening. All ranks were very fit and keen, and the prospect of a fight aroused the utmost enthusiasm.

As this was to be our baptism of fire, it will be of interest to record in detail the operation orders for the action in which we were to participate.

Operation Orders By Major-General A. Wallace, C.B., Commanding Western Frontier Force. Mersa Matruh, 24th December, 1915.

Reference Map:

Africa 1/250,000.

Matruh Sheet.

1. The following troops will move to-morrow to operate against the enemy force now occupying Wadi Majid and neighbourhood. 2. The left column, under Brigadier-General Tyndale Biscoe, will move via the Wadi Toweiwia and thence westward.

Troops.

Australian Light Horse, 3 squadrons.

D.L.O. Yeomanry, 3 squadrons.

Yeomanry Machine Gun Section.

Notts R.H.A. (less one section).

Notts R.H.A. Ammunition Column (less detachment). Detachment 1st S. Midland Field Ambulance.

3. The main column will move by the Matruh-sidi Barrani road.

To form right column under Lt.-Col. Gordon, 15th Sikhs.

Advanced Guard.

Commander, Capt. Cates. 2 Coys. 15th Sikhs.

Starting point— South-west exit from camp—to be marked by 2 Signalling lamps.

Main Body.

15th Sikhs (less 2 Coys.). 1st Bn. N.Z. Rifle Bde. 1 Section Notts R.H.A. Royal Bucks Hussars. 2/8th Middlesex (less 1 Coy.)

Notts R.H.A. Amm. Col. (less detachment).

Inf. Bde. Amm. Column. 137th Ind. Field Amb.

S. Mid. Field Amb. (less detachment).

Notts & Derby Field Amb. Demolition Section.

1st line transport of main bodies (less details named in 5) in order of march.

2nd line transport in order of march.

Australian Train, with men's rations, water and greatcoats.

Water Section under Capt. Eaton.

Rearguard. 1 Coy. 2/8th Middlesex. 4. Water for animals will not be carried, and they will probably return to camp in the evening. 5. The only 1st line transport to accompany Infantry Units on the march will be the Regimental Reserve S.A.A., Machine Gun, Signalling Equipment and Entrenching Tools. 6. A detachment R.N.A.C.D. will leave camp at 7 a.m. Commander: Lieut.-Cmmdr. Lister. 6 armoured cars. 7. With the above will move 6 motor ambulances, and the light cars of the R.N.A.C.D. which will be available for ambulance transport. The whole to be under orders of Lieut.- Colonel Sewell, R.A.M.C. 8. A headquarters' signal section and (possibly) a motor-car wireless detachment will accompany headquarters. 9. Reports to head of Main Body. (Signed) G. G. Hunter, Colonel, General Staff, W.F. Force.

Copy No. Copies. 1. G.S.O. 1. Personally. 2. G.S.O. 2. Personally. 3. D.A.A. & Q.M.G. Personally. 4-6. A.D.M.S. (3). Personally. 7. A.D.S. & T. Personally. 8. G.O.C. Infantry Bde. By Orderly. 9. G.O.C. Mounted Bde. By Orderly. 10. O.C. Notts R.H.A. By Orderly. 11. Col. Gordon, 15th Sikhs. By Orderly. 12. O.C. 15th Sikhs. By Orderly. 13. O.C. 1st N.Z.R.B. By Orderly. 14. O.C. 2/8th Middlesex. By Orderly. 15. O.C. R.N.A.C.D. Personally. By Orderly. 16. O.C. H.M.S. "Clematis." By Commdr. Hoo, R.N. By Orderly.

Instructions For Mobile Column.

These instructions were issued on the previous day.

Units of the Mobile Column will take the field equipped as under. Completion of deficiencies must be arranged at once.

Ammunition.

1. In firing In R.H.A. Total rounds Battery. Ammn. Col. per gun. R.H.A. 110 100 210

Rounds, S.A.A., Per Rifle:

On the Person. In Section reserve. In Right reserve. In R.H.A. Amm. Col. Tl.per rifle.

Yeomanry and

Light Horse.. 120 — — 180 300 Infantry, T.F.. 100 20 180 — 300 Infantry, N.Z.R.B. 120 — 180 — 300 Indian Infantry 100 100 100 — 300

Per Machine Gun: With M.G. Section. In Section Reserve. In Bde Amm. Col. Total per gun. Yeomanry …. 3,500 16,000 — 19,500 Infantry. T.F., 19,500 N.Z.R.B. … 3,500 8,000 8.000 19,500 Indian Infantry 6,000 4,000 8,000 18.000

Ammunition.

2. Infantry will complete to 200 rounds per man before moving into action.

Ammunition.

3. A Brigade S.A.A. Column will be formed under command of Lieut. Chaplin. Australian A.S.C., consisting of Infantry Regimental Reserve S.A.A. carried in vehicles.

Vehicles. Rounds G.S. Limbered Wagons. G.S. Wagons, carried. 5 G.S. Limbered Wagons per Brit. & N.Z. Regt. 10 — 160,000 3 G.S. Wagons per Indian Regt. — 3 75,000

With this unit will move 9 rank and file per regiment.

Ammunition.

4. All other regimental infantry ammunition wagons will join this column after troops move into action. Empty wagons will not be sent back to camp without orders from the O.C. Brigade Ammunition Column.

Ammunition.

5. The Notts R.H.A. Ammunition Column will remain a separate formation and will carry:

50 rounds per gun and 180 rounds per rifle in 2 ammunition wagons and 8 G.S. limbered wagons respectively.

Rations.

6. The remainder of the current day's rations will be carried on the person, and one day's ration per man will be carried in the train.

Water.

7. A total of half a gallon per man will be carried in the train. None will be carried for horses.

Equipment: Infantry.

8. Packs must be made as light as possible. Only the great- coat is to be carried therein.

Water And Explosives Units.

9. Special water and explosives units have been organized and will accompany the column. They will be commanded by Capt. Eaton and Lieut. Wilson respectively.

Scale of Ammunition for R.N.A.C.D.

10. Per Machine Gun, 3000 rounds.

Per Rifle, 100 rounds.

Signed) H. W. Tobin, Captain, General Staff. Copies to, etc.

General Wallace's force moved out before daylight on Christmas morning.

The plan of attack was for the right column to advance directly on Jebel Medwa, the left column to make a wide detour southward round the right flank of the enemy to deny his retreat to the west. H.M.S. "Clematis" stood off-shore to assist with gunfire as occasion offered.

By 5 a.m. the right column was on the move south-west along the Khedival Motor Road. The Bucks Hussars formed the screen, and were followed by the 15th Sikhs, who provided the advance guard. The 1/N.Z.R.B. was next in order, and supplied right and left flank guards to the infantry.

At about 6 a.m. the enemy gave warning of our approach by means of a flare on one of the sandhills, and half an hour later the advance guard came under artillery fire from the south-west. The Sikhs immediately shook out into artillery formation, and the 1/N.Z.R.B. was ordered to conform to their movements, bring in the flank guards, and detail one platoon as escort to the guns. Advanced elements of the Senussi were pushed back by the leading sections of the Sikhs, and by 7.15 a.m. our main body had crossed the Wadi Ramleh.

The enemy was now discovered occupying in strength an escarpment about a mile south of Jebel Medwa, and at 7.30 a.m. the Sikhs were ordered to attack the enemy on his right flank, the Bucks Hussars and 2/8th Middlesex to co-operate by a containing attack along his front. West of the road the Sikhs came under rifle and machine-gun fire, but their advance was not checked. They moved steadily forward in extended order, the 1/N.Z.R.B. following in artillery formation for a distance of about a mile. The Middlesex men were soon able to occupy Jebel Medwa, and the right flank was thus secured. The section of the Notts Battery came into action on the high ground near the road 2000 yards east of Jebel Medwa and silenced the enemy's artillery, and at 7.45 a.m. H.M.S. "Clematis" opened an accurate and useful fire, her shooting being "spotted" by our aeroplane.

In the nullahs of the Wadi Medwa the Sikhs met with considerable opposition, and our "A" Company (Major W. KayW. Kay) was sent forward to prolong the firing-line on the left flank. At 9.30 a.m. "B" Company (Capt. E. PuttickE. Puttick) also reinforced the line, going in on the right of the Sikhs, and by ten o 'clock the Wadi Medwa was cleared.

The advance now continued across the rock-strewn ground beyond, and the guns were soon afterwards brought forward to the western side of the wadi, with "C" and "D" Companies (Captains J. Pow and J. R. Cowles), in reserve under cover behind the guns.

At 11 a.m., the left column could be seen operating about two miles to the south-west, and being communicated with by signal, it changed direction northwards along the Wadi Majid.

At the second gun position some casualties to the personnel of the artillery and Col. Gordon's staff details were caused by the fire of a party of the enemy that had crept round to a position on a ridge beyond the nullah on our left. A platoon of "D" Company, under Lieut. H. HoldernessH. Holderness, was despatched to clear up this locality, an operation attended by no little difficulty, and one exceedingly interesting to watch by those in the vicinity of the guns, for they were able to follow the movements of both parties while each was frequently invisible to the other. The platoon, admirably handled, successfully accomplished its mission and left no one to cause further annoyance from this quarter.

By noon "C" and "D" Companies and the four machine-guns were sent into the firing-line, extending it to the right, and the work of clearing out the many branching nullahs at the head of Wadi Majid was carried on, the whole line moving forward slowly but surely. Much delay in getting the Vickers guns up was caused by the unsatisfactory nature of the bor-rowedborrowed teams for the limbers, and Lieut. J. A. D. HopkirkJ. A. D. Hopkirk, who was in command of the section, found it necessary to employ all his men at the exhausting work of assisting the teams in order to get the limbers sufficiently far forward over the rock-strewn country to enable him to bring the guns into action.

Our battalion was held up for some time by hot rifle and machine-gun fire from a donga running forward at right angles from the main enemy position, two companies, with the Sikhs, being on one side of this, and two companies on the other. The line was somewhat long and thin, and at 2.30 p.m. Col Gordon gave instructions for part of the left to be withdrawn and pushed into the centre. For this purpose "A" Company was brought round through a donga from the left of the Sikhs to their right, thus joining up with "B" Company, which was then engaged in driving the forward parties of the enemy from the branch donga referred to above. The enemy's position here was held with great tenacity, and "B" Company's task was not accomplished without considerable difficulty.

It now became evident that the enemy's stronghold was the edge of the main wadi towards our right front, along which he occupied an entrenched position, and at this stage the Sikhs were withdrawn, apparently so as not to hamper the movements of the mounted troops, who had now come into action on the high ground beyond that section of the wadi immediately opposite the Sikhs. The situation being clear and definite, all four companies advanced by steady rushes across the intermediate stretch of plateau, a platoon of "B" Company making sure of the awkward branch donga, and soon after 4 p.m. the final position was taken. A company of the Middlesex Battalion had come up in the rear of our right company, but their aid was not required.

The mopping-up of the wadi was done with thoroughness, and by the time it was completed fully 100 enemy dead were left in the trenches, caves and hollows. Disorganized groups of the Senussi, forestalling the action of our mounted troops, made good their escape through the seaward end of the wadi or over the ridge to the west. Some 34 prisoners were taken, however, while 80 camels and a number of asses, sheep and goats found in the stronghold were destroyed, and about 30,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, with three cases of nine-pounder shells, were brought away and buried.

While the clearing of the wadi was in progress we received orders to return to Jebel Medwa as soon as this duty was completed, and accompanying these instructions was the intimation that the remainder of the force had already left the field. It was after 5 p.m. before the battalion was reformed, and the return march, which had to be carried out in the dark over strange country intersected by a maze of nullahs, and with no guide or suitable map, proved a difficult and trying task. We had several of our own and enemy wounded to bring in, and as we were now short of stretchers, a whole platoon had to be detailed to attend to this problem alone. Thanks largely to the good management and untiring efforts of the medical officer, Capt. G. V. BogleG. V. Bogle, and Lieut. N. L. MackyN. L. Macky and Corporal W. McNabW. McNab, all difficulties in this connection were finally overcome. In addition, we were hampered by the slow movement of the machine-gun limbers whose teams had made such a poor showing during the hours of day-light. However, the bivouac camp at Jebel Medwa was reached at last, and here we rested under the stars until four o'clock next morning, when the column moved off again for Matruh.

The total casualties during the day were 14 rank and file killed, and 3 officers and 47 other ranks wounded. The enemy lost 370 dead and 82 prisoners. Amongst the booty were the office and personal effects of Gaafar Pasha, abandoned by him in his flight. The casualties of our battalion numbered 6 killed

These, the first of our Glorious Dead, were: Sergeant-Major R. C. PurkisR. C. Purkis, Sergeant S. F. WeirS. F. Weir, Corporal A. WoollattA. Woollatt, Corporal E. C. Beresford-Wilkinson, Rifleman T. F. York, and Rifleman J. M. Todd. Of the wounded, Rifleman E. N. Davis died before the year had ended.

and 14 wounded. The dead were brought in and buried in the little military cemetery at Matruh, the officers of the battalion acting as bearers, and before we left the station permanent memorials were erected over their graves.

In his despatch regarding this action, General Maxwell, Commanding the Forces in Egypt, specially mentions Lieut.-Col. Gordon, commanding the right column; and the 15th Sikhs and the 1st Battalion, with their respective temporary commanding officers, Major Evans and Major Austin. Mention is also made of Quartermaster-Sergeant A. L. McCormickA. L. McCormick, Corpl. R. LepperR. Lepper and Rifleman T. Nimmo, for distinguished conduct under fire. Of the New Zealanders, it was said: "This was the first time the men of the 1st Battalion had been in action, but they fought with the steadiness of seasoned troops." All ranks were pleased to have from Colonel Gordon personally his expressions of praise of the battalion's work, and from His Excellency the Honorary Colonel the following message: "Best congratulations to the New Zealand Rifle Brigade on their first action. Trust wounded are doing well."

The immediate result of the action was the retirement of The Senussi with his staff and the remains of his force to Unjeila and Halazin, some twenty-five miles to the west, and subsequent events show that the Christmas Day fight was the turning-point in the campaign that ultimately brought about his downfall.

Monday, 27th December, was a day of rest, but towards evening there were rumours that the battalion was to go out on column again. On the 28th orders were received for a march, at 2 p.m. of the same day, to Bir Jerawala (Gerowle), twelve miles to the south-east, to operate against a hostile force under Sayed Harun, then threatening the Line of Communications between Matruh and Dabaa.

The mobile column consisted of a detachment of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division, 6 squadrons of Royal Bucks Hussars, a section each of the Notts R.H.A. and "A" Battery of the H.A.C., the 1/N.Z.R.B., 15th Sikhs, 2/7th "Middlesex (less two companies), Force Signalling Section, Ammunition Column, 1st South Midland and 137th Indian Field Ambulances, a Water Section and the Australian Train, and was commanded by Brigadier-General the Earl of Lucan.

The force arrived at Bir Jerawala at 7 p.m. and bivouacked there. At midnight orders were issued for a continuance of the march on the 29th, and at 5 a.m. the column was on the move for Bir Zarka, some nine miles farther to the south, where we expected to meet the enemy. Failing to get touch with him here, we went on five miles beyond Bir Zarka and halted. It became evident that the hostile force had taken alarm and had cleared away in haste; and as it was impossible to pursue farther, we were compelled to commence the return march, taking with us as booty one month's supplies, 400 sheep, 90 camels and 200 tents abandoned by Harun. We bivouacked at Bir Zarka on the night of 29th/30th, reached Jerawala at 10 a.m. on the 30th, where we rested till 2 p.m., and then marched in to Matruh, reaching camp at 7.30 p.m.

This expedition was an extremely arduous one. The country was exceedingly trying, low-lying stretches of loose sand alternating with rock-strewn tablelands, and in the anxiety to get on to the heels of Sayed Harun's force the customary halts were frequently dispensed with. There were several march casualties, even the hardy, seasoned Sikhs finding the strain almost unbearable.

On New Year's Day, Capt. Purdy, with his old platoon of "C" Company, together with the adjutant and medical officer, and an escort of Australian Light Horse and two armoured cars, went out at 6 a.m. to Wadi Majid to bring in the body of Corporal Beresford-Wilkinson, who had been killed in the Christmas Day fight while endeavouring to get a wounded comrade under cover. All our casualties of that day had been safely brought in with this exception. On going forward from the position Beresford-Wilkinson's companions had hastily covered the body, but later, in the darkness of evening, had not been able to locate the spot. Owing to the risks entailed, permission to send out our party was granted by Force Head-quarters with some misgivings, but the mission was accomplished without mishap. The party returned at 5 p.m., and the body was buried in the military cemetery beside those of his comrades.

On Sunday, 2nd January, the battalion attended the Force Church Parade in the coastguard barrack square, Force Head-quarters being present. Rain fell on the 3rd, 4th and 5th, gradually increasing in quantity until finally part of the camp was inundated and had to be shifted to higher ground.

The hospital-ship "Rasheed" arrived on January 8th, and two days later sailed again for Alexandria with sick and wounded.

The instruments having come to hand from Alexandria, the band played a programme in camp on the 8th, to the great delight of everyone, and on the following day, Sunday, headed the battalion in its march to church parade, where it accompanied the singing of the hymns.

In accordance with Brigade Orders, Lieut.-Col. Fulton arrived on the evening of January 9th, and resumed command of the battalion. Capt. Bell had already reported on December 26th and taken up the duties of adjutant again, Capt. Purdy returning to "C" Company.

From 2nd January until the 21st the battalion was employed on outpost duty, supplied parties for construction work on the outpost line or at the landing-stage, or was engaged in training and route-marching. During this period a column, of which we did not form a part, went out in the direction of Baggush. It failed to gain touch with the enemy, but brought in a very large number of camels. We opened our first regimental canteen on the 11th of January, and did a brisk trade in goods brought from Alexandria; and on the 15th held our first camp concert, the performers being our own men, volunteers from the neighbouring Middlesex camp, and the battalion band. Many similar entertainments were given in the various camps, but perhaps the one best remembered was that held at Force Headquarters, by a combined party of New Zealanders and Australians, at which the "star" items were the Earl of Denbigh's French-Canadian song and his story of Waterloo.

On January 19th, 1916, aerial reconnaissance disclosed a concentration of a considerable enemy force, estimated at about 5,000, at Halazin,

This name is incorrectly given in some maps as Hazalin.

25 miles south-west of Matruh. In the encampment the tent of the Grand Senussi was recognized by the observer.

The infantry at Matruh was augmented by the arrival, on January 20th and 21st, of the 2nd Battalion, South African Brigade, and on the 22nd an attacking force moved out at 3.30 p.m. under the personal command of General Wallace. The 1/N.Z.R.B. was the leading battalion of the main body, which reached Bir Shola (16 miles) at 8.30 p.m. Here the force bivouacked for the night in a perimeter camp, our battalion forming the west face.

Here we saw for the first time the recently-invented Lewis gun, which in the days to come was to prove so effective in both attack and defence. Our new comrades, the South Africans, had four of these.

On account of the fact that a perimeter bivouac is usually established at dusk, or later, after a long day's march with possibly a fight thrown in, it seldom comes up to the ideal as set forth in the training-manuals, though the principle is carried out in effect. The infantry are extended along the four sides and are told to dig in. Outposts are placed from 400 to 500 yards out in front of the sides of the square, and these also dig in. They are lucky, however, if these defensive arrangements are carried out only once, for readjustments are sometimes necessary, in which case the lines may be pushed forward or drawn back, and, to the annoyance of all concerned, the digging has to be done all over again. Inside the square, the artillery, cavalry, ambulances, transport and so forth, are allotted spaces; and in sure reliance on the watchfulness of the outpost sentries the camp settles down to rest, till dawn heralds another day's trek and perchance a fight.

At 6 a.m. on the 23rd, after a night's heavy rain, the force moved out from Bir Shola on a compass bearing of 270 deg. in the direction of the enemy camp. It was disposed as under:—

Right Column (Lieut.-Col. J. L. R. Gordon, 15th Sikhs): 1 Squadron D.L.O. Yeomanry. Notts Battery, R.H.A. 15th Sikhs. 2nd Battalion South African Brigade. 1st Battalion N.Z.R.B.

Left Column (Brig.-General J. D. T. Tyndale Biscoe):

1 Squadron Australian Light Horse. 3 Squadrons Royal Bucks Hussars. 1 Squadron Dorset Yeomanry. 1 Squadron Herts Yeomanry. Mounted Brigade Machine Gun Section. "A" Battery H.A.C. (less one section).

Reserve:

2 Troops Surrey Yeomanry. 1/6th Battalion Royal Scots (less two companies). S.A.A. Column.

Detachment of Royal Naval Armoured Car Division, intended for action against the enemy's left flank.

The 1/N.Z.R.B. was the rear battalion of the right column, and found the right flank guard of a half-company and the rear guard of one company. The left column was echelonned to the left front of the right column, moving parallel to and in close touch with it. The reserve moved half a mile in rear of the right column. The train, with a half-battalion of the 2/8th Middlesex Regiment, remained parked at Bir Shola.

At 9 a.m. the right column halted for breakfast, and presently reports came in from the advanced mounted troops on the left that the enemy had been sighted about two miles ahead. At 9.40 a.m., after the march had been resumed, distant firing was heard, the covering screen having become engaged. To support these leading troops, the Bucks Hussars and the battery of the H.A.C. were now sent forward, and the advance continued steadily for some time.

At 10.30 a.m. the infantry filled up to 200 rounds, closed up its column, and the Sikhs, followed by the remaining infantry, advanced to the attack as the mounted troops uncovered the front.

By 11 a.m. the infantry column began to suffer casualties from long-range fire, and the 1st Battalion opened out into artillery formation in rear of the South Africans. A few minutes later the enemy were observed working round our right and driving in the mounted troops. To check this, our flank guard, under Capt. A. I. WalkerA. I. Walker, was pushed out to about 1,500 yards. The main attack was pressed on, and by 12 noon our battalion, coming under heavy long-range rifle and machine-gun fire, was shaken out into extended lines behind the South Africans, to whose movements we conformed. Half-an-hour later it was found necessary to reinforce the right flank guard with two more platoons and two machine-guns, and this whole company, under Captain Puttick, succeeded in driving off from that quarter an attack by some 400 of the enemy, and silencing his two machine guns. At 1 p.m. "C" Company (Capt. Pow) was sent to the left in support of the left company of the Sikhs, and was eventually brought into the firing-line there. At the same time half of "A" Company was brought forward from the rear guard to the reserve.

By 2.45 p.m. the Sikhs, South Africans and part of the New Zealand Battalion were approaching the enemy's main line of resistance, but the mounted troops on the left had not been so successful. Indeed, they had been pushed back to such an extent that by 2.30 p.m. they were occupying, with the guns of the H.A.C., a position nearly 1,000 yards in rear of the Field Ambulance. To restore the situation here, a composite company (half of "A" and half of "D"), under Major Kay, was hurried off to Force Headquarters, where it received orders from General Wallace to attack that section of the enemy, estimated to be some 250 strong, which had almost succeeded in completing its enveloping movement. A sharp fight ensued, and the enemy was at once brought to a standstill. Our men now advanced by successive rushes; the tide was turned; and by 3.30 p.m. the enemy in this quarter was driven off in disorder. The arrival of "B" Company under Capt. Puttick, which had been withdrawn for the purpose from its position on our right flank, completed the security of this point. The position for the time had been very critical, and Major Kay was personally complimented by General Wallace on his quick grasp of the situation and his prompt and thorough action in dealing with it.

In the meantime, the main attack by Colonel Gordon had progressed satisfactorily. His firing-line extended over a mile in length and had moved across ground absolutely destitute of cover, while mirage in the early stages made it impossible to locate the enemy's positions with any degree of certainty. Casualties caused by artillery and machine-guns had been somewhat severe, the enemy's fire being both rapid and accurate. Nevertheless the enemy was slowly but surely pressed back, though his retirement of nearly three miles to his main line of resistance was conducted with such great skill as to deny all efforts to come to close quarters with him.

At about 3.30 p.m., under steady pressure from our infantry, the enemy began to fall back from his main position. Soon his retirement developed into a complete rout, and by 4 p.m. he had finally fled from the field. Pursuit was out of the question. The heavy rain of the previous night had converted the whole country into a quagmire, with the result that the cavalry horses were exhausted, the armoured cars could not operate, and the supply train had not been able to advance more than three miles from Bir Shola. Orders were therefore issued that the advance was to proceed no further than the enemy's camp, which in his flight he had left standing.

Sayed Ahmed himself had left the field early. It appears that, unaware of our movements, he had decided to move south on the night of the 23rd to Siwa, where he was establishing a base for an early direct attack on Egypt. News of our advance did not reach him till after sunrise on that day, and as soon as the first shot was fired he fled westward with a small escort, leaving his main force to cover his retreat. The whole equipment of tents, rugs, camel-packs, arms, ammunition, cooking utensils, medical and general stores, was now burned or otherwise destroyed, and the force moved back some two miles

Representative South Africans, Sikhs and New Zealanders at Matruh, Lieut.-Col. Gordon in the centre, and Lieut.-Col. Fulton on the right of middle row.

Camel Transport.Face p. 48.

A Field Dressing Station at Halazin.

Head of A Mobile Column Returning To Matruh. Copyright. Rev. A. G. Parham, M.C.

The First Graves.Sergt.-Major Robert Charles Purkis, Sergeant Stanley Francis Weir, Corporal Ernest Charles Beresford-Wilkinson, Corporal Archibald WoollattArchibald Woollatt, Rifleman John Mathew Todd.

Riflemen Edgar Norman Davis, Robert Greenlees Blaikie, Leslie Garnet Hookings.

Gafaar Pasha A Prisoner.Copyright. Rev. A. G. Parham, M. C to the position taken up by the field ambulance. Here the situation was somewhat serious, for the number of wounded was considerable. Under ordinary conditions most of the cases would have been despatched in the motor wagons to Matruh without delay, but owing to the deep mud it was impossible to move the vehicles. A perimeter camp was formed and sentries posted, and the troops spent a miserable night without coats, blankets, food or water, the weather being wet and bitterly cold.

On the 24th there was no sign of the enemy, and at 8 a.m. the force started on the return march to Bir Shola. Owing to the state of the ground this proved an arduous undertaking, as all wheeled vehicles had to be assisted by hand. To the New Zealanders, the rear battalion of the main body, fell the greater part of this exhausting labour. The transport of the wounded presented the greatest difficulty. They could not be taken in the ambulances, and those unable to ride had to be carried on stretchers, a severe strain upon the troops already tired out by their own exertions and a sleepless night, and still without food or water. At 2 p.m. we reached the point where the train had been parked, filled our water-bottles, and in somewhat better spirits continued the trudge to Bir Shola. Here, at 5 p.m., we bivouacked, but as it rained again during the night, and the coats and blankets were already wet, very little sleep was obtained.

On the 25th the weather cleared, and the troops marched back to Mersa Matruh, the last of the column getting in by 4.30 p.m.

The total British casualties in this action were:—1 officer killed and 13 wounded; other ranks, 30 killed and 278 wounded. Our battalion had 1 other rank killed and 2 officers and 30 other ranks wounded. The enemy's casualties were estimated from observation and prisoners' reports to be not less than 200 killed and 500 wounded. The British dead were buried at Halazin, but on the discovery later that the enemy had interfered with the graves for the sake of loot, a special expedition went out and brought in the bodies for interment at Matruh.

In accordance with the principles guiding the activities of the Imperial War Graves Commission, the bodies of our dead comrades were, at the conclusion of the war, removed from Matruh to the Chatby Military Cemetery at Alexandria.

The enemy had received a very severe blow, and it afterwards transpired, from the reports of deserters, that the effect of this reverse, following upon that at Wadi Majid on Christmas Day, had not only gone far to discourage the Grand Senussi himself, but had shaken the faith of his followers, many of whom, especially those from the eastern Bedouin tribes, deserted his cause and cleared away to their own country.

Referring to the success attained on the 23rd, General Maxwell states in his despatches: "Especial praise is due to the leading of Colonel Gordon, who commanded the main attack, and to the gallantry of the Sikhs, South Africans and New Zealanders, who fought with invincible dash and resolution throughout the day."

At about this time many changes were being made in the compositon of the Western Frontier Force at Matruh. The monitor "Humber" arrived in port on 30th January and commenced a survey of the harbour. She had been one of the ships employed in bombarding the German right at Nieuport on 18th October, 1914, and doubtless she was now intended for service in co-operation with contemplated land operations in connection with the retaking of Sollum. The Royal Naval Armoured Car Detachment left on 28th January, and was replaced by the Duke of Westminster's Armoured Car Batteries, which were destined to perform some brilliant feats at Sollum and beyond. The Australian Light Horse departed for Alexandria via Dabaa on the 30th. We hoped that the rumour to the effect that the relieving units would come from the New Zealand Mounted Brigade would prove to be correct, but in this we were disappointed, for troops of a Home cavalry regiment came through from Dabaa on 2nd February.

The 2nd Battalion of the South African Brigade, which had arrived at Matruh on 20th January, was joined by another battalion from the same brigade at the end of the month.

On January 26th we ourselves received warning orders that we were to leave Matruh for Ismailia, beginning with one company on the following day,

The following General Order was issued on January 27th:— "On the departure of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, the General Officer Commanding the Western Frontier Force desires to place on record the universal regret of the Force at losing the comradeship of a reliable body of men of whom England may well be proud."

but the weather proved to be too unfavourable for a move, and on the 28th these warning orders were cancelled, the departure being postponed to permit of the 15th Sikhs going first. In the afternoon the first party of the Sikhs left by sea, our band playing them off. We were sorry to see them go. They and our men had fraternized most intimately on the field and in camp, and throughout displayed feelings of sincere mutual regard. We strove to emulate them in battle, and they for their part applauded the dash of our big fellows, whom they spoke of as "all the same Guards."

General Sir John MaxwellJohn Maxwell, K.C.B., commanding the Force in Egypt, arrived at Matruh on the 1st February, and on the following day inspected the battalion. He left the station again in the evening, accompanied by General Wallace, whose health had broken down. Major-General W. E. PeytonW. E. Peyton, C.B., D.S.O., succeeded General Wallace, taking over the command of the Western Frontier Force on February 9th. 1916.

The departure of the battalion was postponed from time to time, and general training and route-marching were continued. A camel-transport detachment having arrived at the station, all ranks were instructed and practised in the art of adjusting camel-packs and making up loads.

The power of the Senussi having been so broken in the engagements of Christmas Day and January 23rd that any danger to Matruh was practically at an end, it was now decided to clear the enemy from the coast westward and retake Sollum.

In connection with this scheme the 1st Battalion, with attached troops, was despatched on a three days' march to the west with the object of establishing an advanced base at Unjeila. Included in the column, which was under the command of Lieut.-Col. Fulton, were a troop of Yeomanry from the 2nd Mounted Brigade, a section of the Notts Royal Horse Artillery, a detachment of the Egyptian Royal Engineers and Labour Corps, and a detachment of the Notts and Derby Field Ambulance. There was practically no wheeled transport, the kits, ammunition, tools and general supplies being conveyed by some 900 camels in charge of about 500 native drivers of the Camel Transport Corps. On the line of march the camels were arranged in four parallel columns and moved on the left flank of the combatant units. Starting from the mosque on the west of the harbour at 9.30 a.m. on 13th February, and proceeding along the coast road, the column reached the end of the first stage and bivouacked at Zawia Um Rakham, after an interesting march of fifteen miles. About half-way from Matruh we came to the break that the enemy had made in the telephone line from Sollum. The line had been dismantled for a long distance and diverted southwards to the camp in the Wadi Majid that we had attacked and broken up on Christmas Day. Repairs were made by a party from headquarters signal corps and connection restored between Um Rakham and Matruh. Repairs to the road were carried out by the men of the Egyptian Engineers, and we were struck with the skill and rapidity with which the work was accomplished, particularly the difficult section at the ascent from Wadi Shaifa, just to the west of Um Rakham.

Along the line of march we passed numerous deserted plantations forming tiny oases about the wells, at which, by means of the quaint shadufs, we watered our animals. Reconnaissances inland towards the south, amongst the sandhills on our right, and for a considerable distance westward of our final halting-place revealed no sign of either men or animals.

The bivouac camp at Um Rakham had an extremely picturesque appearance. Within the regular faces of the perimeter formed by companies of infantry were the little groups of guns, the picket lines of the mounted troops, and the well-ordered sections of kneeling camels with their loads neatly arranged in rows before them and their attendants squatted in the sand nearby, the whole picture being set off by the white sand of the hills towards the shore and the scattered palms and quaint stone huts and tombs of the deserted village. Column headquarters were established outside a group of low buildings which had formed a sort of monastery or college in which the preachers and teachers of the Senussi sect were trained.

Instructions for the following day's march were issued, the outposts, especially those on the plateau to the south-west, were strengthened, and the camp settled down for the night. At 10 p.m., however, orders came through by wire that we were to be relieved next day by a battalion of the South African Brigade, and were to return to Matruh. This alteration in the general plans, as we rightly conjectured, was to mark the con-clusionconclusion of our service with the Western Frontier Force. During the following morning preparations were made for the transfer of our own ammunition and stores from the camel transport to the wheeled vehicles of the South Africans, which were to be taken over by us. Further reconnaissances were made in all directions, but no signs of the enemy were seen; and the only positive result of these was the finding on the seashore of a large number of cases of pure rubber that had been washed ashore from a torpedoed trading-ship. These we salved and brought in, and by their subsequent sale our regimental funds were considerably augmented.

The South Africans arrived during the afternoon, and we commenced our return march at 4.30 p.m. We had a delightfully cool moonlight night, and reached Matruh comfortably by 9.30 p.m. Our recall was a great disappointment to all ranks, as we had been looking forward to taking part in the recapture of Sollum, which would have been a fitting climax to our service in this interesting theatre of war.

An advanced depot was duly established at Unjeila on 16th February, and on the 20th a force, the infantry of which consisted mainly of the 1st and 3rd South Africans, moved out to establish itself at Barrani, thus securing the second stepping-stone on the way to Sollum. This force ascertained on the 26th that the enemy was in strength near Agagia (fourteen miles to the south-east of Barrani), and they moved out at once to attack him. The ensuing action resulted in a severe defeat to the Senussi forces and the capture of the commander, Gaafar Pasha, who, it is reported, afterwards did valuable service on the side of the Allies as Staff Officer to the King of the Hedjaz in Arabia.

The enemy retreated westward towards Sollum, the Egyptian Bedouin deserting him in large numbers; and the bulk of the Western Frontier Force, including the remaining two battalions of the South African Brigade, was brought forward to Barrani. Two columns operating from this station attacked and took Sollum on March 14th, and by a dash of some twenty miles beyond that village the armoured cars under Major the Duke of Westminster succeeded in capturing all the enemy's guns and machine-guns, besides a number of prisoners, including three Turkish officers.

The campaign came to an end with the rescue, by the Armoured Car Detachment, of the survivors of the crews of the "Tara" and "Moorina" from an enemy camp some sixty miles west of Sollum.

General Maxwell, in his despatch, says:—"I think it may fairly be claimed that seldom has a small campaign been so completely successful or had such far-reaching results. The effect of this success has been to remove the anxiety which was at one time felt as to the possibility of hostile outbreaks in Egypt itself, where agitation was known to be rife. The attitude of the people in Alexandria, and more especially of the very large Bedouin population of the Behera province, has completely changed; and any prestige which we may have lost through the evacuation of Sollum has been more than recovered. Moreover, through his failure as a temporal leader, Sayed Ahmed has lost much of the influence which was attached to him as a spiritual head."

Sayed Ahmed afterwards fled to Turkey and was succeeded by Sidi Mohammed Idris, who was the eldest son of Ahmed's predecessor, and who had strongly opposed the entry of the Senussi into the war against the British.

The return to Alexandria commenced forthwith. Battalion headquarters and "D" Company left by sea at 3 p.m. on February 15th, followed by "A" Company on the 16th, and the remainder of the battalion on the 17th. Our new quarters were at the Matras Rest Camp, where the battalion remained for some ten days resting, refitting and training. In consequence of some local disturbance in connection with a threatened attack from the west, for the moment considered imminent, leave was stopped on the night of the 26th, and all ranks were held in readiness to move at a moment's notice. Fortunately the danger passed, and on the night of February 28th the battalion moved from Alexandria and rejoined the Brigade at Moascar on the 29th, pitching its camp next to that of the 2nd Battalion.

Chapter III. On the Suez Canal.

Part 1: Brigade Headquarters And The 1st and 2nd Battalions.

Brigade Headquarters at Heliopolis— Command, Brig.-Gen. Braithwaite—Reinforcements—Move to lsmailia—Formation of the New Zealand Division—Command, Col. Fulton—To the forward zone, Ferry Post.

This account must now go back to the date of the 1st Battalion's departure for Matruh, namely, 18th December, and deal with the Brigade less the two detached units. The headquarters' personnel were still at Aerodrome Camp, Heliopolis, with Lieut.-Col. Fulton in command of the Rifles and also of the New Zealand and Australian Reserve Brigade.

The day after the 1st Battalion left, the 2nd Reinforcements for the Rifle Brigade arrived in camp. This draft consisted of 10 officers and 394 other ranks. The 1st Reinforcements had, of course, come with, the first two battalions of the Brigade.

Lieut.-Col. (Temp. Col.) W. G. Braithwaite, D.S.O., assumed command of the Brigade on December 27th.

The temporary rank of Brigadier-General was granted to Col. Braithwaite while commanding the New Zealand Rifle Brigade.

Lieut.-Col. Fulton retained command of the N.Z. & A. Reserve Brigade, with Major Gibson, Northumberland Fusiliers, as Brigade Major.

A change was effected in Brigade headquarters on January 11th, 1916, Capt. C. W. MelvillC. W. Melvill, N.Z.S.C., taking over the duties of Brigade Major from Major Gard'ner, transferred. The appointment was, however, ante-dated to December 7th, 1915, and Capt. Melvill was granted the temporary rank of Major.

The reinforcements were temporarily organized as a battalion, and at once commenced intensive training of a comprehensive nature, and this was carried on steadily throughout the remainder of December and the whole of January and February. Brigade Headquarters, together with this unit and other details, moved on February 6th to Moascar Camp, Ismailia, whither the 2nd Battalion had gone direct from Alexandria on the 18th of the previous month. Here, in addition to its own company and battalion training, the latter unit had been taking part in manœuvres on a large scale in conjunction with the troops lately returned from Gallipoli. General Birdwood, commanding the Anzac Corps, inspected the Brigade troops at Heliopolis on January 26th, and the 2nd Battalion alone at Ismailia on February 18th. At the end of the month, as we have seen, the 1st Battalion joined up with the Brigade.

After its glorious service on Gallipoli, from the famous landing in April, 1915, to the brilliant withdrawal at the end of the year, the New Zealand and Australian Division, which formed part of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, concentrated at Moascar during the first week of January, 1916. Here, in common with the other formations of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, it entered upon a period of intensive training to fit it for action in the defence of the Canal, to take the field against the Germans, or to meet any other emergency that might arise. In the course of the process of reorganization, however, it soon became patent that the Australian and New Zealand reinforcements and convalescents had accumulated to such an extent that they could not be absorbed under normal conditions, and that the training formations into which they were being drafted were becoming unwieldy. Reinforcements alone were coming forward every month at the rate of twenty per cent. in excess of ordinary requirements, and in addition there was a large number of surplus men intended for mounted units, who, because of their desire to get early into the firing-line, were willing and eager to transfer either to artillery or to infantry units. Moreover, half the New Zealand Rifle Brigade was already in Egypt, and the remaining two battalions were expected early in March. Careful investigation made it clear that it would be quite feasible, as well as eminently desirable, to form additional Australian Brigades, detach the Australian formations from the New Zealand and Australian Division, and reconstitute the latter as a Division composed entirely of New Zealand troops. Negotiations to this end were immediately entered into, and by the middle of February the establishment of an additional Anzac Corps and of a purely New Zealand Division within the 1st Anzac Corps was commenced.

By the end of the month the various adjustments had been completed, and on March 1st the change of name from "The New Zealand and Australian Division" to "The New Zealand Division" was announced. Major-General Sir A. H. RussellA. H. Russell, who in the previous November had succeeded General Godley, continued in command.

In the New Zealand Rifle Brigade very few alterations were entailed, for though the 3rd and 4th Battalions had not arrived, they were expected in the course of a few days, and the organization was already practically complete. Indeed, beyond the transfer of reinforcements and some of our officers to the 1st and 2nd Brigades, which had been formed of the old New Zealand Infantry Brigade, we were scarcely affected by the change.

On this date our Brigade Commander, Brig.-Gen. W. G. BraithwaiteW. G. Braithwaite, D.S.O., with Major C. W. MelvillC. W. Melvill, N.Z.S.C., his Brigade Major, went over to similar appointments in the newly-formed 2nd Brigade, and Lieut.-Col. Fulton was again appointed to the temporary command of the Rifle Brigade, with Capt. H. M. W. RichardsonH. M. W. Richardson, N.Z.S.C., as Brigade Major. Capt. E. PuttickE. Puttick, one of the original 1st Battalion company commanders, was on the same date seconded for duty with the 2nd Brigade as Staff Captain.

Inter-brigade operations were carried out on March 3rd. The 1st Brigade represented a British force coming from Telel- Kebir, and was attacked by our two battalions, representing a Turkish force. It is noteworthy that to the total of 131 march casualties sustained during this trying day on the desert we contributed only five.

The 1st Battalion was inspected by G.O.C. Ist Anzac Corps on March 6th, and on the following day the Brigade moved out to the camp at Ferry Post, about half a mile east of the Suez Canal, where the New Zealand Division took over the defensive sector from the 2nd Australian Division, which was being withdrawn for despatch to France.

Ferry Post covered one of the most important bridgeheads established during the recent rapid development of the Canal defences. When the Turks attacked in February, 1915, the fighting had taken place on the very banks of the Canal itself, the British forces being for the most part on the western side. Now, however, the defensive works extended far to the eastward, the first line being from six to seven miles distant. Some two and a half miles behind this ran the second line of defence, while the third was close to the Canal. Metalled roads, railways and water-pipe lines had been carried well up towards the front and were being rapidly extended. The trench systems in the forward lines of defence consisted mainly of self-contained "localities," each prepared for a strong garrison of from a battalion to a brigade, and were very strongly wired. They were temporarily held by troops of the Mounted Brigade, but were reconnoitred by representatives of the various infantry units told off for their occupation in case of enemy attack. Beyond the foremost line, patrols of Mounted Rifles scoured the desert, while air-men prosecuted their investigations still farther afield, for though the Turkish Military Railway was still far from the Canal, nothing was left to chance.

Even in the third line, which was practically on the Canal, the utmost watchfulness was maintained. No traffic was allowed after dark except through the examining post, and then only if the outpost commander was satisfied on the points of identity and business. Natives without armlets or passes were not permitted to pass through in either direction, and as an additional precaution, a strip along the front of the line was smoothly swept each day before nightfall, so that any possible eluding of the sentries might be discovered.

To the men of our Brigade, who had had little experience in duties of trench-construction beyond that gained in the moist soils of the New Zealand training-grounds, the defensive works were a striking example of skill and perseverance. The dry sand appeared to be more or less continually flowing; the sides of the trenches could be maintained in position only by the use of framing and matting, while the frequent high winds were accompanied by a drift which here and there almost obliterated the works. It appeared to us that when we came to occupy the trenches we should find it more difficult to fight against the forces of Nature than against those of the enemy.

On the 11th the 2nd Battalion replaced the 1st Brigade troops in the defensive line from Bastion "A" on the right to the Beacon Light on the Suez Canal on the left, the strength employed being two companies. The 2nd Battalion was relieved of this duty on the 15th by the 1st Battalion, which in turn handed over to the 1st Brigade on the 17th.

Part 2.—The 3rd and 4th Battalions.

Inauguration and training—Dress—Maymorn and Rangiotu Camps—Departure for Egypt—Arrival at Ferry Post.

While the Brigade was at Ferry Post, the 3rd and 4th Battalions arrived from New Zealand, and this may be a fitting place for a record of their early history; but as the organization and training of the "left half" of the Brigade followed so closely on the lines adopted by the older portion, a mere outline will be found sufficient for our purpose.

Colonel V. S. SmythV. S. Smyth, N.Z.S.C., (Reserve of Officers, Royal Warwickshire Regiment), was appointed to the temporary command, with Capt. John BishopJohn Bishop, N.Z.S.C., as Camp Adjutant. Having served in a similar capacity with Lieut.-Col. Fulton during a considerable portion of the training period of the "right half," Capt. Bishop, who had been retained for this purpose, was specially qualified for the position of staff officer; while Col. Smyth had had, in addition to his service in the Imperial Army, several years' experience in command of military districts in New Zealand.

The special preparatory training of officers and non-commissioned officers commenced at Trentham on September 7th, 1915, and the men marched in on the 11th and 12th of the following month. On the 15th a move was made to Maymorn, some six miles to the north of Trentham, where a tented camp was occupied, and general training commenced at once.

Major J. A. CowlesJ. A. Cowles, of the 17th (Ruahine) Regiment, took over the command of the 3rd Battalion, with Captain H. S. N. RobinsonH. S. N. Robinson, N.Z.S.C., as Adjutant. The 4th was commanded by Major A. E. WolstenholmeA. E. Wolstenholme, of the 4th (Otago) Regiment, his Adjutant being Lieut. J. L. TurnbullJ. L. Turnbull, of the 1st (Canterbury) Regiment. All appointments were, of course, provisional, being subject to alteration when the battalions should join up with Brigade on active service.

As in the case of the earlier battalions, each unit had its orderly-room with complete staff, and the establishment of headquarters' sections and details received early attention, so that, if called upon, it could move out at a moment's notice completely organized. Efficiency in all respects was the one aim, and this, in spite of adverse conditions, was, as the event proved, amply attained. The ill-luck that attended the career of the band was felt as a great drawback. It suffered repeated casualties owing to sickness, and was often practically defunct.

In the matter of dress, the 3rd and 4th Battalions were in some respects more fortunate than their predecessors, for by this time some slight degree of finality had been reached. The blaze of the 3rd was a black cloth triangle of 1 1/2 inch side, standing on its base, while that of the 4th was a similar patch placed with its base uppermost. These were worn on the hats and caps as in the other two battalions. The puggarees issued, however, were plain khaki without the central strip of scarlet, a defect that was remedied in due time after the units joined up with the Brigade. Unfortunately the men could not be issued with khaki uniforms for some six weeks after their enlistment, and, as a consequence, could not be given leave to town for that period—a deprivation which they bore with admirable patience and resignation. In the case of officers of all grades, boots, puttee-tapes, belts, frogs, scabbards, ties, etc., were black, in which respect they differed somewhat from the officers of the 1st and 2nd, and consternation reigned when it was found on arrival in Egypt that certain modifications had to be carried out for the sake of uniformity.

Owing to long-continued bad weather, Maymorn at last became untenable, and at the beginning of December the battalions moved to the site of the old Rifle Brigade camp at Rangiotu, where, as in those former days, much better conditions obtained, and where both the general health and the work of the units rapidly improved. From the people of the neighbouring towns they received the same kindly treatment as was bestowed upon their predecessors. They were hospitably entertained by various clubs and patriotic societies, and the indefatigable concert parties from Palmerston North continued their good work as of old.

Final leave commenced on December 19th, and continued for fourteen days, and on its conclusion work was resumed with renewed vigour. The usual short period of special continuous training in attack and defence, outpost work and bivouacking, was carried out on the sandhills about Himatangi; and this was followed by the musketry course, taken by the 3rd at Palmerston North and by the 4th at Wanganui. During the period of general training, Colonel C. R. MacdonaldC. R. Macdonald, of the General Staff, delivered a series of lectures on trench warfare and machine- gun tactics.

Towards the end of January, when the time for departure was at hand, a general inspection parade was held by the Honorary Colonel, His Excellency the Earl of Liverpool, who complimented the new units on their fine appearance and smart work, and referred in graceful terms to the good reports of the older battalions already on active service.

The 4th Battalion left for Auckland on February 3rd, and after a march through the city in pouring rain, embarked on the 4th. The battalion (less "C" Company) was accommodated on the "Mokoia" (Transport No. 43), and "C" Company went aboard the "Navua" (Transport No. 44), in company with the 3rd Field Ambulance and the Maori Reinforcements. These transports sailed from Auckland at 1 a.m. on February 5th. The 3rd Battalion left camp on the 4th, marched through Wellington, embarked on the "Ulimaroa" (Transport No. 42), and sailed at midnight on the same date.

Unlike the 1st and 2nd Battalions, these two units embarked without equipment or rifles. There was little space on board ship for training, but the work done was carried out regularly and efficiently. Lectures were given daily, and every effort was made by means of physical drill and sports to keep all ranks fit. The monotony of the long voyage was relieved by frequent concerts, mock trials, and the time-honoured ceremonial of Neptune's Court, well and truly carried out, on passing from the Southern to the Northern Hemisphere. Each unit produced its ship's magazine, that of the 3rd being known as "The Blast," and that of the 4th as "The Mokoian." There was considerable excellence in both, and probably "The Blast," printed at Colombo, could hold its own with any similar publication. Its printed matter was well selected and written in fine style, while the illustrations by Lance-Corporals Thompson and Bell were produced with that clever and humorous touch which afterwards became famous throughout the Division.

The transports called at Albany on 15th February, leaving on the 17th, and were at Colombo on the 28th and 29th. At each of these places route marches were held and general leave given, and at Albany the officers were invited to a ball given by the citizens. The behaviour of the men at both ports of call was the subject of favourable comment on the part of shore officials and the people generally, the only "regrettable incident" being the stranding of two or three of the personnel at Colombo owing to a misunderstanding as to the hour of departure. As the last of the troopships left the latter port and was making good headway westwards, a small tug came racing out and signalled her to stop. There was much speculation as to the reason for this action, and the usual wild explanations multiplied as the tug was seen to lower a boat which pulled smartly over to the trooper. The gangway was put down, and up this majestically stepped a solitary Rifleman. This was the famous New Zealand footballer, "Wing" David afterwards killed in action in France—a man much beloved by his comrades and something of a trial to, though secretly admired by, his officers. Arrived on deck, he waved a haughty dismissal to the tug and a condescending signal to the bridge that the troopship might now proceed. The usual cold formalities regarding the matter of absence without leave engaged the attention of the delinquent and his commanding officer at orderly- room next morning.

The troops disembarked at Suez, moved by rail to Ismailia, and marched to the Brigade camp across the Canal at Ferry Post, the 3rd Battalion reporting on March 13th and the 4th Battalion two days later.

Part 3.—The Brigade Complete.

Command, Brig.-Gen. Fulton—Promotions and adjustments— No. 3 Machine-gun Company—Lewis Gun Sections—Training Battalion—Return to Moascar—Training—Preparations for departure —Inspections—Embarkation—Arrival at Marseilles.

On the arrival of the 3rd and 4th Battalions the rearrangement of the officers of the Brigade, already commenced in connection with the formation of the Division, was proceeded with. The adjustment involved transfers and promotions which necessitated reference to the Expeditionary Force Headquarters, and were not completed until the last week of March, when the undesirable suspense and uncertainty which had been felt as a drawback right from the inception of the Brigade gave place to the feeling of satisfaction that approximate finality had at last been reached. In this matter the settlement of the command of the Brigade was not the least gratifying feature. The principal details of the adjustment were as under:—

Brigade Headquarters:

Lieut.-Col. (Temp. Col.) H. T. Fulton to command the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, with the temporary rank of Brigadier- General. Capt. T. R. Eastwood (The Rifle Brigade) to be Brigade Major, with the rank of Major. Capt. R. G. Purdy, N.Z.S.C., to be Staff Captain.

1st Battalion:

Major W. S. Austin to be Lieut.-Colonel, and to command the Battalion. Capt. J. G. Roache to be Major, and to be Second-in-Command. Lieut. H. HoldernessH. Holderness to be Captain, and to be Adjutant. Capt. G. E. Simeon, Quartermaster, to be Major.

2nd Battalion:

Major R. St. J. Beere to be Second-in-Command. Lieut. E. J. Brammall to be Quartermaster.

3rd Battalion:

Major J. A. Cowles to be Lieut.-Colonel, and to command the Battalion. Major A. Winter-EvansA. Winter-Evans to be Second-in-Command. 2nd Lieut. J. S. D'H. Birkby to be Lieutenant, and to be Adjutant. Capt. J. McD. Johnston to be Major, and to be Quartermaster.

4th Battalion:

Major C. W. Melvill, N.Z.S.C., to be Lieut.-Colonel, and to command the Battalion. Major A. E. Wolstenholme to be Second-in-Command. 2nd Lieut. D. KennedyD. Kennedy to be Adjutant.

Captains P. H. Bell, J. Pow and E. Puttick, of the 1st Battalion, and A. Digby-Smith, of the 2nd, were promoted to be Majors. Major Puttick was for the time being with the 2nd Brigade as Staff Captain, and did not return to us until the middle of July, when he took over the position of Second-in- Command of the 4th Battalion on the death of Major Wolstenholme. Majors Bell, Pow and Digby-Smith became senior Company Commanders of the 1st, 4th and 3rd Battalions, respectively. Capt. A. J. PowleyA. J. Powley had been appointed Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion in January, and Lieut. H. Eastgate Quartermaster of the 4th in the previous October.

Immediately after his arrival with the 3rd and 4th Battalions, Col. Smyth left us to take over the control of the New Zealand Base at Kasr-el-nil Barracks, Cairo. When the Base was moved to England, he brought the training units from Egypt, and for some time commanded Sling Camp, Salisbury Plain.

Coincident with the organization of the Division, the Machine Gun Sections were withdrawn from their battalions and combined into Machine Gun Companies, one of which was attached to each Brigade. That formed of Rifle Brigade sections was known as No. 3 Company, and came into being officially on March 1st. As the establishment of a Machine Gun Company was headquarters and four sections of four guns each the organization was a simple matter, for the sections were ready-made, and it was only necessary to draft in the personnel for the Company Headquarters and the extra officer now required for each section. The following were the officers as finally arranged:—

Officer Commanding: Capt. J. LuxfordJ. Luxford (3rd Battalion).

No. 1 Section: Lieut. R. G. GallienR. G. Gallien (1st Battalion), Lieut. L. S. CiminoL. S. Cimino (1st Battalion).

No. 2 Section: Lieut. A. C. FinlaysonA. C. Finlayson (Otago Mounted Rifles), 2/Lt. K. D. AmbroseK. D. Ambrose (1st Battalion).

Colonel (Major General Sir) E. W. C. Chaytor, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B.

Brigadier-General W. G. Braithwaite, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Lieut.-Col. J. A. Cowles.

Lieut.-Col. W. S. Austin, D.S.O.

Major W. KayW. Kay, O.B.E. Face p. 65.

No. 3 Section: Lieut. C. G. HayterC. G. Hayter (Canterbury Mounted Rifles), 2/Lt. P. D. RussellP. D. Russell (Otago Mounted Rifles).

No. 4 Section: Lieut. C. S. GeddisC. S. Geddis (Otago Mounted Rifles), Lieut. J. A. D. HopkirkJ. A. D. Hopkirk (1st Battalion).

The Company served with the Brigade until January, 1918, when all the machine-gun sections of the Division were organized into the New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion of four Companies (Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury, Otago), and so passed from the control of Brigade commanders.

To take the place of the Machine Gun Sections, preparations were made for the establishment of Lewis Gun Sections in each battalion, and the following officers were appointed as specialists to supervise the training of the personnel and to superintend the general work:—1st Battalion, 2nd Lieut. N. H. ArdenN. H. Arden; 2nd, 2nd Lieut. H. M. KeesingH. M. Keesing; 3rd, 2nd Lieut. C. E. BridgeC. E. Bridge; 4th, Lieut. J. W. SnaddonJ. W. Snaddon. Lewis guns, however, were a new and practically untried arm, and were not available for issue at a greater rate than two per battalion, though the regulation scale of four per unit, as laid down by the Army Council at the beginning of the year, was made up before we entered the trenches on the Flanders front. As the usefulness of the guns, both in attack and in defence, became more and more clearly demonstrated, the rate of issue steadily increased until it stood, towards the close of the war, at 36 per battalion, 32 for ordinary use and four for anti-aircraft purposes.

To complete the adjustment there now only remained the formation of a Training Battalion, which would absorb the reinforcements for the Brigade, and from which would be drawn as required drafts of officers and men whose training would be completed under conditions more nearly approaching in general character those of active service than could be expected to obtain in the home training camps. This unit, known as the New Zealand Rifle Brigade Training Battalion, was established at Moascar on March 21st, the details being taken in the main from the second and third reinforcements for the first two, and the officers from all four battalions. Major W. KayW. Kay, from the 1st Battalion, was placed in command, with Captains J. Bishop and W. E. Christie as Adjutant and Quartermaster, respectively. Following were the first company officers:— No. 1 Company, Capt. W. G. Bishop and Lieut. A. Hog-gansHoggans; No. 2 Company, Capt. O. W. Williams and 2nd Lieut. W. G. IvilW. G. Ivil; No. 3 Company, Capt. C. HorsnellC. Horsnell and Lieut. F. E. GreenishF. E. Greenish; No. 4 Company, Capt. P. V. Hackworth and 2nd Lieuts. E. A. Winchester and N. W. Shackleford.

When the Division left Egypt for France the Training Battalion remained at Moascar. A brief outline of its subsequent history is given in Appendix III.

The Brigade moved on March 20th from Ferry Post to Moascar Camp, where it remained until it left for France early in the following month. During the stay at these camps, training was continued with unabated energy. Company, battalion and brigade parades, route marches and staff rides, night operations and trench-digging, specialist training and transport work, each had its place, till at last all ranks, the newer arrivals as well as the "old hands," felt that they were fit for any emergency. Yet, with all our labours, there was time and opportunity for much pleasure. The hot season was not far advanced, and the general surroundings had a special interest. There was a liberal allowance of leave to Cairo. Ismailia and its beautiful plantations and gardens, Lake Timsah and the Suez Canal with their naval and mercantile shipping, even the open desert itself with its scattered remains of bygone civilizations, all had a charm that was irresistible. Bathing parades to the lake or the Canal were a special joy, and often practically the whole personnel of the Brigade would be in the water at one time; and, though reminders of the great world-strife were never absent, there was a refreshing restfulness in a quiet evening stroll to the Canal after a crowded day of toil on the sands of the desert.

Then, too, we had, what so seldom occurred in after-days, the whole of the Division assembled in one place. There was consequently an opportunity for our fellows to mix with the stalwarts from Gallipoli and hear from them at first hand what it meant to be in close contact with the enemy under conditions which would probably prevail in that theatre of war whither we were destined soon to go. We saw much of the other Anzacs also, and in this connection a spontaneous display of goodwill is worthy of note. A brigade of Australians marching across the desert from Tel-el-Kebir was overtaken by a heat-wave, with the result that the men were suffering march casualties to an appalling extent. Word of their plight reached the camp of the New Zealanders near by, and at a hint, rather than an order, every available water-cart, every spare dixie, and every water-bottle within reach was taken out by our men, who streamed over the sands hastening to bring relief to their neighbours in distress.

The time for the departure of the Division was now near at hand, and the final preparations were pushed to completion with all speed. Para-typhoid inoculation had been carried out twice towards the end of March. Kits were reduced by sending away all private belongings, forage caps were finally handed in,

The felt hats, officially known as "smasher" hats, were still worn with the longitudinal crease in the top, and the distinguishing black patch was retained on the puggaree until May 23rd, when it was transferred to the sleeve of the tunic. It was not until the 7th September following that the now familiar peaked arrangement of the crown was ordered. The resemblance between our hats and those of the Americans was afterwards freely commented upon. This likeness, however, was only general; for whereas we had a puggaree the Americans had a cord, and while our creasing brought the ridges one running from front to rear and the other across on the line of the shoulders, the ridges of the American hats crossed diagonally.

and on April 1st the new charger-loading, short M.L.E. rifles were drawn in exchange for the old M.L.E. long rifles that had hitherto been in use.

We had been inspected by General Godley and seen at training by H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, and now, on April 3rd, the whole Division paraded before General Sir A. J. MurrayA. J. Murray, commanding the Forces in Egypt. To us this was a very imposing parade, the first occasion on which we had seen ceremonial work on such a scale; but we left the ground at the conclusion of the march past with the consciousness that our hard training had not been in vain so far as it affected our physique, smartness, steadiness, and general appearance. With due thoughtfulness the quicker step of the Rifle Brigade had been provided for, the band accommodated its time accordingly, and, notwithstanding the drawback of loose sand, the several battalions in close column of platoons swung by at the trail in fine form.

On the same evening orders were received for moving out and embarking for France. The Advance Party of the Brigade under Capt. Purdy entrained for Port Said on the evening of the 5th April, and embarked there on the "Franconia." On the same day the 1st Battalion left Moascar for Alexandria and embarked on the "Arcadian." The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions and the 3rd M.G. Company departed from Moascar on the 6th at different times, commencing at 3 a.m., and embarked at Alexandria, the 2nd (less a small party which went on the "Minnewaska") on the "Arcadian," and the 3rd and 4th and the M.G. Company on the "Alaunia," a fine transport which, unfortunately, was torpedoed on her return journey from Marseilles, a fate which also subsequently befell both the "Franconia" and the "Arcadian." Brigade and Battalion Transport Sections, with their horses and mules, were quartered on the "Elele" and the "Menominee." The complete outfit of vehicles, which we had brought with us from New Zealand, was left behind in Egypt.

The departure from Alexandria commenced on April 7th. Little space was available on the ships for training exercises, but much time was devoted to lectures on trench warfare and preventive measures against gas attacks. In addition to the usual precautions taken against attack from submarines, all ranks wore lifebelts constantly both by day and by night, and each ship supplemented quick-firer, Lewis gun and Vickers gun sentries with sections of men with loaded rifles specially posted on either side.

No untoward event occurred, however, though there appeared to be frequent scares, and the course taken sometimes seemed to be a very roundabout one. Off the coast of Sardinia, for instance, the "Alaunia" was compelled to "about ship" for half a day and then zigzag to her destination. Except in the Gulf of Lions, the weather was fine and the sea smooth, and the transports arrived at Marseilles all well on the 12th, 13th and 14th.

Chapter IV. In The Battle Zone Of The Flanders Front.

Part 1.—Movements.

Marseilles to Steenbecque—First billets—Training—Detachments —Tunnellers—Trench mortars—Inspection by General Plumer— To Estaires—First visit to trenches—To Morbecque-—To Armentieres.

The journey from Marseilles across France to the battle zone occupied the greater part of three days. Battalions moved at different times, each in a single train composed for the most part of fairly comfortable coaches. We had not the omnipresent Y.M.C.A. of later days to supply us with tea and biscuits, and, as halts for any length of time were very few and far between, we had to be content with the ordinary fare as provided for on the army scale of rations. From our observations we concluded that there was one long line of rationtins, in various stages of decay, from the Mediterranean to the Channel; for wherever the train paused for a time, and these stops seldom took place at a station, the permanent way was lined on both sides with the familiar square cans lying in the open in defiance of the strict rule that "What you cannot burn you must bury." Indeed, sanitary matters of any kind seemed to have entered not at all into the calculations of the authorities concerned.

Long railway journeys are always more or less wearisome, and this was no exception to the general rule; but the novelty of the scenes which succeeded each other as we moved northward served to relieve the tedium. The monotony of the desert here gave place to green fields, early flowers, trees putting forth their first buds, extensive and orderly vineyards, quaint villages, ancient towns and thriving cities, and, in the south at least, bright sunshine bathing all. It seemed like a special privilege to see white folk again, and the smiles and cries of the cheering children were particularly touching to men so far from home. In the bleak north the line approached the coast, and before turning inland again we caught a glimpse of the waters of the English Channel, and one is safe to say that few of us failed to be stirred by the thought that not far beyond stood the white cliffs of the Motherland whose welfare lay so close to our hearts.

From Marseilles our route ran through Arles, Avignon, Orange, Vienne, Lyons, Macon, Dijon, Montereau, Corbeil, Juvisy (on the outskirts of Paris), Creil, Clermoine, Longneau, Amiens, St. Roche, Longpre, Abbeville, Etaples, Bifur d'Boulogne, St. Omer, Bifur Wallon Capelle, Hazebrouck, Steenbecque. With many of these points to the north of Paris we were destined to become more familiar during the years that lay before us.

The first unit to move left Marseilles at 4.24 p.m. on April 13th, and, travelling day and night, reached Hazebrouck, the official destination, at about midnight on the 15th/16th. Here the commanding officer was verbally informed by a full corporal that the battalion was to go on to Steenbecque. After some trouble these instructions were verified and the train proceeded accordingly. The remaining battalions arrived at Steenbecque station at short intervals. Each battalion on detraining was met by the French billeting officer, and officers and men were immediately told off into groups and marched to their quarters under the guidance of members of the advance party, who had come on ahead with Brigade Headquarters.

Brigade Headquarters and the 2nd Battalion were quartered at Steenbecque, an interesting village with a quaint old church the gate-posts of which were unusually curious. The 1st Battalion was billeted in neighbouring farmhouses, and the 3rd and 4th in the adjoining villages of Tannay and Thiennes. On a readjustment of the area, which now came under the command of General Fulton, the 1st Battalion a few days later moved to the village of Boeseghem.

The various Transport Sections of the Brigade detrained with their horses at Abbeville, and having drawn at that base the vehicles to replace those we had left in Egypt, commenced the long three days' trek of sixty miles to the Steenbecque area, where they arrived on April 22nd.

This was our first experience of billets, and it will readily be understood that there was no little difficulty in getting comfortably settled down, especially on the part of those units that arrived in the middle of the night. Hitherto we had lived for the most part in orderly-arranged hutments or tented camps, or had bivouacked in the open; but here we had to fit ourselves into such accommodation as was afforded by barns, lofts and sheds, none too liberally supplied with straw, but paid for by the British authorities at a fixed rate per head. For the officers, rooms were usually found wherein they slept and messed and carried out with moderate convenience their administrative duties. The peculiarities of the French farmhouse were in many respects a source of wonderment. In the darkness, one unfortunate company commander made an involuntary personal reconnaissance of the ancestral midden which formed the most striking feature of the courtyard of his quarters, and received his commanding officer, on the latter's round of inspection during the morning, in an ill-fitting suit of velveteen provided by his obliging host. The notices in English posted up at all the house-pumps—"Not to be used for drinking purposes" —at first appeared odd, but careful consideration of the position of the well led to a most respectful obedience of the instruction.

We found the inhabitants of the district kindly and obliging to a degree, and such good people as those of La Belle Hotesse and the other hamlets and villages will long be remembered for their solicitude on our behalf. Cupidity, an unfortunate trait displayed by the country people in some billeting areas occupied in later days, was not a characteristic here. Usually the greatest kindness was displayed by those who had suffered most. The war, it will be remembered, was already drawing to the close of its second year, and signs of its effects were not wanting. There was a marked absence of able-bodied men; in the fields women and old men followed the plough or executed other forms of manual labour from daylight till dark; and as the people wended their way to church, on Sundays and Saints' days, one noticed that the majority of the women and children wore mourning.

On arrival in the battle zone the New Zealand Division became reserve to the Ist Anzac Corps under Lieut.-General Birdwood, the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions being already in the line.

General training, specialist work and route-marching commenced at once. Every possible square foot of land being under cultivation, our exercises had perforce to be carried out on the roads. Flannelette gas-helmets were issued, and training in their use formed an important part of our daily exercises. Before the end of the month the whole Brigade attended a special demonstration, every man being subjected to the ordeal of the gas-cloud and passing through trenches charged with both lethal and lachrymatory gas.

As early as April 20th, battalion commanders received the first of a long series of orders couched in such terms as these: "Please detail (so many) other ranks to report at (such-and- such) School of Instruction for a course in (subject)..…" Orders of this kind came to hand with more or less frequency right through our career in France, as often as not while the unit was moving up to take over a new sector in the line, or even in the thick of a fight.

When the Brigade was in the line during the Battle of the Somme, in September, 1916, one officer and fifteen other ranks were detached for a course of instruction at the Lewis Gun School, Le Touquet.

The system itself was an excellent one, providing as it did for the special training of officers and other ranks in various branches of military work, and ensuring that the unit as a whole was kept up-to-date in all developments in the art of fighting; but to the fretting commanding officer, chronically under establishment in officers and non-commissioned officers, it seemed to be carried out with a merciless unconcern as to the fitness of things. The order on this occasion was for the despatch of eight non-commissioned officers per battalion for gas-helmet instruction at the Gas School at Oxelaere.

"Please detail an officer of the rank of Captain for duty as Town Major at Estaires." This was a class of order that was always received with dismay, for it was a point of honour that officers so detached should be in the highest degree efficient. For this particular post Capt. R. O. BrydonR. O. Brydon was detailed on the day after our arrival at Steenbecque, and the services of a very able officer were lost to the 1st Battalion for a period extending over many months. It is still an unsolved mystery why such a position was not filled by an ex-service officer from England, too old for active service but still willing and able to carry out non-combatant duties of this nature. At that time, it must be remembered, battalions had to find their "specialist" officers from amongst their platoon commanders, and companies were correspondingly short. In this case Capt. Brydon was the second-in-command of a company.

Two officers and 100 other ranks were detached for duty with the 172nd Tunnelling Company on April 30th. As practically all of these men were thus, as the event proved, finally separated from the Brigade, brief mention may here be made of their subsequent career. They were in every case experienced either in mining or in some allied occupation that would specially fit them for the particular service for which they were now detailed. The men drawn from the 1st and 2nd Battalions were commanded by 2nd Lieut. G. LewisG. Lewis, and those from the 3rd and 4th by 2nd Lieut. S. J. E. CloseyS. J. E. Closey. They were privileged to be the first New Zealand troops to serve in the trenches of the battle-front in France, for on the day after leaving us they entered the line in the Bois Grenier Sector, then held by the 19th and 21st Australian Battalions. Three days later they were called upon to man the trenches when the sector was raided by the Germans, but fortunately, though the bombardment was especially severe, they escaped without casualties. They were thanked by the Australian brigadier for their assistance in the fighting as well as for their service as stretcher-bearers. When the New Zealand Division went into the line on May 10th, our detachment relieved part of the 1st Canadian Tunnelling Company in the New Zealand sector, and later, on the arrival in France of the 2nd Australian Tunnelling Company, the New Zealanders were transferred from their old company, the 172nd, and were attached to the Australians, remaining on duty, however, on the New Zealand front. While here, the New Zealand miners were specially detailed for the sinking of the "Anzac Shaft," with its series of galleries, in trench 74 of the Armentieres sector. This was the first satisfactory steel-lined water-tight shaft ever sunk in the Second Army area; and as the whole of the work was executed by New Zealanders, the achievement is one of which we have no small reason to be proud. The detachment experienced a second raid on the evening of July 3rd, the enemy's main objective being, on that occasion, the underground works in course of execution at another point. As soon as it became clear, during the artillery preparation, that the enemy would probably attempt the destruction of the shaft, the sappers were withdrawn from the galleries where they were at work, and 2nd Lieut. Closey remained behind with two or three of their number to mask and protect, by means of sandbagging, the entrance to the shaft-head. When shells began to fall thickly about the spot, the officer sent the men back to the shelter of a dug-out in rear and completed the work alone, just managing to escape when the raiders entered the trench in search of the shaft-head. This, however, had by then been so effectively covered and disguised that the enemy failed to locate it, and the number of unexploded mobile charges left behind at this spot testified to the raiders' disappointment. The Australian officer reporting upon the matter states in conclusion: "There is not a question of doubt in my mind that 2nd Lieut. Closey, by sticking to his duty under heavy shell-fire, saved our mining system from possible destruction." From time to time our men were drafted in small parties from the Australian to the New Zealand Tunnelling Company, with which unit the majority continued to serve in various sectors, for the most part far removed from those held by the New Zealand Division, until the end of the war.

On April 22nd the Brigadier and the Battalion Commanders attended an interesting demonstration, held at Berthen, in the use of light, medium and heavy trench mortars. Important improvements had recently been made in this comparatively new arm, and the display was distinctly heartening. Visions of the period of tragic stress were called up by the fact that the journey to the trench mortar school was made in a London motor-'bus.

In addition to inspections at various dates by the Brigadier and the Divisional Commander, the battalions were seen at work on April 25th by General Sir H. PlumerH. Plumer, the Commander of the Second Army, of which we now formed a part.

The Brigade marched fifteen miles, from Steenbecque to billets in Estaires, on May 1st. and the same evening we had our first experience of a gas-alarm, which, however, eventually proved to be false. We were now well within the battle zone. On our first morning in Steenbecque we heard the rumble of distant artillery fire, and at night the flashes of the guns could be distinctly seen. At Estaires, bursts of machine-gun fire were frequently heard, sometimes in great intensity.

On May 6th. the Brigadier, Brigade Major, the Commanding Officers and Company Commanders of the 1st and 2nd Battalions went to Armentieres and were attached to the 51st Brigade, 17th Division, for a twenty-four hours' tour of duty in the trenches. By this means valuable information was obtained as to the new conditions under which we were presently to work, but, as frequently happens, the sector which was so closely studied did not prove to be the one the Brigade eventually took over.

Three days later the Brigade marched back to Morbecque for a special course in musketry and practical Lewis and Vickers gun training. Here our first Brigade School was established, bombing being the principal subject taken up.

The New Zealand Division commenced to take over from, the 17th Division east of Armentieres on 10th May, the 1st Brigade going into the right sector of the front line on the 13th, and the 2nd Brigade into the left sector on the 14th. The length of the front occupied was 6,000 yards. On the right were the 2nd Australians. The Division was on the left of the Corps sector, and on the left again, north of the River Lys, was the 9th Division, afterwards relieved by the 41st.

On May 13th the Brigade moved forward again, the 1st and 2nd Battalions marching to Doulieu and the 3rd and 4th to Estaires. A further move towards the front was made on the 15th, when the Brigade marched in to the town of Armentieres as part of the Divisional reserve. The 1st Battalion, with two companies in Armentieres and two in Houplines, relieved the 9th West Riding Battalion as reserve to the left Brigade sector, the Brigade there having all four battalions in the line. A readjustment was made on June 8th, after which date each Brigade found its own reserve.

Before the war Armentieres was a town of some importance, and had a population of over 25,000. It is situated close to the Belgian frontier, some ten miles west of Lille. The canalized Lys, on the banks of which it stands, was one of those inland waterways so greatly valued in this part of the country, and Armentieres was a small but busy river port. It was particularly famous, however, as one of the more impor-tantimportant manufacturing centres. Its many factories were engaged mainly in the spinning of flax, hemp and cotton yarn, and in the production of woollens, cottons and linens. In addition there were several large distilleries, soap works and tanneries; the minor manufactures were various; and there were extensive brick-making works.

When we first came to Armentieres a considerable proportion of the inhabitants was still in the town, for only certain quarters had as yet suffered from shell-fire. During our short stay we were to witness some remarkably accurate shooting on the part of the German gunners, such churches of the town as were then intact coming in for special attention; and more than once we were to suffer casualties through sudden bursts of concentrated "hate" upon the neighbourhood of our billets. It was not till the following year, however, that the place was systematically shelled, and in connection with the temporary German advance in this area in 1918, the destruction of the town was completed. While we were quartered at Armentieres we had excellent billets situated mainly in abandoned factories, while certain of the more pretentious dwellings, now deserted, formed convenient homes for the various Brigade and Battalion Headquarters. One of our battalions was, during a spell out of the line, billeted in a large building that had been a Girls' College, and the lady-principal was still in residence. It is worthy of note that this lady was able to tell us of our next move into the line some time before official warning or definite orders reached the headquarters of the battalion, and she complained most bitterly that, apparently through the soldiers' unguarded talk, such information frequently filtered out till it reached the civilian residents, amongst whom it became the common topic of conversation.

The transport lines of the various units of the Brigade were established at Pont de Nieppe, just west of the town; and here also were situated the Divisional Baths for the men's use, and the laundry establishments through which clean underclothing was issued.

Part 2.—The Fighting On The Flanders Front From The Outbreak Of War Till May, 1916.

First German advance—Liege—General German advance—Brussels —Mons—Namur—Lille—The Aisne—The Marne—The British to the left of the line—West Flanders campaign—New Corps come in—Armentieres—Nieuport—La Bassee—Arras— Ypres—Messines—Positions—Neuve Chapelle—second Battle of Ypres—Minor offensives—Trench fighting—Line readjusted— Loos—Winter trench-work.

It may not be out of place to give here a brief outline of the progress of the fighting on or about the Flanders front from the outbreak of war up till the beginning of 1916. This account will of necessity be somewhat disconnected and sketchy; but it may serve to get the situation from time to time into proper perspective, and clear away erroneous ideas formed from the reading of contemporary newspaper accounts, which, as we now know, were not always strictly impartial.

The German advance towards France was first attempted mainly through Liege, the gateway to the Belgian plains. By the evening of August 3rd, 1914, German columns were on Belgian territory, and on the following day were closing in on Liege from the north-east, east and south. At this time the Belgian army was still in process of mobilization and was being placed in position to resist a German advance on Brussels and Antwerp. It was realized that Liege must eventually fall, but the city was nevertheless held in order to gain time, for as long as its forts could withstand the enemy's attacks he could make no progress by rail towards the plain beyond. The bombardment of the Liege forts commenced on August 4th, and three days later the city was entered; but Liege did not become an open gateway until the 15th, when the last of the forts was taken.

In the meantime the general advance of the German forces had begun. The enemy had got six armies in position, the First in the north and the Sixth in Alsace in the south. The general plan was to carry out a great sweeping movement, pivoting on the Sixth Army opposite Belfort, the First and Second Armies passing through Belgium, and forming the right of the German front descending upon Paris and the Marne Valley. This movement commenced on August 7th. By August 15th the First and Second Armies passed through Liege for Namur and France, and four Army Corps were sent against Brussels and Antwerp. Five days later Brussels surrendered.

The British Army was in position before Mons, west of Namur, by August 21st, on a front of about 25 miles. This "contemptible" force, commanded by Sir John FrenchJohn French, consisted of the Ist Army Corps (Haig), the IInd Army Corps (Smith-Dorrien), and one Cavalry Division (Allenby). On the right of the British was the French Fifth Army, while away to the westward beyond the British left was a force of French Territorials. The task of the British was to protect the left of the general advance to the north. The Allies' plan was, first to meet the shock of the German advance on the defensive, and then to take the offensive against the German right by a turning movement with Namur as the pivot. This was expected to raise the siege of Namur, and thus open the way to re-occupy Brussels and form a junction of the British left with the Belgian Army advancing from Antwerp.

On August 22nd the Germans attacked the front and right flank and rear of the French Fifth Army, which gave way. Information as to the situation did not reach Sir John FrenchJohn French, and the result was that the attack on the British next day was doubly severe. Under pressure from the front and on the right flank the British were slowly but surely forced back and the famous retirement from Mons began.

The worst of the retreat from Mons was over by the evening of August 28th, by which date our IInd Army Corps was on the Somme. Thenceforward the pursuit was slack, and the British were in position on the Aisne on the 30th.

Notwithstanding the lesson of Liege, the fortress of Namur was held to be invincible; yet, attacked on August 20th, it was entered by the Germans three days later.

In the vicinity of Lille was the extreme right of the German force advancing upon Northern France. This force consisted mostly of cavalry and horse artillery, with the IInd Corps of Infantry, the last being rushed forward by motor transport. It operated beyond the right of the German First Army (von Kluck) and formed a huge raiding-party, which had for its object the cutting of the communications of the British force with its principal bases at Boulogne and Havre. Moving southwards with its right on the River Lys, it created panic amongst the civilians in the district, and took Lille. That city, with its obsolete fortresses, the Allies made no attempt to hold. British Marines were hurried across the Channel to save Ostend, but the Germans had no intention of occupying that port, their main line of advance being by Arras towards Amiens. The raiding force for the time being met with no opposition. The Allies, relying on their anticipated victorious advance into Belgium, had made no preparation to meet this contingency. Amiens was evacuated forthwith. British Headquarters sent orders to abandon Boulogne as the main supply base, and a new base was established at St. Nazaire at the mouth of the Loire.

We return now to the British Army which, on August 30th, had reached the Aisne, and had on its left a new French Army, the Tenth, which had come into position on August 28th. The line now held by the left of the Allies was an ideal position: indeed, it was the one actually selected forty years before by the French Staff for a final stand against an invading force that might overcome the frontier defences and be marching on Paris. The enemy's pressure on the centre, with the object of dividing the force and then mopping up the western portion, including, of course, the British, proved, however, to be too great, and a general retirement to the Maine was ordered. The great retreat from Mons, in which 100,000 British were opposed to a quarter of a million Germans, came to an end on September 5th.

Von Kluck's First Army, instead of continuing its sweep towards Paris, now changed direction to the south-east and attempted to drive a wedge between the left of the French Fifth Army and the right of the British force, which he was pleased to consider demoralized. As a result of this change, the raiding force of cavalry off on von Kluck's right was drawn in to conform, and Lille was evacuated by the Germans. Advantage was immediately taken of von Kluck's mistake in moving across our front. His right was attacked on September 6th, by the British and French on the left of the Allied line; pressure was continued on the 7th; and on the following day the German right was in retreat. On the 9th the German centre was badly beaten, and on the 10th the Battle of the Marne became a drive. The enemy, however, was too strong in numbers for us to convert his retreat into a rout, and on September 12th he had got back in good order to the Aisne. The position taken up was as nearly perfect as could be imagined, situated as it was on the crest of a plateau some two miles north of the Aisne stream. In passing over this ground a few days before, the enemy had left behind working parties to prepare defensive trenches in case of a retirement.

On the supposition that the enemy was merely holding a delaying position, the British opened the Battle of the Aisne with a frontal attack. We succeeded in crossing the stream on September 14th, but, after a five days' struggle, realized that this was no rearguard matter, and a weary war of entrenchments began.

To turn the enemy's right, the two new French Armies on our left, the Seventh and the Tenth, extended our line at right angles from the Aisne beyond Albert to Arras and Lens, and almost to the Belgian frontier, a distance of nearly seventy miles. Then the Germans took the offensive, stretching out their right in the endeavour to outstrip our movement. In this new effort, by which he hoped to secure the Channel ports and the Seine Valley for an advance on Paris, the enemy had the advantage of the better railway systems.

By the end of September, Sir John French had come to the conclusion that in consequence of the extension of the line the British Army was in the wrong place. At Mons it had been on the extreme left. Now it was almost in the centre of the Allied line, and consequently there were difficulties in the matter of communications and supplies, which crossed those of the French Armies. If the British were transferred to the left of the line, we should then be within easy reach of the Channel ports. There was also another aspect to be considered, namely, the imminence of a great offensive against Britain herself, with the possession of the Channel ports as the immediate objective. Antwerp was at its last gasp, and when that city should fall to the Germans a fresh army would be available for a dash at the gap between Lille and the sea. Even now the finest of the German troops were under orders for the north, and in the first week of October large masses of German cavalry appeared again in the neighbourhood of Lille and Armentieres. General Joffre concurred in the views of Sir John FrenchJohn French, and the transfer was accordingly arranged.

Now commenced the West Flanders campaign, which proved to be harder and more intricate than any the Allies had yet fought. It was a self-contained campaign, in which only three out of the eleven Allied Armies, namely, the French Eighth, the British, and the French Tenth, took part. When it was seen that Antwerp must fall the following plan was adopted by the Allies. The Belgian Army, covered by Sir Henry RawlinsonHenry Rawlinson's British force, consisting of the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division, recently landed at Ostend and Zeebrugge for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Antwerp, would retire by Bruges and Ghent to the line of the Yser to protect the Allied left, and, together with the new French reinforcements, meet any attack along the coast by German troops released after the fall of Antwerp; Lille and La Bassee to he held by the Allies; and the British, pivoting on La Bassee, to swing south-east, isolate the northern wing of the Germans, and threaten the communications to the south.

By September 30th the French Tenth Army had got into position, with its right on the River Ancre near Albert and its left extending beyond Arras to the vicinity of Lens. Several French Territorial Divisions occupied Lille and Douai opposite the German right. On October 8th the Germans, who still held Lens, took Douai and shelled Arras and Lille. Their cavalry were still scouring this region as far west as Hazebrouck. Bailleul and Cassel, and were therefore within twenty miles of Dunkirk.

On October 11th, the IInd Corps (Smith-Dorrien), on the way to the new position in the line, had marched from Abbeville and was placed on the left of the French, between Bethune and Aire. On the same day the Corps wheeled round till its left rested on Merville, and during the next four days pushed the Germans back to the La Bassee-Lille Road. Further advance was checked by strong counter-attacks. Indian troops first came into the line on 19th October, the Lahore Division being placed near Bethune in support of the IInd Corps.

The IIIrd Corps (Pulteney) arrived at St. Omer on October 11th and marched to Hazebrouck. On the 13th it moved towards the line Armentieres-Wytschaete, linking up the Ypres and the La Bassee sections of the front. This Corps came into conflict with the enemy in strength at Meteren, and, after a sharp fight, drove him out of Meteren and Bailleul and occupied the line Bailleul-St. Jans Cappelle. By October 17th the IIIrd Corps had taken Sailly, Nieppe and Armentieres, and pushed forward to a position with its right at Bois Grenier, three miles south of the Lys, and its left at Le Gheer, a mile north of the river. Here we were against the main German line, and it was found impossible to recover Lille, from which the enemy had driven the French Territorials on the 14th, or, indeed, to make any further advance from the position taken up here on October 19th. "This, the British right centre [about the Armentieres sector] was destined to have one of the most awkward places in all the coming: battle. It was not itself the object of any great massed attack, as on the Yser, at Ypres, and at La Bassee, but it suffered from being on the fringe of the two latter zones,.……and was gravely endangered in the German enveloping movements."

John Buchan: "Nelson's History of the War."

The nucleus of the IVth Corps (Rawlinson) was the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division (Byng), which, as we have seen, had gone from Ostend and Zeebrugge to help the Belgians at Antwerp. When that city fell on October 9th; the Belgians and the British in accordance with the general plan, fell, back towards the Yser Canal. The Belgians took up the line of the Yser from Houthulst Forest (north-east of Ypres) through Dixmude to Nieuport, with French Territorials in support. Our 7th Division took up a position cast of Ypres on the line Zandvoorde-Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, with the 3rd Cavalry Division as advanced guard on a line roughly from Bixschoote to Poelcapelle. French Cavalry holding Passchendaele. On October 18th, two days after the Allies had secured these positions, four reserve corps, rushed up from Germany, were put into the line from Roulers to Menin. Our IVth Corps, in the endeavour to secure the latter place as a pivot for a turning movement, came into contact with this overwhelming force, and being unable to make headway, entrenched itself on an eight-mile line just east of Gheluvelt cross-roads.

The Ist Corps (Haig) having detrained at St. Omer and marched to Hazebrouck on October 19th, was ordered to move through Ypres to Thourout, and to march thence against Bruges and Ghent. The presence of the four new German corps was not fully known to our Headquarters; and the 1st Corps, soon meeting with determined opposition at their hands, had to settle down east of Ypres as the left wing in the great struggle.

Opposed to the Allied line of nearly 100 miles from Albert to the sea at Nieuport were one and a half million German troops, outnumbering us by five to one. The four principal points in the line, at any one of which an advantageous breach might, be made for a German advance against the Channel ports and our lines of communications, were, in descending order of importance, Arras, La Bassee, Ypres, and Nieuport. Strangely enough, the Germans, in the great series of battles which now commenced, struck at all four points simultaneously.

The struggle for the shortest route to Calais, via Nieuport, came to an end on October 31st through the deliberate flooding of the countryside by the Belgians, who blocked the mouth of the Yser Canal for that purpose.

The fighting about La Bassee, where the Germans attacked in great strength on October 22nd, resulted in the pushing back of the left of the British line in that region, till, by the middle of November, the front ran from Givenchy (west of La Bassee) northwards past the west of Neuve Chapelle to near Laventie, thence bending back towards Estaires. Indian troops were employed with the British in these engagements, but the climatic conditions proved unsuitable.

The Indian Divisions were transferred to eastern theatre of war towards the end of the following year.

The heavy stroke at Arras by the Germans from October 20th to 26th was considered by them to be one of the main battles of the war, but by the beginning of November this attack had definitely failed.

The First Battle of Ypres commenced on October 21st, when Haig, in accordance with instructions, endeavoured to advance with the Ist Corps to Thourout and thence to Bruges and Ghent. In the course of the fighting the French Territorials were driven out of Houthulst Forest. The 7th Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division, then in the vicinity of Becelaere, were strongly attacked and the IInd Corps was compelled to halt on the line Zonnebeke-St. Julien-Langemarck-Bixschoote. The German attack was heavy all along the line; in the region of Armentieres, the posts on the left of the IIIrd Corps were driven in, Le Gheer being occupied by the Germans, though recovered later. Day after day the fighting continued. On October 29th a cumulative attack was made on the whole line, marking the beginning of the sternest struggle of the campaign in the West. The critical point of the whole battle, the crisis of the Flanders campaign and perhaps of the whole Western war, came on the 31st, but still the Allies held out. We lost Messines on November 1st. On November 11th the Germans made their supreme effort, the Prussian Guards being put in against Gheluvelt. They failed, however, and by November 20th both sides fell back generally upon the ordinary routine of trench warfare. So ended one of the most remarkable contests of the war, a great German army of a million being checked and bewildered by one only a fifth of its size. We had yielded some ground, but our line remained unbroken.

For the three weeks' Battle of Ypres the German losses are estimated at not less than 250,000; those of the Allies from Albert to Nieuport were over 100,000; in the Ypres fight alone the British lost 40,000.

From this time onward till early March of 1915, both sides devoted themselves to trench construction, with occasional raids, small attacks and counter-attacks. Of the raids the most important were those made by and upon the Indian troops about Givenchy, and of the minor attacks the heaviest were those at La Bassee.

In March, 1915, a new British Corps, the Vth, under Sir Herbert PlumerHerbert Plumer, came into the line north of Wytschaete; to the sonth of the Vth was the IInd Corps, behind Wytschaete and Messines; the IIIrd Corps (Pulteney) was east of Armentieres; the IVth Corps (Rawlinson) lay southwards from Estaires to west of Neuve Chapelle; thence the Indian Corps extended towards Givenchy; and finally came the Ist Corps linkinig up with the French. North of Ypres the French, with British cavalry at intervals, held from the salient to Dixmude, whence the Belgians continued the line to the sea at Nieuport. The Canadien Division came in in February.

We now had two armies in the field, the First Army (Haig), consisting of the Ist, the IVth, and the Indian Corps, and the Second Army (Smith-Dorrien), comprising the IInd, the IIIrd and the Vth Corps. The total strength of all arms was approximately half a million.

"It is instructive to remember that the British under Marlberough were rarely more than a division strong; that at Waterloo we had a division and a half; that at our strongest in the Peninsula we had no more than one modern army corps; that in the Crimea we had under two divisions; and that at the full tide of the Sonth African War we less than a quarter of a million, men. March, 1915, saw a British army assembled on the Flemish borders twelve times as large as that which had triumphed under Wellington in the Peninsula, and fifty-five times greater than the force which charged with King Harry at Agincourt." —John Buchan: "Nelson's History of the War.

A new British offensive opened on March 10th, when troops of the First Army attacked at Neuve Chapelle, south of Armentieres, with the object of straightening the line and securing the ridge commanding Lille, Roubaix and Turcoing. To distract attention the Ist Corps attacked from Givenchy, and the IIIrd Corps advanced just south of Armentieres. They succeeded in capturing the village of Neuve Chapelle, but not the ridge. The hamlet of l'Epinette was taken on March 12th by troops of the IIIrd Corps, who advanced their line 300 yards on a front of half a mile.

The Second Battle of Ypres raged from April 22nd to May 13th, 1915, the Germans directing their attack mainly against the northern part of the salient between Ypres Canal and the Menin Road. Owing to operations elsewhere, the enemy found our line thinly held. On this occasion the Germans first used gas

Liquid fire was first used by the Germans in their attack on the British trenches at Hooge Crater two months later.

in large quantities against our lines, the Canadians, who had put up a magnificent fight, suffering heavily from this barbarous weapon. As a result of the succession of attacks the salient was considerably reduced in size, but our line still remained unbroken.

Our minor offensives, such as that at Festubert, near La Bassee, in the middle of May, showed the necessity for greater artillery strength, and also that under our attacks the enemy's front did not bend but would break up into a series of field fortresses. The net result proved to be a condition of stalemate.

Midsummer activities in the West were a succession of small things, the one outstanding exception being the German attack on the French in the Argonne; and trench fighting now rose to the rank of a special science.

During the late summer of 1915 the British took over some thirty miles of additional line, and the front line from the North Sea southwards to the Somme was held thus:—Belgians and French on the Yser; British Second Army (Plumer) from Boesinghe, round Ypres, to a point south-west of Armentieres; the First Army (Haig) to a point due west of Lens; the French Tenth Army to the south of Arras; the new British Third Army (Monro) thence to the Somme.

The enemy held his front in varying degrees of strength, his troops being most heavily massed round Ypres, Armentieres, La Bassee, Lens, and all the avenues to Lille. For the present it was the task of the British to hold these forces in position, not necessarily to win ground.

In September the Freneh advanced in Champagne, and as a subsidiary action to that operation we attacked at Loos on the 25th, our object being to isolate the railway junctions of Lens and open the way into the plain of the Scheldt. Loos was taken, but the greater objective was not secured. Four other but smaller attacks made at this time included one by troops of the IIIrd Corps from Bois Grenier, south-west of Armentieres, against the German trenches at le Bridoux.

This fighting died away by the beginning of November, and both sides settled down to trench work during the winter.

Sir Douglas HaigDouglas Haig became Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces on December 15th, 1915.

For several months there was little of importance to chronicle. There were endless local attacks and counter-attacks, mining and counter-mining, and an incessant struggle with nature, but no extensive operations. At this time, initiated, apparently, by the Canadians, the small raids were evolved, a novel form of minor operation by which damage was inflicted, prisoners taken for identification purposes, and the enemy kept in a constant state of tension, but in which the raiding parties always returned to their own lines without making any attempt to gain territory.

Such was the general position in Flanders when the New Zealand Division came to France in the spring of 1916.

Chapter V. Armentieres.

Part 1.—In The Trenches.

First tour in the line—A battalion sector—To reserve—First raid, 2nd Battalion—Australians relieved in the Rue Marle sector —Armentieres bombarded—Inter-battalion relief—4th Battalion raid—Germans raid 2nd Battalion—Enemy bombardments—

Fighting patrols—Relieved by 18th Division.

On the night of 22nd/23rd of May the New Zealand Rifle Brigade commenced its first tour of duty in the trenches in France, taking over from the.2nd Brigade part of the sector due east of Armentieres. During the previous day or two a careful reconnaissance had been carried out by officers and non-commissioned officers, who made themselves as thoroughly acquainted as possible with the whole area, and more particularly with the front-line trenches and No Man's Land. Specialists, such as Lewis gunners and observers, went in on the 21st, thus ensuring that there should be no break in their particular work. The 1st Battalion relieved 2nd Auckland in the Epinette sub-sector—the point of the salient—while 2nd Otago was relieved by the 3rd Battalion. The 2nd and 4th Battalions came in on the night of 23rd/24th, the former relieving 2nd Canterbury in the Pont Ballot sub-sector on the left of the lst Battalion, and the latter taking over from 2nd Wellington the remainder of the Brigade sector from Hobbs' Farm to the River Lys. The battalions were now in their normal order from right to left, and the area occupied by the Brigade formed the left sector of the Divisional front. The lst Brigade was on our right, and across the River Lys on our left were troops of the 9th Division.

All ranks were fairly familiar with the sector generally, for, in addition to the preliminary visits paid by officers and non-commissioned officers, the battalions had, since the 19th, been supplying working parties for the trenches up to sixty per cent. of their total strength. It was, nevertheless, a strange experience, this first taking-over of a sector of the line, with all that it meant in the matter of responsibility, to say nothing of the possibilities before us. Yet, to many, these serious aspects bulked less largely than such immediate difficulties as the passage of the narrow communication trenches, in the darkness, and encumbered by the loads of impedimenta of various kinds, for in those days we took a good issue of blankets into the trenches, and the cooking was done even in the front line itself. The finding of dug-out quarters, the exchange of sentries in the fire-bays, the relief of trench-officers, the checking of stores and equipment, and a hundred other duties and formalities, were to us by no means an easy task; but all was successfully accomplished, and in good time we had returned the "Cheerio!" of the last of the outgoing troops, and had sent off in code the message "Relief complete."

The sketch-map opposite page 96 shows the more important details of a battalion sector of the front-line trench System. It is that occupied by the 1st Battalion when the Brigade first went into the line. The heavy lines represent the trenches, and those of the Germans opposite the sector are also shown, but in lesser detail. As an indication of the low-lying nature of the ground, it may be pointed out that what appear to be narrow roads are really drains as they originally existed, the water from most of these finding its way into a larger drain, the Becque de la Blue, and thence into the River Lys at Armentieres. With this word of explanation in mind, the two or three roads leading forward, as well as that along which the front trench had been constructed, will easily be distinguished. The roads, of course, even if they had not been broken up by shell-fire, were useless as ordinary means of access to the various parts of the sector, for, as the ground rose behind the German line, the enemy had our area well under observation. The actual front-line trench, some 1300 yards in length, extended from Auckland Avenue on the right to Hepbura Avenue on the left, where the 2nd Battalion sector began. As will be seen, it followed the line of scattered houses, or rather their remains, that once formed the hamlet of l'Epinette. It was not held continuously throughout its whole length, but was divided into four "localities" separated by "gaps," with the object of breaking up any attack the enemy might make. The localities were sited and constructed in such a way that not only were they practically self-contained, and so expected to hold out for a considerable time unaided, but they were also able to bring crossfire to bear in support of one another. The gaps were so placed that the enemy breaking through, which he would more easily do at these points, would be dealt with conveniently by the garrison of the covering trenches in rear, while at the same time he would be subjected to flanking fire from the localities. The gaps were not occupied, but were systematically patrolled under arrangements made by the officers in charge of the neighbouring garrisons; and every precaution was taken, by means of construction work and camouflage, to ensure that any difference between the occupied and the unoccupied trenches should be imperceptible from aeroplane or other observation.

As the soil-water level practically corresponded with the surface of the ground, all the trenches, whether in forward or rear lines, were formed of earthworks. The fighting trenches were broken up into fire-bays, the spaces between being solid and thick enough to minimize the lateral effect of shell-fire as well as to afford protection from flanking fire. Where the construction was well advanced, a travel-trench was added to and connected with the fire-trench, so that it was possible to walk along the trench either by winding in and out of the fire-bays, or by moving along the travel-trench without disturbing the men in the bays.

The earthworks were supported to a certain height on the inner side by means of wooden frames lined with boards or corrugated iron or "expanded-iron" netting. The most effective frame was made somewhat in the form of an inverted capital A; the "duck-board" flooring rested on the cross-bar, which at the same time acted as a strut and the drainage collected and flowed beneath. Above the framing the required height of cover was secured by resorting to sandbagging. Owing to repeated bombardments and reconstructions the most advanced earthworks developed into an intricate maze of abandoned masses of tumbled timber and clay, with new fire-bays pushed into the most unexpected places. In the parados, the bank of earth forming the rear part of the trench, were little "dug-outs" where the men not on duty snatched their brief periods of fitful sleep. In general they were large enough to hold four men. The walls, formed of bags of clay, were sometimes lined with timber, while the discomfort was in some de-greedegree lessened by covering the earthen floor with sections of duck-board. The roofs were formed of corrugated iron resting on iron or wooden rails, with earth piled on top in sufficient thickness to afford protection from shrapnel. They were usually entered from the passages connecting the fire-bays with the travel-trench. Occasionally, where the parapet was unusually thick, these so-called dug-outs were constructed in that bank. In similar structures stores of water, rations and ammunition were kept. In the front line of the battalion sector there were two Vickers machine-guns in concrete emplacements which were sited to sweep the two sides of the angle forming the salient. As they were intended for defensive purposes only, they were normally silent. The positions of these and also of the Lewis guns are indicated in the diagram.

For the sake of clearness the belt of wire entanglement that ran along the forward side of the advanced trench is not shown; lines of crosses mark the position of barbed wire in other parts.

Behind the front line ran a close-support System, and in rear of this again a second support line. Much farther back was a reserve or subsidiary System. Owing to the peculiar shape of the front trench-line, the rear trenches had to be sited so as to cope with an attack on either or both sides of the salient.

Between the support and the reserve systems we had in this sector two strong-points known as S.P.X. and S.P.Y., and in the sector held by the 2nd Battalion there was a third, called S.P.Z. These were little all-round systems constructed on slightly-rising ground, and designed to break up the enemy's attack if that should succeed in breaking through the forward lines. The garrison of each was one platoon, strengthened by a Vickers gun and crew.

Access to this part of the Brigade sector was had mainly through the communication trench known as Buterne Lane, which, from the main road of Houplines, a suburb of Armentieres, led to the subsidiary line. Byrne's Boulevard led forward from this, and branched off to Plank Avenue, connecting up with the right of the forward system, and to Willow Walk and Japan Road, by means of which the other face of the salient was most conveniently reached. Each of these was well constructed, and was provided at intervals with fire-steps so that the communication trench could be used to form an effective flank if the need should arise.

The battalion sector was garrisoned as follows: "A" Company held the locality on the right, and found its own supports. "B" Company was responsible for the three smaller localities, namely, one consisting of the Retrenchment, with its advanced posts at 5th and 6th Houses, a second locality at 2nd House, and a third forming the miniature salient east of Japan Farm. Two platoons of "D" Company were in support to "B." These were located in the support and second support lines, supplied posts in the Pioneers' Retrenchment then under construction, and were to be prepared to reinforce the garrison of either face of the main salient. The remaining platoons of this company occupied S.P.Y. and S.P.X., which they were to hold at all costs. "C" Company, in reserve, had two platoons in the trenches of the subsidiary line and two in Quality Street. Battalion Headquarters and the Regimental Aid Post were in Willow Walk.

Rations and general supplies came up from Houplines by way of the tramway constructed along the road marked "Australia Avenue;" but as the forward portions of the tram-line were frequently out of repair owing to shell-fire, supplies were usually dumped near the junction of Willow Walk and Japan Road, and from this point distributed by carrying parties.

A word might be added as to the mode of indicating exactly positions on the map, and thus on the ground. A sheet to the scale of 1 in 20,000 would represent an area of, roughly, ten miles by six. This itself would be one-fourth of a larger rectangle, the four parts of which were distinguished by the terms N.W., N.E., S.W., and S.E., respectively. This greater division was numbered, and the particular sheet used by us for general purposes was known as 36 N.W. This sheet was divided into a number of large squares, bearing the letters A, B, C, etc., in capitals. Each of these was again divided, by what were known as the "grid-lines" of the map, into thirty or perhaps thirty-six squares, numbered accordingly. Finally, each of these was subdivided into four squares, the two upper being a and b, and the two lower c and d, but there was, of course, no necessity to show these letters on the map. The side of the quarter-square always represented a length of 500 yards. By judgment, or by means of a cardboard scale, the sides were again subdivided into ten, or where greater accuracy was required, into one hundred imaginary parts; but in maps drawn to a large scale the tenths were shown on the gridlines. Now, to state the position of a given point within the square, the eye runs along the bottom of the square from left to right until it reaches the part of the line immediately below the point, and the subdivision here is noted; similarly, the eye runs up the left side until opposite the point, and this subdivision is noted also. Thus, on the accompanying sketch, which is based on a small portion of Sheet 36 N.W., and covers part of the C and I rectangles, Chicken Farm is at point I. 5.c. 35.70. So, also, the map reference for Strong-Point Y would be given as I. 4.b. 95.65, and that for Strong-Point Z as C. 28.d. 80.25. The point of the salient would be stated as being at I, 5. central.

The printed trench-maps usually gave no details in the area occupied by the British, beyond what could be obtained from any ordnance map drawn to the same scale. On the other hand, they showed the German trench-system in great detail, information regarding which was obtained from aeroplane photographs, and, in the preparation of the plates, superimposed upon the ordinary French ordnance maps. The use of an ingenious prismatic instrument enabled this to be done by hand with great ease and exactitude.

The reproduction of an aeroplane photograph, facing page 97, to show the locality of the 2nd Battalion's raid, covers also a portion of the ground referred to in the description given above. It was taken about a fortnight before we went into the line. In this the bright, even lines of the roads are clearly contrasted with the dark lines of the drains. The abandoned fields in our own territory as well as in No Man's Land are plainly marked, and the practised eye may distinguish the shadows cast by orchard and hedge trees. The embankments forming the communication and fighting trenches show, as usual, with great clearness. Buterne Farm and the three strong-points, X, Y, and Z, may readily be picked up, as also may the patch of trampled ground between the tramway on Australia Avenue and Willow Walk, over which. Innumerable carrying parties had passed by night as they took supplies to the front-line trenches. The effects of artillery bombardment appear to be more striking on the German side of No Man'a Land than on our own; Box Farm, for instance, had been so battered as to be almost indistinguishable, but it will be seen, also, that Buterne Farm had not escaped attention of this kind.

Our men quickly adapted themselves to the new conditions and soon became proficient in all branches of stationary trench- warfare, as well as in the varions forms of labour entailed in the upkeep and improvement of an extensive trench-system. The New Zealanders found that what had been sufficient cover for their predecessors was not nearly high enough for them. and they had to set to work at once to raise all breastworks by two or three additional layers of sandbags. It was soon discovered, also, that the entanglements in front of the line were far from perfect, and night wiring-parties found constant employment filling up breaks caused by shell-fire, and adding to the depth of the existing wire. Our snipers immediately began to gain ascendancy over those of our neighbours across the way, and very soon all old "windy" notice-boards in our line, bearing such warnings as "Keep low," "Beware of Sniper," were torn down. Above all, our patrols reached a high pitch of efficieney, moved about No Man's Land with great boldness and cunning, and frequently brought in trophies such as snipers' plates and samples of the enemy's wire. In the work of patrolling, all had to take their share, and the experience so gained was of inestimable value as one of the factors making for the maintenance of high morale.

Our casualties for the month of May were:—

Killed. Wounded. Officers — 1 Other Ranks 5 54

The first officer to become a casualty was 2nd Lieut. J. H. CockJ. H. Cock, 3rd Battalion, who was wounded on May 31st.

Included in this list were three men of the 3rd Battalion killed and two wounded through the small dug-out they were occupying being struck by a high-explosive shell during a concentrated enemy bombardment of the trenches. The occupants were buried in the debris, and the Company commander (Capt. Drummond), who happened to be in the vicinity on his round of inspection, proceeded, with the assistance of Sergeant S. F. BreachS. F. Breach and Riflemen W. B. Thomson, J. H. Cannon and T. Barrow, to dig out the buried men—a task which, in spite of the continued heavy shell-fire and of the fact that they were in full view of the enemy owing to the breaching of the parapet, the fearless little party succeeded in accomplishing, fortunately without further casualties. Actions such as this were common enough in later days. Mention of the incident is made merely to indicate not only the fine spirit with which our men, as yet inexperienced and unseasoned, were imbued, but also that adaptability to strange circumstances which was to stand them in such good stead in the varied experiences that lay before them. At the beginning of June we were relieved by the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Auckland and 2nd Otago taking over from the 1st and 3rd Battalions on the night of lst/2nd, and the 2nd and 4th Battalions being relieved by 2nd Canterbury and 2nd Wellington on the following night. We were again billeted in Armentieres. The Brigade became Divisional reserve, and the 3rd Battalion was detailed as Brigade reserve to the left sector, the 1st Battalion as garrison of the Armentieres lines of defence.

The period spent out of the line was by no means one of slothful ease. Large parties were regularly supplied for construction and repair work in the forward lines, these duties being carried out under the general supervision of Engineer officers, and having for their object the rapid improvement of the defences of the sector. Thus our men, while having the advantage of better living-quarters, still had to face the same difficulties and dangers that formed part of their lot while holding the trenches. Certainly the strain was not so constant, but the opinion was often expressed—for it is the soldier's privilege to grumble—that they were better off in than out of the line. Training was carried on whenever possible, but this was perforce usually confined to practice in rapid wiring and the further instruction of specialists in their important work. In addition the 1st Battalion was employed in preparing to occupy the inner defences of the town in case of emergency, while a party of the 2nd Battalion was busily engaged perfecting its arrangements and training for a raid.

Our first raid on enemy trenches was carried out by the 2nd Battalion on June 25th.

The Division's earliest raid was that undertaken by a party from the 2nd Otago Battalion under Capt. Alley and Lieut. Espiner, on June 16.

The Somme offensive was about to open, and it was necessary to endeavour to compel the enemy to maintain his strength outside the region that the Allied forces were to assault. To this end a period of special artillery activity commenced on June 24th, and continued for eighteen days, and from Ypres southward to the Somme a great series of raids was carried out against the German trenches. The sector selected for our particular enterprise was opposite that which the battalion had recently held to the left of l'Epinette; and full knowledge of No Man's Land and of the enemy's wire had been gained by repeated patrolling during the period spent in holding the line, and also while the unit was out in reserve.

The orders for the raid, which are given below, indicate the extent to which every point was thought out and every emergency provided for. The various blanks in the orders were kept open till the very last convenient moment. Lieut.- Col. Stewart's temporary headquarters were in the front-line trench. All subsequent raids were executed along similar lines, though later on, as units became accustomed to this class of work, the written instructions gave less and less attention to minute detail.

How successful this operation proved to be will be seen from the report of the raid, which is also given in full.

3rd New Zealand(Rifle) Brigade. Order No. 8.

Headquarters,

18th June, 1916.

Reference Map: Armentieres, Sheet 36, N.W.2, 1/10,000 and attached sketch 1/2,500.

On the night of…… June, 1916, the 2nd Battalion, N.Z.(R.) Bde., will carry out a raid on the enemy's trenches opposite Pont Ballot, from C.29.a.4.1½ to C.29. a. 5.4. (where ditch enters trench), with the following objects:—

(a) To take prisoners and secure identifications. (b) To capture or destroy any machine-guns or trench mortars found. (c) To report on enemy's trenches and dug-outs. (d) To decrease enemy's morale. (e) To obtain all information possible. 2.

The following information has been obtained by reconnaissance:—

(a) The stream running from C.29.a.1½.2¾. in N.E. direction to C.29.a.3.4½. is about 3 ft. wide and shallow, with a hedge on the eastern bank. (b) The ground rises slightly in a S.E. direction from the stream to mid-way to the "Four Daisies" Road (C.29.a. 2½.2.), and then falls to the road. (c) The "Four Daisies" Road (C.29.a.2½.1½. to C.29.a.4¾.) is a flat turf road, wired along its length except for a passage way on western side. The wire is composed of knife rests covered with thick barbed wire. These rests could easily be lifted aside by hand or destroyed by T.M. bombs. From C.29.a.2½.1½. there is a shallow ditch 6 to 8 feet wide, filled with two-strand galvanized barbed wire, which runs for 50 yards along eastern face of road where the ditch ends. This wire is continued to within 20 ft. of C.29.a.4.3½. (d) The ditch running from C.29.a.3¾.4½. in a S.E. direction through the enemy's trenches is dry throughout its length, but blocked with earth where "Four Daisies" Road crosses it. (e) From S.E. of "Four Daisies" patch to the Pont Ballot— Brune Rue Road the ground is a mass of barbed wire. (f) There are two saps running out from the enemy's trenches, one on either end of the portion to be attacked. The northern end is known to be occupied as a listening post, and is guarded at its head by knife rests. (g) The grass is long between Assembly Point, C.29.a. 3.4½. and "Four Daisies" Road, but is shorter on the German side of the road. (h) There are not thought to be enemy machine-guns in the portion of the trench to be raided, and the trenches are reported to be lightly held. 3.

The reasons why this portion of the enemy's line was chosen are as follow:—

(a) Impossible for enemy to bring enfilade fire from the Southern trenches on our right, or near enfilade fire on our left flank. (b) Our artillery can establish a barrage on flanks and support line. (c) Only one communication trench (C.29.a.5¼.3.) into firetrench. (d) Nearest point of support trench is 120 yards in rear. (e) Ground in No Man's Land is suitable for an Assembly Point in at least two places. (f) Roads and hedge on flank to keep direction. 4.

The following troops, under Capt. A. J. PowleyA. J. Powley, 2nd Battalion, N.Z.(R.) Bde., will take part in the advance and attack:—

(a) Patrol—1 N.C.O. and 4 men. (b) Left Bombing Party—Lt. Castle, 2 N.C.O.'s and 10 men. (c) Assault Party—Lt. Davidson, 2 N.C.O.'s, 10 men and 2 Engineers.

Sketch-Map of a Battalion Sector, L'Epinette, Armentieres. Face p. 96.

Aeroplane Photograph of the Trenches about Pont Ballot, east of Armentieres, the scene of the raid by the 2nd Battalion on June 25th, 1916.

References:— E: the point of exit from our trench; B: the assembly-ditch; A and C: the flank point of the section raided; D: the group of shell-holes known as the Four Daisies. (d) Intelligence—2 men. (e) Right Bombing Party—2 N.C.O.'s and 10 men. (f) Left Flank Party—1 N.C.O. and 2 men, with Lewis gun. (g) O.C. Raid and Signallers—Capt. A. J. Powley, 1 N.C.O. and 3 men. (h) Stretcher-Bearers—1 N.C.O. and 8 men (4 stretchers). (i) Right Flank Party—1 N.C.O. and 2 men, with Lewis gun. (j) Messengers—6 men.

Total: 3 Officers, 11 N.C.O.'s, 59 men.

5. Patrol will leave our trenches (T.80 and 81) at C.29.a. ½.¾., and wait at Assembly Point until rest of party arrive; and after bombardment has lifted, they will move forward and will cut the wire at point selected. When wire is cut, they will inform O.C. Assault and guide the Assaulting Party through the gap. When Assaulting Party has entered the trenches, the Patrol will collect under the parapet and prepare an exit for Assault Party; they will take charge of any prisoners.

Assault Party will leave our trenches at C.29.a.½.¼., and will move to the point of assembly, C.29.a.3.4½, eastern bank of stream. When the Patrol moves forward, the Assault Party will follow in rear to within 30 yards of "Four Daisies" Road, where they will wait until Patrol has reported wire to be cut. The O.C. Assault Party will give the order to move through the wire and enter the enemy's trenches.

The Assault Party will move through the gap in single file, extend on a frontage of one man per yard, and enter the trench to their front. They will take one prisoner at once, and then kill any other enemy met with there. When this has been done, half the party will move to either flank and get in touch with the bombing parties on our flanks, forming connecting links down the trench. The prisoners will be passed along the trench to O.C. Assault Party at the point of exit from the trench. The Assault Party will not take more than 3 prisoners in all.

As soon as the enemy's trenches are entered, the O.C. Assault Party will send back a runner to report to O.C. Raid. O.C. Raid will send back the word "entered" by telephone and lamp to O.C. Attack. As soon as the parties have returned to the Assembly Point after the raid, the O.C. Raid will send "returned" by telephone and lamp to O.C. Attack.

Right Bombing Party will follow the Assault Party and, on reaching the wire, will move up on their right in single file and enter the trench. Half the party, with senior N.C.O., will at once move along the trench to C.29.a.4.1½, killing any enemy met with. On their point being reached they will block the trench, and prevent anyone giving assistance to portion of trench raided. The remainder of the party will work up the trench from point of entry to the blocking party, clearing dug-outs and taking prisoners. Not more than 3 prisoners to be taken.

Left Bombing Party will follow Assault Party and, on reaching the wire, will move up on their left, in single file, and enter the trench. Lt. Castle, 1 N.C.O., 2 bayonet men, and 6 bombers will move along trench, killing any enemy met with, to C.29.a.5.4. (ditch), where they will block the communication trench just South of the ditch, and also the main fire-trench. The remainder of the party will act in a similar manner to the remainder of the right bombing party.

Intelligence Men will move in rear of Assault Party in the trench and search enemy dead and dug-outs, and will remove and bring back pay-books, identity discs, shoulder-straps, letters, pocket-books, specimen of flares, revolvers, gas helmets, etc. They will pay particular attention to the construction and design of trenches and dug-outs.

Messengers. One each with O.C. Assault Party, Right and Left Bombing Parties, and 2 to remain with O.C. Raid. The messenger with O.C. Assault Party will carry with him a luminous tape, which he will pay out from a point 30 yards in front of enemy's wire up to enemy's parapet and into trench.

Left Flank Party will move out from our trenches in rear of Right Bombing Party to the Assembly Point C.29. a.3.4½., and will take up a position at junction of road and stream. They will be prepared to deal with any enemy who move out North of the raiding area.

Right Flank Party will move out in rear of stretcher-bearers from our trenches, keeping to the North side of Pont Ballot—Brune Rue Road to junction of that road with the "Four Daisies" Road, where they will take up a position to deal with any enemy who move out South of the raiding area.

Signallers will move out in rear of Left Flank Party and lay out two lines along stream bank to Assembly Point. They will take with them three telephone sets and two electric signal lamps.

Parties will move out from our trenches at C.29.a.½.¾. in the following order:—

Patrol. Left Bombing Party. Assault Party. Intelligence Party. Right Bombing Party. Left Flank Party. O.C. Raid and Signallers. Stretcher-bearers. Right Flank Party. 7. O. C. Raid will remain at Assembly Point C.29.a.3.4½. with signallers, 2 messengers and stretcher-bearers. 8. O.C. Attack, Lt.-Col. A. E. StewartA. E. Stewart. 2nd Bn., will be at………with signallers and messengers. With him will be the Divisional Trench Mortar Officer (Capt. White) and Artillery Liaison Officer. 9. Dress. All ranks will wear general service uniform with boots and puttees. Steel helmets will be worn. Faces and hands will be blackened. Every man will have a piece of white material 3 inches broad on each arm. These will be covered with a piece of dark cloth, which will be removed on entering the hostile trenches. Gas helmets will be carried by all ranks. 10. The Raiding Party will assemble at.…p.m. at the head of Fiji Avenue at junction of "stop" in Locality 6a. Six spare men will also parade. O.C. Attack will carefully inspect all ranks to see that they are carrying nothing likely to be of value to the enemy. 11.

Action. Parties will move out to the Assembly Point from C.29.a.½.¼. at the following times:—

0 (Zero)

Zero hour was 10.30 p.m. The remaining times are given in horns and minutes after zero.

—Patrol. 0.15—The remainder of the Raiding Party in the order given in Para. 6. They will collect at the Assembly Point and there remain. 0.45—The artillery will open fire on the portion of the trench to he raided, and also on the flanks and supporting trenches in rear. At the same time the Trench Mortar Batteries will cut the wire as nearly as possible at C.29.a.4½.3. 1.00—The barrage will he lifted and concentrated on enemy's flank and support trenches. The raiding party, preceded by the patrol, will advance to within 30 yards of the enemy's wire, in 3 columns in single file from right to left: Right Bombing Party, Assault Party, Left Bombing Party. They will then carry on as in Para. 5.

No One is on any account to move forward from the Assembly Point until 1.00.

The right flank party will not move from our trenches up to its position until 1.00, and, on the signal for withdrawal being received, will remain another 5 minutes in their position and then withdraw to our trenches.

12. Should the N.C.O. in charge of the Patrol find that all the wire has not been cut, he will send back to O.C. Assault and at once start cutting the wire. The O.C. Assault is responsible for keeping touch with the Patrol. 13. Wounded men will either walk or be carried back at once. 14. Prisoners will be handed out at once from the point of exit, and will be taken over by the Patrol, who will escort them to O.C. Raid. 15.

Withdrawal. The raiding party will not remain in the enemy's tranches more than 10 minutes, but may be withdrawn earlier on a signal given by the O.C. Assault. The signal for withdrawal will be two long and two short blasts on the whistle, which will be passed along the trench by the Assault Party, and repeated by Officers and N.C.O.'s in charge of parties. All parties must return to the point of exit within one minute of signal, and Officers or N.C.O.'s in charge must ensure that no man is left unwarned. There must be no delay in returning to exit after signal for withdrawal has been made; should any party be actively engaged they should hold on for a short time longer, but must send a man to report at once to O.C. Assault Party.

The Left Bombing Party will be the last to leave, and will cover the retirement of the party. After passing through the wire, parties will move back to the Assembly Point as rapidly as possible, and report at once to O.C. Raid.

16. The O.C. Raid will decide whether parties are to remain at Assembly Point until retaliation has ceased, or return to our trenches. Should he adopt the former course, he will inform the O.C. Attack as to his action and the situation, so that our barrage can be discontinued. He must make similar arrangements for wounded and prisoners. 17. The O.C. Attack will arrange to evacuate prisoners and wounded to the rear, and to provide the escort for prisoners, who should be taken to Advanced Brigade Headquarters, together with any captured documents. Prisoners should not be allowed to converse with each other, and should be kept apart. As soon as possible after return to the trenches, the O.C. Attack and all officers engaged in the raid, together with Intelligence men, will report to Advanced Brigade Headquarters. 18. The Raiding Party, on returning to our trenches, will give their names to O.C. Attack and move off to their billets. The names will also be checked again at exits from Spain and Gloucester Avenues. 19.

The following special telephone wires will be laid:—

(a) 1 line from Advanced Brigade Headquarters to O.C. Attack. (b) 1 line from artillery group to Liaison Officer. (c) 1 line from O.C. 2nd Auckland Bn. to O.C. Attack. If these lines fail runners will have to be employed where possible. 20. All watches will be synchronized at 9 a.m., 3 p.m., and 8.30 p.m. on the day of the raid, by telephone with Brigade Headquarters. 21. In order to warn all units concerned, and also neighbouring units, of the night selected for the raid, the following message will be sent: "..……" the hour named being the approximate time the patrol will leave our trenches. Should the operations be postponed, the following message will be sent: ".……" 22. The O.C. Attack may at any time decide not to proceed with the operations, and if he so decides, must inform Advanced Brigade Headquarters at once. 23. The Brigade Grenade Officer will provide all the bombs necessary for the Raiding Party, and will carefully inspect these both before and after being fused. 24. O.C. 2nd Battalion will arrange with his Medical Officer for spare stretchers to be at hand. 25. A countersign will be arranged for all parties going over the parapets. 26. Major R. St. J. Beere, 2nd Bn., will remain in the vicinity of O.C. Attack during operations, and will take over the duties should the latter become a casualty. He should, however, not be in the same dug-out. 27. O.C. Artillery Group and O.C. Machine Gun Company will report to Advanced Brigade Headquarters at.…p.m. 28. Reports to Advanced Brigade Headquarters at 2nd N.Z. Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 5 Rue Jesuit.

Report On Raid On Enemy's Trenches By Party Of 2nd Battalion, 3rd New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade. Narrative.

The raid was carried out in accordance with Brigade Order No. 8, dated 18th June, 1916.

The scouts went out at 10.30 p.m., cut a way through our wire, reconnoitred the ground to front and flanks, and heard a wiring party working on the wire at the point to be raided.

At 10.45 p.m. the Raiding Party commenced to leave the trenches for the Assembly Point. All ranks were in position, at 11.9 p.m., and bombardment commenced at the appointed time, 11.15 p.m.

Both telephone wires to the Assembly Point were broken immediately bombardment commenced—it is thought by "blow-backs" from our own trench mortars, as the enemy's retaliation had not commenced. Enemy's retaliation commenced at 11.25 p.m., and fell on support trenches S 80 and 81.

At 11.30 p.m. our bombardment on front line trenches lifted.

The Assaulting Party, preceded by scouts, advanced, and found all enemy's entanglements broken up with the exception of three strands on a width of 20 yards at the nearest point and 20 feet at the parapet. The ditch in front of the enemy's trench was found to be about 8 feet wide and 5 feet deep, and was difficult to cross.

11.36 p.m. The party assaulted the trenches and carried out the programme arranged.

11.51 p.m. They remained in the trenches for fifteen minutes and then withdrew.

Up to this time there had been no casualties. While withdrawing, an enemy's bomb, carried by one of the men, Rifleman McPhee, exploded, killing him and wounding three others. These men were amongst the last seven or eight to leave, and there was some difficulty in getting them away. A large quantity of papers, equipment, etc., was left in No Man's Land in consequence. An attempt will be made to recover some of this to-night. During the withdrawal five other men were wounded.

The party came into our trenches between 12.5 and 12.30 a.m.

At 12.33 a.m. the artillery bombardment was stopped. The artillery should have stopped at about midnight, but, owing to telephonic communication breaking down, information could not be sent that all men were in.

From a careful estimate, 29 Germans were killed by the Assaulting Party, and 9 prisoners were brought in; 7 were handed to the A.P.M., and 2 Germans (wounded) are in the hospital.

Artillery.—Support was excellent. No damage, however, was done by the howitzers to the portion of the trenches assaulted. Just beyond the northern end, the enemy's trench was well broken up by the howitzers.

The medium trench mortar fire was very good and effective. The enemy was completely cowed, and put up practically no resistance.

Trenches. The enemy's trench is dug out of the ground—in fact is a trench with a parapet of about one foot, and a glacis to the ditch in front. It is revetted with hurdles, and is very narrow. The ditch was 8 feet wide and 5 feet deep, and, though quite dry, was found a difficult obstacle to negotiate. The width of his parapet was about 20 feet. The parados is solid earth. Fire-steps were similar to our own. Under the parapet was a good dug-out, with table and electric light; also a number of "funk-holes," lined with timber, and large enough to hold two or three men. The duck-boards were of the same kind as ours.

Two sappers were taken with the party, and were instrumental in doing considerable damage to the enemy's works. They located a gas-engine, similar to a Lister engine, used for pumping purposes, and absolutely wrecked it with five slabs of gun-cotton. The dug-out was also wrecked, and two bomb-stores blown up.

No machine-gun emplacement was found, nor any machine-guns. There was a wire from the trench to the support trenches, with a "pull," probably for a bell. In the trench was a big bell, probably for a gas alarm. No sign of mineshafts could be found.

A large quantity of papers, bombs, five gas helmets, and five rifles were collected. The attack was carried out under the orders of Lt.-Col. A. E. StewartA. E. Stewart, O.C. 2nd Battalion, 3rd New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade.

The raiding party was commanded by Capt. A. J. PowleyA. J. Powley, and the assaulting party was under Lieuts. A. P. Castle and C. J. H. Davidson.

The raiding party consisted of 3 officers and 70 other ranks, 2nd Battalion, 3rd N.Z. (R.) Bde., and 2 other ranks N.Z. Engineers.

I desire to express my appreciation of the excellent work done by all ranks and the cool manner in which all the details were carried through.

(Signed) H. T. Fulton, Brigadier-General, Commanding 3rd N.Z. (R). Bde.

In connection with this achievement, undoubtedly brilliant, and all the more noteworthy for the fact that it was a first attempt, only one modest recommendation was made for immediate recognition of meritorious service, and Capt. A. J. PowleyA. J. Powley was in due course awarded the Military Cross. Later, however, the special services of Lance-Corporals H. G. Le Comte and W. W. C. Bedggood, upon whose excellent work as scouts and patrols much of the success of the enterprise depended, were recognized by the award of the Military Medal.

Of the many commendatory messages received by the Brigade, probably the most highly prized was that sent through Divisional Headquarters by General Birdwood, commanding the 1st Anzac Corps, who telegraphed as follows:—

"Well done, New Zealand! Congratulations on success of your raid. Please convey congratulations to Rifle Brigade."

For the month of June the casualties in the Brigade were:

Killed. Wounded. Officers 2 1 Other Ranks 21 90

It will be noted that although we were engaged in stationary trench warfare, the casualties were somewhat heavy. They were caused almost entirely by shell-fire, which was intermittently active both on the trenches and on the town.

The New Zealand Rifle Brigade relieved the 6th Australian Brigade in the Rue Marle sector, south of Armentieres, at the beginning of July. The 2nd Battalion took over from the 23rd Australian Battalion in the front line on the right, or Bois Grenier, sub-sector on the night of 2nd/3rd July, the 1st Battalion at the same time going into the subsidiary line at Bois Grenier, relieving the 22nd Australians. A very heavy bombardment of Armentieres rendered relief difficult, one company of the 1st Battalion being cut off in the town for an hour.

This was a lurid night. The artillery activity on both sides was more intense than anything we had yet experienced; and to make matters worse, the enemy's incendiary shells ignited buildings in various parts of Armentieres. The 4th Battalion Headquarters were repeatedly struck, and Major A. E. WolstenholmeA. E. Wolstenholme, and the medical officer, Capt. F. E. Guthrie, were killed by the explosion of an 8-inch shell. On the following night the 4th Battalion relieved the 24th Australians in the front line on the left, or Lille Road, sub-sector, and the 3rd Battalion went into Brigade reserve in Rue Marle, in which village Brigade Headquarters were established. The 4th Australian Brigade was in the line on our right, and the 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade on our left. All three Brigades of the New Zealand Division were now in the line, and there was practically no reserve. During the night of 8th/9th July the Germans raided the "Mushroom," in the 1st Brigade's line, a good deal of the enemy's bombardment falling on our trenches.

At this time, in the deserted fields within the trench-system, poppies, began to bloom, and the whole countryside, including even some parts of No Man's Land, was soon a blaze of scarlet. Here and there these gay flowers showed themselves in masses on the edges and down the sides of the other wise prosaic communication-trenches; while in places whole stretches of barbed-wire belts behind our front line were transformed into delightful banks of brilliant silky bloom.

An inter-battalion relief was effected on the night of llth/12th July, the 3rd Battalion

The 3rd Battalion was now under the command of Major A. Winter-EvansA. Winter-Evans. Lieut.-Col. J. A. CowlesJ. A. Cowles, who had been evacuated sick a few days previously, did not return to the unit.

from Rue Marle changing places with the 1st in the Subsidiary Line at Bois Grenier. General Plumer, commanding the Second Army, in company with G.O.C Division, visited the Brigade on the 13th and expressed his appreciation of the successful efforts made in carrying out his general instructions as to holding the opposing force in position.

On July 14th orders were received for a readjustment of the line, our Brigade being instructed to side-step to the right, taking over from the 8th Australian Brigade, then under orders to move to the Somme battlefield, as far south as the Bridoux Salient, but retaining also half of the old sector. In accordance with these orders, the 1st Battalion moved up from Rue Marle on the same evening and relieved the 30th Australian Battalion on our right, and on the following night 1st Wellington took over our left sub-sector from the 4th Battalion. The adjustment was completed on the night of 16th/17th, when the 4th Battalion relieved the 31st Australians in the Subsidiary Line, and the 3rd Battalion took over from the 32nd Australians in reserve. The New Zealand Division now held a front normally occupied by two Divisions.

Before moving out, the 4th Battalion launched a successful raid on the enemy trenches opposite the Lille Road Salient on the night of 14th/15th July. The party consisted of three officers and 118 other ranks, Major J. PowJ. Pow being in command, with Capt. H. C. MeikleH. C. Meikle and 2nd Lieut. A. J. PriceA. J. Price in charge of the assaulting parties.

The plan of attack was generally on the lines of the raid by the 2nd Battalion, but in three respects it was somewhat unique. In the first place the artillery bombardment was divided into two phased, separated by an hour's interval, the first of these constituting what was known as a dummy raid, and the second, immediately preceding the real attack, being designed to catch the enemy at work while effecting repairs to his trenches. Then a machine-gun barrage, the idea of which originated with Lieut. L. S. CiminoL. S. Cimino, of the 3rd Machine Gun Company, was used for the first time, and this proved so satisfactory as to become a recognized feature in most subsequent operations, major as well as minor. In the third place, the troops participating in the raid had had no special training whatever, and the admirable smoothness with which the operation was carried out is sufficient indication of skilful planning, fine leadership, and excellent discipline. Our men, however, were somewhat disappointed at the results of their endeavours, for the double bombardment had been so intense and accurate that both the trenches and their garrison were found to be completely obliterated. Not a little of the success of the undertaking was due to the excellent work of the scouts and patrols, conspicuous among whom were Sergeant J. A. MartinJ. A. Martin and Rifleman D. P. Geaney. On the night prior to the raid, the patrol of which Geaney was a member was fired upon and an officer and a sergeant wounded. These, after almost superhuman effort, he succeeded in bringing into our lines. Again, on the night of the raid, Geaney was scouting on the left of the party, when he observed a number of Germans leave their trench and endeavour to work round our flank, but he attacked these single-handed and bombed them back. Unfortunately, on the return of our raiders Geaney was seri-ouslyseriously wounded. Sergeant Martin, who saw him fall, bound up his wounds under heavy fire and brought him safely into our lines.

Our third raid was carried out on the night of 19th/20th July, when two officers and 60 other ranks of the 1st Battalion, operating from the sector held by the 2nd Battalion, entered the German trenches opposite a point just south of the Rue du Bois Salient. Capt. J. R. CowlesJ. R. Cowles was in charge of the raid, and Lieut. N. J. ReedN. J. Reed and 2nd Lieut. N. L. MackyN. L. Macky commanded the two assaulting parties. The artillery fire was not so accurate as usual, the batteries operating having moved in only the night before, but it had the effect of shaking the Germans, most of whom retired to their dug-outs and refused to come out. As a result no prisoners could be brought in, but 33 of the enemy were killed by our men. Identifications and other valuable information were obtained. Owing to the skilful handling of his men by Capt. Cowles, who took full advantage of cover in No Man's Land, both before entry into and after withdrawal from the enemy's trenches, the casualties were very slight, only six of our men being wounded, most of these cases occurring as the party was leaving our parapet.

Sergeant J. R. MillerJ. R. Miller had a peculiarly exasperating experience. In charge of a section of bombers, he was rather seriously wounded on entering the German trench. Notwithstanding this, he led one group of his men to their appointed place, bombing the enemy along the trench as they went, and established a block as planned. This accomplished, he moved to where another group was carrying out a similar task in a branch of the trench and assisted them to complete this work also, thus rendering the flank secure. Presently the signal for the recall was sounded, and Sergeant Miller, though in great pain, struggled back with an inanimate form in his arms. On closer inspection at the first rest, he discovered that the object of his solicitude was not a wounded comrade, but a dead German. Lieut.-Col. W. S. AustinW. S. Austin, who was in charge of the attack and had taken up his position in the front line, was wounded during the progress of the raid, and upon his evacuation the following day Major J. G. RoacheJ. G. Roache assumed command of the 1st Battalion.

In connection with this operation some very fine preparatory reconnaissance work in No Man's Land had been carried out by the intelligence officer, 2nd Lieut. A. HudsonA. Hudson, who, unfortunately, was killed on patrol on the 14th July.

The 1st Battalion was also much indebted to Lance-Corporal H. E. Le ComteH. E. Le Comte, a 2nd Battalion scout of conspicuous ability. This non-commissioned officer having thoroughly explored No Man's Land both by day and by night, was able to supply much valuable information. He had already located during daylight the bodies of two men killed on patrol, and was instrumental in bringing these in. On four different occasions he accompanied patrols of the 1st Battalion reconnoitring the area over which the raiding party was to operate, and by his intimate knowledge of the ground the work of these patrols was greatly simplified. In the raid itself he commanded the little group of scouts, consisting of Riflemen W. S. Howell, E. Erickson, W. Dean and F. C. O. Griffiths, who covered the assembly and moved up to the enemy's wire after the preliminary bombardment. The entanglements being found insufficiently broken, the party proceeded to complete the opening with wire-cutters. Though under heavy rifle fire, they succeeded in their task and returned to the assembly position to report, carrying back with them Rifleman Howell, who had been wounded. This done, they guided the attacking parties forward to the breach, and so on to their objective.

Before the whole of the raiding-party had returned, the trenches of the 2nd Battalion were subjected to intense artillery and minenwerfer fire, and an enemy raid developed on the Rue du Bois salient just to the left of the sally-port. Some twenty Germans effected an entrance into part of the forward trench known as the Dead End, but were immediately ejected, leaving prisoners in our hands. That the enemy penetration was not more extensive was largely due to the heroic work of Corporal H. AshtonH. Ashton, who, the only unwounded man of the sentry group at the block in the Dead End, kept the Germans at bay and thus facilitated their expulsion by parties under Lieutenants A. P. Castle and G. K. Dee. The effect of the bombardment by the German heavy trench mortars was so great that it was thought at first the enemy had sprung a mine. One of our light trench mortars was destroyed, and the officer in charge, together with nine men of his section, was killed. Other casualties numbered 38, including three missing. The redoubtable Le Comte, in company with Lance-Corporal W. W. C. Bedggood and Rifleman Muff, followed the Germans across No Man's Land, and brought in mobile charges, bombs and equipment dropped in their flight.

It was during the enemy bombardment in connection with this raid on the 2nd Battalion's trenches that Capt. Cowles displayed such fine judgment in extricating his men from a difficult position. The assembly line for Cowles' parties, both before and after the assault, was a few short lengths of old trench in the middle of No Man's Land. From this position Cowles had sent back some small groups of his men, when the German barrage covering the enemy raiders came down and involved that part of the line to which our men had to return. Sizing up the situation with that readiness and certitude for which he was already noted, he held the remainder of his men with him until the bombardment slackened and then quickly withdrew them, thus escaping both the shelling on our lines and that which the Germans put down in No Man's Land to cover the retirement of their own men.

On this night also the 1st Brigade sent over a raiding party which met with considerable success.

These operations by the New Zealand Division, which included the liberation of smoke and gas at various points, were intended to distract attention from an attack made by the Australians against Fromelles from Fleurbaix and Laventie, just to the right of the New Zealand sector.

See p. 116.

An inter-battalion relief took place on the night of 24th/25th July, the 3rd Battalion relieving the 1st in the Bois Grenier sector on the right, and the 4th taking over from the 2nd in the Rue du Bois salient on the left.

From this date onwards the enemy continued his spiteful bombardment of our trenches by heavy minenwerfer, Rue du Bois salient coming in for more than its fair share. For our part there was much shooting by heavy artillery, the principal targets being the known and suspected minenwerfer positions. The period was marked also by reconnoitring and fighting patrol work by all battalions, and as the Germans displayed a like activity there were many interesting encounters in No Man's Land. In one of these exploits, on the night of 27th/28th July, a 3rd Battalion patrol came in contact with a party of the enemy and suffered as well as inflicted casualties. In the darkness Rifleman Wood, known to have been wounded, was missed, and on the following night a fighting-patrol under Sergeant R. SimmersR. Simmers went out to endeavour to locate and bring him in. Evidently the patrol was expected, for the Germans, carefully concealed, surprised our men, one of whom was killed and four wounded. This seemed like a disaster for our party, but the position was immediately retrieved through the energy and fine leading of Sergeant Simmers. Pushing on at once with his four remaining men, Lance-Corporals Lind and Bassett, and Riflemen Hooper and Gibson, he bombed the Germans back, found the wounded man Wood, and brought him in to our lines. Lance-Corporal Bassett had performed a little exploit on his own account that afternoon, having gone out at four o'clock to investigate what appeared to be signals from Rifleman Wood, but to his disappointment finding only a white rag fluttering in the long grass. Our casualties during the month of July were:—

Killed. Wounded. Missing. Officers 5 6 — Other Ranks 22 187 3

Part 2.—Training For The Somme.

Training at Armentieres—Second Army Training Area—Fourth. Army Training Area—To the Somme Battlefield.

At the end of July and the beginning of August the Brigade received frequent visits from officers of the 18th Division, which was under orders to take over the section of the line held by the New Zealand Division.

The 55th Brigade commenced relieving on August 4th, when the 8th East Surreys took over from the 1st Battalion. On the following day the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were relieved respectively by the 7th Royal West Surreys and the Royal West Kents. The 4th Battalion was relieved by the 11th Royal Fusiliers on the 7th. Our battalions went into billets in Armentieres, and the Brigade became Divisional reserve. The 1st Battalion formed the garrison for the inner defences of the town. During the quiet days of the first week of August we had no fewer than 20 casualties, including one killed.

Intensive training now began, and it became evident to all ranks that the Brigade was destined to participate in active operations at an early date, especially as contact aeroplane work formed an important part of the exercises. General Sir A. GodleyA. Godley, now commanding the IInd Anzac Corps, together with the G.O.C. Division, watched the battalions at work, and on August 12th inspected the Brigade.

On August 14th the New Zealand Rifle Brigade was relieved in Divisional Reserve by the 154th Brigade, and entrained at Steenwerck for the Second Army Training Area. Brigade Headquarters and the 1st and 2nd Battalions were quartered at Wallon Cappel, and the 3rd and 4th Battalions at Ebblinghem. While the various units were marching to the entraining station from their billeting-areas at Armentieres, the King passed in his car. His Majesty was greeted with the cheers peculiar to the New Zealanders—never vociferous, but none the less hearty and genuine. In the Second Army Training Area the Brigade, in the intervals of training, assisted the inhabitants in their harvesting work.

Having been farewelled by the Second Army Commander, General Plumer, the Brigade, on August 20th, marched to St. Omer, and there entrained for Abbeville. By the following day we had joined the Xth Corps of the Fourth Army and were settled down in the new training area, with Brigade Headquarters at Velma Chateau, Limercourt; the 1st Battalion in Doudelaineville; the 2nd Battalion in Fresne Tilloloy, and the 3rd and 4th in Huppy. Here training was continued at high pressure until the end of the month, the battalions specializing in the trench-to-trench attack and embodying in their work every possible lesson that could be learned from the fighting that had been for some time in progress on the Somme. In particular, the new attack formation was carefully rehearsed, and special training given in contact-plane work. Of the many specially-instructive lectures with which the period of intensive training were interspersed, our own Somme veterans will not readily forget that delivered in the fields of Doudelaineville by Col. Campbell, a British officer familiarly known as the "G.H.Q. Bayonet Agitator." The possibilities of the bayonet were so vividly portrayed by this fire-eater that every officer and man amongst his hearers "saw red" and positively ached to get to work with the cold steel.

We commenced the move from this area to the Somme Battlefield on September 2nd, the various units marching by road and reaching Dernancourt, two miles south of Albert, on the 8th. The lst Battalion moved by stages through Le Quesnoy- sur-Airaines, Vaux and St. Gratien; the 2nd Battalion through Le Quesnoy-sur-Airaines, St. Sauveur and Alonville; the 3rd through Longpre, Fremont and St. Gratien; and the 4th through Longpre, St. Vast and Alonville. On September 4th. 5th and 6th, the units for the time being at rest continued their traininig, contact-plane work again receiving special attention.

The Brigade made the final march on September 9th. when Fricourt Camp, east of Albert, was reached.

Chapter VI. The Battle of the Somme, 1916.

Part 1.—The Earlier Fighting.

Preparations for the summer campaign—Plan—Position—Preliminary bombardment—Opening of the attack—Progress—The French—Attack resumed—Results of second phase.

Before proceeding to deal with the part taken by the New Zealand Rifle Brigade in the battle of the Somme of 1916, it will be well to take a brief survey of the progress of events in that field from the commencement of the great series of engagements on July lst up till the middle of September.

Preparations for a summer campaign had been long in progress, but the actual date of the opening of the offensive had not been fixed. The British armies had been rapidly growing in numbers, and the supply of munitions was increasing to a highly satisfactory degree; and, in order that the reinforcements should have the fullest opportunities for intensive training, and that the accumulations of munitions on the ground should in every way satisfy all requirements, the Commander-in-Chief was desirous of postponing the attack as long as possible, subject only to the necessity of commencing operations before the season was too far advanced. The Germans, however, were continuing their pressure on Verdun, and the Austrian offensive on the Italian front was gaining ground. Relief in the latter theatre, where by the end of May the pressure of the enemy was becoming alarming, was secured by the opening of the Russian campaign early in June. The enemy, however, did not in any way lessen the fury of his attacks on Verdun, where, though the heroic defence of our Allies had gained many weeks of inestimable value to us and to them, the strain was now becoming intolerable. In view of the general situation here and elsewhere, it was agreed that a combined French and British offensive should open not later than the end of June.

The right flank of the British joined up with the left of the French in the vicinity of Maricourt, about a mile north of the Somme river, and the plan agreed upon provided for a French advance along both sides of the river, while the British pushed from Maricourt to the Ancre in front of St. Pierre Divion.

The British faced a dominating ridge rising more than 500 feet high, and forming the main watershed between the Somme and its tributaries on one side, and the rivers of South-western Belgium on the other, and having a general direction from east- south-east to west-north-west. The southern face is steeper than the northern, and is broken up into a series of long irregular spurs and deep depressions. Well down the forward face, the enemy's first system of defence ran from the Somme northwards for two miles, then westwards for four miles to near Fricourt, where it turned nearly due north, forming a great salient. Six miles north of Fricourt the trenches crossed the River Ancre, a tributary of the Somme, and running northward still, passed over the summit of the watershed near Hebuterne and Gommecourt, and so on down its western spurs to Arras. Behind this twelve-mile front from the Somme to the Ancre the enemy had a strong second System of defence, sited near the crest of the watershed and from 3,000 to 5,000 yards in rear of the first system. Nature and art and infinite cunning had combined to make his position formidably strong; and, after his two years' labour at his defences, he not unnaturally looked upon them as impregnable.

During the last week in June artillery bombardments, gas and smoke discharges, and more than seventy raids, were carried out against the enemy trenches opposite the whole British front, which since April, 1915, had increased in length from thirty miles to ninety. The air force, too, was particularly active, on one occasion destroying every observation balloon visible.

At 7.30 a.m. on July lst the British infantry assault was launched, and "the greatest one-day battle ever known in the world's history" commenced. The British main attack extended from Maricourt to St. Pierre Divion. Simultaneously a holding attack was directed against the enemy from the Ancre as far as Serre, with the object of containing his reserves and occupying his artillery; while further north a de-monstrationdemonstration was made against both sides of the Gommecourt salient. The attack on the front from Maricourt to Serre was entrusted to the Fourth Army, under General Rawlinson, and the subsidiary attack at Gommecourt to troops from the Army commanded by General Allenby.

On the right our troops met with immediate success, and rapid progress was made. Montauban was carried, and the Briqueterie on the east and the ridge on the west of the village of Mametz were stormed and taken, as was a large section of trenches to the north of Fricourt, with the result that this village was threatened from three sides. Striking progress was made at numerous points from Fricourt to Gommecourt, but many of these gains had to be given up owing to the enemy's continued resistance at such points as Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel.

The French attack on a five-mile front on the banks of the Somme had also gone well. They penetrated to a depth of 1¾ miles, and on the following day pushed on and took Flaucourt, driving the Germans back towards Peronne. Their toll of prisoners for the two days was over 6,000.

The operations of July lst had tested the German line, and, in view of the results, it was decided to press forward on a front from our junction with the French to a point midway between La Boisselle and Contalmaison; to maintain a steady pressure from La Boisselle to the Serre Road, this portion to form a pivot on which our line could swing as attacks to its right made progress to the north; and on the remainder of the front—from the Ancre to Gommecourt—to hold the enemy to his positions and prepare for a resumption of the subsidiary attack there later should this be found desirable. In order to give General Rawlinson a free hand for his operations from the south, General Gough was given command of the pivotal sector from La Boisselle to Serre.

On these lines the attack was continued, and by the middle of July the British had taken Bernafay Wood, Trones Wood, Longueval, Mametz Wood, the two Bazentin Woods and the two Bazentin villages, Contalmaison and La Boisselle; and from the French left at Maltz Horn Farm the line ran east of Trones Wood, west edge of Delville Wood, north of Longue-valLongueval, Bazentin-le-Grand, Bazentin-le-Petit, Contalmaison Villa, Contalmaison, Contalmaison Wood, Ovillers.

The second phase of the great battle lasted from the middle of July till the middle of September, a contest during which "the enemy, having found his strongest defences unavailing, and now fully alive to his danger, put forth his utmost efforts to keep his hold on the main ridge. This stage of the battle constituted a prolonged and severe struggle for mastery between the contending armies, in which, although progress was slow and difficult, the confidence of our troops in their ability to win was never shaken. Their tenacity and determination proved more than equal to their task, and by the first week in September they had established a fighting superiority that has left its mark on the enemy, of which the possession of the ridge was merely the visible proof."

Sir Douglas HaigDouglas Haig's Despatches.

During this period the policy of vigorous raiding all along other parts of the front was continued. The largest of these enterprises was that carried out on July 19th by an Australian Division, south of Armentieres.

†See p. 109.

The lst Anzac Corps, under General Birdwood, moved down to the Somme front immediately after this exploit.

The main events of this second phase were the taking of Pozieres by the Australians, July 22nd to 26th; the capture, two days later, of the whole of Delville Wood, in which the good work of the South Africans was conspicuous; of Guillemont, Sept. 3rd; of Leuze Wood, Sept. 5th; and of Guinchy and the greater part of High Wood, Sept. 9th. In addition, slow but steady progress had been made in the advance against the stupendous defence works of Thiepval, and the concentrated efforts of the French had also been eminently successful. On 13th September the British line ran from midway between Maurepas and Combles, where it joined up with that of the French, east and north of Leuze Wood, east of Guillemont, north of Guinchy, north of Delville Wood, through High Wood, midway between Pozieres and Martinpuich, just south of Mouquet Farm, and thence to a point about 600 yards south of Thiepval. The remainder of the line northward was practically unaltered. The enemy had lost all observation posts on the main ridge with the exception of those in High Wood and N.N.E. of Guinchy. The British, on the other hand, had now a clear view of Courcelette Martinpuich, Flers, Lesboeufs, Morval and Combles. Combles itself was threatened, and the French advance towards Sailly-Saillisel along both sides of the Bapaume-Peronne road was thereby materially assisted. Gradually the enemy was being pushed into the low-lying ground in the apex of the triangle Albert-Bapaume-Peronne. That he recognized the desperate nature of his position is shown by an Order of the Day issued as early as July 30th, which contained the statement: "……The decisive battle of the war is now being fought on the fields of the Somme…Attacks must break against a wall of German breasts.…"

Such was the position at the end of the second phase of this great struggle, and it was the privilege of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade to participate in the opening events of the third and final phase, in which the British advance was pushed down the forward slopes of the ridge, extended on both flanks, and the whole of the plateau from Morval to Thiepval, with a good deal of the lower ground beyond, captured and firmly

Part 2.—The Third Phase: New Zealanders Engaged.

Section 1—General.

The New Zealand Rifle Brigade in the line—Plans for the forthcoming attack—Tanks—"B Teams"—Objectives for the New Zealand Division—Method of attack—Artillery preparation— Conditions.

The Brigade having reached Fricourt on the 9th of September, proceeded on the following day and night to take over the sector held by troops of the 165th Brigade, 55th Division, and of the 2nd Brigade, lst Division. The 1/N.Z.R.B. relieved the 1/5 King's in the front line from the junction of Peach and Tea Trenches inclusive, to Sap "A" exclusive. The 4/N.Z.R.B. relieved both the 2nd Bn., K.R.R., and the 2nd Bn., Royal Sussex, in the front line from Sap "A" inclusive to Cork Alley exclusive. Thus the front line ran south-east to north-west from a point 500 yards N.W. of the northern apex of Del-villeDelville Wood, to within about a hundred yards of the eastern corner of High Wood. The 2/N.Z.R.B. went into Savoy and Carlton Trenches in support of 1/N.Z.R.B., relieving 1/7 King's, and the 3/N.Z.R.B. went into Carlton and Check Trenches, behind the 4/N.Z.R.B. The 3rd Machine Gun Company and the 3rd Light Trench Mortar Battery went into the sector at the same time. Brigade Headquarters were established at Bazentin-le-Grand. The Divisional front was covered by the 14th Division Artillery and half the N.Z. Division Artillery, all under command of C.R.A., N.Z. Division. On the night llth/12th the greater part of the Brigade front line was swung forward, the right being advanced some 300 yards. Each front line battalion constructed three forward posts 20 yards long, with flank trenches of five yards, connected these up, and dug a communication-trench to complete the System.

On the evening of the 12th the four battalions were relieved respectively by the Auckland, Canterbury, Wellington and Otago Battalions of the 2nd Brigade, and went back for a short period of comparative rest, the lst and 4th to Mametz Wood, and the 2nd and 3rd to Fricourt Wood. Brigade Headquarters moved to Pommiers Redoubt.

At 3 a.m. on September 14th, Brigade orders were issued for an attack on Flers in connection with a general advance of the line on the following day. It was at once evident, not only that plans for the forthcoming attack were exceedingly thorough as to minute detail, but that they were characterized by unusual features in at least two respects. Contrary to the usual practice, on the 15th September the whole force of the Allies was to move forward at the same time, from the line Vermandovillers to Thiepval, in a combined endeavour to thrust the enemy back over the whole front of attack. In the second place the new armoured cars known as "tanks" were to be employed for the first time. Light armoured cars had been used with great success in the flying-column work on the Egyptian deserts against the Senussi, but they would be useless in the trench country of Europe. A tank is well-nigh invulnerable except from a direct hit by a shell; can surmount any kind of obstacle except deep water or an excavation approximating its own length; can flatten out any barbed wire entanglement, however complicated; is practically a moving fortress, and even when its motive power fails can be turned into a ready-made strong-point. The event proved that, all things considered, the tanks, at this their first appearance in battle, came well up to expectations, the most serions drawback proving to be the slowness of their movements when compared with the impetuons dash of the infantry.

It may be mentioned here also that instructions were issued to the effect that a percentage of the officers, non-commissioned officers and specialists of each unit were to be left out of the line. Experience in the earlier stage of the Somme battle had shown the wisdom of such a precaution, for these officers and men, being experienced and well-trained, would, in case very heavy casualties were sustained, form a substantial nucleus round which the unit could be reconstituted without an undue break in its continuity or in its traditions. The second-in-command of each battalion was quartered at the transport lines, at which position he would be able most efficiently to carry out the duty of sending forward supplies of water, rations and ammunition. The personnel thus excluded from participation in a major action were styled the "B. Teams," and were for the time being included in what were known as the "Brigade Details."

The New Zealand Division had joined the XVth Corps, Fourth Army, and in the operations on the 15th September was to have the 41st Division on its right and the 47th Division, Illrd Corps, on its left, and had four tanks allotted to it. The task set the New Zealand Division was an advance of from 2,500 to 3,000 yards on a front something over 800 yards wide, and the attack was planned to cut through Switch Trench, Flers Trench, Flers Support, the north-western corner of Flers Village, Grove Alley, beyond the village, and to terminate with the most advanced troops in position roughly in the form of a spear-head with its point on Factory Corner, 1,500 yards west of Gueudecourt.

The New Zealand Rifle Brigade and portion of the 2nd Brigade were detailed to carry out the attack, which was divided into four distinct phases, as under:—

First Objective, or Green Line: The Switch Trench from the junction of Coffee Lane therewith. This objective, roughly 600 yards from our front line, was allotted to the 2nd Brigade, and the troops employed were the 2nd Auckland and the 2nd Otago Battalions, which were then occupying the front line.

Second Objective, or Brown Line: A zigzag line from the junction of Fat Trench with Flers Trench, about 600 yards almost due west of Flers Church, along Fat Trench, up Fish Alley, along Flag Lane and across to the Flers-High Wood Road at a point about 300 yards west of its crossing with the Longueval-Factory Corner Road. The Brown Line was roughly 1,000 yards in advance of the Green Line, and its capture was allotted to our 4th Battalion (Lieut.-Col. C. W. MelvillC. W. Melvill).

Third Objective, or Blue Line: A line running northwest from the extreme northern point of Flers to Abbey Road, and thence bending back as a flank line to the point where Flers Support crosses the Longueval-Factory Corner Road. The taking of this objective, which was from 900 to 1,000 yards in advance of the Brown Line, involved the capture in succession of sections of Flers Trench, Flers Support, Fort Trench. Grove Alley, Abbey Road, and a strong-point where Fort Trench joined Abbey Road. The task was allotted to the 2nd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. A. B. StewartA. B. Stewart) and the 3rd Battalion (Lieut.-Col. A. Winter-EvansA. Winter-Evans).

Fourth Objective, or Red Line: A line facing north- west, with its left on the forward point in the Blue Line at Abbey Road, and its right at the road-junction 300 yards south of Factory Corner, and also a defensive flank on the right, facing Gueudecourt. The capture of the Red Line, which, without reckoning the defensive flank towards the east, was over 1,100 yards in length and nearly at right angles to the preceding objectives, was entrusted to the lst Battalion (Major J. G. RoacheJ. G. Roache).

The final objective of the Division on our immediate right, the 41st, was to include Flers; while the 14th, on the right of the 41st, was expected to pass beyond Gueudecourt. The advance of the 47th Division on our left was not to go beyond Flers Support, their final objective being in the form of a right angle, one arm being about 500 yards of Flers Support, and the other a line about twice that length facing the High Wood-Ligny Thilloy Road. The Brigades on our right and teft flanks were the 122nd and the 140th, respectively.

Two Vickers guns of the 3rd Machine Gun Company, and two Stokes mortars of the 3rd Light Trench Mortar Battery, were attached to each of the four battalions of the Brigade, and came under the orders of the respective commanding officers during the operations. The remainder of the machine-guns were held in Brigade reserve, and were detailed to give covering fire to the advance.

Two contact aeroplanes were detailed for duty over the sector operated on by the Division, and were to be in the air, weather permitting, from zero till dark on the 15th, and on the following day one was to be up from. 6.30 a.m. till 8.30 a.m.

"Battle order" for every man consisted of rifle, bayonet and equipaient less pack; 220 rounds of ammunition and two bombs; haversack, worn in place of the pack, with waterproof sheets, jersey, two empty sandbags, 24 hours' rations, iron rations, water-bottle filled; two gas helmets,

These were the old pattern, a saturated flannelette bag fitted with air outlet and eyepieces.

one worn on the chest at the alert position; and a steel helmet. Every alternate man carried a pick or a shovel strapped to his back.

For the units of the Brigade, positions of assembly were selected within 500 yards of the new front line held by the Auckland and Otago troops, and the battalions were instructed to complete their dispositions by 9.30 p.m. on the 14th.

The "leap-frog" method of attack was adopted; that is, as each objective was taken it became the jumping-off place for fresh troops in their attack on the next succeeding objective. The main drawback in this system is that the new assaulting troops assembling in the successive starting-places become intermingled with the men consolidating there, and unavoidable delay may be caused thereby. Besides this, the bodies advancing towards the more distant objectives are subject to the enemy fire directed on the successive captured positions as well as on themselves as they pass across the open.

The most intense artillery bombardment ever known in the previous history of the war had opened on the German lines on September 12th,

The New Zealand Artillery alone fired approximately half-a-million rounds at the Somme.

and continued unabated to the zero hour for the great infantry advance, which was fixed for 6.20 a.m., September 15th. The successive attacks were timed to fit in with the lifts of the more terrific barrages, and the hours set were as follow:—Infantry capture Green Line, 6.40 a.m.; capture Brown Line, 7.50 a.m.; capture Flers and establish Blue Line, 8.20 a.m.; advance from Blue Line and establish Red Line, 10.50 a.m.

Friday, September 15th, broke fine, but with a morning mist. The enemy artillery fire on our front was much below normal and no casualties had been suffered by our men overnight; everything, indeed, with the exception of our own artillery, was unusually quiet. A Royal Flying Corps report of an air reconnaissance, carried out shortly before zero, stated that Crest Trench, lying between our front line and the first objective, appeared to be in good order; that Switch Trench, the first objective, had been practically obliterated; that Fish Alley, running north from the right of our first objective and through our second to Flers Trench, had been to a great extent re-dug; and that Flers Trench and Flers Support appeared to be badly damaged in many places. Reports from battalions showed that all minor hitches incidental to the completion of preparations in the adverse conditions that prevailed had been overcome; and General Fulton awaited with confidence the opening of the attack. News received from Division at 6.15 a.m., to the effect that of the four tanks allotted to the sector one was out of action and the remaining three late, was somewhat disconcerting; but as the several advances had been arranged to coincide with the lifts of the barrage, and were not to be dependent on the movement of the tanks, it was realized that the delay on the part of the latter would not interfere with the infantry programme.

Section 2.—The Advance Beyond Flers, September 15th.

Second Brigade to Switch Trench—4th Battalion to Brown Line —3rd and 2nd Battalions to Flers Trench and Flers Support— Flers taken—1st Battalion to Grove Alley—Consolidation—2nd Wellington reinforce—Relief—Non-combatants—General progress —Results.

At zero hour, 6.20 a.m., the intense barrage opened, and six minutes later began creeping forward by lifts of 50 yards per minute until it joined the stationary barrage on Switch Trench, the first objective. Simultaneously with the commencement of the barrage, 2nd Auckland and 2nd Otago swarmed over the parapet, moved swiftly forward to the line

Order of Battle—Somme, September 15, 1916. of shell-bursts, the regularity of which was beyond praise, and followed it forward step by step, until, at 6.40, it lifted from the section of Switch Trench which formed their goal. With a final rush the trench was carried, all resistance here as well as in Crest Trench, which they had taken in their stride, being overcome in a few minutes.

Ten minutes after zero the leading companies of the 4th Battalion, "C" (Major J. PowJ. Pow) on the right and "B" (Capt. A. J. PowleyA. J. Powley) on the left, moved forward, following at a suitable distance the rear wave of 2nd Otago. All four companies had been arranged in the assembly-trench in such a manner that upon emerging they would fall at once into the new attack formation, which had been so assiduously practised during the period of training. Thus the platoons of "A" Company (Capt. J. L. TurnbullJ. L. Turnbull) were assembled alternately with those of "C," and the platoons of "D" Company (Capt. M. H. R. JonesM. H. R. Jones) with those of "B," and by the time all had left the trench the battalion was moving in eight waves, each 60 paces behind the other, and each wave consisting of eight sections marching in single file. Between the sections an interval of 100 yards was preserved, so that the front covered was roughly 800 yards. Approaching Switch Trench the battalion halted and the men lay down to await the moving forward of the barrage. When this lifted the battalion advanced again, and presently wave after wave dashed in upon the trenches of the Brown Line. All ranks displayed magnificent spirit, and by 7.50 a.m. the enemy's stubborn resistance had been overcome, and the men were hard at work putting the captured trenches into fighting trim and constructing additional strong-points in preparation for withstanding more effectively a possible counter-attack. Of the two Vickers guns attached to the battalion, one was placed on either flank. That on the left had excellent targets in the shape of parties of retreating Germans, while the other, commanding both the road from Flers and also Flers Trench to the north, did some useful work against a counter-attack launched during the afternoon. The left was further strengthened by the posting there of a light trench mortar section with two guns. The tanks were not an unmixed blessing. One became disabled at 8 a.m., on reaching the centre of Brown Line, and drew heavy artillery fire, which was sufficiently in-accurateinaccurate to leave the tank unscathed while inflicting casualties upon the troops in the vicinity.

Lieut.-Col. Melvill had come forward with his battalion to a position slightly in rear of the objective, but here his headquarters came under rifle and machine-gun fire, and the liaison officer and others of the personnel were struck. A move was therefore made to the Brown Line itself. Inspection of the position revealed the fact that the right company, in keeping touch with the troops of the flanking Division, had extended to a considerable distance beyond the boundary line, but no adjustment was made till later in the day.

Though the successful achievement of the 4th Battalion has been told in few words, it must not be supposed that the task was either simple or easy. The capture of the objective, together with the 1,000 yards' advance from the assembly position, had taken over an hour, and during that time the attacking troops had been subjected to heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. Casualties had been heavy right from the commencement. Lieut. K. R. J. SaxonK. R. J. Saxon and 2nd Lieut. W. W. McClellandW. W. McClelland each completed the advance in charge of a company, all other officers of the two companies having fallen. In a third company 2nd Lieut. H. G. CarterH. G. Carter led in the final assault in the place of his company commander, who had been wounded in the earlier stages. Saxon and Carter had themselves been wounded but were able to carry on, and the work of all three officers was reported upon as being conspicuously good. Similar fine leadership was displayed by Sergt. J. A. Martin and Rifleman T. Wilson, who reached the objective as temporary platoon-commanders. Sergt. Martin was killed just as his work was accomplished. The trying duties of the stretcher- bearers commenced at once, and many stirring tales are told of the deeds of those patient and self-sacrificing workers. The names of Riflemen W. T. Douglas, W. C. Campbell and A. Dunthorn are recalled in this connection, these men having performed some remarkable feats in conveying wounded men to places of safety single-handed. Their work was supplemented by that of Corporal S. R. McDonaldS. R. McDonald, a combatant non-commissioned officer, who, immediately after the capture of the objective, went forward from the trench, bound up the wounds of two men under fire, and brought them safely in, though he himself was severely wounded; and by that of Rifleman H. Youle, who similarly rescued no fewer than five men.

In the meantime, following closely behind the 4th Battalion's rear companies as they advanced to the attack, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had been coming forward to gain a position in the Brown Line. This was to be their jumping-off line for an advance involving the capture of a large area intersected by such formidable works as Flers Trench, Flers Support, parts of Grove Alley and Flers Village, and the sunken Abbey Road with its strong-points and deep dug-outs. Each moved on a single company frontage, the platoons being in artillery formation with the sections arranged chequerwise. The companies were in the normal order, the commanders on this day being Major A. J. ChildsA. J. Childs and Captains R. O. Brydon, J. B. Bennett and C. Horsnell, in the 2nd Battalion; and Capt. A. ThomsonA. Thomson, Lieut. W. N. Masefield, Capt. J. D. K. StrangJ. D. K. Strang and Capt. W. C. HarleyW. C. Harley in the 3rd. While crossing Switch Trench the troops came under severe fire from machine-gun nests in Crest Trench, the mopping-up of which had not at that moment been completed. The advance was not checked, however; indeed, the forward movement appears to have been carried on too impetuously, for a number of the men of these units had already mingled with the leading waves of the 4th Battalion when the latter made the assault on the Brown Line. There was ample time for such reorganization as was required, and punctually at 8.20 a.m., the 2nd and 3rd Battalions left the Brown Line and advanced towards the third objective. At this stage the 3rd Battalion lost three company leaders, Capt. Strang being killed and Capt. Thomson and Lieut. Masefield wounded.

On the right, the 2nd Battalion companies experienced little difficulty in dealing with their section of Flers Trench; but they came under heavy machine-gun fire from Flers Support as they moved forward from the former, and this caused a few minutes' check.

On the left, the 3rd Battalion found trouble at once. The wire in front of Flers Trench was practically intact, and, while held up by this obstacle, the leading companies suffered heavily at the hands of the German machine-gunners and snipers. Repeated efforts were made to break through the bar-rierbarrier, among these being a particularly daring bombing attack led by 2nd Lieut. R. A. BennettR. A. Bennett, but all attempts proved utterly unavailing. The men thereupon took cover in shell-holes and awaited the arrival of the tanks, then momentarily expected. Lance-Corporal E. BassettE. Bassett, becoming impatient, moved out into the open and repeatedly picked off enemy snipers as they showed their heads to fire. He put up an excellent score, and came through the ordeal without a scratch. Equally commendable was the work of a runner, Rifleman J. R. B. Harwood, who moved about the scattered parties in the shell-holes, establishing touch and aiding organization.

Two tanks came up at 10.30 a.m. One of them took up a position on the extreme left flank, while the second proceeded to deal with the wire and machine-guns holding up our men. Realizing the difficulties confronting the leading waves of the 3rd Battalion, Major J. PowJ. Pow, of the 4th Battalion, together with 2nd Lieut. A. C. FultonA. C. Fulton and a party of riflemen and bombers, moved forward to their assistance. Bombing along Flers Trench he met with wonderful success, capturing no fewer than 145 prisoners, including two officers. Bombing parties of the 3rd Battalion had also been active, and presently, this section of Flers Trench being taken, the rear waves of the battalion advanced. Sending parties up the saps and inwards from the left flank, they secured Flers Support and pressed on to capture their allotted portion of Abbey Road. Here a fine action was performed by Rifleman J. R. Walters. Going forward under fire, he dressed the wounds of eight men who had fallen in advance of the position, and brought them in unaided. Not content with this, he carried two of the worst cases overland to a more protected spot 200 yards in rear.

Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion was engaged in dealing with its section of Flers village. Progress in this locality was at first slow owing to machine-gun fire from the north-west corner of Flers and from Abbey Road. Here Major Childs, the senior company commander of the battalion, was killed while pressing forward with his men. Noting the delay, the commanding officer of the 4th Battalion sent up his reserve platoon to assist. Skilfully handled by 2nd Lieut. W. W. DoveW. W. Dove, these additional men proved sufficient to turn the scale. Both the Abbey Road and the village positions were now smartly cleared, and when consolidation was well under way the platoon of reinforcements was withdrawn. Our men were by this time well beyond the right boundary of the Divisional sector, but this was rendered necessary through the Division on the right failing to cover the whole of its allotted front.

The capture of the Blue Line was now complete, and the two battalions got to work constructing strong-points and establishing blocks.

During the advance of the 3rd Battalion from the Brown Line and in the work of consolidating the captured objectives, 2nd Lieutenants A. L. Martin, S. J. E. Closey and W. A. Gray, who, owing to casualties amongst the officers, had had to assume the duties of company commanders, did conspicuously good work under most difficult conditions. Closey and Gray, indeed, found themselves the only officers left in their respective companies. Sergeants J. E. Day, S. F. Breach and R. Simmers took over the duties of their fallen platoon commanders with no less satisfactory results. To the north of Flers brilliant work was done by that fine officer, Capt. R. O. BrydonR. O. Brydon, of the 2nd Battalion, who reorganized the remains of two companies, established two strong-points, and beat off repeated enemy counter-attacks. Wounded early in the morning, he carried on with great tenacity and cheerfulness throughout the 15th, but was killed on the following day. Sergt. N. E. Fitzgerald, also of the 2nd Battalion, had all the officers of his company killed or wounded; he rallied forty men, and with them established a post north of Flers, and this he held with his garrison, now reduced to twenty-five, until the evening of the 16th.

The two Stokes mortars attached to each of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions got well forward and came into action, but their usefulness was curtailed owing to the insuperable difficulty experienced in bringing forward additional ammunition supplies. The four Vickers guns were of the greatest assistance. They covered the advance of these two units, and, later, that of the 1st Battalion, besides aiding materially in beating off a counter-attack on the left of the 3rd Battalion's position in the Blue Line. Ill-luck attended the gun sent forward to help on the men of this battalion held up at Flers Trench, for it was

A Trench on the Somme."Great Push," Hutchinson's.

Night, 14th/15th September, 1916."Great Push," Hutchinson's.

A Relic of the Somme— One of the First Tanks.

A Lewis Gun in the Front Line.

A Trench Mortar Shoot.

An 18-Pounder. (Gunners wearing Gas Masks.)disabled by shell-fire before it could come into action. The work of Sergeants C. V. Ciochetto and P. J. Clark, Corporal G. R. BoothG. R. Booth, and Private L. V. GibsonL. V. Gibson, all old Rifle Brigade men, in handling the guns during these stages, was specially praiseworthy. At 10 a.m., on a call from the 3rd Battalion for reinforcements, two guns from the Brigade reserve were sent up. They were so placed as to give good covering fire to the left flank, but they were not called upon to operate.

The 1st Battalion, detailed for the task of securing the final objective, consisting roughly of Grove Alley, moved forward immediately behind the 2nd and 3rd. The advance was made on a two-company frontage. "A" Company (Capt. L. M. InglisL. M. Inglis) on the right and "B" (Capt. B. R. LankshearB. R. Lankshear) on the left, leading, with "C" (Capt. P. A. ElderP. A. Elder) and "D" (Capt. H. C. MeikleH. C. Meikle) following in support. Part of "D" Company had been detailed as battalion reserve. Approaching the Blue Line the battalion began to suffer heavy casualties from machine-gun fire coming from the left. Lance-Corporal F. N. FletcherF. N. Fletcher, with a bombing-party of six men from one of the rear companies, swung out beyond the left flank, located the enemy machine-gun, and attacking it from flank and rear succeeded in bombing out the crew and destroying the gun, thus removing a serious obstacle to the advance. The check aggravated the slight confusion that had already arisen from the intermingling of the men of the 1st with those of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Indeed, the necessary orderly arrangement of sections of the 1st Battalion was repeatedly upset through yielding to the irresistible temptation to join in any local fighting that might be going on, and hence it was found imperative, when the Abbey Road was reached, to make a brief halt in order that proper organization might be restored before making the final swinging advance on Grove Alley.

The general situation at about 11 a.m. was as follows:— The Green Line occupied by 2nd Auckland and 2nd Otago; the Brown Line held by the 4th Battalion; Fiers Trench, Flers Support and Blue Line generally being consolidated by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions; Flers village occupied by a mixture of New Zealand Rifle Brigade and English troops; and the 1st Battalion reorganizing in Abbey Road. Beyond the right the position was uncertain, although it was known that a small party from the Brigade on that flank was digging in, north of Flers near the German strong-points known as Box and Cox,

At 11.30 a.m. the 1st Battalion continued the advance from the vicinity of Abbey Road, both leading companies coming under severe machine-gun fire from a number of guns on the high ground away to the left in the neighbourhood of Goose Alley, besides suffering many casualties from shell-fire in the general bombardment. They even had to face two field guns firing at point-blank range, though this difficulty was finally removed by the daring action of 2nd Lieut. J. R. BongardJ. R. Bongard, who with a party of seven men dashed forward in the face of the fire, bayoneted the teams and captured the guns. Section by section, however, these companies gained a footing in Grove Alley, and under a hail of bullets commenced the work of consolidation.

As time went on it became increasingly evident that the position occupied by the battalion was extremely precarious. The effective strength had been sadly reduced by casualties throughout the long advance of nearly two miles under fire and without a barrage, and now that the greater part of the objective was secured it was found that no touch could be got with the troops of the Division on our right, either to the north or to the north-east of Flers. It was concluded, rightly, as the event proved, that our neighbours were not on their objective, and even the small party about Cox had by this time disappeared. Thus the right flank was entirely "in the air," and the whole position, besides being under fire from both west and east, was enfiladed by machine-guns from about Factory Corner to the north-east. At about 2 p.m., therefore, when the awkwardness of the situation was fully realized, the captured guns were disabled and the right company was withdrawn slightly till it faced the north. The digging of a series of posts covering Flers, from Cox to the left of the Blue Line, was now begun, the position thus taken up being some 400 yards short of the extreme point of the final objective. The new line at once came under concentrated shell-fire and had to bear the brunt of repeated counter-attacks, and the situation called for prompt and energetic action on the part of the few junior officers and non-commissioned officers left. 2nd Lieut. N. L. MackyN. L. Macky, who was in charge of the reserve of two platoons, on ascertaining that the right was still uncovered and that the enemy was advancing in that quarter, sent information back and immediately took his men forward to establish a defensive flank, a task which he succeeded in accomplishing only after much severe fighting. 2nd Lieut. W. G. HarrisonW. G. Harrison, who had led two platoons to the final objective, now found his command reduced to twenty men. With these he commenced the establishment of a strong-point near Cox, and though for a long time completely isolated, he succeeded in beating off all attacks until troops eventually came up on either side. 2nd Lieut. N. AngusN. Angus, who had been placed in charge of a burial party and had followed up the advancing lines in connection with his special duty, now found the work of defence more urgent and necessary, and having collected some scattered men he constructed a separate strong-point, which he handed over only when conditions had become more settled. This done, he realized the need for augmenting the ration parties, and he at once pressed his burial men into this new service, making four successive trips from the dump to the advanced posts before relinquishing his self-imposed task at daylight on the 16th. Company-Sergt.-Major G. H. BolesG. H. Boles early in the afternoon found himself in command of his company, now without an officer, and both in Grove Alley as well as later in the line of posts north-east of Flers, displayed remarkable powers of leadership and organization. Here also Sergeants A. R. Blackmore, R. T. Caldwell and C. Gair proved their ability in grappling with unusual situations, and their independent work was of the utmost value during the establishment and final consolidation of the line covering Flers. Sergt. Caldwell's work in particular was noted by Major Gwyn ThomasGwyn Thomas, Brigade Major of the 122nd Brigade, who wrote in glowing terms of his display of intitiative, and referred especially to the support afforded to the troops on the right.

Machine-guns were promptly brought forward and placed in position under the personal supervision of 2nd Lieut. A. H. PrestonA. H. Preston, who proved to be of invaluable assistance both in establishing and in holding the advanced line. Particularly good work was performed by the two gun crews under the control of Sergt. W. Paine. The line, which now extended over 400 yards beyond the right of the Divisional boundary, was further materially strengthened by the arrival of a tank, which look up a position on the Flers-Ligny Thilloy Road.

At 3.20 p.m. the Brigade received orders from Division that the advance was to proceed no further than Blue Line, which, with Flers, was to be consolidated and held at all costs. This was welcome news to the much-tried men of the 1st Battalion, to whom the necessity of withdrawal from Grove Alley an hour before had proved a bitter experience. At this time the troops on our right advanced to Flea Trench, on the right of Cox, and linked up with us. They, however, withdrew again at 7.30 p.m., making it necessary for us to refuse our right still further. This extension was brilliantly carried out and, against a series of attacks, maintained by a composite party of men from the 1st and 2nd Battalions under Capt. L. M. InglisL. M. Inglis. Later in the night a platoon from the 2nd Wellington Battalion reinforced the sparsely-held line on this flank.

No connection had been made with the troops of the 140th Brigade on our left, and it was ascertained later that they had not been successful in gaining that part of Flers Support which formed their objective, having advanced only as far as the Flers-Martinpuich Road in continuation of our Brown Line. The left flank was thus quite open, and to overcome this difficulty the 3rd and 4th Battalions were ordered to dig a trench forming a defensive flank back towards Flag Lane, and the 1st, 2nd and 4th were instructed to dig a support line to this. The night of 15th/16th September proved comparatively quiet, and this defensive work was successfully accomplished without serious interference.

During the night the 2nd Wellington Battalion, which had come up earlier to reinforce, took over the section of Abbey Road held by companies of our 2nd Battalion, the latter rejoining the remainder of the battalion in Flers Trench and Flers Support. In view of the very high percentage of casualties suffered by the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, the arrival of the 2nd Wellington companies was very welcome. They entered heartily into the struggle, and, in particular, the presence of the party with our refused right flank added greatly to our sense of security.

In addition to the close inspection of the lines, and of the position generally, made towards the end of the day by Gene-ralGeneral Fulton, and by Major Hastings of the Divisional Staff, a notable reconnaissance was carried out by Capt. R. G. PurdyR. G. Purdy, Staff Captain, from 11 a.m. till 5.30 p.m. Incessant machine-gun and artillery fire, together with the truly awful state of the ground, had rendered communication almost impossible, and the general obscurity of the situation towards the end of the forenoon called for a personal investigation covering the whole sector. This was undertaken with eminent success by Capt. Purdy, and his report, together with those sent in from time to time by battalion commanders, showed that the work of the different units had been entirely satisfactory, and that, all things considered, the situation generally was even better than could have been expected.

The day of the 16th September was spent in consolidating the lines. At 9 a.m. the enemy made a more determined counter-attack than those that had developed during the previous afternoon. This came from the north-west, but was eventually beaten off, the Vickers guns attached to battalions putting in some excellent work. At 9.30 a.m., to facilitate the continuation of the advance of the Divisions on both flanks, the 1st Wellington Battalion passed through our line and retook Grove Alley.

On the night of 16th/17th September we were relieved by the 2nd Brigade, and went into Divisional Reserve in Savoy and Carlton Trenches and Check Line, Brigade Headquarters remaining at Carlton Trench.

The work of the various subsidiary sections on the 15th and 16th, such as the medical, transport and signal sections, and the carrying, ration, stretcher and burial parties, cannot be recounted at length. Under, conditions that beggar description they carried on without pause in the face of the most fearful obstacles and with absolute contempt of danger. The recorded and unrecorded instances of heroism and persistence displayed by these men, many of whom had not the excitement of personal combat to spur them on, are beyond all praise.

In performing the duties in connection with the establishment and maintenance of communications, so vital an element in the successful conduct of operations, only the signaller knows the trials and dangers that have to be faced. It is shell-fire that cuts his wire, and it is under shell-fire that he must go out and find and mend the break, and that without a moment's unnecessary delay. Conspicuous amongst those who laboured so faithfully and well in this important work were Lieutenants G. A. Avey and E. Burrows, Sergt. J. N. Beattie, and Riflemen N. L. Ingpen and A. Beattie. But wires cannot be taken far forward at once, nor can they serve all parts of the field. The bulk of the work of communication in a moving engagement must be performed by battalion and company runners, and many were the astonishing feats, not only of bravery but of endurance, that were placed to the credit of these indefatigable men. Of those who devotedly served in this capacity mention may be made of Corporal E. D. DuthieE. D. Duthie, Riflemen A. C. Elliott, W. G. Franklin, H. P. Parsons, C. C. Palmer, D. G. Irvine, A. W. Forsyth, H. Gowers, E. H. Campbell, A. Bridgeman, and A. E. White, the last being the sole survivor of six company runners.

The wounded can speak most feelingly of the medical officers and their orderlies and of the stretcher-bearers, but there were few with the Brigade at the Somme who did not see something of their self-sacrificing labours. Such will call to memory Capt. G. V. BogleG. V. Bogle, who in the forward area worked at his dressing-station in the open unceasingly for thirty-six hours at a stretch, and was killed by a shell as he paused to take a first brief respite from his labours; his orderly, Lance-Corporal C. J. HentyC. J. Henty, who had served with like devotion and now carried on alone, ceasing his labours twelve hours later, when the last wounded man of his battalion had been evacuated from the dressing-station; and Lance-Corporal H. RosanowskiH. Rosanowski and Rifleman Myers, two of the few stretcher-bearers who came through the ordeal unscathed. No less devoted was the action of the Revd. Clement Houchen, Chaplain to the 1st Battalion. He accompanied his unit throughout its long advance, rendered invaluable assistance to the medical officer, aided the stretcher-bearers, soothed the last moments of many a passing hero, and, when no further help could be given to the living, accompanied the burial parties to lighten their labours and perform the last sad offices to the dead. Removed from the stirring scenes of the forward area, yet still under fire, the seconds-in-command and quartermasters of battalions worked without ceasing at the dumps, sending forward supplies of water, food and ammunition, their duties being as trying, though perhaps not as arduous, as those of the carrying parties, some of whom had to trudge more than two miles each way. Finally, there were the men of the transport sections, equally faithful, and making good their boast that nothing should cause them to fail their comrades in the hour of need.

The advance of the Allied forces elsewhere had on the whole gone well. The scheme of operations is thus stated in Sir Douglas HaigDouglas Haig's Despatches of 23rd December, 1916: "The general plan of the combined Allied attack which was opened on 15th September was to pivot on the high ground south of the Ancre and north of the Albert-Bapaume Road, while the French Army devoted its whole effort to the rearmost of the enemy's original systems of defence between Morval and Le Sars. Should our success in this direction warrant it, I made arrangements to enable me to extend the left of the attack to embrace the villages of Martinpuich and Courcelette. As soon as our advance on this front should reach the Morval line, the time would have arrived to bring forward my left across the Thiepval Ridge. Meanwhile on my right our Allies arranged to continue the line of advance in close co-operation with me from the Somme to the slopes above Combles, but directing their main effort northwards against the villages of Rancourt and Fregicourt, so as to complete the isolation of Combles and open the way for their attack upon Sailly-Saillisel."

The success of the morning's operations, resulting as they did in the capture of Flers, in the advancement of the English troops on the right to within striking distance of the strong line of defence running before Morval, Les Boeufs and Gueudecourt, and in the complete clearing of High Wood on our left, made it possible to carry out during the afternoon that part of the plan which provided for the capture of Martinpuich and Courcelette, and by the end of the day both these villages were in British hands. By the 18th September the advantages gained on the 15th were enhanced by further progress between Flers and Martinpuich, and by the capture of the Quadrilateral, an enemy stronghold just to the east of Ginchy, which had hitherto held up the advance of the right towards Morval.

The result of the lighting from the 15th to the 18th was, to quote from General Haig's Despatches, "a gain more considerable than any which had attended our arms in the course of a single operation since the commencement of the offensive. In the course of one day's fighting we had broken through two of the enemy's main defensive systems and had advanced on a front of over six miles to an average depth of a mile. In the course of this advance we had taken three large villages, each powerfully organized for prolonged resistance. Two of these villages had been carried by assault with short preparation in the course of a few hours' fighting. All this had been accomplished with a small number of casualties, in comparison with the troops employed, and in spite of the fact that, as was afterwards discovered, the attack did not come as a complete surprise to the enemy."

Between the 15th and 18th of September, the French on our right had gone forward north of Priez Farm and were threatening Combles, while south of the Somme they had taken Berny, Deniecourt and Vermandovillers, and were before Bovemt and Ablaincourt.

From this date forward the New Zealand Rifle Brigade as a whole was not engaged in any large attack on the Somme, though, in addition to the ordinary trench tours, it supplied individual battalions to one or other of the 1st and 2nd Brigades to assist in carrying on the advance, such units becoming temporarily attached for this purpose.

The Brigade remained in Divisional reserve until the night: of 18th/19th September, when it moved forward into the intermediate area, with the 4th Battalion in Switch Trench and the remaining battalions in rear. Heavy rain had come on during the 18th, and the shattered surface of the country rapidly deteriorated into a sea of mud. During the following week the Brigades relieved one another in succession. The weather was too unfavourable for operations beyond small affairs of outposts, but no adverse conditions were permitted to interfere with work devoted to extending and improving the saps, strengthening the posts, and preparing generally for either continuing the advance or withstanding counter-developments.

Section 3.—General Attack Renewed, September 25th.

General Objectives—1st Brigade to Factory Corner—N.Z.R.B. in reserve—1st Brigade to Gird Support—4th and 2nd Battalions attached—General success about Thiepval—2nd Brigade relieves the 1st—N.Z.R.B. in reserve—2nd and 3rd Battalions attached to 2nd Brigade—2nd Battalion bombing exploit—2nd Brigade and a 3rd Battalion company attack about Eaueourt 1'Abbaye— Conditions—N.Z.R.B. relieves 2nd Brigade—Departure from the Somme—Congratulations-—Casualties.

The weather having improved somewhat, the attack along the whole front was renewed on the 25th. The task for the New Zealand Division, the capture of the high ground from Factory Corner to Goose Alley, was allotted to the 1st Brigade, in support to which the New Zealand Rifle Brigade was held in readiness. The objectives on the British front included the villages of Morval. Les Boeufs and Gueudecourt, and a belt of country about 1,000 yards deep curving round the north of Flers to a point midway between that village and Martinpuich. The attack was successful everywhere except at Gueudecourt; but on the following day this village was captured, as also was Combles, in which the French and the British joined hands in the early morning.

On the 27th a further attack was made. In this the 1st Brigade again successfully participated, taking a section of Gird Trench and Gird Support west of the Ligny Thilloy Road. Our Brigade, less the 4th Battalion, which had been handed over to the G.O.C. 1st Brigade on the previous evening, continued in support. Two companies of the 4th Battalion were moved to the North Road and were for the time being attached to the 1st Wellington Battalion. At 2 a.m. on the 28th, one of these companies was sent forward to reinforce 1st Auckland and capture that portion of Gird Support still occupied by the Germans between the left of 1st Auckland and Goose Alley. This operation was successfully carried out during the early hours of the same day. At 9 a.m. the 2nd Battalion also passed to the command of the G.O.C. 1st Brigade, two companies being sent to Flers Trench and two to Flers Support. In the evening the 3rd Battalion took over the Brown Line from the 4th.

Following on the success of the push on the right on September 25th, the Fifth Army, at about noon on the 26th, launched a general attack against Thiepval and Thiepval Ridge on a front of 3,000 yards. The attack was a brilliant success. By the early morning of the 27th the famous enemy strongholds, Moquet Farm, and Zollern, Stuff and Schwaben Redoubts, besides the village of Thiepval, were taken. On the 27th, also, the enemy east of Thiepval was pushed back until he came to a stand in his strong defences running in front of Le Sars and Eaucourt l'Abbaye.

During the night of 28th/29th the 2nd Brigade relieved the 1st Brigade in the line, the New Zealand Rifle Brigade remaining in the intermediate area from Flers Support to the Longueval-Bazentin-le-Grand Road, with the 2nd Battalion, now under the command of the G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, in Flers Trench and Flers Support. The 4th Battalion returned to Brigade.

On 29th September the 3rd Battalion passed to the command of the G.O.C. of the 2nd Brigade, and the following night relieved 2nd Wellington in the front line, Gird Support, from Ligny Thilloy Road westward. Early in the morning of the 30th, 2nd Lieut. H. M. PrestonH. M. Preston, of the 2nd Machine Gun Company, who was with the 2nd Battalion, opened out on an enemy working-party of two officers and 20 other ranks and practically annihilated it, only two Germans escaping.

During the afternoon of the 30th, the 2nd Battalion, under orders from the G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, took part with the 19th London Regiment on our left in a bombing attack on Flers Trench and Flers Support beyond the High Wood-Ligny Thilloy Road. The attack, vainly attempted by the Londoners alone on the previous evening, was this time completely successful, excellent work being done by Capt. H. E. BarrowcloughH. E. Barrowclough, Lieut. G. A. AveyG. A. Avey, and Sergeant A. McLeodA. McLeod. At one point in this attack the advance was brought to a standstill through the skill and tenacity with which an enemy post was held, till finally Lance-Corporal J. W. VoyleJ. W. Voyle, taking a few bombers, moved round its flank in the open and kept the garrison inactive, thus enabling the post to be rushed from the front.

The 2nd Brigade launched a further attack on 1st October, working in conjunction with the 47th Division on the left, the objective of the latter being Eaucourt l'Abbaye. It was not intended that our 3rd Battalion, still holding the right of the 2nd Brigade's line in Gird Support, should take part in this advance, and its commanding officer received definite instructions to this effect. Shortly after noon, however, he was ordered to make a local attack at zero hour (3.15 p.m.) in concert with troops of the 21st Division on our right, who were also pushing forward. The task was to be accomplished by "C" Company (Capt. W. DrummondW. Drummond), with a second company in support, and consisted of an advance of about 500 yards and the establishment of a forward line of strong-posts. This order was countermanded at 2 p.m., two platoons now being substituted for the whole company, the remaining half-company to be held in support. The operation was gallantly and successfully carried out, but it proved to be a very costly one. Heavy casualties were caused by machine-gun fire coming in from the high ground on the right, and it was found necessary on this flank to send forward not only the supporting platoon but also an additional platoon from "B" Company, then held in reserve. Much of the success in capturing and holding the position was due to the fine leadership displayed by 2nd Lieuts. A. L. Martin and S. J. E. Closey, and to the excellent work done by Sergeant A. ShearerA. Shearer, who, when his platoon commander was killed, carried on in control and completed the consolidation of two of the strong-points. When darkness fell, Sergeant Shearer made a thorough reconnaissance of No Man's Land and marked down with accuracy the position of the enemy's posts in the vicinity. Worthy of note, too, is the prompt action of one of the platoon-sergeants, Sergeant S. F. BreachS. F. Breach. During the first advance the Lewis gun team giving covering fire was put out of action, with the result that the forward movement was brought to a standstill; but realizing the position, Sergeant Breach seized the gun himself, continued the covering fire, and so enabled his platoon to renew the advance.

The following extracts from the account of the officer in charge of one of the attacking parties will give some slight indication of the difficulties faced by our men in this and many similar tasks, of the awful conditions under which they worked, and of the dogged nature of their determination to carry on and win through in face of it all:—

"The troops on our immediate right dissolved under the German fire, and our attack was carried out after the fashion of a solo raid. We had had little time to prepare—only about two hours………However, when the barrage lifted we gained our objective, an old German strong-point in and about the sunken part of the road from Flers to Ligny Thilloy, but our casualties had been exceedingly heavy. No sooner had we commenced consolidating than hurried orders came for a further advance. In executing this second attack we had to pass over dreadfully-exposed ground and under concentrated fire from all enemy weapons within reach. As a demonstration the advance had great value, for the Boche began to leave his trenches, and the forward party did enormous execution, so much so that the whole system was undoubtedly emptied of the enemy. The position lay well over the crest, some 150 yards away, and commanded a long-distance view in many directions. The rear party were pinned down on the crest, only one man getting through to those in the front position. The collection of wounded was impossible until dark came on, and so proved to be an extremely difficult task.

"I was in command of the strong-point established here; and when, at 4 a.m. on October 2nd, I received orders to evacuate, I went back overland to Battalion Headquarters to verify what seemed to me an extraordinary instruction. There I ascertained that the withdrawal had been ordered by the G.O.C. of the Brigade to which we were attached, because of the fact that the 21st Division on our right had no troops beyond Gird Support, and that consequently we were quite 'in the air.' By the time I had returned to my post, day was breaking. The dead were left where they were, and after a final scour for wounded, we withdrew, weary and sick at heart.

"At about 9 a.m. I received an order cancelling the withdrawal and instructing me to re-occupy the position. Could anything be more desperately hard? On the previous day my company had lost an officer and 15 other ranks killed, and 55 other ranks wounded. All my non-commissioned officers and all my specialists were casualties, and my company strength was down to 41. Could I ask these few remaining men to face again the ordeal they had already gone through at such a cost? They had had no real sleep and no hot food since the great battle opened on September 15th, and they were living now mainly because their high spirit had risen superior to physical exhaustion and the strain of the hellish fire of the previous day. If I should find them reluctant I could not blame them, but they rose splendidly to the occasion.

"I had settled on twenty men as sufficient for the effort, twelve riflemen and a Lewis gun team of eight, and instructed 2nd Lieut. Clark to send them after me in pairs, rushing from hole to hole, and I hoped he would stop the advance if the losses should prove to be too great. And so we started off on the task, in broad daylight and without a barrage. We had 700 yards to go, and I decided quite finally, as also, I think, did my men, that no one would reach the position alive. Of the twenty, only six got forward to the battered post. The others we never saw again..…

"When we handed over on relief that night the strong-point was an advanced and isolated post, and the unit on our right was far in rear. I recall the expression on the relieving officer's face as I detailed frankly the plans I had for improving the parapets and traverses. It will be remembered that we had had heavy rain, and this, combined with the incessant shelling, had made the soil so yeasty that nowhere would it stand. I had therefore been compelled to resort to the only expedient left, and of the bodies that lay thickly about the remains of the trenches the few survivors of my party had already built two traverses and a parapet as a shield from the steady fire coming from the flanks as well as from the front."

The 2nd Brigade, having successfully carried out its task of advancing the line, was relieved by the New Zealand Rifle Brigade during the night of 2nd/3rd October, and 1st Canterbury and 1st Wellington came under command of our Brigadier. Our men cannot be said to have come into the line fresh and vigorous, for both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had been attached to the 2nd Brigade since the 29th September, and as has been stated above, both battalions, especially the 3rd, had been engaged in severe fighting. In addition, the 1st Battalion had gone over to the G.O.C. of the 2nd Brigade on the night of 1st/2nd October, being placed in Flers Trench and Flers Support, with two platoons attached to 1st Canterbury, two platoons detailed as carrying party to our 2nd Battalion, and two told off for similar duties with the 3rd. Hence, for the time being, our Brigade had consisted merely of Headquarters and the 4th Battalion.

When we took over the sector the average strength of our own battalions was down to 380; and the front line, some 2,500 yards in length, extended from beyond the Flers-Ligny Thilloy Road on the right, to the road junction about 300 yards north-east of the Eaucourt Abbey ruins on the left.

Three battalions occupied the front line, the 3rd remaining in its old position on the right, the 4th taking over the centre, and the 1st the left. The 2nd Battalion was in support, with three companies in Goose Alley and one in Grove Alley; and the attached 1st Wellington and 1st Canterbury troops were held in reserve in Flers Trench, Flers Support, and Brown Line. Brigade Headquarters were at Ferret Trench. The weather was atrociously bad, and the trenches waist-deep in mud.

On the following night, 3rd/4th October, we were relieved by the 122nd Brigade of the 41st Division, and went into bivouac at Pommiers Redoubt.

The command of the sector passed from the New Zealand Division to the 41st on the morning of October 4th, but, as was customary, the 3rd Machine Gun Company remained in position for some time after relief. At 5 a.m. on the 4th, some two hours after the infantry had changed over, the Germans counter-attacked, and in the action that followed our machine-guns put in some very useful work. Of the section in charge of Lance-Corporal C. O. SamsonC. O. Samson, one of the original 2nd Battalion machine-gunners, the General Officer Commanding the 122nd Brigade reports as follows:—

"The New Zealand machine-gun team was of particular assistance. All except one man of the team were hit, and the machine-gun was at length put out of action. This man, Lance-Corporal Samson, behaved with the greatest gallantry, working his gun to the end."

Here we spent two days resting, cleansing and refitting—in so far as these could be accomplished in the circumstances—and General du Cane, Commanding the XVth Corps, having in felicitous terms farewelled the Division, we departed on October 6th on our return to the Armentieres region.

So ended our work on the Somme at this time. That the Division had done well may be gathered from the following messages of congratulation:—

From Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces:

"The New Zealand Division has fought with the greatest gallantry in the Somme battle for 23 consecutive days, carrying out with complete success every task set, and always doing more than was asked of it. The Division has won universal confidence and admiration. No praise can be too high for such troops."

From General Rawlinson, Commanding the Fourth Army: "I desire to express to all ranks of the New Zealand Divi-sionDivision my hearty congratulations on the excellent work done during the Battle of the Somme.

"On three successive occasions (15th and 25th September and 1st October) they attacked the hostile positions with the greatest gallantry and vigour, capturing in each attack every objective that had been allotted to them. More than this, they gained possession of, and held, several strong-points in advance of and beyond the furthest objectives that had been allotted to them.

"The endurance and fine fighting spirit of the Division have been beyond praise, and their successes in the Flers neighbourhood will rank high amongst the best achievements of the British Army.

"The control and direction of the Division during the operations have been conducted with skill and precision, whilst the artillery support in establishing the barrage and defeating counter-attacks has been in every way most effective.

"It is a matter of regret to me that this fine Division is leaving the Fourth Army, and I trust that on some future occasion it may again be my good fortune to find them under my command."

The achievement had been glorious, but the price of victory was high, for the total casualties of the Division numbered nearly 7,000. Those of our own Brigade were as under: Killed.Wounded.Missing.Total.Officers1247—59Other ranks27011712331674Grand total:1733

The number "missing," it should be explained, is that given in the immediate returns, for which purpose it is ascertained by subtracting from the number going into action the total made up of those answering the roll-call at its conclusion, plus those actually known, by name, to have been killed or wounded. As the result of subsequent courts of enquiry it was reduced almost to vanishing-point. In the case of one battalion, for instance, a large parcel of identification discs collected by the burial-party was destroyed by shell-fire, and thus formal investigation as to the disappearance of an unusually large number of men had to be made.

It is interesting to note in this connection that of the whole Division not more than a score of prisoners were taken by the enemy.

It was with mingled feelings that we turned our backs upon the scene of our first participation, as a complete Brigade, in a prolonged engagement with the enemy on a grand scale. There was sadness in the thought of the gaps that had been made in our ranks, and grief that so many friendships cemented by common experiences in camp and billet and trench—friendships so exquisitely sincere that it is impossible to convey by mere words more than a faint suggestion of their nature—were now severed, never again to be renewed on this side of eternity. For we had left on the field of battle more than a full company-strength of officers and men who had paid the extreme price and yielded their all in the cause of Honour; and of those broken comrades, exceeding in number the strength of a whole battalion, there were many who, we knew full well, had fought their last fight.

But the soldier must steel himself. To yield to sadness would tend to unfit him for his task, and we knew that we had but touched the fringe of what lay before us. And so we cheered ourselves with the reflection that though we had suffered greatly we had served not indifferently. We had "done our bit" with a Division that had within the comparatively brief period of three weeks covered itself with glory and had earned definite distinction in an army that had accomplished what the enemy had confidently considered to be impossible. In the actions on the Somme the Division was always in a salient of its own making, and in the thrusting out and the holding of the first of these, when Flers was covered on the north on September 15th, the New Zealand Rifle Brigade by its successive bounds had carried forward the longest single advance made throughout the period of the Division's fighting in the great battle.

The sights and sounds of struggle and carnage burnt in upon our memories could never be entirely obliterated; fragments of the all-pervading mud and filth of the battered area over which we had fought and struggled still clung to arms, equipment, clothing, even to the very pores of the skin, and conspired with the weariness of mind and body to recall and again recall the horrors of our recent experiences. But our faces at last were turned towards the peaceful open country, and we were out for rest. Soon enough we should resume the tiresome stationary trench warfare further north, but in the meantime here were smiling fields, unbroken woods and villages, dry billets, and, above all, hard solid ground to walk erect upon. The past was gone; to dwell upon it would be unnerving. The future was in the lap of the gods, and our present duty was to prepare ourselves to meet whatever was in store for us with that spirit of confidence which had sustained us hitherto, and this end would best be served by enjoying to the full the blessings that now lay to our hands.

New Zealand has erected in France and Belgium four memorials to her soldiers. The first, at Longueval, commemorates their earliest ex- ploits as assaulting troops in a great battle on the Western Front; the second, at Messines, serves as a reminder of the brilliant part they played in one of the most perfectly planned and executed actions of the war; the third, at Gravenstafel, is placed within view of the scenes of our activities in the various parts of the Ypres Salient, but perpetuates more particularly the memory of those who fought so victoriously about the village of Gravenstafel itself, as well as of those who struggled no less gallantly at ill-fated Passchendaele; while the fourth, at Le Quesnoy, stands as a monument to the achievements of the Division in the final advance to victory. The Longueval memorial, like those at Messines and Gravenstafel, takes the form of an obelisk. It has been placed where the road leading due north from that village crosses Switch Trench, and occupies a fine position at the highest point of the trench- site, a thousand yards east of High Wood. On the shaft is the inscription in English and in French: "In honour of the men of the New Zealand Division. First Battle of the Somme, 1916." On two of the panels of the massive base are engraved the sentence: "The New Zealand Division, after gaining this position as their first objective, launched from it the successful attack on Flers, September 15, 1916." This is sufficiently comprehensive, but the inscription on the rear panel, "New Zealand Division, Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury, Otago," would at first sight appear to be somewhat slighting to the troops of the 3rd Brigade, who carried the advance forward from Switch Trench to a position beyond Flers and who were not drawn from any particular province of New Zealand. The front panel has an exquisite design, with a suggestion of Maori carving, showing in the centre the words "New Zealand" enclosed within a laurel-wreath supported by crossed taiaha. The base bears in addition the phrase: "From the uttermost ends of the earth."

In the temporary church at Longueval, which is simply one of our Nissen huts with a bell-tower constructed of parts of a broken windmill, a small brass tablet has been placed bearing the simple inscription: "To the glory of God and in memory of those of the New Zealand Division who fell in the battles of the Somme, 1916, 1918."

Section 4.—Further Progress of the Battle.

October advances—Broken weather—Renewed offensive on the Ancre—End of the Battle of the Somme—Results achieved.

The account of the progress of the great battle from about the time of the departure of the New Zealand Division early in October up till the middle of November, when, owing to the continued bad weather, active operations of importance practically ceased, may be briefly summarized.

Eaucourt I'Abbaye on our immediate left, which had been captured early on October 2nd, was counter-attacked and retaken by the enemy on the same date, but it came finally into the possession of the British on the 3rd. In order to assist the French in their advance on Sailly Saillisel, Morval had been handed over to them. On October 7th another Allied advance began and by the afternoon Le Sars was taken, the line advanced close to Le Barque and Ligny Thilloy, and on to the crest before Le Transloy. The French advance brought them close to Sailly, and their right, farther south, had also gone forward. The general success could not be further exploited owing to heavy rain.

Operations re-opened on October 12th, the line being slowly pushed forward everywhere on the right. The French took Sailly on the 15th and Sailly Saillisel on the 19th. There is little doubt that only the abominable nature of the weather prevented the taking of Bapaume. Unfortunately "the moment for decisive action was rapidly passing away, while the weather showed no signs of improvement. By this time the ground had become so bad that nothing less than a prolonged period of drying weather, which at that season of the year was most unlikely to occur, would suit our purpose."

Sir Douglas HaigDouglas Haig's Despatches.

On November 9th the weather moderated, being now dry and cold, with frosty nights and misty mornings, and final preparations for a renewed offensive on the Ancre were pushed on. The attack by the Canadians on the 11th brought the British close to the strong German positions immediately in front of Pys and Warlencourt, and on the 13th the attack on the Ancre front commenced. St. Pierre Divion, the famous Y-Ravine and the strong redoubts in rear, and the enemy's front line system half a mile beyond Beaumont Hamel, fell to the British troops on that day, and on the 14th the gains in this neighbourhood were still further improved. Then the weather broke again and continued to be so unfavourable that the Battle of the Somme of 1916 came practically to an end.

The three main objectives of the offensive had, however, been achieved. Verdun had been relieved; the main German forces had been held on the western front; and the enemy's strength had been considerably worn down. "Any one of these three results is in itself sufficient to justify the Somme Battle. The attainment of all three of them affords ample compensation for the splendid efforts of our troops and for the sacrifices made by ourselves and by our Allies. They have brought us a long step forward towards the final victory of the Allied cause."

Sir Douglas HaigDouglas Haig's Despatches.

The captures made by the British from July 1st to November 18th included: 38,000 officers and men, 29 heavy guns, 96 field-pieces and howitzers, 136 trench mortars, 514 machine guns.

Chapter VII. From Fleurbaix to Ploegsteert.

Part 1.—The Boutillerie Sector.

From the Somme back to the Lys—Into the line, Boutillerie Sector— Small-box Respirators—Command—Inspections—1st Battalion raid on Turk's Point—The Colonel-in-Chief at Bailleul— 2nd Battalion raid on the Angle—Raid by the Germans—4th Battalion raid on Corner Fort—3rd Battalion raid—Inspection by Sir Douglas Haig—Christmas Day "dummy raid"—Command and staff—Enemy's "dummy raid" on New Year's Day—2nd Battalion raid on the Lozenge—Out to Divisional reserve— General: trenches; artillery; patrolling; billets; schools; working- parties; aerial activity; regimental band; railway-construction party; a bitter winter.

After its participation in the Somme operations the New Zealand Rifle Brigade on October 6th marched to Albert, and there entrained for Longpre-les-Corps-Saints. From the detraining station the various units again took the road for their billeting areas, and by 6 a.m. on the 7th had settled down for a few days' rest in their new quarters, the 1st and 2nd Battalions at Mareuil, the 3rd at Villers-sur-Mareuil, and the 4th at Bray-les-Mareuil.

General Fulton departed on leave on October 9th, and Lieut.-Col. A. E. StewartA. E. Stewart assumed temporary command of the Brigade.

On the evening of the 10th the Brigade proceeded by road to Abbeville, where train was taken for Bailleul, whence battalions, on their arrival, marched to and billeted at Outtersteene. Here General Godley, commanding the IInd Anzac Corps, to which we had now returned, held a conference with the Brigadier and battalion commanders on the 12th.

In accordance with orders for the Brigade to relieve the 14th Australian Brigade in the Boutillerie Sector, the 1st and 2nd Battalions marched on the 13th October to Vieux Berquin, and were transported thence by motor-bus to Bac St. Maur and Fleurbaix. During the night of 13th/14th these units relieved the 55th and 56th Australian Battalions, respectively, in the line. The remainder of the Brigade arrived at Fleurbaix and Bac St. Maur on the 14th, Brigade Headquarters being located at the former village.

The sector taken over had a front line exceeding 2,500 yards in length. It was immediately south of the Bois Grenier Sector, which, it will be remembered, was handed over by our Brigade when we moved out for the Somme. The 1st New Zealand Brigade came in on our immediate right. Beyond the 1st Brigade was the 61st Division, and the 34th Division joined up with us on the left.

The 2nd Brigade was detached to "Franks' Force," and remained with it until December 3rd. Franks' Force was a temporary organization formed of reserve Brigades from the two remaining Division of the IInd Anzac Corps after the 51st Division had been sent to the Somme. It was holding the Houplines Hector at Armentieres.

The new small-box respirators, which afterwards proved so effective against any form of gas projected against us by the enemy, were now being introduced, and on October 18th the Brigadier, commanding: officers and company commanders attended at the Gas School at Nouvean Monde for instruction in their use.

Lieut.-Col. Austin, from hospital, and Lieut.-Col. Melvill, from leave, reported on October 15th and resumed command of the 1st and 4th Battalions respectively. General Fulton returned from leave on the 19th. Lieut.-Col. Winter-Evans, commanding the 3rd Battalion, and Lieut.-Col. A. E. StewartA. E. Stewart, commanding the 2nd Battalion, proceeded to England on leave on the following day.

General Plumer, commanding the Second Army, accompanied by the G.O.C. Division, visited the Brigade and inspected the 4th Battalion on October 23rd.

On October 25th the 1st and 2nd Battalions were relieved in the line by the 3rd and 4th, and went to billets at Fleurbaix and Bac St. Maur. As the visibility was poor and the sector comparatively quiet, the interchange was carried out before nightfall, this being the first of many daylight reliefs.

On the morning of the 31st the Army Commander presented the ribands of a number of decorations awarded to officers and other ranks in connection with raids and the engagements in Egypt and on the Somme, and after this ceremony inspected the 2nd Battalion at Bac St. Maur. The Hon. W. F. Massey, Prime Minister, and Sir Joseph WardJoseph Ward, who had been attending an Imperial Conference in London, were present at both these parades.

Our casualties for the month of October were:—

Killed. Wounded. Officers 2 4 Other ranks 49 155

A daylight relief was effected on November 6th, the 1st and 2nd Battalions taking over the line from the 3rd and 4th.

At 6 p.m. on the 16th a party of two officers and 50 other ranks from the 1st Battalion, under the general direction of Capt. C. K. GasquoineC. K. Gasquoine, carried out a raiding-assault on a section of the enemy's trench known as "Turk's Point," but under stress of our artillery preparation the Germans had temporarily evacuated that part of their line, and no prisoners were taken.

The raid was so well executed as to deserve some tangible results. The position selected for attack was a small salient adjoining a re-entrant in the enemy line, and while it was expected that at least one machine-gun position would be found there, the configuration of the German trench was such as to preclude any possibility of enfilade fire being brought to bear on the assaulting troops. Corporal O. A. GillespieO. A. Gillespie, a patrol leader of exceptional ability, had frequently traversed the ground to be passed over, and knew almost every inch of it, and under his guidance all the leaders and many of the men had been taken over it in order to gain personal knowledge of its features. A ditch ran directly across from our own to the enemy's parapet, and other ditches at right angles to this provided suitable cover and convenient assembly positions. On the night of the adventure Gillespie and his patrol preceded the raiders across No Man's Land, and ascertaining that the artillery and trench mortars had cut a perfect opening thirty yards in width through the strong belt of wire protecting the position, sent back word to this effect to Capt. E. H. BuckeridgeE. H. Buckeridge, who had by this time filed his men into position at the point of assembly in No Man's Land and disposed his flanking parties with Lewis guns at their appointed places. 2nd Lieut. A. D. SmithA. D. Smith and the twenty men told off for the actual entry were guided forward to the gap, and passing through this, they took up their stations under the parapet on a frontage of forty yards and awaited the signal for the final dash. This given, the entry was made simultaneously and bombing parties worked right and left for a hundred yards. All had gone exactly as on the practising-ground, even to the absence of an enemy to deal with, for the closest search failed to reveal any Germans, dead or alive, and nothing in the way of identification of any kind could be found. There was much water in the trench, and the ground behind as far as could be seen was more or less completely submerged. Mental notes were taken of the nature of the defences, one or two concrete dug-outs were blown up by the sappers accompanying the party, and the stated time having expired, the disappointed men were withdrawn to our lines. If Lieut. Smith's cup of irritation was not quite full as he beat the air in the German trench, it surely overflowed when he sprained his ankle during his return.

On the 18th the 3rd and 4th Battalions relieved the 1st and 2nd in the line, the interchange being completed by 4.50 p.m.

Representative officers of the Brigade went to Bailleul on November 4th to meet H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, Colonel-in-Chief.

Our casualties for November were comparatively light, the numbers being:—

Killed. Wounded. Officers 1 2 Other ranks 4 58

On December 1st the 1st and 2nd Battalions relieved the 3rd and 4th in the line, the latter units going into billets in Fleurbaix.

A week later a party from the 2nd Battalion, under Lieuts. G. A. Avey and H. H. Daniell, silently raided "The Angle," but found that the enemy garrison had beaten a retreat when they discovered our men approaching. We were not able to secure prisoners, but succeeded in blowing up bomb-stores and parts of the parapet with gun-cotton. Valuable information of a general kind was obtained.

The enemy attempted a raid on December 10th, directing his attack on part of the trenches held by "A" Company of the 1st Battalion. At dusk, and during the usual period of evening stand-to, very heavy machine-gun fire swept the parapet, the fire being continued for a considerable time. Presently it diminished on the right flank and was concentrated on the central portion of the battalion sector. Nothing unusual was apprehended, however, and the night sentries having been posted, the men stood down to draw their tea. At this moment an intense bombardment opened, trench-mortar fire being directed with considerable accuracy on the front trench and sap-heads, and an artillery barrage placed in rear and well down the communication-trenches. The significance of this was at once apparent and the garrison stood-to again, every man being at his post within three mintues of the opening of the bombardment.

The expected development was not long in coming. A German trench-mortar bomb landed in the bay where a Lewis gun post had been established to command a gap in our wire and also a line of trees that ran across No Man's Land from the enemy's trench to our own. This bomb wounded three men in the post, but the fourth, Rifleman W. H. Butler, as yet uninjured though somewhat shaken, continued his guard single-handed. By the light of a flare he now distinguished a party of the enemy making their way through the wire, and upon these he immediately opened fire. Unfortunately, his gun jammed before half a drum had been fired off and while feverishly struggling with the mechanism he was struck by a stick-bomb and severely wounded. Another man in the post, Rifleman P. H. Glifford, though mortally wounded, now struggled once again to his place on the fire-step to protect his fallen comrades with rifle and bayonet, and continued with what little strength remained to him to live on the attackers.

Fire had, of course, been taken up by the posts on the right and left, and this was supplemented by Sergeant P. ClarkP. Clark of the 3rd Machine Gun Company, who, when our Lewis gun ceased firing, mounted his Vickers gun on the parapet to take up the work. The attempted raid was thus brought to an abrupt conclusion. An interesting feature of the affair was the smooth manner in which Major Bell's plans for meeting eventualities of this kind worked out. No sooner had the point of attack been determined that the bombing parties told off for the purpose had taken up their appointed positions ready to bomb through; information was sent back, artillery support called for, touch with the flank companies secured, and the reserve platoon brought up, all without a hitch of any kind. When the artillery fire on both sides had died down sufficiently, patrols were sent out. These found two dead Germans, one on our parapet and one in the wire, both riddled with bullets; and strung out along the line of approach by the trees, German bombs and steel helmets, eloquent indication of a hasty retreat.

The 3rd and 4th Battalions came into the line on December 12th, relieving the 1st and 2nd Battalions by 2.30 p.m.

At midnight on December 17th/18th a strong party of four officers (2nd Lieuts. G. E. F. Kingscote. F. T. Bennington, B. Mollison and A. Bongard) and 170 other ranks of the 4th Battalion, together with 12 sappers, the whole under the command of Capt. W. W. DoveW. W. Dove, carried out a very successful raid. Profiting by the experience gained in our recent minor operations, the plans for this raiding force were laid on a more ambitious scale, and had for their primary object the close examination of the enemy's support line as well as his forward trench at a salient known as "Corner Fort." This point had been visited by our patrols on various occasions during the previous two or three weeks. Lance-Corporal H. S. EastgateH. S. Eastgate entered it without difficulty on 27th November, and on the following night took a patrol of seven men over to gain additional information, but this time he got into difficulties. He was met by a superior force and his party suffered casualties. Though himself wounded he carried back to a place of safety one of his men in worse case than himself, and then conducted a stretcher-party from our lines and brought the wounded man in. Rifleman N. A. Nicholson, one of the patrol, after leaving the enemy's trench, lay up for a time outside, and on hearing groans, went through the wire again and discovered a wounded comrade. He dressed his wounds, but these being too serious to permit of his being carried in single-handed, Nicholson came back to his own lines, reported the case, guided a bearer-party across, and so completed the rescue.

Corner Fort was inspected again by one of the six officers' patrols sent out at the end of the month, when the gap in the wire was found to be closed, and the position apparently strongly held. Sergeant W. McConachyW. McConachy also had carried out special investigations during the week previous to the raid, as had Capt. Dove and several of his section leaders.

Capt. Dove's raiding force consisted in the main of four platoons, one from each of the companies of the battalion. It was divided into three parties, besides the usual covering and flanking groups. Each had its own assembly position in No Man's Land, and each its separate point of entry. The party under Lieut. Bennington entered at the point of the salient, made good their hold on the 600 yards of front trench allotted to them, wiped out a sentry group of four men, and proceeded to investigate the maze of trenches comprising Corner Fort itself. These proved to be little more than dummies constructed of wood and canvas to deceive aeroplane observers. Such trenches as existed were so full of water that the men found it more satisfactory to move across the open. A group of trenches in rear of the so-called fort was found to be the real strong-point, and some difficulty was experienced in silencing the two machine-guns that were firing from it. A long-range bombing attack failed to do this, but more success eventually attended the action of Riflemen J. Keys and E. M. Phelan, who wormed their way up to the position from a flank and bombed the garrison from close range. Heavy wire and deep water unfortunately precluded the possibility of securing the guns.

2nd Lieut. Kingscote's party got into the front line some 200 yards to the right of the point with little opposition, and worked back towards the support line, but owing to the flooded state of the trenches and the intricate nature of the many saps that had to be searched, no further progress was made before the time for withdrawal. Only one dug-out was discovered and only one party of Germans met with by this section of the raiders.

The party under 2nd Lieut. Mollison entered at a point about 400 yards to the left of the apex of the salient, and, according to plan, split up into two groups, each of about 20 men. One of these, under the direction of 2nd Lieut. Bongard, secured the flank covering the main communication trench. A section was sent along the front-line trench to search those parts that were not obliterated. These found a strongly-wired post, the garrison of which succeeded in keeping their assailants at bay with egg-bombs, the ranging of which so greatly exceeded that of our own. Another section searched the main communication-trench. In a small cutting leading from this a bombing party under Sergeant H. C. WelchH. C. Welch came across ten Germans, who at first showed fight, but on being beaten back, took refuge in a dug-out. This was at once attacked, five prisoners dragged out, and the remainder bombed. Further on, a second dug-out was discovered, but this contained nothing of greater interest than important papers.

In the meantime 2nd Lieut. Mollison with the second group pushed on down the communication trench to the support line, the redoubtable Sergeant McConachy leading. On the way two occupied dug-outs were located and bombed. The support line was found to be in splendid order, well revetted, and floored with wide duck-boards. Well sunk into the parapet at intervals of twenty yards were comfortable dug-outs, each provided with a porch fitted with rifle-racks, the main compartment being large enough for the accommodation of ten men. These were searched, but from all but one the occupants had fled. From this three prisoners were taken. The other inmates refused to come out and were promptly despatched with bombs.

The time allowed for the enterprise had now expired, and the engineers having completed the demolition of the tramline, pumping-plant and dug-outs, the raiders withdrew. Nine prisoners were captured, all but one being taken from the support line. Important documents were found in an officer's dug-out. During the progress of the raid there had been bursts of machine-gun and rifle fire from various points, and much bombing activity on both sides, yet our casualties had been surprisingly light. One man was killed just as the party left our lines, and four were wounded later. From time to time the Germans fired signal rockets, mainly from the support line, but the only artillery response was from a light gun, which threw six shells into our lines. Five of these were "blind" and fell on the support line as our men were crossing No Man's Land on their way back.

Congratulations on the successful issue of this minor operation were received from the Commanders of the Army, the Corps, and the Division.

A raid by two officers and 67 men of the 3rd Battalion on the 23rd proved less successful. The enemy was no doubt smarting under the treatment meted out to him by the 4th Battalion five days previously, and was determined not to be caught again so soon, for though the section now raided was opposite the other flank of our sector it was found to be held by a very strong garrison who were evidently expecting an attack. As planned and practised, the raid was to have been a "silent" one, in other words an assault without special artillery support in the form of either preliminary bombardment or accompanying barrage. At the last minute, however, and contrary to the expressed wish of the raiders themselves, a short bombardment by our medium trench-mortars on two suspected machine-gun posts was ordered. In accordance with these instructions the trench mortars fired while the assaulting party waited in their assembly position out in No Man's Land; and although only twelve mortar-bombs in all were thrown, it was considered that this brief bombardment served to put the garrison immediately on the alert. In any case the essential element of surprise was now non-existent.

The enemy allowed our men to make their way through the wire and form up by the parapet, and then opened up such an intense machine-gun, rifle and bomb fire upon them that further progress was impossible. Many gallant attempts were made still to push on in the face of this fire. 2nd Lieut. M. F. WalshM. F. Walsh, who commanded the assaulting party, persisted till he fell mortally wounded. Sergeant H. AndersonH. Anderson, the first to reach the parapet, alone attacked one of the flanking machine-guns and bombed it out of action. But all was without avail, and withdrawal had reluctantly to be ordered. Rifleman J. Hansen, a stretcher-bearer, with extreme self-sacrifice remained behind, searching for wounded and tending them under fire in shell-holes, on the enemy parapet, and in the German wire, eventually guiding bearer-parties who brought them in. One of our wounded, known to have been lying near the enemy parapet, still remained unaccounted for. To accomplish his rescue, Rifleman W. D. H. Milne set out from our lines, found his man and brought him in, though in accomplishing this achievement Milne himself was mortally wounded.

Capt. W. A. G. PenlingtonW. A. G. Penlington, who was in general control of the operation, handled the awkward situation with promptitude and discretion; while the covering-party commanded by 2nd Lieut. W. A. GrayW. A. Gray skilfully fulfilled its mission in the face of the enemy artillery fire which became intense in No Man's Land, and when this service was completed remained out for further voluntary duty with the stretcher-bearers.

Sir Douglas HaigDouglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief, inspected the 2nd Battalion at Sailly on the 22nd.

During the afternoon of December 23rd the 1st and 2nd Battalions relieved the 3rd and 4th in the front line.

Throughout Christmas Day, to disabuse the mind of the enemy as to the possibility of any fraternization, our artillery carried out an intermittent but very heavy bombardment of the German lines, culminating in a "dummy raid" at 8.35 p.m. The enemy's retaliation was only slight.

General Fulton departed for England on December 28th for a month's leave, and on the 31st Lieut.-Col. H. HartH. Hart, D.S.O., 1st Wellington Regiment, assumed command of the Brigade. On the 13th Major W. H. HastingsW. H. Hastings reported for duty as Brigade Major, vice Major T. R. EastwoodT. R. Eastwood, evacuated to England, sick. Lieut.-Col. C. W. MelvillC. W. Melvill, 4th Battalion, went over to the temporary command of the 2nd Brigade on the 20th.

The casualties for December were:—

Killed. Wounded. Officers 2 Other ranks 10 55

On 1st January, 1917, the Germans returned the compliment of Christmas Day by bombarding our sector heavily from noon till 3 p.m. On the same day the 3rd and 4th Battalions relieved the 1st and 2nd in the front line, but fortunately our interchange had commenced unusually early, and consequently the casualties were not so numerous as they might otherwise have been.

A party from the 2nd Battalion, consisting of two officers (2nd Lieuts. L. I. Manning and D. C. Bowler) and 78 other ranks, the whole under the command of Capt. J. B. BennettJ. B. Bennett, executed an extremely successful raid on January 7th.

The objective was the "Lozenge," a rectangular set of trench works just behind the enemy front line opposite the left of the Brigade sector, and the enterprise involved not only the attack on this suspected strong-point, but also the taking and the temporary holding of three communication-trenches leading back from the front line. The preliminary scouting had been minute and thorough, and before five o'clock in the evening the raiders moved out from the lines full of confidence, crossed on portable bridges the stream running athwart the line of advance, and settled