New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force (Vol. I)

Front Cover

Spine

Back Cover

Title Page

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 By Authority: R. E. Owen, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand 1953

Per ardua ad astra

—Motto of the Royal Air Force

The Royal Air Force, created during war in 1918 by the fusion of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, took the motto under which the RFC had trained and fought. The words were first suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Yule, OBE, then a young officer in the Royal Engineers, to a brother officer who had joined the RFC. It was one evening in May 1912, when ideas for a motto for the new air arm were being sought, that the two men were walking down from the Royal Engineers' Mess on Laffan's Plain to the shed where Colonel Cody kept his ‘strange machine’. After various ideas had been discarded, Yule suddenly hit upon the now famous phrase. His suggestion was forwarded to Whitehall where, after some doubts and discussion of the Latin, it was finally accepted. The motto may be rendered as ‘Through the steeps to the stars’ or ‘Through difficulties to glory’, but the Latin words, now pregnant with meaning to so many, are such an apt and true expression of all RAF effort and endeavour that they hardly need to be translated.

London burning, 29 December 1940 Black and white photograph of smoke billowing with tops of London buildings and houses showing

New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force Volume I: EUROPEAN THEATRE September 1939–December 1942 Wing Commander H. L. THOMPSON WAR HISTORY BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRSWELLINGTON, NEW ZEALANDGEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESSLONDON1953Distributed bywhitcombe & tombs ltd.Christchurch, New Zealand Geoffrey Cumberlege oxford university press London

Foreword

By Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, GCB

I HAVE often wondered whether anyone who was not in very close touch with our Air Forces during the War even began to realise the fantastically high standard of personal skill, determination and courage demanded of every air crew, or the skill, technical integrity and perseverance demanded of the ground crews by the daily round, the common task. Countless were the acts of almost superhuman determination and bravery which passed unknown to all but a handful or, if known, were taken for granted and passed unrecorded. The New Zealander, perhaps more than most, has a way of regarding such things as all in the day's work. One is therefore especially glad to see here a factual record of some at least of the matchless deeds of New Zealand airmen. But the reader must, in this as in any written account of air operations, read between the lines much that cannot be expressed in words if he is to get a true impression of the spirit which made New Zealand airmen such grand comrades working with their colleagues from the other Dominions and the Home Country.

Contents

Page foreword vii introduction xix chapter 1 the royal air force and early new zealnd representation 1 Events leading to formation of RAF—Early difficulties and achievements—Failure of Disarmament Conference—Belated expansion—Fighter, Bomber, and Coastal Commands in August 1939—Respective strengths of RAF and Luftwaffe. New Zealanders early with the RAF—Prominent personalities—Service in many spheres between the wars— Increasing flow to Britain from 1936—Various training schemes—New Zealanders with the RAF at outbreak of war—Maori airmen and the Dominion contribution. chapter 2 early operations from britain and france 23 The war at sea begins in earnest—Early reconnaissance patrols —Protection for convoys and fishing fleets—Bombers seek and attack enemy warships—Leaflet raids—Patrols against German minelaying bases—Origin and formation of No. 75 Squadron. With the RAF in France—Early inactivity—The first combats. chapter 3 meeting the german attack 40 Denmark and Norway invaded—British efforts to assist Norway—New Zealanders take part in reconnaissance, minelaying, and bombing attacks—Fighter pilots operate from Norway—Gain air superiority in Narvik area—The withdrawal from Norway. The German attack in the West—New Zealanders in action with the fighter squadrons in France—Bombing attacks from French and English bases—The German breakthrough —Covering the evacuation from Dunkirk—Operations over France during June 1940. chapter 4 the battle of britain 70 The fateful hour—A short respite is well used—New Zealanders in Fighter Command—Relative strengths and tactics of opposing air forces—The German plan—Combats during the first phase—The main assault begins—New Zealand pilots in action—The critical period—Enemy attack switches to London—Park's tactics—Further successes by New Zealand pilots—Change of enemy plan—The ebb of battle—Comparison of British and German tactics. chapter 5 bombing and reconnaissance, 1940 103 Early bombing policy—New Zealanders with Bomber Command—The first bombing raids—The part of No. 75 Squadron—New Zealanders with other units. The work of Coastal Command—Anti-invasion patrols— Reconnaissance of the Norwegian coast—Escorting convoys —New Zealanders among the pioneers of photographic reconnaissance. Changing strategy of the air war at end of 1940. chapter 6 defeating the night raider 125 The closing phases of the German assault on Britain—Scale of the night attack—British air-raid casualties—Early efforts to intercept the night bomber—New Zealanders among the successful pilots—Improvements in the technique of night interception—RAF achievement during the spring of 1941— Virtual cessation of German raids by June but counter measures continued. The first ‘Intruder’ patrols—New Zealanders with No. 23 Squadron—A promising form of night fighting is developed. chapter 7 air war at sea 140 German advantages and achievements, 1940—The Battle of the Atlantic opens—New Zealanders in air patrol and attack—Early operations from Iceland—A U-boat surrenders —New Zealanders open the first base in West Africa. The campaign against enemy shipping—Aerial minelaying —Attacks with bomb and torpedo—The Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen. chapter 8 early bomber offensive 161 Increasing New Zealand strength in Bomber Command— Prominent personalities—The organisation of bombing operations—Night raids on Germany and Italy during the second winter—Daylight attacks by the Blenheims—Early difficulties of night bombing—Some typical experiences— Growth of the German defences—Operations against Germany during 1941—Further attacks on Italy—The warships at Brest. chapter 9 the part of no. 75 squadron 183 The base at Feltwell—New Zealanders with sister squadron —Operations during the severe winter of 1940—Some eventful missions—Intensive activity during the spring— Attacks on the German transport system—Sergeant Ward wins the VC—Further hazardous flights—Heavier casualties during the autumn—Bombing the battleships. chapter 10 increasing new zealand participation— formation of nos. 485, 488, and 489 squadrons 207 Meeting the demand for trained aircrew—The Empire Air Training Plan—Its conception and development—New Zealand's part—The Article XV Squadrons—Formation and early operations of Nos. 485, 488, and 489 Squadrons—New Zealanders in varied roles—Instructors and Medical Officers— Isherwood leads the RAF Wing to Russia—Pioneering the Atlantic Ferry—The development of air transport and reinforcement—The ‘met’ flights and air-sea rescue. chapter 11 day fighters, 1941 224 Aftermath of the Battle of Britain—Brief appearance of the Italian Air Force—Small-scale German raids—New Zealand pilots in combat—Daylight activity declines—Fighter Command renews its strength—New Zealanders as leaders and squadron commanders during 1941—The convoy patrols —Offensive sweeps over northern France begin—Intensified with the German attack on Russia, June 1941—New Zealand pilots in action—The part of No. 485 Squadron—Some varied experiences—Stronger enemy opposition—A change of tactics—Further episodes involving New Zealand pilots. chapter 12 heavier bombing raids—advent of no. 487 squadron 246 Allied strategy and the bomber offensive—A shortage of trained crews—Increasing Dominion representation in Bomber Command—New Zealanders with No. 2 Group—The formation of No. 487 Squadron—An eventful first mission— Daylight raids by the heavier bombers—Attacks on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau—The advent of ‘Gee’—Air Marshal Harris appointed AOC-in-C of Bomber Command— Heavier attacks on Germany by night—The ‘thousand bomber’ raids—The part of No. 75 Squadron. chapter 13 pathfinders and raids on italy 273 Allied strategy is more clearly defined—Night raids in July and August 1942—Heavier casualties and the need for better navigational aids—Formation of the Pathfinder Force—New Zealanders amongst the first crews—The early Pathfinder raids—Some hazardous missions—Successful attacks on Italy—December raids on Germany—The part of No. 75 Squadron during the second half of 1942 chapter 14 battle of the atlantic, 1942 291 A critical period in the war at sea—New Zealanders with Coastal Command—The convoy patrols—Men and their machines—The U-boat campaign in the Western Atlantic— Early Biscay patrols—The first Leigh Light aircraft— Further improvements in anti-submarine warfare—Enemy counter measures in the Bay of Biscay—Patrol and attack in the North Atlantic—Protecting the North African convoys— New Zealanders in successful attacks on U-boats—The bitter struggie in the North Atlantic continues. chapter 15 attacking enemy ships with mine, bomb, and torpedo 315 The challenge to Britain's sea power—German ore traffic from Scandinavia—Laying mines from the air—An eventful sortie—New Zealanders in bombing attacks on enemy merchant ships—The early work of No. 489 Squadron —Torpedo attacks on German warships—Increasing defences of the enemy merchant vessels—No. 489 Squadron begins patrols along the Norwegian coast—Successful torpedo attacks —The development of the first Strike Wing. chapter 16 day fighters during 1942 333 The changing role and equipment of Fighter Command— New Zealanders in command of bases, wings, and squadrons during 1942—Nos. 485 and 486 Squadrons—Intensive activity on a February afternoon—Renewal of the offensive over northern France in strength—A typical mission—Operations during March and April—New Zealand pilots in combat—The part of No. 485 Squadron. Stronger enemy opposition to sweeps and ‘circuses’ —Covering the Dieppe raid—New Zealanders lead formations in patrol and attack—Offensive operations during the closing months—Protection of coastal shipping during 1942—No. 486 Squadron and the ‘tip and run’ raiders. chapter 17 night fighters, 1942 359 German effort against the United Kingdom—The British night fighter force—New Zealand representation—The technique of night interception—Dominion airmen in action. ‘Intruder’ patrols are continued—Some successful missions —Decline of enemy activity by night towards the close of the year—The German Air Force at the end of 1942 and the growing ascendancy of Allied air power. appendices— I Principal Events of the Second World War (1939–42) with particular reference to air operations in Europe 370 II A Flight to Italy in November 1940 382 III Strengths and Casualties 388 IV Principal types of British and German operational aircraft during the first three years 389 V Glossary 392 VI Bibliography 395

List of Illustrations

London burning, 29 December 1940 Frontispiece Imperial War Museum Following page Anson on convoy patrol 108 German bombing attack on British Fleet in the Firth of Forth, 16 October 1939 108 Original members of New Zealand Flight, No. 75 Squadron 108 A Whitley of Bomber Command takes off on a leaflet raid 108 Ground crews coaxing the propeller of a Battle bomber on an airfield in France 108 Flying Officer E. J. Kain, DFC 108 The town of Narvik Imperial War Museum 108 Wreckage of a Dornier 17 bomber in a French cornfield 108 Low-level attack by Battle bombers on a German convoy in France 108 Burning oil depots at Dunkirk 108 British troops on the beach at Dunkirk waiting to embark The Times 108 The German leaders, June 1940 108 German photograph of a Heinkel III dropping its bombs during the Battle of Britain 108 German photograph of a direct hit on the oil storage tanks at Purfleet, on the Thames 108 Vapour trails over Westminster 108 His Majesty the King with Flight Lieutenant A. C. Deere, DSO, OBE, DFC and bar, DFC (US), Croix de Guerre 108 Pilot Officer C. F. Gray, DSO, DFC and two bars 108 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Keith R. Park, GCB, KBE, MC and bar, DFC, Croix de Guerre 108 Hudson of Coastal Command on a reconnaissance of the Norwegian coast 108 Sunderland on patrol over a convoy of troopships approaching Britain 108 A Coastal Command Blenheim above an enemy tanker attacked in the North Sea 108 Part of the dock area at Dunkirk where the German invasion fleet was concentrated Imperial War Museum 108 A section of London east of St. Paul's Cathedral after the raid of 29 December 1940 Imperial War Museum 108 The centre of Coventry after the attack of 14 November 1940 Imperial War Museum 108 ‘Returning with over 700 hits from an operational flight.’— German caption 108 Defiant about to take off on a night interception patrol 108 German supply ship on fire in a fiord in south-west Norway 108 U-boat (U.570) which surrendered south of Iceland to a Coastal Command Hudson 108 Aircraft on an airfield in Iceland 108 Blenheims of Bomber Command attack Rotterdam on 16 July 1941 108 Attack on power stations at Cologne on 12 August 1941 108 Direct hits on docks and shipping at Le Havre on 15 October 1941 272 Wreckage of a Wellington shot down near Bremen 272 Halifaxes attack German warships at Brest on 18 December 1941 272 Bombing up a Wellington of No. 75 Squadron The Times 272 Sergeant J. A. Ward, VC, and four photographs showing the damage suffered by his aircraft 272 The Empire Air Training Scheme—New Zealanders in Canada Royal Canadian Air Force 272 Line up of Spitfires subscribed by New Zealand for No. 485 Squadron 272 Hudsons preparing for Atlantic ferry flight at Gander, Newfoundland 272 The combined raid at Vaagso, 27 December 1941 272 Italian bomber shot down near the east coast of England in November 1940 272 Hurricane of No. 257 Squadron refuelling in the snow 272 Pilots examine the wreckage of a Junkers 87 in January 1941 Imperial War Museum 272 German photograph showing a Hurricane breaking up in mid-air and the pilot parachuting 272 Sergeant K. O. Law's Wellington which returned to base safely though badly damaged by a night fighter 272 The railway workshops before and after the ‘thousand- bomber’ raid of 30 May 1942 on Cologne 272 German officers examine the wreckage of an RAF Stirling shot down over Germany on 29 July 1942 272 A New Zealand bomber crew of No. 75 Squadron in 1942 Sport & General 272 U-boat under air attack by a Sunderland in the Bay of Biscay, 5 June 1942 272 In a dispersal hut at a fighter station as pilots wait for orders to ‘scramble’ Imperial War Museum 272 Fighter pilots being briefed for an operation 272 View from the control tower as a flight takes off 272 Recounting experiences on returning from a sweep over northern France 272 Boston crews being briefed before the Dieppe raid, August 1942 Imperial War Museum 272 Bombs fall from a Boston in the early stages of the Dieppe raid Imperial War Museum 272 A street in Exeter on the morning after the heavy German night raid of 24 April 1942 The Times 272 Squadron Leader D. J. Scott 272 The Battle of Britain Memorial Window in Westminster Abbey 272

Unless otherwise credited, the photographs come from the Air Ministry Information Section, supplemented from the Royal New Zealand Air Force Official Collection.

List of Maps

Facing page Europe 9 The Battle of France—situation on 18 May 1940 43 Bomber Command Operations, September 1939 – December 1941 109 Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 – January 1942 143 Battle of the Atlantic, January – July 1942 289 Battle of the Atlantic, August 1942 – May 1943 307 In Text Page Norway 41 The Battle of Britain. Phase 1: 10 July – 18 August 1940 77 The Battle of Britain. Phase 2: 24 August – 6 September 1940 84 The Battle of Britain. Phase 3: 7–27 September 1940 91 Operation Sealion, German plan for invasion of England 94 Bomber and fighter operations, 1942 247 Attacks on German sea communications 328

Acknowledgments

For their generous assistance in the matter of records my thanks are due to many officers of the Air Ministry, London, particularly to Mr. J. C. Nerney and his staff of the Historical Branch, without whose help the work could not have been accomplished. They are also due to Flight Lieutenants B. G. Clare and N. W. Faircloth who wrote narratives on Bomber and Fighter Commands, and to Sergeant S. W. R. Holmes for additional research and the preparation of biographical notes. I also wish to record my gratitude to the many men who have written in response to our requests for information and also to those who have read and commented upon the text, especially to Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park. The illustrations have been arranged from photographs in the RNZAF official collection and others supplied by Air Ministry and the Imperial War Museum, London.

H. L. Thompson

London,April 1953

The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment.

Introduction

FOR centuries wars have been conducted on land and sea. But now, within the last few decades, a third and larger theatre has been found for them, one which flows over both land and sea and which more than either of these is a place of vision, of speed and freedom of movement. The advent of airship and aeroplane as weapons of war, and the possibility that the air might become a great highway for the traffic of peace, had long been foreseen. However, the visions of earlier ages and the more practical theories and experiments of the nineteenth century had to wait upon the invention of the internal combustion engine for their realisation. Even then doubts and prejudices retarded the progress of aviation and, in the military sphere, the aeroplane was regarded for some time merely as an ancillary weapon to the older forms of warfare. In the opening stages of the First World War, the machines operating on the Western Front were used solely for observation purposes such as the detection of enemy batteries, the direction of artillery fire, and the photographing of the territory immediately behind the enemy lines; machines designed expressly for aerial combat did not appear in force until the second year, and it was only towards the end of the conflict that various types of bomber aircraft were rapidly developed. Then came the Armistice, which prevented a demonstration of the full power of the new weapon.

For the next twenty years the strategic value of the new weapon was to remain a matter for conjecture since, during the period of uneasy peace which separated the two conflicts, aviation was not used as a war weapon on any considerable scale. Even when it did play a part it was under conditions not likely to be reproduced in a world struggle between major powers. In Abyssinia the Italians had things all their own way, while in China and in Spain the opposing air forces were hardly comparable either in numbers or in quality. Nevertheless there were many prophets, chief among them being the Italian general, Giulic Douhet, who conjured up alarming visions of what might happen in future wars.

Douhet had commanded the first Air Battalion in the Italian Army and was appointed Commissioner of Aviation in Mussolini's first administration. His Il domino dell’ aria (first published in 1921) subsequently achieved a wide circulation in Europe.

These enthusiastic exponents of air power predicted sudden and ruthless attacks with high-explosive and gas bombs which would quickly smash war industries and centres of population. The new mechanical age was receptive to such destructive ideas and contemporary popular imagination was stimulated by such writings as H. G. Wells' The Shape of Things to Come.

But while the doctrine of an overwhelming bomber force striking knockout blows in the early stages gained its adherents, controversy continued in military circles with the result that, in 1939, divergent views of what air power might achieve were held by those who controlled the destinies of the principal nations. These views were strongly influenced by tradition and geographical position. The United States, although she had made rapid strides in air transport internally, was remote from Europe and her only likely enemy was Japan. Therefore she relied upon a powerful navy for defence and, apart from the few followers of that stormy petrel, Brigadier William Mitchell (better known as ‘Billy’), was largely unappreciative of the growing importance of air power. Her air forces remained divided between army and navy and were the subject of much controversy. France, weakened by the First World War and distracted by political strife, was unable to maintain the development of the air arm and devoted her energies to building and holding the Maginot Line. On the other hand the totalitarian states, bent on expansion, had more readily grasped the destructive possibilities of the new weapon. Italy had fashioned an air force of considerable size; Japan had seen that air power would aid in furthering her ambitions in the Far East; while Germany, after her disavowal of the Treaty of Versailles, had gone ahead with the expansion of the Luftwaffe which, aided by skilful propaganda, threatened to dominate the skies of Europe.

In Britain a few far-sighted and determined men had established a basic organisation that was to stand the test of war, but the Commonwealth as a whole, long dependent on sea power for its protection, had failed to recognise fully the advent of air power as a matter of importance in the strategy and tactics of war. The air was still regarded by many as a revolutionary and comparatively untried field in which the prophecies of a handful of visionaries had not been put to the test. And although the events of the First World War had shown that the submarine was a new and major factor, and the aeroplane a potential factor affecting sea power, the British people continued to believe that the Empire was still secure under the protection of the Royal Navy. Indeed it was not until the events of 1940 brought about a rude awakening that we began to realise what the coming of air power meant, not only to the security of the Empire, and in particular of Britain herself, but also to the conduct of the war as a whole. The lesson was driven home only at the cost of much blood and bitterness. Only gradually did we come to see the vital dependence of all surface operations on the progress of the war in the air and to understand the essential truth contained in General Smuts' conclusion, arrived at nearly thirty years earlier when aircraft were still bird-cages of wood and wire: ‘It is important for the winning of the war that we should not only secure air predominance, but secure it on a very large scale.’ Fortunately we were given the time and opportunity to do so.

The Second World War was to see the testing of the various theories of air power developed during the years of peace and the gradual emergence of new concepts regarding its application to the problems of warfare on land and sea. Whereas, for example, Britain soon found she had much to learn, particularly in the tactical field, the Germans discovered that they had underestimated the strategic value of air forces operating at long range over land and sea. In the opening stages, when the Luftwaffe achieved a series of dazzling but easy victories, the principle laid down for its employment was both simple and direct. It was the theory of the blitzkrieg;

‘Lightning war’—a term much used by Hitler and Goering in public speeches as part of the campaign to produce fear of the Luftwaffe. The word was adopted in Britain towards the end of 1940 as ‘Blitz’, more in connection with the night raids by the German Air Force.

the elimination stage by stage of each and every obstacle which might interfere with the free movement of the ground forces; and in the type of continental warfare which the German High Command had planned it proved highly successful. Then came the Battle of Britain in which the Luftwaffe was employed in an independent role for the first time. Britain, having had a brief interval in which to strengthen her air defences, survived the onslaught. But the German High Command did not appreciate the full significance of this failure of its air arm, and subsequent operations continued to be subordinated to the requirements of the Wehrmacht. Thus while the Luftwaffe was able to achieve further successes in Russia and the Mediterranean during 1941, it did not develop strategic operations against the British Isles and, as a direct result, was subsequently unable to maintain air supremacy over Germany. By the time the German leaders realised that they were confronted with a new situation for which their pre-war plans and designs made little provision, the initiative had passed to their enemies. Having taken note of earlier German successes and failures, the Allies had developed a wider view of air power and were well advanced with their plans to secure air superiority as a preliminary to victorious operations by land, sea, and air.

But the achievement of Allied supremacy in the air was not a relatively straightforward issue like a naval or land battle. It was certainly not just a series of combats between fighters; rather was it a complex affair involving many kinds of operations carried out by many types of aircraft. For example, the bombing attacks on the enemy's oil supplies, his communications and factories, were an important contribution to Allied air supremacy in all theatres. Altogether it was a campaign rather than a battle, and one in which the advantage swung from side to side as scientific and technical discoveries were applied to the war in the air. Many found this difficult to grasp since operations designed to secure and maintain command of the air were often not visible to those who were benefiting from them and, in the early days of the war, this was a frequent cause of misunderstanding.

On the other hand, air superiority was only achieved and maintained with the aid of the land and sea forces. Supplies had to be brought by ships, and airfields had to be secured and held against the enemy land forces. Without supplies or deprived of bases, air forces could not operate. Altogether, final supremacy in the air was wrested from the enemy only after a long and bitter struggle, a long-drawn-out battle of wits by day and by night in fair weather and foul. It was neither an easy nor a quick victory. Simultaneously the enemy's communications and war industries had been brought almost to a standstill by bombing, and valuable support given to the armies in the field and to naval forces in maintaining command of the sea.

* * * * *

Throughout the Second World War the air forces of the British Commonwealth were deployed as geography and strategy dictated. Canada, for example, sent a large air force to Europe, and at the same time took a major share in the Empire Air Training Scheme. South Africa's main contribution was made in the Middle East. Australia and New Zealand devoted a considerable portion of their manpower to the Pacific and to training; both countries also sent many men to the Royal Air Force. In the case of New Zealand, just under 11,000 airmen went from the Dominion to serve with units in Europe, the Middle East, and South-East Asia. It is with the fortunes of these men that the present history is mainly concerned.

The task of presenting a satisfactory account of their work has proved difficult as they were, for the most part, scattered among Royal Air Force units in the different theatres of war. At the same time very few records were kept by the Dominion concerning the activities of its airmen. The method adopted has been to record their work and achievements against a background of the operations of the Royal Air Force. It has been found convenient to divide the narrative into three parts: the first—the present volume—deals with the services of New Zealand airmen in Europe up to the end of 1942; this theatre will be completed in a second volume, while a third will be devoted to the Middle East and South-East Asia.

Many more volumes would be needed to record all the exploits of Dominion airmen during the Second World War, but as Raleigh remarks in his introduction to The War in the Air, ‘No history can be expected to furnish a full record of all the acts of prowess that were performed in the long course of the war. Many of the best can never be known. Honours were surely earned by many who lie in unvisited graves and those who were both heroic and lucky must share their honours, as they would be the first to insist, with those whose courage was not less though their luck failed them.’ Furthermore, the men who flew against the enemy were so many that comparatively few of their names can be mentioned. However, every effort has been made to indicate the contribution made by outstanding individuals and to illustrate the narrative by typical incidents in which New Zealand airmen were involved. In this matter of names, changes and promotions were so rapid during the war that the prefixes of rank often varied from month to month. Where a particular deed or part of a man's service is described, therefore, the rank held at the time of mention is given; on the other hand, where an airman is referred to in more general terms, he is given the rank held at the end of hostilities. A brief biography is given in a footnote on first mention, the rank shown being that held on discharge or at date of death.

The records used in compiling the narrative have been, for the major part, those made available by the Air Ministry in London. In addition to the more personal details of service and achievement, these included the original sortie and combat reports and the mass of operational record books, files, and other documents compiled by RAF commands, groups, and squadrons; the despatches, memoirs, and wartime reports of various Allied commanders; the post-war interrogations and accounts of certain German leaders and many contemporary enemy documents—among them the highly secret statement kept by the German High Command of their daily aircraft losses and replacements.

The written record has been supplemented as far as possible by individual accounts and interviews, and such sources have supplied many of the liveliest things in the volumes. Unfortunately, how- ever, the squadron war records are often sketchy, particularly in the first years, and even when surviving airmen set down what they remember, the whole war lies between them and those early days and their memory is often fragmentary.

It has been felt necessary, for the proper perspective of the narrative, to begin with a short account of the development of the Royal Air Force and the growth of New Zealand representation in its units up to the outbreak of the Second World War.

CHAPTER 1 The Royal Air Force and Early New Zealand Representation

FOLLOWING the achievement of the Wright brothers in flying the first power-driven machine in 1903 at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, France led the way in the diverse experiments that took place in Europe. Britain, cautious in accepting new ideas, lagged behind and it was not until June 1908 that the first flight over English soil was made by A. V. Roe at Brooklands. However, between that time and 1912 when the British Government took a hand in the building up of an air service, many private organisations began, and with this birth of British aviation the names of men like Butler, Rolls, Sopwith, de Havilland and the Short brothers will always be associated. Their experiments in frail and unsteady machines make a story which is an epic in itself. In fact, the national air service was built up out of the mass of material offered by the skill and intelligence of such men.

For some time, however, the question of whether the new force should be a separate branch of the armed services was the subject of much controversy, and although the Royal Flying Corps was first formed as a separate arm in 1912 with naval and military wings, naval tradition proved too strong and soon led to the establishment of the Royal Naval Air Service. The Royal Flying Corps then became a distinct military body. It was partly because of this dual development that, during the early years of the First World War, the air services were the subject of much confusion and delay in the matters of equipment and supply. The Royal Flying Corps in particular had to pay heavily in losses of both men and machines and it was only the untiring efforts of men like Viscount Trenchard,

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount H. M. Trenchard, GCB, OM, GCVO, DSO, Legion of Honour (Fr), Order of St. Anne (Rus), Order of Leopold (Bel), Distinguished Service Medal (US), Order of St. Stanislas (Rus), Croix de Guerre (Bel), Order of the Crown of Italy, Order of the Sacred Treasure of Japan; England; born 3 Feb 1873; joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1893; seconded RFC 1912 and RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1919; commanded first Wing of RFC, France, 1914; appointed to command RFC, France, 1915; founded Independent Force in France, 1918; first Chief of Air Staff, RAF, 1918–29.

who took command in France at the end of 1915, that carried the force through very difficult times. Previously, as commandant at Farnborough, Trenchard had ‘not only produced more squadrons than had been thought possible at the start, but he instilled into them that high spirit which persisted throughout the war and has been handed on as a tradition to this day’.

History of the Air Ministry, C. G. Grey (Allen and Unwin).

But at the end of 1916 the Germans were well on the way to mastery of the air over the Western Front, and this fact, together with the subsequent bombing of London in daylight, aroused such general misgivings about the state of British air power that the government of the time was forced to appoint a committee of inquiry. This was presided over by General Smuts, and in the now famous report which was submitted to Lloyd George's cabinet in August 1917, he declared:

The time is rapidly approaching when the subordination of the air service can no longer be justified. It can be used as an independent means of war operations …. As far as can at present be foreseen there is no limit to the scale of its future independent war use. And the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and the destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale, may become the principal operations of war to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.

About the same time Winston Churchill, with similar foresight, advocated ‘not merely an ancillary service to the special operations of the Army and Navy but an independent arm co-operating in the general plan’.

Nevertheless there was still opposition to any change from both the Admiralty and the War Office so that it was not until April 1918 that the Royal Air Force was formed as an independent service, absorbing both the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service. Then, before the newly instituted force could show its paces, the war came to an end. A period of economy and retrenchment followed in which the young air force was cut down and little effort made to keep it up to date in equipment; indeed for a long time its few surviving pilots went on flying obsolete aircraft left over from the war. Even the principle of an independent service was continually opposed and was only maintained largely through the tenacity and courage of Trenchard, who had now become the first Chief of Air Staff. Indeed, throughout the period between the wars, when the British people were gripped by a strange mixture of idealism and pacifism, Trenchard was to remain a stalwart advocate of a strong and separate air force.

Fortunately, the RAF quickly justified its continued existence by providing an economical means of controlling certain vital areas of the Empire. It was found that aircraft possessed the great advantage of being able to visit the scene of incipient unrest within a few hours of the receipt of news, whereas the organisation of a military expedition took time, during which the trouble might spread. A strong air contingent in the Middle East and a somewhat smaller force in India soon became a cheap substitute for part of the military garrison in those areas, while in Iraq the main control was actually transferred from the Army to the Air Force. The modest operations which followed went far to maintain the continuity of the air weapon in British hands and, in the Middle East, to familiarise personnel with a theatre of war which was later to prove vital. Many men who served in these regions found compensations for the hardships they endured; there were frequent changes of scene, different types of flying activity and encounters with fresh people. For those who, as T. E. Lawrence wrote, ‘flew with their minds and imagination’, it was the most interesting part of their service career.

At the same time the air routes linking various parts of the Empire were being developed. Although these were eventually taken over by commercial firms, it was the Royal Air Force which blazed the trails by making the initial flights, reconnoitring territory, deciding upon landing grounds and then covering each route as a service exercise before handing it over. The flights across wide tracts of uncivilised and strange country, often under conditions of extreme heat and discomfort, demanded qualities of resource and endurance, and there is little doubt that such arduous and adventurous operations furnished the best possible experience and training to be found in peacetime. Other long-distance flights, apart from those connected with Imperial communications, were also made during the years between the wars. Records were deliberately sought since they provided opportunities for testing aircraft and maintaining a high standard of aviation. The Schneider Trophy was won outright, Everest was conquered from the air, while speed and height records were also established by Royal Air Force pilots.

But the force, as a whole, remained lamentably weak. Although in 1923 it had been decided that Britain should not be left in a condition of inferiority in air strength to any country within bombing range, this principle was never applied. In fact, never in all the years from 1923 to 1939 was Britain other than in a position of inferiority in the air to some power within striking distance of her shores. So slowly did expansion proceed that when the ill-fated Disarmament Conference opened in 1932 Britain was a fifth-rate air power. The two sterile years that followed, during which the debate dragged on and Britain's rearmament was halted, were indeed ‘years that the locusts ate’.

‘The years that the locust hath eaten’ (Joel, ii, 25). Sir Thomas Inskip used this phrase to describe the period 1931–35.—Quoted in Churchill, The Second World War (Cassell), Vol. I, page 52.

In October 1933 the Germans had walked out of the conference, and from that moment the expansion of the Luftwaffe proceeded apace, for in spite of the Treaty of Versailles Germany had begun to create an air force even before Hitler came to power. By March 1935 Hitler felt sufficiently secure to proclaim to the world the rebirth of the German Air Force and to appoint Goering as its Commander-in-Chief, a post which that flamboyant personality retained throughout the war.

Goering had commanded a squadron in Richthofen's Fighter Geschwader (Wing) in the war of 1914–18; he had met Hitler in Munich in 1922 and then became the first leader of the Nazi Storm Troops, playing a prominent part as such in Hitler's abortive Putsch of 1923. When in 1933 Hitler came to power he thus saw in Goering his perfect collaborator and a man with enough of the glory of the old Richthofen days to appeal to the popular imagination. Hitler therefore showered appointments on him, giving him four posts in the Government—amongst which was one of Special Commissioner for Aviation. In April 1933, when the Commissariat became the Air Ministry, Goering found himself as Air Minister.

With the failure of the Disarmament Conference and the shipwreck of all the hopes founded upon it, Britain reluctantly renewed the expansion of her armed forces and, in particular, of the Royal Air Force. But while this expansion proceeded somewhat slowly at first, its progress was guided by sound principles. Britain might possibly have overtaken Germany's lead had she been prepared to sacrifice quality to quantity, and the temptation to do so was very strong in those days. But wise decisions were taken which were to create a force superior in quality to that of Germany —first to build a defence capable of inflicting crippling losses on the enemy's air force should it cross the British coast, and second, to create a striking force with a hitting power at least as great as Germany's. Although only the first of these objectives was barely attained by the time the first serious encounters came, by taking the longer view and planning the production of the four-engined bomber, Britain was eventually able to achieve the second objective. If in the pre-war years one race was lost, another was won, and the RAF secured a lead in technical efficiency which it retained, with few exceptions, throughout the conflict. This was particularly true in the field of radar where the work of Sir Robert Watson-Watt and his team, begun in 1935, was to prove of the greatest value. Further, the decision to introduce the eight-gun Hurricane and Spitfire fighters, with all the attendant delays in design and production involved, was a courageous one. The British Commonwealth owes a great debt not only to the designers of these aircraft, Sidney Camm and the late R. J. Mitchell respectively, but also to those who, in their foresight, strenuously advocated this powerful armament. But it was not only in machines that Britain sought quality rather than quantity. The same principle was also applied in the selection and training of the men to fly and maintain them. In fact, the rigorous and thorough system of selection and training developed by the RAF was to prove our salvation in the grim struggle that lay ahead.

An important feature of the expansion which took place during the late thirties was the large programme of aerodrome and factory construction. In eastern England there began the building of the chain of air bases from which the four-engined bombers were later to batter the German Reich, while in other areas the construction of new airfields for fighter and reconnaissance squadrons was commenced. Names later familiar to New Zealand airmen now began to appear in the lists of the new stations under construction. At the same time the industrial centres of Britain began the changeover from peace to war, with all the complicated planning and readjustment this involved.

By 1938, however, although these measures for the expansion of the Royal Air Force were steadily gaining momentum, its equipment was still very much in the transitional stage, with obsolescent types of aircraft predominating and replacements not yet available in any quantity. The Munich crisis, which came in September of that year, was both a lucky escape and an incentive to further effort. Nevertheless, even after a further year of respite and accelerated progress with the various expansion schemes, the strength of the Royal Air Force was still inadequate for the tasks which faced it.

Fighter Command

The three operational commands, Bomber, Fighter and Coastal, had been created in 1936, when the former ‘Air Defence of Great Britain’ was abolished. A training command was established at the same time; it was subsequently subdivided into two commands for flying training and technical training. In 1938 three further commands were established—Maintenance, Balloon and Reserve.

was probably in the strongest position with sixteen squadrons of Hurricanes and ten of Spitfires, supported by eight Blenheim, four Gladiator and two Lysander squadrons. But it had virtually no reserves of fighter pilots. Furthermore Spitfires and Hurricanes were being produced only at the rate of two a day. A system for the control of fighter aircraft in the air was being developed, under which the whole of Britain would eventually be divided into groups and these in turn into sectors. This organisation was closely linked with the ground defence and the air-raid warning systems. Its efficiency, however, depended on accurate and timely information regarding the movements of hostile aircraft being passed by the Observer Corps and radiolocation posts to Group and Command headquarters. But the chain of radiolocation stations was far from complete and communications not fully developed, while sectors were short of equipment and satellite landing grounds inadequate.

At the end of August 1939, the fighter squadrons were deployed in three main operational groups covering roughly south-eastern, southern, and eastern England respectively. The first of these, No. 11 Group, was primarily responsible for the defence of London, while the others, Nos. 10 and 12 Groups, covered the vital areas of Southampton and the Tyne. However this left large regions unprotected, and it was not until late in 1940 that fighter cover could be provided over most of the British Isles. Meanwhile Fighter Command had the additional tasks of protecting East Coast convoys and the naval base at Scapa; it was also committed to provide support for the British Army in France.

Bomber Command possessed some thirty-five squadrons but many of them were not yet fully trained for operations. Furthermore ten of these squadrons were equipped with obsolescent Battles and a further ten with Blenheims. Only five had Wellingtons, and the rest of the force was made up of Whitley and Hampden squadrons in approximately equal numbers. None of the characteristic four-engined bombers which were to play so great a part in the strategic air offensive were yet available. In fact, the production of Stirlings and Halifaxes did not begin in earnest until the early months of 1939 while the Lancaster was, as yet, unknown.

Thus during the early period of the war the term ‘heavy bomber’ was used to describe Wellington, Whitley, and Hampden aircraft. Later, with the introduction of four-engined bombers, the former aircraft were classified as ‘medium bombers’.

The bomber force was divided into six operational groups, located along the eastern side of England in areas designed to suit the range of their aircraft and the purpose for which they were to be used. Each group had training squadrons to the west of it. On 2 September 1939 however, No. 1 Group, the largest, comprising approximately 160 aircraft, was transferred to France, leaving only just over 350 aircraft available for operations from bases in the United Kingdom. But even this small force could not be maintained at a high rate of serviceability, while the size and surface of many of its airfields were not suitable for the aircraft they had to accom- modate. In fact, during the first winter of the war, many of the grass aerodromes could not be used at all for considerable periods. Altogether throughout the first two years of its operations, problems of supply, both of aircraft and aerodromes and their equipment, and of men to service and maintain them, were seriously to affect the efficiency of Bomber Command.

In August 1939 Coastal Command, with an operational strength of fewer than 180 aircraft, was in an even less enviable position since it was called upon to operate with maximum intensity from the outbreak of hostilities. Its aircraft were distributed among 16 squadrons organised in three groups on a geographical basis. Their headquarters were situated, along with those of the Royal Navy, in Area Combined Headquarters at Plymouth, Chatham and Rosyth.

Later, in October 1940, when the U-boat threat in the Western Approaches began to assume serious proportions, a fourth Area Combined Headquarters was established at Liverpool. This system of operational control, fixed in 1938, provided a working arrangement for the co-ordination of the air effort of Coastal Command with that of the Royal Navy. Liaison officers were stationed at the Admiralty and at Coastal Command Headquarters in London, while at the Area Combined Headquarters the local naval staffs shared an operations room with the air staffs of the Coastal Command Group. Once initial difficulties had been overcome, this organisation worked well and contributed largely to the successful conduct of operations in the Battle of the Atlantic.

The main strength of the Command lay in its nine squadrons of Ansons, versatile and reliable aircraft, but limited in range and performance. Only one squadron had new American-built Hudsons, and only one squadron, equipped with the Vildebeeste—an aircraft which rather belied its name—could carry torpedoes. Furthermore the flying boat situation was serious since only two squadrons had Sunderlands, the remainder being equipped with an assortment of seaplanes of indifferent performance. The role assigned to the Command in the event of war was a strenuous one and this meagre collection of aircraft was scarcely equal to the many tasks entrusted to it.

In the final war plans Coastal Command had been given the following tasks: (a)

Assistance to the Home Fleet in the detection and prevention of enemy vessels escaping from the North Sea to the Atlantic.

(b)

Provision of anti-submarine patrols.

(c)

Air searches over home waters to afford reconnaissance for the Home Fleet.

(d)

Provision of an air striking force for attacks on enemy warships.

In fact it soon became necessary to enlist the aid of training aircraft and, during the autumn months of 1939, when the enemy's submarine campaign began to cause considerable alarm, ‘scarecrow’ patrols were flown by Tiger Moths. These training aircraft were quite unarmed and carried no bombs. On sighting an enemy submarine they carried out a mock attack, hoping thereby to force the vessel to submerge and so restrict its activities.

Altogether, on the outbreak of war, the Royal Air Force numbered in its first-line strength barely 1800 aircraft, including 400 overseas, and many of these were obsolescent types. The German Luftwaffe, on the other hand, possessed some 4160 machines, almost all of modern design with speeds and performance at least equal to similar types in Britain.

Details of the principal British and German operational aircraft are given in Appendix IV.

Its main strength lay in bomber aircraft specially designed for close support of ground forces, together with a large number of transport planes which were to be employed for the same purpose. The Germans also had a considerable force of fighter aircraft, but these too were mainly designed to provide protection for bomber formations in short-range operations ahead of the ground forces. In fact, long-range aircraft were not developed by the Germans to any extent because of their avowed intention of winning the war by a series of lightning strokes carried out by their air and ground forces working in close collaboration. However, judged by the standards of that time, the German Air Force was a powerful and efficient weapon. In the immediate pre-war years it had found opportunities to test the performance of its aircraft and to discover and remedy defects. The extensive Lufthansa service,

The Deutsche Lufthansa was a heavily government-subsidised company which controlled all German airlines with the exception of one operating to Russia. It was formed in 1926, and although its aircraft were ‘civilian’, they were designed with a view to rapid conversion for military purposes.

army manoeuvres, air displays and international competitions all served this purpose well. Finally, the Spanish Civil War gave the Luftwaffe the chance of testing its new machines under actual war conditions, when useful experience was gained and valuable lessons learned. Their application was to follow swiftly in the overwhelming of a large part of Europe after a few months of the war.

The Royal Air Force, on the other hand, was only at the beginning of its expansion and lacked much of this experience. Nevertheless it was splendidly trained and designed for operational employment in accordance with a sound strategic doctrine. In 1940 it was just strong enough to hold the fort against the Luftwaffe and then, in the following years, to push it back and keep it back from the heart of the Empire's war effort. Eventually, gathering strength and stretching its wings over land and sea in company with powerful allies, it made possible those naval and military operations which brought about the complete collapse of the enemy.

The men who served with the Royal Air Force came from every corner of the world. They were the pick of their nations' young manhood—a gallant company who made courage and devotion the rule rather than the exception. While life in the air service had it trials and was commonly short, few would have changed their lot. The wide fields of the air were their battleground where speed and movement gave exhilaration and a sense of high adventure. Yet their work involved oft-repeated periods of intense strain when every moment might bring some fresh trial of quickness of brain or steadiness of nerve. And if to the onlooker they often appeared casual, it should be remembered that this was but a cloak to hide their true feelings—a protective shell which fortified an inward resolution. These men who fought in the air overcame more than their enemies. They and those who worked for them on the ground grappled successfully with many technical problems

EUROPEColour map of Europe and perfected a vast array of scientific devices which had a decisive influence on the war in the air. By their valour and steadfast devotion to duty they added lustre to the tradition of their service— a tradition which had been fashioned and welded in the First World War and in the years between. This they did in the storm of anti-aircraft fire, in the flash of combat and in long flight over the desert, the tropic jungle, and the lonely wastes of the sea.

* * * * *

Airmen from the Dominion of New Zealand were associated with the Royal Air Force from its inception in 1918. Even before that time New Zealanders were flying with the squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, sharing their hardships and difficulties in flying comparatively primitive machines. During the First World War 500 New Zealanders saw service in one or other of these units. On the cessation of hostilities in November 1918, the majority of these men returned to their own country, but a few remained in England to continue service with the Royal Air Force and several achieved further distinction before the Second World War began. In this respect the careers of Carr, Coningham and Park are of particular interest.

Air Marshal Sir Roderick Carr

Air Marshal Sir Roderick Carr, KBE, CB, DFC, AFC, Orders of St. Stanislas and St. Anne (Rus), Croix de Guerre (Fr); RAF (retd); England; born NZ 31 Aug 1891; 1 NZEF, 1914; transferred RNAS 1915 and RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1926; served in France, 1939–40, with Advanced Air Striking Force; AOC Northern Ireland, 1940–41; AOC No. 4 Group, Bomber Command, 1941–44; DCAS, Supreme HQ, Allied Expeditionary Force, 1945; AOC Base Air Forces, SE Asia, 1945; AOC-in-C, India, 1946.

had left New Zealand in 1914 as a trooper with 6 Squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles. But he was keen to fly and a year later joined the Royal Naval Air Service, with which he saw three years of active operations over France. Then he transferred to the Royal Air Force and in 1919 went with a squadron to Russia, winning the Distinguished Flying Cross for his services there. In 1921, he joined Shackleton's last expedition to the Antarctic as pilot of the plane carried by the Quest. On his return to England he rejoined the RAF and for the next few years served with various units in the United Kingdom. In May 1927 Carr set a world record for the longest non-stop flight by flying a Hawker Horsley service biplane from Cranwell in Lincolnshire to the Persian Gulf—a distance of 3400 miles—in just under 35 hours. After commanding a bomber squadron in England for a short period, he went to the Middle East until 1934, then returned to serve as Senior Air Officer in HMS Eagle, one of the first aircraft carriers. Command of a Flying Training School in England followed until war began, when he was sent to France in charge of a section of the Advanced Air Striking Force. He was later appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 4 Group, Bomber Command, a post he was to hold for the greater part of the war.

Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham,

Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, DFC, AFC, Legion of Honour (Fr), Distinguished Service Medal (US), Order of Leopold (Bel), Croix de Guerre with Palm (Bel); born Brisbane, 19 Jan 1895; 1 NZEF, 1914–16; entered RFC 1916; permanent commission RAF 1919; AOC No. 4 Group, Bomber Command, 1939–41; AOC Western Desert, 1941–43; AOC 1st TAF, North Africa, Sicily, Italy, 1943–44; AOC-in-C 2nd TAF, invasion of NW Europe and Germany, 1944–45; lost when air liner crashed during Atlantic crossing, Jan 1948.

although born in Brisbane, was educated in Wellington and wished to be known as a New Zealander. He was, in fact, very proud of his nickname ‘Maori’ which somehow became corrupted to ‘Mary’. Two days after the outbreak of war in 1914, Coningham enlisted in the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, but after service in the Middle East was invalided home in 1916 with typhoid. On regaining his health he travelled to England at his own expense and within a week of his arrival had entered the Royal Flying Corps. Following a short period of training he joined a squadron in France, and before being wounded in July 1917 had gained the Military Cross and the Distinguished Service Order for his exploits as a fighter pilot. On his recovery Coningham returned to France as a squadron commander and won the Distinguished Flying Cross. In 1919 he was appointed to a permanent commission in the RAF, and after serving for four years on home establishments, went to Iraq to command a squadron engaged in restoring and maintaining order in this newly mandated territory. Later, while on staff duties in Egypt, he blazed the trail for the ferry route across Africa which was afterwards used for supplying aircraft to the Middle East and India. This was in October 1925 when, in command of a flight of three De Havillands, Coningham made the double journey from Cairo to Kano, in Nigeria. He was awarded the Air Force Cross in the following year and returned to England to serve at the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, and the Central Flying School before being posted to Khartoum in 1932. Three years later he was back in England at Coastal Area Head- quarters, and was one of the first staff officers in Coastal Command on its formation in 1936. A few months before the Second World War began Coningham was appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 4 Group, Bomber Command. He was later to return to the Middle East and play an outstanding part in the conduct of air operations in that theatre; subsequently he was to command the Second Tactical Air Force in Europe.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park

Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith R. Park, GCB, KBE, MC and bar, DFC, Croix de Guerre (Fr), Legion of Merit (US); RAF (retd); Auckland; born Thames, 15 Jun 1892; in First World War served Egypt, Gallipoli and France with NZ Field Artillery, 1914–15, and Royal Field Artillery, 1915–16; seconded RFC 1917; permanent commission RAF 1919; SASO, HQ Fighter Command, 1938–40; commanded No. 11 Fighter Group during Battle of Britain; AOC No. 23 Training Group, 1941; AOC RAF Egypt, 1942; AOC RAF Malta, 1942–43; AOC-in-C Middle East, 1944–45; Allied Air C-in-C SE Asia, 1945–46.

showed a taste for adventure early in life by going to sea in one of the vessels of the Union Steamship Company. Then, early in August 1914, he enlisted in the New Zealand Field Artillery and saw active service as a bombardier in Egypt. He also took part in the original landing at Gallipoli and remained on the Peninsula until the final evacuation. He then served for some time in France, through the first Battle of the Somme, until he was wounded a second time, invalided to England, and declared fit for home service only. Undaunted, Park joined the Royal Flying Corps and returned as a fighter pilot to France, where deeds of outstanding gallantry during 1917 won him the Military Cross and bar. He had ‘accounted for nine enemy aircraft, three of which were completely destroyed and six driven down out of control’. Sir Keith was himself shot down twice, once by anti-aircraft fire and once in combat, but he continued flying and the last months of the war saw him commanding the squadron in which he had already served both as a pilot and as flight com- mander. By this time his battle honours had been increased by the awards of the Distinguished Flying Cross and the French Croix de Guerre. He had also been mentioned in despatches. In the years which followed he saw service in Iraq and Egypt, returning to England in 1926 to command first a fighter squadron and then the fighter station at Northolt, during which time he organised the flying programmes for the air pageants at Hendon in 1929 and 1930. Shortly afterwards he became Commanding Officer of the Oxford University Air Squadron for two years and received the unusual distinction of the honorary degree of Master of Arts for his services. After a term as Air Attaché at Buenos Aires Park returned to England, and the outbreak of the Second World War found him serving as Chief of Staff to Lord Dowding,

Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding, GCB, GCVO, CMG; RAF (retd); England; born Moffat, Dumfries, 24 Apr 1882; joined Royal Artillery 1898; RFC 1914; seconded RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1919; AOC-in-C Fighter Command, 1936–40; on special duty (under Minister of Aircraft Production) in USA, 1940–41; Principal Air ADC to HM the King, 1937–43; retired Jul 1942.

who was AOC-in-C Fighter Command. Then began a second period of distinguished war service, the highlights of which were to be his command of No. 11 Fighter Group during the Battle of Britain, and his brilliant conduct of air operations from Malta during 1942.

Among other New Zealanders who remained with the Royal Air Force between the wars were Air Vice-Marshals MacLean,

Air Vice-Marshal C. T. MacLean, CB, DSO, MC, Legion of Honour (Fr); England; born Greymouth, 18 Oct 1886; served with Royal Fusiliers, 1914–15; seconded RFC 1915; permanent commission RAF 1919; AOC No. 2 Bomber Group, 1938–40; AOC No. 23 Training Group, 1940; retired Dec 1940.

Maynard,

Air Vice-Marshal F. H. M. Maynard, CB, AFC, Legion of Merit (US); England; born Waiuku, 1 May 1893; served with RN Divisional Engineers, 1914–15; transferred RNAS 1915; RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1919; AOC RAF, Mediterranean, 1940–41; Air Officer in Charge of Administration, Coastal Command, 1941–44; AOC No. 19 Group, Coastal Command, 1944–45.

and Russell.

Air Vice-Marshal H. B. Russell, CB, DFC, AFC; RAF; born Hastings, 6 May 1895; commissioned Royal Field Artillery, 1914; seconded RFC 1915 and RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1919; SASO, No. 21 Training Group, 1939–40; SASO, No. 2 RAF Component, France, 1940; served with Fighter Command, 1940–41; AOC No. 215 Group, Middle East, 1942–43; AOC No. 70 Group, United Kingdom, 1943–45; Air Officer i/c Administration HQ FTC, 1946–49.

MacLean, after distinguished service with the Royal Fusiliers and the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War, which included command of a wing in France, served with the RAF in India and then in the Middle East, where he was in charge of air bases in Iraq, Egypt, and at Aden. Shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War he was appointed AOC No. 2 Group, Bomber Command. Maynard, who had begun his flying career in 1915 with the Royal Naval Air Service, flew with units in Britain, in the Middle East and Iraq before returning to command the University of London Air Squadron in 1935. In January 1940 he was appointed from Air Ministry to Malta, where as Air Officer Commanding he achieved notable success in organising the air defence of the island in the initial stages, when few people had any faith that Malta could hold out against sustained attack. Russell had joined the Royal Flying Corps in 1915 and won distinction in France before being taken prisoner in the following year. Between the wars he served in the United Kingdom and in Iraq, and then commanded the squadron stationed at Aden. Subsequently he served with Fighter Command in Britain and as Air Officer Commanding a group in the Middle East.

Such men were the pioneers of the Dominion's contribution to the work of the Royal Air Force, a contribution which was to grow in strength during the years between the wars until, by 1939, there were several hundred New Zealanders serving among its units. Aviation in New Zealand had developed slowly and because of this, from the early twenties, individuals and small groups of young men who were eager to fly had begun to make their way to England to join the RAF. Some paid their passages, others worked their way as deck hands, as stewards, as ships' writers and even in the stokehold. On their arrival in England many were accepted for service immediately but others, for various reasons, had to wait months before they could satisfy the high standard required. Very few accepted the first or even a second refusal. Rather than return to New Zealand they took odd jobs or eked out their savings until they could appear successfully before a selection board. Several who eventually found they could not be accepted as aircrew joined for training in ground duties. One youth who had made his own way to England at the age of 17, worked as a labourer on a farm and then as a handyman in a London hotel while pressing his application for entry into the RAF. He subsequently became an outstanding bomber pilot and navigator, winning the Distinguished Service Order as well as the Distinguished Flying Cross and bar.

During the years which followed many of these men served in remote parts of the world where air power, because of its mobility, was proving invaluable in keeping the peace. In Egypt, Palestine, Iraq and in the Aden Protectorate, they became painfully familiar with scorching heat and blinding sandstorms as they successfully carried out the policy of ‘control without occupation’, which was economical in both manpower and equipment. This was particularly the case on the north-west frontier of India, where the warlike tribes who inhabited the wildest of country had always been difficult to control.

One of those who served in this region was Air Vice-Marshal McKee.

Air Vice-Marshal A. McKee, CB, CBE, DSO, DFC, AFC; RAF; born Oxford, Canterbury, 10 Jan 1902; joined RAF 1926; permanent commission 1936; commanded No. 9 Sqdn 1940; Wing Commander, Training, No. 3 Bomber Group, 1941; commanded RAF Station, Marham, 1941–42; RAF Station, Downham Market, 1942–43; Base Commander, Mildenhall, 1943–45; AOC No. 205 Group, Italy, 1945; SASO HQ Mediterranean and Middle East, 1946–47; Commandant RAF Flying College, Manby, 1949–51; AOC No. 21 Group, Flying Training Command, 1951–.

He had joined the Royal Air Force in 1926 and, after training in Egypt, spent five years in India with his squadron, mainly on the North-West Frontier during the time of the Afghanistan rebellion and the Waziristan rising. Afterwards he flew as a test pilot in Lahore and finally as commander of a communications flight at Delhi, before returning to England as an instructor. After being mentioned in despatches in 1931, McKee was awarded the Air Force Cross in 1939 for his services during this period. Air Commodores Barnett

Air Commodore D. H. F. Barnett, CBE, DFC; RAF; born Dunedin, 11 Feb 1906; Cambridge University Air Squadron 1926–29; permanent commission RAF 1929; commanded No. 40 Sqdn 1940; RAF Station, Swanton Morley, 1942–43; Air Staff Strategic Bombing duties, Bomber Command, 1944; SASO (Org), Bomber Command, 1945; commanded Air HQ, Mauripur, India, 1947; Director of Operations, Air Ministry, 1949–.

and McGregor

Air Commodore H. D. McGregor, CBE, DSO, Legion of Merit (US); RAF; born Wairoa, 15 Feb 1910; joined RAF 1928; permanent commission 1932; commanded Nos. 33 and 213 Squadrons, 1939–40; RAF Station, Ballyhalbert, 1941; RAF Station, Tangmere, 1942–43; Group Captain, Operations, Mediterranean Air Command, 1943–44; Allied Deputy Director of Operations, Intelligence Plans, North Africa and Italy, 1944; AOC Levant, 1945–46; Planning Staff, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Washington, 1949–50; AOC 2nd Tactical Air Force, Germany.

were among those who served in the Middle East. Barnett, who had joined the Cambridge University Air Squadron in 1926 and been granted a permanent commission in the Royal Air Force three years later, commanded a bomber squadron at Shaibah in Iraq. During the disturbances in Palestine in the late thirties McGregor led the only fighter squadron there at the time. It was equipped with Gladiators, and small detachments stationed at strategic points had the difficult task of assisting the ground forces to round up the armed bands of tribesmen who were roaming the countryside destroying property and communications. As these marauders left their villages on the approach of army units, it was only the unexpected arrival of aircraft, usually at dawn, that enabled them to be trapped. Messages would be dropped to the encircled village or area telling the inhabitants that they would be unharmed so long as they did not try to get out of the ring before the ground forces arrived to search and investigate. So successful were these tactics that order was completely restored in Palestine by the middle of 1939. For his fine leadership in these operations, McGregor was awarded the DSO.

Somewhat different were the experiences of Wing Commander A. H. Marsack,

Wing Commander A. H. Marsack, MBE; born Parnell, Auckland, 6 Oct 1906; joined RAF 1930; permanent commission 1936; Special Intelligence, Middle East, 1939–44.

who was employed as an Intelligence officer in the Aden Protectorate during the late thirties. In the course of his duties he was often called upon to investigate incidents with the local tribal chiefs, but by exercising initiative and tact he was usually successful in bringing about a peaceful solution to the difficult problems that arose. On one occasion, however, when a certain tribe defied government orders, he organised air action and, after being under fire from the rebels for two days, eventually effected the occupation of their village with a small band of irregulars. He was awarded the MBE in June 1938, and a few months later was mentioned in despatches for further work in this region. His brother, Group Captain D. H. Marsack,

Group Captain D. H. Marsack; born Parnell, Auckland, 26 Feb 1909; joined RAF 1930; permanent commission 1936; Intell and Admin duties, Middle East, 1939–45.

who was engaged on similar duties in Palestine about the same time, was mentioned in despatches in 1937. Both continued to do valuable work as Intelligence officers in the Middle East in the years which followed.

Others who saw early service with the Royal Air Force returned to New Zealand to assist in the building up of the Dominion's own air force. Air Commodore Findlay,

Air Commodore J. L. Findlay, CBE, MC, Legion of Honour (Fr), Legion of Merit (US); RNZAF; born Wellington, 6 Oct 1895; served East Surrey Regiment, 1914–16; served in RFC and RAF; joined NZ Air Force, 1923; commanded No. 48 Sqdn, 1938–40; RAF Station, Hooton Park, 1940–41; SASO, Air Department, 1941; AOC Central Group, 1942–43; Head of NZ Joint Staff Mission, Washington, 1943–.

who had flown with the Royal Flying Corps and then with the Royal Air Force, and Air Commodore Wallingford,

Air Commodore S. Wallingford, CB, CBE, Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Hythe, Kent, 12 Jul 1898; served Rifle Brigade and RAF 1916–20; NZ Air Force, 1922–24; RAF 1924–29; NZPAF 1929–36; NZ Liaison Officer, London, 1938–40; Air Force Member for Personnel, 1941–42; AOC No. 1 (Islands) Group, 1943–44; Air Force Member for Supply, 1944–46; Air Force Member for Personnel, 1948–52.

who had also been with the RAF in the First World War, were among the first officers appointed on the creation of the New Zealand Air Force. In 1938 Findlay went back to England to command a coastal squadron and in the same year Wallingford was appointed New Zealand Air Liaison Officer in London. Air Commodore Olson

Air Commodore E. G. Olson, DSO; born New Plymouth, 27 Feb 1906; joined RAF 1926; appointed RNZAF 1935; commanded No. 75 (NZ) Sqdn, 1942; commanded RAF Station, Oakington, 1942–43; AOC RNZAF HQ, London, 1944–45; died 15 May 1945.

joined the Royal Air Force in 1926, served with a squadron in Egypt and on the North-West Frontier, then returned to New Zealand to become an instructor at Wigram. Air Commodore Kay,

Air Commodore, C. E. Kay, CBE, DFC; RNZAF; London; born Auckland, 25 Jun 1902; entered RAF 1926; appointed RNZAF 1935; commanded No. 75 (NZ) Sqdn, 1940–41; Air Staff, No. 8 Bomber Group, 1942; commanded RNZAF Station, New Plymouth, 1943; Ohakea, 1943–44; Wigram, 1944–45; Air Force Member for Supply, 1947–51; AOC RNZAF HQ, London, 1951–.

who had enlisted in the Royal Air Force about the same time, specialised in meteorology and navigation and then became an instructor in New Zealand. However, before returning to the New Zealand Air Force, he flew from England to Australia in 1930, took part in the Melbourne Centenary race four years later, and afterwards flew the Tasman Sea. Subsequently both Kay and Olson were to serve with and command No. 75 New Zealand Squadron during the war. Kay, in fact, was one of the original members of the unit. This coming and going between Britain and New Zealand continued on a small scale throughout the early thirties and eventually led to the development of a regular system of interchange of officers, particularly in the technical branches.

During the period of increased technical development in Britain before the war, several New Zealanders were among those who won distinction as test pilots. Flight Lieutenant Piper,

Flight Lieutenant H. L. Piper; England; born Duvauchelle, Akaroa, 2 Apr 1899; served RAF 1927–33; test pilot Short Bros., 1934; Short and Harland Ltd., 1938–46; chief test pilot 1946–48.

who joined Short Bros. in 1934, continued in this work and subsequently became chief test pilot. By the end of the war he had flown and tested 77 different types of machines, including the Mayo composite aircraft, the original splitting tests of which were carried out in 1938. It was a unique type of flying, this business of taking into the air a machine which had never been flown before. It demanded certain rare qualities, the chances of ultimate survival were slender and, like all other test pilots, Piper had many narrow escapes. Before joining Short Bros. he had served with the Royal Air Force on a short-service commission which he obtained in 1927, and it was during this period that he made the notable flight to Australia with Kay, then a flying officer, as his co-pilot and navigator. Their machine, a Desoutter monoplane, was purchased with money obtained from the sale of Piper's farm in New Zealand. Petrol supplies had to be organised before the flight started as there was then no comfortable chain of prepared airfields. Eventually, on 9 February 1930, they set off and after many adventures, which included forced landings in the desert and on the beach near Akyab, in Burma, they reached Sydney on 3 April.

Group Captain A. E. Clouston,

Group Captain A. E. Clouston, DSO, DFC, AFC and bar; RAF; born Motueka, 7 Apr 1908; joined RAF 1930; test pilot, Experimental Section, Royal Aircraft Establishment, 1939–40; served with Directorate of Armament Development, MAP, 1940–41; commanded No. 1422 Flight, 1941–43; No. 224 Sqdn, 1943–44; RAF Station, Langham, 1944–45; BAFO Communication Wing, 1945–47; RNZAF Station, Ohakea, 1947–49; RAF Station, Leeming, 1950; Commandant Empire Test Pilots' School, 1950–.

after obtaining a short-service commission in 1930, first served as a fighter pilot, winning renown for his skill in aerobatics, which were a feature of the air displays in England at that time. Then in 1935 he accepted a post as a test pilot at Farnborough, where he carried out tests on new aircraft and the devices that were being fitted to them. He also flew aircraft in ice-forming conditions, on many occasions with his machine completely iced up. ‘He has continued to fly,’ says an official report, ‘with three to four inches of ice piled high on the front of the windscreen, with large chunks of ice coming through the engine nacelle and striking the fuselage, and has generally carried the experiments to the limits under which he could retain any sort of control over the aircraft’. By accepting the high risks involved in these test flights he furnished valuable data for the scientists, as also did his later work which led to the standardisation of the balloon cable. This involved flying into a cable in an aircraft specially fitted with a steel-netted cockpit to protect the pilot from the wire which was frequently lashed round the aircraft by the propeller. In 1936 Clouston turned his attention to long-distance flying and air races. His many exploits during the next few years included remarkable and record-breaking flights to Cape Town, Sydney, and New Zealand.

The flight to New Zealand was made in March 1938, in a De Havilland Comet, the time taken being 4 days 8 hours.

At the beginning of the war he was recalled from the Reserve to continue his work as a test pilot and was later closely connected with experimental work on the Turbinlite searchlight as an aid to the interception of enemy night raiders. His work was recognised by the award of the Air Force Cross in 1938 and a bar to this decoration in 1942. He afterwards served with distinction in Coastal Command.

Group Captain Isherwood

Group Captain H. N. G. Isherwood, DFC, AFC, Order of Lenin (USSR); born Petone, 13 Jul 1905; served with NZ Mounted Rifles, 1924–30; joined RAF 1930; permanent commission 1936; flying duties, Aeronautical and Armament Experimental Establishment, 1936–41; Sector Commander, No. 9 Fighter Group, 1941; Controller, HQ No. 9 Fighter Group, 1941; commanded No. 151 Hurricane Wing in Russia, 1941; commanded RAF Stations, Church Stanton, Valley and Woodvale, 1942–44; RAF Station, Mauripur, India, 1944–45; commanded No. 342 Wing, SE Asia, 1945; killed in aircraft accident, 24 Apr 1950.

was also engaged in the testing of new aircraft during the pre-war years. He had joined the Royal Air Force in 1930 and, after training in Egypt, served for four years on the North-West Frontier and then with a fighter squadron in Eritrea before returning to England in 1936. Early in that year he joined the staff of the experimental station at Martlesham Heath in Suffolk, where he later commanded one of the flights of the performance testing section. This section carried out the development flights of the Hurricane, Spitfire, Beaufighter and Typhoon, fighter aircraft that afterwards proved so successful in operations against the enemy. In the King's Birthday honours for 1940 Isherwood received the Air Force Cross. He was later to lead a fighter wing in Northern Russia and serve with distinction in South-East Asia.

Another New Zealander who flew as a test pilot in the early thirties was Wing Commander Moir,

Wing Commander J. F. Moir, AFC and bar; born Christchurch, 13 Aug 1902; served RAF 1926–35; recalled Sep 1939; commanded No. 8 EFTS, 1939–41; No. 10 Flying Instructors' School, 1941–45.

who had joined the RAF in 1926. Before taking up experimental flying he had served with a bomber squadron and then as an instructor at the Central Flying School. Group Captains Grindell

Group Captain G. J. Grindell, DFC, AFC and bar; born Geraldine, 20 Aug 1910; joined RAF 1932; permanent commission 1938; flying duties, No. 5 FTS, 1939–40; Air Staff, HQ Flying Training Command, 1940–42; commanded No. 487 (NZ) Sqdn, 1942–43; RAF Station, Fiskerton, 1943–44; SASO, RAF Mission to Australia and New Zealand, 1944–46.

and Gordon,

Group Captain D. McC. Gordon, OBE, AFC; born Waverley, Patea, 7 Apr 1905; joined RAF 1930; permanent commission 1936; CFI, No. 7 FTS, 1938–40; commanded an Initial Training School, Canada, 1940–41; control duties, HQ No. 18 Group, 1941–42; commanded No. 119 Sqdn, 1942–43; RAF Stations, Invergordon, Castle Archdale and Lagens, Azores, 1943–46.

both of whom entered the RAF in the early nineteen-thirties, and Wing Commander Hooper

Wing Commander W. E. Hooper, AFC; born Pihama, Waimate Plains, 17 Jul 1906; served RAF 1930–37; recalled Sep 1939; CFI, No. 8 EFTS, 1940–41; commanded No. 26 EFTS, 1941–45; No. 25 (Pilot) EFTS, 1945; killed in civil flying accident, Oct 1950.

were among those who did valuable work as flying instructors during the period of expansion before the war. Gordon had previously flown with one of the pioneer flying boat squadrons, while Grindell had served with a fighter squadron at Aden and Hooper with a bomber squadron in Iraq before being posted to instructional duties.

In the pre-war years several New Zealanders engaged in civil flying after a period of early service with the Royal Air Force. Wing Commander Stead

Wing Commander G. G. Stead, DFC; England; born Hastings, 8 Sep 1911; served RAF 1930–34; recalled RAF 1940; flying duties No. 204 Sqdn, 1940–41; CFI, No. 4 OTU, Coastal Command, 1942; on loan to RNZAF, 1942–43; seconded BOAC, 1943–45; appointed Senior Captain BOAC 1945.

started the Stockholm service for British Continental Airways while Captain Glover,

Squadron Leader H. L. M. Glover; England; born Dunedin, 2 Feb 1907; served RAF 1930–37; recalled RAF Nov 1940; released for duty with BOAC, 1942; appointed Senior Captain BOAC, 1943.

who had worked his passage to England in 1930 to serve with the RAF, later joined Imperial Airways and was one of the original pilots on the Durban and Singapore routes. Both these men rejoined the Royal Air Force in 1940 to fly Sunderlands. Stead was posted in turn to the Shetlands, Iceland, the Mediterranean and West Africa, before becoming chief instructor at the flying boat training centre in Scotland. Glover flew with a squadron in the Mediterranean and later returned to British Overseas Airways to fly on the ‘Horseshoe’ route from Durban to Calcutta, Cairo, Lagos, Mombasa and Mada- gascar. Two other pilots eventually found their way to the Pacific. Captain Burgess,

Captain J. W. Burgess; born Dunedin, 15 Aug 1908; served RAF 1931–35; chief pilot Tasman Empire Airways, 1939–43; served with BOAC as Senior Captain, 1943–51.

after serving with the Royal Air Force for five years, joined Imperial Airways and in 1937 made the Australian and New Zealand survey flight in the flying boat Centaurus. He subsequently became chief pilot for Tasman Empire Airways. Captain Craig

Captain W. J. Craig; England; born Wanganui, 25 Jun 1910; served RAF 1932–37; joined Imperial Airways 1937; later transferred BOAC; seconded Tasman Empire Airways 1939; attached RNZAF 1941; appointed Senior Captain BOAC, 1942.

was with the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom and India until he joined Imperial Airways in 1937. Subsequently he transferred to Tasman Empire Airways, and in 1941 was attached to the RNZAF to command the first New Zealand flying boat squadron in the Pacific.

During the early thirties the number of men making their own way to Britain had increased considerably until, by the end of 1935, approximately a hundred New Zealanders were serving with the Royal Air Force, most of them as pilots. Several youths had also reached Halton under an apprentice scheme, while a few fortunate ones were nominated as cadets to the RAF College at Cranwell. Then, in 1936, at the request of the British Government, a start was made with the selection in New Zealand of candidates to serve as pilots in the Royal Air Force. As soon as volunteers were accepted they went to England for training, the first group arriving in July 1937. Thereafter parties of from twelve to twenty sailed at approximately monthly intervals for the next two years, the total number sent being 241. Shortly afterwards this scheme was supplemented by another under which men were given their preliminary training as pilots in New Zealand and sent to the Royal Air Force as ‘trained cadets’.

The pilots were enlisted into the RAF under a short-service commission scheme, and the United Kingdom paid the New Zealand Government £1550 for each pilot trained in the Dominion.

Training began at Wigram in June 1937, and the first seven pilots left for England in the following April. Altogether 133 men were sent to England under this arrangement, the last of them arriving early in 1940.

By that time a much larger training scheme had commenced. In April 1939, as a result of the visit of an Air Mission from the United Kingdom, New Zealand offered, in the event of war, to train a thousand pilots each year for the Royal Air Force. In the following month, however, at the request of the United Kingdom, this proposal was modified to the provision of 650 pilots and the same number of navigators and air gunners each year. In addition the Dominion also agreed to train maintenance personnel. This plan was put into operation in September 1939, but it was soon replaced by the Empire Air Training Scheme, based on the agreement signed in Ottawa during November of that year—one of the most inspired and fruitful decisions of the war. The large majority of New Zealand airmen who served with the RAF during the Second World War were, in fact, trained under this latter scheme.

Details of the origin and development of the Empire Air Training Scheme are given in Chapter 10.

But while those who went to Britain under the pre-war arrangements were members of the Royal Air Force, those who began their training later remained members of the Royal New Zealand Air Force and during their service overseas were regarded as ‘attached’ to the RAF. For all practical purposes, however, they were also members of the Royal Air Force since they were maintained, clothed, accommodated and paid equivalent rates of pay by the British Government.

The outbreak of war found New Zealand, along with other parts of the Empire, largely unprepared for full participation in the struggle. Nevertheless in the air the Dominion was able to make an immediate contribution since, by September 1939, there were already 550 New Zealanders serving in the Royal Air Force, the largest number from any part of the Commonwealth outside the British Isles. Many were still completing their training but approximately 200 were serving with operational units in the United Kingdom, with a few others scattered among the squadrons in the Middle East, in India, and in the Far East. While most of these men were engaged in flying duties as pilots, individuals were also to be found serving in almost every section of the Royal Air Force, as administrative and medical officers, in the technical and equipment branches and in other ground duties. This ubiquity was, in fact, to be a feature of the Dominion's participation throughout the war.

From the outset New Zealand adopted a generous attitude with regard to the disposal of the men she trained and provided. Early in 1940 the Dominion Government informed Britain that ‘they wished to emphasise that the formation of New Zealand squadrons was not desired where this may affect adversely the efficiency of the Royal Air Force, nor did they wish to restrict the posting of New Zealand personnel serving with either Royal Air Force or New Zealand Squadrons'.

At the same time, in addition to a small number of men engaged in training for maintenance duties and a few officers on interchange, there was in England a group of 20 New Zealanders who had been got together to fly home the first of 30 Wellington aircraft previously ordered by the New Zealand Government. When war came these men were placed at the disposal of the Royal Air Force. Shortly afterwards they formed the nucleus of No. 75 New Zealand Squadron, the first Commonwealth squadron to be formed in Bomber Command.

Thus, in the early difficult months, the Dominion was represented in the Royal Air Force by this band of pioneers. Barely half were to survive the war. Many, in fact, were either killed or made prisoners of war during the first year of the conflict, when British airmen faced heavy odds in the air battles over Belgium and France, in the Battle of Britain, and in the early bombing raids over Germany. Those who remained continued to give of their experience and render sterling service as leaders, as commanders of various units and as specialists in many fields. The contribution they began and the comradeship they established were to provide a fine example for those who came later.

The flow of men from the Dominion was to increase rapidly as the Empire Training Scheme began to bear fruit. By the end of 1943, in spite of a heavy commitment in the Pacific, New Zealand had sent 3400 aircrew direct to Great Britain and a further 4300 mainly through Canada. While the main contribution continued to be flying personnel, a significant number of New Zealanders were also trained in the Dominion and Canada for various ground duties with the Royal Air Force, as fitters, armourers, wireless operators and radar mechanics. As the war progressed they became scattered throughout the various operational and maintenance units in Britain, the Middle East, and South-East Asia. But in a struggle where technical skill and scientific knowledge were of supreme importance in securing and maintaining air superiority, these men made a contribution which it is difficult to overestimate. Indeed without the patient and enduring effort of the ground crews, often working under conditions of extreme physical discomfort, the victories in the air would not have been won. The men who flew the machines they serviced would be the first to affirm this.

In the New Zealand contingent with the Royal Air Force there was to be a significant contribution from the Maori people, whose representatives flew in each of the principal theatres of war. Flying Officer Pohe,

Flying Officer P. P. Pohe; born Wanganui, 10 Dec 1914; farmer; joined RNZAF Sep 1940; prisoner of war 22 Sep 1943; shot after attempting to escape from Stalag Luft III, 25 Mar 1944.

who arrived in May 1941, was the first Maori pilot to reach the United Kingdom. He was posted to a bomber squadron and had the distinction of being the first of his race to bomb Germany. He also dropped parachutists in the famous raid on Bruneval. Pohe failed to return from a mission to Hanover on the night of 22 September 1943, and was taken prisoner. He took part in the famous escape from Luft III towards the end of March 1944 and was one of the fifty Allied airmen who were afterwards shot by the Germans. Among Maori fighter pilots, Flight Lieutenant Wetere

Flight Lieutenant J. H. Wetere, DFC; Wellington; born Hoe-o-Tainui, 16 Aug 1918; civil servant; joined RNZAF Nov 1940.

flew with distinction in Hurricanes and later in Typhoons. In two tours of operations he made many attacks against German airfields, military installations, transport and shipping. Warrant Officer Wipiti

Warrant Officer B. S. Wipiti, DFM; born New Plymouth, 16 Jan 1922; refrigerator serviceman; joined RNZAF Jan 1941; killed on air operations, 3 Oct 1943.

shared in the destruction of the first Japanese aircraft shot down over Singapore in December 1941. He later lost his life while flying with a New Zealand fighter squadron in Britain. In the Middle East Flight Lieutenant Bennett,

Flight Lieutenant E. T. K. Bennett; Dunedin; born Hastings, 16 Mar 1920; labourer; joined RNZAF Mar 1941.

brother of Lieutenant- Colonel C. M. Bennett, DSO, commander of the Maori Battalion in 1942–43, served in the Desert Air Force and was also prominent in ground strafing attacks over Italy.

A small group of New Zealand girls was to serve with Britain's WAAF and with the Air Transport Auxiliary. Miss Trevor Hunter, who joined the Wellington Aero Club in 1931 at the age of 16 and qualified as a pilot shortly afterwards, was with the Air Transport Auxiliary in the United Kingdom for four years, flying new aircraft from the factories to the operational units. Miss Betty Black, one of the earliest New Zealand women pilots, who flew with the Southland Aero Club, also served with the Air Transport Auxiliary for a long period.

Administration of Dominion personnel with the Royal Air Force came largely under the Air Ministry, but at the beginning of 1938 New Zealand had established a liaison office in London which, in June 1942, was expanded to an air headquarters under Air Commodore Isitt.

Air Vice-Marshal Sir Leonard Isitt, KBE, Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Christchurch, 27 Jul 1891; NZ Rifle Brigade 1915–16; RFC and RAF 1916–19; joined NZPAF 1919; DCAS, RNZAF, 1943; CAS, RNZAF, 1943–46.

This organisation, besides dealing with the more personal problems of New Zealand airmen serving in Britain, acted as a useful link between the Air Ministry in London and Air Department in Wellington. Throughout the war the New Zealand High Commissioner in London, Mr. W. J. Jordan, and his staff were keenly interested in the activities of New Zealand airmen and their welfare. Frequent visits by Mr. Jordan to units in which New Zealanders were serving did much to maintain high morale.

Altogether just under 11,000 men from the Dominion saw service with the RAF in the Second World War, and although seven squadrons were identified with New Zealand, the large majority of these airmen—over 90 per cent—became scattered throughout units in the United Kingdom and in various parts of the world. Many saw service in the Middle East, in South-East Asia, in East and West Africa, as well as in Canada and South Africa. They won many honours but they also suffered heavy casualties. No fewer than 3290 lost their lives, while a further 580 became prisoners of war. In all, their service was such that the people of the Dominion could read with justifiable pride the Air Council's message at the end of hostilities paying tribute to ‘the illustrious part which New Zealand airmen had played’ and ‘the honour they had brought to their country and to the Royal Air Force by their gallant service in all theatres of war’.

CHAPTER 2 Early Operations from Britain and France

WHEN war with Germany began on 3 September 1939, the Royal Air Force was in no position to undertake any large-scale offensive action, and for some time British policy was governed by the consideration that the less bombing there was the better. Considerable apprehension was felt about the effect of heavy air attacks on London and the fact that Bomber Command was far from being able to return blow for blow. Therefore, following President Roosevelt's appeal

Roosevelt appealed to each of these governments' to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no event, and under no circumstances undertake bombardment from the air of civilian population or unfortified cities upon the understanding that the same rules of warfare shall be scrupulously observed by all their opponents'.

to the governments of Europe, Britain quickly responded with instructions to her armed forces prohibiting bombardment of anything except ‘strictly military objectives’. Contrary to general expectation, however, the Germans had no intention of launching an immediate air assault against the British Isles. Instead, they poured out radio threats while they completed their conquest of Poland. Hitler, in fact, hoped to isolate the Polish ‘incident’ and to declare a temporary truce; early in October he actually made overtures for peace with the Western democracies. Thus, after the capitulation of Poland, there followed a period of inaction which was perplexing to many observers, and there was soon much talk of a ‘phoney war’. This epithet was, however, hardly applicable to the war at sea, which was real and continuous from the outset. Britain's increasing dependence on seaborne supplies had not escaped the notice of the German naval commanders, not all of whom subscribed to the Nazi doctrine of a short war in which victory would be achieved by the superior power of the Luftwaffe. Recalling how the German Navy had brought Britain to the verge of defeat in 1917, they saw that if the northern exits of the North Sea were forced open and eventually controlled, a fruitful campaign might then be launched against British commerce in the Atlantic.

The early months of the war were, therefore, mainly concerned with the efforts of the Royal Navy, aided by slender air forces (principally those of Coastal Command), to restrict the operations of German U-boats and prevent surface raiders and major naval units escaping into the Atlantic. Meantime British fighter pilots and many of the bomber crews chafed at their inactivity.

‘The first week of the war we were expecting to be bombed at any moment’, writes a fighter pilot. ‘But no bombers came and soon the tension gave way to a feeling of unreality. Boredom soon followed’. In Bomber Command ‘The days passed slowly. September petered away and brought the fogs of October. Flying training was often cancelled. We spent day after day in the crew room, sometimes listening to lectures. Occasionally some aircraft were wanted but they did not always go. Standing to. Standing by. Standing down. The days dragged by in the same dreary routine’.

The coastal squadrons, on the other hand, were called upon from the outset to fly long hours on reconnaissance over the North Sea or on anti-submarine patrols and as escorts to shipping.

There were, by this time, some fifty New Zealanders scattered among the units of Coastal Command, and as soon as war began they were engaged upon one or other of these duties. No. 48 Squadron, whose Ansons escorted convoys and hunted U-boats in the Channel, held particular New Zealand interest. In 1918, as a fighter reconnaissance unit, it had been commanded by Sir Keith Park, then a major. Now, at the beginning of the Second World War, there were seven New Zealand pilots on its strength and it was once again commanded by a New Zealander, Wing Commander Findlay, whose service with the air arm dated from the days of the Royal Flying Corps. On 3 September 1939 No. 48 Squadron had commenced operations from an airfield near Portsmouth and a week or so later established an advanced base at the airport on Guernsey in the Channel Islands. Subsequently the squadron's Ansons assisted in the rescue work of the SS Domala, the first ship sunk in the Channel by enemy action. They were also early in combat with the enemy although at first the Anson, with its low speed and lack of armament, proved no match for the German aircraft encountered. However, after two machines had been lost because of these disadvantages, the squadron improvised two Lewis gun mountings in the cabin, with the guns firing through the windows to cover the blind spots on either side. One of the original members of the unit records that ‘the crew of the first aircraft so fitted collected an unsuspecting Hun’. This was typical of the expedients adopted by RAF crews in the early days to overcome the difficulties under which they operated.

The Avro Anson, originally a civil transport machine, was the mainstay of Coastal Command in the initial stages and most of the reconnaissance patrols, designed to prevent the escape of German raiders from the North Sea, were also flown by these aircraft. From bases on the east coast of Scotland a continuous line patrol was directed towards Norway, supplemented by searches at dawn and dusk to the north and south of this line. New Zealanders shared in these duties from the outset. On the third day of the war one of them, Pilot Officer Edwards,

Squadron Leader L. H. Edwards; RNZAF; Wellington; born New Plymouth, 22 Jun 1913; joined RAF May 1939; transferred RNZAF May 1944; p.w. 5 Sep 1939.

was attacked by an enemy seaplane over the North Sea. His guns failed; the machine caught fire and crashed on the sea. The enemy pilot, keen to have confirmation of his victory, landed and picked Edwards up and he became the first British officer to be made prisoner of war. But the early air patrols were, on the whole, monotonous and unexciting, and as autumn deepened into winter the conditions under which the aircrew operated were often extremely arduous. Apart from having to fly in the stormy weather prevalent around the coasts of Britain at the close of the year, some of the squadrons were based at airfields that were either improvised or still under construction. Many were sited in bleak and remote spots where the wind seemed perpetual and mud universal. Indeed, in almost every respect the early months of the air war at sea were a period of difficulties and trial during which experience in the technical side of air-sea warfare had to be painfully accumulated. Special radar equipment for the detection of enemy vessels was slow in appearing and both weapons and aircraft often proved disappointing in performance. In particular, the anti-submarine bombs carried were too few and two small to inflict serious damage.

The majority of aircraft carried only 100-pound bombs which were not lethal even if a direct hit was obtained while the U-boat was still on the surface. A British submarine which sustained a direct hit at the base of the conning tower from one of these bombs suffered no damage to its pressure hull. The 250-pound bomb carried by the flying boats was not much better as it had to detonate within six feet of the hull before inflicting serious harm. Owing to a rather uncertain fuse the minimum height of release was 600 feet to avoid damage to the aircraft, with the result that accuracy was a matter of luck. The only bomb-sight available required a steady run up to the target at an altitude in excess of 3000 feet, so was quite useless against such an elusive and momentary target as a quick-diving submarine. Furthermore, except in the Hudsons, there was no efficient distributor whereby a properly spaced stick of bombs could be dropped, which meant that they fell singly or in a ragged salvo. On most occasions the U-boat lookouts were able to give warning of the aircraft's approach so that their vessel was already beneath the surface before bombs could be released.

Fortunately the Germans started the war with a comparatively small fleet of U-boats, some fifty in number, of which only half were of the ocean-going type. Mechanical defects and the distance they had to travel from their German bases, made even longer by the harassing from the air, rendered their operations against shipping during the first six months of the war more of an irritant than a real menace.

The total tonnage lost by U-boat action between September 1939 and the end of March 1940 amounted to 350,000 tons compared with 700,000 tons during the single deadly month of November 1942, when the Battle of the Atlantic was at its height. The outstanding achievement of the U-boat command during the first months of the war took place in the early hours of 14 October 1939, when a German U-boat, braving tides and currents, penetrated the defences of Scapa Flow and sank the battleship Royal Oak at anchor.

Concentration for the Norwegian campaign produced a deceptive lull in their activities, and it was not until the second half of 1940 that intensified operations by both German U-boats and aircraft in the Western Approaches seriously threatened Britain's supply lines.

Thus, in the early months of the war the main interest was in northern waters. Here the maintenance of the regular reconnaissance patrols made heavy demands on both men and machines, yet in spite of difficulties experienced in keeping aircraft serviceable there were few days on which searches were not flown. Unfortu- nately, however, the northern patrols failed to achieve their object, for during the closing months of 1939 U-boats, armed merchant raiders, and German warships succeeded in passing through the North Sea into the Atlantic. The battleship Admiral Graf Spee had slipped through at the end of August and caused considerable anxiety until brought to an ignominious end at Montevideo four months later by British forces which included HMS Achilles of the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy. The failure to prevent such break-outs was largely due to the fact that the reconnaissance patrols, owing to the limited range of the Anson, were weakest at the very place where they needed to be strongest, that is, immediately off the south-western coast of Norway. A second reason was that the enemy's attempts to break out of the North Sea were made under cover of bad weather in poor visibility. The failure to locate the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in November 1939 may be attributed almost wholly to the latter cause.

Strong enemy opposition in the air over the North Sea also made it very difficult to maintain effective reconnaissance since at this time the Royal Air Force possessed no long-range fighter aircraft. The Anson, though reliable, had only light defensive armament, while the Hudson, which came into use in October, was also insufficiently armed. In air combat it lacked manoeuvrability and was regarded by some as difficult to handle. The inevitable result was that many air combats over the North Sea during the first months were indecisive. But there were a few successful engage- ments. On 1 January 1940 Pilot Officer Carey,

Pilot Officer G. W. F. Carey, DFC; born Christchurch, 25 Apr 1916; joined RAF Mar 1939; killed on air operations, 14 Jul 1940.

whilst on patrol over the North Sea in a Hudson of No. 220 Squadron, encountered two Heinkels. He immediately attacked one of them. The first shots registered hits and the enemy aircraft crashed into the sea. Carey then turned his attention to the second Heinkel and, after exhausting his front-gun ammunition, manoeuvred so as to enable his rear gunner to fire on the enemy, but before the results of this engagement could be observed the German machine entered cloud and was lost. Unfortunately, a few months later both Carey and his navigator, Pilot Officer Vartan,

Pilot Officer P. K. Vartan; born Dannevirke, 18 Jun 1918; joined RAF Oct 1938; killed on air operations, 14 Jul 1940.

were lost when their aircraft flew into the Newcastle balloon barrage while they were returning from patrol in thick weather.

In addition to the North Sea reconnaissance patrols, the airmen with Coastal Command engaged in various other tasks during the first winter of the war. Convoys were escorted, special searches made for suspicious or distressed vessels and protection given the fishing fleets, all of which involved long hours of tedious flying. Only occasionally were these patrols enlivened by a brush with an enemy plane or by the sighting and attack of a submerging U-boat, and even then decisive results were rare.

At the time, over-eager acceptance of inconclusive evidence of destruction led to exaggerated claims, particularly with regard to U-boats. Only one of these vessels was sunk as a result of air attack during the first six months of the war.

The arduous and monotonous nature of the work was accentuated by the unusual severity of the winter that year, with frost and snow over most of the British Isles for several months. The record book of one squadron in Scotland, with which several New Zealanders were flying, contains this entry in January 1940:

Fourteen inches of snow covered the aerodrome. An attempt was made to clear two runways with a snow plough—finally runways were made by towing grass rollers behind a lorry. These proved satisfactory while freezing conditions lasted.

Under such conditions landing and taking off, particularly at night, was a hazardous business, and location of a base on return from a long patrol frequently proved very difficult when, in addition to the snow, there was fog or mist. Casualties were not uncommon.

From October 1939 the protection of convoys and the fishing fleets—the ‘Kipper’ patrols—along the east coast of Britain was shared by the fighter squadrons. Although, at first, there were few interceptions of enemy aircraft, these patrols did provide the fighter pilots with some relief from the comparative inactivity and suspense that had been their lot since war began. Fighter Command had been organised principally to defend the British Isles from air attack, but instead of the mass raids expected there had been only a few small attacks on naval bases and warships at Rosyth and Scapa Flow. Indeed, for the first nine months, enemy activity was almost entirely confined to reconnaissance and occasional attacks on shipping in the North Sea. In the new year when the enemy raids on coastal shipping increased, several New Zealand pilots were among those who reported engagements with German aircraft. Early in February Flying Officer Carbury

Flying Officer B. J. G. Carbury, DFC and bar; born Auckland; joined RAF Sep 1937.

shared a kill with two members of his squadron, the enemy machine, a Heinkel 111, being forced down into the sea by their attacks. But most of the encounters were inconclusive. Often after pursuing his quarry through cloud a pilot would perhaps get in a burst at long range and then lose touch. On the whole, fighter operations from British bases continued to be routine. The maintenance of monotonous ‘standing patrols' over convoys and fishing vessels imposed a considerable strain on both the pilots and their aircraft, but these months spent on investigation and identification, with an occasional engagement, provided experience which was to be of great value in the hard fighting that lay ahead.

The early operations of Bomber Command were restricted both by British policy and the course of events, with the result that activity was mainly confined to training flights and reconnaissance over enemy territory by night. But some squadrons did see early action in the war at sea. Their task was to locate and attack units of the German Fleet. Unfortunately, training and equipment for such duties were in an elementary stage; moreover, the enemy warships were well defended, both by their own massed batteries of anti-aircraft guns and by squadrons of fighters. Thus while British bomber crews displayed courage and fortitude of a high order in pressing home attacks, their efforts could hardly be assured of success.

New Zealand airmen flew on several of these eventful missions. On the first day of the war Flying Officer Litchfield

Flight Lieutenant F. L. Litchfield; England; born Croydon, London, 21 Feb 1914; joined RAF 1936; transferred RNZAF Jul 1945; p.w. 6 Aug 1941.

was navigator in the leading aircraft of a small formation of Wellingtons which made a search for units of the German Fleet reported at sea in the vicinity of Heligoland. The bombers flew through thunderstorms and ice-laden clouds but in the extremely bad visibility were unable to locate a target. On the afternoon of the following day a force of 15 Blenheims and 14 Wellingtons was detailed to attack enemy warships observed by reconnaissance that morning near Wilhelmshaven and in the Schillig Roads. As well as fighter opposition, there was considerable anti-aircraft fire from both ships and shore batteries and altogether five Blenheims and two Wellingtons were lost. Two New Zealanders who took part were fortunate to survive. Squadron Leader Lamb

Squadron Leader L. S. Lamb; born Wellington, 5 Aug 1910; joined RAF 1930; killed in aircraft accident, 30 Oct 1939.

led a section of Wellingtons but, before they could attack, they were set upon by enemy fighters and two of the Wellingtons were shot down. After jettisoning his bombs, Lamb succeeded in reaching cloud cover and returned safely. Sergeant Innes-Jones

Squadron Leader M. H. S. Innes-Jones; RNZAF; Blenheim; born Wellington, 5 May 1917; joined RAF 1934; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944.

was navigator in one of a formation of five Blenheims which found and attacked the Admiral Scheer in the Schillig Roads. His was the only aircraft to pass through the withering fire from the warship and return to England. From German sources we now know that several bombs hit the Scheer but failed to explode—being fused for eleven seconds delay, they probably bounced overboard from the armoured deck.

Further searches were flown at intervals during the next weeks but it was not until 3 December that another attack was made on German warships. On that day twelve Wellingtons found and bombed two cruisers and six smaller craft off Heligoland. The bombs were dropped from 10,000 feet and this enabled the aircraft to escape without casualties. However, it also reduced the effectiveness of the attack, and the only damage inflicted was the sinking of a minesweeper through which a bomb passed without exploding. Eleven days later twelve Wellingtons were sent to search the Heligoland area. Over the North Sea the crews found themselves flying through storms, with heavy cloud down to within a few feet of the sea. Nevertheless the formation kept on course and was able to locate a German naval force at sea. As they approached their target the Wellingtons met heavy anti-aircraft fire. They were also attacked by fighters. Three bombers went down in flames while a fourth, captained by Flight Lieutenant Hetherington,

Flight Lieutenant E. J. Hetherington; born Timaru, 16 Oct 1914; joined RAF 1936; killed on air operations, 14 Dec 1939.

was heavily hit and later crashed while attempting to land at base. The air battle developed into a running fight along the German islands and continued until the bombers were well on their way back to England. One pilot reported seeing four aircraft crash into the sea in flames and records in his diary: ‘It was growing dark and these aircraft burned for some time after hitting the water. They looked like four enormous beacons and not only lit up the water but illuminated the sky as well.’ Squadron Leader McKee led the British formation this day and he was subsequently commended for ‘his leadership and accurate flying without which losses might have been heavier’. Flying with him was Corporal Knight

Flight Lieutenant C. B. G. Knight, DFM; RNZAF; Whenuapai; born Tolaga Bay, 7 Jun 1912; joined RNZAF 1937. Knight was the first member of the RNZAF to be decorated in the Second World War.

who, as chief wireless operator of the formation, succeeded in obtaining useful bearings from German stations and in passing messages to base, including sighting reports of the enemy warships. He performed this task under difficult conditions and in spite of continual distractions, not the least of which was the enemy tracer passing near him.

Aircraft from Bomber Command continued to search the North Sea, but after further heavy losses in an engagement with German fighters on 18 December 1939, when 12 out of 24 Wellingtons were shot down, orders were given for the cessation of daylight attacks and reconnaissance in force close inshore. These early bombing operations had, in fact, already demonstrated what was to be confirmed by subsequent events—that in the face of the superior German fighter force, unescorted heavy bombers with low speed and restricted firepower could not be successfully employed in daylight attacks.

Meanwhile, from the first nights of the war, Whitleys and Wellingtons of Bomber Command had been dropping propaganda leaflets over German towns. These missions had a dual purpose. It was hoped that the presence of British aircraft over many parts of the Reich would impress their own vulnerability on the German people, Goering having previously boasted that enemy aircraft would never penetrate the German defences. More important, the British crews would be able to acquire useful information and experience. They were ordered to study landmarks, the effectiveness of the German blackout, the position of searchlights and guns, activity on enemy airfields, and generally make themselves familiar with the country over which they flew. Altogether, these long flights by night over enemy territory contributed much to the later efficiency of Bomber Command, paving the way for improvement not only in high-altitude flying but also in the provision of aids to navigation, in facilities for emergency landings and escapes from damaged machines. The aircraft engaged in these early ‘leaflet raids' met little opposition from the enemy defences, possibly because the Germans felt the leaflets could do little harm and did not wish to betray gun and searchlight positions. All the same the conditions under which the bomber crews operated during the icy winter of the first year of the war were extremely severe. They frequently flew through vile weather in which wings and fuselage were so heavily coated with ice that it became difficult to maintain height. Ice would also jam the ailerons, elevators or rudders and cause the pilot temporarily to lose control. All too often the heating system would fail and men would suffer acute pain from the cold at high altitudes. Frostbite was common. On many flights the crews saw the strange light of St. Elmo's fire playing about the wing tips and propellers; sometimes the whole aircraft would be outlined in violet light, sparks would fly from one point to another, and every movement of the crew crackled in the electric air. Even the leaflets crackled and gave off sparks as they dropped through the chutes after the bundles had been cut. One pilot, on experiencing this phenomenon for the first time, declared that he found it ‘much more frightening than being shot at’. In these early days the crews also had little radio assistance and, for the most part, they had to rely upon dead-reckoning navigation.

The kind of thing that could happen on these missions is well illustrated by the experiences of Pilot Officers Gray

Flying Officer K. N. Gray, DFC, Czechoslovakian War Cross; born Christchurch, 9 Nov 1914; joined RAF 1937; killed in aircraft accident, 1 May 1940.

and Long

Flying Officer F. H. Long, DFC; born Masterton, 16 Jul 1916; joined RAF May 1939; killed on air operations, 13 Mar 1941.

one night in November 1939. Gray was the captain and Long the navigator of a Whitley detailed to drop leaflets over Cuxhaven and then reconnoitre for warships in that area and in the vicinity of Heligoland. The first part of the flight was uneventful, but just after the leaflets had been dropped the aircraft ran into a snowstorm and, as a result of ice formation, became extremely hard to control. Then, a few moments later, it was struck by lightning which tore away large portions of the fabric on both wings. Gray nevertheless determined to complete his task and turned his damaged machine towards Heligoland. But soon he found great difficulty both in climbing and maintaining airspeed, owing to the damage and the increasing weight of ice. Finally the Whitley began to lose height rapidly and it was not until it had fallen several thousand feet that Gray managed to regain some sort of control. Now quite certain that a landing in the sea was inevitable, he ordered his wireless operator to send an SOS and his navigator to prepare the dinghy for launching. However, after a further struggle with the controls, he found he could just manage to hold the aircraft in the air so requested a course to steer for home. During the long return flight across the North Sea, which had of necessity to be carried out at a low altitude, heavy rainstorms were met and the aircraft was only just controllable—any easing of the pressure required to maintain it on an even keel at once resulted in a downward plunge. But Gray, of small build and not particularly robust, displayed exceptional skill in handling his aircraft; eventually the English coast was reached and the Whitley landed at an airfield in East Anglia.

Both Gray and Long subsequently lost their lives while serving with Bomber Command. Gray was killed a few months later when his Whitley struck a hill in bad weather and was burnt out. Long failed to return from an attack against Berlin early in 1941.

New Zealand airmen were also with the bomber squadrons which, from mid-December, flew offensive patrols over enemy seaplane bases as a counter-measure to the laying of magnetic mines by these aircraft in the entrances to British ports. The patrols visited the islands of Sylt, Borkum, and Norderney and attacked seaplanes taking off and landing. They also bombed any lights that were seen, thus restricting enemy activity by causing the dousing of flare paths. These operations, which included several attacks on the bases themselves,

On 19 March 1940 the seaplane base at the island of Sylt was the target for the largest-scale bombing raid thus far launched by either side. Thirty Whitleys and 20 Hampdens were employed in the attack, which was primarily a reprisal for a raid on Scapa Flow by 15 German bombers four days previously.

caused a notable reduction in enemy minelaying from the air and gained time for the development of a reply to the German magnetic mine.

These early months of the war with Bomber Command hold special interest for the Dominion in that they saw the formation of No. 75 New Zealand Squadron, soon to take a prominent part in the first bombing raids on Germany, and with which many New Zealanders were to serve with distinction. Altogether 1370 aircrew from the Dominion were to serve with the squadron for various periods during the Second World War, and of these men 442 lost their lives whilst flying with the unit and a further 77 after leaving it. The squadron's story really begins early in 1937, when New Zealand decided to obtain 30 Wellington bomber aircraft from the United Kingdom.

This decision was one of the results of the acceptance by the New Zealand Government of a report submitted by Air Chief Marshal Sir Ralph A. Cochrane on the future policy and development of the New Zealand Air Force. He was at this time serving with the Royal Air Force as a Group Captain and was lent to New Zealand to make this report. Air Chief Marshal Cochrane was New Zealand's first Chief of Air Staff and from 1950 to 1952 Vice-Chief of Air Staff, Royal Air Force.

Shortly afterwards the preliminary arrangements were concluded, it being understood that the first six of these aircraft would be ready for transit about August 1939. At the same time a New Zealand officer, Squadron Leader Buckley,

Air Commodore M. W. Buckley, CBE, Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Seacliff, 3 Aug 1895; served in RNAS during First World War; joined NZPAF 1926; commanded NZ Flight, 1939–40; No. 75 (NZ) Sqdn, 1940; RAF Station, Feltwell, 1941; AOC Northern Group, Auckland, 1942–43; AOC No. 1 (Islands) Group, Guadalcanal, 1943–44; DCAS, RNZAF, 1944–45; AOC RNZAF HQ, London, 1946–50.

was sent to England to gain experience with this new type of aircraft. He was attached to one of the first squadrons in Bomber Command to be equipped with Wellingtons and later served as its flight commander at Marham, in Norfolk.

It was at this station, on 1 June 1939, that a New Zealand Air Force unit was established, with Buckley as its commanding officer, to form and train crews and then despatch the Wellingtons to New Zealand. Meanwhile arrangements were being made to supply men to fly the aircraft. Some were sent from New Zealand, but most of the pilots and navigators were selected from aircrew already serving with or on attachment to the Royal Air Force. During the next few weeks men began to arrive at Marham in ones and twos until, by the end of July, the unit consisted of twelve officers, all pilots, and six airmen.

They were Squadron Leaders M. W. Buckley and C. E. Kay, Flight Lieutenant C. C. Hunter, Flying Officers J. Adams, A. A. N. Breckon, J. N. Collins, A. B. Greenaway and F. J. Lucas, Pilot Officers W. H. Coleman, T. O Freeman, W. M. C. Williams and N. Williams, Sergeants W. D. Steven and T. R. Read, and Leading Aircraftsmen D. C. McGlashan, J. T. White, E. P. Williams and R. A. J. Anderson. These men were to form the first flight. They were joined in August 1939 by Squadron Leader R. J. Cohen, who was to command the second flight, and Flight Lieutenant I. G. Morrison, who was to be a member of it. Owing to the war this second flight was never formed.

With Squadron Leader Buckley doing the flying training and Squadron Leader Kay in charge of navigation, the unit was busy during this and the following months preparing for the 13,000-mile flight to New Zealand.

The advent of war, however, raised a fresh problem, for all the members of the unit were now keen to stay in Britain and take part in operations against the enemy. This was solved by the prompt action of the New Zealand Government, which waived its claim to the aircraft and placed the personnel of the unit at the disposal of the Royal Air Force, an offer that was readily accepted. It now appeared that the unit would be disbanded and its members posted to RAF squadrons, but the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, expressed a strong desire that the New Zealand Flight, as it was now known, should retain its identity and be employed as a separate unit within his command. His suggestion was forwarded to New Zealand by the Air Council, who pointed out that, apart from its direct military value, the presence of a New Zealand unit, however small, would have a stimulating effect on the peoples of Great Britain and France.

At this time a Canadian fighter squadron was being formed in England and a Royal Australian Air Force squadron was preparing to commence operations with Coastal Command.

The Government expressed willingness to co-operate but indicated that, at the moment, it would not be possible to provide the necessary flying and maintenance personnel for a full squadron without seriously delaying the expansion of the training schemes to which New Zealand was already committed. Early in December advantage was taken of the presence in London of the Hon. P. Fraser, then Deputy Prime Minister, to discuss the proposal further, when it was suggested by Air Ministry that if sufficient New Zealand personnel were not available, the full complement could be made up by men from the British Isles. Mr. Fraser confirmed the desirability of forming a New Zealand Squadron and agreed to discuss this suggestion with his colleagues and the New Zealand Air Staff on his return.

Meanwhile the members of the New Zealand Flight, somewhat restless at the uncertainty regarding the future of their unit, had begun training for an operational role. This was necessary since, until the outbreak of war, the unit was interested only in the flight to New Zealand and therefore was not proficient in armament, photography or operational flying. During the second half of September the flight had moved to RAF Station, Harwell, and then, in January 1940, to Stradishall, near Newmarket. A further move took place in the following month to Feltwell, in Norfolk, where at last the unit found a more permanent home.

During this period all kinds of technical and administrative difficulties had to be overcome. Equipment for training had to be borrowed from other units; key maintenance personnel were posted and had to be replaced. When aircraft arrived they were mere skeletons and had to be fitted with all the gear used on operations. But under Buckley's enthusiastic leadership such difficulties were overcome and the flying training continued. Gradually more air- crew, including a number of New Zealanders, were posted to the unit by the Royal Air Force, which also supplied additional maintenance personnel. Then, early in March, the New Zealand Government finally approved the formation of a New Zealand Squadron within the Royal Air Force, and shortly afterwards, on 1 April 1940, Air Ministry issued instructions that ‘No. 75 (N.Z.) Squadron should be formed round the existing New Zealand Flight at Feltwell.’ As far as possible it was to be manned by New Zealanders then serving in Britain, but for the time being ground and maintenance staff would be provided by the Royal Air Force.

Meanwhile, in addition to its training programme, the squadron had already commenced flying against the enemy. The first sortie was made on 27 March, when three Wellingtons were despatched to drop leaflets on Brunswick, Ulzen and Luneberg. The captains of the three aircraft were Squadron Leader Kay, Flying Officer Collins

Flight Lieutenant J. N. Collins; born Wellington, 31 Mar 1917; joined RNZAF Jul 1939; killed on air operations, 21 May 1940.

and Flying Officer Adams.

Wing Commander J. Adams, DFC, AFC; born Christchurch, 31 Aug 1913; joined RAF 1937; transferred RNZAF Jun 1939; commanded No. 5 Blind Approach Training Flight, 1941; CO No. 40 Sqdn, RNZAF, 1943–44.

Pilot Officer Freeman

Wing Commander T. O. Freeman, DSO, DFC and bar; born Lawrence, 5 Jun 1916; joined RAF 1936; transferred RNZAF Jul 1939; commanded No. 115 Sqdn, 1941–42; commanded RNZAF Fighter Wing, New Georgia, 1943; killed on air operations, 17 Dec 1943.

flew as second pilot to Kay, with LAC Williams

Flight Lieutenant E. P. Williams, DFM; Wellington; born Rotorua, 22 Sep 1916; joined RNZAF May 1938.

as wireless operator. Pilot Officer Harkness

Squadron Leader D. J. Harkness, DFC; born Midhurst, Taranaki, 16 Sep 1916; joined RAF Dec 1938; killed on air operations, 31 May 1942.

was second pilot to Collins and Pilot Officer Larney

Squadron Leader G. K. Larney, DFC; RAF; born Wellington, 18 Oct 1912; joined RAF Jun 1939.

was second pilot to Adams. The remainder of the crews were men from Britain. Difficult weather conditions were experienced throughout the flight but the mission was completed without incident, the squadron record book reporting briefly that:

The three aircraft took off independently and set course for Dorum on the German coast. Leaflets were dropped over the areas detailed from heights of 7–10,000 feet. Navigation was by dead reckoning and ‘astro’, very few fixes being obtained and these were considered unreliable. Squadron Leader Kay had considerable success with Astro navigation which proved fortunate as on entering heavy clouds the wireless transmitter burnt out and was useless for the rest of the flight. Exceedingly bumpy weather prevailed and the freezing was also severe, the temperature at one stage being —28°.

Four similar sorties were made early in April by Wellingtons from the New. Zealand Squadron, the captains of which were Flight Lieutenant Breckon,

Wing Commander A. A. N. Breckon, DFC; RNZAF; Ohakea; born Auckland, 28 Nov 1913; joined RAF 1935; transferred RNZAF Jun 1939; commanded Navigation Training Sqdn, Bassingbourn, 1940–41; held various commands and staff appointments in New Zealand and Pacific, 1941–45.

Flying Officers Coleman,

Flying Officer W. H. Coleman, DFC; born Christchurch, 29 Nov 1916; joined RAF 1937; transferred RNZAF Jul 1939; killed on air operations, 25 Jul 1940.

N. Williams

Flight Lieutenant N. Williams, DFC; born Frankton Junction, 4 Oct 1915; joined RAF 1937; transferred RNZAF Jul 1939; killed on air operations, 11 May 1941.

and W. M. C. Williams.

Squadron Leader W. M. C. Williams, DFC; born Wanganui, 31 Aug 1912; joined RAF 1936; transferred RNZAF Jul 1939; killed in aircraft accident, 15 Jul 1943.

Although searchlights were active on each occasion they failed to locate the high-flying aircraft, which were able to complete their task successfully. The opening of the Norwegian campaign a few days later brought the squadron fresh duties and saw the start of its bombing operations against the enemy.

* * * * *

During the early months of the war a small group of New Zealand airmen saw service in France with the squadrons of the Royal Air Force which had been trasnferred to that country at the outbreak of hostilities. The air units among which these men were scattered were organised in two separate parts, each having distinct functions. The first part, the Advanced Air Striking Force, was a bomber force made up of ten Battle squadrons from Bomber Command, under whose control it remained for several months. The idea behind its despatch to France was that, should the Germans begin bombing, these medium bombers could retaliate on Ruhr targets at closer range than from Britain. The second part, the Royal Air Force Component, was intended to form an integral part of the British Expeditionary Force for which it was to provide reconnaissance and protection. It thus consisted of aircraft for reconnaissance, together with four fighter squadrons, all of which were under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in France, General Lord Gort.

Field Marshal Viscount Gort, VC, GCB, CBE, DSO, MVO, MC, Legion of Honour (Fr); born 10 Jul 1886; joined Grenadier Guards, 1905; Chief of Imperial General Staff, 1937–39; C-in-C BEF, 1939–40; Inspector-General to the Forces, 1940–41; Governor and C-in-C, Gibraltar, 1941–42; Governor and C-in-C, Malta, 1942–44; High Commissioner and C-in-C, Palestine, and High Commissioner, Transjordan, 1944–45; died 31 Mar 1946.

This division of control and the need for closer co-operation with the French led, in January 1940, to the creation of a unified British Air Force France Command but, even so, many problems remained unsolved.

Until the German attack on the Low Countries opened early in May 1940, no bombing operations were flown from France since, as has already been indicated, the Allies were anxious to avoid initiating any action which would arouse German retaliation. For reasons of his own, the enemy also refrained from starting any unrestricted bombing offensive, so that instead of the inferno which many had anticipated there was an unexpected, if foreboding, calm. Nevertheless, although the squadrons in France made no bombing raids, they were employed in exercises with the ground forces in their areas and on reconnaissance and leaflet dropping operations over Germany. While most of these missions were uneventful they were occasionally enlivened by the impartiality with which some anti-aircraft gunners treated all aircraft they sighted. One New Zealander with No. 73 Squadron had the unenviable experience of being shot down over Calais in September by the French artillery to whom he was demonstrating a Hurricane for recognition purposes. Fortunately he was uninjured and was able to make a forced landing on the beach near the town. There were also odd incidents such as when one British crew, after a leaflet dropping sortie, inadvertently landed at a German airfield near the frontier. Fortunately they realised their mistake before the Germans reached them and took off again to reach France safely.

For fighter pilots stationed with the British Army close to the Belgian border the winter of 1940 was a period of grinding mono- tony. Day after day they made their way through snow, slush, and mud to their cheerless dispersal points, to remain at readiness throughout the daylight hours. This tense waiting was always one of the most trying and difficult situations with which fighter pilots had to contend, and during this period it was particularly hard for them to accept continued inaction.

In some contrast to this dull existence were the experiences of the men serving with the two Hurricane squadrons attached to the Advanced Air Striking Force near the Franco-German border. One of these pilots, Flying Officer Kain,

Flying Officer E. J. Kain, DFC; born Hastings, 27 Jun 1918; joined RAF 1937; killed in flying accident, 7 Jun 1940.

nicknamed ‘Cobber’ by his comrades in No. 73 Squadron, was soon to become widely known for his exploits. Throughout his school days Kain had been keen on flying and after leaving college had joined the Wellington Aero Club, making his first solo flight after only six hours' dual instruction. In 1936 he had travelled to England where he obtained a short-service commission in the Royal Air Force within a few months of his arrival. He trained as a fighter pilot and quickly became an expert at aerobatics, first with Gladiators and later with Hurricanes, and in 1938 gave an exhibition in the Empire air display at Hendon. Although deservedly popular among his fellow pilots, Kain was a strong individualist and soon became recognised as something of a ‘wild devil’. In France his squadron was based at Rouvres, a small village midway between Verdun and Metz and roughly 35 miles from the frontier over which the Hurricanes patrolled. One who knew the squadron well declares they were a ‘happy, carefree bunch, full of confidence and making the best of the situation in which they found themselves'. At first incidents were few, but on 30 October 1939 the first enemy aircraft was shot down over France by an English pilot of No. 1 Squadron. A few days later, on 8 November, Kain scored his squadron's first victory by destroying a Dornier 17. He was on the ground at his aerodrome when he first sighted the enemy aircraft flying high above. He leapt into his Hurricane and climbed to intercept. At 25,000 feet he was able to close on the Dornier and get in three bursts at short range. Nothing happened for a moment, then white smoke began to pour from one of its engines. Kain broke away, but as the enemy did not fall he climbed again and opened fire, continuing until he was within fifty yards. At this point the Dornier banked steeply and spiralled to earth to crash in the middle of a small village, ten miles north-east of Rouvres. ‘Fortunately’, says a contemporary report, ‘beyond a bedridden woman who suddenly found the use of her legs again, a few broken windows, and a burnt out cowshed, no damage was caused’. But for some months such combats were the exception rather than the rule. Apart from one day towards the end of November when six enemy aircraft were destroyed, one of them by Kain, interceptions were at a minimum throughout the winter months. Incessant rain waterlogged airfields; then came heavy snowfalls accompanied by blizzards which gave the snow a treacherous coating of ice. Nevertheless, during the greater part of this time the fighter pilots continued to maintain readiness or fly ‘standing’ patrols over vital areas.

It was not until March that the enemy renewed his activity over France. On the second day of that month Kain again distinguished himself in an encounter with seven Heinkels which he chased into Germany. Then, on being attacked by fighters, he turned and shot one down. Eventually, although nearly blinded by smoke and fumes, he managed to regain a friendly airfield.

During the next few weeks Kain continued to figure conspicuously in his squadron's activities. On one particularly active day towards the close of the month 14 British pilots had combats and claimed seven of the enemy without loss to themselves. Kain accounted for one of the aircraft destroyed, and possibly a second, before he himself was forced to bale out of his blazing Hurricane.

He afterwards told how ‘Three of us were on patrol when we sighted four Messerschmitts which came around at us in twos. We turned with them and I got in a side shot at the last one. He stalled and then spun down with smoke and flame pouring out of his machine. Then more Messerschmitts appeared and the sky seemed full of planes dashing about. Found another flying loose and put a burst at him. He turned on his side and went down smoking. Then the sky seemed suddenly clear. But almost at once there was a crash, the top of the hood was shot away and my machine caught fire. The shock must have knocked me out for a moment since when I came to the Hurricane was in a steep dive and flaming. Could not get out until I'd pulled her out of the dive. By that time my face and hands were burnt a bit. Forgot to pull the ripcord at first and when the parachute opened it jerked me sideways—one shoulder strap had slipped off. Down I went through a bank of cloud….’

He landed alongside a wood to find himself in the midst of a skirmish between opposing patrols so sought cover and then made his way on foot towards what he hoped were the French lines. After a short time he was picked up by a French captain who took him on the back of a motor cycle to the nearest village, where he received medical attention. Kain was up and about the following day, walking with the aid of a stick.

About the same time Flying Officer Stratton,

Wing Commander W. H. Stratton, DFC and bar; RNZAF; London; born Hastings, 22 Jul 1916; joined RAF 1937; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944; commanded No. 134 Sqdn, Middle East and India, 1943–44; OC Flying Wing, Wigram, 1945; served with BCOF, Japan, 1947–48.

who was with No. 1 Squadron, shared in the destruction of the first Messerschmitt 110 to be shot down by the Royal Air Force over France. He was flying in a section of three Hurricanes which intercepted nine of these new enemy fighters north-east of Metz. The battle began at 26,000 feet and Stratton later reported:

I endeavoured to turn on to the enemy nearest me, but immediately went into a spin. A number of Messerschmitts were firing their rear guns. I recovered from my spin and was beginning a steep climb when a 110 dived past in front of me, so I made a steep diving turn on to his tail. He made little effort to shake me off and I expended all my ammunition. When I broke away one of his engines was on fire.

This same aircraft had previously been damaged by the leader of the section. After Stratton's attack it was last seen gliding in an easterly direction giving out clouds of smoke. The German pilot escaped by parachute and was later captured. The third pilot of the section had meanwhile damaged two other Messerschmitt 110s. All three airmen were afterwards entertained at a special dinner in Paris (at Maxim's in the Rue Royale) which had been promised by Air Marshal Barratt

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur S. Barratt, KCB, CMG, MC, Order of the Crown and Croix de Guerre with Palm (Bel), Order of Polonia Restituta (Pol), Legion of Honour (Fr), Croix de Guerre with Palm (Fr); RAF (retd); England; born Peshawar, India, 25 Feb 1891; joined Royal Artillery 1910; seconded RFC 1914 and RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1919; AOC-in-C, British Air Forces in France, 1940; AOC-in-C, Army Co-operation Command, 1940–43; AOC-in-C, Technical Training Command, 1943–45; Inspector-General of the RAF, 1945–47.

to the first pilot to destroy one of these aircraft. These successful combats deserved celebration since they dispelled the rumours which usually surrounded new enemy aircraft, and which in the case of the Messerschmitt 110 had credited it with a higher performance than was proved on closer acquaintance.

Sporadic engagements with German reconnaissance machines continued until the end of April when there was a lull in air activity on the eastern frontier. New Zealand pilots were involved in several inconclusive encounters but most of their work consisted of routine patrols covering army movements into the outer defences of the Maginot Line. The lull was short-lived for, on 10 May, Germany invaded the Low Countries, and the few squadrons of the Royal Air Force in France were soon engaged in violent air battles with practically the whole strength of the Luftwaffe. But before this happened the Germans had already invaded Norway and Denmark to secure their northern flank against any possible diversion from the projected campaign against France.

CHAPTER 3 Meeting the German Attack

THE Germans began their invasion of Norway and Denmark at dawn on 9 April 1940. Within twenty-four hours, as a result of careful preparation and amazing treachery, all Denmark was in German hands and the principal Norwegian ports and airfields had been captured. The story of what happened in Norway reads like a modern version of the Trojan Horse. There the Germans had created a large group of sympathisers under a Major Quisling and these people—known as ‘The Fifth Column’— formed the spearhead of the attack. They were quickly supported by paratroops and by infantry disguised as seamen or civilians and previously embarked on ships trading with Norway. The capture of Oslo, which fell in two hours, was typical. Fifth columnists seized the main buildings and radio stations and then, helped by airborne troops, held them until seaborne forces broke through the harbour defences to reinforce.

Air power was, however, the decisive factor. It enabled the Germans to make simultaneous airborne landings at key points in both countries and then fly in transport aircraft with infantry and supplies. In Denmark the airfields at Aalborg fell to the Germans with ease, as did the whole of Jutland and Copenhagen itself; demonstrations by bombers and fighters, together with a massed fly past of transport aircraft bound for Norway, had the desired effect and brought about complete capitulation. In Norway airborne landings at the main ports were quickly followed by fighter attacks on the airfields and the small Norwegian Air Force, caught unawares, was almost annihilated on the ground. Paratroops then landed and secured the airfields as forward bases for the Luftwaffe. At Trondheim, where the airfield did not fall until the second day, the Germans improvised a landing strip in the snow near the port and transport aircraft were able to fly in with their loads. Reports of these events were received in London with incredulity; indeed there were many in Britain who, unappreciative of the extent to which air power could now be exercised over narrow waters, felt that by invading Norway Hitler had blundered. They were soon to be disillusioned.

From the outset the small Norwegian army fought gallantly, but the odds against it increased rapidly as German reinforcements arrived by sea and air with little opposition. An appeal was made to the Allies for assistance,

The complicated pattern of political events at this time is fully described in T. K. Derry's The Campaign in Norway, one of the volumes of the Official British War History.

whereupon a frontal attack by the Royal

NORWAYBlack and white map of Norway Navy on Trondheim was planned, but this had to be abandoned in the face of German air superiority. On 14 April the advance party of the Allied Expeditionary Force landed in the Narvik area in an effort to cut off enemy supplies of Swedish iron ore. At the same time an attempt was made to capture Trondheim as a base for operations by landing forces at two small ports to the north and south, Namsos and Aandalsnes. But by the time these landings took place the Germans had so extended their hold that most of southern Norway was under their control. The pressure northwards from Oslo increased and the Allied and Norwegian armies were driven back. Very soon the enemy's unremitting air attacks on these forces, on their bases and lines of communication, made further resistance hopeless. The Allied troops were re-embarked early in May and resistance left to the isolated Norwegian units fighting in the mountains. Thus, when the Battle of France began on 10 May, Norway was practically in German hands. Only at Narvik in the north did the Allies enjoy a brief success, in which both the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force played a notable part. However, the pressure of events caused the evacuation of Narvik to follow during the first week of June.

During the short campaign the RAF did what it could to bring aid to the hard-pressed Norwegians and to units of the Allied armies which joined them. Among the tasks in which New Zealand airmen assisted were reconnaissance of the Norwegian coast, laying mines, and bombing enemy airfields and shipping. In particular, the spacious airfield at Stavanger was frequently attacked by both Bomber and Coastal Command aircraft during the first weeks. The initial attack on this target was made by Bomber Command at dusk on 11 April when six Wellingtons, preceded by two Blenheims, bombed at low level in the face of intense anti-aircraft fire. One Wellington, in which Pilot Officer Rankin

Pilot Officer D. A. Rankin; born Wellington, 23 Nov 1914; joined RAF Mar 1939; killed on air operations, 11 Apr 1940.

was flying as second pilot, was seen to crash in flames after being hit. The same night New Zealanders flew with the force of Whitleys and Hampdens which swept the Kattegat and attacked several vessels. On the following morning 23 Blenheims, 36 Wellingtons, and 24 Hampdens were despatched to attack a naval force reported by a reconnaissance aircraft. Most of the Blenheims abandoned the search because of low cloud, while the Wellingtons saw little and lost three of their number in an engagement with Messerschmitts. Only one formation of twelve Hampdens sighted a target, bombing two warships without success. Six Hampdens were lost, one of them captained by Flying Officer Johnstone.

Flying Officer K. J. A. Johnstone; born Suva, 3 Jul 1915; joined RAF 1937; killed on air operations, 12 Apr 1940.

THE BATTLE OF FRANCE—situation on 18 May 1940 Colour map outlining the battle of france

Subsequent attacks on both ships and airfields proved equally ineffective in hindering the German occupation of Norway. This was really not surprising for no preparations had been made and the aircrew lacked many of the things necessary for successful bombing, such as large-scale target maps and photographs that could be studied beforehand. Indeed, they often crossed the North Sea searching for the targets allotted them with nothing better than a sheet of an extremely small-scale map or a tracing from the town plans in a tourist guide to Norway. In consequence a considerable number of crews were unable to find their objectives. A second adverse factor was the weather since, by day, the British aircraft, operating without fighter escort, were ordered to attack their targets only when they had cloud cover. This often obliged the pilots to turn back. On the other hand the clouds that were deemed indispensable to daylight attack were generally accompanied by foul weather. Moreover the whole of Norway was still deep in snow, rendering identification of landmarks difficult; the upper air was bitterly cold, and when clouds gathered they were laden with snow, freezing drizzle and hail. Flying conditions over the North Sea were also treacherous, with gales accompanied by rain and sleet frequently sweeping across it.

Wellingtons from No. 75 Squadron made a number of sorties in the course of the campaign. On 12 April four crews took part in a search for enemy warships reported off south-west Norway. In that area they met cloud down to sea level, with the result that it proved impossible to locate a target. All however returned safely. On two occasions during the next fortnight small formations made attacks on the enemy-held aerodromes at Stavanger and Aalborg. But probably the most interesting mission undertaken by the squadron during this period was a special reconnaissance of Narvik Fiord, far to the north. This was flown on 12 April by a Wellington captained by Flight Lieutenant Breckon.

Pilot Officer D. J. Harkness and LAC E. P. Williams were members of his crew, which also included a naval observer.

At this time it was known that the Germans held Narvik in force. A naval battle had been fought two days previously and the Royal Navy was to sail up the fifty miles of the fiord on 13 April to complete the destruction of German naval units in the Narvik area. Breckon's reconnaissance was in preparation for the second attack. The Wellington took off at dawn from an airfield in the north of Scotland and, in steadily deteriorating weather, flew over a thousand miles along the Norwegian coast to Narvik Fiord. During the reconnaissance of the fiord itself, strong winds and snowstorms caused great difficulty in controlling the aircraft.

‘In places the clouds came down almost to sea level’, Breckon afterwards reported. ‘Visibility was reduced to 500 yards or less and we had the most terrific bumps that members of the crew had ever experienced. At one point when we were flying at 200 feet in a heavy snowstorm we doubted whether we should be able to find our way safely out of the fiord.’

Altogether the Wellington was in the air for over 14 hours, making this the longest reconnaissance that had been flown up to this time. Three days later Breckon made another flight of nine and a half hours to Trondheim.

Similar patrols were flown by other New Zealanders during the first days of the campaign. On 9 April Squadron Leader L. E. Jarman,

Group Captain L. E. Jarman, DFC; RAF; born Christchurch, 17 Aug 1907; joined RAF 1929; permanent commission 1934; CFI, No. 23 OTU, 1941; commanded RAF Station, Litchfield, 1941–42; SASO, No. 93 Group, 1942–43; commanded RAF Station, Kirmington, 1943; RAF Station, Wyton, 1943–44; SASO, No. 205 Group, Italy, 1944–45.

as captain of a Wellington from No. 9 Squadron in Bomber Command, made a reconnaissance of part of the Norwegian coast. He had very little cloud cover and his machine came under heavy fire from the ground. He also narrowly missed interception by enemy fighters but managed to secure useful information on the disposition of German naval forces at Kristiansand, Bergen, and at intermediate points. As flight commander of his squadron, Jarman subsequently led formations in several attacks on targets in Norway, and on one occasion his was the only aircraft to reach and attack Stavanger airfield in the face of weather conditions which compelled the return of the other aircraft engaged in the operation. Jarman had previously served with an RAF bomber squadron in the Middle East. In May 1940 he was commended for his ‘consis- tent courage and determination’ in early operations with Bomber Command.

Another New Zealander to distinguish himself in the opening days of the Norwegian campaign was Pilot Officer Tacon,

Wing Commander E. W. Tacon, DSO, MVO, DFC and bar, AFC; RAF; born Napier, 6 Dec 1917; joined RAF May 1939; Coastal Command, 1939–41; flying training appointments in Canada, New Zealand and United Kingdom, 1942–44; commanded No. 236 Sqdn, 1944; p.w. 12 Sep 1944; Commander of the King's Flight, 1946–50.

who flew a Hudson of No. 233 Squadron, Coastal Command. During one reconnaissance flight to Utsirc, south of Bergen, he was in combat with a Heinkel which eventually made off after being hit and its rear gun silenced. On another occasion, while searching for the battle cruiser Scharnhorst, he located and attacked three anti-aircraft ships. Shortly afterwards he made a successful reconnaissance of Haugesund and obtained good photographs of the port and shipping from a low level. While making a second run over the port his starboard engine was hit by anti-aircraft fire, but Tacon succeeded in nursing his Hudson back across the North Sea, a distance of some 300 miles, and reported useful information to his base. But probably his most daring exploit was when he volunteered to carry a naval officer to ‘spot’ for the bombardment of Stavanger aerodrome by a British cruiser. They left from a Scottish base in the early hours and reached the target area just before dawn. Then, on receipt of a pre-arranged signal from the cruiser, the Hudson flew over the airfield and dropped a flare and incendiary bombs. By good fortune the bombs fell among some enemy aircraft on the ground and the fires helped the cruiser to obtain the correct line and range. In spite of anti-aircraft fire which ‘considerably enlivened the proceedings', the Hudson crew continued the task of spotting for the naval bombardment. They were attacked by a Junkers 88, but by skilful manoeuvring Tacon was able to avoid the enemy, complete his task, and return safely to base. Tacon, who had learned to fly in the evenings at the Hawke's Bay Aero Club, was with his squadron at the outbreak of war. His exploits during the Norwegian campaign marked the beginning of an outstanding career with Coastal Command.

The bombing attacks, minelaying, and reconnaissance patrols were continued throughout April. Aircraft from Coastal Command flew continuously over the North Sea and along the Norwegian coast reporting enemy movements and, as opportunity offered, attacking ships and targets inland. The crews of the Hudsons and Blenheims operating from bases in Scotland had a gruelling time as they were also called upon to protect British naval forces and convoys in northern waters. Bomber Command directed its main effort against German-occupied airfields in Norway and Denmark, and there is evidence that these attacks caused a reduction in the scale of the enemy's bombing in the Aandalsnes and Namsos areas. In particular, little air interference was experienced by the Allied land forces during their evacuation, when heavy bombing attacks were maintained against German airfields on four successive nights. But meanwhile, owing to the distance they had to fly, and faced with an enemy air force superior in numbers and possessing bases in the area of combat, there was little that the squadrons of Coastal and Bomber Commands could do to aid the ground forces in contact with the enemy. Because of the limited range of its aircraft Fighter Command was unable to operate from Britain, but after the Allied Expeditionary Force landed an attempt was made to provide it with some support by sending fighters to operate from bases in Norway. Several New Zealanders were to play a distinguished part in these operations. On 21 April when No. 263 Gladiator Squadron was despatched to operate from the vicinity of Aandalsnes, the main Allied base, Flying Officer Vickery

Flying Officer H. E. Vickery; born Invercargill, 7 Sep 1913; joined RAF 1936; lost in sinking of carrier Glorious off Norway, 9 Jun 1940.

sailed with the advance party to advise on the preparation of landing grounds. Eventually a site was chosen at Lake Lesjeskogen, the surface of which was frozen. Then, in the face of enemy bombing of the jetty at Aandalsnes, and a shortage of both equipment and transport, petrol and ammunition dumps were established in the woods by the lake and the surface of the proposed landing ground cleared. On the evening of 24 April Pilot Officer Jacobsen

Pilot Officer L. R. Jacobsen, DFC; born Wellington, 5 Mar 1915; joined RAF Oct 1938; lost in sinking of Glorious, 9 Jun 1940.

was one of the 18 pilots who flew their Gladiators to this lake from the aircraft carrier Glorious. None of these men had ever taken off from a carrier before. Unfortunately, from the moment of its arrival the unit was thrown on to the defensive in the protection of its base from German bombing attacks, and this situation was further aggravated by a serious shortage of stores, equipment and spare parts, and of quick rearming and refuelling facilities. It was with such handicaps and against a background of snow and ice that the ill-equipped squadron attempted to fight off the German bombers. Its pilots made a gallant, if brief, stand against overwhelming odds.

Shortly after daybreak next morning the Germans began bombing the frozen lake and continued to attack periodically all through the day until dusk. By midday the surface of the lake was pitted with bomb craters and ten of the Gladiators had been destroyed whilst waiting on the ice to be refuelled and rearmed—tasks which the pilots themselves had to undertake. During the afternoon the five aircraft still serviceable were flown to the landing area at Setnesmoen which had been prepared by the advance party. The next morning two more aircraft were lost, one by enemy action and the other by engine failure. That afternoon Jacobsen took off on patrol in the one remaining serviceable aircraft. He was twice in combat with Heinkels but in each case lost touch before he could complete his attack. The last flight of the day and the last before the squadron was ordered to return to Britain was again made by Jacobsen. He took off in the late afternoon in an unsuccessful attempt to intercept several enemy aircraft which were bombing the landing ground.

The return of the Gladiator squadron to Britain and the evacuation of Allied ground forces from central Norway virtually ended the struggle, except in the Narvik area where the Allies had been fighting since the middle of April with some success. The delay in despatching fighter support to this area was mainly because of the need to prepare landing grounds at Bardufoss and Skaanland. The latter was found soft and unsuitable for Hurricanes, so two squadrons were sent to Bardufoss. Nor was this airfield ideal, for the spring thaw caused extensive flooding. Here, on 21 May, No. 263 Squadron with a new complement of Gladiator aircraft flew off the aircraft carrier Furious; five days later it was followed by No. 46 Hurricane Squadron, brought out by the Glorious. Three New Zealanders were with these units. Jacobsen and Vickery were with No. 263 Squadron, while Flight Lieutenant Jameson

Group Captain P. G. Jameson, DSO, DFC and bar, Norwegian War Cross, Silver Star (US), Order of Orange Nassau (Hol); RAF; born Wellington, 10 Nov 1912; joined RAF 1936; commanded No. 266 Sqdn, 1940–41; Wing Leader, Wittering, 1941–42, and North Weald, 1942–43; Planning Staff, No. 11 Fighter Group, 1943–44; commanded No. 122 Wing, 2nd TAF, 1944–45.

was in command of a flight in No. 46 Squadron. Vickery had already done good work in supervising the construction of the airfield at Bardufoss.

The squadrons began patrols immediately, their main duty being to defend the fleet anchorage at Skaanland, the military base at Harstad and, where possible, to give close support to sea and land forces in contact with the enemy. Despite the absence of an air-raid warning system and the inadequate landing ground, the squadrons operated during the next few weeks with considerable success and gained a definite air superiority in that region. Two days after their arrival Jameson led a section of Hurricanes which found and destroyed two Dornier flying boats on the surface of Rombaks Fiord. These aircraft, which were carrying reinforcements and supplies to German ground forces in the Narvik area, were discovered after a flight over unfamiliar country, well concealed against the almost vertical side of a fiord. Although this made attack difficult, Jameson rearranged his formation, surprised the enemy, and set both aircraft on fire before they could retaliate. Reconnaissance an hour later showed that they had sunk. The following day Jameson destroyed a Junkers 88 which was one of three intercepted by his section south-east of Narvik. He afterwards reported:

I surprised the rearmost enemy aircraft by climbing up under his tail. On opening fire at 200 yards, a bright flash appeared from the 88 and my windscreen was obscured by oil. After breaking away, noticed black smoke was coming from his starboard engine. As I approached again he jettisoned his bombs so fired another burst at about 250 yards. The starboard engine began to burn and the fire gradually spread to the fuselage. Shortly before the machine crashed on the cliff of a fiord, one of the crew jumped by parachute.

On the same day Jacobsen attacked a convoy of six German lorries on the north of Beis Fiord, setting two on fire and causing a number of casualties. Vickery also made several similar sorties attacking motor vehicles, railway stations, troops and strongpoints, including what was later found to be the German headquarters at Hundalen. On such missions the aircraft frequently sustained damage from enemy anti-aircraft fire and returned like lame ducks looking much the worse for wear and, as one pilot put it, ‘with odd bits fluttering or trailing in the breeze’. On 2 June Jacobsen had an eventful patrol during which he attacked four enemy bombers and shot down three of them, with the fourth probably destroyed. Here is his account of this notable engagement:

I was on patrol with another aircraft in the Narvik area along the railway to the Swedish border. Encountered two Ju. 88s and ordered my No. 2 to attack the second aircraft. I attacked the first from approximately 300 yards and attempted to close range, but enemy aircraft drew slowly away whilst diving. Chased him into Sweden and fired another two-second burst at approximately 400 yards, after which enemy machine disappeared into cloud. At this moment the other Ju. 88 crossed my path. After a two-second burst, the enemy dived vertically through cloud, apparently out of control. On following, I had great difficulty in avoiding crashing into mountain sides. Returning to Norwegian territory, I encountered many enemy aircraft low-flying in a wide sweep on Swedish border about Björnfjell. Engaged a Heinkel 111 which pulled up in a stall and dived into ground. On breaking away from this engagement, was attacked by one Junkers 88 and three Heinkels 111s from above and head on. Evaded this attack and positioned myself on another Heinkel 111 at which I fired a burst of three seconds from 250 yards below beam. Was then engaged head on by another Heinkel 111. By evasive tactics, managed to get a point-blank burst of three-seconds as the enemy machine broke away. It was last seen diving, apparently out of control. Now found myself inside a circle of enemy aircraft consisting of two Junkers 88s and six Heinkels 111s. Enemy aircraft again employed head on attack. Fire was also encountered from above and below. I was now using every possible device to evade enemy fire, but noticed that my aircraft had been hit in the engine, and that one of my flying wires had been shot away. After diving to avert collision, I positioned myself on a Heinkel 111 and fired approximately four-second burst. This caused enemy aircraft to rock violently and it was last seen gliding earthwards. On breaking off engagement I was subjected to fire from above and below. My engine was hit and oil tank evidently pierced as my windscreen became coated with black oil which made it impossible for me to see so I broke off engagement and used evasive tactics to avoid attacks which were now being made by four enemy aircraft from above. My engine was giving considerable trouble, but I managed to lose enemy aircraft and return to base.

Three of the aircraft Jacobsen had attacked were later found crashed in Sweden.

The tempo of action at this time can be judged from the fact that No. 263 Squadron flew over 390 sorties and was engaged in 72 combats, while No. 46 Squadron made 249 sorties and had 26 combats. The Gladiators claimed 26 aircraft destroyed and the Hurricanes eleven.

Although the Allies captured Narvik on 28 May, the evacuation of northern Norway had already been decided upon because of the disasters which had befallen the Allies in Belgium. Fighter protection was provided for the withdrawal of the ground forces on 7 June, and on this and the following day the twenty remaining aircraft were flown onto the carrier Glorious and the Bardufoss landing ground was destroyed. Actually orders had been received to destroy the Hurricanes as none of the pilots had previously landed on a carrier. However, following a successful test landing by Jameson and two other pilots, all the Hurricanes were flown on without loss. Unfortunately, the following day the Glorious was sunk by the German battle-cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Jameson and his commanding officer were the only survivors from the airmen who had embarked. They were picked up 120 miles off the coast by a small Norwegian merchant ship after spending three days on a Carley float. It was indeed an irony of fate that fighter pilots who had displayed such gallantry, both in their operations against the enemy and in salvaging their aircraft, should be lost during their evacuation to England.

The efforts of the Royal Air Force to strike at the enemy in Norway did not, however, cease with the withdrawal of the fighter squadrons and the British troops. Throughout the following months bombing attacks were made against enemy communications and airfields. Reconnaissance along the Norwegian coast and over the North Sea was also continued, with the double purpose of watching enemy shipping movements and observing developments in the Norwegian ports. New Zealand airmen continued to share in these tasks, which were carried out by aircraft of Bomber and Coastal Commands.

* * * * *

With startling swiftness the Germans followed their seizure of Norway by a violent onslaught on the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Novel methods of attack confused and bewildered the defenders and, within a few brief weeks, this blitzkrieg culminated in the evacuation of Allied forces from Dunkirk and the collapse of French resistance. The failure of the Allies to co-ordinate the efforts of their land and air forces prevented them from offering effective opposition to an enemy whose unorthodox tactics and swift moves soon proved utterly disconcerting. With their greater mobility and superior armoured strength, the Germans were able to pierce fixed defence systems and then carry out a series of enveloping movements. As their ground forces swept forward they received full support from the Luftwaffe, for the Germans had already developed methods of close co-operation between aircraft and the armoured columns such as had not yet been attempted by the Allies.

The German attack opened in the early hours of 10 May 1940 with assaults on the frontiers of Luxembourg, Holland and Belgium. Simultaneously parachutists and airborne forces landed at strategic points inside their borders, while airfields and communications both in these countries and in France were heavily bombed. The small Dutch and Belgian air forces were overwhelmed at the outset and the French Air Force suffered severely. Practically the whole available strength of the Luftwaffe

The air forces employed by the Germans included some 1300 bombers, including 350 dive-bombers and between 1200 and 1500 fighters. In addition they had about 450 transport aircraft and a similar number of reconnaissance machines. These forces were backed by a generous supply of replacement aircraft and crews, the latter fully and efficiently trained and of high morale.

was thrown into the opening attacks in order to clear the way for the advance of the ground forces. By the end of the first day the Dutch defences were in confusion; the three main airfields at The Hague had been captured by airborne troops and transport aircraft landed after obstructions had been removed. In the Rotterdam area the important Moerdijk bridge was captured and held intact, and some 1200 airborne troops were landed at Waalhaven airfield before midday. Infantry were also brought in to Rotterdam by transport float planes. Elsewhere throughout Holland confusion was successfully spread by paratroops. Very quickly the power of the Luftwaffe achieved the desired result; in particular the savage bombing attack on the centre of the city of Rotterdam had an immediate demoralising effect, and on 15 May the Dutch army capitulated after five days' fighting. Meanwhile, in Belgium, German operations had gone according to plan. The capture of Fort Eben Emael was typical. Here 70 paratroops landed at dawn on the first day within the outer walls and, breaking up into small groups, began to force their way through the inner workings of this modern fortress. Reinforcements arrived by air and within twenty-four hours the demoralised garrison surrendered. Thus one of the most important forts of the Belgian defence line fell with only five casualties to the German paratroops. Other airborne operations in Belgium achieved similar success and most of the main bridges and roads were held for the advancing German armies. These now pressed forward in the Ardennes, feeling their way for the main armoured thrust.

Aerial reconnaissance gave the Germans an accurate picture of the Allied dispositions, and on 13 May their main armoured spearhead struck through Charleville and Sedan and crossed the Meuse. A strong effort was then made by the Lufwaffe in support of the advancing forces. Bombers, with strong fighter cover, attacked bases, troop concentrations, railway marshalling yards and movements of the Allied armies by road and rail, while French airfields were subjected to continual bombing. Strong dive-bomber forces were also employed to prepare the way for the armoured units. As soon as air reconnaissance or ground reports established that points of resistance were holding up the advance, a heavy concentration of air striking power would be called in. On occasion up to nine sorties were flown by single aircraft. As a result the British and French armies were paralysed to a degree that was a revelation to even the Germans themselves, and the legend of the dive-bomber grew.

From the outset the Royal Air Force in France, equipped with a handful of Hurricane fighters and a few squadrons of relatively obsolete Battles and Blenheims, attempted to reply to the enemy's massed air attacks and hinder the advance of his armoured columns. Both air and ground crews made an heroic effort against overwhelming odds, and the fact that it availed little detracts nothing from the many acts of gallantry performed. The support they could receive from the squadrons based in the United Kingdom was limited by the distance involved and by the rapid dislocation of communications. Nevertheless aircraft from Bomber Command operated over the battle area from the first day, whilst fighters from forward airfields in Kent maintained patrols along the Belgian and Dutch coasts to the limit of their range. Three Hurricane squadrons were also sent to France as reinforcements on 10 May, and during the next few days, as calls for further assistance increased, more pilots and the equivalent of six squadrons were sent across the Channel. In addi- tion, fighter aircraft were despatched each day to operate from bases on the Continent. But with the collapse of the Allied front and the loss of airfield facilities that followed the German bombing, it was considered unwise to strip Britain's defences further and commit the major resources of Fighter Command to the battle in France.

This historic decision, one of the most vital of the war, since it made possible the victory over Britain a few months later from which all else flowed, was not made until 19 May when complete collapse in France appeared inevitable. Even then it came only as a result of urgent representations by Sir Hugh Dowding, the C-in-C Fighter Command.

Later, however, as the battle in the north approached its climax, a maximum effort was made by all three Home Commands to cover the evacuation from Belgian and French ports.

At the beginning of May 1940 there were 600 New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force, the majority flying with units of Bomber, Fighter, or Coastal Commands based in the United Kingdom. However, in France there was now a significant representation among the bomber units and in the fighter and reconnaissance squad- rons, with a few men serving in administrative posts or on ground duties. Among the senior officers on the Continent were Group Captains Carr and Russell, both veterans of the First World War returning once more to their former battlefield. Two New Zealand medical officers were also with the RAF in France at this time. During the air operations of May and June 1940, 44 New Zealanders lost their lives. Fourteen were to receive awards for deeds of gallantry in fighter and bomber attacks or for sterling service with the reconnaissance units, whose flights often involved penetrations at low level far behind the enemy lines, and which, in the case of the photographic unit, were made in unarmed aircraft.

From dawn on the first day of the German attack the fighter squadrons in France were heavily engaged with the enemy forma- tions. The Hurricanes covering the advance of the Allied Expeditionary Force into Belgium had many combats, while the two squadrons with the Advanced Air Striking Force in the south reported ‘ceaseless activity’ and ‘a day crammed with incident’. In these initial encounters the British pilots exacted a heavy toll in proportion to the casualties they suffered, over forty German bombers being destroyed on the first day for the loss of ten Hurricanes in combat or through forced landings. Several New Zealanders were among those who reported successful engage- ments. Early in the day Flying Officer ‘Cobber’ Kain of No. 73 Squadron shot down one of nine Dornier 215s which he intercepted while on patrol over Metz. He dived on the enemy and singled out a Dornier for attack, but overshot. However, by turning quickly, he was able to attack and shoot down another bomber in the formation. Two other New Zealanders in the thick of the air fighting on 10 May were Pilot Officers Dini

Pilot Officer A. S. Dini; born Christchurch, 7 Jan 1918; joined RAF Mar 1938 killed in flying accident, 31 May 1940.

and Saunders.

Pilot Officer G. C. Saunders; born Wellington, 21 Dec 1916; joined RAF Oct 1938; killed on air operations, 14 May 1940.

Dini was flying with No. 607 Squadron which had only just exchanged its Gladiators for Hurricanes. In three attacks on enemy bombers he was able to claim one Heinkel destroyed and two possibles. His first encounter took place near Lille when, after an initial burst, the enemy machine ‘emitted a cloud of oil and smoke and was last seen diving towards the ground.’ Shortly afterwards he was on patrol with another pilot from his squadron when they intercepted seven Heinkels over Audenarde. Dini attacked the last aircraft of the formation and saw it fall away and crash in flames. His third encounter of the day took place in the evening, when he intercepted three Heinkels near Douai. Smoke poured from both engines of the machine he attacked, but oil on the windscreen of his Hurricane prevented observation of its fate. Saunders, flying with No. 87 Hurricane Squadron based near Lille, gained his first victory in an engagement with six bombers over Thionville. A shower of debris fell away from one enemy machine after his first burst; it then dropped out of formation and went into a steep dive. Saunders renewed his attack but came under severe fire from the remaining bombers. He managed to put a long burst into one of them and then saw it break away and fall, apparently out of control. Shortly afterwards the radiator of his Hurricane collapsed and Saunders was temporarily blinded with glycol, but he was able to return safely to his aerodrome. A few days later he was shot down while attacking a formation of bombers heavily escorted by fighters. Another pilot to score a success on the first day of the German attack was Flight Lieutenant Malfroy,

Wing Commander C. E. Malfroy, DFC, DFC (US); born Hokitika, 21 Jan 1909; Cambridge University Air Squadron, 1931–32; entered RAF Aug 1939; commanded No. 417 Sqdn, 1941; No. 66 Sqdn, 1942; CFI, No. 61 OTU, 1942; Training Staff No. 10 Fighter Group, 1942–43; Wing Leader, Exeter, 1943–44; commanded No. 145 airfield, 1944; Staff duties, AEAF and SHAEF, 1944; commanded RAF Station Portreath, 1944, and RAF Station, Warmwell, 1945.

who was with one of three reinforcement squadrons of Hurricanes sent from England during the afternoon of 10 May. Immediately upon their arrival in France these squadrons found themselves in the very thick of the fray, and before darkness fell Malfroy's squadron had accounted for six of the enemy. His own victim was a Heinkel 111, one of a formation intercepted near Bethonville, east of Rheims.

The days which followed were equally active and the fighter pilots were called upon to perform feats of endurance that taxed their physical strength to the limit. Because of the small number of aircraft available they had to fulfil a triple role—escorting bombers, attacking enemy columns on the move, and defending their own areas from attack. New Zealand pilots had further successes in the course of these patrols, Kain in particular displaying remarkable skill in combat and establishing himself as an outstanding pilot. On 11 May he destroyed a Dornier 215, his Hurricane being damaged during the combat. The next day, while escorting bombers to attack enemy convoys, he shot down a Henschel 126 and saw it crash near Bouillon. On the 14th Flying Officer Stratton destroyed a Junkers 87 in a combat, during which his squadron drew ‘the unwelcome attention of hordes of Messer- schmitts'. This was over Sedan, the scene of many bitter air battles. Here the Germans were operating large numbers of bombers, many formations being heavily escorted by fighters, so that the Hurricane pilots almost invariably fought against heavy odds. Yet they frequently clawed down their opponents at the rate of three or four to one.

Typical of the aggressive spirit which the British airmen continued to display was Pilot Officer Simpson's

Flying Officer G. M. Simpson; born Christchurch, 22 Jun 1919; joined RAF Oct 1938; killed on air operations, 26 Oct 1940.

engagement with a Messerschmitt 110 on 18 May. After attacking with a long burst, Simpson saw the Messerschmitt make a sudden turn and dive towards the ground, so he broke away. But the enemy recovered and made off over the treetops. Simpson gave chase and after a long pursuit, during which he exhausted all his ammunition, was rewarded by seeing his quarry hit the ground and break up. The following day Kain scored a further success while flying with his squadron as escort to Allied bombers detailed to attack German columns north of the Aisne. On the way to this target enemy bombers were sighted, with three formations of Messerschmitts flying high above them. The Hurricanes set about the bombers, Kain getting a burst into a Junkers 88 in a head-on attack. He then turned and attacked the same machine from the rear and saw it plunge earthwards. The German fighters now dived to join in the fray and Kain fired on one of them, a Messerschmitt 110, as it emerged from a cloud. The enemy machine turned over and spiralled down into the clouds below, black smoke pouring from it. Altogether in this engagement the Hurricanes claimed seven bombers and one fighter for the loss of three of their own formation. Earlier on the same day Flying Officer Ward,

Squadron Leader D. H. Ward, DFC and bar; born Whangarei, 31 Jul 1917; joined RAF Jun 1938; commanded No. 73 Sqdn, Middle East, 1941–42; killed on air operations, 17 Jun 1942.

flying in a section of four Hurricanes, was responsible for the destruction of a Henschel 126 intercepted near Valenciennes. After one of his section had attacked without result, Ward followed and got in several good bursts. As he broke away smoke began to pour from the German machine. He then closed and made a second attack, whereupon the enemy aircraft blew up in the air. Ward had arrived in France only two days previously in company with five other pilots to deliver new aircraft to No. 87 Squadron. On hearing how sorely pressed the unit was at the time, the ferry pilots, who had no definite orders, elected to remain in France. They went into action immediately and took part in the many tasks the squadron was called upon to perform. Only two of the six—one being Ward—lived to return to England.

The strain of conflict was now becoming severe as the fighter squadrons were subjected to increasing pressure from German fighters over the airfields in France. Frequent bombing attacks on these bases also demanded that considerable effort be expended in defending them. Enemy air operations, on the other hand, were wholly offensive and increasingly effective in disrupting the Allied defences. Nevertheless the fighter pilots continued to fly intensively on interception patrols and operated from forward airfields until the last possible moment. On one occasion a flight of Hurricanes returning from patrol were about to land at their advanced landing ground when they were frantically waved away by men on the ground. Somewhat puzzled, the pilots opened up their engines and went round again to find a column of German tanks moving up to the airfield.

Throughout this first week of the campaign the British bomber squadrons in France attempted to reply to the enemy's air attacks and delay the advance of his ground forces. In doing so they suffered heavy losses. This was particularly the case with the Battle squadrons which were at first employed on low-level opera- tions. It was considered that this form of attack would render them less vulnerable to the enemy's fighters, but the fact that the German columns were well equipped with anti-aircraft guns had not been realised. Thirteen out of 32 Battles were lost in one attack on the first day. On the following day, of eight despatched all failed to return. It was not long before nearly half the small group of New Zealand airmen serving with these units had been posted missing on operations. The Battle aircraft was already obsolescent before the campaign began. It was virtually defenceless from the rear and its speed quite insufficient for evasion when attacked by fighters or exposed to accurate fire from the ground. On 12 May an attempt was made to check the German advance towards Brussels by bombing road junctions and bridges over the Albert Canal near Maastricht, but only one of the five Battles despatched survived and it was badly damaged. Of 24 Blenheims which took off from English bases to make an attack on similar targets in Maastricht itself, ten were lost. Both formations not only encountered severe anti-aircraft fire in the target area but were also heavily assailed by enemy fighters. Three of the missing aircraft were captained by New Zealanders, Flying Officer Bassett

Flying Officer T. G. Bassett; born Te Kopuru, 12 Oct 1917; joined RAF Jun 1938 killed on air operations, 12 May 1940.

and Pilot Officers Frankish

Pilot Officer C. R. Frankish; born Wanganui, 17 Dec 1914; joined RAF Jan 1938; killed on air operations, 12 May 1940.

and Keedwell.

Pilot Officer O. H. Keedwell; born Levin, 10 Jun 1913; joined RAF Oct 1938; killed on air operations, 12 May 1940.

Among those who returned safely was Flying Officer Trent,

Squadron Leader L. H. Trent, VC, DFC; RAF; born Nelson, 14 Apr 1915; joined RAF Aug 1938; p.w. 3 May 1943.

who led a section of Blenheims in the attack.

Heavier bombers, based in the United Kingdom, were also operating over the battle area from the beginning of the campaign. Their first attack was launched on the night of 10 May against the important Dutch airfield at Waalhaven, near Rotterdam, and three Wellingtons from No. 75 New Zealand Squadron were among the 36 aircraft detailed. Crews reported hits on buildings as well as on the aerodrome itself, and the Dutch were able to recapture Waalhaven for a short period the following morning. During the next four days and nights New Zealand airmen were among the crews of the small formations of Blenheims and Wellingtons which flew from England to attack enemy columns, bridges and road junctions, Wellingtons from No. 75 Squadron operating on two nights against such targets without loss. But the bombing attacks were insufficient to hinder the rapid advance of the enemy. By 14 May pressure against the Allied forces in Belgium was increasing while, farther south, the situation in the area round Sedan was deteriorating rapidly. Here was the most serious of the penetrations the enemy had made in the Allied lines. Powerful armoured forces had broken through weak French defences north of the Maginot Line, crossed the Meuse and made their way into open country, where they met with practically no opposition.

On the afternoon of 14 May a large-scale attack by some seventy bombers based in France was launched against bridges and roads near Sedan. Throughout their flight the Battles and Blenheims were harried by enemy fighters and at least forty were shot down, some of them before they reached the target area. Pilot Officer Cunningham

Pilot Officer V. A. Cunningham; born Wellington, 24 Apr 1916; joined RAF Aug 1939; killed on air operations, 14 May 1940.

lost his life while making a gallant attempt to machine-gun a bridgehead. Pilot Officer Oakley

Flight Lieutenant H. L. Oakley; Birmingham, England; born Ashburton, 6 May 1917; joined RAF Aug 1939; transferred RNZAF Aug 1943.

was also shot down but managed to escape with minor injuries and was flying again with his squadron on the following day. A third New Zealander, Flying Officer Fitzgerald,

Wing Commander T. B. Fitzgerald, DFC; RNZAF; Wellington; born Timaru, 11 Jul 1919; joined RNZAF Jun 1937; transferred RAF Jun 1938; test pilot, Hawker Aircraft Ltd., 1942; test pilot, De Havilland Aircraft Company Ltd., 1943–44; Wing Leader, Coltishall 1944; Admin duties, HQ 2nd TAF, 1945.

although wounded, carried out a daring low-level attack, was badly shot up and crash-landed. The enemy had been quick to establish an effective fighter and anti-aircraft defence over the whole area round Sedan. As a result, the bombing attacks succeeded in halting the German advance only for a few hours.

During the next few days the whole situation changed rapidly. The German armoured forces poured through the widening gap at Sedan and advanced westward towards the valley of the Somme and the Channel ports. Further north, the Allied forces in Belgium began their withdrawal, abandoning Brussels and Antwerp. With the enemy's rapid advance and his bombing of landing grounds, the air forces in France were forced to retire to less vulnerable positions in the rear, and from this time onwards a succession of moves, combined with failing communications and supplies, had their effect on operations from bases on the Continent.

One squadron record contains the following note: Once again the squadron packed up…. The convoy arrived after a hectic journey minus the ration lorry which had been struck by a bomb during the night. Eventually we established ourselves in tents in a forest alongside the airfield which was very boggy in patches.’

In addition, the roads were crowded with refugees, making it difficult to distinguish friend from foe. The presence of these refugees on the roads did, however, make it easier for airmen who were shot down to return to their units. One New Zealand pilot, who baled out over Belgium after being attacked by a swarm of Messerschmitts, landed near some German tanks. He hid in a wood for some time, then got old clothes from a farmhouse and eventually, after ‘dodging about for eight days', as he put it, joined a refugee column with which he remained for a further week. At last a lorry gave him a lift to the vicinity of the airfield where his squadron was based, and he arrived back just in time to join in the retreat before the airfield was captured. Another New Zealander, shot down after a combat in which he had accounted for at least one of his assailants, found himself far behind the German lines. A Belgian gave him clothes in which he disguised himself as a peasant refugee. For ten days he moved across country towards the German front, which he passed by crawling through long grass and swimming a canal. Occasionally he obtained food and shelter at a farmhouse or cottage and finally reached Dunkirk, only to be arrested by the French. He managed to establish his true identity, however, and got back to England in a motor torpedo-boat. On rejoining his squadron he found that he had been listed as killed and his affairs wound up. Even a forced landing in France could be a hazardous business; one bomber pilot writes of ‘spending a bad hour with a farmer who brandished a shot gun’, before he was identified and rescued by a member of his squadron.

Despite the adverse conditions under which they now operated, the squadrons in France continued to fly an amazing number of sorties. The bombers, flying at a higher level, attacked bridges, troop concentrations and armoured vehicles in a gallant effort to stem the German advance. On 26 May Flying Officer Vernon,

Flying Officer J. E. Vernon, DFC; born Roxburgh, 21 Aug 1915; joined RAF Aug 1938; killed on air operations, 7 Jun 1940.

who was with No. 150 Battle Squadron, led a particularly daring attack on a German headquarters at a chateau near Recogne, in Belgium. In the vicinity of the target the formation he was leading lost touch while flying through a storm, but Vernon went on to locate and bomb his objective. On the return flight he was attacked by six Messerschmitts, but by skilful flying he evaded their initial attacks and his gunner was able to shoot down one Messerschmitt and set fire to another. However, the remaining fighters continued to attack and seriously damaged the British bomber. With its engine failing, the Battle began to lose height rapidly and Vernon was forced to land in enemy territory. He assisted his wounded crew from the aircraft and set it on fire. A German patrol approached and took the wounded men prisoner, but Vernon managed to escape, reach the French lines, and make his way back to his unit. A fortnight later he was lost while making a low-level attack on a German convoy.

Wellingtons, Whitleys, and Blenheims continued to operate from the United Kingdom, although the effort of these home-based forces was now partly directed against communications and oil targets in Germany. There was some disagreement at this time as to whether the heavier bombers should be employed in a strategic or tactical role, but eventually the critical situation which developed in the north forced their employment more in close-support operations during the remainder of the campaign.

Although it had been previously decided that, in the event of a German attack in the West, Bomber Command should attack oil targets in the Ruhr, the opening days of the German offensive witnessed much debate on these matters. The British Air Staff were of the opinion that the role of the heavier bomber was a strategic one, i.e., the attack on German industry and communications, and they were anxious to conserve their slender force of these aircraft for this purpose. However, at this period the relative power of the opposing air forces was so disproportionate that the employment of the British bomber force, in whatever form, would not have redressed the adverse balance which had been struck upon the ground.

At first, Wellingtons from No. 75 New Zealand Squadron carried out each type of operation. On the night of 15 May, six of these aircraft formed part of the force which made the first bombing raid on objectives in Germany. It was aimed primarily at oil plants in the Ruhr, but unfortunately bad visibility prevented the majority of the bombers from identifying and attacking these installations.

The difficulty of identifying towns, let alone individual factories, in the smoke-laden Ruhr, had yet to be realised.

Two nights later the squadron again provided six aircraft, this time as part of a force of 50 bombers detailed to attack objectives in the Ruhr and river crossings at Namur, Dinant and Givet. Again cloud rendered recognition of the targets uncertain, although the six Wellingtons were among the aircraft which reported having made attacks. For the rest of the month the majority of the 43 sorties despatched by No. 75 Squadron were, along with the general effort of Bomber Command, in support of the hard-pressed ground forces. On the night of 19 May one of the objectives was the forests around Fumay and Bouillon where the enemy had concentrated fuel and ammunition supplies. Eleven Wellingtons, seven of them from the New Zealand Squadron, were given the task of setting these forests alight. All the crews located the target and, attacking with both incendiaries and high explosives, succeeded in starting many fires. There was considerable opposition from anti-aircraft batteries in the target area and many of the bombers were hit; one Wellington from No. 75 Squadron had a shell pass right through it without exploding. All returned safely. Subsequent targets for the bombers included the Meuse crossings, railway and road junctions, bridges, troop concentrations and points of congestion close behind the enemy lines. Similar objectives in the north were also bombed by units of Coastal Command based in south-east England, with which a small group of New Zealand airmen were flying. From the commencement of the campaign these squadrons had been called upon to supplement the operations of the other commands against the enemy's advances in Holland and Belgium. They were also employed in protecting supply ships crossing the Channel.

By 20 May the situation on the Continent was critical. The enemy had widened the breach at Sedan and the advance of his columns beyond Cambrai towards Arras now threatened the rear of the Allied armies in Belgium. In fact the forces in the north of the German irruption were, as the enemy raced towards the Channel coast, increasingly cut off from those in the south. By the 22nd this severance was complete. The Germans then exerted maximum pressure on the land forces in Belgium and within a few days it became clear that retirement on Dunkirk and evacuation from that port was the best that could be hoped for the Allies in the north.

Throughout those crowded days of the last week of May 1940, when Belgian resistance collapsed and the armies in the north fought doggedly to hold Dunkirk and its perimeter, the British air squadrons made strenuous efforts to stem the German advance and to beat off the attacks of the Luftwaffe on the bridgehead. Following the withdrawal of the majority of the fighter squadrons from France on 22 May, fighter patrols over the northern battle area had to be flown from airfields in England, but in spite of this handicap the British squadrons continued to give battle, and indeed, as the main strength of the home-based fighter units was thrown in, the Luftwaffe began to falter. In particular the appearance over Belgium of new British aircraft, such as the Spitfire and Defiant, had a most disconcerting effect on the German airmen, and, on more than one occasion, an enemy formation jettisoned its bombs and fled at the sight of a few Spitfires. ‘Now for the first time,’ noted General Halder in his diary on 24 May, ‘enemy air superiority has been reported by Kleist.’ And on the same day the War Diary of the German 19 Corps recorded: ‘Enemy fighter resistance is so strong that our own air reconnaissance was practically impossible.’

It was during this period of intensive air activity that many fighter pilots first saw action against the enemy. Men who had come eagerly to Fighter Command and spent long months in training, yearning all the while for combat, were now given the opportunity of showing their mettle and matching their skill against that of the German pilots.

Shortly afterwards one New Zealander wrote home: ‘When the Germans invaded Belgium and France no one in my Squadron had seen a German aircraft, much less been in action against one. We'd had plenty of flying but it wasn't very different from peace-time flying. Like a lot of others we were just waiting to get our chance. We didn't have to wait long!’

Among the New Zealanders who reported successful engagements during the third week of May were Flight Lieutenants F. N. Clouston

Flight Lieutenant F. N. Clouston; born Motueka, 27 Jan 1913; joined RAF Aug 1938; killed on air operations, 29 May 1940.

and W. G. Clouston,

Wing Commander W. G. Clouston, DFC; RAF; born Auckland, 15 Jan 1916; joined RAF 1936; commanded No. 258 Sqdn, 1940–41; No. 488 (NZ) Sqdn, 1941–42; p.w. (Singapore) Feb 1942.

Pilot Officers Deere

Wing Commander A. C. Deere, DSO, OBE, DFC and bar, DFC (US), Croix de Guerre (Fr); RAF; born Auckland, 12 Dec 1917; joined RAF 1937; commanded No. 602 Sqdn, 1941; Wing Leader, Biggin Hill, 1943; Wing Commander No. 84 Group, 1944–45; commanded RAF Station, Duxford, 1945–46; Air Staff, Malta, 1948–49; commanded RAF Station, North Weald, 1952-.

and Gray,

Wing Commander C. F. Gray, DSO, DFC and two bars; RAF; born Christchurch, 9 Nov 1914; joined RAF Jan 1939; commanded Nos. 403, 616, 64 and 81 Squadrons, 1941–43; Wing Leader, Malta, Sicily and Europe, 1943–45; commanded RAF Station, Skeabrae, 1945; Directorate of Air Foreign Liaison, 1947–49; British Joint Services Mission, Washington, 1949-.

Flying Officer Brinsden,

Wing Commander F. N. Brinsden; RAF; born Takapuna, 27 Mar 1919; joined RAF 1937; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944; p.w. 19 Aug 1943; retransferred RAF, 1947.

and Pilot Officers Cobden,

Pilot Officer D. G. Cobden; born Christchurch, 11 Aug 1914; joined RAF Aug 1938; killed on air operations, 11 Aug 1940.

Gibson,

Squadron Leader J. A. A. Gibson, DSO, DFC; Auckland; born Christchurch, 24 Aug 1916; joined RAF May 1938; commanded No. 15 (RNZAF) Sqdn, 1943–44.

Newton,

Flying Officer K. E. Newton; born London, 24 Sep 1915; joined RAF Jun 1938; killed on air operations, 28 Jun 1940.

Trousdale,

Wing Commander R. M. Trousdale, DFC and bar; born Auckland, 23 Jan 1921; joined RAF Mar 1939; transferred RNZAF Jan 1945; commanded No. 488 (NZ) Sqdn, 1942–43; killed in aircraft accident, 16 Jun 1947.

and Yule.

Wing Commander R. D. Yule, DSO, DFC and bar; RAF; born Invercargill, 29 Jan 1920; Cranwell Cadet, 1938–39; permanent commission RAF Oct 1939; commanded No. 66 Sqdn, 1942; Wing Leader, No. 15 Wing, 1943–44.

Sometimes successes were shared with other members of a formation, but more often they were individual efforts. On 18 May Yule was on patrol over Belgium with a flight of three Hurricanes when they intercepted twelve Heinkel bombers flying through broken cloud. They followed the formation through and attacked when it came out into a clear patch. Yule saw the Heinkel he selected crash to earth. A few days later F. N. Clouston was leading his Hurricane squadron over the battle area when they encountered a swarm of Messerschmitts and a series of dogfights developed. Clouston saw a cloud of smoke and steam pour from the side of the first machine he attacked. The second dived into the edge of a small wood. About the same time his namesake, W. G. Clouston, scored a double success. He was leading a section of his squadron on patrol over Dunkirk and Calais when they met two formations of dive-bombers, about twenty in all, escorted by some thirty fighters. Clouston went for the dive-bombers. His first target turned slowly on its back and dived into the sea. In an attack on a second Junkers he experienced severe crossfire, but saw pieces fall off the enemy machine which then burst into flames.

Flying with another section of his squadron on the same patrol was Flying Officer Brinsden. When about to join combat he saw Clouston's first victim go into the sea. A few seconds later he was able to send another dive-bomber hurtling after it. Deere scored a first double success in more unusual circumstances on 23 May. He was one of two Spitfire pilots detailed to escort a Miles Master —a two-seater training aircraft—that was attempting to rescue a British pilot forced down at Calais-Marck, an airfield which by this time was in no-man's-land. The three aircraft reached this airfield without incident, but just as the trainer was taking off with its passenger, Deere's companion shouted over the radio-telephone that Messerschmitts were approaching. Almost at the same moment one of them dived on the Master but overshot. Deere at once turned on the Messerschmitt and fired two short bursts. It carried on for a short distance then crashed into the sea a few yards from the shore, where its tail remained sticking up out of the water for some months afterwards. He then set about another German fighter which turned over on its back and crashed in Calais itself. An attack on a third Messerschmitt found Deere with his ammunition exhausted so he made for the nearest cloud and returned safely across the Channel. Meawhile, the training aircraft and Deere's companion, who had destroyed at least one other German fighter, had also made good their escape.

On the following day Deere's No. 54 Squadron, with which Gray was also flying, experienced its first big air battle when it engaged two large bomber formations escorted by Messerschmitts. In the many dogfights which followed nine German aircraft were claimed destroyed, with an additional four probables. Of these Deere was credited with one Messerschmitt destroyed and Gray with a probable, in what was his first combat. The next day Gray shared in the destruction of another Messerschmitt whilst escorting Allied bombers over Gravelines, but his Spitfire was badly damaged by fire both from enemy aircraft and the ground. Deere had a similar experience the following morning while escorting ammunition ships into Dunkirk. His section of Spitfires engaged some twenty Messerschmitts and in the resulting mêlèe he had his port wing partly shot away. However, he was able to claim two of the enemy before breaking away to limp home. He afterwards reported tersely:

We saw enemy bombers attacking destroyers off Calais. On going into attack, we were in turn set upon by Messerschmitts 110s. Shot one down in flames after three bursts but immediately became sandwiched between two more, experiencing considerable fire. Steep turned and got on the tail of one of them and after three short bursts, both his engines commenced smoking and, losing height rapidly, he prepared to land north of Calais.

While the air battles continued, the Allied forces in the north were being compelled to give ground. In spite of a dogged defence, Calais fell on 26 May and the evacuation from Dunkirk began that evening. During the next seven days ships of the Royal Navy, assisted by small craft of all kinds, plied back and forth across the Channel carrying the battle-worn troops of the British Expeditionary Force to England. All the time the Germans were pressing in upon the narrow exit from the east and from the west, while the main effort of the Luftwaffe was turned against Dunkirk, its beaches and the crowded ships. Bombers and dive-bombers, with their attendant fighters, were thrown in to the fullest extent that local airfields and supplies permitted. To frustrate these attempts to prevent the evacuation, the squadrons of the Royal Air Force now concentrated upon protecting the Dunkirk area and covering the Channel crossing, while the town of Dunkirk itself, covered by a great pall of black smoke from burning oil depots and abandoned equipment, formed a sombre background to the struggle on land and in the air.

Throughout these grim and desperate days Bomber Command Wellingtons and Blenheims gave valuable assistance to the ground forces striving to prevent the enemy from reaching the beaches. No. 75 Squadron made nine attacks and crews reported good results on each occasion. Meanwhile the Ansons and Hudsons of Coastal Command were busy protecting the stream of small craft making their way to the English coast. They also searched for the helpless —the crowded lifeboats, the men drifting on rafts or in the sea— and, having found them, directed ships to their rescue. But it was inevitable that the main burden of protecting the evacuation should fall upon the fighter squadrons. How well they acquitted themselves in this task is best indicated by the heavy losses they inflicted on the enemy. During the period 27 May to 3 June the Germans, according to their own records, lost 189 aircraft, while British losses during the same period were 131 machines of which 99 were fighters. As the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force afterwards reported: ‘The embarkation of the force would have been well-nigh impossible but for the fighter protection provided.’

The fighter patrols over Dunkirk were controlled by No. 11 Fighter Group, which at this time was under Air Vice-Marshal Park. He was now 48 years of age and was just recovering from a serious operation. Nevertheless, he was not content to direct the battle from England but flew his Hurricane over Dunkirk to study the situation which had developed. On his return he urged that patrols in greater strength be flown over the evacuation area, but the problem was how to meet the conflicting demands of strength and continuity and yet conserve the slender fighter force for the great trial of strength over Britain which was impending. These considerations had restricted the first patrols over Dunkirk to single squadrons, with consequent heavier losses in combat. After strong and repeated representations Park was able to employ patrols of two squadron strength, and although this meant leaving short periods during which there was no air cover, casualties were reduced and there was a marked increase in the number of successful combats. The British squadrons were able to break up many of the enemy formations and thus mitigate the intensity of the bombing attacks on the points of embarkation. Inevitably many of the combats took place out of sight of the troops on the beaches, so that the effect of this intervention was not fully realised at the time. Yet fighter Command did succeed in achieving a large measure of air superiority over Dunkirk, and in so doing scored a notable victory over the hitherto all-conquering Luftwaffe. A few days later, in the course of one of his characteristic speeches of those days, Winston Churchill declared:

Wars are not won by evacuations. But there was a victory inside this deliverance which should be noted. It was gained by the Air Force. Many of our soldiers coming back have not seen the Air Force at work; they saw only the bombers which escaped its protective attack. They underrate its achievements …. There was a great trial of strength between the British and German air forces…. They tried hard but they were beaten back; they were frustrated in their task.

Many of the New Zealand fighter pilots who took part in the Dunkirk patrols scored successes against the enemy. Several had remarkable escapes. One day Flying Officer Ward had his Hurricane badly damaged in combat over Belgium. The gun sights were shot away and his starboard petrol tank was leaking, so he decided to land on a French aerodrome and refuel before returning across the Channel. But just as he began to glide down he saw two Dorniers begin a dive-bombing attack on the airfield he intended to use. Ward dived on the tail of one of them and gave it two short bursts, hitting it despite the absence of gun sights. The second Dornier escaped into cloud. Again he prepared to land but was almost at once attacked by German fighters. However, after some sharp evasive action he managed to get down. The damaged tank was now spurting petrol and the ground staff refused to refuel his aircraft as they regarded it as suicidal for him to fly the machine in that condition. Ward then seized a bayonet and opened out the holes in the leaking tank, emptying it, and then had the other filled. With insufficient ammunition or petrol for further combat he took off for England, only to run into a formation of six Messerschmitts a few moments later. He gave the leader a burst as he came down head-on, then dived to escape further attack and returned safely across the Channel.

Unlike many fighter pilots, Ward was not superstitious. His Hurricane bore a coat of arms of his own designing—a shield, quartered, bearing a broken hand-mirror, a hand holding a match lighting three cigarettes, a man walking under a ladder the figure 13, and under the shield the motto: ‘So what the hell.’

On 28 May Deere was leading his squadron on their fourth patrol of the day when they encountered 17 Dorniers. In the engagement which followed, return fire from one of these aircraft hit the oil system of his Spitfire, and while Deere was half blinded by smoke from the burning oil his engine seized. He was then flying at barely 800 feet over the Belgian coast between Nieuport and Dunkirk, so he made for a stretch of beach along which his Spitfire slithered, finally coming to rest on its nose. Although injured in the head Deere scrambled out of his aircraft, set it on fire, and began to make his way on foot towards Dunkirk. After a hazardous and eventful journey, partly made by converting abandoned cars to his own use, he finally reached that port and returned by ship to England.

On the same day Pilot Officer Newton, after destroying a Messerschmitt in a whirlwind combat, had his Spitfire badly damaged in a further encounter and was forced to bale out over the sea. He was picked up by a hospital ship bound for Dunkirk, and although bombed and machine-gunned during that night, it got back to England the next day and Newton returned safely to his squadron. A similar experience befell Squadron Leader McGregor a few days later. His Hurricane was badly shot up whilst he was leading his squadron against a large formation of German aircraft and he was forced to land in the sea. By a most fortunate chance he was picked up by a ship returning to Dover.

During the last days of May the tempo of action increased considerably as the Germans intensified their attacks on the area around Dunkirk. Formations of dive-bombers, heavily escorted by fighters, were sent to attack the port and the beaches, the ships and the troops who were fighting fiercely to hold the shrinking perimeter. But, throughout each day, fighter patrols took off from airfields in the south-east of England in an effort to supply continuous cover over the Dunkirk area. Frequent interceptions of enemy formations led to short, sharp battles in which the air momentarily filled with whirling aircraft and the sky resounded with the crackle of machine-gun fire. Occasionally a smoke-trailing aircraft crashed into the sea. But the engagements seldom lasted more than a few minutes, except perhaps for the relentless pursuit of a damaged machine. The short endurance of the fighter aircraft was a limiting factor, as in combat fuel was consumed at an alarming rate. Typical of the brief encounters which took place was that which occurred early in the morning of 1 June. A squadron of Spitfires was on patrol over Dunkirk when a formation of some twenty-five German fighters was sighted. Although outnumbered by over two to one, the Spitfires went straight into the attack. A ‘free for all’ quickly developed during which friend and foe became involved in a swirling mass of machines. The performance of the Spitfire surprised the Germans, and the British pilots accounted for at least six of the enemy for the loss of only one of their number. Flight Lieutenant W. G. Clouston was leading a section of this squadron. After attacking one Messerschmitt he saw another come out of cloud just ahead, so he turned and set about it. Tracer entered the enemy machine, which pulled up into a steep climb and then went down in a spiral dive. A moment later he singled out another Messerschmitt and closed in, firing all the time. The enemy stalled and went into a spin from which it failed to recover. On the same day Flight Lieutenant Mowat

Wing Commander N. J. Mowat, DSO; born Oamaru, 18 Sep 1914; joined RAF Mar 1939; transferred RNZAF Jan 1945; commanded No. 607 Sqdn, 1941–42; No. 166 Wing, India, 1942–43; held various appointments India and ACSEA, 1943–44; commanded RAF Station, Peterhead, 1944–45; killed in flying accident, 7 Nov 1946.

was flying with a Hurricane squadron on patrol near Dunkirk when they sighted ‘a mass formation of bombers escorted by Messerschmitts. The squadron went into attack and a general dog-fight followed ….’ In the course of this engagement Mowat attacked one Messerschmitt, which tried to evade by making steep dives and turns. He closed in, firing short bursts, and saw pieces fall off the enemy machine as it went down in a vertical dive. Pilot Officer Trousdale was with a flight of Spitfires which sighted seven Messerschmitts circling below them. They immediately dived to attack. Trousdale got on the tail of one of them and opened fire. Smoke poured from the enemy machine, which spiralled down out of control.

Such were the engagements in which the fighter pilots were involved as again and again they returned to the battle area to challenge the Luftwaffe and make their contribution to the salvation of the thousands of men on the beaches below. Their efforts were not in vain, for the evacuation was succeeding beyond all expecta- tions.

On 4 June the British Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons, ‘… a week ago I feared it would be my lot to announce the greatest military disaster in our history’.

The harbour and approaches to Dunkirk and its neighbouring beaches were thick with craft of every kind, and as the battle continued on land and in the air above, the troops boarded their boats in orderly fashion. Some carried Bren guns which they tied to the rigging and used as anti-aircraft weapons. Others fired their rifles in defiance as the German aircraft swooped down on them. Ships were battered or sunk and there were casualties; but repeatedly, as the waves of bombers came over to attack, the British fighters broke in among them and drove them off or marred their aim so that their bombs fell harmlessly into the sea.

The protective patrols were continued until 4 June, by which time some 336,000 British and French troops had been disembarked in the south-eastern ports of England. On that day Admiral Ramsay,

Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, KCB, KBE, MVO; born 1883; entered RN 1898; Flag Officer Commanding, Dover, 1939–42; commanded Eastern Task Force, Mediterranean, 1943; died 2 Jan 1945.

who was in command of the operation, addressed the following message to the Commanders-in-Chief of Fighter, Bomber, and Coastal Commands:

I and the forces under my command who have been engaged on the evacuation of the Allied Armies owe a deep debt of gratitude to the Royal Air Force for the support and protection which they have given to us. We are fully conscious of the severe strain these operations have imposed on all taking part and we are filled with admiration for the courage and devotion of our comrades in the air.

After the retirement from Dunkirk, a few New Zealanders remained in France with the British air units to the south of the German breakthrough, and during the next fortnight these squadrons did what they could to impede the enemy as he turned to complete the conquest of France. Gallant attacks were made on the advancing German columns by the remnants of the bomber squadrons, while the fighters continued to engage superior numbers in combat. But their efforts were unavailing in the face of the enemy's overwhelming strength and the growing dislocation in the Allies' rear. Even the bases from which the British aircraft operated were now often of an improvised nature—one New Zealand bomber pilot writes of flying during this time from ‘a hastily prepared wheatfield with the fences pulled down and the bumps flattened by the Royal Engineers'. The bomber squadrons continued to suffer heavy losses and New Zealand airmen were among those killed or taken prisoner of war. On 11 June Flying Officer Peryman

Flight Lieutenant B. W. Peryman; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 13 Dec 1919; joined RNZAF Sep 1938; transferred RAF Aug 1939; retransferred RNZAF Apr 1944; p.w. 11 Jun 1940.

was pilot of one of six Battles which took off from Vendome to bomb a bridge across which the Germans were advancing towards Paris. During the attack his aircraft was hit in one of the petrol tanks. It blew up and flames enveloped the cockpit, forcing the crew to bale out. Peryman was the last to leave and his parachute had barely opened before he struck the ground. He had been severely burned about the face, hands and body, and was taken to hospital by the members of a German unit which captured him. In spite of his injuries he attempted to escape the next day but was caught while climbing over a wall.

The German Air Force now directed all its energies to the continuous bombing of communications, towns and airfields, gradually paralysing and undermining the defence. During the third week of June, as the collapse of France became imminent, the remaining squadrons of the Royal Air Force were withdrawn to England. By that time they had fought a vigorous rearguard action across France, through the areas of Rheims and Troyes to the region of the Loire. Finally, operating from the vicinity of Nantes, the fighters had covered the evacuation of the remaining Allied forces from the western ports of France. In all squadrons few of the original flying personnel survived; one Battle squadron, it is recorded, had lost its complete complement of aircrew twice over.

It was during the last days in France, on 5 June, that Flying Officer ‘Cobber’ Kain, whose No. 73 Squadron was one of the few fighter units left on the Continent, engaged in what was to be his last combat and shot down a Messerschmitt near Rheims. Two days later he was killed whilst enjoying a final flight over his own airfield before proceeding to England. He was carrying out aerobatics at a low level when a wing-tip of his Hurricane touched the ground and the machine cartwheeled across the airfield and was wrecked. During the early months of the war, when there was little activity in the air, Kain's exploits received phenomenal publicity in the press and he was acclaimed as the Empire's first air ace of the Second World War. This distinction still appears well justified

The officer of Kain's squadron who compiled the combat reports and kept a record of his squadron's successes credits Kain with the destruction of at least 14 enemy aircraft, with several more probables.

and there is ample evidence that Kain's fine offensive spirit, together with his outstanding ability as a fighter pilot, was an inspiration not only to his fellow pilots but also to thousands of young men in his own country and, indeed, throughout the world.

In the course of the brief campaign in France during June 1940, New Zealand airmen also took part in the operations flown from bases in England. Those serving with the fighter squadrons involved carried out offensive patrols and low-level attacks on enemy aero- dromes. They also escorted bombers on their missions over France. One particularly successful low-level attack on an enemy-held aerodrome near Rouen was made on 20 June by the Hurricanes from No. 245 Squadron, commanded by Squadron Leader Whitley.

Group Captain E. W. Whitley, DSO, DFC; RAF; born Epsom, Auckland, 17 Aug 1908; joined RAF 1930; commanded No. 245 Sqdn, 1939–40; RAF Station, Haifa, 1941; No. 234 Wing, Middle East, 1942; Nos. 209 and 210 Groups, Middle East, 1943; Fighter Leaders' School, 1944; No. 58 OTU, 1945; RAF Station, Church Fenton, 1945.

Flying with him were Flight Lieutenant Mowat and Pilot Officer Spence.

Flying Officer D. J. Spence; born Christchurch, 26 Aug 1920; joined RAF Jun 1939 killed on air operations, 30 Apr 1941.

The attack was made by two sections, led by Whitley and Mowat respectively, a third being left above for protection. There were some fifty German aircraft on the ground and a considerable number of these were reported damaged and four left on fire. Targets in France were also attacked on every possible night by Wellingtons and Whitleys of Bomber Command, 27 such sorties being flown by bombers from the New Zealand Squadron during the first part of June. Typically, on the night of the 5th, seven Wellingtons were led by the flight commander, Squadron Leader Kay, in an attack on the crossroads and marshalling yards at Cam- brai. Two nights later eight aircraft were despatched to bomb individual targets: Flight Lieutenant Breckon attacked a bridge across the Somme, while Flying Officers Freeman and N. Williams bombed a road junction south of Bailleaux and Pilot Officer W. M. C. Williams a German convoy near Abbeville. Kay, detailed to attack enemy units sheltering in the forest south of Bailleaux, was able to identify and bomb road junctions by the light of parachute flares and then scatter incendiaries in the forest. They started good fires. Not content with this success, he went down and machine-gunned the woods to add to the enemy's confusion.

Subsequent targets for the Wellingtons included river crossings, road junctions, and railway communications in France in an attempt to impede the German advance to and across the Seine. But in spite of many gallant efforts, the small force available and the inexperience of many of its crews prevented Bomber Command from intervening with any decisive effect in the swift course of events in France. The enemy's superior mechanical and armoured strength on the ground, combined with his overwhelming air power, very quickly brought about the collapse of French resistance and an armistice was signed at Compiègne on 22 June. By the end of the month the majority of the Royal Air Force personnel had returned to the United Kingdom, some not without adventure. ‘We returned to England by various means,’ writes one New Zealand pilot. ‘I finished up at Nantes as things were getting hot; thence to Southampton via Jersey in a Tiger Moth which rather stretched its range. Luckily I had a favourable wind and was not sighted by any hostile aircraft.’

During the last days the airfield at Nantes was crowded with a strange assortment of machines as civil and communication aircraft were pressed into service to aid the evacuation. There were similar scenes at other points. Many men also left from the western ports where the German air attacks on the transports were heavy. Fighter patrols gave what protection they could and were able to drive off many attacks, but one disaster occurred at St. Nazaire on 17 June when the liner Lancastria was dive-bombed and sunk and upwards of 3000 perished. A British pilot from No.1 Squadron reported the destruction of the bomber which hit the ship. The fighter pilots were, in fact, the last to leave, with the enemy vanguard almost within striking distance. On completion of the final evacuation at Cherbourg, the last Hurricane to fly over the town and harbour was, appropriately enough, piloted by Air Vice-Marshal Park.

Throughout the short compaign the British airmen had played their part well. In gallant, if forlorn, attempts to stem the enemy advance they had battled against superior odds in the air, reconnoitred and pressed home attacks in the face of heavy fire from the ground. The casualties suffered by the Royal Air Force during the battles in Belgium and France included over 600 aircrew, nearly half of whom were pilots. In addition it had lost, from all causes, over 900 aircraft, including 386 Hurricanes and 67 Spitfires, losses which the service could ill afford at this early stage of its expansion. On the other hand, the men who survived, particularly the fighter pilots, had acquired battle experience and confidence which were to prove of the greatest value in the violent air battles soon to take place over England.

CHAPTER 4 The Battle of Britain

NOW Hitler stood triumphant in Europe. Only the British people, sheltered for the moment by the narrow moat of the Channel, remained defiant. They knew, however, that the full fury of the enemy would shortly be turned upon their island, and in town and village, factory and garrison, they made ready to withstand the worst the enemy could cast upon them and, if necessary, to resist the invader with whatever weapons remained or could be quickly forged. In these tasks they were inspired by a leader who never failed to express their buoyant and imperturbable spirit. The closing words of his address to the House of Commons on 18 June were typical:

Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age, made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the light of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say: ‘This was their finest hour.’

But while the Germans, for their part, were anxious for a speedy decision, they hoped that Britain would accept defeat without further struggle and end the war. It was not until Hitler's flamboyant peace offers had been repeatedly ignored that the German High Command began to argue their plans for an invasion of Britain. The difficulties of the operation were realised, in particular by the Naval Staff under Admiral Raeder, who insisted that if the operation was to succeed, both the passage and the landing of troops and supplies would have to be protected from aerial attack. This demanded mastery of the air which, in turn, meant the elimination of the fighter arm of the Royal Air Force. The Germans shaped their plans accordingly and so it came about that, during the summer and autumn of 1940, Fighter Command engaged in a series of bitter air battles in defence of the British Isles. They were to prove the most fateful battles of the whole war, and the victory which followed one of the most decisive. The invasion of Britain was prevented and the base from which in time the forces of liberation were to set out and free Europe was preserved. The legend of German invincibility was destroyed and the power of the Luftwaffe considerably weakened.

According to enemy records, a total of 1733 German aircraft were destroyed between 10 July and 31 October 1940. Fighter Command's losses were 915 machines.

While it was the fighter pilots of the Royal Air Force who were primarily responsible for the victory, aircrews of both Bomber and Coastal Commands made a definite contribution to the upset of the enemy's plans. Continuous reconnaissance patrols were flown over the North Sea and the Channel ports by the coastal aircraft, and as the invasion flotillas were seen assembling in the harbours and canals they were heavily attacked by the bombers. Bomber Command also attacked aircraft factories in Germany and the airfields from which the enemy machines flew against Britain, while in the Western Approaches the Hudsons and Sunderlands of Coastal Command continued to protect the convoys carrying petrol and supplies to the British Isles.

Altogether in the fighter battles, the bombing raids, and the various patrols flown between 10 July and 31 October 1940 by the Royal Air Force, 1495 aircrew were killed, of whom 449 were fighter pilots, 718 aircrew from Bomber Command, and 280 from Coastal Command. Among those killed were 47 airmen from Canada, 24 from Australia, 17 from South Africa, 35 from Poland, 20 from Czechoslovakia and six from Belgium. Forty-seven New Zealanders lost their lives, including 15 fighter pilots, 24 bomber and eight coastal aircrew. The names of these Allied and Commonwealth airmen are inscribed in a memorial book which rests in the Battle of Britain Chapel in Westminster Abbey. In the chapel is a stained glass window which contains the badges of the fighter squadrons which operated during the battle and the flags of the nations to which the pilots and aircrew belonged.

But the Battle of Britain was not fought exclusively in the air. The constant devotion to duty of the ground staffs, often under the enemy's fire, was a vital contribution to the victory, while the hard work of Flying Training, Maintenance and Technical Commands greatly increased the flow of men and machines to the fighting units. A notable part was played by the men and women at the anti-aircraft gun sites, while the contribution of those who worked in the aircraft and munition factories should also be remembered.

* * * * *

After the fall of France it was some weeks before the Germans began the attacks designed to bring the British fighter squadrons to battle and destroy them. It was not until 2 July that Hitler issued the first orders to prepare for an invasion; a fortnight later these were followed by a directive stating that, ‘As England, in spite of the hopelessness of her military position, has so far shown herself unwilling to come to any compromise, I have therefore decided to prepare for, and if necessary, carry out an invasion of England. I therefore issue the following orders: 1. The British Air Force must be eliminated to such an extent that it will be incapable of putting up any substantial opposition to the invading troops….’

The German Air Force was now faced with the tasks of deploying its units and arranging for their supply and maintenance in the new positions, so that a further three weeks elapsed before they were able to develop heavy and sustained attacks on Britain. In the meantime, the Germans attempted to draw Fighter Command into battle under unfavourable conditions by sending formations against coastal shipping and ports during daylight, with scattered attacks on inland targets by night.

This short respite from immediate heavy attack enabled the whole defensive system of Fighter Command to be strengthened and extended to cover areas previously regarded as comparatively safe but which now faced enemy-occupied territory. No. 11 Fighter Group was able to recover from the heavy fighting over Dunkirk; squadrons were re-equipped and civilian airfields taken over and prepared as second-line fighter airfields, which later proved invaluable when enemy bombs wrought heavy damage on permanent RAF bases in south-east England. The production of fighter planes was increased considerably, but the shortage of trained pilots remained serious and could not be remedied so easily.

There were only three fighter operational training units at the time. Nevertheless, during the lull between Dunkirk and the start of the German attacks, they worked intensively, an RAF report noting that, ‘Maximum output was helped by the keenness of the pupils; some New Zealanders who had been trained on Gordons and Vincents in their own country, reached Hawarden one evening, spent the night on Spitfire cockpit drill by the light of torches and began flying the following morning. Salvage of aircraft was imperative: if a Spitfire from Hawarden made a forced landing near the Dee, every available man was rushed to the spot to drag it out of reach of the tide. When the battle began the Operational Training Units added unofficial sorties to their other duties and shot down several raiders.’

It was in this respect that the Dominions and Allies were able to make a valuable contribution.

There were, at the beginning of July 1940, 60 New Zealand pilots scattered among the operational squadrons of Fighter Com- mand. During the next two months others reached these units, and by the time the heaviest air fighting ended in October, 95 pilots had served with the fighter squadrons. A few men were also engaged on various tasks in the complex ground organisation. During the battle four New Zealanders, Squadron Leaders Blake,

Wing Commander M. V. Blake, DSO, DFC; born Newman, Eketahuna, 13 Feb 1913; permanent commission RAF 1937; commanded No. 234 Sqdn, 1940–41; Wing Leader, Exeter and Portreath, 1941–42; p.w. 19 Aug 1942.

P. G. Jameson, Lovell-Gregg

Squadron Leader T. G. Lovell-Gregg; born Wanganui, 19 Sep 1912; joined RAF 1931; commanded No. 87 Sqdn, 1940; killed on air operations, 15 Aug 1940.

and H. D. McGregor commanded fighter squadrons, while others, several of whom had taken part in the air fighting over France and Dunkirk, were to lead squadrons or formations against the enemy at various times. Their leadership, born of skill and experience, was a further contribution to the victory which followed. Air Vice-Marshal Park was largely responsible for the conduct of the battle itself,

In his despatch on the Battle of Britain, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, Commander-in-Chief Fighter Command, writes: ‘I must pay a very sincere tribute to Air Vice-Marshal Park for the way in which he adjusted his tactics and interception methods to meet each new development as it occurred…. during periods of intense fighting there was no time for consultation and he acted from day to day on his own initiative.’

since his No. 11 Fighter Group covered south-eastern England and the approaches to London, the area over which the main fighting was to take place. Throughout the battle Park worked tirelessly in the operations room at his headquarters near London where, by means of the unique system for providing advance information that had been developed, it was usually possible to anticipate the enemy's intentions and make the dispositions necessary to engage his air formations. At the same time Park's concern for the men who were fighting the battle was constant and, after a day of heavy attacks, he would often fly his Hurricane to visit squadrons in order to see for himself how they were faring. In his No. 11 Group approximately half the operational squadrons of Fighter Command were concentrated, to be reinforced by neighbouring groups when the situation demanded. In the event, almost every unit in the Command was heavily engaged at some period of the battle, for the squadrons in the south-east became exhausted and had to be interchanged with those in quieter areas.

The main strength of the British fighter force lay in its Hurricanes and Spitfires. At the beginning of June 1940, out of a total of 446 operationally serviceable aircraft, 331 were Hurricanes and Spitfires, roughly in the proportion of three to two. By the first week of August these totals had been increased to 704 and 620 respectively. The Spitfire, particularly at higher altitudes, was superior to anything the Germans possessed at this time, while the Hurricane, although somewhat slower, was the equal at medium altitudes. Both types had eight machine guns which gave them the superior firepower that, in the early stages, proved so devastating against the unarmed German bombers. At the same time, the early adoption of armour in British fighters gave them a further initial advantage, although the Germans were quick to imitate our methods. Until the end of September, the Hurricanes and Spitfires were able to deal effectively with the enemy fighters, since most engagements took place at heights below 20,000 feet. During the last stage of the battle, however, when the enemy fighters operated at heights above 25,000 feet and their engines had been fitted with two-stage super- chargers, they proved superior and it was only by better tactics that British pilots obtained a certain amount of hard-earned success. Throughout the battle a few squadrons equipped with aircraft found unsuitable for day work

The Blenheim, owing to its low speed and lack of manoeuvrability, had been turned over to night duties for these reasons, and because adequate space was available for an extra operator and the scientific apparatus which was necessary for the development of a new night-interception technique. The Defiant, after some initial success, proved to be too vulnerable against fighters and was also relegated to night work and the attacking of unescorted bombers.

were employed on night interception, since night attacks persisted and increased as the Germans found day bombing more and more expensive. But these operations had little bearing on the main German objective, the attainment of air superiority. The decisive battle was fought by day.

In launching their mass daylight attacks the Germans had one oustanding advantage. They could direct a heavy raid against one part of England where only a proportion of the British fighter strength was available, and by simultaneous feints towards other parts compel Fighter Command to keep considerable forces away from the main point of attack. It was therefore vital that the defenders should have sufficient warning of a raid in order that the fighter squadrons could be airborne in time to make an interception. As a result of Sir Robert Watson-Watt's invention of radio-location, this warning could be given by a series of stations sited at intervals along the British coast. Over land, where the early type of radar was not effective, raid reports were supplied by a chain of Observer Corps' posts whose members tracked enemy formations by sight and sound. And herein lay the essence of Fighter Command's victory. Had the Group Commanders been compelled, by the absence of early warning, to maintain constant standing patrols, they would frequently have found their squadrons at the disadvantage of having to make interceptions with fighters running low in fuel. In addition pilots, engines, and maintenance crews would have been subjected to an intolerable strain by long hours of wasteful flying. The warning system enabled Fighter Command to identify approaching enemy forces and allot the interception to particular groups, and also to reinforce one group by another if necessary. The Group Commander decided which of his sectors should meet any specific raid and detailed the strength in squadrons to be used. The sector commander selected the units to be employed and operated the machinery of interception, using the position, course, height and speed of the enemy aircraft and of his own fighters, information which was concurrently displayed on his plotting table in the operations room. Initially the fighters were controlled by a series of courses broadcast by radio-telephone until the enemy was sighted, tactical control then passing to the fighter leader in the air who directed his pilots into battle. This was, generally speaking, the system under which the battle was fought. Dependent on constant alertness and attention to detail by hundreds of men and women, it had been organised by Air Chief Marshal Dowding in the pre-war years, and because of its inherent flexibility it enabled the German mass attacks to be met and defeated.

During July 1940 Goering made his dispositions for the assault that was to secure the air supremacy which the German High Command regarded as the essential prerequisite to invasion. By the end of that month a striking force of some 2600 aircraft, consisting of 1480 bombers, 760 single-engined and 220 twin-engined fighters, together with 140 reconnaissance machines, had been assembled at various airfields in France, Belgium and Holland. In addition there was a force of approximately 130 bombers and 30 fighters stationed in Norway which had a diversionary value in that it compelled the RAF to retain fighter squadrons in the north. The elimination of the RAF and the British aircraft industry was to be accomplished in two stages. In the first place, the fighter defences located south of a line between Chelmsford and Gloucester were to be beaten down, after which the air offensive was to be extended northwards by stages until RAF bases throughout England were covered by daylight attacks. The first stage was timed to begin early in August, and the day for its launching was given the dramatic code-name of Alder Tag (Eagle Day). Goering considered that this phase, the destruction of Fighter Command in the south, would occupy four days, and the whole task of eliminating the RAF four weeks. Thereupon the invasion itself, with Luftwaffe support, was to be aimed in its greatest strength at the English coast between Dover and the Isle of Wight. Alder Tag was provisionally fixed for 10 August, given favourable weather, so that the invasion could take place at some time during the first two weeks in September. In the event, Goering's timetable went badly awry and Hitler was forced to postpone the actual date of the invasion, first by a few days, then by a week, then indefinitely, and finally ‘until the following year’.

During the first week of July when the fighter pilots were engaged in intercepting sporadic enemy raids against widely scattered targets, several New Zealand airmen were among those who had successful combats. Flying Officer Carbury, leading a section of Spitfires, shared in the destruction of an enemy bomber near Aberdeen; another was claimed by Pilot Officer Lawrence

Squadron Leader K. A. Lawrence, DFC; Christchurch; born Waitara, 25 Nov 1919; joined RAF Mar 1939; commanded No. 185 Sqdn, Malta, 1942; transferred RNZAF Jul 1945.

while flying on convoy patrol off Land's End—this was his squadron's first victory. On 9 July Flight Lieutenant Deere had the first of many amazing experiences that were to come his way during the next two months. He was with a squadron of Spitfires sent to intercept an enemy formation reported near Dover. There they found two groups of Messerschmitts escorting a seaplane which, it was later discovered, had been sent to survey part of the south coast. Deere led a section in to attack and the enemy fighter he selected went straight down into the sea. Whilst manoeuvring to attack a second Messerschmitt, he suddenly saw the enemy plane coming straight at him. Both pilots started to fire simultaneously, neither gave way, and the aircraft collided. Deere's Spitfire was severely damaged, the Messerschmitt having caught the propeller and hood. Unable to bale out, with his engine stopped, and nearly blinded and choked by glycol fumes, he managed to head inland where, after ploughing through various obstacles, his aircraft finally came to rest in the middle of a cornfield and caught fire. Deere broke his way out but, apart from minor abrasions and slight burns, he was uninjured and the following day was back on patrol again.

Attacks on coastal targets and shipping began in earnest during the second week of July.

On the 10th two formations of German aircraft attempted to attack convoys in the Channel. This day, when really large enemy forces—70 in one attack—were first employed, is generally regarded as marking the opening of the battle.

These raids were not easy to intercept owing to the limited warning that could be given of the enemy's intention and the fact that standing patrols could not be maintained in sufficient strength to deal with the larger formations the enemy was now employing. Another difficulty was that the Germans would sometimes send over a small raid first so that the British fighters would be returning to their bases to refuel when the actual attack developed. Nevertheless, a considerable toll was taken of these raiders

192 enemy aircraft were destroyed during the period of these attacks on coastal targets i.e., 10 July–7 August.

and the damage inflicted on shipping was not extensive.

It was on the first day of these heavier attacks that Pilot Officer D. G. Cobden had two successful engagements whilst leading a section of No. 74 Squadron. Enemy bombers escorted by fighters were attacking a convoy off Margate when the Spitfires arrived. Confused fighting developed during which Cobden got on the tail of one of the escorting Messerschmitts and fired a number of bursts at close range. The enemy plane was last seen going down on fire. In a subsequent interception off Dover, Cobden hit one of the bombers, but before he could finish it off he was attacked by several Messerschmitts which combined to riddle his Spitfire. However, he managed to break away and landed on Lympne aerodrome with his undercarriage retracted. Two days later Pilot Officer Bickerdyke

Pilot Officer J. L. Bickerdyke; born Christchurch, 11 Feb 1919; joined RAF Apr 1940; killed in flying accident, 22 Jul 1940.

was with No. 85 Hurricane Squadron, sent to aid a convoy that was being attacked by ten Heinkels off the Suffolk coast. He set about one of the bombers and saw it burst into flames and dive into the

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN PHASE 1: 10 July–18 August 1940 Attacks on South Coast, shipping, ports and airfieldsBlack and white map diagram showing attacks on South Coast of England, shipping, ports and airfields sea. Altogether four of the enemy were destroyed on this occasion without loss. Among other successful combats on the same day was the destruction of a Junkers 88 off the Isle of Wight by Pilot Officer Yule, who also damaged a Messerschmitt 110 in the same engage- ment.

In the intermittent enemy attacks on shipping and coastal targets during the next week, British pilots continued to achieve good results, further successes by New Zealanders including the shooting down of a Messerschmitt over the Channel by Pilot Officer Gray and the destruction of a Dornier bomber by Pilot Officer Gibson. On 19 July, however, Fighter Command suffered a sharp reverse in the air battle which followed a German attack on shipping in Dover Harbour. A formation of nine Defiants, sent to intercept the retreating enemy bombers, was surprised by Messerschmitt fighters and six Defiants were shot down; three of these were captained by New Zealanders, Pilot Officers Gard'ner,

Squadron Leader J. R. Gard'ner; RAF; born Dunedin, 14 Jun 1918; joined RAF Jan 1939; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944.

Kemp

Pilot Officer J. R. Kemp; born Napier, 14 Aug 1914; joined RAF Jan 1939; killed on air operations, 19 Jul 1940.

and Kidson,

Pilot Officer R. Kidson; born Wellington, 7 May 1914; joined RAF Aug 1938; killed on air operations, 19 Jul 1940.

only Gard'ner surviving to be picked up from the sea. Although outnumbered in this engagement, the inferiority of the Defiants—turret fighters which had achieved an initial surprise over Dunkirk—was evident, and they were withdrawn from day operations shortly afterwards.

The enemy was now regularly employing large formations against ports and shipping in the south. On the 24th one of these attacks was directed against the Thames Estuary by a force of twenty bombers escorted by some thirty fighters. The first unit to intercept the Germans was No. 54 Spitfire Squadron, led by Flight Lieutenant Deere, and in the dogfights which followed, ‘with aircraft milling in and out of cloud and the air thick with tracer and incendiary smoke’, the squadron destroyed at least five of the enemy, two of them crashing in the main streets of Margate. Only two Spitfires were lost and shipping in the Thames was undamaged. Deere accounted for one of the enemy and, apart from this, reported ‘general wild bursts at various enemy aircraft but unable to get a decent bead because of constant attacks from behind.’ Pilot Officer Gray, who was flying with Deere, sent one Messerschmitt down and then attacked a second which burst into flames, the German pilot baling out into the sea. Enemy pressure continued to increase. On the afternoon of the following day, some eighty Messerschmitts escorted forty dive-bombers to attack a convoy off Dover. Five Spitfires on patrol in the vicinity attempted to prevent the bombers from reaching the ships but they were at once attacked by the escorting fighters. Gray, who was flying one of the Spitfires, afterwards reported modestly, ‘… attempted to engage the dive-bombers but was immediately attacked by about a dozen Messerschmitts and being rather outnumbered found it difficult to get in a burst.’ However, he did succeed in sending one of them down ‘apparently out of control’. A few hours later both he and Deere were leading sections of their squadron against another large force of dive-bombers attacking the same convoy. Again the British pilots had great difficulty in evading the escorting fighters, but the enemy bomber formation was so dispersed by the Spitfires that other squadrons coming into the battle soon afterwards were able to take a heavy toll. Nevertheless, the Germans displayed great persistence in their attacks, and five ships in the convoy were sunk with a further five damaged, one of which had to be beached.

On 29 July shipping in Dover Harbour was again the target for a heavy attack by some forty dive-bombers. Four squadrons of fighters, two of Spitfires and two of Hurricanes, were despatched to intercept; all were engaged and 15 of the enemy were claimed destroyed for the loss of three Spitfires. Leading a section of No. 501 Hurricane Squadron, Pilot Officer Gibson was early in combat. He afterwards reported:

Sighted enemy aircraft approaching Dover Harbour—engaged a Junkers 87 as it broke away from attack on the ships. Saw enemy machine dive steeply with black smoke pouring from it. Broke off attack as I saw a Spitfire with another Junkers 87 on its tail. Fired at this dive-bomber which burst into flames and plunged into the sea.

In another encounter Pilot Officer Horton

Flying Officer P. W. Horton; born Dunedin, 25 Mar 1920; joined RAF Mar 1939; killed on air operations, 16 Nov 1940.

drove a Junkers 87 down to sea level but ran out of ammunition before he could destroy it. He then made close dummy attacks in an effort to force the bomber lower and was finally rewarded by seeing it strike the water and break up.

So far the enemy's attacks had been directed mainly against the southern coasts of England. In fact, German eyes were already firmly fixed on this part of the country and the fighter squadrons there. Therefore pilots stationed in other parts of Britain, although steadily employed in investigating unidentified plots of aircraft and in protecting coastal convoys, had not been heavily engaged. They were available to reinforce the southern sectors but, before they were called upon to do so, many of them flew long hours on patrol and escort duties, seldom sighting an enemy aircraft.

By the end of the first week in August the Luftwaffe had completed its preparations for the launching of mass daylight attacks, and the next few weeks represented the crucial phase of the battle. Raids on coastal towns and shipping continued, but the main weight of the offensive now shifted to the radar stations, the fighter airfields and aircraft factories in southern England; from the scale of attacks delivered, the tactics employed and the objectives selected, it was clear that the enemy was attempting to gain air superiority by a process of exhausting and swamping the fighter defences. During this phase the Germans showed great versatility both in the timing and direction of their attacks as well as in the formations and tactics they employed. First an attack would be delivered from Calais perhaps towards the Thames Estuary; then, after a carefully timed interval, when the British fighters drawn eastwards might be expected to be at the end of their endurance, a heavy attack would be made on Southampton or Portland. Other threats, after being built up to formidable dimen- sions, would prove to be only feints and the enemy formations would turn away before reaching the English coast, only to return in half an hour when the fighters sent up to intercept them were landing. ‘The main problem’, Air Vice-Marshal Park writes, ‘was to know which was the diversionary attack, and to hold sufficient squadrons in readiness to meet the main attack when this could be discerned from the unreliable information received from the radar stations after they had been heavily bombed.’ The German methods of bomber escort were also varied. At first, a strong fighter formation would fly a mile or so behind and above the bombers. But when the enemy found that the Spitfires and Hurricanes could deliver a well-timed attack before his fighters could intervene, or when the British fighters attacked from ahead or below, he met each move with another change of tactics so that, towards the end of August, German fighter escorts were flying inside the bomber forma- tion, others were below it, and a series of fighters stretched upwards in tiers for several thousand feet. One pilot described the appearance of these formations as ‘like looking up a flight of moving stairs.’

The first really heavy attack on a land target came on the morning of 11 August. On this occasion there was little doubt as to the enemy's objective, since three enemy formations were plotted over mid-Channel on course for Portland and no convoy was in the vicinity at the time. Accordingly, the greater part of eight squadrons was ordered towards that area to intercept. Among them was No. 213 Hurricane Squadron from Exeter, led by Squadron Leader McGregor. In the early stages the Messerschmitt fighters, which were some distance east of the main formation, were brought to battle by other squadrons, but it fell to McGregor's Hurricanes to make the only interception of the bombers before they reached their target. The Hurricanes had been ordered to patrol at 10,000 feet over Portland and had just arrived when the enemy was sighted—50 Junkers 88s flying at about the same level, with an escort of 30 Messerschmitt 109s above and behind them. The Hurricanes immediately attacked the head of the bomber formation and forced many of the bombers to jettison their loads wide of any target. McGregor and his pilots claimed seven of the Junkers destroyed.

The next few days saw intensive enemy activity between the Thames Estuary and the Isle of Wight with attacks on radar stations, airfields, ports and coastal shipping. In an effort to exhaust the British squadrons, the Germans continued to send simultaneous raids against widely separated areas; feint approaches were also made to conceal the real point of attack and to confuse the defenders. Portsmouth and Southampton were frequent targets during this period, and on one or two occasions enemy aircraft penetrated as far as London, notably on 15 August when a force of some thirty bombers broke through to bomb Croydon. In their efforts to meet these heavy attacks the fighter squadrons in southern England were now constantly engaged in interception and combat. Early on 12 August Deere led eleven pilots from No. 54 Squadron—with Gray leading a section—to intercept an enemy raid over Kent. Very soon they sighted some twenty Messerschmitt 109s and climbed to attack. Deere claimed one of the enemy fighters while Gray, after shooting one down near Dover, pursued a second as far as the French coast where he saw it crash on the beach near Cap Gris Nez. The same evening Deere claimed two Messerschmitts while leading his squadron to intercept an attack on Manston aerodrome in Kent. The enemy formation was prevented from reaching its objective and most of the bombs fell harmlessly in open country. Meanwhile, during the afternoon, the Germans had launched a heavy attack against two convoys off North Foreland. But action was joined with such vigour that the dive-bombers never approached within striking distance of the ships. Gibson, who took part in the inter- ception, attacked four of the enemy machines and saw the pilot of one of them bale out. Pilot Officer W. S. Williams

Pilot Officer W. S. Williams; born Dunedin, 28 Sep 1920; joined RAF Mar 1939; killed on air operations, 21 Oct 1940.

was with one of the squadrons which intercepted another attack by nearly 200 aircraft towards Portsmouth. After he had set one bomber on fire, his Spitfire was heavily hit and he was forced to break away. Williams subsequently landed at an airfield on the Isle of Wight with wheels up and his aircraft on fire. Shortly after he had scrambled clear, it blew up.

On 15 August favourable weather enabled Goering to launch the grand assault he had planned for ‘Eagle Day’, and in reply Fighter Command made its maximum effort for the whole battle. This was indeed a memorable day. Altogether five major actions were fought, including one in the north-east where a lasting victory was achieved. This last attack came in the early afternoon with two simultaneous thrusts against Tynemouth and the airfield at Driffield, 100 miles to the south. In both cases aircraft based in Norway and Denmark were employed. The Germans wrongly anticipated that the main British fighter strength had been drawn southwards, and they met with such strong opposition and their formations received such a drubbing that the experiment was never repeated. But although activity on this day ranged over areas as widely separated as Plymouth and the Tyne, the heaviest fighting took place over south-eastern England. All the 22 squadrons available there were engaged, many twice, some three times during the day.

New Zealand airmen were early in action. The first major attack of the day, directed against aerodromes in Kent, saw Pilot Officer Gibson leading a section of three Hurricanes from No. 501 Squadron which became involved with a formation of some twenty dive-bombers. Each member of the section claimed one of the enemy, Gibson seeing his victim burst into flames and crash into the sea. He then noticed that other Junkers 87s were bombing his home airfield at Hawkinge so returned at speed to engage them. In the combats which followed he damaged one of the dive-bombers before their rear gunners set his Hurricane on fire. He was then directly over Folkestone but managed to steer his blazing machine away from the town before abandoning it. Deere's No. 54 Squadron was involved in two major clashes with the enemy during the day. In the first encounter Deere himself scored an easy victory when he caught a German so intent on pursuing a damaged British aircraft that he failed to see the approach of the Spitfire and was blown to pieces in the air. During a further interception by his squadron, Deere chased a Messerschmitt across the Channel and finally shot it down near Calais. Then almost immediately he was set upon by five German fighters which pursued him back towards the English coast. His instrument panel was shattered and his aircraft riddled with bullets. Fortunately the attackers broke away as the coast was reached, but a minute or two later his Spitfire burst into flames and he was forced to bale out at about 1500 feet. Once again his luck held and he landed in some shrubs which broke his fall.

Describing this incident, Deere afterwards told how ‘Bullets seemed to come from everywhere and pieces flew off my aircraft. Never did it take so long to cross the Channel. Then my Spitfire burst into flames, so I undid my straps and eased the stick back to gain height before baling out. Turned my machine on its back and pushed the stick hard forward. I shot out a few feet but somehow became caught up. Although I twisted and turned I could not free myself. The nose of my aircraft had now dropped and was pointing at the ground which was rushing up at an alarming rate. Then suddenly I was blown along the side of the fuselage and was clear. A hurried snatch at the rip cord and, with a jolt, the parachute opened.’

In a further engagement over the Isle of Sheppey, near the mouth of the Thames, Pilot Officer McIntyre

Squadron Leader A. G. McIntyre; born Auckland, 4 Jan 1917; joined RAF Apr 1940.

shared in the destruction of one Dornier and damaged a second. Another victim was claimed by Pilot Officer Mackenzie,

Squadron Leader J. N. Mackenzie, DFC; RAF; born Goodwood, Otago, 11 Aug 1914; joined RAF 1937; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944; commanded No. 488 (NZ) Sqdn, Singapore, 1942; No 64 (RAF) Sqdn, 1944.

who was with one of the squadrons which intercepted the German force from Norway and Denmark in the north-east of England.

During the afternoon of the 15th heavy attacks were directed towards Portsmouth and Plymouth by forces totalling nearly 300 aircraft. No. 87 Hurricane Squadron, led by Squadron Leader Lovell-Gregg, was one of the 14 units despatched to intercept. Near Portland the Hurricanes met some thirty dive-bombers escorted by approximately a hundred fighters, and the air battle which followed was described as the fiercest the squadron had so far experienced. Lovell-Gregg was shot down but his loss was avenged by two other New Zealanders flying with him, Flying Officers Ward and Tait,

Flight Lieutenant K. W. Tait, DFC; born Wellington, 19 Nov 1918; joined RAF 1937; killed on air operations, 4 Aug 1941.

each of whom claimed a Messerschmitt. In another encounter between Dover and Folkestone Pilot Officer Smith,

Wing Commander I. S. Smith, DFC and bar; RAF; born Invercargill, 21 May 1917; joined RAF Mar 1940; commanded No. 151 Sqdn, 1942–43; No. 487 (NZ) Sqdn, 1944.

after persistent attacks in which he exhausted his ammu- nition, finally saw his target, a Messerschmitt 109, go spinning earthwards. His squadron had intercepted a large force of enemy fighters acting as withdrawal cover for a formation attacking further inland, and had fared badly losing four pilots in the encounter. His was the only success. These actions were typical of many in which New Zealand pilots were involved on this memorable day, at the end of which 76 German aircraft had been destroyed for the loss of 34 British fighters.

At the time, 185 German aircraft were claimed as destroyed. But this was not due to any great exaggeration on the part of the fighter pilots, whose claims were almost always made in good faith. In the confused and heavy fighting which occurred it was easy for a pilot to conclude that the German aircraft he saw crash was the one at which he had been firing. At the same time several pilots could, unknown to each other, share in the destruction of one and the same enemy. It is interesting to note that on days of less intensive fighting, the Royal Air Force claims were often actually lower than the figures which German records now reveal.

But this was only the beginning. During the next few days the Germans made further strenuous and determined efforts to beat down the fighter defences in south-eastern England and, apart from a lull on 17 August, heavy and persistent attacks were repeated several times each day on airfields in that area. But after losing 195 aircraft in four days, Goering was forced to call a temporary halt in order to regroup his battered squadrons. Then, on 24 August, the Luftwaffe returned to the assault, extending its incursions as far inland as the airfields around London itself. However, these renewed attacks, although they employed as many as 150 aircraft in a single raid, lacked some of the fire that had characterised the earlier onslaughts and, on occasions, formations were seen to break up and turn back before reaching their objectives. There is little doubt that the Germans were surprised by the tough and sustained resistance which they continued to encounter. Nevertheless the pressure was sufficiently heavy to strain the defences to the limit. The bombing caused considerable damage to fighter airfields, their communications, and to the ground organisation, damage which was more serious than was generally realised at the time, and it was only the most determined and valiant efforts of the ground staffs that kept the Hurricanes and Spitfires flying. In the air battles the defenders were heavily outnumbered on almost every occasion, since the very short warning received by the control made it difficult to get squadrons from different airfields assembled into a single formation. Later, as the Germans penetrated further inland, longer

PHASE 2: 24 August–6 September 1940 Attacks on airfields covering LondonBlack and white map diagram showing attacks on airfields covering London between 24 August and 6 September 1940 warning enabled pairs of squadrons to be grouped together more frequently as one fighting formation, but in the meantime it was imperative to defend the airfields or lose the battle. Thus it was that during this phase the Germans met a succession of attacks by individual squadrons—attacks which, although not always fully co-ordinated, frequently thwarted their efforts to reach some vital target in strength.

Usually when ordered to intercept, a squadron climbed quickly to gain the advantage of height, during which time the leader received further information regarding the enemy's height and direction. On sighting the German aircraft the leader gave the signal for attack to his squadron over the radio-telephone. Thereupon it became a matter of individual combats in which each pilot had his own swift decisions to make in applying the tactics that had been carefully worked out beforehand. Sometimes these combats were short and sharp. As one New Zealand pilot related on 18 August:

We sighted about twenty Messerschmitts below us … dived on to one of them and after several bursts saw his perspex collapse and the aircraft spiralled into the sea.

On the same day another reported:

Intercepted a formation flying south … they dived towards the coast. We followed and I attacked a Messerschmitt from the rear. Smoke came from him as I broke away and eventually saw him crash about 5 miles from the coast.

But often the fighting was more confused with machines milling round as the British fighters broke into the enemy formations:

Attacked a Messerschmitt with a short burst but broke away owing to another on my tail. Turned and got a snap shot at him. Now had three on my tail so climbed steeply and got a short burst at one of them. Climbed further and dived on a Dornier which went down with smoke pouring from one engine. Then turned on a Messerschmitt which was diving on my tail. Gave him a burst but saw others above me so climbed away and dived on a straggler and got in a short burst whilst dodging another. Saw another formation … headed in that direction and dived on one Messerschmitt giving him a burst but had to climb steeply to avoid others. Then attacked a straggling bomber but ran out of ammunition so zig-zagged home.

It was during this critical phase of the battle that several New Zealand airmen—notably Deere, Gray and Gibson—established themselves as outstanding fighter pilots. Gray accounted for at least seven enemy machines in the intensive air fighting of the last two weeks of August. One of his victims crashed into the sea after he had pursued it to within half a mile of the French coast; another blew up and disintegrated in mid-air after his first burst, while two more fell to him whilst they were attacking the airfield at Horn- church, Essex, where his No. 54 Squadron was based. It was after yet another successful combat that his victim landed in a field in Kent and Gray, circling above, saw the German pilot expressing his anger at being shot down by jumping up and down on his life jacket. In a further engagement Gray destroyed two more Messerschmitts when his squadron intercepted a formation retiring after a bombing attack on Tilbury. But during these various encounters he twice had narrow escapes. On the first occasion, his aircraft suddenly went into a spiral dive after the elevator control wires had been severed by a stray bullet, Gray just managing to regain control and land safely. During another encounter a cannon shell exploded behind his cockpit but he was uninjured, even the splinters missing him entirely. Strangely enough Gray, who was to win further distinction in the Middle East and later in France, had failed to pass his medical examination in Wellington when he first applied for a commission in the RAF in 1936. It was not until two years later, after he had worked on a farm to improve his health, that he was finally accepted for training as a pilot.

With the same squadron, and frequently leading either sections or the whole squadron, Flight Lieutenant Deere continued to score more successes during the same period. One of these came on the morning of 28 August when No. 54 Squadron was the first unit to intercept a force of some sixty aircraft over Manston, in Kent. Shortly after he had shot down one of the enemy fighters, Deere's Spitfire was hit and so badly damaged that he was once again forced to bale out. After just missing a farmhouse he landed in the middle of a fully-laden plum tree, bringing most of the fruit to the ground. It is recorded that this tree happened to be the only one still bearing fruit, a choice crop that was being carefully husbanded, and the farmer's indignation on finding the hefty New Zealander sprawling in the bare tree was, for a time, considerable. Three days later Deere had what was his luckiest escape when the airfield at Hornchurch was bombed just as the squadron was ordered to take off. Eight aircraft had safely left the ground and the remaining section, which he was leading, was in the act of taking off when bombs exploded near them and all three Spitfires were wrecked. One machine was thrown across a stream two fields away but the pilot scrambled out unhurt. Deere had one wing and the propeller torn off his Spitfire, whereupon it rose in the air, turned over, and slid across the airfield upside down. He was extricated amidst bursting bombs by the pilot of the third machine, which had suffered a similar fate except that it had landed the right way up. A few minutes later this rescuer collapsed and was carried to safety by Deere. There were other similar narrow escapes. On the same day Pilot Officer Tracey,

Flying Officer O. V. Tracey, DFC; born Dunedin, 15 Mar 1915; joined RAF Aug 1939; killed on air operations, 8 Dec 1941.

after making a head-on attack against a Dornier, which went down with an engine on fire, found his oil duct was pierced so headed for Biggin Hill, only to land just as the enemy bombers arrived overhead. He attempted to take off again but his machine was thrown about and badly damaged by flying metal and debris from bursting bombs. It was indeed inevitable that, under the continuous enemy pressure, fighter aircraft should occasionally be caught on the ground.

During these weeks of heavy fighting Flight Lieutenant Gibson led No. 501 Squadron on many occasions with great skill and courage. After one interception of bombers attacking Manston airfield in Kent, he reported:

The enemy bomber started smoking as I broke away. Turned to attack again only to see him crash into the sea about a mile off Margate.

On 29 August, after sending a Messerschmitt down in flames, Gibson found his own aircraft on fire and had to bale out over the sea, two miles from the coast. But he was picked up by a motor boat and a few days later was reporting:

There were about twenty bombers escorted by some thirty fighters above and behind them … a dogfight started and I managed to position myself on the tail of a Messerschmitt and gave him a short burst. He wobbled and then dived to the ground and crashed near Kingswood….

By the last week of August the heavy fighting had much depleted the squadrons of No. 11 Group and a number had to be with- drawn,

Among them was No. 54 Squadron with which Deere and Gray were flying. During the next month both men did valuable work training new pilots.

their places being filled by units from other groups which had been comparatively inactive. Among those whose squadrons had now moved south into the battle area was Flying Officer Carbury, of No. 603 Squadron, who was to win both the Distinguished Flying Cross and bar before the end of the battle. Carbury had been with this squadron before the war and had done valuable work in training pilots when the unit was re-equipped with Spitfires. During the more recent period while stationed in a comparatively quiet area, he had nevertheless twice engaged in successful combat. On 28 August his squadron entered the thick of the battle and was to be continually engaged in the interception of enemy formations over Kent; during the next ten days Carbury was to claim eight victims. The first of these was shot down while he was leading a section of Spitfires on patrol near Manston airfield. After a frontal attack the Messerschmitt‘… began to smoke and then blew up.’ On 31 August, when particularly heavy raids were directed against airfields around London, Carbury was able to report the destruction of five enemy machines in three successive engagements. Early in the day his squadron intercepted a formation of some twenty enemy fighters. ‘… we were climbing over Canterbury when the enemy were sighted below … dived on a Messerschmitt 109 which turned over and spun in, the pilot jumping by parachute.’ The second encounter took place over his own airfield.

…. Heard over the radio-telephone that enemy were bombing home base so set course and saw enemy proceeding eastwards. Attacked one Heinkel which went straight down into the ground. Made a beam attack on another which after a long burst, went on its back, the pilot jumped and the aircraft crashed and burst into flames near Southend.

His third report regarding his part in an engagement with a large enemy formation during the afternoon was equally brief:

Sighted enemy aircraft over London and we attacked, three of us going for nine Messerschmitts. Got one of them which went straight down. After beam attack on another, it rolled over and went down into a wood.

On the afternoon of 30 August Pilot Officer Hodgson

Pilot Officer W. H. Hodgson, DFC; born Frankton Junction, 30 Sep 1920; radio technician; joined RAF Apr 1940; killed in flying accident, 13 Mar 1941.

was engaged with No. 85 Hurricane Squadron over the Thames Estuary against some thirty Dornier bombers escorted by about one hundred fighters. After damaging one of the Dorniers Hodgson became involved with a Messerschmitt which he shot down. But in this combat his Hurricane was heavily hit and the engine set on fire. He was about to bale out when he realised that he was directly over the Thames oil storage tanks and a thickly populated area. By skilful side-slipping he managed to keep the fire under control and finally landed in a field in Essex, just missing wires and other obstacles erected to prevent the landing of enemy forces by air. This was but one of his many experiences in the course of the battle. After destroying two Messerschmitts in an encounter with a large enemy formation over Ramsgate, he was successively engaged by seven more but managed to evade their attacks without appreciable damage to his aircraft. On another occasion he chased an enemy fighter down from 17,000 feet to sea level near the French coast, where it was seen to crash.

Other fighter pilots who reported successful combats during the heavy fighting which took place in the last week of August and the first week of September included Squadron Leader Blake, who was in command of a squadron in the south-west of England, Flying Officers Tait and Ward, and Pilot Officers Horton, Lawrence, Mackenzie, Tracey, Trousdale and W. S. Williams. But it is not possible to describe all the many engagements nor to record in detail the numerous incidents which occurred—the narrow escapes from destruction at the hands of the enemy, the rescues from the sea and the bombing of the airfields from which the Hurricanes and Spitfires operated. Yet it was with enduring courage that the fighter pilots faced the increasing strain of the intensive flying and fighting demanded of them during this critical period. As one pilot wrote afterwards:

These were hectic days and the only time we saw the pilots of other squadrons was when we met in the mess during the evening after long hours in the air or at readiness. But often, just as one was becoming friendly with a pilot he would get shot down and we would see him no more. When we met the Hun we ‘mixed it’ well and truly. Usually we waited for a moment or two until we were in a favourable position before making the first attack. After that it was every man for himself. There were nearly always more Huns than ourselves. We whirled around taking squirts at as many machines as possible; sometimes when they burst into flames, the crew baled out or we were lucky enough to see where they hit the ground; then we were able to claim victories. After the battle we would rush back to our base, tell our stories to the Intelligence Officer then ask him to get through to the hospitals to see if a friend had got any before he was shot down. I remember the German bombers, flying in tight formation, crossing the English coasts and thinking to myself that they were about to drop their bombs in England, and that I was in a Hurricane and could stop them. I dived to attack and laughed as they broke formation; the crew of one Heinkel baled out; the others sprayed me with tracer—many bullet holes in my plane that time, but within an hour the ground crews had fixed it and my Hurricane was ready for action again. Our life had a devil-may-care sort of happiness but often as we lay in the sun near our machines, waiting at readiness there were moments of great beauty; somehow the colours in the field seemed brightest and the sky the deepest blue just before taking off to meet another raid. At dusk everything became peaceful. We were all tired but happy at the thought of another day's work accomplished. Our Hurricanes stood silhouetted against the sky looking strong and confident, the growing darkness hiding their patched-up paintwork. The following morning we awoke to the roar of engines being tested for another day's work.

* * * * *

By the end of the first week in September both sides were feeling the strain of the intensive fighting. The Germans had lost just over 400 aircraft since 24 August and many of their best pilots. Nor were the British defences in a happy state. Very serious damage had been done to the fighter airfields in No. 11 Group and to their communications and ground organisation. On several occasions Manston and Lympne on the Kent coast were unfit for days at a time for operating fighter aircraft. Biggin Hill sector to the south of London was so severely hit that for a week only one fighter squadron could operate from it. After the battle Park wrote:

There was a critical period between 28 August and 5 September when the damage done to sector stations and our ground organisation was having a serious effect on the efficiency of the fighter squadrons. The absence of many essential lines of communication, the use of scratch equipment in emergency operations rooms and the general dislocation of the ground organisation was seriously felt in the handling of squadrons to meet the enemy's massed attacks…. Had the enemy continued his heavy attacks against the fighter airfields and knocked out their operations rooms and communications, the fighter defences of London would have been in a perilous state….

But an even graver problem was the shortage of trained pilots, which made it difficult to keep units up to strength and relieve them when exhausted. In the fortnight from 24 August to 6 Sep- tember, Fighter Command had lost 103 pilots killed and 128 seriously wounded, while 466 Spitfires and Hurricanes had been destroyed or seriously damaged. The casualties to pilots represented the loss of nearly a quarter of the total pilot strength. Their place could only be taken by new, ardent, but inexperienced men from the training units, and further casualties were incurred because of their lack of familiarity with the latest developments in the air fighting.

By the beginning of September the incidence of casualties became so serious that a fresh squadron would become depleted and exhausted before any of the resting and reforming squadrons were ready to take its place. Fighter pilots were no longer being produced in numbers sufficient to fill the gaps.’—Air Chief Marshal Dowding's despatch on the Battle of Britain.

It was at this point in the battle that the Germans unexpectedly switched the main weight of their attack to London. It now appears that the Germans overestimated the extent to which Fighter Command had been weakened. They were also working to a timetable which had to be completed if their invasion was to take place before the onset of unfavourable weather. In addition Hitler wanted reprisals against London for the attacks by Bomber Command on Berlin and other German cities. Nevertheless, this change was in every way favourable to Fighter Command, since it not only removed the strain on the fighter airfields but also allowed more time for the assembly of larger formations to meet the enemy's attacks.

The Germans now also increased the weight of the desultory and scattered attacks by night which they had been making for some weeks. It was as yet impossible to deal effectively with these attacks since both equipment and methods of night interception were still in the experimental stage, and in the face of the great events that were unfolding by day, the aircrews engaged on the unprofitable task of combing the night skies gained little satisfaction from the knowledge that they were laying the foundation for later successes. Among the few encouraging results of the night patrols at this time was the unique achievement of Pilot Officer Herrick,

Squadron Leader M. J. Herrick, DFC and bar, Air Medal (US); born Hastings, 5 May 1921; Cranwell Cadet, 1939; permanent commission RAF Mar 1940; killed on air operations, 16 Jun 1944.

one of the small group of New Zealand airmen flying with No. 25 Blenheim Squadron against these night raiders. On the night of 4 September Herrick destroyed two German bombers within a few minutes of each other. Nine days later he sent another down in flames, thus accounting for three of the four aircraft claimed by Fighter Command in night operations during the month. All three of Herrick's victims were seen to crash by observers on the ground.

It was in the early evening of 7 September that the Germans launched their first mass daylight attack against London. Some 400 bombers, heavily escorted by fighters, crossed the coast in successive waves, and several formations succeeded in breaking through to the East End of London where they started large fires in dock areas and oil storage depots. Heavy damage was also inflicted on domestic and commercial property. Ten squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes were in the air to intercept the raiders and bitter fighting took place over a wide area of south-eastern England and over London itself. No. 501 Hurricane Squadron, led by Gibson, was hotly engaged with a force of well over 100 enemy aircraft but,

PHASE 3: 7–27 September 1940 Day and night offensive against LondonBlack and white map diagram showing day and night offensive against London between 7 and 27 September 1940 being heavily outnumbered, was unable to claim any conclusive successes, although Gibson himself was credited with a probable. No. 603 Spitfire Squadron, which intercepted part of this same German formation on its way back, had better luck. Carbury led a section into part of the fighter escort and attacked a Messerschmitt, which burst into flames. Then he saw a group of bombers below him so dived and singled out the last of the formation. It went down in a steep dive. Climbing again, Carbury sighted more Germans below so dived through their formation, spraying them with bullets. Although short of petrol and ammunition he returned to the attack, firing the rest of his ammunition at a bomber which ‘began to burn and went earthwards’. Flying with No. 234 Spitfire Squadron, Pilot Officer Lawrence, after damaging a Dornier, went for one of a formation of twelve Messerschmitts which he pursued to the coast, where ‘after three bursts it caught fire and crashed into the sea.’ These engagements were typical of the desperate and gallant efforts made by the fighter pilots during this autumn evening to defend London.

During their attacks on 7 September the Germans lost 40 aircraft, but even such heavy casualties might have been accepted had they been able to repeat the successful breakthrough in strength to London. This, however, they were prevented from doing, their subsequent attacks being met and defeated with steadily increasing success by Fighter Command. Formations aiming towards London were intercepted, broken up, and forced to drop their bombs short of the capital or in its southern outskirts while, at the same time, the number of bombers destroyed rose appreciably. Although this failure of the Germans to bomb London heavily in daylight was due partly to the onset of autumn, with cloudier skies in which the bomber formations became separated from their fighter escorts and fell an easy prey to the British fighters, it was more the tactics employed by Air Vice-Marshal Park which prevented the enemy from achieving his purpose. Park so disposed his squadrons that the Germans were engaged early in their approach and throughout their flight over England. As always, he was determined that the enemy squadrons should be intercepted before they reached their objective with whatever force could be despatched in the time available.

Nevertheless his plan aroused acute controversy. In particular, Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory, in charge of No. 12 Group on the northern flank, did not see eye-to-eye with Park. He preferred to assemble large formations of fighters before sending them south in support of the battle. These did achieve successful interceptions on some occasions but by no means always; moreover it is significant that almost all their successes were scored against retreating enemy forces. This was because of the delay involved in assembling large formations of fighters drawn from several airfields. But such delay might well have been fatal. ‘If the policy of big formations had been attempted at this time in No. 11 Group,’ writes Air Chief Marshal Dowding in his despatch on the battle, ‘many more German bombers would have reached their objective without opposition.’ He might well have added that, as a result, much of London would have been destroyed and tens of thousands of its citizens killed.

In reply to a post-war critic of his tactics, Sir Keith Park made this revealing statement: ‘In view of the criticism of No. 11 Group, I have no option but to record the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in my left rear occupied by No. 12 Fighter Group throughout the Battle of Britain. On a few dozen occasions when I had sent every available squadron of No. 11 Group to engage the main enemy attack as far forward as possible, I called on No. 12 Group to send a couple of squadrons to defend a fighter airfield or other vital targets which were threatened by outflanking and smaller bomber raids. Instead of sending two squadrons quickly to protect the vital target No. 12 Group delayed while they despatched a large Wing of four or five Squadrons which wasted valuable time…. Consequently they invariably arrived too late to prevent the enemy bombing the target.

‘On one occasion I asked for two squadrons to protect North Weald fighter aerodrome from an approaching raid. No reinforcing squadrons arrived from No. 12 Group before this vital station was heavily bombed with loss of life and destruction of hangars, workshops, operations room, etc. On another occasion, No. 12 Group was asked to send a couple of squadrons to protect the fighter station at Hornchurch, but again no reinforcements arrived in time to prevent heavy bombing of this aerodrome….

‘On scores of days I called on No. 10 Fighter Group on my right for a few squadrons to protect some vital target. Never on any occasion can I remember this group failing to send its squadrons promptly, to the place requested, thus saving thousands of civilian lives and also the naval dockyards of Portsmouth, the port of Southampton and aircraft factories.

‘After further experience as commander of the air forces in Malta, in the Middle East and lastly on the Burma front, I say that we should have lost the Battle of Britain if I had adopted the “withholding” tactics of No. 12 Group.’—From an article in the New Zealand Herald, dated 9 September 1952.

In the many encounters which occurred during these attacks towards London, New Zealand fighter pilots continued to score successes. On 8 September Flight Lieutenant W. G. Clouston was leading No. 19 Spitfire Squadron on patrol over south-west London when they were directed towards a formation of Messerschmitts. He afterwards reported:

…. Was about to attack when two crossed my sights so turned on them. The rear one emitted smoke after a short burst and then caught fire. Attacked the second firing the rest of my ammunition, saw my shots register and he went down apparently out of control.

In the same engagement Pilot Officer Bush

Squadron Leader C. R. Bush, DFC; born Wellington, 7 Feb 1918; assurance agent; joined RAF Sep 1939; transferred RNZAF Mar 1946; killed in aircraft accident, 30 Nov 1948.

saw the Messerschmitt he attacked go down in flames and break up. In the late afternoon of 11 September several New Zealanders were with the squadron which intercepted an enemy formation south-east of the capital. It consisted of some forty bombers well protected by a box-like force of fighters. Nevertheless, the Spitfires broke through to the bombers and were able to claim ten of them. Pilot Officer Mackenzie saw his victim glide down and force-land. Carbury concentrated on a Heinkel which became separated from its formation; his first burst hit one of the engines, and subsequent attacks caused the undercarriage to fall out and pieces broke off its nose. At the same time a second attack was pressing towards London from the south-east. Squadron Leader Blake and Pilot Officer Verity

Squadron Leader V. B. S. Verity, DFC; Temuka; born Timaru, 5 Nov 1918; joined RAF May 1939; transferred RNZAF Dec 1943; commanded No. 650 Sqdn, 1943–44.

were with the squadrons which met the enemy over Brooklands and both men reported successful combats. One enemy bomber formation on being attacked immediately turned and fled southwards, jettisoning its bombs to make good its escape.

The morning of Sunday, 15 September, after the early mists had dispersed, was clear and bright and two major attacks were launched against London during the day. Both were heavily defeated, superb interception preventing all but a few aircraft from reaching the capital. Of the New Zealand pilots engaged, six had successful combats and among them claimed eight aircraft destroyed. Flight Lieutenant W. G. Clouston shot down one of these over the approaches to south-east London whilst leading No. 19 Squadron against the first attack of the day, and a second during the heavier

OPERATION SEALION German Plan for Invasion of EnglandBlack and white map diagram showing German plan for Invasion of England raid in the afternoon. This later attack was launched in several waves, the first of which was met south of Canterbury by the Spitfires of the Hornchurch Wing. Pilot Officer Lawrence was with No. 603 Squadron which engaged the fighter escort. He sent one Messerschmitt spinning down and then attacked a further two fighters, damaging both of them. The same enemy force was later intercepted near the Thames Estuary by Nos. 41 and 92 Squadrons with which Pilot Officers Mackenzie and Hill

Pilot Officer H. P. Hill; born Christchurch, 17 Apr 1920; joined RAF Jan 1939 killed on air operations, 20 Sep 1940.

were flying. They reached the bombers in spite of the fighter escort. Mackenzie set fire to one Dornier, and Hill, after his initial attack, saw one of the crew bale out and the bomber catch fire. He then attacked another Dornier which crashed into the edge of a wood on the south side of the Estuary and exploded. During the pursuit of the now retreating enemy, Hill scored hits on a third bomber which crashed near Rochester. Meanwhile, Blake had been in action over Kenley. Leading his squadron to attack, he got a good burst on a Dornier which subsequently crashed on an airfield in Sussex. Turning to continue the attack, he found his windscreen covered with oil from a pipe severed by an enemy bullet, so he glided down to force-land and found himself alongside his victim. Another enemy bomber crashed near the same airfield as a result of attacks by Pilot Officer G. M. Simpson, whose squadron was simultaneously engaged with some thirty Heinkels in that area.

Altogether the day's operations were disastrous for the enemy.

German records reveal that they lost 56 aircraft, the second highest total for the battle. British losses this day were 27.

The bitter opposition which his formations encountered and their failure to break through to London were to have a decisive effect on Hitler's plans for invading Britain. These plans had been maturing steadily over the past month, and by this time the assembly of ships and barges in the Channel ports was almost complete. But the gathering of this armada had not been allowed to proceed without interruption as, from the beginning of September, a large part of the effort of Bomber and Coastal Commands had been directed against the assembly points. Considerable damage was done, including the sinking of a number of ships and barges. This was not without its effect on the German Naval Command who were responsible for getting the invading forces across the narrow seas, and on 10 September the Naval Staff reported to Hitler: ‘The timely conclusion of the preparations is endangered by further difficulties and stoppages resulting from enemy action.’ On 13 September 80 barges were sunk at Ostend, and the following day Admiral Raeder reported, ‘The present air situation does not provide conditions for carrying out the operation as the risk is still too great.’ Concern at the failure of the Luftwaffe to beat down the British air defences increased among the High Command, and on 17 September Hitler, already uncertain, was persuaded to postpone the invasion to an indefinite date. An entry in the German War Diary for that day reads: ‘The enemy Air Force is still by no means defeated; on the contrary, it shows increasing activity.

… The Fuehrer therefore decides to postpone Operation Sea Lion (i.e., the invasion) indefinitely.’ At the same time, ‘air attacks against London are to be continued and the target area extended against military and other vital installations.’

There was much speculation later as to whether an actual landing had not, in fact, been attempted. But the widespread rumours that the Germans had been repelled with heavy losses probably owed their origin to an incident which occurred during August, when the Germans were practising embarkations in barges along the French coast. Some of these barges had put to sea in order to escape British bombing; they were sunk either by bombing or bad weather and the corpses of about forty German soldiers were washed up at various points along the south coast of England.

But although the daylight attacks continued, they became intermittent and steadily diminished in intensity while the night raids became heavier. All the same, the strain on the day fighter squadrons remained considerable for, in addition to increasing autumn cloud, the tactics now employed by the enemy made interception more difficult. In an attempt to divert the fighter patrols from attacking his bombers he used high fighter screens. The bomber formations also operated at varying heights and came over on a much wider front than previously—tactics which greatly increased the difficulty of obtaining accurate advance information of the enemy's approach. Nevertheless it was only occasionally that single aircraft or a small group got through to London by day, largely owing to successful counter tactics evolved by Park and his staff at No. 11 Group headquarters. Reconnaissance by single aircraft was instituted to supplement the information received from other sources, and the fighter squadrons were so disposed that the Spitfires had time to climb to engage the high-flying fighters while the Hurricanes dealt with the bombers and their close escort. Other squadrons formed a third and inner screen. The daylight defence of London thus remained secure.

Many of the combats fought during the last fortnight of September took place over four miles above the towns and fields of south-east England, when all that could be seen from the ground was the strange pattern of vapour trails which the aircraft wove as they circled and fought. The physical strain of fighting at such high altitudes proved very exacting, but in spite of this the British pilots inflicted increasingly heavy losses on the enemy.

Throughout this phase of the battle New Zealand airmen continued to take part in patrol and interception and to distinguish themselves in combat. On 18 September Hill destroyed an enemy bomber in an engagement which began nearly four miles above the spires of Canterbury Cathedral. He was flying in a section of four Spitfires when they sighted 20 Junkers 88s:

The enemy formation broke up and dived for the coast. I attacked one, following it through cloud and out to sea. Exhausted ammunition in a final attack. Both its engines stopped and it pancaked on the water, about seven miles from the coast. Directed motor boat to pick up crew.

Another bomber from this force was destroyed by W. G. Clouston, while on the same day Pilot Officer Bush of No. 242 Squadron reported the destruction of one of six enemy fighters encountered at 17,000 feet:

While trying to climb and attack one of the rear machines their leader did a quick turn and dived on me. Put my aircraft into a spin and then dived but found one Messerschmitt still following me, so did a sharp turn and managed to manoeuvre into good position behind him. After one long burst, saw enemy break up and crash into the sea near Dover.

But often the combats were inconclusive or else pilots were unable to confirm the destruction of the enemy because of cloud or the height at which they were flying. Many reports contain such remarks as:

‘Enemy aircraft fell away in a spin and was still spinning on entering cloud….’ or

‘Aircraft went down vertically but did not see it hit the sea.’

British and German Aircraft Losses 10 July to 31 October 1940 Weekly Totals British fighters lost (complete write-off or missing) Enemy aircraft actually destroyed (according to German records) Enemy aircraft claimed at the time July 10–13 15 45 63 July 14–20 22 31 49 July 21–27 14 51 58 July 28–August 3 8 56 39 August 4–10 25 44 64 August 11–17 134 261 496 August 18–24 59 145 251 August 25–31 141 193 316 September 1–7 144 187 375 September 8–14 67 102 182 September 15–21 52 120 268 September 22–28 72 118 230 September 29–October 5 44 112 100 October 6–12 47 73 66 October 13–19 29 67 38 October 20–26 21 72 43 October 27–31 21 56 60 —— —— —— 915 1733 2698

The closing days of September saw the last of the enemy's attempts to reach London with large formations of bombers, and a distinct change of strategy followed almost at once. Long-range bombers were practically withdrawn from the daylight battle and Messerschmitt fighters, some of them carrying small bombs, were now employed in small but widespread attacks. Such raids were difficult to intercept and demanded further intensive activity on the part of the fighter squadrons, including the maintenance of ‘standing’ patrols over Kent, which were very wearing and often unproductive. Nevertheless the Germans could not hope to secure any decisive result by this last change of tactics. It was, in fact, an admission of failure, confirmed when, on 12 October, Hitler finally postponed his invasion ‘until the following Spring’. Yet the enemy's activity over Britain did not cease with this decision, so that it was some time before many of the defenders realised what they had achieved—the defeat of the German attempt to gain mastery of the air over England and the disruption of Hitler's plans for invasion.

Meanwhile, as the tide of battle ebbed slowly away, the fighter pilots continued to fly many and varied patrols, and although the interception of the fast, high-flying fighters and fighter-bombers was very difficult, there were many occasions on which this was achieved. Carbury was again prominent among those who had successful combats during this last stage of the battle. After an engagement over Kent on 7 October, he reported that ‘… the Messerschmitt, after two bursts went straight into the ground.’ Three days later he was leading a section of his squadron when they sighted 20 Messerschmitts over the Channel heading for France. The Spitfires attacked and Carbury saw his victim dive into the sea. A moment later he caught sight of another enemy fighter trying to climb above him, so he went up after it and attacked. The German machine went down vertically. Carbury followed and saw it crash on the beach at Dunkirk. One wing flew off and the rest of the aircraft shot along the sand.

On 12 October Flying Officer Rabone

Squadron Leader P. W. Rabone, DFC; born Salisbury, England, 2 Mar 1918; joined RAF Mar 1939; transferred RNZAF Mar 1944; killed on air operations, 24 Jul 1944.

sent one of two Messerschmitts with which he was engaged spinning down to crash into the sea off the English coast. The enemy fighters had approached out of the sun and it was only by skilful tactics that Rabone was able to turn the tables on his assailants. At one stage he found himself in a tight circle with both enemy aircraft, and it was not until one of them broke out of this circle that he was able to attack it and, at the same time, evade the attentions of the other. Pilot Officer Trousdale played the opposite role when he destroyed another Messerschmitt towards the end of the month. He dived on three of the enemy from out of the sun and, singling one out, delivered his attack; the Messerschmitt went down vertically and exploded in flames on the ground below. About the same time Pilot Officer I. S. Smith was on local flying practice when he was directed to engage a lone reconnaissance aircraft. Smith climbed and eventually sighted a Heinkel, then after a long chase through cloud, during which he scored repeated hits, had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy land in the sea close to Skegness. Among other successes by New Zealand pilots during October 1940 was the shooting down of a Messerschmitt into the sea by Pilot Officer Wells,

Wing Commander E. P. Wells, DSO, DFC and bar; RAF; born Cambridge, 26 Jul 1916; farmer; joined RNZAF Oct 1939; commanded No. 485 (NZ) Sqdn, 1942; Wing Leader, Kenley, 1942–43; Wing Commander, Training, No. 11 Fighter Group, 1943–44; Wing Leader Tangmere, Detling, West Malling, 1944; commanded Fighter Leader School, Central Fighter Establishment, 1944–45.

while another enemy fighter was claimed by Flying Officer Mackenzie after he had pursued it out over the Channel and set it on fire. Flying Officers Hayter

Squadron Leader J. C. F. Hayter, DFC and bar; Nelson; born Canterbury, 18 Oct 1917; joined RNZAF Nov 1938; transferred RAF Aug 1939; retransferred RNZAF Aug 1944; commanded No. 274 Sqdn, Middle East, 1942; No. 74 Sqdn, ME and Europe, 1943–44.

and G. M. Simpson also reported successful engagements during October.

Before the end of the month British fighter pilots were beginning to fight again over the Channel and even over the beaches of France and Belgium, chasing German raiders on the run. The enemy had now lost the initiative, and as the weeks passed his activity in daylight showed a steady decline. The victory had come slowly and only after the most exhausting efforts, but it was none the less decisive. It was a victory for which a few hundred fighter pilots were primarily responsible; while the battle was at its height, Winston Churchill had paid them his memorable tribute.

It should not be forgotten, however, that their skill and courage would have been unavailing without the ground organisation which served them so well, or without the machines which the skill of designers and aircraft engineers had provided. Indeed, the defeat of the Luftwaffe in 1940 was only made possible by the efforts of that small band of men who early took thought for the Empire's need and quietly laboured to prepare against the day of trial. It was these men who gave Fighter Command the technical superiority, particularly in radio-location and in the firepower and rate of climb of the Spitfire, which, combined with superior strategy and the fine qualities of the British pilots, overcame an almost overwhelming numerical strength under conditions that were largely favourable to the attacker.

On the German side there had not been anything like the same careful preparation. The aerial campaign against Britain was launched after a few weeks' planning by forces lacking the technical equipment with which they could be used to the best advantage. At this time the Germans had no ground-to-air control system. This meant that when taking their squadrons into action the German leaders had no information regarding the movements of the opposing forces such as was enjoyed by the RAF commanders. Moreover communication between aircraft was often difficult, for their radio-telephone was inferior to the British. It was only after the battle started, when they heard commands skilfully and accurately directing Spitfires and Hurricanes on to their formations, that the German pilots realised their handicap.

The Germans also began the Battle of Britain with a fighter production that was not fully capable of meeting heavy losses, and so confident were they of early success that their production of fighters remained static throughout the battle. But among the many factors which can be discerned as contributing to the defeat of the Luftwaffe, probably the most outstanding was the failure of the German Air Staff to appreciate the vital significance of the British early warning radar system and its possibilities when employed in conjunction with ground-to-air control of the defending fighter squadrons. The early attacks on coastal radar stations caused serious damage and, had they been maintained, might well have proved decisive. Yet it is recorded that on 15 August, at an early stage in the battle, Goering declared: ‘It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar stations, since not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action.’

A fundamental weakness in German air strategy and policy was also revealed during the assault on Britain. Over-emphasis on the doctrine of attack had led to a relative weakness in the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe as compared with the bomber and dive-bomber forces. Then, when the latter began to suffer heavy losses, there was a wasteful use of the limited fighter strength as close escort which led to bitter and disastrous quarrels at a crucial point in the battle. The fighter leaders wanted to continue an escort system embodying loose formations and free-lance patrols, but the bomber men demanded closer escort in tight formations. Goering intervened to support the bomber men and the fighters were ordered to fly to a rigid battle plan laid down before take-off. This naturally aroused feelings of resentment and frustration among the German fighter pilots, who saw the entire planning and conduct of the offensive now being dominated by the bomber experts. How strong their feelings were on this matter is revealed in the testimony of General Adolf Galland who, as a major, led one of Goering's fighter wings during 1940 and was later to command the German Fighter Arm.

We saw the whole of our experience from the Spanish war onwards being thrown away,’ he declares. ‘We had to fly straight-and-level with the slow unwieldy bomber stream and were forbidden to engage British fighters unless we were attacked. This meant we were compelled to surrender to the Spitfires and Hurricanes the advantage of surprise, initiative, height, speed and, above all, the fighting spirit and aggressive attitude which mark all successful fighter squadrons.’

Galland also reports an interesting episode. On one occasion when he protested against the new orders, Goering turned on him and asked sarcastically just what kind of fighters he would like to have. ‘Reichsmarschall,’ he replied, ‘give me a squadron of Spitfires.’ The remark became legendary in the Luftwaffe and stimulated a lasting respect for the Spitfire.

Undoubtedly the German fighter pilots had reason to complain. In addition to the false policy of escort, the twin-engined Messerschmitt 110 was proving inadequate in fighting power for long-range escort and the single-engined Messerschmitt 109 did not have sufficient endurance to press the battle to the London area and beyond. But the real difficulty lay in the fact that the armament of the German bombers which, in conjunction with their speed, had been relied upon to offset any deficiency in fighters, proved inadequate when tested in the hard fighting over Britain. Certainly the Germans failed to take sufficient account of the fighting qualities of the Spitfire and Hurricane which had first become evident in France and over Dunkirk, and their machines were outclassed by those very qualities in combination with the British system of radar plotting and fighter control.

But, above all, in judging the German campaign against Britain, it must be realised that after the early victories on the Continent, opinion in the German Air Force ignored the possibility of serious opposition to the great and powerful Luftwaffe. Rapid and easy successes had prejudiced judgment of the fighting capabilities of the RAF. Goering himself, at the height of his power, was dazzled by his own self-esteem, and both he and the whole of the Luftwaffe were subconsciously affected by the outpourings of Goebbel's propaganda department. Only a few of the fighter men had begun to see the possibility of a tough adversary in the Spitfire and Hurricane; but they kept their opinions to themselves for, at that time, anybody who so much as hinted at the possibility of a fighter superior to the Messerschmitt incurred the risk of the serious disapproval of his superiors.

In the almost universal mood of optimism the fact that the Luftwaffe might meet a new set of conditions over England was ignored. The experience of escorted bomber formations during the campaign in France was thought to be adequate, and consequently the Battle of Britain was begun without further training or careful preparation of tactics. When the new conditions were met, the inevitable result was confusion, friction and conflicting opinions. Improvisation followed, with the Germans groping their way from one form of tactics to another in an effort to achieve success.

But by early October it was clear that the battle was lost to the Luftwaffe. The original objectives had already been discarded and now the Germans resorted to attacks on industrial cities, ports, and shipping in the hope of wearing down the British people to the point of capitulation. Concentration of effort gave way to dispersion and there began a long war of attrition. The RAF could now feel more assured of its outcome but Goering and his men, who only three months previously had looked forward to the air battle eagerly and confidently, regarded future operations with considerably less enthusiasm. The wings of the German eagle had been badly bruised and its flight was now less sure and steady.

CHAPTER 5 Bombing and Reconnaissance, 1940

DURING the first year of war the weakness of the British bomber force and the course of events in Europe combined to prevent the launching of any effective bombing offensive against Germany. At the outset moral scruples and fears of retaliation had led the British and French to declare restrictions on the bombing of other than ‘purely military objectives’, and so anxious were they not to undertake any action that might be interpreted as an attack on civilians, that attacks against targets in Germany were practically ruled out during the first seven months of the war. The German bombing of Rotterdam on 14 May 1940 was held to release the Allies from any obligation to restrict their targets, but the development of the land battles in Belgium and France demanded the employment of the bomber squadrons in close support of the ground forces; then, shortly afterwards, the invasion threat to the British Isles required their return to a defensive role. Nevertheless, as opportunity offered, attacks were made on targets in Germany and, following Italy's entry into the war on 10 June, British bombers flew over the Alps to attack the industrial centres in the north of that country.

Among the crews of the aircraft which carried out these early missions were men from every part of the Commonwealth, although at this early stage the New Zealand representation, particularly among the pilots, was relatively high. By September 1940 a total of 220 airmen from the Dominion had served with Bomber Com- mand. Casualties were heavy and just over one quarter of this number had lost their lives, while others had been made prisoner of war. Throughout this first year two of the bomber groups were commanded by New Zealanders, Air Vice-Marshals MacLean and Coningham—both veterans of the First World War. MacLean was in charge of No. 2 Blenheim Group based in East Anglia, while Coningham commanded No. 4 Whitley Group in Yorkshire. This latter formation was, in fact, commanded by a New Zealander throughout the war, for when Coningham went to the Middle East in June 1941 he was succeeded by Air Vice-Marshal Carr. Three of the squadrons in Bomber Command were also led by New Zealanders during the first year, No. 9 Wellington Squadron by Wing Commander McKee, No. 77 Whitley Squadron by Wing Commander G. T. Jarman,

Air Commodore G. T. Jarman, DSO, DFC; RAF; born Ashburton, 20 Feb 1906; joined RAF 1930; permanent commission 1936; CGI, No. 2 FTS, 1939–40; commanded No. 77 Sqdn, 1940–41; No. 76 Sqdn, 1941; No. 19 OTU, 1941–43; RAF Station, Wigtown, 1943; DCAS, RNZAF, 1943–44; AOC No. 229 Group, ACSEA, 1945.

and No. 75 Wellington Squadron by Wing Commander Buckley.

Some of the first bombing raids of May 1940 were directed against oil plants and marshalling yards in the Ruhr, which at that time was immediately behind the land battle. The rapidity of the German advance was not foreseen and it was hoped that the bombing might achieve two objects—some dislocation of enemy war industries and the disruption of supplies to the forces moving forward into Belgium and France. In the event it did neither. The early attacks by small forces of aircraft were mere pinpricks and did not seriously affect the German war machine or prevent supplies reaching the armies and air forces engaged on their rapid subjugation of Western Europe. This was no fault of the aircrews of Bomber Command who flew with great courage and determination in the face of all kinds of difficulties. Nor was the idea of attacking the enemy's communications and oil supplies fundamentally unsound, as the events of later years were to demonstrate. But in 1940 a much heavier effort was needed even to delay the German advance, and neither Britain nor France had sufficient crews or aircraft to make that effort.

The first major bombing raid against Germany was launched on the night of 15 May 1940 when oil plants in the Ruhr were the main objectives for a force of 80 aircraft, which included six Wellingtons from No. 75 New Zealand Squadron. Further raids on oil installations and marshalling yards in the Ruhr were made during the following weeks, but they were intermittent owing to frequent calls for close support by the land forces fighting in Belgium and France. The diversity of operations undertaken during the Battle of France and some of the difficulties which the bomber crews encountered are illustrated by the following record of sorties made by one New Zealand bomber pilot during this critical period:

May 20 Bombing raid on Ribemont Bridge. Stick of bombs fell alongside bridge but actual damage unobserved. Slight anti-aircraft fire and considerable searchlight activity.

May 22 Attack on railway junction at Huson. Bombs fell near target. Approaches guarded by searchlights which made accurate bombing difficult.

May 24 Target was rail and road junction at Aulnoye. Haze prevented clear definition of target and searchlights again made accurate bombing difficult.

May 25 Raid on oil refinery, Mannheim. Target attacked from 9000 feet. Considerable cloud and generally poor visibility.

May 27 Attacked marshalling yard, Dortmund, from 10,000 feet. Bombs observed to fall near southern end of target. Intense searchlight activity.

June 1 Target was oil plant in Ruhr. Adverse weather made identification of target impossible. Forty minutes spent searching area without result. Bombs brought back to base.

June 3 Raid on oil plant at Homberg. Attack made from 10,000 feet. Anti-aircraft fire and intense searchlight activity.

June 5 Attack on tank and stores concentrations in Forest of Gobain. No target presenting itself, bombed alternative target in a marshalling yard at Rheydt.

June 8 Objective was enemy communications in vicinity of Libramont, France. Bombs dropped on roads where troop concentrations were expected. No results seen.

June 9 Raid on road and river crossings at Chateau Thierry. Bad weather, low cloud—bombs burst near the railway junction.

New Zealand airmen were among the crews of the force of Whitleys and Wellingtons detailed to make the first attack on Italy following the declaration of war by that country. Industries in Turin and Genoa were the targets for this raid, which was made on the night of 11 June. Unfortunately the attack proved abortive. The majority of the 36 Whitleys did not reach Italy because of heavy storms encountered over the Alps, while the twelve Welling- tons, six of which were from No. 75 Squadron, did not leave the ground at all. They had flown from England to an advanced base in the south of France early in the day, but so anxious were the French to avoid provoking the Italians to retaliation that they drove lorries and carts on to the airfield to prevent the Wellingtons from taking off. The aircraft then returned to England. After several days of recrimination, permission was finally given for the airfield at Salon to be used, but the capitulation of France prevented the development of heavy attacks on Italy for some considerable time. A few raids were attempted during the autumn by the Whitley squadrons from bases in England, but they were aimed at lowering morale rather than inflicting material damage. The distance and the formidable barrier of the Alps were almost insuperable obstacles at this stage of the war.

With the collapse of France, the Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command, Air Marshal Portal,

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Portal, KG, GCB, OM, DSO and bar, MC, Order of Polonia Restituta (Pol), Order of St. Olav (Nor), Order of the White Lion (Czech), Distinguished Service Medal (US), Order of St George (Gr), Order of the Netherlands Lion (Hol), Order of the Crown with Palm and Croix de Guerre with Palm (Bel); England; born Hungerford, Berks, 21 May 1893; joined Royal Engineers, 1914; seconded RFC 1915 and RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1919; Air Council Member for Personnel, 1939–40; AOC-in-C, Bomber Command, 1940; CAS, RAF, 1940–45.

was anxious to begin the strategic bombing of Germany in accordance with the long-term plans drawn up before the war. Portal had joined the Royal Engineers as a despatch rider in August 1914, and for two and a half years served in France, first as a sapper then, in 1915, as an observer officer with the Royal Flying Corps and finally as a pilot. His record as a fighter pilot was hardly surpassed; in 1917 he won both the MC and DSO and the following year a bar to the DSO. One of his many adventures was to take on five enemy machines at once and shoot down three of them. In the years between the wars he commanded a notable bomber squadron and came to be regarded within the service as an expert in bombing practice and a foremost exponent of the theories which were to have a powerful influence on the operations of the Royal Air Force during the Second World war. ‘In Bomber Command,’ he declared in July 1940, ‘we have the one directly offensive weapon in the whole of our armoury, the one means by which we can undermine the morale of a large part of the enemy people, shake their faith in the Nazi regime and at the same time dislocate the major part of their heavy industry, much of their chemical industry and a good part of their oil production.’

It had already been decided that the main effort should be directed against the German aircraft industry, oil producing plants and communications, but it was soon found that many of the targets were difficult to locate at night. As one New Zealand bomb-aimer wrote at this time: ‘It is very difficult to pick up targets except on clear moonlight nights, and we don't get many of them. One night we ran into bad weather while looking for a place at Hamburg. We flew over cloud all the way there and shot far over our mark and out into the Baltic. Turning back we found ourselves over Kiel at about 2000 feet and they let off everything they had at us. We got away as quickly as possible but had to return without finding our target.’

On the other hand, daylight penetration to any depth had already proved too costly. In these circumstances, objectives on the fringe of enemy and occupied territory received most attention. The Blenheim light bombers were sent to attack aerodromes and ports in the Low Countries, targets which were also given to the Welling- tons, Whitleys, and Hampdens as secondary objectives to those in Germany. With the lack of facilities for navigation by night, many of the heavier bombers were also forced to bomb such targets. Altogether there was much dispersion of effort. Furthermore the forces sent to bomb the various targets were relatively small and their total bomb-load negligible, while the German repair organisation was exceedingly efficient. This was the period when the German town of Hamm was frequently mentioned in communiques, for it possessed one of the largest railway marshalling yards in Germany. Among the bomber crews it became know as the ‘Ham and Egg’ run, ‘egg’ being RAF slang for a bomb. But there were many marshalling yards in the Ruhr area and it is doubtful whether the attacks on Hamm in 1940 had any appreciable effect on the running of the German railways.

In these early raids enemy opposition was, on the whole, slight. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was not often encountered and as yet few German night fighters sought to intercept the bombers. However, there were other hazards. The bombers often flew through dense cloud in the bitter cold of the higher altitudes, over a totally blacked-out country, to be met here and there by searchlights groping through the darkness or by sudden barrages of flak. It was not easy to navigate accurately under such conditions. The bomber, affected by constantly changing winds, rarely flew in a straight line—almost always it moved through the air at an angle, like a boat crossing a swift-flowing river. This drift could only be measured in relation to objects on the ground, so that when the aircraft was forced to fly over heavy cloud for hundreds of miles the navigator could only obtain an approximate position by observation of the stars. The most difficult part of the flight often came at the end of some eight or nine hours' flying, when crews were tired and sometimes half frozen. There was always the return passage across the North Sea where, if the aircraft was damaged, difficulties might develop and lead to a forced landing in the water. When the English coast was reached, too often it would be to find the countryside blanketed in low cloud, fog or mist. Many lives were lost through crews losing their way over hilly country; with his machine running short of fuel the pilot would reduce height in an effort to get some idea of his position, only to crash into high ground.

During these early operations when the location of precise objectives proved more difficult than had been anticipated, aircrews displayed considerable initiative in finding alternative targets. Typically, one night in July Flight Lieutenant Adams, captain of a Wellington from No. 75 Squadron, finding his target obscured by cloud, bombed two supply trains in the marshalling yards at Soltau. His crew saw large fires break out in both trains. Some weeks later, returning from an attack on the Ruhr, Adams noticed night-flying training in progress at an enemy airfield. He attacked an aircraft which was preparing to land and had the satisfaction of seeing it dive straight to the ground and burst into flames. During one of his early sorties as a bomber captain, Pilot Officer Denton

Wing Commander F. H. Denton, DFC and bar; London; born Greymouth, 23 Apr 1917; surveyor; joined RAF Jan 1940; commanded No. 487 (NZ) Sqdn, 1945.

determined to attack an alternative target on the coast rather than bring his bombs back. After a lengthy search he found the harbour of Flushing and dived through a curtain of anti-aircraft fire to attack the docks. The explosion of the bombs rocketed the Wellington several hundred feet upwards, but Denton and his crew were rewarded by seeing fires start. Although their machine was badly damaged with gaping holes in each wing, they brought it safely back to base.

The New Zealand Squadron took a prominent part in this early offensive, regularly despatching aircraft from its base at Feltwell in Norfolk to bomb a wide variety of targets. While these included many of the type usual at this period, such as oil plants and com- munications, more unusual places visited by the squadron were the docks at Bremen, Emden and Wilhelmshaven, explosive factories at Cologne, and a forest south of Freiburg where it was suspected that the Germans had ammunition dumps. The squadron also took part in the first large-scale attack against Berlin on the night of 23 September 1940, when just over 100 aircraft were despatched to attack the German capital as a reprisal for the raids on London. No. 75 Squadron sent six Wellingtons, four of which reported finding this distant target—no mean feat at this period. Although greeted by considerable anti-aircraft fire, all four were able to drop their bombs within the target area and return safely. Outstanding incidents during these months were few compared with the number of raids made by the squadron. On one occasion a Wellington narrowly escaped disaster in a severe thunderstorm over Germany, while on another night a crew had a lucky escape after a crash landing on the east coast of England. The weather was bad and they had brought back their bombs, which exploded, completely destroying the aircraft, just after the crew had left it.

It was towards the end of July that the squadron had its first serious encounter with enemy night fighters when the Wellington captained by Flying Officer N. Williams was attacked by three Heinkels during its return flight from the Ruhr. In the running fight which followed one enemy aircraft was set on fire and seen to crash, a second was reported as badly damaged, and the third driven off. Although his machine was riddled with holes, Williams managed to get it back safely across the North Sea. On the same night, however, another Wellington piloted by Flying Officer Watson

Flying Officer S. M. McK. Watson; born Wellington, 25 Jan 1913; joined RAF Oct 1939; killed on air operations, 20 Jul 1940.

was lost over Germany, and a few nights later Flying Officer Coleman, one of the original members of the squadron, also failed to return, making the third loss suffered by the squadron since operations began. The first had been the loss of the Wellington captained by Flying Officer Collins on 21 May 1940. Altogether, between June and September 1940, 245 sorties were despatched

Anson on convoy patrolBlack and white photograph of plane in air

German bombers struck at the British Fleet in the Firth of Forth on 16 October 1939. This German photograph shows a direct hit on the cruiser Southampton (middle) and a near miss on the Edinburgh

Black and white aerial photograph of bridge with bombs dropping and ship on water

Original members of New Zealand Flight, No. 75 SquadronBlack and white signed photograph of pilots in uniform standing in front of aeroplane

A Whitley of Bomber Command takes off on a leaflet raid. Whitley aircraft were later used by Coastal Command in anti-submarine patrolsBlack and white photograph of aeroplane taking off

Ground crews coaxing the propeller of a Battle bomber on an airfield in FranceBlack and white photograph of men working underneath aeroplane, in snow

Flying Officer E. J. Kain, DFCBlack and white portrait photograph of male pilot in uniform

The town of NarvikBlack and white aerial photograph of town with alps and lake

The wreckage of a Dornier 17 bomber brought down in a French cornfield during the air battles of the record week of May 1940Black and white photograph of men in uniforms standing around crashed aeroplane

Low-level attack by Battle bombers on a German convoy in FranceBlack and white aerial photograph taken from window of plane, tanks on road below

Burning oil depots at DunkirkBlack and white photograph of smoke billowing, with ships in harbour in foreground

British troops on the beach at Dunkirk waiting to embarkBlack and white photograph of groups of soldiers standing on beach, with ships in water in background

The German leaders, June 1940. Hitler with Goering (left), Raeder, and Keitel (right) in the forest of Compiègne on the occasion of the signing of the terms of surrender by the French

Black and white photograph of two officers (Hitler and Goering) in uniform shaking hands, with other officers looking on

A German photograph of a Heinkel III dropping its bombs during the Battle of BritainBlack and white photograph of German aeroplane dropping bombs

A German photograph of a direct hit on the oil storage tanks at Purfleet, near Tilbury on the ThamesBlack and white aerial photograph of oil tanks burning

Vapour trails over WestminsterBlack and white photograph of vapour trails in sky, with Big Ben clock towering in the foreground

His Majesty the King with Flight Lieutenant A. C. Deere, DSO, OBE, DFC and bar, DFC (US), Croix de GuerreBlack and white photograph of the King of England in suit, shaking hands with pilot in uniform at an official ceremony

Pilot Officer C. F. Gray, DSO, DFC and two barsBlack and white portrait photograph of officer in pilot's uniform

Air-Vice Marhsal Sir Keith R. Park, GCB, KBE, MC and bar, DFC, Croix de GuerreBlack and white close up photograph of pilot in flying gear standing in front of plane

A Hudson of Coastal Command on a reconnaissance of the Norwegian coastBlack and white photograph of aeroplane flying over coastal ranges

A Sunderland of Coastal Command on patrol over a convoy of troopships approaching BritainBlack and white aerial photograph of Sunderland aeroplane flying over troopships

A Coastal Command Blenheim above an enemy tanker attacked in the North SeaBlack and white photograph of Blenheim aeroplane flying above trail of smoke from burning target

Part of the dock area at Dunkirk where the German invasion fleet was concentrated. Dock buildings round the upper of the two docks shown have been completely destroyed and unloading cranes smashed. Damaged barges can be seen near the entrance of the upper dock where a number of others have been sunk

Black and white aerial photograph looking down on shipping docks

A section of London east of St. Paul's Cathedral after the raid of 29 December 1940Black and white photograph of bombed buildings in East London

The centre of Coventry after the attack of 14 November 1940Black and white photograph looking down on men and women in the street, with rubble from bombed buildings. In centre, Owen Owen building.

The German caption reads ‘Returning with over 700 hits from an operational flight. The fabric even stood up to a belly landing.’ The inset is described as ‘Heinkel III shooting down a Spitfire’

Black and white photograph of grounded aeroplane, with officer standing on wing, and two aeroplanes flying in sky above

A Defiant about to take off on a night interception patrolBlack and white photograph of a Defiant aeroplane on runway at night before take off

A German supply ship on fire in a fiord in south-west Norway after a dawn attack by a Coastal Command BeaufortBlack and white aerial photograph of smoke rising from ship on fire

U-boat (U. 570) which surrendered south of Iceland to a Coastal Command Hudson. This photograph was taken from the Catalina flying boat which relieved the Hudson. Depth charge is in profile

Black and white photograph of German U-boat rising to surface of sea

Aircraft at the edge of an airfield in Iceland protected from the high winds by mounds of earth and stonesBlack and white photograph of aircraft with aircraft carriers in background, and mounds of earth and rocks

Blenheims of Bomber Command attack shipping and the docks at Rotterdam on 16 July 1941Black and white aerial photograph of bomber plane flying over docks during an attack

Attack on power stations at Cologne on 12 August 1941Black and white photograph of smoke billowing from power stations, with aeroplane returning from attack

BOMBER COMMAND OPERATIONS, September 1939—December 1941Colour map of bomber command operations in Europe by the New Zealand Squadron against targets in Germany for the loss of six aircraft; three of these crashed on their return to England, two whilst attempting forced landings, and a third after the crew had baled out when they ran short of fuel and were unable to find a landing ground. The highest price had to be paid for experience in this new form of long-range warfare, and as the months passed the casualty list mounted steadily. But the spirit of the squadron remained high. Aircrews became attached to their own particular aircraft, several of which were adorned with designs of various kinds—Flight Lieutenant Lucas,

Wing Commander F. J. Lucas, DFC and bar; Queenstown; born Dunedin, 18 Aug 1915; joined RAF 1936; transferred RNZAF Jul 1939; OC No. 1 (GR) Sqdn, 1942–43; served No. 487 Sqdn and HQ Transport Command, 1943–45.

for example, had a large painting on his Wellington of the cartoon character ‘Popeye the Sailor’, and ‘Popeye’ became his own nickname. But it was not long before many of the aircraft also bore markings of a different kind on their outer fabric—numbers of patches covering the scars of bullets and shrapnel, grim reminders of encounters with enemy night fighters and anti-aircraft fire.

New Zealand airmen also flew with many other squadrons of Bomber Command in the early raids on German targets, and a number served with distinction as captains of Wellingtons, Whitleys, Hampdens or Blenheims. Flight Lieutenant McKay,

Group Captain J. J. McKay, DSO, DFC, DFC (US); RAF; born Nelson, 2 Jun 1916; joined RAF 1937; SASO, Air HQ, Levant, 1944; commanded No. 240 Wing, MAAF, 1944–45.

who had been flying with a Whitley squadron since the outbreak of war, had completed 37 sorties over enemy territory by the end of 1940. Flying Officer Menzies

Flight Lieutenant G. J. Menzies, DFC; born Christchurch, 5 Nov 1920; joined RAF Oct 1938; killed on air operations, 22 Jan 1941.

flew as captain of a Blenheim bomber both during the Battle of France and in subsequent raids against targets in France. Flying Officer Nixon

Squadron Leader W. M. Nixon, DFC; RAF; born Auckland, 6 May 1913; joined RAF 1937; p.w. 17 Aug 1940.

completed 30 missions over Germany before being taken prisoner following an attack on the Zeiss works at Jena on 16 August. Flying Officers Paape

Squadron Leader A. M. Paape, DFC and bar; born Dunedin, 13 Apr 1919; joined RAF May 1939; killed on air operations, 3 Apr 1943.

and Svendsen

Flight Lieutenant N. H. Svendsen, DFC; Auckland; born Pukekohe, 27 Jan 1915; joined RAF 1937; p.w. 30 Jun 1941.

captained Hampden bombers on both bombing and minelaying sorties. One night in June, while making a low-level attack on a special target, Svendsen's aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire and the navigator seriously wounded. Although still opposed by enemy fire, he attacked his target and navigated the Hampden back to base. By the end of July Pilot Officer Swift,

Flying Officer J. F. Swift, DFC; born Invercargill, 19 Jun 1917; joined RAF Jun 1938; killed on air operations, 30 Sep 1941.

captain of a Wellington bomber, had completed 30 sorties over enemy territory, while Pilot Officer Parsons

Pilot Officer E. I. Parsons, DFC; born Linwood, Christchurch, 24 Oct 1912; joined RAF Apr 1940; killed on air operations, 14 Aug 1940.

flew continuously with a Whitley squadron until he was lost on 14 August in a raid against the Fiat works at Turin. Parsons had bombed the target but, as the result of an attack by an Italian fighter, had to make the return flight on one engine. When only one mile from the English coast, the Whitley went down into the sea and only three members of the crew survived. Sergeant Reece

Squadron Leader R. A. Reece, DFC, DFM; RAF; born Christchurch, 2 Nov 1914; joined RAF Aug 1938.

completed many sorties as a navigator with a light bomber squadron. On one occasion, although wounded in an engagement with enemy fighters, he remained at his post and guided his pilot safely back to base through severe weather.

On 20 July 1940, when a gallant attempt was made to damage the German battleship Tirpitz which was nearing completion at Wilhelmshaven, Pilot Officer Gould

Flight Lieutenant A. H. Gould, DFC; NSW, Australia; born Wanganui, 26 Sep 1918; joined RAF Mar 1938; p.w. 20 Jul 1940.

captained one of the six Hampdens detailed to bomb at low level. Only three of the aircraft found and attacked the battleship. Flying in almost at mast height, they met a heavy barrage of anti-aircraft fire and all three were shot down. Gould escaped serious injury and was captured. He afterwards told how:

The first hits we received came from destroyers anchored in the harbour when we were about half a mile from the shore. From then on the Hampden was hit continually all the way to the target—both engines, parts of the wings and fuselage were on fire before we passed over the first wharves. My navigator released our bombs as we approached the battleship. Flames lit up buildings and assisted me to clear masts and gantries. As soon as level ground appeared I pulled everything back to come down on what appeared to be a beach. It turned out to be mud flats exposed by the low tide. Our rear gunner was killed and the navigator thrown through the nose of the aircraft. We three survivors were challenged a few minutes later and captured.

Pilot Officer Kirk,

Flight Lieutenant I. C. Kirk; born Parnell, Auckland, 16 Nov 1914; joined RAF Jul 1939; p.w. 2 Sep 1940.

navigator in another Hampden bomber, was fortunate to survive when his aircraft was shot down one night early in September while returning from an attack on Mannheim.

It was about midnight and we were flying at about 11,000 feet between Leige and Maastricht when the aircraft was suddenly caught in the beams of many searchlights. Before our pilot could dive clear we were attacked by a Messerschmitt night fighter. The first bursts put our gunners out of action, both mortally wounded; a second attack smashed the controls and set the port engine and fuel tanks on fire. I was wounded in the head and momentarily dazed. On coming to I tried the intercom. but got no reply. Attempted to crawl up to help the pilot, thinking he was wounded or dead. Found this impossible even though I used all my strength against what seemed like a mass of twisted metal and broken wires. The Hampden was now lurching wildly, so groping my way to the escape hatch I dived out. The air seemed buoyant and as I slowed down I saw the Hampden crash and burst into flames. Unknown to me the captain had been thrown out. He had no recollection of pulling his ripcord, only of landing in a ploughed field with his chute opened enough to break his fall. My own had opened cleanly and I landed in a tree. Scrambling down I threw my gear under a bridge and, failing to find any sign of the others, optimistically set off westward, steering by the stars. Just before dawn a Dutch farmer caught up with me as I limped along. He took me to his home but just as I was about to wash the blood from my head, a German patrol surprised us and took me prisoner.

An unusual experience befell Flight Lieutenant Barker

Flight Lieutenant D. W. F. Barker, DFC; born Gisborne, 27 Feb 1914; joined RAF Nov 1939; died of injuries received on air operations, 12 Feb 1941.

of No. 83 Squadron, when he was returning from an attack on the Dortmund-Ems canal one night in August. Suddenly the port engine was hit and shortly afterwards, while the Hampden was flying over the Dutch coast, the damaged propeller fell off; the bomber fell some 2000 feet before Barker could regain control. Then, about ten miles from the English coast, the other engine began to falter, but by coaxing it along he was able to make a landing in the sea a few yards from the shore. The crew escaped without serious injury. Sometimes, however, the incidents which occurred in flight were of a less serious nature. On one occasion a New Zealand captain was flying his bomber back over the North Sea when there was a sudden and unexpected crash on the nose of the aircraft. His startled crew turned to see the face and head of their captain covered with blood. It streamed down the back of his helmet and he appeared to have been seriously wounded. But all that had happened was that a seagull had hit the front perspex and crashed through it into the pilot's face, and he escaped with no more than a black eye. Many of the sorties by the bomber crews during this period were, in fact, uneventful, often because, as Air Vice-Marshal Coningham wrote at the time, ‘excellent and courageous work was so well done that incidents did not occur.’

* * * * *

From the end of August until the middle of October 1940, the effort of the bomber squadrons was directed almost entirely against the enemy's preparations for the invasion of Britain, and New Zealanders flying with these units found that targets now detailed for attack were the growing concentrations of barges and small ships in the North Sea and Channel ports. The docks and installations in these ports were also bombed. Although increasingly well defended, these were comparatively easy targets to locate and considerable damage was done to the enemy's flotillas and to the ports in which they were assembling. German records reveal that, of the vessels assembled for the invasion of Britain, 21 transports, 214 barges and five tugs had been sunk or damaged by 21 September 1940. The bomber aircraft also co-operated with the Royal Navy, as on the night of 10 September, when two Wellingtons from No. 75 Squadron dropped flares over Ostend harbour to assist warships making a short bombardment. Altogether 45 sorties were flown by the squadron during these weeks against what came to be known as the ‘invasion ports’.

New Zealand airmen with the Blenheim and Hudson squadrons of Coastal Command also took part in these raids and in the attacks on what were described as ‘fringe targets’. They also flew reconnaissance patrols along the enemy-held coastline from Norway to the English Channel as far west as Brest. This watch on the ports from which invasion fleets might be expected to sail was of the greatest importance if early warning of the enemy's intentions was to be received. The patrols were given vigorous code-names. One was called ‘Bulldog’—a name that expressed the British determination at this time to hold out at all costs. Another was named ‘Armada’, with all its historic associations of the overthrow of a vast invading force. But the reconnaissance had to be carried out in the face of stiff enemy opposition, and many aircraft failed to return or came back badly battered after encounters with enemy fighters. On one occasion Pilot Officer Kean,

Pilot Officer R. T. Kean, DFC; born Green Island, 5 Apr 1918; joined RAF Aug 1938; killed in flying accident, 5 Aug 1940.

flying a Hudson of No. 206 Squadron on a dawn patrol off the Dutch coast, was attacked by three Messerschmitts. His rear gunner scored hits on the enemy leader but was almost immediately killed by fire from one of the other machines. The Hudson only escaped destruction through Kean's prompt action in diving to sea level and making violent turns and manoeuvres. Although wounded, he did this with such skill that the enemy finally ran out of ammunition and withdrew. It was while engaged on a similar reconnaissance patrol early in October that Pilot Officer Fowler,

Flying Officer A. L. Fowler, DFC; born Foxton, 21 Jun 1918; joined RAF May 1939; killed in flying accident, 23 Aug 1941.

of No. 248 Blenheim Squadron, fought a spirited and gallant action against a Dornier 215, an enemy machine of superior speed and fire power. During the engagement Fowler was wounded in the face and hands but he continued to press his attacks until the Dornier broke off the combat. Subsequent wireless messages from the German aircraft indicated that it was retiring to base badly damaged and with members of its crew killed and injured.

In northern waters reconnaissance patrols were flown along the Norwegian coast as far as Trondheim. It was in this port that the Scharnhorst was discovered towards the middle of June 1940. Bombing attacks failed to cause any damage to the battle-cruiser but forced her to put to sea. Here on 21 June she was attacked by Beauforts of Coastal Command with greater success, three direct hits being reported. The Scharnhorst then returned to Kiel. Flying Officer Trigance,

Wing Commander K. W. Trigance, DFC; RNZAF; Fiji; born Temuka, 4 Aug 1914; joined RAF 1937; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944; Senior Administrative Officer, Wigram, 1945.

who had been with No. 42 Squadron from the early days of the war, captained one of the nine Beauforts which made the attack. His first bomb was seen to strike a gun turret and send up a shower of debris. A second fell in the water close alongside the warship. The weather was clear when the Beauforts attacked and they were greeted by a heavy barrage. Enemy fighters also appeared and three of the British aircraft were shot down, but Trigance was among those who returned safely. However, this attack was only one of the results of the reconnaissance which continued throughout the summer and autumn over the North Sea and the coastal waters of Norway. Day by day reports were brought back—reports often gathered in the face of enemy fighters and anti-aircraft opposition and in spite of adverse flying conditions.

Although nominally reconnaissance, these patrols assumed a more offensive character as the enemy began to turn the resources of Norway to his own use. Bombing raids were made on such targets as oil storage tanks, oil factories, airfields and on enemy merchant shipping along the coast.

The attacks on merchant ships represented an interesting change of policy. Previously aircraft had been ordered to observe scrupulously the conditions of the Hague Convention, but in July 1940, as a reprisal for the enemy's disregard of maritime law in his attacks on East Coast lightships and shipping, the War Cabinet had reluctantly authorised aircraft to attack at sight enemy merchant vessels in certain specified areas of the North Sea and the Norwegian coast. This marked the beginning of a long campaign against the enemy's sea communications which was later waged along the whole coast of Europe and in the Mediterranean.

A typical patrol was flown on 19 June by Flying Officer Tacon as captain of a Hudson of No. 233 Squadron. Detailed to reconnoitre Kristiansand, he took off from Leuchars airfield in Scotland shortly before dawn, and after two hours' flying across the North Sea a landfall was made on the Norwegian coast. At first the crew were unable to locate their objective through the cloud and rain, but eventually the harbour was found and a temporary break in the sky enabled photographs to be taken. Tacon then flew over the town to release a stick of bombs on the neighbouring airfield. Ships seen in other fiords were then photographed before the Hudson began the return flight. Flying Officer McHardy,

Wing Commander E. H. McHardy, DSO, DFC and bar, Croix de Guerre (Fr); RAF; born Palmerston, 24 Jun 1920; joined RAF May 1939; commanded No. 404 Sqdn, 1942; No. 143 Sqdn, 1943–44.

who had joined No. 248 Squadron shortly after the outbreak of war, was also prominent in these duties. Early in September he completed a notable reconnaissance of the long and difficult Sogne Fiord in which enemy ships were reported to be sheltering; an earlier attempt had failed owing to bad weather. McHardy afterwards reported:

On reaching the entrance to the fiord we found the cloud down to the deck and could not get in, so climbed to 10,000 and went over the top. A mattress of cloud extended to the East but we flew on and after some twenty miles suddenly saw a little hole and water so I went down through it and we found ourselves in the fiord. We flew right up observing a 3000 ton ship just leaving a port on the way. The fiord got narrower and finally we reached the end near the Swedish border. I had to do a semi-stalled turn to get round under the cloud. On the way back the ship was in mid stream and we made a machine gun and bombing attack at mast height obtaining hits on the stern. We then proceeded down the fiord but soon found ourselves trapped with no hole to go back up through again. Fortunately the fiord at this spot was straight for a reasonable distance so I set my directional Gyro in a trial run, turned 180° and with full power climbed dead straight through 6000 feet of cloud earnestly hoping I would not drift into one side or the other as the mountains were 6000–7000 feet high and very close. Eventually we got clear and reached base without further incident.

Trigance had a narrow escape the same month while making a reconnaissance of Aspo Fiord. He had just sighted and bombed a ship in the fiord when three fighters dived upon his machine. By skilful manoeuvring he evaded their first attack, and his rear gunner reported hits on one of them before the Beaufort reached cloud cover. Other crews were less fortunate, and frequently single aircraft engaged on these reconnaissance patrols disappeared without their fate being known.

As the Germans armed their merchant ships, the Hudsons and Blenheims met increasingly heavy fire in making their low-level attacks, and aircraft sometimes limped back with members of the crew wounded or dying. On several such occasions outstanding acts of gallantry were performed. One grey November day in 1940 three Blenheims of No. 235 Squadron bombed two ships off the enemy coast. The captain of one of these aircraft, Pilot Officer Davison,

Wing Commander J. T. Davison, OBE, GM; RNZAF; England; born Ashburton, 7 Jan 1914; commercial traveller; joined RNZAF Oct 1939; commanded Initial Training Wing, Delta, 1944.

was wounded in the foot and thigh during the attack and the rear gunner had part of his arm blown off. Although suffering considerable pain, Davison flew his machine back across the North Sea, only to discover on reaching base that the hydraulic gear had been put out of action. He tried hard to get the undercarriage down but was unsuccessful and was forced to make a crash landing. Unknown to him one of the bombs had failed to release during the attack and this fell and exploded on landing, setting the aircraft on fire and trapping the wounded gunner in the wreckage. Davison and his navigator scrambled clear but then discovered that the gunner was still in the burning aircraft. They immediately returned and, regardless of the flames and the fact that the petrol tanks might explode at any moment, succeeded in dragging the wounded man to safety. Both men were badly burned.

As the year drew to a close the aircrews flying these missions over northern waters had to face the onset of winter as well as the menace of enemy fighters. One Hudson pilot writes:

Our patrols usually began before dawn which meant that crews were roused in the early hours to face a bleak aerodrome in pitch darkness. There was always a bitter wind blowing and perhaps ice on the ground. After briefing, pilots, navigators, gunners and wireless operators would stagger and slither to the aircraft each laden like Father Christmas with their bulky bags, parachutes, flying kit, packets of sandwiches, thermos flasks, pigeon baskets and so on. Flying towards the rising sun it might be that the navigator had just enough light to see the white caps on the grey sea as he lay full length in the nose of the aircraft calculating wind, drift, speed and position. The engines would drone on for a couple of hours before the coast of Norway came into view, although more often than not it would be hidden in cloud or mist. If possible, we flew into the fiords to take photographs, spot shipping and note activity at enemy held aerodromes, but as such objectives were often barely within range of our base, the time spent in the target area was very limited. A further source of frustration was that clear skies with conditions of perfect visibility alternated rapidly with very bad weather.

But these patrols and the bombing attacks were only part of the work of Coastal Command at this time. Other squadrons with which New Zealand airmen were flying continued the vital task of escorting convoys carrying food and supplies to Britain. In the Western Approaches, where the depredations of the German submarines were now becoming serious, the Royal Navy found these air escorts of great assistance, limited though they were in range and number; indeed U-boats seldom ventured to approach ships while an aircraft was patrolling in the vicinity. The Hudsons and Sunderlands were also able to locate small boatloads of survivors from torpedoed vessels and guide warships or merchantmen to the scene to pick them up. In addition to this escort and rescue work, anti-submarine patrols were flown to cover the movements of naval forces in home waters. Occasionally a damaged warship was helped as when the destroyer Kelly, badly mauled in the Battle of Narvik, was found limping back across the North Sea by a Sunderland of No. 210 Squadron and escorted to a Scottish port. The flying boat was captained by Flight Lieutenant Frame,

Wing Commander A. Frame, DFC; born Oamaru, 6 Sep 1916; joined RAF Mar 1938; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944; commanded No. 204 Sqdn, West Africa, 1944–45.

who had joined this unit three months before the outbreak of war. Also prominent during this period as captains of Sunderlands were Flight Lieutenant Stead, who flew with No. 204 Squadron from the Shetlands and later from Iceland, Flying Officer Rea,

Flight Lieutenant W. S. Rea, DFC; born Paengaroa, 7 Oct 1915; joined RAF Mar 1939; killed in flying accident, 5 Dec 1941.

who had joined No. 201 Squadron in October 1939, and Flying Officers Baggott,

Wing Commander S. G. Baggott, DFC; RAF; born London, 25 Nov 1916; joined RAF Jun 1938; commanded No. 95 Sqdn, West Africa, 1945.

Evison

Wing Commander C. E. W. Evison; England; born Invercargill, 27 Mar 1916; joined RAF Jan 1938; commanded No. 204 Sqdn, West Africa, 1943; seconded BOAC, 1944–45.

and Gibson,

Wing Commander T. P. Gibson, DFC; RAF; born Christchurch, 25 Oct 1913; joined RAF May 1938; commanded New Camp Air Base, Gibraltar, 1944–45.

who were with No. 210 Squadron at Oban. Altogether just over 100 New Zealand airmen flew with Coastal Command as pilots, navigators, wireless operators, and gunners during the first year of war. Thirty lost their lives. For the most part their duties had been unspectacular, involving long hours of flying over the sea, seldom relieved by any incident; yet they demanded qualities of quiet courage and endurance which deserve recognition along with the exploits of those who flew on more eventful operations.

* * * * *

During this first year of war a small but important contribution in the reconnaissance field was made by the pilots of the photographic aircraft. In unarmed machines, these men flew over enemy territory photographing German naval bases, ports, airfields and cities. Before and during the campaign in Belgium and France they brought back useful information on the disposition of the enemy's ground and air forces, then later, when the invasion threat increased, photographs were taken of the German preparations by land and sea. The results of the RAF bombing attacks on the invasion targets were also noted. Four New Zealanders, Flight Lieutenant Clark,

Squadron Leader L. E. Clark, DFC; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 16 Aug 1906; joined RAF Nov 1939; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944.

Flying Officers Millen

Flight Lieutenant S. J. Millen, DFC; born Wanganui, 20 Jan 1914; joined RAF Jun 1938; killed on air operations, 16 Dec 1940.

and Milne

Flight Lieutenant C. D. Milne, DFC; RAF; born Petone, 2 Jul 1916; Cranwell Cadet; permanent commission RAF 1936; p.w. 24 Apr 1940.

and Pilot Officer Parker,

Flight Lieutenant W. B. Parker; Blenheim; born Blenheim, 16 Nov 1914; clerk joined RNZAF Sep 1939; transferred RAF Apr 1940; retransferred RNZAF Apr 1945.

were among the small group of airmen who pioneered the work of the special photographic reconnaissance unit in 1940. This unit, which was later to play a vital role in providing information for all three services in the various theatres of war, was not formed until after the outbreak of hostilities since it had been originally intended that photographic sorties should be flown by Blenheim bombers. But it was soon found that these aircraft were no match for the German fighters and they were often unable to penetrate to their objectives. During the early months losses were heavy and photographs few. Meanwhile a civilian air survey operator, Mr. F. S. Cotton, had suggested the fitting of a Spitfire, the fast fighter then being introduced into the service, with cameras instead of guns and relying on its high speed and ability to fly at great heights for protection against enemy fighters. A special unit was formed in October 1939 to develop Cotton's idea, and it soon proved highly successful in operation. Clark joined the unit early in the following month as the third operational pilot to be enlisted for this special task. He was already an experienced pilot—he had made a solo flight from England to New Zealand three years before the war. Milne arrived a few weeks later on transfer from a Blenheim squadron in France, with which he had been flying on photographic duties from the outset. Of his early experiences with the new unit he writes:

We were at Heston, the English base—six pilots, an Australian, a Canadian, two Englishmen and two New Zealanders—typical of many R.A.F. outfits. Early in January Clark, two other pilots and myself went to France to work over Germany while the others remained behind to cover the German ports. They had a Hudson at Heston and used it over Kiel until it was shot down in error by our own fighters over England. In France with our solitary Spitfire we covered a fair area of the German defences in the West, flying at altitudes of 30–35,000 feet in very low temperatures. At first we operated off snow at an airfield south of Lille. Enemy fighters gave us no trouble during the first month but our own anti-aircraft fire and French based Hurricanes caused us a few shocks. With long range tanks in the Spitfire giving up to 4 ½ hours' endurance and operating at high altitudes we were set some problems in D.R. navigation, in conserving fuel supplies and in keeping warm. Flying for photography in sloppy air was also difficult but the worst enemy was our condensation trails.

It was, in fact, the white trail left by his Spitfire which led to Milne being shot down towards the end of April 1940. By that time the Germans were maintaining high-altitude patrols in order to intercept the photographic aircraft.

Six Messerschmitts approached under my ‘con-trail’ but I did not see them as I was busy photographing. The leader put a cannon shell into my engine which rapidly failed. While it lasted I tried to get back to France, suffering further attack on the way. Fifty miles from the frontier at a few thousand feet the engine gave out so I baled out between attacks after putting the Spitfire into a dive to destroy its equipment. Landed in a village and was immediately arrested.

Meanwhile the unit in France had been reinforced with a second Spitfire, and the two aircraft operated from differ