Tomlinson had been unable to find anyone at 25 Battalion Advanced Headquarters as Burton was actively engaged on the escarpment and McNaught was meeting Shuttleworth, who stayed on the right. The remainder of the headquarters were on their way to the rear. In the absence of orders from 25 Battalion (which he had been led to expect) Tomlinson about 5 p.m. launched an attack in the vicinity of the cairn, instructing his platoons that in the event of severe opposition they were not to press the attack but to hold a defensive position on the eastern slopes of Point 175. The enemy were found to be holding the position in strength and Tomlinson therefore occupied a defensive position, easily repulsing an enemy attack which soon developed. Two guns of 9 MG Platoon were on the right flank, where D Company 24 Battalion was firmly established, and the other two, though farther back, could not get into action because of enemy fire from close range. There were still a few men of 25 Battalion in the vicinity and these were rallied to fill a gap between the two 24 Battalion companies, thus establishing a fairly reasonable defensive front, though with little depth. A detachment of A Company 25 Battalion under Lieutenant Henderson

Lt B. R. Henderson; born England, 8 Nov 1910; commercial traveller; died of injuries 22 Mar 1942.

Major Burton, the only company commander left in 25 Battalion and its senior officer on the departure of McNaught, was unaware for some time that the latter had gone and that Shuttleworth was in command. ‘Late in the afternoon,’ he says, ‘on learning that Colonel McNaught had retired severely wounded, I assumed command of the battalion. I appointed Lieut Wilson to command the troops of the defensive position I had organized, over the edge of the escarpment, earlier in the afternoon (when an enemy attempt was being made to cut in behind the forward elements of the Bn some 200 yds behind Bn Forward HQ).

‘This group was designated B Coy altho it contained members of all Coys excepting D Coy. It was organized in two platoons. Wilson and Cathie were the platoon commanders. Later we were joined by Lt Robertshaw and some men from C Coy.

‘We undoubtedly repulsed the enemy penetration but later came into conflict with 24 Bn who came up attacking our position…. This unfortunate exchange of fire was easily undertandable to me because I had been operating along the edge of the escarpment most of the morning and afternoon and it seemed to me that there were prearranged enemy defensive posiions along the whole lower part of the escarpment from Bir Chleta to the area below Pt 175. I met Capt McDonald who was most apologetic and who stated he had no idea that 25 Bn were so far forward. I showed him our Bn HQ and pointed out to him what I believed to be Pt 175. I saw him no more.

‘I received a verbal message that Col Shuttleworth was to take the 25th Bn remnant under command. Leaving Wilson in charge with instructions to hold the position until ordered otherwise by higher authority, I then proceeded to (i) locate 24 Bn commander, (2) move back to B Echelon and have a hot meal, blankets, ammo sent forward, and more men sent to reinforce the position.

‘On meeting Col Shuttleworth he said, “I have been instructed to take your Bn under command; as you are on the spot you look after your own men. I've got enough to do looking after my own Bn, but I want every wireless set you have. There will be a conference at my HQ tonight. I will advise you later.” I showed him where our B Coy was situated and he suggested that they remain there and he showed me his intended disositions which included some 25 Bn personnel. On seeing his proposed dispositions I told him that we had troops of A Coy in front of him. He doubted this and told me so. Whereupon I told him what had occurred in regard to 24/25 exchange of fire during the afternoon and asked him if he would please advise his forward troops that any movement in front of their position could possibly be a portion of A Coy who had earlier worked their way around the escarpment. This later proved to be correct for the next day Lieut Henderson and a number of A Coy personnel reported in from that locality.’

As the light faded there was little fighting and Shuttleworth disposed his D Company above the escarpment instead of in its first position along the slopes. They were quite close to the enemy. In the meantime the remnants of B Company 25 Battalion had formed two platoons from 10 Platoon (Cathie), which had had about eight casualties and a couple of men away escorting prisoners, a few men of 11 Platoon, and about twenty of 12 Platoon as well as stragglers from other companies. Burton took command, with Wilson and Cathie as platoon commanders, but soon left to see Shuttleworth, leaving Wilson in command. Some of B Company's men were used to reinforce 24 Battalion on the edge of the escarpment and the remainder were brought into line a little in rear of Shuttleworth's D Company. The men of 25 Battalion's HQ Company and Battalion Headquarters remained as riflemen in the right rear on the escarpment. The detachment of A Company under Henderson stayed in its forward position.

Back at the transport, Reid

Capt I. D. Reid; Wellington; born Dunedin, 12 Sep 1906; public accountant; wounded and p.w. 22 Jul 1942.

Private S. W. Brown has given his ‘experiences and impressions in a mortar detachment’ during the battle:

‘The ground to our front was a wide and seemingly flat area of about two square miles. This fact made the mortarmen shudder … each forward company would have a detachment of mortars under command and none with the reserve company. As the infantry started their advance the enemy was nowhere to be seen nor was there a shot to be heard. Only an occasional tussock could be seen on the long stretch of ground that sloped gradually upwards to where the enemy were in hiding.

‘The detachment supporting the left flanking company wa following up behind them about 200 yards in the rear. The mortar trucks tailed their crews about 50 yards to the rear. As we advanced the distance between the crew and the infantry was lessened, the tanks began to rumble up, and it was clear that they intended to overtake the forward troops and drive on. The infantry was setting a very hard pace and the mortar-men were gasping for breath. The advance continued for about a mile without any opposition. I then noticed that there was a large gap between their company and the company on the right which appeared to have gone too far to the right. An order was then heard to close in on the right, that the mortar crew and the left company were too far to the left. There was a change in direction and as they pivoted the chaps on the flank almost had to run to catch up. Before they had time to straighten out, they got everything that the enemy had to give. Between the very few lulls the troops moved on, being somewhat confused by this time. Then suddenly a call was made for the mortars. Jumping to their feet they signalled their truck on, which was now some distance back. The driver in the face of enemy fire and understanding the urgent signal, dashed forward with his charge, and immediately commenced to help the crew to unload the gun and ammunition.

‘Working frantically, the gun was set up in about 30 seconds. With the infantry pinned down and the mortar directed on ground about 800 yards away, the enemy were soon able to pick up such a group of men. Resultant fire caused them to go to ground again.

‘When the moment was right the 2 i/c decided the position was hopeless, so signalled up the driver again and was away again with small-arms and anti-tank fire to lend them wings. On reaching the spot where another mortar truck was, it was noticed that the fire was less fierce. Interesting observations were made from here within the next few minutes. Our three tanks were seen up with the infantry but were soon knocked out by an enemy anti-tank gun. Next a line of men with hands raised and being disarmed were seen and numbered about 200. At the same time a deadly menace was creeping in from the left uncovered flank in the guise of a British tank. Not much notice was taken of it until it opened up on the Bn's vehicles. In the distance more men were seen with hands raised and they were soon found not to be Germans. While the mortar crew was wondering what to do, two of the Bn's A/Tk guns came forward to put the “British” tank out of action.

‘At this stage the whole position was precarious for the mortar crew, who were without their mortar commander, and had two guns but only one crew. The tanks had been lost and the carriers had suffered badly. The reserve coy was still in the rear. But there was one consolation in that the menace of the tank was gone.

‘As they were about to operate the two guns with one crew, up came a familiar figure, the C.O. in his car. [Note by McNaught: I had been there for at least an hour. The reserve coy was sent for by me at least an hour after I was on the spot.] We dashed over to him through the reserve coy who were moving up to reinforce the thin ranks. It was noticed that he was badly wounded in the leg. But paying no heed to his own disability he set about to direct the fire of the two mortars and was responsible for laying down an effective barrage for the counter-attacking reserve coy. This went on for 20 mins till the ammunition was expended…. With their ammunition spent the crew, who had been also reinforced by some mortar-men, who came forward with the reserve coy, packed up quickly, and moved back to platoon HQ for replenishment but the platoon commander, counting up the reserve he had, decided against it…. The likelihood of any further action that day seemed remote as the sun was sinking low on the horizon. The crew was instructed to make themselves useful with the wounded…. While assisting the RAP orderlies and the MO I discovered some of the chaps of the missing mortar crew, whose gun they had taken over when the CO had made his appearance. This crew had suffered badly when it became mixed up with the forward troops. Their commander had been killed. [Later, Brown's own missing gun commander returned unscathed after a hectic time with the forward troops.]’

Amidst all this turmoil of battle the battalion's communications (the vehicles with ammunition, tools, weapons, and so forth, and despatch riders carrying messages in the absence or failure of wireless) had to be maintained as far as possible and all concerned displayed great gallantry and devotion to duty. This is illustrated in the citation for the award of a Military Medal to J. B. Kinder,

WO II J. B. Kinder, MM; England; born NZ 1 Apr 1914; salesman.

‘On Sunday, 23 November, 1941, the 25 Bn under the command of Col McNaught, attacked an enemy strongpoint … in the Sidi Rezegh area. The battle raged for several hours causing heavy casualties to the Bn. The Coy wireless sets had been put out of order. The only means of communication was by D/R. Pte J. B. Kinder displayed the utmost coolness and devotion to duty during the entire action by delivering messages to and from the Bn HQ and the coys. His M/cycle was shot away from under him but he quickly put the cycle back into running order and proceeded on his way. Later in the day he was able to procure an enemy cycle which he used till it was disabled by enemy fire. Throughout the whole day and under ceaseless fire, he carried out his duties in the most inspiring manner…. his soldier's record has been consistent with his services in the Greek Campaign.’

Colonel McNaught has written a connected account which considerably clarifies this somewhat confusing battle, though neither in this nor any other account can the times given be regarded as always reliable. ‘The attack had to be launched in haste,’ he wrote, ‘with no reconnaissance worth mentioning. … The forward companies were a few hundred yards ahead of the start line (having been halted there when first orders for attack were cancelled). At zero hour the first wave of tanks went through the infantry. They appeared to go more than the 15 mph ordered. When attack started I received word from HQ Coy Commander that the carriers might not be on time as several were busy refuelling. I ordered all to move up as soon as ready and all that could follow the tanks in.

‘Tanks arrived on objective with covering fire and artillery had no difficulty at first in neutralizing enemy posts on 175. Some carriers arrived before the infantry but most came up with them. Artillery fire on 175 ceased at 1205 on my orders to Major Wilson, Battery commander, who was observing with me. The tanks were then on 175. The infantry moved forward very quickly. D Coy appeared to arrive at enemy trenches forward part of hill without opposition and with carriers rounded up about 150 enemy. B Coy on right seemed to be meeting with opposition. As soon as C Coy had got going across the start line I moved in wireless truck through them, arriving at what was Forward Battalion Headquarters just after D Coy. There appeared to be too many of D Coy in charge of the prisoners and I ordered two men and a carrier to escort them in two groups to the rear, and the rest of D Coy men with them to join their company which had now advanced towards the western edge of 175. This would be about 1220 – 1230. I contacted the Tank Commander a few minutes later, and he asked if he could take his tanks out. I asked him to remain for another ten minutes until we could get more troops up. So far there had been little enemy fire but when D Coy on left and B Coy on right moved further towards final objective machine-gun and rifle fire began to sweep the position. Mortar fire followed. Counter attacks developed from the west and south-west: at first apparently without tanks, later with tanks. C Coy came up under fire and pushed on after D Coy. Men had little cover and the ground was too rocky to dig in. Some had the use of the enemy's hastily dug holes. Companies were moving forward by short section rushes. B Coy were having difficulty in getting forward, being heavily engaged on north-eastern part of the position slightly to my right front. They pushed reserve platoon up towards western edge. Two platoon commanders were killed earlier in the encounter leading their men in hand to hand attacks. There appeared to be several well concealed enemy machine guns and anti-tank gun positions going down into the wadi on the right.

‘K Tp A-Tk had come into position on line with Adv Bn HQ by 1240. J Tp did not arrive till much later and did not come as far up.

‘Up until 1300 hrs the position appeared satisfactory and we were making progress. I sent an order to D Coy Cmdr. to try and dig in where he was at 1300 hrs. His company appeared to be well up to his objective. It became clear to me a few minutes later that there was a very big gap between the forwar companies and I sent a further message to D Coy Cmdr to attempt to move forward in the direction of the Blockhouse (this would tend to close the gap). This message was received by Capt Hastie but he was unable to move, being fully engaged (this I learned only in 1946 when next I saw Major Hastie); he sent a runner back to me. (This was apparently the man who reported to me but who before he was able to deliver his message was shot down and fell at my feet.) A little later I saw B Coy Cmdr (Capt McBride) who reported that his reserve platoon was well forward. I considered with him trying to push it further forward and to the left in the direction of the Blockhouse, but decided to leave it to hold its present forward position. He requested reinforcements as he had lost fairly heavily but as things at this stage were deteriorating on the left front I told him to hold on and attempt to get another platoon further up and I would use carriers to help. From 1315 hours things moved swiftly. The enemy were now shooting us up from both flanks particularly from the left. Bullets at first were over our heads. It was soon obvious that tanks had attacked C and D Coys. At 1400 hrs the situation on the left had deteriorated. I received a bullet clean through the right knee about 1330 hrs but I was still able to keep on my feet. The I.O. and Signals Officer were wounded about the same time and shortly afterwards the wireless operators were killed. The artillery F.O.O. was up with me and I instructed him to bring down fire in support of C and D Coys. This fire fell into the wadi (but from Major Hastie in 1946 learned that much of it fell too far over). The F.O.O.'s remote control was shot away and he had to go back a bit, but continued directing fire under my orders all afternoon. The A/Tk guns of K Troop were in action and suffered casualties. I was hit again, this time in the left thigh. I was knocked over but no great damage was done and I could keep on my feet though I was losing a good bit of blood.

‘Earlier I had ordered the left platoon of C Coy to move up to cover the gap that was still troublesome between the forward elements of B and D Coys.

‘There was some falling back upon battalion Adv. H.Q. but I was able to rally them. About 1345 hours it was apparent to me that D and C Coys had been largely overrun, but by using the carriers I was able to hold the enemy off. I sent a D.R. back to A Coy (Capt. Roberts) to leave their task and report to me for a counter attack. They came forward quickly and got up about 1415 hrs. I told Capt. Roberts the state of affairs and ordered him to counter-attack up the left flank and go about 400 yards. His reply, characteristic of this gallant leader was “Leave the b … to us, we'll drive them back.” A Coy had done most of the fighting in the battle at 0600 hrs but they went at this new task with determination and for the time stabilised the position. They suffered fairly heavy casualties in the process.

‘While I was in touch with the Bde Cmdr I had asked him for reinforcements and he sent up one coy of the 24th Battn. to come into reserve, and a section of M.G. to assist on the left flank. I gave my orders to the O.C. Coy of 24 Bn, but he only moved a few paces away when he fell. It was about this time, or just before, that an enemy tank appeared on the right flank about 60 yards away from me. The A/Tk gun on my left hit it three times and it moved off. It was a captured British tank and fooled me for a few seconds. Enemy tanks on the other flank seemed to have been put out of action.

‘B Coy on the right were still pinned down, but continuing to engage the enemy in the wadi from their higher ground. One enemy M.G. post and some A/Tk guns were still a thorn in their side at 1545 hrs. The position seemed now to be a bit easier though Mortar and M.G. fire were still heavy upon us. I was able to direct a reserve mortar of our own on to harassing fire into the wadi where it was obvious the attacks against us were originating. All this kept me personally very busy and I was not conscious of the great amount of blood I had lost although I was pretty stiff on my walking. I was moving towards a carrier to take me forward to Capt. Roberts about four hundred yards away when I was hit a third time by a bullet through the left knee. I was able to get to my feet after a while and a D.R. (Pte Tomlinson

Sigmn T. W. Tomlinson; born NZ 21 Jun 1918; clerk; died of wounds 4 Jan 1945.

‘Things became rather mixed after this. Major Barrington

Brig B. Barrington, DSO, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; born Marton, 2 Oct 1907; insurance inspector; BM 6 Bde May 1941–Jan 1942; AA & QMG 2 NZ Div Nov 1942–Dec 1944; died Wellington, 17 Apr 1954.

McNaught had played a worthy and gallant part that day, a part worthy of the pertinacity and courage of his battalion. The operation had been a particularly difficult one. It had been hurried to such an extent that there was no time for reconnaissance nor for consideration and discussion of plans of attack, and practically no information was available regarding the enemy. It was in effect almost an encounter attack for 25 Battalion but not so for the enemy, who was in position with tanks, machine guns, mortars, and artillery providing a very effective fire plan supporting his infantry and with all his dispositions hidden from view, with the exception of the few trenches on the eastern side of Hill 175. The substitution of the 12 noon attack with tanks, for the 11.30 a.m. attack without tanks, must have caused some uncertainty and doubt in the minds of the troops. Nevertheless, the men advanced with determination and in the later stages against very severe fire. Gallantly led, they attacked with the bayonet, inflicted many casualties, and captured several hundred prisoners.

Lacking proper observation and sufficient strength, the artillery did its best but its covering fire was quite inadequate for the task, and the same applied to the anti-tank guns. In consequence, three enemy tanks were able to escort infantry into the battalion's forward positions and so leave the troops there, completely without trenches or other cover as they were, no choice but to surrender or be annihilated. The nature of the ground prevented fire positions being dug without proper tools, which could not be brought up against the heavy fire which developed. The battalion's mortars, Bren guns, and rifles therefore could not operate efficiently under the heavy enemy covering fire, which necessitated adequate fire trenches or other cover from which to subdue or reduce it. Unfortunately the medium machine guns with the brigade, which probably would have been very effective with long-range fire against the Rugbet en Nbeidat and positions beyond, were not detailed to support the attack until mid-afternoon.

The British tanks did splendid work and also displayed great courage, but in the absence of adequate covering fire, could not withstand the powerful anti-tank weapons of the enemy.

When it is remembered that, in addition to these disabilities, the operation was the battalion's first desert battle and in fact its first attack, and that the majority of the officers and other ranks had had little battle experience, it is remarkable that the battalion succeeded to the extent that it did.

It did in fact capture and hold Hill 175, though it did not capture the whole of the objective beyond the cairn and was forced to give up that part of the further objective captured by D and C Companies. In the words of Major Burton:‘… from the C.O. down to the least of the private soldiers, all fought a gallant heroic fight. No battalion could have done better under such conditions.’

Twenty-fifth Battalion's casualties in this very severe battle were extremely heavy, the dead alone probably exceeding 100 and the wounded about 150, the heaviest casualties in dead and wounded of any similar battalion action by New Zealand troops in the whole war. Another 100 were captured.

The wounded had a very difficult time. It was practically impossible to collect a great many of them during daylight in the bullet-swept areas, and owing to the large numbers there was considerable congestion at the RAP and the ADS. Private H. R. Mackenzie,

Sgt H. R. Mackenzie, m.i.d.; Wanganui; born Hawera, 26 Oct 1919; school teacher.

‘I took a turn of duty at the phone for a few minutes and then, since the boys were coming in too fast for the Doc and the medical orderlies to cope with, I went down the hill to where the RAP truck was. By now I had forgotten that a dinner-time on this day ever existed and it was becoming late in the afternoon. More prisoners came along with whom were some wounded Huns…. The morphine needle was flowing freely all day. Doc McCarthy, Padre Willis, the orderlies, even the captured German doctor, worked till they were almost to the point of collapsing. I helped to dress various chaps…. Darkness was coming and the last of the wounded chaps came in. Tea had been brought down to us by the cooks and I helped to spoon-feed some of the poor chaps who were incapacitated. I had a copious supply of cigarettes and I gave many away to our own fellows, looking to their needs and comforts as best as I was able to…. The wounded were being taken away now in ambulances and trucks. There were even some German vehicles including ambulances….

L. Grant (Carrier Platoon) who was wounded, wrote:

‘I had to cease fire shortly after as I had stopped a lump of shrapnel in the back. Lt Wroth

Maj C. S. Wroth, m.i.d.; Christchurch; born Christchurch, 6 Mar 1915; Regular soldier.

‘While we were being loaded on to ambulances, I noticed Colonel McNaught—he was sitting on a stretcher smoking his pipe, quite unconcerned—this was the spirit that prevailed throughout. A little later our convoy was halted to form up for the long journey ahead; this was a sad moment for us all; we were suddenly attacked by a column of German tanks. Those of the drivers who used their own initiative were not long in driving at high speed to safety—others were left to the mercy of the enemy. This part of the journey was anything but Heaven, as we had to travel about 90 miles over very rough going, much to the displeasure of many of the wounded…. That night about 9 p.m. we arrived at the 14th C.C.S….

Colonel McNaught was in the midst of all this and relates his experience:

‘I was bandaged up and put to sleep for the night. I don't remember much about that. Then came a very interesting and exhausting time…. A convoy of 2 ambulances, 10 3-ton trucks and a captured German ambulance were ready at 6.30 a.m. 24 Nov. I was put in the front of the German ambulance and with a compass set out to lead the convoy. I was very uncomfortable with one leg stuck out under the driver. We had to go through German lines, past German tanks and German machine gunners in the scrub. My driver was a bit scared but I told him to keep straight on and no one troubled us. You see there were all sorts of rings within rings of different troops at this time. I had to report 15 miles away to an advanced CCS, but it wasn't there and all the ambulances and Clearing Stations had moved back because some German tanks had got through the ring and were making things merry for rear administrative units. We ran into it all, and some German tanks opened fire on my convoy. We had to scatter and go for it. They killed one of their own men in one of our ambulances and one of our men. They captured an ambulance but drove it straight into the South African lines, so we got it back. In all we went 50 miles that day but the last 20 I did on a stretcher in an ambulance. About 7 p.m. a Tank Major beside me died—the journey was too much for him. The next day was uneventful but tiring—40 miles: the third day was the worst, 55 miles and over very rough ground: the fourth day was better, 42 miles and we were in Egypt and slept in beds in a casualty clearing station. In all I had been in 3 different ambulance units—food had been light, 2 meals a day, one of which, breakfast, was usually just porridge, tea and biscuits. The fifth day we entrained in an ambulance train and were in it for 25 hours before arriving at Hospital on the canal. (Note: After the first day I was on my own as the other vehicles ran beyond me. I spent several hours trying to find them. I learned later that they all got back through the wire 24 hours ahead of me and reported me missing. I also learned later that it was Rommel's tanks making their move towards the wire to disorganise the administrative units and supplies that came upon us. My vehicle was not hit though bullets came all around it.)’

The men of the battalion who were with 24 Battalion remained in their positions and the following morning 25 Battalion with its transport moved to an area 700 yards north-east of the cairn on Hill 175, remaining under command of 24 Battalion, which that morning had advanced and regained the crest of the hill a little beyond the cairn. The transport moved back to the brigade transport area, being shelled without effect on the way, and Burton set about the reorganisation of the battalion. He established Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Company, and two rifle companies which, in order to make up a workable strength, included the pioneers, anti-aircraft gunners, sanitary men, clerks, cooks, and drivers.

Lieutenant Ian Reid (Mortar Officer) was appointed Adjutant; Sergeant Slade

Lt G. B. Slade; Petone; born England, 15 Oct 1910; solicitor.

A search of the forward area was made after dark on the 24th to find wounded men reported to be there by one of the wounded. Major Burton and Private Maloney

Pte W. J. Maloney; New Plymouth; born NZ 11 Nov 1918; NZ Rlys fireman; wounded 22 Jul 1942.

With the withdrawal of some of the men from the forward positions and the arrival of stragglers, the strength had increased somewhat, B Company, according to Private Reed, from thirty-eight to about seventy. ‘We eventually raked up about 230 fit men,’ wrote Lieutenant Cathie (10 Platoon), ‘… and Wally Ormond strolled in the following morning from the German lines, after the 24th had made a dawn attack on Jerry and had knocked him back a fair way. We had five rifle company subalterns left—Bruce Campbell,

Capt B. Campbell; born Dunedin, 6 May 1916; clerk; p.w. 22 Jul 1942.

The enemy continued to hold the Rugbet en Nbeidat and the ground to the west of it towards the Blockhouse, from which he harassed 24 Battalion's position.

In the operation against Point 175, 6 Brigade Group had been in a very exposed position, far in advance of the rest of the Division and very vulnerable to attack from the strong enemy armoured forces in the neighbourhood. But the situation now improved. The enemy armour, which had inflicted serious losses on 7 Armoured Division and on the afternoon of the 23rd had overrun 5 South African Brigade, six miles south-west of Point 175, had laagered that evening not far away; fortunately, next morning it moved off to the south-east in an enormous column about 20 miles long, bound for the Egyptian frontier some 50 miles away. The movement was seen by 22 Armoured Brigade, which earlier that morning had concentrated five miles south of 6 Brigade under orders to assist the New Zealand Division. Fourth Armoured Brigade, with similar orders, was a further 12 miles to the south-east; both armoured brigades had had severe losses.

(Rommel himself led the German armoured mass towards Egypt. So far as is known, he was not present during the operations against 5 South African Brigade, and it is of some interest to 25 Battalion to know that there is a probability that he personally was involved in the direction of the battle against the battalion.)

Sixth Brigade's perilous isolation fortunately had ended as 4 Brigade Group that evening, 24 November, approached its northern flank, both formations facing towards Tobruk, and New Zealand Divisional Headquarters had also come forward.