The position at dawn, therefore, was that B Company was in three groups, two in wadis and one some distance forward on the flat ground north of the escarpment, with odd parties scattered behind cover on the escarpment. The majority of D Company was lying in dead ground near the Trigh Capuzzo and 400 yards from the bottom of the escarpment. Most of C Company was sheltering in a wadi near the Sidi Rezegh mosque waiting for Captain Tongue.

Corporal Olde describes the fate of B Company:

About ten of us under Sgt. Lord went into a crevasse in the escarpment to try and find out our position. We found that we were … practically surrounded by enemy on all sides but one, and drew fire if we made a movement. We could look on to a flat and saw some of our company dug in down there but the enemy concentrated heavy mortar fire on them and then drove out and captured them…. We stayed in our crevasse until noon then crept along a gully and met up with some ‘A’ Company personnel, and some more of our own chaps.

In the meantime A Company had reinforced 25 Battalion (as will be described later) and was on the extreme left flank.

Daylight found D Company stranded with over 400 yards of open country between it and the escarpment. Second- Lieutenant Hargrave decided to move eastwards, hoping that the sun would upset the aim of the enemy seen digging in about a hundred yards in front. As soon as the company began to move, however, it was shot at from all sides. Sergeant Robertson, at the rear, was killed instantly, and almost at the same moment Hargrave was wounded. Movement was impossible, and the survivors, about fifty strong, were taken prisoner.

Captain Tongue had returned from his fruitless quest for information when Colonel Allen and Captain Dutton arrived. The commanders discussed the situation and decided that C Company should pull back. The CO and the Adjutant returned to Battalion Headquarters and Tongue gathered up all the troops he could find, about one hundred all ranks. The light was growing fast, they were fired on, and there were many casualties. Men were seen on the skyline shaking blankets and moving about. They were Germans, and the company fixed bayonets and charged uphill. It was a bloody affair with grenades, bayonets and rifle butts, and when it was over there were 29 survivors, nine of whom were wounded, and five German prisoners. C Company, carrying its wounded, moved down the slight reverse slope. Lieutenant Smith, who was in the lead, saw men and vehicles ahead and went cautiously forward to investigate. They were from 6 Brigade, and the first man he met was one whom he had last seen working on his home farm. Captain Tongue reported to Brigade Headquarters, was put into brigade reserve, and for the first time found that the second phase of the attack had been cancelled.

The CO and Adjutant returned to Battalion Headquarters. The runner may have been sent—in all probability was—to D Company, warning it that something was amiss and to return. If so, he did not reach the company. Colonel Allen and his headquarters moved east, looking for B Company, but passed it and, when they in turn were caught out in the open by daylight, took shelter in a wadi. The 26th Battalion, dug in on the escarpment above, noticed Allen's predicament. Colonel Page put on an attack by his C Company and, with a loss of 22 casualties, subdued the enemy fire sufficiently for the 21 Battalion troops to get onto the escarpment.

Meanwhile Major Fitzpatrick, waiting in the slight depression south of the escarpment with B Echelon, heard the rumble of wheeled traffic and thought it was the enemy on the move. It was, of course, the artillery Bren carriers and A Company, which had been turned back by Captain Dutton. The column missed the depression in the darkness and eventually reported to Brigade Headquarters.

B Echelon, now under undirected and spasmodic fire, dug in and watched the fireworks display of tracer and Very lights above them. A little before first light they moved up a narrow defile, passed through elements of 24 Battalion, and met some carriers heavily in action. There was no sign of the brigade B Echelon, and while Major Fitzpatrick was scouting round for information, a panic message from somebody in a staff car sent the vehicles streaming back. Captain Panckhurst stopped them near the Sidi Rezegh airstrip and, by the time Major Fitzpatrick arrived, had them sorted out again. A wireless van came up and a message from Brigade instructed the B Echelon to report to the brigade dispersal area east of the airstrip, where it had moved during the night.

A Company, the only organised company remaining of 21 Battalion, was sent up the ridge to reinforce 25 Battalion. Upon its arrival at that battalion's headquarters about 8 a.m., it was sent with the carrier platoon from 24 Battalion to support 25 Battalion, commanded by Major Burton,

Lt-Col H. G. Burton, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Christchurch, 1 Dec 1899; plumber; NZ Mounted Rifles 1918–19; actg CO 25 Bn 23 Nov-6 Dec 1941; CO 25 Bn 24 Jul-11 Sep 1942; CO 1 and 2 Trg Units 1944.

It was about this time that Sergeant Lord, with his dozen survivors of B Company, arrived in A Company's area. They had not yet had an opportunity of firing a shot and were not displeased when Captain Ferguson pointed out a machine-gun post that was giving trouble further along the ridge. Lord and his party stalked the post and silenced it at a cost of three killed and two wounded, one seriously. They found a stretcher and carried the seriously wounded man to an artillery field dressing station, after which they reported to Battalion Headquarters where, in the words of Corporal Olde, ‘We had a welcome hot meal of meat stew and rice pudding, as we hadn't had a cup of tea or a hot meal for two days.’

Down in the valley behind the brigade B Echelon area 21 Battalion spent 26 November reorganising. Survivors of the three companies who had managed to regain the top of the Sidi Rezegh escarpment made their way by various routes back to the unit, and by nightfall, as far as could be ascertained, the strength was 14 officers and 424 other ranks.

Colonel Allen reported back to Brigade Headquarters about 3 p.m. and found the Brigadier in conference with his other commanders. Another attack on the vital area above the mosque was being prepared: 24 and 26 Battalions were to advance west for two miles, and 25 Battalion was to join 21 Battalion in brigade reserve. A Company 21 Battalion, reinforced by 15 Platoon C Company, was to come under command of 24 Battalion for the operation. The plan was for 24 Battalion to clear the ridgetop and for 26 Battalion to advance across the wadis on the northern slopes as far as the point overlooking the Sidi Rezegh mosque.

The moon was just rising when the attack began. The 26th Battalion met stiff opposition all the way, but cleared each wadi with bayonet, grenade and tommy gun. The Bersaglieri fought bravely and no quarter was asked or given.

The 24th Battalion had an easier time in the early stages. After being pushed off the higher country the previous day, the enemy had withdrawn some distance west to prepared positions above the mosque. The battalion pushed on with determination to a point south of the eminence, where the enemy was waiting, and went in with the bayonet. It was another bloody affair with grenades, cold steel and rifle butts, and, when the position was finally captured, A Company 21 Battalion was down to fewer than forty men.

But the corridor to Tobruk had been opened. The 19th Battalion had linked up with 70 Division.

The operations up to this stage could be summarised as follows: The struggle for the all-important Sidi Rezegh escarpment had started with the attack by 25 Battalion, supported later by 24 Battalion, on Point 175 on 23–24 November. At heavy cost this feature had been captured, but then it had been found that enemy fire from the Blockhouse further west along the escarpment had made the hold on the position precarious and expensive. The Blockhouse had been taken in the second big attack, made on 25 November. Then the night attack on 25–26 November had been undertaken with the intention of seizing the whole of the escarpment, breaking through to Ed Duda, and linking up with the Tobruk garrison. This had partly failed, and through lack of communications 21 Battalion had gone too far and had suffered severely. The final attack on the night of 26–27 November had captured the commanding position above the mosque, and the tactical advantages gained were some compensation for the terrible price that had been paid.

A light rain fell all day on 27 November, and the depleted platoons of A Company 21 Battalion dug themselves in on Sidi Rezegh under desultory long-distance shelling. The German armour was returning from its raid into Egypt. Sixth Brigade was reorganising. The 21st and 25th Battalions were to form a composite battalion under the command of Colonel Allen, with two rifle companies from each and a composite headquarters company. B and C Companies 21 Battalion were merged and arrangements were made with 24 Battalion for the relief at last light of A Company, which would merge with D Company. The 25th Battalion made similar dispositions but, owing to the distance between the two battalion areas, Colonel Allen's command was divided into two parts, one in front and one behind the vehicle dispersal area. A warning order was received for 21 Battalion to be ready to relieve 24 Battalion after dark, but it was later countermanded and A Company stayed on the escarpment with Colonel Shuttleworth.

Colonel Allen left the battalion area to visit A Company. Major Burton, who was commanding the remnants of 25 Battalion, writes:

Just before dark Colonel Allen came up in his car and told me he was going out to see some of his men who were some distance away. He told me the direction he was going, and I advised him not to go. Some of our troops who had just reported in stated they had contacted enemy in large numbers in that direction. ‘The boys will be expecting me, so I must go,’ he said, and with a wave of his hand he entered his car and he and his driver set off into the blue.

The driver (Clegg

L-Cpl F. Clegg; Auckland; born England, 26 Mar 1910; labourer.

The night was as quiet as the day in 21 Battalion's sector. The rain stopped and Friday 28 November dawned with the promise of a warm winter's day after a cold night. But the stillness did not last. The Division still held two of the three escarpments, but there were not enough troops to man the third and most southerly of them, though 1 South African Brigade was expected hourly with the mission of guarding that vulnerable flank. About 9 a.m. a convoy of vehicles was seen on the escarpment moving west. It was assumed that the South Africans had got up as promised, but they were coming from the wrong direction, not that any direction was very right or very wrong in the confused battle. It was difficult in the haze to distinguish between friendly and enemy vehicles, and our artillery was silent. The convoy disappeared over the brow of the escarpment and soon shells were registering on the Sidi Rezegh escarpment. The enemy had returned to the attack.

With A Company still detached, Major Fitzpatrick formed the battalion into two rifle companies, each about forty strong, and a headquarters company. Captain Tongue commanded C Company, Captain Turtill D Company, and Captain Panckhurst Headquarters Company.

Colonel Allen's absence was explained when 26 Battalion decided to clean out an enemy pocket that had twice defied capture. It was a concreted strongpoint with slits that commanded the landing ground to the south and the valley across to Ed Duda to the north-west. The third attempt, assisted by a troop of 25-pounders was successful, and 26 Battalion captured 70 Germans, recaptured 23 of our troops who had been held prisoner, and found Allen's bullet-riddled body. He may have miscalculated the distance or, as is more likely, thought the wadi was unoccupied and offered a short cut to A Company. The news cast a gloom over the battalion. It had lost a brave man, a good soldier, and a commanding officer whose first thoughts were always for his ‘boys’.

Now that the enemy was on the southern escarpment he could make it very hard for any troops to live on the ground below it, and with fire coming from two directions, the front (west) and the rear (east-south-east), the reserve position was becoming untenable. Most attention was being paid to Sidi Rezegh, however, and the volume of fire directed against 24 and 26 Battalions increased hourly. Early in the afternoon an infantry attack from both south and west developed against 24 Battalion, which was holding the extreme western end of the position. The troops were dug in facing north and had to hurriedly readjust their position under a concentration of artillery, infantry gun and mortar fire.

Captain Ferguson had divided his company plus 15 Platoon into four sections, with about ten men in each. Lieutenant Hutchinson, with No. 4 Section, remained in position while the others moved out and attempted to dig new weapon pits under heavy fire. It was an impossible task in the time available on that stony ground, with the enemy less than a thousand yards away. D Company 24 Battalion had also moved out to face the threat, and a number of men were hit while they were hastily making sangars. The converging attack made steady progress and our casualties mounted; when the two companies were finally overwhelmed, A Company consisted of two officers, no NCOs at all, and 20 men. The 24th Battalion finally drove off the attack.

Brigadier Barrowclough decided to move his headquarters to a safer position north of Sidi Rezegh. Major Fitzpatrick was ordered to move on foot and to take only enough vehicles to carry arms and ammunition to a defensive position at Point 175. The balance of the transport would remain and move with Brigade to the new dispersal area. Six tanks (Major O'Neill) were placed under command, and seven anti-tank guns from 259 Battery RA (Major McKenzie) would be waiting to report at Point 175.

It was about 10 p.m. when the column started for Point 175. The night was dark and the sky overcast. Occasional shells exploded in the sand and random bullets whispered overhead. A platoon in extended line followed the guides, with the rest of the battalion in column of platoons, tanks on the left in line ahead, carriers on the right, and transport in the rear. After they had travelled the estimated distance, about three and a half miles, Point 175 failed to show up, so the column was halted while reconnaissance parties felt their way forward but failed to locate any landmark. Brigade was raised by W/T (wireless telegraphy) and agreed to the suggestion that the column remain where it was until daylight. Transport was heard moving and Very lights were seen going up on all sides, but recognition signals had yet to be devised and each column carefully avoided the other. A close laager was formed, with tanks on the outside, until a liaison officer accompanied by Major McKenzie stumbled across them and guided the battalion to its destination.

The battalion B Echelon was guided by Captain Panckhurst. The brigade transport column halted several times and on arrival Panckhurst was horrified to find he had only six trucks. The others arrived later at the dispersal area, still under the impression that the head of the column had been overrun and captured by enemy tanks. What actually happened was that a driver had gone to sleep at one of the halts and only the vehicles in front of him had moved.

At first light a defensive position was organised. The enemy who had been driven off Point 175 by 25 Battalion had dug plenty of trenches, and those most suitable for the purpose were taken over by the new occupants. The battalion was spread in a semicircle, with Captain Tongue's company facing south towards the positions vacated during the night, and a platoon twelve strong—the remnants of D Company under Sergeant Lord—about 400 yards nearer the Blockhouse to take care of the flank and rear; Captain Turtill's company, facing east, completed the arc, with the carriers extending his left flank to the escarpment. The tanks were just behind the northern side of the escarpment, and the anti-tank guns were disposed in depth covering each other.

To the east there were unknown troops moving along the same escarpment over which the battalion had travelled from Bir el Chleta; there were more troops around the Blockhouse on the right, but these were identified as 25 Battalion. With both sides jamming each other's wireless, with front, rear and flanks always changing, and with each side using the other's transport with the utmost impartiality, every vehicle had to be assumed hostile.

Second-Lieutenant King

Maj W. K. King; Auckland; born England, 17 Mar 1905; traffic inspector.