Half an hour later a much stronger force appeared and attempted to sweep away Menastir's opposition. These enemy troops and vehicles, on the ridge about a mile north-east of Battalion Headquarters, launched a heavy attack with artillery, mortars, machine guns and rifle fire. The brunt of this attack was borne by artillery, medium machine guns, and the left forward company (C Company), some of whose men consider this shelling and mortaring the heaviest they ever experienced. Dick Goodall

Pte B. C. Goodall; born NZ 19 Nov 1918; shepherd; killed in action 27 Nov 1941.

Enemy infantry, attempting to close in under cover of this shelling, were checked by unabated fire from the defenders. The Vickers and the artillery (two-pounders, four 25-pounders, and three Bofors), exposed though they were, played a most active part. The fight continued for two and a half hours, by which time the enemy had had enough and halted the attack. To the surprise and relief of 22 Battalion he withdrew (to take the Sidi Azeiz route) and the night was fairly quiet.

Meanwhile large enemy columns were streaming out of Bardia and westwards through Sidi Azeiz. That afternoon and into the night the signallers worked hard trying to get in touch by wireless with outside units. No replies came back. The battalion, still periodically under shellfire, was isolated.

Earlier in the day—whether in the afternoon or morning is not quite clear—tracked vehicles could be heard creaking and moving about (though few men cared to raise their heads to see for themselves). Lieutenant Donald called out: ‘Here's your chance, 14 Platoon, get out your sticky bombs, here come the tanks.’ No tanks came in—they were engaged by the two-pounders and one of them was disabled and its crew captured, the other escaping—which was just as well; for the sticky bombs had neither fuses nor detonators.

The inevitable threat during breakfast came again next day (28 November), within two miles of Battalion Headquarters. One hundred vehicles halted and diverted the battalion's attention by going through the motions of an attack to cover an enemy column moving south-westwards from Bardia, and then withdrew. ‘Well,’ notes one soldier's diary, ‘the miracle has happened, Jerry has suddenly left us unmolested, he must have been in a terrible hurry for he left us without firing a shot. We are not out of danger yet as we are cut off from the outside world so anything may happen yet.’

They were out of touch with the rest of Eighth Army, although the gunners (remnants of 28 Battery) at Menastir had been in touch by wireless with 27 Battery at Capuzzo, which had called up the CRA 4 Indian Division.

The battalion's situation was critical. Ammunition, water, and supplies were very low, not enough to see them through a sizeable attack, although roving carriers collected a little food from an old enemy camp. Everyone had been on half rations for two days, cigarettes and tobacco were vanishing, and Lance- Corporal Butler noted that the evening meal on the 28th was a cup of tea only. Wounded and prisoners had to be moved. Men were dazed or sore from concussion.

The battalion's chances of carrying out its task of preventing enemy movement to and from Bardia now had practically vanished. Colonel Andrew, lacking ammunition, unable to fight effectively, and seeing his food vanishing, had little choice but to move south to contact 4 Indian Division. The decision to move through ‘pirate country’ was not easily reached. Deviations had to be made to dodge enemy columns; at any stage the battalion, without tanks and with few carriers, was liable to run into enemy convoys; and above all, the final leg of the course was between two enemy camps. This allowed the navigator only a small margin of error. If he failed, the battalion and the attached units had every chance of joining B Company in Bardia's prison pen.

The arrangements for the move were made by the second- in-command, Major Greville.

Lt-Col A. W. Greville, m.i.d.; born NZ 5 Aug 1897; Regular soldier; comd Advanced Party 2 NZEF, 1939; DAQMG 1940-41; CO 24 Bn Dec 1941-Jul 1942; killed in action 22 Jul 1942.

At 10 p.m. all lay in the hands of fortune—and in the hands of the navigator, Second-Lieutenant Sam McLernon, who performed his exacting task brilliantly. The convoy was under way half an hour later. Cloudy conditions made navigation difficult; parts of the route were quite unknown and rough. Yet a good speed was kept up. Drivers picked their way to the west of Sidi Azeiz, and at one stage an enemy truck attached itself to the column before becoming lost again. Twice the completely blacked-out column halted during the night while German columns moved across its track. The convoy arrived safe and sound close to Sidi Omar four hours later. Dawn brought gunfire close by, but whether from friend or foe nobody could tell. The battalion made contact at last at 7 a.m. with the Divisional Cavalry, which handed instructions to Colonel Andrew, who learned that he had been appointed to command 5 Infantry Brigade.

The raiding panzers, their visit to the frontier over, were now delivering the coup de grâce in the Tobruk sector. The bloody fighting at Sidi Rezegh and Belhamed ended with the remnants of 4 and 6 Brigades being driven from the approaches to Tobruk. The Division had suffered over 4000 casualties in killed, wounded and prisoners. Some units sought refuge in Tobruk; the remainder broke through a gap in the encirclement and withdrew to the south-east. All but 5 Brigade (which remained under command of 4 Indian Division) were ordered back to Baggush.

During 29 and 30 November 22 Battalion occupied positions east and west of Fort Musaid and reinforced 23 and 28 Battalions in the Capuzzo-Musaid-Sollum sector, which was not attacked. ‘Been digging all day, ground very hard and rocky and blisters galore but the thought of Jerry's accuracy with his mortars etc. makes me dig deeper.’ With Colonel Andrew now commanding 5 Brigade, and Captain John MacDuff acting as Brigade Major, Major Greville took over 22 Battalion.

At the end of November 5 Indian Brigade took over the Capuzzo-Musaid-Sollum position, freeing 5 Brigade to move on to Menastir on 1 December, when once again Bardia was blockaded from the west. This time, much to the 22nd's satisfaction, a whole brigade would be waiting at Menastir to give a warm reception to any enemy movement to or from Bardia. The battalion, patrolling towards Bardia, stayed on the familiar escarpment and sited supporting weapons with great care. A little to the north the Maori Battalion dug into the flat below, facing towards Tobruk and not far from 23 Battalion, which was also astride the road but facing Bardia.

Stubborn Bardia, still holding out, continued to range its guns over the Menastir area. A party under Captain Young reconnoitred the outer defences of the fortress. Major Campbell led a scavenging party to an abandoned camp—spare parts and equipment had been lost when Sidi Azeiz fell—and collected much-needed petrol, spare parts and tools for the LAD, and a few blankets and tents for a small ambulance unit. In fact, the unit now rather resembled a mob of hawkers. Clothes were stiff with dirt and sweat; most of them had not been changed for a fortnight. The afternoon of 2 December turned cold and wet, and little wretched groups with no shelter huddled together over inconspicuous fires, usually in benzine tins.

But things certainly warmed up next morning (3 December), when companies were warned to stand-to in a cold, driving wind. Two large columns of enemy were reported on the way to the relief of Bardia. One column met its doom to the south towards Sidi Azeiz at the hands of an Indian column—100 dead and 100 prisoners.

The other column, 100 to 200 vehicles according to one estimate, came carelessly down the coastal road from the direction of Tobruk. The unsuspecting enemy actually drove into the first Maori positions on the flat before fire was opened on the whole of the column by all weapons within reach. Colonel Andrew had insisted that his brigade hold fire until the last possible moment, and none could play that game better than the Maoris. Wrecked vehicles blocked and tangled transport in many sections of the road, and the enemy fell into confusion with crippling losses, his documents telling of ‘withering fire from well-concealed positions on the escarpment…. the hail of fire.’ In cramped and fireswept positions, enemy 75-millimetre guns and mortars had great difficulty in swinging into action to return the fire and support advancing infantry, which in any case got nowhere. Under the cover of smoke some took to the rough country on the northern side of the road, but were rounded up by a few infantry and carriers. Fire from 28 Battalion (luxuriating in a field day), plus machine guns and heavier supporting weapons of the brigade lined along the escarpment, inflicted severe punishment. Twenty-second Battalion, enthusiastically giving maximum fire support, had a grandstand view of the rout. Care had to be taken when Bardia's guns reached out over the escarpment. Some of the battalion's vehicles on the move panicked and were hit in the ensuing scramble, which was brought under control by an engineer, Sergeant McQueen,

Sgt E. J. E. McQueen, DCM, m.i.d.; born India, 20 Dec 1904; seaman; wounded Nov 1941.

Orders for a move back to the Capuzzo-Musaid-Sollum area gave no time to bury the dead or to salvage battlefield debris. These tasks were taken over by the Divisional Cavalry and South African units providing the relief. The move back to Musaid early on 4 December proved more deadly to 22 Battalion than the previous day's fighting. The column, after travelling for about half an hour, came under shellfire from the guns of an Indian force between Sidi Azeiz and Bardia. A carrier raced towards the guns to call off the shelling. The Indians, expecting an attack, could have been misled by the number of captured German and Italian vehicles in the column, but the general situation in any case was complicated and confusing. A sergeant records the ‘terrible lack of recognition signal’, and two days later he noted: ‘Just heard that 12 of our tanks put out of action by RAF. Not surprised—no co-operation.’ Wherever official news is meagre, unconvincing, or lacking, a host of grey rumours scurries in, attempting to fill the fighting man's need for information.

Fifth Brigade's guns struck back at the unrecognised Indians (‘We got one of their guns and a gunner. Regrettable’), and to make matters worse enemy artillery from Bardia joined in the bombardment. Avoiding cannonades from friend and foe, the hapless battalion, zigzagging its course, finally reached Musaid to occupy, when further shelling died down, positions left by 5 Indian Brigade. On the way an Indian shell, striking a 22 Battalion truck, fatally wounded the driver, Jack Towers,

Pte J. R. Towers; born Palmerston North, 19 Dec 1918; fabric roofer; died of wounds 4 Dec 1941.

The battalion stayed five cold days at Musaid, writing home rather shaky letters, puzzling over all the recent moves ‘just like a game of draughts', and learning the fate of 4 and 6 Brigades. ‘I think,’ wrote one man in words which were only too painfully true, ‘they are split up too much and taking Jerry too cheaply.’ The first rum ration in the campaign arrived, a quarter of a cup each. Cold, cutting winds interrupted sleep, rain soaked blankets and equipment, and touches of ‘Wog guts' were common. Men got to know well a big gun, possibly a naval gun, which fired regularly from the direction of Halfaya. The Musaid-Capuzzo area is remembered for this gun (‘Hellfire Herman’) and for an old Italian plane set in the parade ground.