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        <docTitle>
          <titlePart type="main"><hi rend="sc">Official History<lb/>of the<lb/>Otago Regiment, N.Z.E.F.<lb/>in the<lb/>Great War</hi><lb/>1914-1918</titlePart>
        </docTitle>
        <byline>By <docAuthor><hi rend="c">Lieut. <name type="person" key="name-418732">A. E. Byrne</name></hi></docAuthor>, M.C.<lb/><hi rend="c">Otago Regiment, N.Z.E.F.</hi></byline>
        <imprimatur>
          <hi rend="c">Wlth Maps and Illustrations.<lb/><hi rend="i">Second Edition.</hi></hi>
        </imprimatur>
        <docImprint>
          <publisher>
            <hi rend="c">Printed By J. Wilkie &amp; Co. Ltd.</hi>
          </publisher>
          <pubPlace>
            <hi rend="c">Princes Street Dunedin</hi>
          </pubPlace>
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      <pb xml:id="n3"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-front-d2" type="perface">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Preface.</hi>
        </head>
        <p><hi rend="sc">The</hi> decision which determined the publication of this Volume found equally its inspiration and its purpose in the desire to place on permanent record the part borne by the Otago Infantry Regiment in the Great War which desolated the World during the years 1914 to 1918, and to give it an honoured and enduring place on the crowded roll of fame among the organised forces that stood for Liberty in those dark days of tragedy and suffering, of heroism and sacrifice hitherto unknown in the armed conflict of nations.</p>
        <p>When the compilation of the History was entered upon it became clear that the task of placing on record merely the operations with which the Regiment, in its varying strengths of Battalions, was concerned over a period of four years demanded lengthened, careful and extensive research and inquiry; but to attempt anything approaching a detailed record of the numerous examples of individual valour and sacrifice, of gallant deeds and brilliant service at the cost of suffering and death, would form in itself a monumental epic far exceeding the limits assigned this Volume. In neither instance do official diaries or records, inevitably sparse and sterile in material, always afford the amount of information essential to the requirements of reliable historical accuracy and fulness of incident.</p>
        <p>Allowance having been made for shortcomings due to these and other circumstances, it is hoped that the operations of the Otago Regiment, as part of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, have been invested with some appearance of historical sequence and form, and that a permanent setting has been given to the fame which the sons of Otago and Southland achieved at Anzac and Helles, on the<pb xml:id="n4"/> Gallipoli Peninsula; at Armentieres, the Somme, Messines, Passchendaele, Picardy, Bapaume, and Mormal Forest—the battlefields of France and Flanders. If the History succeeds in keeping fresh the memory of their unconquerable spirit, and if future generations are inspired by the story its chapters unfold, then something will have been accomplished.</p>
        <p>It is appropriate at this point that grateful acknowledgment should be made of the generous assistance given by the Senior Officers of the Regiment towards the successful completion of the History, and of the ready response met with on all sides in the search for information bearing on obscure situations, thereby clearing the ground of much that would otherwise have made the work more difficult and less comprehensive.</p>
        <closer>
          <signed>A. E. B.</signed>
          <add>
            <hi rend="sc">Dunedin,<lb/>New Zealand.</hi>
          </add>
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      <pb xml:id="n5"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-front-d3" type="tribute" decls="#text-1-bibl">
        <head><hi rend="c">A Tribute from<lb/>Major-General Sir</hi> A.H. Russell,<lb/>K.C.B., K.C.M.G. (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.), [<hi rend="lsc">f</hi>.]</head>
        <p><hi rend="sc">Rich</hi> in its traditions of race and the unpurchasable inheritance of an unconquerable spirit, still vibrant and responsive, as the historic Call to Arms so splendidly demonstrated, the sons of Otago stand out conspicuously for the brilliance of their achievements among the soldiers of New Zealand in the Great War. Otago could not, however, with its comparatively modest population be expected to provide unaided the necessary quota for the Regiment which bears its name. In order, therefore, to supply the deficiency and make up the requisite strength, men from all parts of the Dominion were drafted into the Regiment. From this formation it follows that the Otago Regiment may be correctly described as representative not only of the Province from which it takes its name, but of the Dominion itself.</p>
        <p>At the same time it is fair to assume that its ranks included a large proportion of the descendants of those early Colonists who sailed from Greenock in the <hi rend="i">John Wickliffe</hi>, or followed the fortunes of William Cargill, leavened not inconsiderably by the sons of those adventuring Islanders of our common stock who in succeeding years made Otago their home—happy intermingling of Norman, Celt, and Saxon, to which the English speaking race owes its capacity for conquest.</p>
        <p>It is beyond the power of a Commander in any retrospect of the crowded and stormy scenes of war to attempt to distinguish or differentiate between Battalions in their relative and contrasting vicissitudes and general treatment at the hands of Fortune. But it must be said that Fate, especially in the earlier years, seemed to take a sinister<pb xml:id="n6"/> pleasure in placing the Otago Regiment in the hottest corners of the fight. Pope's Hill, May 2nd, 1915, the raid at Armentieres on July 13th-14th, 1916, and Goose Alley on September 27th of the same year, were hard days; but each experience only served to put a finer edge on their steel; and henceforward Fortune smiled on men who had shown themselves independent of her favours and concerned only for the opportunities that appeal to the instinctive fighter.</p>
        <p>Esprit de corps was a strongly marked characteristic of all the Battalions; showing itself equally in the stress and heat of conflict, in the temporary calm of rest billets, and on the march. The record put up by the 1st Battalion of Otago Regiment in its hard and hurried march to Hedauville, in March, 1918, to meet the German attack, when not a man fell out, deserves to take its place among the finest memories of the Regiment as an example of endurance, will-power, and that superb and unyielding spirit which is ever the distinguishing mark of the born soldier.</p>
        <p>No word of the Otago Regiment would be complete without mention of the name of Sergeant Travis, first of all scouts and bravest of men, whose epitaph might well be the single word "Undefeated." Asking him one day, half in chaff, if he could produce a prisoner or two for identification, he replied, "Any time you say the word, Sir." He kept his promise.</p>
        <p>Under a long list of capable Commanders, Charters, Smith, Hargest and others, the Regiment fought, flourished and brought back to New Zealand a measure of honour of which Otago and Southland may well be proud.</p>
        <closer><signed><name type="person" key="name-209146">A. H. <hi rend="c">Russell</hi></name></signed>, <salute>Major-General.</salute></closer>
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      <pb xml:id="n7"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-front-d4" type="perface" decls="#text-2-bibl">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">A Message of Grateful<lb/>Remembrance.</hi>
        </head>
        <p><hi rend="sc">As</hi> one intimately connected with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force from the day of its birth in August, 1914, up to Christmas, 1917, and more especially associated with the Otago and Canterbury Battalions as Brigadier of the 2nd New Zealand Brigade from March, 1916, to December, 1917, I rejoice to think that the work of the Otago Regiment is to be handed down to posterity, and that the glorious deeds of the Otago men are to be kept evergreen and chronicled in a Regimental History.</p>
        <p>No History can adequately describe the fighting qualities and the endurance displayed by these New Zealand men. No task was ever too formidable for them, and to their eternal glory it can be claimed that they never once failed to carry out the duty allotted to them.</p>
        <p>Whether the Otago men were scaling the steep and scrubby slopes of Gallipoli, or charging the German wire entanglements under close machine gun fire, as at the Bellevue Spur, Passchendaele, on October 12th, 1917, they always displayed the highest courage, and an initiative surpassed by none and equalled by few other troops.</p>
        <p>To have served with the New Zealand Division is an honour in itself, but to have commanded its three Infantry Brigades at various periods is a privilege enjoyed by no other man, and will be my constant pride for the rest of my life.</p>
        <p>I hope this History of the Otago Regiment will do full justice to all those gallant souls who came 13,000 miles to uphold their Empire's cause, and especially to those who will never return to their homes in New Zealand.</p>
        <pb xml:id="n8"/>
        <p>We must never forget that it is to these, more than to any others, that we owe the Victory.</p>
        <lg>
          <l>"Who shall sing the song of them,</l>
          <l>The wonder and the strength of them,</l>
          <l>The gaiety and tenderness they bore across the sea?</l>
          <l>In every heart's the song of them,</l>
          <l>The debt that England owes to them,</l>
          <l>The chivalry and fearlessness</l>
          <l>That strove and won her free."</l>
        </lg>
        <p>I hope all New Zealand boys will read the histories of their own Regiments. When they do, the story of the daring deeds of that gallant soul, Sergeant Dick Travis, V.C., D.C.M., M.M., Croix de Guerre, of the 2nd Battalion, Otago Regiment, will surely stir them to the depths.</p>
        <closer><signed><name type="person" key="name-207491">W. G. <hi rend="c">Braithwaite</hi></name></signed>,
					<salute><hi rend="sc">Brigadier-General</hi>,<lb/><hi rend="i">late Commanding 2nd New Zealand Brigade.</hi></salute><add><hi rend="sc">Headquarters,<lb/>Northern Brigade, Independent Division,<lb/>British Army of the Rhine.</hi></add></closer>
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        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Contents.</hi>
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        <p>
          <table>
            <head><hi rend="c">Part</hi> I.</head>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n17"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> I.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <hi rend="lsc">page</hi>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n17"><hi rend="sc">The Call to Arms</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n17">3</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n20"><hi rend="sc">The Regiment Embarks</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n20">6</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n24"><hi rend="sc">Arrival in Egypt</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n24">9</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n26"><hi rend="sc">Turkish Advance on Suez Canal</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n26">11</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n28"><hi rend="sc">Chapter II</hi>.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n28"><hi rend="sc">A Great Enterprise</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n28">13</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n29"><hi rend="sc">Plan of Attack</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n29">14</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n35"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> III.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n35"><hi rend="sc">The Landing</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n35">20</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n47"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> IV.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n47"><hi rend="sc">An Advance Attempted</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n47">28</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n53"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> V.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n53"><hi rend="sc">The Regiment at Helles</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n53">33</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n58"><hi rend="sc">Back to Anzac</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n58">38</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n65"><hi rend="sc">Unparalleled Suffering</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n65">43</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n68"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> VI.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n68"><hi rend="sc">A Great Offensive</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n68">46</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n75"><hi rend="sc">The Attack Launched</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n75">51</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n80"><hi rend="sc">Chunuk Bair</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n80">56</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n85"><hi rend="sc">A Final Struggle</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n85">59</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n89"><hi rend="sc">Suvla Bay</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n89">63</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n90"><hi rend="sc">The Situation Reviewed</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n90">64</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n95"><hi rend="sc">A Rest at mudros</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n95">69</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n97"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> VII.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n97"><hi rend="sc">The Beginning of the End</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n97">71</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n101"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> VIII.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n101"><hi rend="sc">The Evacuation</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n101">75</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n104"><hi rend="sc">Return to Egypt</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n104">78</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n104"><hi rend="sc">Formation of the 2nd Battalion</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n104">78</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n108"><hi rend="sc">Ordered to France</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n108">81</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
          </table>
        </p>
        <pb xml:id="n10"/>
        <p>
          <table>
            <head><hi rend="c">Part</hi> II.</head>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n111"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> I.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <hi rend="lsc">page</hi>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n111"><hi rend="sc">The Western Front</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n111">85</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n113"><hi rend="sc">Armentieres</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n113">87</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n128"><hi rend="sc">An Incident with Consequences</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n128">100</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n129"><hi rend="sc">Raiding and Losses</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n129">101</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n133"><hi rend="sc">Renewed Vigilance</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n133">105</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n137"><hi rend="sc">The Regiment Relieved</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n137">109</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n139"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> II</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n139"><hi rend="sc">Battle of the Somme</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n139">111</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n148"><hi rend="sc">The Regiment in Action</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n148">118</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n157"><hi rend="sc">The Attack Renewed</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n157">127</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n162"><hi rend="sc">A Bitter Experience</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n162">131</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n165"><hi rend="sc">A Final Effort</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n165">134</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n171"><hi rend="sc">Operations Reviewed</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n171">138</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n175"><hi rend="sc">Chapter III</hi>.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n175"><hi rend="sc">Cordonnerie and Houplines</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n175">142</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n188"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> IV.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n188"><hi rend="sc">Bois Grenier</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n188">155</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n192"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> V.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n192"><hi rend="sc">Messines</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n192">159</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n204"><hi rend="sc">Preparations for Battle</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n204">169</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n213"><hi rend="sc">The Attack Launched</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n213">177</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n222"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> VI.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n222"><hi rend="sc">St. Yves</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n222">186</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n230"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> VII.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n230"><hi rend="sc">La Basse-Ville</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n230">194</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n238"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> VIII.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n238"><hi rend="sc">Ypres</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n238">202</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n243"><hi rend="sc">Passchendaele</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n243">207</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n253"><hi rend="sc">Tragedy and Heroism</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n253">215</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n268"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> IX.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n268"><hi rend="sc">Polderhoek Chateau</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n268">229</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n274"><hi rend="sc">Success Denibd</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n274">234</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <pb xml:id="n11"/>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n284"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> X.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n284"><hi rend="sc">The 3rd Battalion</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n284">244</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n287"><hi rend="sc">Le Bizet</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n287">247</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n294"><hi rend="sc">Gravenstafel</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n294">252</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n301"><hi rend="sc">Return to the Line</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n301">259</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n305"><hi rend="sc">The Battalion Disbands</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n305">263</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n307"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XI.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n307">1918</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n307">265</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n314"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XII.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n314"><hi rend="sc">Battle of St. Quentin</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n314">272</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n317"><hi rend="sc">Ordered South</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n317">275</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n322"><hi rend="sc">Holding the Line</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n322">280</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n330"><hi rend="sc">The Enemy Held</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n330">285</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n336"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XIII.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n336"><hi rend="sc">La Signy Farm</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n336">290</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n347"><hi rend="sc">A Period of Rest</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n347">300</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n350"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XIV.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n350"><hi rend="sc">Battle of the Lys</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n350">303</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n356"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XV.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n356"><hi rend="sc">Rossignol Wood</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n356">309</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n366"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XVI.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n366"><hi rend="sc">Sergt. <name type="person" key="name-209489">Richard Travis</name></hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n366">317</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n371"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XVII.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n371"><hi rend="sc">Important Events</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n371">321</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n372"><hi rend="sc">Gommecourt</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n372">322</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n374"><hi rend="sc">An Enemy Withdrawal</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n374">324</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n382"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XVIII.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n382"><hi rend="sc">Turn of the Tide</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n382">329</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n383"><hi rend="sc">Fall of Bapaume</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n383">330</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n392"><hi rend="sc">The Advance Continued</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n392">338</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n403"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XIX.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n403"><hi rend="sc">The Hindenburg System</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n403">348</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n413"><hi rend="sc">Masnieres-Beaurevoir Line</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n413">355</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n417"><hi rend="sc">Fontaine and Viesly</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n417">359</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n423"><hi rend="sc">Vertigneul and Salesches</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n423">364</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n431"><hi rend="sc">Important Successes</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n431">370</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <pb xml:id="n12"/>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n434"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XX</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n434"><hi rend="sc">Fall of Le Quesnoy</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n434">373</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n436"><hi rend="sc">Mormal Forest</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n436">375</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n442"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XXI.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n442"><hi rend="sc">Defeat and Surrender</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n442">380</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n444">IV. <hi rend="sc">Corps Order</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n444">382</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n446"><hi rend="sc">Advance into Germany</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n446">384</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n450"><hi rend="sc">Army of Occupation</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n450">387</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n453"><hi rend="sc">Chapter</hi> XXII.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n453"><hi rend="sc">Conclusion</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n453">390</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#n455">
                  <hi rend="sc">Appendix.</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n455"><hi rend="sc">Reserve or Training Battalion</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n455">393</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>      <ref target="#n460"><hi rend="sc">Honours and Awards</hi></ref></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n460">399</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
          </table>
        </p>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n13"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-front-d6" type="illustration">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Index to Illustrations.</hi>
        </head>
        <p rend="right">
          <hi rend="sc">Page</hi>
        </p>
        <p>
          <table>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP001a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Main Body Now-Commissioned Officers, Otago Regiment</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n22">8</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP002a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Otago Officers on the</hi>
                  <hi rend="i">Annaberg</hi>
                  <hi rend="sc">waiting their turn to Land, April 25th</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n39">24</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP002b"><hi rend="sc">Boats on Anzac Beach—April</hi>. 25<hi rend="lsc">th</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n39">24</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP003a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Razorback leading from Plugge's Plateau to Walker's
										Ridge; Sphinx on left</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n39">24</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP003b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Walker's Ridge, Sphinx, and Russell's Top</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n39">24</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP004a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Turkish Prisoners at Anzac</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n39">24</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP006a">
                  <hi rend="sc">View showing Pope's Hill on left, Deadman's Ridge in centre, and corner of Quinn's Post on extreme right</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n53">33</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP006b"><hi rend="sc">Sergt</hi>.-<hi rend="sc">Major</hi><name type="person" key="name-130156">A. W. <hi rend="sc">Porteous</hi></name>, M.C., <hi rend="lsc">(d.)</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n53">33</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP007a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Entrance to Trenches, Courtney's Post</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n60">40</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP007b">
                  <hi rend="sc">At Quinn's Post</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n60">40</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP008a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Troops Landing on Improvised Pier, Anzac Beach</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n60">40</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP009a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Anzac Cove, before the August Offensive</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n70">48</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP010a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Looking up Sazli Beit Dere; <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> on right</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n73">49</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP010a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Pope's Reserve Gully</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n73">49</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP011a"><hi rend="sc">Lieut.-Colonel</hi> A. <hi rend="sc">Moore</hi>, D.S.O., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.)</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n80">56</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP012a"><hi rend="sc">Major</hi><name type="person" key="name-130289">F. H. <hi rend="sc">Statham</hi></name>, (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.)</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n80">56</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP012b">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Farm and Road leading down the Aghyl Derb, with <name key="name-123667" type="place">Suvla Bay</name> in the distance</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n80">56</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP013a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Cemetery on Plugge's Plateau</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n106">80</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP013b">
                  <hi rend="sc">Anzac Cove to-day</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n106">80</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP015a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Typical French Billet</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n123">96</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP016a"><hi rend="sc">Major-General Sir</hi><name type="person" key="name-209146">A. H. <hi rend="sc">Russell</hi></name>, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>), [<hi rend="lsc">f</hi>.], General Officer Commanding New Zealand Division</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n140">112</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP018a"><hi rend="sc">Lieut.-Colonel</hi><name type="person" key="name-130134">A. B. <hi rend="sc">Charters</hi></name>, C.M.G., D.S.O., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.)</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n158">128</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP019a"><hi rend="sc">Sergt. Donald Forrester Brown</hi>, V.C</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n167">136</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP020a"><hi rend="sc">Lieut.-Colonel</hi><name type="person" key="name-130142">G. S. <hi rend="sc">Smith</hi></name>, C.M.G., D.S.O., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.)</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n167">136</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <pb xml:id="n14"/>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP021a"><hi rend="sc">Brig. - General</hi><name type="person" key="name-207491">W. G. <hi rend="sc">Braithwaite</hi></name>, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.),[<hi rend="lsc">f</hi>.]</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n193">160</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP023a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Officers of 1st Battalion, Otago Regiment</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n211">176</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP024a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Ruins of Ypres</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n244">208</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP026a"><hi rend="sc">2nd-Lieut</hi>. <name type="person" key="name-031200">A. R. <hi rend="sc">Cockerell</hi></name>, D.S.O., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.)</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n262">224</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP028a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Officers of 3rd Battalion, Otago Regiment</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n288">248</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP029a"><hi rend="sc">Lieut.-Colonel</hi> D. <hi rend="sc">Colquhoun</hi>, D.S.O., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.)</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n288">248</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP030a"><hi rend="sc"><name type="person" key="name-208158">Lieut.-Colonel James Hargest</name></hi>, D.S.O., M.C., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.), [<hi rend="lsc">f</hi>.]</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n322">280</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP031a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Lewis Gunners of the Regiment in Support Position near Mailly Maillet</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n322">280</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP033a"><hi rend="sc">Brig.-General</hi> R. <hi rend="sc">Young</hi>, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.), [<hi rend="lsc">f</hi>.]</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n333">288</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP034a">
                  <hi rend="sc">The Windmill near Courcelles</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n342">296</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP035a"><hi rend="sc">Sergt</hi>. L. A. Berg, D.C.M., M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n359">312</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP035b"><hi rend="sc">Sergt</hi>. G. <hi rend="sc">Hayton</hi>, D.C.M., M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n359">312</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP035c"><hi rend="sc">Corpl</hi>. T. J. Beck, D.C.M.. M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n359">312</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP035d"><hi rend="sc">Pte</hi>. H. <hi rend="sc">Melville</hi>, D.C.M., M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n359">312</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP036a"><hi rend="sc">Sergt. Richard Charles Travis</hi>, V.C., D.C.M., M.M., <hi rend="sc">[f]</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n359">312</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP037a">
                  <hi rend="sc">British 9.2in. Naval Gun in Coigneux Valley</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n369">320</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP038a"><hi rend="sc">2nd-Lieut</hi>. J. H. Wilson, M.C., M.M., <hi rend="sc">Bar to</hi> M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n374">324</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP038b"><hi rend="sc">2nd-Lieut</hi>. P. T. Moir, D.C.M., M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n374">324</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP038c"><hi rend="sc">2nd-Lieut</hi>. W. P. Morrin, D.C.M., M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n374">324</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP038d"><hi rend="sc">Sergt</hi>. L. R. Dickinson, D.C.M., M.M.</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n374">324</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP039a">A <hi rend="sc">Corner of Puisieux-au-Mont</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n379">328</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP041a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Bapaume</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n389">336</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP042a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Captured German Tank</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n399">344</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP043a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Heavy Artillery moving Forward</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n399">344</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP044a">
                  <hi rend="sc">German Prisoners passing Havrincourt Wood</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n399">344</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP045a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Cookers of 1st Battalion, Otago Regiment</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n407">352</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP048a"><hi rend="sc">The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment Reviewed by</hi> H.R.H. <hi rend="sc">the Prince of Wales</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n418">360</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP049a">
                  <hi rend="sc">German Prisoners carrying out Wounded</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n427">368</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP050a">
                  <hi rend="sc">In the Track of the Advance</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n427">368</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP051a"><hi rend="sc">Forester's House, Mormal Forest</hi>—<hi rend="sc">showing Graves of the Last Soldiers of the Regiment to Fall in Action</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n437">376</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP052a"><hi rend="sc">Officers of 2nd Battalion, Otago Regiment</hi>—<hi rend="sc">Germany, February</hi>, 1919</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n446">384</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
          </table>
        </p>
        <pb xml:id="n15"/>
      </div>
      <div xml:id="t1-front-d7" type="maps">
        <head>
          <hi rend="c">Index to Maps.</hi>
        </head>
        <p rend="right">
          <hi rend="sc">Page</hi>
        </p>
        <p>
          <table>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP005a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Map of the Gallipoli Peninsula</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n39">24</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP009a"><hi rend="sc">Panorama of Chunuk Bair from</hi> 3 <hi rend="sc">Miles South of Nibrunesi Point</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n70">48</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP014a"><hi rend="sc">Northern Zone, and Approximate British Front Line</hi>, 1916</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n114">88</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP017a"><hi rend="sc">The Somme Battle</hi>, 1916</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n140">112</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP022a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Battle of Messines</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n193">160</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP025a">
                  <hi rend="sc">Gravenstafel and Passchendaele</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n244">208</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP027a">
                  <hi rend="sc">polderhoek</hi>
                </ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n271">232</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP032a"><hi rend="sc">German Advance, March</hi>, 1918</ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n322">280</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP040a"><hi rend="sc">Line of the Great Advance</hi>, 1918 <hi rend="sc">(August 24th-September 30th)</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n379">328</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP046a"><hi rend="sc">Line of the Great Advance</hi>, 1918 <hi rend="sc">(September 30th-October 12th)</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n407">352</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <ref target="#WH1-OtagP047a"><hi rend="sc">Line of the Great Advance</hi>, 1918 <hi rend="sc">(October 23rd-November 5th)</hi></ref>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref target="#n437">376</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
          </table>
        </p>
      </div>
    </front>
    <body xml:id="t1-body">
      <pb xml:id="n16"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body-d1" type="part">
        <head>Part I.<lb/><hi rend="c">Gallipoli.</hi></head>
        <pb xml:id="n17" n="3"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d1" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> I.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d1-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Call to Arms.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Long</hi> after the clamour of historical controversy affecting the reputation of rulers, statesmen and soldiers, whose crimes, genius or virtues have made them outstanding figures in the greatest war of all the ages, has been stilled, and in that more distant time, when the fires of international hatreds shall have burned themselves out, will be read of with racing pulse and swelling pride of race the sudden emergence of this young nation from her sheltered solitude on the farthest edge of the world as an armed and valiant disputant among the war-seamed nations of Europe against barbarism and the lawless doctrine of force.</p>
            <p>Instances are rare in history of such spontaneous expressions of loyalty to blood and kindred, of such devotion, at whatever uncounted cost, of sacrifice and suffering, to the ideals and traditions of our race. In the long roll of martyred nations, as of those that have fought and suffered and yet been spared the agony of national annihilation and the destruction of their liberties, there are imperishable examples of sacrifice and achievement; but nowhere is there to be found inspiration and impulse revealing such splendour of innate and instinctive loyalty, and of chivalry so splendid in its daring than in the instant decision of this Country to stand beside the Motherland in those early days of the gathering storm.</p>
            <p>Impressive also and startling in conception was the swiftness with which her rapid decision was translated into action that gave to the Empire and to Freedom an organisation of fighting men unsurpassed in all the higher qualities of courage, endurance and resource that make in combination the most resistless soldier in the field.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n18" n="4"/>
            <p>The assassination of the Austrian Archduke at Serajevo, on June 28th, 2914, was followed a month later by Austria declaring war on Serbia, thus announcing in decisive terms the defeat of British diplomacy, and the triumph of Germany in the first act of the tragedy which was to leave the greater part of Europe in ruins. Events travelled fast under German direction in the development of the great conspiracy which was soon to shake to its centre a world feverishly alive to its imminent peril.</p>
            <p>On August 2nd Germany declared war on Russia. At the same moment the German legions were swarming into Russian, French and Belgian territory. On August 3rd a formal declaration of war on France followed this open act of hostilities.</p>
            <p>Britain's decision, on which an expectant and excited world, neutral and belligerent alike, waited in breathless suspense, was now taken. On August 4th Britain issued a declaration of war on the leader in the conspiracy against the world's peace.</p>
            <p>The heather was now on fire throughout the Empire. New Zealand, in the van among the eager young Dominion States, three days later cabled an offer of an Expeditionary Force to the Imperial Government.</p>
            <p>With the acceptance of this spontaneous offer, the necessary machinery was at once put in motion for effecting mobilization of the guaranteed force and its concentration at the four principal centres of the Dominion. In the composition of the Expeditionary Force, so far at least as the infantry side was concerned, one complete brigade was offered. The selection of volunteers was to be made on a purely territorial basis, each geographical area furnishing its quota towards its own territorial regiment. Thus, one infantry battalion from each of the four Provinces, Otago, Canterbury, Wellington and Auckland, each comprising four companies corresponding to and named after the territorial regiments then in existence in the Province or military area, constituted the Infantry Brigade. Under this arrangement the 4th (Otago) Regiment, the 8th (Southland) Regiment, the 10th (North Otago) Regiment, and the 14th (South Otago) Regiment each had its representation in the Otago Battalion, nominally, if not actually, to the extent of<pb xml:id="n19" n="5"/> one company, which was named after and perpetuated the Territorial Regiment.</p>
            <p>The call to arms met with an instant and magnificent response from the young men of the Province, who, animated by the feeling that their Country needed them or by a sense of national honour, or prompted by the spirit of adventure, came forward from far and wide at the first asking. Here was ready material for soldiers of the very finest type—all volunteers and all fortified by the same intrepid courage and armed with the strength and ardour of wonderful youth.</p>
            <p>Tahuna Park, Dunedin, was selected as the concentration point for the Province on mobilization being given effect to; and to this area all recruits were speedily drafted on presenting themselves and being passed as medically and otherwise fit for active service. On August 7th the first draft, comprising seven officers and between 60 and 70 other ranks, arrived at Tahuna Park. Other drafts followed immediately from the districts of which Oamaru, Milton and Invercargill were the centres. Tahuna Park thus quickly became established as the receiving and concentrating point for Otago. Probably three-fifths of the men selected were without previous military training; but if they were deficient in this respect, there was nothing lacking in their physique, their bearing, and their spirit. The proximity of the projected date of departure of the Expeditionary Force from New Zealand did not permit of the introduction of a cornprehensive or exhaustive system of military training; in the time available instruction in the exercise and discipline of a soldier could be only of the most elementary order.</p>
            <p>Orders were issued for everything to be in readiness for embarkation of the New Zealand Force for Europe on August 28th, 1914. This allowed but a limited period of time for equipment and organisation. Subsequently the date of departure was postponed to September 18th, and then later to September 25th. This postponement was a welcome one in many respects, as it afforded commanders an opportunity for more extensive training, and the Quartermaster-General's Department facilities for providing the Force with stores and equipment, as far as the resources of the country permitted.</p>
            <p>Ten of the most suitable ships in New Zealand waters at the moment were taken over by the Government and<pb xml:id="n20" n="6"/> rapidly converted into a state which would provide for the transport of a military force. The two vessels allotted to Otago Province were the <hi rend="i">Ruapehu</hi> and the <hi rend="i">Hawki's Bay</hi>.</p>
            <p>Meantime the Otago Infantry Battalion had been formed at Tahuna Park, and the training and perfecting of the organisation proceeded apace. <name key="name-418771" type="person">Lieut.-Colonel T. W. McDonald</name>, N.Z.S.C., had been appointed to command the Battalion, and other officers with territorial experience selected.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d1-d2" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Regiment Embarks.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>On the morning of September 22nd Otago's first contribution to the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, comprised of troops of the Main Body and the 1st Reinforcements, entrained at Tahuna Park, and proceeding to Port Chalmers, embarked on that date on two transports, and were enthusiastically farewelled by the people of the Province. On the evening of September 24th the Otago and Canterbury transports arrived in Wellington Harbour; by the morning of September 25th, under escort of H.M.S. <hi rend="i">Psyche</hi>, they were ready to join the Auckland and Wellington transports, which had already put to sea.</p>
            <p>At this moment, however, orders were issued by the New Zealand Government that, for Imperial reasons, the sailing of the Expeditionary Force was to be temporarily postponed. In accordance with this unexpected development, arrangements were immediately made to disembark all horses and all mounted units. Camps were established in and around Wellington for the mounted units, while the infantry remained on the transports by night, and were taken ashore by day and exercised, for the first time, in tactical operations over the hills around Wellington, one battalion being railed daily to Trentham for musketry practice.</p>
            <p>On October 14th H.M.S. <hi rend="i">Minotaur</hi> and H.I.J.M.S. <hi rend="i">Ibuki</hi> arrived in Wellington Harbour, and on the following day the Auckland transports, escorted by H.M.S. <hi rend="i">Philomel</hi>, arrived at Wellington. At 6 a.m. on October 16th the whole convoy, escorted by <hi rend="i">Minotaur, Psyche, Philomel</hi> and <hi rend="i">Ibuki</hi>, weighed anchor and proceeded out of Wellington Harbour to sea, cheered by large numbers of the people of Wellington and farewelled by His Excellency the Governor, the Military<pb xml:id="n21" n="7"/> Headquarters Staff and Ministers of the Cabinet. Once Cook Strait was cleared, the convoy formed up in columns of divisions, in line ahead, with three of the four escorting cruisers steaming at a distance of six miles, one ahead, one on either beam, and the fourth four miles astern, these distances being reduced by less than half during the night.</p>
            <p>The strength of the Expeditionary Force, consisting of the Main Body and the 1st Reinforcements, totalled 360 officers and 8,067 other ranks, and included 3,815 horses. Its composition was as follows: Commander, Major-<name type="person" key="name-208052">General Sir Alexander Godley</name>, K.C.M.G., C.B., and Headquarters Staff; one Mounted Rifle Brigade; one Field Troop; one Signal Troop; Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance; one independent Mounted Rifles Regiment (the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment); one Infantry Brigade (four Battalions); Divisional Artillery (one Field Artillery Brigade); Divisional Signal Service; Divisional Transport and Supply Unit; Divisional Medical Units.</p>
            <p>The personnel of Otago Battalion was as follows:—</p>
            <p>Officer Commanding, Lieut.-Col. T. W. McDonald, N.Z.S.C.; Second-in-Command, Major J. B. McClymont; Adjutant, Captain A. Moore, D.S.O. (Royal Dublin Fusiliers); Assistant-Adjutant, Lieut. <name type="person" key="name-130081">J. S. Reid</name>; Regimental Transport Officer, Lieut. H. R. Martineau, V.C.; Quartermaster, Lieut. V. J. Egglestone. Attached: Medical Officers, <name type="person" key="name-418757">Captain C. V. A. Baigent</name>, N.Z.M.C., Lieut. W. G. Scannell, N.Z.M.C.; Dental Officer, Captain J. H. Don, N.Z.M.C.; Chaplain, Rev. J. Ross.</p>
            <p>Machine Gun Section.—2nd-Lieut. L. G. Wilson.</p>
            <p>4th (Otago) Company.—Major R. Price, <name type="person" key="name-418755">Captain A. V. Spedding</name>, Lieuts. R. P. Jones, <name type="person" key="name-130081">J. S. Reid</name>, <name type="person" key="name-209176">J. L. Saunders</name>, 2nd-Lieut. A. C. Boyes.</p>
            <p>8th (Southland) Company.—Major J. A. Mackenzie, Captain W. Fleming, Lieuts. W. I. K. Jennings, N.Z.S.C., G. Myers, 2nd-Lieuts. E. M. Gabites, W. F. Tracy.</p>
            <p>10th (North Otago) Company.—Major J. H. Moir, <name type="person" key="name-130289">Captain F. H. Statham</name>, Lieut. T. W. Nisbet. 2nd-Lieuts. C. St. C. Hamilton, J. G. Cowan, W. M. McKenzie.</p>
            <p>14th (South Otago) Company.—<name type="person" key="name-130143">Major W. McG. Turnbull</name>, N.Z.S.C., <name type="person" key="name-130142">Captain G. S. Smith</name>, Lieuts. J. T. Moroney, R. L. Duthie, H. L. Richards, 2nd-Lieut. D. J. A. Lyttle.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n22" n="8"/>
            <p>The embarkation states of the Otago Battalion indicated a total strength, inclusive of the Machine Gun Section, of 34 officers and 1,076 other ranks. Of this number 21 officers and 603 other ranks sailed on the <hi rend="i">Ruapehu</hi>, officially designated H.M.N.Z.T. No. 5, and Lieut.-Colonel T. W. McDonald was appointed Officer Commanding Troops. On the <hi rend="i">Hawke's Bay</hi> (H.M.N.Z.T. No. 9) there were 13 officers and 473 other ranks of Otago Battalion under the command of <name key="name-418772" type="person">Major J. B. McClymont</name>; <name key="name-130048" type="person">Lieut.-Colonel Bauchop</name>, C.M.G., being Officer Commanding Troops of the transport.</p>
            <p>This eventful voyage to the seat of the European War of New Zealand's first Expeditionary Force may be briefly described. Hobart was reached on October 21st, the convoy sailing again on the following day, and reaching Albany on October 28th, where was found in the sheltered waters of King George's Sound an imposing assemblage of transports carrying the troops of the first Australian Expeditionary Force. At 5 a.m. on Sunday, November 1st, the escort, now consisting of H.M.A.S. <hi rend="i">Melbourne</hi>, H.M.A.S. <hi rend="i">Sydney</hi> and H.M.S. <hi rend="i">Minotaur</hi>, put to sea, followed by the Australian transports. Two hours later the New Zealand transports followed in their wake, and on November 3rd the Japanese cruiser <hi rend="i">Ibuki</hi> rejoined the escort. On the night of November 8th-9th the convoy passed 50 miles to the east of the Cocos Islands, and at 6.30 a.m. on the 9th the S.O.S. signal was picked up which resulted in the memorable destruction of the German raider <hi rend="i">Emden</hi> by H.M.A.S. <hi rend="i">Sydney</hi>, which had hurriedly left the convoy in response to the signals sent out from the cable station on the Cocos Group. The announcement of this fine achievement by H.M.A.S. <hi rend="i">Sydney</hi> was received with the greatest enthusiasm on board the troopships. On November 15th the convoy reached Colombo, the victorious <hi rend="i">Sydney</hi>, with 138 prisoners from the battered <hi rend="i">Emden</hi>, subsequently entering the harbour, when the prisoners were distributed over the New Zealand and Australian troopships. On November 17th the New Zealand transports, escorted by the <hi rend="i">Hampshire</hi>, left for Aden, which was reached on November 25th. On the following morning the journey was continued to Suez.</p>
            <p>On November 28th information was received by wireless that there was a probability of disembarkation at Suez, which
							<pb xml:id="n23"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP001a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP001a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP001a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Main Body Non-Commissioned. Officers, Otago Regimes.</hi><lb/><hi rend="i">Commanding Officer:</hi><hi rend="sc">Lieut.-Colonel</hi>. <name key="name-418771" type="person">T. W. McDonald</name>, N.Z.S.C.</head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n24" n="9"/>
							meant that instead of proceeding to England, as was supposed to have been originally intended, the Force was to land in Egypt. This proved to be the case; but the journey was not yet quite at an end. The great waterway of the <name key="name-001365" type="place">Suez Canal</name>, with its defence posts and garrisons of Indian troops, was entered and Port Said reached on December 1st. The <hi rend="i">Emden's</hi> prisoners were now transferred to the <hi rend="i">Hampshire</hi>, and the convoy left for Alexandria on December 2nd, arriving there on the following morning.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d1-d3" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Arrival in Egypt.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>The New Zealand Expeditionary Force had now reached the end of its long journey by sea. Orders for disembarkation were issued, the transports disgorged their freights of men and horses, and on the evening of December 3rd the first troop train left Alexandria for Zeitoun station, about four miles beyond Cairo. Distant about a mile and a-half from the detraining point, and on the edge of the sun-smitten desert, was the site of the camp selected for the New Zealand troops. More and more trains arrived with men, horses, baggage and stores, and in the course of a few days, with all energies directed to one end, the various lines commenced to assume a well-ordered appearance. There were, of course, the disadvantages inevitably arising from the heat of the day and the eternal sand; while at the outset, on account of the futility and inadequacies of the local methods of so-called transport, stores were a long time in coming to hand, and certain inconveniences followed.</p>
            <p>On December 6th Lieut.-Colonel McDonald was admitted to the Citadel Hospital, Cairo, on account of ill-health; and a Medical Board deciding that he would not be fit for duty for a considerable period of time, he severed his connection with the Regiment and eventually returned to New Zealand.</p>
            <p>It was now proposed to use the New Zealand Expeditionary Force as the nucleus of a Division to consist of Headquarters; three Brigades, namely, the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade (including the Ceylon Contingent); New Zealand Field Artillery Brigade; New Zealand Field Howitzer Battery; one Field Company New<pb xml:id="n25" n="10"/> Zealand Engineers; New Zealand Signal Company; Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment; Divisional Train; three Field Ambulances.</p>
            <p>Meanwhile the weather, the great determining factor in all military operations, continued warm by day and cold by night; the general health of the troops was good; and training was in full swing over the open spaces which the desert country afforded. The training was of a severe and exacting nature; and in this connection the long route marches which the infantry daily carried out in full marching order across the sands contributed in a large measure to the high standard of military discipline and the wonderful state of physical fitness ultimately attained. In leisure periods there were afforded opportunities of securing pleasant mental and physical relaxation, either in the city of Cairo, where, it may be said, there was much moral viciousness and much iniquity, or at the great Pyramids of Ghizeh, or the many other places of antiquity which provided unfailing interest and instruction.</p>
            <p>On December 18th, owing to the hostile action of Turkey, the suzerainty of that country over Egypt was terminated, and by Proclamation it became henceforward a British Protectorate; and Abbas Hilmi Pasha, late Khedive of Egypt, because of his adhesion to the King's enemies, was deposed, and the Sultanate of Egypt was offered to and accepted by Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, eldest living Prince of the family of Mohammed Ali. The new Sultan was proclaimed at Cairo on December 20th, the Regiment being included in the strength which represented the New Zealand Division at the ceremony.</p>
            <p>On December 21st Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., Indian Army, who had been appointed to command the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, arrived in Egypt from Bombay. There was a march of the New Zealand Division and the Australian Light Horse through Cairo on December 23rd, and an inspection by Lieut.-<name type="person" key="name-413424">General Sir John Maxwell</name>, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding the Forces in Egypt. <name type="person" key="name-208600">Sir Thomas Mackenzie</name>, High Commissioner for New Zealand, arrived from London on December 24th for the purpose of extending a welcome to the New Zealand troops; on December 30th there was a<pb xml:id="n26" n="11"/> review of New Zealand Forces in honour of the visit of the High Commissioner.</p>
            <p>On December 31st Major <name key="name-130080" type="person">A. Moore</name>, D.S.O., was appointed to the command of Otago Battalion, <hi rend="i">vice</hi> Lieut.-Colonel T. W. McDonald, and was granted the temporary rank of Lieut.-Colonel while holding such appointment. Major J. H. Moir was appointed Second-in-Command of the Battalion, and <name type="person" key="name-130081">Lieut. J. S. Reid</name> became Adjutant.</p>
            <p>Field training and a further review marked the early days of January. At this stage it was announced that the New Zealand Force was to form the nucleus of a second mixed division, to be known as the New Zealand and Australian Division of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, with <name type="person" key="name-208052">Major-General Sir A. J. Godley</name> in command. Such is a brief chronological record of the leading events immediately following the Regiment's arrival in Egypt.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d1-d4" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Turkish Advance on Suez Canal.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>On January 25th orders were received for the move of certain troops to the <name key="name-001365" type="place">Suez Canal</name> area to support the Indian troops already holding that line against an expected attack by the Turks, who were reported to be advancing on the Canal in three columns. The entrainment of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade commenced on the following morning—Otago and Wellington Battalions were ordered to Kubri, about 12 miles north of Suez; Brigade Headquarters and Auckland and Canterbury Battalions proceeding to Ismailia. The defences which were entrusted to Otago and Wellington Battalions, in conjunction with Indian troops already established there, comprised a series of posts, Baluchistan, Kubri, Ghurka, and Shalouf, disposed along the eastern bank of the Canal between Suez northwards to the Little Bitter Lake, a distance of about 15 miles. Preparations were at once made for an expected attack in strength by the Turks.</p>
            <p>The attack on the Canal and its defences developed on February 3rd, The attempts made to cross the Canal failed signally; a large number of the enemy were killed and 650 taken prisoners; and at the close of the fighting on February 4th the enemy was in retreat all along the line, The only point at which the New Zealand Force became seriously<pb xml:id="n27" n="12"/> involved in these operations was in the locality of Serapeum, where the Turks unsuccessfully attempted to effect a crossing of the Canal by means of pontoons; and at a later stage in the day's operations the first and only casualties, one death from wounds and one slightly wounded case, were sustained by the New Zealanders. Otago Battalion was in reserve and was not involved in the attack.</p>
            <p>On Thursday, January 28th, the 2nd New Zealand Reinforcements, comprising 34 officers and 1,189 other ranks, under Major A. B. Charters, arrived at Suez. Disembarkation was effected and the journey continued by rail to the New Zealand Camp at Zeitoun. The arrival of the 3rd New Zealand Reinforcements, comprising 62 officers and 2,147 other ranks, followed on March 26th.</p>
            <p>On March 29th the Division, complete with reinforcements, paraded for inspection by <name type="person" key="name-130045">General Sir Ian Hamilton</name>. From this date events immediately commenced to shape themselves in a direction fraught with great and far-reaching consequences.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n28" n="13"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d2" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> II.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d2-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">A Great Enterprise.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">Orders</hi> were now issued for the Regiment to be prepared to leave Egypt at short notice as part of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force which was to be committed to projected operations against Turkey. By the beginning of April General Headquarters had been established at Alexandria, where a great fleet of transports, comprised of captured enemy vessels, was being assembled and made ready for conveying the forces of the Expedition to Mudros, in the Island of Lemnos.</p>
            <p>Entraining for Alexandria was to commence on the night of April 6th-7th. An advanced base under Major Charters was being formed at Mustafa, Alexandria, and Zeitoun was to serve as a reinforcing and training camp. Orders were subsequently issued postponing entraining for an interval of 72 hours on account of congestion at Alexandria.</p>
            <p>Training was being carried out in long distance route marches, the weight of packs being increased to at least 70 pounds in order to bring the Force up to the state of fitness required for a campaign in the rough and mountainous country of the Gallipoli Peninsula—the scene of the coming struggle. The final preparations of organisation and equipment were now effected, and on Friday, April 9th, entraining for Alexandria commenced.</p>
            <p>As Alexandria was reached and detraining completed, embarkation proceeded without loss of time. On April 10th the first of the transports drew out from the harbour where lay sheltered ships of many nationalities. The Regiment was allotted the <hi rend="i">Annaberg</hi>, one of the several captured enemy vessels lying at Alexandria, which was like most of the others—filthy beyond description, and abominably louse-ridden.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n29" n="14"/>
            <p>On departure from Alexandria the Battalion was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Moore, with Major <name key="name-418773" type="person">J. H. Moir</name> Second-in-Command, and Lieut. J. S. Reid Adjutant. The Company Commanders were as follows: 4th (Otago) Company, Major R. Price; 8th (Southland) Company, Major J. A. Mackenzie; 10th (North Otago) Company, Major G. Mitchell; 14th (South Otago) Company, Major W. McG. Turnbull.</p>
            <p>A journey of three days brought the transports to Mudros Harbour, the rendezvous of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. There in the placid waters of the great natural harbour of the Island of Lemnos, in the <name key="name-032817" type="place">Ægean Sea</name>, lay at anchor ships from the far ends of the world—a fleet of vessels of war and all the small craft incidental to their projected operations, transports, and supply ships.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d2-d2" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Plan of Attack.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>On arrival at Mudros, the general outline of the plan of attack to be made against the Turkish defences on the Gallipoli Peninsula was communicated to Divisional Commanders by the G.O.C. Army Corps. From the information thus supplied it was made known that the forces which were to take part in the operations were as follows: <name type="person" key="name-130045">General Sir Ian Hamilton</name> in Supreme Command. Troops: Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Commanded by General Sir W. R. Birdwood), consisting of the Australian Division under General Bridges, and the New Zealand and Australian Division (two Brigades) under <name type="person" key="name-208052">General Sir A. J. Godley</name>; 29th British Division under General Hunter-Weston; Marine Division under General Paris; French Division under General d'Amade.</p>
            <p>The decision arrived at by <name type="person" key="name-130045">Sir Ian Hamilton</name> and his Staff was that several simultaneous attacks should be made on the Peninsula in order as far as possible to mislead the Turkish Command. Landing places at the extremity of the Peninsula were selected where an assault upon the Turkish defences was to be made, principally by units of the 29th Division. About nine miles along the coast from "Y" Beach (opposite Krithia) and beyond Gaba Tepe, a point was selected for a landing to be made by troops of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, who were to work their way up the heights of <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name>, and distract the enemy forces south of<pb xml:id="n30" n="15"/> Achi Baba by threatening their rear and their communications; the Royal Naval Division was to make a feint attack near the Bulair lines, at the head of the Gulf of Saros; and a landing was to be carried out by the French Division on the Asiatic side, near Kum Kale. The landings were to be carried out under cover of bombardments by the Fleet.</p>
            <p>The objective laid down for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was the ridge over which the Gallipoli-Maidos-Boghali-Kojadere Roads ran, and especially Mal Tepe. The seizure of this position, it was calculated, would threaten or cut the line of retreat of enemy forces on Kilid Bahr Plateau. On this account and the fact that it would prevent the passage of Turkish reinforcements during the attack of the 29th Division at the extremity of the Peninsula, the capture of the objective allotted to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was of vital importance. A covering force, comprised of the 3rd <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry Brigade</name>, was to accomplish the first landing in the darkness at 3 a.m. The Australian Division was to land immediately after the covering force, followed by the New Zealand and Australian Division. Certainly, whatever the force assembled to meet the effort of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, the Turks had had sufficient warning, and ample time to complete the construction of an elaborate and effective system of defence.</p>
            <p>A brief review of events, principally of a naval order, which preceded the first serious military undertaking against the Turkish strongholds, will throw some light on the existing state of affairs in relation to the Gallipoli Peninsula at the time when the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had been assembled at its rendezvous in Mudros Harbour. Turkey entered the lists alongside the Central Empires on October 31st. On November 5th England's declaration of war against Turkey was announced. Curiously enough, on November 3rd, two days previously, an Anglo-French Naval Squadron had opened fire upon the Turkish forts at the entrance of the Straits which divided the European from the Asiatic coast line of the Turkish Empire. This bombardment lasted for a period of ten minutes, and was designed, it was stated, merely to test the range of the guns of the Turkish forts. On February 16th the British War Council decided to despatch<pb xml:id="n31" n="16"/> the 29th Division, hitherto destined for France, to the Island of Lemnos at the earliest possible date; to arrange for a Force from Egypt if required; and to order the Admiralty to prepare transport for the conveyance and landing of 50,000 men. Thus the War Council committed itself to an undertaking which aimed at the occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula by a military force acting in conjunction with the approaching naval attack. The Navy and the Army were jointly committed to the Dardanelles enterprise; but the 29th Division did not begin to leave England until March 16th.</p>
            <p>By the middle of February, in pursuance of the general intentions, a great fleet of ships of war had been gathered in Mudros Harbour. On February 19th the attack by sea opened on the main Turkish forts at the entrance to the Straits. The bombardment ceased at the close of day and the ships withdrew, to resume their efforts on February 25th with increased weight of ships and guns. On this occasion the outer Turkish forts were compelled to cease fire, and on the following day landing parties of marines went ashore and completed the destruction, though at one point, Kum Kale, they were driven back to their boats with some loss. The absence of serious opposition at this stage emphasised the unfortunate nature of the delays subsequently exhibited in effecting military co-operation with the naval undertaking.</p>
            <p>Stormy weather now intervened, and there were no further attacks until March 4th, when a naval squadron, preceded by mine-sweepers, resumed the bombardment of the forts further up the Straits; but it was difficult or almost impossible to determine when these forts were out of action. The Allied naval operations had not so far accomplished any thing of material value; the situation in regard to the co-operation of the Army was still vague and unsettled.</p>
            <p>On March 18th the first serious attempt to force the. Narrows was undertaken, The ships engaged, which included the <hi rend="i">Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Lord Nelson</hi>, and <hi rend="i">Agamemnon</hi>, carried out a heavy bombardment of the several forts, delivering the attack in the form of three successive blows. The conditions were all against the Fleet, and the object was not achieved. The <hi rend="i">Irresistible, Ocean</hi> and <hi rend="i">Bouvet</hi> were sunk; the <hi rend="i">Inflexible</hi> and <hi rend="i">Gaulois</hi> were damaged and beached; and many of the others sustained serious injury.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n32" n="17"/>
            <p>It was on the day prior to this costly undertaking that <name type="person" key="name-130045">General Sir Ian Hamilton</name> arrived at Tenedos to take command of the land forces. The disastrous results which attended the operations of the Allied Fleet on March 18th presented unanswerable arguments against an attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles by sea alone; and almost immediately preparations were commenced for a forced landing and assault upon the Peninsula by the Military Forces acting in co-operation with the Fleet.</p>
            <p>The preliminary and subsequent reconnaissances which were made of the north-western shores of the Gallipoli Peninsula from the Isthmus at Bulair to the extremity at Cape Helles, served to convince General Hamilton of the tremendous difficulties which beset the perilous undertaking shortly to be embarked upon, by reason of the generally steep and precipitous country, and the formidable nature of the defences commanding the restricted stretches of beach available for landing troops. From Bulair to Suvla Bay, a distance of approximately 30 miles, the land rose abruptly from the sea, and the general configuration was such that there was no apparent place suitable for a forced landing and subsequent movement of troops. The coast line of the southern half of the Peninsula, stretching from Suvla Bay to Cape Helles, was also, generally speaking, precipitous; but at certain points there appeared short stretches of coast line the sandy beaches of which at least suggested the possibility of landings being effected. Thus, round the southern extremity of the Peninsula half a dozen such localities presented themselves; while on either side of, Gaba Tepe, about 13 miles northwards of Helles, two apparently good places were located.</p>
            <p>Over this southern half of the Peninsula, where prolonged and fiercely contested battles were fought during the progress of the campaign, stood three main geographical landmarks, namely, overlooking <name key="name-123667" type="place">Suvla Bay</name> the mountain of <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name>, which, from a confusion of spurs and subsidiary features, rose to a height of 970 feet; further to the south and more to the Asiatic side, the great Kilid Bahr Plateau, rising to a height of 700 feet, and forming a natural protection to the forts of the Narrows against attack from the direction of the <name key="name-032817" type="place">Ægean Sea</name>; and further still to the south, Achi Baba, which rose to a height of approximately 600 feet and dominated the<pb xml:id="n33" n="18"/> southern extremity of the Peninsula. The Commander-in-Chief was convinced that success could only be expected from a scheme which involved the rapid landing of the whole of the troops under his command, and a clear and practical recognition of the difficulties presented by the restricted nature of the beaches and the strength of the Turkish defences, which could only be successfully dealt with by effecting simultaneous landings at several points, and by threatened landings at others.</p>
            <p>Following the arrival at Mudros of the transports conveying the troops of the New Zealand and Australian Division, the available time was fully employed in regrouping troops and practising the hazardous operation of disembarkation from the ship's side. The troops lived on board ship, and at the close of disembarkation practices carried out route marches on shore before returning for the day. Conferences between the commanders of the various units of the Division were constantly in progress. On April 24th, at 9 a.m., a Conference of the G.O.C. and Staff, of Brigadiers, and Officers Commanding Battalions, was held on board the <hi rend="i">Lutzow</hi> to discuss points bearing on the projected operations. Secret instructions regarding the landing were now issued.</p>
            <p>On April 21st Sir fan Hamilton issued the following Address to the Troops under his command:—</p>
            <quote>
              <p>"Soldiers of France and of the King:</p>
              <p>"Before us lies an adventure unprecedented in modern war. Together with our comrades of the Fleet we are about to force a landing upon an open beach in face of positions which have been vaunted by our enemies as impregnable.</p>
              <p>"The landing will be made good by the help of God and the Navy; the positions will be stormed, and the war brought one step nearer to a glorious close.</p>
              <p>"'Remember,' said Lord Kitchener, when bidding adieu to your Commander, ' Remember, once you set foot upon the Gallipoli Peninsula, you must fight the thing through to a finish.'</p>
              <p>"The whole world will be watching your progress. Let us prove ourselves worthy of the great feat of arms entrusted to us.</p>
            </quote>
            <p rend="right">"<hi rend="sc">Ian Hamilton</hi>, <hi rend="i">General</hi>."</p>
            <pb xml:id="n34" n="19"/>
            <p>The momentous hour for action was fast approaching. At two o'clock on the afternoon of April 24th the <hi rend="i">Queen Elizabeth</hi>, with <name type="person" key="name-130045">Sir Ian Hamilton</name> and Staff on board, steamed out from the sheltered anchorage of Mudros and headed for the open sea, followed by the other battleships of the Fleet, and then a long line of transports bearing their thousands of the Empire's splendid manhood, many of whom were that day to see the sun go down for the last time. About midnight the New Zealand transports weighed anchor and also moved out to sea, heading for the shores against which there was to be launched an expedition of which there is no parallel in history.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n35" n="20"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d3" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> III.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d3-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Landing.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">The</hi> covering force to the landing to be made north of Gaba Tepe reached its rendezvous shortly after half-past one on the morning of April 25th, and there those who had left Mudros in ships of the Fleet were transferred to their boats; at the same time the remainder of the covering force was transferred from the transports to six attending destroyers. The whole now proceeded to within some four miles of the coast, steering on a point about a mile north of Gaba Tepe. At 3.30 a.m. the tows were directed to go ahead and land, and forty minutes later the destroyers were ordered to follow.</p>
            <p>Through the calm waters of the <name key="name-032817" type="place">Ægean Sea</name>, and in the darkness of the yet unbroken dawn the boats carrying those first dauntless elements of the <name key="name-019688" type="organisation">Anzac Force</name> approached the inhospitable shores of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The point originally selected for the landing was actually not adhered to in consequence of the tows failing to maintain the required direction, and as a result the landing came to be made at a point more than a mile further to the north. Along this narrow length of shelving beach, to be immortalized as Anzac Cove, the covering force of Australians leapt ashore from their boats, now under the fire of the enemy on the heights, crossed the intervening stretch of beach, and scaled the face of the ridges which overhung it. So impetuous, so irresistible, was their rush—some of them reaching a point more than a mile inland—that the Turks who had been hurried to the defence of this part of the coast scattered and fled or went down before the onrush; and so there was established on the broken, scrub-covered ridges of Anzac that precarious footing which, strengthened during the day by the arrival of additional brigades of troops, was to be maintained in the face of repeated assaults hurled against it by an enemy force which at the fall of night was estimated to number several thousand.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n36" n="21"/>
            <p>With the break of day on April 25th the transports conveying the New Zealand troops were approaching the extremity of the Peninsula, where operations had already been launched; by 7 a.m. the Headquarters transport, the <hi rend="i">Lutzow</hi>, had arrived off shore opposite Gaba Tepe. As the transports arrived at this point the troops clambered down the sides, boarded the attending destroyers, which conveyed them further in shore and transferred them to barges, which were then towed by the steam picket boats to within about 300 yards of the landing point. Now came the desperate task of pulling the heavily laden barges over the intervening stretch of water, an easy target for the fire of the enemy. Jumping from the boats as they grounded, the troops struggled through the shallow water under the weight of their equipment and quickly drew up along the shelter of the ridges which overhung the coast line.</p>
            <p>By 9.30 a.m. the personnel of New Zealand Headquarters and the troops contained in the first tow had landed. An hour later verbal instructions were received to the effect that one brigade of the New Zealand and Australian Division was to be utilised to extend the left flank of the 3rd Brigade of the Australian Division, which had formed the covering force for the main operation. Urgent requests were made for reinforcements to be sent to this quarter, and the Auckland Battalion, which was ashore by 12 noon, was at once despatched against <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>, to the south-western slopes of which the enemy was now directing accurate shell fire. Half an hour later two companies of the Canterbury Battalion were landed. At 1 p.m. Auckland Battalion was recalled from the position to which it was first directed, and sent more to the right, to Plugge's Plateau, in order more effectively to connect up with the flank of the 3rd Australian Brigade; while the two companies of Canterbury Battalion were directed to prolong the left flank of Auckland Battalion.</p>
            <p>There now followed a complete hiatus in the disembarkation of the troops of the Division; a fact which in a large measure was to be attributed to the early disembarkations having been more rapidly effected than was anticipated, and the transports further in rear not being hurried on, but adhering to the original times laid down.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n37" n="22"/>
            <p>Shortly after 2.30 p.m. the first troops of Otago Regiment landed from the tows into which they had clambered from the <hi rend="i">Annaberg</hi>. The 8th (Southland) Company, commanded by Major J. A. Mackenzie, landed first, followed by the 4th (Otago) Company, commanded by Major R. Price; the 10th (North Otago) Company, commanded by Major G. Mitchell; and the 14th (South Otago) Company, commanded by <name type="person" key="name-130143">Major W. McG. Turnbull</name>. By 4 p.m. the Battalion had completed landing. As each Company waded ashore it hurriedly formed up under the shelter of the steep ledges which overhung the beach, just as the previous parties had done, and from there was directed by <name type="person" key="name-207491">Colonel W. G. Braithwaite</name>. Otago was at the outset ordered to proceed to the extreme left of the line, but subsequently was recalled and directed to Plugge's Plateau.</p>
            <p>Meanwhile the fighting was continuous and was becoming increasingly heavy. The line taken up by the troops who had been landed up to this stage became heavily engaged at every point. The intervals of time between the various landings; the fact that companies and half companies had on arrival been directed to where they were most urgently required at the moment; and the broken and precipitous nature of the scrub-covered country, all contributed to confusion and intermingling of units, detachments from all Brigades serving alongside each other. The desperate nature of the situation, and the perilous hold which the covering force had secured and was maintaining over the high ground approximately half a mile east of the beach, demanded that all available reinforcements should be flung into the firing line immediately on arrival. Readjustment and reorganisation of units must follow later. The situation at 5 p.m., when the Headquarters of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade arrived on the beach, was as follows: Otago Battalion on Plugge's Plateau; Canterbury and Auckland Battalions with Australian units along the front line of horse-shoe shape extending to the left to <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>; and Wellington Battalion on board the troopship.</p>
            <p>The troops landed were still without the support: of any field guns, while support from those of the Fleet was inadequate on account of the difficulties of observation and communication. The Otago Battalion alone had suffered a considerable number of casualties from the fire of the Turkish<pb xml:id="n38" n="23"/> guns. About 5.30 p.m. six guns of the 26th <name key="name-123639" type="organisation">Indian Mountain Battery</name> arrived and were posted in support of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade on the Plateau, and by their amazing efforts gave valuable support and encouragement to the sorely tried infantry.</p>
            <p>There was no improvement in the general situation towards evening. The troops forming the front line had suffered heavy punishment from the enemy shrapnel and rifle he; there were also considerable gaps in the line and serious disorganisation of commands consequent upon casualties and the inevitable intermingling of units. At the outset small detachments in an excess of zeal and gallantry had advanced too far a field, and in the difficult country had been cut off from the main body and there died fighting to the last. A great deal of the ground which had been gained in the first impetuous rush of the covering force had been lost, and the line of resistance, which had resolved itself into a semi-circular position with the right flank about a mile north of Gaba Tepe and the left on the high ground overlooking Fisherman's Hut, the whole commanded by the enemy, was only with the very greatest difficulty maintained by our force, now sadly depleted and greatly outnumbered and assailed by an enemy confident but mistaken in his ability to sweep them into the sea. As this desperate conflict waged far into the night, the wounded painfully dragged themselves or were carried by the tireless bands of stretcher-bearers down to the beach in ever-increasing numbers, and presented a problem which was almost as complex and as difficult as that which the dauntless troops were endeavouring to solve on the heights above.</p>
            <p>The New Zealand Infantry Brigade Headquarters now represented to Divisional Headquarters that the landing of guns during the night was imperative if the position won at so much cost was to be maintained. At 11 p.m. the G.O.C., A.N.Z.A.C., arrived from H.M.S. <hi rend="i">Queen</hi>, and held a conference at which the G.O.C.'s; of the New Zealand and Australian Division and the 1st Australian Division were present. It was decided to reinforce the 3rd Australian Brigade (the covering force) with all available troops, and connect up its left flank with the right of the New Zealand Brigade. So far only one gun, that of the 1st Australian<pb xml:id="n39" n="24"/> Division, had been landed. Casualties up to midnight were estimated to have been 1,500, and although the hospital ship had left for Alexandria, the arrangements for clearing casualties were in most respects inadequate. On the whole, it was considered the progress achieved was not as great as was anticipated—a state of affairs which was attributed mainly to the fact that disembarkation having taken place north of the point arranged, subsequent confusion had resulted; that the early stages of the operation having advanced more expeditiously and with more success than was anticipated, the remainder of the disembarkation was not accelerated accordingly; that the G.O.C. 1st Australian Division, considering the country unsuitable, forbade the landing of the Australian field guns; and that the Naval arrangements for landing troops towards the close of the day and during the night appeared defective, launches and lighters being scarce and the work in consequence slow.</p>
            <p>The whole situation was indeed fraught with great danger. The troops had been subjected to gruelling fire all day, and the power of successful resistance had been reduced by heavy losses and weakened by exhaustion. The seriousness of the situation was represented to the Commander-in-Chief in the course of a communication delivered to him at midnight following the landing. The possibility of re-embarkation was even mentioned. In a characteristic reply <name type="person" key="name-130045">Sir Ian Hamilton</name> wrote: "Dig, dig, dig, until you are safe."</p>
            <p>Throughout the night an almost incessant and fierce rifle and machine gun fire was maintained. Attacks were delivered by the Turks at several points along the disjointed line; but all their efforts were successfully resisted, and the break of dawn on April 26th found the line unbroken. By 6 a.m. two guns of the New Zealand Howitzer Battery had been brought ashore. The country in which the landing force found itself was most unsuitable for any artillery, save howitzers; and even when the guns were landed it was only by man-handling them up seemingly inaccessible heights that they could be got into position.</p>
            <p>The enemy's guns opened the day with fire of destructive accuracy along the Plateau and the landing places, and our mountain batteries, the howitzers, and the guns of the Fleet at once took up the challenge. At 9 a.m. orders were issued
							<pb xml:id="n40"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP002a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP002a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP002a-g"/><head><hi rend="i">Otago Officers on the "Annaberg" waiting their turn to land, April 25th.</hi></head></figure>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP002b"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP002b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP002b-g"/><head><hi rend="i">Boats on Anzac Beach</hi>—<hi rend="i">April 25th.</hi></head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n41"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP003a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP003a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP003a-g"/><head><hi rend="i">Razorback leading from Plugge's Plateau to Walker's Ridge; Sphinx on left.</hi></head></figure>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP003b"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP003b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP003b-g"/><head><hi rend="i">Walker's Ridge, Sphinx, and Russell's Top.</hi></head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n42"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP004a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP004a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP004a-g"/><head><hi rend="i">Turkish Prisoners at Anzac.</hi></head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n43"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP005a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP005a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP005a-g"/></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n44" n="25"/>
							for a reorganisation of units and for effecting, as far as possible, an equitable division of the line held. As part of the various dispositions which this order affected, 10th Company of the Otago Battalion, under Major G. Mitchell, was despatched to reinforce the line held by troops of the 3rd Australian Brigade at a point known as Steel's Post, and remained there for two days. There was continuous and bitter fighting over that period, and the losses were heavy; among those killed being Lieut. J. G. Cowan. It was for his splendid work during those two days that Sergt.-major A. W. Porteous was awarded the Military Cross, the first to be won by a warrant officer of the Division.</p>
            <p>At midday the remaining guns of the Howitzer Battery were landed and brought into action. The general situation still demanded ceaseless exertion in order to maintain the precarious hold gained on the Peninsula. The Turks adopted various ruses in an endeavour to bring about confusion and retirement of units, calling out that the English troops were advancing and not to fire, also blowing familiar bugle calls; but all these efforts at deception had little or only momentary effect. The strenuous hours of the day were succeeded by a night that was passably quiet along the line of the Plateau; though on the right the Australians were subjected to a determined attack, which was beaten off.</p>
            <p>The efforts made to effect a reorganisation of units had so far been attended with but small success, and the persistent attacks, repeated by the Turks during the 27th, still prevented any advance being made in this direction. Orders were now issued allotting to the New Zealand Infantry Brigade the left section of the line extending from the sea to where the left of Colonel Monash's section ended at the head of <name key="name-123575" type="place">Shrapnel Valley</name>. Otago Battalion was to move up the nullah north of the Plateau, thus prolonging the Australian line to the left until a junction was formed with the right of Canterbury Battalion. This was effected during the afternoon and evening of the 27th, the Battalion, with 4th Company acting as a screen, moving up <name key="name-123575" type="place">Monash Gully</name>, and taking up its position in defence of Plugge's Plateau.</p>
            <p>The enemy's attacks, supported by artillery fire, had been renewed at daybreak on the 27th, and the ridges sloping north-west and south-west to the beach were consistently<pb xml:id="n45" n="26"/> shelled, By 9 a.m. an attack had developed strongly against the left, at <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>, and centre, but was beaten back with loss to the enemy. A desultory fire was maintained throughout the night of the 27th, and frequently the enemy worked up close to our line, but on each occasion was repulsed by rapid rifle fire,—even if the anxieties of the night and the newness of the troops at times led to the expenditure of a great deal more ammunition than was necessary.</p>
            <p>Meantime, in rear of the front line and along the stretch of beach, out of chaos was developing a certain orderliness. The establishment of a field dressing station for the reception of wounded, the accummulation of stores and supplies, the construction of communication trenches to counter the danger of ground exposed to fire, the building of dug-outs and shelters along the slopes of the ridges, and the making of roads and tracks, were works that, once commenced, were constantly extended and improved. The fact of the landing having been made at a point more than a mile north of where it was intended, was more a fortunate circumstance than a mistake. Further south there would have been greater space for movement and manœuvre, but more opposition from the Turks by reason of their preparedness, and less shelter from their guns and howitzers, hidden as they were in the high and broken country and secure from our naval guns with their flatter trajectory. But at the point where the landing took place, difficult and broken though the country was inland, the bills, which sloped down almost to the water's edge, afforded a natural shelter for the base of operations, which was an incalculable advantage under the terrific conditions existing.</p>
            <p>The following Special Order was issued by <name type="person" key="name-130045">Sir Ian Hamilton</name> on April 28th: "I rely on all officers to stand firm and steadfast, and to resist the attempts of the enemy to drive us back from our present position which has been so gallantly won. The enemy is evidently trying to obtain a local success before reinforcements can reach us.... It behoves us all, French and British, to stand fast, hold what we have gained, near down the enemy, and thus prepare for a decisive victory. Our comrades in Flanders have had the same experience of fatigue after hard won fights. We shall, I know, emulate their steadfastness, and achieve a result which will confer added laurels to French and British Arms."</p>
            <pb xml:id="n46" n="27"/>
            <p>Throughout the days of the 28th and 29th the advanced he was frequently engaged, elements of the Turks alternately advancing and retreating; their determination regulated by the fire of the howitzers and the guns of the Fleet. The frequency of these attacks, in which much ammunition was expended, and the fact that they were not pushed through, conveyed the impression that the Turks had now withdrawn a part of the forces, both infantry and artillery, which previously engaged the front, and had sent them to reinforce the troops who were opposing the 29th and French Divisions at the southern extremity of the Peninsula. Nevertheless, a general advance was not feasible because of the limited number of troops available and the non-existence of roads and other vital considerations. To attempt the occupation of a large area of country at this stage of the campaign was out of the question, because of our numerical inability to hold it.</p>
            <p>The morning of April 30th was the quietest so far experienced, and the day was spent in relieving detachments from the Line and sending them to the beach for a rest and bathing—both urgently needed. The exertions of the past several days, the lack of sleep, the constant digging and fighting, and the ceaseless watchfulness required, added to which was the serious depletion of ranks from casualties, had made inroads on mind and body that must be repaired if the ground won was to be maintained, The strength of the Otago Battalion, as disembarked, was 25 officers and 912 other ranks, and a summary of casualties sustained up to midnight on April 29th indicated the losses, exclusive of missing, as 18 killed and 60 wounded.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n47" n="28"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d4" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> IV.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d4-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">An Advance Attempted.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">At</hi> the close of April plans had been prepared for carrying out an operation having for its object the advance of the general he between Quinn's Post and <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>, thereby effecting a much desired improvement in the continuity of our line over this area. The two salient points which it was desired to embrace by means of this operation were, on the right a ridge between Quinn's Post and Pope's Hill—subsequently known as <name key="name-123506" type="place">Dead Man's Ridge</name>—not occupied by the enemy, hut the possession of which it was important should be denied to him, and which dominated a considerable area of ground extending down <name key="name-123575" type="place">Monash Gully</name>; and on the left front a prominence known as Knoll 700, the enemy's occupation of which seriously embarrassed movement between Pope's and <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>. The capture of these two points would have the effect of greatly strengthening and consolidating our line. It was originally intended that the assault which the seizure of these positions involved should be launched on the evening of May 1st; but this decision was interfered with by an attack, determinedly made but repulsed, against the left of the 4th Australian Brigade earlier in the evening.</p>
            <p>Orders, slightly amended, were now issued for the operation to be carried out on the following day, commencing at 7.15 p.m., and preceded by a bombardment by naval and field guns and howitzers. The troops detailed for the operation consisted of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade and the 4th <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry Brigade</name>, and one battalion of the Royal Naval Division, one brigade of which had landed as reinforcements on the evening of April 28th. As no move was to be made by the Australian Division, the right of the 4th Australian Brigade was to stand fast in order to maintain<pb xml:id="n48" n="29"/> connection. The New Zealand Brigade was to advance with its right directed on Knoll 700; while the left battalion of the 4th Australian Brigade was to advance from the northeast and make good a line connecting Knoll 700 with the left flank of Quinn's Post. The battalion of the Royal Naval Division was to form a general reserve. In the further division of tasks Otago Battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Moore, was detailed to seize the line of the Knoll to a point 400 yards north-north-west; while Canterbury Battalion, pushing forward from <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>, was to prolong the line of Otago Battalion to the left.</p>
            <p>At 7 p.m. the bombardment of the Turkish trenches on the Ridge and to the north commenced as arranged, and at 7.15 p.m. lifted on to the enemy's rear slopes and supports. At the appointed time, 7.15 p.m., the 16th Battalion of the 4th Australian Brigade advanced north-east up to the head of the valley, and by 7.45 p.m. had secured a footing on the ridge, although suffering heavy casualties from the enfilade fire of Turkish machine guns. They then commenced to dig in, and were followed by the right of the 13th Battalion of the same Brigade, which gained the high ground to the left and prolonged the line still further to the left towards the Knoll. Unfortunately the Otago Battalion did not arrive at the junction of the valleys at the foot of Pope's until 7.45 p.m., and the first company, which was 4th (Otago), did not clear Pope's, from which point the attack was to be delivered, until 8.20 p.m. The great advantages of simultaneous attack were thus entirely lost.</p>
            <p>Otago Battalion, in order to reach its position of assembly, had left <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name> shortly after 4.30 p.m., proceeding along the beach and up <name key="name-123575" type="place">Monash Gully</name>, but was subjected to delays which even the time allowed did not meet. The failure to arrive at the appointed time was attributed to three causes, namely, the activity of enemy sharpshooters in the trenches at the head of <name key="name-123575" type="place">Monash Gully</name> commanding certain points of the approach; congestion due to stretcher parties moving down the valley towards the beach; and, principally, the half battalion of the Naval Brigade in Monash Gully not having cleared the road sufficiently. Thus the two attacks, which should have been delivered simultaneously in order to benefit to the fullest extent by the preliminary<pb xml:id="n49" n="30"/> bombardment, took place at an interval of about one and a-half hours.</p>
            <p>There were other circumstances which militated against success. It was a night operation; there was the final rush and hurry in the endeavour to recover some of the time lost during the approach march; and the country was exceedingly steep and difficult, there being occasions moving up to assembly positions when the machine guns had to be hauled up steep faces by means of ropes. In face of all these adverse conditions, the Battalion nevertheless advanced to the attack immediately it arrived at its starting point, which was a few yards in advance of the Pope's Hill trenches.</p>
            <p>The advance was to be directed towards the enemy position generally known as Baby 700; but with the exception of 4th Company, which was leading in the attack, the direction followed by the assaulting troops ultimately proved to be too far to the right. The advance of 4th Company continued almost unchecked for a distance of from 200 to 300 yards. The first of the enemy trench systems which defended Baby 700 was reached; but the Turks, who previously had withheld their fire, now swept the ranks of the attacking force with deadly effect. Against this sudden burst of machine gun and rifle fire, which, owing to the fact that the Turkish position was sited on a curve, was delivered in enfilade as well as from front, the attack was abruptly smashed. It was at this stage that Major R. Price, commanding 4th Company, Captain A. V. Spedding, and Lieut. R. E. Egglestone were killed. A few of the attackers actually reached the parapet of the foremost Turkish trench. <name type="person" key="name-209176">Lieut. J. L. Saunders</name>, the only remaining officer of the Company, took command, but could muster only five men. No support was forthcoming; but this mere handful resolutely maintained their position for some hours, until, all being wounded, they were compelled to withdraw. In this phase of the attack 4th Company suffered exceedingly heavy losses; only 45 out of an initial strength of over 200 responding to the roll call.</p>
            <p>Advancing towards <name key="name-123506" type="place">Dead Man's Ridge</name> away to the right, 8th (Southland) Company, commanded by Captain W. Fleming, encountered machine gun fire of such a destructive nature that the momentum of its attack was checked almost<pb xml:id="n50" n="31"/> from the outset. After advancing for a distance of about 200 yards those of the Company who were left reached a point where the nature of the ground afforded temporary shelter from the enemy fire, and after slight reorganisation had been effected the advance was continued. On gaining the high ground again the same destructive fire was encountered, and it was therefore decided to dig in along a line which was only about 30 yards from the enemy's position. The remaining strength of this attacking force now represented about 40 all told. Finally established in two short trenches, they set up an isolated defence which was remarkable for the stubbornness and determination displayed against overwhelming advantage of numbers and position. Swept by fire from the Turkish trenches, assailed by showers of bombs, confronted by the constant threat of being overwhelmed, cut off from all support, and from supplies of food, water and ammunition, and given up as lost, they grimly retained their hold on this advanced position for a period of three days. During the second night the enemy had constructed a new trench at the head of <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>, and from this point the garrison was harassed in enfilade. Every effort of the enemy to storm the position was valiantly beaten off. On the morning of the 4th Lieut. L. Richards was killed. The strength of the garrison was being gradually reduced. On the days of the 3rd and 4th runners were sent back to apprise the Commanding Officer of the situation; but no orders reached the party in return.</p>
            <p>It now became evident that it was impracticable to continue to hold the position indefinitely owing to its complete isolation and the impossibility of obtaining support or supplies, and the two senior officers, Major Moir, who as Second-in-Command had led forward the right half of the Battalion in the first stage of the operation, and Captain Fleming, agreed that the only course open to them was to withdraw under cover of darkness. It was subsequent to coming to this decision, on the evening of the 4th, that Captain Fleming was wounded and succeeded in making his way out escorted by two slightly wounded men. The withdrawal was commenced during the night, and at 1 a.m. on the 5th a part of the garrison reached the beach and there rejoined the remainder of the Battalion. By<pb xml:id="n51" n="32"/> some unfortunate circumstance a section of the garrison which occupied the foremost trench, under Sergt. E. F. Selby, who commanded a platoon of 8th Company from the outset of the operation, did not become aware of the intention to withdraw, and experienced very considerable difficulty in getting back, being compelled to move over towards <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name> and then down the gully owing to the fact that they were being shot at by our men in the belief that they were the enemy.</p>
            <p>Apart from the two remarkable isolated achievements recorded above, the general attack failed to reach its objective, and the losses sustained were exceedingly heavy. In view of this fact support from Canterbury Battalion was despatched, and two officers were instructed to get into touch with Lieut.-Colonel Moore and inform him that reinforcements had been sent to his assistance. With the exception of one company, however, this assistance did not materialise within a reasonable time; and the Commanding Officer's intention of delivering another assault on the Turkish positions had to be abandoned, the Battalion, with the exception of the advanced elements previously referred to, withdrawing to the beach under orders; a resumption of the attack being now considered impracticable.</p>
            <p>The Divisional estimate of casualties sustained in this action was approximately 800 all ranks. Otago suffered badly, losing practically half its strength in both officers and men. In addition to those already mentioned, the list of officers who fell in this operation included <name type="person" key="name-130081">Lieut. J. S. Reid</name>, and 2nd-Lieut. D. J. A. Lyttle. The net results in respect of ground permanently gained were <hi rend="i">nil</hi>. The Otago Battalion was now placed in general reserve on the beach.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n52"/>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP006a">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP006a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP006a-g"/>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="i">View showing Pope's Hill on left, Deadman's Ridge in centre, and corner of Quinn's Post on extreme right.</hi>
                </head>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP006b">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP006b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP006b-g"/>
                <head><hi rend="sc">Sergt.-Major</hi><name type="person" key="name-130156">A. W. <hi rend="sc">Porteous</hi></name>, M.C., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.)<lb/>(<hi rend="i">Killed in Action</hi>).</head>
              </figure>
            </p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n53" n="33"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d5" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> V.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d5-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Regiment at Helles.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">On</hi> the evening of May 4th, two days after the launching of the operation which aimed at an extension of the line between Pope's Hill and <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>, orders were issued for the withdrawal by the New Zealand and Australian Division and the Australian Division of one brigade each for temporary transfer to Cape Helles, where a fresh advance had been determined upon.</p>
            <p>The forced landings on April 25th by the 29th Division at the extremity of the Peninsula, signalised by deeds of splendid heroism and accompanied by fighting of the bloodiest order, were followed by the launching of a general advance on April 27th, in co-operation with the French. Corps, now withdrawn from Kum Kale. On the 28th, in the determination to make all possible headway before fresh enemy reinforcements arrived, a further general advance was commenced on Krithia, beyond which was the dominating feature known as Achi Baba.</p>
            <p>The utmost limits of the advance fell short of Krithia, and owing to the inadequacies of artillery support, the limitations of supply, and the inability of the exhausted and depleted forces to withstand successive determined counter attacks, much of the ground gained had actually to be given up. A momentary lull followed, interrupted by heavy fighting, which broke out on the night of May 1st and continued until midday on the 2nd.</p>
            <p>The result of all this fighting, begun with such sanguinary desperation on April 25th, and carried on with very little interruption for ten days and nights, was the holding of a line approximately 5,000 yards inland from the extremities of the Peninsula. The Turkish forces were now thrown back to a Line previously selected and prepared, and of great<pb xml:id="n54" n="34"/> tactical strength; it was to secure possession of an intervening stretch of ground and test the resistance of this new line of entrenchments and redoubts that operations were now planned.</p>
            <p>For this offensive, launched on the morning of May 6th, selection was made of one brigade each of the New Zealand and Australian Division and the Australian Division. The New Zealand Brigade was relieved in the line on May 5th by two battalions of the Royal Naval Division, and on completion of relief in the early afternoon concentrated in its position of assembly south of <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name> in readiness for embarkation and the journey by sea to Helles. At 8.30 p.m. embarkation commenced, the effective strength of the New Zealand Brigade being set down at 88 officers and 2,724 other ranks. The main embarkation was somewhat delayed, but was accomplished during the night, and early on the following morning the destroyers conveying the Brigade arrived off shore immediately east of Cape Helles. There the troops disembarked and marched to their point of bivouac, and by 9 a.m. were concentrated in the Brigade area near Sedd-el-Bahr.</p>
            <p>At the point of disembarkation there was evidence of the grim struggle which marked the landing at "V" Beach. Aground was the steamer <hi rend="i">River Clyde</hi>, from the specially adapted sides of which the landing troops had poured in face of a hurricane of fire; on the steep bluff to the right the battered and crumbling fort of Sedd-el-Bahr; ahead the defensive trenches and wire entanglements. Leaving this evidence of a conflict never to be forgotten because of the heroism and the tragedy associated with it, attention was attracted to the open country, well-watered and clothed with verdure, affording a striking contrast to the steep, scrub-covered terrain and limitations of space at Gaba Tepe.</p>
            <p>The Regiment, as part of the New Zealand Brigade, was now included in a Composite Division under Major-General Paris. During the day of May 6th, when the attack was opened, the New Zealand Brigade was held in general reserve. The 29th Division, the left of which rested on the coast about three miles north-east of Cape Tekke, had led off the attack, its right moving in line with the south-eastern side of Krithia; while the French Corps, with the 2nd Naval<pb xml:id="n55" n="35"/> Brigade, attacked as its first point the commanding ridge running north and south above the Kereves Dere. By 1.30 p.m. the line had been advanced for a distance of from 200 to 300 yards. The main enemy position was still out of reach. The attack was renewed on the following morning. On the extreme left it was again found impossible to cross the open ground owing to the cross-fire of machine guns concealed in the scrub on the ridge between the ravine and the sea; at other points the advance was also checked. A further attack was now ordered for 4.45 p.m., the whole of the 87th Brigade to reinforce the 88th Brigade, and the New Zealand Brigade to be in support. Excepting the left, the line was thrown forward for a distance of from 200 to 300 yards, and the exhausted troops dug in for the night on the ground gained.</p>
            <p>Once again, on the morning of May 8th, the advance was to be taken up along the whole line. On this occasion the New Zealand Infantry Brigade was to advance through the line held overnight by the 88th Brigade and press on towards Krithia; simultaneously the 87th Brigade was to threaten the enemy works on the west of the Ravine. With the commencement of the attack, timed for 10.30 a.m., and preceded by a bombardment from ships and land batteries, the order of Battalions from right to left was, Canterbury, Auckland, and Wellington, with Otago in reserve on account of its numerical weakness after the attack of May 2nd.</p>
            <p>On the late afternoon of the 7th the New Zealand Brigade commenced its approach march. Following a course approximating to the western coast-line of the Peninsula, the three Battalions which were to take part in the attack reached their assembly positions under cover of darkness, and were then established along a line about 400 yards in rear of the front line as it then existed. In the meantime Otago Battalion, to be in reserve to the attack, had advanced from its area of bivouac near the Stone Bridge on the Krithia Road, and taking the same course as the remainder of the Brigade, covered a distance of about two miles and there dug in for the night. Just before dawn on the 8th the advance was resumed, the Battalion finally reaching some old trenches in the locality of Pink Farm. The Initial stages of the approach had been made in artillery formation; but later enemy fire compelled the Battalion to move in extended order.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n56" n="36"/>
            <p>About 10 a.m. the New Zealand Brigade, less Otago Battalion, advanced under heavy machine gun fire to the existing front line. At 10.30 a.m. the attack was launched. The assaulting infantry almost instantly encountered a blast of machine gun fire equal in its destructive power to that which had stemmed the tide of advance on the previous day. By 1.30 p.m. the attack had been definitely checked, and the losses sustained were exceedingly heavy. Canterbury Battalion, on the right, had advanced about 200 yards beyond the foremost trenches gained by the 88th Brigade; two companies of Auckland Battalion had reached about an equal distance in the centre, but the right company had been compelled to fall back again owing to machine gun fire making a point known as Fir Tree Knoll untenable; while on the left flank Wellington Battalion had encountered heavy and destructive fire from a Turkish trench from which machine guns dominated the entire area of advance. The Brigade was therefore compelled to dig in on the ground gained. Away to the right of the attack the French found it impossible to advance up the crest of the spur west of the Kereves Dere until the line on the left had been pushed further ahead.</p>
            <p>The Commander of the Composite Division now ordered a resumption of the advance by the whole of the New Zealand Brigade; to commence at 5.30 p.m., and to be covered by an artillery bombardment. This was subsequently cancelled and orders issued for a general advance along the whole line. The 29th Division was to attack in a north-easterly direction, with the Composite Division attacking in a parallel position on the right. The objective assigned to the New Zealand Brigade embraced the village of Krithia and the adjoining trenches; the Brigade to attack in a north-easterly direction with its left flank resting on the ravine leading to Hill 472 inclusive, and its right flank on a stream flowing south-west from Krithia. The Australian Brigade was to attack in a north-easterly direction to the right of the New Zealand Brigade. The 88th Brigade was to support the attack of the New Zealand Brigade.</p>
            <p>At 5.30 p.m. the infantry moved forward to the assault. A full measure of success was again denied the attacking troops. The furthest limits of the advance did not extend<pb xml:id="n57" n="37"/> beyond a few hundred yards, and some of the ground gained could not be held owing to the exhausted state of the troops and the losses sustained, It was during this second gallant effort that the Auckland Battalion made its memorable charge over a level stretch of ground, 200 yards across, immediately to the left of Fir Tree Knoll. It was across this open space, to be remembered as the "Daisy Patch," that four successive waves of Auckland Infantry advanced, each to be literally swept away by the concentrated fire of Turkish machine guns concealed in the dense scrub to the left. The last gallant effort of the day of the 8th had now expended itself. The material gains were small; the expenditure in human lives woefully heavy. Many of the wounded lay out over the battlefield during the night owing to the extreme difficulties of evacuation.</p>
            <p>It was in support of this last effort of the day that Otago Battalion was called upon. In the early afternoon 4th and 8th Companies had moved forward in support of Auckland Battalion, and an hour later 10th and 14th Companies moved up, but more to the left towards Wellington Battalion, each exposed to enemy fire as it hurriedly crossed the short stretches of level fields, to be remembered as "Daisy Patches"; but not such bloody patches as that crossed by Auckland Battalion.</p>
            <p>There were serious gaps in the line held that night, the result of severe casualties, inevitable disorganisation and loss of direction in the darkness in the effort to effect a readjustment. During the afternoon the New Zealand Brigade was ordered to take over the line right of the Krithia Nullah; the 88th Brigade to be prepared to give immediate support. Otago Battalion was to connect between the troops of Wellington and Canterbury Regiments; but when the relief was commenced by night the Essex and Royal Scottish troops did not consider it prudent to withdraw owing to the numerical weakness of Otago Battalion. On the following morning (the 10th) New Zealand Brigade Headquarters reported to the 29th Division that owing to the casualties of the Brigade and the fact that the flanks were much further forward than the centre it would be difficult to take up the whole line without retaining some of the 88th Brigade. A reply was received that<pb xml:id="n58" n="38"/> G.H.Q. would arrange the whole matter. On the 11th the New Zealand Brigade was ordered to hand over the section to the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, which had landed on the Peninsula two days previously. The relief commenced shortly after 8 p.m., and command of the section passed between two and three o'clock on the morning of the 12th; Otago Battalion being relieved by the 8th Manchesters. The Regiment now returned to the area of its former bivouac near the Stone Bridge on the Krithia Road.</p>
            <p>The New Zealand Brigade's participation in these operations had resulted in casualties which were set down as totalling 800; Otago Battalion's proportion of this number being 102 all ranks. It was in the shallow trenches finally taken over by the Battalion that Lieut. R. Duthie was mortally wounded.</p>
            <p>On the morning of the 8th a Reinforcement draft for the New Zealand Brigade, numbering about 900 all ranks, under the command of Captain D. Colquhoun, arrived at Cape Helles, and although joining the Brigade subsequent to the attack, was for the most part held in reserve.</p>
            <p>The Regiment now remained at the Stone Bridge for several days, providing working parties, constructing roads, and unloading ammunition and stores. On the afternoon of May 19th advice was received that Anzac was being attacked and that the New Zealand Brigade was to return there with all possible despatch. This was the first occasion, so far at least as the Regiment was concerned, that the term "Anzac" was employed to indicate the front held by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and the officers among whom the movement order was circulated were for a time puzzled to know where "Anzac" really was. Thus hurriedly recalled, the Regiment embarked over the <hi rend="i">River Clyde</hi> on board the <hi rend="i">Eddystone</hi>, and before midnight had moved out to sea. On the following morning the Regiment was back in its old area of Anzac. Here it was ordered into general reserve along with the New Zealand Brigade and bivouacked in <name key="name-123563" type="place">Reserve Gully</name>.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d5-d2" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Back to Anzac.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>During the absence of the Battalion at Cape Helles several events of interest had occurred at Anzac. The New<pb xml:id="n59" n="39"/> Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade under Brigadier-General Russell, and the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade had arrived from Egypt. On May 13th Brigadier-General Russell assumed command of the No. 4 section of defences, and the N.Z.M.R. Brigade took over and occupied <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>. On May 18th enemy mounted troops and guns were observed moving north and east of Krithia in a westerly direction towards the coast, and a warning was issued that this might mean that a hostile attack was contemplated against the Anzac line. At 4 a.m. on May 19th hostile gun fire broke out, and a report was received that the Turks were massing against the left of the 1st Australian Division. The attack quickly developed, and before long practically the whole line had become seriously involved. A succession of assaults, delivered with great weight and persistence, were beaten off with heavy loss to the enemy. In some instances the attacking waves had been simply mown down by accurate machine gun fire. By the afternoon this apparently great effort on the part of the Turks had expended itself, and the Anzac line had held firm. On the following morning Otago Battalion, along with other units of the New Zealand Brigade, on being hurriedly recalled from Helles, had returned to Anzac.</p>
            <p>About 6 o'clock on the evening of the 20th it was reported that Turks in large numbers were moving along the sunken road in the valley east of Johnstone's Jolly. At the same time white flags appeared at many points in the enemy lines. This was at first suspected as a ruse and preparations were made accordingly; but by means of white flags and the Red Crescent the Turks secured a cessation of fire. Their firing he stood up in the trenches, and in some instances came forward with the flag parties as they advanced. Meantime an interrogator had gone out to meet the enemy, and the answer received was that they wished to bury their dead and remove their wounded. They were peremptorily informed that a flag of truce should he sent on the following morning along the beach from Gaba Tepe.</p>
            <p>The enemy party appeared on the following morning as agreed upon, and was met by a patrol and conducted through the lines to Army Corps Headquarters. The outcome of these pourparlers was the arrangement of an armistice or cessation of hostilities between the hours of 7.30 a.m. and<pb xml:id="n60" n="40"/> 4.30 p.m. on May 24th for the purpose of burying the dead and removing the wounded between the opposing trenches. At the appointed time firing ceased all along the line, and the delimitation parties from either side, having met on the beach at a point two kilometres north of Gaba Tepe, proceeded to move down the centre of No Man's Land and mark out with improvised white flags the line of demarcation. This completed, the burial of dead, the removal of wounded, and the clearing of the area of the wreckage of battle was commenced by the fatigue parties from either side. The task was a heavy one, for the Turkish dead in some places lay almost in heaps it was estimated that 3,000 Turkish dead were scattered over the area—and it was soon found that it would be impossible to carry out the original intention of each side burying its own dead. Otherwise the terms of the agreement were adhered to; although there were mutual recriminations as to the amount of curiosity being displayed regarding the opposing trenches both by the Turks and ourselves. By 4 p.m. everyone was under cover again, and the resumption of firing shortly after 4.30 p.m. signalled the close of this remarkable armistice.</p>
            <p>On May 21st the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade arrived and bivouacked in the gully south of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and was followed by one squadron of the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, which was despatched to <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>.</p>
            <p>May 25th, the day following the armistice, was no less memorable because of the sinking of H.M.S. <hi rend="i">Triumph</hi> by an enemy submarine, when lying off-shore about a mile from Gaba Tepe. The vessel heeled over shortly after being struck, and sank within a few minutes, a tragic sight for all those who watched her from Anzac.</p>
            <p>Quinn's Post, situated on the outer circumference of the semi-circle which represented the Anzac line, and at the furthest point from its diameter, now became the centre of bitter and prolonged fighting, On the retention of Quinn's Post depended not only the stability of the general line, but the security of the communications in rear, in <name key="name-123575" type="place">Monash Gully</name> and <name key="name-123575" type="place">Shrapnel Valley</name>. Recent developments had suggested that the enemy intended to make a determined effort to gain a strong foothold at the head of <name key="name-123575" type="place">Monash Gully</name>.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n61"/>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP007a">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP007a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP007a-g"/>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="i">Entrance to Trenches, Courtney' s Post.</hi>
                </head>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP007b">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP007b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP007b-g"/>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="i">At Quinn's Post.</hi>
                </head>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <pb xml:id="n62"/>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP008a">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP008a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP008a-g"/>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="i">Troops Landing on Improvised Pier, Anzac Beach.</hi>
                </head>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <pb xml:id="n63" n="41"/>
            <p>In view of the pronounced salient which the Anzac position formed, the loss of any post was calculated to imperil the retention of the whole line; and further, the ground in the vicinity of posts was generally so restricted and difficult that direct and effective assistance to any post could rarely be given; while difficulty was invariably experienced in making full use of all men at the disposal of post commanders owing to the narrowness and intricacy of the communication trenches. Thus handicapped and restricted from the outset, the situation was made more complex by the fact that before very long the retention of a vulnerable point was not to be determined alone by what took place above ground. In other words, fighting was being carried on under ground as well as above it by a process of burrowing and cross-burrowing, and then listening for indications of the enemy's presence and endeavouring to counter his activities in the same work. These operations were always hazardous, and frequently there was necessity for blowing in galleries in order to counter the development of enemy mining. The explosion of an enemy mine at Quinn's Post on the early morning of May 29th was followed by heavy bombing attacks. The left of the post was isolated by the explosion and No. 3 subsection of the defences rushed and seized by the enemy. An hour and a-half later the lost trench was retaken, but the enemy, now reinforced, again attacked in a determined manner, and in answer to the demand for reinforcements, 4th Company of Otago Battalion was despatched to the locality, and remained there for 36 hours ready for emergencies.</p>
            <p>It was at this stage that orders were issued which resulted in the New Zealand Brigade taking over the line held by the 4th Australian Brigade in the No. 3 section of defences. This was in accordance with a general scheme of relief which was to be effected gradually, and was commenced on the closing day of May. On completion of the relief Courtney's Post was occupied by Auckland Battalion, with Otago Battalion in reserve; Quinn's Post being held by Canterbury Battalion. Interchange of battalions was to be effected every eight days. During one of these periods of occupation of Courtney's a new trench in advance of the foremost line was constructed by Otago and Auckland Battalions in conjunction. Three<pb xml:id="n64" n="42"/> saps were driven forward for a distance of 30 yards and an underground trench constructed; the remaining few inches of overhead crust being broken through when the task was completed, and the new line then occupied. In the process of digging operations, the body of a dead Turk was met with, and it was decided that those who were brought in contact with such an unpleasant object should receive a fortifying issue of rum. A continuance of this stimulant the parties engaged were successful in securing by producing nightly, as evidence, a piece of the same dead Turk.</p>
            <p>On June 9th reinforcements, the 4th, were received to the number of four officers and 239 other ranks. Owing to the reduced strength of the Regiment these were urgently required. There was a daily toll of casualties, even under what might be regarded, in a comparative sense only, as normal conditions. On the morning of June 5th Captain V. J. Egglestone, Battalion Quartermaster, who had rejoined the Regiment when it was at Helles, was killed while drawing rations at the Brigade Dump. Lieut. A. C. Boyes succeeded to the post of Quartermaster.</p>
            <p>Relief of the garrisons of the Posts within No. 3 Section was now effected. In the holding of Courtney's two companies of Otago Battalion were disposed along the crest line, with two companies in immediate support in the terraced bivouacs below. The garrison of the forward line was periodically violently harassed by the enemy, and on these occasions numerous casualties were suffered and the defences badly breached. There was, however, some compensation when a gun of the 26th <name key="name-123639" type="organisation">Indian Mountain Battery</name> firing from Courtney's, engaged two enemy guns on Mortar Ridge and silenced them, for a time at least, after an exciting duel.</p>
            <p>On June 28th a fire demonstration was carried out along the Corps front with the object of preventing, as far as possible, any move of enemy troops from the Anzac zone to the southern or Cape Helles zone, where the 8th Corps was launching an attack with the object of advancing the outer left flank of the British line. The close of the month of June was remarkable for a heavy attack which the enemy delivered against the positions facing the Nek in No, 4 Section, occupied by troops of the mounted regiments. Commencing at 1.30 a.m. on June 30th fierce fighting broke out and lasted until<pb xml:id="n65" n="43"/> dawn. According to a prisoner, the attack had been ordered by Enver Pasha himself, with orders to drive the enemy into the sea; but after the most desperate fighting it was sanguinarily repulsed. Otago Battalion had been relieved in the holding of Courtney's on June 26th; on July 8th it again took over these defences. On the morning of June 30th no attack was delivered against the front of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade.</p>
            <p>Serious attention was now being given to the organisation and formation of hand-grenade parties for use offensively against an entrenched enemy; and orders were issued for the establishment of regular company grenadiers; of permanent arrangements for ensuring and regulating the supply of grenades; and for the training of grenadiers in handling and tactical methods. In the course of the bitter struggles which had waged round the more vital points of the line in the past the effectiveness of the enemy's bombing methods and the profusion of his supplies had been only too apparent, and served to emphasise the serious difficulties under which our garrisons laboured in this all too one-sided phase of close conflict. One result of this development of bomb-fighting was the setting up at Anzac of a bomb factory, from which grenades of various types, the commonest being the jam tin variety, were improvised from material at hand. The necessary organisation had also recently been developed for the prosecution of counter-sniping on a much wider scale than hitherto.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d5-d3" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Unparalleled Suffering.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>In no other theatre of war in which our infantry afterwards served did the conditions under which they lived and fought ever approach those which prevailed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. From the moment of landing they had lived in a narrow strip of country with the sea at their backs and surrounded on all other sides by the enemy. At the most it was only a mile in depth; and whether in "rest" or in the line the men were always within rifle shot of the enemy, and nowhere were they free from the harassing attentions of his guns. The landing had been effected in the face of an enemy superior in numbers and gun power, and securely established in positions which in peace-time manoeuvres would have<pb xml:id="n66" n="44"/> been regarded as impossible for infantry attack. Their superb physique, iron endurance, and perfectly trained condition were the prime factors that enabled them not only to distinguish themselves by their prowess in battle, but to withstand the strain of the incessant and heavy fatigues, the constant exposure to heat by day and cold by night, the unchanging monotony of the diet and the lack of water. At the outset they had landed with light packs, but these had been discarded on the beach in order to enable them more easily to scale the hills and spurs which rose abruptly almost from the water's edge. Many were thus left without change of underwear or without greatcoats; and at that season of the year, although the days were agreeably warm, the nights were very cold.</p>
            <p>Over the first few days there had been no organised line, units were inextricably mixed, and it was only in the intervals of fighting and repelling the violent counter-attacks with which the enemy sought to eject them from their precarious tenure on the hill-tops that trenches were dug and units were gradually sorted out and resumed their identity. And all this while parties from the reduced ranks had to be provided for the arduous work of carrying stores, ammunition and water from the beach to the line, and of transporting by some means or other for there were many casualties and few stretchers—the wounded to the dressing stations on the beach. Until the arrival from Malta of the Pioneers, fatigue parties were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the infantry; and so when men were withdrawn from the line it was never in any sense a rest. All the stores had to be carried ashore from the lighters which came in under cover of night, and the water, which was brought overseas, had to be pumped ashore from the great iron barges. The arrival of the Indian Mule Corps made it possible to ease considerably the burden of the carrying parties; but the muleteers could not go everywhere, nor could they cope with it all.</p>
            <p>While they remained in the line the infantry were obliged to work incessantly in order to strengthen their positions and increase such protection as they afforded. Interior communications had to be extended and covered ways provided where necessary. Out of the line they were little better off.<pb xml:id="n67" n="45"/> They were not permitted to enjoy the doubtful comfort of the bivouacs and shelters they dug for themselves on the sides of the gullies where they rested. By day, and more frequently by night, they were called out to carry, to dig, or to labour at one or other of the heavy fatigues. As the season advanced and the weather became warmer, the place swarmed with myriads of flies, which found a congenial breeding ground in the primitive sanitary arrangements provided, particularly in the crowded bivouac areas near the beaches. Dysentery became rife; in a mild form it was almost universal, and its effect on men already fighting and toiling may be imagined. But the hardest tasks of all were yet to come.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n68" n="46"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d6" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> VI.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d6-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">A Great Offensive.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">The</hi> military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula had now reached a stage which called for the development of a plan of operations which it was strongly hoped would definitely determine the final success of the campaign. From the date of the landing, April 25th, up to the close of July, the troops had been engaged in fighting as constant as it was desperate. Against the odds of enemy superiority in numbers and position, hampered in movement by the extreme limitations of space, and contending against the apparently irremediable disabilities of supply arising chiefly from the isolation of the seat of campaign, this force had not only maintained its first grip on the Turkish Peninsula, but had strengthened it in face of the determined opposition of the enemy. But it was becoming more and more evident that it was impossible for the existing force to go beyond the point then reached; and there was the evident danger of the campaign settling down to one of indefinite trench warfare, instead of action and movement leading to decisive and early results. The most recent operations undertaken had only served to show that neither the forces at Anzac nor at Helles were strong enough in themselves to carry out the task to which they were committed in conjunction with the Fleet, namely, the forcing of the Narrows.</p>
            <p>In view of this situation, the Commander-in-Chief had requested as far back as May 10th that two fresh divisions should be despatched to enable him to bring the campaign to a conclusion. Again on May 17th <name type="person" key="name-130045">Sir Ian Hamilton</name> cabled to the authorities pointing out that if they were to be left to face Turkey on their own resources two Army Corps additional to the existing forces at the Dardanelles would be required. One division had been sent to the Peninsula, but<pb xml:id="n69" n="47"/> between its despatch and arrival the situation in Russia was such as to set free several Turkish divisions for employment in the Dardanelles. During June the addition of three regular divisions, plus the infantry of two territorial divisions, was promised, the foremost of these troops being due to arrive at Mudros by July 10th, while their concentration was to be completed a month later.</p>
            <p>The manner of employment of these fresh forces in order to achieve the greatest measure of success in the speediest and most decisive manner, had now to be determined. Four alternative methods presented themselves to <name type="person" key="name-130045">Sir Ian Hamilton</name>, as follows:—</p>
            <list>
              <label>(1).</label>
              <item>Every man to be thrown on to the southern sector of the Peninsula to force a way forward to the Narrows.</item>
              <label>(2).</label>
              <item>Disembarkation on the Asiatic side of the Straits, followed by a march on Chanak.</item>
              <label>(3).</label>
              <item>A landing at Enos or Ebrije for the purpose of seizing the neck of the isthmus at Bulair.</item>
              <label>(4).</label>
              <item>Reinforcement of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, combined with a landing in <name key="name-123667" type="place">Suvla Bay</name>. Then with one strong push to capture Hill 305 and, working from that dominating point, to grip the waist of the Peninsula.</item>
            </list>
            <p>In setting out the objections to the first course, the Commander-in-Chief maintained that the capture of Krithia could no longer be counted upon to secure the dominating height of Achi Baba, an entirely new system of works having lately appeared upon its slopes—works so planned that even if the enemy's western flank was turned and driven back from the coast the central and eastern portions of the mountain could still be maintained as a bastion to Kilid Bahr. The practicability of the second scheme was discounted by the fact that the expected reinforcements could not permit of a double operation, which would be necessary if Chanak were to be seriously enough threatened to cause the Turks to relax their grip upon the Peninsula. The third proposal, which would mean an attempt to cut the land communications of the<pb xml:id="n70" n="48"/> whole of the Turkish Army, presented naval objections which were considered well-nigh insurmountable. The elimination of the first three of the four schemes above outlined left the fourth, namely, an offensive from Anzac, combined with a landing at <name key="name-123667" type="place">Suvla Bay</name>, as the most practicable; and it was this scheme which the Commander-in-Chief selected.</p>
            <p>"The Australians and the New Zealanders," <name type="person" key="name-130045">Sir Ian Hamilton</name> pointed out in the course of his Despatch, "had rooted themselves in very near to the vitals of the enemy. By their tenacity and courage they still held open the door-way from which one strong thrust forward might give us command of the Narrows."</p>
            <p>Once committed to this great undertaking, which it was hoped would decisively seal the success of the Gallipoli Campaign, all energies were directed to the one end. The most vital preparations within the Anzac area involved the construction in the gullies of terraced bivouacs to give cover from both view and fire to a great assembly of new troops; the construction and improvement of interior communications to ensure the rapid and easy movement of troops within the area; and the provision of covered positions where artillery could be concealed from the observation of enemy aeroplanes—unusually active at this period. All these preparations had to be carried out by the troops on the spot; and for the most part work had necessarily to be undertaken by night.</p>
            <p>Thus was completed the Beach Road, such as it was, from Anzac Cove to No. 3 Post, a road connecting Rest Gully with Reserve Gully, and the widening of what was known as the Big Sap, which provided communication from the northern spit of Anzac Cove to No. 3 Post on the extreme left. In addition to these works there were the thousand and one details of reorganisation and arrangement necessary for the transport and concentration of the new forces destined for the offensive and for the landing and handling of guns and vast supplies of stores, ammunition, water and material; altogether a tremendous undertaking. Throughout the whole of the work there was no complaining, no slackening of effort; all were inspired with the thought that the impending effort would prove to be the crowning reward of their labours and their sacrifices. How near to realisation their hopes came and how far they failed, has yet to be told.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n71"/>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP009a">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP009a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP009a-g"/>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="i">Anzac Cove, before the August Offensive.</hi>
                </head>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <pb xml:id="n72"/>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP010a">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP010a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP010a-g"/>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="i">Looking up Sazli Beit Dere; <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> on right.</hi>
                </head>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP010b">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP010b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP010b-g"/>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="i">Pope's Reserve Gully.</hi>
                </head>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <pb xml:id="n73" n="49"/>
            <p>On the night of August 5th-6th the New Zealand Infantry Brigade concentrated in Happy Valley, immediately to the north of <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name>, preparatory to the offensive.</p>
            <p>The opening day of the great attack to be launched at Anzac was fixed for August 6th. Here, where the real issue was to be fought out by troops of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, the ultimate object and essence of the battle was to gain and occupy a line along the summit of the main Sari Bair Ridge, the capture of which must have meant opening the door to Maidos and the Narrows. The Sari Bair system represented one of the main geographical features of the southern part of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Running parallel to the sea, its lofty crest line looked down over practically the whole of the Anzac positions; but its great strength lay more in the extraordinary diversity of the country which represented its under features than in its own actual height. From the main mass of <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> a series of spurs or ridges extended down to the sea, not in any uniformity or regularity of direction, but irregularly and brokenly, and in places terminating abruptly in steep faces or cliffs; while separating the whole of these spurs were deep ravines or gullies, even more confusing in the diversity of their direction and the precipitate steepness of their sides. The enemy's hold on the main Sari Bair Ridge, a position of great natural strength in itself, was thus doubly fortified by this difficult and broken country which barred the way to the heights.</p>
            <p>For this special reason direct assault was out of the question. Leading up to Chunuk Bair, one of the main features of the <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> system, were two valleys known as Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere; while leading up to Koja Chemen Tepe, the highest point of all, was a third ravine called Aghyl Dere. It was the passage which these ravines provided that was to be utilised in order to deliver the assaults on the main ridge. But before these important assaults could be delivered the ravines themselves had to be secured. Thus the extraordinary complexity of the terrain called for the planning of a series of subsidiary operations which, if successful, were to culminate in the final combined assault which aimed at securing possession of the dominating heights of <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> and the ultimate holding of a line represented by Quinn's Post, cross roads near <name key="name-123573" type="place">Scrubby Knoll</name>, Chunuk Bair, Koja Chemen Tepe.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n74" n="50"/>
            <p>The plan of operations provided for two covering forces preceding the main attack by two assaulting columns. The right covering force was to seize Table Top, Old No. 3 Post, and Bauchop's Hill, which commanded the foothills between Sazli Beit Dere, Chailak Dere and Aghyl Dere; on the success of this enterprise would depend the opening up of the ravines mentioned for the advance of the assaulting columns. The left covering force was to move northwards along the beach and seize the ridge known as Damakjelik Bair, about 1,000 yards north of Bauchop's Hill; this operation would protect the left flank of the left assaulting column during its advance up the Aghyl Dere, and at the same time, it was hoped, assist and protect the right of the 9th Corps in its landing between <name key="name-123667" type="place">Suvla Bay</name> and the mouth of the Asmak Dere, The right assaulting column was then directed to move up the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere and assault the line of the ridge of Chunuk Bair. The left assaulting column was at the same time to move up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Koja Chemen Tepe.</p>
            <p>In addition to the main operations, there were subsidiary undertakings intended to serve the purpose of diversions and influence the enemy in the disposition of his reserves in a manner favourable to our interests. At Anzac frontal attacks were to be delivered by the 1st Australian Division from the right and centre of the Corps front, namely, against the <name key="name-123533" type="place">Lone Pine</name> entrenchments and the works known as German Officers' Trench, both on the right of the front; followed by assaults from Russell's Top against the enemy positions known as the Nek and Chessboard. In addition, there was to be a big attack at Helles; a surprise landing by a small force on the northern shores of the Gulf of Xeros; and demonstrations by French ships along the Syrian coast.</p>
            <p>A reconnaissance of the north-western slopes of <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> and of the various lines of approach led to the decision that the main attack must be delivered by night, the actual assault on the summit being timed to take place well before daylight. Just as the reinforcing troops for the offensive were smuggled into Anzac by night, so the main attack on the <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> position was to be launched as a night operation; and to the tremendous difficulties which the country presented<pb xml:id="n75" n="51"/> was to be added the confusion inseparable from darkness. But on the other hand the advantages which lay with the enemy in the matter of position were so overwhelming and the nature of the operations such that the great thrust would require to be well advanced before daylight broke.</p>
            <p>The forces at the disposal of General Birdwood totalled approximately 37,000 men and 72 guns, with naval support from two cruisers, four monitors, and two destroyers. Actually this force was to constitute two main divisions. The New Zealand and Australian Division, the 13th Division (less five battalions), the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, and the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade were entrusted with the task of delivering the assault upon <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name>. The 1st Australian Division, to which was added the 1st and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades, and two battalions of the 40th Brigade, was committed to the task of holding the existing Anzac position and of delivering frontal assaults from that base. The 29th Brigade (less one battalion) of the 10th Division, and the 38th Brigade were held in reserve.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d6-d2" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Attack Launched.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>The August Offensive, memorable by reason of the desperate and sustained nature of the fighting no less than by the narrowness of the margin by which victory was missed, may be said to have been launched with the assault delivered by the troops of the 1st <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry Brigade</name> against the <name key="name-123533" type="place">Lone Pine</name> entrenchments. The Lone Pine attack was set down to draw the enemy's attention and reserves from the impending main operation; and it not only accomplished this but served decisively to wrest from the enemy a defensive work of main importance. Against a terrific enfilade fire from north and south the Australians gained the enemy's trenches, only to find them protected by an over-head cover of stout pine beams. Both by tearing up these beams and by working round the communication trenches the attackers broke into the entrenchments, killed or captured the Turkish garrison, and finally held their ground against a succession of counter-attacks which were maintained with unabated fury until the morning of the 9th, and in the course of which the losses sustained on both sides were exceptionally heavy.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n76" n="52"/>
            <p>The opening of this sanguinary encounter was followed by a second frontal attack delivered a few hours later by the 2nd Australian Brigade against German Officers' Trench to the left of <name key="name-123533" type="place">Lone Pine</name>; and early on the morning of the 7th by assaults delivered by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade against the Nek and Chessboard Trenches, opposite the centre of the line. In these attacks there were tragic losses, sustained by machine gun fire against which the utmost bravery was unavailing.</p>
            <p>With the launching of the important diversion against <name key="name-123533" type="place">Lone Pine</name> the hour was rapidly approaching when the first move in the real drama was to be made, namely, the opening up of the Deres by capturing the positions which commanded them. Between the fall of darkness and 9.30 p.m. the Navy commenced the shelling of the Nek and Old No. 3 Post, bringing searchlights to bear over the area at intervals, a performance that had been practised nightly for some time and to which the enemy had apparently grown accustomed. At 9 p.m. that portion of the Right Covering Force, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, detailed to attack Old No. 3 Post, crept forward from under cover of the outposts, and half an hour later the searchlights were switched off. This was the signal for the attackers, who moved swiftly and silently out of the darkness. The enemy was overwhelmed, and in an incredibly short space of time the position was in our hands.</p>
            <p>At the same time and in the same manner, the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment, moving up the Sazli Beit Dere, effected the capture of Big Table Top, with its steep and rugged sides and its summit honeycombed with trenches. Simultaneously, the Otago and Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiments, assisted by the Maori Contingent, moved across the Chailak Dere to the assault of Bauchop's Hill—a confusion of ridges and ravines and enemy entrenchments—and shortly after one o'clock on the morning of the 7th this position was also in our hands. Lieut.-Colonel A. Bauchop, C.M.G., Commanding the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, fell mortally wounded in this action; the success gained was largely influenced by his fine leadership and example.</p>
            <p>As the attack against the seaward slopes of Bauchop's Hill progressed, the Left Covering Force made its way <choice><orig>north-<pb xml:id="n77" n="53"/>wards</orig><reg>northwards</reg></choice> by way of the Beach Road for the attack on the Damak-jelik Bair. Crossing the Chailak Dere, the march was continued to the mouth of the Aghyl Dere, though exposed to a certain amount of fire from the spurs of Bauchop's Hill not then captured. The Left Covering Force launched its attack against the Damakjelik Bair, and by 1.30 a.m. on the 7th its capture was reported to have been effected. The line represented by <name key="name-123507" type="place">Destroyer Hill</name>-Table Top - Bauchop's Hill-Damakjelik Bair was now held and the Deres opened up for the assaulting columns.</p>
            <p>At midnight on August 6th, when the right and left covering forces had either effected their tasks or were actively engaged in their completion, the Right Assaulting Column, which included the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and was commanded by Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, was moving up the Chailak and Sazli Beit Deres, the two selected lines of advance, and the Left Assaulting Column was approaching the Aghyl Dere. In accordance with the order of battle for the Right Assaulting Column, Canterbury Battalion, on the right of the front and moving by way of the Sazli Beit Dere, was to attack <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> from the west, and thence continue the advance to Chunuk Bair. Otago, Wellington and Auckland Battalions were to move to the attack by way of the Chailak Dere; next in order to Canterbury from right to left across the Brigade front Otago Battalion was to attack <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> from the northwest, then in conjunction with Wellington Battalion moving on Chunuk Bair. By 10.20 p.m. the left column of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade had arrived at No. 3 Post; a few minutes later the capture of Bauchop's Hill was reported by the covering force, Otago Battalion having assisted to clear its southern slopes. All the attacks by the covering force had been carried out with the bayonet alone; magazines being empty.</p>
            <p>A short distance beyond the entrance of Chailak Dere Otago Battalion, which was leading, came under fire from a concealed Turkish position on the right of the Dere. Lieuts. T. H. Nisbet and H. R. Ker rushed the position with the leading party and cleared it of the enemy. The Battalion then pushed on towards Big Table Top, some distance ahead; but there was direct evidence that there were still parties of the Turks<pb xml:id="n78" n="54"/> to the right who had not been disposed of. After a consultation between Lieut.-Colonel Moore, Captain Colquhoun, commanding 14th Company, which was leading, and Major Statham, commanding 10th Company, it was decided that 14th Company should push ahead, and that 10th Company should attack round to the right. In the course of this operation 10th Company accounted for 100 prisoners. The Battalion then continued the advance on its main objective, <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name>, but met with considerable opposition from the enemy entrenched across the Dere, and had to resort to bombing attacks to clear these positions. Heavy machine gun fire from the Chessboard also swept the advance and caused severe casualties. At daylight Otago Battalion had gained its objective and was then joined by Canterbury Battalion, which had been delayed owing to losing direction on the previous night.</p>
            <p>Three hours later the Battalion withdrew under orders from the line taken up, and under heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the direction of <name key="name-123588" type="place">Walker's Ridge</name> moved across Table Top into the Chailak Dere. Companies were re-formed, and later moved up to the Apex, which represented a continuation of <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> to the left; they were then in rear of Wellington Battalion.</p>
            <p>The confused and broken nature of the country, the difficulty of maintaining direction in the darkness, and the opposition of the enemy had greatly retarded the progress of operations; also the element of surprise, which was to have counted for so much in the attack on Chunuk Bair, was fast disappearing. But the most advanced troops now pressed on beyond <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name>, realising that if advantage was to be taken of the measure of success already achieved, then the attack on Chunuk must be driven home without delay. Against increasing enemy opposition the assault was renewed by Auckland Battalion and by the 10th Ghurkas, who were on the left of the New Zealand Brigade and linked up with the left assaulting column. This force came under heavy fire from the outset, and it was not long before it was brought to a standstill.</p>
            <p>The advance overnight of the Left Assaulting Column had also been seriously retarded. This force had advanced up the line of the Aghyl Dere until it reached a point <choice><orig>approxi-<pb xml:id="n79" n="55"/>mately</orig><reg>approximately</reg></choice> 2,000 yards from the sea, and there the 4th Australian Brigade branched off to the left and followed the line of the north fork of the Dere; the 29th Indian Brigade diverging to the right at the same point and moving up the south fork and the spurs to the north of it. At dawn the Australians were on the line of the Asmak Dere, and the 29th Indian Brigade on a ridge west of the Farm and along the spurs to the northeast. Brigadier-General Cox, commanding the Left Assaulting Column, then ordered Brigadier-General Monash to collect his Brigade, with the addition of the 14th Sikhs, and move to the assault of Koja Chemen Tepe. The growing opposition of the enemy, now strengthened by the hurried arrival of reserves, and the exhausted state of the Column prevented the assault from being delivered.</p>
            <p>The situation at 3.30 p.m. on August 7th was as follows: Brigadier-General Johnston's Column on Rhododendron Spur and ridge; the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade on the Farm ridge below Chunuk Bair and along the spurs to the north-east; the 4th <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry Brigade</name> on the line of the Asmak Dere, the next ravine north of the Aghyl Dere. The Right Covering Force was in occupation of Old No. 3 Post, Big Table Top, and Bauchop's Hill. The Left Covering Force was in occupation of the Damakjelik Bair. The forces detailed for operations from the Nos. 3 and 4 Sections were in occupation of their original lines. The troops comprising the two assaulting columns had been actively engaged throughout the morning and the early afternoon, and were still holding firmly to what they had gained, but were exhausted by fighting and lack of sleep. It was therefore decided to halt on these positions until nightfall before making another attempt to gain a footing on the main ridge of <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name>. The Turks continued to hold portions of the low ground towards the left of the line of the attack between the ridge and the sea, and showed little disposition to retire from there.</p>
            <p>Nor had the co-operation looked for from the north, on which hopes ran high at this crucial moment in our fortunes, materialised, even though the breaking dawn disclosed to many eager watchers the presence of numbers of our ships close in shore to <name key="name-123667" type="place">Suvla Bay</name>.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d6-d3" type="section">
            <pb xml:id="n80" n="56"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Chunuk Bair.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>During the afternoon of August 7th reconnaissances were made with a view to the launching of another attack on the <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> position, and following upon this orders were issued for an advance in three columns. The objective of the right Column, which included the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, was defined as Chunuk Bair; that of the centre and left Columns the prolongation of the ridge north-east to Koja Chemen Tepe, the highest point of the <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> system.</p>
            <p>The renewed assault was timed for 4.15 a.m. on August 8th. Preceded by an artillery bombardment of one hour's duration of the Turkish defence system, the advance commenced as arranged. On the right was Brigadier-General Johnston's Column, headed by the Wellington Infantry Battalion, and supported by the 7th Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the 8th Welsh Pioneers, and the Maori Contingent, the whole led by Lieut.-Colonel Malone; in the centre the 39th Infantry Brigade and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade; on the left the 4th <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry Brigade</name>. The order of battle placed the Wellington Battalion on the right of the line, the Gloucestershire Regiment on the left, with the Welsh Pioneers forming the second line; the Auckland Mounted Rifles and Maori Contingent in the third line; the Otago Battalion to be in reserve at the head of <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name>.</p>
            <p>With the launching of the attack, the Wellington Battalion, in one determined assault, gained the south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. The left troops of the Gloucestershire Regiment, shortly after the advance commenced, had come under heavy enfilade fire, which caused the line to edge over to the right and away from its objective. The captured Turkish trench on Chunuk Bair, which represented the most forward line, was eventually found untenable under the weight of enemy assaults; and save for a few elements who hung on tenaciously to the last, the foremost troops withdrew and entrenched along a line immediately in rear but still on the slopes of Chunuk.</p>
            <p>Now ensued an ordeal of supreme self-sacrifice and extreme physical endurance. With the position battered by fire of almost every description, exposed to the enfilade
							<pb xml:id="n81"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP011a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP011a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP011a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Lleut.-Colonel</hi> A. <hi rend="sc">Moore</hi>, D.S.O., (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.)<lb/>(<hi rend="i">Killed in Action</hi>).</head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n82"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP012a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP012a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP012a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Major</hi><name type="person" key="name-130289">F. H. <hi rend="sc">Statham</hi></name>, (<hi rend="lsc">d</hi>.)<lb/>(<hi rend="i">Killed in Action</hi>).</head></figure>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP012b"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP012b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP012b-g"/><head><hi rend="i">The Farm and Road leading down the Aghyl Dere, with <name key="name-123667" type="place">Suvla Bay</name> in the distance.</hi><lb/>Photograph taken from Chunuk Bair in 1919 by <hi rend="sc">Captain</hi> C. V. Bigg-Wither, Auckland M.R.)</head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n83" n="57"/>
							fire of enemy machine guns, and harassed by persistent bombing attacks, the garrison of this forward line, exhausted and reduced by casualties, refused to yield the ground gained, and at the close of day the Wellington Battalion was still in position on the slopes of Chunuk. It was late in the afternoon before two squadrons of the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment succeeded in reinforcing the right of the line, after being temporarily held up by fire; while the Maori Contingent, which constituted the same line, had swung more to the left, in the direction of the Farm.</p>
            <p>While the right Column of the forces committed to the renewed assault on <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> had thus succeeded in gaining a footing on Chunuk Bair, the efforts of the centre and left Columns had not been attended by the same measure of success. The centre Column, advancing from the positions occupied over-night, moved along the gullies which led up to the Sari Bair Ridge; the right moving south of the Farm against Chunuk Bair, and the left moving up the spurs north-east of the Farm against that part of the ridge which extended north-east of Chunuk. So severe was the enemy's rifle and machine gun fire that little progress could be made; although a certain amount of ground was gained on the spurs to the north-east of the Farm. Away to the left, the 4th <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry Brigade</name> had advanced from its position on the Asmak Dere against the lower slopes of the Abdel Rahman Bair with the intention of then wheeling to the right, forcing a passage up the spur and attacking Koja Chemen Tepe. Strong opposition was met with from the outset, and in spite of every effort no material progress could be made. Finally, seriously threatened by the approach of large enemy forces, the 4th Australian Brigade was forced to withdraw to the line which it had previously occupied on the Asmak Dere.</p>
            <p>The result of the day's fighting, therefore, was that the right Column held the south-western slopes of Chunuk Bair; the centre Column was in occupation of the Farm and the spurs to the north-east of it; and the left Column was contained on the Asmak Dere. This was the situation when it was decided to break off the fight for the day, preparatory to launching a further attack on the main Sari Bair Ridge, using the foothold gained on Chunuk Bair as a pivot.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n84" n="58"/>
            <p>The Otago Battalion, along with the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment (which had come under the orders of the Brigade) was ordered to relieve Wellington Battalion at dusk in the forward trenches on Chunuk Bair. By this time Wellington Battalion had been reduced to a strength which was almost negligible, and but few officers remained. Lieut.-Colonel Malone, a brave and resourceful officer, had been killed. Other units in line had suffered almost correspondingly heavy casualties. In compliance with orders for the relief of Wellington Troops, Otago Battalion proceeded to move forward at dusk, and under the greatest difficulties reached the advanced trenches on the slopes of Chunuk, when the remnants of Wellington Battalion withdrew. It was now decided to extend the original line to the right. Under this arrangement the forces committed to holding the defences of Chunuk were disposed as follows: Two-thirds of the strength of Otago Battalion holding the left front of the line; Wellington Mounted Rifles next in order to the right; and one-third of Otago Battalion's strength, represented by 4th Company, occupying a flanking position on the extreme right.</p>
            <p>A day remarkable for the fierceness of the struggle was succeeded by a night perhaps even more desperate. No food or water reached the garrison; there was no possible chance of getting the wounded away; and the already exhausted defenders, though constantly menaced by the enemy, were forced to exert themselves throughout the night in an endeavour to deepen the shallow trenches—a difficult business owing to the hard formation. Shortly after 4th Company had taken up the position which formed a defensive right flank, movement was observed to the front, but there was some doubt as to its origin. Lieut. J. E. Cuthill accordingly moved out to the front and was able to convince himself that the Turks were massing for attack. This assault was eventually delivered in considerable force; but our men withheld their fire until the enemy had advanced to within 15 yards of the line, when it was so well and truly delivered that the enemy was most sanguinarily repulsed. When beaten off they retired behind the ridge and reformed for a further effort.</p>
            <p>As daylight broke on the 9th considerable numbers of the enemy appeared to the right rear, and at the same time<pb xml:id="n85" n="59"/> a determined attack, preceded by a storm of bombs, was delivered against our front. The enemy's apparent intention was to drive in the front and then attack the garrison in the flank as it withdrew. The first line of trenches was entered, but the enemy was subsequently driven out, and the occupants of the rear trench, temporarily changing their front, dealt with the enemy threatening the flank. This attack was thus beaten off; at all other points the enemy was equally unsuccessful.</p>
            <p>The casualties during the night had been exceedingly heavy. Lieut. Colonel Moore, who had commanded the Battalion from its first days on the Peninsula, was wounded, as also was Major Moir, Second-in-Command. Command of the Battalion was then taken over by Major G. Mitchell.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d6-d4" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">A Final Struggle.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>During the afternoon of August 8th a further reconnaissance was made of the lines of approach to the enemy's positions, and orders issued for a further assault, the third, against the Turkish strongholds on the Sari Bair Ridge. The line to be attacked was that of Chunuk Bair—Hill "Q," under cover of the footing gained by Brigadier-General Johnston's Column. The assault was again to be carried out by three columns. No. 1 Column, which included the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, was to hold and consolidate the ground gained on August 8th, and in co-operation with the other columns gain the whole of Chunuk Bair; No. 2 and No. 3 Columns were to assault the position known as Hill "Q,' No. 3 Column being responsible for the main attack.</p>
            <p>At 4.30 a.m. on August 9th the Naval and all other available guns commenced a bombardment of the enemy defences on Chunuk Bair and Hill "Q"<hi rend="i">;</hi> and with increasing intensity this was continued until 5.15 a.m., when it was directed against the flanks and reverse slopes of the positions to be assaulted. Brigadier-General Baldwin, commanding the No. 3 Column, was to form up his battalions immediately in rear of the trenches occupied by the New Zealand Brigade, and from that point launch his attack in successive lines, keeping as much as possible to the high ground. In<pb xml:id="n86" n="60"/> accordance with this plan arrangements were made to keep the, narrow track clear of all obstructions in the way of upward and downward traffic, and guides were provided for the Column. But in spite of all these precautions, the troops were seriously delayed and hampered in their approach march by the difficult, scrub-covered country which had to be traversed in darkness, and losing direction inclined too far to the left. At the hour of attack the 6th Ghurkas of the 29th Indian Brigade (No. 2 Column) had pressed up the slopes towards <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name>, and were successful in crowning the heights of the nek adjoining Hill <hi rend="i">"</hi>Q." The co-operation of the troops of the No. 3 Column at this, one of the great moments of the August offensive, would have been invaluable. But as if the advantages which the high ground gave them were not sufficient, the Turks were again to have all the chances on their side. Before our grasp had tightened on this success the enemy, apparently perceiving the consequences of this new hold, counter-attacked heavily, and the Ghurkas bent before it. Almost at the same moment as the Turks had launched this counter-stroke, the Commander of the No. 3 Column, finding that he was too late to share in the operations as arranged, had deployed for attack where he stood, which was to the left of the New Zealand Brigade's support trenches at the head of <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name>. But his attack had barely been launched when it came under a terrific fire directed by the enemy from the slopes in front and Hill <hi rend="i">"</hi>Q<hi rend="i">."</hi> So violent, so destructive, and so sustained was this blast that the assault reached but a short distance beyond the Farm—there its momentum ended.</p>
            <p>The New Zealand Troops—Otago Battalion and Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment—who were still grimly holding on to the slopes of Chunuk, had anxiously awaited the relief which this attack, had it been successful, would have brought them. When the completely exhausted state of the defenders of these advanced trenches, and the seriousness of their losses had been represented, encouragement was given by the announcement that Brigadier-General Baldwin's force—the No. 3 Column—was to advance and seize the Turkish positions to the left. The defenders had now witnessed the launching of this action and its failure; and had to some extent suffered in the counter-blast delivered by the enemy.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n87" n="61"/>
            <p>During the day an effort was made to send up reinforcements; two platoons of North Lancashire troops made an effort to reach the position and failed.</p>
            <p>The fact that the troops in occupation of Chunuk Bair had now been fighting almost continuously for three days and nights rendered their relief imperatively necessary. It was pointed out that two battalions would be required to hold the position; and it was urged that the relief should be effected that night. The outcome was that orders for relief were issued at 8 p.m. on the 9th. The line held by General Godley's force at that stage extended up the <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> to the forward trenches on Chunuk Bair, thence in a north-westerly direction through the Farm, and from there northwards to the Asmak Dere, As to the Chunuk Bair position, the trenches extended a distance of about 200 yards across the height, and were shallow in depth. The troops detailed to relieve Otago Battalion and the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment were the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the 5th Wiltshire Regiment, of the 13th Division; the 10th Hampshire Regiment to connect with the troops about the Farm. Towards midnight on the 9th the North Lancashire Regiment had arrived; but it was 2 a.m. on the 10th before the whole of the New Zealand troops on Chunuk Bair were relieved. The Regiment, a mere fraction of its original strength, withdrew to the advanced trenches on <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name>, and passed into reserve. Delayed by the intricate nature of the country and the shelling encountered during their progress up the Chailak Dere, the remainder of the relieving troops, the 5th Wiltshire Regiment, had not yet succeeded in reaching the positions to be taken over.</p>
            <p>With the break of day on August 10th the great struggle for <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> was abruptly and dramatically cut short in its development. By one overwhelming, fatal blow the hold on Chunuk Bair was to be irredeemably lost, and the hopes which this footing, gained at so much sacrifice, inspired of ultimate and complete possession of the Sari Bair Ridge—and Victory—were relentlessly shattered. The enemy had now made the fateful decision of throwing the whole of his available reserves into the conflict. Preceded by a bombardment of considerable intensity they swept over<pb xml:id="n88" n="62"/> the crest in an alarming preponderancy of numbers, down the slopes of Chunuk Bair and Hill "Q," across the foremost trenches—now vacated—on the first-named ridge; and even by the sheer weight of their numbers threatened to turn and overwhelm the whole line. But as each successive wave of the enemy, now advancing almost shoulder to shoulder, swept down the slopes it was caught in the concentrated fire of the whole of the machine guns and rifles of the New Zealand Brigade, now manning the reserve trenches on <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name>. The fire of the warships, of the New Zealand and Australian Artillery, and of all other available guns swept through their ranks, causing heavy loss of life. Eventually shattered and broken by this weight of lead, the enemy onrush at this point was hopelessly crushed. But around the Farm and against the spurs to the north-east the onslaught was such as to cause the line to break and give ground, only to be restored after fierce fighting by fresh bodies of troops. Into the area of this desperate conflict the last two battalions of the general reserve were thrown; and by 10 a.m. this extraordinary effort of the Turks, which at certain points had threatened complete annihilation of the British line, had expended itself, and those of the enemy who had penetrated far down the ridge began to stream back, although few of them ever reached their lines again.</p>
            <p>The capture, and in no less degree the retention, of the Chunuk Bair position by the New Zealand troops concerned had stood as the consummation of an effort remarkable for sustained gallantry and determination of spirit; and that it should have fallen back into the hands of the enemy occasioned a sense of acute loss and sacrifice in vain. At the close of the Turkish counter-attack on the morning of the 10th, the New Zealand Brigade's hold on the top of <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> represented, and remained, the furthest permanent penetration of the enemy's territory; and by virtue of this fact, the position, which formed a pronounced salient, came to be known as the Apex. From that part of it which represented the left curve, known as the Upper Cheshire Ridge, observation was afforded over the area of the Farm; <name key="name-123492" type="place">Canterbury Slope</name> forming the right curve of the salient. But in many respects the position was unsatisfactory, mainly because of its exposed nature, the proximity<pb xml:id="n89" n="63"/> of the enemy's works, and the high ground to its immediate front; and strenuous efforts had to be made immediately towards consolidating and making this most easterly point secure against encroachment, which would have forced a readjustment on lower ground. Across the whole front the Turks at the same time appeared to be displaying feverish haste in the construction of entrenchments and the erection of wire entanglements; whilst on our side it was impossible to carry out a great deal of work on the more important portions of the line during the day owing to the manner in which the enemy dominated the position from the Sari Bair Ridge.</p>
            <p>The four days battle may now be said to have been at an end. The state of exhaustion reached, the disorganisation of units, and the heavy losses incurred prevented any further effort being made in the meantime. Of General Birdwood's forces, it was estimated that the casualties numbered 12,000; a total which embraced a high percentage of officers. The general line, it was true, had been appreciably advanced, but the real goal had not been attained; and the reverse, which had lost to us the foothold on Chunuk Bair, had placed it far out of reach.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d6-d5" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Suvla Bay.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>But there were other circumstances which had determined or influenced the course of the action, and over which those who had conducted the offensive against <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name> from the area of Anzac had no control. As already explained, simultaneously with the attack from Anzac and as part of the Commander-in-Chief's strategical design for the capture of Sari Bair Ridge, a surprise landing was to be effected at <name key="name-123667" type="place">Suvla Bay</name>, north of Anzac. The operation was to be entrusted to the 9th Corps, and according to the prepared plans the first task was to seize the Chocolate and "W" Hills, together with the high ground on the north and east of <name key="name-123667" type="place">Suvla Bay</name>. Possession of all the important heights within artillery range of the Bay having been gained, it was intended to direct the remainder of the force through the Anafartas to the east of <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name>, and by engaging the enemy from this quarter materially influence the success of operations from the Anzac front.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n90" n="64"/>
            <p>The landing was accomplished, though not entirely as designed. Initial confusion was succeeded by hesitation, and finally by fatal inaction, chiefly the result of failure to meet the problem of water supply and distribution and the consequent sufferings from thirst of the new and untried army. With the apparent total inability of those in authority to stir their commands into action the situation became so serious that the Commander-in-Chief himself was impelled to hurry to the spot. The days of the 7th and 8th had passed with practically nothing accomplished; and a belated attempt to advance on the 9th ended in failure. With the arrival of a fresh division of Territorial troops it was decided to make a further attempt to seize the Anafarta Ridge on the 10th; but the attack failed to get on; and orders were issued to the Corps Commander to entrench on a line across the whole front from near the Asmak Dere through the Knoll east of the <name key="name-123498" type="place">Chocolate Hills</name> to the ground held about Kiretch Tepe Sirt, to the north. Additional troops arrived on August 11th, and a further attack was planned against the heights Kavak Tepe-Teke Tepe. The operation was commenced but not persisted in owing to the Corps Commander's representations that even if the heights were gained it would be impracticable to keep the troops supplied with food and water. Under these conditions the only alternative left was to settle down and strengthen the line held. On the evening of August 15th General Stopford handed over his command of the 9th Corps.</p>
            <p>The containing attack delivered at Helles coincident with the launching of the offensive at Anzac was followed by desperate fighting over several days. The success achieved, set down in ground gained, was in no sense pronounced, but the Helles attack had apparently served the purpose for which it was launched, namely, holding down the Turkish forces already in the southern zone and preventing enemy reinforcements being despatched north to Anzac where the main battle was in full blast.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d6-d6" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Situation Reviewed.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>A review of the four days' operations at Anzac would convey but an inadequate idea of the real nature of the struggle were reference not made to the stupendous difficulties<pb xml:id="n91" n="65"/> presented by the problem of water supply; and by the wounded who poured down to the dressing stations. Long before the offensive commenced efforts were directed towards establishing at Anzac great accumulations of water; and by the utilisation of all possible methods of storage a very great deal was accomplished. But another more difficult phase of the problem presented itself when, the offensive having been launched, this water had to be taken up to the troops for whom it was intended. The extraordinary physical exertions demanded by an advance over such steep and rugged country, combined with the intense heat of a midsummer's day, created a thirst which quickly drained the supply carried by each man. The general advancement of the line, the semi-isolated position of bodies of troops, and the initial absence of direct communication to points which were inaccessible by night and exposed to fire by day, together with the inevitable measure of disorganisation attending the first stages of an attack, made it at times impossible to get water up to those most urgently in need of it. Thus to-physical exhaustion were added the acute sensations of a thirst which could not be satisfied.</p>
            <p>While all this grim business of fighting and sweating and toiling was in progress on the heights above, another phase of the conflict was presented in the gullies and on the beach below. As the four days' battle progressed, the medical arrangements, despite the greatest efforts of the personnel, could not keep pace with the increasingly heavy toll of casualties. A certain part of these arrangements, owing to the necessity for observing secrecy, had to be effected within the few hours available after the offensive had been launched, while dressing stations had to be established as the advance proceeded. But it was the inability to cope with such a sudden and tremendous rush of casualties that so seriously complicated matters and led to so much delay and suffering. There were hundreds of walking cases, and even badly wounded, who succeeded in struggling down to the dressing stations; but among the gullies and lying exposed on the hills above there were others who, because of their wounds, were unable to move, and had to lie there indefinitely, suffering and hoping against hope that relief of some sort would come their way. But the toiling bearers were already overwhelmed with work; their<pb xml:id="n92" n="66"/> labours increased by the difficulties of transporting wounded down the narrow gullies which formed the sole means of communication, and through which there passed the constant traffic of mule trains, of relieving troops, of walking wounded, and of the up and down stream of supply. At the beach, barges from the hospital ships and others loaded with mules were filled with stretcher or walking cases as they drew alongside or were emptied, and a way cleared, at least temporarily, for the wounded who continued to pour down from above.</p>
            <p>The casualties sustained by the Regiment during the course of these operations and over the succeeding few days totalled 17 officers and over 300 other ranks. Included among those who fell in action during these days of desperate fighting were <name type="person" key="name-130289">Major F. H. Statham</name>, Captain R. Wilkinson, Lieut. T. H. Nisbet, Lieut. C. R. Sargood, Lieut, G. E. Waite, and 2nd-Lieut. W. M, McKenzie. Major Statham, a fine powerful fellow, was killed alongside his younger brother and Sergt.-major Porteous, M.C. At the close of the operations there were only four officers of the Battalion left unwounded, this number including Lieut. W. G. Bishop, who was awarded the M.C. Many very worthy non-commissioned officers and men also fell in action. There were several whose bravery earned recognition, the Distinguished Conduct Medal being awarded to Sergt. F. Mitchell for his gallant conduct on the right flank of the Chunuk Bair position; to Sergt.-major P. C. Boate; Sergt. A. G. Henderson for his fine work as Battalion Machine Gun N.C.O.; and to Lance-corp. H. D. Skinner. These days of heavy losses and heroic and exhausting effort saw the arrival at Anzac of the 5th Reinforcements under Captain W. Domigan; the Regiment thereby receiving an added strength of approximately 300 all ranks. Without any preliminaries this new force was thrown into the violent struggle then raging.</p>
            <p>With the breaking off of the offensive on August 10th the forces contained at <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> settled down to a defensive role. All efforts were concentrated on defining and consolidating the new line, in reorganising and regrouping scattered units and, as far as possible, in burying the dead. On August 15th the Apex, except for the southern ridge, was taken over by the Welsh Fusiliers, the Regiment, now under the temporary command of Captain H. Stewart,<pb xml:id="n93" n="67"/> of Canterbury Regiment, moving below the New Zealand Brigade Headquarters, for a period of three days rest. On the following day a move was made to a new gully which formerly had been occupied by the Turks, and which was named <name key="name-123552" type="place">Otago Gully</name>. The recorded total strength of the Battalion on August 16th was 360 all ranks; this number including the additional strength derived from the 5th Reinforcements. On the 20th of the month the Battalion returned to the Apex, relieving Canterbury Battalion in the holding of the southern ridge.</p>
            <p>The losses sustained during the August operations had heavily drained the available forces; and with the close of the offensive another phase of wastage presented itself. Weariness of mind and body, the persistently bad and cramped conditions of existence, the lack of nourishing food, and the sapping of vitality until it had reached breaking point commenced to levy an alarming toll of sick and diseased men. The evacuations became increasingly heavy. The August offensive had represented the last gallant expenditure of effort; and wasted bodies simply could not carry on the struggle.</p>
            <p>In the course of a Special Order issued subsequent to the Battle of <name type="place" key="name-123570">Sari Bair</name>, <name type="person" key="name-130045">General Sir Ian Hamilton</name> expressed himself as follows: "The troops under the command of <name type="person" key="name-208052">Major-General Sir A. J. Godley</name>, and particularly the New Zealand and Australian Division, were called upon to carry out one of the most difficult operations that has ever been attempted—a night march and assault by several columns in intricate mountainous country, strongly entrenched and held by a numerous enemy. Their brilliant conduct during this operation and the success they achieved have won for them a reputation as soldiers of whom any country must be proud."</p>
            <p>On August 21st the 9th Corps undertook operations from Suvla which aimed at gaining ground to the east and capturing the "W" Hills and the Anatarta Spur, in which the left flank of General Birdwood's force was to co-operate. This proved to be actually the last offensive action launched against the Turks on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The main success was achieved by the force operating from the left of the Anzac line. The advance was directed against the<pb xml:id="n94" n="68"/> line Kaiajik Dere, Hill 60, and Susuk Kuyu, the force carrying out the attack against Hill 60 and the lower portion of the Kaiajik Dere including the Otago and Canterbury Mounted Rifles and about 500 men of the 4th <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry Brigade</name>. In face of heavy fire the Mounted Rifles reached the south-western slopes of Hill 60; while the <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry</name> gained a footing on the northern side of the Kaiajik Dere. On August 27th a further assault was directed against Hill 60, detachments of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles being again employed. They established themselves on the slopes of the height, and there defied all efforts of the Turks to dislodge them. This signalised the close of the hard fought attacks against Hill 60, and the positions thus gained and held afforded observation over the enemy's lateral communications and a considerable area of the low country towards the "W" Hills and in the direction of Biyuk Anafarta.</p>
            <p>On the last day of the month of August Lieut.-Colonel Herbert arrived and took over command of Otago Battalion from Captain H. Stewart (Canterbury Regiment). The Maori Contingent had now been merged into the New Zealand Infantry Brigade; one platoon being drafted to each Battalion. The reduced strength of Otago Regiment forced a temporary amalgamation of 4th and 8th Companies, designated A Company, and of 10th and 14th Companies, designated B Company.</p>
            <p>On September 2nd about 80 men of Otago Battalion were moved up in close support of the Apex. In accordance with the plan of defence issued by Division the New Zealand Brigade became responsible for garrisoning that part of the line which embraced the Apex, <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> and <name key="name-123492" type="place">Canterbury Slope</name>. Under the same orders defined outer and inner lines of defence were to be constructed; and in this connection the Brigade was made responsible for the outer line of trench work round the Apex, the strengthening of the <name key="name-123565" type="place">Rhododendron Spur</name> position by several lines of trench work, the construction of communication trenches to the valleys east and south-east of Big Table Top, and trench work extending from the Apex to Cheshire Ridge on the left. On the afternoon of the 10th the Apex positions were subjected to an hour's rapid bombardment from several enemy guns; seeming to indicate that an attack was developing, but no infantry action followed.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d6-d7" type="section">
            <pb xml:id="n95" n="69"/>
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">A Rest at Mudros.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>Now came the welcome news that the troops of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment were to move to Lemnos for a period of rest which it was hoped would extend over a month. This was made passible by the arrival on the Peninsula of the 7th <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry Brigade</name>. The relief of units holding the Apex commenced on September 12th, but on the following day a communication was received from Division to the effect that the move to Lemnos was postponed on account of the cold and showery weather and the fact that there would be no tents available for the troops when they arrived there. The reply to this was that the men would be as comfortable there as in the trenches, even if they were without tents, and a request was made that the matter be reconsidered. To the intense satisfaction of everyone concerned, this was later in the day acceded to. The relief was then proceeded with and completed on September 14th. During the early evening the Regiment moved to Anzac Cove, and embarked on the <hi rend="i">Osmanieh</hi> for Lemnos on the following morning. On reaching Lemnos the troops went ashore by ferry steamer, but very little preparation had been made for their arrival The Battalion marched out to Sarpi Rest Camp (Mudros West), but on reaching there after dark found but a limited number of tents for its accommodation. This was a bad beginning, but the conditions improved in the course of a few days, when more tents were secured, the weather brightened, and the luxuries of hot baths and fresh food, with hours of pleasant idleness amidst peaceful surroundings, were enjoyed. It was a rest and complete change such as was needed to restore mental and physical vitality, so seriously impaired by successive months of hard fighting, lack of nourishing food, the trying heat of the summer, dysentery, and the constant strain and weariness which existence at Anzac imposed. The wastage of man power arising from these conditions was reflected in the numerical weakness of the Regiment when it moved away from the Peninsula—a comparative handful of 130 men.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n96" n="70"/>
            <p>While at Lemnos the strength of the Battalion was substantially increased by the arrival of the 6th Reinforcements. Light training was now being carried out, and generally the health of the men was showing a marked improvement under the totally changed conditions of living. Lieut.-Colonel Herbert had some time previously proceeded to Egypt for a brief rest; Captain D. White temporarily commanding the Battalion until the return of Captain D. Colquhoun. During this period the Regiment paraded for inspection by <name type="person" key="name-416631">General Sir C. C. Monro</name>.</p>
            <p>On November 9th this pleasant period of relaxation came to a close, when the Battalion left Lemnos and returned to Anzac, proceeding on arrival into area of bivouac. The New Zealand Brigade again took over the Apex. On the 11th 14th Company of Otago Battalion was sent up from bivouac area to No. 1 Post of the Apex; on the 12th 4th Company was despatched to the same locality. During the 16th there was a good deal of shelling of the Apex, <name key="name-123497" type="place">Cheshire Ridge</name> and Chailak Dere, and on the following evening the enemy opened heavy machine gun and rifle fire against the Apex positions. At this period a heavy storm broke over the Anzac area, causing considerable damage to bivouacs and dug-outs, and along the beach. This was but an indication of what might be expected during the dreaded winter months.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n97" n="71"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d7" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> VII.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d7-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Beginning of the End.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">The</hi> close of the August Offensive witnessed the gradual development of a series of events which were to have a pronounced bearing on the prosecution of the Gallipoli Campaign. While the defences and rear and lateral communications of the new front were being improved and extended and a comprehensive scheme of mining developed, the trend of events elsewhere was such as to give rise to a feeling of uneasy apprehension as to the general situation. The entrance of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers, the desperate straits to which Serbia was reduced, and the vacillation of Greece, all threatened far-reaching consequences. It was, for example, perfectly clear that more artillery and more ammunition would be made available for Turkish operations on Gallipoli; and the anticipated employment by the enemy of heavy artillery on a grand scale called for the strengthening of defensive works and communication trenches and the deepening and expanding of the existing system of dug-outs to an extent beyond anything previously adopted or thought of. Again, while the weather up to the middle of October had remained fairly settled, there were unmistakeable indications of the approach of winter, with its violent snow storms and fierce blasts sweeping in from the <name key="name-032817" type="place">Ægean Sea</name>. Wasted frames were unable to withstand the wholesale sickness which now gripped the garrison; and there was apparently no source of supply that could be drawn upon to appreciably replace the losses caused by the evacuations which followed. The most urgent requests made by the Commander-in-Chief for reinforcements could not be complied with; and it became apparent that the demands of the Gallipoli Campaign were to be subordinated to those of the Western Front. This, it would seem, was the first phase of the developments which pointed to the beginning of the end.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n98" n="72"/>
            <p>On October 11th <name type="person" key="name-130045">Sir Ian Hamilton</name> was cabled to from England and requested to give an estimate of the losses which would be involved in an evacuation of the Peninsula. On the following day he replied in terms which showed that he regarded such a step as unthinkable. Four days later he received a cable recalling him to London for the reason, as he was subsequently informed, that His Majesty's Government desired an independent opinion from a responsible commander upon the question of an early evacuation. In accordance with this decision <name type="person" key="name-130045">General Sir Ian Hamilton</name> relinquished his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and, bidding farewell to the "ever-victorious Australians and New Zealanders," departed for England.</p>
            <p><name type="person" key="name-416631">General Sir C. C. Monro</name>, the new Commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, arrived at Imbros towards the end of October, and from there proceeded to the Gallipoli Peninsula to investigate the situation, and to express an opinion as to whether on purely military grounds the positions should be evacuated, or another attempt made; and if so the number of troops that would be required. The impressions which he gathered are summarised in the following statement: "The positions occupied by our troops presented a military problem unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our entrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in fact, held a line possessing every possible defect. The position was without depth; the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather. No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive; whilst the Turks enjoyed full powers of observation and abundant artillery positions; and they had been given time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer." In face of these and other arguments, "irrefutable in their conclusions," General Monro was convinced that complete evacuation was the only<pb xml:id="n99" n="73"/> wise course to pursue. A visit from Lord Kitchener followed, and the decision to evacuate the Peninsula was apparently then confirmed.</p>
            <p>On November 24th orders were received that a period of 48 hours' silence was to be observed, and that no firing was to take place except in case of actual attack by the enemy. This inactivity was faithfully observed; and on the evening of the 26th it was ordered that the policy of silence should be continued until midnight on November 27th. The reasons advanced for the observance of this period of silence were that it was reported that the Turks believed that the Anzac position was about to be evacuated, and that the ruse adopted would induce him to attack; but whatever the real object aimed at, it must have influenced the success of the critical events now pending.</p>
            <p>During the closing days of November a blizzard of exceptional severity swept over the Peninsula. The country was covered with a mantle of snow, the outlook generally becoming more repellant and less hopeful as the days dragged their slow length along; while the heavy seas racing before the gale that beat the coast made wreckage of the piers and of the barges moored there. Hard frosts and days and nights of intense cold followed. With the commencement of the blizzard, two companies of the Battalion were at the Apex, one at No. 1 Post and one at No. 2 Post, and two companies in reserve in the Chailak Dere, and with the scanty clothing available and the lack of adequate shelter, they suffered severely. The period of frost was succeeded by a general thaw, and the occupants of the lower areas in particular fared badly; while the recognised tracks and routes became practically impassable. Exceedingly bad as the position was, the high ground of Anzac, with its more effective drainage, had saved the garrison from the disaster which overtook the troops of the 9th Corps on the low levels of Suvla. There in many places water rose to the height of the parapet; and despite the greatest efforts to meet effectively the terrible conditions existing, there were recorded 200 deaths from exposure, while over 10,000 sick were evacuated during the opening days of December. Hard contact with the biting blasts of winter, together with the mountainous seas which raged along the desolate coast and<pb xml:id="n100" n="74"/> threatened the landing and consequent maintenance of supplies, created misgiving among the garrison at Anzac, and gave rise to depressing thoughts envisioning an ugly outlook if the present was to be taken as the forerunner of even worse conditions both on land and sea.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n101" n="75"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d8" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> VIII.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d8-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Evacuation.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">On</hi> December 8th Lieut-.General Sir W. Birdwood, Commanding the Dardanelles Army, was ordered to proceed immediately with the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac. It had been previously determined that the evacuation must be conducted by stages, which would contribute to the secrecy so vital to success. Under this arrangement, the withdrawal of a certain proportion of guns and troops, surplus to the requirements of an ostensibly passive winter campaign, was gradually effected. In view of the extraordinary situation of the Army at Anzac it was imperative that nothing should be done which would arouse the suspicions of the enemy. Bearing in mind also how entirely dependent the success of the operation was on fine weather conditions, and in view of the gales and storms which might be expected at any moment in the <name key="name-032817" type="place">Ægean Sea</name>, its rapid accomplishment was of main importance. Thus, with profound secrecy and rapidity as the essential elements of the undertaking, there was presented a military problem which at first sight appeared so complex and so improbable of success that, were it not attended by extraordinary good fortune, to embark upon it was merely to invite disaster. But in so thorough and comprehensive a manner was the scheme for evacuation drawn up, and so expeditiously was it given effect to, that even before the date set down for the final and complete withdrawal a very considerable proportion of men, guns and animals had left the Peninsula, with the enemy apparently quite unconscious of the fact. Though a gradual reduction of the garrison was being effected, there was no departure from the normal life previously pursued both on land and sea. On December 12th 19 guns of various calibres belonging to or attached to the New Zealand and Australian Division were withdrawn.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n102" n="76"/>
            <p>A memorandum was issued on December 13th authorising the formation of a rest camp at Mudros, where, it was intimated, approximately half the forces of Anzac would rest during the winter months. It was on this day the Regiment moved from its area of bivouac to North Beach preparatory to embarking for Mudros. Owing to the shortage of water transport, however, the Battalion was required to march back to Waterfall Gully. At 5.30 p.m. on the following day, December 14th, the Battalion again moved to North Beach <hi rend="i">via</hi> the Main Sap, and under cover of darkness stepped into the waiting barges and silently moved out to the vessel which was to convey them to Mudros and away from the Peninsula for the last time. The official explanation was that the Regiment, in company with other units, was proceeding to the Rest Camp at Lemnos; but there was more than a suspicion that the move was one of deep significance.</p>
            <p>The evacuation was to be concluded to the last man on the night of December 19th-20th. The withdrawal of men, guns and animals, begun after dusk and continued throughout the night, was now in full swing. Everything was proceeding under conditions which promised success. As far as the enemy was concerned nothing had apparently occurred to arouse his suspicions. The remaining artillery was very much in action; the normal rate of rifle and machine gun fire was being maintained; tile movement of troops along the deres and recognised routes showed no diminution in numbers; and fires were kept going in deserted bivouacs. The whole area of Anzac bore the appearance of normal occupation. But under cover of darkness, and concealed from the Turks, the machinery of evacuation was silently and effectively working.</p>
            <p>On the last night but one the troops of the New Zealand arid Australian Division detailed for withdrawal moved down to the rendezvous at KO. 2 Post as soon as darkness set in, and were there formed into groups of approximately 400, which was the capacity of the motor lighters employed to convey them to the troopships. Embarkation proceeded with the utmost smoothness, and by 4.45 a.m. the night's quota of 3,490 men had embarked, leaving 3,000 men to guard the lines of the Division. The day of the 19th passed without incident, except that the enemy shelled the Apex<pb xml:id="n103" n="77"/> with heavy howitzers during the morning and repeated the bombardment during the afternoon. The last 3,000 men of the Division were now divided into three parties, termed A, B, and C. At dusk those of A party marched down to their rendezvous, boarded the lighters, and moved out into the darkness. The B parties followed in their turn, and had completed embarkation shortly after 11 p.m. The C parties were now in sole occupation.</p>
            <p>Weak in numbers but strong in resolution, it had fallen to the lot of these men to hold for a few brief hours and then to silently leave and hand over to the enemy what thousands of their comrades had toiled and sweated and died for during a period of eight months of unexampled hardship and suffering. With the last moments inevitably given over to reflection, what wonder if there passed before them the fleeting vision of long lines of gallant souls who, at the price of a shattered body or in the certainty of immediate death, stormed the rugged slopes of Anzac; of those who by heroism and enduring fortitude immortalized the names of Courtney's, Quinn's, <name key="name-123533" type="place">Lone Pine</name>, Chunuk Bair, the Apex, and Hill 60, and above all else, of those thousands who were to be left behind in their last lonely resting places scattered over the hills and through the gullies of Gallipoli. With these thoughts running through their minds, what wonder if the going was harder than the coming.</p>
            <p>By 1.30 a.m. the last of the garrison had commenced to withdraw. Men moved rapidly and quietly up and down the trenches and fired shots from the various points from which fire was usually delivered. To give an appearance of occupation even after the last man had left, rifles were adjusted in such a manner as to be subsequently discharged. Barricades had been erected in the main deres and communication trenches, and a final covering position established and manned to protect the points of embarkation should the Turks be suddenly apprised of the situation. Everything that could be of use to the enemy bad been either removed, buried or destroyed; and at the last moment huge piles of stores and clothing, soaked in oil, were ready for destruction by fire. The New Zealand and Australian Division had accomplished the withdrawal of 53 guns, of which 12 had been removed during the two final nights. Only two attached guns were destroyed.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n104" n="78"/>
            <p>At 2.25 a.m. on December 20th, the barricade erected in the Chailak Dere was closed, and the last of the garrison filed down to the beach. Without interruption or hindrance they stepped into the lighters and moved silently out to the covering ships ready to receive them; the piles of stores burst into flames—and Anzac was of the past.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d8-d2" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Return to Egypt.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>With the Gallipoli Campaign so unexpectedly closed, the Regiment, after resting and recuperating at Mudros, embarked on the old German <hi rend="i">Derfflinger</hi> on December 24th and sailed for Alexandria. On arrival the journey was continued by rail to Moascar Camp, Ismailia.</p>
            <p>On January 25th, 250 rifles and two machine guns of the Regiment, under Major D. Colquhoun, were ordered to proceed to Bench Mark and Ridge Posts, on the east bank of the <name key="name-001365" type="place">Suez Canal</name>, where the duties were of the lightest order and every facility was afforded for healthful bathing in the waters of the Canal. Two days later the 7th Reinforcements arrived from New Zealand, and the Regiment received an additional strength of six officers and 230 other ranks. Reorganisation of companies followed this absorption of strength, and on January 10th a programme of training was commenced. On the 16th the New Zealand and Australian Division was inspected by General Sir A. J. Murray, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Egypt. On the 26th the Otago detachment in occupation of the two posts on the east bank of the Canal was relieved and returned to Moascar.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d8-d3" type="section">
            <head><hi rend="c">Formation of the</hi> 2<hi rend="lsc">nd</hi> <hi rend="c">Battalion.</hi></head>
            <p>With the arrival of reinforcement drafts and the return of men who had been evacuated through wounds or sickness, the strength of forces was steadily growing, and on February 11th orders were received which led to the formation of new and distinct units. This embraced the establishment of an additional infantry brigade. As evidence of the further expansion of Colonial forces, connection with the Australian formation was severed, and on March 1st the New Zealand Division, which now included the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, with a corresponding<pb xml:id="n105" n="79"/> increase in artillery, officially came into being as a distinct and separate unit in the Field. On February 26th the 4th <name key="name-123632" type="organisation">Australian Infantry Brigade</name> had commenced to move out to Tel-el-Kebir at the rate of one battalion daily, thus severing its long association with the New Zealanders. The 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade was now comprised of the 1st Battalions of Otago, Canterbury, Wellington and Auckland Regiments, and was commanded by Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, C.B. The 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade embraced the newly formed battalions of the same Regiments, Brigadier-<name type="person" key="name-207491">General W. G. Braithwaite</name>, D.S.O., being appointed to the Brigade Command. It had been notified that 50 per cent of officers and from 15 to 25 per cent of non-commissioned officers from available forces were to be drawn upon for the new Brigade; but there was considerable readjustment of personnel before appointments to the different battalions were finally made. The postings which were now made in respect of Otago Regiment, and which included a number of officers from the Otago Mounted Rifles, were as follows:—</p>
            <p>To 1st Battalion.—Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Charters; Captain (temporary Major) D. Colquhoun, Captain D. White, Captain S. Rice, Captain W. D. Jolly; Lieuts. D. H. S. Buddle, W. G. A. Bishop, R. H. Nicholson, P. Mackenzie, W. Ward, W. J. Bevis, G. L. McClure; 2nd.-Lieuts. W. F. Tracy, T. Gillman, J. E. Cuthill, <name type="person" key="name-418758">J. P. Hewat</name>, M. J. White, J. G. Johnston, N. Hall, W. H. S. Widdowson, C. H. Clark, A. P. McCormack, A. G. Brockett, R. R. Gow, A. R. Sutherland, W. D. Stewart.</p>
            <p>To 2nd Battalion.—Major D. B. McKenzie, Major J. A. Mackenzie, Captain W. Domigan, Captain W. G. Wray, Captain D. Thomson, Captain W. T. Joll; Lieuts. G. H. Ferguson, C. St. C. Hamilton, E. B. Alley, A. H. Wright, L. S. Jennings, H. Salmon, H. R. Ker, L. G. Wilson, L. M. Scott, J. H. Barr, P. W. G. Spiers, J. B. Struthers, F. T. Christian; 2nd-Lieuts. W. K. Dougall, T. Fitzpatrick, M. McP. Watt, J. R. Patterson, J. F. M. Fleming, J. Robertson, A. R. T. McDougall, H. G. Brodie, P. Pile, P. A. Spurdle, A. Craig, C. Barry.</p>
            <p>Still further changes were made in commands and appointments in respect of both Battalions; in some instances due to the posting of additional senior officers to the Regiment.<pb xml:id="n106" n="80"/> However, Lieut.-Colonel Charters, who had taken over the 1st Battalion on February 24th (on the occasion of Lieut-Colonel Moore's departure on account of ill-health) continued in command without interruption; while the posting of Major C. E. Andrews, Auckland Regiment, to the Otago Regiment, determined the appointment of Second-in-Command of the 1st Battalion. With the arrival of <name type="person" key="name-130256">Major G. F. Hutton</name>, of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment, and his appointment to the command of the 2nd Battalion, with the rank of Lieut.-Colonel, Major J. A. Mackenzie relinquished his temporary appointment as Officer Commanding, and filled the position of Second-in-Command. The establishment of Infantry Training Battalions, one for each Brigade of the Division, towards the close of March was responsible for the transfer, though in some instances merely of a temporary nature, of several officers and n.c.o.'s of the Regiment. Lieut.-Colonel Moore, now returned, commanded all New Zealand Training Units and Depots, but later, interchanging with Major Hutton, assumed command of the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment. On April 6th Major G. Mitchell and <name type="person" key="name-130142">Major G. S. Smith</name>, both of whom had been evacuated wounded from the Peninsula, returned to the Regiment; among later postings there was on April 12th recorded the transfer of 2nd-Lieut. J. Hargest from the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment to the Otago Regiment.</p>
            <p>All troops of the Training Units were finally transferred to England under the command of Major G. Mitchell.</p>
            <p>On March 5th orders were received that the New Zealand Division was to move to Ferry Post Camp, on the east bank of the <name key="name-001365" type="place">Suez Canal</name>; replacing the 2nd Australian Division, which was ordered to Moascar. This move commenced forthwith, and on completion the dispositions were as follows: 1st Infantry Brigade, Ferry Post; 2nd Infantry Brigade, half-mile west of Allbury Hill. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade occupied the front line of defences. The 1st Battalion of the Regiment had remained at Moascar until March 8th, when it marched out and relieved the 28th Australian Battalion at Ferry Post East and Bench Mark Post. On March 20th the Division commenced its return to Moascar, where by the close of the month the whole of its strength was concentrated.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n107"/>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP013a">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP013a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP013a-g"/>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="i">Cemetery on Plugge's Plateau.</hi>
                </head>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP013b">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP013b.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP013b-g"/>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="i">Anzac Cove to-day.</hi>
                </head>
              </figure>
            </p>
          </div>
          <pb xml:id="n108" n="81"/>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d1-d8-d4" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Ordered to France.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>At the beginning of March it had been made known that the New Zealand Division would at an early date be transferred to France. This, it was realised, meant that the Regiment would sooner or later be thrown into the vortex of the main struggle on the Western Front. Viewed in the light of the immediate prospects which it offered of change of conditions and environment, the announcement was received with general, if subdued, enthusiasm. An exchange of eternal sand for green fields was alluring enough in itself, quite apart from other considerations, real or imagined, Mobilkation parades became the order of the closing days of March; the thousand and one details of equipment, of fitness, of personnel, of stores, and finally of movement and embarkation now received attention.</p>
            <p>Appointments to the principal commands in the Regiment were made as follows:—</p>
            <p>1st Battalion.—Officer Commanding, Lieut.-Colonel Charters; Second-in-Command, Major C. E. Andrews; Adjutant, Lieut. W. F. Tracy; 4th (Otago) Company, Captain D. White; 8th (Southland) Company, Captain S. Rice; 10th (North Otago) Company, Captain D. H. S. Buddle; 14th (South Otago) Company, Major D. Colquhoun; Battalion Quartermaster, Lieut. A. P. McCormack.</p>
            <p>2nd Battalion.—Officer Commanding, Lieut.-Colonel A, Moore, D.S.O.; Second-in-Command, Major J. A. Mackenzie; Adjutant, Captain D. E. Bremner; 4th (Otago) Company, Major G. S. Smith, D.S.O.; 8th (Southland) Company, Captain W. G. Wray; 10th (North Otago) Company, Major D. B. McKenzie; 14th (South Otago) Company, Captain L. S. Jennings; Battalion Quartermaster, Captain H. R. Ker.</p>
            <p>On the night of April 5th the Regiment took the first step in the direction of severing its connection with the land of the Pharaohs. This was the entraining of the 1st Battalion at Ismailia for Port Said, where, on the following day, the greater part of its strength stepped aboard the <hi rend="i">Franconia</hi>, a small proportion being allotted to the <hi rend="i">Ingomia</hi>. The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment entrained at Moascar on April 8th, arriving at Alexandria on the following morning and<pb xml:id="n109" n="82"/> embarking on the <hi rend="i">Llandovery Castle</hi>. The 1st Battalion arrived at Marseilles on April 13th; three days later the 2nd Battalion had also reached its destination in France.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb xml:id="n110"/>
      <div xml:id="t1-body-d2" type="part">
        <head>Part II.<lb/><hi rend="c">France<lb/>and Flanders.</hi></head>
        <pb xml:id="n111" n="85"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d1" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> I.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d1-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Western Front.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">The</hi> Regiment had now set its foot on the shores of a land into the interior of which war had long since been carried by a ruthless enemy, whose progress in every direction was marked by ruin and desolation and the sufferings of a helpless non-combatant population. The days of Gallipoli, with their imperishable glories, their suffering and endurance, their heavy burden of unfulfilled anticipation, of hope deferred, and splendour of achievement,—all belonged now to the past. A new campaign was being entered on, and no one doubted but that the Regiment, fighting side by side with the men of England and France—men of the immortal first Armies—would uphold the gallant name it had made for itself on Gallipoli.</p>
            <p>It was approaching summer, and the fertile valley of the Rhone, through which the Regiment travelled from Marseilles to the interior, was clothed in verdure of the deepest green. Smiling homesteads, nestled in gardens rich in golden promise of fruit and flowers, provided a refreshing feast for the senses, a tonic for mind and body, after the long drab-coloured days of desert and Peninsula. As an amelioration of the attendant weariness of a long journey by rail, there was everywhere the joyous greeting of an enthusiastic people. And through all there was a leaven of interesting and humorous incident, with impromptu feasting, sudden train stoppages and more sudden resumptions.</p>
            <p>The 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which embraced the 1st Battalion of the Regiment, was ordered to concentrate in the Morbecque area, near Hazebrouck, and the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade, embracing the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, in the Rouquetoire area. The 1st Battalion reached its area on April 16th, detraining at Steenbecque, near the <pb xml:id="n112" n="86"/> village of Morbecque, at midnight, and marching out to a small camp situated on the Morbecque-Hazebrouck Road. The camp comprised a number of huts, shelters and tents, and was afterwards to become the XXII. Corps School of Instruction. On the following day Battalion Headquarters-moved into the village, where the billeting officer found accommodation for personnel and animals in the surrounding farmhouses, and the camp site originally selected was vacated. Three days later the Battalion transport arrived from Abbeville.</p>
            <p>The 2nd Battalion of the Repent reached Hazebrouck on the evening of April 18th, detrained at a small station just beyond, and marched a distance of several miles to Rincq. Rain fell during the night, and in the darkness the guide lost his way, and the march being in consequence unduly prolonged, Rincq was not reached until five o'clock on the following morning. Comparatively good billets, however, offered some compensation for this unpleasant experience. On the 21st the Battalion transport arrived from Abbeville.</p>
            <p>This was the Regiment's first experience of being quartered in billets, which demanded an observance of regulations to which the troops had not been previously accustomed. But the conditions generally and the pleasant intercourse with the people of the country provided an agreeable change to men many of whom had only recently gone through the hardships of the Gallipoli Campaign.</p>
            <p>The several succeeding days spent in these areas were devoted to route marches, company drill, night alarms, and, of considerable importance, demonstrations by the Army chemical advisers in the adoption of protective measures against the enemy's use of poison gas. At the same time the first quota of selected officers and men was despatched for a course of instruction to the various Army and Corps Schools.</p>
            <p>On the last day of April the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment moved out from Rincq to Boeseghen, and on the following day, in company with the whole of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, continued the journey to Doulieu. Ths involved a march of approximately 20 miles, and carrying heavy packs and 150 rounds of ammunition it proved a stiff test of endurance <pb xml:id="n113" n="87"/> to which everyone stood up remarkably well. There now followed a further period of rest and mild training, which included throwing live bombs, musketry, and exercise in the several arts of warfare calculated to be useful in view of approaching events.</p>
            <p>It was at this stage that the Commanding Officer and the Company Commanders paid a visit to the Armentieres Sector and had their first sight of the German front line. In company with the officers of the 7th East Yorks Battalion, they spent the night of the 6th-7th May there, acquiring a first-hand knowledge of the front, support and reserve positions of the sector, its general defensive dispositions, and the many important details common to relief. On the return of these officers to Doulieu, a conference for all officers was held with Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, C.B., Commanding the 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d1-d2" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Armentieres.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>On arrival in France, the New Zealand Division was incorporated in the 1st Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, which in turn formed part of the Second Army, then commanded by <name type="person" key="name-405559">General Sir Herbert Plumer</name>. On May 9th it was announced that the New Zealand Division would at an early date relieve the 17th Division in the line east of Armentieres, relief to be completed by May 20th. The distribution of Divisional troops decided upon in accordance with this relief was as follows: Right sector, 1st Infantry Brigade; Left sector, 2nd Infantry Brigade; Divisional reserve, 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. As part of the other details of relief, the l7th Division's Trench Warfare and Grenade Schools of Instruction were to be taken over and maintained for the use of the New Zealand Division. Prior to this date the Regiment had received its first issue of steel helmets.</p>
            <p>Orders were now issued for the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment to relieve the 12th Manchester Regiment in the left Brigade subsector of the line immediately east of Armentieres on the' night of May 14th, and for the 1st Battalion to take over billets in the town as one of the reserve units to the 1st Infantry Brigade. In pursuance of this order the 1st Battalion moved from Morbecque to Estaires on May 9th, <pb xml:id="n114" n="88"/> and after remaining there for three days continued its journey to Armentieres, where comparatively good billets were secured. The 4th and 8th Companies were located at Houplines, east of the town.</p>
            <p>By this date Captain D. White, formerly in command of 4th (Otago) Company of the 1st Battalion, had been detached for duty as Town Major at Armentieres, an appointment which he retained until the German envelopment of the town in 1918.</p>
            <p>The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment reached Armentieres from Doulieu on May 13th. At nightfall on the 14th, after a day of rest and quiet preparation, the Battalion moved up and took over its front line area. Two Companies, 4th and 8th, were disposed along the front line, 10th Company occupied the subsidiary line, and 14th Company was in reserve at Houplines. The relief was effected without special incident or greeting from the enemy, and once the first rush of curiosity as to what was on the other side had been satisfied, the garrison, with that <hi rend="i">sang-froid</hi> and adaptability characteristic of the Colonial, soon found itself firmly established in its first sector in France.</p>
            <p>The line at Armentieres was at this stage typical of other sectors in France where the merely normal conditions of trench-to-trench warfare prevailed; its selection fur the New Zealand Division being doubtless prompted by the belief that it was a suitable area in which to dispose troops as yet unaccustomed to conditions on the Western Front. But the policy of observing what might be termed a passive resistance was of brief duration; and while the sector could hardly compare with the furious and unceasing conflict on some of the areas subsequently held, its pacific reputation quickly disappeared with the introduction of colonial aggressiveness.</p>
            <p>Armentieres, once a prosperous and populous town, bore impressive evidence of the violence to which its proximity to the front line had exposed it. Most of its terrified inhabitants had fled, and those who remained doubtless did so dreading the menacing uncertainties that life offered elsewhere; and perhaps in some degree also because of the lure of trade with the troops quartered there. Incidentally, there was a decided shortage of ready money in the Regiment for some
							<pb xml:id="n115"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP014a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP014a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP014a-g"/></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n116" n="89"/>
							time following the first arrival in France. Most of the available resources had been drawn upon during the journey from Marseilles, and the non-arrival of the Field-Cashier accentuated the existing financial embarrassment. Access to Regimental funds was not possible for the same reason, and the difficulty was not overcome, so far at least as the 1st Battalion was concerned, until Lieut. W, Downie Stewart offered and obtained permission to proceed to Dunkirk, where, by means of letters of credit, he raised sufficient money to purchase supplies of vegetables, and straw for bedding. It was perhaps a peculiar circumstance that during this period of temporarily straitened finance the first announcement should have been made of the fact that leave to the United Kingdom was opened to New Zealand troops.</p>
            <p>Through "Half-past Eleven" Square and along the devious ways which led through and beyond the town, the forward route extended to the shelter of a solidly constructed communication trench, as tortuous in its winding track as its length was seemingly interminable. From this covered way, incoming traffic debouched on to the support and front lines which, by reason of the low-tying country, were more in the nature of great breast-works than deeply dug trenches. At intervals of a dozen yards or so the front line breast-work was punctuated by traverses or semi-blocks, which restricted the danger arising from the lateral burst of enemy shells; while in rear of it a second wall or parados protected the garrison from backward bursts. Between traverses were the fire-bays, where from the wooden steps provided sentries stood up throughout the night listening and peering into the darkness which shrouded No Man's Land. This drab breast-work of mud, most of it contained in sandbags, extended into the dreary distance north and south, while out to the front, belts of barbed wire, broken and irregular from shell fire, ran parallel to it. Across the waste of No Man's Land there was a corresponding system of defences, with the vital difference that it belonged to the enemy. And secretly and vigilantly, day and night without cessation, each side moved and watched from the shelter of these sinuous ditches and mud walls and the almost interminable communications which led to them from the outer world. At night men moved out to erect more wire,
							<pb xml:id="n117" n="90"/>
							or to wander round No Man's Land either for the purpose of stalking the enemy who had ventured abroad or for prying unobserved on his movements. The enemy was heard rather than seen; and thus in time the sense of hearing became more acute than that of seeing. By night hordes of rats, fat and loathsome looking, wandered defiantly over the parapet or duck-walk, devoured all uncovered food, and with their foul bodies pestered those of the garrison who endeavoured to find rest in sleep.</p>
            <p>It would be incorrect to suppose that every yard along this irregular front line was garrisoned. In a settled trench system the forward line comprised localities and gaps, the former occupied by the garrison, the latter merely patrolled at intervals or guarded by an isolated post. The existence of these gaps, of considerable length in places, did not necessarily imply a danger, for in the first place their actual location was unknown, or believed to be unknown, to the enemy, and in the event of penetration they were covered from the flanks or rear by supporting strong-points. Normally, a front line system comprised the front line itself, the support line approximately 100 yards in rear, and the subsidiary line from 600 to 700 yards still further back, with the whole linked up by communication and traffic trenches, and strengthened by machine guns disposed so as to deliver cross or flanking fire. Thus a disposition of forces in depth was assured.</p>
            <p>Further to the rear, in a complete system of defence, there were established additional strong-points or defensive positions calculated to stem the enemy tide in the event of the front line system being penetrated. Under the arrangement existing at Armentieres on the occasion of the New Zealand Division taking over the line, the front was divided into two sectors, each held by one infantry brigade disposed as follows: Front line breast-works, support line, and strong-points, two battalions; subsidiary line, one battalion; in billets, one battalion. The Divisional Reserve consisted of one brigade of infantry, the Pioneer Battalion, and the <name key="name-010590" type="organisation">New Zealand Engineers</name> (three Field Companies).</p>
            <p>The routine observed by the garrison of the front-line, where the normal policy was not to make any advance towards the enemy, was as settled and methodical as any organised
							<pb xml:id="n118" n="91"/>
							business. Day and night watches were rigorously maintained without break, patrols were sent out by night to determine or counter, enemy movement in No Man's Land, and listening posts established in shell-hole or ditch some yards out from the parapet in order to obtain timely warning of enemy approach. The stability and maintenance of the defences constituted a first essential; trenches were kept clean and free from accumulations of fever-breeding rubbish; the cleanliness of arms and ammunition was insisted upon; and, of paramount importance, rations were brought up nightly from the forward dumps, generally in the locality of the subsidiary line, to which point they were conveyed by the battalion limbers under the direction of the company quartermaster-sergeants.</p>
            <p>In the cooking of the daily meals, the closer the cookhouse to the garrison the hotter and the better the food when it reached those for whom it was intended. Thus the cookhouse, run under company arrangements, was frequently established in the front or support line, and if it were not convenient or desirable to have it there, it was often possible to bring the company cooker, or travelling kitchen, up to the next best place.</p>
            <p>The maintenance of ammunition supplies and the forwarding and handling of unlimited supplies of engineering material required for the improvement and extension of the front line system called for the expenditure of further energy during both day and night. Thus the routine of trench life proceeded from day to day, interrupted at times by destructive bombardments, raids and counter-raids, patrol fights, and the various incident of trench-to-trench warfare. The trench system at Armentieres, when taken over by the Regiment in May, showed every evidence of neglect. It was also deficient of many of the approved principles of defence required to meet effectively attempted enemy penetration. This involved the immediate drawing up of a scheme which had for its object the introduction of considerable improvements and extensions, and in this direction the front line system received first attention. The whole of the work to be undertaken was based on a Divisional defence scheme, worked out on the principle of meeting superior forces on the ground allotted to the troops of the Division. Successive
							<pb xml:id="n119" n="92"/>
							defensive positions were to be prepared, and it was laid down that no body of troops detailed to occupy any particular locality was to give it up. If it did happen that ground was lost as the result of enemy action it was to be retaken by counter-attack carried out by troops specially detailed for the purpose; and in that connection every battalion was to have a plan for counter-attack in the event of its front being penetrated. As to the deficiencies of the foremost system, the wire in front was almost a negligible quantity, the trenches were not capable of affording shelter from heavy bombardments, and there was an absence of suitable positions for Lewis guns and of means of countering the enemy's sniping and other forms of activity. To give effect to the principle of distribution of available troops in depth and the holding of the front line with a minimum of men, it was essential that these and other improvements should be carried out without delay.</p>
            <p>The outcome of all this was that over and above the effective garrisoning of the sector the Division had committed itself to a very extensive works programme. Such, indeed, remained the accepted policy throughout the whole of the campaign on the Western Front. The result was that a sector was invariably left immeasurably stronger in matters of construction and details of defence than it was when taken over. By working on sound and well considered lines, a high standard of efficiency was attained; although the drawback, expressed from the men's point of view, was that it involved at times an inordinate amount of hard work and constant fatigue parties in the worst possible weather; and probably extensive works of improvement had only been completed when the sector had to be handed over to a relieving division, which reaped all the benefit. From a broad point of view the policy was, of course, entirely sound, and it had in it the additional and valuable merit of impressive and convincing example. Above every consideration stood out the salient and reassuring fact that stout trenches meant safe shelter under the storm of an enemy bombardment, and in that done compensated a thousand times for the labour expended and the many weary treks at night between Armen-tieres and the line during the intervals of so-called rest which alternated with the periods of actually garrisoning the line.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n120" n="93"/>
            <p>During this first period over which the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment occupied the line east of Armentieres the attitude of the enemy was for the most part passive, though 13 men were wounded, mainly the result of shell fire, and one officer, Lieut. A. C. Boyes, was killed by an enemy sniper.</p>
            <p>This first casualty through the agency of a sniper may be said to have had its lesson. On first taking over the line at Amentieres, the German sniper was an ever-present element of danger, full of daring and ingenuity. A liberal equipment of telescopic-sighted rifles and good field-glasses gave the enemy a sweeping advantage. The distribution of field-glasses was not confined to snipers alone. From our point of view, there was a permanent shortage of field-glasses, and they were always professedly difficult to obtain. For example, they were never on issue to infantry noncommissioned officers and Lewis gunners, to whom they would have been invaluable. As a further advantage the German rifle was superior to the British S.M.L.E. weapon for purposes of sniping, but in that respect alone. However, the time arrived when the organisation of the Regiment's snipers and observers was extended and perfected, and by pursuing a combined aggressiveness, the enemy's ingenuity was effectively countered and his ascendency definitely overcome.</p>
            <p>Relief of the 2nd Battalion in the line at the close of eight days was effected by the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade. A return was made to Arrnentieres for a corresponding period of rest, which really involved nightly visits to the line to repair damage occasioned to trench and parapet by enemy bombardments, or to carry out works of extension and improvement.</p>
            <p>In keeping with the series of reliefs then carried out, the 1st Battalion of the Regiment on May 21st took over from the 1st Battalion of the Auckland Regiment in the front line, as the left Battalion of the right Brigade sector in front of La Chapelle d'Armentieres. This represented the 1st Battalion's initial appearance in the line in France, and the process of relief was accomplished shortly after midnight without incident. On the afternoon of the following day the enemy's artillery assumed a decided aggressiveness, and this form of harassment was continued at intervals with varying degrees of intensity during the remainder of the tour.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n121" n="94"/>
            <p>About this time a message attached to a German rifle-grenade was fired over the New Zealand lines, worded as follows: "Send over the time please, Anzac," It was perhaps more than a coincidence that the Daylight Saving Bill had just come into operation in the United Kingdom, and it was also significant that the enemy was well aware of the identity of the troops occupying the trenches opposite to him. This was the forerunner of other messages which were delivered or posted up from time to time from either side, some of them grim and some of them humorous.</p>
            <p>On the third day of its return to the line the 2nd Battalion was subjected to a sustained trench mortar bombardment. Casualties were few, but considerable material damage was occasioned to the trenches. Following this display of ill-feeling, comparative quietness prevailed until relief arrived on the night of 7th-8th June. Under a rearrangement of dispositions given effect to at this period, the 2nd Battalion entered into occupation of the subsidiary line, extending from Buterne Farm (exclusive) to the River Lys (exclusive).</p>
            <p>It was at Armentieres that the Regiment was afforded the first evidence of the accuracy of expert gunnery, being the occasion when the enemy registered on the Church of Notre Dame and at the fifth found struck the tower, practically completing its destruction before firing ceased. A few days later the enemy directed similarly destructive fire on the church at Houplines. The systematic shelling of billets and gun-pits was almost unknown at this period, most, if not all, of the retaliatory artillery fire being directed against the garrison of the front line, the battered appearance of which was in striking contrast to the support and reserve lines, where comparative immunity and comfort were enjoyed.</p>
            <p>The question of raids was now beginning to receive serious attention by Division. The object of a raid, it might be explained, was in almost all instances primarily to gain information as to the enemy's identity and possible intentions, and secondly to embarrass and harass him. To fight and deal with an enemy successfully, even in trench-to-trench warfare, it was essential to know something about him, who he was, his strength and his temper, his dispositions, and his probable intentions and attitude towards the troops who confronted him. Much of this task of measuring was effected through
							<pb xml:id="n122" n="95"/>
							the agency of patrols and organised observation, but not all of it. Thus a raid, if successful, brought back prisoners who were identified as to their Regiment, a useful guide to the fighting worth of the enemy Division and a contribution to determining the general disposition of his forces. To gain the desired information prisoners were interrogated, and by the adoption of various means persuaded to converse; while documents and other material seized by the raiding party frequently afforded valuable information. The force committed to an enterprise of this kind approached the enemy's lines in silence, or more often under the protective cover of an artillery barrage which forced the opposing garrison to rush for cover, entered his trenches, seized what prisoners were dive after the bombardment, collected maps and documents from dug-outs, and then made speedily back to its own lines and safety.</p>
            <p>Accompanying these raids was a great deal of artillery and trench mortar preliminary and subsequent bombardment, and then retaliatory fire from those who were being raided. Thus as the practice of raiding developed, so did the artillery bombardments increase in frequency and intensity, and if the object aimed at was to arouse the enemy and harass and annoy him, then a great deal of success was achieved. For example, on the night of June l6th, when troops of the 2nd Infantry Brigade carried out a raid on the Breakwater and trenches adjoining, our artillery expended some 5,000 rounds in support of the operation and in conducting a diversion on the Railway Salient near by. Artillery retaliation was a natural sequence, and from this and the other frequent blasts and counter-blasts of artillery fire which a raiding party had directly or indirectly provoked, it followed that the front line trench system and the bewildered and unfortunate infantrymen who garrisoned it were subjected to periods of heavy and destructive battering. The bombardment, perchance, finally expended itself in intermittent shooting throughout the night, or stopped, as if by mutual consent, as suddenly as it had started. The net results of these provoked or unprovoked assaults were, as they affected the infantry, much mental anguish, some killed or wounded, and a badly battered trench system which must be immediately repaired.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n123" n="96"/>
            <p>When the 1st Battalion of the Regiment on June 7th, in relief of the 2nd Battalion of Aucklancl, entered into possession of L'Epinette Salient, which was our closest point to the enemy's line, it involved an increase of the front formerly held by the 1st Infantry Brigade of approximately 1,000 yards. Otago continued to hold the line there until June 21st, which represented an inordinately long spell in the trenches without relief. Raids on the right and left of the sector resulted in the Salient receiving the back-wash of the enemy's artillery retaliation, and casualties were inevitable. The town of Armentieres was also not free from enemy shelling at this period, and at times heavy artillery fire was directed on it. This either preceded our artillery's bombardment of Premesques and Perenchies, to the east of Armentieres, and of other vulnerable spots in the enemy's back areas, or followed as a retaliatory measure. Meantime the cutting of the enemy's wire entanglements by guns of lighter calibre and by trench mortars and the breaching of parapets by howitzers, proceeded apace in view of projected raiding ventures and as part of a general scheme to bewilder and puzzle the enemy. At the same time patrols were constantly out during the night, and brushes and encounters with the enemy; some rather vague as to results, were becoming frequent. In keeping with the avowed policy of aggressiveness it was determined that a mastery of No Man's Land should be obtained. The enemy was apparently imbued with the same offensive spirit, and there was always the possibility of something of interest developing when a patrol from our side crept across No Man's Land under cover of darkness.</p>
            <p>On the night of June 13th a party from 14th Company, under Corporal. W. White, had just established itself in front as cover to a wiring party when it was assailed at close range by a shower of bombs. Wiring operations had been in progress for some nights previously, and the enemy, apparently aware of this fact, had decided on a scheme of interruption. A brief skirmish in the dark followed this surprise attack, and the outcome was that some of our men were wounded, and one of the enemy, a Saxon, belonging to the 133rd Regiment, was captured and brought into our lines by Corporal White. A single prisoner would in later
							<pb xml:id="n124"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP015a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP015a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP015a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Typical French Billet.</hi><lb/><hi rend="i">First Billet occupied by 14th Company, 1st Battalion, near Sercus, on arrival in France, 1916.</hi></head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n125" n="97"/>
							days have been regarded as a modest haul, but more curiosity and more interest were exhibited in this bewildered Saxon than the fellow regarded himself entitled to. But he was the first German prisoner captured in France by the New Zealand Division, and as such was evidently entitled to be treated with care and affection.</p>
            <p>There were further conflicts with the enemy on subsequent nights, and when a patrol from the 1st Battalion went out with the object of determining if possible how strongly the enemy line was held, it penetrated two rows of wire before being discovered, It was then decided to move to the right, and subsequently, when lying down in the wire, a party was heard moving along the enemy trench. From close range a dozen bombs were hurled, but, as frequently happened, results were unknown.</p>
            <p>On the night of June 16th a special party of five officers and 83 other ranks drawn from the different Battahons of the 2nd Infantry Brigade carried out a raid against that portion of the enemy's line known as the Breakwater, The assaulting parties were under the command of Captain E. B. Alley, of the 2nd Battalion of Otago. The particular point selected for the raid was part of the new enemy work opposite Edmead's Farm, and east of Houplines, extending over an approximate distance of 250 yards, with the addition of a portion of the main trench on either side. The raiding troops were divided into wire-cutting and left and right bombing parties, and telephone party. The particular duties of each party had been carefully rehearsed; a special course of training had been undergone in the arts of close fighting, and a careful study made of the ground. The weapons carried included rifles and bayonets, revolvers, grenades, and knob-kerries, and electric torches and wire-cutters were included in the equipment. Whether with the intention of increasing the terror of the enemy or of assisting to lessen the chances of discovery, all ranks had their hands and faces blackened, while the wearing of a white armlet served to distinguish friend from foe once the enemy's trenches were gained.</p>
            <p>The assaulting parties, according to programme, moved out from the sally-port into No Man's Land, and lay down 120 yards in advance of our parapet waiting for the artillery bombardment to commence. The bombardment, with
							<pb xml:id="n126" n="98"/>
							medium and light trench mortars co-operating, proved most effective, smashing the enemy's wire and silencing machine guns which opened up from either flank. At the same time a bombardment of the Mushroom was carried out by way of diversion. As the bombardment lifted, the raiders breached the wire ahead without difficulty, and quickly entered the enemy's trenches. Two Germans were bayoneted by the left party, and others were found dead, but a stout barrier of sandbags and wire prevented any lengthy incursion to the right. The party now withdrew as arranged, and returned to the safety of our lines.</p>
            <p>Our total casualties were two killed and eight wounded, and included Captain E. B. Alley, who, to the regret of all ranks, succumbed to his wounds. No prisoners were secured as a result of the raid, but it was evident that the enemy was not holding the Breakwater in any strength, perhaps for the very good reason that this new work had not reached a stage of completion, Those who took part in the raid were congratulated by <name type="person" key="name-207491">Brigadier-General W. G. Braithwaite</name>, Commanding the 2nd Infantry Brigade, for the fine offensive spirit displayed. Referring to the death of Captain Alley, he stated that it was to this officer's leadership and example that the enterprise owed its success, and had he been spared he was convinced the raid would have been even more successful than it was. It was when approaching the enemy's lines that Captain Alley was mortally wounded, and it was at the same stage that practically all our casualties were incurred.</p>
            <p>Comparative quietness was experienced by the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment during the five days succeeding Its relief of the 2nd Battalion of Wellington on the night of June 21st. Still there were the usual exchanges of compliments between our own and the enemy's artillery, but the solid breastwork trenches and the shelter which they afforded appreciably minimised our casualties. Patrolling continued as actively as hitherto, and the building up and repairing of trenches damaged by artillery and trench mortar fire, and the strengthening and extending of the system of wire entanglements in front of our line all called for strenuous exertions. Works of improvement were, in fact, being pushed forward with increased vigour.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n127" n="99"/>
            <p>Clear weather implied good observation, and in the movement by day of large bodies of troops, or transport, or of any considerable firing by artillery, the presence of enemy observation balloons had always to be taken into consideration. It was on their account that extensive movements of troops along roads under direct observation had invariably to be carried out by night, that screens were fixed along certain highways which would otherwise be exposed to view, and that in summer time unavoidable day-time traffic was required to travel slowly and not raise tale-telling clouds of dust. To say the least it was embarrassing to have these enemy "eyes" peering down and probing into affairs that were not strictly their own; and on the evening of June 26th there was considerable jubilation when our aeroplanes suddenly swooped down on four balloons which were well up behind the enemy's lines, sent three of them crashing in flames, and compelled the fourth to make a hurried descent to escape a similar fate.</p>
            <p>In the course of the Regiment's successive tours in the line, special activity was at all times observed in the direction of obtaining early warning of intended or actual launching of enemy cloud gas attacks. The success of such an attack was a matter depending very largely, almost solely one might say, on the direction of the wind and on the weather, and whenever the wind was "dangerous" from our point of view these precautions were naturally doubled. The discovery of an approaching gas cloud or of indications which led the observer to believe that a gas attack was about to be delivered, was to be heralded by the blowing of sirens which warned everyone to adjust his protective helmet, and notified the garrison to assume a defensive role in view of possible enemy assault following upon the discharge of gas. False alarms were fairly frequent, and a warning raised by some far-off garrison was repeated for a considerable distance on either side. On June 27th elaborate preparations were commenced for the discharge of gas over the enemy's lines. During the hours of darkness over 140 cylinders were placed in position in anticipation of a favourable wind. This was an undertaking involving a considerable amount of labour, apart from the attendant risks and the necessity for absolute secrecy. Delay in discharging gas already installed was
							<pb xml:id="n128" n="100"/>
							dangerous in view of possible enemy bombardments, and in this instance there was cause for further anxiety. A deserter from a battalion of the 1st Infantry Brigade had gone over to the enemy from the Mushroom on the early morning of June 29th, and a subsequent bombardment of the area over which the cylinders were installed, to say nothing of even more destructive occurrences, seemed to confirm prevailing suspicions. At 10 p.m. on June 30th gas was delivered north of Hobb's Farm. Everything worked without a hitch, and the severity of the bombardment which the enemy directed to our front line and Houplines by way of retaliation conveyed the suggestion that the operation had been attended by success.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d1-d3" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">An Incident with Consequences.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>In the ordinary course of events the 1st Battalion of Otago would have relieved the 1st Battalion of Auckland Regiment on the night of the 3rd-4th July, but fearing that the enemy might have received information from the deserter previously referred to, the relief was at the eleventh hour postponed for a period of 24 hours. By that precaution Otago certainly escaped the disaster which overtook Auckland. At dusk, which was the usual time of effecting reliefs, a whirlwind bombardment suddenly burst over the front and support trench systems of Localities 74, 75, and 76, garrisoned by troops of the 1st Battalion of Auckland. The bombardment was continued with great intensity, so much so that it was considered that an enemy attack was about to be launched against the garrison of L'Epinette. Two platoons of 8th (Southland) Company, under Lieut. R. R. Gow, were accordingly despatched to the front line, and proceeded overland in order to relieve the assumed pressure on Auckland. On nearing the support line they were forced to pass through heavy shelling, and several casualties were sustained, but on arrival at the front line it was found that their services were not required. The party thereupon returned to the reserve line.</p>
            <p>The following morning at daylight three working parties were despatched from the Battalion to the front line to assist in clearing the wreckage. An extraordinary scene of destruction presented itself. The unfortunate Auckland
							<pb xml:id="n129" n="101"/>
							garrison had sustained 150 casualties, many of them buried alive in the fire-bays, and these the working parties had to assist in digging out. Had the intended relief not been cancelled, Otago must have shared a corresponding fate. When the Battalion took over the line from Auckland Regiment on the night of the 4th-5th, the parapet was found to be practically flattened out; there was no evidence of wire in front, no bivouacs remained undamaged, and a travel trench extending from right to left of the sector had to be dug during the hours of darkness. The communication trenches, Plank Avenue and Second House Avenue, the former hitherto presumably unknown lo the enemy, were damaged beyond description, and on every side was evidence of the fury and extraordinary destructiveness of the enemy's bombardment.</p>
            <p>Thus, by a postponement of the date of relief, the 1st Battalion of the Regiment had escaped the disaster which befell Auckland, but strangely enough, the tour now commenced was destined to be marked by an event even more calamitous in its consequences.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d1-d4" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Raiding and Losses.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>In accordance with the promulgated policy of aggressiveness and general scheme of raiding, it was decided that 4th (Otago) Company would on the night of July 13th carry out a raid against the enemy's trenches. The objects of the raid were to obtain information, to harass and mystify the enemy, and to inflict as much harm upon him as possible. The personnel of the raiding party, all told, comprised six officers and 175 other ranks, this number including the assaulting parties, parapet and flanking parties, and the other details of raiding organisation, the whole under the command of Captain W. D. Jolly. Under the prearranged plan scouts and parapet party were to move out from the sally-port 45 minutes before zero hour and the flanking parties fifteen minutes before that time, and take up their positions in shell-holes with the object of protecting the flanks in the event of a counter-raid. The scouts were then to return and lead out the remainder of the raiding party to a concealed position in front of and distant 150 yards from the line to be
							<pb xml:id="n130" n="102"/>
							assaulted. Our artillery was to open with a slow rate of fire 10 minutes before zero, at which moment artillery and trench mortars were to open with full intensity over the enemy's trenches and wire entanglements. Twenty minutes later the trench mortars were to direct their fire against the flanking trenches, while that of the artillery was to be lifted, thereby forming a semi-circular barrage round the area to be assaulted. Scouts and parapet party were then to rush forward, the scouts' duty being to ascertain the condition of the wire, return and lead the raiders through the gaps. The parapet party was to cross the enemy's trench and bomb suspected shelters in rear, while the assaulting parties were to work along the trench itself in four different sections. Meantime, the two flanking parties, facing half-right and half-left respectively, were to guard the flanks from our side of the enemy's wire, while special detachments were to watch the flanks from inside the wire. The 8th (Southland) Company was to provide a patrol to cover the right flank of the raiding party, the 10th (North Otago) Company acting similarly in respect of the left flank. All these duties were made perfectly clear and familiar by practice and training, and nothing was left to chance so far as preparation was concerned in order to ensure the success of the operation. But, alas, through some tragic cause, the whole affair was to prove a ghastly and expensive failure.</p>
            <p>During the afternoon the enemy had carried out a certain amount of artillery fire which had all the appearances of a ranging shoot. The misgivings and suspicions aroused in not a few minds by this action were later only too fully confirmed. Every man was in his position in No Man's Land at the appointed time, and the artillery support was forthcoming as arranged. But no sooner had our barrage lifted and the raiding troops proceeded to move forward than a concentrated and murderous shrapnel and machine gun fire fell like a thunder-clap over No Man's Land between our front line and the objective. Under this withering and devastating blast the raiders vainly endeavoured to press forward. The casualties became increasingly heavy; all the officers were either killed or wounded, and when finally the order came to withdraw, merely a handful of men remained to stagger back to our lines. The whole affair
							<pb xml:id="n131" n="103"/>
							was a tragedy; and though no definite information could, of course, be obtained on the point, the natural conclusion come to was that the enemy had secured warning of the raid, and the 4th Company walked into a trap only too well prepared.</p>
            <p>The casualties sustained were:
							<table><row><cell>Killed</cell><cell>…</cell><cell>4 officers and 31 other ranks.</cell></row><row><cell>Wounded</cell><cell>…</cell><cell>4 officers and 118 other ranks.</cell></row><row><cell>Reported missing</cell><cell>…</cell><cell>6 other ranks.</cell></row></table></p>
            <p>This represented a total loss of 163 of all ranks. The casualty list included the following officers: Killed—Captain W. D. Jolly, Lieut. L. Millard, Lieut. T. Gillman, and 2nd-Lieut. G. Black; Wounded—Lieut. M. J. White, Lieut, J. G. Johnston, Lieut. E. Salmon, 2nd-Lieut. C. H. Clark.</p>
            <p>The Battalion Commander was immediately confronted with the formidable task of getting in the many dead and wounded lying in No Man's Land. Every available man was requisitioned for stretcher-bearing purposes, and although everyone worked desperately hard throughout the night, and certainly no one harder and more regardless of danger than Pte. J. D. Stark, the task had barely been completed when daylight broke and put an end to operations. Further bearer parties were out on the following night over the track of the ill-fated raid, and one wounded man and 17 bodies were recovered. It was on the occasion of this renewal of the search that 2nd.-Lieut. A. G. Brockett was killed.</p>
            <p>By all these losses of officers, non-commissioned officers and men the Regiment sustained a heavy misfortune; certainly the worst that had befallen any of its companies in so short a space of time during its fighting days in France, and reinforcements, both in officers and men, had to be asked for at once. The Battalion formation was now temporarily reduced to one of three companies instead of four; and in consequence of this fact and the extended line being held owing to the transfer of certain divisions to the area of the Somme, the three Companies, 8th, 10th, and 14th, were called upon to hold the line for a period of 32 continuous days without being afforded the opportunity of going back to the subsidiary line.</p>
            <p>Major C. E. Andrews had now left for the United Kingdom on duty, and Major D. Colquhoun succeeded to the post of Second-in-Command of the 1st Battalion.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n132" n="104"/>
            <p>A raid on the enemy's lines had also been undertaken by the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, then in reserve at Armentieres. The preliminary training was carried out at the Brigade Trench Warfare School of Instruction, and everything augured well for the success of the operation, which was timed for 1.30 a.m. on July 12th. At the appointed time assaulting, flanking, bombing and blocking parties took up their positions in No Man's Land, but the party sent across in advance returned and reported that they had failed to find any gaps in the enemy wire after patrolling and examining it over a distance of 100 yards. Captain D. E. Bremner, who was in command of the enterprise, reached within 20 yards of the enemy wire with his assaulting party. From there it was ascertained that the wire was intact, and deciding that it was impossible to breach it in the short time at his disposal, he made up his mind to withdraw. On the return journey some casualties were incurred as a result of an alarmed enemy's artillery and trench mortar fire.</p>
            <p>Our artillery's assistance on the night of this operation was all that could be desired, fire being brought to bear on the enemy's front, rear and communication trenches. A diversion was also created over the Railway Salient. The enemy retaliated with a heavy barrage over our front and support trenches, opening and ceasing almost in unison with our own guns. Briefly, the raid was a failure because, primarily, the wire had not previously been cut by our guns and trench mortars as required, although those who were in command of the trench mortars claimed that the wire had been dealt with, and that the raiders went to the wrong place. The fact remained that the wire which confronted the raiding party was so thick that it could not have been cut sufficiently to afford a passage through in the time available under the rapid programme. Casualties numbered four killed and nine wounded.</p>
            <p>On July 16th the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment took over the line from the 2nd Battalion of Wellington. Three days later a raid was carried out by troops of the 1st Infantry Brigade on enemy trenches immediately north of the Railway Salient, and on the right of Otago's sector, in order to give support to an attack by the XI. Corps in conjunction with the 5th Australian Division against the enemy system
							<pb xml:id="n133" n="105"/>
							extending from Faquissart to La Cordonnerie. By way of participating in the minor operation, Otago Battalion had a considerable strength posted in No Man's Land in anticipation of and in order to check a possible counter-attack by the enemy. No action, however, developed as far as Otago troops were concerned.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d1-d5" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Renewed Vigilance.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>At this period a particularly active patrolling of No Man's Land was being maintained, and the number of patrols operating was unlimited. The enemy was evidently more or less alive to this activity, and as ours were fighting patrols, as distinct from reconnoitring parties, there were frequent clashes. In some instances large numbers of the enemy were observed or encountered and engaged by our patrols with varying degrees of success. It was not always possible to establish the results of these bombing encounters, but it was at least clear that the enemy did not escape damage. But there was also the danger of our own patrols clashing, and in the darkness mistaking each other for the enemy, and there was pretty conclusive evidence that this did occur on more than one occasion.</p>
            <p>On July 21st Major J. A. Mackenzie left the 2nd Battalion and proceeded to England to take over command of the New Zealand Details Camp established at Codford, whereupon <name type="person" key="name-130142">Major G. S. Smith</name>, D.S.O., succeeded to the position of Second-in-Command of the Battalion.</p>
            <p>The appearance in the line of parties of the Royal West Kents (122nd Brigade of the 41st Division), led to conjectures of possible relief and a move to a new locality. These anticipations, however, were not realised, and all that the visit of troops of another unit, ever a prolific source of conjecture and rumour, meant on this occasion was the possibility of the 122nd Brigade taking over the left sector, then held by the 1st Infantry Brigade. But before the time arrived for this order to become operative it was cancelled.</p>
            <p>On July 9th the order by which all troops forming the garrison of the front line were to remain awake throughout the hours of darkness was cancelled, and to each group of
							<pb xml:id="n134" n="106"/>
							two or more bays there were to be eight men on duty, two furnishing double sentry, two awake and sitting on the fire-step within immediate call, and the remainder asleep in the trench but fully equipped and ready to man the fire trench on an alarm being given. It was also laid down that an officer was to be constantly on trench duty, in the same manner as an officer was on watch on board ship. It was further ordered that the garrison of the front line system, except those furnishing the day sentry groups, carried out at least four hours manual labour in improving the defences.</p>
            <p>The hours of darkness were still very brief indeed; but on July 28th the times of standing-to were readjusted so as to extend from 9.30 p.m. to 10.30 p.m., and from 3.30 a.m. to 4.30 a.m. By this alteration the intervening night hours of extreme vigilance were lengthened; but the disappearance of the long summer days was still some distance ahead. The routine of stand-to and stand-down was that at the time appointed in the evening the whole of the garrison took up a definite position in the fire-bays, fully armed and equipped, and remained at their posts for a period of approximately one hour, when the order to stand-down was sent along. The regular watches were then set and maintained throughout the night, and all members of the garrison whose presence was not immediately required in this direction or who were detailed for other duties of routine, retired from the fire-bays. At the appointed time in the morning the order to stand-to was again sent along the line, and once more all arms turned out fully equipped and took up their stations, remaining there until the order to stand-down was received. The reduced day watches were then set and carried on. The general idea of this scheme originated in the almost uniform experience that approaching dusk and approaching dawn were the two most likely moments of enemy attack, and that at these times the garrison should accordingly be fully prepared for any such emergency. And so the system was maintained until the termination of trench warfare in the closing days of 1918. At times the observance of this custom could only have been regarded as more or less formal, yet it continued to provide the opportunity for ensuring that every man knew his correct battle station and that he was possessed of his full fighting equipment, while it also served
							<pb xml:id="n135" n="107"/>
							to accustom everyone to turning out rapidly and effectively. If, of course, the morning and the outlook were foggy, stand-down was not given as usual, and very often it was on this account unavoidably prolonged.</p>
            <p>There was no order more welcome to men in the line, and none more cheerfully passed along, than the morning "stand-down," for it implied that the majority of the night sentries could retire to their shelters for that long-deferred sleep; while in winter time it was immediately followed by the platoon commander or sergeant on his rounds with the ever-welcome rum. The rum issue was unquestionably a great institution, for it assured an exhilaration and warmth of body which lasted until steep caught the chilled and weary soldier. Where, it might be asked, is the war-worn veteran of a winter campaign who has not confessed that the morning's tot of rum has "saved his life" after a night's vigil in the merciless cold and pelting rain, perchance after standing knee-deep in mud, or after crawling about in the filth and uncertainties of No Man's Land, or lying exposed in the slime of a listening or advanced post out beyond the cornparative friendliness of the parapet?</p>
            <p>A Divisional Order issued at this period served to reveal something of only one of the many methods employed to determine pending enemy activities. For some time, it was stated, a listening apparatus had been installed within the New Zealand area and close to the front line trenches. Taking into consideration the position both of the instrument and the signal offices from which messages were intercepted, and the proximity of the German trenches, it was quite certain that the enemy, if in possession of a similar apparatus in the vicinity, was overhearing our messages. Events had happened on the Divisional front which must lead to the conclusion that in many cases the enemy had intercepted our telephone and buzzer messages, and thereby obtained important military information. There was good reason to believe that in this manner the enemy had obtained previous warning concerning two raids carried out by the Division, the result being that he was prepared to meet them, and we in consequence suffered heavy casualties and were unsuccessful. It was therefore laid down that the use of telephones and buzzers was forbidden in advance of the subsidiary line
							<pb xml:id="n136" n="108"/>
							except in cases of extreme urgency, and in all other cases was to be confined to the signal service and artillery forward observing officers. The greatest care was also to be exercised in the transmission of all messages, and no map locations were to be mentioned over the telephone or buzzer.</p>
            <p>It was a long cry from Armentieres to the Somme, but during the month of July it was decided that special vigilance was to be observed along the whole of the Second Army Front in order to prevent the enemy withdrawing troops from opposite our front to the region of the Somme, where the great British offensive was then in full swing. In keeping with this important order and to give effect to its purpose, the Division was to be prepared to face greater risks and greater casualties. In other words, the enemy was to be engaged so actively that he would regard it as unwise or unsafe to move any troops away to the south. No Man's Land was to be our land; our artrllery was to be more active; the enemy's wire was to be cut; his parapets demolished; billets bombarded; frequent raids were to be carried out and others threatened, and counter-battery work actively engaged in. The supply of ammunition for 18-pounder guns in particular was to be unlimited, and no-restrictions were to be placed on the amount of shooting to be done by light guns and trench mortars because of retaliation. To what extent the Regiment was intended to participate in this programme of organised fury was never fully realised, for very soon it was to be much more vitally concerned in this same Somme offensive.</p>
            <p>It was not until August 6th that the 1st Battalion of the Regiment moved out of the line at L'Epinette after completing a memorable tour, the commencement of which dated back to July 5th. Four days later a warning order was issued to the effect that the New Zealand Division was to be relieved in the Armentieres sector by the 51st Division. On August 15th, the day after the relief of the Division commenced, officers of the 6th Battalion of the Black Watch visited the sector in view of their taking over from the 2nd Battalion of Otago, which was then in line. Relief was accomplished on the 17th, and Otago marched back to billets.</p>
          </div>
          <pb xml:id="n137" n="109"/>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d1-d6" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Regiment Relieved.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>The Regiment was now clear of the line for a definite period, after three months' occupation of the sector lying east of Armentieres. It was the Regiment's first sector on the Western Front, and its tenure had provided a drastic introduction to methods of trench-to-trench warfare where both sides were very much in earnest. The period spent at Armentieres was remarkable for the strenuous conditions it imposed on the garrison. Enemy artillery bombardments were of great frequency, and at times of considerable intensity; and over and above the formidable list of casualties which this involved, it also meant that there was an insistent demand for fatigue parties at all hours of the day or night for repairing damaged trenches, From the point of view of the infantry the Armentieres period was a very hard and exacting one.</p>
            <p>On coming out of the line, particularly after a tour that had been unduly prolonged, the most gratifying aspect of the change-over was the opportunity afforded of obtaining a hot tub at the Divisional Baths established at Pont de Nieppe. There; with the aid of liberal supplies of hot water and soap, it was possible to get rid of the fifth and vermin of the trenches, followed by an issue of clean underclothing, all of which produced a feeling of such delightful invigoration and freshness as to make the miseries and hardships of the preceding few weeks seem almost worth while.</p>
            <p>The Regiment was now committed to a period of rest and training which was to prepare it for its approaching participation in the operations of the great offensive of the Somme, Immediately on coming out of the line it departed for the South, and after a journey by road and rail extending over several days, reached the localities of Citernes and Airaines, south-east of Abbeville. On arrival no time was lost in settling down to business. The Regiment was definitely committed to an early participation in the Somme Battle, and bearing in mind this fact, special attention was directed to practice in attack operations and in trench consolidation; while for the officers there were in addition frequent conferences and discussions in relation to the most recently evolved offensive tactics.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n138" n="110"/>
            <p>On August 25th Lieut.-Colonel A. Moore, D.S.O., relinquished command of the 2nd Battalion of Otago in order to rejoin his Regiment, the Dublin Fusiliers, and two days later <name type="person" key="name-130142">Major G. S. Smith</name>, D.S.O., was appointed to the command of the Battalion.</p>
            <p>The programme of training mapped out for the Regiment aimed at producing an all-round high state of fighting efficiency, and of fitness of mind as well as of body; and when on September 2nd the Division broke camp and headed for the area of the Somme, it was calculated that everyone was in perfect fighting trim.</p>
            <p>It was decided that the journey to the new sphere of operations should be relieved by frequent and regular halts, during which training was continued. The route of march brought the Regiment into and along the valley of the Somme River, and though the weather on occasions was showery, being late summer, the journey on the whole was pleasant because of the changing scene, and from a military point of view highly beneficial. There were some stiff marches <hi rend="i">en route,</hi> but the high standard of mental and physical fitness attained during the course of training operations was reflected in the comparatively airy manner in which these tasks were approached and carried out.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n139" n="111"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d2" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> II.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d2-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Battle of the Somme.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">The</hi> formidable assault which was launched by German arms in the middle of February, 1916, against the great Fortress of Verdun, and which had been maintained at an enormous cost in lives and material, had by the month of June reached what was considered to be its highest point of intensity. Up to that stage the valiant French Armies had withstood the most desperate German efforts to reach their objective; but it was nevertheless seriously felt that the time had arrived when some great counter-stroke should be launched in order to relieve the French of this continuous and must exhausting pressure. It was, indeed, not long before this feeling was to find formidable expression; for preparations were at once begun for the opening of a great British Offensive on the Somme front. The projected offensive had really a two-fold purpose, as in addition to the fact that it was calculated primarily to divert German reserves from Verdun to the north, it would also represent a great endeavour to break through the vaunted German lines of defence which had been built up there during two years or more of incessant labour and engineering skill.</p>
            <p>On the morning of July 1st, 1916, the first burst of the British attack swept like a hurricane over the enemy lines, extending from the terrible salient of Gommecourt in the north to Frise in the south. How the terrific succession of British assaults on that memorable opening day broke with such murderous results against the formidable walls of the defences of Gommecourt in the north, and how at the close of the day the enemy line had been smashed between Fricourt and Frise in the south, and of the ebb and flow of victory during succeeding days and weeks, must remain among the most memorable and most sanguinary events in the history of the War.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n140" n="112"/>
            <p>It was into the vortex of this Somme Offensive, or rather series of distinct Somme Battles, that the Regiment, as part of the New Zealand Division, was thrown during the month of September. Though it had not up to that date been identified with any major operations on the Western Front, the Regiment had conclusively proved its worth during several months of active trench-to-trench warfare. But its participation in the Somme Battle was to earn for it a newer and wider fame and reveal its higher qualities as a fighting force, with initiative and extraordinary determination and intensity of purpose as its outstanding characteristics. Thus, along with the several units of the New Zealand Division the Otago Regiment entered the Somme with that dominant fighting spirit ever the fruitful parent of valorous deeds, and also with a lively anticipation of desperate adventure on hand. And in the whole series of operations in which it was engaged, its best fighting reputation was more than maintained. The sacrifices demanded were exceedingly heavy, but when in the early part of October the Regiment, woefully thinned arid weakened, marched out of the Somme, it had made for itself a new and a greater name and worthily merited its share of the splendid tributes bestowed on the New Zealand Division by the Higher Commands.</p>
            <p>It would be well to preface the account of the Regiment's participation in the Somme Battle by a description of the country over which the general operations extended. The enemy's main position was sited on high undulating ground which, rising to more than 500 feet above sea-level, formed the watershed between the Some on the one side and the rivers of south-western Belgium on the other. On the southern face of this watershed, which ran generally from east-south-east to west-north-west, the ground fell in a series of long irregular spurs and deep depressions to the valley of the Somme. Along the forward slopes of this face the enemy's first system of defence, starting from the Somme near Curlu, extended first northwards for 3,000 yards and then westwards for 7,000 yards to near Fricourt, where it turned nearly due north, forming a great salient angle in the enemy's lines. Approximately 10,000 yards north of Fricourt the trenches crossed the River Ancre, a tributary of the Somme, and continuing northwards passed over the summit of the watershed,
							<pb xml:id="n141"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP016a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP016a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP016a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Major-General Sir</hi><name type="person" key="name-209146">A. H. <hi rend="sc">Russell</hi></name>, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., (<hi rend="sc">d.</hi>), [<hi rend="sc">f.</hi>]<lb/><hi rend="i">General Officer Commanding New Zealand Division.</hi></head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n142"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP017a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP017a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP017a-g"/></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n143" n="113"/>
							about Hebuterne and Gommecourt, and down its northern spurs to Arras. Between the Somme and the Ancre, on a frontage of about 20,000 yards, the enemy had a second strong system of defences, established generally on the southern crest of the highest part of the watershed, at an average distance of from 3,000 to 5,000 yards behind the first system of trenches.</p>
            <p>The whole of these defences, as a result of about two years' preparations, had been rendered very formidable indeed. The first and second systems comprised several lines of deep trenches, protected by great belts of wire entanglements. The woods and villages between these systems had been converted into fortresses, and the existing cellars and chalk-pits supplemented by elaborately constructed dugouts. The enemy salients were particularly well defended, and every provision made for bringing enfilade machine gun fire across the front. Spacious dug-outs afforded shelter to the garrisoning troops during periods of heavy bombardment, and concrete machine gun emplacements were so arranged as to enable the trenches to be swept in the event of their capture. The whole system was one of extraordinary strength and depth. The enemy had other prepared lines of defence behind his second system of trenches. Between the Somme and the Ancre our trenches ran parallel and dose to those of the enemy, but below them; and while good direct observation was afforded over the German front system and also over the defences on the slopes between the first and second systems, the latter in many places could not be observed from the ground held by us. North of the Ancre the opposing trenches ran transversely across the main ridge, and there the enemy defences were equally formidable. At that point the enemy enjoyed no material advantage in the matter of command of ground; though mainly owing to the nature of the country our direct observation over the enemy country was not as good as it was further south.</p>
            <p>The 11th September found the Regiment within close call of battle. The two Battalions were resting, the 1st at Fricourt, and the 2nd outside Mametz Wood, and at both places the final preparations and finishing touches were being effected prior to going into action. During the succeeding<pb xml:id="n144" n="114"/> few days officers of both Battalions availed themselves of every opportunity of becoming acquainted as far as possible with the ground over which the impending attack was to take place; lengthy conferences were held, maps were closely studied, and everything possible done by exhaustive preliminary preparation to ensure the success of operations.</p>
            <p>In leaving the Armentieres area and moving to the area of the Some, the New Zealand Division had passed from the Second Army, under General Plumer, to the Fourth Army, under General Rawlinson, and was now incorporated in the XV. Corps.</p>
            <p>On September 12th it was announced that the Fourth Army and the Reserve Army, together with the French, who were on our right, were to attack the enemy simultaneously on September 15th. The Fourth Army was confronted with an ambitious programme. It was to attack the enemy's defences with a view to the capture of Morval-le-Boeufs, Gueudecourt and Flers, and at the same time break through the strong enemy defences in the areas of those villages. The attack was to be pushed home with the utmost vigour until the most distant objectives had been reached. For the preceding two and a half months, it was pointed out, we had been unceasingly wearing down the enemy until his <hi rend="i">morale</hi> was badly shaken; and it was therefore confidently <hi rend="i">.</hi> hoped that a combined and determined effort, such as that about to be made, would result in decisive victory. It is true that British strength and British valour had been employed against the iron walls of the great German defensive system for two and a half months; that artillery beyond anything previously used or thought of had been brought to bear against him; but fortified as he was behind those terrible barriers of wire and other ramifications of almost impenetrable defence, it is doubtful if his <hi rend="i">morale</hi> was as severely shaken as might reasonably have been supposed. The desperate and sustained nature of his resistance certainly did not justify this conclusion.</p>
            <p>The participation of the XV. Corps in the attack included the New Zealand, the 14th, and the 41st Divisions; and in line of battle the New Zealand Division was placed on the Corps left, while the 47th Division, of the 111. Corps, was in turn on our left.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n145" n="115"/>
            <p>The objective assigned to the New Zealand Division was to be attacked by the 2nd Infantry Brigade and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, with the 1st Infantry Brigade in Divisional reserve. The 2nd Infantry Brigade was selected to attack and capture the first objective, with a limit of two battalions for that purpose, and with the remaining two battalions intact and not to be used without reference to the G.O.C. Division.</p>
            <p>The various lines of the Corps objective will serve more clearly to illustrate the scope and nature of the task in which the New Zcalanders were to be employed. Enumerated in order, they were briefly as follows:—1st—The line of Switch Trench. 2nd—The line of Flers and Fat Trenches, extending along the front of Flers village and running practically parallel to Switch Trench. On the left there was a divergence from Flers Trench in the direction of and along the high ground of Fat Trench and thence back to the point of the cross-roads junctioned by Flag Lane in order to straighten out the general line. 3rd—The village of Flers, and a line extending from Flers support on the left up to Abbey Road, and thence across the tear of the village and along Bulls Road to the right. 4th—The final objective, which was to embrace the village of Gueudecourt and its northern outskirts, and the intervening country and trench systems. The 2nd Brigade attacking troops were to assemble forward of Worcester and Tea Trenches (two battalions), and in Savoy and Carlton Trenches (two battalions); and the 3rd Brigade troops just forward of the two 2nd Brigade rear battalions and to the left of Longueval; while two battalions of the 1st Infantry Brigade were to assemble in Mametz Wood, and two battalions (including the 1st Battalion of Otago) in Fricourt Wood, ready to move at 15 minutes' notice in the event of being required.</p>
            <p>The 1st and 2nd New Zealand Field Artillery Brigades, and the artillery of the 14th Division, were immediately supporting the New Zealand Division's share in the general attack. A heavy and devastating bombardment of the hostile defences over the area we ace concerned with had commenced on the 12th September, and the sullen roar and rumble of hundreds of guns of many calibres pounding at and endeavouring to destroy the extensive German defence system already augured well for the 15th.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n146" n="116"/>
            <p>In not a few respects the impending attack had new and strange features for the Regiment. The weight of concentrated artillery employed was infinitely greater than anything hitherto experienced; the attack was to be carried out behind what might be described as the protective screen of advancing walls of steel—technically known as the creeping barrage; there were to be in the air contact aeroplanes which would keep in constant touch with the infantry and register for the information of those concerned the line or points which had been reached, determined by spotting the ground flares lit by the infantry when on their objective, or by personal observation; and, of more moment and interest than all else, the occasion was the first on which tanks, those monstrous and fantastic creations of the mechanical mind, were to make their appearance. How much the tanks actually fulfilled of all that had been predicted of them, on this occasion at least, is a matter that invites some argument. The number employed with the New Zealand Division was four, and in view of the fact that at least three of them were quickly out of action owing either to mechanical troubles or inability to cope with the great craters and shell-holes and upheavals which they encountered, it might perhaps have been wiser to have delayed their appearance until such time as they could have been assembled in greater numbers. One of the four tanks allotted to the Division did actually perform extraordinarily effective work, reaching and passing beyond the village of Flers, breathing death and destruction as it lumbered along its track and instilling fear of a kind hitherto unknown into those of the enemy who encountered it; for, gazing at it for a second, in terror they fled precipitately.</p>
            <p>In keeping with the policy of attack laid down for September 15th, no pause was to be made on the line of Coffee-Crest Trenches, which were to be dealt with by "mopping-up" parties specially detailed, On reaching the first objective no further advance was to be made until one hour after zero—which, clearly expressed, is the time the attack opens—after which the artillery barrage was to begin creeping forward towards the line of the second objective. Two hours after zero the infantry were to advance for the capture of the third objective; and four and a half hours after zero they were to move forward to the assault and capture of the <pb xml:id="n147" n="117"/> final objective and the formation of a defensive flank facing west. It will be agreed that an attack must be laid down on specific and express lines of procedure; in other words, on the basis of a time-table, in order to produce unanimity and co-ordination of action at all points and to work out a definite and accurately timed programme of artillery cooperation. This is what is aimed at, and normally what would be achieved; but there are incidents and various checks and fluctuations in the tide of battle which at times rather seriously interfere with the execution of this prearranged programme, and it is then that initiative and quick decision translated into rapid action on the part of those in command of the situation are of priceless value.</p>
            <p>To resume the narrative of the Regiment's operations, on September 12th the 2nd Battalion, at fighting strength, marched up to the right front of High Wood and took up a position, handed over by the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, in Wood Lane, Worcester Trench, and Seaforth Trench, Battalion Headquarters establishing itself in an old German dug-out. During the night patrols went out towards Crest Trench, which was then part of the German front line, while digging parties connected Farm Trench with Wood Lane. The following day the Battalion commenced an important work in the construction of a new line, to be named Otago Trench, which extended to the west and connected Tea Trench with the Apex near High Wood. This work was taken over next day by one company of Wellington Battalion and one company of Canterbury Battalion and completed. At this stage the 1st Battalion of Otago had reached Fricourt Wood, arriving there about 11 o'clock at night and bivouacking. This brings us to the evening preceding the attack. The 2nd Battalion was in position and ready for the serious events of the morning. To make assurance doubly sure Lieut.-Colonel Smith had a long conference with his Company Commanders on the task that lay before them, and with a feeling that everything was in order, there was no reason to doubt that on the following morning the Battalion would acquit itself gallantly and well in this new phase of fighting. Much useful information had been gained by Sergt. R. Travis as a result of an exhaustive night reconnaissance of the area of Switch Trenches.</p>
          </div>
          <pb xml:id="n148" n="118"/>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d2-d2" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Regiment in Action.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>The weather broke fine on the morning of September 15th. Zero hour was fixed at 6.20 am., and by 6 o'clock all ranks had breakfasted and were fortified by a stout issue of rum. In order as far as possible to conceal from the enemy the hour of attack there was no increase of our artillery fire immediately before the assault was timed to commence. Shortly after 6 o'clock three distinct lines of troops of the 2nd Battalion of Otago, which in conjunction with the 2nd Battalion of Auckland was to open the New Zealand Division's attack, had formed up in front of the new Otago Trench at intervals in depth of about 50 yards, and a fourth line was in Otago Trench itself.</p>
            <p>Zero hour, 6.20 a.m., was the common signal for a mighty effort on the part of infantry and artillery. An intense and hurricane-like barrage of field artillery instantaneously broke out along the line; the great howitzers in the rear, hitherto firing but intermittently, now burst forth in extreme violence, and the anxiously awaiting lines of infantrymen stepped forward as in one accord and moved straight to their task. But the advancing waves had not proceeded far before officers and men began to drop from the ranks, for heavy machine gun fire was coming from the left and from the front of High Wood. It had been strongly impressed on everyone that the leading waves must hug the barrage, but the pace of the barrage and the pace of an anxious infantry barely coincided, and even before Crest Trench had been reached two distinct halts had been made to allow of the barrage lifting. During these intervals men took snap-shots at machine guns which were observed on the line of Crest Trench. When it was possible to move forward again not a few in their eagerness worked their way through gaps in the barrage and were caught up in our own fire. On the left the 140th Brigade was temporarily held up outside High Wood, the result being a considerable and dangerous gap on our left flank, and from this quarter enemy machine guns and snipers enfiladed and swept our advancing waves with disastrous effect.</p>
            <p>On the right of the Battalion the position was quite secure, and close touch was maintained with the 2nd Battalion of Auckland. which in turn was in touch with the 122nd
							<pb xml:id="n149" n="119"/>
							Brigade of the 41st Division on its right. Thus, with Otago and Auckland Battalions attacking on a combined frontage of approximately 950 yards, Crest Trench was stormed and its garrison quickly dealt with. Those of the enemy who chose to remain in it and confronted the Otago men hurled bombs and fired their rifles at the advancing infantrymen almost up to the last moment, and then threw up their hands and called for mercy. Two hundred or more of the enemy had previously elected to turn and run towards the shelter of Switch Trench in the rear, and a considerable number of them were shot down by our Lewis gunners in the third wave before they reached it. Crest Trench was in point of fact thus left lightly held, the leading wave quickly rushed it, fiercely brushed aside the enemy's foolish presumption of mercy to be bought so easily, and when Crest Trench was finished with there was a grim significance in the fact that the only enemy left alive in it were two stretcher bearers and two wounded men.</p>
            <p>Sections from the fourth wave, now up in line, were left to mop up the trench, and the three leading waves swept on towards the more formidable Switch Line, a distance of about 250 yards ahead. Up to this stage the Battalion had suffered severely from the machine gun fire from the left previously referred to, but the 140th Brigade had now come up more into line and the trouble from that quarter diminished accordingly. On arrival at Switch Trench the four waves, according to programme, had merged into one, and when they jumped into the trench there was not much work left for the bayonet. Switch Trench had been strongly held by machine guns, but the speed with which the attack was delivered, and the manner in which it was pushed forward, prevented the enemy bringing these weapons into action once the barrage had forced him to run to cover. It was a case of point-blank rifle fire, a sudden rush, a liberal use of the bomb, and Switch Trench was clear of the enemy and in our hands. This was at 6.53 am., or half an hour after the attack had opened. The only prisoners taken were four German officers. Our slightly wounded were left as guard over deep dug-outs which, although already well bombed, possibly still contained lurking enemy.</p>
            <p>The Battalion, in company with Auckland, then went forward a distance of 70 yards, and the siting and digging
							<pb xml:id="n150" n="120"/>
							of a new line in front of Switch Trench was at once commenced. Major W. G. Wray and Captain D. E. Bremner, although both had been wounded, marked out the line along Otago's front. By midday, as the result of desperately hard work, the new line had been dug to an appreciable depth. The enemy's artillery had now determined our line of consolidation, and commenced shelling it with most destructive precision. This continued until well after dusk, and in places the new trench was completely blown in, necessitating a great deal of re-digging; but our men, working with extraordinary vigour, had by evening dug into a depth of six feet over all. Following upon the capture of the objective one company of the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury came up and commenced the construction of strong-points and otherwise ensured the safety of the refused left flank from the possibility of attack from the direction of High Wood; while the placing of four additional Vickers guns along the front gave still further security. During the night this Canterbury Company continued its task and connected up with the line of the 140th Brigade to the left.</p>
            <p>For the purposes of the attack our artillery barrage in its various phases had proved wonderfully accurate and effective. The enemy's wire was practically smashed up all along the line, whilst his trenches were almost entirely demolished and in places quite obliterated. That the Germans up to the point when this avalanche descended upon them had lived with some degree of luxury was evidenced by the discovery of hot coffee, wine, and good cigars in some of the deep dug-outs—all spoils for the victors. Thus the first objective in our first attack on the Somme was carried and held. But our casualties were heavy. The Battalion went into action with 20 officers and 816 other ranks, and the losses for the day in killed, wounded and missing, were 15 officers and 445 other ranks; but the advance had been magnificently and determinedly carried out from start to finish. It was from the left flank that the Battalion suffered most; and in view of the volume of machine gun fire which came from that quarter during the advance, and the fact that our left had not then been linked up with the right of the 8th Regiment of the 140th Brigade, and that High Wood had not at that stage been cleared of the enemy, <choice><orig>Lieut.-<pb xml:id="n151" n="121"/>Colonel</orig><reg>Lieut.-Colonel</reg></choice> Smith, who had gone forward to personally reconnoitre the position, naturally for a time viewed the situation with a good deal of uneasiness. His left companies had suffered very severely. The 10th Company, after losing all its officers, was, for example, reduced to 36 men, and was commanded with much skill and judgment by Sergt. H. Bellamy. The arrival of the company of the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury, however, fortified the exposed left flank, and it was finally made quite secure.</p>
            <p>At midnight on the 15th Otago was relieved by Canterbury, and the remnant of the Battalion marched back during the early hours of the morning to Savoy and Carlton Trenches. It rested there until 3.30 p.m. on the 16th, and during that interval men who had been wounded or got adrift in the confusion of attack were coming in from all quarters wet and weary beyond description. In the afternoon the Battalion moved up again to Worcester, <name key="name-011004" type="organisation">Black Watch</name> and Seaforth Trenches, with an effective strength of 17 officers and 466 other ranks; and later in the evening took in hand the task of consolidating and making its position on the left flank secure against a threatened counter-attack from the direction of High Wood. The Battalion remained there over the 17th and the greater part of the 18th.</p>
            <p>In resuming the narrative of the day's operations, it will be necessary in order to gain some fairly clear idea of the general course of the attack to remember that after a lapse of one hour from zero the troops of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade were to advance to the assault and capture of the remaining objectives. At the appointed time the artillery barrage reopened with all its former intensity, and the men of the Rifle Brigade, passing through Otago and Auckland troops, now settled on the Switch Line, moved forward to the second objective, which was practically the trench system extending along and defending the south-western side of Flers village. Simultaneously, as these troops advanced from their assembly points, the 2nd Battalions of Canterbury and Wellington moved into the positions thus vacated. The Rifle Brigade, in face of heavy machine gun fire, captured the second line, then advanced to the assault of the third objective, and finally swept through the western edge of the village of Flers. About 1 p.m. advice had been received that an enemy <choice><orig>counter-<pb xml:id="n152" n="122"/>attack</orig><reg>counterattack</reg></choice> was developing from a point north-west of the village, and the 2nd Battalion of Wellington was ordered to move forward and meet it and afford support to the 3rd Brigade troops. The enemy was now heavily shelling the Switch Line and sweeping the areas between there and Flers village. The two leading Companies of Wellington, however, pushed on through Flers and beyond to the north-western side of the village. The capture of Flers was not actually in the New Zealand Division's programme, but to that extreme point, the north-western side, three platoons of 3rd Brigade troops had forced their way. The Wellington men were distributed along the shelter of the sunken road in rear, and a return was made to reconnoitre and search the village; but so grim had been the earlier fighting there that only dead and maimed and dying men were found in the streets and among the shattered ruins. A continuation of the search along the road leading from Flers to Factory Corner, and to the right of the village, located two further platoons of 3rd Brigade troops. The Wellington troops were immediately called upon to fill the gap between these isolated right and left parties, and by connecting up the front the northern side of Flers village was secured. It was during this stage that one of the four tanks allotted to the Division, having nosed its way through the ruins, performed valuable work, lumbering along the Flers-Factory Corner Road and covering the infantry's task of consolidation with broadsides of machine gun fire and blasts from its forward gun. Later in the evening the position encircling Flers was made more secure by the arrival of additional men and machine guns, and before midnight the line was well dug in and protected by the cross-fire of Vickers guns. When a systematic search of the village was made, most of the cellars were found to contain enemy in numbers. Several prisoners had been taken when an enemy party came out with a machine gun and raked the clearing party, killing three and wounding four; thereafter no prisoners were taken.</p>
            <p>At the close of the day the XV. Corps consolidated on the line held, which was approximately that of the third objective. There was further grim work ahead for the morrow.</p>
            <p>We may now turn to the 1st Battalion of the Regiment, which we had left in Fricourt Wood when the attack opened <pb xml:id="n153" n="123"/> early in the morning awaiting developments and ready for any emergency. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the Battalion moved up to Mametz Wood and again bivouacked. The 14th Company was then detached and ordered to proceed to Green Dump to act as ration carriers, and the Battalion was thus left with three Companies. Shortly after midnight it moved out from Mametz Wood and proceeding through Thistle Alley worked its way up to the allotted point of assembly, which comprised trenches prepared for the troops concerned in the attack of the 15th. Heavy rain, the darkness of night, and the strangeness of the surroundings did not tend to make this operation an easy one.</p>
            <p>The general attack of the XV. Corps on Les Boeufs and Gueudecourt was to be resumed on the following morning, the 16th. The III. Corps on the left was engaged with the high ridge west of Flers and the village of Martinpuich. It was later discovered that bombing parties had reached the neighbourhood of Gird and Gird Support trenches on the right of Flers and found that they were lightly held. Further reconnaissances also pointed to Grove Alley being vacated. It was accordingly decided to suspend the heavy artillery bombardment of Gird and Gird Support trenches, and the 14th and 41st Divisions were ordered to push forward strong patrols and if possible occupy these lines. The New Zealand Division was to co-operate by guarding the left flank and occupying the line of Grove Alley originally allotted to it, which was on the left and in advance of the line then occupied. The 1st Infantry Brigade was ordered to carry out this operation, to move one Battalion up to near the third objective and concentrate the remainder of the Brigade between the Switch Line and the road leading thence to the south. It was decided that after this, the fourth objective, had been gained, further objectives would be attacked; the New Zealand Division's share in this extension of operations to be the capture of Goose Alley, stretching from Flers Trench to Gird Support and representing a front of approximately 1,750 yards, and joining up with the III. Corps. This actually meant for us swinging the attack round to the west from the northerly direction previously followed.</p>
            <p>At 10.20 a.m. on the 16th the 1st Battalion of Wellington occupied Grove Alley with ease, and pushed forward patrols
							<pb xml:id="n154" n="124"/>
							in the direction of Goose Alley. By 10.45 a.m. the 1st Battalion of Otago, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Charters, commenced to move forward to Switch Trench, and before 1 p.m. had reached and settled down there. In order to reach this position the Battalion had been forced to pass through a heavy barrage of fire, extending right along Switch Trench and from there back over the reverse slope to Tea Trench and its left extensions. The casualties incurred in effecting this change of positions for the attack were fairly numerous.</p>
            <p>But the intended attack on Goose Alley, timed for 1 p.m. on the date mentioned, did not take place, owing to the attack of the 41st Division on the right not having advanced sufficiently far north of Flers. It was accordingly announced that the general attack would be renewed on the 18th, with the 55th Division in relief of the 41st, and the 21st Division in relief of the 14th. On the 17th it was notified that a further postponement to the 21st was necessary. But subsequently it was definitely postponed until the 25th owing principally to the severity of the weather and the ever-accumulating mud and accentuation of difficulties of movement and traffic.</p>
            <p>During the night of the 16th-17th the 1st Battalion had moved up to Fat Trench in relief of the 4th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade, and the deepening and improvement of this line which was then effected materially assisted in keeping down casualties later. With the Battalion established in Fat Trench, the situation had continued fairly normal up to 1 p.m. on the 17th, when the enemy opened and maintained for some time a heavy bombardment of our left sector, occupied by 8th and 10th Companies. This intense bombardment of our lines was renewed at 3.30 p.m., and continued until 6 p.m., at which stage a message that the enemy was barraging Cough-drop Line necessitated steps being taken to watch the left flank closely in view of possible enemy action. There was a further resumption of this heavy shelling at 9 p.m., but it was not so severe over our area as formerly. The ultimate result of these periods of extreme artillery activity was an increasing toll of casualties and a necessity for constantly effecting repairs to our trenches.</p>
            <p>At two o'clock on the morning of the 18th a message was received from Brigade that the Battalion of the
							<pb xml:id="n155" n="125"/>
							London Rifles on our left was making an attack on that part of Flers Trench and Flers Support adjoining the left of the line held by the 1st Battalion of Auckland and extending to Goose Alley, and that Otago Battalion was to take over the position when it had been consolidated. Previous to this, the 10th (North Otago) Company, commanded by Captain J. Hargest, had been in touch with the 8th London Regiment in Fat Trench, and because of the latter's numerical weakness had taken over about 200 yards of its line. When the 8th London troops attacked at 5.30 a.m. the Lewis guns of 10th Company, together with two Vickers guns under Lieut. R. B. Caws, were thrust forward in readiness to support their right flank, and for the material assistance thus given an appreciative letter of thanks was received from the G.O.C. 47th Division. The 8th (Southland) Company, commanded by Major S. Rice, now proceeded to take over the new line, but the enemy in Goose Alley harassed our men with bombs from the high ground at the junction of Flers Trench and Goose Alley, the locality of many grim struggles, and endeavoured to work their way down from it. It was therefore necessary to bomb the enemy back in the direction of Goose Alley and establish protective blocks. The work accomplished on this morning by our bombers, under Lance-corp. W. Murray, against almost overwhelming odds, was of a very gallant order. The enemy resorted to volley firing, and in addition to being more liberally supplied with bombs, had the advantage of position on the high ground. However, our party succeeded in accomplishing its task of establishing and maintaining a block, notwithstanding the fact that every bomber of the Battalion who had been engaged had become a casualty.</p>
            <p>At 11 p.m. the Battalion was relieved by Companies of the 2nd Battalions of Otago and Auckland, and moved back to Carlton Trench, reaching there at 4.30 a.m. on the 19th. The weather was now extremely bad, and the floundering in the deep mud and ooze of the Somme made a change-over a most exhaustive process. A hot meal was served at Carlton Trench, and subsequently there was a slight improvement in the weather. But the troops were in the worst possible state of wretchedness and exhaustion. The period just completed, though it had passed without
							<pb xml:id="n156" n="126"/>
							an actual attack being delivered, represented one of the very worst the Regiment had experienced. Incessant rain had fallen for 60 hours; the men were standing or moving knee-deep in mud the whole of the time; they were soaked in rain, and no hot food was procurable owing to the long distance to be covered from the dump. Furthermore, the effect of the enemy shell fire on congested trenches made the conditions simply appalling. On arrival at Carlton Trench, where the Battalion bivouacked over the succeeding few days, the state to which everyone was reduced was that of the deepest misery and exhaustion. Major Colquhoun at this time rejoined the Battalion, officers who had been left at the Rest Camp arrived, and the 14th Company returned from Green Dump, where it had been providing carrying parties. All available roads, such as they were, were taxed to the utmost by the constant stream of wheeled traffic with material of war for the artillery and front line, and with the heavy rain on top of all this, were in an almost impassable state. But repairs must be kept going; new roads must be formed as the Army advanced; and the demand for large working parties under these circumstances was inevitable. Still, the period represented a short respite of a kind and allowed for the gathering of new strength for a further effort before many hours.</p>
            <p>When the 2nd Battalion of Otago moved up to Flag and Fat Trenches on the 18th in conformity with the relief of the 1st Brigade, the position on the left still remained obscure. The enemy was apparently determined not to be ousted from Flers Trench and Flers Support in the locality of Goose Alley, nor to be denied his hold on the junction of Drop Alley. The 4th and 8th Companies were sent up in support of Auckland troops who were endeavouring, though unsuccessfully, to push the enemy out by bombing attacks; and in the interval 10th Company was concerned with the digging of a new assembly trench. It was imperative that a footing should be gained on the high ground in order to facilitate our further advance and the ultimate capture of the Gird trenches. On the 20th Canterbury troops made a most determined assault on the enemy at this point under cover of darkness in an endeavour to definitely settle the ownership of the disputed locality of Goose Alley and Drop <pb xml:id="n157" n="127"/> Alley. The attack, in which the fighting was of the fiercest order, was successful, but was followed by a well organised counter-attack up Flers Line, which drove back the bombing post and the garrison of the strong-point, regained the whole of Drop Alley and threatened the left and left rear. Rallying to the attack once more Canterbury overwhelmed the enemy in a fierce encounter, drove him off the crest, and finally held and consolidated the position against a further counter-attack launched on the evening of the 21st. Canterbury Regiment naturally suffered heavily in this bitter struggle; but the ground was strewn with German dead, of whom it was estimated 300 had been killed in the fighting just concluded.</p>
            <p>On the evening of the 21st there was an intense bombardment of all our lines. We were now in touch on the left with the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch, who had relieved the London Regiment, and at about 10 p.m. we were in turn relieved by the 4th Battalion of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, and companies went back independently to Worcester and Seaforth Trenches. On the 22nd welcome reinforcements arrived to the number of eight officers and 140 other ranks. The Battalion was being seriously weakened in strength, but in spite of the gruelling work, the heavy and almost incessant shelling, and the mud of seemingly unfathomable depths, there was no diminution of the fighting spirit. So it was, indeed, with the whole of the Regiment.</p>
            <p>On September 24th the 1st Battalion moved out from Carlton Trench, <hi rend="i">via</hi> Turk Lane and Fat Trench, and the 2nd Battalion took up its quarters in the positions thus vacated. By 3 a.m. on the 25th the 1st Battalion had relieved Rifle Brigade troops in Flers Trench. The order of the day was quick reliefs, for it was only in this way that the hardships imposed by the weather and the unfavourable conditions generally could be successfully overcome. At 6 a.m. our trenches were heavily bombarded, and it was not until about 8.30 a.m. that the situation had quietened down. It was thought during this bombardment that the enemy was about to launch an attack, but no infantry action developed.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d2-d3" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Attack Renewed.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>The time had now arrived for the resumption of the general attack by the Fourth Army. In the minor, though <pb xml:id="n158" n="128"/> none the less desperate efforts of the preceding few days, we had gradually strengthened and advanced our positions, and had done much in the direction of asserting a valuable moral ascendancy over the enemy. The task allotted to the XV. Corps on September 25th was the capture of Gird Trench as far as its junction with the Gueudecourt-Factory Road, and the village of Gueudecourt itself. The New Zealand Division's share in this attack was the capture of Factory Corner, and the establishing of a line thence to the high ground running north-east from Flers Support across to Goose Alley over a frontage of 1,900 yards. This was to be carried out in conjunction with the advance of the III. Corps on our left, which was concerned with the capture of Flers Trench up to the High Wood-Thilloy Road, and finally joining up with the Reserve Army at Courcelette. The New Zealand Division was thus on the left of the XV. Corps, and on the gaining of the day's objective was to take over from the III. Corps on Flers Support as far north-west as its junction with Goose Alley. Three Battalions of the 1st Infantry Brigade were to be utilised for the New Zealand Division's part in the attack, namely, Otago, Auckland, and Canterbury, in order named from left to right.</p>
            <p>The preliminary bombardment of the enemy's lines by the massed guns of all calibres had commenced at 7 a.m. on the 24th, but, as previously, in order to keep from the enemy any indication of the actual time of attack, there was to be no intensified bombardment immediately preceding zero hour. Grove Alley presented a rather serious obstacle to advancing troops owing to its great depth and width; but to overcome this difficulty steps were dug in the sides and duck-boards placed ready for facilitating the passage across. The attack really combined two stages, with the second part of which the 1st Battalion of Otago alone was concerned; the intention being to push forward to the high ground beyond the lower portion of Goose Alley fronting the first objective. The attack was to be carried out with two companies, constituting four waves in the front line, namely, 10th (North Otago) Company, commanded by Captain J. Hargest, and 4th (Otago) Company, commanded by Temp.-Captain J. Herbert, both being led and directed by Captain Hargest, with 14th (South Otago) Company, commanded by Captain W.
							<pb xml:id="n159"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP018a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP018a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP018a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Lieut.-Colonel</hi><name type="person" key="name-130134">A. B. <hi rend="sc">Charters</hi></name>,<lb/>C.M.G., D.S.O., (<hi rend="lsc">D.</hi>)</head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n160" n="129"/> Ward, in support and 8th (Southland) Company commanded by Major S. Rice, in reserve. On the morning of the attack the enemy artillery had opened up very heavy fire along Flers Support. Zero hour was fixed for 12.35 p.m., and prior to that time the two leading waves had formed up in Grove Alley and the second two in rear.</p>
            <p>Punctually to time the barrage of many guns broke out along the front, the great howitzers joining with unexampled violence in the chorus. Almost at the moment that our barrage fell, the fire from many light enemy guns grouped about Goose Alley ceased abruptly. The attack got well away, moving behind the barrage with such regularity as to resemble a practice movement on a grand scale. The road and low ground in front of Grove Alley having been safely crossed, the ascent of the ridge running up to Goose Alley was commenced; but fairly heavy machine gun fire from the right front was encountered and a number of casualties sustained. A party of the enemy, numbering from 50 to 60, bravely counter-attacked over the crest of the ridge as our attack was actually in motion, but their attempt to get through our barrage was unsuccessful, and when our attacking troops passed over the ground a few wounded men and three smashed machine guns were all that was left of them. This enemy attack was delivered from about the junction of Goose Alley and the Flers-Eaucourt L'Abbaye Road, and was probably conceived with the object of covering the withdrawal of the enemy quick-firing guns previously referred to. On arrival at the crest of the hill it was found that Goose Alley, instead of being on the near slope, as was assumed, was about 200 yards down the forward slope, and in attacking down hill the men came under heavy sniping and machine gun fire from the direction of Eaucourt L'Abbaye, the sparseness of the line alone preventing many casualties. In Goose Alley itself the enemy was encountered in but limited numbers, and they were either bayoneted or surrendered.</p>
            <p>The work of consolidation of the new line was immediately commenced, and Lewis gun posts were pushed forward to a distance of from 60 to 100 yards. Goose Alley, on the left of the newly-formed position, was found to be so blocked with the dead of friend and foe, the result of the desperate and bitter fighting which had waged round the junction of Goose <pb xml:id="n161" n="130"/> Alley and Flers Support during preceding days, that a new trench had to be dug in front. The supporting 14th Company was sent up to refuse the right flank, and dug in along the Flers-Eaucourt L'Abbaye Road, facing north-east, the line at this point now forming a pronounced salient at the apex of which a strong-point and block were established. The operation had proved eminently successful.</p>
            <p>The 55th Division reported that it was in touch with Canterbury troops at Factory Corner, but the position there nevertheless for some time remained obscure. There was, indeed, a gap of about 500 yards between the right and the 55th Divisional troops, but this was ultimately adjusted by the 55th Division bridging it with strong-points. On the left everything had gone well, and we were in touch with the 1st Division. The day passed without change in the situation, though the enemy worried us in a desultory manner with heavy shells. Early in the afternoon Battalion Headquarters were blown out, and had to be moved forward to a new position in Flers Support. On the following day Battalion Headquarters again moved, on this occasion to Goose Alley, where a conference of Company Commanders was held in reference to further operations.</p>
            <p>On the afternoon of the above attack, a warning order was received from Corps that in the event of the situation being very favourable the New Zealand Division should be prepared to receive orders to attack the line of Gird Trenches north-west of Gueudecourt and thence south along Goose Alley to the point where it was then held. As the 1st Battalion of Otago was on the left flank of the projected attack, Lieut.-Colonel Charters was ordered to form a defensive flank along the line of Goose Alley by constructing a line of strong-points facing north-west. The 55th Division on the right would at the same time attack from the Gueudecourt-Factory Corner Road northwards. The situation in Gueudecourt village, however, was not clear, and for that reason the attack intended for the 26th was postponed until the 27th. As a matter of fact, between four and five o'clock on the afternoon of the 26th the enemy was observed in considerable numbers advancing across the open from the direction of Ligny Thilloy and Le Barque with a view to attacking the 55th Division, east of Factory Corner. After covering some <pb xml:id="n162" n="131"/> distance they were seen to conceal themselves in the corn and long grass, whereupon the area was promptly and, apparently, effectively searched by the 55th Field Artillery.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d2-d4" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">A Bitter Experience.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>The attack for the 27th, to which the 1st Infantry Brigade was committed, was timed to commence at 2.15 p.m., and at 7 a.m. the preliminary bombardment opened. The 1st Battalion of Otago was again on the left of the attack, and when the barrage came down deployed in the following order: 14th Company on the right; 4th Company on the left; 8th Company in support; and 10th Company moving north along the line of Goose Alley on the left of the attack.</p>
            <p>Punctually to time and in good order the Battalion advanced to the attack, and with only a moderate number of casualties crossed the line of Factory Corner-Eaucourt L'Abbaye Road, From this stage the ground fell away abruptly and the attacking troops almost immediately came under a withering blast of fire from enemy rifles and machine guns posted along Gird Trench and Gird Support. The two leading Companies, 14th and 4th, valiantly endeavoured to press on against this hail of fire; but it was only a question of distance when they were literally swept away by it. Every officer and almost every man became a casualty. The 8th Company, following in rear, now advanced into the breach. With equal gallantry the endeavour to reach Gird Trench was renewed, only to find that the protecting wire in the low lying ground was uncut. Here the attack withered away, and the few survivors, the remnant of three shattered Companies, took refuge in the shell-holes. A few of our men, joining up with the 1st Battalion of Auckland on the right, had succeeded in reaching Gird Trench.</p>
            <p>In the meantime, 10th Company, advancing up Goose Alley on the left of the attack, found this enemy trench almost obliterated, an example of our artillery's incessant pounding. Posts were established at intervals of about 150 yards in order to form the left flank of the Division. On crossing the road, Goose Alley was found to be so utterly wrecked by shell fire that it practically ceased to exist. The required strength <pb xml:id="n163" n="132"/> for a post pushed down the forward slope overlooking Gird Trench and there dug in.</p>
            <p>It was now realised by Captain Hargest, commanding 10th Company, that the frontal attacking Companies had failed to gain their objectives; had in fact been practically destroyed; and as there were no officers it was decided to dig in on the line gained. Assuming command of the remnant of the four Companies, for 10th Company had also suffered heavily, Captain Hargest established a line which extended across to the right, thus forming a junction with Auckland, whose left Company had also received very severe punishment and had been equally unable to reach its objective. When darkness came down the line was further consolidated; sergeants were placed in command of the various posts; all the wounded that could be collected were brought into Goose Alley, and as many of the dead as possible were buried. Owing to the high total of losses in killed and wounded this was a bad day for the 1st Battalion. About one o'clock on the following morning a company of Wellington Battalion, together with a section of the 1st Trench Mortar Battery, came up and assisted to strengthen the position.</p>
            <p>A further attack was contemplated with the object of capturing portion of the Gird system to right and left of Goose Alley, as well as an extension of Goose Alley itself. The attack, timed for 3 a.m. on the 28th, was to be carried out by Wellington troops, with the assistance of a tank, with the 55th Division on our right co-operating. On their way up to position of assembly so large a percentage of the troops intended for the operation was cut off by heavy artillery fire that when daylight broke it was decided not to persist in the attack. A reconnaissance subsequently made of the area covered by the junctions of Gird Trench and Gird Support with Goose Alley disclosed the fact that it was actually at the bottom of what might be described as a saucer, and practically untenable in itself. At a later hour a successful attack by troops of the New Zealand Division gave us possession of Gird Trench, Gird Support, and Goose Alley extending to the lip of the saucer, a distance of about 100 yards, and under cover of darkness the three trenches were junctioned.</p>
            <p>The 1st Battalion's attack against the Gird system of <pb xml:id="n164" n="133"/> trenches and along Goose Alley on September 27th unquestionably represented the Regiment's most bitter and costly experience on the Somme. When the Battalion marched out of the line on the night of the 28th it was reduced to a strength of 113, which was considerably below that of a company. The fire encountered by the leading companies almost immediately after crossing the line of the Factory Corner-Eaucourt L'Abbaye Road was of a nature such as only those who had gallantly, though vainly, endeavoured to struggle through it could realise; and the line which the attack reached was only gained because of the extraordinary spirit of self-sacrifice of officers and men in face of overwhelming odds; Gird Trench, and Gird Support in particular having been densely packed with an enemy liberally supplied with machine guns. The problem presented by having to handle such a number of wounded called for the greatest exertions of the stretcher parties, who worked unceasingly throughout the night under almost insuperable difficulties of mud and distance. Many of the wounded succeeded in staggering back unaided, but there were others who were so sorely wounded as to be beyond the aid of the bearers when their turn came.</p>
            <p>The 2nd Infantry Brigade took over the line on the night of the 28th, and it fell to the lot of the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, then resting south of the Longueval-Bazentin Road, to relieve the 1st Battalion. The relief was apparently discovered by the enemy as it was being effected, and it was only the proximity of cover afforded by Goose Alley that saved the Battalion from the artillery fire that followed. During the night a communication trench was constructed in order to improve the junction with the 2nd Battalion of Auckland on the right. On the left we were in touch with the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade.</p>
            <p>On the 29th the 1st Battalion of Otago had moved over to Mametz Wood, and was there afforded the rest so sorely needed.</p>
            <p>The enemy, now obviously out of temper at being compelled to give ground at so many points, viciously shelled the locality of Goose Alley throughout the day following the inter-change of Battalions, and machine gun and sniping fire added to our casualties. This was maintained over the 30th, <pb xml:id="n165" n="134"/> indicating on the part of the enemy a state of increasing nervousness and fear of further attacks. And, indeed, he had good grounds for alarm, for an attack, in which the New-Zealand Division was concerned, had already been planned for Sunday, October 1st. This operation was directed towards sweeping the enemy out of his positions in the Gird system in the neighbourhood of Goose Alley, and attacking and capturing a line of trenches over a front of approximately 1,000 yards westward to a point known as the Circus. The 47th Division (of the III. Corps) on our immediate left, was co-operating, with Eaucourt L'Abbaye as its main objective. The New Zealand Divisional task was allotted to the 2nd Infantry Brigade, to which two Battalions of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade were attached for the purposes of the attack. The Brigade was also responsible for the left flank, and for a communication trench running from the Circus south to the L'Abbaye Road. In the further allotment of tasks Otago and Canterbury were selected as the two assaulting Battalions, while Wellington Battalion was detailed to follow Otago as an immediate support; Auckland meantime holding our front line in Gird Trench on the extreme right of the attacking Battalions.</p>
          </div>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d2-d5" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">A Final Effort.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>At seven o'clock on the morning of October 1st a heavy preliminary bombardment of the enemy's defences over the Corps front was commenced. Zero hour was fixed for 3.15 p.m., and in order to deceive the enemy it was decided that at zero hour an additional and intense bombardment should be put down over his lines on a part of the front on which no attack was to be launched.</p>
            <p>The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment assembled in Goose Alley for the attack, and under cover of an artillery barrage extending over a line parallel thereto, moved forward at zero hour to the assault in four waves, each perfect in line and interval, and with rifles at the slope. Almost immediately, 4th Company on the right, together with portion of 8th Company, came under heavy machine gun fire from the direction of Gird Trench. The 10th and 14th Companies on the left were at this stage advancing across a depression which afforded comparative cover, and thus escaped the <pb xml:id="n166" n="135"/> gruelling fire which confronted the right companies. The 4th and 8th Companies had moreover a difficult manoeuvre to execute. After advancing for a distance of about 200 yards to their front it was necessary to incline to the right and then eventually to change direction to that quarter; and despite the heavy fire encountered the movement was effectively carried out.</p>
            <p>As the last Otago company went forward two companies of Wellington Battalion moved up Goose Alley and then forward in two waves in rear of and in support to Otago. Advancing to the crest of the ridge after changing direction, 4th and 8th Companies were seriously depleted in strength under the blasts of machine gun fire which swept their ranks. Every officer was a casualty, and non-commissioned officers and men were heavily hit. But with unfailing determination they pressed on, successfully reaching their objective and passing some distance beyond it. The terrific nature of our artillery barrage had so completely destroyed the enemy trench line that the objective was not recognisable; and soon afterwards the remnant of the attacking force were required to withdraw from under the line of our stationary barrage to what constituted the laid down objective, and there dug in with the supporting Wellington troops. In the meantime the two left companies of Otago, with equal determination, had pushed forward and past the Circus and established themselves along the road about 300 yards in advance of it, and there gained touch with the 19th London Regiment. It was near the Circus that Sergt. Donald Forrester Brown, of 10th (North Otago) Company, attacked and killed single-handed five enemy machine gunners and put the gun out of action. For his extraordinary courage and daring, and his equally worthy performance in the first attack on September 15th in rushing and knocking out enemy machine guns which were holding up the advance, this very gallant fellow was awarded the Victoria Cross. His death in action at a subsequent period of operations extinguished an heroic spirit and deprived the Regiment of a splendid soldier. Closely and actively associated with Sergt. Brown, and contributing to the success gained in the Battalion's opening attack, was Sergt. J. Rodgers, a soldier possesssing great courage and determination and equal to every emergency.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n167" n="136"/>
            <p>The 10th and 14th Companies had fared badly in the matter of losses. The first real opposition encountered was from a trench south of the Circus, where the enemy was finally either shot down or ran away. Touch had now been lost with 8th Company owing to the gaps created in its ranks and the dense smoke of battle which obscured the outlook. Furthermore, the extent to which the enemy trenches had been smashed by our artillery fire made it a difficult matter to determine the actual objective. The Circus was naturally thought to be a well defined point, but from a defensive point of view it had ceased to exist, and the men of Otago, together with those of the Wellington Company who had come up in support, pushed on to the ridge about 300 yards ahead and established themselves on what was certainly a very strong position, this step being taken as the result of a decision arrived at by the officers on the spot after a careful reconnaissance. Orders were subsequently received, however, to bring the flank back to the Circus in order to conform to the general line; and at 10 p.m. Captain W. G. A. Bishop, M.C., succeeded in getting into touch with our right Companies and Wellington troops, and before daylight the whole position was consolidated and made secure by punctuating the front with strong-points and the aid of machine guns. The entire attack had been splendidly carried out under galling fire and consequent severe losses, its success being entirely due to the dash of the assaulting troops under conditions of a most exacting nature. The artillery's part in the attack was certainly gruelling work for the men behind the guns; but even in spite of their devastating fire the enemy showed surprising quickness in getting his machine guns into action once the barrage had lifted. A very considerable number of the enemy were killed, and the prisoners taken totalled 200. Otago entered the attack with a strength of 19 officers and 314 other ranks; and the casualties sustained in the operation and while holding the line on October 2nd amounted to four officers and 33 other ranks killed, six officers and 93 other ranks wounded, 49 other ranks being recorded as missing; making a total of 10 officers and 175 other ranks.</p>
            <p>On the right of Otago the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury sustained heavy casualties from rifle and machine gun fire while advancing across the open. On approaching the
							<pb xml:id="n168"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP019a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP019a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP019a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Sergt. Donald Forrester Brown</hi>, V.C.<lb/>(<hi rend="i">Killed in Action</hi>).</head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n169"/>
							<figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP020a"><graphic url="WH1-OtagP020a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP020a-g"/><head><hi rend="sc">Lieut.-.Colonel</hi><name type="person" key="name-130142">G. S. <hi rend="sc">Smith</hi></name>, C.M.G., D.S.O., (<hi rend="sc">d.</hi>)</head></figure>
							<pb xml:id="n170" n="137"/> enemy's trenches they were also subjected to heavy fire; and severe fighting took place before they finally drove the enemy out and established themselves on the line of their objective. One minute before the attack was launched 36 oil mortars were discharged against the enemy from the front occupied by Canterbury, and 30 of these projectiles were observed to burst in Gird Support 400 yards away, covering the front with dense smoke and flame. When the trench was captured several groups, one of 20 and one of 15, of enemy dead were found badly scorched and charred by the oil flames. Some of the prisoners, as might have been expected, complained bitterly of the use of burning oil, and told of the terror excited by the fear of being caught by the flames. On the left of Otago men of the 19th London Regiment connected up at 5.30 p.m., but actually they were cut off from their own Division, the 47th, north of Eaucourt L'Abbaye; and arrangements had to be made by the New Zealand Division for the temporary feeding of 80 men. The day of October 2nd, when Otago continued in line, was characterised by persistent and heavy shelling over a wide area. On October 1st an attack was launched against Eaucourt L'Abbaye and the enemy defences east of it, and by the evening of the 3rd the whole of the village had been wrested from the enemy.</p>
            <p>At two o'clock on the morning of October 3rd the 2nd Battalion of Otago was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. Darkness, the heavy rain, the appalling mud and the distance to be covered, made the relief operation a most trying one, and save for the hot meal which was issued on getting back, Carlton Trench offered little more in the way of comfort than any other part of the battle-field; most of the men being destitute of ground-sheets or great coats. During the day the Battalion trekked down to Fricourt, six miles away, and there rested until 3 p.m. on October 6th.</p>
            <p>In the meantime the 1st Battalion had moved up on the 2nd from Mametz Wood to Switch and neighbouring trenches in relief of the 4th Battalion of the Rifle Brigade as support Battalion. The holding of this position was quite a brief affair, for on the following day the Battalion was relieved by troops of the 124th Brigade of the 41st Division and went back through the ooze and mud to Pommiers Redoubt, where it bivouacked over the succeeding three days.</p>
          </div>
          <pb xml:id="n171" n="138"/>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d2-d6" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Operations Reviewed.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>An order for the relief of the New Zealand Division, less Artillery, by the 41st Division, was issued on October 2nd, and two days later this had been given effect to. The Regiment thereupon marched out of the Somme Battlefield and turned its back on the devastated region, bringing to a close its first great period of sustained fighting on the Western Front. For 23 days the Regiment had been heavily engaged in fighting of the most desperate kind. It had been pitted against and fought to a standstill the best and most seasoned troops of the German Army, and had acquitted itself in a manner that evoked widespread confidence and admiration. That the enemy regarded the retention of every yard of ground as a matter of the most vital importance, and stubbornly contested it as such, was proved by the contents of a captured German Order, dated September 25th, from which the following is an extract: "The guiding principle during the fighting on the Somme is that no sap-head or shellcrater will be abandoned without the express order of the Supreme Command of the First Army." But the express orders of the Supreme Command of the First German Army, however much they were respected, were found impossible of fulfilment because of the demands of our own irresistible infantry.</p>
            <p>The methods of warfare employed in the Battle of the Somme were for the most part entirely new to our men, but they were assimilated and improved upon with an instinctive and ever ready initiative keenly alive to every emergency, backed by an unconquerable determination and a fighting spirit that never hesitated about paying the heavy toll so remorselessly exacted as the price of victory.</p>
            <p>The toll levied in dead and wounded, in maimed and missing, and in personal sacrifice and suffering was heavy indeed; but if the Regiment was at times temporarily broken in strength it was never broken in spirit. The appalling mud of the Somme Battlefield; the exertion and terrible weariness of unceasing trekking to and from the line; the prolonged and heavy fighting against a clever and stubborn enemy; the rain and its accompanying miseries; and the difficulties of transport, accentuated by the disappearance <pb xml:id="n172" n="139"/> of roads and tracks and the congestion of a never-ending traffic which must feed the insatiable maw of the front line, all multiplied and heaped up what might be regarded as insurmountable difficulties and hardships; but these were overcome with a determination and spirit that made our entry into the arena of the Somme the complete and sweeping success that it was. The gallant conduct in action of Company Sergt.-major Knox (4th Company, 2nd Battalion), who was awarded the Military Cross, was highly typical of the fine courage and leadership displayed by the senior non-commissioned officers of the Regiment throughout the operations.</p>
            <p>In reading these only too brief records of the fighting on the Somme, the conclusion arrived at might be that on each occasion on which the Regiment went into definite action, it suffered almost annihilating casualties. Certainly our losses were very heavy, but this fact serves to illustrate the formidable and almost irresistible strength of the enemy defences, even after our stupendous array of artillery had dealt with them. The system of frontal or bludgeon attacks against an enemy strongly entrenched and fortified must invariably prove expensive, and the tasks to which the Regiment was committed on the Somme were of such a nature that less determined and less valiant troops might have faltered in pushing them home to a successful issue. Viewed in this light, and considering the fact that all objectives were ultimately gained, and at times a great deal more, it will be realised that heavy losses were the inevitable price of victory. For example, the general attack on September 15th, in which the Regiment made its debut on the Somme, was attended by considerably greater gains than in any single operation launched since the great offensive had opened; and greater even than in the course of any subsequent operation. The New Zealand Division commenced its operations on a frontage of 950 yards, which was ultimately extended to 2,800 yards. It captured five miles of enemy front trenches, and five and a-half of subsidiary trenches, and effected an advance to a depth exceeding two miles.</p>
            <p>A congratulatory message received from <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name>, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces, ran as follows:—"The New Zealand Division has fought with the greatest gallantry in the Somme Battle for 23 consecutive days, <pb xml:id="n173" n="140"/> carrying out with complete success every task set, and always doing more than was asked of it. The Division has won universal confidence and admiration. No praise can be too high for such troops."</p>
            <p>General Rawlinson, Commanding the Fourth Army, wrote as follows:—"I desire to express to all ranks of the New Zealand Division my hearty congratulations on the excellent work they have done during the Battle of the Somme. On three successive occasions (15th and 25th September and 1st October) they attacked the hostile positions with the greatest gallantry and vigour, capturing in each attack every objective they had allotted to them. More than this, they gained possession of, and held, several strong-points in advance of and beyond the furthest objectives that had been allotted to them. The endurance and the fine fighting spirit of the Division has been beyond praise, and their success in the Flers neighbourhood will rank amongst the best achievements of the British Army. The control and direction of the Division during these operations have been conducted with skill and precision, whilst the artillery support in establishing the barrages and defending counter-attack has been in every way most effective. It is a matter of regret to me that this fine Division is leaving the Fourth Army, and I trust that on some future occasion it may again be my good fortune to find it under my command."</p>
            <p>During these 23 days of fighting the Division had sustained the formidable total of over 6,700 casualties of all ranks. This was, of course, a severe blow, but it was gallant sacrifice freely given. The part which the Otago Regiment played in this grim business may be gained from the following list of casualties:—
							<table><head><hi rend="sc">1st Battalion.</hi></head><row><cell/><cell>Killed.</cell><cell>Wounded.</cell><cell>Missing.</cell><cell>Total.</cell></row><row><cell>Officers …</cell><cell rend="right">5</cell><cell rend="right">8</cell><cell rend="right">—</cell><cell rend="right">13</cell></row><row><cell>Other Ranks</cell><cell rend="right">46</cell><cell rend="right">277</cell><cell rend="right">64</cell><cell rend="right">387</cell></row></table></p>
            <p>
              <table>
                <head>
                  <hi rend="sc">2<hi rend="sc">nd Battalion.</hi></hi>
                </head>
                <row>
                  <cell>Officers …</cell>
                  <cell rend="right">5</cell>
                  <cell rend="right">24</cell>
                  <cell rend="right">1</cell>
                  <cell rend="right">30</cell>
                </row>
                <row>
                  <cell>Other Ranks</cell>
                  <cell rend="right">81</cell>
                  <cell rend="right">334</cell>
                  <cell rend="right">133</cell>
                  <cell rend="right">548</cell>
                </row>
                <row>
                  <cell/>
                  <cell rend="center">Grand Total</cell>
                  <cell>..</cell>
                  <cell>978.</cell>
                  <cell/>
                </row>
              </table>
            </p>
            <pb xml:id="n174" n="141"/>
            <p>The immediate result of these formidable casualties was reflected in the state of Companies, which, though they were 250 strong at the outset and had subsequently received reinforcements, were in some instances now reduced to a minimum of about 30 all ranks. Moreover, the few survivors were in a condition of almost pitiable exhaustion and weariness, and presented a woeful spectacle when contrasted with the extraordinary physical fitness and great buoyancy of spirits so evident when the Regiment marched down to the area of the Somme at the beginning of September.</p>
            <p>When the Regiment once more turned its head to the north it left behind it many stout fellows who had paid the supreme price of devotion to duty, but in the hard realities of war, regrets, however keen, had quickly to give place to the serious affairs of the morrow.</p>
            <p>As a test of strength the Battle of the Somme was convincing, if terribly expensive. The breaking of the weather in the middle of October so multiplied the difficulties of attack as to make it impossible to exploit the situation in such a manner as to reap the full benefits. The pressure on Verdun had been removed, the transfer of German troops from the Western Front had been prevented, and the enemy's strength had been considerably weakened. The concluding stages of the Somme Battle were slow and tremendously difficult, but at its close the British advance had extended down the forward slopes of the ridge, until from Morval to Thiepval the whole plateau and a considerable area of ground beyond had been wrested from the enemy. The general withdrawal of the enemy in March of the following year to the Hindenburg Line, which, branching off from the original defences near Arras, extended south-eastwards for a distance of 12 miles to Queant, and thence passed west of Cambrai towards St. Quentin, represented the final realisation of the fruits of the Somme Offensive.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n175" n="142"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d3" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> III.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d3-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Cordonnerie and Houplines.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">When</hi> the Regiment marched out of the Somme Battlefield on October 3rd, 1916, it withdrew behind the lines in order to rest and regain some of its lost strength and vitality, immediately prior to trekking north again. The 1st Battalion spent three days at Pommiers Redoubt, between Montauban and Mametz, and the 2nd Battalion marched back to the Base Camp at Fricourt. On October 3rd rain fell for the greater part of the day, and the succeeding days saw very little improvement in the general conditions. The intervening time was now devoted to reorganising the battalions, posting reinforcements to the various companies, cleaning equipment, and resting.</p>
            <p>On October 4th a Divisional Order was issued that the New Zealand Division (less Artillery, which was to remain on the Somme for a further period) would be transferred from the Fourth Army to the Second Army, and temporarily was to be transferred from the XV. to the X. Corps from midnight 6th-7th October, and was to move to the Hallencourt area, thereafter entraining at specified points with a view to proceeding northwards.</p>
            <p>The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment accordingly marched out from Fricourt to Dernancourt on October 6th, and entrained for Longpre. Then followed a march of eight miles to Erondelle, and during this stage of the journey the completely exhausted state of the men was very much in evidence. The 1st Battalion followed on October 7th. Leaving Pommiers Redoubt it marched to Albert, which was still being intermittently shelled by the enemy, and there entrained for Longpre, arriving there on the 8th, and thence marching to Airaines. On October 11th the 1st Battalion entrained at Longpre for Caestre, reaching there in the early <pb xml:id="n176" n="143"/> evening and proceeding by motor lorries to Estaires, where reinforcements were received. On the same day the 2nd Battalion marched to Pont Remy, where it entrained for Bailleul, which was reached shortly before midnight. From this stage there was a march of ten kilometres to Strazelle. The Regiment remained at these two points over the succeeding two days, and on the 14th the 1st Battalion was transferred to billets near Bac St. Maur, and the 2nd Battalion to Armentieres.</p>
            <p>Orders had now been issued for the relief by the New Zealand Division of the 5th Australian Division in the Sailly sector and the Houplines sub-sector. The 1st Infantry Brigade and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade were to take over the Sailly sector and relieve the 15th Australian Brigade (Cordonnerie sub-sector) and the 14th Australian Brigade (Boutillerie sub-sector) respectively; while the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade was to relieve the 8th Australian Brigade Group (Houplines sub-sector), and was to be attached for tactical purposes to Franks's Force, a Composite Division commanded by General Franks, and comprising three brigades, one of which was now to be the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Command of the new divisional sector was to pass on October 14th.</p>
            <p>The Cordonnerie sub-sector taken over by the 1st Infantry Brigade was but a short distance south-west of Armentieres, and was overlooked by the high ground on which was situated, at a point about midway in the sector, the partially ruined village of Fromelles. It was against the ridge on which Fromelles stood that an attack by Australian troops had been directed a few months previously with such tragic losses, many of their dead still lying unburied in No Man's Land. The ground along which the front line breast-work of the Cordonnerie sector extended, and for a considerable distance to the rear of it, was exceedingly low lying and flat, and drainage, more particularly during the winter months, was a source of constant anxiety and labour. The sector when taken over from the 5th Australian Division was in a very neglected state of repair and defence, and although it could never be regarded as anything but a very quiet part of the line there were sufficient discomforts during the wet season, owing to the lack of decent accommodation and the flooded state of the <pb xml:id="n177" n="144"/> line and its approaches, to make it one of the most unpleasant. With the first heavy rainfall a great many of the sandbag shelters collapsed, and the duck-boards along the communication trenches were always more or less afloat. During the winter months conditions on the Houplines sub-sector were not very much better. Persistent hard work and sound organisation during the succeeding months of occupation of these parts of the Western line effected an appreciable though very gradual improvement in conditions. The breastworks were strengthened and a vast amount of wire entanglements constructed along the selected lines of defence, as well as some fairly substantial shelters for the garrisons of the front and support lines, while large numbers of men were kept constantly employed on the drains and waterways in the rear in order to clear the area of water; but the fall was too negligible to produce any material improvement.</p>
            <p>The portion of the Corps front for which the New Zealand Division was responsible extended over a length of approximately 5,600 yards. Within the area allotted to the Division the defensive system comprised the front breastwork, which was continuous; the 70 yards line which was continuous but out of repair; and the support line which comprised a series of small posts, joined laterally by a continuous fire trench and breastwork combined; while slightly in rear of this line further posts existed. The subsidiary line consisted of a series of defended localities or posts, none of them of a very substantial nature. The normal distribution of troops in the Sailly sector was that to each of the two sub-sectors was allotted one infantry brigade, and in each brigade sub-sector two battalions were allotted to the front line system and subsidiary line, with two battalions in brigade reserve. In the forward system the garrison of the front line trench was reduced to a minimum, sufficient men, together with Lewis guns and a small proportion of Vickers guns, holding it so as to ensure the repulse of a surprise attack unaccompanied by bombardment; the strength of the garrison approximating 150 men per 1000 yards. The defence of the system was thus organised in depth, and the governing principles on which action, in the event of hostile attack, were based were that no body of troops to whom a portion of a defensive line or post was entrusted would give it up under any circumstances; while hostile <pb xml:id="n178" n="145"/> penetration at any point was to be met by immediate counterattack while the enemy was still disorganised and had not had time to establish himself.</p>
            <p>On October 13th the front line of the Cordonnerie sector was taken over by Canterbury and Wellington troops, and on the following day the 1st Battalion of Otago relieved the 58th Australian Battalion in reserve. Three platoons of 4th Company occupied strong-points known as Winter's Night, Junction and Croix Blanche, in rear of the subsidiary line, the remainder of the Battalion being in billets still further in rear and within close range of Bac St. Maur. In the Houplines sub-sector, in accordance with the dispositions of the 2nd Infantry Brigade on being attached to Franks's Force, the 2nd Battalion of Otago was established as brigade reserve in billets at Armentieres, 4th and 8th Companies being billeted at Barb-wire Square, 10th Company at Tissage, and 14th Company at Lock House. During the several succeeding days the Regiment supplied working parties for the front and support lines of the two sectors. On October 20th the 2nd Battalion moved into the front line and took over from the 2nd Battalion of Wellington.</p>
            <p>The Battalion remained in the line for a period of six days, the enemy displaying very little activity during the tour. The only incident of note occurred during the night of the 25th. At 8 p.m. one of our listening posts sighted a party of six Germans at a short distance from our wire. They were challenged, but no reply being received, were bombed; subsequently machine gun fire was brought to bear on No Man's Land. Search failed to discover any further signs of the enemy, until at 8.20 p.m. a second and larger party were sighted approaching our wire. On being challenged they deployed and advanced on the listening post. One of the two men of the post ran back to give the alarm, when the remaining man shot one of the enemy dead, and after throwing bombs at the others withdrew to our lines. Lewis gun fire completed their dispersal, and later the body of the dead German was brought in and identification established. On the following day the Battalion was relieved and moved back to the subsidiary line. Here it was fitted out with the much improved small box respirator for protection against gas attacks. It remained in occupation of the subsidiary line <pb xml:id="n179" n="146"/> until the close of the month, the daily routine consisting chiefly in supplying working parties under the direction of the Divisional Engineers.</p>
            <p>The 1st Battalion of the Regiment commenced its initial tour of the front line of the Cordonnerie sub-sector on the afternoon of October 26th, when it relieved the 1st Battalion of Wellington in the left of the Brigade sector, extending from Mine Avenue to Devon Avenue. The enemy's attitude, generally speaking, remained passive, while our main activity was directed to battering down his front line and wire entanglements by means of concentrated trench mortar bombardments. The mortars employed were the heavy 68-pounders, the projectiles of which were commonly known as "plum puddings," and light Stokes, and by these means considerable damage was caused to the enemy's front line breastwork without, however, evoking any serious retaliation. These trench mortar bombardments became an almost daily performance, and from our point of view provided an inspiring spectacle; but owing to the fact that the enemy, as subsequent investigations disclosed, was not holding his front line in any strength, our demonstrations must have occasioned him very little real concern, apart from the material damage sustained.</p>
            <p>On November 8th the 1st Battalion was relieved in the line by Wellington troops after a fairly long tour, and moved back to billets formerly occupied in the locality of Rue de Quesnoy, near Bac St. Maur. On November 12th the Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion of Auckland in Brigade support, a series of five posts being occupied in the subsidiary line, with the strength of the garrison of each post at one platoon. On November 16th the Battalion moved into the front line system, 14th, 8th, and 10th Companies occupying the front and support lines in that order from right to left, one platoon of each company being in the front line and three in support, with the 4th Company in reserve. On the night of the 22nd a patrol led by Corporal G. Vincent, who was well supported by Pte. R. Bett, entered the enemy's trenches at a point known as the Tadpole, and examining it over some length found it unoccupied. This patrol definitely established the fact that the enemy, in consequence of the breached and broken state of the trenches as a result of our sustained trench mortar bombardments <pb xml:id="n180" n="147"/> and the difficulties of drainage, was holding his front by means of isolated posts, and had presumably withdrawn the major part of his garrison to the higher and less disturbed area of Fromelles. The tour ended on November 24th, the Battalion returning to billets in Rue de Quesnoy and locality.</p>
            <p>The 2nd Battalion had returned to the line in the Houplines sub-sector on the opening day of November in relief of Wellington, and continued in occupation there until the 7th. Two days later, when in billets at Armentieres, over 170 reinforcements arrived and were posted to the different companies. When the Battalion returned to the line on the 13th the tour then commenced proved by no means as uneventful as those that preceded it. On the 14th portion of the front line trench system was badly damaged by minenwerfer fire; and on the following day at 5.20 p.m. the enemy commenced an intense bombardment of our front line, extending from Hobb's Farm to the River Lys. Minenwerfers were again largely employed by the enemy, resulting in serious breaching of the parapet. The bombardment was maintained for half an hour, and on ceasing the enemy, to the number of about 30, penetrated our line and worked along in the direction of 14th Company Headquarters and the entrance to our underground workings, where they appeared in some numbers. Five minutes afterwards they returned to their trenches on a given signal, leaving behind two demolition charges. Very considerable damage was occasioned to our trenches, which was increased by a second bombardment commencing at 6.5 p.m. and lasting until 6.20 p.m. Several huge craters were left in our lines and Irish Avenue was badly blown in. Our casualties, due mainly to the severity of the bombardment, were unfortunately heavy, amounting to nine other ranks killed, one officer and 25 other ranks wounded, and two other ranks missing. One of the raiders was shot by a company cook, and the body being left in our lines was identified as belonging to the 9th Bavarian Regiment. There were several aspects of this raid which, from our point of view, were considered as unsatisfactory. An inquiry held subsequently disclosed the fact, among other things, that the S.O.S. signal had not been put up, and that the wire between Company and Battalion Headquarters had been cut, and that no artillery support was available.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n181" n="148"/>
            <p>On the following night a raid was attempted against the enemy's lines. At 6.45 p.m. a party of ten other ranks under Lieut. W. Chapman left our trenches and advanced across No Man's Land in single file. On reaching the enemy's wire the party halted, and a reconnaissance was carried out over a distance of 70 yards. At one point the enemy's trench extended back in the shape of the letter V, with a distance of 50 yards from point to point. A machine gun opened fire from either extremity, and it was considered inadvisable to attempt an entrance over this locality. The wire over the area reconnoitred was thick and strong, our artillery fire having had little effect on it. The party accordingly returned to our lines.</p>
            <p>On November 19th Otago was relieved in the line by Wellington, and moved back to the subsidiary line where it remained until the 25th, supplying working parties and carrying out a certain amount of training. On the 26th, the day following the Battalion's return to the line, the enemy heavily replied to a brief trench mortar "shoot," resulting in considerable damage to our trenches. During the next few days officers of the 10th Australian Brigade, 3rd Australian Division, visited the line in view of an early relief. This was commenced on the last day of November, when the Battalion returned to Armentieres as Brigade reserve.</p>
            <p>There were occasions, particularly during the Regiment's earlier periods in France, when the S.O.S. call was sent out to the supporting artillery without there being sufficient justification for the expenditure of ammunition which it involved, simply because the purpose of the S.O.S. call was not fully appreciated at the time. The S.O.S. (Save our Souls) was a call from the infantry to the artillery for immediate assistance by covering with fire any portion of the front line which was being threatened or attacked. The call could be given by any officer on duty in the front line, and to that end every company, platoon and forward observing officer in the front line was required to carry at all times a message signed and ready to hand in to the signal office for immediate and priority despatch when an enemy attack appeared probable. Simultaneously with the handing in of the message the S.O.S. rocket was to be sent up, and the signal repeated at short intervals until it was clear that it had been observed and the
							<pb xml:id="n182" n="149"/>
							necessary support was forthcoming. The sending out of the S.O.S. call had really to be decided upon by the officer on the spot, and there were occasions when it was considered that the situation could be handled without the support of the artillery, and if such did prove to be the case there was more merit in the achievement. If, on the other hand, the responsible officer failed to correctly appreciate the situation, and the enemy profited by the fact of the S.O.S. not being sent out, there were unpleasant consequences. But the making of a quick and accurate decision in this, as in all other questions, in time became a matter of intuition. It was laid down that on receipt of the S.O.S. message, or on observation of the S.O.S. rocket, or on the enemy heavily bombarding our front or No Man's Land, or when heavy rifle or machine gun fire was heard from the front and the enemy's parapet could not be observed, the batteries covering the front would open fire. The 18-pounders would place a shrapnel barrage as near to our trenches as safety permitted, gradually creeping forward over No Man's Land until it reached the enemy's front line trenches, when high explosive would be substituted wholly or in part for shrapnel, while howitzers would open fire on the enemy's front trenches. Fire would thus be directed and maintained until the situation was reported clear. In order to test the efficiency of the arrangements for obtaining immediate artillery support, it was open to battalion or company commanders of the front line, and this opportunity was on occasions availed of, to call for a test round at any time of the day or night, the time taken between the acceptance of the message and the arrival of the round being expected not to exceed 30 seconds. There were also circumstances under which requests could be made for the fire of our artillery to be directed to any special locality or target; but in cases where the fire of the heavier howitzers was required, and the locality to which it was to be directed was in close proximity to our own lines, the limitations to the accuracy of guns and howitzers and the variations to be expected at different ranges had to be taken into account, in view of our garrison being brought within the danger zone.</p>
            <p>An order issued on November 30th stated that gaps had been cut in the enemy's wire, and that during the night of November 30th-December 1st strong patrols were to be sent
							<pb xml:id="n183" n="150"/>
							out along the whole Divisional front with the object of discovering the dispositions of the enemy's most advanced troops, and the condition and disposition of the wire in rear of his front line breastwork to the depth penetrated. If resistance was met with, no attempt was to be made to force an entry. Fighting was to be avoided, and the investigations were to be carried out secretly and silently so as not to allow the enemy to know that his lines had been entered. The capture of prisoners, it was pointed out, would probably do more than anything else to clear up the existing obscurity of the situation.</p>
            <p>In conformity with this order patrols, each of one officer and 20 other ranks, went out over the front at midnight, some of them succeeding in penetrating the enemy's front line, and to a point 200 yards beyond. In only two instances were challenges received. The enemy's trenches were found to be so blown about as to be unrecognisable, representing merely a series of craters and shell-holes, emitting in places a strong smell, pointing to the presence of enemy dead. The conclusions to be drawn from the joint observations were that the enemy's forward trenches were too seriously damaged and water-logged for occupation; that no attempt had been made to repair the damage done; that the enemy had one or two small isolated posts stationed in his front line with ready exit available by means of communication trenches; and that an appearance of holding the front line was simulated by firing flares from posts some distance in the rear. During the early hours of the morning an enemy patrol came over as far as our wire, indicating a certain anxiety on his part as to the meaning and purpose of our enterprise, while machine gun fire was for some time directed to one of our sally ports. The fact that the enemy had adopted the wise plan of getting out of the mud and going back to the higher and drier ground in rear for the period of the winter months, was now fully confirmed. It was, however, becoming increasingly evident that he was carrying out a considerable amount of constructive work in that more favourable tactical position.</p>
            <p>Towards the close of November instructions were issued for the reorganisation of the New Zealand Divisional Artillery. The effect of this, it is interesting to note, was that the Divisional Artillery, then consisting of four Brigades, was <pb xml:id="n184" n="151"/> converted into two Brigades, each of one six-gun howitzer battery and three six-gun 18-pounder batteries, the surplus batteries to form an Army Field Artillery Brigade of the same number of batteries and guns, and to be under the orders of the G.O.C. Army.</p>
            <p>On December 2nd the 1st Battalion of the Regiment returned to the line in relief of Wellington, and continued to garrison the trenches until the 10th. The weather was now exceedingly wet and cold, hard frosts alternating with rain and snow. The issue of gum boots and frequent changes of socks considerably alleviated the hardships of the winter months; but nevertheless the parades of sick on returning to billets became increasingly large and for some time occasioned grave concern. The low-lying, fog-laden country of Flanders, and the never-ending mud doubtless contributed to this condition of affairs; but for the major portion of it the primary cause was to be found elsewhere. It was now that the severe strain and exposure to which the Regiment had been subjected during the course of the Somme fighting was making itself felt among those who had come through it, but had never properly recovered from the effects. Thus many had been reduced to a state which left them unable to withstand the severity of the winter months, and when this was realised a more generous policy in the matter of timely evacuations was decided upon and given effect to.</p>
            <p>The 1st Battalion made another tour of the line before the close of December, and on the 23rd, when it was relieved, went out to new billets at Bac St. Maur, on the banks of the River Lys, and was then placed in Divisional reserve. The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, on being relieved at Houplines and leaving Franks's Force at the close of November, had marched down to Bac St. Maur, and entering into billets there, commenced a course of training which extended over the succeeding three weeks.</p>
            <p>On December 22nd <name type="person" key="name-413221">Sir Douglas Haig</name>, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, paid a visit to the New Zealand Divisional area, and the Regiment was included in his tour of inspection. A fairly generous bill of fare was provided for Christmas Day, the first spent by the Regiment in France; and both Battalions having the good fortune to be out of the line the day passed very quietly. The general attitude of <pb xml:id="n185" n="152"/> the troops in line on this occasion was one that could not have been mistaken by the enemy, and the deliberate harassment of his lines and billets throughout the day and night by the New Zealand Divisional Artillery must have convinced him that there was no goodwill or desire for fraternisation on our side of the line.</p>
            <p>A Divisional Order was issued on December 28th to the effect that the 1st and 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigades were to be reorganised as follows:—1st Infantry Brigade: To be comprised of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Auckland Regiment, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Wellington Regiment. 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade: To be comprised of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Otago Regiment, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Canterbury Regiment. It was notified that the reorganisation was to take effect as from January 1st, 1917. This, in brief, meant that where formerly the 1st Infantry Brigade was comprised of all 1st Battalions, and the 2nd Infantry Brigade of all 2nd Battalions, the 1st Infantry Brigade would in future comprise the four battalions which represented the North Island of New Zealand, and the 2nd Infantry Brigade the four South Island battalions. The system of distinguishing units by the wearing of regimental patches was at the same time extended, the patch of Blue and Gold (Otago Regimental colours) on a background of Black (Divisional colour), as worn by the 2nd Battalion of Otago from its formation in Egypt, being adopted by the 1st Battalion, with a distinguishing difference in the adjustment on the two colours which formed the diamond-shaped centre of the patch.</p>
            <p>In accordance with the reorganisation of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, on New Year's Day, 1917, marched out of its reserve billets in the Rue Petillon and took over the Cordonnerie sector in relief of the 2nd Battalion of Wellington, Relief was completed about 12 noon, and one hour later the enemy bombarded the whole area with projectiles of various calibre, including lachrymatory gas shells. Casualties amounted to one killed and six wounded, and the front line and communication trenches suffered badly. There was a recurrence of this hostility at 9 o'clock on the following morning, when about 60 minenwerfer shells were hurled against a front of about 100 yards, adding <pb xml:id="n186" n="153"/> considerably to the damage of the previous day. By 11 a.m. the situation had quietened, but at 6 p.m. the area was subjected to further violent shelling for a period of over 40 minutes, and additional casualties resulted. Prompt retaliation by our artillery now followed, and a heavy fire was put down over the enemy's front and support lines.</p>
            <p>There was reason for believing that on the occasion of the enemy's evening bombardment it had been his intention to raid our lines. A patrol drawn from Sergt. Travis's special party of scouts, while operating in No Man's Land, encountered an enemy patrol of considerable strength. This party they effectively bombed, and subsequently heavy rifle fire was opened up from the enemy's parapet. The hostile bombardment referred to commenced a few minutes after our special patrol returned, and the probability was that the enemy discovered in No Man's Land were moving into position prior to raiding. One outcome of this continued straffing was an immediate call for working parties from the reserve battalion in order to repair the damage to the defences. Comparative quietness prevailed over the remainder of the tour, although our own trench mortars were by no means inactive, and during the afternoons heavily pounded the enemy's forward system. On January 8th the 2nd Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the Regiment and moved back to reserve and billets.</p>
            <p>During the 1st Battalion's occupation of the line there occurred two or three incidents which served to reveal outstanding individual merit. A small party which was acting as a cover to our wiring operations by night came under enemy machine gun fire. One of the party was killed and the remainder hurriedly driven in. At daybreak on the following morning Pte. J. D. Stark proceeded some distance across No Man's Land, and recovered the body lying there. He then made a return journey and collected the rifles lost by the covering party in its hasty retirement. Stark afforded a further demonstration of his utter disregard of danger when in broad daylight he walked across No Man's Land by way of challenge to an enemy sniper who an hour or so previously was responsible for a casualty in our lines. Remarkable as it may seem, he gained the enemy's line, floundered along in the mud under the shelter of the parapet over a consider <pb xml:id="n187" n="154"/> able distance, locating an enemy post at the foot of Delangre communication trench, and then as casually returned to our own lines without a shot having been fired at him. An early morning patrol comprised of Sergt. G. H. Seddon, Lancecorp. W. Hay, and Pte. F. W. Hamill, all of the 1st Battalion Snipers and Observers, traversed the lee side of the enemy's parapet over a distance of 700 yards, finally encountering, though still unobserved, an enemy sentry post. The post was apparently at the point of being relieved, and there being now too much daylight to accomplish anything beyond the extensive reconnaissance already effected, the patrol quietly and safely withdrew, one of the party minus his boots, which had been left fast in the mud.</p>
            <p>The Regiment now completed its last period of garrisoning the line at Cordonnerie. The general defensive stability of the sector was considerably greater than when the Regiment first entered into occupation in October. A large number of shelters had been erected for the accommodation of the garrison, the front and support lines and communication trenches had been materially strengthened, and a very extensive system of wire entanglements had been completed over the forward area. In all of this work the Regiment had been hampered by the worst possible conditions of weather. On the 1st Battalion being relieved in the line, it proceeded to billets in the Rue de Quesnoy and neighbourhood, and eight days later, on January 24th, went back to Divisional reserve at Bac St. Maur. On the same day command on the Cordonnerie sector passed from the 2nd Infantry Brigade to the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment had meantime proceeded to billets in the area of Sailly.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n188" n="155"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d4" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> IV.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d4-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Bois Grenier.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">The</hi> Regiment had now barely settled down in the belief that a period of pleasant rest was ahead of it, when on the morning of January 26th advice was unexpectedly received that the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade was to relieve the 101st Brigade of the 34th Division, immediately adjoining the left of the New Zealand Division. This really meant an extension of the Divisional front to the north. The relief was to be completed by midnight on the 26th, and it fell to the lot of the 1st Battalion of Otago to forthwith get into marching order and take the road for the new area.</p>
            <p>The sector to be taken over was known as Bois Grenier, and was situated approximately midway between the Sailly and Armentieres sectors. Otago went into the line direct after a long and vigorous march, and by 10.45 p.m. the relief of the 10th Lincolns was accomplished without hitch or interruption. The night was bitterly cold and the front line accommodation was of the most meagre description. On the following morning, the 27th, the enemy artillery raked our front line and communication trenches for several hours.</p>
            <p>The new area was similar in many respects to the one held at Cordonnerie, the country being low-lying and flat, but as a result of the continued hard frosts was now very much drier under foot. The enemy's activity here was confined for the most part to exceedingly heavy minenwerfer "shoots," which in most instances were fortunately directed to a section of the line that was never actually garrisoned, and known as Jock's Joy. One result of minenwerfer fire was the existence of craters of extraordinary size and depth, there being few projectiles used during the war that were more effective for battering down or destroying defences in the shortest possible time. It will also be generally agreed that their moral effect was not inconsiderable.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n189" n="156"/>
            <p>The 2nd Battalion had followed the 1st Battalion on the 26th to the vicinity of Erquinghem and relieved the 11th Suffolks; 4th, 8th, and 10th Companies going into billets and 14th Company occupying a series of four posts in the sub line. On February 3rd the 1st Battalion was relieved in the line by the 2nd Battalion, and on the 11th a further interchange was effected. Commencing on February 4th, a number of officers and non-commissioned officers of the 57th Division, which had recently arrived from England and was to relieve the New Zealand Division at an early date, were attached to the battalion in line in order to gain knowledge of the sector and the method of holding it. At this stage the low-lying country of Flanders was frequently enveloped in dense fog throughout the day, and while this fact afforded working parties protection from enemy observation, it proved exceedingly disconcerting to patrols, there being occasions when our patrolling parties, having completely lost their sense of direction, had found it necessary to lie out in No Man's Land until a late hour in the morning, when a momentary lifting of the fog revealed the relative positions of the lines.</p>
            <p>The frosts experienced at this period were so severe and had been so continuous that the ground was frozen hard to a considerable depth; and although fatigue parties were despatched at an early hour every morning from the battalion in billets, it was practically impossible to make any impression on the ground with pick or shovel, and much of the time and energy so expended might have been better employed. This was the most severe and prolonged European winter experienced over a period of 30 years, and it exacted the last ounce of vitality to withstand it. For weeks in succession the sun failed to show itself through the dense fog, several inches of snow lay over the country-side, and the general outlook was depressing in the extreme. The only compensating feature was that while during the earlier months of the season almost the whole area of Flanders was under water and deep in mud, the ground was now dry and hard under the influence of the continued frosts.</p>
            <p>On February 16th, between 8 and 8.30 p.m., the left group of the New Zealand Artillery, together with trench mortars, carried out a "dummy" raiding bombardment of the enemy's <pb xml:id="n190" n="157"/> lines in view of a projected operation. The enemy's response was immediate and heavy, more particularly on the right of the Brigade sector, indicating that he was thoroughly alarmed; but the damage to that part of the line held by Otago was inconsiderable. On February 19th the 1st Battalion was to have been relieved by the 2nd Battalion, but owing to the assumed capture of some of the members of a patrol which had entered No Man's Land at the apex of the Bridoux Salient on the right of the line held by Otago troops, the relief was postponed for a period of 24 hours. The 2nd Battalion of Otago thus took over the line on the 20th, and four days later the Regiment was relieved as a whole by troops of the 172nd Brigade of the 57th Division; the 1st Battalion in reserve handing over to the 2nd-5th South Lancashires, and the 2nd Battalion to the 2nd-4th South Lancashires. Command of the Brigade sector passed on the following day. The 1st Battalion moved off to billets at Noveau Monde, and two days later proceeded to Nieppe; while the 2nd Battalion, after spending a night at Sailly, marched to De Seule.</p>
            <p>The Regiment, now in Divisional reserve, remained in these localities for a period of approximately three weeks, and spent a very profitable and enjoyable time in training, which was for the most part of a recreational order. Football matches were played, sports meetings held, and cross-country races run. The military side of training was not neglected, many useful lessons being learned on the area selected near Bailleul, particularly in regard to the new fighting organisation of a battalion; <name type="person" key="name-207491">Brigadier-General W. G. Braithwaite</name>, Commanding the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade, critically noting the operations.</p>
            <p>On March 9th the Regiment paraded on the Bailleul-Nieppe Road for inspection by Major-General Sir A. Godley, who was accompanied by the Right Hon. Walter Long, Secretary of State for the Colonies. The morning was exceedingly cold and bleak, and on this account and because of the fact that everyone had to stand for an unduly long time under the weight of full packs, the occasion did not excite any particular enthusiasm. The period of rest and training finally came to a close, and although the weather was at times bad and the billets only passably good, the complete respite from the line and from fatigues was very welcome; while the attempts, <pb xml:id="n191" n="158"/> ultimately successful, of an enemy aeroplane to bring down in flames a British observation balloon over Nieppe, probably ranked first as a diversion for troops behind the line. On March 3rd Major D. Colquhoun left the 1st Battalion and proceeded to the United Kingdom for the purpose of organising and taking command of the 3rd Battalion of the Regiment about to be formed with the establishment of the 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade.</p>
            <p>On March 10th orders were issued for the relief by the New Zealand Division of the 36th Division in the area extending from St. Yves Avenue on the right to the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road on the left, generally known as the Messines or Douve sector.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n192" n="159"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d5" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> V.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d5-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Messines.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">On</hi> the morning of March 14th, 1917, the 1st Battalion of the Regiment marched out of Nieppe, passed through Romarin and Neuve Eglise <hi rend="i">en route,</hi> and went direct into the line fronting Messines in relief of part of the 13th Royal Irish Rifles and the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers. This was in compliance with an order for the relief by the New Zealand Division of the 36th Division in the Messines or Douve sector. On the following day the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment left De Seule, and by midday was established in Kortepyp Camp, near Neuve Eglise.</p>
            <p>The sector thus taken over by the Regiment extended from the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road on the left to where the Wulverghem-Messines Road crossed our front line on the right. On the left extremity, known as Slush Gap, the distance between the opposing front lines was less than one hundred yards; but commencing almost at the right battalion boundary, the German line swung back at right angles across the valley of the Steenbeek, and thence following a course along the lower slopes of the opposite ridge, formed a deep re-entrant. Standing on the right extremity of the dominating ridge which overlooked our lines and far to the rear, was the gaunt skeleton of Messines; away to the left the village of Wytschaete; and in the shelter of the valley to our left rear a few battered buildings which marked the site of the village of Wulverghem.</p>
            <p>In taking over the new sector, 4th and 8th Companies occupied the front line with two platoons each, the balance of their strength in Fort Osborne and Surrey Lane and in Agnes Street respectively. The remaining two companies, 10th and 14th, occupied Forbes Terrace, S.P. 4, Fisher's Place and <pb xml:id="n193" n="160"/> Marine Terrace. The sector, generally speaking, was in a moderately good state of defence and repair; and along the partially sheltered reverse slope of the ridge on which the foremost line was sited, there were numbers of deep shelters in which the main garrison of the defences was quartered. The attitude of the enemy during the first few days of our tenure was such as to indicate that he had been accustomed to regard our side of the line with a great deal of complacence. This state of affairs was quickly altered by the aggressiveness of the Battalion sniping organisation, and it was only a question of time when a complete ascendency was gained over the enemy in this phase of trench-to-trench warfare. Our first period of holding the line in the Messines sector was comparatively quiet; but while the enemy artillery was only periodically active our own artillery carried out some effective early morning "shoots" at targets presented by working parties on the Messines Ridge. On March 22nd the 1st Battalion went back to billets and reserve at Kortepyp Camp, and the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment took over the line. On the following day the 1st Battalion moved across to Vuaxhall, Belfast and Hillside Camps a short distance off.</p>
            <p>In the course of a Divisional memorandum issued at this date, it was pointed out that the enemy could concentrate sufficient reserves for an offensive on a large scale on the Western Front. It was thought probable that should the enemy attack the blow would fall on the Second Army in the neighbourhood of the Ypres Salient, extending as far south as Hill 63. It was also decided that an attack on Armentieres in strength, either as a diversion or to assist an attack on Hill 63, would require to be taken into account. It was further considered that the weight of such an attack would fall on the Ypres Salient, and as the position there was dangerously exposed, withdrawal on that front was more likely to be necessary than opposite the southern flank of the enemy's attack. The defence of Hill 63 and of Neuve Eglise in rear of it was therefore of the utmost importance, as they furnished a pivot connecting our front line system with the second line positions on which the troops holding the Ypres Salient might fall back. The defence of Armentieres, which to a large extent prevented Hill 63 from being outflanked from the south, was also important.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n194"/>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP021a">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP021a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP021a-g"/>
                <head><hi rend="sc">Brig.-General</hi><name type="person" key="name-207491">W. G. <hi rend="sc">Braithwaite</hi></name>, C.B., C.M.G.,<lb/>D.S.O., (<hi rend="sc">d.</hi>), [<hi rend="sc">f.</hi>]</head>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <pb xml:id="n195"/>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP022a">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP022a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP022a-g"/>
              </figure>
            </p>
            <pb xml:id="n196" n="161"/>
            <p>The 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade when in the line was tactically responsible for the front line from the River Douve to the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road and for the subsidiary line and all the intervening area. The right Brigade was responsible for the defence of Hill 63 and of Ploegsteert Wood within the Divisional area. Maintenance and improvement of the trench system was an important consideration. Front line companies were to carry out two hours work per day, and companies of support battalions five hours per day, exclusive of time occupied in moving to and from work. Each Battalion in Brigade support was always to have one company ready to move at 15 minutes' notice throughout the night, with the remainder of its strength ready to move within three-quarters of an hour, in fighting order. In the application of the general principles of defence formulated, troops and Vickers machine guns were to be distributed in depth; the ground between front and subsidiary lines was to be organised so that it could be fought bit by bit; the front line was to be held by a minimum garrison consistent with safety; and finally, the placing of Vickers guns in the front line was to be avoided.</p>
            <p>In keeping with the above policy, and for the purposes of establishing a reliable defensive system, it was found necessary to outline at once a considerable amount of constructive work, and in the allotment of working areas the 1st Battalion of Otago was made responsible for its front line, Surrey Lane, Midland Farm, and the Wulverghem Switch Line; while the 2nd Battalion was allotted its front line, Spring Walk, Northumberland Avenue, Durham Road, and part of the Wulverghem Switch. On the 16th a new subsidiary line, extending from Hill 63 to connect with the Wulverghem Switch at Wulverghem, was selected. Thus the Regiment was committed to a big programme of trench work immediately on moving into the Messines sector; and even at the outset the fatigue parties supplied by the battalion in reserve comprised as many as 450 men per day. Midland Farm, for maintaining the defences of which the 1st Battalion was responsible, was practically the mainstay of the front line system. It included a system of deep dug-outs and galleries connected with the trenches by stairways; the whole of the defences of this redoubt being such as to assure a protracted resistance.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n197" n="162"/>
            <p>At 4 o'clock on the morning of March 24th the enemy opened a terrific bombardment over the left of the sector occupied by the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, the full force of his fire being directed over the locality extending from Spring Walk to the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road and beyond, across Slush Gap and into the neighbouring Division's sector. The bombardment opened with heavy minenwerfer fire, followed by high explosive shell and shrapnel. The S.O.S. call was immediately sent to the 1st Field Battery by the officer on trench duty. Shortly afterwards the wire to the 15th Howitzer Battery and the direct wire to the Artillery Brigade were cut by the heavy shelling. Our artillery retaliation, however, was prompt in reply to the first call, and being on the correct sector gave immediate support to our infantry. About five minutes after the opening of the bombardment numbers of Germans moving in two lines in single file and estimated in strength at about 80, were observed advancing across No Man's Land. Our Lewis guns at once opened fire on them, and it appeared as if the attack might be beaten off. The enemy, however, succeeded in entering our front line between Durham Road and Northumberland Avenue, and penetrated to a depth of about 100 yards. They were finally driven out by our Lewis gunners and bombers, who displayed great gallantry under a most intense bombardment. Between 5 and 5.10 a.m. the bombardment slackened off and a few minutes later ceased. Our casualties were 12 killed, 21 wounded, and one missing, believed buried. Three members of the Lewis gun crew of the left post were killed and one wounded, and the remaining man stuck to his post to the last.</p>
            <p>Our front trenches suffered badly, and Spring Walk, Northumberland Avenue, and Durham Road were badly damaged. On the left the signal station was demolished and all wires cut, and the signallers had to be dug out, but were uninjured. The raiders did not escape punishment, and there was much evidence of blood on the outer side of the parapet. One wounded German was left in our lines riddled with bullets, and was sent back to the adjoining Division's dressing station on the Wytschaete Road. The preliminary bombardment was of a very heavy and destructive nature; but the raiders could hardly claim to have achieved any permanent <pb xml:id="n198" n="163"/> or material success. The enemy who penetrated the line at Slush Gap left behind several boxes of explosive, which suggested that they had aimed at reaching our underground workings.</p>
            <p>On March 30th the 1st Battalion returned to the line in relief of the 2nd Battalion. While in reserve some of the companies had not been free from enemy shelling, apparently intended for batteries in the same locality, and it was during one of these occasions that 2nd-Lieut. F. C. Whittaker received wounds from which he subsequently died. On April 5th the Battalion was relieved in the line by the 8th Border Regiment of the 25th Division, and moved back to Kortepyp, command of the left sector passing to the 75th Brigade of the 25th Division on the same afternoon. The weather during this stage was still bitterly cold, and there were frequent heavy falls of snow; and there was in addition the cheerless reflection that the long and dreary European winter was not yet at an end. On April 4th the 2nd Battalion shifted camp to De Seule. Although the two Battalions were now out of the line, practically the full strength of the Regiment was being directed to the prosecution of front line work either by day or night. The journey to and from the line was in itself an exhausting ordeal owing to the great distance to be covered; the only consolation being that our back areas were at this time practically free from the attentions of enemy long range artillery, and undisturbed rest was afforded as a consequence.</p>
            <p>It had long since become apparent by reason of the amount of preparation in progress behind our lines in the way of road and railway construction, the erection of dressing stations, the digging of gun-pits in forward positions, and the arrival of long range guns, that a big attack on Messines Ridge was imminent. All this evidence provided food for speculation; and the work that was being carried out in the front line areas with so much energy was regarded with a special interest as being part of the attack preparations. On the night of April 13th an operation involving the construction of a great trench line in No Man's Land under the very nose of the German garrison was daringly undertaken and accomplished without incurring a single casualty. It was necessary to construct this trench as a stepping-off line for an impending <pb xml:id="n199" n="164"/> attack owing to the depth existing between our front line and the enemy's from its point of intersection by the Wulverghem-Messines Road on the left and its meeting with the Steenbeek on the right; and also in order to obtain improved alignment. The length of the new work was approximately 1,100 yards, and its greatest distance from our line 180 yards. There was a considerable amount of preliminary work to be done in the direction of patrolling and reconnoitring No Man's Land in order to obtain complete control of it, also in siting and taping out the trench; and in this connection exhaustive and valuable work was performed by Lieut. C. H. Molloy, of the 1st Battalion.</p>
            <p>Early in the evening of April 13th five officers and 400 men under the command and direction of Major J. Hargest, M.C., moved up to the line, and shortly after 10 o'clock went out into No Man's Land and commenced digging operations. In view of its proximity to the enemy's line, and the very large number of men employed, the operation was naturally regarded as a very hazardous and delicate one; but it was so well organised and controlled by Major Hargest, and was prosecuted with such vigour that by three o'clock on the following morning it had been entirely completed and the whole party was clear of the area. The accomplishment of this task was always regarded as a remarkably fine performance. A strong covering party was furnished by the Wellington Battalion, but beyond certain desultory shelling the night was quiet and the enemy apparently unaware of what was going on. The existence of 1,100 yards of freshly constructed trench in No Man's Land doubtless occasioned surprise and interest in the enemy's lines on the following morning, and it was noticeable that during the day some of his artillery registered on it. The entirely successful completion of this undertaking, and the special reconnaissance performed by Lieut. Molloy, were the subject of a congratulatory message from Brigadier-General Braithwaite, which was read out on the following evening, when the last working party from the 1st Battalion during the month of April assembled prior to moving up to the line.</p>
            <p>On the morning of the 14th an unlucky enemy shell struck a pile of trench mortar bombs at Ration Dump, alongside La Plus Douve Farm. A terrific explosion followed, <pb xml:id="n200" n="165"/> and of a working party from the 2nd Battalion four men were killed and one wounded. Subsequently a German official communication stated that in consequence of the traffic observed for several days going to and from a building over which flew the Red Cross flag, they had shelled it and a loud explosion followed; the implied suggestion being that the Red Cross flag was being used to conceal the presence of an ammunition dump. This was put forward as a counterblast to charges made against the enemy at that time of sinking British hospital ships. As a matter of fact, there was a dressing station about 300 yards away over which the Red Cross flag flew, and the enemy was entirely wrong in his assumption that there was any connection between the dump at La Plus Douve Farm and the building which did duty as an advanced dressing station.</p>
            <p>On the morning of April 16th the Regiment temporarily turned its back on the line and the strenuous work of trench construction tor a period of intensive training, and set out for the Quelmes area, approximately 50 miles distant. During a three days' march there were occasional falls of snow and sleet. The 1st Battalion, after successive nightly halts at Sec Bois and Sercus, finally settled in the area of Esquerdes, while the 2nd Battalion, after halts <hi rend="i">en route</hi> at Strazelle and Eblinghem, entered the area of Leuline, Etrehem, and Hudethun. Here, under the direction of Brigade, a systematic course of training was commenced, and in ten days a great deal of strenuous and valuable work was accomplished. Attack practice figured largely in the syllabus, and it was in these exercises, aided by an exact model of the German defences over the Messines Ridge, that the real lessons were learned for the important operation to which the Regiment was shortly to be committed. During the course of manoeuvres visits or inspection were made by General Plumer, Commanding the Second Army, and by General Russell, Commanding the New Zealand Division, and there were frequent lectures and conferences for officers on matters of training and in relation to the concerted attack itself. On May 1st the Regiment commenced its return journey. The 1st Battalion was back at Kortepyp Camp on the evening of the 3rd, and the 2nd Battalion reached De Seule on the same day.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n201" n="166"/>
            <p>The storm clouds were now gathering on the horizon; the rumble of gun fire was growing louder and more insistent day by day; trench mortars had commenced the cutting of the enemy's wire, and all the preparations for impending attack were advancing under the eyes of an enemy from whom, by reason of his dominating position, they could not well be concealed. At 9.30 p.m. on May 5th the enemy opened a heavy bombardment of our back areas. This was continued for an hour, repeated at midnight, and again at 4 a.m. The 1st Battalion was compelled to beat a hasty retreat from Kortepyp Camp to the adjoining fields, and later it was deemed advisable to dig in there as a means of shelter. As it was eight men were killed and eleven wounded, and the huts were badly damaged. On the occasion of this unexpected bombardment the Division sustained a total of 106 casualties, and in addition lost over 80 horses. Our artillery fired 2,500 rounds on the enemy billets and back areas by way of retaliation, and on the following night when the enemy repeated his performance, though with nothing like the same disastrous results owing to the precautions taken, again replied vigorously. The real punishment, however, was meted out on the night of the 7th, when our artillery, in conjunction with the whole of the formidable forces of the Second Army, opened out on selected targets in the enemy's rear areas with five minutes' intense fire, and at 11 o'clock repeated this very salutary lesson.</p>
            <p>With the return of the Regiment no time had been lost in resuming the front line labours on which it had been engaged previously. A vast amount of preliminary work, such as the construction of assembly trenches and approaches, still required to be carried out, demanding the constant employment of units not actually engaged in garrisoning the line. The control and direction of the whole comprehensive programme of work for which the 2nd Infantry Brigade was responsible was entrusted to Major J. Hargest, of the 1st Battalion of Otago. The construction of the Otira Assembly Trench, 600 yards in length and traversed, was commenced on the 9th, and a few days later the travel trench was opened out and completed. On May 10th command of the Wulverghem sector, the left portion of the New Zealand Divisional sector, had passed to the 25th Division. On the 22nd the 1st Battalion moved to Hill 63, and the 2nd Battalion relieved the <pb xml:id="n202" n="167"/> 1st Battalion of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade in the front line between Currie Avenue and Medicine Hat Trail, with headquarters at McBride's Mansions. With the 1st Battalion fatigues continued to be the order of the day and night, cutting new trenches and improving others. The assembly trenches, although their construction involved a vast amount of labour, were only intended for disposing troops for a few hours prior to the commencement of attack.</p>
            <p>Hill 63, where the 1st Battalion was now quartered, was like most other areas, not immune from enemy shelling, and on the 26th a direct hit on one of the huts killed two men and wounded another of 14th Company. As a result of the increasing intensity of enemy artillery retaliation, the casualties of the 2nd Battalion during its tenure of the line totalled three killed and 23 wounded. Patrols were out constantly over night in order to determine the attitude of the enemy. A patrol from the 1st Battalion, comprising ten other ranks under 2nd-Lieut. A. R. Cockerell, succeeded in penetrating to the enemy support line, and established the important fact that the enemy was holding the immediate front mainly by means of two great strongholds, the Moulin de I'Hospice on the right and Birthday Farm on the left. On the same night four artillery officers were taken out by this patrol for a distance of about 300 yards in order to determine the state of the Wulverghem-Messines Road for the passage of artillery.</p>
            <p>The 2nd Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the Regiment during the afternoon of May 30th, and moved back to the slopes of Hill 63, to return daily or nightly to trench labours. On the early morning of June 1st Major W. G. Wray, M.C., was wounded by a shell which burst outside his quarters, and in consequence he was evacuated. During the afternoon and early on the following morning the enemy heavily bombarded our front line system, but all this was as nothing compared to the manner in which our own artillery was pounding the enemy and his defences. The Battalion's front line was being garrisoned at this stage by 4th and 8th Companies, with 10th Company at Petawawa Farm, and 14th Company at Red Lodge. The maintenance of nightly patrols with a view to announcing immediately any change in the enemy's dispositions and attitude towards <pb xml:id="n203" n="168"/> our ever-increasing artillery hostility and other indications of impending attack, was essential to the accumulation of an accurate intelligence in relation to the enemy, and in this important preparatory phase a large share of the work devolved upon 2nd-Lieut. C. F. Wilkie.</p>
            <p>On the night of June 1st Major J. Hargest, accompanied by Sergt. T. Sounness, 8th (Southland) Company, penetrated a considerable distance through the enemy's lines. When within 50 yards of Uhlan Support, a party of 20 Germans emerged from a partially demolished structure in rear, and moving quickly in single file worked their way from shell-hole to shell-hole towards their front line. It was assumed that they were moving out to establish a series of listening posts, and in order not to be cut off, it was deemed expedient by our patrol to withdraw. The enemy's trenches were found to be battered almost beyond recognition, and no evidence of occupation was encountered over the front system. Scarcely a root of ground remained that was not pitted or churned, some of the shell-holes being from ten to fifteen feet deep. It was in this inferno of unceasing shell fire and upheavals of the earth's surface that the enemy garrison of the Messines Ridge lived for several days before the final blow overwhelmed them.</p>
            <p>On June 2nd the 2nd Battalion took over the remaining portion of the Brigade sector, 10th and 14th Companies relieving troops of the 1st Battalion of Canterbury. The sector held now extended to Donnington Hall on the right. During the same afternoon the Corps artillery opened a violent bombardment over the Messines Ridge, with a practice barrage on No Man's Land, the enemy replying vigorously over our several communication trenches. Our casualties were one killed and six wounded; the precaution having been taken previously of withdrawing most of the garrison from the front line. On the morning of June 3rd Otago was relieved by Auckland troops, and marched back to the area of concentration at Canteen Corner. Here over the succeeding three days the Regiment was finally organised and equipped and rested before going into battle; an important side of this preparation being represented by lengthy conferences and discussions on the various phases of the <hi rend="i">Magnum opus.</hi></p>
          </div>
          <pb xml:id="n204" n="169"/>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d5-d2" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">Preparations for Battle.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>A brief study covering the period of the early part of 1917 will throw some light on the Allied situation then existing on the Western Front, and the relation which the Battle of Messines was to bear to the general scheme. In accordance with the plan of campaign adopted by the Allied Armies for the year 1917, a series of offensives were to be launched an all fronts, so timed as to assist each other by depriving the enemy of the power of drawing upon any one of his fronts in order to reinforce others. One of the fronts selected for these operations was Flanders, where an attack was to follow immediately upon one at Arras. The positions held by the Allies in the Ypres Salient since May, 1915, were under the direct observation of the enemy and at the mercy of his well-placed artillery. Their defence under such unequal conditions imposed a long and exhausting strain, It was maintained that our positions would be vastly improved by the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, and of the high ground extending thence north-eastwards for several miles, and trending north through Broodseinde and Passchendaele. Subsequently, certain modifications were made in the general plan, due to unexpected military and political developments in the early weeks of the year, and to new proposals for action submitted by the French. The principle of the Spring offensive was, however, adhered to; and it was agreed that if the full results hoped for from the combined British and French operations were not achieved in a reasonable time the main efforts of the British should be transferred to Flanders, as originally intended.</p>
            <p>On April 9th the First and Third Armies, which were entrusted with the main British attack, opened the Spring Campaign with the Arras Offensive, and later the Fourth and Fifth Armies co-operated. At the close of six days fighting distinct successes had been achieved, measured in captures, ground gained, and the number of German divisions attracted to the area of the attack. Our front had been advanced four miles further east, and all the dominating features of the landscape, including the well-known Vimy Ridge, were in our possession. On April 16th the French followed with their main attack on the Aisne, and on April <pb xml:id="n205" n="170"/> 23rd the British reopened the ball on a front of nine miles from Croisilles to Gavrelle. Obstinate resistance and strong counter-attacks at first stemmed the British tide, and the advance had to be renewed on the following day, this time with more definite success. The final attacks of the Arras Offensive were launched at Monchy-le-Preux and at Fresnoy, the former on April 28th, and the latter on May 3rd. The French attacked at Chemin des Dames on May 5th, and brought to a close the Spring Campaign and the first half of the Allied general plan. The Campaign had been successful at many points; but it was not as decisive as had been hoped.</p>
            <p>Attention was now directed to the development of the Northern plan of operations. The first phase of this, the Summer Campaign, was the delivering of a blow by the Second Army, which embraced the New Zealand Division, against the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge. The capture of this dominating geographical feature was an essential preliminary to the completion of the preparations for the offensive east and north of Ypres, which was to follow. Meantime activity was maintained on the Arras front in order to cover intentions. The immediate preparations for the Messines attack were as elaborate as those that preceded either the Somme or Arras Battles; but in view of the manner in which the enemy overlooked us it was doubtful if our intentions were long concealed; and as time advanced the only real uncertainty for the enemy was when the attack would actually be launched.</p>
            <p>The preliminary work involved a big programme of road and railway construction, the assembling and registering of artillery, the establishment of forward dumps, the erection of dressing stations, and the problem of water supply. There was also the deep mining offensive, which had, in fact, been carried on for many months in face of stupendous difficulties of construction and the dangers of active counter-mining by the enemy. Along the original Second Army front there were 24 mines, which had involved the driving of 8,000 yards of galleries. Of these four mines were outside the front finally selected for the attack and one other was lost as the result of a mine blown by the enemy. This left 19 mines charged with over one million pounds of explosives as one of the terrible and unparalleled forces to be employed against the enemy in the Messines Battle.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n206" n="171"/>
            <p>A brief topographical explanation will assist the reader to visualise the situation and appreciate the task involved. The Messines-Wytschaete Ridge lay almost midway between the towns of Armentieres and Ypres. Situated at the eastern end of a chain of abrupt, isolated hills which divided the valleys of the Rivers Lys and Yser, it linked up with the rising ground which stretched north-east from Wytschaete to the Ypres-Menin Road, and then northwards past Passchendaele to Staden. The village of Messines, situated on the southern spur of the ridge, commanded a wide view of the Lys Valley and enfiladed the British lines to the south. Northwest of Messines was the village of Wytschaete, situated at the point of the salient and on the highest part of the ridge and commanding even more completely the town of Ypres and the whole of the British positions in the Ypres Salient. The Messines Ridge had many great natural advantages, and these the enemy during his long tenure had developed to the utmost. Messines and Wytschaete villages stood as the main centres of resistance, with numerous farm-houses and buildings, outwardly innocent looking shacks, as strong-points of great tactical strength. The German front line skirted the western foot of the ridge in a deep curve; the second line system followed the crest of the ridge and formed an inner curve. The forward defences consisted of an elaborate and intricate system of well-wired trenches and strong-points, forming a defensive belt approximately 2,000 yards in depth. The many farms and woods were well prepared for defence, and the face of the ridge was liberally punctuated with strongly constructed and well concealed machine gun emplacements, with concrete dug-outs designed to protect the garrisons against the effects of our artillery fire. The enemy had fortified these naturally strong positions in a manner calculated by him to form an impregnable barrier to any attack on the part of the Allies.</p>
            <p>A systematic bombardment of the enemy's elaborate trench system and defences and the cutting of wire had commenced on May 21st, and was intensified about seven days later. Night firing on a grand scale commenced on May 27th and 28th, when billets, headquarters and villages in the enemy back areas were shelled by long-range artillery, and a continuous barrage maintained over his communications in <pb xml:id="n207" n="172"/> order to make it practically impossible for him to bring up supplies, to relieve or to reinforce the garrison of the Ridge. For ten days and before the assault was launched, our artillery carried out a most extensive and destructive programme of counter-battery fire. In this phase of warfare there was most determined retaliation by the enemy, and over the last few days a great artillery duel raged, in the course of which many of our guns were demolished and great dumps of ammunition blown up.</p>
            <p>On June 3rd elaborate orders for the attack and capture of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge were issued. The operation was entrusted to the Second Army, under the Command of <name type="person" key="name-405559">General Sir Herbert Plumer</name>, and the front selected for the attack extended from a point opposite St. Yves to Mount Sorrell inclusive, a distance, following the curve of the salient, of between nine and ten miles. The final objective was the Oosttaverne Line between these two points; and the greatest depth to which the attack was to penetrate represented about two and a-half miles. The frontage allotted to the II. Anzac Corps; which embraced the New Zealand, the 3rd Australian, and the 25th Divisions, extended from St. Yves to the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road.</p>
            <p>The attack of the Corps was divided into two phases, as follows: 1st—The attack and capture of the Black Line, which extended across the forward side of the village of Messines; 2nd—The attack and capture of the Green or Oosttaverne Line. The first phase was to be carried out by troops of three Divisions disposed side by side, namely, the 3rd Australian, the New Zealand, and the 25th, from right to left. The second phase was to be carried out by the 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions; and to this end the 4th Australian Division was to pass through the New Zealand and 25th Divisions and capture the Green Line opposite the fronts of those Divisions. The New Zealand Division, being in the centre of the Corps front, was thus entrusted with the honour of capturing Messines Village. In the allotment of tasks within the New Zealand Divisional area, the 2nd Infantry Brigade and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade were committed to the capture of the first and second German lines on the forward slopes of the ridge and the village of Messines itself. The two Brigades were to attack side by side, the 2nd Brigade <pb xml:id="n208" n="173"/> on the left and the 3rd Brigade on the right, the Brigade boundary being represented by a straight line drawn from a point in Hanbury Support, along the line of the Gooseberry Farm-Messines Road, and through the centre of the village.</p>
            <p>In the subdivision of the 2nd Brigade task the attack was to be carried out with two battalions in front, namely, the 1st Battalion of Otago on the left, and the 1st Battalion of Canterbury on the right, with the inter-battalion boundary represented by a line running from our new front line at Calgary Avenue to the road junction at Moulin de l'Hospice (inclusive to Otago), thence along the Wulverghem-Messines Road to the cross-roads on the north-western side of the village. The 4th (Otago) Company, commanded by Captain C. H. Molloy, on the right, and 8th (Southland) Company, commanded by Captain J. Thompson, on the left, were detailed to capture that portion of the objective allotted to the 1st Battalion of Otago; and special parties from these two companies were detailed to deal with the two strong-points—the Moulin de l'Hospice on the right, and Birthday Farm on the left. The 10th (North Otago) Company and two platoons of 14th (South Otago) Company, the whole under Captain E. F. Selby, with Lieut. E. V. Freed in immediate command of the two 14th Company platoons, were committed to the capture of the enemy trenches between the Wulverghem-Messines Road and the left Divisional boundary. The Battalion reserve comprised the remaining two platoons of 14th Company, which were to follow the troops assigned to the second objective as far as the German front line, and there under cover await orders. Captain D. Rae was appointed Liason Officer to the Irish Brigade on the immediate left of the New Zealand Division.</p>
            <p>After the capture of Oyster Reserve Trench, or Brown Line, by the 1st Battalions of Otago and Canterbury, a further advance was necessary in order to straighten out the line. The 2nd Brigade's main objective, the capture of Messines and the formation of a defensive line round the eastern side, was entrusted to the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury, to which was attached one company of. the 2nd Battalion of Otago. This particular company, the 10th (North Otago), was responsible for straightening out the line on the left, and in its path was one of the enemy's formidable strongholds, <pb xml:id="n209" n="174"/> known as Swayne's Farm. The 2nd Battalion of Otago, less 10th Company, constituted the Brigade reserve, and if required was to be prepared to assist in the capture of the forward line of objectives within the Brigade area, or to move to any threatened point in the event of hostile counter-attack. The capture of the foremost line, known as the Black Line, the establishment of strong-points on the Black Dotted Line still further ahead, and the capture of enemy guns was to be carried out by troops of the 1st Infantry Brigade.</p>
            <p>Owing to the fact that the German trench system swung forward sharply from our line of stepping-off, it was realised that the 25th Division on the immediate left of the New Zealand Division would be considerably in rear of our left flank when the general move commenced at zero. The left flank of the New Zealand Division would thus be exposed to the enemy until such time as the left Division of the Corps had advanced sufficiently far to effect a junction, which, according to the time-table of attack, was expected to take place when in line with Occur Avenue. Thereafter troops of the two Divisions would advance in close touch to the Black Line, when the three attacking Divisions of the Corps should be side by side. In thus leaving our left flank temporarily exposed there was an element of danger, but under the circumstances it was unavoidable; and in order to reduce the attendant risks to a minimum protection was to be afforded by an artillery and machine gun barrage and by a smoke screen.</p>
            <p>Twelve tanks were detailed to co-operate with the Division, and eight of these were allotted to the 2nd Infantry Brigade. All plans for the capture of objectives, however, were based on the supposition that no co-operation from tanks would be forthcoming, thus providing against any failure on their part to get forward with the infantry.</p>
            <p>The arrangements for the participation of a stupendous array of artillery were most elaborate and complete, and included all the intricate details of barrages, creeping and standing, for the actual attack; for counter-battery work, and the shelling of back areas and communications; and finally for the pushing forward of guns once our objectives had been won, and then reopening on new lines and fresh targets. This <pb xml:id="n210" n="175"/> meant an extraordinary concentration of artillery, from rows of 18-pounders established within a few hundred yards of our front line, to siege artillery and long-range guns mounted on rails and concealed in dummy houses. In addition to medium and heavy howitzers, the attack of the New Zealand Division was to be directly supported by nineteen 18-pounder batteries, representing 114 guns, and six 4.5 in. howitzer batteries, representing 36 howitzers. Immediately prior to the assault there was not to be any intensified bombardment, and artillery work was to be carried on as usual until zero as a precautionary measure against affording the enemy any indication of the hour of attack. From the German front line onwards the advance was to be protected and supported as follows:—<hi rend="i">(a)</hi> A creeping 18-pounder barrage moving in advance of the infantry with lifts of 100 yards; (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) a standing 18-pounder barrage to ensure that the infantry as they advanced were not shot at through the creeping barrage; <hi rend="i">(c)</hi> a standing barrage provided by 4.5 in. howitzers, which would lift when the infantry approached to within approximately 300 yards; <hi rend="i">(d)</hi> a medium and heavy howitzer barrage which would lift when the infantry approached to within approximately 400 yards. These barrages were to be established on successive trenches and strong-points within the limits of safety of each gun or howitzer in such a manner that the whole of the area over which the infantry had to pass was kept under fire until the last possible moment. A new feature in attack in the way of barrages was to be provided by 144 machine guns along the Corps front, and of this number 56 were allotted to the New Zealand Division. In addition, eight Stokes mortars were attached to the various battalions as useful weapons for battering down or completing the destruction of any stronghold found to be still holding out.</p>
            <p>The leading Battalions of Otago and Canterbury Regiments were to move forward on a two company frontage. The two leading waves were to be responsible for the capture of the first objective, the Blue Line; the third wave for the second or Brown Line; and the fourth wave in the case of Otago was to be used for straightening out the Brown Line on the extreme left. The 2nd Battalion of Canterbury, plus the 10th Company of the 2nd Battalion of Otago, was to <pb xml:id="n211" n="176"/> follow the two leading Battalions on a two company frontage at a distance of not more than 50 yards, and the 2nd Battalion of Otago was in turn to move in rear of Canterbury, with its left on the Wulverghem-Messines Road, and form up in a position of readiness in the dead ground in the valley of the Steenbeek.</p>
            <p>At eight o'clock on the evening of June 6th the 1st Battalion of the Regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Charters, paraded in full attack order; an hour later the 2nd Battalion paraded similarly equipped. <name type="person" key="name-130142">Lieut.-Colonel G. S. Smith</name> at this stage temporarily handed over command of the 2nd Battalion to Major McCrae, and proceeded to Morbecque. The Regiment now moved off from its area of concentration, and commenced the march to the positions of assembly in the forward zone. The allotment of assembly positions was as follows:—1st Battalions of Otago and Canterbury Regiments, in the new advanced trench and Otira Trench; 2nd Battalion of Canterbury Regiment, in Auckland and Canterbury Trenches; 2nd Battalion of Otago Regiment, in Napier and Canterbury cut north of Calgary Avenue. The arrangement of positions was successfully accomplished and to time, although it had to be effected under very trying conditions. The enemy poured gas shells over our communication trenches throughout the evening and the early part of the night, which necessitated the wearing of gas helmets when moving through the affected areas. By 12.30 a.m. on June 7th all troops of the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade were in position in their assembly trenches. The 1st Battalion of the Regiment was at fighting strength of 27 officers and 576 other ranks; the 2nd Battalion at 26 officers and 772 other ranks.</p>
            <p>Zero hour, the opening moment of the attack, was fixed for 3.10 a.m. on June 7th. The few preceding hours remained comparatively quiet, the intervening time being devoted to rest and sleep or sober reflection and thought. Four minutes prior to zero a section of machine guns opened its barrage, and although this might have led to confusion and alarmed the enemy, it apparently passed unnoticed; and the morning being dark and misty, a premature forward move by some of the troops in the rear assembly trenches was not observed.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n212"/>
            <p>
              <figure xml:id="WH1-OtagP023a">
                <graphic url="WH1-OtagP023a.jpg" mimeType="image/jpeg" xml:id="WH1-OtagP023a-g"/>
                <head><hi rend="sc">Officers of 1st Battalion, Otago Regiment.</hi><lb/>(<hi rend="i">From a Photograph taken before Battle of Messines</hi>.)</head>
              </figure>
            </p>
          </div>
          <pb xml:id="n213" n="177"/>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d5-d3" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">The Attack Launched.</hi>
            </head>
            <p>Punctually to time the great series of underground mines were fired, the effect instantly being a premonitory heaving and trembling of the earth, as if Nature, in some mad freak of hideous sympathy with the prevalent human wickedness, was preparing to launch an assortment of horrors on her own account. Simultaneously with the rending of the blood-soaked Ridge, again to be the scene of desperate conflict, the dark and sullen sky, as yet untouched by the sleeping dawn, was suffused with a red glow as the fire of the massed artillery broke out along the line, its thunderous reverberations rolling over the distant spaces of the battlefield. The infantry were at once in motion, and in splendid unison were now sweeping over the foremost German defences.</p>
            <p>The first trench system offered comparatively light resistance to our advance, and the attacking troops pressed on up the slopes of the Ridge to the assault of their main objectives. Within the hour the New Zealanders had captured Messines; before midday Irish troops had fought their way through Wytschaete; and then the attackers commenced to move down the eastern slopes of the Ridge. It was not long before our guns were being pushed forward. The final part of the Second Army's attack developed soon afterwards; by evening the advance had reached the approximate line of the final objective; and over 7,000 prisoners, 67 guns, 94 trench mortars, and 290 machine guns had fallen to the possession of the Second Army. The terrible and overwhelming destruction caused by the explosion of the underground mines, the pulverising blows of the artillery, and the rapidity with which the attack had been carried through by the infantry, left the enemy at the close of the day beaten and bewildered and the great stronghold of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge in our hands.</p>
            <p>The assaulting waves of the 1st Battalion of Otago Regiment, side by side with Canterbury troops, moved forward to the attack across No Man's Land at the appointed time. Seven minutes after zero, and before the enemy's counter-barrage came down, the whole of the 2nd Brigade troops were clear of the forward assembly trenches. The rapidity and ease with which this was accomplished, and the <pb xml:id="n214" n="178"/> subsequent comparative absence of indecision in the matter of assigned duties and direction were to be attributed to the frequent rehearsals of the attack during the period of training prior to the offensive. Moving in extended order, and closely following the barrage, the Otago Infantry crossed the valley of the Steenbeek and commenced the attack of the slopes in front. The German front line they had taken in their stride, and with almost incredible speed had captured and were consolidating the first objective. The two great strongholds, Moulin de l'Hospice and Birthday Farm, were surrounded and captured before the garrisons could do any material damage with their machine guns; and in and around these localities five machine guns and 50 prisoners were taken and a number of the enemy killed. The two platoons committed to the capture of the Moulin de l'Hospice, in consequence of casualties to officers, were led to the final assault by Sergt. J. H. Wilson. A single machine gun had continued firing even up to the point when the position was surrounded, until it was finally put out of action by Sergt. J. Mason. Immediately this objective was gained consolidation was commenced over a line 80 yards in advance of the enemy strong-point; and it was at this stage that Pte. C. A. Fitzpatrick on jumping into a shell-hole encountered an enemy machine gun which he forthwith attacked single-handed, bayoneting five of the crew and capturing the gun and one of the enemy.</p>
            <p>The 10th Company and two platoons of 14th Company, under the command of Captain E. F. Selby, which were committed to Otago's portion of the second objective, moved forward and similarly quickly overwhelmed the opposition. Continuing their advance, they established themselves on a line approximately 200 yards in rear of Swayne's Farm, and there commenced consolidation. A machine gun now came into action from Swayne's Farm and threatened to interfere with operations. This new development was, however, countered by the arrival of one of the two tanks (the second having been ditched on the way up) detailed to cooperate with 10th Company and the two platoons of 14th Company. Captain Selby directed the tank commander's attention to the enemy opposition at Swayne's Farm, and the tank was headed straight for the redoubt, demolishing the <pb xml:id="n215" n="179"/> superstructure and compelling the surrender of the garrison and large numbers of the enemy who had apparently collected there for shelter.</p>
            <p>Consolidation on the line gained now continued without interruption; but it was found necessary to construct and garrison about 100 yards of trench towards the left in order to connect up with the troops of the 25th Division, this actually being beyond the New Zealand Division's boundary. Lieut. Freed, in immediate command of the two platoons of 14th Company, had materially assisted with his formation towards the success of operations, though wounded early in the attack.</p>
            <p>The suddenness of the assault and the fact that our attacking infantry had broken into the hostile defences almost at the moment the barrage lifted, afforded the enemy small chance of bringing his machine guns into action. Without our effective barrage and swiftly attacking infantry the German strongholds encountered, with their two or three machine guns and their garrisons varying in strength from 15 to 40 men, would have presented expensive propositions. Consolidation having been commenced over the new ground, it was not long before sufficient depth had been dug to afford comparatively good cover. Digging operations were vigorously pushed ahead throughout the day, and the positions strongly fortified against possible counter-attack. The two reserve platoons of 14th Company were directed to assist with the consolidation of the second objective, and Battalion Headquarters was established in a concrete emplacement on the Wulverghem-Messines Road, above the Moulin de 'Hospice.</p>
            <p>On the right Canterbury troops had also made quick progress, capturing their first objective after meeting with inconsiderable opposition and securing 17 prisoners and three machine guns from the redoubt known as Au Bon Fermier Cabaret.</p>
            <p>The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment (Major McCrae in command), less 10th Company, moved forward at zero from its assembly positions in artillery formation, and reached the position assigned to it at 3.16 a.m., where the troops dug in on a line named New Oyster Trench, and at 4 a.m. Battalion Headquarters was established there. The 2nd <pb xml:id="n216" n="180"/> Battalion of the Regiment constituted the Brigade reserve, and was to assist in the capture of the forward objective if required. Accordingly, at 5 a.m. the 14th Company, commanded by Captain Bremner, went forward to act as support to the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury, while No. 14 platoon joined in the mopping-up of Messines Village, afterwards assisting in conjunction with Nos. 13 and 16 platoons in the consolidation of New Oxonian Trench forward of Messines; No. 15 platoon digging in as a reserve in rear of the village. One platoon of 4th Company received orders to construct a trench connecting Canterbury's left flank with the right flank of the 25th Division east of Swayne s Farm. This was accomplished by 2.30 p.m., though not without casualties, for fairly heavy shell fire was now being experienced. The 4th Company, commanded by Captain P. Spiers, advanced to reinforce the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury, but after halting and taking cover on the crest of the ridge found that its services were not required, and moved back to New Oyster Trench. Two platoons of 8th Company went forward and assisted Canterbury in the work of consolidation. By 6 p.m., the 4th, 8th, and 14th Companies had returned to New Oyster Trench, and by 10 p.m. had completed consolidation over a distance of 600 yards.</p>
            <p>Under the command of 2nd-Lieut. (Temp.-Captain) J. Rodgers, M.M., 10th Company of the 2nd Battalion of Otago, which was attached to Canterbury and was entrusted with the task of capturing October Support from its junction with Oxonian Trench to the left Divisional boundary, carried out its task with the 25th Division in line on the left, and under heavy shell fire dug in about 200 yards in advance of its section of the Yellow Line. Practically no artillery fire had been encountered until the enemy's support line was passed, and no heavy fire until the objective was occupied. The earlier successful intervention of a tank had practically disposed of Swayne's Farm as a serious obstacle to progress, and there remained but a few stragglers to round up. The Distinguished Conduct Medal was conferred upon Company Sergt.-major J. C. Fothergill for his fine service during the period of consolidating the captured position. The same distinction was won by Pte. T. J. Beck, Battalion runner, who, though twice wounded, had remained on duty.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n217" n="181"/>
            <p>The 2nd Battalion of Canterbury, in clearing the village of Messines, was temporarily held up south of the Square, but the process of envelopment from left and right relieved the situation. Here a large number of the enemy were killed, several machine guns knocked out, and 180 prisoners taken. Opposition from enemy trenches in the cemetery was dealt with, and the capture of the Yellow Line was completed. The enemy's shelling of the forward area became increasingly heavy as the day advanced, and the gradual withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Battalion of Otago relieved the congestion and appreciably minimised casualties. At 8 a.m. Major McCrae had gone forward to the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury and found that unit's Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Colonel H. Stewart, badly wounded, and at his request assumed command until the arrival of Major Starnes shortly afterwards.</p>
            <p>During the clearing of Messines our artillery had placed a "box" barrage round the village. The task of the 1st Brigade troops, following upon the capture of Messines, may be briefly described. Their particular operation was the establishment of the Black Line and the Black Dotted Line ahead, which was to serve as a jumping-off place for the 4th Australian Division in its attack on the foremost lines of the day's advance, the Green Dotted and Green Lines. Following in the wake of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade troops, they had established themselves on the Black Line by 5.30 a.m. Stubborn resistance was encountered at several points, and two 77 mm. guns, several machine guns, and many prisoners were captured. There was a pause in the attack for about three hours, and at 8.40 a.m. parties moved forward under cover of the barrage, captured one 77 mm. field gun, established posts on the Black Dotted Line, and sent out patrols to reconnoitre the ground ahead.</p>
            <p>Shortly after 1 p.m. the enemy were observed from various points to be heavily massing for counter-attack, and soon were advancing in several waves along the whole of the Divisional front, preceded by an intense barrage over our forward lines. Similar reports of a counter-attack developing came from the 25th Division on the left. Our artillery barrage was immediately called for and brought down; many machine guns joined in the firing and the counter-attack was effectively stopped and crushed.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n218" n="182"/>
            <p>At 3.10 p.m., following upon a further pause in the attack, the 12th Brigade of the 4th Australian Division advanced through the New Zealand troops on the Black Dotted Line. In this operation, representing a continuance of the day's battle, the Australians apparently met with much resistance and heavy fire from newly prepared gun positions, which the long break in the attack time-table had afforded the enemy every opportunity of establishing. The right Battalion was reported to have been held up by concrete machine gun emplacements, and later in the evening the left Battalion was reported to be on its objective. About 8.30 p.m. there were reports of a further enemy counter-attack, and during the evening several S.O.S. calls were received by the artillery, which opened up at S.O.S. rates; but beyond the enemy's heavy shelling it was doubtful if there was any real justification for the vast expenditure of ammunition which these calls involved. There were counter-attacks, both threatened and launched, at various points of the Australian front on the following day, when the enemy shelling was persistently heavy; while our aeroplanes reported considerable enemy movement over the back roads, all of it in a westerly direction. However, the forward line was definitely established by 10 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, and at 9 a.m. on the 9th the 4th Australian Division assumed command of the front held in advance of the New Zealand Division as far back as Messines and including that place. The New Zealanders then went into Corps reserve, and at midday the 2nd Infantry Brigade was ordered to commence dribbling its battalions back to billeting areas.</p>
            <p>We now return to the troops of the Regiment. On the night of June 7th-8th arrangements were made for the 2nd Infantry Brigade to carry out within 48 hours a relief which involved holding the Purple Line and all ground west of Messines and east of the original No Man's Land, Accordingly orders were issued for the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Otago to remain in the trenches they were holding and complete consolidation. The headquarters of all battalions were moved back to their original places in the assembly trenches, whence it was much easier to maintain telephone communication with companies and with Brigade. Throughout the night the enemy artillery heavily pounded Messines and the trenches <pb xml:id="n219" n="183"/> east and west of it; the infantry over this area suffering severely, particularly from enfilade fire from the direction of Frelingien and Deulemont. During the early hours of the morning of the 8th, 10th Company of the 2nd Battalion of Otago was withdrawn from the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury, and rejoined its own unit in reserve. The 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade was still holding the Black and Black Dotted Lines.</p>
            <p>About 8.45 on the night of the 8th the enemy sent up the S.O.S. signal all along the line, evidently under the impression that we were about to make a further advance. The enemy's artillery barrage and our counter-barrage were intense; but there was a certain wildness about the German shooting. This artillery duel lasted for about two hours, and finally as the fire of our guns slackened off, that of the enemy died down. About 11 p.m. a report was received from the 25th Division on the left that they were being attacked, and that a mixed force of New Zealanders, Australians, and English troops were falling back; but the alarm was apparently occasioned by the fact that a relief was being effected to which the troops referred to belonged. Thereafter, there were no further alarms, and comparative quietness prevailed.</p>
            <p>During the morning of the 9th arrangements were made for the 2nd Infantry Brigade, then in close battle reserve, to be relieved that night by the 4th Australian Brigade; but at 2 p.m. orders were received to withdraw into Corps rest area without being relieved by other troops. Instructions were accordingly issued for Battalions to withdraw independently to the Waterloo Road area, and at 5 p.m. the 1st Battalion of Otago left its trenches and marched back to rest billets at Mahutonga Camp. The 4th, 8th, and 14th Companies of the 2nd Battalion had on the previous night commenced digging a communication trench from the junction of Oxonian Trench and October Support to connect with the extension of Calgary Avenue, and completed the work at 10 a.m. on the 9th. At 2.30 p.m. the Battalion moved back to Vauxhall Camp, arriving there late in the evening. Here over the succeeding days the Regiment secured that rest which it had so splendidly earned.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n220" n="184"/>
            <p>The extensive and careful preparations over the period immediately preceding the attack, the splendid unison in which all arms worked, the wonderful co-operation of a mighty array of artillery, and the incomparable work of the infantry, combined with the splendid leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers, made the Messines Battle a decisive and sweeping success. The operation was a set piece in which everyone knew his duty intimately and well; an important factor in the execution of a scheme of attack so superlatively vital in its issue, so vast in the range of its unavoidable complexities and the multiplicity of its interdependent detail, and depending so largely for its success on the clock-like precision of responsive and cohesive action throughout the whole of the large force employed; on its readiness in meeting and overcoming unexpected difficulties and beating down resistance; on its intelligence, courage and dominating will power; all of which were most brilliantly in evidence in this memorable combination of leadership and fighting man. Needless to say there was abundant reason for the elation which followed the capture of Messines and its dominating and seemingly impregnable ridge. The casualties suffered during the actual attack were not heavy. The initial blow dealt the enemy was so sudden and so overwhelming as to leave him little time for recovery before the infantry were upon him. It was subsequent to the capture of the Ridge, under the enemy's intensely heavy shell fire, that our casualties commenced to mount up. Enfilade artillery fire from the southeast proved particularly damaging to us, and with so many troops in a congested area heavy losses were inevitable. From about 250 casualties during the actual attack, the 2nd Infantry Brigade's list had increased to 900 before relief was effected on the evening of the 9th.</p>
            <p>Twelve tanks were allotted to the New Zealand Division for the attack. It was intended that eight of these should co-operate with the 2nd Infantry Brigade, but were to work independently, each to have its particular objective laid down. Strong protest was made by Brigadier-General Braithwaite against the tanks being brought up too close over night, because of the danger of their noise of movement giving notice of our time of attack to the enemy. In this he was finally successful, although it was understood that the <pb xml:id="n221" n="185"/> delay would prevent the tanks from getting up in time to assist the attacking troops in taking their earlier objectives. As anticipated, their work was of comparatively small value, as six of them never got out of No Man's Land.</p>
            <p>The list of captures made by the 1st Battalion of the Regiment included 160 prisoners, two 77 mm. field guns, and nine machine guns. The prisoners captured during the operation seemed to have lost all power of effective resistance as a result of the terrific artillery bombardment they had been subjected to, and apparently submissively resigned themselves to the attack and the irresistible power behind it.</p>
            <p>The losses sustained by the Regiment in the Messines Battle were as follows:—lst Battalion—Killed, three officers and 30 other ranks; wounded, three officers and 189 other ranks; recorded as missing, 17 other ranks. The officers who fell in action were: Lieut. N. L. Forsythe, and 2nd-Lieuts. C. F. Wilkie and A. J. Tiddy; among the list of other ranks killed in action was Lance-corp. J. P. Egan, D.C.M., who as stretcher-bearer had rendered long and splendid service to the Regiment. 2nd Battalion—Killed, 24 other ranks; wounded, five officers and 113 other ranks; recorded as missing, five other ranks. 2nd-Lieut. (Temp.-Captain) J. Rodgers, M.C., M.M., who displayed fine qualities of leadership during the operation, subsequently died of wounds received in action.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n222" n="186"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d6" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> VI.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d6-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">St. Yves.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">The</hi> Regiment remained at Mahutonga Camp, in the Waterloo Road area, resting and reorganising, until June 12th, when orders were issued for the 2nd Brigade of the New Zealand Division to return to the line, and take over the St. Yves sector, lying between Messines on the north and the Bois de Ploegsteert on the south, and bounded by the River Douve on the left and Westminster Avenue on the right. In compliance with this order the 1st Battalion entered into occupation of the trenches of the left sub-sector, extending from the Douve to Ash Avenue, and relieved the 36th Battalion of the Australian Imperial Forces. Since our leaving the line at Messines on June 9th the Australians had pushed forward to a line opposite the village of Warneton, and had there established a series of outposts. The system of trenches known as the Potteries, in the same locality, had been captured, and the general advance accomplished represented a distance of approximately half a mile beyond the Green Line, which was the final objective of the attack of June 7th.</p>
            <p>The new sector taken over by the 2nd Infantry Brigade was divided into two sub-sectors, each held by one battalion distributed in depth. It comprised flat, undulating country, with a low spur lying between the River Douve and Ultimo Avenue, about 1,500 yards to the south, and extending from La Hutte through St. Yves to a point approximately 1,000 yards west of Warneton, which was held by the enemy. South of this spur, between the eastern edge of Ploegsteert Wood and the Armentieres-Warneton railway, the country was slightly lower and nearly flat, wet in places, and difficult to drain. East of the railway the ground fell gradually to the River Lys, with sufficient slope for the drainage of trenches in the vicinity. Along the western bank of the river the ground was marshy in places.</p>
            <pb xml:id="n223" n="187"/>
            <p>The dispositions of the 1st Battalion of the Regiment on entering the line were as follows:—4th Company holding the outposts in front of the Potteries; 10th and 14th Companies in the support trenches; and 8th Company in Battalion reserve. During the course of a preliminary reconnaissance of the sector by Company Commanders, Captain D. Rae, commanding 8th (Southland) Company, was wounded, and evacuated. The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, in Brigade support, was billeted at the Catacombs, a system of deep tunnels under Hill 63, on the northern edge of the Bois de Ploegsteert. On the afternoon of the day on which the line was taken over, the 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which was in line on the right, and was then attached to the 3rd Australian Division, had found the German front and support lines south of St. Yves evacuated. These positions they occupied during the night, thereby straightening out our front over the old German support line and removing the salient of the Birdcage. On the 2nd Brigade taking over its part of the line on the night of June 12th, patrols were sent forward from various points in order to determine if the enemy still held the adjacent strong-points. These patrols moved out in the direction of Sunken Farm, Knoll 30, and Flattened Farm, and also down the River Douve. Owing to the early dawn not much information could be gained; but there was something definite in the fact that the patrols were fired upon from Flattened Farm and Knoll 30. Later on a patrol was sent out in the direction of Trois Tilleuls Farm to the south, but returned without information; though when another patrol was sent out it was fired upon when approaching this point. Patrols also worked along Ultra Support and Ultra Lane, but no enemy was encountered.</p>
            <p>During the night battalions in the line consolidated and strengthened their front trenches and advanced posts, which had been handed over in a very poor state, especially those in the Potteries system, where we were supposed to take over five posts at a strength of 20 men in each, but where actually there were only three posts with a garrison of seven men in each. Certain points on our front occupied by detachments of the Corps Mounted Troops were also relieved by the 1st Battalion of the Regiment. As the Brigade sector had been taken over on a night of intense darkness and no previous <pb xml:id="n224" n="188"/> knowledge of the ground existed, successful patrol work was exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.</p>
            <p>On June 13th instructions were issued for the 2nd Infantry Brigade to advance its front to a depth of 1,500 yards, and to seize the enemy's forward posts, with the intention of eventually linking them up. This line was to run approximately from the road near La Truie Farm, and then north through Sunken Farm, to the Douve River, thus extending along the western side of Warneton Village and connecting with a similar advanced line thrown forward on our left by the 75th Brigade, and on our right by the 3rd New Zealand (Rifle) Brigade. The operation was to be carried out during the evening without the assistance of an artillery barrage. It was calculated that the undertaking was a comparatively simple one; that it was merely a question of dribbling forward small parties unobserved by the enemy and seizing successive objectives on the way, each objective affording support and covering fire for the capture of the next. It was further presumed that the enemy had withdrawn his main strength. The task, however, was really beset with many difficulties, and was by no means as easy of accomplishment as was anticipated.</p>
            <p>Late in the afternoon information was received that the 25th Division, on our left, had no intention of moving forward that day without artillery support, and that therefore the New Zealand Division was committed to the operation alone and without artillery support. It was accordingly undertaken, but was only partially successful. Troops of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade on our right reached their objective, but those of the 2nd Infantry Brigade came under heavy fire from the enemy artillery, which doubtless, as the result of a reconnoitring visit from several low-flying aeroplanes, anticipated our advance. Instead of going forward at 9 p.m., Otago in consequence did not move until 11.30 p.m. The night was intensely dark, the troops committed to the attack did not know their country, and there was great danger of losing direction. This was actually what happened to Otago on the left. They completely lost their way, and finally arrived back at where they had started out from without accomplishing anything. Canterbury was in a sense more fortunate and did slightly better. Troops of that battalion occupied <pb xml:id="n225" n="189"/> Flattened Farm, and established a strong-point to the right of it, but considerably in rear of the intended objective. After weathering the enemy artillery barrage, heavy machine gun fire was encountered; there were some mistakes in the matter of recognition of points, and when daylight broke and put an end to operations Canterbury had reached and was holding an exposed line approximate to Unchained Trench. The operation was a costly one and could certainly not be regarded as successful.</p>
            <p>The original intention was that this undertaking should have been carried out by the two battalions of the 2nd Brigade which had suffered least during the attack on Messines. With this object the 2nd Battalion of Otago and the 1st Battalion of Canterbury had been placed in the Catacombs, prior to being brought up during the hours of darkness for the advance; the 1st Battalion of Otago and the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury meantime holding the Brigade line. It had been further understood that the attack would take place at dawn, when the assembly could have been accomplished under cover of darkness. It eventually turned out, as already stated, that the attack was to take place in the evening, and it being impossible to assemble in daylight without announcing our intentions, the two battalions holding the line had perforce to be committed to the attack. Thus weariness was added to a certain unpreparedness.</p>
            <p>On June 14th steps were taken with a view to making a second attempt on this advanced line. At half-past seven in the evening the operation was launched under a heavy artillery barrage. The objectives were the same as previously, excepting that Otago was detailed to deal with Sunken Farm in order to relieve Canterbury, who had suffered severely from the enemy's shelling on the previous night. The 10th (North Otago) Company, commanded by Captain C. Bryce, made an advance of approximately 800 yards, and established a series of three strong-points overlooking Warneton from the west. Subsequently, one of these strong-points, on the left, was evacuated by our garrison under the stress of heavy shelling, thereby leaving the right flank dangerously exposed until it was later restored. One platoon of 8th (Southland) Company, under 2nd-Lieut. A. R. Cockerell, captured Sunken Farm, and dug in about 50 yards beyond. To the right of <pb xml:id="n226" n="190"/> Sunken Farm, and now in rear of our outpost line, was a position which the enemy, apparently unaware of our new dispositions, about an hour later came out to reoccupy, but with disastrous results to themselves; for being allowed to come within close range, they were shot down to the last man. Our casualties during the operation, due mainly to machine gun fire from the direction of the railway line west of Warneton, were two killed and 34 wounded; but the advance, despite many adverse conditions, was carried out with dash and skill. Canterbury, on the right, encountered the enemy in considerable strength in places, and after brisk fighting captured Au Chasseur Cabaret, and La Truie Farm. The enemy retreated along the La Basse-Ville Road, and there vainly endeavoured to rally. The left strong-point established by Otago at a point adjoining the River Douve linked up with the 75th Brigade, which, now operating in conjunction, had also carried its objectives. The enemy still held the Warneton railway line, and occupied many of the houses in rear of it, but the pushing forward of posts had actually been successful along the whole Army front, and brought us up against the Warneton line. This was as far as it was then desirable to advance.</p>
            <p>Over the succeeding 24 hours there was heavy enemy shelling, a great deal of which was directed to the Potteries system of trenches. Retaliation was asked for from our heavy artillery on several occasions, and but spasmodically granted. At about 9 p.m. on the 15th the S.O.S. signal appeared on our left, and our field batteries maintained an intense fire for an hour. No counter-attack developed. During the day our Sunken Farm outpost accounted for two enemy snipers and drove a third from his position. At 10.30 p.m. on the 15th the Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, after which companies moved back to the Catacombs for a rest.</p>
            <p>Prior to effecting this relief the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, after leaving the Messines Sector on the 9th, had enjoyed a period of rest at Vauxhall Camp. On the 11th <name type="person" key="name-130142">Lieut.-Colonel G. S. Smith</name> returned from Morbecque and reassumed command of the Battalion. On the evening of the 12th a move was made to the Catacombs under Hill 63, and on the following day 8th and 14th Companies commenced <pb xml:id="n227" n="191"/> the construction of a communication trench in rear of the Potteries system, and on the succeeding night completed the work. The remaining two companies of the Battalion on the night of the 14th constructed a second communication trench towards the Potteries. When the 2nd Battalion proceeded to take over the line on the 15th, it came under enemy shell fire, and several casualties were incurred. The 8th (Southland) Company occupied the advanced posts, 14th (South Otago) Company the second outpost line, and 4th (Otago) Company the main line in rear. The 10th (North Otago) Company occupied the reserve trenches at Prowse Point, and acted as carrying party for the forward troops during the period of garrisoning the line.</p>
            <p>A great deal of work was necessary in order to consolidate and strengthen our recent gains. A new support line extending over a considerable distance required to be constructed, existing trenches to be deepened, and the forward posts to be wired. The whole of the Battalion, less those who garrisoned the advanced posts and a small garrison in each company sector, was engaged on these works during the two following nights, the whole of the available strength of the 1st Battalion being similarly employed. The tour of the line, brief though it was, was exceedingly strenuous. On the day of taking over the line, the enemy artillery heavily shelled our advanced posts and trenches, particularly the Potteries system. Our own batteries had previously retaliated at intervals, but the enemy apparently was not disposed to slacken off. Accordingly, shortly after midnight a heavy barrage and counter-battery fire was opened by our artillery and maintained for 15 minutes. This proved fairly effective in silencing the enemy. Low-flying German aeroplanes also displayed considerable activity, searching out our forward posts and trenches and firing their machine guns on the garrisons. Our casualties over the period, in consequence of this repeated hostile activity, amounted to 13 killed and 33 wounded.</p>
            <p>At this period there were circumstances which seemed to indicate a German withdrawal from Warneton and the River Lys, There was no intention of advancing our line beyond the railway; but in order to maintain touch with the enemy it was deemed advisable to send out a patrol as far as the <pb xml:id="n228" n="192"/> railway line. Accordingly Otago established a post which commanded the railway and overlooked the village of Warneton. Later on, however, it became evident that the enemy had not withdrawn from Warneton as anticipated, as he was observed to be constructing strong-points which must serve to protect the village.</p>
            <p>The 1st Battalion moved out of the Catacombs early on the morning of the 18th, and before noon was established in Kortepyp Camp. The 2nd Battalion was relieved in the line by the 1st Battalion of Auckland on the same day, and by 5.30 the following morning the last company had reached and settled down in camp at De Seule.</p>
            <p>The total casualties sustained by the Regiment between June 6th and June 19th, a period of great activity and many hardships, were 23 officers and 544 other ranks, made up as follows:—1st Battalion—14 officers and 289 other ranks; 2nd Battalion—9 officers and 255 other ranks. This total included, of course, the casualties sustained in the Messines operations.</p>
            <p>Events in the line following upon the Otago Regiment going into rest area may be briefly summarised. Patrols entered La Basse-Ville, and further south Pont Rouge on the night of the 18th-19th June was found to have been evacuated by the enemy; but he was still holding and covering Warneton by a series of trenches and fortified shell-holes and hedgerows. By June 30th the New Zealand Division had handed over the front to the 4th Australian Division.</p>
            <p>The Regiment now turned its attention to reorganising and training. On the 21st, as part of the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade, it was inspected by the Corps Commander, Lieut.-<name type="person" key="name-208052">General Sir A. J. Godley</name>. Later there was an inspection by the Divisional Commander, <name type="person" key="name-209146">Major General Sir A. H. Russell</name>, while a small detachment proceeded to Bailleul for inspection by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught. The time spent during the tour in reserve afforded much desired rest, and an opportunity for attending to many necessary details which came under the comprehensive heading of interior economy. On the 28th the Regiment moved to a new camping area close to the Neuve Eglise-Wulverghem Road.</p>
            <p>On July 5th Major J. Hargest assumed command of the 1st Battalion, Lieut.-Colonel Charters having temporarily <pb xml:id="n229" n="193"/> taken over command of the 2nd Brigade. On July 12th the Regiment struck camp, the 1st Battalion proceeding to the Berquin area, and the 2nd Battalion to Doulieu near by. On July 15th <name type="person" key="name-130142">Lieut.-Colonel G. S. Smith</name> proceeded to the United Kingdom on leave, and <name type="person" key="name-416666">Major J. McCrae</name> assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, On the 17th, however, he was evacuated sick, and Major Hargest, of the 1st Battalion, filled the vacancy, Captain (Temp.-Major) E. S. McIntyre in turn taking command of the 1st Battalion, and continuing in charge when Lieut.-Colonel Charters left for the United Kingdom on leave. On the 18th the 2nd Battalion having vacated its billets in the Doulieu area moved to Romarin Camp, and on the following day the 1st Battalion marched to the Catacombs under Hill 63.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <pb xml:id="n230" n="194"/>
        <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d7" type="chapter">
          <head><hi rend="c">Chapter</hi> VII.</head>
          <div xml:id="t1-body-d2-d7-d1" type="section">
            <head>
              <hi rend="c">La Basse-Ville.</hi>
            </head>
            <p><hi rend="sc">On</hi> the successful conclusion of operations against Messines and fronting Warneton, the final dispositions for the main Allied offensive east and north of Ypres were entered upon. Although driven from the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, the enemy still possessed direct observation over the Ypres Salient from the east and south-east, as well as from the north. By the middle of July preparations were well advanced for this, the Third Battle of Ypres. The front of the Allied attack decided upon extended from the Lys River opposite Deulemont northwards to beyond Steenstraat, a distance of over 15 miles; but the main blow was to be delivered by the Fifth Army on a front of about seven and a-half miles, from the Zillebeke-Zandvoorde Road to Boesinghe, inclusive. Covering the right of the Fifth Army, the task of the Second Army (which included the New Zealand Division) was to advance a short distance only, the main idea being to extend the threatened area of attack, and by that means force a distribution of the enemy strength.</p>
            <p>The attack was launched on the morning of July 31st, and on the greater part of the selected front the resistance of the German infantry was quickly overcome and good progress made. At the close of the day, after fierce fighting, the British Fifth Army had carried the German first system of defence south of Westhoek, and except at Westhoek itself, where they were established in the outskirts, had gained the whole of the crest of the ridge and denied the enemy observation over the Ypres Plain. Further north the enemy's second line of defence had been captured as far as St. Julien, and north of that again the British held the line of the Steenbeek to our junction with the French, who had gained all their objectives. Meanwhile the attack on the Second Army front had also met <pb xml:id="n231" n="195"/> with complete success, A period of stormy w