Brig.-General G. N. Johnston, C.M.G., D.S.O., (d). (F). who commanded the New Zealand Artillery in the Field during the whole period of the war
By
Lieut.J. R. Byrne , N.Z.F.A.
Printed by Whitcombe and Tombs Limited
Auckland, Christchurch, Dunedin and Wellington, N.Z. Melbourne and London.
Contents
List of Illustrations
List of Maps
Foreword
I have been asked to write a few words as a foreword to the Regimental History of the N.Z.F.A. I am naturally glad to do this, though I do so with the greatest diffidence, owing to the fact that my close personal relationship with the New Zealand Field Artillery ceased in July, 1916, when to my very great regret the New Zealand Division left my command. I can, therefore, write only about the early period of the war, though I need hardly say that I never failed to take the greatest interest and real pride in the achievements of the New Zealand Forces.
It was in December, 1914, that I first made acquaintance with the New Zealand gunners, when the artillery sent from the Dominion consisted of one brigade of field artillery, viz., three four-gun batteries. This force was under the command of
Later on, and shortly before leaving Egypt, the brigade received a most welcome addition in the form of the 4th (four-gun) Howitzer Battery, under the command of
Later in the same month, the 2nd and 1st Batteries joined the 4th Howitzer Battery at Anzac, while early in May the 3rd Battery was landed at Cape Helles, but rejoined the rest of the brigade at Anzac in the middle of August. In the same month the 5th Battery arrived at Anzac from New Zealand, to be followed in October by the 6th Howitzer Battery.
Only those who served throughout those weary months at Gallipoli can fully realize the strenuous times which all the gunners went through; and only those who were able continuously to visit the gun positions will ever know the magnificent work done night and day, for weeks, and even months, without relief, by all ranks of the batteries. The great spirit shown by all, and their determination not to be daunted by any difficulties or discomfort, or by the heavy enemy artillery which was constantly shelling our positions, are qualities which will ever live in my memory; and I shall always have a feeling of the greatest admiration, and, indeed, I might say affection, for the New Zealand Artilleryman. His Australian brother well knew his value, for Australia and New Zealand were there fighting shoulder to shoulder, realizing how the safety and honour of the one depended equally on the staunchness and courage of the other—and neither ever failed. I cannot think of gunners ever having had to work over more difficult ground than they were called on to do at Gallipoli. They always rose to the occasion, and well lived up to that proud regimental motto of "Ubique."
The day came, however, when the Gallipoli Peninsula had to be evacuated. On our withdrawal to Egypt in the spring of 1916, the New Zealand Forces were reorganized and expanded to a complete division, which included the formation of the artillery into the normal divisional organization of three brigades, and as such it proceeded to France in March, 1916.
On arrival in France, the Anzac Corps was called upon to occupy that portion of the front of the British lines in the immediate vicinity of Armentières; and so well do I remember with what real goodwill the New Zealand gunners first established themselves on the outskirts of that town. Here it was, I think, that the infantry began to realize to the fullest extent how much their whole existence in the line and eventual success must depend upon the work done by the artillery; and how no army could hope to win battles unless infantry and artillery had complete confidence in each other. That the infantry did possess this complete confidence in the accurate shooting of their batteries speaks for itself; for, having acquired this, the infantry realized that they could carry out an attack and advance under the closest covering fire from their own guns with as much immunity as it is possible for infantry ever to have in a modern battle—and this must always be the greatest glory which gunners can achieve.
The part taken by the New Zealand Artillery during the latter period of the war must be described by others who know it better than I do. I will conclude by saying what a real privilege I have always considered it to be the commander and comrade of these brave and true men for the many months we served together, and I most heartily wish them all happiness and prosperity for many years to come in this beautiful land of New Zealand.
, General.W. R. Birdwood
From The C.R.A.
I have been asked to write an introduction to the History of the New Zealand Field Artillery in the Great War, now being prepared in New Zealand. That History will contain all details regarding the New Zealand Field Artillery in the war, so that I may only be expected to make some general observations. From the formation of the original Brigade in New Zealand, the Artillery was always animated by a spirit of self-sacrifice and a desire to fulfil to the very limit of its ability its function of protecting and supporting its own infantry. How well it succeeded in accomplishing this task at Anzac, and in all the hard-fought battles on the Western Front may be gauged from the regard in which the New Zealand infantrymen held their own gunners.
After the Armistice the Artillery marched to Cologne, through an interesting country, passing by many of the old historic battlefields of the Netherlands—Malplaquet, Ramillies, Oudenarde, Waterloo, etc. One could not help thinking how surprised some of those old warriors of the past would have been could they but have seen a Division of their descendants from far-off New Zealand march past—a Division that had fully maintained the high fighting reputation of their forebears. The Artillery journeyed past Maubeuge, Mons, Charleroi, Namur, Liege, and so into Germany, arriving at Cologne shortly after Christmas, 1918. After a pleasant and interesting experience at Cologne, the Artillery, in common with the rest of the Division, was demobilised, and within a month or two had ceased to exist.
The New Zealand Divisional Artillery is now a thing of the past; its guns are silent and many of its members lie buried on the battlefields of Gallipoli, of Flanders, and of France. Those who came safely through have settled down again to their normal occupations; the survivors will, I feel
All who had the honour of belonging to the New Zealand Field Artillery will, I feel sure, cherish the memory of their association with that Force as time goes by; forgetting the hardships of the war, they will remember only the spirit of good feeling and friendliness that animated all ranks in every phase of the conflict. Their varied experiences and journeyings in foreign lands will be pleasant to look back upon as the years roll by; and above all they will always cherish an increasing feeling of satisfaction at the thought of duty well done in the greatest war known to history.
It only remains for me, as the old C.R.A. of the New Zealand Division, to thank all ranks of the Artillery for their loyal co-operation throughout. I shall always look back on my command as the highest honour which could have befallen me, and I count myself fortunate in having been so long associated with such men.
, Brig.-General,G. N. Johnston
Part I.—The Gallipoli Campaign.
Chapter I.
The Outbreak of War.
A distinguished writer of another generation has described history as being mainly a register of the crimes of rulers and the sufferings of the people. This statement, no doubt, had its origin in a long and unbroken succession of wars—dynastic wars, racial wars, and wars of conquest—all of which down through the ages, from the campaigns of Cæsar to the Napoleonic wars, and the most frightful war of all the centuries in our own most recent day, have formed the staple subject of history. The general truth of the statement is incontestable; but never from the beginning of recorded time has it been pregnant with such terrible meaning, or exemplified in a form so appalling in its consequences to the world, as in its relation to the Great War that raged for nearly five years, from August, 1914, onwards, with a violence and on a scale of destruction and suffering and loss of human life without parallel in the history of the world.
The clear and instant comprehension of one outstanding fact—the peril that menaced the Empire—was the clarion call that roused the young nations in the outer seas of the world to a sense of the danger that threatened the Motherland, under whose protecting hand they were able to follow unmolested in their removed isolation, the peaceful way that led to growth and nationhood. The people of New Zealand clearly, and at once, recognized that a struggle was being forced upon them as a member of the household of British Nations, and by an enemy
Overshadowed somewhat by the vastness of the armaments on land and sea, which the Great Powers of the world had launched against each other in this concentration of destructive force, it is questionable whether even among the people of New Zealand to-day there is as clear an understanding as there should be of the full measure of her services and her sacrifices as a nation in arms, mobilised to the near limit of her fighting manhood, enrolling and equipping, and then transporting to the other end of the world, the largest number of men in proportion to population of the overseas Dominions. And, also, as short memories are the rule in the crowded and fevered life of the world, and the obliterating hand of time has an unchanging habit of dealing not too tenderly with much that should be regarded as sacred to the nation, it is the duty of New Zealand to-day, not only to those of her soldiers who still live, but even more so to those who have fallen, and not less as an inspiring message to future generations of New Zealand, to see that the valour of her soldiers, and the loyalty of her people to a great cause, are given a permanent and honoured place in her national literature.
This is conceived to be history in its highest form. It stands as an implied, if not direct, repudiation in language and spirit of those ideals that may imperceptibly lead young nations, fresh from the discovery of their prowess in war, in directions not conducive to their ultimate happiness and security. But while
The rapidity with which a succession of dramatic events of the profoundest import to the world followed the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis, at Serajevo, on June 28th, 1914, threw the nations concerned into a delirium of feverish anticipation, without the power to visualise even in the remotest degree the vastness of the calamity that was about to desolate the world. One month after the Serajevo tragedy, which, viewed from any human standpoint, concerned only a very small number of people, Austria had declared war on Serbia. Then followed that succession of terrible events which plunged almost the whole world into the abyss. Five days after Austria's declaration of war, Germany sent her troops into Luxembourg, violated French territory without even a formal declaration of war, made war on Russia, and opened her campaign of savagery on the practically defenceless people of Belgium. England, up to this point, had been tirelessly engaged in efforts of peaceful negotiation, remonstrance, and protest, and despairing of stemming the tide of war by such means, declared war on Germany on August 4th, 1914, and immediately entered the lists on the side of France and her Allies.
Three days after England's declaration of war with Germany, the New Zealand Government cabled to the Imperial Government offering to provide an Expeditionary Force, and on August 12th the offer was accepted. Already, on July 30th, preliminary arrangements had been made by the Defence Authorities of the Dominion for raising a voluntary Expeditionary Force for service in Europe or elsewhere, and the moment the cable of acceptance reached New Zealand this prepared machinery was set in motion. Concentration camps were established in the Military Districts, in which the Mounted Rifles
Command of the Brigade was given to Lieut.-Colonel G. N. Johnston, R.A., one of the Imperial officers whose services had been loaned to New Zealand to assist in the training of her Territorial Forces. Lieut.-Colonel Johnston remained in command of the New Zealand Artillery during the training in Egypt and throughout the Gallipoli campaign, and going to France as C.R.A. of the Division, held his command until the close of the war. The Adjutant of the Brigade was Lieutenant J. M. Richmond, R.N.Z.A., 2nd Lieutenant W. L. Moore being Orderly Officer.
The officers of the three batteries were:—1st Battery—Major F. Symon, Captain C. McGilp, Lieutenant C. N. Newman, and 2nd Lieutenants J. C. Dunnet and F. M. Turner. 2nd Battery—Major F. B. Sykes, R.A., Captain G. E. Daniell, Lieutenant V. Rogers, Lieutenant R. C. Wickens, and 2nd Lieutenant A. E. Horwood. 3rd Battery—Major I. T. Standish, Captain C. V. Leeming, Lieutenant R. Richards, Lieutenant C. Carrington, and 2nd Lieutenant T. Farr. Brigade Ammunition Column—Captain F. G. Hume, R.N.Z.A., Lieutenant N. Purdie, and Lieutenant S. W. Morton.
The gunners who had been posted to the original six-gun battery were distributed amongst the three new batteries, and on this nucleus the establishment of gunners was built
The horses were a fairly mixed lot. The best of the gun horses came from the stables of the Royal New Zealand Artillery. These were few in number, however, and so the drivers, good horsemen most of them, had a busy time for a while schooling the raw material in the way that a gun horse should go. During the few weeks that elapsed before the Brigade moved down to Wellington in readiness for embarkation, details of organisation and equipment occupied most of the energies of commanding officers and their subordinates, Limerick, and the 3rd Battery and the B.A.C. on the Arawa. On September 23rd the Brigade entrained at Palmerston North for Wellington, and on arrival there shortly after mid-day marched through the streets of the city to the barracks at Mt. Cook. Embarkation was carried out the following day.
The Main Body, as the first Expeditionary Force has always been called, comprised one Mounted Rifle Brigade, one Infantry Brigade, an independent Mounted Rifles Regiment, a Brigade of Field Artillery with a Brigade Ammunition Column, Field Troop N.Z.E., Signal Troop, Signal Company, Mounted Field Ambulance, No. 1 Field Ambulance, and Divisional Train. The force which actually sailed totalled 8,417 of all ranks. Of this total 6,900 had had some previous military training, 3,600 having served in the Territorial Force at the time of enlistment.
The 4th (Howitzer) Battery was not formed at the same time as the 18pr. batteries, as the offer of a howitzer battery was not accepted by the Imperial authorities until shortly before the embarkation of the Main Body. When its formation was decided on, one officer and a few N.C.O.'s who had acquired experience in howitzer batteries in the Territorials were withdrawn from the 18pr. batteries to assist in the training of the new unit, which it was then decided should leave New Zealand with the 2nd Reinforcements. The Battery was organised and trained at Trentham Camp, and when it left New Zealand was commanded by Captain N. S. Falla, who had with him Lieutenant H. J. Daltry, Lieutenant R. Miles, Lieutenant E. Gardner, and 2nd Lieutenant J. G. Jeffery.
An official farewell was tendered to the units which embarked in Wellington, at a big parade held in Newtown Park on September 24th. The Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Wellington Infantry Battalion, and the Artillery Ruapehu and Hawke's Bay from Port Chalmers, and the Tahiti and Athenic from Lyttelton. The fleet stood ready to sail with the dawn, but before the morning it was known that its departure had been indefinitely postponed. The Waimana and Star of India, which had left Auckland the previous night, had been recalled to that port by a wireless message, and the transports at Wellington went alongside the wharves again and made ready to disembark all the mounted units with their horses. The fleet would not sail, it had been decided, without a sufficiently powerful escort. On disembarking, the Artillery with their horses and vehicles marched out to the Lower Hutt Racecourse, and went into camp. During the three weeks that elapsed before the Force finally sailed away the batteries were able to devote their whole energies to training, and the time was very profitably spent.
The escort for which the Force had been waiting arrived at last on the afternoon of October 14th, to the surprise and delight of the soldiers, who were growing tired of the long delay. Two big cruisers, H.M.S. Minotaur and the Ibouki, the latter flying the Japanese flag, steamed quietly and unannounced into the harbour at Wellington, and were at anchor almost before the city was aware of their arrival. By the following afternoon the mounted units, which had been encamped around Wellington, had embarked again with their horses and vehicles, and the transports one by one moved out into the stream. The Maunganui, which was the flagship of the convoy, and on which was Major-General A. J. Godley, commanding the Expeditionary Force, was the last transport to leave the wharves; and as she went past the cruisers in the gathering dusk, the men-of-warsmen gathered aft and woke the echoes with their cheers.
The Main Body Sails.
Whoever looked to the heavens for an omen in the early morning of October 16th, when the cruisers and convoy one by one put out to sea, must have been well content with what they read; for the sky was cloudless, and only the soft early morning mists obscured the first rays of the sun. Everyone was on deck by reveille, to watch the two big cruisers plough their way out through the Heads, followed by the convoy, led in two divisions by the Psyche and the Philomel. There was no demonstration and little noise; but the soldiers turned their eyes again and again to take another glimpse of the city before it disappeared from view, or to look at the little knots of people who had gathered on the heights to bid them a silent farewell. Very soon the last boat had cleared the Heads, and the convoy, gathering speed, proceeded through the Straits and out into the open sea. Led by the Minotaur, far in advance, the transports sailed in two parallel "divisions," with the Ibouki half a dozen miles off on the starboard side and the Psyche a similar distance away on the port side. The Philomel brought up the rear some three or four miles astern. This first day came in companionship with perfect weather, and the troops revelled in the warmth of the sunshine and the novelty, for most of them, of life at sea; but on the following day the weather freshened. The glamour of blue skies and placid seas was gone, and the majority of the voyagers found that getting their sea-legs was a rather painful ordeal. The great majority of the men were sea-sick, and some of the seasoned travellers were obliged to admit the force of example. The horses were well looked after during this period, as the men who still kept their legs were always willing to do more than their share. Within a couple of days' sail of Hobart the breeze fell away, and, cheered again by the bright sun, the afflicted made a rapid recovery. The prospect of getting ashore and stretching their legs was hailed by all ranks with the utmost enthusiasm. The coast of Tasmania was sighted on the morning of October 21st, and before noon the transports were safely in the harbour.
The troops from five of the ships were taken for a route march after lunch, and the remainder went ashore the following morning. The weather was fairly warm, and marching was hot work after a week in cramped quarters at sea; but the discomfort was forgotten in the delight of getting ashore again. The unexpected arrival of the convoy had taken the townspeople by surprise, yet they mustered in great numbers and lined the streets to watch the marching columns go by, cheering the men on their way with gifts of fruit and flowers. Twenty-four hours after its arrival, the convoy left Hobart for Albany, where the New Zealand ships were to join those of the Australian Expeditionary Force. The wharves were crowded as the transports slowly backed out to the accompaniment of the music of the regimental bands and the mingled cheers of soldiers and civilians. During the night a heavy fog enveloped the fleet, which for some hours was obliged to feel its way slowly forward at reduced speed, amidst a tumult of sound from screeching syrens. A heavy swell made matters seem more uncomfortable, but by 7 a.m. the fog had lifted, and normal speed was resumed. There had been gloomy forebodings of rough weather in the Australian Bight, but the swell soon subsided, and pleasant conditions again prevailed.
Early on Monday morning, October 25th, a signal went round the fleet that a private of the New Zealand Medical Corps had died the previous night on board the Ruapehu; and the intelligence of this first death came almost as a shock to men who had thought only for that side of war that promised excitement and adventure, that stirs the blood and fires the imagination, and little for that other side on which lay its tragedy and suffering and death. In the afternoon an impressive burial service was held. At 3 p.m. the Ruapehu moved up to the centre of the two divisions, and the troops on every transport were paraded facing inwards. Five minutes later all engines were stopped, and the convoy rode motionless on the water while a brief funeral service was held on every ship, and the body was committed to the deep. The customary volleys were fired on the Ruapehu, and the Last Post sounded; the Ruapehu hauled her ensign close up, and the convoy
Albany was reached on Wednesday, October 27th. The head of the long line of transports entered the outer harbour about 7 a.m., and saw disposed about the broad waters of King George's Sound the transports of the Australian Expeditionary Force, ranging in size from the fourteen thousand ton Euripides down to ocean tramps of a third her tonnage. Australians and New Zealanders having come within hail greeted each other with cheers and coo-ees on the one hand and fantastic Maori war-cries on the other. During the four days the fleet remained in the Sound the majority of the New Zealand transports stayed at anchor, but some went alongside and advantage was taken of the opportunity to give the troops a march ashore. The day before the voyage was resumed Major-General Godley paid a visit to all the New Zealand transports.
At daylight on Sunday, November 1st, the Minotaur led the way out to the open sea, followed in slow procession by the transports, their decks thronged with troops, who watched in silence the stately setting out of the great Armada. By the time the last of the New Zealand transports had cleared the heads the long line extended almost as far as the eye could reach. The escort now consisted of the Minotaur in the lead, the Ibouki, and the two Australian cruisers, Sydney and Melbourne. Once clear of the land, the Australian transports formed into three parallel divisions spaced a mile apart, each transport keeping an interval of 800 yards from that in front. The New Zealand ships, still in two divisions, steamed in rear. The strictest orders were issued regarding the danger of showing lights at night; beyond necessary navigation lights ships were to be absolutely darkened; and as a further precaution no rubbish was to be thrown overboard that would float and leave behind a tell-tale trail, but was to be consigned to the stokehold or galley fires. The faulty station-keeping of some transports was a matter of much concern to the Minotaur, which frequently sent out messages pointing out the danger
A week after leaving Albany the Minotaur said good-bye to the convoy, and her place as leader was taken by the Melbourne. Before leaving, the Minotaur sent the following farewell message to the New Zealand transports:—"I am ordered on another service; wish you the very best success when you land in France. Give the Germans a good shake up. It has been a great pleasure to escort such a well disciplined force and convoy. Good-bye." Later in the day all transports were enjoined to take the strictest precautions with regard to lights during the night as the Cocos Islands would be passed before dawn. The night passed uneventfully, but in the morning, shortly after six o'clock, everyone was thrown into a fever of excitement, first by the significant manœuvring of some of the escorting cruisers, and then by the news that S.O.S. signals had been received from the wireless station at the Cocos Islands. The operators on most of the transports picked up these messages, which stated that a strange warship was entering the harbour. Other messages were received mixed up with a string of meaningless words, which evidently were being sent out in an attempt to "jam" the station on the island.
Meanwhile the Sydney had made off at top speed in the direction of the Islands, her place on the flank of the convoy being taken by the Melbourne, which was joined a little later by the Ibouki. The Sydney was soon hull down, and very shortly was lost to view. The convoy proceeded on its way Melbourne and the Ibouki cruising well out on the quarter from which any threat to the fleet would be most likely to come.
For the next few hours the soldiers were obliged to content themselves with conjecture as to what was happening away beyond the horizon, but at 9.30 a.m. it was announced that the enemy ship had been brought to action, and shortly after 11 a.m. the wireless was busy again with the electrifying intelligence that the enemy had beached herself to prevent sinking." Even yet it was not known that it was the notorious Emden which had been brought to book at last; but the restraint was over, and the men expressed their relief after the period of anxious waiting by cheering long and vigorously. It required only the news that it actually was the Emden which had been defeated by the Sydney to complete their satisfaction and start them cheering anew. However great the pride with which the Australians viewed the honours which had fallen to their young Navy, it was fully shared by every New Zealander, and the official congratulations of the Force were duly offered to the Sydney on the results of the Australian Navy's first engagement. The Sydney had two men killed and thirteen wounded, but the list of killed and wounded on the battered Emden ran into big figures. Three days after the engagement was fought the big liner Empress of Asia passed the convoy on her way to pick up the Emden's prisoners and bring them on to Colombo.
On November 13th the New Zealand transports quickened their speed in order that they might arrive at Colombo in advance of the Australian boats, and so lessen the congestion which would be caused by the simultaneous arrival of the whole fleet. During the previous night the Line had been crossed, and so on all the transports the afternoon was devoted to the traditional ceremonies. King Neptune and his Consort came aboard, were received with fitting ceremony, and impartially exacted tribute from all of high or low degree. A few days later, on Sunday, November 15th, the transports arrived at Colombo, getting close in to land in the early morning, while the air was yet fresh and cool. As the boats crept slowly in towards the harbour and edged their way in the
Soon after the New Zealand transports had come to anchor in the harbour the Australian transports commenced to arrive; then came the Empress of Asia and the Sydney, fresh from her victory at the Cocos Islands. The Sydney bore little trace of her engagement, but all about her decks were rows of stretchers on which lay her own and many of the enemy wounded; and so there was no cheering or noisy welcome. As she entered the harbour and passed the transports the troops crowding the decks stood to attention in a silence that was more eloquent than cheers. The prisoners from the Emden, totalling about one hundred and forty, were divided into parties of half a dozen, and distributed over the various transports.
While the boats were being coaled and watered the troops were given shore leave, parties two hundred strong being sent ashore from each transport at a time. The men revelled in the freedom and in the opportunity of seeing something of a place and people so unlike anything to be seen in their own temperate clime. Borne along by the lean, sweating rickshaw-men, many of them explored the outskirts of the town, or drove about under the cool shade of the fine avenues that decorate the thoroughfares. The majority considered the chance of a change of diet too rare to be neglected, and in the hotels and restaurants they regaled themselves with the best that money could buy. The persistent and persuasive vendors of "precious" stones and antiquities reaped a harvest, and few there were who did not take back to the ship some small memento of their first visit to Colombo. Coaling and watering were completed by the morning of November 17th, and before noon the New Zealand transports and some of the Australian ships had moved out of the harbour, and, escorted by the Hampshire, had set out on the way to Aden.
From Colombo to Suez was the least interesting portion of the voyage, and certainly the most trying for the horses, many of which were on the lower decks or in the holds, where the air was close and stifling. For days there was not the slightest breeze to ripple the mirror-like surface of the sea, or to temper the scorching heat of the sun. The men shed most of their clothing, and in leisure times lounged about the decks under the canvas awnings; at night they brought their blankets up on deck and slept under the stars. The days became very monotonous; interest flagged in the performances of the flying-fish; and even the sunset with its riot of glorious colour palled after a while, so that it was something of a relief when the convoy steamed into Aden in the early morning of October 25th. There was no shore leave, nor was anyone very disappointed in consequence. An arid, rocky spot shimmering in the blaze of the tropical sun, and its harbour infested with hungry sharks, it was sufficiently unattractive to make the crowded transports seem pleasant by comparison. After bringing on those Australian boats which had been last to leave Colombo, the Ibouki said farewell to the convoy, and steamed away for her home waters. From this point onwards the Hampshire was the only escort, and she led the way when the convoy, united again, left for Suez. As the convoy proceeded up the Red Sea a wireless message was received warning the whole Force to be prepared to disembark in Egypt. Most of the men had firmly believed that they were on their way to England, and would ultimately go from there to France, and they parted with their illusions regretfully, but once it had been definitely stated that the voyage would end at Egypt they were quick to realise the cogency of the reasons which probably lay behind this decision. At Suez, where the leading transports anchored for an hour or two, detailed disembarkation orders were brought out to the flagship, the Canal pilots were taken aboard, and the Maunganui led the way into the Canal. A powerful electric light was installed in the bows of each, boat so that they might feel their way along the narrow channel in the darkness.
Of the town of Suez little could be seen—a glimpse of the palm-shaded water-front, a glimmer of lights, and then the
The first transports to pass through the Canal reached Port Said by the evening of December 1st; others continued to arrive during the following morning, and late in the afternoon the New Zealand convoy set out on the final stage of its long journey. Definite orders as to the disembarkation at Alexandria had been issued, and there was no delay when once the boats were alongside the quays. The city was in sight at dawn, and very soon after breakfast the transports had berthed, and men and horses and stores were pouring out on to the wharves. The Force was to be encamped on the outskirts of Cairo, so there was still a train journey of almost 150 miles before its travels would for the time being be over. Once the batteries had marched their horses down the big ramps, and slung their guns and stores up from the holds, they had to set to and pack them into the long troop trains which were in waiting to carry them off to their new home on the edge of the great desert.
Strenuous Days in Egypt.
The site chosen for the New Zealanders' camp was on the edge of the desert, about eight miles out from Cairo, on the outskirts, almost, of Heliopolis, a suburb built on modern ideas, with clean, broad, paved streets and substantial buildings. The camp was skirted by the main road that ran
Despite their seven weeks at sea in cramped and often ill-ventilated quarters, the horses came off the transports in very good condition. They were weak, of course, and uncertain on their legs, but they improved rapidly. For the first few days they were led out for a very modest spell of exercise, which was increased by progressive stages until within a fortnight they were pronounced fit for normal work. During this period manœuvres were out of the question, but the Brigade, in common with all other arms, had embarked without delay on a thorough course of training, which began at the most elementary stage. The drivers devoted the greater part of their time and energy to grooming and exercising their horses, and the gunners grew fit at standing gun-drill, and studied afresh the complexities of their pieces. This individual training, which was thorough and complete, was followed by
In the evening, after their day's training on the desert, the Colonial soldiers poured into Cairo like a human tide—the New Zealanders from Zeitoun, and the Australians from their big camp at Mena, by the foot of the Pyramids, and the Light Horse Camp at Ma'adi. There was a sprinkling of English Territorials, but it was essentially a slouch-hatted invasion. Leave was general until a fairly late hour; and from six o'clock in the evening onwards the streets were filled with this moving, restless throng, to whom the life of the age-old city came as a revelation in many ways. They filled the eating houses and saloons; and in the variety houses where, in "Continental" style, they could sit at little tables and be served with refreshments during the performance, they formed such a large part of the audience that it was matter for wonder how those establishments had existed before the advent of the colonial. There was no by-way and no corner in the city itself which they did not explore, full of life and the buoyancy and insatiable curiosity of youth. It was scarcely a matter for surprise, and perhaps even less for stricture, if some lost their heads for a little, transported as they had been with the swiftness of modern magic from the decencies and orderliness of their remote homes and set down amidst the distractions of a city the life of which was as novel as it was unbounded in its license. The shops and the quaint native bazaars were a never-ceasing attraction; the soldiers disbursed freely, and the shopkeepers and itinerant vendors of "antiquities" and all manner
On December 18th Egypt was proclaimed a British Protectorate; the Khedive, who had made open avowal of his sympathies with Turkey on the declaration of war with that country, was deposed, and a new Sultan of Egypt in the person of Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, was proclaimed at the Abdin Palace, Cairo, on December 20th. Three days later the New Zealand Expeditionary Force marched in strength through the streets of the city, such a display of force being rightly regarded as at once the most prompt and efficacious argument that could be addressed at the moment to the disturbed native mind. It was the first occasion on which the whole force had been publicly paraded since its arrival; and men and horses made a display worthy of the force. The field batteries turned out with their guns and wagons, and gave an impression of smartness and efficiency. The horses had completely recovered from the effects of the long voyage, and their smooth, well-groomed coats literally shone in the sun. In the Opera Square, in the centre of the city, the General Officer Commanding the British Forces in Egypt took the salute as the long column went by, and everywhere along the route the populace applauded the spectacle; but the average Egyptian is no mean dissembler. Christmas Day, two days later, passed quietly, but with due observance in the matter of Christmas fare.
By the New Year the camp was beginning to wear a more habitable air. Messing huts were erected in all the lines; wet canteens were properly established, and a big hall had been erected, where picture entertainments, lectures, and boxing competitions were held almost every night. These healthy distractions were of very great benefit in helping to keep the men in camp in the evenings, and served considerably to brighten the routine of the soldier's life. There was little or no sickness in camp; beyond the troublesome bouts of sand colic which afflicted all the newcomers, the process of acclimatisation was easy and rapid. The mid-day heat was trying, but the early mornings and the evenings were delightfully cool. The chief annoyance was the occasional khamseen, when for a space the wind lifted the face off the desert, blotting out the sky with great clouds of fine sand that penetrated everything and everywhere.
As the first Expeditionary Force fell considerably short of the establishment of a complete division it was decided to incorporate with the New Zealanders two brigades of Australian troops—the 1st Light Horse Brigade, and the 4th Infantry Brigade; at the time this policy was decided on the 4th Brigade was on its way from Australia, and was due to arrive in Egypt about the end of January, 1915. The composite division thus formed was styled "The New Zealand and Australian Division." There was a shortage of Divisional troops; but one company of Field Engineers and two companies of the Divisional Train were formed as reinforcements became available. Two Small Arm Ammunition Columns were also formed, and a section of Divisional Ammunition Column, which was sent out from England, was temporarily attached to the Division.
At the end of January the Artillery was strengthened by the arrival, with the 2nd Reinforcements, of the 4th (Howitzer) Battery. The transports carrying the 2nd Reinforcements arrived at Suez a couple of days after the New Zealand Infantry Brigade had been ordered to the Canal to assist in its defence against the Turkish attack, and at the time when the attack was being almost momentarily expected. The Knight of the Garter, passed through the Canal, on January 28th; the vessel had anchored overnight in the Bitter Lakes, and before proceeding the guns were brought up on deck and lashed ready for action; but the precaution proved unnecessary. The gunners saw only the Indian and Colonial troops, who lined the banks as they steamed past, and with whom they exchanged enthusiastic greetings. The Battery disembarked at Alexandria, and on arrival at Zeitoun occupied lines adjoining those of the 18pr. Batteries. The gunners at once devoted their energies to training and the drivers to getting their horses into condition. The majority of the men had had no previous experience of practical artillery work, but they had received some sound elementary training in New Zealand, and once the horses were available for work the Battery grew daily more efficient. The flat country was not very suitable for howitzer work, and no live shell practice could be permitted owing to the great scarcity of ammunition. Beyond the 800 odd rounds brought from New Zealand there was no other 4.5in. howitzer ammunition in Egypt until shortly before the opening of the Gallipoli campaign. The Battery had reason to be proud of its weapons, which were of the very latest pattern, and the only guns of their kind in Egypt at that time. It is beyond question that had the howitzer batteries of the New Zealand Terriorial Force not been in possession of these very modern guns before the outbreak of war they would not have been available in Egypt, and the colonial troops would not have had the benefit of their protection on Gallipoli. Before the Brigade left Zeitoun a Howitzer Battery Ammunition Column was formed from personnel available in Egypt.
Right through February and on into March the Brigade persevered untiringly with its training out on the desert. The work was sufficiently strenuous to try to the utmost the stamina and endurance of the men; no constitutional or physical weakness could withstand such a searching test, and the few unfit were rapidly discovered. Training became much more interesting as it progressed, and the keenest interest was taken in the tactical evolutions in which the Brigade was exercised. On night operations with the Division, batteries marched out
By the middle of March it was apparent that the long days—and nights—of training had brought the ample reward in the success which had attended the training of the Division, which from being merely a collection of units, had become a coherent, disciplined, and perfectly efficient force. Individually, the men were in perfect physical condition, and were full of eager anticipation when it became whispered about that the Division might not remain much longer training on the desert. The end of the month drew near, and it became definitely known that both the 1st Australian Division and the New Zealand and Australian Division, which constituted the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, were shortly to be given an opportunity of proving their mettle in an actual theatre of war. The men were not told what their destination was to be, but the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was then in process of formation; for what purpose it was not difficult to conjecture. The spectacular but costly naval attacks on the forts guarding the Dardanelles had failed, and the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force hoped to accomplish what had been found impossible for the Navy.
On 29th March the whole Division paraded on the desert to the north of the camp for inspection by Sir Ian Hamilton, Commanding the M.E.F. There had been other inspections and parades which had savoured more of the ceremonial; now they were to march past under the critical eye of the soldier who was to lead them on the Great Adventure. There was a wind blowing, and the movement of such large bodies of troops raised great clouds of dust which almost obscured the sky; but that was of no moment to men who for months had made the desert their element. The guns of the Artillery Brigade had already been prepared for war by coats of "camouflage" paint, which somehow gave them a strikingly business-like appearance; and, as the batteries went by the saluting base in succession they gave an undeniable assurance of strength and fitness.
By Easter definite orders were issued for the movement of the Division, less the Mounted Rifles and Light Horse Brigades, to Alexandria for embarkation. Preparatory embarkation parades were held by ships, and during the last few days all batteries devoted much time and energy to completing their equipment. With such a tremendous influx of troops into the country, the ordinary sources of supply had been strained beyond their limits, and the complete equipping of batteries became a matter of much concern. The appointment of a commissioned officer as Brigade Quartermaster proved a considerable help, and gradually every difficulty was overcome. On the night of April 9th the first train load of guns, horses, and men moved out from the main Cairo station on its way to Alexandria. The harbour and the wharves were crowded with transports and men-of-war, and the tremendous accumulation of stores and material of every description on the waterfront gave the New Zealanders some idea of the magnitude of the preparations involved in the great venture on which they were about to embark.
The Artillery sailed on four transports, Headquarters and 1st Battery being on the Katuna, the 2nd Battery on the Surada, the 3rd Battery on the Californian, and the 4th (How.) Battery on the Australind. These practised hands made light work of loading the horses and slinging the guns and vehicles, and once their loading was complete transports sailed away independently and without escort. The waters of the Mediterranean had not at that time the evil reputation which the activities of German submarines earned for them in later days. There was a risk of attack from Turkish torpedo boats, however, and there was some alarm on the Surada when S.O.S. signals were received from an English transport which was being attacked by a Turkish destroyer only some fifty or sixty miles away. With some effort one of the 18prs. was got up on deck ready to open fire; but in the meantime the Navy had gone to the scene of the attack and the Turkish destroyer was driven ashore on a neighbouring island.
On all the transports the soldiers were busy during the trip to Lemnos perfecting the arrangements for a speedy disembarkation. In every battery there were men who at sea or Katuna, where the gunners were so dubious as to the ability of the Lascar crew to do the job decently that they did everything themselves. One by one the transports made their way through the island-studied Ægean, and were escorted through the narrow entrance to Lemnos harbour by the destroyers cruising about in the outside waters. The big land-locked harbour presented an unforgettable spectacle. Close at hand were the fighting ships, the battle cruisers of France, England, and Russia, and stretching away in the background were the long lanes of crowded transports. Of greatest interest to the colonials was the big Queen Elizabeth, of whose formidable strength romantic minds had woven many a fanciful story. There was much to interest the eye and stir the imagination in the big harbour, where there was never a quiet moment, but always the coming and going of patrolling destroyers, the buzzing of an occasional 'plane bent on a reconnaissance, and the incessant flitting to and fro of naval cutters and despatch boats.
During the week or more that they lay waiting the fateful day of the attack, gunners and drivers assiduously practised unloading the guns and wagons on to pontoons, and slinging the horses fully harnessed. The final plans for the landing were being concerted; maps were issued, and the great scheme was unfolded to the soldiers. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was to force a landing on the coast of the Peninsula to the north of the headland known as Gaba Tepe, and endeavour to force a way across to the Narrows. The remaining three divisions of the M.E.F. were to operate at the southern end of the Peninsula. The 29th Division, the last of the British regular divisions to take the field, was to land with the Royal Naval Division at Cape Helles; the French Division was to land at Kum Kale, and after destroying the forts at that spot on the Asiatic shore was to join the two British Divisions at Helles.
Chapter II.
The Landing at Anzac.
At last on the afternoon of April 24th the great fleet of men-of-war and crowded transports began to clear Mudros harbour, and set out for the shores of Gallipoli. The New Zealand transports lifted anchor early, and steaming down the long lane of ships, dropped anchor again near the netted and closely guarded entranceway. From this vantage point the New Zealanders watched with swelling emotions the vessels of the fleet, and the host of transports move in stately procession out into the open sea. Elated at the thought that at last after their weary months of training and waiting they were to be tried on the testing ground of battle, and thrilled by the moving spectacle, the men cheered vociferously as each ship went slowly past. Night fell at last, calm and very dark, and at midnight, while the soldiers slumbered in their quarters below, the New Zealand transports steamed out to sea with darkened lights. They needed no reveille that morning. The boom of heavy gun-fire heralded the dawn, and clustering up on deck the troops caught their first glimpse of war. Looking shorewards they could see the hills of the Gallipoli Peninsula faintly outlined in the half-light of the coming day; and lined along the coast the dim shapes of great ships of war, which broke again and again into vivid bursts of flame.
By the time it was full day the transports had arrived opposite the little bay on which the covering force of Australians had landed, and which was to become famous for all time as Anzac Cove. The whole line of warships could now be plainly seen stretching away south towards Cape Helles until they became lost in the clouds of smoke. Close at hand were the transports, some of them moving out after having unloaded their troops; but the majority awaiting their turn to transfer their human freight on to the destroyers or big barges.
The First Battery in Action [Photo by the Author A section of the 4th (Howitzer) Battery landing on the beach at Anzac on the morning of April 26, 1915
The New Zealand and Australian Division commenced to disembark at 9 a.m. The troops of the 1st Australian Division had driven the Turks beyond the tangled mass of spurs and steep ridges which overlook the beach at the landing place, and were then endeavouring in face of superior numbers to hold the ground which they had won. The task of the New Zealanders on landing was to extend the line on the left of the Australians, and particularly to support the left of the 3rd Australian Brigade, which had landed as the covering force at 5 a.m. The enemy had rushed some batteries of field artillery into action, and as the New Zealanders climbed from the transports into the barges and boats in which they were to be towed ashore, they could see the shrapnel bursting along the water's edge. The densely packed barges offered a very tempting target to the Turkish gunners as they drew slowly in to the shore; but though casualties in the boats were frequent they were not heavy. As they landed the men were flung into the fight without regard to particular units. The need was desperate, and there was no delay. Discarding their weighty packs they went straight up the slopes and gullies and engaged in the desperate struggle against great odds. But the Division was being landed very slowly; night had fallen before the whole Brigade of New Zealand Infantry had been got ashore. For some hours in the middle of the day there was a complete stoppage in the disembarkation; and this at a time when the enemy had been strongly reinforced and was fiercely counter-attacking.
Artillery Headquarters landed with the boats of the first tow, which reached the shore a few minutes before 10 a.m., and the C.R.A. and staff immediately commenced to reconnoitre positions for the Brigade. It needed no reconnaisance to show that in such country it would be a matter of the greatest difficulty to select positions for the 18pr. batteries; it was, however, quite suited for howitzers. Efforts were made to get some of the guns ashore, but without avail; and Headquarters had to content itself with the selection of positions, and the partial preparation of some of them during the night.
The only guns that had been landed by evening were two Indian mountain batteries, and one solitary Australian 18pr.
The Artillery in Action.
Casualties during the day had been extremely heavy, and the troops were almost exhausted with their terrible and continuous struggles. The enemy, too, had suffered severe losses, but he had been constantly reinforced, and threatened at any moment to sweep the troops of the Army Corps from their precarious hold on the precipitous and hard-won ridges. The night brought no relief, and the anxiety was so great that a conference was held at which the possibility of a withdrawal was discussed; on the Artillery transports orders were received to stand by the boats in case a re-embarkation should be ordered. But the idea of withdrawal was peremptorily dismissed by the Commander-in-chief; it was decided that the Australind on to barges. The Left Section of the Battery landed at 6.30 a.m. on the 26th April, and immediately went into action at the foot of Howitzer Gully, the guns being pulled along the beach by two teams of Australian horses which had been brought ashore the previous afternoon. The first round, fired at ten minutes to seven, was sent into the "blue" at a range of three thousand yards, so that the infantry might know without delay that their artillery had commenced to arrive, and an involuntary cheer went up from the hillside at the welcome sound. It was music to the ears of the battle-weary men in the line Within a few minutes of firing its first round the section had been linked up with an observing station on Plugge's Plateau, and was busy engaging targets with an unvarying accuracy that certainly did not suggest that the gunners were having their first practice with live shell. Soon after coming into action this section was engaged by hostile guns firing from Gaba Tepe, but they were silenced by the fire of the warships. The remaining two guns of the Battery were landed about noon, and occupied positions which had been prepared overnight to the north of Ari Burnu Point. The first target was the Fisherman's Hut, from which enemy snipers had done a good deal of execution, and a direct hit was registered with the third round. These two guns remained in action on Ari Burnu during the whole period of the campaign, being moved only when the orders came for evacuation.
By the close of the second day a line had been established with some continuity; trenches were gradually being dug and strengthened, and ammunition, stores and water were being got up to the line by the carrying parties, who laboured up the gullies and precipitous slopes oblivious of the enemy shrapnel, or the snipers who took toll of their numbers from the scrub-covered tops. On the beach a pier had been improvised from some barges which had been stranded on the shingle, which on subsequent days was strengthened with planking and stout beams, and did service until the more
Late in the afternoon of April 26th arrangements were made to disembark the 2nd Battery, but it was the early morning of the 27th before the guns were finally got ashore. Two big barges went alongside the Surada about dusk, and into each was loaded a section of guns and limbers, and a full complement of ammunition. About 9 p.m. a trawler took charge of the two barges and towed them close in shore, where the Battery was informed that it could not land that night. The gunners spent a cheerless night lying off-shore in the barges, listening to the patter of the stray bullets in the water all round them. At dawn the trawler took them to within a hundred yards of the shore, near Hell Spit, the gunners laboriously manœuvring the unwieldy barges over the remaining distance. As they were landed the guns and vehicles were drawn up on the beach and concealed as far as possible; but the disembarkation had hardly been completed when the enemy commenced to shell the beach with shrapnel. The Battery did not go into action at once, but the officers spent the day endeavouring to find a position for the guns which would be accessible besides being suitable in other respects. Everywhere they were faced with sheer cliffs or apparently impossible slopes; but it was recognised that the guns would have to be dragged up a track which must be prepared without delay. There was no alternative; as the flat trajectory guns could not shoot over the cliffs they must be got up on top of them. In the meantime the two guns of the Right Section were manhandled up to a temporary position on the shoulder of the ridge above Ari Burnu. The position afforded only a limited field of fire to the north-east; but the guns did some very effective shooting on this zone.
Anzac Position
There was an exciting moment cm the crowded beach during the afternoon of the 28th, when observers, watching through a telescope the busy movements of the Turks on the distant point of Nibrunesi, reported that a heavy gun was being dragged into position. A gun firing from Nibrunesi Point could enfilade the beach, and play terrible havoc on the crowded slopes sheltered by Plugge's Plateau and the shoulders running down to the sea. The left section of the Howitzer Battery opened fire, but failed to reach the Point, and beach parties working with feverish energy to get the ammunition from the beach to the shelter of Howitzer Gully, were filled with anxious apprehension. Messages had been sent out to the Navy, however, and a cruiser away on the left opened fire on the Point, and relieved the situation. A party of New Zealand Infantry, which made a successful landing on Nibrunesi Point at dawn on May 2nd, destroyed an observation post as well as capturing a number of prisoners, and reported the existence of a prepared gun position, but no gun.
The Left Section of the 2nd Battery, which had been in reserve on the beach, got a sudden call into action some time after midnight on the 28th. Infantry patrols had reported that the enemy was moving along the flat to the north of the Cove, evidently with the idea of attacking the somewhat exposed left flank. All spare men and beach parties stood to arms, a defensive line was occupied, and the gunners dragged their two guns through the heavy sand to a position near the left section of the 4th Battery. Supplies of ammunition were brought up, and the guns stood ready for action, but the threatened attack was abandoned. Once again the Navy had come to the rescue, destroyers standing in and throwing a concentrated beam across the flat from their searchlights. On this brightly illumined path the Turk very wisely refused to show himself. As the two guns were in full view of the enemy by day, they were removed with the first flush of dawn.
A position had now been found for the 2nd Battery on the top of Plugge's Plateau, but the question of how the guns were to be got up had yet to be settled. However, a working party of infantry, some hundreds strong, was set to work to make
Plugge's Plateau was an almost level piece of ground a few acres in extent which crowned the slopes of Anzac Cove. Standing on the Plateau and looking east across Monash Gully the forward trenches at Quinn's Post were in full view; while lower down were the communication trenches with which the beaver-like industry of sapper and infantryman had honeycombed the face of the cliff. Above these forward trenches, almost in the same line of sight with them, and a bare twenty yards further on, was the Turkish front line. The 2nd Battery watched this point, the most vulnerable in the whole system, and the most vital. It could see and shoot at scarcely any other; but though its arc of fire was so limited, the shooting the guns could do within this arc was so effective and of such value as to make the position one of great importance. Careful ranging and most accurate fuze-setting alone rendered it possible for the guns to engage the enemy twenty yards beyond their own line at a range of between nine hundred and a thousand yards. The deadly effect of this direct fire can be imagined; and after one or two experiences the enemy was little disposed to leave his trenches in the face of it.
Three guns of the 1st Battery arrived on the beach on the afternoon of April 30th, and were followed by the remaining
It will readily be seen that in addition to possessing a preponderance in guns, and more plentiful supplies of ammunition, the enemy enjoyed every advantage of position and observation. In the Anzac area, circumscribed and altogether unsuitable for the use of field guns, batteries were obliged for the most part to occupy positions that might almost be described
One of the 3rd Battery Guns at Caps Helles
At the commencement of the campaign ammunition had all to be taken up to the guns by hand, but when the Corps settled down, and such things became better organised, the employment of transport mules relieved the gunners of a heavy burden. It was not a long carry to the howitzers; but few of the gunners will forget the dragging climb up to Plugge's Plateau, or to the 1st Battery's position on Walker's Ridge. Most of the ammunition for the 1st Battery was taken up by pack mules on the road constructed for the guns, and a fair measure of success attended a scheme for hauling it up the cliffside by a rope let down on the right of the Sphinx.
The Turk long cherished the illusion that it was possible by sheer weight of numbers to fling back into the sea the adventurous soldiery who had wrested this narrow footing on his coast, but the absolute failure of all his desperate attempts in the closing days of April must have gone some way towards dispelling it. During most of this time the 4th Battery was the only field battery supporting the Division, and the value of its support to the wearied infantry is almost beyond estimation. The only limit to its activities was the ammunition supply, which had to be husbanded with the most jealous care. For two hours, at one of the most critical periods, the guns were entirely without ammunition. This was on April 27th, and difficulty was at first experienced in getting fresh supplies sent ashore, but at last some arrived from the Australind, and the guns were able to resume shooting.
By the end of April the line had been reorganized by extricating troops which had become mixed with ether units in the confusion of the early fighting, preparations following for an attack on May 2nd, with the object of improving the line by capturing a commanding knoll between Quinn's Post and Walker's Ridge. The attack, which was made at night over unfamiliar, broken country, was not successful. It was preceded by a bombardment by the field guns that were in action, and the guns of the Navy; but owing to the conditions it could not be directly supported by artillery fire. The attacking troops suffered heavy losses from machine-gun and rifle fire during the night, and when the dawn came found their positions so exposed as to be absolutely untenable.
The Turkish Attacks in May.
Three days later the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, with the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, left Anzac for Helles. The temporary withdrawal of these two brigades so weakened the line that the gravest anxiety prevailed, until the tension was relieved by the arrival on May 12th of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the men of the Australian Light Hone. On the arrival of these fresh troops the battalions of the Royal Naval Division, who had been assisting to hold the line, were embarked for Helles. While the line had been so thinly held the New Zealand batteries in action played a very responsible part in the defence of the position. The 2nd Battery, tirelessly vigilant in following every movement of the enemy in front of Quinn's and the neighbouring posts, lent invaluable aid to the infantry on the morning of May 10th, during a strong enemy counter-attack. On the previous night troops of the Royal Marine Brigade had made a sortie and captured some trenches, the possession of which would materially have improved the position at that point. The assaulting troops had succeeded in establishing themselves in the captured trenches, and reinforcements had been sent up, but at dawn the Turks heavily counter-attacked, and recaptured the trenches. The direct fire of the 2nd Battery's 18prs. on Plugge's Plateau, and the high explosive of the 4.5in. howitzers inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy, who paid dearly for their success. Later in the morning the 2nd Battery so effectually shelled the trenches in front of Quinn's Post that the shooting drew warm praise and a message of thanks from Brigadier-General Trotman, R.M.L.I., commanding No. 3 Section of the line. Further evidence of the deadly effectiveness of the fire of these two batteries on this occasion was had some time later, when an entry was found in the diary of a Turkish officer to the effect that two Turkish regiments on May 10th lost 600 killed and 2,000 wounded.
Despite the fact that they were few in number and so ill supplied with ammunition, the three New Zealand batteries shot so well and so consistently on every emergency, and at every critical period, that invariably they received the warm
On May 16th, the day before the 1st Battery guns were got up to Walker's Ridge, Major-General Sir A. J. Godley sent to the C.R.A. a message referring in appreciative terms to the shooting of the batteries then in action. "Please convey," the message ran, "to all your batteries now here my high appreciation of the excellent shooting they have made while in action here. All commanders of posts are loud in their praises of the support they have had from the, howitzers and No. 2 Battery, and on behalf of the whole Division I wish to express to them our thanks for the good work which has led to such substantial results."
When the Turks made their big attack on May 19th, the shore artillery supporting the Division consisted of the 4th Howitzer Battery, the 1st and 2nd Batteries, and one 6in. howitzer manned by men of the Royal Garrison Artillery. This gun had been landed on the night of May 16th, and on the following day hauled up Walker's Ridge to an excellent position which gave a good field of fire, but its value was rather discounted by the fact that only one hundred and fifty
- No. 1 Section—3rd Australian Infantry Brigade, 6 guns A.F.A., 6 guns Indian Mountain Battery.
- No. 2 Section—1st Australian Infantry Brigade, 5 guns Australian F.A., one 6in. howitzer.
- No. 3 Section—1st Light Horse Brigade and 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, 3 guns Indian Mountain Artillery, 2 howitzers 4th Battery, N.Z.F.A., 2nd Battery, N.Z.F.A.
- No. 4 Section—N.Z. Mounted Rifles Brigade, 4 guns 1st Battery, N.Z.F.A., 3 guns Indian Mountain Artillery, 2 howitzers 4th Battery, N.Z.F.A., one 6in. howitzer.
The attack was expected and prepared for. Word had been received of considerable movement of enemy troops along the roads on the Peninsula, and reinforcements had been seen marching to Anzac from the southern zone at Helles. The Navy vigorously shelled these roads and communication ways; the Turkish response at Anzac making it clear at once that his artillery had received an accession of strength, including some guns of very heavy calibre, which had not previously opened fire. The attack opened suddenly at midnight on May 18th, when rifle and machine-gun fire more violent than anything that had previously been experienced, broke out along the whole Anzac front. All ranks had been warned of the imminence of the attack, both the riflemen in the trenches, and the gunners by their pieces, calmly awaiting the moment of assault. The crash of the Turkish shells punctuated this prolonged roar from rifle and machine gun. Towards 3 a.m. the fire slackened somewhat, but increased in intensity again when the Turkish infantry at last advanced to the attack. The first effort, which was directed against the left of No. 2 Section, was repulsed with rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire; but it was only a foretaste of what was to follow. The Turks came on four times, always to be repulsed with loss. At the same time a heavy attack was delivered on the north-east salient of No. 4
The growing light gave the artillery observers a better chance, and while the 2nd Battery was pouring its short range murderous fire into the trenches opposite Quinn's and Courtney's, the 1st Battery and the Howitzers were making good practice on large bodies of the enemy assembling in Johnston's Jolly. Employing an increased number of guns, the enemy shelled the trenches, interior positions and the beach. The 2nd Battery in particular was subjected to a fairly steady fire from light calibre guns, but little damage was sustained. This Battery, whose left section was getting most of the targets, got some splendid shooting about ten o'clock; a large force of the enemy which had been unable to make any headway in an attack directed against the left of Courtney's Post and the right of Quinn's, swung round to the left of Quinn's, where they were so severely handled by the guns that their attack was completely broken up. By that time the impetus of the attack was spent, but the enemy was further harassed by gun-fire in the valley east of Plateau 400, where they were endeavouring to reorganise their shattered ranks.
For the not inconsiderable part which it had played in thus definitely checking this great attack, which it was later discovered was ambitiously designed by the Turks to drive the invaders back into the sea, the 2nd Battery received the thanks of Colonel Chauvel, commanding the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, and Brigadier-General Monash, commanding the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, both of whom stated that the Battery saved Quinn's Post, as they could not have held the position without its support. When the enemy was
Desultory firing continued until the afternoon of May 20th, when there came a marked lull, and about six o'clock Red Crescent and white flags appeared at various points in the enemy's line. The Turks appeared at first desirous of an armistice to get in wounded and bury their dead; but it soon became apparent that the flags were part of a ruse to gain time and cover the massing of troops for another attack after dark. Those of the enemy who had left their trenches were warned to go back, the 1st and 2nd Batteries were ordered to open fire, and troops in the line were warned against a possible attack. The enemy did actually attack during the night in the direction of Courtney's Post, but the attack lacked vigour, and was broken up. An hour and a half after midnight, however, the whole line was shelled, and a determined attack was made on Quinn's Post; but the attackers again fared badly at the hands of the 2nd Battery, whose fire drove them to the shelter of their trenches, and beat back all other attempts to assault. Slow fire was kept up on the enemy's trenches in this locality until 4 a.m., when all guns opened up in a general bombardment which extended over half an hour.
The following day negotiations of a formal character were opened by the enemy with a view to arranging a suspension of arms. A Turkish officer made his way along the shore from Gaba Tepe, under cover of a white flag, and was met and escorted, blindfolded, through the lines and along the beach to Army Corps Headquarters. The negotiations extended over some two or three days, but a suspension of arms was finally arranged for May 24th, to commence at 7.30 a.m., and to terminate at 4.30 p.m. At the appointed hour the armistice parties from each force met on the right flank of the Anzac
The day following the Armistice was marked by a tragic and dramatic happening, which for the time, at any rate, left an even more marked impression on the minds of everyone than had the grim business of the previous day. This was the sinking by a submarine of H.M.S. Triumph, in the light of broad day, and almost at the very feet of the watchers on the slopes of Anzac. A hostile submarine had been reported off Gaba Tepe on May 22nd, and in consequence all transports lying off shore had been ordered to Mudros, although this meant the dislocation of the supply arrangements for the force on shore. Extra precautions had also been taken by ships of the navy, which were kept under way as much as possible. The Triumph was standing about a mile off shore, a little south of Anzac Cove, when a great column of smoke and water rose up from her side, and she quickly commenced to heel over. The big ship must have flashed the news abroad that she was hit and in her death agony, for from every quarter came racing destroyers and naval small craft. From away down south in the direction of Cape Helles black shapes on the skyline, each of them a torpedo-boat destroyer, began to increase in size, and presently into plain view they came, spreading out fan-shape, with the foam rising to their decks almost, and the smoke spreading out in a black mottled wake overhead. One or two destroyers cruising nearer at hand had Triumph, and were busy taking off the crew, while picquet boats and pinnaces had put off from the shore with a like despatch. Slowly the Triumph heeled over until her decks were almost perpendicular and her port guns were tilted skywards, and within twelve minutes of being struck she had turned completely over, the great length of her red keel glistening in the sun. While the questing destroyers circled round, hungry for a sight of the submarine, the vessel gradually sank deeper in the waters, until with a little swirl she disappeared completely from view. The old ship had become familiar to everyone at Anzac, and the spectacle made a profound impression on the thousands who stood on the hills and watched her tragic end. At midday she rode trim and strong, the sun beating on her clean bare decks, and the smooth, shining length of her big guns; but within the hour she had been stricken to the vitals, and found her last resting place in the blue waters of the Ægean.
Chapter III.
The Isolation of Anzac.
For nearly a fortnight after the landing the C.R.A., Lieut.-Colonel Johnston, had his headquarters at the foot of Howitzer Gully, close by the headquarters of the Division, on the northern end of the Cove. But these quarters were cramped and inconvenient, and it was soon discovered that the congested and exposed beach front was unsuitable for the location of the headquarters of the Division. Shelters were accordingly prepared on a terrace at the head of a small gully which ran almost to the foot of the precipitous slopes of Plugge's Plateau, where Headquarters remained from May 7th until the eve of the August offensive. Army Corps Headquarters was in a central and accessible position at the very foot of a gully running off the centre of the Cove, where General Birdwood, living as unpretentiously as the most junior member of his staff, directed the ceaseless activities of his soldiers. From the very day of the landing the Cove became the hub or centre from which radiated everything that was vital to the life of the Corps. There were located the Supply Depôts of the Army Service Corps, the Army Ordnance Stores, and the Field Ambulance stations. The Cove was protected from direct fire by the steep sides of Plugge's Plateau, from which two long shoulders ran down to the sea, terminating in the two points that marked the northern and southern extremities of the little strip of beach—Ari Burnu on the north, and Hell Spit on the south. Never was a force so precariously placed, clinging by virtue only of its tenacious courage to a strip of broken and barren coast-line three thousand yards in length, and a bare thousand yards in depth at the centre, with the sea at its back, and hemmed in on three sides by a foe superior in numbers and guns, and lacking little in courage and leadership. But no one ever doubted its ability to hold what had been seized. Who could have doubted in face of such bold confidence and intrepidity?
The difficulties of supplying the troops with ammunition and the bare necessaries of existence were enormous and never-ceasing. Consider for a moment that the country they held yielded nothing, not even a sufficient water-supply, and that all supplies had to be brought by sea from the base at Alexandria, 800 miles distant, and landed on the open beaches at Anzac. The ordinary methods of supplying an army's needs could not be employed; there was no precedent which might be referred to for guidance, the position being unexampled in military history. Only the intelligent and skilful co-operation of the Navy made the task practicable. Between the base at Alexandria and Anzac there were but two harbours, Mudros Bay, distant 60 miles, and Kephalos, over at Imbros; and neither of these harbours possessed any piers or facilities for the transhipment of stores. The position became further complicated when enemy submarines began to make the Ægean Sea dangerous to shipping, and it became necessary to prohibit the big transports and store ships from proceeding north of Mudros. Up to that time the transports had stood off the coast at Anzac, and discharged their supplies or disembarked their reinforcements into lighters, which were towed into the beach; but the advent of the submarines made another transhipment necessary. At Mudros supplies were loaded into steam trawlers and mine sweepers, which discharged them into lighters and barges off Anzac or across at Kephalos. At Anzac the Turkish guns commanded all the landing places, so that everything had to be landed under cover of darkness.
The working of the whole system was dependent on the vagaries of the weather. Even during the summer months the broad surface of the bay at Mudros was sometimes swept by a northerly or southerly wind, which seriously impeded or delayed transhipment, but in the autumn and winter Anzac was often isolated for days at a time by gales which swept the open bay at Kephalos, and made the exposed beaches at Anzac quite unapproachable. The establishment of a reserve supply of stores at Anzac was the only measure which could be taken to minimise the dangers of isolation incurred by these breaks in the lines of communication. Within the first week after the landing of the force, the little mounds of stores on
The bulk of the water supply also came from overseas. A certain quantity of water was to be had at Anzac, and by seeking for water in likely places, and improving existing wells, the local supply was considerable increased. At the end of June it was estimated that there was a natural supply at Anzac of eighteen thousand gallons per day, a further thirty per day coming from Alexandria by transports and store ships. These vessels pumped their supplies into a water ship, from which it was taken to Anzac in water-barges which were moored to the shore, the water being finally pumped into tanks on the beach, where it was jealously guarded and doled out to the thirsty troops.
Though the maintenance of the army from a distant base over sea routes frequented by enemy submarines was certainly an arduous, and often a hazardous, undertaking, it was in the landing and distribution on shore that danger showed itself grim and in deadly earnest. From his vantage point to the south, on the bold headland of Gaba Tepe, the enemy could see almost everything that went on in the Cove, while his guns covered not only the beach but the sea for some distance off-shore. The beach was occasionally shelled by light guns firing from the direction of Anafarta; but the guns so cleverly concealed near the Olive Groves beyond Gaba Tepe commanded a perfect enfilade of the water-front, the accuracy and frequency of their fire making them a constant and deadly menace. So effective was their fire that an attempt to land anything during the hours of daylight was a flouting of death that received a quick and final answer. So during the long day the beach was quiet enough except for the frolicking of the bathers, who, making the most of their opportunity, disported themselves in the sparkling waters of the bay between the bursts of shelling.
With the coming of night the narrow water-front began to swarm with the activities of beach fatigues, carrying parties and the chattering muleteers of the Indian Supply Column.
The pinnaces brought the unwieldy and heavily-freighted barges in to the piers, and the sweating fatigues filed in ghostly procession from the piers with their burdens of food supplies, ammunition and stores. From this advanced depôt on the beach the supply columns loaded up their pack mules and handy little transport carts, and filed off in the darkness on their various routes to the forward dumps.
Reinforcements for the Division were usually landed an hour or two before daylight. Full of curious questions, and marvelling at the seeming animated confusion on shore, the newcomers were promptly led into the comparative safety of one of the gullies running off the beach, and thence taken by guides away to their respective units. By the time the stars had begun to pale before the first roseate flush of dawn, the tumult had subsided; the last lighters had been emptied, the Supply Depôt had sent out its last load of stores, the Ordnance Depôt its final consignment of ammunition, and the transport drivers were commencing to filter back and arrange their little carts in orderly rows on the beach. With the rising of the sun the water's edge and the piers were given over to the morning bathers, who came trooping down, lightly or not at all clad, from their burrows and shelters on the slopes overlooking the bay.
For an army so disadvantageously situated the daily ration was a liberal one, and the occasions on which there was anything approaching a shortage were very rare. But there was an appalling lack of variety about the ration, and this circumstance was a contributory cause of much of the sickness which so grievously weakened the force during the summer months. Tinned beef—"Bully-beef"—and the square white granite army biscuit formed the foundation of the ration, and a very firm foundation too. These two articles of diet were never in short supply; great quantities of them were always kept stacked on the beach, and they were perfectly secure from the attentions of acquisitive souls who visited the Supply Depôt under cover of night in hopes of agreeably supplementing their ration. The biscuits were impervious to climatic influences or change of temperature, but the beef was often found to be par-boiled when brought straight from the
When the summer was advanced, and almost every soldier was weakened by the ravages of dysentery and kindred troubles, some efforts were made to alleviate the distress by introducing some variety into the ration, but they did not go far, and achieved little. There was no one who would not willingly have given a portion of his pay each week if thereby he could have secured an occasional change from a diet so monotonous that it became nauseating to a sick stomach. But the Gallipoli campaign was nearing its conclusion before any active steps were taken to provide canteens over at Imbros, and by the time the canteens had become well established, and the system of purchase by unit representatives was in running order, preliminary steps were being taken for the evacuation.
Obviously it is impossible for an army in the field to carry into practice all the laws of sanitation that ordinarily govern a civilised community. The soldiers are too busy fighting for one thing; too busy at times even to bury their dead; and for a host of other reasons the sanitation of a fighting army must always be a matter of difficulty, and, especially in a warm climate, a source of anxiety. At Anzac these difficulties were intensified a hundred-fold by the circumstance that for many months the force was confined to the narrow strip of country on which it first established itself. From the outset nothing was left undone to keep the area as clean as possible, and so minimise the risks of an outbreak of disease; but inevitably much of the ground became foul, and formed breeding places for myriads of flies, which swarmed everywhere, and seriously aggravated the already prevalent dysentery. The colonials had experienced the fly plague in Egypt, which was a natural breeding-ground for anything that had its origin in filth; but the flies in Egypt were a pleasant and soothing companionship
The Fighting in Midsummer.
The varied activities of the artillery, both offensive and defensive, during the three weeks that had elapsed since the landing, culminating in the big Turkish attack in the middle of May, made such serious inroads on the slender ammunition supplies that a drastic curtailment of the normal daily expenditure became an imperative necessity. After the fighting of May 19th and the two following days had simmered down, an order was issued cutting down the allowance for 18prs., 4.5in., and 6in. howitzers to two rounds per gun per day. Two rounds per gun did not even suffice for the checking of registrations. Observing officers in their posts had to content themselves with gazing at targets which they could not engage, however tempting they might be. This was galling enough, but it was even harder for battery commanders to refuse, as they must, the frequent requests from the front line for support from the guns. Their cruel necessities forced them to deny to the infantry the support they expected and so sorely needed. The gunners employed much of this enforced leisure in further improving the gun positions, and their own accommodation. Here again they were faced with the almost absolute lack of materials. A few sandbags could be had, but nearly all the timber and sandbags that were landed went to meet the prior claims of the front line. So for the artillery there ensued a long period of irksome and enforced inactivity, which was broken in real earnest only when the guns were called on to help in countering a Turkish attack, as on May 29th, or in supporting some local operation by their own troops.
It had become apparent that the Army Corps could not hope to make any decisive move forward without first receiving strong reinforcements and a more liberal supply of ammunition. Although the enemy had been unable to accomplish his avowed purpose of sweeping the invaders into the sea, he had succeeded in confining them to the circumscribed area on which they had established themselves on the day of landing. Week by week the fighting began more closely to approximate to siege warfare. The failure of the series of attacks in which the New Zealand Infantry Brigade had been engaged at the southern end of the Peninsula early in May had similarly made it equally plain that no decisive step towards victory was likely to be achieved with the forces which Sir Ian Hamilton then had at his command in that theatre of operations. The situation was summed up in a Force Order issued by the General Officer Commanding the M.E.F. on May 11th, in which it was stated that "Owing to the numerous and well-planned entrenchments now held by the enemy in the vicinity of Achi Baba, and also at Gaba Tepe, the operations in the immediate future will approximate more to semi-siege warfare than to open operations in the field. Further progress must now be made by continuous and systematic attack on certain portions of the hostile line rather than by a general action involving the advance of the whole line at once…."
The fact that trench warfare had set in and that no operations on a large scale appeared to be contemplated, did not diminish the aggressive alertness of the colonial troops at Anzac, nor did it mean any lessening of the constant struggle between the two opposing forces; a struggle which became more bitter and intense in those places where the front line trenches ran close together, and grave issues hung on the loss or gain of a few yards, or even of a few feet. At Quinn's Post, that vulnerable point in the defences where the defenders dare not yield one inch, so close to their backs was the edge of the cliff, the fighting assumed a character which invested it with new and fearful dangers. Despairing, doubtless, of ever advancing over the open against the devastating fire which his assaults always encountered from the trenches addi-
The "Water-Queue" on the Beach at Anzac [Photo by the Author
tion
Close fighting continued in front of Quinn's Post for the next couple of days. The Turks had an apparently unlimited supply of bombs with which they constantly harassed the defenders of the Post, who replied as best they might with the "jam tin" bombs made at Anzac. Two enemy saps were actually pushed forward to within five yards of the front line, and these it became necessary at all hazards to destroy. At 1 p.m. on May 30th two parties of thirty-five men each went forward under covering fire from the 2nd Battery and the guns of two batteries of Indian Mounted Artillery, the operation being preceded by a heavy fire from the 2nd Battery on the enemy trenches, 100 yards in rear of their front line. The storming parties cleared the sap-heads and penetrated into the trenches beyond; but in spite of the supporting fire they were gradually driven back by a series of counter-attacks in which the enemy's lavish supplies of bombs placed the attackers at a grievous disadvantage. Colonel Chauvel, commanding the 3rd Section of Defence, was again warmly appreciative of the 2nd Battery's shooting, and in a message to the Divisional Commander expressed the opinion that the guns had caused great execution amongst the enemy, and fulfilled their task of keeping down hostile fire.
Practically ever since the day of the landing the weather had been consistently fine except for an occasional shower of rain. The days had been bright and warm and the nights fine, but somewhat cool to men who had been tempted by the brilliance of the sun to discard most of their warm clothing. But the hot summer season was advancing, and by June the heat had become oppressive, and combined with the ills and afflictions that it brought in its train, was a grievous burden to men who had already been sorely tried in body and spirit. As the heat increased, the amount of clothing worn by the average individual became less and less, until the absolute minimum was reached by the many, who contented themselves with a very short pair of "shorts," boots, and headgear of the
Every day the guns from the Olive Groves swept the beach with their deadly enfilade, and hardly a day passed when they did not exact a toll in killed and wounded, but none ever thought of foregoing his swim in consequence of these risks. It was certainly a characteristic of Anzac that immunity from constant danger was to be sought nowhere; but there was something infinitely more tragic and terrible in being stricken down while enjoying an hour off duty on the beach, than while in the trenches, or serving the guns in the heat of battle. The guns usually fired in short bursts at uncertain intervals; and as they were firing at a considerable range the shells gave some warning of their approach and enabled the most active to dive for the shelter of the big stacks of boxed provisions or the lee side of the iron barges that usually lay alongside the pier. There they crouched while the shrapnel swept over their heads with that familiar but frightful swishing sound; and the stretcher-bearers rushed the wounded to cover. In a few moments the shelling would cease, men would straighten themselves up with an air of mingled relief and caution; then one, more intrepid than the rest, would lead the way again into the tempting waters, and in a few minutes it would seem as if there had never been anything to disturb their splashing and frolicking.
The summer dragged on slowly enough. The strength of the force was slowly dwindling through the wastage from sickness and the daily casualties in killed and wounded, and the prospect of making some decisive move without the addition of strong reinforcements became more and more remote. At every point the Army Corps was faced with wire entanglements and deep entrenchments which the enemy, strongly reinforced and enjoying every possible advantage that the position could offer, was daily making more formidable. For the garrison at Anzac there was never any rest. The inactivity of the force was only comparative. Because it was not called upon to make any prodigious effort there was none the less no lessening of the incessant and arduous fatigues, no respite from the constant dangers and alarms, the sniping, night patrols, and the fierce bombing encounters at those places where the opposing lines ran closely together. Before the commencement of the lengthy preparations for the August offensive gave them a heartening indication of big events at hand, the soldiers were inclined sometimes to wonder how much longer the depressing routine of "holding on" was to continue. The monotonous waiting during the hot summer weeks was calculated to do more to lower the morale of the soldier than all the exhausting struggles that had preceded it. In men of another temper it would have produced a fatal lethargy, and a decay in their fighting spirit, but in the Australians and New Zealanders it bred only a restlessness and a growing desire for some decisive action to end the seeming impasse.
In this frame of mind everyone turned with anxious interest to the theatre of operations at the southern end of the Peninsula, where the British and French forces were laying siege to the great natural fortress of Achi Baba. Those battles and the possibilities they suggested were a constant topic of discussion in June; and there were always at least one or two rumours in circulation that Achi Baba had fallen or was about to fall. Every time the noise of the guns at Helles rolled up to Anzac in swelling volume, and the shoulders of the big hill were cloaked in the sullen gloom of war, it was freely prophesied that its fall was imminent. So strongly does hope
The fighting at Relies, however, had a more immediate material effect on the affairs of the Army Corps, inasmuch as any big attack by the Allied forces in the south always found an echo at Anzac in the shape of a local operation undertaken in the hope of diverting some of the Turkish reserves from the real attack. In rear of his positions on the Peninsula the enemy possessed ample sheltered country in which to dispose his reserves, and with lateral communications was able to move men to either Anzac or Helles at short notice. A diversion at Anzac was liable to be of a costly nature; but at any rate it never failed to attain the dual object of retaining the Turkish forces opposite the colonials and attracting some portion of his reserves.
On the occasion of the big attack at Helles on June 4th, the efforts made at Anzac to distract the attention of the enemy took the form of three distinct enterprises—a demonstration in the direction of Gaba Tepe, and raids on a section of trench opposite Quinn's, and on German Officers' Trench, opposite Courtney's Post. New Zealand infantrymen carried out the raid from Quinn's Post, the assaulting party numbering sixty men. They were to leave their own trenches at 11 p.m., under cover of artillery fire, make a dash across No Man's Land, and capture the selected portion of trench, which was then to be put in a state of defence, and linked up with their own front line. The first phase was accomplished swiftly enough, the trench being successfully seized, and some Turks bayoneted, in addition to twenty-eight who were taken prisoners. The raiders were supported by the 2nd Battery, N.Z.FA, the 4th Australian Battery, and the 21st Indian Mountain Battery, firing on the front and left front of their objective, while a section of the 4th Howitzer Battery
The closing days of June were marked by further heavy fighting, but this time it was the Turk who attacked, and the Turk who suffered heavy losses. Activity commenced with another containing movement to assist the forces at Helles, local attacks being made on the right of the Anzac position by the Australians. Whether or not this diversion simply succeeded beyond expectations, or whether the enemy had been planning an attack upon Anzac is not quite clear, but at any rate the Turk assembled in great force in his trenches during the hours following the attack, and himself advanced to the assault shortly after midnight on June 29th, after a preliminary bombardment of great intensity, and a torrent of rifle and machine-gun fire. On the right of the Anzac sector the enemy's reserves had already been severely handled by guns of the Australian and New Zealand Artillery during the afternoon, the 1st Battery having effectively engaged large parties behind Lone Pine. Again when the enemy determinedly launched several heavy columns against the left and left-centre of the line, shortly after 1 a.m., the guns played havoc with his reserves, and cut gaps in his ranks as they moved forward to the attack. Showing more than usual determination, the attackers still pressed on in face of a murderous machine-gun and rifle fire, and some few even penetrated into the trenches held by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, where they were promptly bayoneted. A large force then
Chapter IV.
How the Guns Were Starved.
From the earliest hours of the Gallipoli campaign it needed no master of strategy to divine that one of the most fatal weaknesses of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force lay in its shortage in guns, especially howitzers, and in shells. This weakness in a potent and indispensable arm detrimentally affected the fortunes of the army at every stage and in every phase; and the appalling casualty lists were undoubtedly swelled by reason of the necessarily inadequate artillery preparations for infantry assaults against strongly fortified and naturally formidable positions, and across broken and difficult country, the like of which was unknown in France or Flanders. The New Zealand batteries which landed on the Peninsula successfully overcame obstacles which might well have been considered insurmountable. They dragged their guns up the precipitous hillsides, and fought them for months under the direct gaze of an enemy more liberally supplied with both guns and shells. But despite their skill and devotion they were handicapped and at times almost crippled by a factor beyond their control—the shortage of shells.
In chronicling the part played by the New Zealand Field Artillery in the Gallipoli campaign it is unnecessary and inadvisable to attempt to deal with the events leading up to the inception of this "immortal gamble," to analyse the causes of its failure, or to speculate on the far-reaching consequences that success would have had on the general course of the war. But the artillery were so directly affected by certain of the shortcomings under which the Expedition suffered, that no history would be complete without some reference to them.
From the outset the War Office seemed to display a tragic lack of understanding of the magnitude of the undertaking to which the country was about to commit itself in the Gallipoli Expedition. The Army was but ill-equipped with guns, many
In contrast to this pitiful weakness the French troops which landed at the southern end of the Peninsula were well equipped with guns and howitzers, and were always well supplied with ammunition, so that they became the envy, as well as the admiration, of the British gunners. On occasions the French generously lent some of their batteries to the British in order to help them in their preparations for an assault. In the attack at Helles on the 12th and 13th July the French placed some thirty or forty guns and howitzers under British command; and' on account of the shortage of British ammunition the French guns undertook the whole of the preliminary artillery preparation for the assault.
Situated far distant from the source to which he must look for the supplies of men and munitions, which were vital for the successful prosecution of the campaign, and almost for the very existence of his army, Sir Ian Hamilton could present his pleas or press his demands only in the comparative brevity of a cable, or by the slow process of a despatch. In neither way was he likely to carry conviction to the War Office against the arguments and influence of those who were opposed to any diversion of strength from the main issue on the Western Front, insisting that not a man nor a gun could be spared from France. Yet what incalculable consequences might have followed from the diversion to Gallipoli of some very small proportion of the forces that were expended in the indecisive battles fought by the British and French on the Western Front in 1915! Had the original British forces on Gallipoli not been literally starved in guns and shells there are reasonable grounds for the belief that their efforts might have been crowned with success, and the Dardanelles opened and made secure for the passage of the Fleet. At any rate it is certain that the losses in killed and wounded would have been very considerably less, and those of the enemy incomparably greater. The British armies in France and Flanders suffered severely from the shortage of guns and shells throughout the whole of 1915, but surely no other troops had ever to advance against such strong positions with less artillery support than was afforded the infantry of Anzac and Helles.
The messages which passed between the Commander-in-Chief of the Dardanelles Army and Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State for War, afford illuminating evidence of Sir Ian Hamilton's urgent and almost incessant, but for the most part fruitless, appeals for more guns for his army, and of his endeavours to quicken the sluggish and uncertain flow of ammunition supplies. After having very early in the campaign described the ammunition question as acute, Sir Ian Hamilton placed the position with much fullness before the Secretary of State, and pointed out that a liberal supply of ammunition, especially H.E., would enormously reduce the loss of life. Only three aeroplanes were available, and trouble
But the War Office, apparently convinced that the needs of the far-distant campaign must not be permitted to interfere with the paramount claims of the cause near at hand, remained unmoved by all appeals and every demand. For the great battle of August, inexperiencd troops were sent to reinforce the Gallipoli army—to meet an enemy whom Sir Ian Hamilton had already described to the War Office "as a very formidable foe, and individually better fighting men than the Germans"—and any increase in the rate of ammunition supplies was insignificant. During the tremendous fighting in August the 18pr. ammunition sent out averaged only eleven rounds per gun per day.
The total artillery strength at Anzac by May 17th was just under forty guns and howitzers, included in which were the twelve guns of the Indian Mountain Artillery, and the two 6in. howitzers which had just been landed. Both these howitzers were old, and badly equipped with stores; and as only 150 rounds of ammunition were sent with each piece their usefulness was rather limited. In June Anzac asked G.H.Q. for more of these howitzers, but there was only one available, and there was no ammunition. In their attack on May 29th, the Turks had a numerical superiority in guns of about two to one, and as they were mostly well-concealed and
Every effort was being made at this juncture to build up a store of ammunition for the big operations which were being planned for the month of August, but notwithstanding that this meant submitting to hostile fire without retaliation, the situation was accepted in the cheerful, self-sacrificing spirit that was characteristic of Anzac. Battery commanders managed to achieve surprising results with the small number of rounds that were made available from time to time. The guns of the 4th Howitzer Battery were constantly in request for breaking up enemy works and strong points, and engaging targets that lay in "dead" ground for the flat-trajectory 18prs. On June 12th one of the 4th Battery guns at the foot of Howitzer Gully was taken up to Plugge's Plateau, near the 2nd Battery position, thus giving it a more effective range for engaging distant targets. More particularly on the right flank there were always plenty of tempting targets out of range of the shore artillery, and for a considerable time the Commander of the Australian Field Artillery had made urgent representations for two 4.7in. naval guns with which to engage them. It was not, however, until July 11th that one very old and much-worn gun arrived, and was placed in position on the right flank, firing its first round on July 26th. As it was frequently out of action its usefulness was very limited.
The Turks no doubt experienced difficulties and anxieties about their own ammunition supplies, but never at any period was there anything to indicate that they were in the same sore straits as the Army Corps at Anzac, or the British Forces at Helles. On July 10th, indeed, a memorandum was issued by G.H.Q., stating that news had been received to the effect that
The expected arrival of two more batteries from New Zealand, the 5th Battery of 18prs. and the 6th Howitzer Battery, made necessary some reorganisation in the composition of the New Zealand Divisional Artillery at the end of this month. In an order published on July 26th, the details of this reorganisation were set forth. In place of the existing Brigade of four batteries, two Brigades were created, each consisting of three Batteries. Major F. Symon, 1st Battery, and Major F. B. Sykes, 2nd Battery, were promoted Lieut.-Colonels, and given command respectively of the 1st and 2nd Brigades. Lieut.-Colonel G. N. Johnston, commanding N.Z. Divisional Artillery, was promoted Colonel. The composition of the Brigades was as follows:—
1st Brigade:—1st Battery—Major C. McGilp; 3rd Battery—Major I. T. Standish; 6th (How.) Battery—Captain G. E. Daniell; 1st Brigade Amm. Column—Captain A. E. Horwood.
2nd Brigade:—2nd Battery—Major F. G. Hume; 4th (How.) Battery—Major N. S. Falla; 5th Battery—Major G. J. Beattie; 2nd Brigade Amm. Column—Captain T. Farr.
The Divisional Ammunition Column, an attached British unit, was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Cochrane, D.S.O. The 3rd Battery was of course at Cape Helles, and the Brigade Ammunition Column in Egypt.
Chapter V.
The 3rd Battery at Helles.
When Sir Ian Hamilton decided at the beginning of May to make a supreme effort to capture Achi Baba, the big hill that dominated the southern extremity of the Peninsula, he drew upon the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps for two brigades of infantry and five batteries of artillery. Included in the latter was the 3rd Battery, N.Z.F.A., which still lay off-shore from Anzac in the transport Californian. The Battery received orders to disembark at Helles on May 4th; Major Standish, who had been ashore at Anzac with an observing party, rejoined his command, and the transport sailed for Helles at midnight on May 3rd. The battery, complete with guns, horses, and wagons, went ashore in two big pontoons, and disembarkation was complete at midnight on the 4th. A position for the guns having been reconnoitred on the left flank of the line, was occupied by the evening of the 5th, and wagon lines were established near the landing beach. The Battery was attached to the 147th Brigade, R.F.A., commanded by Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Wynter, D.S.O., and covered portion of the line held by the 29th Division.
The British and French troops, which had made good a landing at Helles, were in somewhat better case than the Colonials at Anzac. With each flank resting on the sea, they held a line running across the base of the Peninsula, and the nature of the country, together with the extent of ground occupied, afforded more freedom of movement in rear of the line. The Turks had fallen back some distance on a prepared, though not continuous, line of entrenchments and redoubts, protected by wire and skilfully disposed machine-guns. Behind them rose the shoulders of Achi Baba, which their industry and valour was to convert into a stronghold so formidable as to be described some months later by the Commander-in-Chief as "the strongest fortress in Europe."
The 3rd Battery opened fire for the first time at 11 a.m. on May 6th, on the commencement of the big attack which, at the close of three days' fighting, left the Allied forces relatively no better off than it had been at the commencement. The close of a day's desperate fighting on May 6th found the attacking brigades virtually in the positions which they had occupied in the morning. At most an advance of a few hundred yards had been made at certain points, but at great cost. A long day's fighting on the 7th was equally without results, but it was decided to make one further effort on the following day. Accordingly, orders were issued for the renewal of the attack on the 8th, at 10.30 a.m. The New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which, as part of a composite Division had hitherto remained in reserve, was now attached to the 29th Division, in place of the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade, withdrawn into reserve. The attack was preceded by a heavy bombardment from the Navy and shore batteries, which plastered the Turkish trenches and the slopes of Achi Baba with shrapnel and high explosive; but the moment the attacking infantry moved forward from their trenches they were greeted with a roar of rifles, machine-guns, and field-guns, which the altogether insufficient bombardment had failed utterly to silence. The New Zealand Infantry Brigade, advancing towards Krithia, over "The Daisy Patch," a perfectly smooth stretch of ground swept by rifle and machine-gun fire, suffered terrible casualties, but still pressed doggedly on until very flesh and blood could go no further. An advance of a few hundred yards had been made, and to this dearly-won strip of ground the New Zealanders clung with desperate tenacity. It was impossible to go further, but they refused to go back. At no other point in the advance were the gains more appreciable, and by nightfall the attack had definitely failed.
It had become evident that victory by open movement on the surface could hardly be hoped for. Barbed wire entanglements and scientifically disposed machine guns had so strengthened the enemy's power of defence that open assault must be terribly costly in lives, and barren in results, unless it was accompanied by an intense artillery preparation and support, such as the Dardanelles Force was incapable of
During the three days' battle the 3rd Battery assisted in the preparatory bombardments, and lent valuable supporting fire to the infantry on its front. The battery fired a total of 420 rounds during these three days—more than half of them on the first day of the attack. A few Turkish shells fell round the position on the 7th; but the pits gave some shelter, and a trench dug in rear of the Battery afforded cover for personnel when not engaged on the guns. On the day following the conclusion of the attack, a new position was chosen for the Battery on the cliff-edge overlooking the western shore of the Peninsula, the guns covering the extreme left of the line. This position was occupied by the evening of May 10th, and there the guns remained until their departure for Anzac in the middle of August. The wagon lines remained in the position they had first occupied near the landing beach. All ranks worked very hard to improve the gun and ammunition pits and to create as much shelter as possible from the flying shrapnel. The guns were connected by trenches, deep and narrow, and dug-outs were cut on the face of the cliff overlooking the blue and sparkling waters of the Ægean Sea. A sheltered track ran along the cliff-side from the Battery to the Observing Station, situated some five hundred yards forward of the guns. The position was overlooked by the enemy, but the gun emplacements were concealed by scrub, which was always kept freshly cut, and in the hot weather the dust was kept down by sprinkling sea water in front of the pits. All the trenches and communication ways on the front covered by the Battery were carefully registered, as well as enemy redoubts and salient points along the front. These targets afforded good shooting within the limits imposed by the ammunition supply, but it was a matter of more difficulty to locate and successfully engage the Turkish machineguns, which were invariably cleverly concealed, and the field batteries, which, as at Anzac, certainly had all the advantages of position.
Except on the occasions when the guns were called on to provide covering fire for some local operation, or assist the infantry against a counter-attack, the daily expenditure of ammunition was small; often it was insignificant, and there were days when the guns did not fire at all. A supply of ammunition had always to be carefully accumulated for a pending operation, and if stocks were depleted by any sudden call or emergency a lean period must follow until a reserve had been once more established. Over two hundred rounds were fired on the evening of May 12th in supporting a successful surprise attack by a party of Ghurkas, who scaled the cliffs on the extreme left and carried the formidable work known as "Ghurka Bluff," situated to the north-east of Y. Beach. By this operation the left flank, which a succession of costly efforts had been unable to advance, was moved forward nearly 500 yards.
In the big battle of June 4th the Battery fired just under a thousand rounds, a record at that time for one day's shooting or for any single operation. A considerable reserve of ammunition had been built up, and the attack was preceded by a more thorough and careful bombardment than had yet been possible. As on previous occasions, the British 8th Corps, consisting of the remains of the 29th Division, with the Indian Infantry Brigade, the 42nd Division, and the Royal Naval Division, in that order from left to right, held the left and centre of the line, while the two Divisions of the French Corps Expeditionaire held the right. The French, who were relatively stronger in artillery than the British Divisions, and were better supplied with ammunition, lent the British two groups of their 75's for use in the attack. The guns of the fleet with such heavy guns as the Force had on shore, opened a deliberate bombardment at 8 a.m., and continued until 10.30 a.m. At 11 a.m. the bombardment recommenced, and continued until 11.20, when a feint attack drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns. At 11.30 a.m. the bombardment became general, guns of all calibres joining in, and firing with great intensity until 12 noon, when the guns lengthened their range, and protected by their "barrage," the infantry advanced in earnest.
Lieut.-Colonel F. B. Sykes, D.S.O., (d), R.A.
For the first half hour the advance was rapid, especially in the centre, and hope of decisive victory ran high. But the further advance of the 29th Division was checked through the Sikhs on their left being held up by barbed wire at the first trench remaining undamaged by the bombardment. Reinforcements were hurried up from the reserve, but even the new battalions were unable to advance, and the left of the British line thus found itself kept in check. The French at first made good progress. The formidable Haricot Redoubt, commanding the approach to the southern slope of Achi Baba, which had barred the way almost since the first advance, was rushed and captured. "Within an hour, however, the Turks made an overwhelming counter-attack upon the redoubt, shelling it heavily, and pouring masses of troops down the deep communication trenches. A fatal gap was thus opened between the French and British lines, and the fortune of the battle turned. The Royal Naval Division and the 42nd Division were forced in turn by enfilade fire to fall back from the position they had won, and when night came on and the battle closed the gains at most did not exceed two or three hundred yards in depth. Again the hopes of victory had been dashed by a costly but gallant failure.
So far as the 3rd Battery was concerned a succession of quiet days followed the big effort of June 4th. During the ten days following June 7th, the Battery expended on an average less than ten rounds a day. Then on June 18th the guns were busy again assisting to repel Turkish counter-attacks on the left of the line, and on June 28th they supported a most successful attempt to dislodge the enemy from his hitherto unshakable hold on the western coast. Pivoting upon a point in the line a mile inland from the sea, the assaulting troops took all their objectives, the attack being carried out in two phases. The greatest gains, of course, were on the coast furthest away from the pivotal point. There five lines of Turkish trenches were captured, and the British line was advanced nearly one thousand yards. For several days following this success the Turk made strong counter-attacks, which led to bitter fighting, but he was able to press none of them home. For their close and accurate shooting in
On the 12th and 13th July an attempt was made to seize the enemy's foremost trench system along the centre and right, and so conform with the advance that had been registered on the left flank. Two days' solid fighting, in which the French again lent the British the support of some of their batteries, achieved only a partial success. The 3rd Battery and two R.F.A. Batteries fired in support of a diversion by troops of the 29th Division on the left, the allotment of ammunition per battery, being 500 rounds. During the preliminary registration the enemy opened fire on the 3rd Battery position, and one or two casualties were incurred. The Battery was again freely shelled during the operation; more casualties were suffered, material damage was done to some of the wagons, and a fire was caused in the thick dry scrub in front of the guns, one of the wagons being burnt, and the position swept clear of cover.
The Battery remained at Helles until the middle of August, taking part in all the operations undertaken by the British troops in that zone, including the containing attacks in August. On August 17th the Battery received orders to proceed to Anzac to join the New Zealand Division, and embarked the same night on the Queen Louise.
The Anzac Area Showing the positions held by the 1st and 2nd Batteries and the two sections of the 4th (Howitzer) Battery prior to the August offensive.
Chapter VI.
The August Offensive.
At last, while the summer was yet at its height, events began to shape themselves for the great battle of Sari Bair, which was at once to set the seal on the heroism, the endurance, and the self-sacrifice of the soldiers at Anzac, and to mark the culmination of their hopes. Early in the campaign it had been made apparent to the Commander-in-Chief that neither at Anzac nor at Helles were his forces strong enough to fight their way through to the Narrows. On May 10th Sir Ian Hamilton had cabled to the War Office asking for two fresh divisions, and a week later another cable was sent, stating that if the Force was going to be left to face Turkey on its own resources two additional Army Corps would be required. The 52nd (Lowland) Division had been sent to Gallipoli, but whilst it was en route Russia, owing to the serious turn of events on the Eastern front, had given up the idea of co-operating from the coast of the Black Sea, and as a result several more Turkish divisions had become available for the defence of the Dardanelles. Finally, during June, Sir Ian Hamilton was promised three regular divisions plus the infantry of two Territorial divisions. The advance guard of these troops was due to reach Mudros by July 10th, and their concentration was to be complete by August 10th. A decision as to the method of employing these reinforcements was arrived at only after every practicable scheme had been exhaustively considered in all its aspects. These schemes were readily narrowed down to four in number, which may best be summarised in the terms of the Official Despatch:—
- (1) Every man to be thrown on to the southern sector of the Peninsula to force a way forward to the Narrows.
- (2) Disembarkation on the Asiatic side of the Straits, followed by a march on Chanak.
- (3) A landing at Enos or Ibrije for the purpose of seizing the neck of the isthmus at Bulair.
- (4) Reinforcement of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, combined with a landing in Suvla Bay. Then with one strong push to capture Hill 305, and working from that dominating point, to grip the waist of the Peninsula.
The considerations in favour of an assault from Anzac combined with a surprise landing at Suvla appeared conclusive; the plan seemed to afford a reasonable prospect of success, and was not subject in any measure to the unanswerable arguments which were responsible for the rejection of each of the other three schemes. Furthermore, the scheme was acceptable to the Navy, and it was considered that the bay at Suvla would afford a good submarine-proof base, and a good harbour excepting during south-west gales. As the season was advancing, and the enemy was making his position more secure each day, there were manifest dangers in unduly delaying the launching of the attack. The last drafts of the reinforcements were due to arrive on the 4th or 5th of August, and August 6th was therefore fixed as the date on which the battle would open.
The fresh troops available for the impending operations consisted of the 10th (Irish) Division, the 11th (Northern) Division, and the 13th (Western) Division, all comprising the 9th Army Corps, and the Infantry Brigades only of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, and the 54th (East Anglian) Division. The 9th Corps was composed of New Army troops, and the 53rd and 54th were Territorial Divisions. All were without experience in war. The 13th Division and one Brigade of the 10th Division were to reinforce the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps at Anzac, and to the remainder of the 9th Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir F. Stopford, was given the task of landing at Suvla Bay, and co-operating with the attack from Anzac, by first seizing and holding the Chocolate and Ismail Oglu Hills, together with the high ground on the north and east of Suvla Bay. If the landing went off smoothly it was hoped that these hills would be in the possession of the
The elaborate dispositions which had to be made at Anzac for the reception and concealment in an already overcrowded area of large bodies of fresh troops, threw a heavy burden on the garrison. Sick of the monotony, and keenly alert for evidences of change, the soldiers were not slow to grasp the significance of the preparations, which they were called upon to undertake in July, and the momentous nature of the events impending was instinctively realised. The prospect of some great decisive movement, with its alluring possibilities of success, was a tonic to men worn by incessant endeavours and weakened by privation and disease, and the spirit in which the men faced their heavy task was as admirable as the heroism which they displayed in the subsequent battles.
The entire details of the operations allotted to the troops to be employed in the Anzac area were formulated by Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, and all these local preparations, vast as they were, were carried out in their entirety by the garrison at Anzac, and faithfully completed by August 6th. Everything had to be done secretly and by stealth under the very eyes of a vigilant enemy. Two tasks of the first magnitude were the widening of the "Big Sap," the long communication trench which wound out to the outposts on the left flank, and the making of a road for wheeled traffic along the beach in the same direction. The sap was deep and narrow, and much of it ran through hard-baked clay, so that the task of bringing it to the uniform width of five feet involved a tremendous amount of sheer hard work for the sweating fatigues, "Work on the road running along the exposed beach front had perforce to be done by night, a
As the disembarkation of the fresh troops would extend over several nights some method had to be devised of securely concealing the newcomers during the few days which would elapse before the opening of the battle. Terraces and shelters were accordingly dug on the hillsides, and in these they lay hidden alike from the enemy aircraft and scouts on the heights. Great supplies of food were landed and ammunition in such quantities as the resources of the Force were capable of furnishing. The provision of an adequate supply of water was the most difficult of all problems, its solution calling for the most careful forethought and calculation so that no contingency might be unprovided for, and nothing left to chance. Little ever stood between Anzac and thirst, so dependent had it always been on the sea-borne supplies of tepid but welcome water; but in the battles that were to be fought on the sun-baked heights, water would be as indispensable almost as ammunition. Dependence on regular daily supplies involving too great a risk, a reservoir of great tanks was formed on the hillside above the beach. A system of pipelines and supply tanks was created, and the water from the barges after being pumped by hand into tanks standing on the beach, was lifted up to the reservoir by a stationary engine brought from Egypt. There were delays and mishaps of course, but anything that could not be supplied was improvised, and every obstacle was overcome by the fertile resource of minds which had been trained to cope with many desperate situations.
At last the long-expected reinforcements began to arrive. Throughout the nights of August 3rd, 4th, and 5th, they swarmed on to the beach from the crowded boats and barges that drew silently in out of the night, and as they landed were guided away to their concealed bivouacs to await the opening of the battle. The troops now at the disposal of General Birdwood amounted in round numbers to 37,000 rifles and 72 guns, with support from two cruisers, four
The artillery support in the operations was so planned as to make the most effective use of the very small number of guns available on shore. These numbered only 72 of all classes. In addition to the 18prs. of the Australian and New Zealand Field Artillery, and the one New Zealand 4.5in. howitzer battery, there were the 10pr. guns of the Indian Mountain Artillery, five batteries of 5in. howitzers, three 6in. howitzers, and the solitary 4.7in. naval gun on the right flank. There were in addition, of course, the guns of the fleet, but their effective value was limited, and they could not be used for the close support of attacking troops. In view of the great issues at stake, and the terribly difficult nature of the operations upon which the army was about to embark, it must be said that in material, whether in numbers of guns or in supplies of shells, the artillery at Anzac was pitifully inadequate.
The Attack at Lone Pine.
The New Zealand batteries played a very prominent part in paving the way for the frontal attacks which were made by the Australian Division on August 6th and 7th, and particularly valuable was their support to the 1st Brigade of Australians in their heroic and altogether successful attack at Lone Pine. During the 4th, 5th, and 6th of August, the works on the enemy's left and left centre were subjected to a slow bombardment; the 1st and 4th Batteries bombarding the Lone Pine trenches, which were provided with strong overhead cover, and well protected by barbed wire entanglements. The 1st Battery was given the task of destroying the wire; and wire-cutting, as experience showed in France, calls not
High explosive shell was used by the 18prs. for the first time on this occasion, and its effect on the wire was watched with interest. It was found, however, that low-bursting shrapnel was much more effective. The 4th Battery did a lot of shooting on the enemy's trenches at both Lone Pine and Johnston's Jolly; but the lack of ammunition made the work piecemeal, and the heavy overhead cover on the trenches at Lone Pine remained intact when the infantry attacked. Hostile batteries were very active, and one of the 1st Battery guns on Russell's Top was put out of action. One of the 4.5in. howitzers also went out of action owing to a broken buffer spring, but a new spring was rushed up from Cape Helles. The howitzer batteries (4.5 and 5in.) were limited to a mere 30 rounds per battery on the day before the attack, and 40 rounds only were allowed each battery on the day of attack for their fire action from 4 a.m. to 3 p.m., though this was supplemented by "a quick rate of fire" from 4.30 p.m. till 5.30 p.m. At the former hour an "intense bombardment" by all guns was commenced, and continued until the moment of assault.
The gunners did their utmost throughout with the hopelessly inadequate material at their disposal; more they could not do. The wire had been well cut up by the 1st Battery, which had expended over two hundred rounds on wirecutting since morning; about one half of the Turkish troops in the enemy fire trenches at the commencement of the bombardment were killed or wounded; but the result of the shooting in dealing with the massive overhead cover of the enemy's front line trenches was so inconsiderable as to be of little' use to the infantry. After crossing No Man's Land in face of a storm of rifle and machine gun fire they found the overhead cover practically intact, and the weighty beams defied all individual efforts to remove them. Then came a pause while groups of
While the attack was proceeding the 1st Battery directed its fire on the trenches at Johnston's Jolly, the 2nd Battery engaging those opposite Quinn's and Courtney's Posts; while the 4th (howitzer) Battery assisted a strong effort to neutralise the fire of enemy guns that could bear on Lone Pine by shelling hostile guns on Mortar Ridge. Enemy guns on Scrubby Knoll, Battleship Hill, Gun Ridge, and at the Olive Groves and Wine Glass Ridge were similarly engaged by a force of guns made up of four 5in. batteries, two 6in. howitzers, the 4.7in. gun, and the guns of the Australian Artillery. There was little abatement in hostile fire, however; and it was considered that the expenditure of ammunition by the old and worn 5in. howitzers was not justified by results on this occasion.
From the very commencement the enemy made it quite plain that he was determined at all costs to regain the important work which had been wrested from him in such indomitable fashion. Within an hour the guns were called upon to assist in repelling a heavy counter-attack which swept in wave on wave, both from the north and from the south, and nearly a week elapsed before the Turks seemed willing to relinquish their efforts and accept defeat. For three days the Australians had to meet constant counter-attacks and continuous and heavy shelling and bombing, the enemy's supply of bombs being apparently inexhaustible. During this period the 1st Battery, in particular, and the 2nd Battery and the 4.5in. howitzers inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy's reserves. Time after time the guns of the 1st Battery swept the enemy's ranks in a deadly enfilade as they pressed forward to the counter-attack, and more than once their fire was sufficiently destructive to break an enemy assault at its inception.
The battery was under heavy fire throughout August 6th and the following night, and the gun emplacements were so
The Australian infantry were quick to acknowledge the valuable, and indeed vital, support they had received from the 18prs. of the 1st Battery, which had on occasions succeeded in crushing the Turkish assaults the moment the attackers moved from cover. This successful attack was eminently valuable as a diversion, and was considered by the Commander-in-Chief "more than any other cause to have been the reason that the Suvla Bay landing was so lightly opposed, and that comparatively few of the enemy were available at first to reinforce against our attack at Sari Bair." But the same measure of success did not attend other frontal assaults which were made from the existing Anzac position during the night and early morning of August 6th and 7th. There were two fruitless assaults on German Officers' Trench, and attacks by troopers of the Australian Light Horse from Quinn's Post, Pope's Hill, and Russell's Top. In the ill-fated ventures from Quinn's and Russell's Top, the Light Horse troopers, while conscious of the terrible odds against them, advanced over their parapet in ordered lines, and were swept away by an annihilating stream of machine-gun fire. Whatever advantages may have been gained by these heroic but hopeless assaults were dearly bought.
The Battle of Sari Bair.
As night began to fall, and while the Turkish reserves were gravitating towards the bitter struggle at Lone Pine, the attacking columns of General Godley's force were silently assembling for the master stroke—the night assault on the heights of Sari Bair. Now had arrived the most momentous phase of the whole campaign, for upon the issue of the struggle upon which the veterans of Gallipoli were about to embark side by side with the untried soldiers of the New Army, depended the success or failure of the whole great undertaking. The Sari Bair Ridge, the objective of the assaulting columns, ran roughly parallel to the coast line, and was flanked on the coastward side by a number of long broken spurs which ran down to within a few hundred yards of the beach. The gullies, or deres, in between were steep, broken, and scored with the rushing waters of many a winter's storm. In parts they were choked with a tangle of scrub and close undergrowth, which would add enormously to the difficulties and dangers of a night march up their unreconnoitred ways, yet through them lay the only road to the goal on which all hopes were set. It was manifestly impossible for an attacking force to break the Turkish line, seize the lower heights, and then fight a way up the gullies in the darkness and arrive at the top intact and in condition for an assault on the ridge. The attack must be made in two stages, the first of which must be devoted to the capture of the positions which commanded the entrances to the deres and the clearance of the lower portion of the deres themselves. Accordingly the force was divided into four columns, two of which, designated covering columns, were to open up a path for the two assaulting columns.
The total force available comprised the New Zealand and Australian Division (less the Australian Light Horse), the 13th Division (less five battalions), and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. The four columns into which they were divided were:—
Right Covering Force (Brig.-General A. H. Russell):—New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, Maori Contingent, Field Troops, N.Z.E.
Left Covering Force (Brig.-General A. H. Travers):—4th Battalion South Wales Borderers, 5th Battalion Wiltshire Regiment, half 72nd Field Company.
Right Assaulting Column (Brig.-General F. E. Johnston):—New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 1st Field Company, N.Z. Engineers.
Left Assaulting Column (Brig.-General H. V. Cox):—29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 2nd Field Company, N.Z. Engineers.
Divisional Reserve:—6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment, 8th Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers), 39th Infantry Brigade, half 72nd Field Company.
The Right Covering Force was to move out from No. 2 and No. 3 Posts at 9 p.m., and seize the enemy positions on Old No. 3 Post, Table Top, and Bauchop's Hill. The accomplishment of this task would open up the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere for the passage of the Right Assaulting Column, which was to commence to move up these gullies at 10.30 p.m. The Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere both led up to Chunuk Bair, which the Column was to attack, after having cleared Rhododendron Spur on its way up to the Ridge. The Left Covering Force was to march northwards along the flat, and then turn inland and seize Damakjelik Bair, a hill which lay some 1,400 yards north of Table Top. The seizure of this position would protect the left flank of the Left Assaulting Column during its climb up the Aghyl Dere. The Left Assaulting Column, moving off at 10.30 p.m., was to cross the Chailak Dere and march northwards until it rounded Walden's Point, when it was to work up the Aghyl Dere and assault Koja Chemen Tepe or Hill 971, joining up with the left of the Right Assaulting Column at the head of Kur Dere, behind Hill Q.
Of the Divisional Reserve, portion was to be assembled in readiness at the foot of the Chailak Dere, and the remainder at the foot of the Aghyl Dere.
The total weight of artillery which was available to support the attack, was so small as to be almost insignificant, especially in view of the magnitude of the operations and the issues at stake. In addition to the three New Zealand Batteries there were available three 5in. batteries of the 69th Brigade, R.F.A., and the solitary 6-in howitzer on Walker's Ridge. To make matters worse, none of the New Zealand Batteries could lend their full strength to the support of General Godley's force, as they could not be spared from the areas which they covered on the centre and left of the Anzac line. Thus one section of the 1st Battery faced north from Russell's Top; the other section still watched Lone Pine, where its support was essential in face of the prodigious efforts being made by the Turks to redeem the loss. The 2nd Battery on Plugge's Plateau could not be spared from the defence of Quinn's Post, and so could direct only a very limited amount of fire on the Sari Bair Ridge, and that by map only. Only half of the 4th Howitzer Battery could be counted upon, as the section in Anzac Cove continued to cover the area from the Chessboard southwards to the sea. Thus of the artillery emplaced at Anzac before the opening of the battle there were actually available only two 18prs., two 4.5in. howitzers, three batteries of 5in. howitzers, and one 6in. howitzer. In addition, there were the ably-handled but obsolete 10pr. guns of the Indian Mountain Artillery, which went forward with the attacking infantry. A force, equal almost to an Army Corps, was to be supported in a major operation against a skilful, well-led, and more numerous enemy by two 18prs., little more than a dozen howitzers, and the fire of some ships of war. The value of the naval guns was greatly lessened by the fact that they could engage only the forward slopes of the hills, and that they could not be used for the close support of advancing infantry.
As the attack from the left flank was essentially a surprise attack in which much depended on the rapid exploiting of the strategical opportunities so created, there was no attempt at an artillery preparation of the initial objectives. A limited programme of artillery fire had been drawn up, however, under which fire was brought to bear at fixed times on the Nek, the
Stripped of all encumbering gear, in light fighting trim, the covering columns moved quietly out with bayonets fixed. Distinguishing patches of white calico were worn on the back of each man, so that there might be no fatal mistaking friend for foe in the confusion of close fighting in the darkness.
The Right Covering Force opened the fighting, advancing from Nos. 2 and 3 Posts shortly after 9 p.m. Its task of carving a path for the passage of the assaulting Brigades of infantry was all-important, as any failure to seize its objectives and fulfil its mission would imperil the whole undertaking. But imbued with the spirit of invincible resolution which animated the whole force this night, the mounted riflemen or the men of the Maori Contingent were not in the mood to be stayed by ordinary obstacles. No. 3 Post, which had been recaptured from the Mounted Rifle Brigade at the end of May, and which the enemy had since made very strong, was captured by stratagem, thus obviating the loss of life which would have resulted in an attempt to take the Post by open assault. For some considerable time prior to the attack the destroyer Colne had made it a nightly practice to shell the Post, illumined by the glare of her searchlight, from 9 o'clock till 10 minutes past, and again from 9.20 till 9.30 p.m. As each of these brief bombardments always began and ended at precisely the same time
While the Auckland Mounted Rifles were carrying the fortress of Old Number Three Post by an admixture of boldness and strategy, the remaining sections of the Right Covering Force were advancing to their allotted tasks. The Wellington Mounted Rifles were stealing on Destroyer Hill and Table Top, and the Canterburys and Otagos were advancing on Bauchop Hill from the flat ground to the north of Number Three Post. In both attacks the enemy was met in force, and stood his ground, the attackers suffering severely from machine-gun and rifle fire as they closed in in the darkness on the entrenched positions. But the determination with which the attack on Bauchop Hill was pressed home, despite the loss of gallant officers and men, and the very audacity of the frontal assault against the forbidding face of Table Top, brought their deserved reward. By midnight the task of the column was virtually accomplished; the Sazli Beit Dere, the Chailak Dere, and part of the Aghyl Dere were open to the passage of the assaulting columns, and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade was making its way up to the assault on Chunuk Bair. The Otago, Auckland, and Wellington Battalions were to proceed by way of Chailak Dere, and the Canterbury Battalion by the Sazli Beit Dere.
It was half an hour after midnight before the Left Assaulting Column crossed the Chailak Dere and pushed on across the flats to the Aghyl Dere, which it entered hard on the heels of the Left Covering Force. This force, composed entirely of units of the New Army, had moved out from No. 3 Outpost when the attack on Bauchop's Hill had developed, and
The first light of the breaking day revealed the columns still laboriously struggling up the gullies and spurs, and yet beyond striking distance of the coveted crest of the Sari Bair Ridge. It revealed also the bay at Suvla crowded with the transports of the 9th Army Corps, an inspiriting spectacle to troops exhausted with the night's terrible exertions and conflicts with an unseen enemy. All hopes of a surprise attack on the Ridge had vanished, but the New Zealand Brigade pushed on in daylight until it reached a point afterwards known as the Apex, on the top of Rhododendron Spur, only a bare quarter of a mile from Chunuk Bair. Of the Left Assaulting Column, the Indian Brigade, which had advanced up the southern fork of the Aghyl Dere, had gained possession of the ridge west of the Farm below Chunuk Bair, and along the spurs to the north-east. It had succeeded in obtaining touch on the right with the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and on the left with the 4th Australian Brigade. This brigade had fought its way up to the north of the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere, making for Koja Chemen Tepe, and had succeeded in gaining the ridge overlooking the head of the Asma Dere.
The enemy now showed signs of having thoroughly recovered from his surprise, and had received strong reinforce-
The 18 Pr. Q. F. Gun
ments
With the three 5in. howitzer batteries of the 69th Brigade, and the guns of the 4th Battery, the Force was comparatively very strong in howitzers; but however ably handled, these unfortunately were not the best weapons with which to support an infantry advance across open country. During this period, however, there were a number of 18prs. lying idle on the beach at Anzac, waiting to be taken over by certain of the batteries which were to land at Suvla Bay. As the 9th Corps had as yet displayed little signs of life, the likelihood of these guns being claimed for a day or two seemed small, so it was decided to man them with such men as could be spared from other batteries and bring them into use. One battery of two of these guns, and two 18prs. borrowed from the Australians was placed under command of Captain G. E. Daniell. It was emplaced on the flat immediately to the north
For the attack at dawn on August 8th, the whole force was reorganised into three columns, of which the Right Column was to attack Chunuk Bair. This column was commanded by Brig.-General F. E. Johnston, and comprised the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, the Auckland Mounted Rifles, and the Maori Contingent, and two battalions from the reserve. The Centre and Left Columns, commanded by Major-General H. V. Cox, were to attack Hill Q. and Abdel Rahman Bair, and thus converge on Koja Chemen Tepe. The attack began promisingly on the right, where the Wellington Infantry Battalion and the 7th Gloucesters, supported by remaining units of the column, pressed forward with intrepid resolution to the very crest-line of Chunuk Bair. On the centre and left the attack fared badly, being unable to make any headway against the concentrated fire from the heights. But a footing had been gained on the coveted ridge; and it well might be that this would mark the turning point in the bitter and prolonged struggle. It had become obvious by this time that whatever successes were to be achieved must be gained unaided by the force at Anzac. The army at Suvla seemed to be stricken with some paralysing inertia, and the soldiers fighting on the slopes of Sari Bair, exhausted, tortured with thirst, but still of bold spirit, looked in vain for help from that quarter. If the hold on Chunuk Bair was for the valiant soldiers of Anzac a cheering presage of victory, for the Turk it was an ugly omen of defeat, and all day he made desperate efforts to throw the New Zealanders back from Chunuk Bair, and to break the line held by the left and centre columns. All day long and into the night the enemy assailed the shallow, hastily dug trenches on Chunuk Bair with artillery and rifle fire and showers of bombs, and attacked again and again with troops brought fresh from reserve; but the New Zealanders were determined at all costs to cling to their hardly-won footing on the heights.
A Glimpse of Victory.
At last night came, and if it brought no respite for the forward troops, it at least enabled them to be supplied with a little—a very little—water and food, and supplies of ammunition. To attack again and at once in an endeavour to exploit the success on Chunuk Bair was almost the only course left open; so the columns were again reorganised and preparations made for a further effort, on the issue of which would depend the success or failure of the whole operation. The attack was to be made by the following three columns:—
No. 1 Column (Brig.-General F. E. Johnston)—26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles, N.Z. Infantry Brigade, and two battalions of the 13th Division.
No. 2 Column (Major-General H. V. Cox)—21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Brigade (less the 7th Gloucesters), 6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment, and the Indian Infantry Brigade.
No. 3 Column (Brig.-General A. H. Baldwin)—Two battalions each from the 38th and 29th Infantry Brigades, and one from the 40th Brigade.
No. 1 Column was to hold and consolidate its position, and in co-operation with the other columns to gain the whole of Chunuk Bair and extend to the south-east. No. 2 Column was to attack Hill Q. No. 3 Column, the units in which had been brought from reserve, was to make the main attack. It was to march by way of the Chailak Dere after dark on the night of August 8th, and after gaining touch with No. 1 Column, advance up the slopes towards Hill Q.
At 4.30 a.m., on August 9th, the most furious bombardment that it was possible to bring to bear was opened on the Chunuk Bair Ridge and Hill Q. by the guns on the left flank, and as many as possible from the Anzac area, assisted by the fire of the naval guns. The guns on the hills at Anzac, away on the right, with the 4.5in. howitzers on the beach, were able to enfilade the enemy's position on the ridge, their fire being quite as destructive as that of the guns firing at closer quarters
While the troops of No. 1 Column fulfilled their task of holding on to their positions on Chunuk Bair, the 6th Gurkhas of the Indian Infantry Brigade, as well as some of the 6th South Lancashire Regiment actually fought their way up to the very crest of Hill Q. For a brief space the little band stood on the objective for which so many thousands had fought and bled and died, and gazed upon the Turkish communications—the roads winding far below them, and the Narrows, whose forts and mine-fields had blocked the way for the fleet, and across which the Turks brought troops and supplies from the Asiatic shore. But this prospect of victory was to be short-lived, and its termination sudden and tragic. Suddenly a salvo of heavy naval shells fell among the Ghurkas. The confusion which ensued on this shattering of their ranks by the shells of their own Navy was yet at its height, when the enemy, rallying, charged back on to the crest, and drove the Ghurkas and Lancastrians back down the slopes up which they had just fought their way at great cost. The loss was irretrievable. General Baldwin's Column, which was to have made the main attack, was hopelessly late, and was unable at this critical moment to exercise any influence on the fortunes of the battle. Instead of launching their attack from immediately in rear of the trenches held by the New Zealanders, as had been planned, the battalions of No. 3 Column had got no further than the neighbourhood of The Farm. The enemy's attempt at a decisive counter-stroke extended along the whole line, but the New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair, undismayed by the fury and frequency of the assaults, clung desperately to their grip on the heights.
That evening the line ran along Rhododendron Ridge, up to the crest of Chunuk Bair, where a lightly dug trench-line, some two hundred yards in length, was held by about 800 men.
At dawn on August 10th, the Turks delivered a counter-attack against this precarious line with troops estimated at something over the strength of a division. Attacked from three directions at once, the New Army troops on Chunuk Bair were literally engulfed, the enemy pouring over their positions and down the crest like a human tide, but it was full daylight, and as the Turkish infantry topped the crest and came down the slopes, they were subjected to a perfectly annihilating fire from the shore and naval guns, as well as from the machine guns of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Never on the Peninsula had the New Zealand gunners been offered a better target, and never was an opportunity more eagerly seized. A section of the 1st Battery on Russell's Top did tremendous execution amongst the Turks streaming down Chunuk Bair towards the Farm; while from their positions on the flats on the left the scratch battery manning the 18prs. of the R.F.A. shot into the Turkish masses over open sights as fast as the guns could be reloaded. In the gullies, where they attempted to take refuge, the enemy were relentlessly pursued by the howitzers, the two guns of the 4th Battery north of Ari Burnu, and the 5in. howitzers shelling all the ground out of reach of the 18prs., and driving the enemy back into the open. The enemy suffered tremendous losses from this concentrated fire; but the line fell back, and the attacking army finally lost its footing on the Ridge.
The great attack had failed, and the Turks remained in possession of the dominating heights which had been the goal of three days' ceaseless endeavour and sacrifice. Instead of the strip of country a few hundred acres in extent, which had been the extent of the original position at Anzac, an area of
To meet the new situation a good deal of movement of guns was necessary. On August 10th the section of the 4th Battery which had been situated at Anzac Cove was moved out to Taylor's Hollow, the first re-entrant north of the Chailak Dere, the bed of which where it reached the beach had been itself the northern boundary of the old Anzac position. Four days later two guns of the 2nd Battery were moved from Plugge's Plateau to the left flank, where they joined one of the scratch batteries which had been formed during the offensive. On the 18th the arrival of the 3rd Battery from Cape Helles made a welcome addition to the artillery strength of the Division. The left section of the battery at once went into action on one of the spurs running up from the flat ground near Taylor's Hollow, with an arc of fire to the north-east in the direction of the "W" Hills. The day following the right section got into action in the same position, and the remaining guns of the 2nd Battery joined the section already in position near Taylor's Hollow. Such was the disposition of the batteries for the assaults on Hill 60 or Kaiajik Aghala, as it was otherwise known, which marked the last offensive action of the force at Anzac.
Hill60.
After the failure of the attack on the Ridge Sir Ian Hamilton cabled to the War Office, pointing out the sadly weakened condition of his Divisions, and urging that large reinforcements must be sent at once if the campaign was to be brought to a rapid and successful conclusion. The answer to these requests effectually dispelled all hopes of a resumption of offensive operations on a scale that would be likely to produce any decisive results. Reinforcements could not be sent. Forced to make the best of a bad situation, Sir Ian Hamilton decided to strengthen his forces at Suvla Bay as far as lay in his power, and to make an attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe—known at Anzac as the "W" Hills. The possession of these
The attack was fixed for the 21st of August, and the artillery support was to be rendered by the following guns:—2nd, 3rd, and 4th (How.) N.Z.F.A., "Daniell's" Battery (two Australian guns), three 5in. howitzer batteries of the 69th Brigade, one 18pr. battery at Lala Baba (Suvla Bay), certain of the mountain guns, and naval guns. It had been intended that the guns at the disposal of Colonel Johnstone should give their support solely to General Cox's attack on Hill 60, and all the preparations were made to this end; but almost at the last moment these dispositions were upset by an order for a general bombardment of the Turkish trenches in front of the 9th Corps. Accordingly, at the eleventh hour the whole programme of artillery support had to be revised in order that for the first phase of the action support might be given to the 9th Corps alone. This seriously interfered with the preparation of the ground over which the Colonial and other units of General Cox's force were to advance, and instead of the bombardment commencing at 2.15 p.m., it did not begin until 2.45 p.m., when fire was switched from the 9th Corps' front.
From 3.30 p.m., when the infantry assault commenced, the 18pr. batteries were engaged on any target which presented itself. They made good shooting on enemy reinforcements advancing at Anafarta, and got particularly good results on various targets in the direction of Kabak Kuyu, Susak Kuyu, and the northern slopes of Kaiajik Aghala. Meanwhile the howitzers of the 4th Battery were bombarding enemy trenches on Kaiajik Aghala, where their shooting was accurate and effective, prisoners captured later reporting that this shelling caused heavy casualties. The attack fell short of success, the enemy rifle and machine-gun fire at some points being so intense that it was impossible for the attackers to make headway. On the left the Indian troops succeeded in gaining the
Late on the afternoon of the 21st one of the guns in "Daniell's" Battery was completely destroyed by a shell which burst in the bore, fortunately without wounding any of the crew. The gun, which had been borrowed from the Australians, was replaced by one from the 2nd Battery. On the evening of August 26th the right section of the 3rd Battery moved its guns to a new position on the north-western slopes of Damakjelik Bair. At the close of the month the whole battery was established in a position on the edge of the beach about a mile north of No. 3 Outpost.
In the interval which ensued before the second and final attack was made on Hill 60 on August 27th, the Hill was kept under fairly constant fire, especially during the hours of darkness. So frequently were requests for night-firing received from the infantry that the daily allowance of ammunition, which had again been reduced to five rounds per howitzer
Chapter VII.
Nearing the End.
Although the second attack on Kaiajik Aghala had been in a large measure successful, the success was of purely local importance. It could not in any way affect the fortunes of the campaign, which had been already finally decided by the failure of the attack on the Sari Bair Ridge, and the tragic fiasco at Suvla Bay. But though all chances of success were thus irretrievably lost, the campaign dragged wearily on for another four months. During this lengthy period of stalemate the action of the artillery was of necessity largely routine, though the routine was never devoid of hazards and hardships, and its activities continued to be severely limited by the inadequate supplies of ammunition. The spirit of all ranks and arms in the Division was unaltered. The great battle had brought victory no nearer; there had been no amelioration in the conditions of living, and the rigours of a stormy winter were close at hand; but at Anzac confidence remained firm and faith unshaken. The condition of some of the units in the line was such, however, that a rest of some sort became imperative. During September the worn-out and sadly thinned infantry brigades and mounted rifle regiments of the Division were withdrawn for a brief period of rest at Lemnos. The Divisional troops, including of course the artillery, remained at their posts without relief until the evacuation.
The New Zealand batteries, together with the other attached batteries under the command of the C.R.A., covered during this period the fronts of the N.Z. and A. Division and the 54th Division. The strength of the artillery had grown considerably since the beginning of August, and the big area of country gained to the north of the original Anzac position gave scope for the employment of more heavy guns. The New Zealand Artillery itself had been strengthened by the arrival of the 3rd Battery from Helles, and the 5th Battery from Egypt. The 1st Battery was still on Walker's Ridge. The
At the end of August it became necessary to decide as to the disposal of some heavy artillery, including one 15in. howitzer, which had been held in readiness for use in the event of a successful issue to the battle of Sari Bair. Regarding the 15in. howitzer the C.R.A., G.H.Q., gave it as his opinion that as matters stood the army had no use for this weapon, and that it was inexpedient to land it on the Peninsula. The employment of heavy guns on the Peninsula had been depending for some weeks on the outcome of the recent operations, and if those operations had resulted in putting the army astride the Peninsula heavy guns landed at Suvla and
Thus when the campaign had almost reached its closing stages the artillery had grown so considerably in strength as to present an almost imposing array when compared with the few batteries which the Division possessed in the first months at Anzac. The increase in gun-power, however, was almost purely nominal, because guns are of no use without shells, and the supply of ammunition never showed any increase that was worth the name. The War Office informed Sir Ian Hamilton at the end of September that all available ammunition was needed for France, and so to the very end the artillery was always grievously hampered and handicapped by this never-ending dearth of shells. That the New Zealand batteries achieved so much and stood so high in the estimation of their own front line troops speaks volumes for the service at the guns and the careful skill of the observers, who had to see to it that the maximum results were obtained with each day's quota. There was never any lack of good targets; and requests were constantly being received from the infantry for fire to be directed on to some particularly troublesome enemy machinegun, or perhaps a redoubt or strong point. Such requests were seldom declined, and generally the shooting was satisfactory in its results. But more difficulty was experienced in dealing with enemy batteries, which neglected none of the advantages of position. Almost all the battery positions at Anzac were overlooked by the enemy, and some of them, such as the 3rd Battery's position down near the beach, lay in full view of the enemy on the commanding height. On the other hand, most of the Turkish batteries were situated on their own side of the high ridges beyond observation. Possessing ample supplies of timber and abundance of labour, both scarce commodities at Anzac, they built innumerable covered emplacements which served as alternative positions to which they
Generally the activity of the enemy guns was most successfully countered by neutralising fire where the positions were known, or by prompt retaliation on to registered points in his lines. The enemy guns seemed to be liberally enough supplied with shells, and in addition to subjecting battery positions to periodic bouts of shelling, engaged in some destructive shoots round about the headquarters area near Nos. 2 and 3 Posts. The mules of the Indian Transport Columns suffered badly on one or two occasions, and some losses were also experienced amongst the New Zealand artillery horses which were picketed in Waterfall Gully. The 5th Battery had landed with all teams and waggons, but most of them had been sent back to Egypt, and there were kept on the Peninsula only a few horses per battery—sufficient merely for moving the guns when required.
The 1st Battery remained always up on the heights at Russell's Top, although application had been made to Army Corps Headquarters for its relief by an Australian Battery so that it might be employed on the left flank. About the end of September, however, one gun was taken out to the left to be used in an ingenious effort to obtain close range enfilade fire on some trenches on Hill 60. The plan adopted was to drive a tunnel through to the face of the cliff, which commanded these particular trenches, and bring the gun through the tunnel to a chamber from which an embrasure or port could be broken out in the cliff-side when it was desired to open fire. The gun, piece by piece, was taken through the tunnelway, and reassembled in the pit, but for some reason the
The 6th (How.) Battery, which had been despatched from New Zealand in June, arrived at Anzac from Egypt on the night of October 12th, and was parked for the night in Reserve Gully. On the night of the 15th-16th the Battery got into action on the left of Walden's Point. Though the artillery of the Division was relatively strong in howitzers, there was always plenty of work for modern weapons like those possessed by the 4th and 6th New Zealand Batteries, and the 6th Battery, which was commanded by Captain G. E. Daniell, established its usefulness from the very day of going into action. An unfortunate and tragic mishap occurred in this battery a few days before the evacuation, a premature, which burst immediately in front of the muzzle, destroying the piece and killing two and wounding three of the crew. About the same time one of the 2nd Battery guns also had a premature, the force of the explosion tearing the piece into strips, but the crew escaped without injury.
On the whole the batteries got off well in the matter of casualties, despite the fact that none of them escaped a share of the liberal attentions of the Turkish batteries. The low casualty rate was attributable in some measure to the industry which the gunners displayed in strengthening their positions and digging shelters. The skilful placing of batteries, so far as the limits of the terrain permitted, and their concealment where possible, also served to reduce casualties, although naturally the howitzers had more freedom of choice in selecting their positions than the 18pr. batteries. Dysentery, however, claimed an increasing toll, and at times the small drafts of reinforcements coming forward were barely sufficient to keep the gunners up to strength.
Seasoned campaigners as they were, the men did not wait for the onset of the winter weather before endeavouring to make their dug-outs as nearly weatherproof as possible. The
The bad weather set in in good earnest on November 27th, when the Peninsula was swept by a violent gale, accompanied by heavy rain. The storm caused a tremendous amount of damage on the landing beaches, and for the time completely isolated the troops at Anzac. Snow fell heavily during the night to complete the discomfiture, and by the morning of the 28th the whole countryside was completely enveloped. The cold was intense, and the traffic on the roads and tracks up to the forward areas turned the snow to slush, and so churned up the clay that locomotion became almost an impossibility. The artillerymen were more fortunately circumstanced than the units in the line or in their scanty bivouacs in reserve, and by comparison they suffered little. Observing officers rapidly discovered the effect of the altered conditions on their shooting, and the necessity for making all calculations for the atmospheric conditions was fully demonstrated. Such tempting targets had not offered since the fighting in August. The first morning after the blizzard large numbers of the enemy freely exposed themselves outside their trenches, which seemingly were bad enough to make them think the risk worth while. The guns soon taught them to keep under cover, but before the lesson was fully learnt it had been dearly bought. Across the flat country towards Anafarta the labouring mule trains, silhouetted against the white expanse, also afforded some good shooting for several of the batteries.
The Evacuation.
On October 16th Sir Ian Hamilton was recalled to London, in order, as he was informed on his arrival, that the Government might have the opportunity of obtaining a "fresh, unbiassed opinion, from a responsible commander, upon the question of early evacuation." This was the first of the series of events which led to the evacuation of the Peninsula; but at the time its significance was not understood by the soldiers, to whom nothing was made known of the reason which lay behind the Commander-in-Chief's recall. His successor, General Sir Charles Munro, did not arrive at Gallipoli until the end of the month, and during the interval command of the Forces was temporarily held by General Birdwood. The visit to Anzac on November 13th of Lord Kitchener created a sensation in the trenches through which the famous soldier passed, and raised a perfect welter of picturesque conjecture, and set many rumours afloat, regarding his visit and its probable consequences. Lord Kitchener proceeded to the observing station of the 2nd Battery, from where he was afforded a comprehensive view of the Anzac country. Within a few hours he had left Anzac, and was proceeding up the coast to Suvla.
Before the decision to evacuate had been actually taken, preparations towards that end were quietly begun, and so successfully was the real aim hidden that for a long while it was completely unknown to the soldiers themselves. In order to accustom the enemy to such a thing, and so lessen the risk of raising his suspicions, a period of silence of forty-eight hours was ordered at the end of November. Not a shot was fired during this period, and all work that would be apparent to the enemy ceased. Whatever he may have thought the Turk made no move, but his trenches were seen to be strongly manned on the first morning that normal activity was resumed, and they were accordingly treated to a brisk bombardment from six batteries, shooting being good and effective in its results. That evening the 54th Division, whose front had been covered by the New Zealand Artillery since the close of the August fighting, was withdrawn. Before leaving the
The Tragedy of Ypres The ruins of the Cloth Hall and the Cathedral
On the day on which the first detachments left the Peninsula, there arrived a large quantity of canteen stores, which had been purchased for the artillery by an officer who had been sent to Imbros some time previously. It was a bitter reflection that these stores of provisions, which the batteries had had no opportunity of buying for eight months, should arrive on the eve of their departure. The stores could not be taken away by units, so a certain amount of them were sold by auction, and the remainder were destroyed so that they might be of no use to the enemy.
The evacuation of the New Zealand Field Artillery, and the other batteries attached to the Division, extended over little more than a week. Orders to evacuate the guns were issued on December 10th, and the evacuation began the following night, when one section of guns from each New Zealand
The number of guns withdrawn from the Peninsula during the evacuation totalled fifty-three, of which number twelve were evacuated during the last two nights. Two guns attached to the Division were destroyed. These were a 5in. howitzer in Australia Valley, and one 3pr. Hotchkiss gun in the Aghyl Dere. Both were blown up an hour or two before the evacuation was completed. Eight ammunition wagons were also left behind, and four horses, which had been ordered to be destroyed, but were turned loose at the last moment. Any ammunition that remained was buried or thrown into the sea.
The final stages of the evacuation were carried out with methodical quietness, and exactly according to the time-table which had been laid down. It was a trying and anxious time for the whole Army Corps, but for none so much as the small garrison which held Anzac during the last twenty-four hours, and whose lives may be literally said to have hung by a thread. Everything possible was done in order to create the appearance of normal activity, and even to encourage the enemy in the belief that fresh troops were being landed by night. The
Thus ended the ill-starred Gallipoli campaign, in which the soldiers of New Zealand had tasted at once the thrill of victory and the bitterness of disappointment. They had faced all the changing fortunes of the campaign with determination and unflinching courage, and if final victory had not been theirs they at least had done all that was humanly possible to achieve it. The task of the Artillery had been one of peculiar difficulty; enough has already been said of the terrible nature of the country in which the guns were fought, and of the incessant anxieties caused by the meagre and uncertain ammunition supply. That the New Zealand batteries achieved so much in face of this combination of adverse circumstances, and that they indubitably earned the confidence and gratitude of the soldiers whom they supported must for all time stand to the credit of the men who fought the guns on Gallipoli, and to the honour of the Field Artillery of New Zealand.
Part II.—The Western Front.
Chapter I.
The Division Sails for France.
The almost simultaneous evacuation of the troops from Anzac, Suvla Bay, and Cape Helles threw a tremendous burden on the transport services in the Mediterranean, and the return to Egypt of the troops of the New Zealand and Australian Division, although carried out as expeditiously as possible, was not completed until the New Year had dawned. The evacuation of Anzac having been a gradual process extending over more than a week, units arrived back in Egypt distributed on different transports, and in no particular order. On arrival at Alexandria some parties proceeded to Zeitoun, and others to Moascar. At this latter place, which was merely a railway siding a mile from. Ismailia, on the banks of the Suez Canal, advance parties were proceeding with the establishment of a big camp where the Division was to be once more concentrated under canvas. With the arrival of the Infantry Brigades, the artillerymen with their horses and guns, other Divisional troops, and the Supply and Transport services, the camp took on an air of bustle and animation, and the men gradually settled down again to the routine of training.
By the time units had settled down in their new quarters and training had been thoroughly entered on, the Divisional Staff had completed a comprehensive scheme of reorganisation which had as its object the formation of a self-contained, complete New Zealand Division. This scheme, which was immediately put into operation, involved the withdrawal from the Division of the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade and the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, a circumstance which was almost as sincerely regretted by the men of those Brigades
The composition of Brigades with the names of Brigade and Battery Commanders was as follows:—
1st Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel F. Symon).- 1st Battery—Major C. McGilp.
- 3rd Battery—Captain
C. V. Leeming . - 7th Battery—Captain
A. E. Horwood . - 8th Battery—Captain
C. N. Newman .
2nd Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel.F. B. Sykes )- 2nd Battery—Major F. Hume.
- 5th Battery—Captain Beattie.
- 13th Battery—Captain T. Farr.
- 14th Battery—Major
H. C. Glendining .
3rd Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel.I. T. Standish )- 9th Battery—Captain
R. S. McQuarrie . - 10th Battery—Captain R. Wickens.
- 11th Battery—Captain V. Rogers.
- 12th Battery—Captain
H. A. Davies .
- 9th Battery—Captain
4th (Howitzer) Brigade (Lieut-Colonel.N. S. Falla )- 4th Battery—Captain
J. L. H. Turner . - 6th Battery—Captain
G. E. Daniell . - 15th Battery—Captain R. Miles.
- 4th Battery—Captain
The first essential was the provision of personnel, the equipment was to come later. The men for the new units
Although a great deal of hard work had to be done, life meanwhile was not without its pleasant interludes of sport and recreation; games of football were played in the evening and on Saturdays, and inter-unit matches created a great deal of interest and enthusiasm. Frequent swimming parades gave the men ample opportunity of disporting themselves in the pleasant and invigorating waters of Lake Timsah, and a system was introduced by which men in turn were granted
On April 3rd the Division, which had already had a visit from H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, was inspected by General Sir Archibald Murray, Commander-in-Chief Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and two days later units began to entrain for the ports of embarkation. The preliminary movement orders showed that the Divisional Artillery was to entrain on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April. Immediately the camp was thrown into that orderly disorder of preparation which always precedes an enterprise of any magnitude. Kit inspections and the checking of equipment, the return of surplus stores, and the making up of shortages were followed by the striking of camp as unit after unit moved off to the entraining point at the railway siding, where the presence of large native working parties added to the noise and confusion. Few said farewell to Egypt with any regret; on the contrary, the prospect of action and a change of environment was hailed with enthusiasm. Light work was made of the entraining, and as fast as trains were available they were loaded up and set off for Alexandria, where men and horses were to embark for Marseilles. Guns, wagons, and ammunition were not taken, as Batteries and Ammunition Columns were to be newly equipped on arrival in France. Transports proceeded to Marseilles individually, and without attached escort; and though the submarine menace in the Mediterranean was then a real and growing one, the transport of the Division was accomplished without serious incident.
Everyone was eager for his first glimpse of France, and the ship's rails were lined and every vantage point on deck was crowded as the transports made their way up the picturesque harbour and proceeded to their berth at the wharves. All civilians had been rigorously excluded from the vicinity of the wharves, so that most of the ships arrived without any welcoming fuss. The disembarkation was carried out with the same despatch that had characterised the embarkation, and as units came ashore they were packed into long troop trains, and set off on their journey northwards through the heart of Southern France. The countryside was clad in the fresh and tender verdure of spring, and looked fair indeed to eyes that for long had gazed upon nothing more attractive than the scarred slopes of Gallipoli, the bare hills of Lemnos, and the parched and boundless spaces of the Egyptian desert. Marseilles and the sea were quickly left behind, and soon the way lay through the Rhone Valley, with its blossoming orchards and orderly vineyards, its quaint little clustering villages, and its busy towns. It was a long, slow journey, and the not over comfortable accommodation gave little opportunity for easy rest or sleep; but the way was never wearisome. The beauties of the countryside, the sense of change, and the novelty of the surroundings left no room for dull thoughts or weariness of mind. Lyons, Dijon, Versailles (where a glimpse was obtained of the famous palace), and Rouen were all passed in turn, and finally Havre, the destination for the time being, was reached after a journey that in most cases had extended over fifty hours.
At Havre, where the Artillery were to be fully equipped before proceeding to join the Division in its billeting area, several days were spent in camp on an exposed hillside above the town. The weather was bitterly cold, and a chilling wind blew straight in off the sea, proving very trying to men so suddenly transported from a tropical climate. There was little time to worry about the cold, however, for the days were busily occupied with the drawing of every detail of equipment required by Batteries and Ammunition Columns. Units took their teams, in many cases freshly drawn from the Remount Depôt, to the great base stores on the quayside, and marching
The billets which had been reserved for the Artillery were situated in and about small villages, such as Lynde, Le Ciseaux, and Blaringhem, small places with a poor estaminet or two, and little else of note beyond the church with its spire standing up above the clustering thatched roofs. The old barns and disused stables, which served as billets, were made comfortable enough with the aid of straw bedding, even if they were not overclean; but the season had been wet, and the gun-parks and horse-lines were for the most part quagmires. Nor were there any manœvring grounds available, so that beyond a route march or two no departure from the ordinary routine was attempted. Before going into the line, however, batteries were called on to undergo a test of their shooting abilities. Each Brigade in turn was required to send a party of gunners from each of its batteries to Calais, where they carried out live shell practice on ranges on the sea-front. As a test of shooting ability, if it were so designed, the affair was very simple, but it served to demonstrate the discipline and smartness of the gun-crews. In congratulating the men of one battery on their shooting, which had been but typical of that of all the brigades, an English staff officer explained that all batteries were being so tested prior to going into the line in France since, on occasions, one or two batteries had inflicted as much damage on their own infantry as on the enemy!
Before the Division was ordered into the line at Armentieres some further substantial alteration was made in the composition of the artillery brigades. The howitzer batteries were distributed between the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades, and
1st Brigade (Lieut-Colonel F. Symon, C.M.G.)—1st, 3rd, 7th and 15th (How.) Batteries.
2nd Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel Sykes, D.S.O.)—2nd, 5th. 9th, and 6th (How.) Batteries.
3rd Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel I. T. Standish, D.S.O.)—11th, 12th. 13th, and 4th (How.) Batteries.
4th Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel N. S. Falla, D.S.O.)—8th, 10th, and 14th Batteries.
Brigade Ammunition Columns were abolished, and a 4th Section was added to the Divisional Ammunition Column, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel M. M. Gard'ner. The four Brigades and the Divisional Ammunition Column were commanded by Brig-General G. N. Johnston, C.R.A. of the New Zealand Division. The Division was now commanded by Major-General A. H. Russell.
Armentieres.
Armentieres, where it had been decided the Division should serve its apprenticeship on the Western Front, had for long been a quiet sector, undisturbed by any of the fierce contests which had raged along other parts of the long battle front. It was a good breaking-in ground for a Division which had seen no previous fighting, and it was a suitable place in which to "spell" a Division which had been heavily engaged. The New Zealand Division, fully reinforced and rested and strengthened after its hard but splendid service on Gallipoli, came to France confident in its strength and vigour, and eager to prove its quality in the new arena; but there was yet much to be learned of the complexities of a system of warfare which, new in itself, was subject to changes almost every day. Without this necessarily accurate knowledge and the perfection and thoroughness of organisation insistently demanded as a primary condition of success, valour and endurance would avail but little.
The Sector on which the New Zealand Division first went into Action on the Western Front
The Division was now attached to the 1st Anzac Corps as part of the Second Army, commanded by General Sir Herbert Plumer and about the middle of May orders were received to move up to Armentieres to relieve the 17th Division in the line. Artillery units made a two days' trek of the journey from the billeting area to Armentieres, and experienced fair enough weather, although it was still somewhat cold. Batteries had previously sent forward by motor 'bus small advance parties, who had quartered for a week with the outgoing batteries, and whose business it had been to familiarise themselves with the area covered by the guns of the battery they were to relieve, with the location of its observation posts, the system of communications, and all else that was essential. The relief was completed between the 16th and 19th of May, the greater part of it being carried out in daylight. Command of the artillery on the sector passed to New Zealand Divisional Artillery Headquarters at 10 a.m. on May 19th.
The new guns which had been drawn at Havre were not retained, but were handed over to the outgoing batteries, whose guns were taken over as they stood in the pits. This system of exchange, though often rendered necessary by circumstances, never came to be acceptable to the New Zealand gunners.
The 6,500 odd yards of front line trenches which constituted the sector was held by the New Zealand Infantry in two sections. At the outset the 1st Infantry Brigade held the right sector and the 2nd Infantry Brigade the left sector, the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade being in divisional reserve. For artillery support purposes the front was divided into three zones, right, centre, and left, each being covered by an Artillery Group. The 4th Brigade, as such, did not go into the line, its three batteries having been, apportioned one to each group. Thus the Right Group, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Sykes, consisted of the 2nd Brigade and the 10th Battery; the Centre Group, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Symon, of the 1st Brigade and the 8th Battery; and the Left Group, under Lieut.-Colonel Standish, of the 3rd Brigade and the 14th Battery. Lieut.-Colonel Falla, being thus without a command, was entrusted with the charge of the Divisional
In attempting to describe the conditions at Armentieres the first thing that might be said, so far at least as the artillery were concerned, is that they in no sense approximated to anything that had been expected or imagined. All preconceived notions relative to the place and the people under the existing conditions of war were dispelled on a first introduction to the new environment. After the active preliminaries of taking over the positions had been completed, attention was at once held by the calm, philosophic, but yet active and businesslike attitude of mind with which the people had accepted the conditions that suddenly confronted them. Nothing in the experiences of active warfare afforded a study so impressive and in many respects so interesting. The mind does not readily associate peaceful agrarian industry with the activities of war; but here in the open country, day by day, entirely regardless, or perhaps utterly oblivious, of danger, were the peasantry, men and boys too old or too young for war service, and even women, engaged in the labour of the fields in front of the British gun positions, and within close range of the guns of a merciless enemy.
Armentieres before the war was a fair-sized and busy manufacturing town, with a population of about thirty thousand, drab and uninteresting in many ways, and wearing an air of industry rather than of affluence. But what a contrast between this and that other theatre of war in which the Division had last figured—between Armentieres and Anzac. Gallipoli was bare, barren, and unpeopled, an inhospitable place in which the heat and cold and all the attendant hardships of the campaign were suffered without any of the alleviations which contact with a civilised community offers. In leisure times at Armentieres the soldier could go shopping, though the selection was limited and prices were high, and before returning to the guns or the billet enjoy afternoon tea, vin ordinaire which formed their stock-in-trade. At odd places in the Square and in the principal streets shopkeepers still plied their business, estaminets kept their doors open, subject to restrictions imposed by the military authorities, and did a brisk trade in the evening, when many of the troops in the town were freed from duty. Still more venture-some were others, women mostly, who kept their estaminets open at Houplines and across the Pont de la Targette, almost within sight of the German lines, and within easy range of their light field guns. These had escaped the occasional shellings which the town had undergone; but many of them were to pay dearly for their boldness in later days, when the town was subjected to savage bombardments by the enemy. In the meantime, however, they were led into an assumption of deceptive security by the periods of immunity which they had enjoyed in the past. For long the sector had been extremely quiet, little or no aggressiveness being displayed by the artillery on either side. The advent of the New Zealand Division, however, was marked by the institution of a policy of active shooting which had as its only limitations the exigencies of the ammunition supply. Even in the early days at Armentieres the expenditure of gun ammunition seemed prodigal after the jealous manner in which supplies had been husbanded at Anzac; but the question of ammunition supply was, no doubt, still a cause of concern and anxiety to the High Command.
The first duty of battery commanders on taking over their new positions was to register the enemy front line and all salient points within their group zone, and also an S.O.S. line on which a barrage could be laid down at any point on the Divisional front threatened by the enemy. Measures of defence having thus been decided on, a policy of active shooting was at once adopted. Exercises in concerted shooting were carried out with the dual purpose of obtaining proficiency in their execution and of harassing the enemy. One of the first of such shoots was the bombardment of a building reputed to be an enemy headquarters, by two Artillery Groups, each battery firing fifty rounds of high explosive. Whether headquarters
The study of the art of camouflage was at that time more or less in its infancy, but the majority of the battery positions in and around Armentieres were placed in positions which themselves afforded a good deal of concealment. As activity became more marked, both as regards normal shooting and the preparation and support for the frequent raids by the infantry, so the enemy developed his counter-battery work, and redoubled his efforts to reconnoitre positions by aeroplane, or to pick up the gun-flashes by balloon observation. The aeroplanes were the most to be feared. The balloon observer, riding high in the blue miles behind his own front line, could do little more than locate gun flashes; but the flying men, swooping through the frantic shelling of the anti-aircraft guns, could see a good deal, and, more dangerous still, carry away photographs, to be enlarged and microscopically examined by experts. To reduce the risks from this quarter a look-out was kept on duty at battery positions from break of day till dark. Equipped with binoculars and whistle he carefully scanned
The enemy was very thorough in his methods once he had marked his quarry, but the fact that these methods seldom varied was the saving of many lives. First came a deliberate and careful registration by aeroplane; so deliberate that there was generally ample time to withdraw the crews to a flank before the range was found and the "5.9's" which he favoured so much for this work began to stream in. The protecting fire, which might have been expected on these occasions from the heavy artillery in rear, was never available when it was most required—another consequence of the compulsory economy in ammunition. A bombardment of a battery position would last several hours, and if the range were effective would wreck pits and shelters and turn order and strength into chaos and ruin; but direct hits on the guns were extraordinarily few, and batteries were never put completely out of action. During the fiercest shelling communication was always maintained with Group Headquarters, from either the usual control post or an improvised one, and the personnel were always ready to man the guns on an emergency call. In the three months in which the Division held the sector battery after battery was shelled out by the enemy heavy guns; immunity was enjoyed by none, and often the shelling was so destructive that the pits and shelters had to be rebuilt or fresh positions sought. As instancing the persistence of these efforts to destroy the guns, the 3rd Battery positions was subjected to a three hours' bombardment from batteries of 77's, 4.2's, and 5.9 howitzers on the morning of July 9th. Over 2,000 rounds were dropped in and around the position. Three men were killed and seven wounded, but only one gun was put out of
Apart from the repairing of positions damaged by shell fire, or work on reserve positions which batteries had been ordered to construct, a great deal of energy was directed towards the strengthening of gun pits and the provision of better storage for ammunition, as well as in making the shelters for the crews safer and more habitable. Some diversity of opinion existed at that time as to the type of pit or shelter which would best stand the concussion of a heavy shell; the chief ambition seemed to be to devise something that would withstand the smashing impact of a 5.9in. howitzer shell. Handbooks on the subject were issued for the guidance of battery commanders; but the confidence which they expressed in various types of shelters was not always shared by the people who had to put these theories into practice.
The pits at Armentieres were of the two designs then most commonly followed. Two stout cupolas of heavy corrugated iron locked together in an arch and built over with sandbags to a good depth and width formed a fair shelter which could be further improved by a layer of "bursters" of concrete blocks. The bursters, of course, were designed to detonate the shell before it had penetrated, and so lessen its disruptive effect. More interior space was afforded by the square pit in which the roof of iron rails, sandbags, and bursters was supported by stout pit-props. In addition, the sandbag outer walls could be built high enough to support another superimposed roof, constructed in the same manner as the first roof, but raised sufficiently to leave an air space between the two, which, it was thought, would absorb much of the concussion of the bursting shell. In carrying out constructive work, whether on new or established positions, consideration had always to be given to the vital question of concealment, and obviously too many liberties could not be taken with positions that were more or less in the open. To alter their appearance substantially would be to court destruction.
Batteriess were situated in all manner of places: in halfruined dwelling houses, in factories in which they fired through the doors or camouflaged breaches in the walls, and in some back gardens of houses on the outskirts of the town. One 4.5in. howitzer battery for some time had its guns set just inside the big cemetery on the west side of the river, while an 18pr. battery had a gun dug right in under the railway embankment on the river's edge.
The country behind the line offered few natural advantages for observation, being flat and featureless. For shooting on the enemy front line or for wire-cutting, observation was naturally from the front line or support trenches, but observation posts there gave a restricted view, and were of little use for engaging targets at any considerable range. For this work recourse was had to the upper stories of buildings, or to one of the tall chimney stacks which stood in groups among the factory buildings in Houplines. This elevated post was gained by means of a perilous climb up the iron rungs set inside the chimney. To the uninitiated it was a trying experience. One seemed to be climbing for hours in a darkness as profound as night, and the slender rungs set at generous intervals rattled disconcertingly in the bricks. A small trapdoor gave on to the platform set just below the chimney top, and from there, seated on a stool, with his map on his knees and the telephonist at his elbow, the observer could command through peepholes set in the wall of the chimney a wonderful stretch of enemy country. Here at night, also, a sentry was posted to give instant warning over the telephone of the S.O.S. rocket from the Division's own lines. Doubtless the enemy suspected the existence of these eyries; sometimes he shelled them, and at least one observer suffered the experience of having the chimney beneath him "holed" by a shell which struck it as he sat aloft directing the fire of his guns.
The trenches taken over by the infantry on coming into the line had been in such a bad condition that a tremendous amount of labour had had to be expended in effecting an improvement; but this had not been allowed to interfere with a policy of unchanging aggression which found expression in
The issue of a raid depends on many factors, each vital to success, but none more vital than the human factor—the quality of the men who go over. The New Zealand infantryman possessed the qualities that make the ideal raider. He was disciplined and composed under shell-fire; he had initiative and intelligence to meet emergencies; and he had an adroitness and strength and desperate courage that made him feared at close quarters. The raiding party was always carefully selected, and the men were thoroughly schooled in their task. They were familiarised with every detail of the locality to be raided, and careful instruction and rehearsal made each individual perfectly familiar with his part in the scheme. From the outset the planning of the raid was marked by the closest co-operation between the infantry and artillery staffs, and detailed orders as to wire cutting and barrages were issued to Artillery Groups and the Divisional Trench Mortar officer. The registering of the guns was usually carried out as quietly as possible a day or two before the raid, every effort being made to avoid rousing the enemy's suspicions. Most of the wire-cutting was done by the trench mortars, assisted by the 18prs. The usual scheme of support provided for the barraging by both 18prs. and 4.5in. howitzers of the portion of trench to be raided, a vigorous bombardment under cover of which the infantry crept out from their own lines, their faces blackened, and some of them carrying knives, knobkerries, or such other weapons as seemed most suitable for close fighting in a trench. At the appointed time the barrage lifted, and the raiders rushed the trench, while the guns laid down a semi-circular curtain of fire about the scene of operations, closing all avenues of support for the raided enemy. Fire was maintained until groups had been notified of the
The tactics employed on these occasions were naturally varied at times in order that the enemy might not be able to anticipate what was coming. On the occasion of a raid undertaken by the Pioneer Battalion, eager to emulate the achievements of the infantrymen, it was decided to have no artillery support during the raid, but to create a diversion at another point in the enemy's line. During this diversion, created by the Centre Group, the raiders proceeded to cross No Man's Land. The guns and howitzers of the Left Group were laid to cover them but the gunners awaited the ascent of a green rocket as the signal to fire. Apparently the raiders had some difficulty in clearing the enemy wire, which had been cut during the afternoon by 18prs. and trench mortars. On finally passing through the last belt the disposition of the enemy in some force on either flank led the raiders to suspect a trap, and they withdrew without casualties, calling on the Left Group to fire immediately they were inside their own wire. The soaring green rocket was answered by a simultaneous crash from the waiting batteries, and the enemy, who had been clearly visible from the trenches at one time, were believed to have suffered heavy casualties.
It could hardly be expected that a uniform degree of success could attend enterprises of this nature against an enemy who was himself brave and skilful, and strongly backed by artillery. Sometimes also the raiders found that the gaps in the broad belts of wire protecting the enemy's trenches had been imperfectly cut, or that repairs had been carried out under cover of darkness. There were risks and contingencies which it was not possible to provide against. A raid attempted by the 1st Battalion Otago Regiment on July 13th failed because of the totally unexpected and withering fire which the enemy brought to bear on the party, and which heavy guns were quite unable to neutralize. All three groups of
The observation balloons which the enemy kept up all day long behind his lines when the weather conditions were favourable were a source of anxiety and annoyance to everyone, and it is hardly necessary to say that an organised attempt to destroy them made by the R.F.C. on the afternoon of June 25th was watched with an eager and sympathetic interest. At 3.30 p.m. all guns stood by ready to engage hostile antiaircraft batteries which might endeavour to impede the effort. The only batteries reported active, however, were in the areas to be covered by the heavy artillery and the guns of the 2nd Australian Divisional Artillery. On our own front the attack was very successful, three of the balloons being set on fire and destroyed.
At the beginning of July, orders were issued for the five batteries of the Centre Group to withdraw and relieve eight batteries on the left of the 2nd Australian Division, the Right and Left Groups to be responsible each for half of the Centre Group zone. On the night of the 2nd July the guns of four
A number of raids were carried out during July, and though they were generally successful, at least one was most disastrous in its results. This was the raid previously referred to, by the 1st Otago Battalion on the 13th of the month. On the occasion of a raid by the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade on the following night, supported by the Right Group, two mortars of "Z" Battery, and the 5th, 6th, 9th, and 10th Batteries, the raiders, 100 strong, successfully rushed the enemy trenches, but found them obliterated by artillery fire,
Recognition of the work of the artillery of the Division on these occasions was contained in the following message sent by the G.O.C. of the Division, Major-General Russell, to Brig.-General Johnston:—
"Please convey to your officers and men the appreciation of the infantry and myself of their work in connection with the raids undertaken by the Division. They have by their good shooting earned the implicit confidence of those whom they support."
The concluding days of the month were quiet on both sides so far as artillery work was concerned. During the night of the 23rd-24th July the 11th Australian Field Artillery Brigade came in to strengthen the artillery on the front, and a week
Little reference has so far been made to the Divisional Trench Mortars, the unit formed almost on the eve of going into the line at Armentieres; but it must now be said that of such value did the mortar batteries prove that they came to be regarded as an indispensable factor in almost every enterprise undertaken by the Division. Three batteries in all, X., Y., and Z., each equipped with four medium weight mortars firing a 60lb. bomb, their greatest usefulness lay in the very powerful support which they were able to lend to all the raiding and other trench activities of the infantry; a usefulness to which the courage and devotion of the personnel contributed very materially. The mortars were mounted on solid wooden platforms set in the front line, from where they could be used to greater advantage as regards range and accuracy. They were used principally for wire cutting and destroying enemy trenches, new works, and strong points. In preparing a gap in the wire for a raid, the spot selected would be ranged on in the daytime, and the same night, very shortly before the raid, the wire-cutting would commence. This method, if successful,—and it generally was—had obvious advantages over the cutting of the wire by 18prs. in broad daylight. In addition, the mortars nearly always directly supported the raid, either by firing on the enemy front line on either flank of the section of trench being raided, or by creating a diversion at another point. The work was arduous, involving a great deal of hard physical labour; fresh positions had frequently to be constructed, and all the ammunition had to be carried from the dump somewhere near the subsidiary line, although in this latter task the infantry helped with carrying parties. The gunners were usually relieved each week, spending a week in the line and a week in billets.
When the Division went to the Somme the trench mortars were not required in the line, and the officers were, therefore, in most cases temporarily attached to various batteries, the gunners being distributed between the batteries and the Divisional Ammunition Column, or employed on ammunition dumps. Both officers and men returned to their batteries when the Division left the Somme area, and in the sector to which it then proceeded the mortars carried out a great deal of active shooting.
Chapter II.
The Battle of The Somme.
After having held the line at Armentieres for three months, preparations were begun for the relief and departure of the Division, and almost immediately it was common report that its route would lie towards the Somme, where for over six weeks the British and French armies had been engaged in the most desperate series of battles which had yet been fought. The arrival of advance parties from the 51st (Highland) Division made departure a matter merely of days, and on the 17th of August the New Zealand battery positions were taken over by the batteries of the incoming Division, and detachments withdrew to the wagon lines. On this occasion the stir and incident attending a divisional relief were greater than usual. The New Zealanders displayed for the Scottish troops a regard greater than they had seemed to entertain for other Home troops with whom they had been associated; and this found expression in a great deal of fraternising in the streets and in billets as well as in the more congenial atmosphere of the numerous estaminets.
The 2nd and 3rd Brigades of Artillery and the Divisional Ammunition Column marched out from Armentieres on the 18th of the month, followed the next day by the 1st and 4th Brigades. All remained for a few days in the Blaringhem area, the time being devoted to "squaring-up" and ordinary routine duties. After this brief spell units marched to St. Omer and Arques, where they entrained and were taken to Pont Remy and Longpre, whence the 1st Brigade marched to billets at Erondelle, and the 2nd Brigade to Liercourt, the 3rd and 4th Brigades going to Fontaine-sur-Somme, and Bailleul, and Bellifontaine. The Divisional Ammunition Column was billeted at Longpre.
With the exception of one bad day of drenching rain while some of the batteries were out on an all-day training exercise, good weather was experienced during the week that was spent in this quiet and sheltered corner of the Somme Valley. Most of the time was devoted to hard training; but apart from the value of the training, the rest was beneficial to men who were soon to be engaged in a prolonged period of fighting of the most severe and trying description. Although no time was given to sport there was plenty of swimming to be had in the big pools that marked the course of the river, and everyone was in good heart when, on the 29th of the month, they set out on the next stage of the journey which was to bring them to the threshold of the battlefield.
For the artilleryman, who travels in greater ease than the heavily-burdened infantryman, a trek through new country in fine weather provides a pleasant interlude from the vicissitudes of life in the lines. Reveille sounds with the dawn, or earlier, and by the time breakfast is ready the horses have been watered and fed, and harnessed ready for an immediate start. Brigades move together, with a good interval between batteries, and every unit must be on the road at the appointed time. The early morning air is cool and invigorating; the horses are fresh, and swing steadily along with taut traces to the tune of jingling accoutrements and the rumble of the heavy vehicles of the long column half veiled in the morning mist. Every turn of the road brings something new to wonder at or to admire; and the driver sitting easily in his saddle exchanges sage observations with the gunner marching in rear of his gun. The ten-minute halts mark the passing of the hours; and then, if the journey be not a short one, comes the mid-day halt to water and feed the horses, and munch what the orders term "the unconsumed portion of the day's ration." A column on the march is always preceded by a billeting officer, who, riding hot-foot in advance, has the available billeting accommodation ready to apportion to units by the time they arrive at the night's resting-place. Trekking in heavy weather is disagreeable for the men and severe on the horses, which very frequently have to stand in the mud in some exposed horse lines after a hard journey on heavy roads.
Some such unfavourable conditions as these prevailed on the two days' march to Bonnay and Corbie. The first night was spent in Picquigny and neighbouring villages, whence on the next day the route lay through Amiens. It rained heavily both days, much to everyone's discomfort; and Amiens, which the Division was to know again under more tragic circumstances, looked sodden and grey as the columns swung down the slopes and wound through the outskirts of the town. Moderately fine weather was experienced during the week which was spent in the Bonnay-Corbie area before the artillery went into the line, and the men were able to dry their gear and clothing. Most of the guns were sent to the ordnance workshops at Heilly, and all equipment was thoroughly overhauled. The men were by this time wound up to a high pitch of uncertain but shoving expectancy; they had made the long journey down from Armentieres in easy stages, and for a week had waited on the very edge of the battlefield within close earshot of the guns, which filled the air with their incessant clamour and lit up the sky at night with their flashes.
On September 1st the C.R.A. with the Brigade-Major motored to Pommiers' Redoubt, about half a mile east of Mametz, and proceeded on foot to an O.P. near Longueval Windmill, whence they looked across the country on which the Division, at dreadful cost, was shortly to win the right to rank equal with the premier divisions that England had placed in the field. Brigade and battery commanders also rode forward to view the country and inspect the positions which they were to occupy. On the morning of September 5th a section from each battery and from the Divisional Ammunition Column moved up to the wagon lines of the units they were to relieve, and on the same day the guns were taken up to battery positions. The remaining sections followed next day. All the main roads for some distance behind the front were crowded with slow-moving columns of traffic, and as they approached their destination the drivers of the ingoing sections got a first experience of the congestion and pressure of traffic which was to be such a marked feature of all the roads on the Somme. The seemingly endless lines of motor-lorries, wagons, limbers, and vehicles of every description, with here and there
The guns of the remaining sections were taken up to battery positions on the afternoon and evening of the 6th September. The 1st and 2nd Brigades relieved two brigades of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, and were attached to the 14th Divisional Artillery, less the 15th Battery, which was placed under the orders of the 23rd Heavy Artillery Group, and during operations on the Somme was engaged on counter-battery work. The artillery of the 14th Division, with attached brigades, was commanded by Brig.-General Sandys, C.M.G., who was wounded by a shell on September 6th, close to the 9th Battery position, his command passing to Brig.-General G. N. Johnston, C.R.A. of the New Zealand Division. The 3rd and 4th Brigades formed a group under Lieut.-Colonel I. T. Standish, and relieved that portion of the 33rd Divisional Artillery which was attached to the 7th Division. The 7th Divisional Artillery was very shortly afterwards relieved by the 30th Divisional Artillery. The Divisional Ammunition Column relieved that of the 33rd Division.
Batteries of the 1st Brigade took over positions near Flat Iron Copse, and the 2nd Brigade batteries first went into positions due west of Montauban, in Caterpillar Valley. The 18pr. batteries of the 2nd Brigade assumed the formation of two six-gun batteries. The 6th (How.) Battery was in Caterpillar Valley about a thousand yards north of Montauban. The 3rd and 4th Brigades went into positions in the valley which lay a thousand odd yards south-west of Longueval. In misty or dull weather the road up to the guns was safe enough by day; and advantage was accordingly taken of the conditions prevailing to get most of the guns in during the afternoon of their arrival. For those that went up after dark, the obstructions on the roads or tracks that made locomotion difficult by day were enormously increased. Some guns got
All wagon lines were situated in the neighbourhood of Dernancourt and Becordel-Becourt. The dumps from which supplies of ammunition were drawn were near by, and horses were watered at the long line of canvas troughs which had been erected in the valley below the wagon lines.
No. 3 section of the Divisional Ammunition Column and fifteen G.S. wagons of No. 4 section were to assist in the supply of ammunition to the batteries of the 3rd and 4th Brigades, while the remainder of the column was employed in supplying ammunition to the 1st and 2nd Brigades. The supply of ammunition to the Divisions was carried out in two stages. The first stage from railhead to the dumps was by motor lorries, supplemented by the wagons of the Ammunition Column; from the dumps batteries drew their ammunition and carted it to the gun positions with the assistance of the Ammunition Column sections allocated to their particular brigade.
To give some idea of the part which the New Zealand Division was called upon to play in the battle of the Somme, it is necessary to refer briefly to the tactical position which existed at the beginning of September, about which time the Division was moving up into the line. The Allied offensive on the Somme, which had opened on July 1st, after a week's violent bombardment, had been undertaken with a threefold object: to relieve the strain on Verdun, where the Germans continued to exert a persistent and powerful pressure despite their frightful losses; to stop the further transfer of German troops from the Western Front, and so assist the Allies in other theatres of war; and, finally, to wear down the strength of the German armies, with always the possibility of breaking completely through on the front chosen for the launching of the offensive.
The positions held by the enemy along this front possessed great natural advantages for defence; and labouring for nearly two years, he had done almost all that human ingenuity and endeavour could do to render them impregnable. In spite of these formidable obstacles, in spite of the enemy's desperate resistance and the heavy losses sustained by the attacking divisions, rapid and almost substantial progress had been made on July 1st, the opening day of the offensive. By midday Montauban had been carried, and the whole of the ridge to the west of the village was cleared a little later. Mametz had also been entered, and Fricourt surrounded on three sides. It is true that these villages had been absolutely obliterated by a devastating series of bombardments and counter-bombardments; but their possession was coveted and fought for none the less bitterly despite that fact. At Thiepval, and north of the valley of the Ancre as far as Serre, on the left flank of the attack, the attack had made no headway, and terrible losses had been suffered. The nature and magnitude of the preparations which had had to be made for an offensive such as this had of course rendered concealment impossible; while the enemy, apparently, had considered himself secure in his heavily wired and labyrinthine system of trenches and dugouts. But the successes on the right and centre of the attack, and the vigour and resolution with which they had been followed up during succeeding weeks, quickly dispelled this feeling of security, and awakened him to a sense of his imminent danger; he had in consequence increased his gun power, and thrown picked divisions into the line in a desperate resolve to stem the tide, which ebbed and flowed a little, but always threatened to overwhelm his defences.
The position, as it stood at the end of the first week in September, was that practically the whole of the crest of the main ridge behind the enemy's original positions had been gained on a front of some five miles from Delville Wood to the road above Mouquet Farm, about a mile east of Thiepval. In those places where British troops did not completely hold the crest of the ridge they had most of the advantages of observation; while a firm footing had also been established on the ridge east of Delville Wood as far as Leuze Wood. It will
At the outset brigades expended anything from 800 to 1,000 rounds every twenty-four hours on normal shooting, and quite exclusive of any special tasks. Hostile batteries were very active round Longueval and Delville Wood, and in addition artillery areas were subjected to a fair amount of shelling with high explosive and gas shells, both lethal and lachrymatory. The 1st Brigade area was heavily shelled by 8in. howitzers from 7 a.m. till 1 p.m. on the 7th, while the 4th (How.) Battery lost a gun almost before the gunners had time to settle down into action. The enemy was slowly searching the valley with a few big shells when by an unlucky chance he got a direct hit on one of the gun-pits, destroying gun, ammunition, and pit, and killing one man and wounding five.
On September 8th orders were issued that the 4th Army would resume the attack on the following day at 4.45 p.m. The attack was preceded by a deliberate bombardment, which commenced at 7 a.m. on the 9th, with no intense fire previous to zero. The 1st and 2nd Brigades supported the infantry of the 3rd Corps, and the 3rd Brigade Group assisted in the support of the infantry of the 14th Corps. The bulk of the gains were on the right, where Ginchy was captured; otherwise the gains were inappreciable, and little or no progress wag made at High Wood and east of Delville Wood. A counter-attack on Ginchy was repulsed.
Preparations were now being completed for the general resumption of the offensive on September 15th. Fresh troops were being brought in ready to take their place in the line, and the artillery were getting up stocks of ammunition for the prolonged bombardment which was to commence on the 12th. The general idea for the advance of the British armies
On the 10th, battery commanders of the 2nd Brigade selected more forward positions for their guns. The two sixgun 18-pr. batteries were placed down the slope of the crest five
Lieut.-Colonel I. T. Standish, C.M.G.. D.S.O.. (d)Lieut.-Colonel N. S. Falla, C.M.G., D.S.O., (d)
The bombardment opened on the morning of Tuesday, September 12th, all along the line from Thiepval to Ginchy, and continued steadily for three days. The 18-prs. were employed chiefly in cutting wire, searching communication trenches etc., while the 4.5in. howitzer batteries which were not engaged on counter-battery work directed their fire on enemy trenches, observation posts, and machine-gun emplacements. Each battery was given its programme of shooting; but its activities did not end there. Observing officers were constantly on the look-out for suitable targets, and any sign of life or movement in the trenches or on the roads behind the enemy line was instantly the target for several batteries. The whole enemy system of trenches for a great depth was battered with high explosive and sprayed with shrapnel, and any belts of wire entanglements that could be observed at all were methodically wiped out; roads and communications were shelled by day, and even more vigorously by night, when they carried most traffic, and groups of heavy guns concentrated their efforts on the destruction of enemy batteries; in short, the whole area behind the enemy lines was kept under a continuous and destructive fire, blocking the movement of troops and stopping the supply of water, rations, or ammunition. Gas shells, fired by the 4.5in howitzers, were here used for the first time by the New Zealand batteries. On the nights of September 13th-14th and 14th-15th the allotment of ammunition
An order issued to the troops on the eve of the attack read:—"For the last two and a half months we have been gradually wearing down the enemy. His morale is shaken, he has few (if any) fresh reserves available, and there is every probability that a combined and determined effort will result in a decisive victory."
The morning of Friday, September 15th, dawned fine, but cool and: misty—a typical autumn morning. For three days now the bombardment had gone on with unwavering persistence, neither diminishing nor increasing in volume, suggesting nothing so much as a giant machine controlled by a single mind; but at six o'clock, twenty minutes before zero hour, it seemed to increase in intensity and violence. One thought that nothing could exist under this annihilating storm of shells; but when at 6.20 a.m. the infantry left their trenches and moved forward behind the barrage, the enemy was manning his machine guns, and his artillery put down a heavy and accurate barrage. That day the new armoured cars or tanks, as they became universally known, were used for the first time, lanes being left in the barrage for their advance. Despite the fact that some of them broke down before they reached their front line, and that, of the twenty odd which managed to cross the German line, about a third were almost immediately crippled through some cause or other, they did very good work in fighting machine gun nests and strong points, and in flattening out belts of German wire. As yet, however, they were only in the experimental stage; and, undoubtedly, their greatest success that day lay in their moral effect, as they lumbered up to the German trenches, looming huge and uncertain in the half light.
All the objectives were reached on almost the whole front attacked, the chief exception being on the right flank, east of Ginchy. The New Zealand Infantry took Switch Trench, and finally fought their way into Flers, passing through it, and establishing their line a considerable distance beyond the village,
On the front covered by the 3rd and 4th Brigade Group, English troops captured and consolidated their allotted portion of Switch Trench, closely supported by 18-prs. of the group. On pushing on to their third and final objective, however, the infantry had been unable to withstand the German counter-attacks, and had fallen back on to what was known as the Bull's Road line. In this case it had been deemed necessary to push the 3rd Brigade forward on the heels of the advancing infantry, and for this reason the brigade had moved its waggon lines forward from Becordel to the slopes of the high ground behind Montauban on the night preceding the advance. The 4th Brigade reverted to the command of the Brigade Commander, Lieut.-Colonel N. S. Falla, and remained in action behind Longueval awaiting orders to advance. Batteries of the 3rd Brigade commenced to move forward about 9 a.m. on September 15th, the advance of each one being covered in turn by the remaining batteries. The positions chosen were on the forward and reverse slopes of a long shallow valley, which extended eastwards of the road running from Longueval to Flers, and 1500 to 2000 yards in front of Longueval. The 11th Battery moved forward at 9 a.m., and was followed at hourly intervals by the 12th, 13th, and 4th (Howitzer) Batteries in succession. Each battery carried a light, portable platform in two sections, designed for use in crossing trenches, but they were not required
Of those still living who went with the guns through Longueval that day, and down the tortured road that led on to Flers, assuredly none will forget it while memory lives. From the battery positions they were just leaving, a rough track led up the slopes and joined the main road that led into Longueval. There was but little shelling there, and only an occasional big shell fell into the village itself, but from High Wood, right along the crest to Delville Wood and beyond, the German gunners had laid down a deep, heavy barrage from seemingly every known calibre of gun. And through it ran the road to the forward positions. It might have been thought an impassable barrier; but the infantry had gone through it, and were fighting away in advance of it; and the guns went through. Battery after battery wound through the tumbled ruins of the village, and down past the ragged remnants of Delville Wood, a ghastly place where the big high explosive shells were sending up great gouts of black earth and pieces of wood, and Heaven only knew what else.
The postions were gained at last with surprisingly few casualties. The guns were unlimbered, the gear and ammunition dumped on the ground, and the teams with their lightened
Meanwhile the efforts of the 3rd Brigade observing officers to get their batteries into touch with the attacking battalions had not in all cases been successful. Infantry units had got mixed up in the advance, and could not be located in the confusion. Observation posts were established, however, and many targets effectively engaged, among them several hostile battery positions which were shelled by the 4th (howitzer) Battery. The difficulties of maintaining communication were common to all brigades. The wires laid forward from the batteries were continually being cut by bursting shells, and the maintenance of communications was terribly difficult No sooner was one break in the line repaired than a bursting shell would gap the line somewhere else, and fling the loose ends perhaps half a hundred yards apart. The linesmen stuck to this apparently hopeless task with resolute courage, and the fact that communication was maintained at all is the highest testimony both to their contempt of danger, and to the value of
Towards the fall of evening the fury of the enemy's gun-fire seemed to have somewhat spent itself, work on the advanced battery positions, occupied, and in course of preparation, was pushed on during the night, and a great deal was accomplished before the shelling began to quicken up again with the first streaks of dawn. The tired teams were given no respite, being employed throughout the night bringing up supplies of ammunition to the guns. The 1st Brigade, which had kept its teams standing by on the afternoon of the 15th, in readiness for a move, had received orders to advance its guns on the morning of the 16th. By dawn the 7th Battery was in its new position to the east of High Wood, and close to the wood itself. As soon as this battery had registered, the 3rd Battery commenced to move up, and its guns were in position and registered by 1.50 p.m., upon which the 1st, and also the 15th (howitzer) Batteries advanced, the whole Brigade being in position by 6 p.m. The 2nd Brigade batteries did not move forward until the 18th and 19th, when they occupied positions to the south of High Wood.
On the 19th also, the 10th and 14th batteries of the 4th Brigade, with the 8th battery, which had hitherto been held in reserve, commenced to move into position in "Devil's Gully," near the 3rd Brigade batteries. The weather had broken on the 18th, a depressing, wetting rain having fallen almost incessantly from the Monday to the Wednesday. The roads were in an almost indescribable state. Wherever they had been constructed off the route of the one original paved road which ran through the area, it speedily became impossible to distinguish them from the surrounding sea of mud and shell holes. To bring up the guns was a task of some magnitude. The 10th
The break in the weather so hindered operations that the offensive was not resumed by the British armies until Monday, 25th September, but this delay in no way interfered with the activity of the guns. Despite the unfavourable conditions for observation the field guns were ever busy, night and day, while the "heavies," screened by camouflage netting, and disposed round about the slopes near Longueval, or ranged in imposing lines behind the crest that ran west from Delville Wood, were continually sending over their big shells that went rushing through the air like giant birds in flight. The brigades
Orders issued on the 17th regarding the expenditure of ammunition, laid it down that for night firing the nightly expenditure for brigades was to be five hundred rounds for the 18-pr. batteries, and one hundred and twenty rounds for the howitzers. Day firing consisted chiefly of careful registration to enable future barrages to be as accurate as possible, of wire-cutting, destruction of strong points, counter-battery work, and firing on hostile movement and dead ground.
On the morning of the 21st, the C.O. 1st Brigade and the Officer Commanding 1st Battery reconnoitred a wire-cutting position close to Flers, from which the battery had to cut wire in front of a portion of Gird Trench for the attack on the 25th. Digging was commenced and the guns moved up after dark. The battery registered soon after daylight, and at once commenced to cut the wire, a task on which it was still engaged on the 24th, while the bombardment for the attack on the following day was taking place.
Losses at the guns were continuous and heavy, brigade areas frequently being subjected to destructive shelling both of high explosive and gas; and, in addition, a number of casualties were also caused by prematures or faulty ammunition fired by other batteries in rear of the 1st and 2nd Brigades. One of these shells penetrated a gun emplacement in the 5th Battery scattering the ammunition, but fortunately no casualties resulted. In a gas shell bombardment on the 21st the 1st Brigade had four men killed and eleven wounded, and a little later the 3rd Battery was heavily shelled, and had one officer and three men killed and four men wounded, two guns put out of action, and a large quantity of ammunition blown up. Waggon lines were also shelled, and sometimes bombed at night, and as a consequence of the shelling some batteries which had established their waggon lines in more forward positions were compelled to withdraw them behind Montauban.
Showing the Progress Made During the Period the New Zealand Artillery Was in Action
(The black line I represents approximate line when the New Zealand Division went on to the Front in September, 1916, and black line 2 that covered when the New Zealand Artillery withdrew in October).
The attack on September 25th, which had been delayed by bad weather, was general along the Allied front, from the Somme to Martinpuich, and the objectives set for the attacking divisions included the villages of Morval, Les Bœufs, and Gueudecourt, and a belt of country about 1000 yards in depth, curving round the north of Flers, to a point midway between that village and Martinpuich. The New Zealand Divison was on the left of the 15th Corps with the 55th Divison on its right, and the 1st division of the 3rd Corps on its left, and was assigned as its objective, Factory Corner, and the establishment of a line thence to the division's junction with the 3rd Corps. The 1st Infantry Brigade made the attack, the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Brigade being in reserve. The attack was preceded by a bombardment which began at 7 a.m. on September 24th, and continued until zero hour, 12.25 p.m. on the 25th, with no intense fire before zero.
The enemy made strenuous efforts to lessen the weight of this bombardment by heavily shelling battery areas, especially on the morning of the 25th, when he opened a searching fire with guns of all calibres on the 3rd and 4th Brigade positions in Devil's Gully. His fire was accurate and destructive, and a great number of casualties were caused. Captain F. S. Robinson and Second Lieutenant L. Jardine were both killed; both officers belonged to the 12th Battery, Captain Robinson having been given command on the death of Captain H. A. Davies, who was killed by a shell on September 15th. Fortunately the enemy's fire slackened before zero hour, and batteries were able to complete their programme of shooting.
A feature of the day's work was the employment against the enemy of two guns of a 77mm. battery which had been captured in the advance of September 15th, and which lay on the outskirts of Flers. There was a plentiful supply of ammunition, and an officer and a party of men from the 13th Battery went forward, manned the guns, and opened fire on a stranded tank which lay within the German lines, and which it was believed the enemy had converted into a strong point. Eighty rounds were fired at a range of 700 yards, direct laying, and a considerable number of direct hits were obtained. Hostile
The barrage for the advance was effective, and the New Zealand infantry reported it as being even and regular. Advancing behind it they carried their objectives; and consolidated their position in characteristically workmanlike fashion. When night came on the advance along the front had reached its limits, except at Gueudecourt, where a stout and successful resistance had been offered by the enemy from a section of his fourth main system of defence. The fall of the village on the following day came as the sequel to an interesting little adventure, in which a tank was the principal actor. The tank started out from the line in the early morning, followed by bombers, and lumbered down the trench which had kept the English infantry from reaching their objective on the previous day. At the same time an aeroplane appeared on the scene, and promptly taking in the situation, sailed down the length of the trench, briskly machine-gunning the occupants as it went. Against these embarrassing attentions only one decision was possible, and presently the usual tokens of surrender were displayed. The tank rolled on and routed out a lot of machine gunners from their lairs in the village; the infantry followed up this advantage, and after some stiff fighting the village was cleared of the enemy. Batteries of the 3rd and 4th Brigades assisted in this operation by direct observation, and throughout the day observing officers were afforded some splendid shooting.
At one stage of the day enemy troops were observed massing for a counter-attack from behind Gueudecourt to Factory Corner; every available gun was immediately directed on the locality, and the attack broke down at its inception. On this day the enemy was being harassed at many points, and the right wing of the Fifth Army was attacking Thiepval and the Thiepval ridge. A great deal of movement could be observed in the enemy's back areas, and traffic was very dense along the main Bapaume-Peronne Road, out of range, of course, for the field guns. Officers from some of the 4th Brigade batteries, however, improvised communications to some heavy batteries, and directed their fire while they shelled the road. The fact that heavy artillery groups seldom maintained communications to the more forward observing stations must, on many occasions, have diminished the accuracy and effectiveness of their fire.
Throughout this day, the 26th, the 1st and 2nd Brigades were busily engaged cutting wire in front of Gird Trench, which the infantry were to assault on the following day. At the hour of assault, 2.15 p.m. on the 27th, both brigades co-operated in establishing a creeping barrage in front of the advancing infantry. The objective was gained by 3 p.m., and from that hour until 9 p.m. a protective barrage was put down, while the new positions were being consolidated. Throughout the night, also, the batteries searched and swept all the country in rear of the ground which the enemy had lost, in order to prevent any possibility of counter-attack.
Contending with the Elements.
At this stage of the offensive, when the enemy had been shaken by a series of shattering blows which seriously weakened his power of resistance, leaving him little time or opportunity to recover himself, a continuance of fine weather would have meant much to the Allied cause. But the weather broke at the end of September, and almost the whole of October saw a succession of drenching rains. It was a period of unremitting, hard, physical toil for all ranks. It had again become necessary to push the New Zealand batteries forward, and the task of dragging them over the almost non-existent roads, and across
Owing to the fall of the ground some of the batteries could be only partly concealed from the view of the enemy, and as a result they suffered heavily during the whole of the time they remained in these positions. For the same reason ammunition or stores could be brought up only under cover of darkness or in wet and misty weather. The only avenue of approach to Flers and the vicinity for wheeled traffic was by way of the road that ran down from Longueval, and this was under observation during the day. The 3rd and 4th Brigades had an alternative pack route past the east corner of Delville Wood, and similar routes were later reconnoitred and used west of the Flers road. This road had long since been rutted out of recognition, was badly pitted by shell holes, and at night when it was always thick with traffic the enemy shelled it more heavily than during the day. But picking a way across country through the maze of shell-holes and old trenches, following a track on which the horses floundered up to their bellies in the mud, was infinitely worse. It was a physical impossibility to take up stores or ammunition in the limbers; wheeled traffic being out of the question, everything had to be packed. There was no equipment on issue for packing, but the ammunition was carried on each side of the saddle in canvas bags, sandbags, or shell baskets which were salved on the battlefields. The horses suffered grievously from overwork, insufficient food and lack of shelter, some of them becoming so gaunt and weak that when they fell into a shell-hole they had not the requisite strength to drag themselves out,
From the time in September when the wet weather set in, the conditions at the waggon lines grew steadily worse: over-head cover of any description was, of course, out of the question. Horse lines became quagmires, where the lean and jaded beasts stood up to their hocks in the mud; and batteries, with their reduced strength at the waggon lines, constantly employed packing ammunition, were unable to do anything to improve the position. Watering facilities were uniformly bad, also, and it was no uncommon experience for the horses of a unit to be led back to the lines without having watered, after a long and fruitless wait at the crowded troughs.
Following on local advances which had been made during the last days of September, between Gueudecourt and Courcelette, the enemy had fallen back on his defences running in front of Eaucourt l'Abbaye and Le Sars, and on the afternoon of October 1st an attack was launched against Eaucourt l'Abbaye and the defences to the east and west of it, the total front involved in the attack being about 3000 yards. From 7 a.m. on the 1st of October the trenches to be attacked by the
Sections of the 3rd Brigade batteries went forward after dark on October 1st, to positions on the west of Flers, from where they were to support further advances which had been planned to embrace Ligny-Thilloy and le Barque. The positions were in most cases fairly exposed, and it was therefore deemed advisable to move under cover of darkness, and have the guns dug in and concealed as securely as possible before dawn. On the way up from the old positions in Devil's Gully some of the guns were delayed by heavy shelling on the Flers road, and when they left the road and struck across country the guide, unfamiliar with the route, and doubtless confused by the shelling, lost his way in the inky darkness. Precious time was lost in locating the positions, and by the time they had been reached by the joint efforts of the sorely tried horses and the gunners working with drag ropes and shovels the night was well advanced. The task of digging the pits in the heavy clay was attacked with feverish energy, and the guns were run into the pits as the first streaks of dawn appeared. Canvas camouflage screens were hurriedly thrown over the pits, and the effect was completed by a few shovelfuls of earth and weeds, after which the tired gunners had the satisfaction of seeing a German aeroplane fly all unsuspecting over their heads.
The New Zealand Division, less artillery, was withdrawn from the line on the night of the 3rd-4th October, on relief by the 41st Division. The Artillery remained in the line, all four brigades
"I desire to express to all ranks of the New Zealand Division my hearty congratulations on the excellent work they have done during the battle of the Somme.
"On three successive occasions (15th and 25th September and 1st October), they attacked the hostile positions with the greatest gallantry and vigour, capturing in each attack every objective that had been allotted to them. More than this, they gained possession of, and held, several strong points in advance, and beyond the furthest objectives that had been allotted to them.
"The endurance and fine fighting spirit of the Division has been beyond praise, and their success in the Flers neighbourhood will rank high amongst the best achievements of the British Army.
"The control and direction of the Division during these operations have been conducted with skill and precision, whilst the Artillery support in establishing the barrage, and defeating counter-attacks has been in every way most effective.
"It is a matter of regret to me that this fine Division is leaving the Fourth Army, and I trust that on some future occasion it may again be my good fortune to find them under my command."
October was a bad month for the batteries. It rained almost incessantly; the batteries were heavily shelled in their advanced and exposed positions and lost a great many of their personnel; and for the drivers and the men of the Ammunition Column, the journey to the guns was a nightly struggle against the elements; while since the departure of the rest of the Division the rations had become so meagre and unvaried as to warrant the making of representations on the subject, after which there was an improvement. The enemy gunners harried the pack columns on the roads, and used their heavy guns unsparingly in the effort to destroy battery positions. With the absolute shortage of material and labour, nothing but splinter-proof shelters could be built at the most, and every battery suffered
The 2nd Battery's new position was systematically shelled for three or four days at the opening of the month, and it was decided to move the battery in sections. One section was attached to the 5th Battery, and the other came under the command of the O.C. 9th Battery, and was dug in 500 yards north of that battery's position.
Although the conditions prevailing during October made the launching of an offensive on a big scale impossible, it was a month of hard fighting, in which the infantry were almost crippled from the outset by the difficulties under which they fought, and the results in consequence were of little value. On October 7th the Fourth Army attacked again from Les Bœufs to Destremont Farm, near Le Sars. Le Sars itself was captured and some progress was made east of Gueudecourt. On the front covered by the New Zealand batteries the attack was not successful. The 1st Brigade, to which "X" Battery, R.H.A.,
A Pack Column going forward to the Guns At Passchendaele [Offical PhotoLieut.-Colonel R. S McQuarrie, D.S.O., M.C
Altogether the advantages gained in this attack were somewhat disappointing, and it was in consequence decided to wait until weather conditions permitted of a further advance to be preceded by an ample artillery preparation. The enemy had, brought up fresh troops on the front, and it was feared that he might use these in an attempt to win back some of the ground which had been wrested from him at such great effort. Certain arrangements of a defensive nature were accordingly made to render abortive such an attempt on his part. Enemy country was, if possible, kept under more constant observation from artillery observation posts, and forward communications were made more complete, and kept in good working order. At the batteries an effort was made to improve the overhead cover, and an order was issued by the 21st Divisional Artillery Headquarters to bring the reserve of ammunition at the guns up to 1000 rounds per gun.
On October 15th one section each of the 11th and 13th Batteries went forward from Devil's Valley, and occupied positions east of Flers which had been reconnoitred the previous
Further attacks were attempted on the 12th and 18th October, but the gains achieved were of no moment; the weather continued execrable, and as the Commander-in-Chief phrased it in his official despatch, "the moment for decisive action was rapidly passing away." In addition, the enemy was profiting by past experience; he made a better tactical use of his machine guns, his most potent weapon of defence; and the weather continued to aid him. In preparation for the attack on the 12th the guns commenced to bombard the enemy's defences at 7 a.m. on the previous day, and at quarter past three the same afternoon they opened a Chinese barrage, which, as the name might suggest, reverses the usual procedure by creeping back instead of forward. The enemy evidently read this as the preliminary to an attack, for he instantly replied with a furious barrage, even shelling his own line in his flurry; and at the same time his counter-battery guns commenced to shell the New Zealand batteries. When the attack really was launched at 2.5 p.m. on the following day, innumerable red rockets sent up all along the German line, brought the hostile barrage down five minutes after zero. His fire was, moreover, somewhat below normal, due to the shelling of his batteries by the heavy artillery, and gas-shelling by the 4.5in. howitzers.
The ensuing days were spent in thoroughly preparing the ground for the attack on October 18th, in which the objectives were very little different from those that had been set on the 12th, so far at any rate as the immediate front covered by the New Zealand batteries was concerned.
In addition to the shooting which usually paved the way for an attack, this preparation took the form of special bombardments, in conjunction with the heavy artillery, of enemy trenches and sunken roads, and other points which were likely to prove dangerous obstacles to the advance of the infantry. This
Throughout this period the work of the batteries had been carried on under an almost continual and destructive fire from the enemy heavy guns; but although casualties had been heavy and a great number of guns had been destroyed or put out of action, the various tasks assigned to the brigades in the preparation and support for infantry operations had been faithfully carried out, though necessarily with a reduced number of guns. When a battery was not engaged on any task of immediate importance the gunners were usually withdrawn from the pits if the positions were being very heavily shelled; but when firing in a barrage, on S.O.S., or any other task of vital importance, there was no question of "cease fire" or withdrawal, and it was on such occasions that most of the casualties were suffered at the guns. On October 10th, the 11th Battery had been forced to withdraw its advanced section, after having had one gun buried and the other completely destroyed. On the 13th, the 1st Battery had had a gun and several hundred rounds of ammunition destroyed; and on the following day several batteries had been deluged with gas shells. The detachments had to wear their gas helmets for several hours, and amongst other casualties suffered, Captain F. E. Cooke, 5th Battery, had been killed. The 1st Brigade, which was grouped with the 2nd Brigade, under the orders of the C.R.A. 12th Division as from the 16th of the month, had had its headquarters blown out the previous day by 8in. shells, and had to seek fresh quarters.
As instancing the desperate nature of these efforts to annihilate the batteries, of which each brigade had its experience almost every day, the 5th Battery was shelled for three days, the shelling on the 20th lasting over ten hours and two guns being put out of action. The shelling became so intense that the position had to be temporairly evacuated, and on the 21st Captain L. V. Hulbert, Captain N. F. S. Hitchcock, brigade
On the night of the 21st, the sections of the 3rd Brigade which still remained in Devil's Gully, where they also had been subject to frequent periods of shelling, joined the section which had been for some time near Flers, the guns going into pits which had been prepared for them. Most of the 18-prs. struggled through the mire, but the two howitzers of the 4th Battery got badly bogged after crossing the Flers Road, and fresh teams were required to complete the journey the following night.
A feeling of general satisfaction was experienced when word was at last sent out that a relief was impending by the batteries of the 1st Australian Divisional Artillery; but such is deferred hope that many of the men refused to believe the good news until they had actually seen the advance detachments of the relieving Australians, the reports of whose presence at the waggon lines they had at first regarded as a fable. To relieve the detachments was one thing, but to get the guns in and out was another in the unbelievable condition into which the roads had fallen. However, with treble teams, and by aid of much hard endeavour a section was got up to most battery positions on the night of the 25th. The following day, providentially enough, dawned dull and misty, so that it was possible to take teams up the Flers road, and carry on in daylight with the work of extricating some of the guns and limbers that had sunk deep in the mud the night before. After viewing the condition of the roads, brigade commanders agreed to exchange guns where it was impossible to get the New Zealand guns out. The 1st Battery, having no guns at their position, took four guns to Flers with ten-horse teams, under cover of the fog, and later on these were taken to the position in Abbey Road. In the case of the 14th Battery it was quite impossible to get the guns out, and the battery therefore exchanged guns with the 24th Australian Battery. The relief was finally completed about 9 o'clock on the night of the 26th, though the 4th Battery had to send a team back from Bonnay a couple of days later to take out one of their howitzers which had been left very badly bogged
Thus ended one of the hardest periods of prolonged fighting in which the Divisional Artillery were ever engaged in the whole course of the war. For fifty-two days, from September 5th to October 27th, the guns had been continuously in the firing line without rest or respite of any description whatsoever; and such had been the nature of the fighting, and the length of the casualty lists, that most of the officers and many of the gunners had spent the whole period at the gun positions. It constituted at once a supreme test of efficiency, and a most severe trial of endurance, taxing the men's physical strength to the very fibre. In the positions which were first occupied there was not much to do in the nature of constructive work, as the batteries simply walked into established positions, but when they advanced after the attack on September 15th, and when they finally went forward to near Flers, the positions had to be completely made; had to be made in spite of the nature of the ground, riven by shell-fire, and then water-logged by the rains; and in spite of the fact, also, that sandbags and timber were practically unprocurable from the usual sources. In the second positions it was found that casualties were minimised by digging deep narrow trenches in rear of the gun-pits in which the personnel could take shelter from the flying splinters. In these positions, also, some form of protection from prematures from batteries in rear was imperative. The concentration of artillery along this portion of the British front was so great that it was a matter of difficulty to find positions for them all. Wherever the country offered any measure of concealment they were massed in row upon row, and at night when they all sprang into concerted action, or opened up in response to an S.O.S. from the infantry, the eye was bewildered by the myriad flickerings of the field guns and the vivid flashes from the heavy guns massed behind them.
After the last move forward a great deal of material was salvaged from the German trenches and dugouts in the neighbourhood, and used in providing overhead cover and weather-proof shelters for the ammunition. The heavy timber was also used for gun platforms, without which the guns became unsteady and the shooting less accurate. The almost incessant hostile shelling was responsible for a tremendous number of casualties in all ranks, and entailed also a great deal more work in digging out buried guns and rebuilding positions. The labour at the guns was increased by the fact that in wet weather almost every round fired had to be carefully cleaned by hand. Where it was possible the men at the guns were relieved occasionally by detachments from the waggon lines, but as the casualties became heavy this was found more difficult. The large batch of reinforcements which arrived from the Artillery Reserve Depôt in England, late in September, relieved the situation to a certain extent, but within a week or two the constant toll of casualties had again seriously reduced the strength of every battery.
The 3rd Battery suffered a higher percentage of casualties than any other unit in the Divisional Artillery; the total of killed and wounded being about eighty, including seven officers. As the number at the guns was normally about forty, this meant that the entire gun strength was casualtied twice over. Captain C. V. Leeming, who commanded the battery when it went into the Somme fighting, was wounded on September 30th, and Captain C. Carrington, who subsequently assumed command of the battery, was himself fatally wounded on October 8th. For the remainder of the fighting on the Somme the Battery was commanded by Lieutenant O. Opie.
The strain of the continuous firing was found to be very severe on the guns, and in addition to the number that were destroyed or put out of action by hostile shell fire, guns had constantly to be sent to the Ordnance Workshops for repairs, especially after any periods of particular activity. Buffer springs were a constant source of trouble, and as batteries did not carry spare springs, which they could have fitted themselves, a gun would have to be sent to Ordnance to have the springs renewed, and so be out of the firing line for three or four days.
Divisional Ammunition Column and battery drivers had an unenviable time; on the terrible roads nearly all night and every night with jaded horses that had reached the point of exhaustion, they had to squeeze through the traffic blocks, run the gauntlet of the shelling, and by some sixth sense find their way across the black waste of shell-holes and broken trenches to their own particular battery. Often they made two and sometimes three trips from more or less forward dumps to which they carted ammunition by waggon in the daytime. From the time the New Zealand Infantry left the Somme rumours were constantly circulated that the artillery were about to the relieved; but the dashing of these successive hopes in no way deterred the men, who retained their cheerful spirits until at last thy marched out muddy, verminous, and a good deal ragged, but quite satisfied.
Chapter III.
Fleurbaix.
Two days after the Artillery withdrew from the Somme, Major J. M. Richmond, Brigade Major of the Divisional Artillery, proceeded by car to Sailly to make arrangements for the relief of the artillery of the 5th Australian Division, then supporting the New Zealand Infantry, which was by this time established in the line at Fleurbaix, on the right of the 2nd Anzac Corps, which was then in the Second Army. Units remained a day or two in their billeting areas at Bonnay and Corbie before setting out on the road, and spent most of the time endeavouring to get rid of the accumulated mud. A number of horses were evacuated on account of their extremely poor condition, and more had to be evacuated after the first stage of the journey to Sailly, the whole of which was done on the road by easy stages. The days were drawing in, and the weather was cold with a good deal of rain, and, as a consequence, the trek was attended with some discomfort. On the second day's march two brigades, which were to be billeted for the night at Amplier had to wait for several hours in the rain after reaching their destination, owing to the difficulty which was experienced in negotiating the only entrance to the lines, which were in such bad condition that the iron shelter huts in Which the men were billeted stood out like islands in a sea of mud. On reaching their billeting areas behind Estaires, brigades and the D.A.C. rested for a day or two, after which on the nights of the 7th-8th and 8th-9th November, three brigades took over positions at Fleurbaix from the 5th Australian Divisional Artillery. The 2nd Brigade No. 3 Section D.A.C. and "X" Battery Trench Mortars went back to Armentieres where they relieved the 13th Australian Field Artillery Brigade in what was known as "Franks' Force," holding the left sector of the front occupied by the 2nd Anzac Corps.
The brigades which went into Fleurbaix were formed into two groups. The right group comprised the 1st Brigade and one battery of the 4th Brigade (the 8th) under Lieut.-Colonel Symon, and the left group comprised the 3rd Brigade, with the 10th and 14th Batteries of the 4th Brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Standish. Most of the pits were in fairly good condition; but the season had been wet for some time, and the roads even were under water in places when the batteries marched in, so that a great deal of work required to be done to drain the pits of the water which seeped into them from the saturated ground, and generally to put them into a more workable condition. Where the pits could not be drained by ordinary methods, a sump hole dug in a corner collected the water which was then baled or pumped out. The sector was a fairly quiet one, however, and there was plenty of time to be devoted to the improvement of conditions in both the gun-pits and the men's shelters. Many of the latter were in half-ruined farm houses Which stood near—by the positions, and it was possible in these cases to do a great deal to make them more comfortable. Some of the batteries had their waggon lines as much as seven or eight miles in rear, but this was not a matter of such consequence, in view of the good condition of the roads, and the small demands made on transport for the cartage of ammunition. The state of the different waggon lines naturally varied a good deal; but though some of them were in very exposed positions, and the approaches were axle deep in mud, a few week's work wrought wonders.
The cold weather, and the not over-generous horse ration, made it difficult to effect anything but the most gradual improvement in the condition of the horses, many of them indeed never fully recovering from their gruelling experiences on the Somme. Advantage was taken of every opportunity for grazing, and units themselves bought straw and cut it into chaff to supplement the ration; but it was an uphill fight As at the guns the men at the waggon lines were able to make themselves comfortable enough, and everyone rapidly recovered from any ill-effects of the hard campaigning. New issues of clothes were
On taking over the sector it was notified that the ammunition alowance for the period 7th to 17th November would total only 5,500 rounds for the 18-prs. and 2,300 rounds for the 4.5in. howitzers. The two medium trench mortar batteries and the one heavy mortar on the front were, for a while, the principal mediums of activity. In six days they fired over 800 rounds, including 280 rounds for a raid by the Rifle Brigade. This raid was supported by the Left Group Artillery and the trench mortars, which made a clean job of cutting the wire; but on the raiders entering the trenches they were found to be empty. During the whole month the trench mortars continued very active, and besides engaging strong points and other features in the enemy trench system, cut a lot of wire. In one day over 400 rounds were fired into the "Sugar Loaf" salient, doing considerable damage to the trenches and wire. In the early days of December hostile shelling showed something of an increase. At 5.15 p.m. on December 10th portion of the trenches came under heavy shelling, the bombardment being principally directed on Devon Avenue and Abbot's Lane, and a minute or two later the infantry sent up an S.O.S. rocket. Batteries promptly opened fire and frustrated an attempt to raid.
On December 20th, and for a few days following, the guns on both sides of the line were fairly busy; but on Christmas Day, which was cold and bleak, the enemy gunners remained silent, thought the New Zealand batteries carried out a special programme of shooting during the afternoon and evening. It was related that the enemy had sprung a surprise on the troops in line on the sector on the evening of Christmas, 1915, and possibly this activity was designed to provide against a similar occurrence. One day at the front is very much like another, and the only thing that outwardly marked this day as in any way different from the others was the provision of unlimited quantities of the traditional Christmas cheer. The material for these elaborate "spreads" was obtained almost entirely from farms in the back areas, where there was tremendous mortality among the cackling flocks, and from the Expeditionary Force canteens. It can hardly have been said to have been a "happy" Christmas; but at any rate everyone made the best of the untoward circumstances. The remainder of the month was uneventful enough, and batteries marked the passing of the year by a combined shoot on the enemy's roads and communications on the night of 31st December-1st January.
The most severe weather of the season was not experienced until after the New Year. Snow fell early in January, not a heavy fall, but sufficient to cover the ground lightly, and increase everyone's appreciation of the leather and sheepskin waistcoats which were being issued. A hard frost set in immediately after, and the weather continuing cold and dry it was many weeks before the snow had entirely disappeared. The long nights were bitterly cold, and even on the brightest days the cold and watery-looking sun had hardly vigour enough in its rays to pierce or scatter the mists that hung over the low-lying country-side. Pools and open ditches were frozen hard, and every clear piece of ice was the rendezvous for bands of skaters or "sliders" who considered themselves quite well repaid for an occasional bump on the head or for skinned elbows. Precautions were taken against the occurrence of trench feet, not unlike frost-bite in its effects, and despite its name, by no means peculiar to men in the trenches. Whale oil was issued, and it was made compulsory to rub the feet with it each day; on such a sector
While at Fleurbaix the Divisional Artillery was subjected to a further and final process of reorganisation which effected big changes in its constitution by the breaking up of one Brigade and the establishment of six-gun batteries in the remaining three. The 4th Brigade was broken up, and its three batteries were apportioned by sections to batteries of the 1st and 3rd Brigades. The 16th (howitzer) Battery, which had been formed and trained in England under the command of Captain J. G. Jeffery, and had just arrived in France at the time, was similarly disposed of. By this means the batteries of the 1st and 3rd Brigades became six-gun units, and the strength of a brigade was increased from 16 to 24 guns and howitzers. The detail of the reorganisation was a follows:—
8th Battery—Right Section to 3rd Battery, 1st Brigade.
Left Section to 1st Battery, 1st Brigade.
10th Battery—Right Section to 13th Battery, 3rd Brigade.
Left Section to 7th Battery, 1st Brigade.
14th Battery—Right Section to 11th Battery, 3rd Brigade.
Left Section to 12th Battery, 3rd Brigade.
16th (howitzer) Battery—Right Section to 4th (howitzer), 3rd Brigade.
Left Section to 15th Battery, 1st Brigade.
It was not until the end of March that the batteries of the 2nd Brigade were brought up to six-gun strength by the absorption of three 18-pr. sections and one 4.5in. howitzer section, which were formed at the Reserve Depôt at Aldershot, and were composed of reinforcements, and men who had joined the depôt on discharge from hospital.
The Left Group, consisting of the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 4th (howitzer) Batteries of the 3rd Brigade, carried out this reorganisation on January 20th. With the exception of the 11th Battery, which moved to the 14th Battery position, no changes of position were involved. Two days later the change was effected in the Right Group, which comprised the 1st, 3rd, 7th, and 15th (howitzer) Batteries of the 1st Brigade. As a temporary measure and for tactical purposes only, the two sections of the 8th Battery, which were being incorporated in the 1st and 3rd Batteries, were formed into a four-gun battery.
About the same time the 2nd Brigade was made an Army Brigade, and as such came directly under corps for all tactical purposes. The principle of the Army Brigade was that they constituted a mobile Artillery Force, which could be moved conveniently by corps from place to place in the line to strengthen the local artillery or to support operations pending or in progress. Army Brigades were subject to frequent moves, often at very short notice, and the 2nd Brigade was often detached from the Division after becoming an Army Brigade; the most extended absence being in the late autumn when the Division was in the Ypres salient. During this period of nearly four months the brigade occupied a sector on the coast near Nieuport.
An extension of the front occupied by the Division took place on the night of January 26th, the 2nd Infantry Brigade relieving an infantry brigade of the 34th Division. That Division's right
About this time artillery activity on both sides of the line was somewhat on the increase, and the enemy commenced to pay a fair amount of attention to the New Zealand batteries; several of them were heavily shelled at various times, but the damage to either guns or personnel was small. Enemy trench mortars also were active, and had frequently to be silenced by the fire of one or other of the batteries. The policy adopted by battery commanders was to locate these mortars as accurately as possible with the assistance of the infantry and to register their position. On word then being received from the infantry or forward observer of the activity of any paticular mortars, neutralising fire was at once supplied. This system worked very well in practice, was prompt in its results, and undoubtedly did much to minimise the effectiveness of hostile trench mortar fire. Infantry activity displayed itself in occasional raiding, these excursions being supported by our guns and mortars with almost uniform success.
On February 14th advance parties of the 285th Brigade, R.F.A., 74th Division, arrived to prepare for the relief of the 1st Brigade. The relief was commenced the same night, one section of each battery being relieved, and was completed the following night, the outgoing sections proceeding to waggon lines at Steenwerck. However, a raid on a big scale had been planned to take place on the 21st of the month, and on the 17th, the 15th. (howitzer) Battery, two guns of the 1st Battery, and four guns of the 7th Battery moved back into the line near Bois Grenier to assist in the artillery support for the operation. Commencing at 8 p.m. on February 16th, the Left Group carried
The raid in force, for which the 1st Brigade guns had returned to the line, took place at 5.35 a.m. on the 21st, and was supported by the whole of the Divisional Artillery in the line, the 285th Brigade, R.F.A., and the 2nd Anzac Corps Heavy Artillery. The raiding party consisted of 18 officers, 500 other ranks of the 2nd Battalion Auckland Regiment, and a party from the 2nd Field Company Engineers. The infantry moved forward in three waves at 30 seconds intervals; the plan being that the first wave should deal with the enemy front line, and the second and third with the supports; the Engineers were to make use of the time during which the trenches were held by demolishing dug-outs, etc. The Right Group 18-prs. and some howitzers of the 285th Brigade created a diversion on the right of the raiders, and the Left Group, specially composed of batteries from the 1st and 3rd Brigades and five trench mortars, created a diversion to their left. The raid was directly supported by thirty-nine 18-prs., ten 4.5in. howitzers, eight trench mortars, and certain guns and howitzers of the 2nd Anzac Heavy Artillery. The barrage came down like a dropped curtain, and was paticularly accurate and even. Severe casualties were inflicted on the enemy and forty-three prisoners were taken. Cease fire was ordered at 6.55 a.m., and the remainder of the day was very quiet. During the progress of the raid a shell landed close to one of the mortars of "Z" Battery, Trench Mortars, killing one and wounding three of the detachment.
Immediately following on this raid the headquarters of the 57th Divisional Artillery took over the sector from the headquarters of the New Zealand Artillery, which then moved to Steenwerck, in view of the pending relief of the 25th Divisional Artillery, in line near Ploegsteert. This relief was completed
A New Zealand Battery in Action near Kansas Farm During the Fighting at Passchendaele
Official Photo
Wintry Conditions in the Ypres Salient. An 18 pr. in Action near Zonnebeke [Official Photo
Chapter IV.
The Battle of Messines.
For many months, indeed, since the late autumn of 1916, preparations for the attack on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge had been proceeding steadily and unobtrusively, but in March they were fast reaching such dimensions that concealment was impossible; thenceforward they were pushed on with the utmost rapidity, and with all the resources at command. The railways which served the area had had to be extended, new roads constructed, and provision made for an adequate supply of water, which had to be brought forward by pipe lines from the Kemmel Hills or from sterilising barges on the River Lys. It was a huge constructive scheme, demanding much exhaustive and informed thought, and careful elaboration of multitudinous detail, and to its masterful handling throughout was due the complete success that attended it. The difficulties always attendant upon an enterprise of such magnitude were increased by the fact that the enemy's positions completely overlooked the British lines, and much of the area in rear. To deprive him of this direct observation over practically the whole of the Ypres salient was one of the objectives of this attack, and of the subsequent prolonged struggles, which began at the end of July, for the ridges further north. The launching of the attack on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge had been fixed for a date early in June, and fully two months before that date all the countryside behind the forward positions was alive with the countless activities which must always precede such an offensive.
On March 15th the Division relieved the 36th Division on the left in the sector from St. Yves Avenue to the Wulverghem- Wytschaete Road, and handed over its sector to the 3rd Australian Division. The artillery relief was conducted on the 16th and 17th of the month. The 1st Brigade went in on the left to the positions vacated by the 153rd Brigade R.F.A., and the 3rd Brigade relieved the 173rd Brigade, R.F.A., and became
Since the beginning of March hostile artillery fire had been on the increase; several battery positions had been engaged, and some ammunition had been destroyed; while on the 8th, the enemy guns had been very active all day, and had destroyed Rutter's Lodge used by the 12th Battery as an observation post. After the Division had settled down in its new sector, this activity increased, and several raiding parties were launched by the enemy in an effort to secure identification. At 3.55 a.m. on March 23rd, the right group fired in response to an S.O.S. call; after heavily shelling the front line the enemy put down a box barrage and raided, but was driven back without obtaining identification. The following morning two enemy parties raided the line on the left goup sector, but both were driven off.
At the beginning of April work was commenced on the construction of battery positions to accommodate the mass of artillery which was to support the attack, and in the laying down of the network of tramways and light railways which were to serve the area for its supplies of ammunition and stores of all descriptions. Forward dumps were established for the provision of material required in construction work, and large working parties, generally a battalion or more in strength, were engaged on the burying of a cable running forward to a control station in rear of the trenches. This cable was buried to a good depth, and proved a tremendous improvement on the old system of ground wires, which could never be properly maintained in the heat of a bombardment. On April 1st the 3rd Brigade was entrusted with the building of ten battery positions. The infantry assisted by providing working parties, and a dump was formed and material issued to the batteries as it was required. magnum opus positions, as they were styled, had all to be carefully camouflaged, even before work was commenced, so that not the slightest indication of their presence might be observed by the enemy. Usually the site chosen was covered from end to end by great strips of green camouflage netting, and the men toiled under cover of this. Units of the Divisional Artillery constructed twenty-five battery positions on and near Hill 63 and in Ploegsteert Wood, the work being supervised by Major Glendining and Major C. McGilp.
In pursuance of the policy of resting the Division by units, the Artillery Brigades were withdrawn from the line in turn for a period of two weeks, which were spent in training and recreation in the Lumbres area, near St. Omer. By April 6th the 1st Brigade batteries had withdrawn to their waggon lines on relief by the 112th Brigade, R.F.A., and on the 9th the Brigade left on the march to the Lumbres-Tilques area for its period of rest. On the 6th, at midnight, the Division contracted its right, and the front was narrowed down to that on which it was to attack on the 7th of June, and following on the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade the right group, less the 12th Battery (which was temporarily under the tactical command of the C.R.A., 3rd Australian Division), extended its zone to embrace the whole divisional front. During this time one battery of the 112th Brigade was attached to the group. On the 19th and 20th the 3rd Brigade was relieved by the 110th Brigade, R.F.A., and marched out for the rest area on the 22nd. The 110th Brigade was relieved by the 1st Brigade on its return from Lumbres on the 24th. The 3rd Brigade returned from Lumbres on May 7th, but did not go into action until four days later; during this interval the Brigade supplied a daily working party one hundred strong for work on the magnum opus positions.
While out of the line batteries carried out a certain amount of training, but a good deal of time was devoted to sport in the way of football competitions, sports meetings, and cross-country races. The men benefited very much by the spell; but in the 1st Brigade the horses returned in rather poor condition, due to the cold weather which had been experienced and the work during training. No interruption in the works in progress had
On May 13th, the Divisional Artillery Horse Show was held near Westhof Farm; the condition of the teams and vehicles entered in the show was in all respects excellent, and reflected the greatest credit on the drivers, to whose zeal and labour such creditable results were due. The 7th Battery received the cup awarded for the best Battery Transport, and a number of prizes were secured by the sections of the Divisional Ammunition Column.
As the month progressed every day was marked by the most intense activity on the part of the British artillery, heavy and field, and by a corresponding increase in the enemy's retaliatory fire and counter-battery work. Wire cutting was carried out each day on the particular zones allotted to each Brigade, and targets at night included enemy tramways and roads, and places which had been shelled by the heavy artillery during the day; this latter practice was adopted in order to hamper repair work which might be attempted under cover of darkness. In order to secure the greatest degree of perfection in the elaborate and
Brigadier-General Johnston had moved his headquarters from Steenwerck to Westhof Farm on April 30th, and on the 22nd and 23rd of May forward concentration areas which had been established for all units of the N.Z.F.A. were occupied. The object of these concentration areas was to have the headquarters of each brigade, the limbers, firing battery, and first-line waggons of each battery, and the sections of the D.A.C. grouped forward in a manner that would provide for better tactical and administrative control in the coming advance. Spare horses and men and transport were left at the rear waggon lines.
On the last day in May most of the batteries spent some time cleaning up uncut wire in their zones, and by the end of the day all the wire within wire-cutting range in group zones was reported cut. From 6 a.m. this day onwards fire was maintained continuously, day and night, on all roads, bridges, communication trenches, light railway junctions, and transport halting places on the front. Thus there was no road or approach by which the enemy could transport stores or ammunition, or bring up reliefs for his weary and harassed infantry without being subject to this incessant and destructive fire. What mental and physical agony this meant when prolonged for over a week may readily be conjectured. The enemy guns were very active during the night of June 1, Hyde Park Corner, where there was always
From June 1st the daily expenditure of ammunition had been 150 rounds per gun and howitzer, and this expenditure continued right up to the day of attack. Prior to the assault there was to be no intense bombardment and no departure from what had been for some time the normal and customary procedure in the daily and nightly attention given to the enemy. It was a critical moment in the consummation of the scheme—the hour preceding its tumultuous birth—and anything that might give the vigilant German mind any idea of the hour of the attack was to be rigorously avoided. "It is essential," said the order on the subject, "that there should be no increase or slackening in the rate of fire before zero hour, and that everything should appear normal." Such was the density of the smoke and dust resulting from the ceaseless shelling of the enemy front that the whole countryside was completely hidden from aerial observation. A cessation of fire was in consequence ordered for fifteen minutes each day, to allow aeroplane photographs to be taken.
The assault on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge was entrusted to the 2nd Army, commanded by General Sir Herbert Plumer, and the front selected for the attack extended from opposite St. Yves to Mt. Sorrell inclusive, a distance of between nine and ten miles. The final objective was the Oostaverne line, running between these two points, and the greatest depth to which it was planned the advance should penetrate was about two miles and a half The frontage allotted to the 2nd Anzac Corps, in which were the 3rd Australian, New Zealand, and 25th Divisions from right to left, extended from St. Yves to the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road, and the objectives included the capture of the enemy's guns to the north-east of Messines and towards Oostaverne. For the Corps the attack was divided into two phases. In the first phase it was to attack and capture the Black line, which extended across the rear of Messines, involving of course the taking of Messines by the New Zealand Division in the centre. In the second phase the Corps was to capture the Green or Oostaverne line, which, on the front of the New Zealand Division, was about twelve hundred yards beyond the Black line. The three Divisions in line—3rd Australian, New Zealand, and 25th—were to carry out the first phase, and the second phase was entrusted to the 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions, the latter of which was to pass through the New Zealand and 25th Divisions, and capture the portion of the Green line opposite their front. In the New Zealand Division the 2nd Infantry Brigade, on the left, and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade attacked side by side.
The projected operation had previously been thoroughly rehearsed by all the attacking troops on a large scale, exact model of the Messines area; and before June 7th arrived every man was perfectly familiar with the part his unit was to. play in the battle. The signal for the attack was to be the explosion of a number of heavily-charged mines, which had been prepared during many months of unremitting and dangerous labour. Along the original Second Army front there was a total of twenty-four mines, which had involved the driving of eight thousand yards of galleries. Of this total four mines were outside the front of the attack, and one had been destroyed by the enemy. The remaining nineteen mines, charged with over
From first to last the operation in every detail, from the most important to the very minor, was thought out and planned with the most exacting care and, as far as was humanly possible every phase was carried out with clock-work precision. In the scheming of the barrage which preceded the infantry in their advance along the whole Army front no spot which might possibly prove an obstacle to the advance was left untouched. On the front of the New Zealand Division the barrage travelled a depth of less than two thousand yards in just over twenty lifts; so it may literally be said to have swept along in front of the advancing troops. A feature of the barrage in its earlier stages was the active presence of 144 machine guns along the Corps front, 56 of them being on the front of the Division. In addition to heavy guns and howitzers, one hundred and fourteen 18-prs. and thirty-six 4.5in. howitzers covered the Divisional front of 1,500 yards. The 18-prs. were divided into three groups; and there was one group of 4.5in. howitzers. "F" Group consisted of the 1st, 3rd, and 7th Batteries of the 1st Brigade, and A, B. and C Batteries of the 242nd Brigade R.F.A. The three 18-pr. batteries of the 3rd Brigade, the 11th, 12th, and 13th, were grouped with one battery of the 38th Brigade, and three batteries of the 311th Brigade R.F.A.
The system of grouping batteries did not generally affect administration to any extent, while it rendered the tactical handling of the artillery much simpler. Nearly all 18-pr. batteries were used on the creeping barrage, while the howitzer group was allotted special tasks. The standing barrage was generally a heavy gun barrage, although it also included 18-prs., and was laid well back, with the object of frustrating any attempt to bring up reinforcements as well as to keep down the fire of enemy riflemen and machine-gunners.
The last synchronisation of watches before zero hour took place at 9.30 p.m. on the June 6th. During the night the enemy threw over a great quantity of gas shell, chiefly lachry-matory on to Hill 63 and the vicinity. The shelling of battery positions which continued all day was also kept up during the
A
Good Example of a Barrage Map The lines between the Divisional Boundaries show the successive "lifts" of the barrage as it moves forward in front of the advancing infantry. The "Blue Line." "Black Line," etc., indicate the Various objectives.
The barrage was completely effective, and so successful in its purpose of opening a way for the attackers as to extort the highest praise from the infantry commanders. In order to make it as weighty and destructive as possible at the outset of the attack, all 18-prs. employed on the creeping and standing barrages kept one hundred per cent. of their guns firing for three-quarters of an hour after zero. At the expiration of that time every opportunity was taken of briefly resting the guns; but, meanwhile, those guns still in action substantially increased their rate of fire and swept in order that there should be no weakening of the barrage.
After capturing Messines the infantry pushed on, and finally reached the Black line, which was their obejctive for the time being. At this juncture troops of the 1st Infantry Brigade took up the task of establishing this line and the "Black Dotted Line" a little further down the eastern slopes of the ridge; these positions were to serve as the "jumping-off" place for the 4th Australian Division in its attack on the Oostaverne Line, the final objective. Following in the wake of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, the 1st Brigade troops had established themselves on the Black Line at 5.20 a.m. Stubborn resistance had been encountered at many points, and some light field guns, several machine guns, and many prisoners
The 4th Australian Division's attack on the Oostaverne Line was postponed for two hours, the "new zero" being 3.10 p.m. The final objective was reached about a quarter to four, after which a protective barrage was maintained for a further twenty minutes, and then all batteries reduced their fire to a very slow rate. As soon as word was received that the Oostaverne Line had been taken S.O.S. zones were allotted to each battery by group commanders, and all stood by ready to open fire upon the first sign of a counter-attack. Several S.O.S. calls were received during the early part of the evening, and all were promptly responded to, but it is doubtful if any real need existed for this vast expenditure of ammunition. At 9 p.m. "G" Group received a message from the group forward observing officer with one of the Australian Battalions that the line had been pushed back about three or four hundred yards; but Artillery Headquarters ordered the group to fire on the original S.O.S. line. A second message received by group at 9.20 p.m. stated that the Black Dotted Line was being held by the infantry, but Divisional Artillery Headquarters again ruled that fire should be kept outside the Green Line, as no definite information could be gained on the subject. Incidents of this description were of fairly frequent occurrence during the hours following a battle when communications were severely disorganised, and responsible officers were often obliged to make the most momentous decisions on the most meagre and uncertain information. Whatever doubt existed overnight had vanished by the morning, when the Australians were consolidated on their furthest assigned objectives.
On all other parts of the front the advance had been equally successful, and when time was gained to tally up the prisoners they were found to number over seven thousand; while in material the enemy had lost 67 guns, 94 trench mortars, and 294 machine guns.
During the first phase of the attack the field batteries were practically free from hostile fire. This was not an unusual experience, as it was frequently found that at the outset of an attack the enemy concentrated the heaviest weight of his artillery on barrage work, in his effort to stop the advancing infantry. In this instance, however, there were two other factors at work which undoubtedly had an effect on the situation. The first was that hostile batteries must have suffered heavily from the neutralising fire of our counter-battery guns; and the other was that a number of batteries on the front attacked were withdrawn to the rear. All the indications pointed to the fact that the enemy expected the attack to be pushed further than it actually was. The first hostile fire came from a flank, from the direction of Deulemont and Warneton, at about 9 a.m., principally directed against batteries on Hill 63, where one dump of about 3,000 rounds of ammunition was destroyed, and against Messines.
Groups experienced the usual difficulty in getting accurate and immediate information regarding the trend of events, but considering the difficulties of maintaining communication under such circumstances, much valuable information was received during the day from observing officers who had gone forward with the attacking infantry. Owing to the difficulty of main-taining communication by wire, these observers sent in many of their messages by runner or by carrier pigeon, by both of which methods, of course, messages were, unfortunately, subject to considerable delay.
Elaborate arrangements had, of course, to be made for supplying the enormous quantities of ammunition consumed by the massed batteries for days before and during the attack. It was a big undertaking, on the success of which great issues depended, and the fact that the system of supply never failed at any single point is the highest tribute that can be paid to the organising ability and range of vision displayed in its
All the construction work was done by Canadian and South African units, assisted by the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion, which maintained the system after its completion. It was late in the day when the lines were handed over for traffic, and it was imperative that the ammunition should commence to pour in without delay; there was little traction, however, and there were anxious moments when some mishap or breakdown threatened to dislocate the whole service. At one stage, the whole supply was dependent on the working of one petrol light line engine, and with the attack little more than twenty-four hours off another of these engines stopped, owing to a defect in a small but vital part and an officer of the D.A.C. had a midnight gallop to have it repaired. Nor did matters always run smoothly on the broad gauge; one night the second train to arrive failed to stop at the terminus, and ten trucks of ammunition went over the end of the line into a swamp. On occasions, also, enemy aircraft bombed the trains at Bailleul. But despite these mischances, and the destruction of a great quantity of ammunition by hostile shelling after it had been brought forward, supplies were always more than adequate. Between noon of May 31st and noon of June 7th the 18-pr. batteries expended 126,200 rounds, and the 4.5in. howitzers
This method of supply relieved battery transport of a big burden, and meant the saving of a great many horses and mules. A certain number of mules were used for haulage on the lines, and for hauling the ammunition up Hill 63. But the activities of the Divisional Ammunition Column did not end with the feeding of the field batteries; it handled a large proportion of the ammunition for the 6in. howitzers, took up small arm ammunition and bombs by mule-packs as far forward as it was possible to go, and then handed them over to the infantry, and night after night carted wire and stakes and material of all descriptions to within a few hundred yards of the front line.
The three medium trench mortar batteries and the one heavy battery did more than their share of shooting during the weeks preceding the attack; working under conditions of unusual difficulty they carried out a surprisingly big programme of shooting; and the thoroughness with which they dealt with dug-outs, strong points, and other features in the enemy's forward trench system, in addition to cutting great quantities of wire, marked a distinct development in their offensive use. The enemy retaliated strongly with artillery fire, and the mortar batteries were often forced to obtain covering fire from their own field batteries; on occasions, also, they fired under cover of a bombardment from the field guns. Enormous quantities of ammunition were fired away during the fortnight immediately preceding the attack, and the distinction of having achieved the "record" shoot was not lightly regarded by the mortar men themselves. On May 24th, three batteries of medium mortars fired a total of no less than 1,265 rounds; but this was eclipsed a few days later, when three batteries got through a total of 1,950 rounds. The trench mortars fired up to the opening of the attack, and then withdrew to Pont Nieppe.
There was little change in the situation on the 8th of June; throughout the day Messines and the ridge were bombarded by enemy guns from the direction of Warneton; but as Messines was not occupied by the infantry the effects of this shelling were
Considerable changes were made in the composition of the groups immediately after the attack. After the capture of the Black Line the 38th Australian Brigade joined "G" Group, and at 4.15 p.m. A., B., and C. Batteries of the 311th Brigade left the group for another command. On the 9th, "F" Group lost the batteries of the 242nd Brigade but next day was joined by the 15th (howitzer) Battery from "H." Group. Batteries of both groups moved forward by the 12th June to positions below Messines, near the Wulverghem-Messines Road, and the mobile waggon lines were moved forward to fresh quarters east of Neuve Eglise.
The 2nd (Army) Brigade.
The 2nd (Army) Brigade was detached from the New Zealand Division for a period of practically three months—from early in March until the middle of June, when the Brigade came once more under the control of New Zealand Divisional Artillery Headquarters. During that period the brigade had been subject to a good many moves, and its batteries had figured in a number of minor operations on different parts of the front from Bois Grenier to Messines. At the beginning of March batteries were in action in rest positions at Fleurbaix, firing only on S.O.S. calls. On the 7th of March the Brigade, with the exception of
At the beginning of April an operation was carried out on an extended sector running south from Armentieres, by which It was sought to impress the enemy with the belief that the artillery along the front was being strengthened, and possibly that active operations were projected. The method adopted was to move mobile batteries rapidly up and down the front, and to display the greatest possible degree of activity during the brief interval that each position was occupied. In accordance with this plan the 2nd Battery was attached to the 57th Division on the Laventie-Bois Grenier sector, and during the three days over which the operation extended, occupied no less than twelve positions. Each day four positions were occupied with one gun in each, and each gun fired 250 rounds per day. Observation posts were allotted to the battery before the guns were in action, the Divisional Signal Company assisting the battery staff in arranging communication between the "battery" and the observation post. Targets were chiefly roads, tracks, and salient points in trench systems, and the shooting was carried out in a manner that gave the impression that a great deal of registration was taking place. The operation certainly was successful to the extent that it brought down heavy fire on battery positions on the front.
The Brigade remained in waggon lines training and over-hauling equipment until April 13th, when a move was made to Neuve Eglise, and parties 200 strong were supplied for work on the tramway system, trench mortar emplacements, and magnum opus positions in the neighbourhood of Hill 63. On the 22nd the Brigade returned to the vicinity of Steenwerck; and being again attached to the 57th Division, Brigade Headquarters moved into Armentieres, the 2nd Battery taking up a position at 1'Armee, the 9th at Fleurbaix and the 5th and 6th (howitzer) at Houplines. On the nights of 3rd and 4th May the Brigade was relieved in the line by the 7th Australian Brigade, and on the 5th marched out via Wallon Cappel to the training area at Lumbres, being inspected en route by the G.O.C., 2nd Anzac Corps and the Corps G.O.C., R.A. The field training carried out at Lumbres included a field day with the 11th Australian Infantry Brigade, when operations were conducted somewhat on the lines of a rehearsal for the attack on the Messines Ridge. On the 20th the Brigade marched out for Wallon Cappel, under orders from the 25th Divisional Artillery, and proceeded thence to waggon lines at Bailleul. On May 22nd the Brigade went into positions east of Neuve Eglise. On the 23rd, Brigade Headquarters was installed near Neuve Eglise; the Brigade, less 6th (howitzer) Battery, now forming the nucleus of "C" Group, 25th Divisional Artillery. Mobile waggon lines were established by Dranoutre, the remaining men and horses being left at the lines at Bailleul. Batteries of the Brigade took part in the preparation for the Messines attack, and assisted in the barrage which covered the advance of the infantry of the 25th Division. On the afternoon of the 7th the Brigade moved forward to positions previously reconnoitred on Hill 63, all batteries being in action by 6 p.m. These positions were occupied until the 15th, when batteries moved forward again to emplacements already partly prepared near the old British front line at Seaforth Farm.
This Photograph, showing an artillery driver endeavouring to extricate his Pack Mule from a Shell-Hole, Conveys Some Idea of the Appalling Conditions Which Prevailed at Passchendaele
Official Photo
St. Yves.
From June 12th onwards, enemy fire on artillery areas and roads began to display a marked increase; and the fact that a good deal of this fire came from opposite the Divisional front showed that the enemy had recovered his confidence, and brought his guns forward again. After the batteries of the Division had settled down in their advanced positions they commenced firing 900 rounds per battery per day on enemy roads and communications behind the Warneton lines in preparation for a further advance, which had been ordered for the evening of June 13th. The artillery were to support the infantry of the New Zealand Divison, which relieved the troops of the 3rd Australian Division in the line on June 12th, in the St. Yves sector. In this operation the line was to be advanced to a depth of 1,500 yards, and as it was not thought that the undertaking would prove particularly difficult, it was to be carried out without any artillery support in the way of a barrage. Late in the afternoon of the 13th, however, information was received that the 25th Division, which was to co-operate on the left, would not advance without artillery support. The New Zealand Division's original plans were adhered to, however, but the attack was only partially successful. The 3rd (Rifle) Brigade reached its objective, but the 2nd Infantry Brigade on the left came under heavy fire from the German artillery, and did not succeed in pushing home the attack.
A second attempt, supported by an artillery barrage, was more successful next evening. The attack was fixed for 7.30 p.m.; but it was after 6 p.m. when the instructions for the creeping barrage were received by Group Headquarters, and battery commanders got their orders from the runners barely in time. Fire died down to normal at 9.30 p.m., but the heavy shelling to which the Messines Ridge and the whole area between the ridge and Wulverghem had been subjected all day went on unabated.
From the 17th of June the amount of harassing fire carried out by the Division was gradually decreased, but hostile shelling of roads and villages and battery positions continued without diminution right to the end of the month; Ploegsteert Village
The activities of the artillery were now no more than normal, and the usual routine of events came as something of a relief after the strenuous happenings of the past month; no peace was had, however, from the enemy counter-battery guns, which continued persistently active. Heavy casualties were suffered on the 20th, and the 11th Battery, which was shelled all day, lost five men killed and three wounded. The position was made untenable and a fresh situation was reconnoitred and occupied the following night.
During the shelling on the 20th one section was located in a small cottage, the guns firing through the windows. This building was set on fire as a result of the enemy shelling, and the ammunition stored in the pits exploded and destroyed both guns. Three or four gunners managed to make their escape from the burning and shattered ruin, but the remainder were killed by the explosion. Including those guns which were casualtied during July, the battery had eleven guns put out of action during the fighting along this front, and of that total no less than seven were totally destroyed.
The Artillery covering the front was considerably weakened by the withdrawal on the 25th and 26th of June of the 2nd (Army) Brigade N.Z.F.A., which went out to waggon lines near Steenwerck, and of the 7th Brigade A.F.A. Orders were
The 3rd Brigade was now commanded by Lieut.-Colonel N. S. Falla, vice Lieut.-Colonel Standish, who had proceeded to England on duty. Major Glendining, for the 11th Battery, assumed command of the Divisional Ammunition Column, and the 11th Battery was commanded by Captain J. G. Jeffery.
La Basse Ville.
Although the New Zealand Division did not go into the line again for nearly three weeks, the Artillery remained in rest for little more than a week only. Brief as it was, this period of rest proved beneficial to all ranks. A good deal of time was devoted to recreation, and a combined sports meeting proved a pronounced success. On July 8th the two Brigades, the Divisional Ammunition Column, and the Divisional Trench Mortars, commenced the relief in the line of the 4th Australian Divisional Artillery. Batteries took over the guns, which they had handed over a week earlier to the Australian batteries. On the night of the 16th-17th July the 311th Brigade, R.F.A., went into action on the front, which was then covered by three brigades of field artillery. By the 20th the New Zealand infantry had returned to the line in relief of the 4th Australian Division.
By the time the whole Divison had returned to the line preparations for the third battle of Ypres were so far advanced that the lengthy and careful artillery preparation which was to precede it had already been commenced. Although the enemy had been driven off the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge he could still
The front involved extended from the River Lys opposite Deulemont northwards to beyond Steenstraat, a distance of over fifteen miles; but the main blow was to be delivered by the Fifth Army on a front of about seven and a half miles, from Zillebeke-Zandvoorde Road to Boesinghe, inclusive. The Second Army, in which the New Zealand Division was still included, covered the right of the Fifth Army; it was required to advance a short distance only, the main idea being so to increase the area threatened by the attack that the enemy would be forced to distribute his strength and his gun-power. The First French Army was to co-operate on the left of the Fifth Army. The New Zealand Division, in the La Basse Ville sector, was on the extreme right of the front affected by the attack, and during the closing days of the month assisted the Second Army in its part in the scheme of operations by local operations, and an apparently significant increase in its artillery activity.
When the artillery first returned to the line the allotment of ammunition for all purposes was reduced to fifty rounds per gun per day for the 18-prs. and thirty-five rounds per day for the howitzers; but on the 21st of July it was raised to 75 rounds per gun and howitzer. Much of this fire was directed against enemy roads and approaches, and bombardments and practice barrages were also carried out. The enemy replied by severely shelling battery areas and bombing back areas by night. The batteries of the 3rd Brigade suffered heavily, and had a number of guns destroyed. The 11th Battery was shelled intermittently over a period of six or seven days; on the 13th it was shelled with 5.9in. and 8in. shells; on the 16th, some hundreds of 8in. shell were put round and about the position; more material damage was inflicted on the 17th, and an ammunition dump was exploded on the 20th; and finally, on the 22nd, the battery was shelled from 1 p.m. till dusk with 11in. shell, the battery
Some idea of the violence of the shelling to which the New Zealand batteries were subjected during the period that followed the Battle of Messines may be gained from the fact that the 15th (howitzer) Battery, which was fortunate to go through both the Battle of the Somme and the Battle of Messines without losing any guns by shell fire, lost a total of eight guns in this manner during the two months following the Battle of Messines.
At 2 a.m. on July 27th troops of the 1st Infantry Brigade attacked La Basse Ville, which had been heavily shelled by the artillery at intervals during the previous week. The infantry attacked under cover of a barrage which the infantry commanders described as entirely satisfactory. The village was captured, but at 5 a.m. the small garrison which had been left in possession was driven out by a strong enemy counter-attack. The enemy's counter-battery guns were very active during the operation, and during the remainder of the day the front and support lines were heavily shelled at intervals.
A second attack was launched against La Basse Ville at 3.50 a.m. on the closing day of the month, and enemy posts in front of Warneton were also raided at the same time. Strong opposition was encountered in La Basse Ville, but the place was taken and held, an enemy counter-attack being repulsed. As from the 20th of the month artillery groups had ceased to exist, and tactical control was now by brigades, but for the operation against La Basse Ville a special group commanded by Lieut.- Colonel Symon, was formed of the 1st, 7th, 13th, and 15th (howitzer) Batteries and D Howitzer Battery of the 11th Brigade. Although the barrage was necessarily a thin one, it
The weather at the beginning of August was bad and the low visibility restricted the activity on both sides of the line, although the enemy gunners continued to devote a fair amount of attention to La Basse Ville. On the 10th the weather improved, and the sector became more lively. Our howitzer batteries commenced to carry out gas shell bombardments, chiefly with asphyxiating shell on selected points, such as suspected headquarters, etc. Retaliation was fairly prompt and in kind, 3rd Brigade Headquarters being twice shelled with poison gas shell on the night of the 13th. Although hostile fire showed a slight decrease during the month the enemy had continued to pay some attention to counter-battery work, and most of the New Zealand batteries had been shelled at one time or another. Though casualties had been light several guns had been destroyed, and the Division had the misfortune of losing one of its ablest battery commanders in the person of Major Horwood. As a sergeant-major in the R.N.Z.A., Major Horwood joined the Expeditionary Force shortly after the outbreak of war, and was commissioned in 1914, just before leaving New Zealand. He rose to the rank of Major, and commanded the 7th Battery, and was recognised as a capable officer and a skilful battery commander. On one occasion during the month also, the enemy shelled the ammunition dump at Romarin, killing one man and wounding five others.
On the night of September 4th the Artillery of the 8th Division, with its attached Army Brigades, commenced to relieve our artillery, following the usual method of relieving one section the first night and the remaining two the following night. Command passed to the C.R.A. of the 8th Division at 10 a.m. on the 6th. The same day units marched to the Morbecque area, via Steenwerck, Le Verrier, Vieux Berquin, and La Motte. After three days spent in this area Divisional Artillery Headquarters moved to the Thiembronne area, the 1st Brigade trekked to Flechin, the 3rd Brigade to Estree Blanche, and the D.A.C. to Laires. The trench mortar personnel proceeded in motor
On September 14th Lieut-Colonel Symon proceeded to England for a course in artillery staff work, and on his departure command of the brigade was given to Lieut-Colonel J. A. Ballard, R.F.A.
On September 20th the whole of the Divisional Artillery left Thiembronne at very short notice, and trekked to Wallon Cappel, the C.R.A. and staff moving to Hazebrouck. The following day the 1st Brigade moved to Boeschepe, and on the 26th the 3rd Brigade and the D.A.C. moved to Busseboom, After having been out of the line for little more than three Weeks, orders were now received that the Division was to return to the line, to engage in the struggle which had been desperately raging for two months for the possession of the heights overlooking the salient.
Chapter V.
Passchendaele.
The Third Battle of Ypres had opened on the last day of July, two months before the New Zealand Division was moved into the fighting; but it had not continued without interruption during the whole of that time. On the afternoon of the day on which the first attack was launched rain commenced to fall, continued all night and for the four following days, and speedily transformed the battlefield into a vast morass, in which movement became so limited that a resumption of active operations was impossible until better weather permitted of more freedom and ease of movement underfoot. The slight improvement that took place in the weather towards the middle of August allowed of a second attack being launched on August 16th; but unsettled conditions again followed, and efforts for the remainder of the month were confined to a number of small operations east and north-east of Ypres. Desperate fighting was the rule during September, the enemy's positions having been attacked on a front of eight miles on the 20th of the month and again on the 26th, on a slightly reduced front. The enemy did not abandon the positions that were wrested from him in these attacks without a severe struggle, and his frequent counter-attacks led to fierce fighting; but except at one or two points the attacking troops succeeded in holding on to their gains. Very considerable but costly progress had been made by the end of September; but the enemy was still in possession of the main line of the ridge at many points. The advance was to be renewed on October 4th, when the main effort was to be directed against a front of about seven miles, extending from the Menin road to the Ypres-Staden railway, and preparations for this attack were being completed when the New Zealand Division relieved the 59th Division in the St. Jean sector east of Ypres.
The Division was still in the 2nd Anzac Corps which also included the 3rd Australian Division, and two attached Divisions, the 49th and 66th. In the attack on October 4th the New Zealand Division was to be on the extreme left of the 2nd Army. On its right was the 3rd Australian Division and on its left the 48th Division, XVIII Corps, Fifth Army.
A tragic experience befell the Artillery at the very outset. In accordance with orders received by the Division, both the 1st and 3rd Brigades went into certain positions near Frezenberg; but no sooner had they been occupied than further orders were received for their withdrawal and transfer to new positions south of St. Julien. During the brief interval, however, the locality had been subjected to a continuous and destructive fire, and both brigades suffered heavy losses in men and guns. The opinion that the orders were issued to the Division in error may not have been correct, but it was difficult to conceive of any circumstances by which they could be justified. Headquarters of the Divisional Artillery were established at Watou on the 28th of September, and the same night batteries commenced to go into the positions at Frezenberg in relief of batteries of the 42nd Divisional Artillery, the 1st Brigade relieving the 210th Brigade and the 3rd Brigade the 211th Brigade R.F.A. Batteries came under heavy fire from the moment of taking over, and the losses in men and guns were very severe. The 15th (Howitzer) Battery lost some of its guns, and the 11th Battery lost five guns before the artillery of the 3rd Australian Division relieved both Brigades, guns being exchanged. On withdrawal. a move was made to new positions which had been reconnoitred by Lieut.-Colonel Falla, south of St. Julien and east of the Steenbeek.
The new positions were situated in a locality which was at once innocent of cover or protection, and where the best was very little better than the worst. The whole area occupied by the Division was in a very bad state; it had been devastated by shell fire, and had become water-logged by the heavy rains, and during the early days of the month a tremendous amount of necessary work had to be done in repairing roads, tracks, and bridges, the existing conditions of which very seriously increased the already considerable difficulties of transport. Gas shells
In view of the impending attack the trench mortars did not go into the line, and the personnel were attached to the D.A.C., which was concentrating all its energies on the task of coordinating arrangements for the supply of ammunition to the guns. It had taken over a dump near the railway at Ypres, and a more forward dump in Oxford Row, near Wieltje. Orders were issued on the 1st October stating the amount of ammunition to be at battery positions by the night of 3rd-4th October, at 960 rounds per gun for the 18-prs, and 760 rounds per howitzer. As the positions continued, fairly free from shelling, the task of getting this ammunition up was made much easier, and Battery Commanders were able to register and calibrate their guns. The fact that the registration in some cases was carried out by direct observation from the battery positions will convey some idea of their proximity to the line and of their exposed nature.
Preparations for the attack on the 4th were speedily completed and detailed orders for the work of the artillery in the advance were issued to batteries. In addition to the heavy artillery on the front there was a strong concentration of field artillery. Brigadier-General Johnston had under his command ten brigades of artillery, five of which constituted the Right Main Group, and the remaining five the Left Main Group; in all there was a
The task of the Division was divided into two parts—the capture of the "Red Line" sited on the reverse slopes of the Abraham Heights Spur, and the "Blue Line," approximately 800 yards further on, and extending from Kronprinz Farm, through and including Berlin Wood, to near Hamburg. The attack was made by the 1st and 4th Infantry Brigades, with the 2nd Infantry Brigade in reserve. Zero hour was 6 a.m., and though the infantry met with strong opposition all objectives were captured and consolidated. The barrage was good, and counter-attacks were broken up by gun-fire. The Division secured over a thousand prisoners in the attack, and captured about sixty machine guns, besides gaining a deal of very valuable ground
On this occasion, at least, the gunners had reason to be rather thankful that the ground on which they fought was so yielding, for the high velocity shells, hurtling in with frightful rapidity plunged deep into the mud before exploding, and thus were robbed of much of their effectiveness. Had these shells been detonating on hard ground they would have annihilated the whole line of batteries.
The barrage in this attack gave general satisfaction, Brigadier-General C. W. Melville, Commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, reported on it in the following terms:—"The barrage was excellent, and all ranks were full of praise and admiration for it. It was easily followed, and very few shorts were experienced." The Divisional Commander, Major-General A. H. Russell, also congratulated Brigadier-General Johnston on the work of the artillery, which he described as splendid.
The success attained by the New Zealand Division was almost uniform on the whole front of the main attack in spite of strong opposition and the nature of the ground, sodden with the rains
The eastern approaches to Passchendaele were shelled with gas on the night after the attack, and harassing fire was continued the following day. On the evening of the 5th the New Zealand Division was relieved by the 49th Division, but the Artillery remained in the line under the command of the C.R.A., New Zealand Division. It had become necessary to move the batteries forward in preparation for the next stage of the advance, and positions had been reconnoitred a little east of Winnipeg by Brigadier-General Johnston and Lieut.-Colonel Falla, who had gone forward for that purpose on the 5th. The ground forward was found to be in a terrible condition, however, and it was at once seen that it would be impossible for the batteries to move forward till a road of some description had been made. This work was at once undertaken, and orders were issued for the positions to be prepared in the meantime, and supplies of ammunition sent forward in readiness for their occupation. Packing was, of course, the only possible method of supply, and the Divisional Ammunition Column was detailed to assist battery transport; each 18-pr. position was to be supplied with 600 rounds per gun, and each howitzer position with 450 rounds per howitzer. Rain had fallen again on the night of the 4th, and so bad had the weather become that it seemed as if the heavens and the earth had conspired to stay the forward flow of guns and ammunition. The terribly congested roads were rapidly churned into a condition that rendered them wellnigh impassable. The guns had to be fed, however, and the drivers struggled forward with their packs, at every step
On the night of the 4th-5th, two Brigades (the 295th and 296th Brigades, R.F.A.) were withdrawn from the line, leaving eight brigades supporting the divisional front. Following on this the Right Main Group was ordered to move three brigades up to forward positions, and the Left Main Group was ordered to move forward two brigades. An endeavour was to be made to adhere to the principle that at least two-thirds of these guns should always be in action covering the front whilst the moves were in progress. On October the 6th heavy rain fell again, and a visit to the forward areas revealed a most depressing scene; the roads were blocked by heavy howitzers, caterpillars, lorries, and field guns and under the rain and the shelling, men, so coated with mud that they moved with difficulty, were endeavouring to get them forward or off the road out of the way. Dead men and horses lay about; and a hostile long range gun was patiently searching for the battery positions.
The congestion finally became so bad that an absolute impasse resulted; and at 6 p.m. the routes forward were closed for a period so that they might be cleared. This expedient did not avail much however, and efforts to get the guns forward failed in almost every case as a result of the condition of the roads, and the blocks on the Wieltje-Gravenstafel and St. Julien-Winnipeg Roads. So many guns became stranded on the way to forward positions that on the evening of the 7th a reorganisation of zones became necessary; the Right Main Group being given one-third of the front to cover, while the Left Main Group (which included the New Zealand Brigades), having all its guns in action, covered the remaining two-thirds. Guns not in action were in every case either completely bogged or else blocked on the road; but wherever possible they were hauled off the road and got into action on the spot.
The heavy rain which fell on October 7th and 8th was not allowed to interfere with the resumption of the attack on October 9th on a front of over six miles, from a point east of Zonnebeke to the junction of the British line with the French north-east of Langemarck. On the left the French continued the attack to a point opposite Draaibank, minor operations being undertaken on the right to the east and south-east of Polygon Wood. The greatest measure of success was attained on the left, near the junction with the French. On the front which the New Zealand batteries assisted in covering, the 49th Division did not achieve substantial results; the assembly for the attack was carried out in cold, drenching rain, and inky darkness, whilst some of the attacking troops were on the march nearly all night, and arrived at the place of assembly only in time to take part in the engagement. As the infantry were held up at different points the advance did not proceed according to timetable; and finally the creeping barrage was stopped and brought back as a standing barrage on about the line of the first objective. Though the weather conditions continued to become steadily worse, orders were at once issued for a renewal of the attack on the 12th, and instructions concerning the artillery support were received by the New Zealand Brigades on the afternoon of the 10th.
Two days after the unsuccessful attack by the 49th Division it was relieved in the line by the New Zealand Division. The 3rd (Rifle) Brigade moved up to La Brique, north-east of Ypres, on the 9th and the following night commenced to go into the line, in company with the 2nd Infantry Brigade, which had been brought up to Ypres by motor 'buses. Meanwhile the weather continued unsettled and more rain fell. Command of the sector passed to the New Zealand Division at 10 a.m. on the 11th.
While this relief was in progress the New Zealand gunners were struggling to get their guns forward from the positions which they had occupied during the attack by the 49th Division. The night before this attack it was decided that an attempt should be made the next day to move the New Zealand batteries forward to a position near the Winnipeg Cross Roads, and instructions were issued by the C.O. Sub-Group that the 13th and 1st Batteries were to make the attempt with two guns, and
"
On Trek " [Official Photo
A
British Tank Going into Action [Official Photo
The Tragedy of October 12th.
The front of attack for the 12th was between the Ypres-Roulers Railway and Houthulst Forest, and the attack was to be made by troops of the Second and Fifth Armies, the latter being on the left. The objectives included Passchendaele Ridge and the village of Passchendaele itself. The New Zealand Division, with the 3rd Australian Division on the right, and the 9th Division of the Fifth Army on the left, was to attack with two Brigades disposed side by side. The two brigades chosen for the attack were the 2nd Infantry Brigade and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, the 4th Brigade being in Divisional Reserve. The Division's first objective was the Red Line which extended from the Ravebeek to the left across the Bellevue Spur, and the second objective was the Blue Line one thousand yards further on. When the New Zealand Infantry came into the line on the night of the 10th, there was only a very imperfect and confused understanding as to the general condition of affairs, but reconnaissances that night and early the following morning disclosed the fact that the enemy blockhouses were still intact and the wire uncut. A request was sent in for heavy artillery fire, but the amount of fire supplied entirely failed in its purpose, and another urgent, request for heavy artillery fire was sent in on the afternoon of the 11th. Some time later the heavy artillery opened fire on Bellevue Spur, but the fire was of brief duration, and the damage to the enemy defences small.
The assembly of the infantry for the attack commenced at 6.30 p.m. on the 11th and, continuing through the night, was satisfactorily accomplished before daylight on the 12th, despite the darkness and the heavy condition of the ground. Rain held off during the night, but commenced to fall in the early hours of the morning. Zero hour was at 5.25 a.m. and about 5 o'clock the enemy commenced to shell the assembly areas, and a number of casualties was suffered. The attack was met with heavy machine gun fire, though the enemy's barrage was weak; with indomitable courage and tenacity the attackers pushed on until brought up by the pill-boxes and the uncut wire. The attack failed before it had reached the first objective. The artillery barrage proceeded according to programme, until messages were received that the infantry advance was held up,
Very heavy casualties had been suffered by both Brigades of Infantry which took part in the attack; the losses in killed and wounded numbered 2730. Communications were utterly disorganised, the greatest difficulty was experienced in getting rations and water to the men in the forward areas, and the condition of the wounded was pitiable in the extreme. Many lay all night in the mud, exposed to the hail and rain and the bitter cold. On the night of the 12th-13th 1,200 men of the 4th Infantry Brigade, and every spare man from the Artillery and the Army Service Corps were engaged in getting out the wounded, a battalion of the 147th Brigade having been also loaned to the Division for the same purpose. Six or eight men were required to carry a wounded man on a stretcher over that veritable morass, and it took hours for each party to flounder down to the dressing stations.
From the moment the attack opened, the artillery barrage was weak and patchy as a direct result of the conditions under which the guns had to shoot; but this deficiency, though serious in itself, was not the chief factor in the tragic failure. The primary causes of the failure of the attack were the deep and continuous belts of uncut wire which faced the attacking infantry, and the massive concrete blockhouses, or pill-boxes, from which the
Despite the fact that the artillery was almost reduced to total immobility and that even movement on foot was a matter of extreme difficulty, orders were actually issued to certain batteries about this time regarding the provision of mobile sections of 18-prs. in readiness to co-operate in case of a rapid advance on the front by cavalry. And this at a time when even unburdened animals became so hopelessly bogged that extrication became impossible and they had to be destroyed. Obviously Corps Headquarters must have possessed a better knowledge of the conditions prevailing in forward areas than such an order would seem to suggest; needless to say the opportunity of assisting the cavalry in a "rapid advance" never arose.
Notwithstanding the adverse conditions with which they had to contend, the shooting of the New Zealand batteries was not allowed to suffer, and careful checking of registration was frequently carried out in order to obviate any risk of inaccurate shooting. Several complaints were made regarding short shooting, however, and on the afternoon of the 14th October reports of "shorts" were received from one of the brigade observers; but it was ascertained that the New Zealand batteries had not been in action at any of the times stated, the officer commanding the sub-group having visited the infantry in the afternoon for the purpose of having the matter cleared up. On the 16th all 18-pr. guns on the Divisional front fired two rounds per gun on the S.O.S. line, and an hour later a report was received that some of the shells had fallen short. Lieut.-Colonel Falla expressed his conviction that none of the batteries of the New Zealand sub-group was responsible, and asked that they should be permitted to fire alone on the same lines. Permission was granted, and the shooting was reported to be quite satisfactory. This test exonerated the batteries from any suspicion of blame; but it also did more in strengthening the confidence of the infantry of the Division in their own Artillery.
At 11 a.m. on the 13th batteries were ordered to reduce fire to thirty rounds per gun every twenty-four hours; but this made matters little easier for the drivers, as supplies of ammunition had to be got up to the forward positions yet to be occupied; it was almost impossible for horses to get into the positions, and the ammunition had often to be dumped at the side of the road and carried to the guns by hand. The decision having been come to that all guns were to be moved forward to the positions near Winnipeg-Kansas Cross Roads with as little delay as possible, a company of New Zealand Pioneers was detailed to help repair the roads and assist in extricating the guns from their positions, and moving them forward. This was on the 15th of the month, but nothing was done towards moving the guns that day, owing to the condition of the roads. On the following day two 18-prs. and three 4.5in. howitzers were brought forward; but on the 17th, when the day was fine and the ground was drying fast, the roads were so heavily shelled that considerable delay was caused, and by the evening
The position by the 20th was that about two-thirds of the New Zealand Artillery had been got up to the forward positions, where the simultaneous packing of ammunition had provided 800 rounds per 18-pr. and 450 rounds per howitzer. During this period the enemy had persistently shelled the whole area with guns of every calibre up to 11in., the shelling being particularly heavy round Spree Farm, Nos. 5 and 6 Tracks, Kansas Cross, and the whole of the Gravenstafel Spur. He had also systematically searched for battery positions, both forward and rear, and had made a favourite target of the Schuler Galleries, where the New Zealand batteries had their control posts. Night bombing of the waggon lines and rear areas had become systematic, whilst the enemy bombing planes had also begun to come boldly over by day. bombing battery positions and the traffic on the crowded roads. At 10 a.m. on the 20th command of the artillery on the Divisional front passed to the C.R.A., 3rd Canadian Division, which was relieving the New Zealand Infantry; command of the Left Main Group passed to Brigadier-General Forman, C.R.A., 49th Division, and Lieut.-Colonel Falla remained in command of the sub-group.
During the six days which elapsed before the Canadian Corps joined in the renewal of the attack, the New Zealand Brigades were occupied in vigorous harassing fire, most of which was carried out at night, and in taking part in preparatory barrages, which were designed to thoroughly sweep the enemy's territory to a considerable depth. Steps were taken to deal with all uncut wire, and vigorous counter-battery work was done along the whole front, the 4th (Howitzer) Battery being attached to a counter-battery group for this purpose. In short, a thorough effort was made to remove the obstacles which had chiefly been responsible for the arrest of the advance on October 12th. The activity of the enemy batteries chiefly found expression in the heavy shelling of battery positions and communications. The attack was launched at 5.45 a.m. on October 26th, on a front extending from the Ypres-Roulers Railway to beyond Poelcappelle, the Canadians attacking on the right on both sides of the Ravebeek, a small stream flowing south-westerly from Passchendaele. On the left bank of the stream they advanced astride the main ridge, and established themselves on the small hill south of Passchendaele; strong resistance was encountered on the Bellevue Spur, however, which was only captured on a second attempt in the afternoon.
The supporting barrage, advancing in lifts of 50 yards every four minutes, went through all its phases till 10.30 a.m. when cease fire was ordered, and at noon the S.O.S. line was given as the line of the protective barrage for the first objective. Hostile fire throughout the day was mostly directed on forward areas, but back areas and battery positions were heavily shelled throughout the night with howitzers of all calibres and high-velocity guns. Batteries were subjected to equally heavy fire practically every night until the next attack on the 30th. On this occasion the front of attack extended from the Ypres-Roulers Railway to the Poelcappelle Westroosebeke Road. On the right the Canadians continued their advance along the high ground, and reached the outskirts of Passchendaele, but the village was not finally captured until November 6th, some days after the New Zealand batteries had been relieved. Zero hour on the 30th was 5.50 a.m., and the supporting barrage was entirely satisfactory. Fire ceased at
On November 1st batteries of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery commenced the relief of the New Zealand batteries, taking over the guns as they stood in the pits. The relief was completed the following night, when the personnel of the New Zealand batteries, which had not received any guns in exchange, withdrew to the waggon lines. Both Brigades and the Divisional Ammunition Column moved out for the Watou area at 9.30 a.m. on the 3rd. While the relief was in progress waggon lines were heavily bombed, and casualties to men and horses were suffered, the 15th battery having twenty-six horses killed on the night of the lst-2nd November.
After the New Zealand Artillery had withdrawn from the line the following letter was received by Major-General Russell, G.O.C. the Division, from Major-General L. J. Lipsett, Commanding 3rd Canadian Division:—"I must thank you very much for the great assistance given to us by your artillery during the Passchendaele battles. They have been very highly spoken of by all our people. They worked hard, and were keen on producing results."
The following letter was also received from Brigadier-General P. A. Mitchell, C.R.A., 3rd Canadian Division:—"Now that the New Zealand Artillery are leaving my command, I wish to place on record my appreciation of the high standard of efficiency maintained by them while they were assisting to cover the offensive operations of the 3rd Canadian Division. In spite of the difficulties of bad weather, and almost impassable roads, they kept their guns in action and their ammunition dumps filled with a regularity which would have been impossible without a high standard of discipline, energy, and efficiency. I should be glad if you would convey my thanks to all officers, N.C.O.'s, gunners, and drivers of the New Zealand Artillery for their gallant and faithful work in trying circumstances."
After spending three days in the Watou area, the artillery marched to the Wallon Cappel area on November 7th. For several days the weather was wet and disagreeable; but both viâ St. Sylvestre-Cappel. In this area units remained until they received orders to return to the line in the Ypres salient.
The 2nd Brigade at Nieuport.
Three weeks after the battle of Messines the 2nd (Army) Brigade was withdrawn from the front then covered by the New Zealand Division, and concentrated at waggon lines at Le Veau, near Steenwerck. The brigade did not rejoin the Division until the first days of December, 1917, when in company with the 1st and 3rd Brigades it went into the Ypres sector in support of the New Zealand Infantry. During almost the whole of the intervening months the Brigade was in action on the Belgian coast, where, about the end of June, British troops had relieved the French on the sector from St. Georges to the sea. This relief was effected in accordance with an arrangement by which the French should take part in the Third Battle of Ypres, by extending the British flank northwards beyond Boesinghe, on the left of the 5th Army. Though the 2nd Brigade was not in consequence in the fighting at Passchendaele, its experiences on the coast were strenuous enough. The enemy had on the sector a strong concentration of artillery which pursued an extremely aggressive policy during the period from July to mid-November, when the Brigade marched south again. From an artilleryman's point, of view the sector was remarkable for the amount of labour which the French had devoted to the construction of strongly-protected, almost shell-proof, battery positions. The New Zealand batteries, however, had to build their own pits, as well as those for half-a-dozen other batteries, and were not afforded the shelter of any of these reinforced positions until a few weeks before their departure.
After withdrawing from the line near Messines, on June 26th, batteries spent until 10th July in refitting and general training, after which the Brigade and Brigade Ammunition Column marched off en route for the coast, where the brigade was to go into the line near Nieuport, under the 1st Divisional Artillery. The first night was spent in billets in the Staple area, whence the march was continued on successive days to Wormhoudt, Ghyvelde, and finally Coxyde, where waggon lines were established. The long warm days were, in a measure, pleasant enough for trekking; but the midday heat on a dusty road was likely to be trying to both horses and men, and a welcome departure from the ordinary routine was made by travelling in the cool of the early morning. The column was on the road by 4 a.m., and the day's journey was generally completed by 10 or 11 a.m.
On arrival at Coxyde the Brigade learned of the attack which the enemy had made on the British positions on the Yser Canal, near Lombartzyde, a few days previously, and the batteries were ordered to go into the line next day. The positions were situated on the sand dunes, and guns fired across the Yser Canal. Positions were partly prepared, the pits being camouflaged and provided with platforms. A good deal of work was, however, required to render them satisfactory; but the Brigade was unable to concentrate its efforts on the improvement of its own positions. Working parties had to be furnished for the construction of positions for three batteries for the 330th Brigade, R.F.A., which, with the New Zealand batteries, were to compose "C" group. Positions had also to be prepared for three batteries of "E" group, and one battery of "D" group, and the Brigade was occupied with these extra labours for two weeks. There were big concentrations of both British and German artillery along the front, and the liveliest activity was displayed on both sides; the enemy's shelling of battery areas became more and more a feature of his activity, until it gradually came to be regarded as a normal part of the day's events. The flat country afforded very little cover; and by the end of July the brigade had suffered a good many casualties, six other ranks having been killed and two officers and twenty-six other ranks wounded. Batteries had embarked on a policy of harassing and
Ammunition and rations were brought up by the road from Oost Dunkerke, which ran straight towards the line for about two miles, until it reached the canal, providing a perfect enfilade for the enemy guns. It was almost continually under fire from guns of all calibres and, to avoid the shelling, supplies were packed up to the guns by devious routes. Occasionally trainloads of ammunition were taken forward a certain distance and dumps formed, but this was not always possible. Bad weather was experienced in the early part of August, and much discomfort was caused, by the heavy rains; the flats became flooded, increasing the difficulties of transport, and the gun-pits in the low-lying dunes were under water for some time. In digging the pits, water was generally struck about two feet below the surface of the ground, and it was accordingly a case of building up rather than digging in. Conditions were not improved by more violent shelling of battery areas. A trial barrage on August 5th, on the opening line of a projected operation in conjunction with the 66th Divisional Artillery, was answered by heavy retaliation; but the only battery which the enemy succeeded in locating was B Battery of the 330th Brigade, where a gun was put out of action, and a number of casualties inflicted. The 6th (Howitzer) Battery experienced a bad day on the 12th, when three of its guns were put out of action, and on the following day Brigade Headquarters and the vicinity were shelled with what were afterwards discovered to be 17in. shells from one of the big coast guns along by Ostend. The brigade's counter-activity took the form of harassing fire programmes and practice barrages in company with other brigades and the destruction of an active hostile battery by the 6th Battery; support was also lent to two projector gas attacks.
At the close of the month the personnel at the guns was withdrawn for rest to the waggon lines, which were situated in particularly pleasant quarters in the sand dunes at Coxyde-les-Bains. During this brief spell all ranks were able to enjoy
On September 2nd the Brigade went into action again under the 42nd Divisional Artillery at Nieuport Bains, but five days later came under the orders of the 32nd Divisional Artillery, and as the projected operations had been cancelled offensive shooting was reduced to normal limits. The enemy, however, was apparently still fearful of some offensive action on the part of the British forces, and kept his guns aggressively active. Brigade Headquarters and battery positions were shelled both day and night, and on fine nights the congested camps and waggon lines in the back areas were bombed. Emplacements were destroyed and guns damaged, and on one occasion an eleven inch shell demolished the headquarters mess—fortunately unoccupied at the moment. Even some time after the fire of the brigade had been reduced to moderate limits the enemy fiercely retaliated in response to anything that suggested a departure from the normal; and his observing aircraft were always active when conditions permitted. Casualties in the brigade during the month totalled thirty-three.
October, ushered in with broken weather, brought no diminution in the enemy's shelling; "shell storms" or violent bursts of fire on some selected area were of frequent occurrence, and on occasions were of such duration and intensity that the heavy artillery had to be called on for neutralising fire. On October 16th the brigade took part in a bombardment of the Palace Hotel, Westende Bains, the enemy retaliating with a series of shell storms round and about batteries and on the east dunes, causing several casualties in the brigade. During severe shelling on the 8th the 2nd Battery had seven casualties, one of the two who were killed being 2nd Lieutenant T.S. Grant, who had only that day joined the unit, after passing through an Officers' Training College in England.
French troops commenced to take over the sector again in November, and on the 17th of that month a brigade of French Field Artillery marched in to relieve the 2nd New Zealand
The column marched out from the waggon lines at Coxyde at 3 a.m. on the 21st, and spent that night in the Ghyvelde area, proceeding the following day to Winnezelle and so to Morbecque. Bad weather was experienced on the march, and conditions were in unpleasant contrast to those experienced on the way to the coast. The movement northwards of so many British troops, and the marching to the coast of the French, threw an enormous amount of traffic on the roads, and also made billeting accommodation both scarce and inferior, while good waggon lines were not to be had. At Morbecque, where the Brigade received orders to rest and carry out training and refitting, the vehicles and horses had to be parked on the roads about the Nieppe Forest. The roads were narrow and edged with deep ditches, which were a danger to the horses, but after strong representations had been made on the subject, permission was obtained to use some open fields as waggon lines. All guns and howitzers were handed into the 2nd Anzac Corps "gun pool" at Reninghelst, necessitating the borrowing of a few 18-prs. and 4.5in. howitzers from a nearby English brigade for training purposes.
On December 5th parties were sent forward to take over the guns of the 3rd Australian Field Artillery Brigade in the line at Ypres, and the following day the Brigade, which was rejoining the New Zealand Division after having been detached for five months, marched by way of Boeschepe to its new waggon lines near Dickebusch.
Chapter VI.
Wintering in the Salient.
On the night of the 14th-15th November the New Zealand Division relieved the 21st Division in the line at Ypres, on a sector extending from the Reutelbeek, northwards to Noordemdhoek. The Divisional Artillery did not go into the line, but the C.R.A., Brigadier-General Johnston, with his headquarters staff, moved into the Ypres area to take command of the artillery supporting the Division. This command comprised the 3rd Australian Field Artillery Brigade and two Army Brigades R.F.A. The C.R.A. established himself at Chateau Segard, between Ypres and Dickebusch, where the headquarters of the Division was to remain during the winter months. On November 26th the front held by the Division was extended southwards to the Scherriabeek, thus embracing Polderhoek.
The Divisional Trench Mortars, which had accompanied the Division when it first took over the sector, and had since been engaged in preparing positions, assisted in the support of the unsuccessful attack made on Polderhoek Chateau by the New Zealand Infantry on December 3rd—two days before the New Zealand batteries came on to the front. In this attack the Divisional Trench Mortars used for the first time the 6in. Newton trench mortars with which they had just been equipped. Some 850 rounds were fired, and one mortar was destroyed by hostile shell-fire. On the night of December 5th, the Division was relieved by the 30th Division on that portion of its front south of the Reutelbeek. Four days later the Divisional sector was extended northwards to a point approximately one thousand yards north of Noordemdhoek.
The New Zealand Field Artillery moved into the line in support of their own troops in the first week in December. Batteries being still without guns, the gunners were taken up from Boeschepe in motor lorries, and took over the guns of the artillery then covering the Division. In this manner the 1st
The prospect of wintering in the salient was faced with the philosophic acceptance of events that becomes a characteristic of the soldier. The men were nearly all quite familiar with the nature of the country, but the scene that unfolded itself as they left the lorries at the Birr Cross Roads, and proceeded on foot to the battery positions, was forbidding in the extreme. The way lay through the country over which the attacking divisions had fought their way in the Third Battle of Ypres, and on every hand the fighting had left its indelible impress. Nothing had been left untouched by the shell storms that had swept up and down and over every inch of the land. The roads, so busy through the long hours of darkness, were deserted by day and were littered on either side with broken waggons and limbers and ambulance carts, and all the wreckage of transport and material that accumulates along a road line during heavy fighting. Batteries of the 1st Brigade were situated about the slopes forward from Hooge Crater; the 9th and 6th (Howitzer) Batteries of the 2nd Brigade were near Glencorse Wood, and the 2nd and 5th, with the 12th Battery of the 3rd Brigade, were on the left of Westhoek; the remaining batteries of the 3rd Brigade, the 11th, 13th, and 4th (howitzer) were very close together near the Westhoek Cross Roads.
Captured German blockhouses situated near the positions were used as battery headquarters and sleeping quarters, but like the gun positions themselves, they were in a very bad condition. Some of them were feet deep in dirt and debris
Many of the gun positions were in an indescribable condition; the pits were water-logged and innocent of approaches or decent platforms, and were littered about with empty charge cases, and odd piles of ammunition which seemed on the point of sinking out of sight in the mud. Too much could not be expected in an area where a prolonged period of heavy fighting had been followed by persistently bad weather; but improvements were possible, and steps were at once taken to have them effected. Pits were drained, cleaned up, and provided with weather-proof ammunition racks and stable platforms, and splinter-proof sleeping shelters were built for the crews. Before the hard weather came and bound the surface of the earth in its iron grip, nearly all the ammunition lying about the positions had been cleaned up, and most of the charge cases salved; little of the ammunition was used, however, as it was found to have seriously deteriorated by exposure and damp. All this was achieved, not in a day or a week, but after long and patient toil during the short daylight hours, and subject to the interruptions of enemy shelling. An immense amount of salving was done by the Division during these months, and the value of the material and ammunition collected from all parts of the sector ran into very big figures. Every waggon or ration cart that visited the forward areas returned with a load of material of some description, and every man in formed parties marching down from the line carried some small thing back to the "dump," where, in striking letters, was displayed a notice which queried of the passer-by what he had salved that day.
The front offered excellent facilities for observation, but communications were hopelessly inadequate at the outset, and improvements were not effected until the Division had been some considerable time in the sector. Shooting a battery under decent conditions as regards observation and communication has a strong fascination for an observing officer, but it is more exasperating than fascinating when communication is constantly being broken, and orders take minutes to filter through to the battery. At Ypres a message had often to go through four or five stations to reach the guns, and a telephonist had constantly to be on the alert to ensure that another station did not "cut in," and take the wire. Shooting suffered under such conditions, and opportunities for effective fire were frequently lost. It was only after long endurance of these difficulties that buried wires were run to the headquarters of infantry battalions, whence batteries linked up their observation posts with ground wires which were laid on the bottom of the communication trenches or pegged to the sides.
When brigades first established their waggon lines there were no shelters of any description for the horses, and in a great many cases there were not even any standings. The 1st and 3rd Brigades and the D.A.C. were allotted lines in an exposed area, about a mile north-east of Dickebusch, and the 2nd (Army) Brigade and the Brigade Ammunition Column had their lines together somewhat nearer to Dickebusch. With the winter well advanced, and the horses still low in condition after the hardships suffered at Passchendaele, it was imperative that something should be done to provide them with dry standings and shelter from the bitter winds that swept across the open countryside. A number of G.S. waggons were employed carting broken bricks from Ypres, where the ruined and shattered buildings provided an inexhaustible source of supply. These were distributed to units, and standings were gradually provided for the horses, and the approaches to the lines generally improved. The erection of suitable shelters provided a much more difficult task, owing to the difficulty of securing material; timber and roofing iron were to be obtained only in small quantities, and the supply was by no means constant. Parties of men had been sent forward to erect these shelters,
A
Depressing Prospect: the Ypres Salient under Show [Official PhotoThe Watering Point at Louvencourt [Official Photo
Encouragement was given to every form of sport during the winter, and a variety of amusements and entertainments were promoted to brighten the tedium of existence. Rugby football took pride of place among the sports, and the most fervid enthusiasm was aroused by a series of matches between batteries and brigades in the final of which the 1st Brigade defeated the 3rd Brigade. A Divisional Fifteen was selected after a series of trial matches, and after defeating the Welsh Division's Fifteen at Merville by 14 points to 3 journeyed to Paris, and there defeated a team representative of the French Army. The most popular and successful entertainment ever presented by any party of entertainers from the Division, was the pantomime which was produced on a really elaborate scale in a big marquee near Dickebusch, and attracted crowded "houses" for a lengthy period. At the Artillery lines a commodious recreation hut was erected by the Y.M.C.A. for the use of the artillerymen; its construction was long delayed