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cover photograph Two-pounder firing en portée
IT IS THE INTENTION of this series to present aspects of New Zealand's
part in the Second World War which will not receive detailed treatment in the campaign
volumes and which are considered either worthy of special notice or typical of many
phases of our war experience. The series is illustrated with material which would otherwise
seldom see publication. It will also contain short accounts of campaigns and operations
which will be dealt with in detail in the appropriate volumes.
printed by whitcombe and tombs limited christchurch
new zealand
IN portées, which were fitted with ramps and winches to enable the guns
to be quickly hoisted into place. Special fittings on the lorry enabled the trail and spade to be
clamped firmly to the deck so that the gun, pointing over the rear of the portée, was ready for
immediate action.
During the training in preparation for the campaign, the regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. E. Oakes, Biographical details of those named in this account are published on p. 31.portées: that is, en portée. It was obvious that the
best place from which to fight an anti-tank gun was from a properly dug gunpit; but the digging
of pits took time and, once dug in, the gun could not be moved at a moment's notice. Colonel
Oakes therefore made provision in training for those occasions when there was no time to dig
pits or when a formation on the move had to be defended against attack.
Portée tactics had to be based on the fact that the gun was high off the ground, with the gun-shield the only protection for crew and weapon. This shield could ward off small-arms fire only
from the direct front, so that against crossfire, explosive shells, mortar bombs, and armour-piercing projectiles both gun and crew were vulnerable. It was laid down that this vulnerability
should be reduced by exposing the gun and its crew to enemy observation for the shortest possible
time. The men were taught to fight their guns from behind whatever cover, in the form of ridges
or folds in the ground, was available. First the gun made for such cover; then the vehicle was
backed up until the barrel of the two-pounder cleared the concealing rise—that is, to a hull-down
position. A few shots were fired and the portée was again run down under cover. That process was
repeated, with the gun changing its position as often as possible to confuse enemy gunners. The lie
of the land did not always permit this, but on several occasions in the
The initial role of the New Zealand Division in this campaign depended on the success of the
armoured divisions of the 30th Corps, which opened the fighting on 18 November by driving
across the Libyan border with the intention of first searching out and destroying the enemy tanks,
and then continuing westward to relieve beleaguered Trigh Capuzzo, marked on the map as a motor road, was in fact a series of tracks to the south of, and running roughly
parallel to, the main
On the afternoon of 22 November, when the brigade was on its way towards Bir el Chleta,
urgent messages from 30th Corps showed that the early reports of British armoured successes
had been optimistic. Far from being destroyed, German tanks were pressing in strength against
Because the German armour was still strong, and not as weakened as the first reports had indicated, a heavy responsibility was thrown on the New Zealand artillery, and especially on the Anti-Tank Regiment. The British tanks, outgunned by the German tanks and the very effective 88-millimetre and 50-millimetre anti-tank guns, were far too hard pressed to spare much of their strength to protect the New Zealand infantry.
The 6th Brigade kept a strict lookout during the night of 22–23 November. The 33rd Battery's
two-pounders were placed round the brigade perimeter, and outside them the infantry manned a
series of listening posts. In relays, one gunner watched at the firing position of each anti-tank gun
while his crew-mates slept beside the portée. The night was tense but without alarm. At 3 a.m.
the march to 2 the troop commander, led the four portées after the rest of the brigade.
The troop caught up with the 24th Battalion, under whose command it had been the previous
day, at first light, just as the brigade group halted for breakfast. The formation had set out with
the intention of swinging to the south to avoid a German force known to be at Bir el Chleta,
but in the darkness an error in navigation had resulted in the halt being made right on top of the
German position, and when the troop arrived a small engagement was raging. The brigade had
clashed with part of the headquarters of the German Afrika Korps. The Germans had a few tanks
and armoured cars, but those were quickly dealt with by a squadron of Valentine tanks of the
42nd Battalion,
The order of march had been changed overnight, and L Troop now found itself under the
command of the 26th Battalion. There was no longer time for breakfast, and the brigade resumed
its move towards
The brigade made for the Wadi esc Sciomar, a break in the escarpment three miles east by
south of Point 175, a convenient place from which to reconnoitre the position and plan its action.
L Troop was on the left front of the 26th Battalion group, followed by four of the Valentine tanks.
The gunners were surprised that they and not the tanks headed the advance; but the Valentines,
heavily armoured and slow, were not as manoeuverable as cruiser tanks, and not as well fitted for
the lead as the more mobile portées.
A few miles before the wadi was reached there appeared to the west a large group of British
tanks and other vehicles, some of them still smouldering. (It was learned later that on the previous
afternoon enemy tanks had forced the 7th Armoured Division's 3, that as there
were probably British wounded among the wrecks their safety must be the first consideration.
By the time Lieutenant Pepper returned and gave the order to cease fire, the troop had fired about
fifty rounds at distances above the limit allowed by the range scales. The Germans were seen to be
making off to the west with some captured Honey tanks, but the gunners were forbidden to
resume firing. Instead, the troop's guns covered the advance of three of the battalion's Bren carriers,
which went over to the mass of tanks and trucks to look for British wounded. An ambulance,
packed with injured men, came back to the battalion.
The carriers soon returned and the column resumed its march. At the Wadi esc Sciomar it was
apparent that the enemy held Point 175, on the escarpment to the east of 4, commander of the 6th Brigade, issued orders
for the 25th Battalion, with the 24th in reserve, to attack and capture Point 175; the 26th Battalion
with its supporting arms was to establish contact with the 5th South African Brigade, five miles
south-west of Point 175.
The 26th Battalion group set out at once. With the infantry were the four two-pounders of
L Troop and eight 25-pounders of Major A. T. Rawle's5 30th Battery (6th Field Regiment).
Again the troop led the advance, with the guns in a shallow crescent in front of the battalion
column, the order from the right being L1, L2, L3, and L4, the centre guns slightly in advance
of those on the flanks. Lieutenant Pepper in his 15-cwt. truck rode behind L2, and the troop 3-ton
lorry, containing reserve ammunition and rations, in charge of the troop subaltern, Second-Lieutenant I. G. Scott6, followed L3.
The battalion met the South Africans just before half past twelve. They had been in action the
previous day, and had dug in on a rise on the southern escarpment. (Though this was ‘high ground’
THE BATTALION was immediately deployed in an all-round defensive position. Colonel
Page placed four of the 30th Field Battery's 25-pounders (E Troop) on the northern side of
the perimeter and four (F Troop) on the southern, while L Troop was told to dig its guns in
facing east. Diagram A.
The level ground offered no choice of positions, so the guns were simply sited in line at intervals
of about fifty yards along the infantry FDLs Forward defended localities. This term is applied to the most advanced areas of a defensive position. They are
usually sited to support each other by fire. In the case of an all-round defence, as on this occasion, the FDLs marked
the circumference of the area held.
Up to this stage the 26th Battalion had not seen the main enemy force. Apart from the South
Africans, however, there were scores of knocked-out vehicles, armoured and otherwise, to show
that the area had been one of recent desperate combat. The South Africans were only too well
aware that their position was known to the enemy. Early that morning three British-type tanks
had rolled up to their lines, their turrets open, the crews wearing the familiar black berets of the
Allied armoured formations and waving their hands in, presumably, friendly greeting. Approaching
slowly, they had ample chance to gain a good general idea of the South African dispositions.
When right up to the FDLs, their turrets were slammed down, their machine guns fired a few
bursts of unexpected and deadly rounds, and the tanks made good their escape. (Six days later the
Germans were to repeat this same trick to break the desperate resistance of the remnants of the
The real blow fell on the South Africans a few minutes after 3.30 p.m. A strong force of enemy tanks with infantry in lorries approached from the south-west, swung across the brigade's western perimeter and, making good use of the knowledge gained from their earlier reconnaissance, drove hard at the defences.
The smoke, dust, and flames of battle, and the position of the late afternoon sun, made it hard at first for the New Zealanders to see what was happening. A few shells, probably overs, landed in the 26th Battalion area. But very soon after the attack started, urgent messages from the South Africans, asking for all the artillery support the battalion could afford, made it clear that the situation was desperate. The 30th Battery's guns were then moved to the western flank and opened fire at the German armoured vehicles and transport.
About four o'clock, when the L Troop gunners had finished digging their gunpits—L4 was
actually in position in the pit—all gun commanders were called to troop headquarters, in this case
the troop commander's truck. In charge of the four two-pounders were Sergeants T. E. Williamson7, P. Robertson8, T. E. Unverricht9, and T. H. Croft10, of L's 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. They
quickly reported to Lieutenant Pepper, and learned from him that the South Africans were in
imminent danger of being overrun, that all the 26th Battalion's supporting guns were to form a
line on the western perimeter, and that the troop was to move immediately. The sergeants ran
back to their guns. The gunners cursed more or less automatically when they heard that their
digging was all for nothing, but the sight of their commander's truck, with Lieutenant Pepper
leaning from the cab and beckoning them emphatically to follow him, made it plain that this was
no time for recrimination.
L2 and L3 were the first guns to follow. Their crews had been warned that they would be
required to take part in a dusk patrol and were not to take the guns from the portées before it
was over. L1 and L4 had to be winched back on the portées and clamped down before they could
start to move. Lieutenant Pepper set a merry pace round the northern flank of the battalion
perimeter, and the portées, especially the last two, had to travel fast to keep up with him. The four
field guns that had been deployed to the north had already moved and were getting into action in
new positions, this time preparing to fire over open sights instead of indirectly at distant targets,
when the troop raced behind them. Following the original plan, some of the British guns had
fallen back to help close the gap on the west of the battalion. The new gunline started from the
right with four of the 30th Battery's 25-pounders, then two British field guns, and then two
two-pounders en portée, also British. When his truck reached the left of this line, Lieutenant
Pepper leaned out of the cab with a red flag. First waving it in violent circles, he pointed to the
west. Every anti-tank gunner knew then where his weapon was to go into action, and the direction
from which the enemy would appear.
The regiment's two-pounder troops had practised many times the manoeuvre which L Troop
now carried out in grim earnest: the quick deployment of guns en portée to meet a sudden attack.
After the signal for action, the pointing flag told the gun commanders in which direction their
portée into its place in line facing the enemy. The gunners
agreed that nothing they had done in practice could compare for speed with their performance
under the stimulus of real action. And there was another time-saving factor: the gun commanders
did not have to look for cover. There was none.
It was about half past four by the time the troop's guns, high on the decks of their portées on a
bare desert and with a sinking sun shining almost directly against them, swung into position on
the left of the line. By this time the enemy was aware of the presence of the New Zealanders for
small-arms fire was brought down on the 26th Battalion. The South African position was enveloped
in swirls of dust and overhung by smoke, shot through in many places by the flames of burning
vehicles, and at first it was impossible to make out individual tanks or trucks. The gunners had
been told by Lieutenant Pepper that the South Africans were being overrun and that German
tanks would almost certainly bear down on the New Zealand position. ‘There are lots of them,’
he said in warning the gun commanders, ‘maybe over 150. But don't let that worry you. They
are only little ones.’
The infantry waited in their slit-trenches for the enemy to come within effective small-arms
range. On the right of the gunline the 25-pounders were firing steadily, and still farther to the
right the anti-tank gunners could hear the gunfire of the other 30th Battery troop Diagram B.
‘Keep your engines running all the time,’ said Lieutenant Pepper to each gun commander as he hurried round the troop for a final check. Even though there was no cover, the guns were to be moved after each few shots, so that when smoke and dust obscured the position the enemy gunners would not be able to pick them by their flashes.
a german light tank — mark 2
East from Point 175
TRANSPORT
waiting to move:
Gnr A. Graham on left and Sgt T. E. Williamson on right
Dug in, ready for action
EN PORTÉE A photograph of New Zealanders shows portée action
A. FIRST DISPOSITIONS
Diagrammatic - not to scale
As the camera saw it—
a German tank closing
in on 6th Brigade
B. FINAL DISPOSITIONS
Diagrammatic - not to scale
As the artist painted it—
a tank battle
BATTLE SCENES IN LIBYA
th BRIGADE
th BRIGADE UNDER FIRE
AMBULANCE, AND A
TWO-POUNDER IN THE
FOREGROUND
IN THE DISTANCE
—view from the back of an L Troop
lorry
OUT PORTÉE
COMMANDER
Lt C. S. Pepper
and his truck
A gun crew during training Sgt Unverricht on left of front row
Back Row: A. V. Matthews, C. G. Rowe, W. M. Jamieson, P. J. Keenan, D. Bryant
Front Row: E. A. Frost, N. C. H. Weston, F. D. Nicholson
THE GUNNERS did not have long to wait before the Germans were seen to be attacking,
with a mass of armoured vehicles, from the South African position. The two supposed
Valentines on the right front suddenly wheeled and opened fire. One of their first shots, a
50-millimetre armour-piercing shell, crashed through the lower left side of L1, disabled the gun,
smashed the left foot and ankle of the gun-layer, Gunner Andy Graham11 and came to rest on
the deck of the portée. (The crew kept this shot, and when Graham went back to New Zealand it
was his most cherished souvenir.) Before an effective shot had been fired at the enemy, L1 had been
knocked out.
At
Lieutenant Pepper's remark to the gun sergeants that the tanks, though numerous, were small
ones, was borne out when the troop started shooting. It was amply demonstrated in later desert
campaigns that the more heavily armoured of the German Mark 3 and Mark 4 tanks were impervious to two-pounder fire at ranges over 800 yards. But the early German tanks had much
lighter armour. On this occasion the gunners saw tanks burst into flame from hits scored with the
range at 1500,
Beyond the apparent fact that there was an imposing mass of them, it was impossible for the gunners to form an accurate estimate of the number of enemy tanks in this first drive against the 26th Battalion. It was agreed by all on the spot that the number was at least fifty, but they could not see clearly enough to make an accurate count. Nor was there time to do so. At first the enemy tanks, apparently without knowledge of the identity or strength of the New Zealanders, simply poured down on the position with no sign of a definite plan of attack. When the blast of fire from the 25-pounders and the two-pounders convinced them of the strength of the defence, they withdrew, and a far more cautious policy was adopted. But until the attackers realised the position and altered their tactics, the L Troop gunners worked under great pressure.
Following Lieutenant Pepper's injunction, L3 fired five shots, the tracer tracks of at least two
of them showing direct hits on their targets, then changed its position. As its portée backed again
towards the enemy another German 50-millimetre shell found a mark. It pierced the left side of
the shield, miraculously missing both Sergeant Unverricht and the layer, Bombardier C. J. Smith12,
went on through the cab of the portée, mortally wounding the driver, Gunner F. D. Nicholson13,
With half the troop's effective strength out of action, L2 and L4 carried on. In that first few hectic minutes while the tanks closed the range, the little two-pounder shells were most effective. The procedure of ordinary anti-tank shooting was, for a short time, discarded. Normally the Number 1, the gun commander, selects a target and directs the layer until it appears in his telescope. He then gives the range and deflection to be allowed for a moving target. The loader slams a shell into the breech and, as the spring forces the block home, taps the layer on the shoulder to let him know the gun is ready, and the Number 1 gives the order to fire. The gun's target knocked out, the Number 1 orders ‘Stop!’ selects a fresh target for the layer, and so on. This time the targets were too thick to be easily selected and the need too pressing for any stops.
‘Pick your own target through the telescope, Frank,’ said Sergeant Peter Robertson, of L2,
to his gun-layer, Bombardier F. C. 14. Almost at the same time, a similar understanding was
reached between Sergeant ‘Chum’ Croft of L4 and his layer, Gunner A. B. Gordon15. Whenever
enemy shells came close the portées moved; but after every change of position, the initial direction
of the Number 1 and his final order to stop were the only formal commands.
As the range closed, the tracer showed hit after hit on the enemy tanks. On the right the field gunners worked like men possessed, firing armour-piercing shot over open sights. They could not match the high rate of fire of the two-pounders, with their semi-automatic breech and light, easily handled ammunition, but one hit with the 25-pound shell was almost always sufficient to disable a tank, while two, three, and even four good shots were often needed from the lighter weapons.
Noticing the troop's rate of fire, Lieutenant-Colonel Page called to Lieutenant Pepper. ‘Cyril,’ he said, ‘if your chaps keep shooting at that speed they'll be out of ammunition in no time.’ ‘It's all right, sir,’ Pepper shouted in reply, ‘we've got some extra.’ When first the group had met the South Africans he had replaced the ammunition his guns had fired during the morning. The South Africans had urged him to help himself from their supply, and not only had he replaced the rounds fired, but he had also loaded a lot more on his own truck.
After what seemed to the gunners to be nearer half a day than little more than half an hour, the enemy decided he had stumbled on something that presented much more than merely a mopping-up task. The tanks returned to their original start line and fanned out on the flanks in crescent formation. This favourite German method of attack enabled the machine guns at either end of the line to bring a severe crossfire on the defenders. A line of burning vehicles testified to the shooting of the New Zealand guns, both two- and 25-pounders, but the casualties were only a small proportion of the enemy tanks. Enough remained to form a wide crescent and, although more cautiously, resume the attack. By now there was no sign of the British field or anti-tank guns. For some reason they had been withdrawn, and only L Troop's two guns and the 30th Field Battery remained to protect the infantry and take what toll they could of the enemy armour.
Still there was no lack of targets for the two-pounders. Though the enemy tanks had fallen
Meanwhile Sergeant Unverricht had not been able to find assistance for the badly wounded
Gunner Nicholson. He reported to Lieutenant Pepper and was directed to get the help of the troop
subaltern, Second-Lieutenant Scott, and the troop 3-ton lorry. Lieutenant Scott and his driver,
Gunner R. F. Davies16, soon backed the lorry to the knocked-out portée. The tailboard was lowered
and Gunner Nicholson lifted gently to the deck. But when the lorry tried to tow the gun back to
a safer place two more casualties were suffered. With the tow-rope attached, Gunner P. J. Keenan17,
the L3 loader, jumped on the front bumper bar of the portée and shouted to Gunner Davies to
drive on. He did so, but just as the portée was gathering way down a slight incline the three-tonner
unexpectedly stopped. With its steering gear and brakes useless, the portée rolled down the slope
and crashed into the back of the lorry, Gunner Keenan having his leg badly shattered between the
two vehicles. There was excellent reason for Davies' lack of response to shouts to move his lorry
out of the way. He had been wounded in the hip by a Spandau bullet as he sat behind the wheel.
The two guns still in action did not waste an opportunity to disrupt the enemy attack. Trucks
were bringing enemy infantry well up behind the gradually advancing tanks, and parties were
jumping out and trying to bring mortars and anti-tank guns into action. Gordon and portées, and it was by good fortune that there were no further casualties in the
troop.
BEFORE long both crews exhausted their ammunition. Each two-pounder in the regiment
carried 192 rounds on the portée. In the morning engagement L4 had fired about ten rounds,
which reduced its supply to 182, and L2 had fired about sixteen, leaving it with 176. There remained
first of all the ammunition on the knocked-out guns. From L2, Gunner A. J. Harris18, the Bren
gunner, and Gunner M. A. Harry19, the ammunition number, made their way over forty yards of
bullet-spattered ground to L3. On each trip they brought back eight rounds apiece, a container
of four shells in either hand. Gunner P. Quirk20, the ammunition number of L4, later assisted by
the Bren gunner, Gunner L. O. Naylor21, had anticipated the shortage and was already replenishing
his supply from the other knocked-out gun, L1. In his case as well, the task of bringing up the
extra ammunition meant a most dangerous sprint under fire.
By this time the Germans were shelling the position and in spite of the efforts of the New Zealand gunners had managed to get some mortars into action, but very few of the heavy missiles landed among the troop's vehicles. Either that was good luck, or the enemy might have been seeking first to knock out the field guns on the right of the line. But as the tanks and infantry began to close on the position, the machine-gun fire and armour-piercing shot became heavier. The ammunition numbers carried on until all the shells of the knocked-out guns were carried to the two-pounders still in action.
While the action was in progress its various stages were reported to the 26th Battalion's parent formation, the 6th New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Brigadier Barrowclough ordered the battalion to disengage and retire to the main body of the group. To do this darkness was essential. The question was whether the enemy could be held at bay until last light. It would be about half past six in the evening before there was sufficient gloom to cover the withdrawal. By six the enemy was getting close; but the infantry and guns fought sternly on. After one heavy shell and mortar barrage the enemy's fire slackened, but the battalion's Bren gunners and riflemen maintained their rapid rate. When some of the crew of L4, not noticing that the light was beginning to fail, took advantage of the lull to smoke the first cigarette of the afternoon, the flare of their matches at once drew the enemy's fire.
Any vehicle moving on the front was fired on by the anti-tank guns, and parties of infantry provided alternative targets. L2 fired all L3's ammunition. Lieutenant Pepper had expected this, and in good time had an extra supply available from his reserve store. By the time the withdrawal was ordered, L4 was using the last of the containers brought over from L1.
The temporary slackening of the enemy's fire did not mean that he was abandoning the attack.
Just after seven o'clock, when the 26th Battalion was nearly ready to withdraw, there came a
hail of machine-gun fire, which the German infantry followed with a resolute attack. It was dark
by the time they had come within 800 yards of the New Zealanders but they could be seen clearly
against the glare of burning vehicles. The New Zealand infantry then put the finishing touch to an
afternoon of determined and skilful defensive fighting. Led by Captain A. W. Wesney22, the
battalion's B Company counter-attacked in a bayonet charge that caused heavy casualties and
completely repulsed the enemy. In this charge this fine officer was killed.
As it could not be taken, away, Lieutenant Pepper ordered that L3, the gun with the knocked-out portée, should be made completely unfit for use. Sergeant Unverricht and Bombardier ‘Cy’
Smith took the breech block with its firing mechanism from the gun.
‘Since we're here, Terry,’ said Smith, ‘wouldn't it be as well to take some of the tinned stuff?’
The sergeant agreed, and each seized as many tins of tongue, sausages, and fruit as he could carry. They had just returned to the troop three-tonner when the heavy machine-gun concentration hit the area. Both dropped to the ground. Smith lay flat with his head against a tin of sausages, and when a lull enabled him to shift position he found that a German bullet had pierced the tin, missing his head by inches.
THE BATTALION'S withdrawal was made in good order, quickly, and with complete success.
German flares were casting a bright light over the position when the troop received orders
to retire. Its vehicles, now three portées, the commander's ‘pick-up’, and the troop 3-ton lorry,
were in the last party to leave. This comprised the field artillery, which kept up its fire to the very
last moment, the battalion's Bren carriers, and the last infantry company, the infantrymen riding
on the gun vehicles and the carriers. One German prisoner also found a seat in the troop commander's truck. It was not until eleven o'clock at night that L Troop and the 26th Battalion
re-established contact with the 6th Brigade and bedded down for the night near Point 175.
Before the withdrawal the troop's casualties were attended by the 26th Battalion's Medical
Officer, Lieutenant G. C. Jennings Regimental aid post.23, who earned the admiration of the gunners by bringing his
RAP
Reporting on this action, Brigadier Barrowclough wrote: ‘It will be appreciated that this small force had been hotly attacked by an enemy column which had already proved itself strong enough to defeat and overthrow the whole of the 5th South African Brigade Group. That the 26th Battalion and its supporting artillery and anti-tank guns were able to maintain their positions and come out of the action with surprisingly few casualties was an eloquent tribute to the high standard of training and fortitude of all ranks. After the action there was no question that the infantry had the highest possible regard for the gunners. Nor were the gunners less generous in their praise of the way in which the infantry first stood its ground and then fought the rearguard action back to the main body of the Brigade group.’
Lieutenant Pepper estimated that L Troop had knocked out 24 tanks as well as many unarmoured
vehicles. As the fight progressed the front had become lined with burning vehicles, some South
African, many of them transport lorries. In the dust and smoke, with the sinking sun shining into
the eyes of the observer, it must have been extremely difficult to make an accurate count. The fact
that eight field guns of the 30th Battery were also in action against the enemy armour made a tally
all the more uncertain. It was reported by the British that the German attack against the South
On the debit side, one L Troop gunner was killed and three were wounded, and two guns
and one portée lost. The afternoon's fighting in this area cost the
At the time of this engagement, it is probable that Rommel thought he had encountered a
considerably larger proportion of the New Zealand Division than was actually the case. It was
later stated by Colonel Mario Revetria, Chief Intelligence Officer of the Italian forces under
Rommel's command, that the German leader had first been under the impression that the 6th
New Zealand Infantry Brigade had been virtually wiped out in company with the 5th South
African Brigade on 23 November. Instead, on that same afternoon, the 25th Battalion had
driven the Germans from Point 175, and the brigade was to take heavy toll of the enemy from
the
Throughout this short but severe action the leadership of the anti-tank troop commander, Lieutenant Pepper, was an inspiration to his men, and indeed to all the New Zealanders there. Regardless of the heavy small-arms fire, he moved from gun to gun encouraging the crews, meeting every emergency promptly and with skill. At one stage, when the arrival of some South African vehicles and the distortion of an order gave the impression that there was a general withdrawal, he corrected the error and by personal visits to each gun made sure that the line was maintained. For this outstanding work under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, and his complete disregard of personal danger, Lieutenant Pepper was awarded the Military Cross. It was a grave misfortune for the troop and the regiment when, three days later, he was so badly injured by a staff car which backed into the slit-trench in which he was resting, that he had to be invalided back to New Zealand.
Good fortune attended L Troop to the end of the short but bitterly-fought campaign. Both the
battery's other two-pounder troops, J and K, were overrun with the 24th and 26th Battalions
above the mosque at
First World War1Lt-Col T. H. E. Oakes, MC and bar
CO 7 NZ Anti-Tank Regt, 16 May-30 Nov 1941; killed in action,
2Lt C. S. Pepper, MC; clerk; born NZ,
3 Lt-Col J. R. Page, DSO, m.i.d.; Regular soldier;
15 May 1940–27 Nov 1941; wounded
4 Maj-Gen H. E. Barrowclough, CB, DSO and bar, MC, ED, m.i.d.; barrister and solicitor;
wounded, Messines,
5 Maj A. T. Rawle, m.i.d.; insurance clerk; born
6 Capt I. G. Scott; commercial traveller;
7 Sgt T. E. Williamson; contractor; Te Kauwhata; born
8 Lt P. Robertson; labourer;
9 Sgt T. E. Unverricht; labourer; Heretaunga; born
10 Sgt T. H. Croft; farm worker; Omihi; born NZ,
11 Gnr A. Graham; labourer;
12 Sgt C. J. Smith; carpenter; Upper Hutt; born
13 Gnr F. D. Nicholson; labourer; born NZ,
14 WO II F. C. Barker; freezing worker;
15 Lt A. B. Gordon; student;
16 Gnr R. F. Davies; sugar worker;
17 Gnr P. J. Keenan; salesman;
18 Sgt A. J. Harris; joiner;
19 Sgt M. A. Harry; cellarman;
20 Gnr P. Quirk; labourer;
to
21 Sgt L. O. Naylor; labourer; Lumsden; born Lumsden,
22 Capt A. W. Wesney; clerk; born
23 Capt G. C. Jennings; medical practitioner; England; born NZ,
The occupations given in each case are those on enlistment
THE OFFICIAL SOURCES consulted in the preparation of this account were
the war diaries of Headquarters 6th New Zealand Infantry Brigade and the 26th
New Zealand Battalion, and a special report on the campaign by the commander of the
6th Brigade, Brigadier H. E. Barrowclough. Most of the material is drawn from interviews
and correspondence with men who took part in the action. The assistance of former members
of L Troop, 33rd New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery, and also of the 26th Battalion and
the 30th New Zealand Field Battery, is gratefully acknowledged.
THE MAP, DIAGRAMS, and SKETCHES were drawn by L. D. McCormick.
THE PAINTING on page 17 was by Captain Peter McIntyre.
THE PHOTOGRAPHS come from many sources, which are stated where they
are known:
THE AUTHOR,
Branch
Anti-Tank Regiment and is at present writing the history of that unit. He was
wounded on
the type used throughout the series is
Aldine Bembo which was revived for monotype from a rare book printed by aldus
in 1495 * the text is set in 12 point on
a body of 14 point
Drawn from the German official chart
IT IS THE INTENTION of this series to present aspects of New Zealand's
part in the Second World War which will not receive detailed treatment in the campaign
volumes and which are considered either worthy of special notice or typical of many
phases of our war experience. The series is illustrated with material which would otherwise
seldom see publication. It will also contain short accounts of operations which will be
dealt with in detail in the appropriate volumes.
printed by whitcombe and tombs limited christchurch
new zealand
Admiral Graf Spee, commanded by Captain Hans Langsdorf, sailed from
Deutschland, put to sea, her tanker
supply ship having sailed two days earlier. To wait upon the Admiral Graf Spee, the tanker Altmark,
carrying three months' stores, had sailed from Admiral Graf Spee was to cruise in an area north-west of the Cape Verde Islands;
afterwards, she was to operate on the South Atlantic trade routes.
The broad lines of British naval policy for the protection of sea-borne trade in the event of
war with
During the last week of August active steps were taken to put the two cruisers of the New
Zealand Division of the Achilles, received
his sailing orders for the Leander and a draft of young ratings from the training depot joined the
ship, which left her berth at
After clearing the harbour the Achilles proceeded at 14 knots for the Panama Canal; but during
the night of 2 September she was ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, Achilles arrived at
During the next six weeks, the Achilles patrolled the west coast of South America and visited
numerous harbours and anchorages in Achilles arrived on the coast, were fugitives such as the Lahn from Erlangen from New Zealand, which had vanished into the Achilles, the only Allied warship in those waters, sufficed to keep German trade at a standstill
and virtually to immobilise some seventeen merchant ships totalling 84,000 tons along a coastline of
5000 miles from the Panama Canal to the Strait of Magellan. Thus was exemplified the truth of the
old saying that nine-tenths of naval warfare is made up of the continuous drudgery and monotony
of patrol duties and the search for enemy vessels which are not there, but which would be if the
patrols were not.
But the restraining influence of the Achilles on that coast was about to be removed. On 1 October
the Admiralty received word that the British steamer Clement, 5051 tons, had been sunk off the
coast of Admiral Scheer. It was,
in fact, the Admiral Graf Spee, who had struck her first blow. Prompt and far-reaching measures
were taken to hunt her down. The Achilles was in the vicinity of the Gulf of Exeter (Captain F. S. Bell, RN), Cumberland (Captain
W. H. G. Fallowfield, RN), and Ajax (Captain C. H. L. Woodhouse, RN), and for about six
weeks, the destroyers Hotspur and Havock. On 5 October the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, of the formation of eight hunting groups, each of ‘sufficient strength to
destroy any German armoured ship of the Deutschland class or armoured cruiser of the Hipper class’.
Thus, the appearance of a single enemy raider in the South Atlantic set in motion a vast naval
machine involving twenty-two ships, as well as the despatch of two battleships and three cruisers
to Emden.
After a second visit to Achilles carried on to the southward. She entered the Strait of Magellan at midday on 19
October, anchored overnight, and cleared the Achilles sailed from
Port Stanley on 23 October and proceeded to the southern approach to the Exeter three days later. On 27 October the Achilles met the
Cumberland, under orders to patrol with her in the Rio de Janeiro-Santos area. Commodore
Harwood transferred his broad pendant to the Ajax and the Exeter sailed for Port Stanley to carry
out urgent repairs. She replaced the Achilles on 11 November.
Nothing had been heard of the enemy raider for three weeks, and on 3 November the Admiralty
informed the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, that all German capital ships and cruisers
were believed to be in their home waters. Next day, the Admiralty issued orders that Force ‘G’
(Cumberland and Exeter) and Force ‘H’ ( Sussex and Shropshire) should exchange areas, an arrangement that would not only give the former ships an opportunity to rest and refit, but also provide
Commodore Harwood with the hunting group of long-steaming endurance he so greatly desired.
The two forces had actually sailed to effect the change-over when, on 17 November, the Admiralty
learned that the pocket battleship was in the
AFTER SINKING the Clement on 30 September, the Admiral Graf Spee made a cast more
than Newton Beech, 4651 tons, the Ashlea, 4222 tons, and the Huntsman, 8196 tons—
all homeward-bound from South Africa. On 14 October, south-west of St. Helena, the raider
refuelled from the Altmark, to whom she transferred the crews of the sunken ships. Returning
towards the African coast, she intercepted and sank on 22 October the steamer Trevanion, 5299
tons, homeward-bound from Altmark in mid-Africa Shell, 706 tons, 160 miles north-east
of Lourenco Marques. Next day she stopped the Dutch steamer Mapia but allowed her to proceed.
Eleven days later, the Admiralty ordered Forces ‘H’ ( Sussex and Shropshire) and ‘K’ (Ark Royal and
Renown) to patrol south of the Cape of Good Hope to intercept the raider. But, by that time, the
Admiral Graf Spee was back in mid-Altmark and re-embarked the masters and senior officers of the ships previously sunk.
The Achilles remained in company with the Cumberland till 5 November and then patrolled
the coast from Santos to Rio de Janeiro, where she arrived on 10 November and spent two days.
Returning south, she met the Ajax on 22 November and spent the day searching for the German
merchant ships Lahn and Tacoma, which had escaped from Chilean ports. The search was unsuccessful, both German ships arriving at Achilles
started next day on another long, independent patrol which took her more than
Early in the morning of 4 December the Achilles received orders from Commodore Harwood
to return to Admiral Graf Spee represented but tiny circles in the 10,000,000 square miles of
the South Atlantic.
The Admiral Graf Spee had returned to the area where she had sunk the Trevanion and there, on
2 December, she intercepted and sank the Blue Star liner Doric Star, 10,086 tons, homeward-bound
from New Zealand and Doric Star had succeeded in transmitting a distress signal giving her
position at the time of attack. Knowing this, Captain Langsdorf left the area at high speed. Early
next morning he sighted and sank the Shaw Savill steamer Tairoa, 7983 tons, bound from Admiral
Graf Spee refuelled from the Altmark for the last time. She was then nearly half-way between
St. Helena and the Streonshalh, 3895 tons, laden with wheat from the
When the Doric Star reported on 2 December that she was being attacked by a pocket battleship,
she was more than 3000 miles from the South American coast. A similar report was broadcast early
the following day by an unknown ship—it was in fact, the Tairoa—170 miles south-west of that
position. Commodore Harwood correctly anticipated that the raider, knowing she had been
reported, would leave that area and probably cross the South Atlantic. He estimated that at a
cruising speed of 15 knots, she could arrive in the Rio de Janeiro focal area by the morning of
12 December, the
At seven o'clock on the morning of 12 December, the Ajax and Achilles joined company with
the Exeter 150 miles east of Punta Medanos, in the southern approach to the Cumberland was refitting at Port Stanley. During the afternoon, Commodore Harwood gave his
captains the clearest picture of his intentions in two brief signals, the first of which began: ‘My
The Admiral Graf Spee was a well-armoured ship of some 12,000 tons displacement, with a
speed of 25 knots or better. She mounted six 11-inch guns in two triple turrets and eight 5.9-inch
guns, four on each beam. The 11-inch guns had a maximum range of 30,000 yards (15 sea miles)
and fired a projectile of 670 pounds. She also had eight torpedo-tubes in quadruple mountings.
The Exeter was armed with six 8-inch guns in three turrets, each gun firing a projectile of 256
pounds. The Ajax and Achilles each had eight 6-inch guns in four turrets, firing a projectile of
112 pounds. The secondary guns of the German ship were the equal in weight of the main armament
of either the Ajax or the Achilles. She could fire a total weight of 4830 pounds as against 3328
pounds from the three British cruisers, though the rate of her 11-inch guns was slower. The
British ships had an advantage in speed of about five knots. But against the material superiority
of the Admiral Graf Spee was to be set a vitally important moral factor. British naval doctrine,
established by long tradition, laid down that ‘war at sea cannot be waged successfully without
risking the loss of ships. Should the object to be achieved justify a reasonable loss of ships, the fact
that such losses may occur should be no deterrent to the carrying out of the operation.’
AT 5.20 ON THE MORNING of 13 December, the British squadron was in a position
about 240 miles due east from Cape Santa Maria on the coast of Ajax, Achilles, Exeter, steaming north-east by east at 14 knots. The sun rose at 5.56 a.m.