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        <docTitle>
          <titlePart type="main">DOCUMENTS<lb/>
Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939–45</titlePart>
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        <pb xml:id="nii"/>
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By Authority:<lb/>
<hi rend="sc">R. E. Owen</hi>, Government Printer, <name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>, New
Zealand<lb/>
<date when="1949">1949</date></imprimatur>
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        <docTitle>
          <titlePart type="main">DOCUMENTS<lb/>
Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939–45</titlePart>
        </docTitle>
        <docEdition>
          <hi rend="i">VOLUME I</hi>
        </docEdition>
        <docImprint>
          <publisher><name key="name-110027" type="organisation">WAR HISTORY BRANCH</name><lb/>
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS</publisher>
          <pubPlace><name key="name-008844" type="place">WELLINGTON</name> : NEW ZEALAND</pubPlace>
          <docDate>1949</docDate>
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      <div type="preface" xml:id="_N66017">
        <head>PREFACE</head>
        <p><hi rend="sc">The decision</hi> to publish this series of documents and communications between the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> and the Governments of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> and <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>, and between the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> and the General Officer Commanding the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force and official representatives abroad, was taken by the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> shortly after my appointment as Editor-in-Chief of the New Zealand War Histories in <date when="1946">1946</date>. It was necessary to do so in order to record fully New Zealand's part in the Second World War, with special emphasis on the problems which confronted the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> and <name key="name-016917" type="organisation">War Cabinet</name>, the information which was before them, their views, and the decisions taken. Some delay has occurred in publication owing to the necessity of securing the consent of overseas Governments.</p>
        <p rend="indent">The original documents are held in the Prime Minister's Department and in the Service Departments. All the despatches received and sent during the war years are not being published, but all important messages relevant to the different topics are included; those omitted are of a trivial or personal nature. There has been no censorship. Most despatches in the first two volumes deal with the 2nd NZEF in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>; the third volume concerns the <name key="name-008892" type="place">Pacific</name> theatre.</p>
        <p rend="indent">An arbitrary numbering has been adopted for the convenience of readers, but the despatches are otherwise in their original form and order except where they have been paraphrased to comply with security requirements.</p>
        <p rend="indent">A problem was posed in the arrangement of the documents: whether they should be (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) in chronological order, or (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) according to subject. The former method would present the documents strictly according to date and without regard to their contents and subject-matter. Such a course would allow the reader to see the business of the New Zealand
<pb n="vi" xml:id="nvi"/>
Government and <name key="name-016917" type="organisation">War Cabinet</name> as it appeared at the time with its daily ramifications. But the disadvantages of the chronological method are too obvious to need mention, and this arrangement would have been most irksome to a reader attempting to follow the history of any one problem.</p>
        <p rend="indent">After full consideration a compromise of the two systems was decided on. The material in this series is arranged under subject headings, in chronological order; footnotes have been added and an index has also been provided.</p>
        <p rend="indent">The point at which to commence the first volume also received attention and it was decided to start with the Declarations of War. Declarations against <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name> and <name key="name-021006" type="place">Thailand</name> will appear in a later volume.</p>
        <p rend="indent">New Zealand's pre-war foreign policy will be dealt with in a separate volume of the Official History. In later volumes there will be sections dealing more fully with Naval and <name key="name-023234" type="organisation">Air Force</name> problems.</p>
        <closer>
          <signed rend="right">
            <hi rend="sc">
              <name key="name-208411" type="person">H. K. Kippenberger</name>
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          <salute rend="right">Editor-in-Chief,<lb/>
New Zealand War Histories</salute>
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        <head>CONTENTS</head>

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              <cell rend="right">
                <hi rend="sc">page</hi>
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                <hi rend="sc">Preface</hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#nv">v</ref>
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              <cell><hi rend="sc">Outbreak of War and Declarations</hi>—</cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell rend="indent">
                <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n1">1</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell rend="indent">
                <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n9">9</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell rend="indent"><name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name>, <name key="name-026913" type="place">Hungary</name>, Roumania, and <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n13">13</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">Negotiations Regarding Participation of New Zealand's Armed Forces</hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n17">17</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">Appointment of Commander, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force</hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n23">23</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">Formation and Despatch of First Echelon and Arrival in Egypt</hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n34">34</ref>
              </cell>
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            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">First Echelon in Egypt: Command and Employment</hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n62">62</ref>
              </cell>
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            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">Second Echelon: Diversion to <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, Command and Employment</hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n83">83</ref>
              </cell>
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            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">
                  <name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name>
                </hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n156">156</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">Concentration of the 2nd New Zealand Division: Policy concerning Detachments</hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n182">182</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">Special Units</hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n208">208</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">
                  <name key="name-002294" type="place">Greece</name>
                </hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n239">239</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell>
                <hi rend="sc">
                  <name key="name-003325" type="place">Crete</name>
                </hi>
              </cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n285">285</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell><hi rend="sc">Appendices</hi>—</cell>
              <cell/>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell rend="indent">Agreed Conclusions of Discussions between Officials held at the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> on <date when="1939-11-02">2 November 1939</date></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n333">333</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell rend="indent"><hi rend="sc">New Zealand Forces</hi>: Note of a Meeting held at the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> on <date when="1939-11-06">6 November 1939</date></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n335">335</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell rend="indent">Interchange of Information between the Governments of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> and New Zealand</cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n338">338</ref>
              </cell>
            </row>
            <row>
              <cell rend="indent"><hi rend="sc">The Position in Egypt</hi>: Memorandum by <name key="name-207994" type="person">Major-General B. C. Freyberg</name></cell>
              <cell rend="right">
                <ref type="page" target="#n341">341</ref>
              </cell>
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    <body xml:id="t1-body">
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      <div type="chapter" n="1" xml:id="c1">
        <head>Outbreak of War and Declarations<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-008556" type="place">GERMANY</name></hi></head>
        <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c1-1">
          <head>1<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-1" n="1"><p>Secretaries of State for Dominion Affairs in the United Kingdom Government during the war were:</p>
<table rows="7" cols="2"><row><cell>28 Jan 1939 – 3 Sep 1939</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. Viscount Caldecote, PC, CBE, KC (then <name key="name-131336" type="person">Sir Thomas Inskip</name>).</cell></row><row><cell>3 Sep 1939 – 12 May 1940</cell><cell><name key="name-016428" type="person">Rt. Hon. Robert Anthony Eden, PC, MC</name>.</cell></row><row><cell>12 May 1940 – 5 Oct 1940</cell><cell>Viscount Caldecote.</cell></row><row><cell>5 Oct 1940 – 21 Feb 1942</cell><cell><name key="name-016415" type="person">Rt. Hon. Viscount Cranborne, PC.</name></cell></row><row><cell>21 Feb 1942 – 28 Sep 1943</cell><cell><name key="name-016389" type="person">Rt. Hon. Clement Richard Attlee, PC, CH.</name></cell></row><row><cell>28 Sep 1943 – 3 Aug 1945</cell><cell>Viscount Cranborne.</cell></row><row><cell>3 Aug 1945 – 7 Oct 1947</cell><cell><name key="name-016380" type="person">Rt. Hon. Viscount Addison, KG, PC.</name></cell></row></table>

<p>On <date when="1947-07-02">2 Jul 1947</date> the title of this office was changed to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.</p></note> <hi rend="i">to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi><note xml:id="ftn2-1" n="2"><p>Governors-General of New Zealand during the war were:</p>
<table rows="2" cols="2"><row><cell>1935–41</cell><cell><name key="name-012365" type="person">Rt. Hon. George Vere Arundell Monckton-Arundell, 8th Viscount Galway, PC, GCMG, DSO, OBE</name>; died <date when="1943">1943</date>.</cell></row><row><cell>1941–46</cell><cell><name key="name-131338" type="person">Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril Louis Norton Newall, GCB, OM, GCMG, CBE, AM.</name> (Created Baron, <date when="1946">1946</date>.)</cell></row></table>
</note></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-01">1 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p>Defence.</p>
          <p>Precautionary stage<note xml:id="ftn3-1" n="3"><p>Precautionary Stage. Paper ONS 135, issued by the Organisation for National Security, Prime Minister's Department, <name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>, on <date when="1939-08-11">11 Aug 1939</date>, contains a list of messages to be received from the Government of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> on the threat of war. These were the normal abbreviated messages which His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> would address to the Dominion Governments in the event of the initiation of precautionary and war measures. The meaning of the warning telegram, ‘Defence. Precautionary stage adopted against (Power(s))’ was as follows:</p><list type="simple"><label>(<hi rend="i">a</hi>)</label><item><p>Relations with (Power(s)) have become so strained that His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> have found it necessary to adopt precautions against possible surprise attack and to initiate preparations for war, including precautionary stage of defence schemes at defended ports.</p></item><label>(<hi rend="i">b</hi>)</label><item><p>Your Government is asked to co-operate and to notify His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> by telegraph of the precautionary measures taken.</p></item></list></note> adopted against <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> and <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="2" xml:id="n2"/>
        <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c1-2">
          <head>2<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-2" n="1"><p>Prime Ministers of New Zealand during the war were:</p><table rows="2" cols="2"><row><cell><date when="1935-11-28">28 Nov 1935</date> – death, <date when="1940-03-26">26 Mar 1940</date></cell><cell><name key="name-209178" type="person">Rt. Hon. Michael Joseph Savage, PC.</name></cell></row><row><cell>1 Apr 1940 – 13 Dec 1949</cell><cell><name key="name-207989" type="person">Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser, PC, CH.</name></cell></row></table></note></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-01">1 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">This morning Cabinet met and considered the position. It was decided that, subject to consultation with the French Government, we should address a communication to the German Government to the effect that we had received reports of the German invasion of <name key="name-034869" type="place">Poland</name>, and that unless we received immediate assurances that the German forces were being withdrawn from Polish territory our obligations to <name key="name-034869" type="place">Poland</name> would be fulfilled.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c1-3">
          <head>3<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-02">2 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 1 September (<ref target="#c1-1">No. 1</ref>). The acting Prime Minister<note xml:id="ftn2-2" n="2"><p>Hon. P. Fraser. Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser had been Minister of Education, Health, and Marine and acting Prime Minister during Mr. Savage's illness.</p></note> desires me to inform you that the precautionary stage has been adopted in New Zealand and that the Mandated Territory of <name key="name-005889" type="place">Western Samoa</name><!-- Samoa, Western --> and the Island Dependencies<note xml:id="ftn3-2" n="3"><p>New Zealand's island dependencies are the <name key="name-031209" type="place">Cook Islands</name> (thirteen islands in two groups), Niue, and the Tokelau or Union Group. The Chatham, <name key="name-002817" type="place">Auckland</name>, Campbell, and Kermadec Islands are included in the Dominion group proper for both administrative and statistical purposes.</p></note> have been duly advised. In addition, examination services are being established forthwith, all Regular reservists and a proportion of the Special Reserve (Class 2)<note xml:id="ftn4-2" n="4"><p>The Territorial Force Special Reserve was formed in <date when="1937">1937</date>. Single men between the ages of 18 and 25 years (later changed to 30 years) were eligible for enlistment and were given three months' continuous training in camp, during which facilities were provided for free vocational training. (In <date when="1939">1939</date> the period of training was increased to five months, half of this time being spent in vocational training.) At the end of the training period the men were given the opportunity to enlist in the Regular Force to fill vacancies, and assistance was given to others to obtain permanent civilian employment. The reservists were posted to Territorial units and undertook to attend a course of ten days' training once a year for a period of three years and to report for service in New Zealand in an emergency if required.</p></note> are being called out, coastal defences are being manned with skeleton crews, and guards are being placed at all vital points.</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand entirely concur with, and warmly endorse, the action taken by His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, including that specified in your latest telegram (<ref target="#c1-2">No. 2</ref>).</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="3" xml:id="n3"/>
        <div type="section" n="4" xml:id="c1-4">
          <head>4<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-02">2 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following is the text of a statement in the House of Commons at 7.45 p.m. this evening by the Prime Minister:<note xml:id="ftn1-3" n="1"><p>Prime Ministers of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> during the war were:</p><table rows="3" cols="2"><row><cell>28 May 1937 – 11 May 1940</cell><cell><name key="name-131339" type="person">Rt. Hon. Arthur Neville Chamberlain, PC.</name></cell></row><row><cell>11 May 1940 – 26 Jul 1945</cell><cell><name key="name-015658" type="person">Rt. Hon. Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, PC, OM, CH.</name></cell></row><row><cell><date when="1945-07-26">26 Jul 1945</date> – to date</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee, PC, CH.</cell></row></table></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">Sir Nevile Henderson<note xml:id="ftn2-3" n="2"><p>Rt. Hon. Sir Nevile Meyrick Henderson, PC, GCMG; United Kingdom Ambassador at <name key="name-006973" type="place">Berlin</name>, 1937–39.</p></note> was received by Herr von Ribbentrop<note xml:id="ftn3-3" n="3"><p>Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop; German Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 1936–38; German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1938–45; convicted of war crimes, and hanged, Nuremburg, <date when="1946-10">Oct 1946</date>.</p></note> at half past nine last night and he delivered the warning message which was read to the House yesterday. Herr von Ribbentrop replied that he must submit the communication to the German Chancellor.<note xml:id="ftn4-3" n="4"><p><name key="name-006503" type="person">Adolf Hitler</name>, Chancellor of the German Reich, <date when="1933">1933</date>–death, <date when="1945">1945</date>; Head of the German State, 1934–45.</p></note> Our Ambassador declared his readiness to receive the Chancellor's reply. Up to the present no reply has been received. It may be that the delay is caused by consideration of a proposal, which meanwhile had been put forward by the Italian Government, that hostilities should cease and that there should then immediately be a conference between the Five Powers—Great Britain, <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>, <name key="name-034869" type="place">Poland</name>, <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>, and <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>. While appreciating the efforts of the Italian Government, His Majesty's Government for their part would find it impossible to take part in a conference whilst <name key="name-034869" type="place">Poland</name> is being subjected to invasion, her towns are under bombardment, and Danzig is being made the subject of a unilateral settlement by force. His Majesty's Government will, as stated yesterday, be bound to take action unless the German forces are withdrawn from Polish territory. They are in communication with the French Government as to the limit of time within which it would be necessary for the British and French Governments to know whether the German Government were prepared to effect such a withdrawal. If the German Government should agree to withdraw their forces, His Majesty's Government would be willing to regard the position as being the same as it was before the German forces crossed the frontier, that is to say, the way would be open to discussion between the German and Polish Governments on the matters at issue between them, on the understanding that the settlement arrived at was one that safeguarded the vital interests of <name key="name-034869" type="place">Poland</name> and was secured
<pb n="4" xml:id="n4"/>
by an international guarantee. If the German and Polish Governments wished that other powers should be associated with them in the discussion, then His Majesty's Government for their part would be willing to agree.</p>
          <p rend="indent">There is one other matter to which allusion should be made in order that the present situation should be perfectly clear. Yesterday Herr Forster,<note xml:id="ftn1-4" n="1"><p>Herr Albert Forster, Nazi District Leader of Danzig; appointed by <name key="name-006503" type="person">Hitler</name> on <date when="1939-08-23">23 Aug 1939</date> to be Head of the State of the Free City of Danzig.</p></note> who on 23 August had, in contravention of the Danzig constitution, become the Head of the State, decreed the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich and the dissolution of the constitution. <name key="name-006503" type="person">Herr Hitler</name> was asked to give effect to this decree by German law. At a meeting of the Reichstag yesterday morning a law was passed for the reunion of Danzig with the Reich. The international status of Danzig as a Free City is established by a Treaty<note xml:id="ftn2-4" n="2"><p>The status of Free City was conferred upon Danzig by Articles 100–8 of the Treaty of <name key="name-032512" type="place">Versailles</name>. Its separation from the German Empire became effective on <date when="1920-01-10">10 Jan 1920</date>, although the formal proclamation to that effect was not made until <date when="1920-11-15">15 Nov 1920</date>, when the new status of the city was officially proclaimed by the representative of the League of Nations. A High Commissioner appointed by the League was resident in the Free City. The position of the city was strengthened by the Danzig-Polish Treaty, <date when="1920-11-09">9 Nov 1920</date>, and by the Warsaw Convention, <date when="1921-10-24">24 Oct 1921</date>. The Danzig Constituent Assembly handled the internal administration of the Free City, but the conduct of its foreign relations was in the hands of the Polish Government.</p></note> of which His Majesty's Government are a signatory, and the Free City was placed under the protection of the League of Nations. The rights given to <name key="name-034869" type="place">Poland</name> in Danzig by Treaty are defined and confirmed by Agreement concluded between Danzig and <name key="name-034869" type="place">Poland</name>. The action taken by the Danzig authorities and the Reichstag yesterday is the final step in the unilateral repudiation of these international instruments, which could only be modified by negotiation. His Majesty's Government do not, therefore, recognise either the validity of the grounds on which the action of the Danzig authorities was based, the validity of this action itself, or of the effect given to it by the German Government.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="5" xml:id="c1-5">
          <head>5<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-03">3 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to my telegram (<ref target="#c1-4">No. 4</ref>) containing the Prime Minister's statement, Cabinet, meeting after midnight, decided that the British Ambassador in <name key="name-006973" type="place">Berlin</name> should at once ask to see Ribbentrop at 9 a.m. today, Sunday, and at that interview inform him that unless the Chancellor's reply is received by 11 a.m. today His
<pb n="5" xml:id="n5"/>
Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> will from that hour regard themselves as at war with <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The Prime Minister proposes to make a statement in the House of Commons at noon today.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="6" xml:id="c1-6">
          <head>6<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-03">3 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to my earlier telegram (<ref target="#c1-5">No. 5</ref>). The text of the communication to be handed to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, or other representative of the German Government, by His Majesty's Ambassador at 9 a.m. today is as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">Sir,</p>
          <p rend="indent">In the communication which I had the honour to make to you on 1 September, I informed you, on instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,<note xml:id="ftn1-5" n="1"><p>Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs in the United Kingdom Government during the war were:</p><table rows="3" cols="2"><row><cell>1 Mar 1938 – 23 Dec 1940</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. the Earl of <name key="name-121146" type="place">Halifax</name>, KG, PC, OM, GCSI, GCIE (then Viscount Halifax).</cell></row><row><cell>23 Dec 1940 – 26 Jul 1945</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. R. A. Eden.</cell></row><row><cell><date when="1945-07-26">26 Jul 1945</date> – to date</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, PC.</cell></row></table></note> that unless the German Government were prepared to give His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> satisfactory assurances that the German Government had suspended all aggressive action against <name key="name-034869" type="place">Poland</name>, and were prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> would, without hesitation, fulfil their obligations towards <name key="name-034869" type="place">Poland</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Although this communication was made more than twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received, but German attacks have been continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honour to inform you that unless not later than 11 a.m., British summer time, today satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by the German Government and have reached His Majesty's Government in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from that hour.</p>
          <p rend="indent">If the desired German assurance is received, the Ambassador must inform His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> before 11 a.m. Failing receipt by that hour, the German representative in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name><note xml:id="ftn2-5" n="2"><p>Dr. Herbert von Dircksen, German Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 1938–39; German Ambassador at <name key="name-032504" type="place">Moscow</name>, 1928–33, at <name key="name-011643" type="place">Tokyo</name>, 1933–38.</p></note> will be informed that, as from that hour, a
<pb n="6" xml:id="n6"/>
state of war exists, and His Majesty's Ambassador in <name key="name-006973" type="place">Berlin</name> is to act accordingly.</p>
          <p rend="indent">This information should be treated as very secret until the expiry of our time limit.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="7" xml:id="c1-7">
          <head>7<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-03">3 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My earlier telegram (<ref target="#c1-6">No. 6</ref>). No reply received by eleven.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="8" xml:id="c1-8">
          <head>8<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-03">3 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Defence.</p>
          <p rend="indent">War has broken out with <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="9" xml:id="c1-9">
          <head>9<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-04">4 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="right">(Despatched 1.55 a.m.)</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand desire immediately to associate themselves with His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> in honouring their pledged word. They entirely concur with the action taken, which they regard as inevitably forced upon the British Commonwealth if the cause of justice, freedom, and democracy is to endure in this world. The existence of a state of war with <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> has accordingly been proclaimed in New Zealand,<note xml:id="ftn1-6" n="1"><p>The text of the Proclamation, published in a <hi rend="i"><name key="name-122677" type="work">New Zealand Gazette</name></hi> Extraordinary on <date when="1939-09-04">4 Sep 1939</date>, was as follows:</p><p rend="right"><name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>, <date when="1939-09-04">Monday, 4 September, 1939</date></p><p rend="indent">His Excellency the Governor-General has it in command from His Majesty the King to declare that a state of war exists between His Majesty and the Government of the German Reich, and that such a state of war has existed from 9.30 p.m., New Zealand Standard Time, on the third day of <date when="1939-09">September, 1939</date>.<note xml:id="ftn2-6" n="*"><p>*So making New Zealand's declaration of war simultaneous with the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>'s declaration, 11 a.m. British summer time, <date when="1939-09-03">3 Sep 1939</date>.</p></note> Given at <name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name> this third day of <date when="1939-09">September, 1939</date>.</p><p rend="right"><hi rend="sc">Galway</hi>, Governor-General</p></note> and His Majesty's Government in New Zealand
<pb n="7" xml:id="n7"/>
would be grateful if His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> would take any steps that may be necessary to indicate to the German Government that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand associate themselves in this matter with the action taken by His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.<note xml:id="ftn1-7" n="1"><p>At the request of the United Kingdom Government, the notification of the existence of a state of war between New Zealand and the German Reich was transmitted to the German Government by the United States Ambassador in <name key="name-006973" type="place">Berlin</name>. On <date when="1945-12-07">7 Dec 1945</date>, in reply to an inquiry, the United States Political Adviser for <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> informed the United States Department of State that the archives of the United States Embassy in <name key="name-006973" type="place">Berlin</name> were largely destroyed by fire during the war, and that copies of the note transmitted to the German Government on behalf of the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>, and of the German Government's acknowledgment, were therefore not available.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">The New Zealand Government wish to offer to the British Government the fullest assurance of all possible support. They are convinced that the step that has been taken will meet with the approval of the people of this Dominion, and they will in due course give the fullest consideration to any suggestion of the British Government as to the method, or methods, by which this Dominion can best assist in the common cause.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="10" xml:id="c1-10">
          <head>10<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-03">3 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 4 September (<ref target="#c1-9">No. 9</ref>). The generous pledges of support given by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have been received with the deepest appreciation by His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. It is of the greatest encouragement in this difficult hour to know that the people of New Zealand share our view that no other course was open than to take up arms for the re-establishment in the world of good faith and the renunciation of force. We will take appropriate steps to communicate New Zealand's attitude to the German Government, and will let your Government have as soon as possible any suggestions which we can make regarding New Zealand's co-operation.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="8" xml:id="n8"/>
        <div type="section" n="11" xml:id="c1-11">
          <head>11<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-04">4 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 3 September (<ref target="#c1-8">No. 8</ref>). My Ministers desire me to state that a Proclamation has been issued notifying a state of war with <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> as from 9.30 p.m., New Zealand standard time, on 3 September. The following action has been taken by the Armed Services:</p>
          <p rend="indent">NAVY: Three vessels for mine-sweeping are being taken up. Two defensively equipped merchant ships are being armed and the necessary Naval Reserves are being called up to initiate the various war services.</p>
          <p rend="indent">ARMY: Coast and anti-aircraft defences are being manned in full, the necessary Territorial Force coast and anti-aircraft units being mobilised for the purpose.</p>
          <p rend="indent">AIR: The Royal New Zealand Air Force is being mobilised and Regulations<note xml:id="ftn1-8" n="1"><p>Aviation Emergency Regulations <date when="1939">1939</date>.</p></note> have been issued authorising the requisitioning of civil aircraft and aerodromes, and imposing certain restrictions on civil flying….<note xml:id="ftn2-8" n="2"><p>Details of emergency regulations issued, covering alien control, change of name, impressment of motor-vehicles, passport control, supply control, enemy trading, detention and seizure of ships, oil fuel, &amp;c., have been omitted.</p></note></p>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb n="9" xml:id="n9"/>
      <div type="chapter" n="2" xml:id="c2">
        <head>
          <hi rend="i">
            <name key="name-001383" type="place">ITALY</name>
          </hi>
        </head>
        <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c2-1">
          <head>12<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-9" n="1"><p>Viscount Caldecote, who had succeeded Mr. Eden in the Cabinet re-shuffle earlier in <date when="1940-05">May 1940</date>.</p></note> <hi rend="i">to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-26">26 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">During the recent week <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> has been preparing for war. The Italian Army has been mobilised for the last fortnight, and she has increased the number of her troops in <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name> and has brought those in <name key="name-020121" type="place">Albania</name> up to war strength. The Italian Navy is fully prepared and reinforcements have been sent to the <name key="name-022542" type="place">Dodecanese</name>. Movements of the mercantile marine are to some extent controlled. The Italian Air Force will be ready for war by the end of the month; ARP<note xml:id="ftn2-9" n="2"><p>Air Raid Precautions.</p></note> measures, however, are not well developed. Endeavours have also been made to whip up public opinion by organising demonstrations and by an inspired press campaign.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Signor Mussolini,<note xml:id="ftn3-9" n="3"><p>The portfolios held by Mussolini were: Head of the Government, Prime Minister, Secretary of State, 1926–43; Minister of Internal Affairs, 1922–24, 1926–43; Minister of War, 1926–29, 1933–43; Minister of Marine and for Air, <date when="1943">1943</date>; Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, <date when="1943">1943</date>.</p></note> on whose decision all depends, has publicly placed himself on <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>'s side. He wishes to obtain rectification of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s position in the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name>. He is deeply impressed by <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>'s strength and seems to believe that the Allies cannot win. He is afraid of <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">German influence over the Italians, already great since the Italo-German military alliance,<note xml:id="ftn4-9" n="4"><p>Signed in <name key="name-006973" type="place">Berlin</name> on <date when="1939-05-22">22 May 1939</date>.</p></note> is increasing through control of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s police system and fifth column activities. All these considerations point to <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s entry into the war against the Allies at the moment which suits her or, more accurately, suits <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>. The likelihood of this taking place in the next few days will probably depend on whether in that period <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> achieves a sweeping victory or suffers a set-back.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In view of certain factors, these considerations might, however, equally point to Mussolini's intention to satisfy <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>, and perhaps gain his own ends in the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name>, by exercising the maximum pressure on the Allies, short of war. Among these
<pb n="10" xml:id="n10"/>
factors are the known reluctance of the King<note xml:id="ftn1-10" n="1"><p>King Victor Emmanuel III. Abdicated <date when="1946-05-09">9 May 1946</date>; died in Egypt, <date when="1947-12-28">28 Dec 1947</date>.</p></note> and prominent persons like Marshals Balbo<note xml:id="ftn2-10" n="2"><p>Air-Marshal Italo Balbo; Italian Minister of Aviation, 1929–33; Governor-General, of <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name>, <date when="1933">1933</date>–death, <date when="1940-06">Jun 1940</date> (in aircraft accident).</p></note> and Badoglio<note xml:id="ftn3-10" n="3"><p>Field-Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Marchese del Sabotino, Duke of <name key="name-025840" type="place">Addis Ababa</name>; Governor-General of <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name>, 1928–33; Viceroy of <name key="name-020117" type="place">Abyssinia</name>, <date when="1936">1936</date>; Italian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jul 1943–Jun 1944.</p></note> to fight England; the desire of public opinion for peace (though this cannot be stressed too far in view of Mussolini's hold over the public); the relative lack of reserves of material in all three fighting services; and the extreme vulnerability of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> from an economic standpoint, and of the Italian Empire from a military standpoint.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Viewed as a whole and independently of other considerations, these factors would constitute an argument for believing that Signor Mussolini will confine his activities to extreme pressure short of war. They almost suggest that it might be possible at a price to postpone temporarily the entry of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> into the war against the Allies. It is quite possible that demands of a far-reaching nature may be presented shortly to the Master of the Rolls<note xml:id="ftn4-10" n="4"><p>Master of the Rolls. Originally chief of the twelve clerks or masters in chancery, and as such, keeper of the rolls, especially of the register of original writs and of all patents and grants under the Great Seal. With later modifications in his duties, the Master of the Rolls became in fact the deputy of the Chancellor; he is now also chairman of the State Papers and Historical Manuscripts Commissions. The present Master of the Rolls is Lord Greene (Rt. Hon. Wilfrid Arthur Greene, PC, OBE, MC) who was appointed in <date when="1937-05">May 1937</date>.</p></note> during negotiations on contraband control.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The evidence suggests, however, that Mussolini has reached the conclusion that it is possible and/or necessary for him to override the difficulties which stand in the way of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> going to war with the Allies. If this is so, he is to some extent under German control. In that event, the actual date of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s entry into the war will depend almost entirely on the moment when it best suits <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>. Only then will it be possible to see whether the German hold over <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> is so strong that <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> is unable to stay out, even if in the circumstances she desires to do so.</p>
          <p rend="indent"><name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> has now reached such a stage of dangerous equilibrium between peace and war that a minor incident, which she would construe as an affront, might well precipitate her into war.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The indications are that Signor Mussolini has at present made up his mind to enter the war on the side of <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>, but there is no evidence available from which the date of that entry may be deduced.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="11" xml:id="n11"/>
        <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c2-2">
          <head>13<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-10">10 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Although it is not yet officially confirmed, Signor Mussolini is reported to have stated at 6 p.m. today that a declaration of war had already been handed to the Ambassadors of Great Britain and <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>. A further telegram will be sent as soon as possible.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c2-3">
          <head>14<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-10">10 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Official intimation has been received that the King of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> will consider himself at war with Great Britain and <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> as from midnight tonight.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="4" xml:id="c2-4">
          <head>15<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-11">11 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Defence.</p>
          <p rend="indent">War has broken out with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="5" xml:id="c2-5">
          <head>16<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-11">11 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">In consequence of the official intimation that the King of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> will consider himself at war with Great Britain and <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> as from midnight on 10 June, the existence of a state of war with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> has been proclaimed here as from the equivalent time, namely 10.30 a.m. New Zealand standard time. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be-grateful if such steps as are necessary may be taken to indicate to the Italian Government that His Majesty's Government
<pb n="12" xml:id="n12"/>
in New Zealand associate themselves in this matter with His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> and with the Government of <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>.<note xml:id="ftn1-12" n="1"><p>At the request of the United Kingdom Government, the New Zealand declaration was transmitted to the Italian Government by the United States Ambassador in Rome. Under the date of <date when="1946-01-28">28 Jan 1946</date>, the United States Department of State was informed by the American Ambassador in Rome that the records regarding New Zealand's declaration of war on <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> were burned on <date when="1941-12-08">8 Dec 1941</date> and that no copies exist. On <date when="1946-01-17">17 Jan 1946</date> the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the American Embassy at Rome that no trace of the pertinent correspondence could be found in the remains of the ministry's archives.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">This cynical and cold-blooded attack by <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> at a moment plainly chosen in the belief that it will afford the maximum embarrassment to the Allied arms and in the hope, which we know will be dispelled, that it will result in an easy triumph and prompt gains for <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>, will call forth here, as elsewhere throughout the Commonwealth and in those countries that are banded together to resist aggression, the strongest feelings of indignation. At this moment His Majesty's Government in New Zealand wish to renew in the fullest measure the assurance of their firm determination, and that of the people of this Dominion, to assist by every means within their power until the menace of ruthless and unprincipled aggression has been finally and completely destroyed.<note xml:id="ftn2-12" n="2"><p>In a <hi rend="i"><name key="name-122677" type="work">New Zealand Gazette</name></hi> Extraordinary published on <date when="1948-01-05">5 Jan 1948</date>, termination of the state of war which had existed in New Zealand with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>, Roumania, <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>, <name key="name-026913" type="place">Hungary</name>, and <name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name> was announced, such termination synchronising with the respective dates of deposit by New Zealand of the instruments of ratification of the treaties of peace with each of those countries. Since the instrument of ratification of the treaty of peace with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> was deposited on <date when="1947-12-24">24 Dec 1947</date>, the state of war which had existed in New Zealand with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> was deemed to have terminated on that date.</p></note></p>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb n="13" xml:id="n13"/>
      <div type="chapter" n="3" xml:id="c3">
        <head><hi rend="i">AXIS SATELLITE POWERS IN EUROPE</hi><lb/><name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name>, <name key="name-026913" type="place">Hungary</name>, Roumania, and <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name></head>
        <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c3-1">
          <head>17<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-13" n="1"><p>Viscount Cranborne had succeeded Viscount Caldecote at the Dominions Office in <date when="1940-10">Oct 1940</date>.</p></note> <hi rend="i">to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi><note xml:id="ftn2-13" n="2"><p>The Hon. P. Fraser had been Prime Minister of New Zealand since the death of the Rt. Hon. M. J. Savage in <date when="1940-03">Mar 1940</date>.</p></note></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1941-12-06">6 December 1941</date>
          </opener>
          <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c3-1-1">
            <head>DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST FINLAND, <name key="name-026913" type="place">HUNGARY</name>, AND ROUMANIA</head>
            <p rend="indent">The following is the text of instructions which are being sent forthwith to His Majesty's Ambassador at <name key="name-202800" type="place">Washington</name>:<note xml:id="ftn3-13" n="3"><p>The Earl of <name key="name-121146" type="place">Halifax</name> (then Viscount Halifax) had relinquished the Foreign Secretaryship in <date when="1940-12">Dec 1940</date> to assume the position of His Majesty's Ambassador at <name key="name-202800" type="place">Washington</name>. which he held until <date when="1946">1946</date>.</p></note></p>
            <p rend="indent">Please ask the United States Government to instruct the United States Ministers at Helsingfors,<note xml:id="ftn4-13" n="4"><p>H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld.</p></note> Budapest,<note xml:id="ftn5-13" n="5"><p>Herbert C. Pell.</p></note> and Bucharest<note xml:id="ftn6-13" n="6"><p>Franklin Mott Gunther.</p></note> to convey the following message to the Finnish, Hungarian, and Roumanian Governments:</p>
            <p rend="indent">On (<name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name> only, 28 November; remainder, 29 November) His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> conveyed to the Finnish (Hungarian, Roumanian) Government through the United States Minister at Helsingfors (Budapest, Bucharest) a message to the effect that unless by 5 December the Finnish (Hungarian, Roumanian) Government had ceased military operations and had in practice withdrawn from all active participation in hostilities against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Majesty's Government would have no choice but to declare the existence of a state of war between the two countries.</p>
            <p rend="indent">(<name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name> only). Since the Finnish Government's reply makes it clear that they have not complied with the above conditions and do not intend immediately to do so a state of war will exist between the two countries as from 12.1 a.m. GMT on 7 December.</p>
            <pb n="14" xml:id="n14"/>
            <p rend="indent">(<name key="name-026913" type="place">Hungary</name> and Roumania only). Since the Hungarian (Roumanian) Government have returned no reply to this communication, and since information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government affords no indication that they intend to comply with the above conditions, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from 12.1 a.m. GMT on 7 December.</p>
            <p rend="indent">It is essential that these messages should be delivered before the time specified above and I should be grateful if the time of delivery could be reported.</p>
            <p rend="indent">The Governments of <name key="name-007274" type="place">Canada</name>, <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>, New Zealand, and South Africa have been informed of these instructions. You will be informed if the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> wish you to request the United States Government to inform the Finnish, Hungarian, and Roumanian Governments that a state of war will similarly exist between New Zealand and those countries. <name key="name-007274" type="place">Canada</name>'s<note xml:id="ftn1-14" n="1"><p>Hon. Leighton G. McCarthy, KC.</p></note> and <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>'s<note xml:id="ftn2-14" n="2"><p>Rt. Hon. Richard Gardiner Casey, PC, CH, DSO, MC; Australian Minister to the <name key="name-031090" type="place">United States</name>, 1940–42; Minister of State Resident in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> and member of the United Kingdom War Cabinet, 1942–43; Governor of Bengal, 1944–46.</p></note> Ministers may receive instructions to concert action with you if time permits, but you should not on this account delay your action on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. So far as (South Africa ?) are concerned, we understand that owing to necessary preliminaries concerted action will not be possible.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c3-2">
          <head>18<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1941-12-07">7 December 1941</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The existence of a state of war with <name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name>, <name key="name-026913" type="place">Hungary</name>, and Roumania has been proclaimed here as from one minute after noon, New Zealand summer time, on <date when="1941-12-07">7 December 1941</date>.<note xml:id="ftn3-14" n="3"><p>The New Zealand declarations were again timed to synchronise with those of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. New Zealand's declaration of war on <name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name> was communicated to the Finnish Government by the American Minister to <name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name> on <date when="1941-12-08">8 Dec 1941</date>; that on <name key="name-026913" type="place">Hungary</name> was transmitted to the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the American Minister at Budapest on <date when="1941-12-07">7 Dec 1941</date>; and that on Roumania by the American Minister at Bucharest on <date when="1941-12-06">6 Dec 1941</date>. The <hi rend="i"><name key="name-122677" type="work">New Zealand Gazette</name></hi> Extraordinary dated <date when="1948-01-05">5 Jan 1948</date> announced that the state of war which had existed in New Zealand with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>, Roumania, <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>, <name key="name-026913" type="place">Hungary</name>, and <name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name>, should be deemed to terminate on the date of deposit by New Zealand of the instruments of ratification of the treaties of peace with those countries. The treaties of peace between New Zealand on the one hand and Roumania, <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>, <name key="name-026913" type="place">Hungary</name>, and <name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name> on the other were ratified by New Zealand on <date when="1947-12-31">31 Dec 1947</date>. The state of war with those countries was therefore deemed to terminate on that date.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <pb n="15" xml:id="n15"/>
        <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c3-3">
          <head>19<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1941-12-15">15 December 1941</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent"><name key="name-018182" type="place">BULGARIA</name>. No official confirmation of the press report that <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name> has declared war on us and the <name key="name-031090" type="place">United States</name> of <name key="name-008197" type="place">America</name> has yet been received, possibly because Bulgarian interests are not represented in this country. His Majesty's Ambassador has therefore been instructed to inquire from the United States Government what is the position and what action they have taken regarding the protection of our interests in <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="4" xml:id="c3-4">
          <head>20<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1941-12-17">17 December 1941</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My telegram of 15 December (<ref target="#c3-3">No. 19</ref>).</p>
          <p rend="indent">A reply has been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at <name key="name-202800" type="place">Washington</name> advising that the only report so far received from the United States Minister at Sofia<note xml:id="ftn1-15" n="1"><p>George Howard Earle.</p></note> is that the declaration of war on both Great Britain and the <name key="name-031090" type="place">United States</name> of <name key="name-008197" type="place">America</name> has been announced in the Bulgarian Parliament, and that he is expecting to receive official confirmation at any moment. Meanwhile the Minister is already handing over to <name key="name-035423" type="place">Switzerland</name> the British and <name key="name-031090" type="place">United States</name> interests in <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="5" xml:id="c3-5">
          <head>21<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1941-12-24">24 December 1941</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My telegram of 17 December (<ref target="#c3-4">No. 20</ref>).</p>
          <p rend="indent">The official notification of <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>'s declaration of war expected by the United States Minister at Sofia has so far not been received, but the United States Government have told us that they consider themselves in a state of war with <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name> on the strength of the announcement in the Bulgarian Parliament. Owing to the absence of official information, we have so far felt unable formally to recognise
<pb n="16" xml:id="n16"/>
that a state of war exists with <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>, and this attitude is causing us considerable embarrassment since, although the Turkish Government might prefer that we should not be formally at war with <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>, <name key="name-004979" type="place">Yugoslavia</name> and particularly the <name key="name-022633" type="organisation">Greek Government</name> have steadily pressed us to declare war on <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In these circumstances we have reached the conclusion that it will be necessary to announce that we regard a state of war as having existed since the date of the announcement in the Bulgarian Parliament, and notification to this effect will be published in the <hi rend="i">London Gazette</hi> not earlier than 27 December; the text of the notification is contained in my immediately following telegram.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="6" xml:id="c3-6">
          <head>22<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1941-12-24">24 December 1941</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The text of the notification of a state of war with <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name> is as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government have been informed by the Government of the <name key="name-031090" type="place">United States</name>, who were in charge of British interests in <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name>, that a declaration of war by that country on Great Britain was announced in the Bulgarian Parliament on 13 December. His Majesty's Government have so far received no official communication to this effect from the Bulgarian Government, but in view of the above information it is hereby notified that a state of war exists between the two countries as from 13 December.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="7" xml:id="c3-7">
          <head>23<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1941-12-29">29 December 1941</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The existence of a state of war with <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name> has been declared as from 13 December.<note xml:id="ftn1-16" n="1"><p>The New Zealand Government's notification of a state of war with <name key="name-018182" type="place">Bulgaria</name> from <date when="1941-12-13">13 Dec 1941</date> was, at the request of the United Kingdom Government, communicated to the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Swiss Minister at Sofia late in <date when="1942-01">Jan 1942</date>.</p></note></p>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb n="17" xml:id="n17"/>
      <div type="chapter" n="4" xml:id="c4">
        <head>Negotiations Regarding Participation of New Zealand's Armed Forces</head>
        <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c4-1">
          <head>24<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the High Commissioner for the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-17" n="1"><p>Sir Harry Fagg Batterbee, GCMG, KCVO, High Commissioner for the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> in New Zealand, 1939–45.</p></note></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-08">8 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 4 September.<note xml:id="ftn2-17" n="2"><p>Not published. In this telegram the High Commissioner stated that the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> would be glad to receive as soon as possible the United Kingdom Government's suggestions on the form of New Zealand's co-operation; he also transmitted the views of the acting Prime Minister on the channel of communication.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">The views of Defence authorities here on the forms of cooperation<note xml:id="ftn3-17" n="3"><p>See telegram from Governor-General of New Zealand to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of 4 Sep (<ref target="#c1-9">No. 9</ref>) and reply (<ref target="#c1-10">No. 10</ref>).</p></note> which would be most helpful are as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">NAVY: The following suggestions are based on the assumption that <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name> will be neutral.</p>
          <p rend="indent">By placing HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110456" type="ship">Achilles</name></hi><note xml:id="ftn4-17" n="4"><p>HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110456" type="ship">Achilles</name></hi>, 6-inch cruiser, 7030 tons, subsequently to play an important part in the action against the German pocket battleship <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110455" type="ship">Admiral Graf Spee</name></hi> off the <name key="name-030591" type="place">River Plate</name>, <date when="1939-12-13">13 Dec 1939</date>. The <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110456" type="ship">Achilles</name></hi> had left New Zealand to join the West Indies Force on <date when="1939-08-29">29 Aug 1939</date>.</p></note> and two escort vessels under the orders of the Admiralty, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have made the maximum possible strategic contribution at sea under the present circumstances, since HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi><note xml:id="ftn5-17" n="5"><p>HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi>, 6-inch cruiser, 7270 tons, badly damaged by a torpedo in night action off <name key="name-031620" type="place">Kolombangara</name>, 12–13 Jul 1943; she went to the <name key="name-031090" type="place">United States</name> for repairs and rearming and afterwards reverted to the <name key="name-003205" type="organisation">Royal Navy</name>.</p></note> requires to be retained on the station to guard against the threat of attack on shipping by armed raiders. Previous suggestion of maintenance of a third cruiser cannot be considered as an immediate requirement.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As regards naval personnel, we should like to avail ourselves of the following:</p>
          <list type="simple">
            <label>(<hi rend="i">a</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">Trained naval reserves surplus to New Zealand requirements to be made available for the <name key="name-003205" type="organisation">Royal Navy</name>.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">b</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">Officers recruited from civil life, either trained civil pilots for service in the <name key="name-003573" type="organisation">Fleet Air Arm</name> or yachtsmen or former Mercantile Marine officers suitable for Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Commissions.</p>
            </item>
            <pb n="18" xml:id="n18"/>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">c</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">Telegraphists and signalmen, artificers, scientists (electrical and wireless telegraphy), and skilled electrical workmen recruited from civil life.</p>
            </item>
          </list>
          <p rend="indent">It would be appreciated if the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> could furnish the approximate numbers of personnel likely to be available under the above categories and could indicate capacity for increasing numbers of trained personnel which will become available as the war progresses.</p>
          <p rend="indent">New Zealand to accept responsibility for fitting out and manning one armed merchant cruiser, the provision of a second ship being left for subsequent consideration.</p>
          <p rend="indent">New Zealand to undertake the equipping of the most suitable ships available as fast liners and defensively equipped merchant ships. There are equipments for four fast liners and forty-two defensively equipped merchant ships at <name key="name-002817" type="place">Auckland</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">New Zealand to consider the provision of gun-layers (defensively equipped merchant ships) as these cannot be provided from <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> resources. Defensively equipped merchant ships' instructional staffs to be provided if possible from local sources at <name key="name-002817" type="place">Auckland</name> and at any other New Zealand port which His Majesty's Government in New Zealand consider desirable.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Consideration to be given to the building of whale-catchers and trawlers for local defence in private yards. (Requirements of trawlers are large but the extent cannot be estimated.)</p>
          <p rend="indent">ARMY: The measures already taken by New Zealand to guard the cable station at <name key="name-032024" type="place">Fanning Island</name><note xml:id="ftn1-18" n="1"><p>See Volume III. A force of two officers and 30 other ranks had embarked for <name key="name-032024" type="place">Fanning Island</name> in HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> on <date when="1939-08-30">30 Aug 1939</date>. This force was the first platoon of A Company, specially formed to garrison the island, the importance of which lay in its value as a cable station. Each of the company's three platoons served for six months on the island before being relieved by the next platoon for duty. In <date when="1942-04">Apr 1942</date> the garrison was relieved by <name key="name-031090" type="place">United States</name> troops.</p></note> are much appreciated. As regards other measures, it is thought desirable to consider the position under alternative hypotheses:</p>
          <list type="simple">
            <label>(<hi rend="i">a</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">that <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name> is neutral and is adopting a friendly attitude towards the democratic countries;</p>
            </item>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">b</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">that <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name> is neutral and is adopting an attitude of reserve towards the democratic countries.</p>
            </item>
          </list>
          <p rend="indent">As regards (<hi rend="i">a</hi>), while we hope that the war will be of short duration, we must prepare for a long war which will call for the employment of all our resources. We therefore hope that New Zealand will be able to exert her full national effort, including the preparation of her forces with a view to the despatch of an expeditionary force.</p>
          <p rend="indent">We are committed to sending a military force to <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>, and its reinforcement by a New Zealand contingent would be very welcome
<pb n="19" xml:id="n19"/>
both to us and to the French. We might, however, become engaged in other theatres, and it is therefore not possible at present to suggest to New Zealand the destination and composition of any expeditionary force which she might think fit to provide. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will no doubt consider whether they would prefer to relieve <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> units in, for example, <name key="name-020943" type="place">Singapore</name>, <name key="name-034739" type="place">Burma</name>, and <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name>, as and when brigades become available, or to delay the despatch of a smaller formation until a complete division could be made available for a main theatre of war.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Should individuals from New Zealand wish to come here to enlist in <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> units it should be pointed out that our policy is to avoid a rush of volunteers, such as occurred in the early days of the last war, and to expand by means of a controlled intake. At present we cannot therefore accept volunteers for the infantry and artillery, but we should welcome at once technical personnel and particularly electricians, instrument mechanics, fitters, mechanics, and motor transport drivers. Officers with similar qualifications and medical officers would also be of great value.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Under hypothesis (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) we feel that it would be unwise for New Zealand to despatch an expeditionary force overseas, but New Zealand could assist by holding formations ready at short notice for the reinforcement of <name key="name-020943" type="place">Singapore</name> and <name key="name-000854" type="place">Fiji</name> or of British and French islands in the South-West Pacific.</p>
          <p rend="indent">AIR FORCE: The generous offer made by New Zealand in placing at our disposal personnel and aircraft in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>,<note xml:id="ftn1-19" n="1"><p>On <date when="1939-08-26">26 Aug 1939</date> His Majesty's Government in New Zealand had offered to place at the disposal of the <name key="name-003198" type="organisation">Royal Air Force</name> the New Zealand Squadron personnel and aircraft at Marham and New Zealand Air Force personnel in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> on interchange or attachment.</p></note> and the action already being taken by New Zealand under the agreed training scheme,<note xml:id="ftn2-19" n="2"><p>In a telegram on <date when="1939-09-04">4 Sep 1939</date> to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> had announced its intention of modifying the existing <name key="name-023234" type="organisation">Air Force</name> training scheme for war training purposes. The organisation would utilise to the full the aircraft in or expected in the Dominion within the next three months, but emphasis was placed on the necessity for the supply at the earliest possible date of obsolete aircraft from the <name key="name-003198" type="organisation">Royal Air Force</name> to enable the increased output of trained aircrews to be maintained.</p></note> which we much appreciate, meets our own requirements, and we would only suggest that these be pressed on with all possible speed. We will supply aircraft as soon as possible.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In order to speed up and expand the agreed organisation, we assume that the fullest possible use will be made of civil aviation resources.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="20" xml:id="n20"/>
        <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c4-2">
          <head>25<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-13">13 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Having had the opportunity, which they warmly appreciate, of perusing your telegram of 8 September (<ref target="#c4-1">No. 24</ref>) to the High Commissioner for the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> in New Zealand, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have the following observations to offer on the course which they propose to take to enable them to play their full part in the war.</p>
          <p rend="indent">NAVY: They note with appreciation that HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> will be retained on this station and, on her return from <name key="name-032024" type="place">Fanning Island</name> on 13 September, she will be ready to take up her duties before the end of this week.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It is believed that very few trained naval reserves surplus to New Zealand requirements could be made available for the <name key="name-003205" type="organisation">Royal Navy</name>. Steps are being taken immediately to ascertain the number, which it is not expected will exceed fifty or sixty.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It is considered that no trained civil pilots could be made available for service in the <name key="name-003573" type="organisation">Fleet Air Arm</name>, their services being required here to facilitate the programme referred to by you in the section on the <name key="name-023234" type="organisation">Air Force</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Inquiries are being made for yachtsmen and former Mercantile Marine officers suitable for Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve commissions. It is anticipated that a substantial number could be made available and a further communication on this subject will be sent in due course.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Inquiries are being made as to telegraphists and signalmen, artificers, scientists (electrical and wireless telegraphy), and skilled electrical workmen, and the number available surplus to local requirements will be notified in due course. It is not considered that many will be available, but the possibilities of increasing the number of such trained personnel are being investigated.</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand accept the responsibility for fitting out and manning one armed merchant cruiser, the provision of a second ship being left for subsequent consideration, and they propose that they should assume liability for the <hi rend="i">Monowai</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-20" n="1"><p>Union Steam Ship Company, 10,852 tons.</p></note> when the necessary instructions have been received from the Admiralty.</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand accept the responsibility for equipping ships as fast liners and defensively equipped merchant
<pb n="21" xml:id="n21"/>
ships. They take it that their responsibility will be limited to equipping these ships as they become available here and providing guns' crews. An instructional staff for this purpose is already provided at <name key="name-002817" type="place">Auckland</name> and it is not considered, in the meantime at any rate, that an instructional staff at any other port would be advantageous.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Inquiries are being made as to the possibility of building whale-catchers and trawlers, and the result will be communicated to you later. A few existing boats, which are now being inspected, may be available, but it is not felt that local facilities will be adequate for any material production under this head.</p>
          <p rend="indent">ARMY: As indicated in my telegram of 9 September,<note xml:id="ftn1-21" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c6-1"><hi rend="i">Formation and Despatch of First Echelon and Arrival in Egypt</hi> (No. 41)</ref>.</p></note> the steps already being taken are entirely appropriate as the preliminary steps required to meet the position under either of the alternative hypotheses (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) and (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) in your telegram to the High Commissioner. The training of the first echelon<note xml:id="ftn2-21" n="2"><p>The term ‘echelon’ was first officially used in an Army Headquarters memorandum of <date when="1939-08-29">29 Aug 1939</date>. The term was displaced by ‘contingent’ in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> (2nd NZEF Routine Order <ref target="#c1-7">No. 7</ref>, <date when="1940-09-23">23 Sep 1940</date>), but by the decision of the Adjutant-General ‘echelon’ remained in use in New Zealand (Defence 300/1/33, <date when="1940-12-08">8 Dec 1940</date>). Throughout this series the more familiar term ‘echelon’ is retained.</p></note> will commence on 3 October next. After the first echelon has done two months' training, it is proposed to call up a second echelon consisting of 5000 officers and men and a third echelon of 5000 two months later, <hi rend="i">i.e.</hi>, four months after the beginning of the training of the first echelon. This will complete the personnel (officers and other ranks) for one infantry division.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Under hypothesis (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) it is considered, subject to the receipt of adequate equipment for training in mechanised warfare (or alternatively, subject to an opportunity being afforded for such training after departure from New Zealand) and provided always of course that safe and adequate means of transport is available, that a fully trained division could leave the Dominion for service in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>, or any theatre of war which at the time might be indicated as more appropriate, within a period of eight months from today. Within the limits specified in this paragraph, troops sufficiently trained for garrison duty could be made available within a period of two months from today up to a strength of 6000, within four months up to a strength of 11,000, and within six months up to a strength of 16,000.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The question whether troops under training should be held in this Dominion until a full division is available for active service in a theatre of war, or whether in the meantime, or alternatively, troops should be despatched for relief of <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> units, for example, in <name key="name-020943" type="place">Singapore</name>, <name key="name-034739" type="place">Burma</name>, or <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name>, as and when brigades become available, is a matter which His Majesty's Government in
<pb n="22" xml:id="n22"/>
New Zealand propose to consider in the light of circumstances as they arise and of any views or advice which they would be grateful to receive from time to time from His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will take an early opportunity of pointing out the inadvisability of individuals attempting themselves to proceed to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to enlist in the infantry or the artillery, and they will take immediate steps to ascertain the number of technical personnel, particularly electricians, mechanical workmen, mechanics, motor transport drivers, also officers with similar qualifications, and medical officers, who are surplus to necessary requirements here and available for service in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. A further communication on this matter will be forwarded in due course.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Under hypothesis (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> will be guided by circumstances and by the advice of His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, and within the limits of the programme laid down they will hold formations ready at short notice to reinforce <name key="name-020943" type="place">Singapore</name>, <name key="name-000854" type="place">Fiji</name>, and British and French islands in the South-Western Pacific.</p>
          <p rend="indent">AIR FORCE: Every possible step will be taken to press on with the agreed training scheme. It is noted that His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> will supply aircraft as soon as possible, and in the meantime every possible use will be made of civil aviation reserves available here as and when those reserves can be brought into effective use.</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are deeply grateful for the helpful and carefully reasoned appreciation of the steps which they might take, as set out in your telegram to the High Commissioner, and at no time will they fail to make every effort to comply with the suggestions in that telegram and with any further suggestions that His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> may make.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c4-3">
          <head>26<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-13">13 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> are very grateful for your telegram (<ref target="#c4-2">No. 25</ref>) and most warmly appreciate the ready response of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand.</p>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb n="23" xml:id="n23"/>
      <div type="chapter" n="5" xml:id="c5">
        <head>Appointment of Commander, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force</head>
        <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c5-1">
          <head>27<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-23" n="1"><p>Rt. Hon. <name key="name-208361" type="person">W. J. Jordan</name>, PC; from <date when="1936">1936</date> to date.</p></note> <hi rend="i">to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-16">16 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">…<note xml:id="ftn2-23" n="2"><p>Text omitted concerned employment of Colonel Sir Stephen Allen, KBE, CMG, DSO, Military Secretary 2nd NZEF, 1940–41.</p></note> <name key="name-207994" type="person">Major-General Freyberg</name><note xml:id="ftn3-23" n="3"><p><name key="name-207994" type="person">Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Cyril Freyberg</name>, VC, GCMG, KCB, KBE, DSO, LL D. In <date when="1939-09">Sep 1939</date> was General Officer Commanding, Salisbury Plain Area, with the rank of Major-General; appointed to command 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in <date when="1939-11">Nov 1939</date>, and continued to do so until <date when="1945-11">Nov 1945</date>; Governor-General of New Zealand from <date when="1946-06-17">17 Jun 1946</date> to date.</p></note> offers his services to New Zealand and would be glad to serve with compatriots again.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c5-2">
          <head>28<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The acting Prime Minister to the High Commissioner for New Zealand</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-10-02">2 October 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 16 September (<ref target="#c5-1">No. 27</ref>) ….<note xml:id="ftn4-23" n="4"><p>Text omitted concerned employment of Sir Stephen Allen.</p></note> Advise <name key="name-207994" type="person">Major-General Freyberg</name> that his offer is warmly appreciated and that the Government are at present considering how best they could utilise his services.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c5-3">
          <head>29<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi><note xml:id="ftn5-23" n="5"><p>Then attending a conference of Dominion ministers in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>.</p></note> <hi rend="i">to <name key="name-207994" type="person">Major-General Freyberg</name>, General Officer Commanding, Salisbury Plain Area</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-04">4 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Will you come to <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> and consult with me about the NZEF?</p>
          <closer>
            <signed rend="right"><hi rend="sc">Peter Fraser</hi>,</signed>
            <salute rend="right">Deputy Prime Minister,</salute>
            <mentioned rend="right">
              <address>
                <addrLine>New Zealand</addrLine>
              </address>
            </mentioned>
          </closer>
        </div>
        <pb n="24" xml:id="n24"/>
        <div type="section" n="4" xml:id="c5-4">
          <head>30<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Letter from <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to Mr. C. A. Berendsen</hi>,<note xml:id="ftn1-24" n="1"><p>Sir Carl A. Berendsen, KCMG, New Zealand Minister at <name key="name-202800" type="place">Washington</name> since <date when="1944">1944</date>. At the time of this reference, Mr. C. A. Berendsen, CMG, Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, <name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>; later New Zealand High Commissioner in <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>, 1943–44. Mr. Berendsen had accompanied Mr. Fraser to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> in <date when="1939-10">Oct 1939</date>.</p></note> <hi rend="i">Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department</hi></head>
          <div type="section" xml:id="c5-4-0">
            <opener>
              <salute rend="right">General Officer Commanding,</salute>
              <mentioned rend="right">
                <address>
                  <addrLine>Salisbury Plain Area,<lb/>
Bulford Barracks,<lb/>
<name key="name-000492" type="place">Wiltshire</name></addrLine>
                </address>
                <lb/>
                <date when="1939-11-06">6 November 1939</date>
              </mentioned>
              <salute rend="sc">My Dear Berendsen,</salute>
            </opener>
            <p rend="indent">I realise how difficult it must be for you and your Minister at the present time, and my only wish is to do anything I can to be of any assistance to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Perhaps my best contribution would be to put upon paper my views upon the two problems we discussed at our meeting last night:</p>
            <list type="simple">
              <label>(1)</label>
              <item>
                <p rend="hang">The choosing of the GOC for the New Zealand Forces.</p>
              </item>
              <label>(2)</label>
              <item>
                <p rend="hang">The problem of mobilising, training, and maintaining the New Zealand Division in the field.</p>
              </item>
            </list>
            <p rend="indent">The latter question is a very big one, involving many problems that must affect the speed and efficiency by which the Division can be prepared for war. All these problems and the decisions that must be taken carry with them serious financial repercussions. I have discussed this in attached <ref type="appendix" target="#a2">Appendix II</ref>.<note xml:id="ftn2-24" n="2"><p>Not published. This appendix dealt with the mobilisation and collective training of the New Zealand Division. It envisaged the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> as the probable training area and <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> as the setting for subsequent operations.</p></note></p>
            <p rend="indent">After my talk with the Deputy Prime Minister, I was diffident about discussing the question of your choice of GOC. But since these are such unusual times, I feel that you will appreciate that any advice I give you is from an entirely detached point of view.</p>
            <p rend="indent">The choosing of a GOC is so much a matter of opportunity. As you will realise, the number of first-class, experienced, and fully trained Commanders in a small Regular Army, such as we possess here in England, is relatively not great. The New Zealand Division certainly deserves to get a Commander who will appreciate and understand the wonderful material with which he is being entrusted. Further, and this is most important, he should be a man who will weld the Division into one large happy family. I am sure that it is only upon these lines that best results can be achieved.</p>
            <pb n="25" xml:id="n25"/>
            <p rend="indent">With such a Commander and building upon the traditions that already exist, the New Zealand Division will be second to none. Mr. Fraser was kind enough to inquire whether I would like to be considered as a possible Commander. I need hardly say that I feel highly honoured. If, after due consideration, the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> wanted my services, the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> would have to apply to the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> for me. I for my part would come to you even if it meant giving up the command of an Army Corps to do so.</p>
            <p rend="indent">I have put as <ref target="#c5-4-1">Appendix I</ref> my views upon some of the essential qualities necessary for a GOC.</p>
            <p rend="indent">In any case, whatever your decision may be, I hope that you get the GOC that you want and that he will do full justice to the New Zealand Division.</p>
            <p rend="right">Yours sincerely,<lb/>
<hi rend="sc"><name key="name-207994" type="person">Bernard Freyberg</name></hi></p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c5-4-1">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">APPENDIX I</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">In view of the fact that the New Zealand Division will have far fewer officers from the Imperial Forces than had its predecessor of <date when="1914">1914</date>, and also of the fact that a large proportion of the officers that they will bring with the Division will have had little opportunity of commanding troops in the field, even upon manœuvres, great responsibility will fall upon the GOC and his staff during the collective training period before going to <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>. This, in my opinion, is a very important consideration. This is, I know, offset by a leavening of officers who served in the war [1914–18].</p>
            <p rend="indent">The GOC, whoever he may be, should have been trained upon manœuvres in the command of a force of all arms, and in addition should have a wide war experience of command during the war. In my opinion, he should have commanded an Infantry Brigade, or similar Artillery Command, for the last years of the war. I suggest this because it is important that he should have practical experience of making and carrying out artillery fire plans in the various phases of battle. He should have actual experience in command during:</p>
            <list type="simple">
              <label>(<hi rend="i">a</hi>)</label>
              <item>
                <p rend="hang">A retreat under heavy enemy pressure;</p>
              </item>
              <label>(<hi rend="i">b</hi>)</label>
              <item>
                <p rend="hang">A counter-stroke;</p>
              </item>
              <label>(<hi rend="i">c</hi>)</label>
              <item>
                <p rend="hang">The forcing of a river line against opposition;</p>
              </item>
              <label>(<hi rend="i">d</hi>)</label>
              <item>
                <p rend="hang">Operations in open warfare involving the co-operation of all arms.</p>
              </item>
            </list>
            <p>So much for the minimum requirements from a tactical and training point of view.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Apart from this the Commander should also have practical and very detailed knowledge in the care and comfort of his troops. He
<pb n="26" xml:id="n26"/>
must understand the complicated structure of Army life, and be able to teach his officers and men how best to make use of the excellent arrangements and material generally, such as the ration and cooking equipment, stores, &amp;c., with which he will be issued upon mobilisation.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="5" xml:id="c5-5">
          <head>31<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-07">7 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I have discussed the command of the New Zealand forces with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff<note xml:id="ftn1-26" n="1"><p>Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff during the war were:</p><table rows="3" cols="2"><row><cell>7 Sep 1939 – 26 May 1940</cell><cell>Field-Marshal Lord Ironside, GCB, CMG, DSO (then General Sir William Edmund Ironside).</cell></row><row><cell>May-Dec 1941</cell><cell>Field-Marshal Sir John Greer Dill, GCB, CMG, DSO (then General Sir John Dill). Head of British Joint Staff Mission, <name key="name-202800" type="place">Washington</name>, <date when="1942">1942</date>–death, <date when="1944-11-04">4 Nov 1944</date>.</cell></row><row><cell>Dec 1941 – Jan 1946</cell><cell><name key="name-004995" type="person">Field-Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke</name>, KG, GCB, OM, DSO (in <date when="1940">1940</date>, General Sir Alan Francis Brooke).</cell></row></table></note> and Mackesy.<note xml:id="ftn2-26" n="2"><p>Major-General Pierse Joseph Mackesy, CB, DSO, MC; Commander 49th (West Riding) Division and Area, Territorial Army, <date when="1938">1938</date>; commanded land forces in Narvik area <date when="1940">1940</date>; visited New Zealand in <date when="1939">1939</date> at request of <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> and made a report on the <name key="name-035199" type="organisation">New Zealand Military Forces</name>.</p></note> The Chief of the Imperial General Staff speaks most highly of <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> both from the point of view of command in the field and administration. He thinks we could not do better and indeed states that <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> will be given an English division in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> at a very early date, though he would be happy to release him if we wanted him. I gather that <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> would be glad to accept the New Zealand Division though I have not discussed this with him. I have satisfied myself about <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>'s fitness and personal qualities by long personal interview….<note xml:id="ftn3-26" n="3"><p>Text omitted concerned the proposed retention in New Zealand of Major-General J. E. (later Sir John) Duigan as Chief of the General Staff.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="6" xml:id="c5-6">
          <head>32<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser to the Prime Minister</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-10">10 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I left for <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> last night and expect to return on Wednesday or Thursday. Before leaving I saw Allen and my conversation with
<pb n="27" xml:id="n27"/>
him strengthens my conclusion that <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> is the best man for the command of the New Zealand Division….<note xml:id="ftn1-27" n="1"><p>In the text omitted Mr. Fraser requested an early reply to his telegram of 7 Nov (see <ref target="#c6-6"><hi rend="i">Formation and Despatch of First Echelon</hi>, No. 46)</ref>, and gave his views on a speech on war aims by the Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee, then Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="7" xml:id="c5-7">
          <head>33<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. W. Nash</hi><note xml:id="ftn2-27" n="2"><p>Rt. Hon. Walter Nash, PC, Minister of Finance and Customs from <date when="1935">1935</date> to date; Deputy Prime Minister since <date when="1940-03">Mar 1940</date>; New Zealand Minister at <name key="name-202800" type="place">Washington</name>, 1942–44.</p></note> <hi rend="i">(<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>) to the Hon. P. Fraser</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-15">15 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The Government have decided, after full consideration of his record and brilliant service, to offer the appointment of General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Expeditionary Force to <name key="name-207994" type="person">Major-General Freyberg</name>. This decision should remain confidential until further advice and no public reference or announcement should be made in the meantime.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="8" xml:id="c5-8">
          <head>34<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon P. Fraser to the Prime Minister</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-17">17 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">….<note xml:id="ftn3-27" n="3"><p>See <ref target="#c6-8"><hi rend="i">Formation and Despatch of First Echelon</hi> (No. 48)</ref> for rest of text.</p></note> With reference to your telegram of 16 November,<note xml:id="ftn4-27" n="4"><p>Mr. Nash's telegram to Mr. Fraser of <date when="1939-11-15">15 Nov 1939</date> (<ref target="#c5-7">No. 33</ref>) offering the command of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force to <name key="name-207994" type="person">Major-General Freyberg</name> is undoubtedly the telegram referred to.</p></note> your offer of the command of the 2nd NZEF has been conveyed confidentially to <name key="name-207994" type="person">Major-General Freyberg</name> and has been accepted by him. I have still to obtain the official approval of <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name>. When this is obtained, but not before, I suggest an official announcement be made by you. <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> has submitted certain proposals for his movements but I will consult <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> before forwarding my recommendations to you….<note xml:id="ftn5-27" n="5"><p>Administrative detail omitted.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <pb n="28" xml:id="n28"/>
        <div type="section" n="9" xml:id="c5-9">
          <head>35<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to the Hon. P. Fraser</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-18">18 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">…. It is hoped that a public announcement can be made either over the air on Tuesday evening at seven o'clock or in the evening press of the same day. This statement will also announce the appointment of <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> and the desire of the Government to retain General Duigan<note xml:id="ftn1-28" n="1"><p>Major-General Sir John Evelyn Duigan, KBE, CB, DSO, Chief of the General Staff in New Zealand, 1937–41. Created KBE in <date when="1940">1940</date>.</p></note> in New Zealand, and that this has been made possible by the availability of <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> who has been offered, and has accepted, the command of the New Zealand forces overseas….<note xml:id="ftn2-28" n="2"><p>See <ref target="#c6-9"><hi rend="i">Formation and Despatch of First Echelon</hi> (No. 49)</ref> for rest of text.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="10" xml:id="c5-10">
          <head>36<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser to the Prime Minister</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-18">18 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 18 November (<ref target="#c5-9">No. 35</ref>) has been received and noted. The High Commissioner will publish the announcement here simultaneously. Today I saw Ironside who expressed his entire concurrence and approves of <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>'s appointment. He has telegraphed the Secretary of State for War<note xml:id="ftn3-28" n="3"><p>Secretaries of State for War in the United Kingdom Government during the war were:</p><table rows="6" cols="2"><row><cell>29 May 1937 – 6 Jan 1940</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. Leslie Hore-Belisha, PC.</cell></row><row><cell>6 Jan 1940 – 13 May 1940</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. Oliver Frederick George Stanley, PC, GCSI, MC.</cell></row><row><cell>13 May 1940 – 23 Dec 1940</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. R. A. Eden, PC, MC.</cell></row><row><cell>23 Dec 1940 – 23 Feb 1942</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. Viscount Margesson, PC, MC (in <date when="1940">1940</date>, Captain the Hon. Henry David Reginald Margesson).</cell></row><row><cell>23 Feb 1942 – 4 Aug 1945</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. Sir (Percy) James Grigg, PC, KCB, KCSI.</cell></row><row><cell>4 Aug 1945 – 5 Oct 1946</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. John James Lawson, PC.</cell></row></table></note> for formal approval. I expect to receive this on Monday and shall telegraph you immediately. In the meantime you will of course not publish the appointment until you have received my telegram. Ironside and <name key="name-005268" type="person">Gort</name><note xml:id="ftn4-28" n="4"><p><name key="name-005268" type="person">Field-Marshal Viscount Gort</name>, VC, GCB, CBE, DSO, MVO, MC; Chief of the Imperial General Staff 1937–39; Commander-in-Chief, British Field Force, 1939–40; Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Gibraltar, 1941–42; Governor and Commander-in-Chief, <name key="name-004214" type="place">Malta</name>, 1942–44; High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, Palestine, 1944–45. Died <date when="1946-03-31">31 Mar 1946</date>.</p></note> both consider that <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> should immediately spend a
<pb n="29" xml:id="n29"/>
period in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> with the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name>, and Ironside has promised a suggested programme of his movements, which I shall telegraph to you on receipt….<note xml:id="ftn1-29" n="1"><p>Notification of the despatch in a later telegram of biographical details of <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>'s career has been omitted.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="11" xml:id="c5-11">
          <head>37<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser to the Prime Minister</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-30">30 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">….<note xml:id="ftn2-29" n="2"><p>See <ref target="#c6-21"><hi rend="i">Formation and Despatch of First Echelon</hi> (No. 61)</ref> for rest of text.</p></note> <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> has already spent a short but, in the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff, adequate period in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>, and both he and the Chief of the General Staff consider it essential that he should go to New Zealand at the earliest possible moment to make contact with the Government and Duigan, see for himself the officers and men, and generally familiarise himself with all problems. He will leave <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> by air for <name key="name-000576" type="place">Alexandria</name> direct on 6 December, and will leave <name key="name-000576" type="place">Alexandria</name> and arrive in New Zealand with us by the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120082" type="place">Niagara</name></hi>,<note xml:id="ftn3-29" n="3"><p>RMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120082" type="place">Niagara</name></hi>, Canadian-Australasian Line, 13,415 tons, sunk by a mine in the <name key="name-120026" type="place">Hauraki Gulf</name>, <date when="1940-06-19">19 Jun 1940</date>.</p></note> leaving <name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name> on 21 December. He then proposes after a few weeks in New Zealand to proceed immediately to Egypt, though this must depend on the date of the First Echelon's departure.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="12" xml:id="c5-12">
          <head>38<lb/>
<hi rend="sc">Report by the Hon. P. Fraser on his Visit to England in <date when="1939">1939</date></hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c5-12-1">
            <head>APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING</head>
            <p rend="indent">….<note xml:id="ftn4-29" n="4"><p>See <ref target="#c6-26"><hi rend="i">Formation and Despatch of First Echelon</hi> (No. 66)</ref> for rest of text. As the original of this report could not be traced, this draft was supplied by courtesy of Mr. Fraser, who has partially reconstructed the report from notes made at the time.</p></note> This again was one of the matters which I felt it essential to take up at the earliest possible moment and by the courtesy of the British authorities I was enabled to have a very early interview with General Ironside.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Before this interview, however, I had an opportunity of a discussion with <name key="name-207994" type="person">Major-General Freyberg</name>, who was kind enough to come to <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> especially for the purpose, and I was at once struck
<pb n="30" xml:id="n30"/>
not only by his personality and by his obvious experience and confidence, but particularly by the supreme importance which he clearly attached to the proper treatment of the troops and to the necessity of proper and timely administrative measures to ensure their welfare and their safety. I have, since that interview, seen a great deal of <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> and I am convinced that my first impressions are right and that he is clearly the best choice for the post that is open to us. General Mackesy was good enough to come to <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> from <name key="name-008321" type="place">Yorkshire</name> and he also spoke highly of <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>. I also made an opportunity, in accordance with your suggestions, for an interview with Sir Stephen Allen, who spoke in the highest terms of <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> and assured me that in his view it would be impossible to get a better man.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Armed with these views and opinions, when I saw General Ironside I told him that we were considering him (<name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>) for the post of General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. He at once made it plain that in his opinion we could not make a better choice. He also spoke in the highest terms of <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>, whom he had known for a very lengthy period, and he expressed the opinion that <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> invariably took care of his men even at the risk of his own safety. He referred also to the wide experience which <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> had, not only in fighting but in the organisation of large bodies of men on a war basis. He regarded him as an admirable man to command a division, and indeed he had <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> on his own list, with five others, to be given command of an English division at a very early date. He made it plain that if we wanted <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> he would certainly allow us to have him, and that if we did not he would shortly be appointed to command an English division.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Subsequently, when in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>, I had an opportunity of mentioning the matter to Lord Gort who also spoke in terms of high praise of <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>, though he thought he should have at least two months in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> before assuming command of a division. At a later discussion I raised this aspect of the matter with General Ironside. He deprecated this on three grounds, firstly, that <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> would learn enough of the present method of operations in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> in a week; secondly, that the present methods were as yet untried and might not be held to; and, thirdly, it was not impossible that the New Zealand Division would have to be employed in a totally different form of warfare in a totally different theatre of war.</p>
            <p rend="indent">When I saw Mr. Winston Churchill<note xml:id="ftn1-30" n="1"><p>Then First Lord of the Admiralty.</p></note> just prior to my departure he told me that upon my arrival in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> he had sought an opportunity to see me with a view to pressing me to urge upon the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> the desirability of appointing
<pb n="31" xml:id="n31"/>
<name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>, whom he regarded as pre-eminently suitable to command such magnificent troops as the New Zealand Division had always proved themselves to be in the past and would, he felt, continue so to do. Further confirmation came from Sir Charles Fergusson<note xml:id="ftn1-31" n="1"><p>General Sir Charles Fergusson, GCB, GCMG, DSO, MVO, Governor-General of New Zealand, 1924–30.</p></note> who went out of his way to express his satisfaction at the appointment and his admiration for <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>'s qualities. Indeed, I think it proper to say that I have heard no criticism of the appointment and nothing but praise, and that I am entirely satisfied that the right thing has been done. My colleagues will, of course, have an opportunity of judging for themselves during the short period that the General will be in New Zealand. I should add that on the way out he proved to have a most business-like manner of formulating and preparing lists of the matters which he wished to discuss and the steps he thinks should be taken to ensure the welfare, comfort, and safety of the troops under his command.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="13" xml:id="c5-13">
          <head>39<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Memorandum from the Prime Minister to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi><note xml:id="ftn2-31" n="2"><p>This is <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>'s charter from the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>.</p></note></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-01-05">5 January 1940</date>
            <salute>The General Officer for the time being<lb/>
Commanding the 2nd New Zealand<lb/>
Expeditionary Force Overseas</salute>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The General Officer Commanding will act in accordance with the instructions he receives from the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, subject only to the requirements of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. He will, in addition to powers appearing in any relevant Statute or Regulations, be vested with the following powers:</p>
          <list type="simple">
            <label>(<hi rend="i">a</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">In the case of sufficiently grave emergency or in special circumstances, of which he must be the sole judge, to make decisions as to the employment of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and to communicate such decisions directly to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>, notwithstanding that in the absence of that extraordinary cause such communication would not be in accordance with the normal channels of communication indicated in the following paragraphs and which for greater clearness are also indicated in an attached diagram.<note xml:id="ftn3-31" n="3"><p>Not published.</p></note></p>
            </item>
            <pb n="32" xml:id="n32"/>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">b</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">To communicate directly with the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> and with the Army Department concerning any matter connected with the training and administration of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">c</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">To communicate directly either with the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> or with the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, in respect of all details leading up to and arising from policy decisions.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">d</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">In all matters pertaining to equipment, to communicate with the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> through normal channels, and through the liaison officer of the High Commissioner's office in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>, the former to be the official channel.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">e</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">In matters of command, to adhere to the normal military channels between the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> and the General Officer Commanding the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force overseas.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">f</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">To establish such administrative headquarters and base and line of communication units as are necessary for the functions of command, organisation [including training], and administration with which he has been invested.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">g</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">To organise, [train],<note xml:id="ftn1-32" n="1"><p>The references to training in square brackets in paragraphs (<hi rend="i">f</hi>) and (<hi rend="i">g</hi>) have been added at <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>'s request. They are not included in the text of this memorandum in the files of the Prime Minister's Department, but were later added to the memorandum at the GOC's request.</p></note> change, vary, or group units and formations in such manner as he considers expedient from time to time.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(<hi rend="i">h</hi>)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">To fix and alter the establishment and composition of units and formations as the exigencies of service may in his opinion require from time to time.</p>
            </item>
          </list>
          <p rend="indent">After the <name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name> has left New Zealand no officer above the substantive rank of captain will be sent overseas without the concurrence of the General Officer Commanding.</p>
          <closer>
            <signed rend="right"><hi rend="sc">M. J. Savage</hi>,</signed>
            <salute rend="right">Prime Minister</salute>
          </closer>
        </div>
        <pb n="33" xml:id="n33"/>
        <div type="section" n="14" xml:id="c5-14">
          <head>40<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Memorandum from the Minister of Defence</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-33" n="1"><p>Hon. Frederick Jones, Minister of Defence from <date when="1935">1935</date> to date.</p></note> <hi rend="i">to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-01-05">5 January 1940</date>
            <signed><name key="name-207994" type="person">Major-General B. C. Freyberg</name>,</signed>
            <salute>General Officer Commanding,</salute>
            <mentioned>
              <address>
                <addrLine>2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force Overseas,<lb/>
<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name></addrLine>
              </address>
            </mentioned>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The General Officer Commanding is hereby vested with the following powers:</p>
          <list type="simple">
            <label>(1)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">Authority to increase the scale of ration, if necessary.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(2)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">Authority to procure equipment (shown on equipment tables) that cannot be supplied through official channels. Such equipment to be bought through Ordnance channels where possible.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(3)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">Authority to incur expenditures which cannot be foreseen at present, and which the General Officer Commanding considers necessary, for protection of the health of the Force.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(4)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">Authority to incur expenditure, not exceeding £500 for any one transaction, for the recreation or other amenities of the Force.</p>
            </item>
            <label>(5)</label>
            <item>
              <p rend="hang">Authority to disburse, at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding, from an entertainment fund which will be provided, to an amount not exceeding £1000 per annum.</p>
            </item>
          </list>
          <closer>
            <signed rend="right"><hi rend="sc">F. Jones</hi>,</signed>
            <salute rend="right">Minister of Defence</salute>
          </closer>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb n="34" xml:id="n34"/>
      <div type="chapter" n="6" xml:id="c6">
        <head>Formation and Despatch of First Echelon and Arrival in Egypt</head>
        <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c6-1">
          <head>41<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-09">9 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have decided to raise a special military force for service within or beyond New Zealand. Enlistment will be entirely voluntary and will be confined to men and non-commissioned officers between the ages of 21 and 35.<note xml:id="ftn1-34" n="1"><p>An Army Headquarters instruction of <date when="1939-10-05">5 Oct 1939</date>, while maintaining the 21–35 age limit generally, left it to the discretion of Officers Commanding Districts to extend the age limit to 40 years in the case of warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, specialists, and certain tradesmen specially suitable for employment overseas, on condition that they were classified as physically fit for service in any part of the world. On <date when="1940-04-11">11 Apr 1940</date> the age limit for other ranks was increased to 40 years.</p></note> In the case of officers the maximum age limits will be Subalterns, Captains 35, Majors 40, Lieutenant-Colonels 45. Medical standard requires fitness for active service in any part of the world.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Enlistments will be received from 9 a.m. on Tuesday 12 September. Preference will be given to single men not engaged in essential industries in the following order: (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) serving members of the Territorial Force; (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) members of the infantry section of the Special Reserve;<note xml:id="ftn2-34" n="2"><p>Men who had undergone a five months' course of combined military and vocational training, after which, for the three following years, they were required to spend ten days a year in camp.</p></note> (<hi rend="i">c</hi>) members of Class I of the <name key="name-017551" type="organisation">National Military Reserve</name>;<note xml:id="ftn3-34" n="3"><p>Men who had undergone not less than two years' Territorial training.</p></note> (<hi rend="i">d</hi>) other single men with or without military training.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Enlistment will be for the duration of the war and twelve months thereafter or until lawfully discharged.<note xml:id="ftn4-34" n="4"><p>Terms of enlistment. An opinion on the legal liability of members of the Defence Forces to serve, and the duration of that liability, is given by the then Adjutant-General, Brigadier A. E. Conway, in a letter dated <date when="1945-09-21">21 Sep 1945</date> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand, an extract of which is quoted here:</p><p rend="center"><hi rend="sc">Duration of Legal Liability of Members of Defence Forces to Serve</hi></p><p>I think the position is as follows:</p><p rend="center"><hi rend="i">Volunteers</hi></p><p rend="indent">1. Volunteers enlisted ‘for the duration of the war and twelve months thereafter or until lawfully discharged’.</p><p rend="center"><hi rend="i">Conscripts</hi></p><p rend="indent">2. Persons compelled to serve under the National Service Emergency Regulations, must remain, until lawfully discharged, members of the Armed Forces to which they are transferred, in the same manner as if they had voluntarily enlisted therein and taken the oath of allegiance (Regulation 17 (3)). Unless by inference the ‘duration plus twelve months’ of the volunteer is imported into this clause, there is no legal limit to the duration of a conscript's liability to serve under these Regulations.</p><p rend="indent">3. Regulation 4 of Expeditionary Force Emergency Regulations <date when="1940">1940</date>, provides that members of 2nd NZEF shall be enlisted ‘for service … for the duration of the present war and for twelve months thereafter’.</p><p rend="indent">This provision was passed in the days of voluntary enlistment but has not been repealed….</p><p rend="center"><hi rend="i">Conclusion</hi></p><p rend="indent">4. The earliest limits to the duration of the legal liability of volunteers or conscripts whether in 2nd NZEF or other sections of the Defence Forces is twelve months after the duration of the war.</p><p rend="right">(Signed) <hi rend="sc">A. E. Conway</hi>,</p><p rend="right">Brigadier,<lb/>
Adjutant-General</p></note> The first step in the
<pb n="35" xml:id="n35"/>
establishment of this force will be the enlistment of 6600 officers and men, and the organisation will consist of Divisional troops and one infantry brigade and will be taken into training in special camps at <name key="name-026522" type="place">Papakura</name>, <name key="name-004459" type="place">Ngaruawahia</name>, <name key="name-026686" type="place">Trentham</name>, and <name key="name-009235" type="place">Burnham</name>. Training will be for a minimum period of three months. It is hoped to have the First Echelon in training within three weeks of opening enlistment.<note xml:id="ftn1-35" n="1"><p>Enlistment began on <date when="1939-09-12">12 Sep 1939</date>. Prior to the general mobilisation of recruits, which began on 3 Oct, officers and NCOs provisionally selected for the First Echelon underwent special courses of instruction commencing on <date when="1939-09-27">27 Sep 1939</date>.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c6-2">
          <head>42<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Chief of the General Staff (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>) to the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name></hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-26">26 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The first contingent will comprise: <name key="name-006644" type="place">Divisional Headquarters</name>, Employment Platoon, Divisional Section Intelligence Corps, Headquarters Infantry Brigade, Headquarters Divisional Artillery, Headquarters Divisional Engineers, <name key="name-025383" type="organisation">Divisional Cavalry Regiment</name> (less
<pb n="36" xml:id="n36"/>
two squadrons), Field Regiment of Artillery (three 18-pounder batteries and one 4.5-inch howitzer battery); Field Park Company, Field Company of Engineers, Divisional Signallers<note xml:id="ftn2a-36" n="*"><p>*Less proportion for two infantry brigades and two artillery regiments.</p></note>, three Infantry Battalions, one Machine Gun Battalion, <name key="name-022800" type="organisation">Divisional Ammunition Company</name><note xml:id="ftn2b-36" n="*"><p>*Less proportion for two infantry brigades and two artillery regiments.</p></note>, <name key="name-003202" type="organisation">Divisional Petrol Company</name><note xml:id="ftn2c-36" n="*"><p>*Less proportion for two infantry brigades and two artillery regiments.</p></note>, Divisional Supply Column<note xml:id="ftn2d-36" n="*"><p>*Less proportion for two infantry brigades and two artillery regiments.</p></note>, <name key="name-031663" type="organisation">Reserve Mechanical Transport Company</name>, one Field Ambulance, one Field Hygiene Section, one <name key="name-022825" type="organisation">Provost Company</name>, <name key="name-024331" type="organisation">Divisional Postal Unit</name>, Base Details—Total 324 officers, 6227 other ranks….<note xml:id="ftn1-36" n="1"><p>The numbers of officers and other ranks in each unit were included in the cable but, as in many cases these were not the numbers embarked, they have been omitted. A schedule of the various types of mechanical transport to be sent with the contingent has also been omitted.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">Force is as per latest British war establishments, excepting: 18-pounder and 4.5-inch howitzers in lieu of 25-pounder, Vickers Machine Gun Battalion in lieu of Bren carrier platoons, Lewis guns in lieu of Bren, no anti-tank guns or rifles, <name key="name-025383" type="organisation">Divisional Cavalry Regiment</name> motorised including six only Bren carriers and no light tanks…. Would be glad to have your recommendation with regard to any Corps or Army Troop units which should be provided in proportion. Certain matters of policy affecting mechanical transport and equipment are the subject of a separate telegram (<ref target="#c6-3">No. 43</ref>) from the Governor-General.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c6-3">
          <head>43<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-09-26">26 September 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have considerable doubt as to the desirability of despatching with the Expeditionary Force that is contemplated when circumstances permit, the mechanical transport and much of the equipment referred to by the Chief of the General Staff in his telegram to the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> (<ref target="#c6-2">No. 42</ref>). The mechanical transport available here is of an improvised character consisting of Fords, Chevrolets, Bedfords, and Leylands, adapted as near as possible to <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> types, and in view of what would appear to be the paramount necessity of conserving shipping space His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are inclined to the view that much might be gained were it possible for His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to provide full equipment of mechanical transport of <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> type at the point of arrival of this contingent.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Similarly, much of the artillery and automatic equipment of the force is obsolescent or obsolete, and, quite apart from the desirability
<pb n="37" xml:id="n37"/>
of leaving a reasonable portion of such equipment in New Zealand to meet contingencies, it would appear to be desirable to re-equip the force with modern equipment at its point of arrival.</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be grateful for the views of His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> on this matter.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="4" xml:id="c6-4">
          <head>44<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> to the Chief of the General Staff (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-10-03">3 October 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to the questions raised in your telegram of 26 September (<ref target="#c6-2">No. 42</ref>). The intention is to provide all War Department types of mechanical transport in the theatre of war by the time the concentration of the entire Division is completed. Training vehicles and equipment will be provided as the brigades arrive. The existing equipment in New Zealand must suffice for immediate training requirements and should remain in New Zealand for security reasons.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Corps troops most needed in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> are: Medium Regiment of <name key="name-003128" type="organisation">Royal Artillery</name>, with existing equipment and tractors or haulage vehicles now in use, and one <name key="name-005008" type="organisation">Survey Battery</name> based on War Establishment III/<date when="1931">1931</date>/13/4.<note xml:id="ftn1-37" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c13-1"><hi rend="i">Special Units—<name key="name-005008" type="organisation">Survey Battery</name></hi> (No. 313)</ref>.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">Also personnel for any of the following units which you may care to provide:</p>
          <list type="simple">
            <item>
              <p>Headquarters Corps Troops, <name key="name-015592" type="organisation">Royal Army Service Corps</name>.</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>One Corps Troops Ammunition Company.</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>One Corps Troops Supply Column.</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>One Corps Petrol Park.</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>One Corps Ammunition Park.</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>One Anti-Aircraft Brigade Company, <name key="name-015592" type="organisation">Royal Army Service Corps</name>.<note xml:id="ftn2-37" n="2"><p>The New Zealand Government replied on <date when="1939-11-06">6 Nov 1939</date>, that it had deferred the formation of these units until information on the future of the New Zealand Division was available.</p></note></p>
            </item>
          </list>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="5" xml:id="c6-5">
          <head>45<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-10-06">6 October 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to your telegram of 26 September (<ref target="#c6-3">No. 43</ref>). The policy in relation to the equipment of the contemplated New Zealand
<pb n="38" xml:id="n38"/>
Expeditionary Force has been considered by the Army Council,<note xml:id="ftn1-38" n="1"><p>The control of the British Army is vested in the Army Council. The Secretary of State for War is its President. The Army members are the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Adjutant-General to the Forces, the Quartermaster-General to the Forces, the vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff.</p></note> who agree that in the circumstances it would be undesirable to despatch with the force the mechanical transport and other equipment referred to in your telegram. The New Zealand Chief of the General Staff is being informed of the equipment which it is suggested should be sent.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It will be appreciated that in view of the numerous calls on military equipment provided by the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, it will not be possible to supply much, if any, equipment from the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> for the force while it remains in New Zealand, and it will therefore be necessary to rely upon existing [equipment?] for training during that period. The Army Council will, however, do their utmost to provide adequate equipment for the further training of each New Zealand contingent at its point of arrival overseas. It will be the Council's aim to complete the equipment of the whole formation by the date when the three contingents proposed have finished their training and are able to take the field in formation.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="6" xml:id="c6-6">
          <head>46<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-07">7 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I have discussed with the Secretary of State for War, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,<note xml:id="ftn2-38" n="2"><p>General Sir William Ironside.</p></note> and the War Office Staff the movements of the <name key="name-035199" type="organisation">New Zealand Military Forces</name>.<note xml:id="ftn3-38" n="3"><p>See <ref type="appendix" target="#a1">Appendix 1</ref>, <hi rend="i">Agreed Conclusions of Discussions held at the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> on</hi> 2 <hi rend="i">Nov</hi> <date when="1939">1939</date>, and <ref type="appendix" target="#a2">Appendix 2</ref>, <hi rend="i">Note of a Meeting held at the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> on</hi> 6 <hi rend="i">Nov</hi> <date when="1939">1939</date>.</p></note> The general opinion is that while the matter is for the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> to judge, the international situation <hi rend="i">vis-è-vis</hi> <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name> is sufficiently clear to warrant the despatch at any rate of the First Echelon. The unanimous opinion is that Egypt is most suitable from the point of view of both training facilities and strategical position. Inquiries are now under way as to dates, and it seems probable that the First Echelon could be moved to Egypt on the conclusion of their three months' training, which we assume (and please confirm by telegraph) will be towards the end of January, although the actual date must, of course, depend on the Admiralty's provision of ships. If you desire an immediate and firm decision in order to take in the men of the Second Echelon, please telegraph your views on this matter.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="39" xml:id="n39"/>
        <div type="section" n="7" xml:id="c6-7">
          <head>47<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to the Hon. P. Fraser</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-11">11 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">In reply to your telegram of 7 November (<ref target="#c6-6">No. 46</ref>), Cabinet has agreed to the despatch of the First Echelon to Egypt. Its three months' training and final leave will be completed by 20 January. Transport will be required for 354 officers and 6416 other ranks, making a total of 6770.<note xml:id="ftn1-39" n="1"><p>The numbers actually embarked were: 354 officers, 6175 other ranks: total, 6529.</p></note> This number includes 26 officers and 608 other ranks as a first reinforcement for the First Echelon. The War Office have already been informed concerning the units which will compose this force (<ref target="#c6-2">No. 42</ref>). So far as the Second Echelon is concerned, the officers are already in training,<note xml:id="ftn2-39" n="2"><p>Officers of the Second Echelon entered camp on <date when="1939-11-08">8 Nov 1939</date>.</p></note> NCOs enter camp at the end of the month, and other ranks when the First Echelon leaves New Zealand.<note xml:id="ftn3-39" n="3"><p>The first draft of other ranks for the Second Echelon entered camp on <date when="1940-01-12">12 Jan 1940</date>.</p></note> Should the sailing date in January be adhered to the Second Echelon could then be ready for transport in mid-April, but we do not contemplate consideration of arrangements for the transport of the Second Echelon until the disposition of troops has been approximately determined.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The Government would be glad if you could discuss arrangements with the Director of Sea Transport<!-- Sea Transport, Director of --><note xml:id="ftn4-39" n="4"><p>Sir William George Hynard, Kt, CB, CBE; Director of Sea Transport, 1939–42; Assistant Director-General, Ministry of War Transport, 1942–44; representative of the Ministry of War Transport in <name key="name-007274" type="place">Canada</name>, 1944–46.</p></note> in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, who will act in collaboration with the responsible official here in providing the necessary vessels for the transport of the force. Please ascertain whether the fitting-out of vessels could be done overseas. It should be borne in mind that neither horses nor the equipment referred to in the telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General—No. 45 of 6 October—are to be taken overseas. It is presumed you will discuss with the Admiralty the nature and adequacy of the escort to be used for the safe conduct of the force.</p>
          <p rend="indent">We will have to announce almost immediately our intention to despatch the force overseas and the publicity procedure is now being prepared.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 10 November has just been received.<note xml:id="ftn5-39" n="5"><p>See <ref target="#c5-6"><hi rend="i">Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF</hi> (No. 32)</ref>.</p></note> A further message will be sent to you within the next few days.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="40" xml:id="n40"/>
        <div type="section" n="8" xml:id="c6-8">
          <head>48<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser to the Prime Minister</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-17">17 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I have discussed your telegram of 11 November (<ref target="#c6-7">No. 47</ref>) with the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name>. All arrangements for the move will be made in the first instance by them in collaboration with the Admiralty and Ministry of Shipping, and it is not necessary to approach the last two Departments separately. It is fully appreciated here that adequate escort is an essential [contingency?].</p>
          <p rend="indent">As it is not clear from your telegram whether you desire the fitting-out of transports to be done in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> or in New Zealand please communicate further on this point. As regards public[ity], care should be taken to keep the destination and date of sailing secret. I suggest that you confine the public statement to the fact that the force will proceed overseas shortly for further training, but please see next paragraph of this telegram.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In view of the importance of the decision indicated in your telegram under reference, I consider that the information should be conveyed officially by telegraph as from Prime Minister to Prime Minister and that the public announcement should be delayed until then. In the meantime I have informed the authorities here unofficially of the substance of your telegram….<note xml:id="ftn1-40" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c5-8"><hi rend="i">Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF</hi> (No. 34)</ref>, for rest of text.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="9" xml:id="c6-9">
          <head>49<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to the Hon. P. Fraser</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-18">18 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">In accordance with the advice contained in your telegram of 17 November (<ref target="#c6-8">No. 48</ref>) a telegram will be sent on Monday direct to the Prime Minister of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> informing him of the decision to send the First Echelon overseas, and requesting that no publicity should be given in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> until the decision has been announced in New Zealand. We will arrange to advise him of the time of announcement here. It is hoped that a public announcement can be made either over the air on Tuesday evening at seven o'clock or in the evening press of the same day….<note xml:id="ftn2-40" n="2"><p>See <ref target="#c5-9"><hi rend="i">Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF</hi> (No. 35)</ref>, for text omitted.</p></note></p>
          <pb n="41" xml:id="n41"/>
          <p rend="indent">Arrangements to fit up all the transports in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> would be most convenient and helpful to us, but if this cannot be done we must be advised at once so that we may advance arrangements here. It is possible that the Admiralty Sea Transport Regulation Standards may not be entirely acceptable and a committee here is examining this question.<note xml:id="ftn1-41" n="1"><p>In point of fact they were not acceptable, and the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> requested that additional shower and sanitary facilities be provided.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="10" xml:id="c6-10">
          <head>50<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-20">20 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to the offer made by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand to His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, which was contained in my most secret telegram of 13 September,<note xml:id="ftn2-41" n="2"><p>See <ref target="#c4-2"><hi rend="i">Negotiations regarding Participation of New Zealand's Armed Forces</hi> (No. 25)</ref>.</p></note> and following upon discussions between the Hon. P. Fraser and Ministers and officials of His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, I understand that the international situation is sufficiently clear to warrant the despatch of the First Echelon of the New Zealand [Expeditionary Force] and that Egypt is the most suitable point to which it can be trans-shipped. I have to inform you that, in these circumstances, the despatch of the First Echelon overseas has been decided upon by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. It is understood that the troops will proceed to Egypt for the completion of their training and there await the arrival of the Second and Third Echelons. It is also understood that all arrangements for the move will be made in the first instance by the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> in collaboration with the Admiralty and the Ministry of Shipping.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The First Echelon's three months' training and final leave will be completed by 20 January, and, to ensure the completion of arrangements, your early advice as to the availability of ships and escort would be appreciated. The New Zealand General Staff have already informed the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> concerning the numbers and units composing this force.</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand desire to make this decision public within the next day or so, but as a number of related matters have not yet been completed the exact time and date of this statement cannot at present be determined. They would be glad if you will defer any publicity in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> until you are
<pb n="42" xml:id="n42"/>
advised of the exact time of announcement here. The destination and approximate time of sailing will of course be kept secret.</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand desire to re-affirm the determination of the people of this Dominion to sustain to the fullest extent of their resources the war effort upon which they have now engaged. They desire also to re-affirm their pledge of wholehearted support for the British Commonwealth of Nations and <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> in the struggle for international security and for democratic freedom. It is the solemn hope and heartfelt wish of the people of New Zealand that the aims for which they have engaged in this struggle will result in that new world order, solidly based on principles of peace and security for individuals and nations alike, without which the enjoyment of living would not be possible.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="11" xml:id="c6-11">
          <head>51<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-20">20 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My colleagues and I are deeply appreciative of the decision of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, communicated in your telegram of 20 November (<ref target="#c6-10">No. 50</ref>), to despatch the First Echelon of the New Zealand Division. This further example of New Zealand's whole-hearted determination to play her full part in the struggle in which we are engaged will be most warmly [welcomed?] here. In accordance with your request no prior announcement will be made here, but I should be glad if you would arrange to let us know as far as possible in advance the terms of the proposed announcement in New Zealand, and the time at which it is to be made, so that arrangements can be made for suitable publicity here.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="12" xml:id="c6-12">
          <head>52<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi><note xml:id="ftn1-42" n="1"><p>Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> during the war were:</p><table rows="4" cols="2"><row><cell>Apr 1939 – Aug 1941</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. Robert Gordon Menzies, PC, KC.</cell></row><row><cell>Aug 1941 – Oct 1941</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. Arthur W. Fadden, PC.</cell></row><row><cell><date when="1941-10">Oct 1941</date> – death, <date when="1945-07">Jul 1945</date></cell><cell>Rt. Hon. John Curtin, PC.</cell></row><row><cell><date when="1945-07">Jul 1945</date> – to date</cell><cell>Rt. Hon. Joseph Benedict Chifley, PC.</cell></row></table></note> <hi rend="i">to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-21">21 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Cabinet has been considering the very difficult questions which arise in relation to sending troops out of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>. As you know,
<pb n="43" xml:id="n43"/>
we have a division enlisted for service at home or abroad on terms similar to your own. Our general view is that, in spite of a reassuring survey of the Far Eastern position just received from the Foreign Office and promises made by the Admiralty in relation to the defence of <name key="name-020943" type="place">Singapore</name>,<note xml:id="ftn1-43" n="1"><p>See Volume III, <hi rend="i">Appreciation of Probable Japanese Policy in the <name key="name-005851" type="place">Far East</name></hi>, dated <date when="1939-11-15">15 Nov 1939</date>; also memorandum on the Naval Defence of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> and New Zealand, <date when="1939-11-23">23 Nov 1939</date>.</p></note> there is still some real uncertainty about the position of <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name>, which might become more acute if <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> invaded <name key="name-007841" type="place">Holland</name> and the <name key="name-020796" type="place">Netherlands East Indies</name> were cut from their mother country. Further, while Australian public opinion would warmly support sending troops abroad if land warfare in <name key="name-008008" type="place">Europe</name> assumed a critical character, there is a feeling that in the present state of affairs—with only five British divisions in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> and as yet no casualties—the despatch of Dominion troops cannot be very urgent. Another consideration which has puzzled us is that whereas we are finding the greatest possible difficulties in obtaining even a fraction of the shipping needed for some of our export commodities, it seems to be assumed that there would be no difficulty in securing ships and naval convoy for a military force. To sum up, our judgment is that we should watch developments of the next three or four weeks before committing ourselves to the despatch of our division overseas. At the same time, we do not wish to be out of step with you as we think that from every point of view the closest co-ordination between our policies is essential. Any comments you care to make on this matter would be greatly appreciated.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="13" xml:id="c6-13">
          <head>53<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-22">22 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">In giving effect to the decision contained in my telegram of 20 November (<ref target="#c6-10">No. 50</ref>) I desire to inform you that it seems essential that the actual despatch of the First Echelon must, in the light of circumstances at the time, be determined by the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> itself. Before the First Echelon leaves for its destination my colleagues and I feel that we must satisfy ourselves that the seas through which the transports shall pass are considered to be free of submarines or of a heavily armed raider such as the <hi rend="i">Admiral Scheer.</hi><note xml:id="ftn2-43" n="2"><p>German pocket battleship, 10,000 tons, six 11-inch guns; capsized after being damaged in <name key="name-003198" type="organisation">Royal Air Force</name> bombing attack on <name key="name-007788" type="place">Kiel</name> on the night of 9–10 Apr 1945.</p></note> We are compelled for instance to take into account the effect on public opinion of such matters as press statements current
<pb n="44" xml:id="n44"/>
at the present time that <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> is negotiating for the purchase of Russian submarines in the <name key="name-005851" type="place">Far East</name>. It is also possible that the situation <hi rend="i">vis-à-vis</hi> <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name> may have deteriorated. These and similar factors must necessarily be taken into account by His Majesty's Governments in New Zealand and <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> in the interests of the security of their own peoples. I am sure that His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> will fully appreciate the force of the above reservations.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="14" xml:id="c6-14">
          <head>54<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-22">22 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The questions raised by you in your telegram dated 21 November (<ref target="#c6-12">No. 52</ref>), concerning the despatch of an overseas force, have been considered by my colleagues and myself. Acting on advice received from the United Kingdom Government and from our delegate at the Ministerial Conference in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>,<note xml:id="ftn1-44" n="1"><p>Hon. P. Fraser.</p></note> we have decided to send the First Echelon of our Special Force overseas, and on the day before your telegram was received had so informed the United Kingdom Government. I had intended to inform you and the other Dominion Prime Ministers of our action today as soon as the time of publication between the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> and ourselves had been arranged.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I fully appreciate the difficulties with which you are faced in <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>. Our particular problems are, I think, of a different nature. Because of our limited training facilities and the lack of modern equipment it is not possible for us to train more than one echelon at a time. We decided to send the first body overseas as soon after their elementary training is completed as transport and naval escort facilities are available, in order to make room for the next body, and also to enable the men to complete their training on the modern equipment which we do not possess. Moreover, we feel that the retention of our voluntary system of recruiting<note xml:id="ftn2-44" n="2"><p>The last day of voluntary enlistment for overseas service was <date when="1940-07-22">22 Jul 1940</date>.</p></note> is to some extent dependent on the knowledge and the fact that the men will serve overseas. I regret that your telegram did not come earlier to enable discussions to take place, but I had assumed that the matter was one of common arrangement with our Ministers in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>. I would be greatly obliged if you would keep this information secret until advised by us of the date of publication here.
<pb n="45" xml:id="n45"/>
I assure you that no troops will leave New Zealand until we are completely satisfied that any possible danger of attack by any force is eliminated. This condition has been strongly emphasised in our communications to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="15" xml:id="c6-15">
          <head>55<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Hon. P. Fraser (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-28">28 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">After careful consideration by the Army Board, and acting on its recommendation, the Minister of Defence proposes to make the following appointments: Colonel E. Puttick to command the 1st Infantry Brigade;<note xml:id="ftn1-45" n="1"><p>Although this was the first infantry brigade of the 2nd NZEF to be formed, it was subsequently named the 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade.</p></note> Lieutenant-Colonel K. L. Stewart, General Staff Officer, 1st Grade; Major W. G. Gentry, GSO 2; Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Stevens, AA &amp; QMG; Major D. T. Maxwell, DAAG; Major A. W. Greville, DAQMG; Colonel R. Miles, commanding New Zealand Artillery; Major C. S. J. Duff, Brigade Major; Major G. H. Clifton, Headquarters Divisional Engineers; Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Crump, commanding New Zealand Army Service Corps.<note xml:id="ftn2-45" n="2"><p>Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO. Commanded 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade 1940-41 and New Zealand troops in Egypt in <date when="1940">1940</date> during absence of <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> in <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>; commanded New Zealand troops (4th and 5th Brigades) in <name key="name-003325" type="place">Crete</name>, <date when="1941-05">May 1941</date>; Chief of the General Staff and General Officer Commanding, <name key="name-035199" type="organisation">New Zealand Military Forces</name>, 1941–45.</p><p>Major-General Keith Lindsay Stewart, CB, CBE, DSO. General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, 2nd NZ Division, 1940–41; Deputy Chief of the General Staff (in New Zealand), 1941–43; commanded 5th Brigade, Aug–Nov 1943, 4th Armoured Brigade, Nov 1943 – Mar 1944, and 5th Brigade, Mar – Aug 1944, when taken prisoner of war near <name key="name-000842" type="place">Florence</name>; commanded 9th Infantry Brigade (J Force), Nov 1945 – Jul 1946; Adjutant-General, <name key="name-035199" type="organisation">New Zealand Military Forces</name>, Aug 1946 – Mar 1949, Chief of the General Staff, <date when="1949-04">Apr 1949</date> – to date.</p><p>Brigadier William George Gentry, DSO, OBE. GSO 2, <date when="1940">1940</date>; AA &amp; QMG, 1940–41; GSO 1, <date when="1941">1941</date>–2; commanded 6th Brigade, 1942–43; Deputy Chief of the General Staff (in New Zealand), 1943–44; commanded New Zealand Troops in Egypt, 6th NZ Division, and NZ <name key="name-004203" type="place">Maadi Camp</name>, Aug 1944 – Feb 1945; commanded 9th Brigade (in <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>), <date when="1945">1945</date>; appointed New Zealand representative on Joint Chiefs of Staff Organisation in <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>, <date when="1946-04">Apr 1946</date>; Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Jul 1946 – Nov 1947; Adjutant-General, <date when="1949-04">Apr 1949</date> – to date.</p><p>Major-General William George Stevens, CB, CBE. Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, 2nd NZ Division, <date when="1940">1940</date>; Officer in charge of Administration, 2nd NZEF, 1940–45, including period as Commandant, NZ <name key="name-004203" type="place">Maadi Camp</name>, and GOC 6th NZ Division; GOC 2nd NZEF, 22 Nov 1945 – 6 Jul 1946 (after <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> relinquished command).</p><p>Colonel Douglas Todd Maxwell, OBE. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, <date when="1940">1940</date>; GSO 2, Oct 1940 – Jan 1941; GSO 2 and later AA &amp; QMG, 2nd NZEF Base, <date when="1941">1941</date>; AA &amp; QMG, 2nd NZ Division, Oct 1941 – Jun 1942; returned to New Zealand for duty <date when="1942-08">Aug 1942</date> and held various senior staff appointments, including Commandant, New Zealand Staff College, Aug 1943 – Mar 1944; posted to 2nd NZEF (<name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name>), <date when="1946-03">Mar 1946</date>, seconded to HQ BCOF; returned to New Zealand, <date when="1947-07-27">27 Jul 1947</date>.</p><p>Lieutenant-Colonel Alec Wilkie Greville. Commanded advanced party 2nd NZEF, <date when="1939">1939</date>; Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, 1940–41; CO 24th Battalion, Dec 1941 – Jul 1942; killed in action, <name key="name-010927" type="place">Alamein</name>, <date when="1942-07-22">22 Jul 1942</date>.</p><p>Brigadier Reginald Miles, CBE, DSO, MC. Commander Royal New Zealand Artillery, 1940–41; commanded 2nd NZEF (<name key="name-029547" type="place">UK</name>) <date when="1940">1940</date>; taken prisoner of war, <date when="1941-12">Dec 1941</date>; escaped to <name key="name-035423" type="place">Switzerland</name> with Brigadier J. Hargest from prison camp near <name key="name-000842" type="place">Florence</name>, <date when="1943-03">Mar 1943</date>; died in <name key="name-007594" type="place">Spain</name> on way to <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, <date when="1943-10">Oct 1943</date>.</p><p>Brigadier Charles Staunton John Duff, DSO. CO 34th Anti-Tank Battery, 1939–40, 7th Anti-Tank Regiment, 1940–41; commanded Artillery Training Depot, <date when="1941">1941</date>; CO 4th Field Regiment, 1941–42; returned to New Zealand on duty, <date when="1942-06">Jun 1942</date>; Commander Royal Artillery, 3rd NZ Division, 1942–44; held various staff appointments in New Zealand, 1945–47; NZ Military Liaison Officer, <name key="name-001298" type="place">Melbourne</name>, 1947–48.</p><p>Brigadier George Herbert Clifton, DSO, MC. Brigade Major, 5th Brigade, <date when="1940">1940</date>; Commander Royal Engineers, 2nd NZ Division, 1940–41; Chief Engineer, 30th Corps, <date when="1941">1941</date>; commanded 6th Brigade, Feb – Sep 1942, when taken prisoner; escaped in <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>, <date when="1945-03">Mar 1945</date>; liaison officer with organisation for Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (<name key="name-005851" type="place">Far East</name>), <date when="1945">1945</date>; seconded to HQ BCOF (<name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name>), 1946–47.</p><p>Brigadier Stanley Herbert Crump, CBE, DSO. CRASC, 2nd NZ Division, 1940–45; commanded rear party organisation in <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name>, 1946–47; commanded 2nd NZEF (<name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name>), <date when="1947">1947</date>; on staff of HQ BCOF and NZ representative on Disposals Board in <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name> 1948–49.</p></note> Battalion and other officers for the First Echelon have already been selected. The Minister would normally make appointments as mentioned, but he, with General Duigan, would prefer that you should inform <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> before the appointments are finalised this week.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="46" xml:id="n46"/>
        <div type="section" n="16" xml:id="c6-16">
          <head>56<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-28">28 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The advice contained in your telegram of 22 November (<ref target="#c6-14">No. 54</ref>) is acknowledged with thanks. I fully appreciate that the course of action taken is entirely a matter for your Government. In view, however, of principles (1) and (5) proposed in your letter of <date when="1938-09-23">23 September 1938</date>,<note xml:id="ftn1-46" n="1"><p>See <ref type="appendix" target="#a3">Appendix 3</ref>.</p></note> and concurred in by one of my predecessors, that they ought to exchange decisions on defence policy and, for mutual advice, the fullest possible information in time of war, I regret that earlier consultation was not possible. My Government is of the view that further clarification of the situation in regard to <name key="name-007841" type="place">Holland</name> and possible repercussions on the <name key="name-020796" type="place">Netherlands East Indies</name> is necessary. Further local training of our forces affords a period for this without prejudicing our strength here or later co-operation when the forces are ready to take the field. I am announcing to the House tomorrow that our Special Division, which was raised for service at home or abroad as occasion might require or permit, will proceed overseas when it has reached a suitable stage in its training. It is anticipated that this will be early in the New Year. After further training overseas the Division should be able to take its place in a
<pb n="47" xml:id="n47"/>
theatre of war in the European spring. It has been suggested to Casey<note xml:id="ftn1-47" n="1"><p>Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, Australian delegate to the Ministerial Conference in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>.</p></note> that he consult with the United Kingdom Government and your representative on the co-ordination of our force's shipping requirements with New Zealand arrangements.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="17" xml:id="c6-17">
          <head>57<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The New Zealand Military Liaison Officer (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi><note xml:id="ftn2-47" n="2"><p>Brigadier R. S. Park, CBE, New Zealand Military Liaison Officer, <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>, throughout the war; at the time of reference a Lieutenant-Colonel. In <date when="1942-02">Feb 1942</date> he was appointed New Zealand representative on the <name key="name-022976" type="organisation">Joint Planning Staff</name>, Chiefs of Staff Committee, <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>.</p></note> <hi rend="i">to the Chief of the General Staff (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-28">28 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent"><name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> state that owing to difficulties of shipping and provision of escorts no convoys are possible from <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> and New Zealand between 28 December and 1 March. This entails the date of sailing of the New Zealand first group being advanced three weeks or delayed six weeks. No other alternative is possible. It is essential that the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>'s decision of the sailing date for the first group be cabled immediately.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="18" xml:id="c6-18">
          <head>58<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The New Zealand Military Liaison Officer (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to the Chief of the General Staff (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-29">29 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> requests that appointments to commands and staff of the first group be no longer delayed as he has full confidence in your selection. However, he would like to be consulted over appointments for the second and third groups.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="19" xml:id="c6-19">
          <head>59<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. W. Nash (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>) to the Hon. P. Fraser (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-29">29 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The New Zealand Government's decision to send the First Echelon overseas appears to have embarrassed the Australian Government,
<pb n="48" xml:id="n48"/>
and for your information in discussions with Casey the following facts may be of value:</p>
          <p rend="indent">On 21 November, the day following our formal offer to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>,<note xml:id="ftn1-48" n="1"><p>No. 50.</p></note> Menzies cabled stating that they were considering the very difficult questions connected with sending troops out of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> and suggesting that the despatch of Dominion troops could not be very urgent. The reasons he gave were the uncertain position in the <name key="name-005851" type="place">Far East</name>, the possible effect on the Dutch East Indies should <name key="name-007841" type="place">Holland</name> be invaded by <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>, and the unenthusiastic state of public opinion in <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> arising from the comparative inactivity on the Western Front and the small number of British divisions in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Menzies also commented that they were finding the greatest difficulties in obtaining even a fraction of the shipping needed for some of their exports, while there seemed to be no difficulty in securing ships and naval convoy for a military force.</p>
          <p rend="indent">For all these reasons they intended to watch the developments of the next three or four weeks before committing themselves to the despatch of their division overseas, but, not wanting to be out of step with us, they asked for our comments. We replied to Menzies on the next day informing him that we had already told the United Kingdom Government that we had decided to send the First Echelon overseas and were then waiting for the time of publication to be arranged before informing him of our action. We regretted that we had not discussed the matter earlier but had assumed that it was one of common arrangement with our respective Ministers in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>. We told him that we too had our particular problems, such as limited training facilities, lack of modern equipment, the desirability of sending the First Echelon overseas for advanced training, and the fact that the departure of the First Echelon would also make the initial training facilities available for those volunteering for the Second Echelon. We said, further, that the retention of our voluntary system of recruitment was to some extent dependent on the public knowledge of the fact that the men would serve overseas. We informed Menzies of the time of the announcement in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> and New Zealand as soon as we received your telegram on 23 November.<note xml:id="ftn2-48" n="2"><p>Not published. In this telegram Mr. Fraser stated that the announcement had been issued to the press.</p></note> It would appear that this action on our part was not welcome, and we are informed unofficially that Menzies considered that he should have been consulted before our decision was taken. It may be that he was embarrassed politically since Curtin<note xml:id="ftn3-48" n="3"><p>Mr. Curtin was at this time Leader of the Opposition in the Australian Federal Parliament.</p></note> had just stated publicly that he was opposed to the despatch
<pb n="49" xml:id="n49"/>
of troops overseas, and our announcement may have forced the Government's hand.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Today we have received another telegram from him (<ref target="#c6-16">No. 56</ref>) pointing out the desirability of exchanging information and decisions on defence policy and regretting that earlier consultation on the Expeditionary Force had not been possible. He stated that he was announcing today that he anticipated sending the Special Division overseas early in the New Year, and that he had suggested to Casey that he consult with the United Kingdom Government and with you regarding the co-ordination of shipping requirements for their forces with New Zealand arrangements. In view of the information contained in Park's telegram to Duigan this morning (<ref target="#c6-17">No. 57</ref>) it may be that some transport arrangements have already been made for <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> and New Zealand. I would be glad if you would consult with the United Kingdom Government urgently and let me have your comments in time for Cabinet's meeting tomorrow morning.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="20" xml:id="c6-20">
          <head>60<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser to the Prime Minister</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-29">29 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I regret that I am unable to confer with the United Kingdom Government or Casey in time for your Cabinet meeting tomorrow, but the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> who have already had under consideration the co-ordination of transport of the Australian and New Zealand forces state that the position is as follows: Owing to the desirability of Australian troops relieving British troops in Palestine by the end of January it is essential that the first Australian group should leave not later than the beginning of January. The Australian troops for early transport consist of three groups, and the New Zealand First Echelon one group. The shipping available for transport can carry two groups only and the remaining two groups must therefore be carried on the second voyage. The first two groups will probably leave on or about the end of December and the second two groups probably on or about the beginning of March. The First Echelon of New Zealand troops can proceed either with the first or second voyage, and the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> would be grateful for the very early expression of your wishes….<note xml:id="ftn1-49" n="1"><p>The text omitted requested an immediate reply to an earlier telegram and explained a delay in replying to points raised in other telegrams from the Prime Minister dated 28 and 29 Nov.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <pb n="50" xml:id="n50"/>
        <div type="section" n="21" xml:id="c6-21">
          <head>61<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser to the Prime Minister</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-11-30">30 November 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to your telegram of 29 November (<ref target="#c6-19">No. 59</ref>). While I much regret the apparent misapprehension in <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>, and although we should encourage all possible discussions and exchange of information, I have no doubt whatever about the correctness of the decision of the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> to despatch the First Echelon overseas, nor do I feel that there can be any suggestion of want of frankness with <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>. Negotiations for the despatch of the Australian forces have been proceeding here simultaneously with those for the despatch of the New Zealand forces, and indeed, after receipt of your telegram of 11 November (<ref target="#c6-7">No. 47</ref>), I stated on 16 November at a meeting with <name key="name-016917" type="organisation">War Cabinet</name>, in the presence of Casey, our intention to despatch the force. Neither then nor at any other time did Casey give me any indication that <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> was [not?] taking the same course, and, while at that meeting and subsequently Casey asked for further assurances with reference to the <name key="name-005851" type="place">Far East</name> situation and naval protection for Australian (territory?), he left no doubt as to the intention of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to despatch the force. I have at all times made it plain, as have you, that even the First Echelon will not be despatched without adequate naval escort nor should circumstances at the time not warrant it. You should note also that His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> have emphasised in the strongest possible terms the great importance they attach from the moral and psychological point of view to the association of Dominion troops with those of the Mother country.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The question of co-ordinating shipping has been dealt with in my telegram of 29 November (<ref target="#c6-20">No. 60</ref>). I understand that the Australian Government have not yet accepted the proposed dates.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I expect to leave <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> on Wednesday next with Berendsen and Waugh<note xml:id="ftn1-50" n="1"><p>John Thomson Waugh, private secretary to the Prime Minister; later joined the Royal New Zealand Air Force and lost his life in an aircraft presumed to have crashed into the sea <hi rend="i">en route</hi> from <name key="name-000854" type="place">Fiji</name> to New Zealand on <date when="1944-08-20">20 Aug 1944</date>.</p></note> and to catch the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120082" type="place">Niagara</name></hi> at <name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name> on 21 December.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 28 November (<ref target="#c6-15">No. 55</ref>). <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> feels that he must accept the recommendations of military advisers in New Zealand but considers that all over 40 years of age should submit to careful medical examination by a cardiologist. He suggests also, and I concur, that all appointments be subject to confirmation after Divisional training in Egypt….<note xml:id="ftn2-50" n="2"><p>For rest of text see <ref target="#c5-11"><hi rend="i">Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF</hi> (No. 37)</ref>.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <pb n="51" xml:id="n51"/>
        <div type="section" n="22" xml:id="c6-22">
          <head>62<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to the Hon. P. Fraser</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-12-02">2 December 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I acknowledge your telegrams of 29 and 30 November (<ref target="#c6-20">Nos. 60</ref> and <ref target="#c6-21">61</ref>). The Government have decided to send the First Echelon overseas on the first voyage. Your suggestion relative to <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>'s visit<note xml:id="ftn1-51" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c5-11"><hi rend="i">Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF</hi> (No. 37)</ref>.</p></note> coincides with Duigan's recommendation but his arrival on 24 December in <name key="name-002817" type="place">Auckland</name> is very close to the present projected date of departure of the echelon, 28 December. However, if the departure is delayed by one week, which Batterbee says may be possible, this would give <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> approximately ten days in the Dominion before the men left. Moreover, a delay of a week would be particularly valuable in view of normal Christmas holiday arrangements and the transport difficulties connected therewith.</p>
          <p rend="indent">We have been advised by Duigan that all matters relating to disembarkation, preparation of encampment and assembly of equipment for training, and other matters connected with the reception of troops in Egypt, would be <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>'s responsibility, and we are presuming that he will make the necessary arrangements before his arrival in New Zealand. Assuming that this could be done, we would be glad to know whether <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> wishes an advance party<note xml:id="ftn2-51" n="2"><p>The advanced party of the First Echelon, under the command of Major A. W. Greville, NZSC, DAQMG, 2nd NZEF, left New Zealand on <date when="1939-12-11">11 Dec 1939</date> and disembarked at <name key="name-001387" type="place">Port Said</name> on <date when="1940-01-07">7 Jan 1940</date>.</p></note> to proceed from New Zealand to assist in this work. While we assume that all the necessary arrangements have been made by the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> authorities in consultation with the Australian and New Zealand representatives overseas, we should be glad to know definitely that all fitting-out and equipment of transports will have been done before they arrive in New Zealand. We would also like to have explicit advice on the nature of the naval escort proposed. Presumably the only arrangements required of us here concern the men's clothing, blankets, and the provision of the thirty days' reserve food supplies asked for by the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name>. These matters are already in hand.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Whilst all staff positions will be subject to change if desired by <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name>, the best procedure would be for the appointments already notified to be gazetted. <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> has already informed Duigan (<ref target="#c6-18">No. 58</ref>) that he has full confidence in Duigan's selection of officers to fill these appointments.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="52" xml:id="n52"/>
        <div type="section" n="23" xml:id="c6-23">
          <head>63<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Hon. P. Fraser to the Prime Minister</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-12-05">5 December 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 3 December.<note xml:id="ftn1-52" n="1"><p>Not published. In this telegram the Prime Minister suggested <date when="1940-01-06">Saturday, 6 Jan 1940</date>, as the date of departure of the First Echelon.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> have now agreed to Saturday, 6 January, as the date of departure of the First Echelon from New Zealand, and arrangements are being made accordingly. The following ships, with their present passenger-carrying capacity shown in parentheses, have now been allotted to the New Zealand contingent: <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207162" type="ship">Dunera</name></hi> (1400), <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207163" type="ship">Rangitata</name></hi> (533), <hi rend="i">Orion</hi> (1112), <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207164" type="ship">Sobieski</name></hi> (1150), <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207165" type="ship">Empress of Canada</name></hi> (800), <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207166" type="ship">Strathnaver</name></hi> (1123). This list is subject to adjustment.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The ships will be victualled by their owners and the troops will be carried as passengers. Additional accommodation required will be installed and details of distribution among the convoy will be telegraphed later. Park will inquire as to vehicles and will telegraph you as soon as possible.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It is essential that the date and all arrangements in connection with departure, including escort, should be kept in the highest degree of secrecy.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I was not at first satisfied with the escort proposed but have today seen the First Lord<note xml:id="ftn2-52" n="2"><p>Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty.</p></note> and he is now making arrangements which I regard as satisfactory. I shall convey details on my return….<note xml:id="ftn3-52" n="3"><p>The text omitted concerned the extension of Lord Galway's term of office as Governor-General, the use of secret cipher, &amp;c.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="24" xml:id="c6-24">
          <head>64<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The General Officer Commanding, British Troops in Egypt</hi><note xml:id="ftn4-52" n="4"><p>Field-Marshal Lord Wilson, GCB, GBE, DSO; in <date when="1940">1940</date> Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. GOC-in-C, British Troops in Egypt, 1939–40; Military Governor and GOC-in-C, <name key="name-003430" type="place">Cyrenaica</name>, <date when="1941">1941</date>; GOC-in-C, British Troops in <name key="name-002294" type="place">Greece</name>, <date when="1941">1941</date>; GOC, British Forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, <date when="1941">1941</date>; C-in-C, Allied Forces in <name key="name-003449" type="place">Syria</name>, <date when="1941">1941</date> (GOC 9th Army); C-in-C, <name key="name-021954" type="place">Persia</name>-Iraq Command, 1942–43; C-in-C, <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, <date when="1943">1943</date>; Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, <date when="1944">1944</date>; Head of British Joint Staff Mission in <name key="name-202800" type="place">Washington</name>, 1945–47.</p></note> <hi rend="i">(<name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>) to the Chief of the General Staff (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-12-09">9 December 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>, in his first communication [to the Minister of Defence] as the official chief, reports that all arrangements relating
<pb n="53" xml:id="n53"/>
to the disembarkation and reception of New Zealand troops in Egypt and standing camps for accommodation are in hand. The question of the early assembly of arms, equipment, and vehicles in Egypt for training is being urged on the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name>. There was little latitude in the selection of the concentration area as other divisions are already here.</p>
          <p rend="indent">After consultation with the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Troops in Egypt, two sites appear possible: on the <name key="name-001365" type="place">Suez Canal</name> or near <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>. Certain serious defects make the <name key="name-001365" type="place">Suez Canal</name> site unsuitable. Training areas are soft sand, unsuitable for vehicles without desert equipment; no amenities nearer than 23 miles; some risk of malaria. <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> sites: El Maadi—6 miles from <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>. <name key="name-000935" type="place">Helwan</name>—15 miles from <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> with a ten-minute train service. El Maadi will take the whole of the First Echelon, and <name key="name-000935" type="place">Helwan</name> the Second and Third Echelons.</p>
          <p rend="indent">These sites have serviceable training areas, with hard desert, are healthy, and relatively free from mosquitoes and sandflies. Their proximity to <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> affords adequate amenities. Have inspected <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> sites.</p>
          <p rend="indent">An early decision is essential as eight weeks only remain and time is the important factor. It will be necessary to arrange water, sanitation, and buildings; large numbers of hutted cookhouses, dining halls, and institutes. Owing to the late start hutting cannot be completed before the arrival of the First Echelon.</p>
          <p rend="indent">After taking all available advice in the short time possible, have agreed, on your behalf, to General Wilson's proposal that the <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> sites be approved. Am certain this action is in the best interests and I have made every effort to obtain full information before deciding. Accommodation in tents—four men each—with bed-boards, palliasses, and mosquito nets when necessary. Huts for dining halls, kitchens, men's institutes, officers' and sergeants' messes, stores huts, offices, and bath houses. Owing to the late decision not all will be completed by the time of arrival, but I have given orders for priority of buildings to ensure the minimum interference with comfort….<note xml:id="ftn1-53" n="1"><p>The text omitted dealt with the advantages of the <name key="name-026979" type="organisation">NAAFI</name> (Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes) canteen service and enumerated equipment required from New Zealand for officers' and sergeants' messes.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">British Troops in Egypt using <name key="name-026979" type="organisation">NAAFI</name> service, which, if wanted, is available for us. It is in no way obligatory for the New Zealanders to employ <name key="name-026979" type="organisation">NAAFI</name> but it may be advantageous owing to the limited stay here. <name key="name-004203" type="place">Maadi Camp</name> will have nine large canteens, each catering for 700…. Suggest, therefore, that no decision should be reached upon the question of employment of <name key="name-026979" type="organisation">NAAFI</name>
<pb n="54" xml:id="n54"/>
before I give a detailed explanation of the situation to unit commanders on my arrival.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Cheap postal concessions on letters ex Egypt being arranged for the New Zealand Division.<note xml:id="ftn1-54" n="1"><p>The above text, taken from the GOC's files, differs in many places from that of the telegram received by the Chief of the General Staff.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="25" xml:id="c6-25">
          <head>65<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to the Prime Minister</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1939-12-13">13 December 1939</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Further to Mr. Fraser's telegram of 5 December (<ref target="#c6-23">No. 63</ref>), the Ministry of Shipping now advise that the ships allotted to the First Echelon are <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207162" type="ship">Dunera</name></hi> (capacity 1476) due <name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name> 24 December, <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207168" type="ship">Otranto</name></hi> (1484) due 2 January, <hi rend="i">Orion</hi> (1500) due 2 January, <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207163" type="ship">Rangitata</name></hi> (535), <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207164" type="ship">Sobieski</name></hi> (1150) due 22 December, <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207165" type="ship">Empress of Canada</name></hi> (800) due 31 December.<note xml:id="ftn2-54" n="2"><p>The allocation was later changed. The six transports which conveyed the First Echelon to Egypt were <hi rend="i">Orion</hi>, 23,371 tons, Orient Line; <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207167" type="ship">Strathaird</name></hi>, 22,281 tons (which replaced <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207168" type="ship">Otranto</name></hi>), Peninsular and Oriental Line; <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207165" type="ship">Empress of Canada</name></hi>, 21,517 tons, Canadian-<name key="name-008892" type="place">Pacific</name>; <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207163" type="ship">Rangitata</name></hi>, 16,737 tons, New Zealand Shipping Company; <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207164" type="ship">Sobieski</name></hi>, 11,030 tons, Gdynia-America Line; <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207162" type="ship">Dunera</name></hi>, 11,162 tons, British India Steam Navigation Company. The <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207165" type="ship">Empress of Canada</name></hi> was torpedoed by a U-boat in the South Atlantic and sunk, <date when="1943-03-13">13 Mar 1943</date>.</p></note> The New Zealand Naval Board are being advised by His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> of their responsibility concerning convoy arrangements, &amp;c. The actual allocation of personnel to vessels will be the responsibility of the military authorities….<note xml:id="ftn3-54" n="3"><p>Details of messing scales and charges for troop transports, and of cargo and equipment to be carried, have been omitted.</p></note> So far as can be seen, all vessels will be available at the port of embarkation at least three days before the programmed dates of sailing in order to allow adequate time for embarkation, &amp;c. The <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207164" type="ship">Sobieski</name></hi> belongs to the Polish mercantile marine and has been chartered by the Ministry of Transport as a troop transport. To prevent any inconvenience in administration a British Master and nucleus staff are being placed on board for liaison duties with personnel. Please telegraph as early as possible your agreement in general with these proposals.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="55" xml:id="n55"/>
        <div type="section" n="26" xml:id="c6-26">
          <head>66<lb/>
<hi rend="sc">Report by the Hon. P. Fraser on his Visit to England in</hi> <date when="1939">1939</date><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <p rend="indent">Arrangements were being finalised for the despatch of New Zealand forces towards the end of January but in the first place the question arose as to where they should go.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Expert opinion was completely unanimous on this subject. While there was a general appreciation of the advantages that would be gained by bringing New Zealand and Australian troops to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, particularly from the psychological point of view of the association of the men with their kinsfolk in Great Britain, nevertheless there were two main reasons which out-weighed these advantages: the first was the undesirability of bringing the troops from a New Zealand summer to a winter in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> into probably unprepared quarters, and the second and deciding factor was the desirability of keeping a strategical reserve in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, where, in addition, the climate was stated to be reasonably healthy, and where training facilities and training areas could readily be made available. The deciding factor was, of course, that of the strategical reserve, and I had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that we should accept the request of the British Government that our troops should proceed to Egypt and the Australians to Palestine. This having been arranged, the next step was a somewhat surprising one relating to the date of departure. This was, of course, complicated by the necessity, firstly, of having the necessary shipping available to transport large bodies of men and, secondly, and this was the important factor in this connection, the escort. Shipping difficulties prevented the whole of the Australian forces and the New Zealand First Echelon being moved at the same time, and the provision of the necessary escort rendered it essential, in the opinion of the Admiralty, that the combined Australian and New Zealand forces should move in two bodies, the first towards the end of December or the beginning of January, and the second towards the beginning of March. The awkwardness of the situation that thus developed was realised in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>, but the British authorities felt that they had no alternative in the matter, and the best they could do for New Zealand was to give us the option of joining either the first or the second voyage. I should like to say here that the prompt decision of the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> in admittedly difficult circumstances was greatly appreciated in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> by the British authorities, and indeed, by myself, and the arrangements that have now been made are, I think,
<pb n="56" xml:id="n56"/>
on the whole satisfactory. In particular, the ships to be provided as transports and the accommodation for the troops seemed to be very good.</p>
          <p rend="indent">On the question of escort,<note xml:id="ftn1-56" n="1"><p>Naval escort for the First Echelon convoy, later joined by Australian troopships, was: <name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>–<name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name>, <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110017" type="place">Canberra</name>, <name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name>, Leander</hi>; <name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name>-<name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name>, <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110017" type="place">Canberra</name>, <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>, <name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi>; <name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name>–Colombo, <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name>, <name key="name-008315" type="place">Kent</name></hi>, and French cruiser <hi rend="i">Suffren</hi>; Colombo – <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name> – Port Tewfik, <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name>, <name key="name-120032" type="place">Sussex</name>, Hobart, Westcott</hi>, and <hi rend="i">Eagle.</hi> (HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi>, battleship, 29,150 tons, eight 15-inch guns; HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110017" type="place">Canberra</name></hi>, 8-inch cruiser, 9850 tons; HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi>, 6-inch cruiser, 7270 tons; HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi>, 8-inch cruiser, 9870 tons; HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008315" type="place">Kent</name></hi>, 8-inch cruiser, 10,000 tons; <hi rend="i">Suffren</hi> (French), 8-inch cruiser, 10,000 tons; HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120032" type="place">Sussex</name></hi>, 8-inch cruiser, 9830 tons; HMS <hi rend="i">Eagle</hi>, aircraft-carrier, 22,600 tons (sunk by torpedo in <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name>, <date when="1942-08">Aug 1942</date>); HMAS <hi rend="i">Hobart</hi>, 6-inch cruiser, 7105 tons; HMS <hi rend="i">Westcott</hi>, destroyer, 4-inch guns, 1100 tons.)</p></note> I had in the first place some small difficulties. The original suggestion, so far as the New Zealand First Echelon was concerned, was that the convoy should be escorted to <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> by HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110458" type="ship">Leander</name></hi> only, and, from <name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name> onwards, that the escort should be strengthened by HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207203" type="ship">Ramillies</name></hi> and by Australian cruisers. I at once made representations to the Admiralty that I could not regard the <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> as sufficient escort across the Tasman, and although the naval officers who saw me on the matter informed me that the Admiralty were convinced that there was no risk involved, I remained firm….<note xml:id="ftn2-56" n="2"><p>The original of the report is missing. This draft was supplied by courtesy of Mr. Fraser.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">I think we may be satisfied that the escort now provided is adequate against any scale of attack that is at all likely to be made, but the First Lord gave me the assurance that if there were at the time any fear of submarines being in the vicinity of the route to be taken (which he thought in the highest degree unlikely) he would at once arrange for the despatch of the necessary destroyers to deal with such a menace.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I should perhaps add here, as I have mentioned previously, that the First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) was immensely appreciative of the steps that were taken by the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>, not only to play an early part in general operations but also to meet the admittedly difficult situation that had developed in regard to the time of departure. Indeed, he spoke in terms of emotion and expressed an obviously genuine gratitude for and admiration of the attitude of co-operation which the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> had so generously adopted….<note xml:id="ftn3-56" n="3"><p>See <ref target="#c5-12"><hi rend="i">Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF</hi> (No. 38)</ref> for rest of text.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <pb n="57" xml:id="n57"/>
        <div type="section" n="27" xml:id="c6-27">
          <head>67<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>) to Headquarters, British Troops in Egvpt</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-01-03">3 January 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I have inspected the First Echelon. Its training has suffered from lack of equipment, ammunition, vehicles, and weapons. The force will require a further period of individual training and cannot be ready for war for three months.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="28" xml:id="c6-28">
          <head>68<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-01-13">13 January 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are in some doubt whether the naval escort proposed for the First Echelon of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force from <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name> to its destination<note xml:id="ftn1-57" n="1"><p>Port Tewfik.</p></note> is adequate, and they would be grateful for an assurance from the Admiralty to that effect.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="29" xml:id="c6-29">
          <head>69<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-01-24">24 January 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 13 January (<ref target="#c6-28">No. 68</ref>). The Admiralty state that the escort arrangements communicated to the New Zealand Naval Board in their telegram of 28 December,<note xml:id="ftn2-57" n="2"><p>Not published. Admiralty instructions for the conduct of the convoy, covering its composition, escort, command, route, itinerary, and fuelling arrangements, were given in this telegram.</p></note> and concurred in by the Board in their message of 30 December,<note xml:id="ftn3-57" n="3"><p>Not published.</p></note> are still considered adequate. Should the situation change, the necessary measures will be taken by the Admiralty to provide whatever additional protection the circumstances may require.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In addition to the agreed escort of one cruiser for each group after passing <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name>, the Admiralty state further that arrangements have been made to double the Perim patrol while the convoy is in the Gulf of <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name> and the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="58" xml:id="n58"/>
        <div type="section" n="30" xml:id="c6-30">
          <head>70<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>, General Officer Commanding, 2nd NZEF, to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-02-15">15 February 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I have to report that I have come from <name key="name-006674" type="place">Suez</name> where I have been round the last two ships of the convoy which brought the New Zealand troops to <name key="name-006674" type="place">Suez</name>. You will have seen the official report which Reuters cabled.<note xml:id="ftn1-58" n="1"><p>Not published.</p></note> It is my wish that you should have now a more detailed statement dealing entirely with the New Zealand point of view.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The work of guarding the convoy was carried out by the <name key="name-003205" type="organisation">Royal Navy</name>, assisted by a powerful escort comprising ships of the <name key="name-003205" type="organisation">Royal Navy</name>, the <name key="name-020009" type="organisation">Royal Australian Navy</name>, the New Zealand Division of the <name key="name-003205" type="organisation">Royal Navy</name>, and the French Navy. No member of the force will ever forget the wonderful and imposing sight of that fleet of great liners and warships as day by day it forged unmolested towards its goal. The imposing spectacle was photographed from the air by the official cameraman, who circled round the leading ships as they steamed up the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The whole trip will be remembered by all ranks. It is the first time that troops leaving New Zealand have travelled in great liners of British and foreign mercantile marines. It was very different from travelling in the holds of cargo ships, as their predecessors travelled. On this journey the men had the spacious decks of these liners for deck games, and the swimming baths. In many ways it resembled a cruise though, of course, every available opportunity was taken to continue the military training and physical drill of all ranks. I am glad to report that as a result of the healthy life led by the force, with the exception of a few minor accidents and one death, the men arrived looking bronzed and the picture of health….<note xml:id="ftn2-58" n="2"><p>The text omitted referred to the death and burial at sea of a member of the force.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">Shore leave was granted to the men at both ports of call and this privilege was enjoyed by all to the full. In the case of going on shore in the Australian port [<name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name>], the Australians proved most hospitable. I am to report that the behaviour of the men was good, and their popularity with the townspeople was exceptional and their welcome most whole-hearted. I am certain that if, on future occasions, men go ashore at this port, they will have a similar welcome. The visit on shore at the other port [Colombo] was looked forward to by all because it was their first introduction to the
<pb n="59" xml:id="n59"/>
mysteries of the East. The visit was fully enjoyed. They bought many souvenirs which have been posted off to relatives and friends in New Zealand, who will no doubt later receive queer-looking parcels and surprises.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The men are now in the process of being disembarked at <name key="name-006674" type="place">Suez</name> by the Embarkation Staff and, as I write here in my office at <name key="name-006644" type="place">Divisional Headquarters</name> in our camp, I can hear the strains of the band of a famous British regiment and the pipes and drums of a famous Scottish regiment playing one of our units into camp, where an excellent meal has been provided for them, and where they will draw their bedding and equipment and make themselves comfortable for the night.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I am just off now to see the men marching in and when I return shall send a further telegram reporting what I have seen in the units' camps.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The disembarkation will take from three to four days to complete; so far only two units and some details have arrived. The situation in camp is one of orderly confusion, which will take some days to clear up. All hands are wiring in to do this.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="31" xml:id="c6-31">
          <head>71<lb/>
<hi rend="sc">Report by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd NZEF, to the Minister of Defence</hi><lb/>
[<hi rend="i">Extract</hi>]</head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-02-19">19 February 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">….<note xml:id="ftn1-59" n="1"><p>This extract is from a long report by <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence. The report gave an account of the voyage from New Zealand to Egypt and reviewed the behaviour of the troops during leave at ports of call; the arrival and official welcome at <name key="name-006674" type="place">Suez</name>, accommodation and welfare facilities at <name key="name-004262" type="place">Maadi</name>, leave arrangements, health precautions, and training programme were other subjects covered.</p></note> The journey of the First Echelon ended at <name key="name-006674" type="place">Suez</name> on 12 February…. It was a most impressive moment for us all. Soon after daybreak on the 12th, the leading transports steamed into the harbour and were met by me and such members of our staff as had already arrived in Egypt. A little later a launch bearing the Ambassador's flag brought out Sir Miles Lampson, the British Ambassador to Egypt, Mr. Anthony Eden, and the immediate military chiefs. After introductions all round to the senior officers on the ship and the nurses, the distinguished visitors went to the after-deck. Speaking from the hatch cover, under the red ensign of the Mercantile Marine, with the men filling every vantage point,
<pb n="60" xml:id="n60"/>
including the rigging, the Ambassador announced that he had a message to read from His Majesty the King, signed by the King's own hand. This was loudly cheered. The King's message was as follows:</p>
          <q>
            <p rend="indent">I know well that the splendid tradition established by the armed forces of New Zealand will be worthily upheld by you, who have left your homes to fight for the cause that the whole Empire has made its own.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Now that you have entered the field of active service, I send you a very warm welcome, together with my best wishes for your welfare.</p>
          </q>
          <closer>
            <signed rend="right">(Signed) GEORGE R.I.</signed>
          </closer>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="32" xml:id="c6-32">
          <head>72<lb/>
<hi rend="sc">Supplementary Report by the Rt. Hon. P. Fraser on Arrangements for the Escort of the First Echelon</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1948-10-05">5 October 1948</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">During my visit to <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> in <date when="1939">1939</date> the question of the naval escort for the ships conveying our First Echelon to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> was discussed with the Admiralty. The matter had also been the subject of cable discussion with the <name key="name-024927" type="organisation">Naval Board</name> in <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">A Captain came from the Lords of the Admiralty to see me at the Savoy Hotel, <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>. He expressed the Admiralty's regrets that a more senior officer was not available to convey the message. I replied that I did not attach any importance to the rank of the officer conveying the message but was very much concerned about the nature of the message itself. He stated that a cruiser could not be sent from <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> and that the <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> would be the only naval vessel to escort the First Echelon across the <name key="name-000100" type="place">Tasman Sea</name> to <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>, where they would join with the ships carrying the first Australian forces also bound for the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. In Australia a stronger naval escort consisting of several cruisers would be waiting.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In reply I requested the officer to convey my compliments to the Admiralty and to inform the Sea Lords and all concerned that the ships conveying our First Echelon would not sail from New Zealand unless more adequate naval protection was provided.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Some days later, in acceptance of an invitation from Mr. Churchill, who was then First Lord, I waited on him at the Admiralty. I met Mr. Churchill for the first time on this occasion having been unable
<pb n="61" xml:id="n61"/>
for various reasons to accept previous invitations from him to dinner and luncheon. On my being shown into the room by Captain Tennant (later Admiral Tennant)<note xml:id="ftn1-61" n="1"><p>Admiral Sir William George Tennant, KCB, CBE, MVO. Senior Naval Officer, <name key="name-003521" type="place">Dunkirk</name>, during the evacuation of the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name>, May–Jun 1940; appointed Commanding Officer HMS <hi rend="i">Repulse</hi> <date when="1940-06-18">18 Jun 1940</date> and served on her till she was sunk in company with HMS <hi rend="i">Prince of Wales</hi> off Malay Peninsula, <date when="1941-12-10">10 Dec 1941</date>; as Rear-Admiral, 4th Cruiser Squadron, was in charge of naval operations covering occupation of Madagascar, <date when="1942-09">Sep 1942</date>; appointed Flag Officer, <name key="name-026342" type="place">Levant</name> and Eastern Mediterranean, <date when="1944-11-05">5 Nov 1944</date>; Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies Station, 1946-49.</p></note> Mr Churchill, after shaking hands, immediately informed me that His Majesty's Ship <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110017" type="place">Canberra</name></hi> would go to New Zealand to escort our First Echelon, as well as the <hi rend="i">Leander.</hi> I thanked him very cordially for this decision and then stated that I thought he and the Admiralty could do better still.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I explained that a battleship had never visited New Zealand and that it was a splendid and, indeed, a unique opportunity to strengthen New Zealand's war effort, intensifying the already high morale of the New Zealand people, by sending a battleship to accompany our troops. Mr. Churchill immediately agreed that it was a splendid suggestion and made a note upon an envelope which was lying conveniently near and said it would be done.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As a result, some weeks later the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi>, under the command of Captain Baillie-Grohman (now Admiral Baillie-Grohman)<note xml:id="ftn2-61" n="2"><p><name key="name-005040" type="person">Vice-Admiral H. T. Baillie-Grohman</name>, CB, DSO, OBE. Commanding Officer HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> from 5 Jan 1939 to Jan 1941; during evacuation from <name key="name-002294" type="place">Greece</name>, <date when="1941-04">Apr 1941</date>, served as Flag Officer attached <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> at Army Headquarters; appointed to HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120039" type="place">Nile</name></hi> (<name key="name-000576" type="place">Alexandria</name>) for special service on staff of Commander-in-Chief, <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name>; appointed to HMS <hi rend="i">Badger</hi> (parent ship, Harwich) in command of Base, <date when="1944-03-01">1 Mar 1944</date>; Flag Officer in Command, <name key="name-007788" type="place">Kiel</name>, <date when="1945-05-08">8 May 1945</date>.</p></note> entered Wellington Harbour with a banner flying on which were the words ‘Well done <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110456" type="ship">Achilles</name></hi>’ in honour of the part played by the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110456" type="ship">Achilles</name></hi>, under the command of Captain Parry (now Admiral Parry),<note xml:id="ftn3-61" n="3"><p><name key="name-005810" type="person">Vice-Admiral W. E. Parry</name>, CB. Commanding Officer HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110456" type="ship">Achilles</name></hi> 27 Jan 1939 to 15 Oct 1940; Chief of the New Zealand Naval Staff, First Naval Member of the New Zealand Naval Board and Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron 1 May – 15 Oct 1940; relinquished command of the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110456" type="ship">Achilles</name></hi> and post as Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron on <date when="1940-10-15">15 Oct 1940</date>, but retained Commodore's rank as Chief of Naval Staff and First Naval Member till <date when="1942-06-30">30 Jun 1942</date>, when he returned to England; appointed Commanding Officer HMS <hi rend="i">Renown</hi> <date when="1943-01-02">2 Jan 1943</date>; commanded Naval Force ‘L’ (Follow-up) of Eastern Task Force covering British landing operations on <name key="name-016111" type="place">Normandy</name> beaches on <date when="1944-06-06">6 Jun 1944</date>; Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiralty, Jul 1946 – May 1948; promoted Vice-Admiral, <date when="1948-01-04">4 Jan 1948</date>; appointed Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Naval Staff, <name key="name-020011" type="organisation">Royal Indian Navy</name>, <date when="1948-07">Jul 1948</date>.</p></note> in the Battle of the <name key="name-030591" type="place">River Plate</name>.</p>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb n="62" xml:id="n62"/>
      <div type="chapter" n="7" xml:id="c7">
        <head>First Echelon in Egypt: Command and Employment</head>
        <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c7-1">
          <head>73<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-02-28">28 February 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Advice has been received from the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> that the Military Secretary of the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name> has raised the question whether, in the event of the Dominion forces joining the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name>, staff officers of such formations are to be regarded as other staff officers within the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name> and whether they can be made available for transfer, upgrading, &amp;c., into British formations. Similarly, can British staff officers be appointed to Dominion formations? Secondly, in regard to brigade and unit commanders and seconds-in-command, is it intended to keep the Dominion forces intact or should the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name> draw on them, and <hi rend="i">vice versa</hi>, as the demands of efficiency suggest? Thirdly, he states that very many advantages would result in pooling our resources both in the case of staff and commanders, and also that the interchanges and infusion of new blood would mutually benefit both British and Dominion formations. The War Office would appreciate your views on the above proposals. I am advising Headquarters, 2nd NZEF, by air mail.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c7-2">
          <head>74<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Chief of the General Staff (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>) to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> (<name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>) [Extract]</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-03-02">2 March 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">…. <note xml:id="ftn1-62" n="1"><p>Text omitted concerned the appointment of commanding officers for 5th and 6th Field Regiments, New Zealand Artillery.</p></note> The High Commissioner for New Zealand in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> has communicated with you by air mail regarding the interchange of staff officers of the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name> and those of the Dominion forces; similarly in regard to brigade
<pb n="63" xml:id="n63"/>
and unit commanders. The Government do not like this idea. On receipt of Jordan's air mail letter I would be glad to have your views by cable. The progress of the Second Echelon is very satisfactory.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c7-3">
          <head>75<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-03-11">11 March 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following telegram has been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>:<note xml:id="ftn1-63" n="1"><p>Rt. Hon. <name key="name-005377" type="person">Lord Killearn</name>, PC, GCMG, CB, MVO; at time of reference, Sir Miles Wedderburn Lampson.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">On <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>'s invitation I attended a parade this morning of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force and was privileged to take the salute. The men looked in fine fettle and are evidently settling down well in their new surroundings. As I told them, their general bearing and appearance was most impressive.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="4" xml:id="c7-4">
          <head>76<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to the High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-03-20">20 March 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 28 February (<ref target="#c7-1">No. 73</ref>). It is the wish of the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> that New Zealand staff officers should be retained for service with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. The same applies to brigade and unit commanders and seconds-in-command.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="5" xml:id="c7-5">
          <head>77<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-25">25 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">In the terms of the emergency powers given me by the New Zealand Cabinet as General Officer Commanding, New Zealand Expeditionary Force, <note xml:id="ftn2-63" n="2"><p>See <ref target="#c5-13"><hi rend="i">Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF</hi> (No. 39)</ref>.</p></note> I was empowered to commit the New Zealand Expeditionary Force to active operations in the event of
<pb n="64" xml:id="n64"/>
an emergency. My move to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name><note xml:id="ftn1-64" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c8-52"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-000815" type="organisation">Second Echelon</name></hi> (No. 152)</ref>.</p></note> and <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s possible action in the near future may necessitate fresh powers being given to a competent military commander on the spot. For the information of Cabinet, the training of the troops has progressed well, but it has been greatly handicapped by lack of equipment and latterly by very hot weather. Collective training upon a full scale has been handicapped by the absence of necessary instruments and signal equipment and by the shortage of many classes of weapons, in most cases only 25 per cent being available. Even if complete equipment is made available from the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> war reserve a further period of training is necessary before the force could be used for active operations. At present the New Zealand Expeditionary Force are responsible for the security of <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name><!-- Cairo, security of -->, where more than 30,000 Italians live and where fifth column activities may be attempted. Later, when <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> is pacified, units may be required to garrison defences or have some other role connected with the internal security of Egypt. Had I been here and time did not permit the whole question being referred to the New Zealand Cabinet, I should have agreed to commit the force to the defence of Egypt<!-- Egypt, defence of -->. As speed is the essence of combating fifth column activities I recommend that in my absence authority be given to General Wilson, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief [British Troops in] Egypt, to use the 2nd NZEF in defence of our vital interests here.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="6" xml:id="c7-6">
          <head>78<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-26">26 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">In view of the way the situation appears to be developing and the threat of impending hostilities with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>, the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> are strongly of the opinion that you should remain in Egypt and that you should not proceed to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> at this juncture. Please act accordingly unless you can show us strong reasons to the contrary, which will receive every consideration. We feel that Falla<note xml:id="ftn2-64" n="2"><p>Brigadier N. S. Falla, CMG, DSO, Commandant 2nd NZEF Base, <name key="name-004203" type="place">Maadi Camp</name>, Egypt, Nov 1940 - Jun 1941; released from 2nd NZEF and attached to British Ministry of Transport, <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>, as New Zealand representative; died at sea, <date when="1945">1945</date>. In <date when="1940-02">Feb 1940</date> Lieutenant-Colonel Falla was appointed Base Commandant, NZ Overseas Base, and at this time was in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p></note> and Park, in co-operation with the High Commissioner, can adequately look after accommodation, &amp;c., for the Second Echelon in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p>
          <pb n="65" xml:id="n65"/>
          <p rend="indent">On the assumption that you remain in Egypt and retain immediate and personal command, we authorise you to use New Zealand troops as you suggest for operations against any possible fifth column, and subsequently on any necessary garrison or other duty in defence of Egypt<!-- Egypt, defence of --> for which your force is adequately trained, fitted, and equipped. This authority is subject to the express condition that you should not, except in an emergency of which you must be the judge, commit your troops to any operations for which, in your opinion, they are not yet adequately trained, fitted, and equipped.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Having regard to your telegram of 25 May (<ref target="#c7-5">No. 77</ref>) and to previous reports on the subject, please telegraph at once a report as to: (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) the extent to which you are without necessary equipment or ammunition for the operations contemplated, and (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) the reserve supplies of ammunition and equipment in Egypt upon which you can draw if necessary. In particular we would like to know whether you have at your disposal, or can at once obtain, sufficient small-arms ammunition.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="7" xml:id="c7-7">
          <head>79<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Prime Minister</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-26">26 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I am in general agreement with the contents of your most secret telegram of 26 May (<ref target="#c7-6">No. 78</ref>) and will communicate them to the Commander-in-Chief, who is in accord with your views. For the information of Cabinet, there are ample war reserves of ammunition and equipment here and the men are well trained and fit for the limited operations contemplated by the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. In the event of war with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> the situation in Egypt is giving no anxiety. The Italian forces are unlikely to take the offensive due to <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name>'s geographical position between <name key="name-004869" type="place">Tunis</name> and Egypt; they have no sea communications with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>, and the lack of drinking water and roads across the desert between <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name> and the <name key="name-120039" type="place">Nile</name> valley would prevent operations by an army of any size. Although mobilisation equipment for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force has not yet arrived, the garrison of Egypt is adequately equipped and large reserves of troops are available for Palestine and <name key="name-003449" type="place">Syria</name>. I am not anxious about arrangements for the reception, accommodation, and comfort of the Second Echelon in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. MacCormick<note xml:id="ftn1-65" n="1"><p>Brigadier K. MacCormick, CB, CBE, DSO, ED; at this time Assistant Director of <name key="name-016593" type="organisation">Medical Services</name>, New Zealand Division; on <date when="1940-10-01">1 Oct 1940</date> became Deputy Director of <name key="name-016593" type="organisation">Medical Services</name>, 2nd NZEF (later Director of <name key="name-016593" type="organisation">Medical Services</name>), with rank of Brigadier.</p></note> and Greville know every detail, and I am sending
<pb n="66" xml:id="n66"/>
King<note xml:id="ftn1-66" n="1"><p>Brigadier T. J. King, CBE, New Zealand Ordnance Corps; at this time a Lieutenenant-Colonel.</p></note> and Crump for Ordnance and <name key="name-003197" type="organisation">RASC</name> problems, making a strong team under Falla. The troops are in great heart and are longing to get to the active work for which they are being trained. One month with full-scale equipment would fit these men for <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>. From all accounts the Second Echelon have benefited from the new training syllabus and I feel that with two months' collective training they would be fit for war. What I wish my Minister to realise is that none of the senior officers of the Second Echelon are fit to start unit or collective training without first being trained themselves. Every day I am kept from taking their preparation in hand will delay the ultimate preparedness of the troops. While for the present I agree that I should stay here, the situation <hi rend="i">vis-à-vis</hi> the Allies and <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> may ease or be precipitated in the next few days, and the question whether my presence is most useful here or in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> could then be reconsidered. As you will no doubt appreciate, splitting a force always raises problems of this kind.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="8" xml:id="c7-8">
          <head>80<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-13">13 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Further to my telegram of 26 May (<ref target="#c7-7">No. 79</ref>), the situation here is really unchanged by <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s declaration of war. The round-up of Fascist leaders by the police went off smoothly and the danger of the fifth column is now greatly reduced. In the existing circumstances the garrison of Egypt appears to be more than adequate. The possibility of active operations for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force is remote. Due to shortage of equipment no further headway with the training of the First Echelon can be made. I submit that I should now proceed to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> with the training staff to train the Second Echelon. Will you cable if you approve my going? Air passages to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> are now more difficult. It would help me administratively to have a forecast from Cabinet as to their ultimate plans.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="67" xml:id="n67"/>
        <div type="section" n="9" xml:id="c7-9">
          <head>81<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-14">14 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My message of 13 June (<ref target="#c7-8">No. 80</ref>) crossed the Prime Minister's message of the same date [14 June]. <note xml:id="ftn1-67" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c8-75"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-000815" type="organisation">Second Echelon</name></hi> (No. 175)</ref>. The difference in time between New Zealand and the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> is responsible for the above error in the date of the message being acknowledged.</p></note> An urgent reply to my question is required as planes to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> are scarce and one leaves with a seat for self and Colonel Stewart on Sunday, via Sahara.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="10" xml:id="c7-10">
          <head>82<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Minister of Defence to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name><lb/>
[Extract]</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-15">15 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegrams of 13 and 14 June (<ref target="#c7-8">Nos. 80</ref> and <ref target="#c7-9">81</ref>). The Government approve of your proceeding to <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> at your discretion….<note xml:id="ftn2-67" n="2"><p>For complete text see <ref target="#c8-80"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-000815" type="organisation">Second Echelon</name></hi> (No. 180)</ref>.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="11" xml:id="c7-11">
          <head>83<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Chief of the General Staff (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-16">16 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following is for the Minister of Defence and General Duigan: As arranged with the Minister, I leave here on the 17th arriving in England approximately on the 21st. After the 17th all personal or very secret telegrams for me should be addressed to the High Commissioner for New Zealand in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>; all telegrams involving new matters should go to <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> with a copy to Headquarters, 2nd NZEF, <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>; all other telegrams should go to Headquarters, 2nd NZEF, <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>. Headquarters' office staff will still be in <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> with Stevens and Gentry for (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) administration, and (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) training of Divisional units, for both of which purposes they deal direct with me. Puttick is responsible for training the 4th Infantry Brigade and for local administration and discipline. In the event of active operations during my absence in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, the New
<pb n="68" xml:id="n68"/>
Zealand troops in Egypt would come under his command. I recommend that during my absence you should grant Brigadier Puttick the same special power granted to Brigadier Miles.<note xml:id="ftn1-68" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c8-77"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-000815" type="organisation">Second Echelon</name></hi> (No. 177)</ref>.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="12" xml:id="c7-12">
          <head>84<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to the High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-17">17 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following message is for the personal information of <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>:</p>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 16 June (<ref target="#c7-11">No. 83</ref>). The Government agree to all your proposals and are willing that the same powers as were granted to Brigadier Miles be granted to Brigadier Puttick.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="13" xml:id="c7-13">
          <head>85<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to the Prime Minister</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-08-13">13 August 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">This morning I took up the matter of equipment with the Secretary of State for War,<note xml:id="ftn2-68" n="2"><p>Rt. Hon. R. A. Eden.</p></note> who admitted that the First Echelon requires certain additions to bring it up to war establishment and stated that these are being supplied as quickly as possible. The force from here<note xml:id="ftn3-68" n="3"><p>The Second Echelon.</p></note> will be fully equipped with modern arms. Equipment on a training scale will await the arrival of the <name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name> and every effort has been promised for earliest completion to war establishment.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I expressed your concern at the slow progress in equipping our force and at the vagueness as to the date of delivery to the First and Third Echelons.<note xml:id="ftn4-68" n="4"><p>See <ref target="#c9-19"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name></hi> (No. 230)</ref>.</p></note> The Secretary of State for War promised to give the matter his personal attention. He will give me full details on 16 August, after which I will cable you.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="69" xml:id="n69"/>
        <div type="section" n="14" xml:id="c7-14">
          <head>86<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand to the Prime Minister</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-08-16">16 August 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to my telegram of 13 August (<ref target="#c7-13">No. 85</ref>), I saw the Secretary of State for War, who explained the equipment situation as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">The First Echelon in Egypt is at present better equipped than similar formations there, and with additional equipment, including the latest 25-millimetre [-pounder?] guns now <hi rend="i">en route</hi>, will have full war equipment except tanks for the <name key="name-025383" type="organisation">Divisional Cavalry Regiment</name>. The Second Echelon in this country is now receiving full war equipment. This is to be completed by 30 September in readiness for possible movement. The Third Echelon will have a training scale of equipment on arrival at its destination. Its full war equipment is now being shipped. By October or November when this echelon will have completed its training, the 2nd New Zealand Division will be fully equipped, except possibly for tanks, the shortage of which is due to losses in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>. However, every effort is being made to overcome this shortage.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="15" xml:id="c7-15">
          <head>87<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Headquarters 2nd NZEF (<name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>) to the Chief of the General Staff (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-08-22">22 August 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">On the arrival of the Australian division<note xml:id="ftn1-69" n="1"><p>6th Australian Division.</p></note> at <name key="name-000935" type="place">Helwan</name> by the end of August our troops are to take over defence of Lines of Communication. The infantry relieve an Indian brigade.<note xml:id="ftn2-69" n="2"><p>A brigade of 4th Indian Division.</p></note> The 26th Battery, which is not yet equipped, is to take over in position one troop of 4.5-inch howitzers at <name key="name-009139" type="place">Amiriya</name> and one troop of six 18-pounders at <name key="name-023770" type="place">Maaten Baggush</name>. Two companies of the Machine Gun Battalion defend the <name key="name-009139" type="place">Amiriya</name> area against airborne attack. The Divisional Cavalry, 25th Battery, and the Machine Gun Battalion, less two companies, are in reserve and work on defences in the vicinity of <name key="name-023770" type="place">Maaten Baggush</name>. The 6th Field Company remain at <name key="name-000576" type="place">Alexandria</name>. The Anti-Tank Battery is training 180 Regular British and Indian and Australian infantry officers and other ranks on one month's course and will remain at <name key="name-004262" type="place">Maadi</name> till 15 September.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="70" xml:id="n70"/>
        <div type="section" n="16" xml:id="c7-16">
          <head>88<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs<note xml:id="ftn1-70" n="1"><p>Rt. Hon. Viscount Caldecote.</p></note> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-01">1 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The despatch of reinforcements in personnel and equipment to the various theatres outside the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> has been given active consideration here. During the first eight months of the war, the greater part of the Army's effort was devoted to building up the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name> in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>, and since the evacuation from <name key="name-003521" type="place">Dunkirk</name> it has been necessary to allot most of the current armaments production to home defence. In consequence, the forces overseas have received very little reinforcing of men or of material since the outbreak of the war. The present position is that the French collapse has greatly increased the scale of the attack in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, and our interests in the <name key="name-005851" type="place">Far East</name> are also threatened by Japanese hostility. If the British Empire is to retain its position in these areas, substantial reinforcements of men and equipment must be despatched. The bulk of the equipment must be obtained from the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">We have still much to do before all requirements for the defence of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> have been met, but the equipment of our forces here and the strength and organisation of our defences have already made considerable progress. Furthermore, as winter approaches, the practicability of an invasion will decrease because of weather conditions. It has therefore been decided to allocate from now onwards a considerably larger proportion of <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> resources in men, and approximately 50 per cent of future production of equipment, to reinforcements for other theatres and to the provision of equipment for their garrisons and reserves. The corresponding slowing up in the completion of the defence arrangements of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> will be accepted.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> is the theatre in which reinforcements are most urgently required, since there are indications that a large-scale offensive by the Italians will be launched when the weather is favourable for campaigning in this area (September to April). The urgent requirement is for additional armoured fighting vehicles and artillery (including anti-aircraft artillery). One army tank battalion, one cruiser tank regiment, and one light tank regiment have already been despatched by fast convoy, and a further convoy carrying artillery reinforcements will sail shortly. One division is being sent from <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name>. The despatch of the balance of the 6th Australian
<pb n="71" xml:id="n71"/>
and New Zealand Divisions from the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> will be arranged as soon as practicable.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Urgent steps are also being taken to provide the equipment required (including the equipment for the reinforcement of the Special Service units) in all items essential to enable them to fight, and to provide the necessary reserves of weapons and equipment. Although equipment will not be issued exclusively to each theatre in turn, military priority will be given to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. To meet the most urgent requirements in this theatre, 48 anti-tank guns, 20 Bofors anti-aircraft guns, 48 25-pounder guns, 500 Bren guns, 250 antitank rifles, with ammunition for all the above, 1,000,000 rounds of tracer small-arms ammunition, and 50,000 anti-tank mines have been recently despatched and a further large consignment will leave shortly. In addition, a separate allotment of weapons and equipment is being sent shortly to <name key="name-020415" type="place">East Africa</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It has been proposed that the forces in <name key="name-007464" type="place">Malaya</name> should shortly be reinforced by one Australian division, and the defence of <name key="name-000854" type="place">Fiji</name> increased by a brigade group from New Zealand.<note xml:id="ftn1-71" n="1"><p>8th New Zealand Brigade Group.</p></note> Consideration is also being given to the provision from other sources of anti-aircraft artillery reinforcements. It is intended that the forces in the <name key="name-005851" type="place">Far East</name> should be equipped in all items essential to enable them to fight and to provide 180 days' reserve of all essential weapons and equipment as soon as possible.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Additional African infantry brigade groups are being raised in <name key="name-020415" type="place">East Africa</name> and <name key="name-004991" type="place">West Africa</name><!-- Africa, West --> for employment in these theatres. The detailed composition of the garrisons which will eventually be required is under consideration. Certain additional anti-aircraft batteries are required to reinforce the (<name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name>?) land garrison, and will be provided, together with thirty days' reserves, as soon as possible. In India the British garrison has been depleted by eight battalions since the outbreak of war. Replacements for these battalions will have to be sent from the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> as soon as they can be spared.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As far as the <name key="name-023234" type="organisation">Air Force</name> is concerned, the immediate essential requirement is not to despatch squadrons from the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> but to re-equip the existing squadrons overseas with first-class aircraft. This re-equipment will later be supplemented by the reinforcement of first-line strength squadrons. In the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> the first objective is to provide bomber aircraft capable of attacking <name key="name-002931" type="place">Benghazi</name>, the only effective base for operations against Egypt, and modern fighters to defend the Fleet base at <name key="name-000576" type="place">Alexandria</name>. Eighty-four <name key="name-021133" type="place">Blenheim</name> aircraft, which will re-equip five existing squadrons in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> by the end of September, are being despatched.
<pb n="72" xml:id="n72"/>
<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name> aircraft to equip one squadron and Hurricane aircraft to re-equip three squadrons will be sent out during the same period. In addition, commencing at the end of September, thirty-six long-range Blenheims and eighteen Hurricanes per month will be provided to replace wastage overseas generally. It is hoped also to provide two fighter squadrons and two general reconnaissance squadrons for <name key="name-007464" type="place">Malaya</name> by the end of <date when="1940">1940</date>, but this must depend on the development of the situation in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> and in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The above proposals also involve heavy shipping and naval escort problems, and these are receiving urgent consideration.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="17" xml:id="c7-17">
          <head>89<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the High Commissioner for the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-07">7 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to the telegrams of 3 and 12 August from the Governor-General of New Zealand.<note xml:id="ftn1-72" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c9-13"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name></hi> (Nos. 224</ref> and <ref target="#c9-19">230</ref>).</p></note> His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will now have been informed of the general policy regarding reinforcements in personnel and equipment to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> as indicated in my telegram (<ref target="#c7-16">No. 88</ref>). The following are the comments of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> authorities regarding the outstanding points raised in the telegrams under reference, namely: (1) the prospects of a large-scale attack in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, possibly from more than one direction and possibly with German assistance; and (2) the position, in detail, of the scale of equipment for the New Zealand forces in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">During the autumn, an Italian attack on Egypt from <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name> is likely, and we are taking all possible steps to deal with such a contingency. Certain information as to these steps was contained in my telegram (<ref target="#c7-16">No. 88</ref>), and further information will shortly be sent. Although there is a possibility that German forces might co-operate from <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name> or initiate an attack from <name key="name-003449" type="place">Syria</name>, it is unlikely that either of these threats could materialise without considerable preparation by the Germans, and of this no definite indication has yet been received. In particular, an advance from <name key="name-003449" type="place">Syria</name> would take a considerable time to prepare and long warning of such preparation should be available.</p>
          <pb n="73" xml:id="n73"/>
          <p rend="indent">As the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> have no doubt been informed by the Officer Commanding the New Zealand troops in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, arrangements have been made by the Commander-in-Chief in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> for a brigade group to be moved from <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> to an operational theatre in the <name key="name-024430" type="place">Western Desert</name> in the near future.<note xml:id="ftn1-73" n="1"><p>No. 87.</p></note> As for the equipment of this brigade group, it is not possible to say exactly what are the deficiencies, since it has been found necessary to pool all equipment and vehicles in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, but this brigade group and one of the Australian brigade groups, which is also moving into an operational theatre, are being equipped to the highest scale possible from existing sources in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. After this has been done the combined deficiencies of the two brigade groups in the principal items of equipment will, as far as can be ascertained at present, be as follows:</p>
          <list type="simple">
            <item>
              <p>37 2-inch mortars</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>144 anti-tank rifles</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>65 light machine guns</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>32 machine guns</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>44 light tanks</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>18 Bren carriers</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>48 25-pounder guns</p>
            </item>
          </list>
          <p>While, therefore, the equipment of this New Zealand brigade group is not complete, it is on as generous a scale as is possible at the moment, and it is thought that it should be adequate for the role which it is intended these troops should undertake.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As regards the remaining New Zealand forces now in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, the available training equipment will include the following among the principal items:</p>
          <list type="simple">
            <item>
              <p><date when="1730">1730</date> rifles</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>9 2-pounder anti-tank guns</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>8 18-pounder guns</p>
            </item>
            <item>
              <p>4 4.7-inch howitzers</p>
            </item>
          </list>
          <p rend="indent">As regards the third New Zealand echelon, which has sailed in US 4, the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> were informed in my telegram to the Governor-General of 30 July,<note xml:id="ftn2-73" n="2"><p>See <ref target="#c9-12"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name></hi> (No. 223)</ref>.</p></note> of the major items of equipment which are being made available to this contingent. This equipment has already been shipped and should arrive in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> about the middle of September. It is on an equivalent scale to that provided for many Regular units in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As indicated in my telegram to the Governor-General of 26 July,<note xml:id="ftn3-73" n="3"><p>See <ref target="#c9-9"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name></hi> (No. 220)</ref>.</p></note> it is the intention in the autumn to move the second New
<pb n="74" xml:id="n74"/>
Zealand echelon, now in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. The New Zealand Government will be fully informed as soon as definite proposals for the movement of this contingent can be communicated to them, but they may wish to know at once that it is hoped that this contingent will be fully equipped here before it sails.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Further, as indicated in the third paragraph of my telegram of 1 September (<ref target="#c7-16">No. 88</ref>), the Commander-in-Chief in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> will be allocated a very large proportion of the new equipment from the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to make up the deficiencies among the forces under his command.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="18" xml:id="c7-18">
          <head>90<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Minister of Defence to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-10">10 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The New Zealand Government is disturbed by information received as to the present deficiencies of the New Zealand brigade group now moving into an operational theatre in the <name key="name-024430" type="place">Western Desert</name>—see the telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the High Commissioner for the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> in <name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>, dated 7 September (<ref target="#c7-17">No. 89</ref>). It would appear that the brigade group probably has 18 2-inch mortars instead of 36, 23 anti-tank rifles instead of 95, 182 light machine guns instead of 215, 19 machine guns instead of 36, 6 light tanks instead of 28, 21 Bren carriers instead of 30, no 25-pounders instead of 24.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I should be glad, (1) if you could ascertain, or else instruct Puttick to inform me, what actual supplies of equipment have been issued to the New Zealand brigade; (2) whether it is sufficient for the task allotted; and (3) if possible, how soon are the deficiencies likely to be made good. Your personal opinion on the equipment position would be appreciated.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="19" xml:id="c7-19">
          <head>91<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-12">12 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 10 September (<ref target="#c7-18">No. 90</ref>). I can appreciate how anxious you must be about the lack of equipment in Egypt. The delay in answering your telegram is due to being near <name key="name-028932" type="place">Dover</name> in bivouac waiting hopefully for a German landing. I have not yet
<pb n="75" xml:id="n75"/>
seen the Secretary of State's telegram of 7 September (<ref target="#c7-17">No. 89</ref>); when I do I will communicate with Puttick and will then send you the answers to your three questions, but it will take some days. Meanwhile I am in constant touch with <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>. For your information, I forward a cable received from Puttick, dated 31 August:</p>
          <p rend="indent">The move of the New Zealand forces to the <name key="name-024430" type="place">Western Desert</name> commenced on the 28th and will be completed by the 6th, less the Anti-Tank Battery and the signal class.<note xml:id="ftn1-75" n="1"><p>The Signal School, which had been left at <name key="name-004262" type="place">Maadi</name>, rejoined 2nd New Zealand Divisional Signals on 16 Sep.</p></note> <name key="name-208314" type="person">Inglis</name><note xml:id="ftn2-75" n="2"><p><name key="name-208314" type="person">Major-General Lindsay Merritt Inglis</name>, CB, CBE, DSO, MC, VD. At the time of this reference he was temporarily in command of 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade with the rank of Colonel; commanded 4th Infantry Brigade 1941–42 and 4th Armoured Brigade 1942–44; temporarily in command of 2nd New Zealand Division, Jun–Aug 1942, after <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> had been wounded, and in Jun–Jul 1943; Chief Judge of the Control Commission Supreme Court in the British Zone of Occupation, <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name>.</p></note> with Headquarters 4th Brigade commands Lines of Communication, which include Cavalry, Artillery, and Machine Gun Battalion, which are employed on the defences. <name key="name-006644" type="place">Divisional Headquarters</name>, in reserve near <name key="name-001485" type="place">Daba</name> in readiness to assume command of groups concentrating for active operations, will carry out reconnaissance and TEWTs<note xml:id="ftn3-75" n="3"><p>Tactical Exercises Without Troops.</p></note> and reinforce Lines of Communication headquarters or <name key="name-004262" type="place">Maadi</name> as necessary. Stevens with small staff and Base details remains at <name key="name-004262" type="place">Maadi</name> to prepare for the Third Contingent. <name key="name-006630" type="organisation">Army Service Corps</name> surplus to field force requirements remains at <name key="name-004262" type="place">Maadi</name> but is organised ready to reinforce on Lines of Communication if required. <name key="name-031663" type="organisation">Reserve Mechanical Transport Company</name>, ASC, and 6th Field Company remain detached as at present.</p>
          <p rend="indent">When I received the above cable, and knowing the position when I left, I considered the equipment of the First Echelon sufficient for the role assigned to it. Your cabled figures do not appear correct but Puttick's reply will give me the correct figure. Even so, it should be remembered that normal brigade groups have no cavalry regiment and only a machine-gun company of twelve instead of nineteen Vickers guns. It is true that the force is weak in anti-tank rifles and lacks new 25-pounders, but it has 18-pounders—a good gun—and besides other arms has a large number of Brens. I consider that the First Echelon when kept together as a formation is a formidable fighting force quite adequate for the task allotted it.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As you know, the equipment situation for the past year has been very bad and has been accentuated by French losses. Production here is much improved, but the quantity required to make the defences of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> secure has been enormous. Excellent progress has been made but at the expense of the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. The danger of attempted invasion is nearly over. By the end
<pb n="76" xml:id="n76"/>
of October, unless the German bombing of factories interferes seriously with production, we shall be past the danger point. After the end of September all interest will centre in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. The equipment [position] there is not good but, thanks to most firm representations to the highest authority here, a new policy has been agreed to and in the immediate future the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> is to get 50 per cent of the production of our factories. Enormous shipments were made last month; some have now arrived and will continue to arrive for some months. These include aeroplanes, tanks, guns, ammunition, &amp;c. With regard to the New Zealand Expeditionary Force's equipment, the Second Echelon will be complete in every detail before embarkation except for twelve antitank 2-pounders and minor details of <name key="name-003201" type="organisation">Royal Engineers</name> field company equipment. The balance of the equipment for the First Echelon, including its full complement of 25-pounders and all vehicles, is now on the water. Training equipment for the <name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name> upon a basis of 50 per cent issues has been shipped and should be available upon their arrival. I believe that from now on the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> equipment position will continue to improve, and by the end of November the New Zealand Expeditionary Force should be able to take the field as a division.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Undoubtedly this autumn has been most difficult here. We should have been relieved of our operational role tomorrow and completed mobilisation pending embarkation. Three days ago these orders were cancelled and we are to stay out here covering <name key="name-028932" type="place">Dover</name> until the end of the month or when the present good weather breaks. Immediately War Office liberates me I fly to Egypt by the quickest route. Meanwhile the position in England is excellent, everybody, especially the women population of <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>, showing great spirit. I can assure His Majesty's Government in New Zealand that our men are well trained, fit, and in great heart, and that the equipment position is adequate. I am confident that our men will play their part if called upon to defend either Great Britain or Egypt.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="20" xml:id="c7-20">
          <head>92<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to Headquarters 2nd NZEF (<name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-13">13 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following is for Brigadier Puttick:</p>
          <p rend="indent">The New Zealand Government is disturbed by information received from the Dominions Office as to your present equipment deficiencies and operational role. The Minister of Defence reports that your brigade group probably has 18 2-inch mortars instead
<pb n="77" xml:id="n77"/>
of 36, 23 anti-tank rifles instead of 95, 182 Brens instead of 215, 19 Vickers instead of 36, 6 light tanks instead of 28, 21 Bren carriers instead of 30, nil 25-pounders instead of 24. To enable me to assure the Government will you as soon as possible send me answers to the following questions: (1) Is the main New Zealand force together or is it split up into two groups, one under you and the other under <name key="name-208314" type="person">Inglis</name>? (2) Are our main forces cast in a role to defend Lines of Communication or are they with the Desert Army? (3) When are you likely to get the balance of your equipment?</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="21" xml:id="c7-21">
          <head>93<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-19">19 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">On 10 September Puttick reported as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">All well. I am perfectly satisfied with the conditions under which the force is employed. It has now been decided to form an extensive defensive position at <name key="name-023770" type="place">Maaten Baggush</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In answer to my telegram (<ref target="#c7-20">No. 92</ref>) sent after receiving your message of 10 September (<ref target="#c7-18">No. 90</ref>), Puttick reported on 17 September:</p>
          <p rend="indent">I consider the equipment situation very satisfactory and better than that of many Regular units here. Vickers, Bren, and anti-tank rifles are complete for fighting units, and the remainder almost complete. Each battalion has seven carriers out of ten, balance in a week only; also 25 per cent 2-inch mortars. The Divisional Cavalry have nine light tanks and eight carriers, with eleven carriers shortly, but no .5-inch machine guns. The Artillery have eighteen 18-pounders, plus eight howitzers. Twenty-five-pounders are due shortly. Answering your three questions: (1) The New Zealand Expeditionary Force is concentrated and under my command. (2) It is holding a sector of the defence of the <name key="name-023770" type="place">Maaten Baggush</name> area with, and under the command of, the 4th Indian Division. (3) The remainder of the equipment, except for 25-pounders and light tanks, will be available in ten days from the 17th.</p>
          <p rend="indent">For the information of the Minister, <name key="name-023770" type="place">Maaten Baggush</name> is 29 miles in the rear of <name key="name-001092" type="place">Mersa Matruh</name>, our foremost defences, and approximately 140 miles from <name key="name-001351" type="place">Sollum</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Realising that the <name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name> is arriving in Egypt in about two weeks untrained and only partially equipped, I send for your information the latest appreciation from General Wavell of the situation in Egypt, dated 12 September:</p>
          <pb n="78" xml:id="n78"/>
          <p rend="indent">Evidence and indications of enemy intentions on the Libyan front are as yet inconclusive. Movements in the <name key="name-024430" type="place">Western Desert</name> on the 10th/11th still appear preparatory and indicate no immediate intention of a major advance. The recent move forward closely follows the plan adopted by the Italians during the last two months of gradual approach by stages to the frontier. As the enemy approach close to the frontier, protective troops covering the formation of defended localities noticeably increase. The immediate intention seems to be the strengthening of defences on a broad front up to the frontier line to prevent our continued penetration which has been a running sore and a consistent cause of casualties in men and material. The propaganda value to the Italians of re-occupying territory previously overrun by us must not be overlooked. Also, Italian occupation of <name key="name-001351" type="place">Sollum</name><!-- Sollum, Italian occupation of --> is projected. Results of air reconnaissance and other rearward indications still provide no evidence that a major attack is impending.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As for the Home front, I still consider a German invasion not a possible operation of war. Movements of shipping off the French coast and the recent savage bombing attacks on <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> are so pronounced that every precaution must be taken. The weather here is bad and there are indications of equinoxial gales commencing. I understand now that our departure for Egypt is again retarded by the order of the Prime Minister who considers that in our role in the defence of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> we cannot be spared while the threat remains. The splitting of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force has caused great difficulties. As Commander I feel torn between the military needs of both theatres, Egypt and here. I know you will be greatly relieved that both echelons are well equipped with modern arms and reserves of warlike stores adequate for all contingencies, also that their training has progressed very satisfactorily. The force in Egypt is, however, short of tanks, artillery, and air support. With the <name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name> arriving, I feel sure of your approval to my transferring to Egypt as soon as the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> releases me</p>
          <p rend="indent"><hi rend="sc">Postcript</hi>: News has arrived that the Italians have advanced in force to <name key="name-001329" type="place">Sidi Barrani</name> and it appears that a serious effort to invade Egypt has begun. I have arranged to fly out as soon as a plane can be produced. This depends on meteorological [word omitted] on account of ice forming on the wings. I shall take Stewart, and Miles will follow as soon as possible. Hargest, who has shaped very well in training, will be left in command of the Second Echelon.<note xml:id="ftn1-78" n="1"><p>The above text, taken from the GOC's files, differs in a number of respects from the telegram received in New Zealand in which there were many mutilations and omissions.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <pb n="79" xml:id="n79"/>
        <div type="section" n="22" xml:id="c7-22">
          <head>94<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-23">23 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">On the grounds of the urgency of the situation here, I have experienced opposition to my leaving the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. I feel certain, however, that the Egyptian situation is the more difficult and I am leaving by bomber on the 22nd, via <name key="name-004214" type="place">Malta</name>, arriving in the early morning of the 24th. I feel that with the situation developing in Egypt, and with our small army in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, I should go there. Stewart accompanies me, and Falla and Miles will come as soon as passages can be arranged for them.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="23" xml:id="c7-23">
          <head>95<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> (<name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>) to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-24">24 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Stewart and I have arrived. I have taken over command.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="24" xml:id="c7-24">
          <head>96<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-27">27 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I have just returned after two days in the <name key="name-024430" type="place">Western Desert</name> with the <name key="name-005395" type="organisation">4th Brigade Group</name> who occupy a defensive position in reserve. Everybody is fit and well and in excellent spirits. Their arms and equipment are now practically complete, except that they are still armed with 18-pounders. I would be unwilling to pass any opinion upon the likelihood of the Italians launching a serious attack here. My views two months ago were as expressed in my official appreciation to the British Prime Minister on 29 July<note xml:id="ftn1-79" n="1"><p>For the text of this appreciation see <ref type="appendix" target="#a4">Appendix 4</ref>.</p></note> which should have reached you by now. Owing to the arrival here of aeroplanes, tanks, and equipment upon a large scale the situation is easing. Nevertheless, if the Italians do attack in the next month we shall be fighting numerically superior forces and will be at a disadvantage as regards artillery, tanks, and aircraft. Tomorrow I go to <name key="name-006674" type="place">Suez</name> to meet the <name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="80" xml:id="n80"/>
        <div type="section" n="25" xml:id="c7-25">
          <head>97<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence [Extract]</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-10-28">28 October 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">….<note xml:id="ftn1-80" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c10-12"><hi rend="i">Concentration of the 2nd New Zealand Division</hi> (No. 249)</ref> for rest of text.</p></note> I have just returned from the desert after a four-day training scheme with the First Echelon. The Artillery have now calibrated and fired a training practice with 18-pounders; they should get 25-pounders any day now. The 4th Infantry Brigade are fit and 95 per cent equipped. In my opinion the <name key="name-005395" type="organisation">4th Brigade Group</name> are now trained and equipped on a sufficient scale to take any operational role. They will operate in the <name key="name-024430" type="place">Western Desert</name> until they are relieved by an Australian division.<note xml:id="ftn2-80" n="2"><p>6th Australian Division.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="26" xml:id="c7-26">
          <head>98<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-12-13">13 December 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Our Divisional Signals, Petrol and Ammunition companies, Supply Column, and <name key="name-031663" type="organisation">Reserve Mechanical Transport Company</name> took part in the recent battle, the <name key="name-005395" type="organisation">4th Brigade Group</name> being in reserve at <name key="name-002877" type="place">Baggush</name>. The 6th Brigade continue training at <name key="name-004262" type="place">Maadi</name> and are quite fit to fight the Italians when equipped.</p>
          <p rend="indent">There is no doubt that we have had very great success. Apart from prisoners, estimated at over 30,000, we have captured a large portion of the guns of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s Libyan army which will be hard to replace. The result of the battle is far-reaching—we now have the initiative, but I warn you against undue optimism as the enormous distances and the lack of roads, railways, and motor transport must limit success. Had we the necessary rails and rolling stock we could knock out the Italians in <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name> before the hot weather. Meanwhile, our success will influence the situation in the <name key="name-120048" type="place">Balkans</name> and should stiffen resistance; in any case, little can happen there until the spring.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="81" xml:id="n81"/>
        <div type="section" n="27" xml:id="c7-27">
          <head>99<lb/>
<hi rend="sc">Note for the New Zealand Division from General Wavell</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-81" n="1"><p>Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, PC, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, CMG, MC (then General Sir Archibald Wavell); GOC-in-C, <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, 1939–41; GOC-in-C, <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name>, 1941–43; Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific, Jan–Mar 1942; Viceroy and Governor-General of <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> 1943–47.</p></note></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-12-27">27 December 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I feel that I owe an explanation to the New Zealand Division, and especially to the 4th Infantry Brigade, regarding the recent operations in the <name key="name-024430" type="place">Western Desert</name>. I know that they are disappointed at not having taken part in the advance on <name key="name-001329" type="place">Sidi Barrani</name> or beyond, and perhaps feel hurt that they have been used for all the hard work of making defences and then have not been detailed to take part in the attack when attack became possible.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I therefore give you the reasons which influenced the decision not to use them in the advance. It was my original intention to do so. But the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>, quite naturally and quite rightly, has always wished that the New Zealand Division should be employed in active operations only as a complete division under its own Commander. I am sure that if I had been able to explain the situation to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>, they would have granted permission for the 4th Infantry Brigade to be used, as they have granted permission for the special use of a part of the forces they have supplied. At the time when the decision had to be taken, however, it was still several weeks before the operations were to take place, the strictest possible secrecy was being maintained, and the number of those who knew that an operation was to take place at all was extremely limited. To consult the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> would necessarily have involved the communication of some details of the plans to several people and possibly some discussion of them. It would have been necessary to place the Brigade under the command of the Commander of the 4th Indian Division. I felt that I could not do all this without some detailed explanation to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> which might have jeopardised secrecy. I therefore decided, somewhat reluctantly, not to use the New Zealand Brigade, and to use instead the 16th Infantry Brigade which I could do without reference to anyone.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As regards the use of the Australian Division for the second stage of the operations, I required a whole division, and if I had sent forward the New Zealand Brigade it would have been necessary to form a composite division of Australian and New Zealand troops, which I had been given to understand was contrary to the wishes of the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>. It would have either broken up the New Zealand Division or would have involved a further
<pb n="82" xml:id="n82"/>
relief at a later stage with loss of time and waste of transport. It had always been my intention that the Australian Corps should eventually take over the <name key="name-024430" type="place">Western Desert</name>, and that the New Zealand Division when complete should become the General Headquarters Reserve. This explains why I was unable to send forward the New Zealand Brigade in the second stage of the operations.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As you know, however, the assistance that has been given by the New Zealand Division to the operations in the <name key="name-024430" type="place">Western Desert</name> has been invaluable, and the recent success could not have been gained without it. The New Zealand Division has supplied its Signals, its transport, its Engineers, Railway and other personnel who have made up our shortage in these very necessary services. I should like to refer also to the magnificent work done by the Long Range Patrols who relieved me of any anxiety about the Southern Libyan Desert, from which the Italians might have threatened Upper Egypt or the <name key="name-020991" type="place">Sudan</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I take this opportunity of thanking the New Zealand Division for all the assistance they have so willingly provided during the very difficult period when the defence of Egypt<!-- Egypt, defence of --> was dangerously weak, and I very much regret that it was not possible for them to take an even greater share in the advance from <name key="name-023779" type="place">Matruh</name>. Their turn will come before long, and I have every confidence that their leadership, training, and spirit will win them great distinction in any operation in which they take part.</p>
          <closer>
            <signed rend="right">
              <hi rend="sc">A. P. Wavell</hi>
            </signed>
          </closer>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="28" xml:id="c7-28">
          <head>100<lb/>
<hi rend="i">General Headquarters, <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, to the Chief of the General Staff (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-12-29">29 December 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following is for publication if you wish:</p>
          <p rend="indent">In the Western Desert New Zealand mechanical transport units have played an important part in the operations up to date. In the opening stages they carried infantry forward to the attack and displayed coolness and resolution under fire. Since the first attack they have worked continuously at the arduous task of bringing forward supplies under difficult conditions and over long distances by day and night. In addition, New Zealand signallers have provided essential links in the system of communications, working long hours under trying conditions; in this way they have contributed largely to the successes obtained.</p>
        </div>
      </div>
      <pb n="83" xml:id="n83"/>
      <div type="chapter" n="8" xml:id="c8">
        <head>Second Echelon: Diversion to <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, Command and Employment</head>
        <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c8-1">
          <head>101<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-02-03">3 February 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With regard to the escort proposed for the Second Echelon of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have had the opportunity of perusing the correspondence which has passed by telegraph between the Admiralty and the New Zealand Naval Board.<note xml:id="ftn1-83" n="1"><p>During the voyage of the First Echelon to Egypt reports were received from HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> that the very large distances being steamed, sometimes at high speed, were bringing strain on her boilers and machinery and engine-room personnel. Unless the Australian and New Zealand Naval Boards considered battleship escort for the Second Echelon convoy across the <name key="name-000100" type="place">Tasman Sea</name> necessary, the Admiralty proposed that the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> should rest and refit at <name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name>. In a message to the Admiralty dated <date when="1940-01-25">25 Jan 1940</date> the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> expressed the hope that the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi>, for reasons of morale, would come to New Zealand. The Admiralty replied that in view of the very large amount of steaming done by the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> in recent months it was essential that she should have a short refit, which could best be arranged at <name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name>, but should a change in the naval situation in New Zealand waters make it essential for a battleship escort to be provided, the sailing date of the convoy would be adjusted accordingly.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">They fully appreciate the difficulties in the way of again despatching HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> to New Zealand, but they cannot bring themselves willingly to accept as adequate on this occasion an escort of strength less than that considered necessary in January. However remote the danger may be and however strong the proposed escort in comparison with any attack that can reasonably be contemplated, they feel that they, and indeed the Admiralty, would be in an indefensible position if any untoward development was to take place with a weaker escort than in January when the circumstances were certainly not more threatening.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Therefore, quite apart from the desirability of showing a battleship in these waters as frequently as possible, they feel that they cannot consent to the arrangements proposed and must ask for HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> to be sent to New Zealand as previously, even if this means a delay of a few days in the convoy's departure.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="84" xml:id="n84"/>
        <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c8-2">
          <head>102<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-02-15">15 February 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">In reply to your telegram of 3 February (<ref target="#c8-1">No. 101</ref>). The Admiralty, on whom rests the responsibility for providing adequate escort, regard the position as being better than in January, and they see no military necessity to provide a battleship escort between New Zealand and <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> in the present situation. However, in deference to the representations of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, the Admiralty agree that HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> should proceed to New Zealand on this occasion. It will be appreciated that this will mean a delay of nine days in the sailing of the convoy.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c8-3">
          <head>103<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-02-16">16 February 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My Prime Minister is indeed grateful for your telegram of 15 February (<ref target="#c8-2">No. 102</ref>). His Majesty's Government in New Zealand warmly appreciate the Admiralty's decision.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="4" xml:id="c8-4">
          <head>104<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board to the New Zealand Naval Board</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-03-18">18 March 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Director of Sea Transport<!-- Sea Transport, Director of -->'s telegrams 1701 and 1702 of 15 March.<note xml:id="ftn1-84" n="1"><p>Not published. A telegram dated 6 Mar from the Admiralty to the Australian and New Zealand Naval Boards notified the division of the convoy into a fast and a slow group. HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> was to form part of the escort for the slow group. Telegrams 1701 and 1702 gave details of the movements of the ships in each group and the probable itinerary of each convoy. One Australian brigade was to travel in the slow convoy and the rest of the Australian contingent and the Second Echelon from New Zealand in the fast group.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">It is proposed that HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110017" type="place">Canberra</name></hi><note xml:id="ftn2-84" n="2"><p>HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110017" type="place">Canberra</name></hi>, 8-inch cruiser, 9850 tons; lost in the battle of Savo Island (<name key="name-140020" type="place">Solomons</name>), <date when="1942-08-09">9 Aug 1942</date>.</p></note> and HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> should form the ocean escort for US 3 (fast convoy)<note xml:id="ftn3-84" n="3"><p>The letters US as used by the Admiralty denoted an inward bound convoy; WS signified outward bound. Convoy US 2 was the slow group, carrying Australian troops only, and US 3 the fast group.</p></note> on the New Zealand
<pb n="85" xml:id="n85"/>
station and that HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi><note xml:id="ftn1-85" n="1"><p>HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi>, 8-inch cruiser, 9870 tons.</p></note> should relieve HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> in 160 degrees east, approximately.<note xml:id="ftn2-85" n="2"><p><hi rend="i">i.e.</hi>, in mid-Tasman. The New Zealand Naval Board concurred in the use of the <hi rend="i">Leander</hi>.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="5" xml:id="c8-5">
          <head>105<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Admiralty to the Australian Commonwealth and New Zealand Naval Boards</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-03-18">18 March 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The Admiralty concur with the proposal outlined in your 1116 of 17 March.<note xml:id="ftn3-85" n="3"><p>Not published. In this telegram to the Admiralty the <name key="name-019701" type="organisation">Australian Commonwealth Naval Board</name> proposed that the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> should remain at <name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name> for an extra period to assist her refit before going to <name key="name-001298" type="place">Melbourne</name> to escort the slow convoy.</p><p rend="indent">The number quoted in each of these naval telegrams is the time of despatch.</p></note> They regret that the moral effect of the intended visit by HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> to New Zealand will now be lost, but it will be realised that the change in plan is inevitable as the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> has neither the speed nor the endurance to accompany the fast group.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It is presumed that the Australian and New Zealand Naval Boards will now arrange mutually for the escort of the New Zealand contingent across the Tasman.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="6" xml:id="c8-6">
          <head>106<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The New Zealand Naval Board to the Admiralty</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-03-20">20 March 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 18 March (<ref target="#c8-5">No. 105</ref>). His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are very uneasy whether the escort proposed from New Zealand to <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> (<hi rend="i"><name key="name-110017" type="place">Canberra</name></hi> and <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> to 160 degrees east, thence <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110017" type="place">Canberra</name></hi> and <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi>) and onwards is sufficiently strong, and they would be glad to have information of the Admiralty's intentions regarding the escorting forces proposed for the whole voyage.</p>
          <p rend="indent">For the information of the Prime Minister, the <name key="name-024927" type="organisation">Naval Board</name> suggest that your reply to the foregoing should include an appreciation of the liability of attack by surface forces and the relative advantages of (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) a fast convoy with weak escort, and (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) a large, slow convoy with a stronger escort.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="86" xml:id="n86"/>
        <div type="section" n="7" xml:id="c8-7">
          <head>107<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board to the Admiralty</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-03-21">21 March 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to the New Zealand Naval Board's telegram of 20 March (<ref target="#c8-6">No. 106</ref>). Although the escort are considered adequate, if desired HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi> could join the trans-Tasman escort in New Zealand.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="8" xml:id="c8-8">
          <head>108<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Admiralty to the New Zealand Naval Board</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-03-28">28 March 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 20 March (<ref target="#c8-6">No. 106</ref>).</p>
          <p rend="indent">As was pointed out in the Dominions Secretary's telegram of 15 February (<ref target="#c8-2">No. 102</ref>), the responsibility for providing adequate escorts rests on the Admiralty. Under existing conditions it is the Admiralty's considered opinion that the only type of raider which might be encountered in the <name key="name-000100" type="place">Tasman Sea</name> is one of the merchant ship type, and consequently the present escort arrangements in the <name key="name-000100" type="place">Tasman Sea</name> are considered adequate.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The question of the relative advantages of (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) fast convoys with weak escort, and (<hi rend="i">b</hi>) larger slow convoys with stronger escort, does not arise on the present occasion because for the reasons given in the Admiralty's telegram 1231 of 6 March, paragraph 1,<note xml:id="ftn1-86" n="1"><p>Not published. Paragraph 1 of this telegram was as follows:</p><p rend="indent">To effect urgent economy in shipping it is under consideration to include <hi rend="i">Queen Mary, <name key="name-207155" type="ship">Aquitania</name>, <name key="name-207156" type="ship">Mauretania</name></hi>, and <hi rend="i">Empress of Britain</hi> in US 2. The speed of some of the other transports will be below that at which these fast liners can be handled and it is therefore necessary to divide the convoy into a fast group and a slow group whose sea-going speed will be 20 and 13 knots respectively. Two escorting forces will therefore be required.</p></note> it is not possible to concentrate all transports in one convoy.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The proposals for the escort for the New Zealand contingent west of <name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name> are contained in the telegram of 6 March and have been concurred in by the <name key="name-019701" type="organisation">Australian Commonwealth Naval Board</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The question of the adequacy of the escorts for all troop convoys is continually under consideration, and should there be any reason for doing so these arrangements would be modified.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="87" xml:id="n87"/>
        <div type="section" n="9" xml:id="c8-9">
          <head>109<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-01">1 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">For the consideration of His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, my Ministers desire me to represent their views on the question of the ocean escort which the Admiralty propose for the convoy conveying the Second Echelon of New Zealand troops.</p>
          <p rend="indent">They have read the message of 28 March (<ref target="#c8-8">No. 108</ref>) from the Admiralty to the New Zealand Naval Board in reply to the latter's message of 20 March (<ref target="#c8-6">No. 106</ref>), the first paragraph of which was sent by their direction. They learn from this that the Admiralty consider an escort of two 8-inch cruisers is sufficient in the existing circumstances, and that the escort arrangements would be modified if there should be any reason for doing so.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The Admiralty refer to your telegram of 15 February (<ref target="#c8-2">No. 102</ref>) which mentioned that Their Lordships are responsible for the adequacy of ocean escorts. My Ministers appreciate this fact and they do not, of course, dispute Their Lordships' judgment in such matters, but they feel bound to point out that it is also their own responsibility to ensure that over 7000 New Zealand troops do not depart from this country unless and until they are fully satisfied that the voyage will be made in conditions providing a reasonable maximum of safety.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Having regard to the information conveyed to the <name key="name-024927" type="organisation">Naval Board</name> by the Admiralty in messages 1550 of 22 March, 1333 of 24 March, and 1131 of 28 March,<note xml:id="ftn1-87" n="1"><p>These naval telegrams are not published. They were to the effect that reports had been received that a pocket battleship accompanied by a tanker had left <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> in the first week of March for commercial raiding.</p></note> which indicates at least a strong suspicion that a pocket battleship is at large, they cannot disguise their uneasiness at the prospect of the convoy being protected by only two warships, both of which are practically unarmoured. The Chief of the Naval Staff has explained to the Government the technical and strategical factors involved, including the safety which the speed of the convoy affords.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Nevertheless, the Government feel that there is an element of risk because an attack might well be made in circumstances highly unfavourable to the defence of the convoy, and they cannot dismiss from their minds the attraction which they imagine this particular convoy, so valuable in both men and ships, would have for the enemy. It may well be, they argue, that a pocket battleship has been sent out for this very purpose.</p>
          <pb n="88" xml:id="n88"/>
          <p rend="indent">Having regard to these considerations, to which my Ministers attach much weight, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand propose that HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> shall proceed the whole way with the convoy, thereafter being at the Admiralty's disposition as already arranged. (The Chief of the Naval Staff concurs.<note xml:id="ftn1-88" n="1"><p><name key="name-005336" type="person">Commodore H. E. Horan</name>, DSC, RN, First Naval Member of the New Zealand Naval Board and Chief of the Naval Staff. On <date when="1940-01-01">1 Jan 1940</date> Commodore Horan had relieved Captain J. W. Rivett-Carnac, DSC, RN, as Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron and Commanding Officer of HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi>. As from <date when="1940-05-01">1 May 1940</date> Captain Horan relinquished the rank of Commodore, Second Class, but remained in command of the <hi rend="i">Leander</hi>, and Captain W. E. Parry, CB, RN, assumed the rank of Commodore, Second Class, and took over from Captain Horan the duties of First Naval Member of the New Zealand Naval Board, Chief of the Naval Staff, and Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron, continuing in command of HMS <hi rend="i">Achilles.</hi></p></note>) Their Lordships are aware that it was not considered desirable here for HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> to leave the vicinity of New Zealand until HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110456" type="ship">Achilles</name></hi> completes her refit, but the <name key="name-024927" type="organisation">Naval Board</name> report that the latter vessel can be at forty-eight hours' notice for sea by the middle of May, and HMS <hi rend="i">Hector</hi><note xml:id="ftn2-88" n="2"><p>HMS <hi rend="i">Hector</hi>, armed merchant cruiser, 11,198 tons, Ocean Steam Ship Company (A. Holt and Company); badly damaged by Japanese aircraft, Colombo, <date when="1942-03">Mar 1942</date>.</p></note> will be available. They are of the opinion that a successful attack on the convoy would be more damaging to Imperial and New Zealand interests than one on New Zealand ports or shipping in New Zealand waters at that time, and they will feel more reassured if the convoy is escorted by two 8-inch cruisers and one 6-inch cruiser.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="10" xml:id="c8-10">
          <head>110<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-11">11 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The point of view of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, contained in your telegram of 1 April (<ref target="#c8-9">No. 109</ref>), in desiring to ensure that the voyage in question will be made under conditions of maximum safety is appreciated by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. They agree that His Majesty's ship <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> will be employed more usefully on escort duty than in defence of New Zealand interests against the forms of attack visualised in their message to the New Zealand Naval Board of 28 March (<ref target="#c8-8">No. 108</ref>), against which it is considered the presence of the <hi rend="i">Hector</hi> and <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110456" type="ship">Achilles</name></hi>, the latter at forty-eight hours' notice from the middle of May, will afford adequate security. In the circumstances, they welcome the additional security to the convoy which the presence of the <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> will afford. It is the intention that, on conclusion of the escort duty, the <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> should join the East Indies Station.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="89" xml:id="n89"/>
        <div type="section" n="11" xml:id="c8-11">
          <head>111<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The New Zealand Naval Board to the <name key="name-019701" type="organisation">Australian Commonwealth Naval Board</name></hi><lb/>
<hi rend="i">[Extract]</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-12">12 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">….<note xml:id="ftn1-89" n="1"><p>Acknowledgment of an earlier telegram (not published) has been omitted.</p></note> As offered in your telegram of 21 March (<ref target="#c8-7">No. 107</ref>), the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> would appreciate arrangements being made for HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi> to rendezvous with the convoy in the vicinity of Cook Strait.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="12" xml:id="c8-12">
          <head>112<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Memorandum from the Naval Secretary to the Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-19">19 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c8-12-1">
            <head>OCEAN ESCORT FOR TROOP CONVOY</head>
            <p rend="indent">Perhaps you will be good enough to inform the Honourable Prime Minister that a telegram has been received from the Admiralty, addressed to the Australian and New Zealand Naval Boards, stating that in consequence of the present uncertainty as to the attitude of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>, the French Admiralty are effecting a strong concentration of their naval forces in the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> and urgently desire the very early return of the French 8-inch cruiser <hi rend="i">Suffren.</hi></p>
            <p rend="indent">The Admiralty state that the best arrangement which can now be made for the ocean escort, to enable the wishes of the French Government to be met, is to provide HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name></hi><note xml:id="ftn2-89" n="2"><p>HMAS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name></hi>, 6-inch cruiser, 6830 tons; lost with all hands after destroying the German raider <hi rend="i">Kormoran</hi> in <name key="name-001315" type="place">Indian Ocean</name>, <date when="1941-11-19">19 Nov 1941</date>.</p></note> in place of the <hi rend="i">Suffren</hi> from Cocos Islands<note xml:id="ftn3-89" n="3"><p>Approximately midway between <name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name> and Colombo, and the site of a strategically important cable station.</p></note> ot the destination.</p>
            <p rend="indent">The effect of this will be that from Cocos Islands the escort will consist of one 8-inch cruiser and two 6-inch cruisers.</p>
            <p rend="indent">In making this proposal the Admiralty state:</p>
            <p rend="indent">As German naval forces are fully occupied in North Sea operations<note xml:id="ftn4-89" n="4"><p><name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> had invaded <name key="name-007390" type="place">Norway</name> on 9 Apr. The two battles of Narvik had taken place on 10 and 13 Apr, and the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name> had been landed at Namsos and Narvik between 15 and 18 Apr 1940.</p></note> and as both pocket battleships were located in German waters on 6 April, Admiralty considers escort force composed of <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008315" type="place">Kent</name>, <name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name></hi>, and <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> from Cocos Islands to <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name> for US 3
<pb n="90" xml:id="n90"/>
is adequate and therefore propose complying with the French suggestion. The convoy situation with reference to the attitude of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> will be kept under constant review.</p>
            <p rend="indent">The Australian Naval Board have communicated their concurrence in these proposals to the Admiralty and to the New Zealand Naval Board.</p>
            <p rend="indent">If the Prime Minister approves, it is proposed to signify the concurrence of the New Zealand Naval Board.</p>
            <closer>
              <signed rend="right"><hi rend="sc">N. T. P. Cooper</hi>,</signed>
              <salute rend="right">Naval Secretary</salute>
            </closer>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="13" xml:id="c8-13">
          <head>113<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The New Zealand Naval Board to the Admiralty</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-19">19 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your 1250 of 17 April.<note xml:id="ftn1-90" n="1"><p>Not published. The text of this telegram is given in the Naval Secretary's memorandum of 19 Apr to the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department.</p></note> Although most reluctant still further to reduce the strength of the proposed escort and much concerned as to the situation that may result, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are nevertheless prepared to accept the point of view expressed by the Admiralty. At the same time they must stress the fact that they would feel much happier were it possible to substitute an 8-inch cruiser for a 6-inch cruiser. They ask that such further consideration as is practicable be given to this possibility.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="14" xml:id="c8-14">
          <head>114<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Chief of the Naval Staff in HMS Leander to <name key="name-024929" type="organisation">Navy Office</name> (<name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-20">20 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 19 April (<ref target="#c8-13">No. 113</ref>). Please inform Ministers that I consider the Admiralty's disposition for the ocean escort quite adequate in the present strategic situation.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="15" xml:id="c8-15">
          <head>115<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Admiralty to the New Zealand Naval Board</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-21">21 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 19 April (<ref target="#c8-13">No. 113</ref>). The acceptance by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand of the Admiralty's views
<pb n="91" xml:id="n91"/>
is much appreciated. The decisions were reached after the fullest consideration of the situation by the Admiralty, who regret that under the present circumstances no further strengthening of the escort is practicable.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="16" xml:id="c8-16">
          <head>116<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-29">29 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The presence in the Eastern Mediterranean of HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi>, which is now engaged in escorting a convoy from New Zealand and <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>, is essential at the earliest possible moment.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Resulting from operations on the Norwegian coast and the consequent location of units of the German Fleet, the Admiralty are satisfied that there is no danger to the convoy from German warships and that the only possible danger would be from a merchant ship raider, for which the cruiser escort is adequate. The Admiralty are therefore issuing instructions to HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> to cease acting as escort for the convoy and proceed ahead.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="17" xml:id="c8-17">
          <head>117<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-30">30 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I suggest that, having regard to the Italian situation and the possibility of the passage through the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name> becoming impracticable, consideration be given to the postponement of the embarkation of the New Zealand Forces until the situation is clarified. Accommodation would not be available here for the New Zealand troops if the convoy were held up in <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>. In this connection, my immediately following telegram contains the text of a telegram sent today to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="92" xml:id="n92"/>
        <div type="section" n="18" xml:id="c8-18">
          <head>118<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-30">30 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following is the text of the telegram sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs:</p>
          <p rend="indent">The Commonwealth Government, having regard to the deterioration of the Italian situation and the possibility of the [passage of] Australian and New Zealand convoys through the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name> becoming impracticable, propose that the embarkation of Australian troops for the third convoy, due to sail from <name key="name-008850" type="place">Sydney</name> on 5 May, should be postponed until the situation is clarified. Because of the difficulty of accommodating the New Zealand troops in <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> in the event of their being delayed here, the Commonwealth Government have suggested similar action to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>. It is considered preferable to postpone the embarkation instead of delaying the convoy with troops on board at an intermediate port. The present arrangements for the embarkation of the Australian troops will be temporarily postponed pending your advice.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="19" xml:id="c8-19">
          <head>119<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-30">30 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Having regard to the imminent departure of the Second Echelon of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, for the safety of which until its arrival at its destination His Majesty's Government in New Zealand can by no means divest themselves of responsibility, and in view of your telegram of 29 April (<ref target="#c8-16">No. 116</ref>) and of previous communications with reference to the possibility of Italian hostility, my Prime Minister would be glad to have at the very earliest possible moment any further information that may be available as to the possibility of hostile action by <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> during the succeeding month. He also requests from you an appreciation of the Italian forces that are now or might at the appropriate moment be available to attack the convoy <hi rend="i">en route</hi> to Egypt, and an intimation, in as detailed a form as possible, as to what steps His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> would propose to take, in the event of Italian hostility, to protect the convoy from attack by air or sea while <hi rend="i">en route.</hi> The
<pb n="93" xml:id="n93"/>
Prime Minister would be grateful also for an indication of the probable steps that would be taken if the possibility of diversion is contemplated in these circumstances.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="20" xml:id="c8-20">
          <head>120<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-30">30 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">In regard to the question of the departure of New Zealand and Australian troops, my Prime Minister has had the opportunity of perusing the telegram dated 30 April from the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to you.<note xml:id="ftn1-93" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c8-18">No. 118</ref>.</p></note> My immediately following telegram (<ref target="#c8-24">No. 124</ref>) contains the text of my Prime Minister's reply. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be grateful if a reply to my telegram of 30 April (<ref target="#c8-19">No. 119</ref>) could be despatched so as to reach here by 8 a.m., New Zealand time, on 1 May, as the New Zealand troops embark on that date. At the same time please repeat your reply to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="21" xml:id="c8-21">
          <head>121<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-30">30 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I regret that it is not possible to reply by the time requested, but hope to reply within the next few hours.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="22" xml:id="c8-22">
          <head>122<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-30">30 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My telegram of 29 April (<ref target="#c8-16">No. 116</ref>). It has now been decided that for the time being HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> need not be detached.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="23" xml:id="c8-23">
          <head>123<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-04-30">30 April 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Before the receipt of the telegrams dated 30 April from the Australian and New Zealand Governments (<ref target="#c8-18">Nos. 118</ref> and <ref target="#c8-19">119</ref>)
<pb n="94" xml:id="n94"/>
the question of the safety of your convoys was already under consideration. Unless the situation improves, the Admiralty consider that it would be undesirable to pass convoys US 2 and US 3 through the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The alternative of the troops proceeding by the overland route to Egypt, via <name key="name-025905" type="place">Basra</name>, is considered impracticable by the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> for climatic and administrative reasons. Moreover, if war with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> were to break out subsequent to the arrival of the contingents in Egypt, there might be considerable difficulties in equipping them, as the necessary material has to come from <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> resources. In the circumstances it has been necessary to consider the advisability of the diversion of both convoys.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Since better training facilities exist in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> than in other possible destinations and since the equipment must be supplied from this country, it is suggested that the best course would be to divert these contingents to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. It would, of course, give us great pleasure to welcome Australian and New Zealand troops here, and the Admiralty are confident that adequate security can be afforded for convoys moving by the Cape of Good Hope route to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">We should be grateful if we could be informed as soon as possible whether this would be agreeable to the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In that event, unless the situation shows marked improvement, we shall order convoy US 2 to be diverted before it enters the Gulf of <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to convoy US 3, we hope that the arrangements for embarkation as previously contemplated will be completed. Convoy US 3 would be diverted on the same date as US 2 if diversion proves to be necessary. The War Office are explaining to <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> the position as set out above.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="24" xml:id="c8-24">
          <head>124<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-01">1 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Further to my immediately preceding telegram (<ref target="#c8-20">No. 120</ref>). The following is the text of my reply to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>:</p>
          <p rend="indent">I am very grateful for your telegram of 30 April (<ref target="#c8-17">No. 117</ref>). We had ourselves been considering today the question of the pending convoy. We had not considered that the situation at
<pb n="95" xml:id="n95"/>
present warranted postponement of departure, but before the receipt of your communication we had today sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, the text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram.<note xml:id="ftn1-95" n="1"><p>The telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs referred to is <ref target="#c8-19">No. 119</ref> of <date when="1940-04-30">30 Apr 1940</date>.</p></note> We propose to reconsider the matter on receipt of the Secretary of State's reply, but we are continuing in the meantime with the arrangements for embarkation, which takes place on 1 May. We have now asked the Secretary of State, to whom the text of this telegram is being repeated, to reply to our telegram tonight and repeat his reply to you.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="25" xml:id="c8-25">
          <head>125<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-01">1 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The situation as set out in the Secretary of State's telegram of 30 April (<ref target="#c8-23">No. 123</ref>), which has been repeated to you, has now been considered by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. They are in general agreement with the measures suggested in that telegram, and they propose to act accordingly. Before however advising His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to that effect they would be grateful to know the views of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>. A very early reply would be appreciated in view of the fact that the convoy is due to sail on 2 May.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="26" xml:id="c8-26">
          <head>126<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-01">1 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Thanks for your telegram. The following reply has been sent to the telegram of 30 April (<ref target="#c8-23">No. 123</ref>) from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs:</p>
          <p rend="indent">Immediate consideration has been given your telegram of 30 April, but the Government feel some difficulty in arriving at a decision as to the ultimate destination of the convoy without additional information regarding the strategic considerations
<pb n="96" xml:id="n96"/>
involved in <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s possible entry into the war and the repercussions that this step may have in the <name key="name-120048" type="place">Balkans</name>, the Near East, the North-West frontier of <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name>, and in the <name key="name-005851" type="place">Far East</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Prior to answering your suggestion that the second and third convoys be diverted to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, the Commonwealth Government would like an appreciation by your Chiefs of Staff on the likely possibilities of the prospective situation, the measures required to counter probable enemy plans and to provide for security of our interests, and the zone in which an Imperial Force could co-operate most effectively. We can then see more clearly our part in the scheme of things. No doubt this information is readily available as the possibility of being confronted with an alliance of this nature has long been referred to in <name key="name-005338" type="organisation">Committee of Imperial Defence</name><!-- Imperial Defence, Committee of --> documents.<note xml:id="ftn1-96" n="1"><p>The <name key="name-005338" type="organisation">Committee of Imperial Defence</name>, in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, is in effect a committee of representatives of all those State Departments which may be concerned in any way with preparations for national defence. The committee has no executive function in itself. Its conclusions take the form of recommendations to Cabinet. The closest liaison is maintained with the other Governments of the British Commonwealth. Activities are directed by a central committee, of which the Prime Minister is the only permanent member, aided by such other Ministers or officials as he cares to summon.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">The Commonwealth Government is gravely concerned at the prospect of the 6th Division being split into parts located in Palestine and in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. Though this entails administrative handicaps there is also the possibility of difficulties in re-concentration from the operational point of view, and in our minds the latter is imperative. Furthermore, such a wide dispersion might contravene the fulfilment of the decision as to the theatre in which an Imperial Force should serve.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Pending the receipt of the appreciation and a decision, our view is that the second convoy should be held at Colombo for a few days, and in view of the urgency of the matter the Chief of the Naval Staff was asked to forward a signal to that effect to the Commander of the escort and the Admiralty.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In the appreciation of the Chiefs of Staff it is desired that they should traverse the considerations involved in equipping the division. As there are important local considerations which must be brought into the picture, the Australian Chiefs of Staff have also been asked to submit a similar review.</p>
          <p rend="indent">This telegram has been repeated to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="97" xml:id="n97"/>
        <div type="section" n="27" xml:id="c8-27">
          <head>127<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-01">1 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The Chiefs of Staff are preparing an appreciation, but it is not expected that it can be telegraphed before Friday. In the meantime, it is hoped that New Zealand arrangements for the departure of the Second Echelon will proceed.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="28" xml:id="c8-28">
          <head>128<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-02">2 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The suggestion contained in your telegram of 30 April (<ref target="#c8-23">No. 123</ref>), that the Second Echelon of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force should, if circumstances require it, be diverted to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, has been agreed to by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. However, they have seen the telegram addressed to you by the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>,<note xml:id="ftn1-97" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c8-26">No. 126</ref>.</p></note> and having regard to the point of view taken by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> and the embarrassment which would result were <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to take one course and New Zealand another, they would appreciate at the earliest possible moment tomorrow morning, New Zealand time, an expression of the opinion and the advice of His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. In the meantime, pending the receipt of a reply to this telegram, when they will decide the course they intend to adopt, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have determined not to alter the arrangements for the embarkation of the Second Echelon (which is now taking place) or its departure tomorrow. In making their decision they would also be greatly assisted if they could be informed of the details of the escort proposed in the case of diversion and furnished with the most explicit assurances that the safety of the convoy is fully assured.</p>
          <p rend="indent">A repetition of this telegram is being sent to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="98" xml:id="n98"/>
        <div type="section" n="29" xml:id="c8-29">
          <head>129<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-02">2 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram <ref target="#c8-27">No. 127</ref>. The Second Echelon is leaving today accordingly.<note xml:id="ftn1-98" n="1"><p>A total of 428 officers and 6410 other ranks (total 6838) sailed in the Second Echelon. The ships in which they sailed were <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207155" type="ship">Aquitania</name></hi>, 44,786 tons, Cunard White Star; <hi rend="i">Empress of Britain</hi>, 42,348 tons, Canadian-<name key="name-008892" type="place">Pacific</name>; <hi rend="i">Empress of Japan</hi> (now <hi rend="i">Empress of Scotland</hi>), 26,032 tons, Canadian-<name key="name-008892" type="place">Pacific</name>; and <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110454" type="ship">Andes</name></hi>, 25,676 tons, Royal Mail Line. The <hi rend="i">Empress of Britain</hi> was sunk on <date when="1940-10-28">28 Oct 1940</date> off the west coast of <name key="name-120007" type="place">Ireland</name>.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="30" xml:id="c8-30">
          <head>130<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-02">2 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Further to my telegram of 1 May (<ref target="#c8-26">No. 126</ref>). The Commonwealth Government has decided that the embarkation of the third convoy should proceed as arranged. By the time it reaches <name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name>, at the latest, the appreciation asked for from the United Kingdom Government should have been received and a decision reached by the Commonwealth Government as to the destination of the AIF. From your telegram of 1 May,<note xml:id="ftn2-98" n="2"><p>See <ref target="#c8-24">No. 124</ref>.</p></note> it has been noted that you did not consider the situation at present warranted postponement of the convoy's departure.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="31" xml:id="c8-31">
          <head>131<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board to the Admiralty</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-02">2 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">If the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> can make the <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> available, the Commonwealth Government are agreeable for the escort for US 3 to consist of the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi> and the <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> between <name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name> and <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name>, if this route is used.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="32" xml:id="c8-32">
          <head>132<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-03">3 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following telegram has been received from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in reply to my telegram of 1 May:<note xml:id="ftn3-98" n="3"><p>See <ref target="#c8-26">No. 126</ref>.</p></note></p>
          <pb n="99" xml:id="n99"/>
          <p rend="indent">The matter was considered in Cabinet this morning. If the US 2 convoy were allowed to proceed normally beyond Colombo, it still would be possible to divert it before entering the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name> should the situation require it. In the circumstances we [suggest ?] that this course be followed and if, as we hope, the Commonwealth Government agree, we should be glad if they would arrange accordingly for a further signal to be sent to the Commander of the escort. As indicated in my telegram (<ref target="#c8-27">No. 127</ref>), we hope to telegraph tomorrow the general appreciation for which you have asked.</p>
          <p rend="indent">My telegram immediately following contains the text of our reply.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="33" xml:id="c8-33">
          <head>133<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-03">3 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following telegram has been transmitted to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs:</p>
          <p rend="indent">It has been noted from your telegram (<ref target="#c8-23">No. 123</ref>) that unless the situation shows marked improvement you proposed to order convoy US 2 to be diverted before entering the Gulf of <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name>. Our proposal for detention at Colombo was to safeguard ourselves against a situation in which, under certain possible circumstances, our troops might be held up indefinitely in some port with less favourable climatic and other conditions than Colombo.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Should it arise, we assume that our concurrence in the convoy proceeding as originally arranged will cover this eventuality, and the Chief of the Naval Staff has been requested, therefore, to advise the Commander of the escort as desired.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="34" xml:id="c8-34">
          <head>134<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Admiralty to the Australian Commonwealth and New Zealand Naval Boards</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-03">3 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">If it is found necessary to divert US 2 and US 3 to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> via the Cape of Good Hope, the Admiralty's intentions for escort are as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">US 2. From the <name key="name-001312" type="place">Arabian Sea</name> to <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name>, via the Cape—<hi rend="i"><name key="name-120030" type="place">Ramillies</name></hi> and <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008315" type="place">Kent</name></hi>.</p>
          <pb n="100" xml:id="n100"/>
          <p rend="indent">US 3. From Fremantle to <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name>: to rendezvous ‘A’ in midway position, <hi rend="i"><name key="name-110017" type="place">Canberra</name></hi> and <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi>; from rendezvous ‘A’ to the Cape, <hi rend="i">Shropshire</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-100" n="1"><p>HMS <hi rend="i">Shropshire</hi>, 8-inch cruiser, 9830 tons.</p></note> and <hi rend="i"><name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>.</hi> From the Cape to <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name>: two 8-inch cruisers of the South Atlantic Command.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It appears from Admiralty data that the endurance of HMS <hi rend="i">Leander</hi> will not allow her to make the passage from <name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name> to the Cape in company of US 3 at 20 knots.<note xml:id="ftn2-100" n="2"><p>Note on telegram by Staff Officer, Operations, reads:</p><list type="simple"><item><p><name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name> to <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name>, 4700 miles approximately.</p></item><item><p><name key="name-000951" type="place">Fremantle</name> to <name key="name-035894" type="place">Durban</name>, 4200 miles approximately.</p></item><item><p><hi rend="i">Leander's</hi> endurance at 20 knots—4520 miles. (CB <date when="1815">1815</date>)</p></item><item><p><hi rend="i">Leander's</hi> endurance at 18 knots—5350 miles. (CB <date when="1815">1815</date>)</p></item><item><p>[CB—Confidential Book listing warships of the British Commonwealth with details of speed, endurance, &amp;c.]</p></item></list></note> It is proposed, therefore, that in the circumstances under consideration, her future employment with the Imperial Forces should be reviewed.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The escort onward from <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name> for both convoys will not be less powerful than two 8-inch cruisers, and it will be strengthened as necessary in the light of prevailing circumstances. Anti-submarine escorts will be provided for the passage through the submarine danger area.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Their Lordships are satisfied that the convoys will be given full security by the above measures.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="35" xml:id="c8-35">
          <head>135<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-04">4 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to my telegram of 1 May (<ref target="#c8-27">No. 127</ref>). The following is the appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff asked for:</p>
          <p rend="indent"><hi rend="b"><hi rend="i">Intervention of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name></hi></hi>—Should Italy decide to intervene she will probably time her entry to coincide with a new development in the West, which might be a German attack on the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> or the Western Front, or an invasion of another neutral state. Neither the Italian Army nor the <name key="name-023234" type="organisation">Air Force</name> is in good condition for war, and it is probable, therefore, that the Italian plan will be to use her Navy to dispute Allied control of sea communications while using the other arms for raids and diversions. The probable Italian action would be either an invasion of the Dalmatian coast or Corfu,<note xml:id="ftn3-100" n="3"><p>A Greek island in the Adriatic, off the western coast of <name key="name-002294" type="place">Greece</name> and about seventy miles from the heel of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>.</p></note> which would no doubt result eventually
<pb n="101" xml:id="n101"/>
in war with the Allies, or direct attack on Allied interests in the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> and the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">There is also the possibility, which is regarded as being remote, that <name key="name-007594" type="place">Spain</name> might enter the war with or soon after <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>, in which case Gibraltar could not be used as a naval base and an increased naval effort would be required in the Western Mediterranean, particularly if <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> should occupy the Balearic Islands.<note xml:id="ftn1-101" n="1"><p>The Balearic Islands of Minorca and Majorca are Spanish territory.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">The defeat of <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> will remain our primary object, and it will be appreciated that, with our existing commitments in <name key="name-007390" type="place">Norway</name>, on the Western Front, and at Home, our first aim in the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> and in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> must be to ensure the security of Allied interests. Measures to achieve this aim will automatically cut <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s communications with the outer seas and immediately impose economic pressure, and will also isolate her possessions in <name key="name-020415" type="place">East Africa</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Measures to re-concentrate Allied naval forces in sufficient strength in the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> are now being taken—the British being generally responsible for the Eastern Basin and the French for the Western. As regards the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name>, we do not anticipate serious difficulty in meeting surface or submarine attack, but we consider it inadvisable in the early stages of the war to expose troop convoys to the risk of air attack from <name key="name-020415" type="place">East Africa</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In addition, Allied plans provide for local offensives as soon as they can be organised; in particular, the French from <name key="name-004870" type="place">Tunisia</name> against <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name>, and Allied forces from Djibouti into <name key="name-020117" type="place">Abyssinia</name>. These attacks would take time to stage. Plans are also under discussion with the French for air action against war industries in north-west <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>, which we consider would be the quickest and most effective way of bringing possibly decisive pressure to bear.</p>
          <p rend="indent"><hi rend="b"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-120048" type="place">Balkans</name> and <name key="name-008587" type="place">Turkey</name></hi></hi>—The situation with regard to the <name key="name-120048" type="place">Balkans</name> and the Near East will depend upon whether <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> attacks <name key="name-004979" type="place">Yugoslavia</name> or <name key="name-002294" type="place">Greece</name>, and whether <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> invades the <name key="name-120048" type="place">Balkans</name>. We shall not be able to give direct support to <name key="name-004979" type="place">Yugoslavia</name> or <name key="name-002294" type="place">Greece</name> until the threat to Allied communications through the Aegean has been countered. We hope that <name key="name-008587" type="place">Turkey</name> will join us against <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>, in which case Allied support will be provided initially through the Anatolian railway<note xml:id="ftn2-101" n="2"><p>The principal and central Turkish railway, which would provide a rail link to the east and with <name key="name-003449" type="place">Syria</name> and Palestine to the south. <name key="name-035363" type="place">Smyrna</name> is the principal terminal on the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> coast.</p></note> until communications through the Aegean can be restored. With Turkey on our side the Bosporus will be closed to <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> and open to the Allies.</p>
          <pb n="102" xml:id="n102"/>
          <p rend="indent"><hi rend="b"><hi rend="i">North-West Frontier of <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name></hi></hi>—<name key="name-006717" type="place">Russia</name> is the only power which could seriously affect our interests here. By itself, Italian intervention would have little if any effect. The present situation in this part of the world is satisfactory and the attitude of the Afghanistan Government <hi rend="i">vis-à-vis</hi> <name key="name-006717" type="place">Russia</name> is reassuring. The possibility of a flare up of tribal trouble always exists, but the army in <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> is fully adequate to deal with any situation in the tribal territory and <name key="name-006717" type="place">Russia</name> cannot develop a land attack on <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> for a long period. Air attack on a limited scale on centres in Northern India is possible and may lead to local internal security problems. We have recently equipped two <name key="name-021133" type="place">Blenheim</name> squadrons in <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> with fighter conversion sets, which would act as some deterrent. Russian invasion of Northern Afghanistan would be a more formidable danger. The Government of <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> is investigating the possibility of helping the Kabul Government to maintain authority in an emergency. The whole tendency of Russian policy, however, is to avoid being drawn into a major war after their experiences in <name key="name-120005" type="place">Finland</name>, and we regard Russian intervention against us as unlikely.</p>
          <p rend="indent"><hi rend="b"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-005851" type="place">Far East</name></hi></hi>—The view of the Foreign Office is that <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name>'s ultimate policy will be decided by the outcome of the war in the West. In the meantime <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name> remains very heavily committed in <name key="name-007843" type="place">China</name> and is fearful of American policy. Her early intervention is, therefore, most unlikely. General indications are that American reactions to any Japanese aggression in the <name key="name-008892" type="place">Pacific</name> would be very strong. The Chiefs of Staff consider as very remote the possibility of direct attack on <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> or New Zealand.</p>
          <p rend="indent"><hi rend="b"><hi rend="i">Australian and New Zealand Forces</hi></hi>—It has always been the intention that the Australian and New Zealand contingents when fully equipped should be employed according to the demands of the strategic situation, and the most likely theatres are the Near East and <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>. If war breaks out with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> it is hoped that it will be possible to reconstitute the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name> route within the first three months. Full war scales of equipment for the Australian and New Zealand contingents will probably be ready by the middle of September. Therefore, there should be no difficulty in re-constituting a complete and fully equipped division either in Egypt or the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> by that date at the latest.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The anxiety of the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments in the event of diversion to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> at the present time and the inherent disadvantages in the splitting of formations are realised. However, all possible steps would be taken to reconstitute the whole expeditionary force at the earliest possible date. Meanwhile, if it is found necessary to divert US 2
<pb n="103" xml:id="n103"/>
and US 3 to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, it is suggested that liaison officers from the Australian and New Zealand forces now in Egypt be attached to these contingents. This arrangement could be made from here if the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments agree.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The possibilities of diversion to <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> and Kenya have been examined. With regard to <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name>, the difficulties are the complete lack of modern training equipment and suitable accommodation for hot weather, while in Kenya there is no suitable accommodation at all. If US 2 and US 3 were diverted to either of these countries, the ultimate reconstitution and equipment of the whole of the expeditionary force would, it is thought, almost certainly be delayed.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Taking into account the above considerations it is recommended that, in the present circumstances, diversion is unnecessary and that the convoys should adhere to their programme. The situation is being watched from day to day and the Admiralty would issue orders for diversion if the situation should demand it at any time. In that event diversion to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> is recommended.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In the event of diversion the Admiralty is telegraphing separate arrangements for escort and security.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="36" xml:id="c8-36">
          <head>136<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-05">5 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Preliminary consideration has now been given to the Secretary of State's telegram of 4 May (<ref target="#c8-35">No. 135</ref>). Some difficulty has been found in reconciling the statement contained in the Secretary of State's telegram of 30 April (<ref target="#c8-23">No. 123</ref>) that ‘unless the situation shows marked improvement’ convoys US 2 and US 3 should be diverted, with the recommendation contained in the telegram now under consideration that ‘in the present circumstances diversion is unnecessary and that the convoys should adhere to their programme.’ However, we are content for our part to allow convoy US 3 to proceed as originally arranged, subject, firstly, to our being kept most closely informed as to developments as they occur; secondly, to the decision as to the ultimate destination being made by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand after considering the views of the Admiralty and of His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, and to our being given an opportunity at the appropriate
<pb n="104" xml:id="n104"/>
time of making that decision with the full facts then available; and, thirdly, to our being satisfied as to the adequacy of the escort proposed, in case of diversion, from <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> onwards, as to which we are at present not without doubt.</p>
          <p rend="indent">We should be glad to have the views of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> before advising His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to the above effect.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="37" xml:id="c8-37">
          <head>137<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <div type="section" xml:id="c8-37-0">
            <opener>
              <date when="1940-05-09">9 May 1940</date>
            </opener>
            <p rend="indent">With reference to your telegram of 5 May (<ref target="#c8-36">No. 136</ref>), it is suggested that most close contact be maintained on this matter. The following telegram has been sent to the United Kingdom Government:</p>
            <p rend="indent">The appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff contained in your telegram (<ref target="#c8-35">No. 135</ref>) has been fully considered by the <name key="name-016917" type="organisation">War Cabinet</name>, and, in so far as matters calling for immediate decision are concerned, the following are our conclusions and observations:</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c8-37-1">
            <head>Route and Destination of Convoy and Escorts</head>
            <p rend="indent">In the present circumstances it is noted that the diversion of convoys US 2 and US 3 is not considered necessary and, subject to later observations, we agree to the convoys adhering to their programmes. In reaching this decision the Commonwealth Government assume that, should war with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> eventuate after either convoy has entered the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name>, the protection provided or readily available will be such as to reasonably ensure the security of the convoys against sea and air attacks whilst <hi rend="i">en route</hi> to their destination. It has been noted that the Chiefs of Staff do not anticipate any serious difficulty in meeting surface or submarine attacks, but consider it inadvisable to expose troop convoys to the risk of air attack from <name key="name-020415" type="place">East Africa</name> in the early stages of the war.</p>
            <p rend="indent">In regard to diversion, it is noted that the situation is being watched from day to day, that the Admiralty would issue orders for diversion if the situation should demand it at any time, and that diversion to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> is recommended. As immediate action may be a vital factor in the safety of a convoy, we concur in action along these lines, but we desire that any such decision should be communicated forthwith for our information
<pb n="105" xml:id="n105"/>
and concurrence and that we should be kept fully informed on the trend of the situation. In agreeing to diversion via the Cape, the Commonwealth Government again assume that the escort arrangements both to <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> and thence onward will ensure the security of both [convoys?] in respect of surface craft and submarines.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c8-37-2">
            <head>Equipping and Re-concentration of <name key="name-016394" type="organisation">Australian Imperial Force</name></head>
            <p rend="indent">With some concern the Commonwealth Government note the statement in your telegram of 30 April (<ref target="#c8-23">No. 123</ref>) that if war with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> were to break out subsequent to the arrival of the contingents in Egypt there might be considerable difficulty in equipping our troops as the necessary material has to come from <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> sources.</p>
            <p rend="indent">It will be recalled that the High Commissioner, in accordance with cabled directions on 26 January,<note xml:id="ftn1-105" n="1"><p>Not available.</p></note> made representations on the situation in the Near East and the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, the possibility of employment of Australian [troops?] on active operations, and the anticipated rate of provision of modern weapons and equipment. In view of the statement quoted we would urge that the utmost expediency be used in fully equipping our troops, the present forecast of which is given as the middle of September.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Should diversion of the convoys to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> become necessary the Commonwealth Government stress the importance of re-constituting the whole expeditionary force at the earliest possible moment and note your assurance that this will be done.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c8-37-3">
            <head>Ultimate Theatre of Employment</head>
            <p rend="indent">It is indicated by the Chiefs of Staff that the most likely theatres for the employment of the <name key="name-016394" type="organisation">Australian Imperial Force</name> are the Near East and <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>. When the training and equipping of the force has reached a stage to enable it to take the field you will no doubt raise this aspect again.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="38" xml:id="c8-38">
          <head>138<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-09">9 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The opportunity of perusing the views of the Chiefs of Staff, as set out in your telegram of 4 May (<ref target="#c8-35">No. 135</ref>) is warmly appreciated by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. They are content
<pb n="106" xml:id="n106"/>
to allow convoy US 3 to proceed as originally arranged subject, firstly, to their being kept most closely informed as to developments as they occur; secondly, to the decision as to the ultimate destination being made by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand after considering the views of the Admiralty and of His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, and to their being given an opportunity, at the appropriate time, of making that decision with the full facts then available (this condition, of course, applies only to the ultimate destination and would in no way preclude the Admiralty from ordering any alteration in course, if and when this appeared necessary for the safety of the convoy); and, thirdly, to their being satisfied as to the adequacy of the escort proposed, in the case of diversion, from <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> onwards, as to which they are at present not without anxiety. If diversion is decided upon they would appreciate a review of the position as regards escort in the light of potential enemy dispositions at that time. In the absence of intimation to the contrary, they assume that if US 3 is not diverted no diminution will be made in the escort proposed from <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name>—namely, two 8-inch cruisers and one 6-inch cruiser to the Cocos Islands, and one 8-inch cruiser and two 6-inch cruisers from the Cocos Islands to <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="39" xml:id="c8-39">
          <head>139<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-11">11 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">We are grateful for your telegram of 9 May (<ref target="#c8-38">No. 138</ref>). Should the situation require diversion the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> will be communicated with as desired. Your assumption in the last sentence is confirmed.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="40" xml:id="c8-40">
          <head>140<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-15">15 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to my telegram of 11 May (<ref target="#c8-39">No. 139</ref>).</p>
          <p rend="indent">Today the <name key="name-016917" type="organisation">War Cabinet</name> have considered the position in regard to US 3 and they have concluded that in view of the present situation in relation to <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> it would be inadvisable for the convoy to proceed towards the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. Accordingly, arrangements are being made for diversion towards <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name>.</p>
          <pb n="107" xml:id="n107"/>
          <p rend="indent">As regards the ultimate destination, it is felt that for the reasons described in my telegram of 30 April (<ref target="#c8-23">No. 123</ref>) it would be desirable for the contingents to proceed to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, and it is hoped this will be agreeable to the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments. It is the intention that the escort will be maintained at its present strength as far as <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name>, except that the 6-inch cruiser will have to be withdrawn on account of fuel endurance. The arrangements for onward escort are at present under consideration, and full particulars of proposals will be communicated as soon as possible together with a short appreciation of the factors on which they are based.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It is understood that two vessels<note xml:id="ftn1-107" n="1"><p>Transport X 5, <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207165" type="ship">Empress of Canada</name></hi>, and transport X 6, <hi rend="i">Empress of Japan.</hi></p></note> have Chinese crews who decline to proceed into the <name key="name-006366" type="place">Atlantic</name>, but this difficulty can be met by the transfer at <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> of the troops at present on these ships to other ships of the convoy in which accommodation can be provided without undue overcrowding. This would ensure the minimum delay at <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> and that the troops would be able to reach the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> in one body.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="41" xml:id="c8-41">
          <head>141<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to Headquarters 2nd NZEF (<name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-15">15 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Diversion of the convoy to <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> has been decided on. The War Office suggest that you may desire key personnel now in Egypt to join the convoy <hi rend="i">en route</hi> or be available on arrival at the new destination. The War Office will endeavour to arrange accordingly. Immediate information as to details of personnel to be moved is requested.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="42" xml:id="c8-42">
          <head>142<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Headquarters 2nd NZEF to the High Commissioner for New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-15">15 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following is for Brigadier Park, Military Liaison Officer:</p>
          <p rend="indent">Does your telegram mean that the destination is <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> or Great Britain? If the latter, please advise if all future New Zealand troops are to concentrate and train there?</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="108" xml:id="n108"/>
        <div type="section" n="43" xml:id="c8-43">
          <head>143<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand to Headquarters 2nd NZEF</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-16">16 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My telegram (<ref target="#c8-41">No. 141</ref>) meant diversion to <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name>, the eventual destination being the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. If the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name> route is considered safe at the time of departure of the <name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name> the present intention is ultimately to concentrate the whole Division in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="44" xml:id="c8-44">
          <head>144<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-16">16 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The proposal contained in your telegram of 15 May (<ref target="#c8-40">No. 140</ref>) to divert convoy US 3 to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> is agreed to by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. On the information available to them, however, they cannot feel that it would be possible to transfer the troops from the ships not proceeding beyond <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> to the remaining vessels of the New Zealand portion of the convoy, and His Majesty's Government in New Zealand presume that all proper steps will be taken to provide suitable and healthy accommodation, and that suitable additional shipping will be supplied if this accommodation cannot be found from the remaining ships of the convoy.</p>
          <p rend="indent">This telegram has been repeated to <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="45" xml:id="c8-45">
          <head>145<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board to the Admiralty</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-16">16 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to ACNB 0207Z, 3 May, to Director of Sea Transport<!-- Sea Transport, Director of --><note xml:id="ftn1-108" n="1"><p>Not published. In this telegram the opinion was expressed that the Chinese crew of these transports would refuse to go beyond <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> if the convoy were diverted to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p></note> regarding the probable hold-up of X 5 and X 6 at <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> owing to trouble with the Asiatic crew.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Following receipt of the message (<ref target="#c8-40">No. 140</ref>) from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs proposing the transfer of troops at <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> from X 5 and X 6 to the other five ships of US 3 for

<pb n="109" xml:id="n109"/>
onward passage to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, we understand that the Commonwealth Government is averse to the consequent overcrowding and other problems such as life-saving equipment, messing, and fresh water. In order to avoid these difficulties we propose that the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207157" type="ship">Orcades</name></hi>,<note xml:id="ftn1-109" n="1"><p>Orient Line, 23,456 tons; sunk by enemy U-boat off the Cape of Good Hope, <date when="1942-10-10">10 Oct 1942</date>.</p></note> due at Colombo homeward bound on 17 May, fitted for <date when="1600">1600</date>, and the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207166" type="ship">Strathnaver</name></hi>,<note xml:id="ftn2-109" n="2"><p>Peninsular and Oriental Line, 22,283 tons.</p></note> due at <name key="name-000565" type="place">Aden</name> homeward bound on 17 May, fitted for 1500, be diverted and ordered to proceed at best speed to <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name>, where they could arrive about 27 May and 26 May respectively. Both ships have a small number of passengers and full cargo for the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> and the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The convoy is due at <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> on 26 May. If you concur with this proposal, we request that immediate steps be taken to arrange diversion.</p>
          <p rend="indent">This telegram is repeated to the New Zealand Naval Board.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="46" xml:id="c8-46">
          <head>146<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> to the Prime Minister of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-17">17 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 16 May (<ref target="#c8-44">No. 144</ref>). The following telegram has been despatched to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs:</p>
          <p rend="indent">The wisdom of diverting US 3 to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> is still causing His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> some doubts, and before agreeing to this course, which would mean the splitting of our forces, they would appreciate early advice of the possibility of completing the training of the troops in North-West India.</p>
          <p rend="indent">If the estimate given in your cable of 4 May (<ref target="#c8-35">No. 135</ref>), that the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name> route can be re-constituted within the first three months of the war with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> is borne out, training could be carried out during this time and there would appear to be no difficulty in re-establishing the division when the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name> is clear.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Would you therefore please advise us of the capacity of <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> to accommodate, train, and equip these troops, and whether such a course holds any advantages in the release of British troops in <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> for service in other theatres. In addition, we would like to receive your views on the alternative of training in South Africa
<pb n="110" xml:id="n110"/>
should the Government of that Dominion be willing for the troops to embark [disembark?] there.</p>
          <p rend="indent">This telegram has been repeated to South Africa and to New Zealand.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="47" xml:id="c8-47">
          <head>147<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-17">17 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 15 May (<ref target="#c8-40">No. 140</ref>). His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have now received advice of the Australian suggestion that the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207157" type="ship">Orcades</name></hi> and <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207166" type="ship">Strathnaver</name></hi> be used to obviate difficulties of overcrowding, &amp;c., from <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> onwards, and they give warm support to this suggestion.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="48" xml:id="c8-48">
          <head>148<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-17">17 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The suggestion that it might be possible to complete the training of the troops in North-West India or the Union of South Africa has been considered and the following is the position as seen here:</p>
          <p rend="indent"><name key="name-005952" type="place">INDIA</name>—<hi rend="i">Accommodation:</hi> There are not enough barracks suitable for white troops in any one neighbourhood to allow the concentration of the Australian and New Zealand troops. It is improbable that sufficient suitable barracks could be found even if the desirability of concentration was ignored. There are serious medical objections to white troops remaining under canvas during the hot weather or the rainy season, and this is the only alternative.</p>
          <p rend="indent"><hi rend="i">Training:</hi> It would be impracticable to carry out training, other than individual training, during the hot weather. The Australian and New Zealand troops have been under training for some three months at least and would require now to be carrying out more advanced training.</p>
          <p rend="indent"><hi rend="i">Equipment:</hi> Both full scale and training scale of equipment would have to be provided from the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> as neither could be supplied from <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name>. This would entail a delay of some two months even in the most favourable shipping situation. At present, with some few exceptions, Australian and New Zealand troops are without any other equipment than rifles.</p>
          <pb n="111" xml:id="n111"/>
          <p rend="indent"><hi rend="i">Role in <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name>:</hi> The acceptance of Australian and New Zealand troops in order to reduce the British garrisons in <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> is not considered practicable because, firstly, these troops would have to be equipped before they could be employed in an active role, and, secondly, any removal of British troops would involve their eventual replacement later on the departure of the Australian and New Zealand troops, since no permanent reduction in the numbers of British troops in <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> could be accepted.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In addition to the points enumerated above, a diversion to <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> would delay in any case the date of readiness of the Australian and New Zealand troops for operations in European theatres of war.</p>
          <p rend="indent">SOUTH AFRICA—It would be for His Majesty's Government in South Africa to say whether suitable accommodation exists and could be made available, but the equipment situation would be the same as for <name key="name-005952" type="place">India</name> except that it could be provided with a little less delay. We greatly hope in these circumstances, as well as on general grounds, that His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name><note xml:id="ftn1-111" n="1"><p>This telegram was addressed to the Governments of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> and South Africa as well as to New Zealand.</p></note> will be willing that the troops should proceed to this country.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="49" xml:id="c8-49">
          <head>149<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-17">17 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to your telegrams of 16 May (<ref target="#c8-44">No. 144</ref>) and 17 May (<ref target="#c8-47">No. 147</ref>). Consideration has been given to the possibility of utilising the <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207157" type="ship">Orcades</name></hi> and <hi rend="i"><name key="name-207166" type="ship">Strathnaver</name></hi>, but it is regretted that they cannot be made available as they are required for other urgent war purposes. No other suitable vessels are available at present, or could be made available within a reasonable period, without serious interference with war requirements. It is not felt that the arrangement described in my telegram (<ref target="#c8-40">No. 140</ref>) would involve appreciable discomfort, and it is also considered that the conditions on board will be entirely suitable and healthy. Adequate water will be available for the increased numbers, and additional life-saving appliances will be put on board at <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name>. In the past some of the vessels have carried considerably larger numbers of troops than those now proposed. Having regard to the present most difficult shipping situation, we very much hope that, in the circumstances, the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments will agree to the course proposed.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="112" xml:id="n112"/>
        <div type="section" n="50" xml:id="c8-50">
          <head>150<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi><lb/>
<hi rend="i">[Extract]</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-19">19 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Circular daily war telegram.<note xml:id="ftn1-112" n="1"><p>Daily war telegrams on the progress of the war were sent by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to each of the Dominion Governments.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">An enemy raider may be at sea in the South Atlantic. The indications are mines off Cape Agulhas, the sighting of a suspicious ship on 2 May, and the fact that the British SS <hi rend="i">Scientist</hi> (6199 tons),<note xml:id="ftn2-112" n="2"><p>Sunk by the German merchant raider <hi rend="i"><name key="name-000340" type="place">Atlantis</name></hi> in the South Atlantic on <date when="1940-05-03">3 May 1940</date>.</p></note> which left <name key="name-035894" type="place">Durban</name> on 27 April, is overdue. Two German merchant ships, which may be acting as supply ships, have escaped, one from Azores and the other from the Canaries.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="51" xml:id="c8-51">
          <head>151<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-20">20 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, in the light of the considerations set out in your telegrams of 17 May (<ref target="#c8-48">Nos. 148</ref> and <ref target="#c8-49">149</ref>), are prepared to agree to the proposals for the diversion of convoy US 3 to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> and for the necessary adjustments in accommodation contemplated. They trust, however, that every possibility of providing suitable accommodation will be explored and that the best arrangements possible will be made, having regard both to the comfort and the health of the troops. In view of the reference in your daily war telegram of 19 May (<ref target="#c8-50">No. 150</ref>) to the possibility of a German raider being abroad in the vicinity of South Africa, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand continue to hold some anxiety as to the safety of the convoy and presume that, with a view to strengthening the escort if necessary, this aspect of the matter is being most carefully watched.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="113" xml:id="n113"/>
        <div type="section" n="52" xml:id="c8-52">
          <head>152<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> (<name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>) to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-22">22 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">As complete arrangements have been made here for its reception and training, I regret the decision to send the Second Echelon to England. Now that the decision has been made and the Division is to be split, the whole policy of ultimate concentration can be reconsidered in the light of active operations upon the Western Front. There is no hurry for a decision on this matter as Falla and MacCormick will make a complete plan, but no financial commitments, for the Division based upon England. Then we need only implement sufficient for the Second Echelon.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I have done all I can to reduce commitments here consequent upon smaller numbers through the hot months. The hospital at <name key="name-000935" type="place">Helwan</name> will now be taken over by British Troops in Egypt and not by us. MacCormick's move necessitates, and I have arranged, Kenrick<note xml:id="ftn1-113" n="1"><p>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier) H. S. Kenrick, CB, CBE, ED, succeeded Brigadier MacCormick first as Assistant Director of <name key="name-016593" type="organisation">Medical Services</name>, 2nd NZEF, and later as Director.</p></note> being diverted from <name key="name-012264" type="place">Capetown</name> as the medical situation in <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> needs first-class administration. Arrangements for a convalescent home have been discontinued as it is cheaper to handle individual cases than to launch out upon hiring and equipping a new convalescent home. The bath at <name key="name-000935" type="place">Helwan</name> [costing?] £1200 has been finished but I have cancelled the filtration plant. I will endeavour to get the bath taken over by War Department funds.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The changed plans will necessitate sending at once by air a small administration staff to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to make arrangements for the reception, accommodation, and comfort of the Second Echelon, followed by myself and a small training staff. I do not intend to leave here until the last minute and will return as soon as the training of the Second Echelon has progressed sufficiently. There seems to be no alternative to these plans. Cable if you approve.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="53" xml:id="c8-53">
          <head>153<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Minister of Defence to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-25">25 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 22 May (<ref target="#c8-52">No. 152</ref>).</p>
          <p rend="indent">The decision to divert the convoy was made by the authorities in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> because of the danger of the transports being subjected to attack should <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> enter the war.</p>
          <pb n="114" xml:id="n114"/>
          <p rend="indent">I concur with your arrangements regarding MacCormick and Kenrick and the proposals relating to the <name key="name-000935" type="place">Helwan</name> bath. I also agree with the suggested plans for the reception, accommodation, and training of the Second Echelon.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="54" xml:id="c8-54">
          <head>154<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-27">27 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My telegram of 15 May (<ref target="#c8-40">No. 140</ref>).</p>
          <p rend="indent">While in the South Atlantic the Admiralty intend escorting US 3 by HMS <hi rend="i">Cumberland</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-114" n="1"><p>HMS <hi rend="i">Cumberland</hi>, 8-inch cruiser, 10,000 tons.</p></note> and HMS <hi rend="i">Shropshire.</hi></p>
          <p rend="indent">Reliable evidence indicates that no German surface warships were outside Home waters on 18 May, and in particular that both pocket battleships were then undergoing repairs. Therefore, it is highly probable that the raider now believed to be at large is of a disguised merchant ship type against which one 8-inch cruiser would be more than a match.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It is the intention that the next port of call should be <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name>, where adequate surface and air anti-submarine patrols are in force, although there is no evidence that German submarines have as yet attempted to proceed so far afield.</p>
          <p rend="indent">With regard to possible Italian intervention, it is known that all Italian surface warships are in the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> or the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name> area. The Straits of Gibraltar are closely patrolled against the possible passage of submarines, and even should hostilities commence against <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> in the immediate future, it is not considered that there would be any necessity to divert the convoy to Trinidad.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The arrangements for escort from <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name> onward will be considered later.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="115" xml:id="n115"/>
        <div type="section" n="55" xml:id="c8-55">
          <head>155<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-29">29 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to your telegram of 20 May (<ref target="#c8-51">No. 151</ref>), it has now been found possible to arrange for one of the two convoy vessels which were to be withdrawn to proceed with US 3.<note xml:id="ftn1-115" n="1"><p>An undated naval message on a Prime Minister's Department file reads: <hi rend="i">‘<name key="name-207165" type="ship">Empress of Canada</name></hi> gone on. Chinese replaced by New Zealand naval draft and others.’ In a message to the Chief of the General Staff on 31 May Brigadier Hargest reported: ‘Accommodation on the trans-shipment satisfactory under emergency conditions. Health good.’</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="56" xml:id="c8-56">
          <head>156<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-29">29 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following message is for Brigadier Falla:</p>
          <p rend="indent">Please keep me posted regarding any developments. Where do the Second Echelon concentrate? Please ensure that all arrangements are reported where necessary to this headquarters for approval and are not discussed or entered into with New Zealand direct. Will you pass this on to Hargest<note xml:id="ftn2-115" n="2"><p>Brigadier James Hargest, CBE, DSO, MC, VD; commanded 5th New Zealand Infantry Brigade until taken prisoner of war at <name key="name-004714" type="place">Sidi Azeiz</name> in <date when="1941-11">Nov 1941</date>; escaped <date when="1943-03">Mar 1943</date>, with Brigadier Miles, from prison camp near <name key="name-000842" type="place">Florence</name> and reached <name key="name-035423" type="place">Switzerland</name>; later reached <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> via <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> and <name key="name-007594" type="place">Spain</name>; killed in action in <name key="name-016111" type="place">Normandy</name> in <date when="1944-08">Aug 1944</date> while acting as an observer with the 50th (Northumbrian) Division.</p></note> and Barrowclough<note xml:id="ftn3-115" n="3"><p>Major-General H. E. Barrowclough, CB, DSO, MC, ED; commanded a composite force of New Zealand troops in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> in <date when="1940">1940</date>; commanded 6th New Zealand Infantry Brigade in <name key="name-002294" type="place">Greece</name> and <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name> in <date when="1941">1941</date>; returned to New Zealand in <date when="1942">1942</date> and was GOC 2nd NZEF in the <name key="name-008892" type="place">Pacific</name> and GOC 3rd New Zealand Division, 8 Aug 1942–20 Oct 1944.</p></note> in due course?</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="57" xml:id="c8-57">
          <head>157<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-05-31">31 May 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Owing to the proximity of Colchester to the present theatre of war, the Eastern Command in England is now organised as a war area, necessitating the dispersion of units. Falla cables:</p>
          <pb n="116" xml:id="n116"/>
          <p rend="indent">Owing to the situation I have arranged provisional accommodation for one battalion at Harwich, one battalion at Frinton, the Artillery and Engineers at Reedhall, <name key="name-015592" type="organisation">Royal Army Service Corps</name> and Royal Army Medical Corps at Romanway, and the remainder under canvas, the <name key="name-005118" type="organisation">Maori Battalion</name> at Berechurch and one battalion at Wivenhoe.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Both from a training and disciplinary point of view this arrangement is a thoroughly bad one for us; further, Essex is now in a bad area for air attacks. Therefore, I have wired Falla as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">Cannot agree to the arrangements suggested for the Second Echelon. Tell the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> that although I am sure that the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> wish to help in the way most acceptable to the British war effort, especially at the present moment, I would point out that the collective training of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force is already grievously interfered with by lack of equipment and the separation of the Second Echelon from the First. The arrangement suggested in the Eastern Command is bad for discipline and will further hamper training for war. I would therefore press to concentrate the Second Echelon in the Southern Command, with preference at <name key="name-026267" type="place">Hungerford</name>. I am communicating with the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I hope this action has your approval.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="58" xml:id="c8-58">
          <head>158<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-01">1 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The New Zealand Government are greatly disturbed to learn from <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> that it is now proposed that the Second Echelon of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force on arrival in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> is to be widely dispersed and not concentrated as previously arranged. The exigencies of the situation are fully realised, but they feel that they must ask His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to do what is possible to make more suitable arrangements than those that are apparently proposed, and especially to make every effort to accommodate the echelon as far as possible in one body and in a suitable locality.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="117" xml:id="n117"/>
        <div type="section" n="59" xml:id="c8-59">
          <head>159<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Minister of Defence to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-01">1 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The Government is in full agreement with the views contained in your telegram of 31 May (<ref target="#c8-57">No. 157</ref>) as to the accommodation of the Second Echelon in England, and they have sent the following telegram to His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>:</p>
          <p rend="center">[Text of telegram <ref target="#c8-58">No. 158</ref>]</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="60" xml:id="c8-60">
          <head>160<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <div type="section" xml:id="c8-60-0">
            <opener>
              <date when="1940-06-04">4 June 1940</date>
            </opener>
            <p rend="indent">The serious shortage of all training equipment in England for some time, due to the re-equipment of the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name>, and the inadvisability of Colchester for concentration are disclosed in the attached exchange of cables with Brigadier Falla:</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c8-60-1">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand to Headquarters 2nd NZEF</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">1 June. Following from Falla:<note xml:id="ftn1-117" n="1"><p>Brigadier Falla's normal channel of communication with <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>, while the latter was still in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, was through the office of the New Zealand High Commissioner in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p></note> Your telegram of 31 May.<note xml:id="ftn2-117" n="2"><p>See <ref target="#c8-57">No. 157</ref>.</p></note> Your wishes have been communicated to the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> who have advised that training equipment is limited to an approximate scale as below, and this will be provided only after the re-equipment requirements of the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name> have been met; unless the contingent is in a battle area there is no prospect of increasing these scales: motor transport—minimum amount for administration only; Bren guns—lower training scale; antitank rifles—ten per battalion; mortars, 2-inch—three per battalion, 3-inch—one per battalion; 2-pounder anti-tank gun—two per regiment; field artillery–six drill-purpose guns and carriages per regiment; pistols—84 for the contingent; Engineers—lower training scale; Signals—interim training scale; Medical—hospital and field ambulance equipped to war establishment if in a troop area, otherwise field ambulance only equipped on lower training scale. The prospect of the New Zealand contingent going to Colchester is welcomed by Eastern Command as the present stage of training of the contingent will be much in advance of other units available there.</p>
          </div>
          <pb n="118" xml:id="n118"/>
          <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c8-60-2">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">Headquarters 2nd NZEF to the High Commissioner for New Zealand</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">2 June. Following for Brigadier Falla: The issues raised in your telegram must be considered carefully. Will you telegraph at once if going to Colchester will enable the contingent to be concentrated in the town, using existing barracks. The suggestion put forward in your telegram of the 30th<note xml:id="ftn1-118" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c8-57">No. 157</ref> of 31 May.</p></note> is quite unworkable. An answer to this is urgently wanted before a decision can be made. Referring to the scale of equipment, will you let us know when the approximate scale mentioned will be available and when the equipment for collective training will be issued; also, when are the Second Echelon expected in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>?</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c8-60-3">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand to Headquarters 2nd NZEF</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">3 June. Your telegram of 2 June. Following from Falla: Tactical considerations rule out the Colchester area. Concentration in town and barracks is considered unsound because of the risk of bombing. Harwich and Frinton were indicated for urgent garrison requirements. The War Office appreciation follows. The only definite information available is that the contingent is due at <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name> on 7 June. I will reply later regarding equipment.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="4" xml:id="c8-60-4">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">Headquarters 2nd NZEF to the High Commissioner for New Zealand</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">3 June. Following for Brigadier Falla: As a permanent base the Colchester area is definitely out of the question. My Government now want to concentrate the Second Echelon in Southern Command. Will you therefore discuss the question with Colonel Allen, who knows all areas, and make the best arrangement possible with the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name>? Any arrangements made must visualise a complete base for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in barracks or hutted camp, together with a concentration area capable of taking the Second Echelon and with possible expansion for further troops. The area should be adjacent to good training areas and musketry facilities; tents are preferred to billets.</p>
            <p rend="indent">The situation disclosed seems thoroughly unsatisfactory. The New Zealand Expeditionary Force is split up with no policy to reunite, particularly the First Echelon, which apparently has been relegated to garrison duties in <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> owing to the absence of mobilisation equipment, while the Second Echelon appears worse off than the First, with no likelihood of taking its rightful place in the field. Further, as no decision as to the final destination has yet been made, no plans can be made for the base organisation. In spite
<pb n="119" xml:id="n119"/>
of the equipment situation disclosed in Falla's cable, I have replied asking that the Second Echelon should concentrate if possible in Southern Command.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Until the Italian situation is clarified, the separation of the First and Second Echelons must now be accepted, and it is for your consideration whether the present policy of keeping the New Zealand troops out of action until the Division is concentrated should be temporarily abandoned. That both echelons will be kept low on the priority list for equipment and employed in garrison duties seems to be the alternative. This would have an adverse effect on the men now that active operations have commenced. If Italy does not enter into the war, or the situation in the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> or the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name> is cleared up, I advise that the First and Second Echelons be concentrated in England at the first opportunity with early despatch to <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> if another brigade can be made available by the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> or the Australians in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="61" xml:id="c8-61">
          <head>161<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-06">6 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">As a result of recent developments, the appreciation as to the intervention of <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> contained in my telegram of 4 May (<ref target="#c8-35">No. 135</ref>), has now been reviewed and it is thought that the first two paragraphs might now be revised to read as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">As Italy's Navy is in better condition for war than <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name>'s Army or <name key="name-023234" type="organisation">Air Force</name>, the probable Italian plan would be to use the Navy to dispute Allied control of sea communications, while using other arms for raids and diversions which may be on a major scale. The probable Italian action would be either a direct attack on Allied interests and possessions in the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> and the <name key="name-001311" type="place">Red Sea</name>, or invasion of the Dalmatian coast or Corfu.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The appreciation still holds good in other respects.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="62" xml:id="c8-62">
          <head>162<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Letter from <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to Brigadier R. Miles</hi><lb/>
<hi rend="i">[Extract]</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-06">6 June 1940</date>
            <salute rend="right"><hi rend="sc">My Dear Miles</hi>,</salute>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Many thanks for your personal and secret letter of 30 May….<note xml:id="ftn1-119" n="1"><p>Brigadier Miles's letter is not published. In it the dispersal of the force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> and the question of command were discussed. A personal message from <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> has been omitted from this letter.</p></note> You will, of course, have been in touch with
<pb n="120" xml:id="n120"/>
Falla and will know what we feel here and what the Government in New Zealand feel about dispersal and going to the training area in the Eastern Command. First and foremost we are, in my opinion, a division training for war. We should not let anything interfere with that, and we should resist to the utmost any effort that may be made to turn us into garrison troops for England. Secondly, I may be quite wrong, but I cannot believe that <name key="name-006503" type="person">Hitler</name> or the Germans intend to attempt an invasion of England. If they do it would be an excellent thing for the Allies. In any case we have rightly decided to concentrate in the Southern Command. It is an ideal area from our point of view. We shall have a show of our own in most delightful surroundings, and the troops, I am sure, will love the country and the town.</p>
          <p rend="indent">With regard to the points you raise about operational command, I am in entire agreement with you. Had I realised the situation I should have sent you fully prepared. You will take command of the troops, and I think you should establish Headquarters which can function in the event of their using the Second Echelon as a striking force, but I strongly urge you to resist any attempt at dispersion. The force should be used as a force. I am sending to you orders in writing, and I am sending to Hargest and you notes on training. Both Stewart and I hope to be Home before very long, but in common with others we want to see this Italian situation cleared up one way or the other. There are one or two interesting developments which I cannot put on paper. However, all appears to be going well.</p>
          <closer>
            <salute rend="right">Yours sincerely,</salute>
            <signed rend="right">
              <hi rend="sc">
                <name key="name-207994" type="person">B. C. Freyberg</name>
              </hi>
            </signed>
          </closer>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="63" xml:id="c8-63">
          <head>163<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-06">6 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Advice has been received from Falla that two areas have been offered to accommodate the Second Echelon—Winchester, in billets, or <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name>, in tents. The War Office advise leaving the question of a base for decision later. I am against <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name> because it would mix us up with the Canadians; further, <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name> is theoretically (?) dangerous point [because of] enemy bombing. On the other hand, Winchester has a very good training area, a good train service, and
<pb n="121" xml:id="n121"/>
excellent conditions for the men. Have cabled Falla to make arrangements for Winchester as the Second Echelon arrives on the 16th. Will you cable if you approve?</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="64" xml:id="c8-64">
          <head>164<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Minister of Defence to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-07">7 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your arrangements for Winchester are approved.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="65" xml:id="c8-65">
          <head>165<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-07">7 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following has been received from Falla:</p>
          <p rend="indent">After further reconnaissance the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> have advised that it is now found impracticable to accommodate the New Zealand contingent in the Winchester area and that arrangements are being made, therefore, to receive it at <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name>; no alternative but to agree.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="66" xml:id="c8-66">
          <head>166<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-07">7 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The Admiralty have had the position in relation to the onward passage of US 3 from <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name> under consideration. The general situation remains as indicated in my telegram of 27 May (<ref target="#c8-54">No. 154</ref>).</p>
          <p rend="indent">HMS <hi rend="i">Resolution</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-121" n="1"><p>HMS <hi rend="i">Resolution</hi>, battleship, 29,150 tons, eight 15-inch guns.</p></note> and HMS <hi rend="i">Arethusa</hi><note xml:id="ftn2-121" n="2"><p>HMS <hi rend="i">Arethusa</hi>, 6-inch cruiser, 5220 tons.</p></note> will be stationed at Gibraltar before the convoy leaves <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name>, and for the last part of the passage units of the Home Fleet will provide cover. In the present circumstances, and with these additional measures of security, it is considered that ocean escort by HMS <hi rend="i">Shropshire</hi> and HMS <hi rend="i">Cumberland</hi> will afford adequate protection, but a destroyer
<pb n="122" xml:id="n122"/>
screen and air reconnaissance will be provided during the passage through the submarine zone. If a change in the situation should so require, means are available to reinforce the ocean escort.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The convoy will pass to the west of <name key="name-120007" type="place">Ireland</name> and is destined for the Clyde.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="67" xml:id="c8-67">
          <head>167<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-08">8 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The arrangements proposed for the escort of US 3 during its onward passage from <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name>, as set out in your telegram of 7 June (<ref target="#c8-66">No. 166</ref>), have been noted with interest and appreciation by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. They note the assurance that the escort proposed is adequate and assume that, in the light of the potentialities of the immediate future, His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> will keep the situation constantly under review, so that should a change in the situation so require the escort can be reinforced immediately.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="68" xml:id="c8-68">
          <head>168<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-08">8 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">We regret to learn from your telegram of 1 June (<ref target="#c8-58">No. 158</ref>) of the concern felt by the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>. We feel that there must have been some misunderstanding as to what has been contemplated. The position is that arrangements had been made for the troops to be stationed in the Colchester area as it was understood from the New Zealand authorities in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> that this area was preferred. However, in the existing conditions, operational reasons would have prevented the full concentration of the Second Echelon if stationed in that area, and the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> accordingly consulted the General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, who agreed that in the circumstances an alternative area to Colchester should be found. The War Office are now in further communication with <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> with a view to deciding
<pb n="123" xml:id="n123"/>
upon an alternative area affording suitable training facilities without dispersion, and they expect to reach a decision at an early date.</p>
          <p rend="indent">We are certain that the above will prove satisfactory to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="69" xml:id="c8-69">
          <head>169<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-08">8 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 7 June (<ref target="#c8-65">No. 165</ref>). It is regretted that Winchester cannot now be made available, and if in your opinion no better arrangements can be made in the meantime we feel with you that we must reluctantly agree to the proposal to accommodate the contingent at <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name> in the hope that an improvement can be made as the opportunity offers.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="70" xml:id="c8-70">
          <head>170<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-08">8 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following message has been received from Falla:</p>
          <p rend="indent"><name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name> reconnoitred today; with a view to facilitating training a generally satisfactory camp has been selected. The Artillery are at Bourley, the infantry, Royal Corps of Signals, and administrative headquarters at <name key="name-024324" type="place">Mytchett</name>, Maoris and Medical at <name key="name-027511" type="place">Ewshott</name>, <name key="name-006630" type="organisation">Army Service Corps</name> and Engineers at Eelmoor.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I have looked up the areas and they seem quite suitable. Anyway, as no other arrangements are possible it would appear that we must agree.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="71" xml:id="c8-71">
          <head>171<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to the Prime Minister</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-12">12 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">As Britain is a war zone the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> intimates that the troops here will be under local command and not under the commander in Egypt. You will be advised officially.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="124" xml:id="n124"/>
        <div type="section" n="72" xml:id="c8-72">
          <head>172<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-12">12 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The Dominion Governments will have appreciated that the success of the German attack in northern <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> has produced a situation in which, possibly in the near future, an attempted invasion of this country has to be taken very seriously into account with practical effects on the disposition of all military forces available in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. Hitherto, the policy which it had been hoped to follow in respect of Dominion troops while training in this country was to allocate them to areas selected primarily on the grounds of suitability for training purposes, and entirely without reference to the possibility of the troops in question having to be used as part of the country's available defence.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Because of the altered situation with which we are now faced it has been necessary to reconsider the disposition of the Australian and New Zealand contingents which will very shortly be arriving in this country. It had been hoped, of course, to locate these contingents, and to make all other arrangements connected with their arrival here, with the continuation of their training solely in view, and the eventual completion of self-contained and fully trained Australian and New Zealand higher formations. As the situation now is, it is necessary to make such arrangements for the location of the contingents as will best suit the needs of the time. All efforts will of course be made to arrange for the continuation of their training on the most effective lines, including, so far as possible, avoidance of dispersal, but there is no alternative to locating contingents in any district in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> where, having regard to the stage of training already reached and the high [quality of the?] troops, they will be best placed to carry out whatever defensive role it might be necessary to allot to them on the occurrence of an emergency. We are confident that in the circumstances no objection will be raised by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of <name key="name-008963" type="place">Australia</name> and His Majesty's Government in New Zealand.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Information to the fullest possible extent will of course be given Dominion Governments as arrangements are decided on and the closest touch will be maintained. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand already will have seen my telegram of 8 June (<ref target="#c8-68">No. 168</ref>) and will no doubt have heard from <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> in more detail.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="125" xml:id="n125"/>
        <div type="section" n="73" xml:id="c8-73">
          <head>173<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-13">13 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to my immediately preceding telegram (<ref target="#c8-72">No. 172</ref>). Regarding the questions of command and administration of that part of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force shortly to serve in this country, we assume that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will wish the principles set out in the memorandum enclosed in your despatch <ref target="#c1-6">No. 6</ref> of 5 June<note xml:id="ftn1-125" n="1"><p>This despatch cannot be traced. The memorandum referred to was the GOC's charter, for which see <ref target="#c5-13"><hi rend="i">Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF</hi> (No. 39)</ref>.</p></note> to apply, subject to such modifications as may be necessitated by the fact that this contingent will be detached from the main body of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force for the time being.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The geographical considerations and the increased difficulty of communication between this country and the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> since the outbreak of war with <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> suggest that the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> will wish the powers, duties, &amp;c., which are defined for and vested in the General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Expeditionary Force as regards the New Zealand Forces in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, to be delegated to and exercised by the Officer Commanding the New Zealand formation in this country. On this point a very early expression of the views of the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> would be appreciated.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="74" xml:id="c8-74">
          <head>174<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Memorandum from the Naval Secretary to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-13">13 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c8-74-1">
            <head>CONVOY US 3: ESCORT ARRANGEMENTS</head>
            <p rend="indent">With reference to my memorandum NA 030/50/2 of <date when="1940-06-07">7 June 1940</date>,<note xml:id="ftn2-125" n="2"><p>Not published. This memorandum forwarded a copy of an appreciation by the Admiralty giving the arrangements for the escort of convoy US 3 from <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name> to its destination. The text is included in the telegram of <date when="1940-06-07">7 Jun 1940</date> (<ref target="#c8-66">No. 166</ref>) from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General.</p></note> I have the honour to report that the following escort arrangements have been communicated by the Admiralty:</p>
            <list type="simple">
              <label>(<hi rend="i">a</hi>)</label>
              <item>
                <p>The convoy left <name key="name-010445" type="place">Freetown</name> on 8 June escorted by HMS <hi rend="i">Shropshire</hi> (8-inch cruiser), HMS <hi rend="i">Cumberland</hi> (8-inch cruiser), and HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-400000" type="ship">Hermes</name></hi><note xml:id="ftn3-125" n="3"><p>HMS <hi rend="i"><name key="name-400000" type="ship">Hermes</name></hi> small aircraft carrier, sunk by the Japanese in the <name key="name-001315" type="place">Indian Ocean</name>, <date when="1942">1942</date>.</p></note> (aircraft carrier).</p>
              </item>
              <pb n="126" xml:id="n126"/>
              <label>(<hi rend="i">b</hi>)</label>
              <item>
                <p>The ocean escort was reinforced on 12 June by HMS <hi rend="i">Dorsetshire</hi><note xml:id="ftn1-126" n="1"><p>HMS <hi rend="i">Dorsetshire</hi>, 8-inch cruiser, 9975 tons; administered the <hi rend="i">coup de grâce</hi> to the disabled <hi rend="i">Bismarck</hi>, <date when="1941-05-27">27 May 1941</date>; sunk by Japanese aircraft in the <name key="name-001315" type="place">Indian Ocean</name>, <date when="1942">1942</date>.</p></note> (8-inch cruiser).</p>
              </item>
              <label>(<hi rend="i">c</hi>)</label>
              <item>
                <p>On 14 June HMS <hi rend="i">Dorsetshire</hi> will be relieved by HMS <hi rend="i">Hood</hi><note xml:id="ftn2-126" n="2"><p>HMS <hi rend="i">Hood</hi>, battle-cruiser, eight 15-inch guns, 41,000 tons; sunk on <date when="1941-05-24">24 May 1941</date>, with three survivors, in the action which led ultimately to the destruction of the <hi rend="i">Bismarck.</hi></p></note> (battle-cruiser, 15-inch guns).</p>
              </item>
            </list>
            <p rend="indent">The ocean escort as from 14 June will therefore consist of the battle-cruiser HMS <hi rend="i">Hood</hi>, two 8-inch cruisers, and an aircraft carrier, and, as previously reported, HMS <hi rend="i">Resolution</hi> (battleship) and HMS <hi rend="i">Arethusa</hi> (6-inch cruiser) will be stationed at Gibraltar, and a destroyer screen and air reconnaissance will be provided during passage through the submarine zone.</p>
            <closer>
              <signed rend="right"><hi rend="sc">N. T. P. Cooper</hi>,</signed>
              <salute rend="right">Naval Secretary</salute>
            </closer>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="75" xml:id="c8-75">
          <head>175<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-14">14 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Please telegraph urgently your comments in full on the following two telegrams received by us today from the British Government:</p>
          <p rend="center">[Text of telegrams <ref target="#c8-72">Nos. 172</ref> and <ref target="#c8-73">173</ref>]</p>
          <p rend="indent">Telegram <ref target="#c8-68">No. 168</ref> referred to in <ref target="#c8-72">No. 172</ref> is in general terms and has no particular bearing. The memorandum referred to in <ref target="#c8-73">No. 173</ref> is that addressed to you on 5 January vesting powers.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="76" xml:id="c8-76">
          <head>176<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-14">14 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The following is for Brigadier Falla:</p>
          <p rend="indent">Since time is getting short I send you this warning. Because of pressure from the British Government, the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> may have to accept to send troops to a war area. Your orders will come from the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="127" xml:id="n127"/>
        <div type="section" n="77" xml:id="c8-77">
          <head>177<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-14">14 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 14 June (<ref target="#c8-75">No. 175</ref>).</p>
          <p rend="indent">My personal opinion remains unchanged regarding the location of the Second Echelon in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. The concentration of the echelon and training for war should be aimed at. The British Government's strongly worded telegrams, however, must be given consideration, especially as our employment in the war area at this juncture may liberate other troops for service in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>. My advice to the Government therefore is as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">If it is necessary in the British Government's opinion to use the New Zealand troops in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> for home defence, they should be adequately equipped with fighting equipment even should a less modern type of equipment only be available. They could then be used as the tactical situation demands—the equipment of the force to be a <hi rend="i">sine qua non</hi> of their being so employed.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The New Zealand troops should not be placed under a British Divisional Commander but should work as a separate formation direct under the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the war area where they are stationed.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Replying to the questions raised in telegram <ref target="#c8-73">No. 173</ref>, I have to advise the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> that I have arranged that Brigadier Miles should command all New Zealand troops in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. As he is competent to carry out these duties I recommend that the decision should stand.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I am satisfied with the proposed administration in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. As we have an efficient administrative staff and as all arrangements have been made, I see no reason to delegate any special administrative powers given to me as General Officer Commanding New Zealand Expeditionary Force. This decision could be altered if the situation proves otherwise.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Referring to the special powers in the memorandum of 5 January signed by the Prime Minister, I feel that in my absence from the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> only the powers under paragraph (<hi rend="i">a</hi>)<note xml:id="ftn1-127" n="1"><p>Paragraph (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) of the memorandum read: ‘In the case of sufficiently grave emergency or in special circumstances, of which he [GOC, 2nd NZEF] must be the sole judge, to make decisions as to the employment of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and to communicate such decisions directly to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>, notwithstanding that in the absence of that extraordinary cause such communication would not be in accordance with the normal channels of communication indicated in the following paragraphs…’</p></note> need be delegated. I suggest that these be delegated by the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> to Brigadier Miles. As time is short I have warned Falla that a change may be possible. Air mail has been re-established now on a fresh route.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="128" xml:id="n128"/>
        <div type="section" n="78" xml:id="c8-78">
          <head>178<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-15">15 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government in New Zealand agree in general with the viewpoint expressed in your telegram of 12 June (<ref target="#c8-72">No. 172</ref>) and approve the use of New Zealand troops, if necessary, for home defence in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, subject, however, to the prior condition that they have been equipped previously with fighting equipment suitable for the purpose, even should a less modern type of equipment only be available. They feel also that the New Zealand troops should work as a separate formation directly under the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the war area where they are stationed and that they should not be placed under a British Divisional Commander.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="79" xml:id="c8-79">
          <head>179<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-15">15 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 13 June (<ref target="#c8-73">No. 173</ref>). It has been arranged by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand that Brigadier Miles should command all New Zealand troops in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. They are arranging for delegation to him of such of the powers referred to in the memorandum enclosed in my despatch <ref target="#c1-6">No. 6</ref> of 5 June as may be necessary. <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> will be available for discussion of any necessary details as it is expected he will be proceeding to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> very shortly.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="80" xml:id="c8-80">
          <head>180<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Minister of Defence to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-15">15 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegrams of 13 and 14 June.<note xml:id="ftn1-128" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c7-8"><hi rend="i">First Echelon in Egypt: Command and Employment</hi> (Nos. 80</ref> and <ref target="#c7-9">81</ref>).</p></note> The Government approve of your proceeding to <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> at your discretion.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 14 June (<ref target="#c8-77">No. 177</ref>). The following messages have been sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs:</p>
          <p rend="center">[Text of telegrams <ref target="#c8-78">Nos. 178</ref> and <ref target="#c8-79">179</ref> of 15 June]</p>
          <pb n="129" xml:id="n129"/>
          <p rend="indent">The delegation of powers to Brigadier Miles under paragraph (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) of the memorandum of 5 January is approved by the Government. Please arrange accordingly if and as required.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="81" xml:id="c8-81">
          <head>181<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to the Prime Minister</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-15">15 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With the arrival of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> this office is receiving many offers of service from New Zealanders already in this country. Is it your wish that we proceed with enlistment? Also please advise the age limit for acceptance.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="82" xml:id="c8-82">
          <head>182<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Prime Minister to the High Commissioner for New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-16">16 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 15 June (<ref target="#c8-81">No. 181</ref>). Your reference to the arrival of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force has occasioned surprise. If we are to understand that the impending arrival has become known then grave anxiety must be felt here, and we would be glad of immediate reassurances on this point.</p>
          <p rend="indent">On the question of enlistments, consult <name key="name-207994" type="person">Freyberg</name> on his arrival. If he considers it practicable and if training facilities permit acceptance, the Government would have no objection to the enlistment of men within the present age group 21–40 years. Please send an estimate of the numbers of such enlistments.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="83" xml:id="c8-83">
          <head>183<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-16">16 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Convoy US 3 has arrived safely in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>. It will be appreciated that this information is not for publication. On the other points mentioned in your telegram of 14 June<note xml:id="ftn1-129" n="1"><p>Not published. This telegram contained details of arrangements for the release of news of the arrival of the Australian and New Zealand contingents in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>.</p></note> a further communication will be sent shortly.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="130" xml:id="n130"/>
        <div type="section" n="84" xml:id="c8-84">
          <head>184<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The High Commissioner for New Zealand to the Prime Minister</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-17">17 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Further to my telegram (<ref target="#c8-81">No. 181</ref>) and your reply (<ref target="#c8-82">No. 182</ref>), it is general talk here that troops of all the Dominions, including those troops now training in other lands, will arrive eventually in <name key="name-005976" type="place">Britain</name>. There need be no fear of any definite knowledge being disclosed as times and places, routes and numbers, or any particulars, even approximate, are not made known. The arrival of our officers from Egypt has aroused curiosity, and the impression is that our troops are coming from there at some time in the future.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="85" xml:id="c8-85">
          <head>185<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-18">18 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to your telegram of 16 June (<ref target="#c8-83">No. 183</ref>) concerning the announcement of the arrival of US 3. As public anxiety about the safety of the convoy is becoming marked, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be grateful if, at the earliest possible moment, they could be informed whether release can be expedited and when it can be effected.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="86" xml:id="c8-86">
          <head>186<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-20">20 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Anzac three.<note xml:id="ftn1-130" n="1"><p>Extract from a telegram of 12 Jun (not published) from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand: ‘Owing to the need for security of vessels of the convoy, it will probably not be possible to release news of arrival for a short time after disembarkation is completed. The exact time cannot yet be given, but as soon as the Admiralty are satisfied on security grounds, a telegram consisting of the code words “Anzac three” will be despatched to the Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments who will on receipt of the telegram be able to release the official communique announcing the arrival of the US 3 in this country….’</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <pb n="131" xml:id="n131"/>
        <div type="section" n="87" xml:id="c8-87">
          <head>187<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-27">27 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I have been in England for twenty-four hours and it is impossible in such a short time to give an appreciation of all the difficulties that exist. Nevertheless, I feel that it would assist you in New Zealand if I give my views and I can add to them when I have had more time. I arrived here after a difficult journey and am at my headquarters in <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name> where the troops are under canvas. Everybody is well and settling down. In spite of the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name>'s decision to disperse, the New Zealand troops in England are now concentrated in the <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name> area and are about to commence training.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In the event of an attack being made on the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> the Second Echelon are in General Headquarters Reserve and will be moved to support any threatened area. At present nothing definite has been planned, but details are being worked out. We shall probably form two groups, one a mobile striking force consisting of the 5th Infantry Brigade with attached troops under the command of Hargest, and the <name key="name-005118" type="organisation">Maori Battalion</name> and other small units as a defensive group for defence of the reserve line under Barrowclough. If the two groups work together they will either be under me, if I am in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, or under Miles.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I have visited the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> and have had conversations with the Director of Military Operations<note xml:id="ftn1-131" n="1"><p>Major-General Richard Henry Dewing, CB, DSO, MC.</p></note> and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.<note xml:id="ftn2-131" n="2"><p>General (later Field-Marshal) Sir John Dill.</p></note> Tomorrow evening I shall be seeing General Ironside.<note xml:id="ftn3-131" n="3"><p>At this time Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces.</p></note></p>
          <p rend="indent">The situation in <name key="name-008008" type="place">Europe</name> has undoubtedly deteriorated, and the military advisers here appear sure that the German Higher Command will attempt an attack on the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, but I find it difficult to believe that they will risk such a hazardous operation which, in my opinion, would be doomed to failure.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I want you to inform Cabinet that the situation here is grave but is improving week by week. For some time to come we shall be short of many of our weapons as there is a desperate shortage of equipment. This is the common lot of most troops here. Nevertheless, I feel that in spite of this, and I am sure that Cabinet will agree with me, New Zealand troops must be prepared to accept battle upon uneven terms in defence of Great Britain.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I have emphasised continually the advisability of concentrating the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and I came here with this
<pb n="132" xml:id="n132"/>
object so as to put before Cabinet the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> point of view and such advice as I thought would enable them to form their opinion. I am still in favour of concentrating as soon as expedient, but since talking to the heads here, and in view of the gravity of the situation both at Home and in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, I have come to the conclusion that we should accept the position of being separated for the present, subject to such minor adjustments between England and Egypt which will in no way cause embarrassment here while, at the same time, they will improve the fighting powers of the force while separated.</p>
          <p rend="indent">A fuller appreciation will be sent to you when I have had time to study the situation in detail. I will do nothing to commit the New Zealand troops in England until I have Cabinet authority. If you are in general agreement with the opinion I have expressed, will you cable me here?</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="88" xml:id="c8-88">
          <head>188<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Letter from the Director of Military Operations and Plans, <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name>, to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-29">29 June 1940</date>
            <salute>
              <hi rend="sc">Sir</hi>
            </salute>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">In connection with the contingent of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force now in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, I am directed to forward you the following information:</p>
          <p rend="indent">At <ref type="appendix" target="#a5">Appendix ‘A’</ref> is a copy of a memorandum of <date when="1940-01-05">5 January 1940</date> from the Prime Minister of New Zealand defining the powers of the General Officer Commanding, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force overseas.<note xml:id="ftn1-132" n="1"><p>See <ref target="#c5-13"><hi rend="i">Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF</hi> (No. 39)</ref>. <ref type="appendix" target="#a5">Appendix ‘A’</ref> is not published.</p></note> The New Zealand Government is arranging to confer on the Officer Commanding the New Zealand contingent in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> such of the powers referred to in this memorandum as may be necessary in the existing circumstances.</p>
          <p rend="indent">His Majesty's Government has informed the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> that, so far as possible, the New Zealand contingent in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> will be given facilities for continuing its training with a view to its ultimate junction with the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> and third contingent to form the New Zealand Division.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The New Zealand Government has expressed its wish that the contingent should be employed as a separate formation and not as individual units or embodied in a British division. The New Zealand Government has also asked that the contingent should not
<pb n="133" xml:id="n133"/>
be used unless it has been previously equipped with fighting equipment suitable for the employment in view, though the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> recognises that less modern equipment only may be available.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In view of the above undertaking and the wishes of the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>, the New Zealand contingent has been placed in <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> reserve.</p>
          <p rend="indent">In an emergency it would be released by the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> and would come under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces.</p>
          <closer>
I am …
<signed rend="right">[<hi rend="sc">R. H. Dewing</hi>,</signed>
<salute rend="right">Major-General], Director of Military Operations and Plans</salute>
</closer>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="89" xml:id="c8-89">
          <head>189<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Minister of Defence to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-06-29">29 June 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I am glad to hear of your safe arrival and am most grateful for the expression of views and the information contained in your telegram of 27 June (<ref target="#c8-87">No. 187</ref>) with which we are in general agreement. We are content to leave all questions concerning the utilisation of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to your discretion, on the understanding that, where possible, before action is taken you will give us the opportunity of forming and expressing an opinion.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="90" xml:id="c8-90">
          <head>190<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-07-04">4 July 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Further to my cable of 27 June (<ref target="#c8-87">No. 187</ref>). I have now had time to get in touch with the situation here. Government opinion, shared by all the Services, is that immunity from invasion cannot be guaranteed with the present naval and air forces at our disposal. Once the enemy has committed himself, naval and air forces will seriously interrupt all lines of communication.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It is felt that a seaborne expedition could be transported in motor boats, submarines, warships, transports, and flat-bottomed motor barges, the latter facilitating rapid unloading of armoured fighting
<pb n="134" xml:id="n134"/>
vehicles. At or near each point of attack the enemy is likely to make use of parachute troops both to capture landing grounds for troop-carriers and to disorganise communications. The possible scale of airborne invasion is estimated at ten to fifteen thousand men in one day. The enemy is likely to use the shortest sea and air route for his main effort against this country, but is sure to attempt diversionary operations in the Shetlands, <name key="name-120007" type="place">Ireland</name>, or in North Scotland.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Undoubtedly, the enemy's object is to defeat the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, thereby destroying the British Empire. His military objectives will be the centre of Government in <name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name> and the centres of production and supply, together with under-water and air attacks on our overseas supply system.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The fact that the enemy has the initiative imposes upon us the strategic defensive, the first object of which is to protect [our shores?] and limit any enemy landing by sea or air and prevent the capture of any port or area which will facilitate the development of the invasion. The second object is to deal swiftly and adequately with the enemy's widely scattered forces by means of mobile columns before these enemy elements have established themselves, and also to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. The third object is to prevent the enemy destroying this country's vital resources.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The Second Echelon have now settled down. Although in common with other troops here they are short of equipment—they have been given a much better allotment than was at first visualised—they are working night and day, Sundays included, to fit themselves for an active role. They are in excellent heart, and the chance of meeting the enemy at a near date has enormously raised their morale. I have reorganised the force into three groups: a mobile force, consisting of a cavalry squadron, an improvised machine gun company, and an improvised infantry battalion from <name key="name-003128" type="organisation">Royal Artillery</name> personnel, under Brigadier Miles; the 5th Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Hargest; and an improvised brigade, consisting of the <name key="name-005118" type="organisation">Maori Battalion</name> and an improvised infantry battalion from reinforcements, under Brigadier Barrowclough.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The New Zealand force in buses will be completely mobile. Operationally we are to work in the closest touch with the 1st Canadian Division, who are fully equipped, and their GOC<note xml:id="ftn1-134" n="1"><p>General Andrew George Latta McNaughton, PC, CH, CB, CMG, DSO; till <date when="1940-07-18">18 Jul 1940</date> commanding 1st Canadian Division as Major-General; from that date until <date when="1940-12-25">25 Dec 1940</date> commanded 7th Corps, which included the New Zealand troops in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>; later commanded Canadian Corps until <date when="1942">1942</date>; commanded First Canadian Army 1942–43; Minister of National Defence, <name key="name-007274" type="place">Canada</name>, 1944–45.</p></note> has agreed to support us with artillery.</p>
          <p rend="indent">My opinion that any attempt at landing in England is doomed to failure is unaltered. The military powers, however, are insistent
<pb n="135" xml:id="n135"/>
that the Germans will make the attempt and the date indicated is early in July. We must hope that they do and that they do not make any move against Egypt, which would be more difficult to counter now that <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> has made a separate peace.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Since the receipt of your message of 29 June (<ref target="#c8-89">No. 189</ref>) expressing general agreement with my opinions, I have gone on with all preparations, and with the emergency powers which the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> saw fit to give me I shall be able to use our men in an emergency in any active role that may be assigned to us. However, as time may still allow, I feel that the Government may wish through normal channels to offer the New Zealand force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to His Majesty's Government for active operations in the event of invasion.<note xml:id="ftn1-135" n="1"><p>The above text, taken from the GOC's files, differs in a number of respects from the telegram on file in the Prime Minister's Department.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="91" xml:id="c8-91">
          <head>191<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Minister of Defence to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-07-04">4 July 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Many thanks for the information contained in your telegram of 4 July (<ref target="#c8-90">No. 190</ref>), which is greatly appreciated. However, we are in some doubt concerning the last sentence, in view of the fact that we advised His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> through official channels on 15 June (<ref target="#c8-78">No. 178</ref>) that we were in general agreement with the point of view expressed in the Secretary of State's telegram of 12 June (<ref target="#c8-72">No. 172</ref>)—a copy of which was telegraphed to you on 14 June—and that we approved of New Zealand troops being used if necessary for home defence in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, subject, however, to the prior condition that they were previously equipped with fighting equipment suitable for the purpose, even should a less modern type of equipment only be available, and to certain conditions as to command. These were both your own suggestions and a copy of our communication to the British Government was telegraphed on 15 June to you at <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> (<ref target="#c8-80">No. 180</ref>). It occurs to us that probably this telegram failed to reach you (in which case you should see the Governor-General's telegrams to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs <ref target="#c8-78">Nos. 178</ref> and <ref target="#c8-79">179</ref> of 15 June) and that my telegram of 29 June, which was intended merely to give you all necessary authority for that purpose, has accordingly been misunderstood. Please telegraph, however, if there is anything more you think we could or should do.<note xml:id="ftn2-135" n="2"><p><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> replied on 10 Jul that ‘the situation as regards the command of the New Zealand Forces in England and their employment is quite satisfactory’.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <pb n="136" xml:id="n136"/>
        <div type="section" n="92" xml:id="c8-92">
          <head>192<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Letter from the Director of Military Operations and Plans, <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name>, to the General Officer Commanding, New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-07-09">9 July 1940</date>
            <salute><hi rend="sc">Sir</hi>,</salute>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">With reference to <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> letter dated 29 June, I am directed to say that it was understood in conversation with you that in exercise of the powers vested in you under section (<hi rend="i">a</hi>) of the memorandum, of which a copy was reproduced at <ref type="appendix" target="#a5">Appendix ‘A’</ref> to the above letter, it is your wish that the contingent of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> should be released by the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> and placed forthwith under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces. This has been done.</p>
          <p rend="indent">I am to ask for confirmation in writing.</p>
          <closer>
I am …
<signed rend="right">[<hi rend="sc">R. H. Dewing</hi>,</signed>
<salute rend="right">Director of Military Operations and Plans</salute>
</closer>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="93" xml:id="c8-93">
          <head>193<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Letter from <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Director of Military Operations and Plans, <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-07-10">10 July 1940</date>
            <salute><hi rend="sc">Sir</hi>,</salute>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I have to acknowledge your [letter] dated 9 July. In confirmation of conversation I now confirm in writing that under my special powers I wish the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to be released by the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> and to be placed under control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces.</p>
          <closer>
I am …
<signed rend="right">[<hi rend="sc"><name key="name-207994" type="person">B. C. Freyberg</name></hi>],</signed>
<salute rend="right">GOC NZEF</salute>
</closer>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="94" xml:id="c8-94">
          <head>194<lb/>
<hi rend="i">Letter from <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence [Extract]</hi></head>
          <div type="section" xml:id="c8-94-0">
            <opener>
              <mentioned rend="right">
                <address>
                  <addrLine>Mytchett Place<lb/>
<name key="name-024324" type="place">Mytchett</name>, <hi rend="sc"><name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name></hi></addrLine>
                </address>
              </mentioned>
              <date when="1940-08-15">15 August 1940</date>
              <salute><hi rend="sc">Sir</hi>,</salute>
            </opener>
            <p rend="indent">I have the honour to report that I have just received your welcome letter of 27 May,<note xml:id="ftn1-136" n="1"><p>This letter is not published. An extract dealing with the proposed formation of the <name key="name-000594" type="organisation">Anzac Corps</name> is included in Volume II.</p></note> which followed me by a belated route to
<pb n="137" xml:id="n137"/>
England. I am happy that the actions and advice I have tendered have met with your approval. I hope that the relationship existing between us will continue because, even with complete understanding between two departments such as ours, the distance and the time lag in correspondence make co-operation difficult.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Since my last report to you the situation has changed completely. The French are now out of the war and for the moment almost hostile, and the Spanish from all accounts are only waiting their moment to remove General Franco and come in with the Axis powers. <name key="name-002006" type="place">Japan</name> also has given evidence of hostile intentions.</p>
            <p rend="indent">I know from the copies of cipher messages I have read that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have experienced most anxious times during the last weeks. I wish, therefore, to give all the help I can in the difficult decisions you are forced to make.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c8-94-1">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">Problems Caused by Splitting the New Zealand Expeditionary Force</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">As you know, I was very much against sending the Second Echelon to England, as I believe also were the Government in New Zealand. The diversion of the Second Echelon to Great Britain not only increased the difficulties of training and organisation of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, but also made it necessary to split the Divisional staff and send part of it here so that the troops could be trained upon modern lines.</p>
            <p rend="indent">When the split was decided upon I sent off part of my staff by air to make plans for the reception of the Second Echelon in England. I intended to follow in time to commence the training. As you will remember, a series of disasters followed. <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> was overrun and this was the moment when <name key="name-001383" type="place">Italy</name> chose to declare war upon the Allies. It was thought at the time that these changes in alignment constituted a threat to Egypt, and it was decided that I should remain there so long as the threat to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> continued.</p>
            <p rend="indent">After the Italian inhabitants in <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> and <name key="name-000576" type="place">Alexandria</name> had been interned, and this was carried out without any trouble, it was agreed that as I was of more use in England than in Egypt I should start for Home by an air route. As the <name key="name-007453" type="place">Mediterranean</name> route was closed we were sent across the Sahara. This journey, to say the least of it, was a most dangerous one. The route was unsurveyed and little preparation had been carried out; consequently there was no ground organisation, and the landing grounds were rough and too small. To add to our difficulties we were overladen. The news of the capitulation of <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name> reached us at <name key="name-001003" type="place">Khartoum</name>. The journey across the intervening French territory was followed by great complications and, to add to these, the plane crashed in the desert, but notwithstanding this we eventually reached England after an eight-day journey.</p>
          </div>
          <pb n="138" xml:id="n138"/>
          <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c8-94-2">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">The Situation in Great Britain after <name key="name-003521" type="place">Dunkirk</name></hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">The situation after our arrival in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> was most interesting. There was considerable military activity, accompanied by a certain amount of apprehension, but there was no panic and no despondency, and public opinion upon the whole was very sound. It was felt, however, both in military and civil quarters, that an attack against Great Britain was imminent.</p>
            <p rend="indent">As far as I can gather the reason for this belief came from the fact that on the one hand the Germans said they were determined to attack and occupy Great Britain, while upon the other hand the <name key="name-003205" type="organisation">Royal Navy</name> and the <name key="name-003198" type="organisation">Royal Air Force</name> said they could not guarantee our shore against seaborne or airborne attack. Furthermore, at <name key="name-003521" type="place">Dunkirk</name> the Army had lost all the modern equipment that existed, with the exception of some rifles. Since then, however, great strides have been made and all the divisions have now been issued with a scale quite sufficient to be effective, although on a reduced basis.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="3" xml:id="c8-94-3">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">Arrangements made for Accommodation in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name></hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">On the arrival of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in England the question of the area of concentration and of our employment was uncertain, because all our arrangements to go to Colchester had to be abandoned owing to the German advance along the Belgian coast, and the vulnerability of the barracks to an air attack.</p>
            <p rend="indent">As you will remember, the War Department had allotted to us a provisional area which split up the whole force and gave them a garrison role on the East Coast, which would have made our training very difficult. I had reported this to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> and, with your approval, had insisted upon concentrating the force to enable us to be able to carry out collective training. After certain negotiations we were allotted a series of tented camps in the <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name> area, and these, I am glad to report, have turned out as well as possible. We have been bombed only twice, and the administrative arrangements have been quite good. Being close to <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name> we have had access to the School of Cookery and I am glad to say that the standard of housekeeping within the units has been brought up to a good level.</p>
            <p rend="indent">I have been to the Forestry Company at Crowborough and have looked into their difficulties and, with a certain amount of assistance, they will now be in a much better position to ensure that their men are properly fed.</p>
            <p rend="indent">So far we have not had any chance to organise games for the men. We have been training night and day to fit them for their part in the battle should the Germans decide to attack Great Britain.</p>
          </div>
          <pb n="139" xml:id="n139"/>
          <div type="section" n="4" xml:id="c8-94-4">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">Factors taken into Consideration in Deciding the Role I should Recommend to the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name></hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">When I arrived in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> on 25 June I found it hard to take the threat of an invasion of Great Britain by the Germans as a serious project. I still believe that any such action is an act of desperation and one which we should welcome. There was, however, the fact that we had lost the whole of the equipment of the <name key="name-020252" type="organisation">British Expeditionary Force</name> (ten divisions) plus all the five months' war reserves which were in the base depots in <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>.</p>
            <p rend="indent">I saw our troops and their Commanders on arrival and then went to the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> and interviewed General Dill and General Ironside. As a result of all my contacts at Home I came to the conclusions:</p>
            <p rend="indent">That Great Britain was in a tight corner and that the people were facing up to their difficulties most gallantly;</p>
            <p rend="indent">That the arrival of the New Zealanders and the Australians in the circumstances had been most opportune and had steadied the nation considerably;</p>
            <p rend="indent">That in the event of an invasion under present conditions any New Zealand troops in England, even though untrained and under-equipped, must be prepared to take their stand in the forefront and defend the Old Country. I felt this partly because I knew if we were to risk our lives we could not do so in a better cause than in fighting to safeguard the people in Great Britain, and also because I knew that should there be an attack, the first question that all our people in New Zealand would ask would be, ‘What part did our men take?’ I felt that you would all expect us to accept battle even on uneven terms in the defence of the heart of the Empire.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Knowing what was expected of us, and after consulting the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name>, I went to the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> and told the authorities that ‘my Government want you to give us as much equipment as you can spare, and would wish you to cast the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the role in which you may consider us to be of greatest assistance at the present moment.’</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="5" xml:id="c8-94-5">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">Role of New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Event of German Invasion</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">They accepted our offer with alacrity and were most appreciative and most helpful about equipment. They assigned to us a position of great importance, as we were made part of General Headquarters Reserve and formed a striking force composed of:</p>
            <list type="simple">
              <item>
                <p>1st Canadian Division</p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>1st Armoured Division</p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>New Zealand Expeditionary Force (<name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>)</p>
              </item>
            </list>
            <p rend="indent">I decided that the quickest method of training was to take out the force and make it work together as such over the actual country
<pb n="140" xml:id="n140"/>
we were to guard. I wish the people of New Zealand could know the wonderful effect the presence of our men had upon the people at Home here. I also wish they could have seen the fine sight of 6000 bronzed New Zealanders marching across the Sussex Weald.</p>
            <p rend="indent">We paid weekly visits back to our camp at <name key="name-002775" type="place">Aldershot</name> to pick up the transport and the additional arms and equipment as they arrived, leaving again for <name key="name-120032" type="place">Sussex</name> as soon as possible. For these operations I organised the Second Echelon into three mobile columns:</p>
            <p rend="indent"><hi rend="b">The Covering Force</hi>, commanded by Brigadier Miles, comprised of—</p>
            <list type="simple">
              <item>
                <p>1 Cavalry Squadron</p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>1 improvised Infantry Battalion of <name key="name-003128" type="organisation">Royal Artillery</name> personnel</p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>
                  <name key="name-025389" type="organisation">1 Machine Gun Company</name>
                </p>
              </item>
            </list>
            <p rend="indent"><hi rend="b">The 5th Infantry Brigade Group</hi>, commanded by Brigadier Hargest, comprised of—</p>
            <list type="simple">
              <item>
                <p>21st Infantry Battalion</p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>22nd Infantry Battalion</p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>23rd Infantry Battalion</p>
              </item>
            </list>
            <p rend="indent"><hi rend="b">The 7th Infantry Brigade Group</hi>, commanded by Brigadier Barrowclough, comprised of—</p>
            <list type="simple">
              <item>
                <p>28th <name key="name-005118" type="organisation">Maori Battalion</name></p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>29th improvised Infantry Battalion (reinforcements)</p>
              </item>
            </list>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="6" xml:id="c8-94-6">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">State of Equipment Issued</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">We had no field or anti-tank artillery, but for a matter of fact neither had any other British formation. We had, however, an adequate amount of arms and equipment:</p>
            <p rend="indent"><hi rend="b">Per Battalion</hi>—</p>
            <list type="simple">
              <item>
                <p>18 Bren guns</p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>10 Boys [anti-tank] rifles</p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>3 Bren carriers</p>
              </item>
              <item>
                <p>25 per cent of unit transport</p>
              </item>
            </list>
            <p rend="indent">We had, however, two complete Bus Companies which could move our whole force at one lift.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="7" xml:id="c8-94-7">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">The Three Full-scale Exercises</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">The Second Echelon moved out of camp as soon as possible and took with it all available arms and equipment, together with its ammunition, engineers' stores, picks and shovels, explosives, and five complete days' rations and water.</p>
            <p rend="indent">The object of these exercises was:</p>
            <list type="simple">
              <label>(i)</label>
              <item>
                <p>To practise Divisional staff in carrying out a bus move of the Division;</p>
              </item>
              <pb n="141" xml:id="n141"/>
              <label>(ii)</label>
              <item>
                <p>To give Brigadiers and Battalion Commanders experience in handling their commands in the field;</p>
              </item>
              <label>(iii)</label>
              <item>
                <p>To try out our administrative services in the field.</p>
              </item>
            </list>
            <p rend="indent">1. The first operation was the hasty occupation of a defensive position at Crowborough, <name key="name-120032" type="place">Sussex</name>. Each of the groups then moved separately in their bus columns down to the sea coast to rehearse repelling possible enemy landings.</p>
            <p rend="indent">2. The next manoeuvre was arranged for Brigadier Hargest's force to fight Brigadier Barrowclough's force.</p>
            <p rend="indent">3. The final scheme was to carry out an endurance march of 100 miles in six days.</p>
            <p rend="indent">During these exercises the Commanders learned how to handle their fast-moving bus columns and their transport, and the junior officers and men found their feet and got the idea of working together as a force. We came back at the conclusion of our last exercise on 8 August, bronzed and fit, and I feel confident that if we are asked to take part in the defence of Great Britain the Second Echelon of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force is a force to be reckoned with, and will give an excellent account of itself wherever it may be used.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Since then, more equipment has arrived and we have now got 50 per cent of our unit transport, together with 100 per cent of our field guns—eight 25-pounder guns and sixteen 75-millimetre (French) guns, 50 per cent or ten 2-pounder anti-tank guns, 100 per cent of our Bren carriers, 100 per cent of our Bren guns, 100 per cent of our Boys rifles. From today we are to all intents and purposes almost 100 per cent equipped.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="8" xml:id="c8-94-8">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">The Problem of What the Future Holds for the British Empire</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">I know that it has been a most difficult time for you in New Zealand, and it has also been a difficult period here both for the staff and for the men. All ranks have responded excellently, and they have worked Saturdays and Sundays and all hours when necessary. I am, however, now quite happy over the results achieved. This crisis and the threat of invasion have given a great stimulus to training. I feel that everybody has come through the training with the greatest credit. I am more than satisfied with the progress made, and feel confident that when we concentrate in Egypt in the near future we shall be able to take the field as a first-class division. Now that it is decided that the New Zealand Expeditionary Force are to concentrate in Egypt, I am going ahead with all preparations. I have sent the ADMS<note xml:id="ftn1-141" n="1"><p>Assistant Director of <name key="name-016593" type="organisation">Medical Services</name> (Colonel K. MacCormick).</p></note> back by sea, in the same convoy as the Railway Construction Group.</p>
            <pb n="142" xml:id="n142"/>
            <p rend="indent">I feel that with nearly 20,000 troops in Egypt we must now make all arrangements for our Base. I am at the moment going into all the details with Brigadier Falla, who will be leaving for Egypt in the course of two or three weeks. I have also arranged to send off early in September Brigadier Miles, Brigadier Barrowclough, Colonel Crump, and the staff of the 6th Infantry Brigade.</p>
            <p rend="indent">As you will realise, the additional numbers to be accommodated in Egypt will necessitate an increase in our medical institutions. We shall now require Convalescent Homes and a <name key="name-023066" type="organisation">Convalescent Depot</name>. You will be glad to hear that the New Zealand General Hospital has opened at <name key="name-000935" type="place">Helwan</name>.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="9" xml:id="c8-94-9">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">The Possible Action of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Event of Invasion</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">Although the situation here looks fairly settled for the moment, nobody can be certain what the Germans mean to do. There is only one certainty I feel, and it is that should the Germans attempt to attack Great Britain, using their land forces, they are bound to suffer a serious reverse.</p>
            <p rend="indent">By the time this report reaches you we shall know a lot more than we do now. I feel, however, very much happier about the state of our equipment and the state of our training.</p>
            <p rend="indent">So much for the equipment, training, and operational side of our work here in England.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="10" xml:id="c8-94-10">
            <head>
              <hi rend="i">Position in Egypt</hi>
            </head>
            <p rend="indent">Since leaving Egypt the situation there seems to have deteriorated and as soon as we have disposed of the possibility of an attack upon this country I shall make my way back to the First Echelon. It is of interest to note that when I arrived here I found that people outside the <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> did not realise how meagre was the margin of safety in Egypt. I was glad, therefore, to be asked by Mr. Churchill to come and dine with him at Downing Street. As a result of my attitude on defence he asked me to write for the use of Cabinet an appreciation of the situation in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. It was not easy for me to do this as I was busy training the New Zealand Expeditionary Force and I had to complete my appreciation while I was on our full-scale exercises at Coleman's Hatch. When it was finished I sent it to the Prime Minister who, in spite of the fact that I attacked the Government policy of concentrating upon the defence of England at the expense of the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>, had it published and circulated to the members of the <name key="name-016917" type="organisation">War Cabinet</name> and the Committee he had appointed to look into the position in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>.</p>
            <pb n="143" xml:id="n143"/>
            <p rend="indent">I asked Mr. Churchill if he would mind my sending a copy of my appreciation, which is most secret, for your information and he readily agreed, so please find a copy attached.<note xml:id="ftn1-143" n="1"><p>See <ref type="appendix" target="#a4">Appendix 4</ref>.</p></note></p>
            <p rend="indent">The Prime Minister then asked me to dine and stay the night at Chequers with him, and we stayed up very late talking about the problems that beset us in Egypt. I feel, therefore, that some good may come of this because I spoke very freely of our difficulties.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Mr. Churchill was fully informed about our Division and asked me to send messages of thanks to New Zealand for all that has been done in these very difficult times.</p>
            <p rend="indent">I have now been given another paper by the Prime Minister to prepare for the <name key="name-016917" type="organisation">War Cabinet</name>. It is upon an operational role, and this I have almost finished.</p>
            <p rend="indent">I was much impressed and comforted by Mr. Churchill's grasp of the situation and I believe that my frank exchange of views with him may have beneficial interest in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>.</p>
            <p rend="indent">Finally, my views on the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> can be taken as those expressed in my appreciation to Mr. Churchill. I am apprehensive that we may not get our reinforcements there in time. If we can hold Egypt and then later on reinforce it with a large, fast-moving, armoured force, together with an <name key="name-023234" type="organisation">Air Force</name> capable of protecting our columns, we can capture <name key="name-001027" type="place">Libya</name> from the Italians without having to do very much fighting.</p>
          </div>
          <div type="section" n="11" xml:id="c8-94-11">
            <head>
              <hi rend="sc">General Questions Of Interest</hi>
            </head>
            <div type="section" n="1" xml:id="c8-94-11-1">
              <head>
                <hi rend="i">(a) The Visit of His Majesty the King</hi>
              </head>
              <p rend="indent">On Saturday, 6 July, His Majesty paid us a visit at Mytchett Place and spent the whole day going round our units. He was much impressed by all he saw and was especially impressed with the smartness and drill of the <name key="name-005118" type="organisation">Maori Battalion</name>.</p>
              <p rend="indent">During his visit His Majesty honoured us by staying to luncheon when he met about 140 officers and nurses picked from all the units of the Second Echelon. Needless to say, his visit, which was attended by the High Commissioner, Mr. Jordan, and the Commander of the 1st New Zealand Expeditionary Force, General Sir Alexander Godley, GCB, was greatly appreciated by us all….<note xml:id="ftn2-143" n="2"><p>In the portion of the text not published <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> reviewed the medical and welfare arrangements for the force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> and made acknowledgment of Patriotic Fund parcels and consignments of apples received.</p></note></p>
            </div>
            <div type="section" n="2" xml:id="c8-94-11-2">
              <head>
                <hi rend="i">(i) Organisation at Home after Departure of Second Echelon</hi>
              </head>
              <p rend="indent">When the New Zealand Expeditionary Force leaves England to concentrate in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> we shall be forced to leave about
<pb n="144" xml:id="n144"/>
one hundred men in hospital who will come to us in Egypt as and when they are fit enough to travel. I intend, therefore, to leave behind a doctor and possibly two nurses, together with a small organisation, to look after them. These will follow us to Egypt as and when they can.</p>
              <p rend="indent">Finally, may I say that as far as I can estimate everything is going well both here and in Egypt. I am anxious that we should concentrate as a division and get our complete equipment as soon as possible. It really looks now as if that goal were in sight. In the work I am carrying out here I am supported by a most excellent body of officers and men who will, when the time comes, give a good account of themselves.</p>
              <p rend="indent">I am most indebted also to the band of officers and NCOs in New Zealand for the excellent work they are doing in training the men for overseas, and am most appreciative of the help given me by Army Headquarters.</p>
              <p rend="indent">It is difficult to say what the future has in store for us all but I am sure that if we can get through the next four months without any major setback, North Africa will be an active and profitable theatre of war for the Allies.</p>
              <p rend="center">I have …</p>
              <p rend="center"><hi rend="sc"><name key="name-207994" type="person">B. C. Freyberg</name></hi>, Major-General,</p>
              <p rend="center">Commanding the New Zealand Expeditionary Force</p>
              <p rend="indent">PS.—I have sent by separate post a copy of this report to the GOC New Zealand Forces, <name key="name-008844" type="place">Wellington</name>.</p>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="95" xml:id="c8-95">
          <head>195<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-08-21">21 August 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The improvement of the military situation at Home continues as re-armament progresses. However, the situation in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> cannot be considered satisfactory until fresh equipment and troops arrive.</p>
          <p rend="indent">No doubt the Axis powers have the initiative for the moment both at Home and in the East, but they also have limitations of action. Their invasion of Great Britain must be attempted before bad weather in September or wait until the spring. Bearing in mind the rate of re-armament, by next spring we should have four armoured divisions and over thirty infantry divisions equipped.
<pb n="145" xml:id="n145"/>
If the <name key="name-021816" type="organisation">German General Staff</name> wish to invade the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> they must do so in the next three weeks or give up the project for good.</p>
          <p rend="indent">As for the invasion of Egypt, the hot weather would appear to preclude until October any large-scale offensive across the <name key="name-120076" type="place">Libyan Desert</name>. The invasion of Egypt, therefore, would not appear likely until after the threat to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> has been disposed of. In either case, the Axis powers would need to re-deploy their air force formations, together with a large number of load- and troop-carrying aircraft. Wastage to these load-carriers in the event of attack on the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> would be very great, perhaps 50 per cent. It is estimated that at least 500 load-carriers would be required, and this is possible as <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> alone has approximately this number. In view of wastage, however, there would appear to be only sufficient load-carriers for one offensive, not both.</p>
          <p rend="indent"><name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> is ready to attack. She is known to have re-deployed her <name key="name-023234" type="organisation">Air Force</name> against the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> and, as rash as it may appear, <name key="name-008556" type="place">Germany</name> will consider very carefully before giving up the invasion plan. I still think that it is not a possible operation of war.</p>
          <p rend="indent">There are two schools of thought upon defence in Government circles here, those who argue that all equipment should be concentrated upon the defence of the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> until the threat of invasion is disposed of, and those who believe that there can be no policy of defence except from the point of view of the Empire as a whole, which brings with it automatically the problems of the defence of the <name key="name-001365" type="place">Suez Canal</name> and <name key="name-020943" type="place">Singapore</name>. I am of the latter school.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, asked me to place my views in writing, and I have done so. These have been printed and circulated to the <name key="name-016917" type="organisation">War Cabinet</name>. There is no doubt that more attention will be taken of the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. Large quantities of arms and equipment are now being shipped to Egypt. A certain quantity is already upon the water, despatched by fast convoy, but until equipment arrives there in large quantities the situation in Egypt is insecure and will remain so until the end of the current year.</p>
          <p rend="indent">It is my opinion that, of the two threats, the attempt to invade the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> would be the least dangerous, where, thanks to the progress of re-armament and the efficiency of our Navy and <name key="name-023234" type="organisation">Air Force</name>, we are now reasonably secure. More serious would be an attack by combined German and Italian forces upon Egypt.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Meanwhile, I am glad to say that the Second Echelon have their complete equipment of Brens, Boys rifles, carriers, light tanks, guns, and warlike stores. Training has proceeded well. We have already completed three full-scale Divisional exercises and you can feel confident that the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> is now equipped, organised, and reasonably well trained.
<pb n="146" xml:id="n146"/>
The officers, both senior and regimental, are good and the morale of the whole force is excellent. Further, I anticipate that the remainder of the Division will be completely equipped shortly. There is no doubt, however, that pending the arrival of equipment in Egypt, the position is decidedly weak.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Orders have been received to complete mobilisation by the end of September before leaving for the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. In view of the decision to concentrate in Egypt, I am making arrangements now to get my staff back to prepare for the arrival of the <name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name>. Brigadiers Falla, Miles, Barrowclough and staff, and Crump, leave the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> on 5 September by packet boat for the Cape, thence by air to <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>. With your concurrence, I propose to wait until the invasion is disposed of or the threat is over, then fly to <name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name> either via Gibraltar or direct over <name key="name-008009" type="place">France</name>. Will you cable me if you agree?<note xml:id="ftn1-146" n="1"><p>On 27 Aug the Minister of Defence cabled his approval of <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>'s plans.</p></note> A copy of my appreciation for Mr. Churchill on the defence of Egypt<!-- Egypt, defence of --> together with a full written report of my actions here in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> is in the post.<note xml:id="ftn2-146" n="2"><p>No. 194.</p></note></p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="96" xml:id="c8-96">
          <head>196<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-20">20 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">My telegram of 26 July.<note xml:id="ftn3-146" n="3"><p>See <ref target="#c9-9"><hi rend="i"><name key="name-023115" type="organisation">Third Echelon</name></hi> (No. 220)</ref>.</p></note> It had been hoped as stated that the situation in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> would permit the despatch of the second New Zealand brigade, now in this country, to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> before or during the present month.</p>
          <p rend="indent">The New Zealand troops are occupying an important place in the defence of Great Britain which could not at present be filled by other troops without serious dislocation. Therefore, it has been thought very desirable that the proposed move should be postponed for a few weeks. His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> hope that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand appreciate the position, though they are aware that the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> attach importance to the concentration in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> at an early date of the New Zealand forces overseas. However, the postponement is intended to be not longer than would permit of the second New Zealand brigade leaving this country towards the end of October.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Expectations are that the Australian troops in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> will leave early next month for the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="147" xml:id="n147"/>
        <div type="section" n="97" xml:id="c8-97">
          <head>197<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-09-21">21 September 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 20 September (<ref target="#c8-96">No. 196</ref>). The United Kingdom's needs during the present critical weeks are fully appreciated by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, and they acquiesce in the desire of the United Kingdom Government to retain the troops of the New Zealand brigade. They are satisfied to leave to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> authorities the date of the departure of those troops to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="98" xml:id="c8-98">
          <head>198<lb/>
<hi rend="i"><name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> to the Minister of Defence</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-10-10">10 October 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The War Office now report considerable delay in the transfer of the Second Echelon to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name>. This is greatly to be regretted as the troops are now fully trained and completely equipped. <name key="name-035484" type="organisation">War Office</name> have just replied to a telegram from me as follows:</p>
          <p rend="indent">The composition of convoy WS 4 sailing in November, which has now been decided, does not include the New Zealand contingent in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, though it includes part of the Australian contingent. There were about 100,000 competitors for a shipment capacity of 30,000. The policy remains to concentrate the New Zealand contingent in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> as soon as practicable. Although I hope that this will be the case, it would be misleading for me to give you an assurance that the New Zealand contingent will be included in WS 5 sailing in December. I do not think that His Majesty's Government could possibly give such a guarantee to His Majesty's Government in New Zealand.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Full efficiency and smooth administration require the earliest possible concentration of the entire Division in Egypt, and I feel that any representation the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> can make to speed up the despatch of the Second Echelon should be made.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="148" xml:id="n148"/>
        <div type="section" n="99" xml:id="c8-99">
          <head>199<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-10-11">11 October 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Advice has been received by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand from <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> that no steps have yet been taken for the despatch to Egypt of the Second Echelon of the 2nd NZEF. In this connection they had understood from your telegram of 20. September (<ref target="#c8-96">No. 196</ref>) that the intention was that the Second Echelon should leave the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> for Egypt towards the end of October, and they gather now that it is unlikely that this move will take place even in December.</p>
          <p rend="indent">While His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are satisfied to leave the date of the departure of these troops to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> authorities (as set out in my telegram <ref target="#c8-97">No. 197</ref> of 21 September), nevertheless they wish it to be understood that the utmost importance is attached by them to the early concentration of the New Zealand Division, and they sincerely trust that at a very early date it will be possible to make arrangements to that effect.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="100" xml:id="c8-100">
          <head>200<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Minister of Defence to <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name></hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-10-11">11 October 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 10 October (<ref target="#c8-98">No. 198</ref>). The continued delay in the concentration of the New Zealand Division has greatly disturbed us and we have today sent the following telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs:</p>
          <p rend="center">[Text of telegram <ref target="#c8-99">No. 199</ref>]</p>
          <p rend="indent">The War Cabinet have considered your letters of 15 and 16 August,<note xml:id="ftn1-148" n="1"><p>There is no trace of any letter from <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name> dated <date when="1940-08-16">16 Aug 1940</date>. A possible explanation is that the appreciation on the position in Egypt (see <ref type="appendix" target="#a4">Appendix 4</ref>) was despatched on that date with a covering letter.</p></note> and your appreciation of the position in Egypt prepared for Mr. Churchill, which have now arrived, and wish me to tell you how greatly they have appreciated your careful analysis of the position. They would be grateful if you would, from time to time, communicate to us your appreciation of the situation as it develops, particularly such information as you can supply regarding the equipment of the New Zealand forces in Egypt, the role they are
<pb n="149" xml:id="n149"/>
expected to adopt, and their fitness and equipment for such purposes. Your messages of appreciation with reference to gift parcels, apples, &amp;c.,<note xml:id="ftn1-149" n="1"><p>These messages were included in <name key="name-207994" type="person">General Freyberg</name>'s letter of <date when="1940-08-15">15 Aug 1940</date> to the Minister of Defence (<ref target="#c8-94">No. 194</ref>), but have been omitted from the extract published in this volume.</p></note> are being conveyed to the appropriate authorities.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="101" xml:id="c8-101">
          <head>201<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-10-21">21 October 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">Your telegram of 11 October (<ref target="#c8-99">No. 199</ref>). The willingness of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand to leave to the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> authorities the date of departure of the New Zealand Second Echelon from the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> is greatly appreciated by His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name>, and they wish to assure the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> again that it has always been, and is still, their policy to concentrate the New Zealand Division in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> at the earliest possible date.</p>
          <p rend="indent">However, it has now become clear that the situation in the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> demands urgent reinforcements of armoured troops, artillery, and anti-aircraft units, and it is essential that priority should be given to the despatch of such troops. The next convoy for the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> from this country cannot contain more than 30,000 troops, and we greatly regret that, in these circumstances, it has been found impossible to arrange for the New Zealand troops in question to leave in that convoy.</p>
          <p rend="indent">Although, unfortunately, it is thus impossible for the New Zealand troops to be sent to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> as soon as we had hoped, we feel sure that the <name key="name-022826" type="organisation">New Zealand Government</name> will appreciate the necessity for giving priority to the troops most urgently required in that theatre of war. All efforts will be made to include New Zealand troops in the following convoy which is due to leave in December, but we should find it very difficult at the present stage to give any undertaking that they will be included in that convoy, in view of the undesirability of deciding upon the units to be included until nearer the time of sailing, when the precise requirements of the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> in the light of the local situation then obtaining can be assessed in detail. However, as soon as the military situation permits, we can assure you that it is our intention that the New Zealand troops should leave for Egypt.</p>
        </div>
        <pb n="150" xml:id="n150"/>
        <div type="section" n="102" xml:id="c8-102">
          <head>202<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The New Zealand Military Liaison Officer (<name key="name-008904" type="place">London</name>) to Headquarters 2nd NZEF (<name key="name-003601" type="place">Cairo</name>)</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1940-11-02">2 November 1940</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">The sailing date to the <name key="name-005853" type="place">Middle East</name> has now been settled. All units of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> are now to complete mobilisation by 29 November. The present intention is that all units will be sent probably in the last week of December if shipping space is available.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="103" xml:id="c8-103">
          <head>203<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1941-01-14">14 January 1941</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I should like, on the departure of the New Zealand troops who are now leaving this country for service elsewhere, to convey to you and your colleagues on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> our thanks for the help which they have rendered in the common cause during their service here. Their fine bearing and keenness have won the admiration of all. We have the happiest recollections of them and hope that they are taking with them equally happy memories of the Home-country in whose defence they have played their part so well.</p>
          <p rend="indent">We send them every good wish. We know that they will ably carry on the splendid traditions of the New Zealand Forces and that they will win fresh laurels for their arms.</p>
        </div>
        <div type="section" n="104" xml:id="c8-104">
          <head>204<lb/>
<hi rend="i">The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs</hi></head>
          <opener>
            <date when="1941-01-16">16 January 1941</date>
          </opener>
          <p rend="indent">I am asked by my Prime Minister to convey the following reply to your telegram of 14 January (<ref target="#c8-103">No. 203</ref>):</p>
          <p rend="indent">Your remarks on the conduct and bearing of the New Zealand troops who have recently left the <name key="name-029547" type="place">United Kingdom</name> are very warmly appreciated by my colleagues and myself. The troops were made
<pb n="151" xml:id="n151"/>
to feel at all times that they were among their own people and that their welcome was genuine and warm, and we here for our part are proud to know that they worthily represented us, and that they have played some part in defending the centre of t