Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939

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DOCUMENTS Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War By Authority: R. E. Owen, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand 1951

Title page DOCUMENTS Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939–45 VOLUME II WAR HISTORY BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND 1951

PREFACE

The originals of the documents published in this volume are held in the Prime Minister's Department and the Service Departments. All communications between the New Zealand Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Commonwealth of Australia, and between the New Zealand Government and the General Officer Commanding 2nd NZEF in the Middle East and official New Zealand representatives abroad, have not been published, but those omitted are of a trivial and personal nature only.

There has been no restriction on access to documents and no censorship. An arbitrary numbering has been adopted, but the despatches are otherwise in their original form except for some paraphrasing to comply with security requirements. In no case has the sense been altered.

The research for the three volumes in this series has been the work of L. S. Hart, formerly of the staff of War History Branch, and C. R. McColl, and the documents have been prepared for publication by W. A. Glue.

H. K. Kippenberger,Editor-in-Chief, New Zealand War Histories

CONTENTS page Preface v Proposed Formation of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps 1 The Operations of the 2nd New Zealand Division in Greece and Crete 16 Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42 22 Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade 49 Libyan Campaign, 1941–42 70 Syria 98 The Battle for Egypt 110 Proposed Withdrawal of 2nd New Zealand Division (November—December 1942) 141 Campaign in Tripolitania and Tunisia 156 Proposed Withdrawal of 2nd New Zealand Division (April—May 1943) and Plans for Future Employment 182 Furlough Scheme 222 Despatch of 2nd New Zealand Division to Italy 263 Campaign in Italy, 1943–44 275 New Zealand Squadron, Long Range Desert Group, in the Dodecanese Operations 308 Maintenance of 2nd New Zealand Division; the Replacement Scheme 328 Attachment of Greek Brigade to 2nd New Zealand Division 396 Proposal to Use New Zealand Detachment for Garrison Duties in Greece 398 End of Campaign in Italy 401 Trieste 415 Return of Division to New Zealand 428 Appendix I: Appreciation of the Problem of the Withdrawal of One or Other of the 2nd or 3rd New Zealand Divisions 449

Proposed Formation of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

1 The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia

Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of Australia during the war were:

Apr 1939 – Aug 1941Rt. Hon. Robert Gordon Menzies, PC, KC.Aug 1941 – Oct 1941Rt. Hon. Arthur William Fadden, PC.Oct 1941 – death, Jul 1945Rt. Hon. John Curtin, PC.Jul 1945 – Dec 1949Rt. Hon. Joseph Benedict Chifley, PC. (Died 13 Jun 1951.)

to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

Prime Ministers of New Zealand during the war were:

28 Nov 1935 – death, 26 Mar 1940Rt. Hon. Michael Joseph Savage, PC.1 Apr 1940 – 13 Dec 1949Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser, PC, CH. (Died 12 Dec 1950.)

4 March 1940

The increase of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force to an Army Corps comprising two divisions with the necessary Corps troops is at present being considered by my Government. They desire to know whether your Government would be willing to combine the New Zealand Forces in an Australian and New Zealand Army Corps under the command of the General Officer Commanding, Australian Imperial Force.

Field-Marshal Sir Thomas Albert Blamey, GBE, KCB, CMG, DSO; GOC 6th Division, AIF, 1939–40; GOC 1st Australian Corps, 1940–41; title altered in 1941 to GOC AIF in Middle East; commanded Anzac Corps in Greece, Apr 1941; Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, 1941; Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces, South-West Pacific Area, 1942–45; died 27 May 1951.

As the name Anzac has become synonymous with the highest degree of military prowess, the opportunity of recreating a force to carry on the traditions associated with this name has considerable appeal to us. Such a step would be inspiring to the national morale of Australia and New Zealand in particular and of the Empire generally. There is also a close psychological affinity between our troops. The effect of such a decision would certainly not be encouraging to the enemy and would be a further demonstration of the solidarity of ourselves with the United Kingdom. The concentration of our forces in one Army Corps has also mutual operational and administrative advantages.

The interests of your forces and your Government would be fully safeguarded in the organisation advocated for the administration of the Corps and by your senior officer's

Lieutenant-General Lord Freyberg, VC, GCMG, KCB, KBE, DSO, LL.D; GOC 2nd NZEF, 21 Nov 1939–22 Nov 1945; Governor-General of New Zealand 17 Jun 1946–; at time of reference Major-General B. C. Freyberg.

right of direct communication with the New Zealand Government.

See Volume I, Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF (No. 39). The appropriate paragraph of the GOC's charter reads:

(b) To communicate directly with the New Zealand Government and with the Army Department concerning any matter connected with the training and administration of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force.

We would appreciate early advice of your views. If the proposal meets with your concurrence it is suggested that a staff representative be sent to Australia early to discuss the working out of details.

It is requested that this message be treated with the utmost secrecy, particularly the reference to the possible expansion of our forces, which will not be announced here before Wednesday evening.

2 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of Australia 4 March 1940

I will bring before the Government the subject referred to in your telegram of 4 March and will then cable you again.

3 The Governor-General of New Zealand

Governors-General of New Zealand during the war were:

1935–41Rt. Hon. George Vere Arundell Monckton-Arundell, 8th Viscount Galway, PC, GCMG, DSO, OBE; died Mar 1943.1941–46Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril Louis Norton Newall, GCB, OM, GCMG, CBE, AM. (Created Baron, 18 Jul 1946.)

to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Secretaries of State for Dominion Affairs in the United Kingdom Government during the war were:

28 Jan 1939–3 Sep 1939Rt. Hon. Viscount Caldecote, PC, CBE, KC (then Sir Thomas Inskip).3 Sep 1939–12 May 1940Rt. Hon. Robert Anthony Eden, PC, MC.12 May 1940–5 Oct 1940Viscount Caldecote.5 Oct 1940–21 Feb 1942Rt. Hon. Viscount Cranborne, PC.21 Feb 1942–28 Sep 1943Rt. Hon. Clement Richard Attlee, PC, CH.28 Sep 1943–3 Aug 1945Viscount Cranborne.3 Aug 1945–7 Oct 1947Rt. Hon. Viscount Addison, KG, PC.

On 2 Jul 1947 the title of this office was changed to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

23 March 1940

In a telegram dated 4 March the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia asks whether the New Zealand Government would be willing to combine the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force with the 2nd Australian Imperial Force to form an Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. My Ministers would be glad to receive an early expression of the views of the War Office on this proposal.

A similar telegram was sent to General Freyberg.

The telegram reads as follows:

[Text of telegram No. 1]

4 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence

Hon. F. Jones, Minister of Defence, 1935–49.

[Extract] 26 March 1940

Sentimental and practical issues, with personal and military as well as constitutional ramifications, are raised by your cable. No doubt Australian sentiment is reflected in the Australian Prime Minister's cable. I am unable to estimate if the revival of Anzac and linking with the Australian war effort would have much appeal to New Zealand, but you are better able to estimate the effect of this.

Practical advantages would be gained by fighting in a Corps with Australian divisions, as their great value on the flank and General Blamey's experience give confidence. If the Corps is agreed to, the organisation and administration of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force must be safeguarded and everything regarding hospitals, welfare of the men, promotion, and supervision of the corps of officers must be kept completely free from the possibility of Australian control or even supervision.

Further, the Australian approach to defence problems requires Cabinet's consideration as it is not entirely similar to the New Zealand Government's. New Zealand desires to assist in the manner best conforming to the British war effort and may not wish to be associated automatically with a possible aggressive Australian attitude regarding strategy….

A personal reference has been omitted.

I would suggest, therefore, that Cabinet reserve to themselves all the powers reserved with the British Government and possibly strengthen them if you link at this stage. If we agree to combine for active operations, the question arises whether to form the Army Corps before or after our theatre of war is decided. I would suggest that the committing of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force to a theatre of war should still be decided by the Government of New Zealand, with my emergency powers fully retained,

See Volume I, Appointment of Commander, 2nd NZEF (No. 39).

and not by the Australian Corps commander as the agent of the Australian Cabinet. When we have entered a theatre of war the normal channels of command, as defined in the prearranged diagram, must be observed.

To sum up, my opinion is that we should link up for operational control only; that the time to link has not yet arrived; that we should continue training under the GOC British Troops in Egypt

Field-Marshal Lord Wilson, GCB, GBE, DSO (then Lieutenant-General Henry Maitland Wilson); GOC-in-C, British Troops in Egypt, 1939–40; Military Governor and GOC-in-C, Cyrenaica, 1941; GOC-in-C, British Troops in Greece, 1941; GOC British Forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1941; C-in-C Allied Forces in Syria, 1941 (GOC 9th Army); C-in-C Persia-Iraq Command, 1942–43; C-in C Middle East, 1943; Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, 1944; Head of British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, 1945–47.

until active operations are anticipated; that then we should enter the Corps on terms of equality.

General Blamey's experience may entitle him to be the first commander but care should be taken not to create a vested interest for Australia, and succession to the command when a vacancy occurs should be available to New Zealand.

5 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand 12 April 1940

With reference to your telegram of 23 March (No. 3). The formation of an Anzac Corps would be welcomed by the Army Council, particularly in view of the magnificent traditions connected with the name. At the same time, they desire to make the following comments:

Since the complete Corps would not be ready for active service until some distant date, it is not possible for the Council to be certain at this stage that a three-division Corps of Australian and New Zealand troops would be required to take the field as a complete Corps. Therefore, they suggest that if such a Corps is formed, the New Zealand and Commonwealth Governments should both be prepared to agree to the New Zealand Division being detached from the Australian Forces, either for operations in another theatre of war or for its combination with a United Kingdom division, in order to form a two-division Corps should operational necessities at the time make either of these courses desirable.

The Army Council has been asked by the Commonwealth Government what Corps troops the Commonwealth should provide for a two-division Corps. A list of the Corps troops considered necessary is being forwarded to Australia, together with a list of the additional Corps troops needed for a three-division Corps. Copies of these two lists are also being despatched by air mail to Army Headquarters, Wellington. As the Commonwealth Government may ask for the balance of Corps troops not raised in Australia to be provided by New Zealand, the New Zealand Government, before coming to any agreement with the Commonwealth Government, may wish to consider the extent of this commitment.

After considering a report on the proposal by the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General J. E. Duigan (in general, he concurred with General Freyberg's views), the New Zealand Cabinet Defence Committee on 17 May 1940 decided that the matter should be discussed with the Australian authorities by the Hon. W. Nash during a forthcoming visit to the Commonwealth. However, the projected visit by Mr. Nash did not take place.

6 Letter from the Minister of Defence to General Freyberg [Extract] 27 May 1940My Dear General,

…. Relative to the question of linking up with the AIF, this matter was before War Cabinet when I took the opportunity of placing your views before my colleagues. The opinion expressed was that you had set out exceedingly well the arguments for and against and that your conclusions were sound. It had been provisionally arranged for the Hon. Mr. Nash

Rt. Hon. W. Nash, PC, Minister of Finance and Customs, 1935–49; New Zealand Minister at Washington, 1942–44; Deputy Prime Minister, 1940–49; Leader of the Opposition, 1951—.

to proceed to Australia this week when he might have had an opportunity of discussing this matter with the authorities. His proposed visit, however, has had to be deferred. If there is any linking up, I feel sure it will be for only operational purposes….

7 General Wavell,

Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, PC, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, CMG, MC (then General Sir Archibald Wavell); GOC-in-C, Middle East, 1939–41; GOC-in-C, India, 1941–43; Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific, Jan–Mar 1942; Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 1943–47; died 24 May 1950.

General Headquarters, Middle East, to General Freyberg

General Freyberg was at this time in the United Kingdom training the Second Echelon.

8 July 1940

Your telegram of 4 July.

Not published. See Volume I, Concentration of the 2nd NZ Division (No. 245). This telegram read:

Have just received from Puttick your proposals for reorganisation with its repercussions upon the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Egypt. As no such change can be made without the approval of the New Zealand Government, I hope these proposals will not be proceeded with. I do not wish to have to disclose to the New Zealand Government the proposals as outlined by you to break up the New Zealand Force, as they would make a most unfavourable impression in New Zealand official circles with repercussions you probably have not foreseen. The answer to any such proposals would, I am sure, be an uncompromising refusal.

To meet a possible attack on Egypt from the Western Desert, it is essential to organise into some battle order the incomplete formations available here. The principal factor affecting this organisation is the shortage of Signals units.

A draft Order of Battle was drawn up for discussion to enable the troops available to be most efficiently organised and commanded in the event of attack. The shortage of Signals made it most economical to form an Anzac Division of one Australian and one New Zealand brigade.

The Order of Battle was discussed on 5 July and it was decided to have separate Australian and New Zealand brigade groups instead of the Anzac Division. This arrangement is less economical of Signals but is workable. The New Zealand Brigade Group includes all New Zealand troops. Brigadier Puttick

Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO; commanded 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade, 1940–41, and New Zealand troops in Egypt in 1940 during absence of General Freyberg in United Kingdom; commanded 2nd NZ Division (4th and 5th Brigades) in Crete, May 1941; Chief of the General Staff and General Officer Commanding, New Zealand Military Forces, 1941–45.

is quite satisfied with the new proposal. It is not intended to implement the Order of Battle till an attack appears probable.

8 General Freyberg (Greece) to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Extract] 6 April 1941

After a difficult journey from Egypt the complete Division has moved forward into Macedonia and is preparing a defensive position. We are now linked with the 6th Australian Division; thus the Anzac Corps is again in being. General Blamey's experience and the Australians' fighting qualities will prove great assets….

See Volume I, Greece (No. 357) for complete text.

9 Headquarters 1st Australian Corps to Advanced Headquarters, New Zealand Division (Greece) 12 April 1941

From 6 p.m. 12 April 1941 the 1st Australian Corps will be known as Anzac Corps. The GOC Anzac Corps

Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Blamey.

in making this announcement desires to say that the reunion of the Australian and New Zealand Divisions gives all ranks the greatest uplift. The task ahead, although difficult, is not nearly so desperate as that which our fathers faced in April twenty-six years ago.

The landing on Gallipoli Peninsula by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps on 25 Apr 1915.

We go to it together with stout hearts and the certainty of success.

10 General Freyberg to Headquarters Anzac Corps 13 April 1941

The reunion of the Australian and New Zealand Divisions is welcomed with the greatest satisfaction by all ranks of the New Zealand Division. Will you please send this message to our comrades of the 6th Australian Division.

11 General Freyberg (Crete) to the Minister of Defence [Extract] 1 May 1941

For the information of the Prime Minister, I saw General Wavell here yesterday and he informed me that General Blamey had expressed the desire to keep the Anzac Corps in being for possible war in Palestine. I told the Commander-in-Chief that I had no power to make such a decision, and that my Government would have to be consulted. I think that General Wavell will approach you on this matter…

See Volume I, Crete (No. 389) for complete text.

12 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

Addressed also to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

7 May 1941

The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, has intimated that he would welcome the suggestion which has been made that the 6th Australian Division and the New Zealand Division should again be formed into an Anzac Corps when they have been re-equipped. General Wavell observes that the formation of the Anzac Corps in Greece gave satisfaction and was appreciated by both divisions. He proposes that the Corps should be stationed in Palestine for that country's defence and recommends that General Freyberg should be selected to command it.

Subject to the concurrence of His Majesty's Governments in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom favour the proposed re-formation of an Anzac Corps and the suggested appointment of Freyberg as Corps Commander. We are, however, anxious that Freyberg should continue as Commander of the Allied forces in Crete for the present.

I should be glad to learn as soon as possible whether the above suggestions commend themselves to the Australian and New Zealand Governments.

13 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand

Hon. W. Nash. Mr. Fraser had left New Zealand on 3 May on a visit to the Middle East and the United Kingdom. He arrived in Cairo on 15 May.

to the acting Prime Minister of Australia

During the absence of the Australian Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies, in the United Kingdom in 1941, the Hon. A. W. Fadden was acting Prime Minister.

9 May 1941

You will have received the telegram of 7 May from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, would welcome the suggestion that the Australian and New Zealand Divisions should be reformed into an Anzac Corps after they have been re-equipped, and that General Freyberg should be selected as Corps Commander in succession to General Blamey.

General Blamey had been appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, on 23 Apr 1941.

War Cabinet has discussed the matter, and it is felt that the reconstitution of the Anzac Corps would give the greatest satisfaction to both the divisions and would be most warmly welcomed by the peoples of Australia and this country, to whom the undying traditions of Anzac are an illustrous part of their common heritage. An early expression of your views on the proposals contained in the Secretary of State's telegram would be gladly received by the New Zealand Government.

There is no trace of a reply to this telegram.

14 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to General Freyberg (Crete) 9 May 1941

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs has informed the New Zealand Government that the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, would welcome the suggestion that the 6th Australian Division and the New Zealand Division should, after being re-equipped, be reformed into an Anzac Corps. General Wavell has also recommended that you should command the Corps. However, the British Government are anxious that you should continue for the present as Commander of the Allied forces in Crete. The proposals are warmly welcomed by us, and we are at present awaiting the Commonwealth Government's views. We would, of course, be glad to have any advice on these matters you may care to offer.

A similar telegram was sent to the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Singapore, for Mr. Fraser, then en route to Egypt.

15 General Freyberg (Crete) to the acting Prime Minister 11 May 1941

I have to thank you for your message of 9 May. While fully appreciating the honour of commanding the Anzac Corps and while realising that the association of Anzac has much to recommend it from an operational viewpoint, I would personally prefer to stay with the New Zealand Division. However, if the New Zealand and Commonwealth Governments so desire, I am prepared to accept the appointment provided that I can remain a servant of the New Zealand Government by continuing to be GOC 2nd NZEF, and provided the New Zealand Division remains part of the Corps I command. It may be possible for me to fly to Egypt and back in a day so that I could discuss this and other matters with the Prime Minister personally. Meanwhile, in accordance with the British Government's request, I must of course remain here with our two New Zealand brigades until we are relieved or until the danger to Crete is past. Our troops are in good form.

16 The acting Prime Minister to General Freyberg (Crete) 15 May 1941

We have just received your telegram of 11 May. The arrangements proposed by you would be most acceptable to us, and I suggest you should take the earliest possible opportunity to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister, whom I will advise. I would be glad also if a copy of your message could be shown to the Prime Minister in Cairo.

In a telegram to Cairo on 17 May General Freyberg repeated for Mr. Fraser's information telegrams Nos. 14, 15, and 16.

17 The Hon. W. Nash to the Rt. Hon. P. Fraser (Cairo) [Extract] 16 May 1941

The Australian Government has not so far replied to our telegram of 9 May (No. 13) on the formation of the Anzac Corps. I have asked Freyberg to have shown to you a copy of his message to me dated 11 May (No. 15). His desire to remain under the authority of the New Zealand Government and to continue as GOC 2nd NZEF if appointed Corps Commander is favourably regarded by War Cabinet. It is suggested that you have an early discussion with him and advise us of your views as soon as possible….

In the text omitted Mr. Nash requested information on the date and place of arrival in Australia of General Sir Guy Williams, then Military Adviser to the New Zealand Government. See also Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade.

18 The Rt. Hon. P. Fraser (Cairo) to the Hon. W. Nash 9 June 1941

With regard to the proposed formation of an Anzac Corps, I have made further inquiries here with Blamey and Wavell but I understand that no further developments have occurred and the matter is still in abeyance. If such a Corps should be formed and Freyberg appointed to command it, then the command of the New Zealand Division would normally fall to either Brigadier Puttick or Brigadier Miles,

Brigadier R. Miles, CBE, DSO, MC, ED; Commander Royal New Zealand Artillery, 1940–41; commanded 2nd NZEF (UK) 1940; wounded and prisoner of war, 1 Dec 1941; escaped to Switzerland with Brigadier J. Hargest from prison camp near Florence, 29 Mar 1943; died in Spain on way to United Kingdom, Oct 1943.

the former of course being senior. Both these officers have received the highest commendation from Freyberg and from everybody in a position to judge, and it is Freyberg's opinion that either of them would be very suitable either as Divisional commanders in the field or as officers in New Zealand. I agree and feel that with their recent war experience it is not possible to go beyond them. As soon as you have discussed the matter adequately with Sir Guy Williams,

General Sir Guy Charles Williams, KCB, CMG, DSO; Military Adviser to the New Zealand Government, May–Nov 1941.

I would be glad if you would let me have, at the earliest possible opportunity, the views of War Cabinet and the Minister of Defence so that reorganisation in Egypt can be facilitated.

19 The acting Prime Minister to General Freyberg (Cairo) 12 June 1941

The New Zealand Government, in giving further consideration to the formation of an Anzac Corps, would like to have your opinion on the implications involved. War Cabinet are particularly concerned about the additional commitment for Corps troops. It is assumed, of course, that the proposed Corps would consist of two divisions only, thus increasing their own share of the Corps troops. While the Government have information concerning the nature and number involved, any additional comments you feel able to give would be welcomed.

20 Army Headquarters (Wellington) to Headquarters 2nd NZEF (Cairo) 20 June 1941

Colonel Conway

Brigadier A. E. Conway, CB, OBE, Adjutant-General, New Zealand Military Forces, 1940–46, who had been in the Middle East for consultations on the reinforcement and reorganisation of the 2nd NZEF.

arrived on 16 June. His papers despatched by safe-hand air mail have been received. Please cable immediately, firstly, whether our losses in Crete will require any alteration in the reinforcement figures already agreed upon,

See Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42.

and secondly, whether General Freyberg and the Prime Minister reached an agreement on the formation of the Army Tank Brigade, as proposed by War Office, and the formation and training of this brigade in New Zealand.

See Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade.

For your information, Conway had discussions at Army Headquarters, Melbourne, regarding the formation of Anzac Corps, but no definite conclusions were reached as Australia is investigating the manpower situation in order to decide what formations can be maintained overseas. If this matter was discussed by General Freyberg and the Prime Minister, please advise what decisions were made. A reply to this cable is required in connection with the preparation of a revised report on manpower needs.

21 General Freyberg to the acting Prime Minister 21 June 1941

Reference your telegram of 12 June (No. 19). On returning from Crete I found that negotiations had been in progress between Conway and Brigadier Stevens.

Major-General W. G. Stevens, CB, CBE; Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, 2nd NZ Division, 1940; Officer in charge of Administration, 2nd NZEF, 1940–45; GOC 2nd NZEF, 22 Nov 1945–6 Jul 1946.

I talked with the Prime Minister and various matters are at present being considered. As soon as the full facts are available I will telegraph you. The delay is regretted, but I was not in a fit state to give the matter proper consideration on my return from Crete.

Mr. Nash replied on 25 Jun that the New Zealand Government would be glad to have General Freyberg's views in due course.

22 General Freyberg to the acting Prime Minister 25 June 1941

Please refer to your telegram of 12 June (No. 19). The term ‘Corps troops’ is a misnomer to some extent as many units of the nature indicated in FFC 36

Field Force Committee, War Office, Organisation Plan 36 (Part 12–2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force) contained proposals for the organisation of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. The organisation was on the basis of one New Zealand Division forming part of an Anzac Corps of three divisions (the other two divisions being Australian), one New Zealand Army Tank Brigade, and one independent brigade (B Force) in Fiji. The plan gave details of the composition and strength of the force and of new units to be formed, and the estimated numbers of reinforcements required to maintain it at various periods of activity.

support the Division whether they form part of the Corps or not, e.g., a medium regiment and a heavy antiaircraft regiment are allotted on the scale of one for each division as required, but normally are not under the direct orders of the Divisional Commander; also all services behind the Division, such as Signal units, Reserve Mechanical Transport Company, &c., working in the gap between Divisional and Corps headquarters. Up to the present the British Army has found this quota of units for us behind the actual Division. It has always been a source of criticism, and it is most desirable as equipment becomes available and manpower in the United Kingdom becomes the bottleneck, that we should take over our share. Without any doubt it is an imperative essential to have our Corps troops if we are in the Anzac Corps. A Corps of three divisions is certainly referred to in FFC 36, but I gather that our quota would not be increased if the Corps is of two divisions only. Most Corps troops units are allotted to a Corps on the basis of so many for each division in such Corps. I strongly recommend that you accept responsibility if the manpower situation permits, and as the rearrangement will require a great deal of planning here, especially as regards new commanders and staff officers, I would be grateful to learn whether the Government agree in principle to the proposals. As men can be made available, details can be altered to suit the New Zealand Government.

23 Headquarters 2nd NZEF to Army Headquarters (Wellington) 25 June 1941

Your telegram of 20 June (No. 20).

As indicated in my telegram of 21 June

See Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42 (No. 47).

I will cable the amended 7th Reinforcement figures today.

The formation of the Tank Brigade was agreed to in principle by the Prime Minister, but he stated that the final decision would not be made until the New Zealand authorities had investigated the implications and had consulted him by cable.

See Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade.

The Prime Minister also agreed that New Zealand should find its quota of Corps troops, but on the same understanding as above.

With regard to the formation of the Anzac Corps, the Prime Minister consulted Generals Wavell and Blamey and afterwards talked over the proposal with me. All were agreed in wanting it, and if the New Zealand Government favour the proposal, it only requires the Commonwealth Government's agreement to bring it into existence.

24 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

Mr. Fraser had returned to New Zealand on 14 Sep.

[Extract] 20 September 1941

Your telegram of 17 September.

See Libyan Campaign, 1941–42 (No. 97).

….

See Libyan Campaign, 1941–42 (No. 99) for complete text.

I have explained to General Auchinleck

Field-Marshal Sir Claude John Eyre Auchinleck, GCB, GCIE, CSI, DSO, OBE; GOC-in-C, India, 1941; GOC-in-C, Middle East, 1941–42; GOC-in-C, India, 1943–47.

the New Zealand Government's view on the formation of the Anzac Corps. The Commonwealth Government have not yet expressed their view. However, it is not possible to form the Anzac Corps yet as the 6th Australian Division is not yet equipped and trained after Greece and Crete, and the 9th Australian Division is in Tobruk. If still desired, it might be possible to do so after some months, depending on the result of the operations now contemplated.

No further telegrams between the two Governments on this subject can be traced.

The Operations of the 2nd New Zealand Division in Greece and Crete

25 Report by Major-General B. C. Freyberg to the Minister of Defence

This report was presented to both Houses of the General Assembly on 9 Oct 1941.

12 September 1941

By the end of March the New Zealand Division was concentrated in Macedonia. The 5th Brigade Group had arrived from England, thus the three contingents were together for the first time in the history of the Division. Their first role was preparing a defensive position, in conjunction with the Greeks, from the coast south of the River Aliakmon to Veria Pass. The long front was too vulnerable for the forces available and, following the enemy's attack on Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April, the Division was ordered to retire to a strong position on the line of the Passes, the 4th Brigade Group to Servia, the 5th and 6th Brigade Groups to Olympus. A quick withdrawal was made in rain and snow. This was accomplished without loss of equipment or supplies, the troops showing a high standard of discipline and endurance in their first trial. Rain and overcast skies were a blessing, as no enemy aircraft molested our forces. This retirement was completed by 10 April.

On the 12th the Australians and New Zealanders were formed into the 2nd Anzac Corps, giving great satisfaction. From the 10th the Division fought several actions mainly as three separate brigade groups, each comprising all arms. The Machine Gun Battalion detachment on the Yugoslav frontier fired the first New Zealand shots at Veve at 9 p.m. on 10 April. On the 13th the Divisional Cavalry and Artillery on the Aliakmon River fought delaying actions, retiring over Olympus Pass on the 14th. The 4th and 5th Brigade Groups under Brigadiers Puttick and Hargest

Brigadier J. Hargest, CBE, DSO, MC; Member of Parliament, 1931–44; commanded 5th NZ Infantry Brigade, 1 May 1940 – 27 Nov 1941; p.w. Sidi Azeiz, 27 Nov 1941; escaped 29 Mar 1943 from prison camp near Florence; killed in action, France, 12 Aug 1944.

respectively came into action simultaneously at the historic Servia and Olympus Passes. The 4th Brigade Group held Servia Pass while Imperial and Greek troops from the Florina Gap withdrew. The infantry action was severe and the Germans suffered heavy casualties. The 5th Brigade Group, plus the Maoris, were holding the long line of the Olympus position, and the 21st Battalion held the coastal defile and railway tunnel near Platamon. At Olympus the Artillery, firing a phenomenal number of rounds, smashed the German tank advance, the infantry beating off heavy attacks made through the woods under cover of mist. The success of the German thrust against the Greeks on the left threatened the rear of the Olympus position and a withdrawal to the Thermopylae line was ordered for 16 and 17 April, Brigadier Barrowclough's

Major-General H. E. Barrowclough, CB, DSO, MC, ED; commanded 7th NZ Infantry Brigade in United Kingdom, 1940; commanded 6th Infantry Brigade, May 1940–Feb 1942; GOC 2nd NZEF in Pacific and GOC 3rd NZ Division, Aug 1942–Oct 1944.

6th Brigade Group moving to a covering position south of Elasson. After fighting with great determination and repulsing heavy attacks, the 4th and 5th Brigade Groups and the Australians retired again under the cover of mists to the south of the 6th Brigade Group. Meanwhile, the 21st Battalion had been forced back from the tunnel by tremendous odds, including a large armoured force. Later, with Brigadier Allen's

Major-General A. S. Allen, CB, CBE, DSO; commanded 16th Australian Infantry Brigade, 1940–41; GOC 7th Australian Division in Syria and New Guinea, 1941–43; GOC Northern Territory Force, AIF, 1943–44.

Australian Brigade Group, they held the Peneios Gorge position. The 21st Battalion suffered heavy casualties. The stands at Peneios and Elasson, where British, Australian, and New Zealand artillery took toll of enemy tanks, breaking their attacks, were vital.

Withdrawal from Greece

The force was finally disengaged on the night of 13 April and the Division withdrew 100 miles to the Thermopylae line. The remarkable success of this withdrawal surprised both the enemy and ourselves. The Division now prepared a line at the historic Thermopylae Pass while the Australians barred the other Athens road. This was destined to be only a temporary position as the collapse of the gallant Greek Army made the continuation of the fight impossible. Brigadier Barrowclough's force, with Divisional Artillery and British batteries, held the Pass. At dusk on Anzac Eve they beat off a strong German attack, 25-pounders destroying a large number of tanks. Disengaging by dark, the 6th Brigade Group withdrew through the 4th Brigade Group and the Australian artillery holding a covering position south of Thebes. That night the 5th Brigade Group successfully embarked for Crete. The Artillery and other Divisional troops, totalling 3600, embarked on the night of 26–27 April. On the 27th the 4th Brigade Group, after being cut off by parachute attacks on the Corinth Canal, fought a determined rearguard action almost on the beach at Porto Rafti, near Marathon, keeping the enemy at bay and embarking safely. Meanwhile the Divisional Headquarters and the 6th Brigade Group moved to the Peloponnese, crossing the Corinth Canal just ahead of a parachute attack on the morning of the 26th. The 26th Battalion attacked and held the airborne troops, and subsequently, with the remainder of the 6th Brigade Group and the attached British and Australian troops, continued the withdrawal through Tripolis and Sparta to Monemvasia. The final evacuation took place on the night of the 28th.

I very much regret the loss of so many of our first-line reinforcements and details of Headquarters left at Athens. The party reached Kalamata, but owing to the temporary occupation of the town by the Germans and the subsequent loss of contact between ships and the land, it was only possible to embark a small party. All branches of the service reached a high standard. The achievements of the infantry, and of the Artillery under Brigadier Miles, have already been mentioned. The demolition of roads and bridges by the Engineers, by delaying the enemy continually, was a great contribution to successful withdrawal. Signals maintained communications during most difficult operations. The Army Service Corps, including the Reserve Motor Transport Company, played a great part in supplying the forces throughout the whole of the operations and in carrying troops. The Medical Services carried out their duties with great efficiency. Almost all the wounded who could be moved were evacuated. The 6th Brigade Group and the 6th Field Regiment were ordered to Egypt, the remainder disembarking at Crete.

Crete

In Crete the New Zealand Division, commanded by Brigadier Puttick, comprised the 4th Brigade Group (Brigadier Inglis),

Major-General L. M. Inglis, CB, CBE, DSO, MC; CO 27th NZ (Machine Gun) Battalion, Jan–Aug 1940; commanded 4th NZ Infantry Brigade, 1941–42, and 4th Armoured Brigade, 1942–44; commanded 2nd NZ Division, 27 Jun – 16 Aug 1942 and 6 Jun – 31 Jul 1943; Chief Judge of the Control Commission Supreme Court in the British Zone of Occupation, Germany, 1947–50.

5th Brigade Group (Brigadier Hargest), and 10th Composite Brigade Group (Colonel Kippenberger),

Major-General Sir Howard K. Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO, ED; CO 20th NZ Battalion, Sep 1939 – Apr 1941, Jun–Dec 1941; commanded 10th Infantry Brigade, Crete, May 1941; commanded 5th NZ Infantry Brigade, Jan 1942 – Jun 1943, Nov 1943 – Feb 1944; commanded 2nd NZ Division, 30 Apr – 13 May 1943 and 9 Feb – 2 Mar 1944; commanded 2nd NZEF Prisoner of War Reception Group in United Kingdom, 1944–45; Editor-in-Chief, NZ War Histories.

the last including an improvised New Zealand battalion of Artillery and ASC personnel and two Greek battalions. Living conditions were hard owing to the shortage of blankets, clothing, cooking utensils, knives, forks, spoons, &c. The first twenty-days' period was spent in preparation, digging, wiring, and putting in guns as quickly as available supplies and equipment arrived. Supply difficulties increased as the air attacks developed. The number of planes available, the exposed position of the aerodromes, and the scale of the enemy air attack made it impossible for the RAF to operate from Crete. I asked that the few remaining fighter aircraft be sent to Egypt to avoid the useless loss of lives of the pilots who had fought gallantly against tremendous odds. The Egyptian aerodromes were too far away to give effective help and the Germans had complete air superiority.

The battle started on 20 May with a tremendous air bombardment followed by glider and parachute landings over the Canea-Maleme area. The [New Zealand] troops were in the Maleme-Canea sectors where the main attack was launched. The majority of the parachutists were mopped up but some gained a footing in the areas away from the defences. The Greek King was nearly captured. The Maleme sector was vital, and here the 5th Brigade Group, including some battalions of the 4th Brigade Group, met the attack from the west while the 4th and 10th Brigade Groups fought along Galatas Ridge. On the first day relays of enemy aircraft strafed our positions and fierce hand-to-hand fighting raged on Maleme aerodrome. At the close of the day the forces faced each other on the east and west of the aerodrome. On the second day, although the aerodrome remained no-man's-land and was under fire from captured Italian guns manned by our Artillery, troop-carriers landed there and beyond the aerodrome in the riverbed, regardless of losses. Parachute reinforcements also arrived and the savage air bombardment continued. A three-hour attack on Galatas was repulsed. That night we watched the Navy send seaborne invaders to the bottom. A counter-attack before dawn on the third day reached Maleme aerodrome but heavy dive-bombing at daylight made further progress impossible, and later in the day an attack by the enemy on our flank forestalled our plan for another counter-attack and forced us to withdraw to a shorter line. Heavy fighting continued on the fourth and fifth days on the new line and at Galatas, where the attacks were again repulsed. Sunday, the sixth day, was critical and hard for the tired Australian and New Zealand troops. After continuous air strafing all day a strong enemy attack took Galatas in the evening, but the British light tanks and New Zealand infantry retook it at the point of the bayonet. In my opinion this was one of the great efforts in the defence of Crete. With Maleme aerodrome no longer under fire, the troop-carriers poured in reinforcements of men and equipment. Tired troops could not withstand this indefinitely and on Sunday night the New Zealand Division and the Australians were ordered to withdraw to a new line west of Suda.

Between Canea and Maleme the New Zealand Division, later supported by Brigadier Vasey's

Major-General G. A. Vasey, CB, CBE, DSO, DSC; then commanding 19th Australian Infantry Brigade; GOC 7th Australian Division; later Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Allied Land Forces, South-West Pacific Area; killed in aircraft accident, 5 Mar 1945.

Australian Brigade, had fought for six days without respite. More than twenty fierce bayonet counterattacks were carried out. The fighting was the most bitter of this war and such fierce hand-to-hand fighting has seldom been seen, while the scale of the enemy air attack was unprecedented. With Brigadier Vasey's brigade, our 5th Brigade covered the withdrawal from Suda. Here at the finish of our real defence the men in the front line said, ‘Let's fix bayonets and go for them.’ A joint New Zealand and Australian bayonet charge drove the enemy back over 1000 yards, but the position could not be held. On the withdrawal to Sphakia Beach our battalions fought rearguard actions together with Australians and Royal Marines. The bulk of the fighting troops were evacuated but losses were heavy. Many of our wounded had to be left behind with doctors and medical orderlies who had spontaneously volunteered to stay with them.

The above is only a brief outline, largely confined to a record of our own units, in an effort to give a picture of the campaign to those at home. We pay tribute to all our comrades—British, Australian, and Greek—who fought so gallantly in both campaigns. Our greatest admiration and gratitude goes to the Royal Navy, who guarded Crete so effectively from seaborne invasion and brought so many safely back from Greece and Crete. History will show these campaigns in their true perspective.

Fresh facts are coming to hand. In Crete the enemy underestimated our strength and expected to capture the island with parachutists alone. He failed and had to lay on a full-scale attack which used up in all 35,000 highly trained and perfectly equipped troops. Although successful, his losses were great and he was severely mauled. He lost at least 4000 killed, 2000 drowned, and 11,000 wounded.

This estimate, based on contemporary reports and on the assumption that the number wounded bore the usual relation to the number killed, now appears to be too high. From figures quoted in reports by the German XI Air Corps (dated 11 Jun 1941) and the German Fourth Air Fleet (28 Nov 1941), and from a strategic survey by the German 12th Army on operations in the Balkans, the enemy casualties in Crete were as follows:

Killed1991Missing (incl 324 lost at sea when convoy intercepted)1995Wounded26526638

From the same sources, it is now known that about 21,000 German troops were engaged.

The ratio of German wounded to killed and missing (practically all the latter must have been killed) appears abnormally low. The New Zealand figures were 643 killed, 1535 wounded; a ratio of approximately 4:9. It is probable that the great majority of the German casualties on the first day (parachutists who dropped in occupied areas) were killed.

By having to fight he was delayed a month in his plans, and when the time came he had neither material nor troops nor the inclination to face further air landings in either the Western Desert or in Syria. What is more important, he has now no illusions about the fate which awaits any attempt at airborne operations against Great Britain.

See also Volume I, Greece and Crete.

Reinforcement of 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, 1940–42

26 The Chief of the General Staff

Major-General J. E. (later Sir John) Duigan, KBE, CB, DSO; Chief of the General Staff, New Zealand Military Forces, 1937–41; created KBE 11 Jul 1940; died 9 Jan 1950.

(Wellington) to the War Office (London) 6 December 1939

The following provision is being made here for reinforcements for the 2nd NZEF:

Every echelon will include normal first reinforcements. The Second Echelon will include second reinforcements for the First Echelon on a similar scale. The Third Echelon will include third reinforcements for the First Echelon and second reinforcements for the Second Echelon, also on a similar scale. Advice is required whether this is considered adequate, and also what subsequent scale of reinforcements should be provided and the frequency of their despatch from this country.

I would be grateful for information regarding the dates on which shipping will be available for the Second and Third Echelons. In view of the desirability of completing the concentration of the Division with the least possible delay, and as training is to be completed with modern equipment overseas, the period of training in New Zealand can be curtailed if necessary. This would allow me to economise on the building programme for housing the troops here during the winter months.

Please inform General Freyberg.

27 The Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) to the War Office 2 January 1940

With reference to my telegram of 6 December.

Can you now advise the scale and frequency of reinforcements required after the despatch of the Third Echelon?

28 War Office to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) 6 January 1940

With reference to your telegrams dated 6 December (No. 26) and 2 January (No. 27).

Reinforcements will be required from New Zealand at a low rate during the training period and at a high rate from the date that the contingent is engaged in active operations. The proposals for reinforcements contained in your telegram of 6 December are considered adequate to cover the training period. To cover active service wastage War Office propose that, in addition to those mentioned in your telegram, the following reinforcements be despatched:

One month's active service wastage for the entire contingent, approximately 2000, to accompany the third flight. Similar numbers to arrive monthly from 1 October onwards.

For reasons of escort and convoy, it will probably be necessary for Australian and New Zealand reinforcements to sail together at intervals of two or three months, which would entail 4000 or 6000 being despatched from New Zealand in September and similar numbers every two or three months. The suggested scale of reinforcements is now being worked out in greater detail and the shipping programme considered in conjunction with Admiralty, Board of Trade, and Australian representatives. A detailed programme of reinforcement sailings will shortly be cabled out for your consideration.

29 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the High Commissioner for New Zealand (London)

Rt. Hon. W. J. Jordan, PC; New Zealand High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, 1936–51.

15 January 1940

With reference to the scale of reinforcements for the 2nd NZEF, please see the telegram of 6 January from War Office to the Chief of the New Zealand General Staff.

The high rate of reinforcement contemplated is giving us concern. It is considerably greater than that which we had allowed for, namely 10 per cent a month, based on experience in the last war. In view of the large manpower requirements for the air training scheme, plus the special formations extra to Divisional establishment already agreed upon,

See Volume I, Special Units.

we are concerned whether we will be able to maintain such a high rate of reinforcement on a voluntary basis. We would be grateful if you and Park

Brigadier R. S. Park, CBE, New Zealand Military Liaison Officer, London, 1939–46; commanded 2nd NZEF (UK) 1941–46; appointed New Zealand representative on the Joint Planning Staff, Chiefs of Staff Committee, London, Feb 1942; Commandant, Northern Military District, May 1947 – Feb 1950; Commander K Force (Korea) Aug 1950–.

could therefore discuss this matter with the War Office and advise us whether, having regard to the actual experience of this war, any substantial reduction in the scale of reinforcement contemplated in the War Office telegram of 6 January will be possible.

30 The New Zealand Military Liaison Officer (London) to the Prime Minister 16 February 1940

In connection with your telegram of 15 January, it has been ascertained that detailed figures for reinforcements, based on the approved amended war wastage rates and having in view the possibility of the New Zealand Division operating in France when trained, have now been worked out by War Office. Reinforcements will also need to arrive in sufficient time to allow training to be completed with modern equipment.

The suggested scale of reinforcements, with the date at which they should arrive in the Middle East, is:

September 1800

October 1800

November 1500

December 1000

January 1500

The Admiralty and the Ministry of Shipping desire to convoy reinforcements in flights at intervals of three months.

A total of 3600 reinforcements should accompany the third flight and 4000 should sail early in October, with a further sailing in January next year.

31 The Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) to Headquarters 2nd NZEF (Cairo) 9 March 1940

Your telegram of 4 March.

Not published. In this telegram Headquarters 2nd NZEF asked for information of Army Headquarters' intentions regarding reinforcement drafts with the Third Echelon and later contingents.

It is proposed to send the following reinforcements in addition to first reinforcements:

With the Second Echelon: second reinforcements to First Echelon units—total 688.

With the Third Echelon: third reinforcements to First Echelon units and second reinforcements to Second Echelon—total 1300.

It is also proposed to provide an additional reinforcement of 1600 all ranks to accompany the Third Echelon.

The 4th Reinforcements will consist of 4100 all ranks, plus proposed additional 2000 all ranks—total 6100 all ranks.

The 5th and subsequent reinforcements will each consist of 4100 all ranks.

After a number of cables and letters had been exchanged General Freyberg recommended that the above proposals should be carried out. Discussions were also held with Colonel N. S. Falla, Commandant 2nd NZEF Base, who visited New Zealand in April.

The proposed extra 1600 all ranks with the Third Echelon and the extra 2000 all ranks with the 4th Reinforcements are to meet the scale suggested by the War Office for September and October. It is not possible to obtain, train, and despatch the full quota of 3600 with the Third Echelon, as suggested by the War Office, so it is proposed to spread this number over the third and fourth drafts.

The average three-monthly wastage from all units of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force has been calculated at 4100, based on six months' intense activity, three months' normal, and three months' no activity, and allowing for wastage from 4100 during the voyage and three months' training.

On 4 Jun Headquarters 2nd NZEF advised that the figure 4100 was correctly based on six months' intense and six months' normal activity. Army Headquarters replied that its telegram (No. 31) should be corrected accordingly.

Please advise your actual monthly wastage.

32 Headquarters 2nd NZEF (Cairo) to Army Headquarters (Wellington) 21 August 1940

The Order of Battle for the Third Echelon has just been received from England. Your telegrams of 9 March (No. 31) and 27 April

Not published. This telegram gave the numbers of officer and other rank reinforcements by arms of the service which would sail with the Third Echelon.

indicated that 2900 reinforcements, other than first reinforcements, were coming with this contingent. The latest list shows no reinforcements other than 638 first reinforcements. Are no other reinforcements coming with the draft?

Pending a decision, it is desirable to have a larger number of reinforcements in view of the demands of the Base organisation which has not yet been built up.

The first intimation of the proposed despatch of a group of nondivisional Engineers units was received here from England on 19 August.

See Volume I, Special Units—Railway, Forestry, and Army Troops Companies, New Zealand Engineers.

Please repeat to this Headquarters any further telegrams regarding the constitution or movement of echelons or reinforcement contingents. Please advise urgently the composition of the reinforcements sailing with the Third Echelon.

33 Army Headquarters (Wellington) to Headquarters 2nd NZEF (Cairo) [Extract] 24 August 1940

Your telegram of 21 August. The Government has decided to limit the Third Echelon to 6131 all ranks….

Details of the composition of the Third Echelon have been omitted.

The balance of the reinforcements with the Third Echelon are required for other purposes….

See Volume I, Third Echelon. Early in August the New Zealand Government decided, in view of the threat of Japanese aggression, to retain from the reinforcements intended for despatch with the Third Echelon a force of 3050 all ranks to garrison Fiji.

34 Army Headquarters (Wellington) to General Freyberg (London) 2 September 1940

The numbers of reinforcements agreed upon were as specified in our telegram of 9 March (No. 31). Excluding first reinforcements, the total number with the Third Echelon, plus the 4th and 5th Reinforcements, was to be 13,100 all ranks. However, the programme of despatch has now been altered as follows to meet the changed situation:

A total of 606 reinforcements accompanied the Third Echelon

The Third Echelon left New Zealand for Egypt on 28 Aug.

in addition to its first reinforcements, the remainder of the reinforcements originally intended for despatch with the Third Echelon being required for other purposes. As already advised, it is intended that the 4th and 5th Reinforcements will each consist of 6500 all ranks,

This telegram or memorandum cannot be traced. See also Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade (No. 67).

thus approximately completing the original programme and strength. The estimates of reinforcements to replace wastage in twelve months, viz., 16,200 all ranks, were based on the rates prescribed for France, and the original programme and strength of drafts were arranged accordingly. Similar estimates on the Middle East scale totalled 9700 all ranks.

Having regard to the alteration in the situation and the change in the probable theatre of operations of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force since the original estimates and plans were made, your views on the amended programme given above and the strength of the reinforcements required for despatch with the 6th and 7th Reinforcements would be welcomed.

General Freyberg replied on 19 Sep that he would send early in October the estimated requirements of 2nd NZEF based on the new situation. These were given in a letter on 26 Oct, not reproduced in this volume.

35 General Freyberg (Egypt)

General Freyberg returned to Egypt from the United Kingdom on 24 Sep.

to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) 30 September 1940

Are you able to do anything to hurry up reinforcements for us here? One brigade in England will not be here before the end of December. Any number would be welcome even though they were given only one month's military training.

Please let me know when you receive the appreciation of the situation in Egypt I did for the British Cabinet, and which I sent you personally by mail from England.

See Volume I, Appendix IV, ‘The Position in Egypt’, Memorandum by Major-General B. C. Freyberg, 29 Jul 1940.

The Third Echelon has just begun to arrive in camp here. All are well.

36 The Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) to General Freyberg [Extract] 2 October 1940

Your telegram of 30 September. Outbreaks of measles and influenza have hampered the training of reinforcements. The 4th Reinforcements are now in camp. I will do everything possible and will discuss expediting their despatch with War Cabinet….

In the text omitted General Duigan advised that he would shortly be leaving New Zealand for Delhi to lead the New Zealand mission on munitions and supplies, and suggested that he should visit Egypt after the conference for discussions with General Freyberg. General Freyberg cabled the Minister of Defence on 3 Oct that ‘exchange of views would be valuable to policy’, and General Duigan arrived in Egypt on 28 Nov.

37 The Minister of Defence to General Freyberg 3 October 1940

Your telegram of 30 September (No. 35) to General Duigan. A total of 2100 troops who have had three months' training is available here for immediate despatch. In view of your request for immediate reinforcements, we are endeavouring to arrange to send them as soon as possible and will advise you of the result. The appreciation you made for the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has not yet arrived here.

38 The Minister of Defence to General Freyberg 12 October 1940

With reference to your telegram of 30 September (No. 35) and my reply of 3 October. Because of the growing tension in the Far East we have reconsidered the proposal to despatch to you forthwith the 2100 troops who have had three months' training, and are now considering sending them to Fiji at the earliest possible moment. We fully realise, however, the urgent desirability of supplying you with the reinforcements that you need, and we suggest for your consideration the following alternatives:

That we should send by the convoy due to leave about the middle of November, an equivalent number of troops selected from those members of the 4th Reinforcements who have had previous Territorial training, and who will by then have been in camp for approximately one month, but including the following with at least four months' training:

250 officers and NCOs

100 Divisional Cavalry

294 Maoris

50 Medical

The second alternative is to hold for further training the 2100 mentioned above and despatch them with the normal 4th Reinforcements, due to leave early in December, which will then number 6500.

We would be grateful if you would send us your comments on these proposals immediately.

39 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 12 October 1940

The difficulty in the Pacific is realised and I wish to help by all possible means. I would be glad to accept the first alternative in your message of 12 October in place of those you desire for Fiji. We would be prepared to accept all reinforcements with one month's service now that Base is functioning.

The 4th Reinforcements sailed in three sections. The first section left New Zealand on 8 Nov 1940, the second section on 20 Dec 1940, and the third section on 1 Feb 1941.

40 Army Headquarters (Wellington) to General Freyberg 27 November 1940

Present indications are that the ships available will take only approximately 3000 4th Reinforcements. In anticipation of this being so, would you please cable what the composition of the draft should be.

41 General Freyberg to Army Headquarters (Wellington) 29 November 1940

Your telegram of 27 November has been received with consternation. It is earnestly requested that every endeavour be made to send the full number. I would point out that the original reinforcements to accompany the Third Echelon were drastically reduced and that undue numbers have been allotted to units outside the Division. I am engaged in the first stages of forming new units and a regular supply of personnel is essential. If, however, the draft must be reduced, please leave behind in order of priority as not required: (a) 18th Army Troops Company, (b) Non-divisional Engineers, (c) 8th Field Company, (d) Machine gunners, (e) Divisional Engineers, and (f) infantry up to whatever number necessary. It is most important that the personnel withdrawn should follow urgently. I will telegraph shortly about the composition of the 5th Reinforcements.

This telegram is not published.

42 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence [Extract] 2 December 1940

….

See Volume I, Concentration of the 2nd NZ Division (No. 263) for complete text.

With reference to your telegram of 2 December,

Not published. This telegram from Army Headquarters to Headquarters 2nd NZEF advised that the shipping position prevented the despatch of the remainder of the 4th Reinforcements until late January, and notified a reduction in the size of the draft (2nd section, 4th Reinforcements) then being prepared for embarkation.

I feel that I must most strongly represent that should we be cast for an operational role we must have at least three months' reinforcements, amounting to 4200, fully trained, in our Base depots. Owing to the need for sending troops to Fiji, I would point out that we were 2300 reinforcements short with the Third Echelon, and with expansion and new units to be formed immediately we shall require an additional 2600 not originally budgeted for. Even if the 4th Reinforcements arrive to time and complete, we should only just be able to have reserves ready by the end of March. I have gone into the whole reinforcement position with General Duigan, who will arrive in New Zealand about the New Year. I strongly urge, and he agrees, sending the 4th Reinforcements complete and trying to expedite part of the 5th Reinforcements to arrive by March. This could be done by drawing some men from Fiji.

43 Army Headquarters (Wellington) to General Freyberg 9 December 1940

Your telegram of 2 December has been interpreted to mean that you desire 2600 of the 5th Reinforcements to be sent with the third section, 4th Reinforcements, and that you do not require 2600 additional to the 5th Reinforcements (6500), 6th Reinforcements (4100), 7th Reinforcements (4100). Will you please confirm and state the composition of the 2600 by arms. Inquiries are being made whether shipping will be available, but at present the indications are unfavourable.

44 Headquarters 2nd NZEF (Cairo) to Army Headquarters (Wellington) 12 December 1940

Reference your telegram of 9 December.

Provided the original total for the 4th Reinforcements (6500), 5th Reinforcements (6500), and 6th Reinforcements and later (each 4100) is adhered to without any deficiency, no additional numbers will be required. We will be glad of as many 5th Reinforcements as are available as early as can be arranged. The composition of the first portion should be as given in my telegram of 5 December

Not published.

up to the total of 55 officers and 2248 other ranks given therein. Any balance should consist of replacements for cavalry and infantry in that order.

45 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 27 February 1941

With reference to the latter part of my telegram of 2 December (No. 42), I am most relieved that the final portion of the 4th Reinforcements is now approaching these shores. As you recognise, we are entering an operational period when our reinforcement depots must be full. Having regard to the physical condition of the troops at the end of the long voyage, the period of training here must be reckoned as three months. As all calculations are based upon the arrival of the 5th Reinforcements on 1 April, I would be most grateful for their early despatch, especially the replacement portion of the contingent, for which see paper 12/1/2035 of 18 January.

Not published. This was a paper on ‘Expansion of 2nd NZEF’ by the Officer in charge of Administration (Colonel W. G. Stevens). The 5th Reinforcements left New Zealand on 7 Apr.

Priority of despatch should be (a) replacements portion, (b) new units portion. With reference to paragraph 34 of the above paper, the Medium Battery of Artillery is not now required and personnel should be allocated to the replacements portion in proportion to all arms.

In a telegram sent on 2 Mar Headquarters 2nd NZEF advised that personnel of the Medium Battery should be converted into a Light Anti-Aircraft Battery.

46 Headquarters 2nd NZEF to Army Headquarters (Wellington) 31 March 1941

Your telegram of 26 March.

Not published. This telegram from the Adjutant-General (Colonel A. E. Conway) concerned the composition of the 6th Reinforcements. The part to which telegram No. 46 refers read: ‘According to my reckoning you will have on the arrival of the 5th Reinforcements approximately 4800 infantry and 200 Maori reinforcements, exclusive of first reinforcements and of 300 Cavalry and 200 Artillery reinforcements which you propose changing to infantry. Is it intended, if 50 per cent infantry and Maoris are added to the 6th Reinforcements, that the 7th Reinforcements (normally 4100) be correspondingly reduced?’

Wastage prior to the arrival of the 5th Reinforcements will reduce the figures much below the 4800 mentioned by you. The transfer of Cavalry and Artillery was only a suggestion and may not be put into effect. Wastage from the Second Echelon was higher than expected and a steady drain, particularly on infantry, has resulted from the formation of Base training and administration establishments and the establishment of Advanced Base. Contingents have arrived so far at longer intervals than was first estimated, and the increase in battalion establishment from the lower to higher [scale] has to be implemented somewhat sooner than was expected. Therefore, I suggest that additional infantry and Maori reinforcements be added to the 6th Reinforcements over and above the normal 7th Reinforcements.

47 Headquarters 2nd NZEF to Army Headquarters (Wellington) 21 June 1941

With reference to your telegram of 20 June.

See Proposed Formation of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (No. 20).

Our losses in Artillery, Engineers, Army Service Corps, and Medical Corps [in Crete] were abnormally high. We will be asking for an increase in these arms in the 7th Reinforcements and a proportionate decrease in other arms, but the exact figures will not be available until about 25 June.

A telegram from Headquarters 2nd NZEF, dated 24 Jun, giving in detail the amended figures for replacements in the 7th Reinforcements has not been reproduced in this volume.

We will reply tomorrow regarding the Tank Brigade and Corps troops.

See Proposed Formation of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Nos. 22 and 23).

48 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to General Freyberg 9 July 1941

Consideration is being given by the Government to the New Zealand Expeditionary Force and related questions, but before coming to a decision it is necessary to have certain information from you.

You have 31,000 troops serving in Egypt according to our estimates. Of this number some 26,000 are regarded as establishment, leaving a surplus of approximately 5000 reinforcements. At present 4000 are en route to the Middle East and another 1600 are due to sail this month. Here in New Zealand we have 4100 training for transhipment in September. Provided there is no high degree of wastage you should have about 14,700 reinforcements by October.

Difficulty is being caused at present by the manpower situation, and in considering the formation of the Army Tank Brigade we must know at once whether on these figures you have more than sufficient reinforcements. Instead of sending the 8th Reinforcements, it may be necessary to hold that number to be trained for an Army Tank Brigade.

Until the prior questions of the Army Tank Brigade and the reinforcements have been considered in relation to the present manpower position, the proposals relating to Corps and Line of Communication troops are necessarily deferred.

See Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade (No. 74).

It is most essential that full details of the strength of the 2nd NZEF and the use of all troops in relation to the above figures should be supplied immediately.

A copy of this telegram was also sent to Mr. Fraser in London.

49 General Freyberg to the acting Prime Minister 10 July 1941

Your telegram of 9 July.

The maximum number overseas, that is on the arrival of the 5th Reinforcements, was 32,300. Killed, prisoner of war, missing, and returned to New Zealand amount to 5800. Left in Egypt total 26,500, not 31,000 as estimated by you. Even under normal conditions, at any one time there are approximately 1800 in hospital, leaving 24,700 available fit for duty in the field and at Base. The establishment is 26,000 so that at the moment there is a deficiency of 1300 and not a surplus of 5000.

The 6th and 7th contingents number 9700. The deficiency of 1300 above, plus the estimated wastage of 600 between now and October, reduce the figure to 7800, of whom a large part will still require about two months' training. The figure should thus be 7800 and not 14,700.

Army Headquarters replied on 22 Jul: ‘For the purpose of estimating future reinforcements we have accepted the position as set out in the first two paragraphs of your telegram of 10 July.’

Should the 8th Reinforcements not be sent, it means that we get no further reinforcements for six months. On the wastage table 7800 should be sufficient for eight months, but against that I would stress the following two points: First, the period October to March is likely to be the next period of great activity for the Division, and losses over that period might well exceed 7800; second, the wastage table is now regarded as giving much too low a figure for periods of normal and no activity.

Therefore, I would strongly deprecate withholding the 8th Reinforcements as the fighting units might find themselves with no replacements available.

Finally, to enable future planning of the 2nd NZEF, I would appreciate early information of the Government's decisions. The men have now fully recovered from the recent difficult times and are in good condition. Units are almost up to strength.

This telegram was repeated to Mr. Fraser in London.

50 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 31 October 1941

I wish to report that I came back from the Western Desert for two days to inspect the 6th and 7th Reinforcements, the latter having just arrived.

The 6th Reinforcements left New Zealand on 27 Jun and the 7th Reinforcements on 15 Sep 1941.

They are an excellent body of troops.

I am very impressed with all I have seen. The men are a fine lot and have made a good impression. I have had good reports on all sides.

I have also taken the opportunity of seeing the young women now installed in the Club. It is early in the day yet to report how the arrangement is working but I have every reason to feel satisfied with the results so far. Yesterday the Commander-in-Chief

General Auchinleck succeeded General Wavell as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, on 5 Jul 1941.

inspected our Base and reviewed 7000 reinforcements. He was most struck by all he saw. I am sending a copy of his letter of appreciation.

Not published.

Today I leave Cairo by air for the Western Desert where everybody is in excellent heart. We are closely associated with the South Africans, an association appreciated by us. On 5 November the New Zealand Division Rugby football team plays a test match in the Western Desert against a representative South African team. The match should be keenly contested.

51 Headquarters 2nd NZEF to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington)

Major-General E. (later Lieutenant-General Sir Edward) Puttick had returned to New Zealand in Sep 1941 to assume the appointment of Chief of the General Staff and General Officer Commanding, New Zealand Military Forces, on the retirement of Major-General Sir John Duigan.

8 December 1941

Could you indicate if war with Japan will in any way affect the supply of reinforcements to the Middle East? We have sufficient trained men to make the Division up to full strength again almost at once.

Casualties appear to be between 4000 and 5000,

See Libyan Campaign, 1941–42.

leaving a balance of about 3500 which, in view of the future likely employment of the New Zealand Division, should suffice for some months.

52 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 26 December 1941

Your telegram of 8 December. In view of the situation in the Pacific and the threat to Fiji, which has recently increased enormously in importance, we are considering the necessity of diverting to that area some or all of the 8th Reinforcements intended for the Middle East. We have, of course, no intention of ignoring our responsibility for maintaining the Middle East Forces at proper strength, though neither we nor you can disregard the possibility that events in this part of the world may greatly increase our difficulties in this respect. If it becomes necessary to divert the 8th Reinforcements as suggested,

On 27 Dec Army Headquarters advised Headquarters 2nd NZEF that the sailing of the 8th Reinforcements had been indefinitely postponed.

I feel sure you will understand the position, and I should greatly appreciate your comments.

53 The Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) to General Freyberg 2 January 1942

The complete mobilisation of the New Zealand Forces has been ordered for 10 January, providing twenty-three battalions and eighteen being formed, nine mounted rifle regiments, four field regiments, and miscellaneous and ancillary troops. Medium guns and howitzers are being utilised to cover various anchorages, leaving only one troop of 6-inch howitzers for the field forces. Field artillery includes thirty-six 25-pounders and fifty 18-pounders. The total strength will be approximately 50,000 by 10 January, rising to 62,000 about one month later, and 68,000 ultimately, all exclusive of the Home Guard. We had already advanced the annual training date for part of the force from January to 15 December, on which date approximately 30,000 troops of all categories, including New Zealand Expeditionary Force reinforcements, were in camp.

Fiji is of the first importance as an essential link in the United States air reinforcing chain and for other reasons, and we reinforced it in December with eighteen field guns and howitzers, four 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, six anti-aircraft searchlights, and 700 men to complete the third battalion. Further reinforcements comprising approximately 4000 troops, four 25-pounders, four Bofors, two 60-pounders, and two 6-inch howitzers are being sent in two flights to raise the force to two brigade groups and two reserve battalions organised as a division. The first flight has sailed and the remainder go in a few days. Arms and equipment have been found from New Zealand, resulting in shortages here, but the United States is despatching the equivalent, plus other equipment, urgently to Fiji and New Zealand, when adjustments will be made if the situation permits.

We have had to use the 8th Reinforcements and Potter

Brigadier L. Potter, CBE, DSO; commanded 14th NZ Brigade Group and Western Area, Fiji, Jan-Jul 1942; commanded 14th Brigade, 3rd NZ Division, 1942–44; Commandant, Central Military District, Dec 1944– Jun 1946; commanded 2nd NZEF (Japan) 1946–48.

as Brigade Commander, Goss,

Brigadier L. G. Goss, CB; GSO 1, Army HQ, Wellington, 1939–41; commanded 8th NZ Brigade Group, Fiji, Jan-Mar 1942; Assistant Chief of the General Staff, Army HQ, May-Nov 1942; commanded 15th Brigade, 2nd NZEF IP, Nov 1942–Jul 1943; commanded 8th Brigade, 3rd NZ Division, Dec 1943—Sep 1944; Deputy Chief of the General Staff, New Zealand Military Forces, Sep 1944—Jul 1946.

G1, Sugden

Colonel A. H. L. Sugden; Commandant Army School of Instruction, Trentham, 1940–41; CO 37th Battalion, 2nd NZEF IP, Dec 1941—Jul 1944; Commandant Army School of Instruction, Apr 1945—Jan 1947; Area Commander, Wellington, Jan—Mar 1947.

and Barry

Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Barry, MBE; Staff Officer Training, Trentham, 1940–41; CO 36th Battalion, 1941–43; commanded N Force (Norfolk Island) Sep 1942—Apr 1943; Area Commander, Wanganui, Sep 1943–Apr 1947.

, battalion commanders, for Fiji, and Parkinson

Major-General G. B. Parkinson, CBE, DSO; CO 4th NZ Field Regiment, Jan 1940—Aug 1941; commanded 1st NZ Army Tank Brigade and 7th Infantry Brigade Group (in NZ) 1941–42; commanded NZ Maadi Camp, Feb—Mar 1943; 6th Infantry Brigade, 1943–44; commanded 2nd NZ Division (Cassino), 3–27 Mar 1944; Commander Royal Artillery, 2nd NZ Division, Jun—Aug 1944; commanded 6th NZ Infantry Brigade, Aug 1944–Jun 1945; commanded NZ Troops in Egypt and NZ Maadi Camp, Jul—Nov 1945; Quartermaster-General, Army HQ, Jan—Sep 1946; NZ Military Liaison Officer, London, 1946–49; Commandant, Southern Military District, 1949–.

for the Army Reserve Brigade here. The Tank Brigade has been organised to provide one battalion of thirty tanks under Groves

Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. M. Groves, MC, Royal Tank Regiment; on loan to New Zealand Military Forces, 23 Aug 1941–25 Sep 1944; Commandant NZ Armoured Fighting Vehicle School, Waiouru, 1941–44.

and three battalions of infantry, all in Army Reserve here, but the training of the Tank Brigade is proceeding. The 9th Reinforcements assemble immediately for a month's intensive training before being posted to units here.

54 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 5 January 1942

Since receiving your telegram of 26 December (No. 52) a telegram from General Puttick (No. 53) has also reached me. From it I gather that the 8th Reinforcements have now been used for other purposes and the 9th Reinforcements also are intended to be posted to units in New Zealand or Fiji.

I fully appreciate the present circumstances in the Pacific and know that the best employment of reinforcement drafts is a matter for you to decide. The reinforcement situation here is quite satisfactory for some months to come.

The final estimate of casualties here is 4000 all ranks

See Libyan Campaign, 1941–42, page 84, note 1.

and on that assumption, when all units are made up to War Establishment (which will be shortly), there will be some 4500 reinforcements available. After making allowance on the one hand for those wounded who return to duty and, on the other, for some small wastage in the next three months, it appears that on 1 April the total reinforcements available will, on a conservative estimate, be 5000. Provided that the next campaign in which the Division is engaged (and which should commence about 1 April) is a normal one and does not involve prisoners of war on the scale of Greece and Crete, this figure of 5000 should be adequate to maintain the force until 1 August 1942, by which date it is hoped you will have been able to despatch some reinforcements. The position here is thus satisfactory for the next six months at least.

In the circumstances, however, I do not propose to proceed with the formation of the Medium Regiment and have intimated to General Headquarters that the desirability of keeping the Division up to full strength will prevent us forming any other new units, however small.

I hope it will be possible to despatch the Army Tank Brigade to the Middle East even at a later date in 1942, but I appreciate that delay is inevitable in the present circumstances.

See Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade.

Should you so desire, I am prepared to release at once Brigadier Wilder

Major-General A. S. Wilder, DSO, MC; CO 25th NZ Battalion, Mar 1940–Sep 1941; commanded 5th NZ Infantry Brigade, 6 Dec 1941–17 Jan 1942; commanded 5th Division, Apr 1942–Jan 1943, and 1st Division (in NZ), Jan—Nov 1943.

and Lieutenant-Colonels Dittmer

Brigadier G. Dittmer, CBE, DSO, MC; CO 28th NZ (Maori) Battalion, Jan 1940–Feb 1942; commanded 1st Infantry Brigade Group, Northern Military District, Apr—Aug 1942; commanded 1st Division, Aug 1942–Jan 1943, and 1st Infantry Brigade Group (in NZ), Jan—Aug 1943; commanded Fiji Military Forces and Fiji Infantry Brigade Group, Sep 1943–Nov 1945; Camp Commandant, Papakura Military Camp, 1946; Commandant, Central Military District, 1946–48.

and Andrew.

Brigadier L. W. Andrew, VC, DSO; CO 22nd NZ Battalion, Jan 1940–Mar 1942; commanded 5th NZ Infantry Brigade, 27 Nov–6 Dec 1941; Fortress Commander, Wellington Area, 1942–43; Area Commander, Wellington, Nov 1943–Dec 1946; Commandant, Central Military District, 1948–.

Brigadier Wilder commanded the 5th Brigade in Libya with distinction after Brigadier Hargest was captured. All three officers have had extensive experience in the field in Greece, Crete, and Libya. In addition I will do all I can to meet any other requests that General Puttick may make.

In a telegram which will probably be despatched tomorrow, I am sending an appreciation regarding the future employment of the Division.

See Libyan Campaign, 1941–42 (No. 116).

55 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 7 January 1942

I should like you to know at once that I am very much obliged to you for your telegram of 5 January and also that War Cabinet warmly appreciate your attitude in this matter. I shall communicate with you further with reference to detailed proposals.

56 General Freyberg to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) 15 January 1942

Reference my telegram of 5 January (No. 54) to the Prime Minister and your telegram of 2 January (No. 53).

We are training to take the field at the latest by 1 April. It is therefore desirable to make any changes in appointments as soon as possible.

Our present Brigadiers are Inglis, Kippenberger, Barrowclough, and Weir.

Major-General C. E. Weir, CB, CBE, DSO; CO 6th NZ Field Regiment, Sep 1939–Dec 1941; CRA 2nd NZ Division, Dec 1941–Jun 1944; commanded 2nd NZ Division, 4 Sep–17 Oct 1944; commanded 46th British Division, Nov 1944–Sep 1946; Commandant, Southern Military District, 1948–49.

The loss in Commanding Officers and Artillery officers has been heavy.

It would help us if you stated your requirements by numbers and categories rather than by names, and we could submit names to you. You can, of course, depend on our wholehearted support.

General Puttick replied on 18 Jan that he would welcome any officers and NCOs either on loan or permanently. Personnel with active service experience ‘able to teach the doctrine of modern warfare’ were required; they would be employed at schools of instruction and with units.

57 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg [Extract] 17 March 1942

….

See Syria (No. 133) for text omitted.

The question of reinforcements for the Division in the Middle East is causing us serious concern, and neither you nor we can ignore the possibility that future developments may be such as to prevent their despatch altogether. We gather from paragraph 8 of your telegram of 3 March

See Syria (No. 132). Paragraph 8 reads: ‘In view of the general situation I will conserve resources to the limit of my powers.’

that this thought has not been absent from your mind, and, should the position develop as we fear it may, then we may have to consider the possibility, if reinforcements cannot be despatched, of progressively reducing the size of our force in the Middle East. We should, of course, deeply regret this, but the possibility exists and must be contemplated. We would wish you to know in this connection, with the highest degree of secrecy, that in considering the forces to be made immediately available to New Zealand and Australia, President Roosevelt has offered to send three divisions at a comparatively early date (one of which is intended for New Zealand and two for Australia) on condition that the Australian and New Zealand Divisions now in the Middle East should remain there, the object being, of course, to minimise the use of shipping, the provision of which for other necessary purposes raises considerable difficulties. We would, of course, very much wish to have had our Division returned to the Pacific area for many and obvious reasons, but in view of President Roosevelt's request, the extreme difficulty of providing the necessary shipping, and the risk involved, we think we must accept the retention of the New Zealand Division in the Middle East, in the meantime at any rate. In order to put you fully into the picture I attach hereto an extract from a communication addressed by me to Mr. Churchill on 15 March, which, while explaining our general views, indicates that we do not at the moment ask for the return of our Division.

The extract is as follows:

See Volume III, Defence of New Zealand for complete text.

We note also that the despatch of the [United States] division is subject to the condition that our own Division remains in the Middle East. This raises for us problems of the first magnitude. It is a fact, as you have so kindly emphasised, that we have not asked for the return of the New Zealand Division and we do not ask it now. But Australian troops are, we are informed, being returned, and with your experience you will realise what a difficult position we will have to face here when this fact becomes known. Our troops have been in the Middle East, divorced from their homes and their people, for two years. Added to their natural desire to see their people again is a much more serious feeling which, I am told, is becoming marked in the Division, that their proper place when their own country is in danger is in the Pacific theatre, and I must say that we have a lot of sympathy with that point of view, which may well be the cause of grave embarrassment and that before long. Again, on this aspect of the matter, the pressure on New Zealand's manpower at the moment and the physical difficulties of transporting troops to the Middle East are such that at present we do not see the possibility of reinforcing the Division. Actually General Freyberg has enough troops at the moment to carry him on without reinforcements for a lengthy period, but the time must arise when the question of reinforcing or not reinforcing will present very great difficulties to us. Finally, on this particular subject, our Division is now trained and experienced in war itself and thus would unquestionably be of infinitely greater value to us in this theatre than any American division can be until it has had equal experience.

As you know, we are preparing here as rapidly as possible, and to the extent that our resources will allow, the forces that we consider necessary to meet any attack on New Zealand and Fiji, and I think you should know also that in order to provide a stiffening of experienced officers and other ranks we may find it necessary to ask you to return a substantial number of officers and men for this purpose. We have come to no definite decision as yet, and we must of course always have regard to shipping and escort difficulties, but there is no doubt in our minds as to the desirability of the proposal, which, if ultimately decided upon, might necessitate our endeavouring to supply you with a corresponding number of reinforcements. Will you please let us have your opinion of this proposal?

If you have any other comments that you wish to make on the contents of this communication, we should of course be very happy to receive them.

58 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 28 March 1942

Many thanks for the information in your telegram of 17 March which enables me to frame policy here.

Your cable raises questions of policy on which I shall require guidance. The reasons for the decision to retain the Division in the Middle East are noted. You ask for comments. At present there is no outward sign of unrest or feeling that the men should return to New Zealand. As reported, we have tackled the question on what I hope are sound grounds and have given a reassuring picture of the measures taken in New Zealand.

See Syria, page 101, note 2.

I think that the majority have accepted the situation with stolid wisdom though the arrival of the American division in New Zealand is bound to cause considerable comment. I personally agree that the New Zealand Division would be more valuable in New Zealand than any other, and if New Zealand is attacked I feel that our place should be at home. But if high policy reasons make it necessary to stay here, the decision will be accepted. I understand from your message that the 9th Australian Division is remaining here. Their return would certainly cause dissatisfaction. We can now point out that both the Australians and ourselves have been retained for reasons of practical strategy. It can be explained that our return would add to the present heavy demands on Allied shipping and escorting vessels as new formations would also have to come by sea to relieve us. Further, with attack against the Middle East imminent, the value in a vital theatre of the highly trained and fully equipped Division can be pointed out. I feel certain the New Zealand Expeditionary Force will respond as they have done before in the very hard times in Greece, Crete, and Libya.

Regarding a stiffening from the New Zealand Division for the New Zealand Forces, may I make a suggestion with every wish to help? I consider that any proposal involving the return of part of the force here will create uneasiness amongst those left behind. I feel personally that although private soldiers may be some help, what is really wanted and what you will ask for will be further officers and NCOs. The following help is already just arriving or is on the way to New Zealand. Several battalion commanders and three Brigadiers, including Stewart.

Major-General K. L. Stewart, CB, CBE, DSO; GSO 1, 2nd NZ Division, 1940–41; Deputy Chief of the General Staff (in NZ), 1941–43; commanded 5th Brigade, Aug—Nov 1943, 4th Armoured Brigade, Nov 1943–Mar 1944, and 5th Brigade, Mar—Aug 1944; prisoner of war, Florence, 1 Aug 1944; commanded 9th Infantry Brigade (J Force), Nov 1945–Jul 1946; Adjutant-General, New Zealand Military Forces, Aug 1946–Mar 1949; Chief of the General Staff, Apr 1949–.

Barrowclough is fit to train and command a division and the other Brigadiers and battalion commanders are fit to command and train brigades. We have also sent 40 other officers and 60 NCO instructors and leaders. This measure caused no unrest, and the system could be continued within the limits of our resources without causing unrest. We cannot send many more senior officers as we now have none of the original Brigadiers and only one original commanding officer. We could send, however, 50 officers and 100 NCOs in view of the good officer material to draw upon here. Perhaps you could replace them with 200 other ranks.

As the campaigning season is approaching and the Division may soon be on the brink of active operations, I would appreciate early advice from you of the Government's decision, stating the arms and categories of the help you wish. We are taking all steps to conserve our strength. We are recalling all detachments and may have to recall the temporary help sent to the Greek Army.

New Zealand officers and NCOs were attached to the Royal Greek Army to help train and instruct the Greeks in the use of British weapons.

I have not mentioned the general situation in the Middle East but intend to do [an appreciation] during the coming week.

See Syria (No. 136).

59 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 6 April 1942

War Cabinet is gratified to learn from your telegram of 28 March that there is no sign of unrest or feeling within your Division for its return to New Zealand. We fully realise that when the American division arrives in New Zealand and its presence becomes known, the attitude of your troops may change. We are confident, however, that they will accept your explanation of the strategic reasons which dictate the retention of the 2nd NZEF in the Middle East and that they will respond as they have always done.

There is no question at present of the return to New Zealand of any part of your force other than individuals.

We are grateful for the offer of more officers and NCOs and will gladly accept them. Our greatest need is for staff officers, commanding officers, company commanders, and senior NCOs of all arms, and especially in heavy anti-aircraft artillery. We realise that you also are probably short in these categories, and we therefore think it best not to limit your selection by stating the arms and categories required. We can employ all you send, irrespective of rank or arm.

Will you please inform General Puttick of the names of those you are sending, together with the appointment which you consider each man can best fill.

We will send you 200 other ranks in replacement. Please telegraph General Puttick specifying the arms of the service desired.

On 26 Apr General Freyberg requested that 175 infantry and 25 signals personnel be sent.

60 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 10 July 1942

The present campaign

See The Battle for Egypt.

again raises the reinforcement question. At the moment we have 3500 reinforcements available while known casualties as at 9 July amount to approximately 900. We shall be better off than the estimate of 1 August given in my telegram of 5 January (No. 54), and will probably be able to carry on until 1 October, at which date the 2nd NZEF may be up to establishment but no reinforcements may be left.

For purposes of training and future policy I assume the Division is to remain in the Middle East for the present. I realise this is a matter for the New Zealand Government, but it is perhaps not out of place to say that the Division is most highly thought of and withdrawal would cause dismay at General Headquarters, Middle East, especially at the moment, when the Middle East garrison is not adequate.

In your telegram of 17 March (No. 57) you warned me that in certain circumstances it might be necessary to reduce the size of the 2nd NZEF. I always have this in mind although, as you will understand, I feel it would be a sad step to break up our existing organisation with all its associations and its great fighting record. As it will be many months before any men can arrive here, and as I shall have to discuss the matter with the Commander-in-Chief,

General Auchinleck.

I should like to have some early indication of the New Zealand Government's policy.

61 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom during the war were:

28 May 1937–11 May 1940Rt. Hon. Arthur Neville Chamberlain, PC.11 May 1940–26 Jul 1945Rt. Hon. Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, PC, OM, CH.26 Jul 1945–to dateRt. Hon. C. R. Attlee, PC, CH.

to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 25 July 1942

The question of keeping the New Zealand Division up to strength has been raised by General Auchinleck. In asking you to consider ways and means of maintaining this splendid unit on its present basis I cannot do better than quote Auchinleck's own words: ‘The value to the Middle East of a trained, acclimatised force such as the New Zealand Division is very great, and I view its possible reduction at the present stage with great concern.’

This extract is from a cable from General Auchinleck to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (General Sir Alan Brooke), dated 23 Jul.

The alternatives to the despatch of reinforcements for the existing force would be either to break up the New Zealand Base organisation with its training centres, schools of instruction, &c., or gradually reduce the Division in size. I should be sorry to see either alternative adopted and hope they can be avoided by the despatch of reinforcements from New Zealand.

I think you intended this month to review the possibility of moving your Army Tank Brigade to the Middle East. If you decided to keep it in New Zealand for the present, I certainly would not press for its despatch overseas.

See Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade.

62 Army Headquarters (Wellington) to Headquarters 2nd NZEF 5 August 1942

The Government is considering sending reinforcements to you. It is anticipated that approval will be given to: (a) the despatch at an early date of approximately 2500 or such smaller number as you may recommend as sufficient to meet immediate requirements, and (b) that a further draft not exceeding 2500 would be made available towards the end of this year.

Next year's programme is to depend on future developments in the Middle East and the Pacific.

The manpower situation here calls for economy, and we suggest that you examine your Base and keep your recommendations for (a) and (b) down to the minimum.

Please cable your recommendations as to the size of (a) and (b) and the composition of (a) by arms.

63 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 5 August 1942

Your telegram of 25 July (No. 61). The question of the reinforcement of the New Zealand Division in the Middle East had already been raised with us by General Freyberg, and we have now decided that in spite of our preoccupations as to the defence of New Zealand and possible operations in this part of the world, in connection with which we have been asked to send New Zealand troops to Pacific areas,

See Volume III, Formation and Employment of 3rd New Zealand Division.

and the really serious questions of manpower that are now confronting us, we must nevertheless, in the meantime at any rate, reinforce the Division. Accordingly, arrangements are being made to despatch a draft as soon as possible.

Will you please give Mr. Nash

The Hon. W. Nash, New Zealand Minister in Washington, was at this time in London for discussions on financial and marketing matters. While in London he attended meetings of the United Kingdom War Cabinet.

a copy of this message.

64 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee. At this time Mr. Churchill was in Egypt on his way to Moscow for conversations with M. Stalin.

to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 6 August 1942

Your telegram of 5 August. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are most grateful to the New Zealand Government for their decision to despatch further reinforcements for their Division in the Middle East, in spite of their preoccupations with the defence of New Zealand with which we fully sympathise. We ask you to accept our warm thanks and assure you that this further proof of New Zealand's readiness at all times to co-operate with us is the more highly valued.

Mr. Nash has been informed.

65 General Freyberg to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) [Extract] 8 August 1942

Your telegram of 5 August (No. 62) was received with thanks and with much relief.

The policy as to where the New Zealand Expeditionary Force is to fight is purely a matter for the New Zealand Government. However, I must make administrative plans ahead, and for these purposes it would appear that it is the intention to keep the 2nd NZEF in the Middle East for at least another six months. During that period the 2nd New Zealand Division must be available for such active service as is required of it.

The estimated ‘total loss’ to date is 3250, made up of killed, died of wounds, missing, and one-third of the wounded. On that basis the reinforcement position at the moment shows a small surplus of 150, which is negligible. It is obvious that casualties in the present action are not yet finished. ‘Total loss’ is increasing daily.

The next draft can presumably not arrive before the middle of October and will require acclimatisation and training before they are employed forward. They will be available for absorption about November, i.e., in about four months time. This draft when it arrives will only compensate for losses in the four months preceding its arrival and will not be available as hitherto to meet losses in the next following four months.

In other words, the 2nd NZEF will show a steady fall below establishment from now on until the draft arrives and will then momentarily be up to establishment again.

The full draft of 2500 thus cannot really meet the requirements of keeping the force up to establishment for the period following its arrival, but will only compensate for losses already incurred.

You will thus appreciate that with active operations ahead from now onward it will be necessary to ask that the full 2500 in both cases be sent. In fact, to put us in the very satisfactory position occupied hitherto, we would require a first draft of about 4700, of which 2500 would bring us up to establishment on the date of arrival and 2200 would allow for wastage in the following three months, i.e., until the arrival of the next draft.

Base establishments have already been combed out here and depots left with minimum staffs pending the arrival of reinforcements.

We will have, therefore, to leave the size of the draft to be fixed by the Government at the highest figure that the manpower situation will allow….

Details of the composition of the draft have been omitted.

On 29 Aug War Cabinet approved the despatch to the Middle East of 5500 men, inclusive of a tank battalion and a proportion of technical personnel. Headquarters 2nd NZEF was advised of this decision on 31 Aug—see Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade (No. 89). This draft, the 8th Reinforcements (5492 all ranks) sailed from New Zealand in the Aquitania on 12 Dec 1942.

Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade

66 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 4 October 1940

In the light of the fighting in Poland and France, a committee under General Bartholomew

General Sir William Henry Bartholomew, GCB, CMG, DSO; GOC-in-C, Northern Command, York, 1937–40; North Eastern Regional Commissioner for Civil Defence, 1940–45.

was set up to consider reorganisation of the Army, and the following recommendations concerning the organisation of a division have been agreed to by the War Office:

(1)

The formation of a reconnaissance unit of headquarters and three companies, each consisting of motor-cycles, scout cars, Bren carriers, and infantry in trucks.

(2)

Field Artillery regiments to be three batteries, each of eight guns.

(3)

Divisional anti-tank artillery to be 76 2-pounder guns, twelve on self-propelled mounting with a reconnaissance unit, the remainder in four batteries each of sixteen guns; infantry anti-tank companies to be abolished.

(4)

The addition of one light anti-aircraft artillery regiment of 48 Bofors guns to the division.

(5)

The addition of one 6-inch howitzer regiment to the division.

(6)

One platoon of infantry for the protection of each division and brigade headquarters.

(7)

Battalion mortar platoons to be increased from two to six 3-inch mortars.

(8)

Two-inch mortars in battalions to be increased by one per section of carriers, that is, an extra four.

(9)

Infantry carrier platoons to be increased to fourteen carriers and some motor-cyclists.

My opinion is that the New Zealand Government should agree to these changes in principle, leaving the question of implementation to be decided by the availability of equipment.

Details would require consideration but, generally speaking, (1) can be effected when equipment is available and I intend using infantry anti-tank personnel, (2) and (6) can be carried out immediately by me, (3), (7), (8), and (9) can be effected when equipment and personnel are available. While agreeing that the inclusion of (4) and (5) would increase the fighting power of the Division, I consider their provision at the moment, apart from additional expense, is not so important. They could be provided, starting with a battery of each. In any case, the weapons themselves will not be ready for many months.

While agreeing that New Zealand should adhere to the British organisation wherever possible, I feel that the above proposals do not go far enough in one respect as the Division would still lack mobile hitting and holding power. I suggest that a cruiser tank unit is wanted. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff during the war were:

7 Sep 1939 – 26 May 1940Field-Marshal Lord Ironside, GCB, CMG, DSO (then General Sir William Edmund Ironside).27 May 1940 – 24 Dec 1941Field-Marshal Sir John Greer Dill, GCB, CMG, DSO (then General Sir John Dill). Head of British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, 1942–death, 4 Nov 1944.25 Dec 1941 – 25 Jun 1946Field-Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, KG, GCB, OM, DSO (in 1941, General Sir Alan Francis Brooke).

originally suggested that although this would be an advantage it would be better to wait until a general change could be made. Later in the discussion he agreed that there was no reason why the New Zealand Expeditionary Force should not depart from the normal by adding a unit to the divisional organisation under the nomenclature of Corps troops, as already done by us in the case of the Machine Gun Battalion and Reserve Mechanical Transport Company, and by the Canadians who have already added brigade reconnaissance groups, &c. I strongly recommend therefore that, in addition to the nine agreed changes, the addition of a battalion of cruiser tanks be made enabling me to regroup the 2nd NZEF by making an armoured brigade consisting of:

(i)

Divisional Cavalry Regiment—already in existence but to be re-equipped with scout cars and carriers.

(ii)

Cruiser tank battalion—additional.

(iii)

27th Machine Gun Battalion—already in existence.

(iv)

Battalion of infantry in the section existing for Reserve Mechanical Transport Company—this will not need any increase as there are already ten battalions in the Division.

(v)

To this group can be attached a regiment from the Divisional Artillery.

General Wavell, with whom I have talked over the above recommendations, is in complete agreement with the proposals as outlined by me. With such a brigade the Division would be a most formidable fighting formation, well fitted to undertake any operation in the Western Desert with an undoubted reduction in casualties. Doubtless you will receive through the Liaison Officer further advice from the War Office.

Subsequent telegrams from the New Zealand Liaison Officer in London to Army Headquarters (Wellington) contained details of the reorganisation and have not been reproduced in this volume.

67 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 18 October 1940

Your telegrams of 4 and 8 October.

General Freyberg's telegram of 8 Oct is not published. In it he estimated the numbers of officers and other ranks required to meet the nine recommendations of the Bartholomew report and his own supplementary recommendations.

We have as yet received no communication from the War Office but, assuming it concurs, the Government approve all changes in principle, the changes to be made as and when equipment becomes available. We presume that you will form the new units and find the increases from personnel already overseas. Should this course be followed, will the reinforcement programme already arranged cover requirements, that is, 6500 4th Reinforcements and 6500 5th Reinforcements?

See Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42.

68 Headquarters 2nd NZEF to the Prime Minister 21 October 1940

Your telegram of 18 October.

The reinforcement programme already arranged is adequate. We would form the units from personnel overseas.

69 New Zealand Military Liaison Officer (London) to the Minister of Defence 4 December 1940

The views of the War Office on General Freyberg's proposals to form an armoured brigade are as follows:

The War Office strongly approve of the desire of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force to have its own armoured formation. It is considered preferable in the existing circumstances to send to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, fully trained reinforcements from the United Kingdom, instead of relying on training from the beginning troops in the Middle East to make up armoured formations. It would be wrong policy to equip a New Zealand armoured brigade by drawing upon equipment scheduled for trained troops from the United Kingdom, who can effectively man tanks soon after they have been issued.

New sources of tank supply must be tapped to equip a New Zealand armoured brigade, or else the issue of equipment to the brigade must take its place in the present production programme when the state of training of the New Zealand troops justifies its introduction. It is possible that General Freyberg has underestimated the time it takes to train a tank soldier from the beginning. Events in the Middle East in the near future also seem likely to render reorganisation and training there a difficult matter.

Therefore, the formation of a New Zealand armoured brigade must be considered a comparatively long-term project. The source from which equipment could be supplied would be a matter for discussion after the New Zealand Government have expressed their views generally on the scheme. In the meantime, the following suggestions on the organisation which could be adopted for a New Zealand armoured brigade are put forward. The brigade should include an armoured car regiment, two armoured regiments, and a machine gun battalion, with the necessary workshop repair organisations, &c.

These views have been communicated direct to General Freyberg by the War Office.

70 The Rt. Hon. P. Fraser (Cairo) to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand

Hon. W. Nash.

23 May 1941

General Williams's movements have now been altered,

A telegram from Mr. Fraser (in Cairo) on 19 May advised the New Zealand Government of the probable dates of General Williams's departure from the Middle East and arrival in Australia.

and he expects to leave Cairo on Friday 23 May, staying two days at Basra, a week at Singapore, and arriving at Darwin on 7 June and Sydney on 9 June. He will then stay a week in Australia, arriving in New Zealand on 15 June. I have had a preliminary discussion with him on general questions and in particular on manpower. He strongly recommends the immediate institution in New Zealand of a school of instruction for armoured fighting vehicles, which would give us the additional advantage of obtaining some forty tanks for training purposes in New Zealand, and which could be used in operations if the necessity arose. This would [mean] our agreeing to raise a tank brigade, for which about half the men required are already allowed for and are in Egypt. If the proposal to reform the Anzac Corps is adhered to we would be required to produce our proportion of Corps troops, and the additional commitment of manpower for these troops and for the complete tank brigade would amount to 7000 men to be allowed for this year. On the other hand, the return to active service of sick and wounded, which has not been provided for in our manpower calculations, will reduce the total number of 16,000 per annum formerly adopted to 10,000 per annum, and as the reinforcement required for Corps troops and the tank brigade would normally amount to 3000 per annum, this would make a total estimated annual reinforcement from 1942 onwards of 13,000, as against our previous estimate of 16,000.

See Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42.

General Williams will also have proposals for an armoured division amounting to some 25,000 men to be supplied from New Zealand, probably from the Territorial forces, if and when the Far Eastern situation warrants sending these troops abroad. However, he has temporarily abandoned this proposal, which will, no doubt, be raised with me in London, and to which it seems to me there are insuperable objections. My own feeling is that we would be expected to provide our proportion of Corps troops, and I am favourably disposed towards the tank brigade proposals which have already been approved and partially provided for; further, training in New Zealand has clear defence advantages. But I think that these matters would be entirely for consideration in Wellington, and I am advising you of the facts in order that you may give the matter preliminary consideration before General Williams arrives. Meanwhile, as a tank brigade of some kind obviously will be required by the New Zealand Division, I have approved the training here of the necessary instructors, some 100 men, who, if the proposal to train the brigade in New Zealand is not proceeded with, will be utilised here. I have not yet discussed these proposals with Freyberg, who may perhaps object to the training of the tank brigade in New Zealand, but the advantages of this course are so great that I hope to obtain his approval when I meet him.

71 The acting Prime Minister to the Rt. Hon. P. Fraser (Cairo) 6 June 1941

Even allowing for the return of sick and wounded, we cannot reconcile our calculations with the figure of 10,000 given in your telegram of 23 May as the annual wastage of the present New Zealand Expeditionary Force.

Colonel Conway is expected back shortly and we propose to defer consideration of this question until his arrival. It is felt that he will have participated in the discussions and will be able to elaborate your calculations.

72 The Rt. Hon. P. Fraser (Cairo) to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand [Extract] 9 June 1941

During my talks with General Williams we discussed a quite impracticable scheme from Dill

General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

providing for the formation by New Zealand of an armoured division, which would number 28,000, for service overseas after the threat of danger to the Dominion has passed….

A personal reference has been omitted.

After discussion with Conway and myself, General Williams abandoned the idea of the armoured division as being beyond our capacity, although he said I would be confronted with the suggestion in London.

The question of the Tank Brigade and Corps troops was also discussed with Williams and Conway. I want War Cabinet to discuss both questions on their merits, having due regard to the manpower and industrial position.

The formation of an Anzac Corps composed of one New Zealand and one Australian division has been agreed to in principle, although the matter has not yet been decided between the New Zealand and Australian Governments….

A reference to New Zealand's contribution of Corps troops has been omitted. See also Proposed Formation of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

With regard to the Tank Brigade, Williams said that if the training of men for overseas were done in New Zealand then up to forty tanks could be provided from the United Kingdom. If this is not over-optimistic and is agreed to by Dill and the War Office when I reach London, the tanks will be a great contribution to the defence of New Zealand and the scheme is good. The effect on manpower of both Corps troops and Army Tank Brigade will be explained in detail by Conway, but it would appear that with Corps troops and the Army Tank Brigade the manpower limit will have been reached by the end of 1943.

Freyberg subsequently agreed that the training of the Tank Brigade can be carried out in New Zealand with advantage if tanks are made available there. The necessary instructors must be sent to New Zealand from the school in the Middle East after training. Although not sure whether this can be done, he will, if possible, get New Zealand instructors trained in time.

73 Headquarters 2nd NZEF to Army Headquarters (Wellington) [Extract] 25 June 1941

Your telegram of 20 June.

See Proposed Formation of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (No. 20).

The Prime Minister also agreed that New Zealand should find its quota of Corps troops but on the same understanding as above….

See Proposed Formation of Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (No. 23) for complete text.

74 The acting Prime Minister to the Rt. Hon. P. Fraser (London) 9 July 1941

This morning War Cabinet had a discussion with General Williams, who impressed us as being very sound and most helpful. However, his proposals raise real difficulties in regard to manpower. To give effect either to the proposals to provide Corps or Line of Communication troops for overseas or to his proposals for the Territorial Force would involve calling up married men by September this year. We feel there are sound reasons, both practical and political, why this step should not be taken for the present.

It is felt, however, that we should form the Army Tank Brigade to be trained in New Zealand, and we are now awaiting a reply from Freyberg to the telegram which I repeated to you today.

See Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42 (No. 48).

It may of course be necessary to talk further about reinforcements, but this should not affect the main decision, which is well within our commitment under the old scale. It is suggested that you discuss immediately with the War Office the question of releasing the equipment for training the Army Tank Brigade. I understand that a list of this equipment was given to you in Egypt by General Williams.

75 The acting Prime Minister to General Freyberg 31 July 1941

Formal approval has now been given by War Cabinet to the formation of the Army Tank Brigade as proposed in FFC 36.

See page 13, note 3.

Instructions have been given that preparations should be put in hand forthwith to call up the 3200 men required.

This telegram was repeated to Mr. Fraser in London.

76 General Freyberg to the acting Prime Minister 1 August 1941

I am pleased that approval has been given to the formation of the Army Tank Brigade. Are Signals, Army Service Corps, Medical, and Ordnance units for the Brigade included in the figures of the men called up, as we make the total required 3532, including officers?

Seven officers and 66 other ranks sail for New Zealand today as instructors for the Armoured Fighting Vehicle School.

77 Army Headquarters (Wellington) to Headquarters 2nd NZEF 4 August 1941

Your telegram of 1 August to the acting Prime Minister.

Steps to select officers for the Army Tank Brigade are now being taken and it is desired to have your recommendations for any appointments, especially those of Brigade Commander and battalion commanders. Regular and Territorial officers in New Zealand will be considered along with those recommended by you.

A number of telegrams on the appointment of officers for the Army Tank Brigade were exchanged at this stage but have not been reproduced. The Brigade Commander was Brigadier G. B. Parkinson, who commanded the 4th NZ Field Regiment at the time of his appointment. He returned to New Zealand in Nov 1941.

The Brigade will be trained in New Zealand

At Waiouru.

and will proceed overseas about the end of March next year.

The disparity in our respective totals is due apparently to the non-inclusion here of the Tank Transporter Company which is included in Corps troops.

The formation of Corps troops is still being considered.

78 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Viscount Cranborne.

[Extract] 4 September 1941

After full consultation with their Military Adviser, General Sir Guy Williams, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have now given careful consideration to FFC 36. Arising from these proposals and the recommendations of General Williams, it has been decided to make provision, in addition to this Dominion's existing manpower commitments, for an additional 3500 men for an Army Tank Brigade, plus an additional 2000 men for Corps and Line of Communication troops….

The text omitted contained details of these proposals in terms of FFC 36, giving the serial numbers of each unit and the dates at which they would be ready to go overseas.

The provision of the rest of the proposals of FFC 36 is still under consideration.

The Home Defence forces here are being reorganised and brought up to the standard of overseas troops, with a view to providing one force from which reinforcements for overseas can be obtained and, at the same time, a more adequately trained and organised body for the defence of the Dominion. In view of the heavy manpower commitments, which are proving and will increasingly prove a very heavy strain on the resources of the Dominion, and the complete inadequacy of the present fighting and training equipment in this country, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand lay particular emphasis on the defence equipment required. It is desired to stress also that, unlike the other Dominions, New Zealand is unable to manufacture essential arms for its own use and therefore is dependent almost entirely on overseas sources for these defence needs. Furthermore, in order that the troops proceeding overseas will be trained with the same type of fighting equipment as will be made available to them on arrival overseas, New Zealand's immediate training programme requires modern equipment. For these reasons, and most particularly because of the existing great scarcity of fighting equipment in the country, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand press strongly for the earliest priority in the undermentioned items of equipment already on order. The figures quoted are inclusive of all equipment already approved for release.

Rifles and bayonets 38,000 Anti-tank rifles 582 Bren guns 2500 Two-pounder or six-pounder anti-tank guns, latter preferred 48 Bofors guns 64 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns 16 Light tanks, for preference US Pattern M.3- 12½ ton 170 6-inch guns for fixed defences (with agreed scale of ammunition for artillery weapons) 10

79 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

Mr. Fraser had returned to New Zealand from the United Kingdom on 14 Sep.

[Extract] 18 September 1941

Your telegram of 4 September.

The further units of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force which His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have decided to offer for service overseas, are warmly welcomed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, who deeply appreciate the spirit which has prompted the offer. We shall await with interest the result of the further consideration being given to the remainder of the proposals in FFC 36.

The proposals regarding the Home Defence forces are also noted with interest. As regards equipment, considerable quantities of some of the items required have already been released and the possibilities of supplying the remainder are now being considered….

The text omitted contained references to other telegrams concerning New Zealand's fixed defences and naval ammunition requirements.

80 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

The Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee had succeeded Viscount Cranborne as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in Feb 1942.

to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 3 March 1942

With reference to your telegram of 12 October.

Not published. This telegram contained amendments to FFC 36 details given in that section of the text of No. 78 which is not published here. The changes were made as a result of representations from Headquarters 2nd NZEF on the order in which units were required in the Middle East.

It was contemplated that the New Zealand Army Tank Brigade would be ready to go overseas this month. In the present circumstances it is suggested that the Brigade remain in New Zealand until July, when the matter should be reconsidered.

81 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 9 March 1942

Your telegram of 3 March. We agree that in the present circumstances the New Zealand Army Tank Brigade be held in the Dominion until July, when its despatch overseas can be reviewed in the light of the strategic situation in the Pacific at that time.

82 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 8 August 1942

In your telegram of 11 March

On 11 Mar General Puttick had advised Headquarters 2nd NZEF of the postponed despatch of the Army Tank Brigade, in similar terms to No. 81.

you said that the decision to retain the Armoured Brigade in New Zealand would be reviewed in July 1942. In Libya last November and in the recent fighting our infantry brigades have been overrun by tanks on three occasions, with heavy casualties, especially prisoners.

The three occasions were Belhamed (Nov–Dec 1941), Ruweisat Ridge (15 Jul 1942), and El Mreir Depression (22 Jul 1942).

We have felt keenly the lack of our own armoured component. I am endeavouring to obtain some Grant tanks for the Divisional Cavalry which would be a help, but the Armoured Brigade would of course strengthen us immensely in attack and defence. I would therefore be very grateful to have an indication from you as to the possibility of the Armoured Brigade being despatched to us. The New Zealand Government may consider that the tanks should be retained, but would they then agree to send trained personnel, in which case I am certain equipment could be made available for them from the Middle East pool.

83 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 14 August 1942

Your telegram of 25 July.

See Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42 (No. 61).

General Freyberg has now asked whether the Army Tank Brigade could be sent to Egypt. He suggests that if the Valentine tanks (of which we have 120) cannot be spared, the Brigade could probably be equipped there. To assist us in considering the question we would like advice on this point. We understand the power and value of this brigade whether in New Zealand or in the Middle East, but we are not in a position to appreciate fully the relative claims of the Middle East and of the defence of New Zealand.

With the reservation that he has insufficient information, the Chief of the General Staff here suggests that in all the circumstances the Brigade should be sent to the Middle East with all the tanks available at the date of despatch, less 40 to 60 to be retained in New Zealand, and with the proviso that the despatch to New Zealand of General Stuart tanks (of which we have 24) should be hastened as far as possible; also, that the strain on our manpower could be reduced by not sending reinforcements to the Brigade and by requiring the Division to adopt the organisation of one tank brigade and two infantry brigades in due course. A broad survey of the situation as it affects the problem would greatly help us in reaching a decision.

84 The Minister of Defence to General Freyberg 14 August 1942

Your telegram of 8 August (No. 82) is being considered by War Cabinet. We have informed London of your proposal and have asked for a broad survey of the situation as it affects the problem and for information whether tanks would be available in Egypt. The Chief of the General Staff suggests that if the Brigade is to be sent it should be on the understanding that reinforcements for it will not be despatched subsequently, and that ultimately you could adopt the British organisation of one tank brigade and two infantry brigades to meet the position that would arise. He also suggests that all the tanks available at the date of despatch should accompany the brigade, less 40 to 60 to be retained here. We would like your comments and also any definite information as to whether tanks would be available in Egypt.

85 The Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) to General Freyberg 16 August 1942

Your telegram of 8 August (No. 82) raises a question of great difficulty both of policy and of manpower. War Cabinet consider that the situation in the Pacific might well be critical and that they must be prepared for an attack on Fiji and New Caledonia, and on New Zealand itself. They are of the opinion that the maintenance of your Division, plus the Army Tank Brigade, and the necessity for maintaining strong forces here, both for local defence and possibly for operations in the Pacific directly affecting the security of New Zealand, would place an intolerable burden on our already greatly attenuated manpower. They cannot provide all these requirements to the full and are considering what is the utmost they can do so far as the Middle East is concerned. In these circumstances I have suggested that in order to have your own armour you might prefer to modify the present Divisional organisation. Cabinet have agreed to my obtaining your opinion on the following alternatives, or any others you may suggest, to assist them in deciding what they can send you, but without committing them in any way:

Firstly: 4700 reinforcements and one tank battalion, plus details.

Secondly: 2500 reinforcements and the Tank Brigade, on the understanding that the Division is reduced to the new British organisation of one armoured brigade and two infantry brigades, plus of course the usual divisional troops. I have pointed out that the second alternative would give you:

(a)

Reinforcements to meet wastage up to the date of arrival.

(b)

Approximately 2400 reinforcements in hand from the surplus infantry brigade.

(c)

Probably a considerable reduction in future casualties through having your own armour.

I have also stated that, while I think the modified division better suited for country where tanks can operate fully, the three infantry brigades would be preferable in enclosed or mountain country. I could, of course, offer no opinion as to the prospects of your operating in the latter type of country. As regards the question of tanks accompanying the battalion or brigade, War Cabinet would like definite information whether or not tanks, together with associated equipment, would be available in Egypt immediately on the arrival of the Brigade. We have, as you know, 120 Valentines, plus 20 on the water and more released from production. I have 24 General Stuart tanks, with 24 on the water and large numbers released, and consider that if the Valentines go to you I should hold 40 to 60 Valentines to support my General Stuart tanks. I would also prefer to send the minimum of ancillary services and their equipment because of shortages for the armour remaining here. I suggest you forward your observations urgently, reserving if necessary the question of the tanks themselves until you are able to get definite information.

Any serious deterioration in the Pacific situation in the meantime would, of course, affect the whole question.

86 General Freyberg to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) 20 August 1942

Your telegram of 16 August.

I realise your difficulties and appreciate the Government's efforts to help in submitting alternative schemes.

I prefer your first suggestion of 4700 reinforcements and one tank battalion.

One infantry brigade, probably the 4th, would be reorganised as a tank brigade, each battalion becoming a tank battalion.

The tank battalion sent from New Zealand would, I am afraid, have to be split up to form a nucleus for the three battalions to be formed here, but care will be taken to see that all ranks, up to and including the commanding officer, are employed in positions worthy of their rank and experience.

In the change-over of the present Division, I would propose to retain the Maori and Machine Gun Battalions and to turn the Divisional Cavalry into a reconnaissance regiment.

The training of technical personnel will have to be set in hand at an early date. In this respect I realise the position that must exist in New Zealand regarding technicians and can only leave it to you to help as much as you can.

The question of the availability of equipment here is being taken up with General Headquarters, Middle East, but I consider it essential that concurrently the New Zealand Government should approach the United Kingdom Government in the matter.

Details will be worked out by Stevens once the Government has agreed in principle. An early decision would be of great help.

87 The Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) to General Freyberg 22 August 1942

I am referring your telegram of 20 August to War Cabinet who will no doubt require my comments. I think you should know these in case you wish to reply to them. They are as follows:

The Tank Brigade has been well trained for twelve months, especially technically. The latter takes a long time, many trades are involved and [tradesmen] difficult to get even here. Over 50 per cent of the battalions alone are tradesmen. I anticipate that Freyberg will have extreme difficulty in raising sufficient technicians to expand one tank battalion to a full brigade.

If one tank battalion goes it must have its proportion of repair and maintenance troops. This involves a considerable upset in the present formation. We cannot send more than the due proportion without accentuating the present difficulty concerning tradesmen in all New Zealand formations.

The expanded tank brigade in Egypt will not be effective for months, during perhaps a critical period when the Division would have neither a tank brigade nor a third infantry brigade. It is doubtful if the tank brigade formed in Egypt could approach the efficiency of the existing tank brigade for twelve months, even if it could find sufficient technicians, &c. The splitting up of a fine tank battalion on arrival largely sacrifices the progress achieved and is likely to cause feeling, while the remainder of the Brigade in New Zealand will be disgruntled at being left behind.

From the New Zealand Army point of view, the draw-off of farmers, industry, &c., is so severe that the despatch of the full 4700 reinforcements will have an increased adverse effect on home defence.

These reinforcements will include many married men drawn in an overseas ballot many months later than the Tank Brigade, which consists of single men due for overseas next after the 7th Reinforcements.

I cannot see any advantage in Freyberg's proposal other than:

(a)

Men posted from the infantry brigade to form the tank brigade will have had war service as infantry.

(b)

It is easier to dispose of the officers and NCOs of the infantry brigade if absorbed by the tank brigade than if used as reinforcements, and disappointment and feeling at loss of identity of units would be reduced.

In my opinion these advantages are negligible compared to the disadvantages involved and the advantages in sending the Tank Brigade from here. Officers and NCOs from the surplus infantry brigade should greatly strengthen the other brigades by providing experienced men to meet casualties and should not take long to absorb in formations, Base, and courses.

My conclusions are that if the Division is to have a tank brigade the best course is:

(a)

Send the Tank Brigade complete. The reserve held to meet wastage here provides sufficient personnel to man 40 to 60 tanks which should be retained in New Zealand if tanks accompany the Brigade.

(b)

On the arrival of the Tank Brigade, and after desert training, withdraw the selected infantry brigade from the 2nd NZEF and use as reinforcements.

(c)

Send all tanks, less 40 to 60, with the Brigade unless Freyberg reports that suitable tanks are immediately available in Egypt.

If only one tank battalion goes, then the Division should retain its three infantry brigades and not attempt to form a tank brigade.

I suggest you give me your comments urgently.

88 General Freyberg to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) 23 August 1942

Reference your telegram of 22 August.

In replying to your telegram of 16 August (No. 85) I assumed that both your suggestions were considered practicable from the New Zealand point of view and recommended the first as it seemed to cause less dislocation for you and would have avoided breaking up the Brigade here. Having read your latest telegram (No. 87), however, I appreciate your reasons for preferring to send the whole brigade and agree also with the advantages mentioned from our point of view.

In the circumstances, do not press the objection to breaking up the 6th Brigade

The 6th Brigade had been provisionally selected for disbandment had the complete Army Tank Brigade been despatched to the Middle East.

as the sentimental aspect is, of course, outweighed by the advantage of having an armoured brigade in the Division as soon as possible. Regarding the question of sending tanks with personnel, I am informed by Stevens who saw the new Chief of the General Staff

Major-General R. L. (later General Sir Richard) McCreery, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, succeeded Lieutenant-General T. W. Corbett, CB, MC, as Chief of the General Staff, Middle East, in Aug 1942.

that tanks would be available here.

You will appreciate the present difficulties of communication with Divisional Headquarters separated from Headquarters 2nd NZEF.

We have just commenced a period of special vigilance as we expect a German offensive in the next few days. The weather is very hot and there are innumerable flies. The situation has improved here. The troops, although tired, are very cheerful and can be relied upon to do well.

The 4th Brigade is still at Maadi.

89 Army Headquarters (Wellington) to Headquarters 2nd NZEF 31 August 1942

The despatch of 5500 men, inclusive of a tank battalion and a proportion of technical personnel, has been approved by War Cabinet, who are also prepared to consider the despatch of tanks for the battalion if equal or better tanks are not available in the Middle East. The question of sending any additional tank battalions or technical reinforcements in future must remain in abeyance in view of the present Pacific situation.

The possible date of departure will be telegraphed later. We would like an early reply whether tanks or technical vehicles are actually required.

90 General Freyberg to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) [Extract] 2 September 1942

Your telegram of 31 August.

You will have realised that the decision to have an armoured component in the 2nd New Zealand Division amends the figures of requirements as given in my telegrams of 8 August

See Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42 (No. 65).

and 15 August

Not published. Contained details of the composition of the 8th Reinforcement draft, subsequently amended.

. For instance, one third of the infantry now becomes Armoured Corps and there is a big increase in ASC….

Text omitted refers to the preparation and despatch of later telegrams giving details of reinforcement requirements.

I am under the impression that with the exception of the tank battalion you will not be able to send any large number of trained New Zealand Armoured Corps personnel, including technicians, but that we will have to train infantry drafts for this purpose. Would you please confirm this.

The question of tanks is now under discussion with GHQ and a firm reply should be available in a few days. Present indications are that no tanks will be required from New Zealand.

As stated in my telegram of 20 August (No. 86) it seems inevitable that the tank battalion will have to be broken up to provide (a) instructors, and (b) a nucleus of trained and skilled personnel for the new regiments here. Would it help you if instead of a completely organised battalion you were to send an equal total of officers, NCOs, tradesmen, and other ranks but merely as drafts that could be drawn from the whole of the Army Tank Brigade. Please advise if this appeals to you, and final confirmation will then be cabled from here.

The 4th Infantry Brigade is the one selected for the change to the Armoured Brigade.

91 Headquarters 2nd NZEF to Army Headquarters (Wellington) 2 September 1942

Reference telegram of 2 September.

General Headquarters state that after consideration they would be very glad to have the tanks, together with any technical vehicles you can spare.

92 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand

Hon. D. G. Sullivan, Minister of Industries and Commerce, was acting Prime Minister during the absence of Mr. Fraser in the United States and Canada. The Prime Minister left New Zealand on 21 Aug and arrived back on 16 Sep. During the visit, which was made at the invitation of President Roosevelt, Mr. Fraser had discussions with the President and attended meetings of the Pacific War Council. He also visited the Prime Minister of Canada, the Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King.

to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 9 September 1942

It has now been decided to despatch a total of 5500 reinforcements to the Middle East, including one battalion of the Army Tank Brigade which has been formed in this Dominion. General Freyberg has been advised to this effect, and he informs us that he will use this battalion as a nucleus for the formation of an armoured brigade, the 4th New Zealand Infantry Brigade being used for the purpose. Having regard to the very critical position which still obtains in the Pacific, it will be appreciated that it was with some reluctance that we decided to despatch the tank battalion, but we are doing this because we wish to increase the measure of protection for the Division in action and at the same time enhance its value as a striking force. We are of course quite willing to send with the tank battalion its complement of Valentines, should this be considered essential, and we understand that General Headquarters, Middle East, would be very glad to have them, but we desire to point out that they are in no way a match for the tanks now being used by the enemy in the Middle East theatre. We are very concerned, therefore, to ensure that the battalion, and ultimately the Armoured Brigade when formed, are equipped with the most modern tanks available so that in action they may be in all respects equal, if not superior, in their striking power to the forces against which they will be engaged. If our armoured force can be equipped with the best tanks available, as we hope may be the case, then we would not propose to send the Valentine tanks from New Zealand unless you consider it essential.

93 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 11 September 1942

Your telegram of 9 September.

The recent decision of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand to send substantial reinforcements to the Middle East, including a battalion of the Army Tank Brigade, has been noted with great interest and appreciation. It is a source of great encouragement to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to be able thus to rely on New Zealand's splendid co-operation in this field. The provision of equipment for the New Zealand armoured troops will be the subject of a further reply as early as possible.

94 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 2 October 1942

Further to my telegram of 11 September, the War Office agree that the Valentines should not accompany the tank battalion personnel to the Middle East. It is proposed ultimately to equip the Armoured Brigade in the same way as the other armoured brigades in the Middle East on Crusader Mark III and Grant and Sherman basis. The Brigade's training equipment is expected to be available in January 1943.

The 3rd Battalion, 1st NZ Army Tank Brigade, left New Zealand with the 8th Reinforcements on 12 Dec 1942. The battalion was disbanded on its arrival in the Middle East. The 1st Battalion was retained in New Zealand on home defence until Jun 1943, when it was disbanded, most of its personnel being posted to the 9th and 10th Reinforcements. The 2nd Battalion, originally intended to form part of the 3rd Division, was also disbanded in Jul 1943. About 270 officers and men from the 2nd Battalion formed the 3rd Division Tank Squadron and served in the Pacific, while most of the remainder were posted to the 10th Reinforcements and served in the Middle East.

The Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) has been informed direct.

Libyan Campaign, 1941–42

95 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 13 September 1941

I have to report that the Division is trained and up to war strength and is now moving in stages to the Western Desert. The reinforcements here in Maadi are shaping well and will be fit to take their place in a month.

Tomorrow I move from here to Headquarters in the desert, therefore delay will occur in answering cables. Everyone is in excellent spirits and good health.

96 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to General Freyberg 16 September 1941

I gather from your telegram of 13 September that it is contemplated the Division should be employed in early operations. In view of the experience in Greece and particularly in Crete, I should be grateful if you would send me at once, if necessary after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, the following information:

(1)

In what operations is the Division to be engaged?

(2)

What is its role?

(3)

Is it completely equipped up to War Establishment in all respects?

(4)

If not, what are the deficiencies?

(5)

Are you satisfied that the Division is ready for action both in respect of training and equipment?

(6)

Is adequate AFV

Armoured Fighting Vehicle.

support available for the operations contemplated?

(7)

Is adequate air support available for these operations, and have appropriate arrangements been made for its use in conjunction with the land forces?

This information is required by the Government to satisfy themselves and, should it be necessary to do so, to assure the people of New Zealand that our troops have not been committed to battle without every possible precaution and preparation to meet every calculable emergency being taken.

97 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 17 September 1941

Besides the information asked for in my telegram of 16 September, would you please advise whether the New Zealand Division is to be associated in a Corps with any other division or divisions and, if so, under whose command and with which division or divisions.

98 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 19 September 1941

Your telegram of 16 September (No. 96).

My telegram of 13 September (No. 95) was intended to notify you that the period of refitting and training the Division was over and that we were moving to the Western Desert for a possible operational role.

The answers to your questions are:

(1)

We are at present engaged in intensive desert training for defensive or offensive operations.

(2)

Our role has not yet been disclosed. As you will realise, it depends on many circumstances.

(3)

The Division is probably the best-equipped unit in the Middle East and is right up to War Establishment except for items which are not available here or are at present in process of being made up.

(4)

Deficiencies at present are twenty-eight light tanks for the Divisional Cavalry and a proportion of light anti-aircraft guns, both of which will shortly be supplied. The Anti-Aircraft Regiment is at present on aerodrome defence duties but is returning to the Division shortly for training in mobile desert operations. The shortage of anti-tank rifles in the 5th Brigade is to be made up shortly.

(5) Yes. The Division is trained, and when the deficiencies mentioned in paragraph (4)

are made up it will be fit for war in every way.

(6)

The importance of armoured fighting vehicles is fully realised, and our strength is now much greater and adequate to deal with the estimated situation in the Western Desert.

(7)

The importance of air support is realised and no operations could be contemplated unless it is adequate. The situation, of course, is entirely different from Crete, as fighter aerodromes are available at all stages. Since your visit here the attitude to air co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the Army has completely changed. The Royal Air Force are doing their utmost, and combined exercises are being carried out.

I do not think there is any division in the Middle East superior to ours. I am certain that as a force we have been treated better than any other in respect of equipment, and when we get our light tanks, which are promised, and our Anti-Aircraft Regiment is trained and desert-worthy, we shall be well trained and fit for war. As may be realised, there is a vital need for secrecy at the moment, and I earnestly ask that no public statement be made just now other than that the Division is in good heart. The Commander-in-Chief has seen a copy of your telegram and of this reply.

A reply to your telegram of 17 September (No. 97) will be sent shortly.

99 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 20 September 1941

Your telegram of 17 September (No. 97).

The Division will be part of a Corps commanded by Lieutenant-General A. Godwin-Austen,

General Sir Alfred Reade Godwin-Austen, KCSI, CB, OBE, MC; commanded 13th Corps in Libya, Sep 1941 – Jan 1942; War Office, 1943–45; Quartermaster-General, India Command, New Delhi, 1945; Principal Administrative Officer, India Command, 1945–46.

specially selected after a successful command in East Africa and Abyssinia. We will be with the Indian Division and possibly a South African division. The Commander-in-Chief has authorised me to tell you for your personal information that General Cunningham

General Sir Alan Gordon Cunningham, GCMG, KCB, DSO, MC; GOC East African Forces, 1940–41; GOC-in-C, 8th Army, 1941; GOC Northern Ireland, 1943–44; GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, 1944–45; High Commissioner and GOC-in-C, Palestine, 1945–48.

late Commander-in-Chief East African campaign, will be in command of operations as a whole.

I have explained to General Auchinleck the New Zealand Government's view on the formation of the Anzac Corps. The Commonwealth Government have not yet expressed their view. However, it is not possible to form the Anzac Corps yet as the 6th Australian Division is not yet equipped and trained after Greece and Crete, and the 9th Australian Division is in Tobruk. If still desired, it might be possible to do so after some months, depending on the result of the operations now contemplated.

100 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 4 October 1941

For various reasons it would help me very much here if you could, for my own personal information, give me an indication when the action in the Western Desert is likely to begin.

101 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 October 1941

Your telegram of 4 October.

Owing to the Australian demand to release all their troops from Tobruk, which complicated our plans, the date of the operation is uncertain.

Representations had been made by the Commonwealth Government for the relief and withdrawal of the 9th Australian Division from Tobruk.

I hope these difficulties will be overcome and will cable you later.

102 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 9 October 1941

I forecast in the appreciation

See Volume I, Concentration of the 2nd New Zealand Division (No. 250).

sent to you last year the equal chance this summer of Germany attacking either Turkey or Russia with the object of obtaining wheat, petrol, and lubricants for the long war necessary to smash the British Empire. We now know that German plans in Syria and Iraq were upset by the losses in Crete. How far he will succeed in getting the above commodities from Russian territory, and when they will be available, is difficult to say. It is certainly possible that in the process of this year's fighting the German Air Force and mechanised army may exhaust their reserves and wear out their machines. There are indications of this, and the authorities are hopeful that such may be the case.

This is a war of machines. Without the preponderance Germany has so far possessed, the offensive in Russia would have been impossible, and should losses be sufficiently great the enemy will have to change his effort and withdraw into a smaller area on the defensive. That stage may be reached before long.

After Crete the situation in the Western Desert developed on these lines: Under pressure from the United Kingdom, the Western Desert Force made an attack on the German position running south from Sollum. At that time maintenance difficulties made it impossible to keep a large number of troops in the forward areas, and there was only a thin outpost position in the front. No additional troops were available for offensive action. The attack had to come forward quickly from sixty miles away from the enemy. An attack requires the concentration of several thousand motor vehicles, guns, tanks, &c., and involves an approach march across open desert providing no cover. Owing to the distances, it is not easy to make an approach march by night and carry out a dawn attack. In spite of these factors, in the June attack we employed inferior forces, especially armoured fighting vehicles and aircraft, with little chance of achieving surprise. The outcome was that we suffered a decided reverse and lost a large number of tanks. After the battle several commanders were sent to other jobs. Upon this fact I do not comment.

The new Commander-in-Chief

General Auchinleck.

was urged by the United Kingdom Government to do an offensive in the Western Desert as soon as he arrived, and it is rumoured that he refused until the necessary resources were available. Resources for the Western Desert comprise not only the provision of fighting forces but of maintenance and transportation services also. Maintenance is often the deciding factor. There is no doubt that in the Middle East good use has been made of the breathing space.

The situation here is now as follows:

The railway and pipeline have been extended well to the west, which will ease the maintenance situation.

The New Zealand, South African, and Indian divisions have been re-equipped.

The AFV situation has improved on our side and we are reported to have a superiority in numbers of five to four.

The enemy has decided superiority in numbers in the air. Reports give this superiority as three to two, and it must be anticipated that he will also reinforce from Greece, Crete, and Sicily. However, our Air Force is reported to be considerable and we have plenty of airfields in depth from which to operate.

From the enemy point of view, they have had five months to improve the forward defences and have not been idle. They have undoubtedly reinforced the Libyan front with men and material, including guns, tanks, and a large number of tank mines. They are past masters at putting out strong rearguards and launching strong counter-attacks with mechanised forces. Their General Staff is competent and they have resources.

In the circumstances the proposed operations are difficult but, nevertheless, offer a good chance of success. The result depends to a great extent on our ability to effect strategic surprise as to the date and direction of our attack, to break quickly through the crust of the German defences, and to smash the mechanised counter-stroke. This, like all modern battles, is in the first place a battle of machines and exploitation by lorry-borne fighting troops of all arms.

Should we succeed there is a reasonable chance of clearing the north coast of Africa. These are vital times, and our ability to play an early part in view of the fierce fighting in Russia is important. I can assure the New Zealand Government that there are no better equipped or trained troops in the Middle East than their Division. The men are in excellent physical and mental condition and will be fully trained, individually and collectively. At present we are in the process of carrying out three brigade battles under the full support of artillery and trench mortars, followed by two divisional rehearsals.

We have already taken part in two reverses, and I feel my responsibilities deeply. I realise how important it is from the point of view of the people of New Zealand, as well as the fighting men themselves, to have a success. I can assure you that nothing is being left to chance.

The Prime Minister replied on 6 Nov: ‘I would like you to know how very much all members of War Cabinet appreciated the timely and most useful views expressed in your telegram of 9 October…. We are greatly heartened by your assurance that there are no better equipped or trained troops than the New Zealanders in the Middle East. Your own care in achieving this result is fully realised and as fully appreciated.’

103 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 13 October 1941

I wish to thank you for your telegram of 5 October (No. 101). I shall be glad to receive the information as soon as it is available.

In the light of our experience in Greece, and particularly in Crete, you will understand that we are naturally apprehensive lest our troops should again, and for the third time, be committed to battle without adequate air support and in circumstances in which they are unable to defend themselves against unrestricted air attacks. We fully realise the exigencies of the present situation and the necessity for striking an early blow in the Desert, not only to improve our own position while the enemy is heavily engaged elsewhere, but also to ease to some degree the pressure upon Russia by such a diversion. Nothing could be further from our intention than to add unnecessarily to your burdens at such a time as this, but we would, if this is at all possible, be glad to be advised of the best appreciation possible of the prospective air, tank, and AFV strengths of the enemy and ourselves in the Middle East, with such details as may be possible as to the types of machines available on both sides and the degree to which and the time within which the enemy, air, tank, and AFV forces respectively could be reinforced from Europe. We should also greatly welcome an assurance that the question of air support, which we, having regard to our experience in the past, regard as a vital factor, has been fully considered and appreciated by those responsible, and that a situation in which our men are called upon to fight without the necessary means of defence and offence, particularly in aircraft, tanks, and AFVs, will not recur.

104 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 15 October 1941

Your telegram of 13 October.

The long delay in striking has been caused by the need to gather ample air and tank strength, and we believe this has now been achieved in full measure. I do not think the enemy will be able to alter these conditions before the day comes. I will cable you more fully early next week.

105 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 24 October 1941

Your telegram of 13 October (No. 103).

In order to make quite sure of the relative air figures I sent Air Chief Marshal Freeman

Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Rhodes Freeman, GCB, DSO, MC; Vice-Chief of Air Staff, 1940; Chief Executive, Ministry of Aircraft Production, 1942–45.

to Cairo to confer with Air Marshal Tedder.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, GCB; AOC-in-C, Royal Air Force, Middle East, 1941–43; AOC-in-C, Mediterranean Air Command, 1943; Deputy Supreme Commander under General Eisenhower, 1943–45; Chief of the Air Staff, 1946–50.

The following are the agreed figures of the Home and Middle Eastern staffs: British air forces 660; Axis forces 642. Probable serviceability of these forces: Day 1—British forces 528; Axis forces 385. Of these latter, little more than 100 are German. Moreover, all the Axis forces are in the shop window. We expect to have about 50 per cent reserves behind the counter. Germany has also in the Aegean and Crete 156 all types, excluding all short-range fighters. In Malta we have 64 bombers. No doubt is entertained by the Commanders that we shall have good air superiority unless the situation alters markedly.

General Auchinleck assures me that the New Zealand Division will have all proper protection. We must not, however, repeat the mistake of the action on 15–18 June

Operation ‘Battleaxe’, in which British forces attempted to sieze Halfaya Pass and capture Sollum, Capuzzo, and Bardia.

by frittering away superiority to put up small local umbrellas over each unit and detachment, thus losing the chance of beating the main enemy air force out of the sky.

Much has been risked in delay in order to gather sufficient armoured forces. It is unlikely that the enemy can reinforce his armour before the battle. We shall have 658 infantry tanks, cruiser tanks, and American cruisers of 12 tons or upwards, against 168 comparable Axis vehicles. The Axis has in addition 234 9-ton light tanks, which play a serious part. The armoured battle is what matters and we hope to force the enemy to it. The destruction of his armoured force would bring ruin to the rest.

The infantry are limited only by transport, but are declared to be superior in numbers to the enemy. General Auchinleck hopes to deploy 450 field guns and over 500 anti-tank guns, with 325 Bofors and over 100 heavy mobile anti-aircraft guns, the last-named exclusive of those in Tobruk. Our columns will therefore be protected by their own flak to an extent never before known by us.

All the above is of fateful secrecy. War Cabinet here have declined to be informed of the date of the offensive. Unless the situation alters in the interval, we are justified in sober confidence.

106 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 25 October 1941

I am most grateful to you for your telegram of 24 October, which is most helpful and is greatly appreciated.

107 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 21 November 1941

New Zealand is deeply stirred by the news that our troops are on the march once more. The progress of the action in the days that lie ahead will be followed with intense interest and in the confident hope that the result will be worthy of the magnificent qualities of the New Zealand Division. On behalf of the Government and people of New Zealand I wish you and the officers and men under your command every success.

Between 21–29 Nov brief reports on the battle were sent regularly to the Prime Minister by Mr. Jordan, then (with Colonel Park) on a visit to the 2nd NZEF in Egypt. General Freyberg's long report on the campaign (No. 111 of 7 Dec) makes the inclusion of Mr. Jordan's telegrams in this volume unnecessary. Mr. Jordan and Colonel Park returned to England by air on 30 Nov.

108 General Auchinleck to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) 3 December 1941

I have just seen General Freyberg who is well and in good heart. He has with him the remainder of the 4th and 6th Infantry Brigades which had to withdraw from Sidi Rezegh because of very heavy enemy pressure. These brigades fought magnificently and inflicted very heavy losses on the enemy, but I fear their own losses have also been severe. They are now going to Baggush to reform and refit.

Part of the 4th and 6th Brigades and the divisional transport are with the Tobruk garrison, which is still holding the salient created by our sally and Belhamed.

The 5th Infantry Brigade is still in the Bardia area and I believe has not yet been heavily engaged, though its headquarters was apparently captured at an early stage of the battle.

On 27 Nov Headquarters 5th Brigade was overrun by German tanks at Sidi Azeiz. Its commander, Brigadier J. Hargest, was captured, together with 46 officers and 650 other ranks.

It has now, however, a reorganised headquarters and is operating successfully under the orders of the 4th Indian Division.

I deeply regret the casualties, but the Division fought magnificently and its losses will not be in vain.

General Freyberg is communicating with the Prime Minister.

109 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 3 December 1941

After several days of heavy fighting round Tobruk the 4th and 6th Infantry Brigade Groups, together with the 21st Battalion, withdrew under pressure. The fighting has been severe and our losses are heavy. At present it is not possible to give any estimate of our casualties as part of the Division is with me, part in Tobruk, and part with the 4th Indian Division near Bardia. So far as I can say, the 5th Infantry Brigade, who are still operating round Bardia under the orders of the 4th Indian Division, have not had heavy fighting and their losses are not great. I am sending this telegram from the battlefield by a General Headquarters staff officer who is flying back to Cairo. Days must elapse before I can get back to telegraph communications, and longer to get the complete facts necessary for a fuller report which will follow in stages.

110 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 4 December 1941

It was with very great relief that I received your message from the battlefield and also the further advice from General Auchinleck that you are well and in good heart. His report that the Division had fought magnificently was fully in keeping with our own expectations. Will you please convey, on behalf of the Government and people of New Zealand, a message of congratulation to the officers and men under your command. The reports of the bitter fighting in which you have been engaged have led us to expect severe casualties. I can assure you that the people of the Dominion are deeply moved by the achievements of the heroic and indomitable New Zealand Division in the face of such heavy odds, and on their behalf I would like to send through you a message of sincere sympathy to all those who have been wounded in battle and to express the hope that they will speedily recover.

111 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 7 December 1941

Further to my telegram of 3 December (No. 109) from the battlefield, I beg to report on the operations of the New Zealand Division in the Libyan campaign up to the present phase marked by the withdrawal from the Tobruk sector of the 4th and 6th Brigades for rest and refit. They have reached Baggush. The 5th Brigade remains under the command of the 4th Indian Division near Bardia.

I am still unable to give the casualty figures, but every effort is being made to ascertain the position and you will be advised the approximate figures, followed by a detailed return at the earliest possible moment.

The general plan of campaign has already been explained by Colonel Stewart.

Colonel K. L. Stewart returned to New Zealand in October to assume the appointment of Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

I can only add that it was made with the greatest care for the safety of the Division as well as the other troops involved. I was not, of course, aware of what was in the Army Commander's mind as to the conduct of the battle. In my opinion the degree of success would depend upon the relative air strengths and the result of the armoured battle. In the air the RAF established complete mastery similar to the Luftwaffe's in Greece. The methods now employed are really effective and with more practice will be a great factor in our ultimate success. Optimistic hopes of quick victory were doomed to disappointment because the armoured battle was not conclusive. The enemy's resources were probably greater than was estimated and his repair organisation was good. However, our tank resources are growing. With the experience gained I am confident that the German armoured forces in Libya will be neutralised.

As a result of the first armoured encounters the German armoured columns retired to the north-west, permitting the rest of the plan to be put into operation. The first objective of encircling and cutting off the enemy fortress line at Bardia - Halfaya - Sidi Omar was brilliantly carried out by the New Zealand Division. The relief of Tobruk, although nearly achieved, remains to be carried out. Operations are continuing at present.

Operations for the New Zealand Division started with a long approach march of about 200 miles from Baggush to the frontier by night and day moves. To our south the Armoured Division and the 1st South African Division advanced on an even longer axis.

On the night of 18 November we crossed into Libya and remained dispersed in a position of defence. The Army Commander would not commit the Division until he considered the enemy armoured force disposed of. All commanders had studied a relief model of the area and everybody knew the scheme thoroughly. We were complete in every detail of equipment, including anti-tank and antiaircraft artillery and a battalion of ‘I’ tanks distributed among our brigade groups, every care being taken not to expose vulnerable columns to the German armoured divisions.

On 19 November the entire Division moved forward in desert formation covered by the Divisional Cavalry. The speed and manœuvrability of the mass of over 3000 vehicles was remarkable. The Divisional Cavalry rushed Sidi Azeiz at dusk, capturing many prisoners. Brigadier Hargest continued on during darkness and the 23rd Battalion carried out a successful attack on Fort Capuzzo, achieving complete surprise. Many prisoners were taken and the water pipeline to Halfaya fortress and the supply line to Sidi Omar cut. Meanwhile Brigadier Inglis led the 4th Brigade forward by night to capture the escarpment north-west of Bardia, cutting the Bardia-Tobruk road. The 4th Brigade was attacked by tanks, artillery, and infantry but the 20th Battalion and ‘I’ tanks counterattacked successfully, destroyed the enemy, and took 370 prisoners, two armoured cars, and some guns. In these operations we suffered only slight casualties. The 6th Brigade Group, under Brigadier Barrowclough, moved to Trigh Capuzzo into Divisional Reserve.

On the following night the Maori Battalion took Musaid and the Sollum Barracks, prisoners, guns, and equipment being captured, including the newest German radio direction-finding set. The German fortress line was thus severed from its supply base at Bardia.

The 6th Brigade Group was ordered to move towards Tobruk under 30th Corps and was detached temporarily from my command. They moved off complete in every detail, including a squadron of ‘I’ tanks. At a later stage Brigadier Barrowclough received orders to advance with all speed to occupy Point 175 and protect a flank of the Support Group heavily engaged at Sidi Rezegh. Fighting their way forward they found Point 175 strongly held. In a bloody encounter it was taken, but 13 of 15 tanks and 50 per cent of the 25th Battalion were casualties. The 26th Battalion was sent farther west to support the 5th South African Brigade on Sidi Rezegh, where they were attacked by a Panzer division. The South Africans were overrun by tanks. The 26th Battalion held its ground completely isolated and knocked out more than 20 tanks, later being withdrawn into the 6th Brigade lines.

The rest of the Division remained in position near Bardia until orders were given to take all the troops that could be spared from the Bardia front to join the 6th Brigade and move on Tobruk, with the object of cutting the by-pass road and establishing a corridor into the fortress.

The 4th Infantry Brigade was disengaged and moved to Gambut, capturing the aerodrome, 130 prisoners, and a considerable quantity of material. Divisional Headquarters, together with the 20th and 21st Battalions, followed, the 20th Battalion cleaning up enemy positions en route.

The advances by day and night along the Trigh Capuzzo of the 4th and 6th Brigades and 21st Battalion were brilliantly carried out. Both sides had decided on simultaneous bold strokes. While we moved on Tobruk, General Rommel moved his armoured force, together with the Italian Ariete Division, in an effort to recapture the Bardia-Sidi Omar fortress line. He took all his tanks and 3000 motor vehicles to just south of Sidi Omar. It is a fair assumption that but for strong pressure at Tobruk the full force of the German motorised infantry formations would have moved on Bardia to relieve the encircled garrisons. If he had succeeded our offensive would have failed.

Our advance upon Tobruk developed into a fiercely fought battle. For the most part we attacked at night with the bayonet to disorganise heavily defended localities. The taking of Sidi Rezegh spur by the 24th and 26th Battalions was a very fierce battle. It was strongly held by German infantry and the 6th Italian Bersaglieri Regiment, dug in and supported by large numbers of anti-tank guns. Heavy casualties were inflicted on both sides. We also took several hundred prisoners and material. At the same time 18th and 20th Battalions carried out a very fine night attack upon Belhamed spur, overrunning three enemy positions, killing the majority, and taking 150 prisoners. Carefully co-ordinated attacks by infantry, cavalry, and tanks on the next day and night, including an advance by the 19th Battalion of 10,000 yards, resulted in our joining hands with the Tobruk garrison at Ed Duda. In these attacks many anti-tank and field guns were destroyed and about 1000 prisoners taken. These attacks largely destroyed the German units opposite us, and had we had reserves available then we could have taken the next ridge, dominated the sector, and cleared the way into Tobruk. As it was, General Rommel, seeing the threat to the whole forward position, concentrated all his available resources and attacked us from every side. We expected the 1st South African Brigade to arrive on the night of 30 November—1 December to support the 6th Brigade Group on the southern flank. Our own 5th Brigade Group was to come as soon as it could be relieved by the 4th Indian Division, but the relief never took place. Although the South African Brigade came, it arrived too late to influence the situation.

Heavy attacks by tanks and infantry against the depleted 6th Brigade forced us off Point 175 on the 29th and off Sidi Rezegh on the 30th, when two battalions were overrun. On the morning of 1 December attacks round both flanks of the 6th Brigade converged with 51 tanks on Belhamed. Eleven tanks were destroyed, but the already depleted 20th Battalion was overrun and a wedge was driven between our battalions on Ed Duda and the rest of the force. Both Divisional Headquarters and the 6th Brigade Headquarters narrowly escaped destruction or capture. Attacks continued unsuccessfully against the remainder of the 4th Brigade Group until dusk when the whole force, other than the 18th and part of the 19th Battalions which remained with the Tobruk Force, disengaged with its transport and moved south-west to junction with our armoured forces, by whom our further movement to the south was covered.

In a telegram to the Minister of Defence on 15 Dec General Freyberg advised that the units left in Tobruk had arrived at Baggush that day.

We have been fighting almost entirely against Germans in Libya—Panzer divisions and motorised infantry. At the start of the operations their morale was noticeably high and they were commanded with determination and dash. In the attack to open the corridor, however, it is significant that over a thousand Germans were taken by the Tobruk garrison and ourselves without much resistance. The fighting was fierce and losses on both sides were heavy. The general situation, owing to the very long distances covered in our advance, was confused. Our long lines of communication were open to raids, and supply columns frequently changed hands according to the progress of the armoured battles in the central desert area. In one raid Headquarters 5th Brigade was captured with Brigadier Hargest. At another stage 6th Brigade captured General von Ravenstein, Divisional Commander of the 21st Panzer Division, complete with most valuable documents. Convoys of wounded were captured and recaptured and Dressing Stations dealt with friend and foe alike. In one case General Rommel visited one of our Advanced Dressing Stations. I regret to report that a large Main Dressing Station outside Tobruk was captured by the enemy during the last days of the fighting, with a loss of 700 wounded and about 500 medical personnel, but it is hoped it will be recaptured.

Our losses are great, especially to the 6th Brigade Group who were detached from the Division during the early days of the offensive. Losses to the 4th Brigade and 21st Battalion were also heavy. We have also lost many senior officers.

New Zealand casualties in the 2nd Libyan Campaign (Nov 1941 – Feb 1942) were:

Killed671Died of wounds208Died on active service (includes deaths through sickness, accident, &c.)202Wounded1699Prisoners of war (includes 201 wounded and prisoners of war and 5 died of wounds while prisoners of war)2042Total4822

The results achieved by the offensive in which we took such an active part are considerable. The enemy fortress line is cut off and its loss will cripple the whole German plan in North Africa and deprive him of a great amount of warlike stores and equipment. All German units have been thrown into the battle, in the course of which we have severely handled many, capturing a large number of prisoners and destroying much equipment.

One result of our operations was that the 4th Indian Division was given time to capture Sidi and Libyan Omars while the Armoured Division has been enabled to refit after its encounters. It must be realised that this is not a battle where the capture of ground or positions are of the greatest consequence. It is a battle to destroy the German elements in Libya, the Italians being of small consequence. It is fair to claim that the part played by the Division to date has destroyed a large portion of the German force, together with a great deal of their equipment and material, and it will prove a great contribution in the main Libyan campaign which still proceeds.

112 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 8 December 1941

Further to my telegram of 7 December, the following are some details of the regrettable loss of senior officers during the campaign. Brigadier Hargest and Lieutenant-Colonel K. W. Fraser

Lieutenant-Colonel K. W. Fraser, OBE, ED; CO 5th NZ Field Regiment, 1 May 1940–27 Nov 1941; prisoner of war, Sidi Azeiz, 27 Nov 1941.

were captured and Major A. N. Grigg, MP,

Major A. N. Grigg, MC; Member of Parliament, 1938–41; killed in action, 27 Nov 1941.

was killed near Bardia while the 5th Brigade were under the 4th Indian Division. General Rommel in his turning movement came into Bardia for supplies. On the way back his column attacked 5th Brigade Headquarters three times, eventually overrunning them. Forty-seven were killed and the remainder taken prisoner.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Allen, MP,

Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Allen; Member of Parliament, 1938–41; CO 21st NZ Battalion, 17 May – 28 Nov 1941; killed in action, 28 Nov 1941.

was killed instantly by machine-gun fire from a German strongpoint while going round his battalion on Sidi Rezegh spur. Lieutenant-Colonels G. Dittmer, H. K. Kippenberger, and J. R. Page

Brigadier J. R. Page, DSO; CO 26th NZ Battalion, 15 May 1940–27 Nov 1941; wounded, Sidi Rezegh, 27 Nov 1941; held various staff appointments in New Zealand, 1942–47; Military Secretary, 1947–49; Commandant, Northern Military District, 1950-.

were wounded and were in the Main Dressing Station in the battle area. The intention was to evacuate everyone to Tobruk as soon as possible as convoys on the Line of Communication were liable to attack by AFVs. The Main Dressing Station was unfortunately captured the day before the corridor was opened. I am very glad to report, however, that Dittmer and Kippenberger and about sixty others have since escaped and are safe. Page is still missing. It is still hoped the hospital will be recaptured.

Brigadier Miles was wounded and captured on 1 December when Divisional Headquarters was attacked. On the same day Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. E. Oakes

Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. E. Oakes, MC; Royal Artillery (retd.); CO 7th NZ Anti-Tank Regiment, 14 May – 30 Nov 1941; killed in action, 30 Nov 1941.

died from wounds and Lieutenant-Colonel C. Shuttleworth

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Shuttleworth, DSO; CO 24th NZ Battalion, 23 Jan 1940 – 30 Nov 1941; prisoner of war, 30 Nov 1941; died in United Kingdom, 15 May 1945.

went missing.

113 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 9 December 1941

I am deeply grieved about the severe losses your heroic Division has suffered in the forefront of the battle. All the accounts I have received pay the highest tribute to their brilliant work. The war is going well in Libya, in Russia, on the Atlantic, and in the United States. I send you every good wish and kindest regards.

114 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 10 December 1941

Thank you very much indeed for the message in your telegram of 9 December. We are proud of the work of the New Zealand Division and trust that their ordeal will have contributed materially to major victory. I should very much like to publish your message, which would I know give great pleasure to the people of New Zealand, and I should be grateful for your permission to do so. All good wishes.

115 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 13 December 1941

I have to report that the 4th and 6th Infantry Brigades are refitting at Baggush. They are nearly up to strength from the well-trained reinforcements we had at Maadi. Morale is exceedingly high. The men feel that the fighting of the Division was the turning point in the battle, which in my opinion is now over. I doubt whether either the 155th German Motorised Regiment or the German Afrika Korps, routed by the 4th and 6th Brigade Groups respectively, will be able to fight for a long time to come. I consider that Benghazi may be recaptured soon without heavy resistance.

The 5th Brigade Group are in the forefront at the moment, where the enemy is surrendering without much fighting. The enemy may fight on the Derna-Mechili line.

Rommel did not attempt to hold this line. From Gazala he moved back to Agedabia, south of Benghazi, and early in January retired to the El Agheila line.

Our fighters, based well forward at Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk, dominate the enemy.

For the personal information of my Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, the Division is now to refit and train for future operations on the Syrian front. I consider it will take two months' hard training to get units and formations up to the requisite pitch. We have lost all commanding officers

Lieutenant-Colonel H. K. Kippenberger, CO 20th Battalion, was wounded on 26 Nov; Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Allen, 21st Battalion, killed in action, 28 Nov; Lieutenant-Colonel C. Shuttleworth, 24th Battalion, prisoner of war, 30 Nov; Lieutenant-Colonel G. J. McNaught, 25th Battalion, wounded 23 Nov; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Page, 26th Battalion, wounded 27 Nov.

and almost all company commanders in the 20th, 21st, 24th, 25th, and 26th Battalions. Some will return in time. There are good young men coming on to fill the gaps. Until the battle in the west is finished we shall be on a low priority for equipment.

Would Cabinet like a short appreciation with particular reference to the position on the Syrian front next spring? I could collect material and do this after visiting there later in the month.

See Syria.

116 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 10 January 1942

I have to report that the Division concentrated at Baggush and is now moving by rail to the Canal area to train for possible spring battles. The question of its future employment is now under consideration. I would greatly appreciate the guidance of the New Zealand Government in the matter.

There can be no doubt that 1942 will be a difficult year. General Auchinleck is now making outline plans. These must be contingent on the action of the enemy. He has now approached me regarding the future role of the New Zealand Division. I asked the Chief of the General Staff, Middle East,

Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Francis Smith, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC; Deputy Chief of General Staff, Middle East, 1939–40; Chief of the General Staff, Middle East, 1941–42; GOC London District, 1942–44; GOC-in-C, Persia and Iraq Command, 1944–45; GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, India, 1945–46; Chief of the General Staff, India, 1946; GOC British Forces in India and Pakistan, 1947–48.

to put his proposals on paper. They are as follows:

The Commander-in-Chief has now decided that the New Zealand Division shall move to Kabrit to reorganise and train. He feels that he must have a really good division as General Headquarters Reserve and it will undoubtedly be wanted, but who can say whether it will be wanted on the Northern front or the Western front, or possibly for an overseas expedition. He feels that it will be of the greatest value to him to have the New Zealand Division in General Headquarters Reserve, and of course he wants to keep it together and well knows that spirit and esprit de corps will soon make it as hard a fighting machine as ever before. There is just one point he has asked me to consult you about. Do you think there will be any adverse reaction on the part of the New Zealand Government if, when the time comes, your Division is used as a landing force in an overseas expedition?

I have discussed with the Commander-in-Chief the problems which must arise in an overseas expedition. The importance of air cover is completely understood, and no operation could be contemplated without having this assured. I am also sure that any operation embarked upon would be one that has been thoroughly worked out with all three Services. There is no doubt, however, that a landing operation on an open beach in the face of opposition is difficult. But there is also no doubt that there is no division in the Middle East better fitted to carry out the difficult role of securing such a landing.

I consider, however, that in view of the whole world position no major overseas operation will be attempted unless the German military situation deteriorates considerably. It would seem, therefore, that the latter part of the Commander-in-Chief's proposal would be less likely than the former.

There may, of course, be smaller operations that have to be undertaken from time to time as part of bigger schemes. I suggest with all respect that in employing troops in these smaller operations you allow me to exercise my discretion. With your present preoccupation in Pacific affairs it is hardly fair to ask you to devote time to what, after all, will be comparatively minor operations. In any project for employing troops in a major operation, such as the overseas expedition referred to in the previous paragraph, I will of course obtain the Government's prior concurrence as hitherto.

I should be very glad to have the Government's views on the matters mentioned above. The troops here are in the very highest form and I am confident that within a month we will have the Division in its best condition once again.

117 The Minister of Defence to General Freyberg 21 January 1942

Your telegram of 10 January has now been considered by War Cabinet, whose views on the questions you raise are as follows:

Our general attitude in regard to the use of the New Zealand Forces is that they should be employed at the time and place and in the circumstances where they can be utilised to the best advantage of the common cause.

At the time we should naturally wish, as in the past, to be consulted before they are committed to any particular operation. In the absence of further information we do not feel that we are in a position to make any detailed comment or indeed to reply to the inquiry made by the Chief of the General Staff, Middle East, as to whether we would have any objection should the Division be used as a landing force in an overseas expedition. Before forming an opinion on such a matter we should wish to know a great deal more of the proposals, and if any information is at present available, for example, as to the area to which such an expedition might be proposed, we should be grateful to have it at once.

In any case, it seems to us that with the situation as it is in the Far East, the demand for reinforcements in that area is likely for some time to come to preclude an overseas expedition elsewhere. In particular the demand for air support in the Far East would seem to us to render impossible for some time to come the provision of adequate air support which, as you point out, would be essential before such an expedition could be successful.

We are not without doubt also as to the possible smaller operations to which you refer, and we shall be grateful for any further information you may be able to give us regarding these possibilities.

118 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 24 January 1942

Further to my telegram of 10 January (No. 116). I have shown your telegram of 21 January to the Commander-in-Chief who states that ‘there is no immediate operation contemplated in which it is proposed to use the whole Division. As in the past, the New Zealand Government will be consulted before any major role is assigned to the New Zealand Division. But the opportunity may arise during a campaign to land a brigade group in the rear of the enemy as part of a larger plan to defeat the enemy forces. In such an event time might not allow reference to the New Zealand Government, and the Commander-in-Chief would be glad of an assurance that, if in the opinion of the Middle East Defence Committee such a landing is desirable, New Zealand troops could be so employed. Adequate support of all kinds, including air support, would be provided. If a New Zealand brigade takes part in such an operation it would be detached only temporarily from the remainder of the New Zealand Division.’

119 The Minister of Defence to General Freyberg 29 January 1942

Your telegram of 24 January. We should much prefer it if, when an operation of the kind referred to by the Commander-in-Chief is contemplated, we could be advised beforehand and thus given an opportunity of forming and expressing our views. But should such prior consultation be found impossible in the circumstances as they arise, we would not insist on it and would be prepared to leave the matter to your judgment, always, however, on the condition that you are personally and fully satisfied both as to the feasibility of the proposed operation and the adequacy of the support—land, sea, and air—that is to be afforded.

120 Letter from General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence [Extract] 6 February 1942My Dear Minister,

I have the honour to enclose a copy of a report

‘Report on the New Zealand Division in Cyrenaica and Lessons of the Campaign.’

that has been drawn up for circulation here among the troops so that they could be taught the lessons of this very difficult battle in which they have played so prominent a part….

In the text omitted General Freyberg stated that the report had yet to be approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

Before the battle started I had an opportunity of talking to the Army Commander and I expressed the opinion then that if he attacked Tobruk, which was surrounded by four Italian divisions and one German division, with two South African brigades he would fail, and that it seemed to me that the New Zealand Division would be ordered to march on Tobruk. I told him I had made all my plans to make this move and that all my officers had been studying the problem. I begged him, however, if the occasion should arise, to send us as a three-brigade division, and I pointed out the weakness in my opinion of a binary division

A two-brigade division.

in such an operation. I doubt if I made any impression on General Cunningham. He thought I was over-anxious and I thought him over-confident.

The move up of the Division, the capture of Capuzzo, and the driving of a wedge into the enemy fortress line was carried out brilliantly by the Division, and it was as fine a piece of work as could be imagined. The work of the 5th Brigade under Brigadier Hargest, which led the advance northwards, was admirable. Our casualties for this operation, which came as a complete surprise to the enemy, were negligible. We now know from the statements of prisoners that the capture of Capuzzo completely upset their plans for the defence of the fortress line. It upset the whole of their communications. The wedge was held throughout the critical days of the battle, three battalions of the 5th Brigade keeping a very large German and Italian garrison on the defensive for a fortnight.

When the crisis came on 22 November conferences were being held, and as a result of the indecisive armoured battles the word ‘Withdrawal’ was being mentioned. You will notice in the account my correspondence with the Corps Commander where I pressed for resolute action against Tobruk, asking that our 5th Brigade be sent as soon as possible. Had this been done the main fight for Tobruk would have been over on 25 or 26 November, by which time we should have destroyed the German positional infantry and been in a position to deal with Rommel's armoured divisions on their return from the counter-stroke into Egypt. However, it is no use being wise after the event. As it was we went forward and dislocated the whole of the enemy defences and joined up with the Tobruk garrison, thus forcing General Rommel to recall his Panzer divisions for the battle of Tobruk. I might point out here the position I found myself in on 23 November. The 6th Brigade had been ordered up to the Sidi Rezegh position, 45 miles away from where we were at Sidi Azeiz, to support the South African brigade which had become isolated there. We had either to support Brigadier Barrowclough or lose him, for it was obvious that all was not going well. At this time, of course, the Brigadier had been detached from my command and was working under 30th Corps. You will see from the maps round about 29 and 30 November and 1 December what a very critical and vulnerable position your Division was in during those anxious days.

The Division is now concentrated at Kabrit, training and refitting, and the men are in good condition, physically and mentally. I am certain that when the time comes for the Division to take its place again they will be as highly trained and as fit as ever before. I need hardly say that we watch anxiously developments in the Pacific and are always looking forward to good news from the South Pacific front.

With best wishes, Yours, &c., B. C. Freyberg

121 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 6 February 1942

I have just received orders for the New Zealand Division to move for a full operational role in the Western Desert, commencing with the 5th Brigade Group on the 10th, followed by the 4th Brigade on the 16th and the 6th Brigade on the 22nd. The New Zealand Division will relieve troops coming out to rest and refit. Equipment is being made up completely in the next two days, except for some transport which will be issued on arrival in Eighth Army area. We are now up to strength in officers and men and the Division is in good condition. I expect a defensive role, but this depends on the Commander-in-Chief's future policy, which has not yet been divulged to me. Would the Government please acknowledge this message.

122 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 7 February 1942

The receipt of your telegram of 6 February is acknowledged. While we must accept the position, we are most disappointed that circumstances now apparently require further operations by the New Zealand Division so soon after its recent heavy losses. We assume that nothing but the serious nature of the emergency

On 21 Jan a German counter-offensive was launched from El Agheila.

has necessitated this step, and we would wish this communication to be shown to the Commander-in-Chief.

123 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 1 February 1942

Major-General Freyberg has just advised us that the New Zealand Division has again been ordered to move for a full operational role in the Western Desert. We have of course told him that we must accept the position, but that we are most disappointed that circumstances already require further operations by the New Zealand Division so soon after its recent heavy losses, and that we assume that nothing but the serious nature of the emergency has made this step necessary. We have also asked him to convey this communication to the Commander-in-Chief.

I feel you should be told that the ill-informed comments emanating recently from America and elsewhere concerning the very large forces retained inactive in the United Kingdom as compared with the needs elsewhere, the despatch of American troops to Northern Ireland, and the use of Dominion forces in the Middle East have been taken up with some force in this Dominion and were indeed reflected, with some degree of embarrassment to us, at the secret session of Parliament yesterday. The New Zealand Forces certainly have had their full share of heavy fighting and have, as you know, suffered very grievous losses, and I greatly fear that their renewed employment will add weight to this point of view, especially since their employment now will be misrepresented here as an indication that their last campaign was useless and that the job must be done again. Indeed, point may well be added to a demand that the New Zealand Forces should be returned to the Pacific area to meet the danger nearer home. As you know, such consensus of sentiments may have mischievous results. To counter any such propaganda and to allay any possible public feeling, I should be most grateful if you would let me have, as far as possible for public use, a full statement of the number of troops at present held in the United Kingdom and of the reasons for their retention—reasons which I do not for a moment suggest are not completely conclusive.

124 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 9 February 1942

Your telegram of 7 February.

Although not their fully trained divisions, the American troops brought to Britain have set free a larger number of mature British divisions for service in the Middle East and the Far East The mere sending of a few American divisions to Suez, Basra, or the Dutch East Indies would hardly justify the opening of a new front with a new power, different weapons, and independent rearward services. This may come, but not yet.

In the meantime only one thing keeps British divisions in this island, namely the shortage of troop-carrying tonnage. The use of shipping on the short haul from the United States to Britain is not comparable with the round-the-Cape voyage to the East. Are you aware that every month for more than a year past we have sent the equivalent of one New Zealand division from here to the Middle East? The great bulk of this is for upkeep. I was so hard pressed for tonnage to send some new divisional formations to the Middle East that six months ago I begged from President Roosevelt the use of some of his fast transports. Today, but for this, the 18th Division would not be at Singapore, and much may turn on that.

Singapore fell on 15 Feb 1942.

Every effort is being made to find the additional shipping over and above the monthly upkeep to send divisions out of this country. The limiting factor is not, and has not for many months been, the safety of the United Kingdom, but rather the difficulty of moving by sea at the speeds necessary for troop convoys, and with the proper escorts, the monthly quotas which have frequently exceeded 35,000 men. Do not allow anyone therefore to reproach the Mother Country with an undue regard for her own security.

The necessity to use the New Zealand Division again so soon grieves me, and the fact proves the emergency. I am, of course, disappointed with what has happened on the Desert front, but I have confidence in Auchinleck. I believe he has not yet shot his bolt and the enemy's position seems highly delicate. We must abide the issue of the event with fortitude.

Now that war with Japan has broken out upon us I am most anxious to work all New Zealand and Australian troops back into the Japanese theatre, but this again depends entirely upon shipping. Night and day we work to find more tonnage: all is continually filled. January's losses in American waters and in the Far East have exceeded the three preceding months combined. The big tide of American shipbuilding has only just begun to flow.

Your consent to the renewed engagement of your Division is keenly appreciated. I wish there were time to exchange them with the 5th Indian Division in Cyprus or with the remaining bulk of the British 50th Division in Syria and Iraq, but evidently the crisis is coming too quickly for that. Hard times are the test and New Zealand has never failed.

Every good wish.

125 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 9 February 1942

As requested, I have shown your telegram of 7 February (No. 122) to the Commander-in-Chief. The situation here is as follows:

In the Western Desert General Rommel has been reinforced and for the moment has the initiative. He is stronger in tanks than we are but the balance will soon be put right. The fighting has been heavy and the losses on both sides considerable. Maintenance is the vital factor in this battle. We are in much the stronger position in this respect, operating from the railhead now across the frontier. The present situation is considered satisfactory, adequate reserves of men and material are available and, generally speaking, there is no immediate cause for anxiety. Our proposed move forward was due to the fact that some of the formations which took part in the more recent operations in Western Cyrenaica will have to be replaced and brought back to refit.

I saw the Commander-in-Chief last night and again today. He sympathises with the point of view expressed in your telegram and has now altered his plans by bringing in another division in our place. There will be a short time-lag of between three weeks and one month, and to tide over this period he has asked me to place the 5th Brigade Group at the disposal of Eighth Army. I have agreed to this course.

The present position is that the 5th Brigade Group will move to Reserve Eighth Army on 11 February as originally arranged, but the remainder of the Division will continue to train in the Canal Area in General Headquarters Reserve. The 5th Brigade Group reverts to my command at the end of the period mentioned. At a later date the whole Division is to move to Syria to work on the northern defences under the command of Ninth Army.

See Syria.

These arrangements will hold good, subject of course to any serious German advance in Libya.

I hope that these fresh arrangements meet with your approval and will lessen the feeling of anxiety on our behalf.

126 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 11 February 1942

Your telegram of 9 February (No. 124) is most helpful to us, as indeed are all your messages, and I am most grateful to you for it, Freyberg now informs me that the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, is now making other arrangements which will involve the use for a limited time of one brigade only of the New Zealand Division, and I am asking him to inform General Auchinleck of our appreciation of this decision, which is a great relief to us.

With the information you have given us, we will, I think, be able to deal adequately with any criticism concerning the retention of British troops in the United Kingdom. I took the opportunity during the secret session this afternoon of reading from your telegram the appropriate references to this matter, and the result is contained in my immediately following telegram which is being published here.

Public opinion in New Zealand is sound and is reacting healthily to bad news. As you say, ‘Hard times are the test’, and you may rely upon us. But equipment is badly needed here and we look to you to do the best you properly can for us.

127 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 12 February 1942

The House of Representatives, assembled today in secret session, having heard and discussed a full and frank review of the present situation, including your own most recent comments, have unanimously asked me to convey to you an intimation of their appreciation and understanding of the position, and to assure you of the unshaken determination of the Parliament, Government, and people of New Zealand to prosecute this war to victory, irrespective of the fluctuations of the struggle.

128 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 12 February 1942

I am most grateful for your very kind message. In this dark hour the resolution of the New Zealand Parliament is a great encouragement.

I will cable you separately about equipment.

129 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to General Freyberg 12 February 1942

I am grateful for your telegram of 9 February (No. 125). We fully agree with the new proposal and would be glad if you will inform the Commander-in-Chief how much we appreciate his decision, which has been a great relief to us.

Syria

130 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence [Extract] 13 December 1941

….

For complete text See Libyan Campaign, 1941–42 (No. 115).

Would Cabinet like a short appreciation with particular reference to the position on the Syrian front next spring? I could collect material and do this after visiting there later in the month.

The Minister of Defence replied on 16 Dec that War Cabinet would welcome this appreciation. See No. 132.

131 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence [Extract] 15 February 1942

Further to my telegram of 9 February.

See Libyan Campaign, 1941–42 (No. 125).

The 5th Brigade Group is now in the Western Desert in Eighth Army Reserve.

I am leaving for Syria by air tomorrow with the principal members of my staff to reconnoitre administrative areas and defensive positions prior to the arrival of the Division. I will not be back for some days, and there may therefore be a time-lag in any cables. All are well….

A personal message has been omitted.

132 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 3 March 1942

Following a detailed reconnaissance in Syria and a visit to the 5th Brigade Group in the Western Desert, I have to report as follows:

The 5th Brigade are in good spirits and health. I am endeavouring to get them back for refit and short musketry and artillery training before following the rest of the Division to Syria. Although the 5th Brigade are detached temporarily, as is usual with detachments I am experiencing difficulty in having them released.

The move to Syria is now in progress with Divisional Headquarters and advanced parties on the way. The 4th Brigade moves by train today, followed by the 6th Brigade. We shall have an advanced formation at Aleppo and shall be preparing and digging extensive defences facing north in the Bekaa Valley, north of Baalbek, flanked on either side by the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon mountains, 9000 and 6000 feet respectively. The conditions are similar to Greece.

The Division is now fully equipped, except for a shortage of transport, and has been training actively since Libya. Small arms have been reclassified, artillery reshot, and the usual amount of marching done. Individual training now ceases. Collective training will be for mountain warfare and for the Syrian Desert, which differs from the Western Desert. The next three months will be hard work— extensive digging and pillbox-making in the northern defences and road-making into the mountains to enable us to use our guns in the high ranges. The lack of roads from the north and east will prevent the enemy using field artillery should they attack across high ground. Training for mountain warfare will separate us from mechanical transport, and infantry sections will have pack mules. In this warfare tanks play a less important part while musketry comes much to the fore.

As the Division will be approximately 650 miles by road from Maadi Base, the question of moving arises. I feel, however, that the present arrangement is not at all permanent and existing conditions at Maadi are very good. I propose, if the Government agree, to leave the main base at Maadi and open the smallest possible advanced base on the coast at Nathanya, south of Haifa, for a depot convalescent camp and General Hospital. I also propose to open a Casualty Clearing Station in or near Beirut. None of these will necessitate new construction.

The prevalence of malaria in Syria raises serious medical problems. The matter, of course, is in hand and I hope casualties will be kept to the minimum. The climate at present is cold but it is hot in the summer. As this is the third summer in the Middle East, it is planned to send each unit to the seaside at Advanced Base for a fortnight during the hot weather.

Beirut is our closest big town and is very expensive. I propose, when the AIF leave there, to take over the club for officers and men. I am also opening a centre for the men at Baalbek. This can all be carried out with the profits from the Forces Club in Cairo and will not make inroads into the Patriotic Fund, which must now cover a larger field.

The men are greatly pleased at moving to Syria.

In view of the general situation I will conserve resources to the limit of my powers.

I join Headquarters in Syria by air this week.

Will you please acknowledge this and say if the Government agree in principle.

133 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg [Extract] 17 March 1942

War Cabinet have noted with interest and agree in principle with your telegram of 3 March on which we have the following detailed comments to make:

(a)

We would be most reluctant at this distance to endeavour to interfere with the concentration of troops considered necessary by the Commander-in-Chief to meet any possible threat in the Western Desert, but if you consider it proper and necessary that we should make representations for the return of the 5th Brigade, which of course we would desire at as early a date as possible, you will no doubt advise us.

(b)

The question of the location of the Base we must leave to your discretion and we see no objection to the proposals that you make.

(c)

The possibility of malaria is disturbing and we rely on you and your medical officers to take every possible step by way of precaution….

See Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42 (No. 57) for rest of text.

134 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 21 March 1942

I have just returned from our northern area in Syria, where we reconnoitred the Turkish frontier from the sea across to the Euphrates. From a defensive point of view the mountain passes on the north-western front are strong and like the mountain passes of Olympus in Greece. The frontier from the north and north-east has no easily occupied defensive position and affords an enemy easy access over ideal tank country. I am certain the line cannot be held in the event of a serious enemy attack unless we have substantial forces and strong armoured and air components. As there is no likelihood of any immediate attack through Turkey there is no need for anxiety, but I am watching the larger aspect of the situation and will keep you in constant touch.

The Division is now situated as follows:

The 6th Brigade Group, under Brigadier Clifton,

Brigadier G. H. Clifton, DSO, MC; Brigade Major, 5th NZ Infantry Brigade, 1940; Commander Royal Engineers, 2nd NZ Division, 1940–41; Chief Engineer, 30th Corps, Oct 1941 – Feb 1942; commanded 6th Brigade, Feb-Sep 1942; prisoner of war, Alamein, 4 Sep 1942; escaped in Germany, Mar 1945; liaison officer with organisation for Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (Far East), 1945; seconded to HQ BCOF (Japan), 1946–47; NZ Military Liaison Officer, London, 1949-.

are in the northern area (Headquarters at Aleppo) with detachments on the Turkish frontier guarding demolition charges on roads, railway tunnels, and bridges.

The 4th Brigade Group are digging and wiring a defensive position facing north on the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, guarding the Bekaa Valley.

Divisional Headquarters and divisional troops are at Baalbek.

All ranks are delighted with the green fields and trees and are feeling the benefit of a colder climate. All are in good health and spirits. I have made notes from General Puttick's statement about the position in New Zealand and all ranks are being given the relevant facts.

This statement on the defence of New Zealand was contained in a telegram from General Puttick to General Freyberg on 5 Mar. In it General Puttick gave details of the strength and equipment of the forces in New Zealand and stressed the strategic importance of the Dominion in the prosecution of the war. The reason for the statement was that Middle East field censorship weekly summaries had shown some resentment in the 2nd NZEF at the suggestion that United States troops should be stationed in New Zealand. General Puttick emphasised the importance of United States naval and air aid to the defence of New Zealand and Fiji in particular, and added: ‘No USA forces are in New Zealand, but the Government and Chiefs of Staff would welcome them in almost any strength. Naturally we would all prefer our own troops from the Middle East, but we realise that strategical, shipping, and time factors predominate at present.’

The 5th Brigade Group were not released from the Western Desert by the promised date but are now due at Maadi on 26 March, where they refit, rejoining the Division by the first week in April.

In our new defensive position we shall have a brigade group of Greeks under command. These are men evacuated from Crete, as yet partially armed and not trained. After the evacuation from Greece we were asked by General Headquarters, Middle East, to train the Greeks. We have sent to the Royal Greek Army numbers of New Zealand officers and instructors to help them in the use of British weapons. Further, we have taken Greek officers and men into our training establishments at Maadi. Thus we have made our contribution to the general pool of instruction in the Middle East. I knew it would have your approval. The Greek Government bore all necessary expenses. The Greek Brigade Group will come up to Syria to complete their collective training under our guidance and will then come under our operational command.

During these difficult times I intend to send you a weekly cable when there is anything to report, giving the New Zealand Government the situation of their forces in the Middle East.

135 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 10 April 1942

I am now back in Syria after a visit to General Headquarters and Base, during which I inspected the 5th Brigade at Maadi. The brigade is fully equipped up to strength, with all its transport, and has never been in better shape. There has been no sickness, and the men are fit and have enjoyed a week's well-earned refitting leave at Maadi. While in the Western Desert they dug a defensive position in solid rock at El Adem.

On 8 April they entrained for Aleppo to take over from the 6th Brigade on the Turkish frontier guarding demolitions on roads, railways, and bridges. The 6th Brigade on relief will move about 20 April to the Bekaa Valley fortress area to prepare the western flank on the Lebanon Mountains. The 4th Brigade is still working on the eastern flank in the Anti-Lebanon Mountains while the Artillery, Engineers, and Cavalry work in the valley between. All work proceeds at maximum speed.

General Auchinleck inspected the defences here recently with General Wilson and expressed satisfaction with what he saw. Later I accompanied them by air on a reconnaissance from Aleppo to Mosul. With the arrival of the 5th Brigade the Division will again be concentrated, though Aleppo is 180 miles from the defensive position in the Bekaa Valley. Conditions here are good though a shortage of potatoes, which has removed them from the ration for six months, has upset the balance of the ration. Mosquitoes have appeared in the north but no cases of malaria are yet reported. The general health is excellent.

I have discussed the position with Australian senior officers. They state that all ranks of the AIF now in the Middle East would be much happier if their situation of uncertainty were settled one way or the other. I informed them that the 2nd NZEF would be remaining in the Middle East. The Australians now have approximately the same number of troops in the Middle East as are in the 2nd NZEF, that is, the equivalent in numbers of two British divisions. Our figures, including non-divisional units, are about 2000 officers and 30,000 men. General Morshead,

Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie James Morshead, KCB, KBE, CMG, DSO; commanded 18th Infantry Brigade, AIF, 1940–41; GOC 9th Division, 1941–42; commanded Australian Corps in Middle East, 1942–43; GOC 2nd Australian Army, 1944.

commanding the 9th Australian Division, has gone to Cairo to take over the AIF Headquarters following the departure of General Blamey,

General Blamey was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces in the South-West Pacific Area in March.

leaving the senior Brigadier to command in the field. As soon as the Australians are announced to be staying I shall issue a clear statement of policy to the men. There is no discontent among the men.

Public Relations have produced a New Zealand film of the Crete and Libyan campaigns entitled ‘Return to the Attack’. It is to be sent to New Zealand and England. I consider it a good film.

I am at present working on a Middle East appreciation which I shall forward as soon as possible.

136 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 16 April 1942

The following appreciation of the position on the Russian and Middle East fronts is forwarded for your personal information.

The evidence shows that Germany has made administrative arrangements to resume the offensive on several fronts, either simultaneously or in succession. The possible fronts are:

(1)

Russia;

(2)

Turkey—by land, sea, and air;

(3)

Cyprus and Syria—by sea and air;

(4)

North Africa.

Despite Axis pressure Turkey remains a potential ally, and in all plans for the defence of the Middle East her attitude is of great importance. It is thought that Turkey will not acquiesce in the passage of German troops unless the Russians are utterly defeated or beaten so badly that they lose Moscow and are driven behind the Volga, thus allowing Germany to concentrate large forces in Thrace and the Caucasus. It is difficult to estimate the Turkish strength: her Government is over-centralised, her army is inadequately equipped, and they miss Kemal's leadership. Turkey, however, remains confident, perhaps over-confident.

At present there is no indication of German reinforcement of the Balkans and Aegean area, and although administrative arrangements may be complete it would be some weeks before the necessary redis-position of forces could be effected.

In view of the present weakness of our naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and our weak military garrison, the invasion of Cyprus and Syria by sea and air might appear an attractive proposition. The condition precedent, however, would be overwhelming air superiority, only attainable by the use of airfields in Anatolia at present not available. The Royal Air Force opinion is that, even if Germany remained on the defensive in Russia, insufficient troop-carrying and transport aircraft are available for a purely airborne attack on Cyprus. This can be ruled out for the present. It is also unlikely and against all teaching that Germany will open up a fresh front until a decision is reached on the main front in Russia. It is probable, however, that she will attack in the Western Desert to improve the jumping-off position against Egypt and to help Japan in the Far East.

Evidence also suggests that the Germans have been fully extended in Russia during the winter. There are doubts about this, but in any case it appears certain that by drawing extensively on their allies and by a comb-out of German industry, they have collected a considerable striking force, including armour, for the spearhead of a new offensive against Russia. Germany's first objective must be to remove the threat of the Russian Army. If she achieves that, I think the Japanese successes in Burma will tend to draw the German effort south as soon as possible to break our hold on the Middle East and the Mediterranean. She will aim to carry out a winter campaign attacking Iraq, Syria, and the Western Desert. Our position here will then be difficult, but the administrative difficulties facing the Germans must not be forgotten as communications through the Caucasus and Turkey in the winter are very bad, and the sea route to Africa requires a large enemy air force to neutralise Malta.

On the evidence available it would be of little value to express an opinion on the future. Everything depends on the result of the battle in Russia this summer. Assuming, however, that the German offensive commences in mid-May, as seems possible, and succeeds, certain calculations are given.

Attack on Iraq through the Caucasus:

From the start of the offensive in Russia to the capture of Stalingrad—one month.

Consolidation and regrouping—two to three weeks.

Advance to frontiers of Turkey and Persia—eight weeks.

Total time for four divisions to arrive at the Persian frontier—14 to 15 weeks.

Attack on Syria through Acquiescent Turkey:

To capture Stalingrad—one month.

To withdraw troops from the Stalingrad front and concentrate in Thrace—one month.

To move four divisions through Turkey to the Turkish-Syrian frontier—two and a half months.

Thus, if the German offensive succeeded, four German divisions could cross the Persian frontier by the end of August and four divisions could cross the Turkish-Syrian frontier by the middle of September.

To sum up: Germany has undoubtedly mobilised all her forces and those of her allies for a supreme effort this year. The situation is parallel in many ways to 1918 with the result much in the balance. If Germany succeeds in Russia and Turkey capitulates without fighting, and no reinforcements of men, tanks, aeroplanes, and ships arrive in the Middle East, we must go on the defensive in the Western Desert, Syria, and Iraq. We must be prepared for loss of territory and for very heavy fighting during the late summer. On the other hand, Russia may prove a tougher proposition than we expect. In any case, should Germany fail to get the decision against Russia, her position will be perilous. Come what may, we must be prepared to fight very hard during 1942, either in defence of the Middle East or in attacking the Axis wherever possible, to support our ally Russia and possibly Turkey.

A cable dealing with the proposed operational role for the New Zealand Division follows.

137 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 18 April 1942

Further to my telegram of 16 April. The Commander-in-Chief has seen my appreciation and comments as follows:

I agree generally but have the following comments. I should not describe Turkey as over-confident. I doubt if Germany's plans in the Middle East will be influenced by the desire to assist Japan directly. Your estimate of the middle of September is presumably based on the assumption that the enemy must first capture Stalingrad before forces for Turkey can be released. The War Office think that with Turkey acquiescent the Germans may be on the Syrian border by mid-July.

138 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 18 April 1942

Reference my telegrams of 16 and 18 April (Nos. 136 and 137). The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, has asked me to consult the New Zealand Government about the possible employment of the New Zealand Division in an operational role. In the summer we may have to send the Royal Air Force into Turkey if she is attacked, irrespective of the situation in Russia or elsewhere. If the RAF go they will be operating from aerodromes built by us in western Anatolia, in positions enabling them to give fighter and bomber cover over the Turkish defences at Catalga and Bulair lines, covering the Bosporus and Dardanelles and the sea approaches to Gallipoli. The importance of this assistance to Turkey, as well as the delay and damage inflicted upon invading German forces, needs no comment.

The role of the Division and attached troops would be to move in troops by road and anti-aircraft guns by rail to protect the RAF and landing grounds from enemy airborne attacks and possible land raids by mechanised forces. It is pointed out that the force so allotted will have the Turkish Army and the Sea of Marmara between it and the main Axis forces attacking from Thrace.

The Commander-in-Chief is anxious to allot the New Zealand Division and another brigade group, probably of the 4th Indian Division, for the task. A decision is urgently required so that joint planning with the prospective Air Commander can begin now.

Realising that the New Zealand Government is not in a position to form a clear opinion either on the risks or conditions of the proposed operation, I send my opinion to enable you to make a decision.

(1)

I have nothing to add to my appreciation regarding the Turkish position.

(2)

The operation envisaged is a difficult one. The move in would be over difficult country and bad roads. The New Zealand force will be completely mobile; the main body would move by road 700 miles, and the force covering the advanced aerodromes an additional 250 miles.

(3)

While the Axis forces are assembling in Thrace, the special force could assemble in the Aleppo area preparatory to a rapid advance taking ten to fourteen days.

(4)

The Turkish defences in Thrace are prepared and a considerable sea obstacle exists. On the other hand, there is the threat to the left front and flank of sea and air landings from the Aegean and the Dodecanese Islands, but such a force would be immobile for some time as port facilities and difficulties of transportation would prevent a large number of vehicles being landed.

(5)

If withdrawal became necessary our main troubles would come from air attack, but considerable anti-aircraft and air defence in depth could be provided.

(6)

The proposed operation is bound to have some measure of success and gain great advantages. The alternative would be to desert Turkey, and she might capitulate and hand over undamaged the whole of her communications. Under a Quisling Government Turkish forces might be used against us. Even if we got part of the way in and had to withdraw prematurely, roads, railways, bridges, &c., could be demolished and the enemy advance handicapped so that attack on Syria might be delayed and even prevented by the winter snowfall.

(7)

The Turkish-Syrian frontier itself cannot be defended, and early withdrawal from it would entail the certain loss of Cyprus, the premature opening of the ports of Beirut and Tripoli, and the surrender of the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean sea routes. Further, if the Suez Canal is to be held until reinforcements arrive, the German advance through Turkey must be met as far from the Canal as possible.

To sum up, we are now fully equipped and in the course of six weeks will be fully trained. There is no division in the Middle East so well fitted to carry out the proposed role. If for any reason you decide against the proposal, another division less well trained would have to do it. The difficulties of getting in and of a possible withdrawal must be fully realised, but provided our headquarters are with the foremost troops and our signal communications are good, we can keep in touch with the position ahead and to our flank and extricate the force should the worst happen. In all the circumstances I feel that you would be justified in accepting the proposed role.

139 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 22 April 1942

The information contained in your telegrams (Nos. 136–8) is much appreciated and we have given most careful thought to the considerations to which you call attention.

On the following assumptions, namely:

(1)

that the move is undertaken only with the full support and approval of Turkey;

(2)

that an assurance is given by the Commander-in-Chief (a) that adequate air support is provided sufficient to ensure that the Division does not have to go through another Greece or Crete, and (b) that adequate forces will be available to protect the Syrian flank and, if necessary, to assist in supporting and extricating the Division, we agree that the Division should be used for the operational role proposed.

You will, of course, keep us advised of the situation from time to time.

140 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 10 May 1942

Reference your telegram of 22 April.

The Commander-in-Chief is most grateful for the helpful attitude of the New Zealand Government. The question of assurances will be the subject of further communications.

I have to report that with Colonels Gentry

Brigadier W. G. Gentry, CBE, DSO; GSO 2, 2nd NZ Division, 1940; AA & QMG, 1940–41; GSO 1, 1941–42; commanded 6th Brigade, 1942–43; Deputy Chief of the General Staff (in NZ), 1943–44; commanded New Zealand Troops in Egypt, 6th NZ Division, and NZ Maadi Camp, Aug 1944 – Feb 1945; commanded 9th NZ Brigade (in Italy), 1945; New Zealand representative on Joint Chiefs of Staff Organisation in Australia, Mar-Jul 1946; Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Jul 1946 – Nov 1947; Adjutant-General, Apr 1949-.

and Maxwell

Colonel D. T. Maxwell, OBE; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, 2nd NZEF, 1940; GSO 2, Oct 1940 – Jan 1941; GSO 2 and later AA & QMG, 2nd NZEF Base, 1941; AA & QMG, 2nd NZ Division, Oct 1941 – Jun 1942; returned to New Zealand for duty Aug 1942 and held various senior staff appointments, including Commandant, New Zealand Staff College, Aug 1943 – Mar 1944; posted to 2nd NZEF (Japan), Mar 1946; Commander British Commonwealth Sub-Area, Tokyo, Jun 1946 – Jul 1947; Commander Area 5, Wellington, Nov 1947 – Oct 1948; NZ Joint Services Liaison Staff, Melbourne, Nov 1948-.

I attended detail planning meetings at General Headquarters, Cairo, examining the whole question from the point of view of organisation, equipment, timing, and forward movement to the concentration area. The scarcity of information about the state of the roads and the country through which we would have to move makes planning most difficult. General Headquarters, Middle East, are therefore trying to arrange with the Turkish Government to send in four New Zealand officers—road engineer, doctor, signals, and General Staff officers—for a fortnight's reconnaissance to report on communications, roads, water supply, hygiene arrangements, &c. On receipt of their reports we shall be in a better position to deal with the problems of planning and administration.

As instructed, I will keep you in touch with the situation as it develops. I am at present preparing a statement on the present state of training and efficiency of the 2nd NZEF.

141 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 4 June 1942

In my appreciations (Nos. 136–8) plans to meet a German attack through Turkey have been the main consideration. Although these plans are still being considered, there is no indication at present of an attack developing. Information indicates that the main German thrust is aimed at the oilfields in and around the Persian Gulf, and the planning now being given first priority is the defence of Persia from attack through the Caucasus. The capture of the Persian oil supply would be a great loss to the Allies, especially in the Middle East.

This message is to inform you of the trend of thought here, and also to advise you that I have been asked at short notice to leave tomorrow with the GSO 1

Colonel W. G. Gentry.

for ten days' reconnaissance in Persia. The reconnaissance is purely exploratory. I shall keep you fully informed of any possible change in policy, which will be referred to you in the ordinary way.

I have to thank you and the Government for my promotion,

In a telegram sent on 3 Jun the Prime Minister advised General Freyberg that he had been granted the temporary rank of Lieutenant-General as from 1 Mar 1942.

which will help me in my dealings here and elsewhere.

The Battle for Egypt

142 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 14 June 1942

I arrived back at Cairo from North-West Persia

See Syria (No. 141).

on the night of the 13th for a Commander-in-Chief's conference on the 15th, to find the situation in the Western Desert, where there has been heavy fighting for the last three weeks, still obscure. There is no doubt that there have been considerable losses on both sides, not only in men but also in tanks, equipment, and transport. Upon arrival here I was warned that as a precautionary measure the New Zealand Division might have to move across to give depth to the defence. This afternoon the Commander-in-Chief confirmed the fact that we were to move to the Libyan frontier area to take up a defensive position. The move, which is to commence at once, will take ten days or more to carry out. The men are in excellent condition and the extra training has been of great value to the new commanders. The health of all ranks is good. We have had only seven cases of malaria while in Syria. I will, of course, keep you in touch with the situation as it develops.

143 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 20 June 1942

The Division is now passing through the Delta and will arrive at its destination west of Mersa Matruh on 25 June.

The situation in the Western Desert is that Eighth Army has been forced onto the defensive and holds a line on the Libyan frontier with a garrison at Tobruk.

The New Zealand Division may be used either in a defensive role, or later, should opportunity present itself, for a counter-stroke in an offensive role together with other troops.

The state of your Division is good. The men have benefited from the period of training in Syria. Although we greatly miss our tried commanders, the younger ones are maturing quickly. We are complete in equipment except for infantry anti-tank guns and a few controlled stores, which are to be supplied in Eighth Army area. We are short of transport.

Will you please acknowledge this cable. I shall, of course, keep the Government in touch, but that will be more difficult as operations approach.

The Prime Minister replied on 22 Jun that the Government fully understood the situation.

144 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 24 June 1942

Further to my telegram of 20 June, there is no doubt that our forces in the Western Desert have suffered a major reverse and the situation at the moment causes anxiety. General Auchinleck has a difficult task here with inadequate resources and inferior tank, tank gun, and anti-tank gun.

The enemy must be stopped, and this will be achieved only after heavy fighting. Casualties must be expected.

The bulk of the Division is already at Matruh, but we are to be relieved and will move almost at once to an area to the south. We shall take the field as a division, less the 6th Brigade, which remains in the rear. The infantry brigades will be changed for purposes of rest. Everyone is in excellent heart and I am certain the Division will not lower its reputation.

145 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 27 June 1942

Regret I was hit on the evening of the 27th, but I shall not be long recovering. I have handed over to Brigadier Inglis

Major-General L. M. Inglis commanded the Division from 27 Jun to 16 Aug 1942.

who, I am certain, will do the job well. Anticipating your approval I have promoted him acting Major-General. We have been holding a position

Minqar Qaim.

and have been attacked from north, south, and east. All attacks have been repulsed. The troops have been excellent and morale is high.

146 Headquarters 2nd NZEF (Cairo)

This telegram was from Brigadier W. G. Stevens, Officer in charge of Administration, 2nd NZEF.

to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) 29 June 1942

General Freyberg wishes the Government to have a brief report of the action up to the time he left the Division. The report is as follows:

On 26 June it was decided to move the Division out of the Matruh area into position on a high escarpment located due south of Wadi Naghamish and running east and west. General Puttick knows the area. This position was occupied on the night of 26–27 June.

On 27 June the defensive arrangements were completed, the Division being well equipped with 6-pounder anti-tank guns and having the full Divisional Artillery of seventy-two 25-pounders. In the early morning columns were seen moving to the north. These were from the 21st Panzer Division, which deployed and attacked continuously during the day.

This was satisfactory to us as we were in position for that purpose. Five separate attacks were made, one infantry attack against the 4th Infantry Brigade under Inglis and one infantry attack against the centre group under Gray.

Brigadier J. R. Gray, ED; CO 18th NZ Battalion, 27 Sep 1939–6 Nov 1941, 28 Mar-29 Jun 1942; commanded 4th Infantry Brigade, 29 Jun – 5 Jul 1942; killed in action, 5 Jul 1942.

Three tank attacks followed from the east, south-east, and south-west against the 4th Infantry Brigade and the 5th Infantry Brigade under Kippenberger.

Some of the German columns carried out complicated manœuvres within artillery range and our guns got good targets. Prisoners said their casualties were high.

In conformity with the general plan a withdrawal was carried out during the night of 27–28 June, the Division being under Inglis. There were guns all round, and the most effective method of withdrawal was what may be called crash tactics, i.e., a charge straight through. This was successful.

General Freyberg was wounded at 5 p.m. on 27 June. I have since confirmed that the withdrawal was successful. The Division, less the 6th Infantry Brigade Group, is intact. The 6th Infantry Brigade Group, which has been detached to the rear, is now moving forward again. General Freyberg is undaunted by his wound.

147 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 1 July 1942

Further to my telegram of 24 June (No. 144), I have to report on the operations of the New Zealand Division up to 30 June.

As you know, on my return from the reconnaissance in Persia the Division was ordered from Syria to the Western Desert, originally to a position west of Matruh. The early fall of Tobruk altered the situation and we were ordered to garrison Matruh as a temporary measure. I was very glad when we were ordered south 12,000 yards to the escarpment, where in co-operation with armoured forces our great mobility could be used to the best advantage. We were in position on the evening of the 26th, twenty-four hours earlier than the time given, and the battle started on the morning of the 27th. The enemy were reported by-passing Matruh and advancing east along the main escarpment overlooking the main road. A small mobile column from the New Zealand Division was sent out which shelled the enemy and forced them to deploy south and attack us as expected. We were in a strong position and had covered our flanks with minefields, while the armoured division

1st Armoured Division.

operated to our south. Our role was to gain time and inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy, but to remain intact ready to fall back on receipt of the code-word. We were attacked on the north, south, and east by the 21st Panzer Division and elements of an infantry division and were shelled throughout the day. Supported by our armoured division we repulsed the enemy tank attack, and the enemy infantry attacks were also repulsed. The enemy suffered heavy casualties. By evening, however, when the code-word was received to retire to the Alamein position, there were enemy concentrations all round. During the last phase of the attack I was forward to see what was happening and was hit by a shell. I handed over to Brigadier Inglis, who arranged details of the withdrawal. A most successful night attack was carried out by the 4th Brigade, who broke through the encircling forces at the point of the bayonet. Bright moonlight made the move of the large body of transport hazardous and the column had to run the gauntlet of enemy tanks, causing disorganisation and casualties. An estimate of the casualties for the fighting to date is 150 killed and 450 wounded. The withdrawal was successfully executed and the Division is now reorganised, the 4th and 5th Brigades as a mobile battle group pivoting on the 6th Brigade, who hold the main southern fortress position in the Alamein Line. The Division is ready and Colonel Gentry has sent me a message saying ‘troops' tails right up.’ The situation generally is serious but not alarming and is developing as expected.

I write this in hospital at Helwan. My neck has been operated on and they are well satisfied. I will be back as soon as possible.

148 Headquarters 2nd NZEF to the Minister of Defence 5 July 1942

The following is a brief report on the situation as at 3 p.m. on 4 July:

The New Zealand Division is operating in the south about twenty miles from the coast in the Alamein position, the 6th Brigade holding the Box and the 4th and 5th Brigades forming a mobile striking force with an offensive role against the enemy flank. We have clear air superiority and the indications are that we now have clear tank superiority. The enemy was severely mauled by our armour in the centre, the salient was straightened, and the enemy withdrew. Several hundred prisoners were taken. Enemy morale is reported to be low, his men being tired and hungry and discouraged, while our morale is very high. The position improves hourly with the arrival of reinforcements. It is too early to get a clear picture, but the above shows a change for the better which should be maintained. A report from Army Headquarters this morning states that the attack by our 5th Infantry Brigade during the night was completely successful, creating havoc (their actual word) among the enemy. Our losses to date are not heavy. Definite figures will follow as soon as they are available.

149 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 11 July 1942

I regret to report that Brigadier Gray, temporarily commanding 4th Infantry Brigade, was killed in action on 5 July, also his Brigade Major, Bassett.

Major B. I. Bassett; 23rd NZ Battalion; Brigade Major 4th Infantry Brigade, Aug 1941 – Jan 1942, 1 Jun – 5 Jul 1942; killed in action, 5 Jul 1942.

Gray was the last of the original unit commanders and is a great loss. He fought most gallantly in Greece and Crete and commanded the Brigade Group with distinction. Bassett was one of our most promising young staff officers. Burrows is now commanding the Brigade.

Brigadier J. T. Burrows, DSO, ED; CO 20th NZ Battalion, 8 Dec 1941–27 Jun 1942; commanded 4th Infantry Brigade, 27–29 Jun 1942, 5 Jul – 15 Aug 1942; commanded 20th Battalion and Armoured Regiment, 1942–43; commanded 5th and 6th Brigades in Italy, 1944; Rector, Waitaki Boys' High School, 1945–49; Commandant, Papakura Military Camp, Mar 1950–.

I have just received a short report from Inglis giving the above information and reporting a successful night attack by the 5th Brigade Group. His estimate of casualties, which must be taken as approximate, is 250 killed and 1000 wounded. The Division continues to do well and morale is high. There is no doubt that the part played by the Division in these operations has been most important in the defence of Egypt.

150 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 12 July 1942

Already fresh fame has been brought to New Zealand's arms at this vital keypoint of the war by the Division which you consented to leave in the Middle East.

See Reinforcement of 2nd NZEF, 1940–42 (No. 57).

It is doing splendid work in the Western Desert.

The unforeseeable tide of disaster which drove us from Gazala to Alamein with the loss of Tobruk and 50,000 men has now been stemmed for the time being. Strong reinforcements have been received by General Auchinleck, raising his Army to 100,000 men, with another 20,000 well forward in the Delta behind them. Thus he is able to double Rommel in men. He has a fair equality in artillery but is still somewhat weaker in armour than the enemy. This imposes prudence upon him for two reasons: firstly, a retire- mentretirement is much worse for him than for Rommel, who has nothing but deserts behind him, and, secondly, far more strength is coming to General Auchinleck than to the enemy. For instance, the 8th Armoured Division with 350 Valentine tanks has landed and will soon be in action. About 400 tanks of all types, which were despatched before the battle began, will reach General Auchinleck in July and early August as replacements. By the end of July the 44th British Infantry Division, 15,000 strong with 72 guns, and fully equipped, should have arrived, followed a month later by the 51st British Infantry Division.

Four months ago I obtained from President Roosevelt the shipping to carry an additional 40,000 men to the East without deciding on their destination till they rounded the Cape. This was very fortunate as without these the reinforcements now proved so needful by the hazards of war could not have been at hand.

When in Washington I obtained from the President 300 Shermans, the latest and finest tanks in the American Army. They were taken from the very hands of the American troops who eagerly awaited them, and were sent by special convoy direct to Suez. One hundred 105-millimetre self-propelled guns, which definitely outmatch the 88-millimetre, went with them, the whole being accompanied by a large number of American key men. These should arrive early in September.

Apart from the 8th Armoured Division, and in addition to the two armoured and one army tank brigades now in action forward, we have in the Delta the personnel of four armoured brigades awaiting re-equipment. About half these men are desert trained in tanks. Therefore, we should be able to bring into action incomparably the most powerful and best-trained armoured division yet seen in the Middle East or indeed anywhere. But I hope the issue will be decided in our favour earlier. This is especially desirable because of the dangers that may develop, though I do not say they will, on the northern approaches to Egypt.

Of scarcely less importance are the air reinforcements given me by the President on the morrow of Tobruk. As you know, we have not hitherto been able for technical as well as military reasons to provide heavy bomber squadrons for the Middle East, though they have often asked for them. Now, however, the President has assigned to the defence of Egypt the Halpro Group

The Halverson Project (abbreviated Halpro) was the name given to the first attack on the Ploesti oilfields by United States heavy bombers on 12 Jun 1942. The force was commanded by Colonel H. A. Halverson, United States Air Force.

of twenty Liberators, which was on its way to India after bombing Roumanian oilfields, ten other Liberators which had already reached India, and a group of thirty-five Liberators from the United States. With the addition of our own Liberators, this gives us about eighty-five of these heavy bombers which should all be available this month. Our two Halifax squadrons will come into action at the same time, making 117 heavy bombers in all. It is this force I rely upon to beat up the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi, hampering Rommel's reinforcements, besides of course, playing the part of a battle fleet in preventing a seaborne invasion of Egypt. Great enterprises are in preparation for the revictualling of Malta, but as these deal with future operations I am sure you will not wish me to mention details. Besides the above the President sent across in the carrier Ranger,

USS Ranger, light aircraft carrier, 14,500 tons, eight 5-inch guns.

which should soon be reaching West Africa, about seventy of the latest Kittyhawks.

Besides this, every preparation has been made to defend the Delta if the battles in the desert should go against us. Here we have very large numbers of men, all of whom have been ordered to take part in the defence of Egypt exactly as if it was England that was invaded. The cultivation and irrigation of the Delta have made it literally the worst ground in the world for armoured vehicles, and armour as a factor would lose a great deal of its predominance. All ideas of evacuation have been repressed, the intention being to fight to the end for every yard of ground. However, as I have said, I do not think this situation will arise.

We are having a great struggle to carry supplies to Russia. One-fifth of the June convoy was sunk and I fear less than half the July convoy got through. The difficulties and dangers of this route, especially during the season of perpetual daylight, are enormous. This is serious as it is almost the only thing we can do for our valiant ally who is taking such a heavy toll of Hitler's armies and will, I am confident, endure to the end. To show you what a good comrade Premier Stalin is proving himself, the Russians have offered us three divisions of partly equipped Poles for the Levant-Caspian theatre and have transferred to Egypt forty Boston fighter-bombers which were on the way to them through Basra. In this last matter the President was my intermediary.

In these difficult days, as it did in the struggle against Napoleon, the House of Commons has proved a rock, and I have also been greatly encouraged by the goodwill of your Government and people. Even though the struggle will be long and we must not relax for an instant, I have never felt more sure that complete ultimate victory will be ours.

We are looking forward to welcoming Mr. Nash.

The Hon. W. Nash, New Zealand Minister in Washington, went to London in the third week of July for discussions on financial and marketing problems. He also attended meetings of the United Kingdom War Cabinet, returning to Washington on 18 Aug.

151 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 14 July 1942

As always your messages are encouraging and inspiring. I am particularly grateful for the information that you have been so kind as to forward and very much touched by your reference, both in your telegram of 12 July and in your recent speech, to the New Zealand troops and the attitude of this Dominion towards the war.

In the course of a speech in the House of Commons on 2 Jul Mr. Churchill said:

Although I am not mentioning reinforcements, there is one reinforcement which has come, which has been in close contact with the enemy, and which he knows all about. I mean the New Zealand Division. The Government of New Zealand, themselves under potential menace of invasion, authorised the fullest use being made of their troops, whom they have not withdrawn or weakened in any way. They have sent them into the battle, where, under the command of the heroic Freyberg, again wounded, they have acquitted themselves in a manner equal to all their former records. They are fighting hard at the moment.

It is certainly most heartening to us to learn of the large reinforcements that may be expected shortly in the Middle East, and indeed of the substantial forces and equipment that are already at the disposal of General Auchinleck. I am particularly encouraged to learn that reinforcements can be sent to Auchinleck in greater force than the Axis can supply them to Rommel. We had ourselves felt that unless Auchinleck could turn Rommel out of Egypt at a very early date, then the advantages of the situation to the enemy, with his sources of reinforcement so much nearer in point of time and distance and so much greater in potential strength, would progressively increase as the weeks and months passed.

The defence of Malta has been an inspiration to us, and we must all hope that it will be possible to retain this strongpoint without too grievous a cost to us in running supplies. The increasing success of enemy attacks on our convoys to Russia is of course a great disappointment to us, as it must be to you and to our Russian friends. The continued gravity of the Axis air and sea attacks on our shipping raises most weighty problems, especially in view of the lengthy and burdensome supply and reinforcement routes that we must maintain, and of the possibility that the Japanese may decide, as there are indications they will, to devote part of their submarine and surface strength to attacks on shipping, both in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific. The reason for our present increased shipping losses has never been fully understood by us. There was a period when the Battle of the Atlantic seemed to be going well on the whole. We can understand that the comparative unreadiness of the United States to meet the submarine menace in American waters must naturally lead to a temporary increase in sinkings in that part of the world, but this scarcely appears to account for the whole of the increase, and I wonder whether you can tell us what other factors, if any, are operating: for example, whether there have been substantial additions to the Axis submarine strength and how this has come about, or whether new and more effective methods have been evolved by them, or any other reasons that may account for the serious position which we are all facing today.

I am very reluctant indeed to bother you with such questions, but these thoughts have occurred to me as a result of your telegram and think it would be useful if I could be informed as fully as possible of the whole picture, good and bad, before my visit in the near future to the United States.

See page 67, note 1.

With all good wishes.

152 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 14 July 1942

I much regret to advise that Colonel Tui Love,

Lieutenant-Colonel E. Te W. Love; CO 28th NZ (Maori) Battalion, 13 May – 12 Jul 1942; died of wounds, 12 Jul 1942.

commanding 28th (Maori) Battalion, has died of wounds received four days ago. Colonel Love was commanding his battalion with great courage and distinction and his loss to the Division is very great.

153 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence [Extract] 14 July 1942

The following is a short report on the situation in the Western Desert based on liaison officer's reports and situation reports from Inglis:

The 4th and 5th Brigades, Divisional Cavalry, and all the Artillery remain in the forward area in touch with the enemy. The 6th Brigade has been temporarily withdrawn to Wadi Natrun. The guns the New Zealand Division captured a week ago were the entire artillery of the Ariete Division. Our troops are in good condition and keen for decisive action, for which neither side appears ready. I cannot comment on the situation without having the full picture. I propose to attend the Commander-in-Chief's conference here (Cairo) tomorrow, after which I will begin to prepare an appreciation of the general situation for your information.

Our casualties are heavy but many of the wounds are light, and the shorter line of communication has had a good effect on the wounded, who reach hospital in excellent condition and recover rapidly.

Reports from the Division pay a glowing tribute to the gallantry and devotion to duty of the American Volunteer Field Service ambulance units serving with us. I suggest you might like to repeat this to Mr. Nash ….

In the text omitted General Freyberg discussed catering facilities established at Maadi for the 2nd NZEF.

154 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 18 July 1942

I have to report that the 4th and 5th Brigades, Divisional Artillery, and Divisional troops have again been in action. On the night of 14–15 July we did a night attack with an Indian division and reached our objective in a six-mile advance against strong enemy defences in depth. Over 1500 prisoners were captured. We suffered moderate casualties during the advance and, I fear, heavy casualties when the enemy counter-attacked in strength with tanks on the following day. The 19th and 20th Battalions of the 4th Brigade and the 22nd Battalion of the 5th Brigade suffered most heavily. So far there are no official details of casualties. The above details are based on a verbal report from Brigadier Burrows. The 4th Brigade has now been relieved by the 6th Brigade, the latter not yet having been in action. I am awaiting a further report from Inglis.

I regret to report that Colonel Sam Allen,

Lieutenant-Colonel S. F. Allen, OBE; CO 2nd NZ Divisional Signals, Jan 1940 – Sep 1941; CO 21st Battalion, Dec 1941 – May 1942, 13 Jun – 15 Jul 1942; commanded 5th Infantry Brigade, 10 May – 12 Jun 1942; killed in action, 15 Jul 1942.

commanding the 21st Battalion, died of wounds. He is another great loss. He was commanding the battalion with gallantry and distinction.

155 Headquarters 2nd NZEF to Army Headquarters (Wellington) 23 July 1942

The New Zealand Division carried out an attack during the night of 21–22 July and day of 22 July

El Mreir Depression.

. The fighting was severe and casualties, it is feared, are heavy. It is regretted that Lieutenant-Colonel Greville has been killed.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Greville; commanded advanced party 2nd NZEF, 1939; Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, 1940–41; CO 24th Battalion, Dec 1941 – Jul 1942; killed in action, Alamein, 22 Jul 1942.

156 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 9 August 1942

I have just finished visiting our General Hospitals at Beirut, the Canal Area, and Helwan following personal experience of the greatest skill and care at No. 1 General Hospital while recovering from my wound. I feel that at the present moment, when there are so many battle casualties in our hospitals, you would be reassured to know something of the wonderful work of our medical services in looking after battle casualties.

Our hospitals are excellently equipped. The saline bath recently bought by the New Zealand Government and installed here is invaluable as the most modern treatment for certain types of wounds. The skill of the doctors and the nursing is of the highest standard and all serious cases have special day and night nurses.

The Director of Medical Services

Brigadier H. S. Kenrick, CB, CBE, ED, was Director of Medical Services, 2nd NZEF, at this time. He held this appointment from 10 May – 18 Sep 1942 and 17 Apr 1943–22 May 1945. Brigadier K. MacCormick, CB, CBE, DSO, ED, was Deputy Director of Medical Services, 1 Oct 1940–8 Apr 1942, and Director of Medical Services, 8 Apr-10 May 1942 and 18 Sep 1942–17 Apr 1943.

reports that the wounded arrive in excellent condition due to quick evacuation, including evacuation by air ambulances now in constant use, and to the high standard of medical attention by our field ambulances, whose excellent equipment and efficiency have greatly impressed the Medical Mission at present visiting the Middle East.

A British group headed by Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Wilson, FRCSE, Regius Professor of Surgery, University of Aberdeen, sent specially to the Middle East to do medical research.

A wonderful spirit of efficiency and devotion to duty is evident amongst all doctors, sisters, and attached services both in the hospitals and in the field. Finally, the great work of the medical services receives continual inspiration from the magnificent spirit of our wounded.

157 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 11 August 1942

I have to report that I took over command of the Division yesterday but today received orders to take over command of 13th Corps temporarily due to the death of General Gott.

Lieutenant-General W. H. E. Gott, CBE, DSO, MC; GOC 7th Armoured Division, Sep 1941-Feb 1942; commanded 13th Corps, Feb-Aug 1942; killed in aircraft accident, 9 Aug 1942.

I have recalled Inglis to command the Division until someone arrives to take over command of the Corps. I will keep you in touch with the situation. Present indications are that the enemy will resume the offensive at an early date.

I visited the 5th and 6th Brigades today and found everyone fit and in good heart.

158 General Froyberg to the Minister of Defence 17 August 1942

I am now back in command of the Division.

The Division, less the 4th Infantry Brigade, is holding part of the forward position in the Western Desert. The 19th, 20th, 22nd, and 24th Battalions, which suffered most heavily, are at Maadi with Headquarters 4th Infantry Brigade refitting and training as fast as possible, but they are not up to establishment except for the 22nd Battalion, which returns here in a few days.

I feel it is my duty to report for your information that the situation here will be difficult for the next few weeks until additional heavy American tanks arrive. If the enemy attacks within the next week, Eighth Army will be hard put to it to maintain its position. Present indications point to the possibility of an enemy attack after 22 August.

Although heavy casualties during July blunted the Division, everyone is in good spirits, and I am certain the Division will again give a good account of itself. The knowledge that we are to be reinforced has given great satisfaction.

See Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade (No. 85).

159 General Freyberg to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) 17 August 1942

Many thanks for your cable.

Not published. See Volume III, Defence of New Zealand. In this telegram, dated 11 Aug, General Puttick reviewed the progress made in building up the Dominion's Home Defence forces. He stated that preparations were being made, subject to Government approval, to despatch the 3rd Division, under the command of Major-General Barrowclough, for an offensive role in the Pacific. Reinforcements for the 2nd Division were also being assembled.

Your congratulations to the Division have been published as a special order and I am showing the secret part to senior officers. The steady progress in equipment and organisation and the proposed offensive role are good news. I realise your difficulties with different medical categories and age groups. I feel sure that Barrowclough will do the proposed job admirably.

The position here is uncertain. Sweeping changes of command

On 15 Aug General Sir Harold Alexander had succeeded General Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and on 13 Aug Lieutenant-General B. L. Montgomery had succeeded General Auchinleck as GOC 8th Army. While Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, General Auchinleck had also commanded 8th Army from 25 Jun 1942.

were needed to bring fresh minds to bear on old problems of desert righting. The next few weeks will be difficult.

The help you are giving us is greatly appreciated. The decision to reinforce the 2nd NZEF was received with great satisfaction also in official quarters in the Middle East and War Office.

160 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 10 September 1942

As you know from Middle East situation reports, the Division has again been in action during the latest thrust into Egypt. The enemy offensive commenced on the night of 30–31 August, gaps being made in the minefield south of the New Zealand position. The minefields were not contested seriously, and next day the enemy advanced eastwards driving back our light armoured patrols. The enemy then swung north and came in contact with British heavy armoured formations working in pre-arranged battle positions, backed by large numbers of field guns and anti-tank guns east of the New Zealand position. The only tank battle joined took place in the evening of 31 August, when the enemy failed against our armour and artillery. Meanwhile the RAF and light armour were harassing the enemy's communications with success. During 1 and 2 September the enemy probed northwards without joining battle, and on the 3rd his withdrawals commenced.

Up to this stage the New Zealand Division was not seriously engaged except for the Artillery, which had harassed the northern flank of the enemy advance. Prior to the offensive our role had been to carry out harassing raids to upset the enemy's plans. Battalions of the 5th and 6th Brigades carried out very successful raids under heavy artillery barrages, important identifications being obtained and uneasiness caused on the central front. A large-scale raid on the night of 30–31 August coincided with the date of the enemy attack and probably caused considerable confusion. As the battle progressed, an enemy attack against the southern or south-eastern flank appeared to be imminent but did not develop. Offensive action was planned, and on the night of 3–4 September we attacked south in co-operation with British troops and tanks. The latter were held up by heavy fire. In our sector we reached our objectives, upsetting the relief of the German 90th Light Division by the Italian Trieste Division. Many of the enemy were killed, prisoners were taken, and equipment destroyed. On 4 September two counter-attacks from the south by German infantry, one with tanks, were launched, both being repulsed with heavy enemy losses, and three out of four enemy tanks coming forward were destroyed by six-pounder anti-tank guns. A further attack from the west was stopped by the fire of 120 guns. The New Zealand Artillery has played an important part in the battle. Antiaircraft gunners brought down several planes each day during the height of the enemy attack. On the night of 4–5 September, to avoid casualties by holding ground of no further tactical value, we withdrew to our original position. Since then the enemy has stabilised his front on minefields down to Himeimat.

The enemy certainly intended his attack to go through, but I do not consider that his withdrawal means he is on the defensive. The results of the recent engagements were highly satisfactory but were certainly not decisive. The time gained, however, makes us immeasurably stronger as reinforcements arrive and troops are trained for desert conditions. Our casualties during the latest operations were approximately 70 killed, 40 missing, and 250 wounded.

These are the figures given in General Freyberg's papers. The figures in the telegram on the Prime Minister's Department file are 40 killed, 20 missing, and 300 wounded.

I am exercised over our losses of senior officers in the last two months: one Brigadier and five commanding officers killed, one Brigadier and three commanding officers captured.

Brigadier J. R. Gray and Lieutenant-Colonels E. Te W. Love, S. F. Allen, A. W. Greville, J. N. Peart, and J. T. Russell were killed. Brigadier G. H. Clifton and Lieutenant-Colonels C. N. Watson, C. D'A. George, and R. J. Lynch were taken prisoner, Lynch dying of wounds on 26 Sep 1942 while a prisoner of war.

The New Zealand Division is now being relieved for a rest by the sea. Leave is being arranged, also baths, canteens, concert party, bands, &c. A period of refitting and training follows with a British armoured brigade under command. The 4th Brigade is now reorganising to become an armoured brigade, courses, &c., being arranged. After the long spell of active operations in the heat, the men deserve a rest and will benefit from it. I can assure you that in the fighting here they carried out their role in the manner expected of the New Zealand Division.

161 The acting Prime Minister to General Freyberg 14 September 1942

We are grateful to you for the résumé of operations in the recent engagement in Egypt which you give in your telegram of 10 September, and are glad to learn that once again the Division gave a satisfactory account of itself. The position regarding senior officers does occasion some concern and we have, after discussion with General Puttick, agreed that he should communicate with you further on this matter.

Subsequent telegrams dealt with the release and employment of certain named officers and have not been reproduced in this volume.

The Division has thoroughly earned the rest and we feel sure that all ranks will benefit by it. Best wishes to all ranks.

162 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 3 October 1942

The Division was withdrawn from the line on 10 September and spent seven days by the seaside. Four clear days' Cairo leave was given to 40 per cent of the Division. The amenities of the special leave camp at Maadi and the Club

New Zealand Forces Club, Cairo.

were fully enjoyed. Much Christmas shopping for New Zealand was done, as the post offices showed. We are now back training, refreshed by the short break.

The 4th Brigade remains at Maadi preparing for an armoured role.

See Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade.

It will be five or six months before they are ready to take the field.

The complete change in Middle East management has cleared the air. One good result is that they now insist that divisions must be kept intact. The result of this simple decision will be manifest in our future battles. It makes the position here much easier, as for two and a half years I have striven to prevent the New Zealand Division being divided into brigade groups, being convinced that by fighting as a division the maximum power is developed. They have gone further and adopted the German model of a permanent Desert Corps kept intact to train and fight as such. The New Zealand Division has been selected as the infantry division for the Desert Corps, otherwise comprising armoured divisions. As reported earlier, until our Armoured Brigade is ready the Army Commander has placed under our command the 9th British Armoured Brigade, comprising one Regular and two Yeomanry tank battalions and a motor battalion—excellent material, well equipped, but as yet lacking necessary training. We are thus the first division with the new British organisation to take the field in the war and we are now training hard to get full fighting efficiency. We are more powerfully armed than either a panzer division or a British armoured division, and the days of infantry being overrun by enemy armour, as on 1 December 1941 and 15 and 22 July 1942,

Belhamed, Ruweisat Ridge, and El Mreir Depression.

which brought long lists of prisoners, are I hope past.

Last week we held a full-scale Divisional exercise with full artillery support, firing live ammunition and employing the most modern tanks. I was greatly impressed by the result.

As you know, I have been concerned by the losses of senior officers. It is too early to say how the new commanding officers are shaping, but I feel certain that after the present training period they will do well. The offer of help received from Army Headquarters is much appreciated and I have communicated direct with General Puttick.

These telegrams have not been reproduced.

On 30 September at ceremonial parades General Montgomery

Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, KG, GCB, DSO; GOC 3rd Division, 1939–40; commanded 5th Corps, 1940; GOC 8th Army, Aug 1942–Jan 1944; GOC-in-C, British Group of Armies and Allied Armies, Northern France, 1944; commanded 21st Army Group, 1944–45; commanded British Army of the Rhine, 1945–46; Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1946–48; Permanent Military Chairman of Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Permanent Defence Organisation, 1948–; Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe, 1951–.

presented immediate awards, including the Victoria Cross to Sergeant Elliott.

Sergeant K. Elliott was awarded the Victoria Cross for most conspicuous gallantry at Ruweisat Ridge on 15 Jul 1942. He was commissioned in May 1943.

The troops looked fine and the marching was of a high order. General Montgomery said afterwards that he was greatly inspired by the appearance of the New Zealand Division, and in addressing a parade of the 9th Armoured Brigade later in the afternoon he said: ‘It is a great honour to have been placed with the 2nd New Zealand Division. They are a veteran division, and I know you will strive to live up to the record they have established here in the Middle East.’

The weather is now cooler and flies are fewer. As you know, the Division has been through a difficult period, but the men are very fit and in excellent heart. Better equipped than ever before, your Division, after the present training period, will be ready as part of the Desert Corps for any future operations in the Battle of Egypt.

163 Letter from General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 14 October 1942Dear Prime Minister,

I am back from the Western Desert for thirty-six hours to see the Commander-in-Chief about keeping the New Zealand Government in touch at all times with the situation. It takes a new Commander-in-Chief some time to understand the relationship of a Dominion force to its own Government. They are prone to look upon us as just another British division. They are inclined to tell us what we may send in the way of information. If I were to agree to the last proposal it would have had the effect of muzzling me completely. I meet him tomorrow morning and shall tell him that I am in duty bound to send you a full and frank opinion of any operation contemplated where the Division is to be employed, that I have done so in the past, and that the New Zealand Government expect it of me in the future. I do not expect I shall have any difficulty except under two distinct headings.

The Commander-in-Chief is always anxious about our sending any dates or intentions dealing with future operations, and in this I know you will fully appreciate and understand their point of view. The second restriction they wish to impose from our point of view is less easy for us to sympathise with. They want to stop any candid account from me being sent after the battle. It is inconvenient, I agree, in many cases, because it may throw too much light upon aspects which they wish to repress. An instance in point was the fighting round Tobruk in November last year when the Division came in at Sidi Rezegh and saved the situation. We have no wish to make difficulties, but I do feel that we owe it to the men when they fight so magnificently to let the people of New Zealand know the whole truth.

As you will have gathered from my cables to you earlier in the year, they were very anxious about Turkey and, indeed, Persia and our northern flank generally.

See Syria.

The loss of the Persian oilfields would have been a great blow to the war effort out here in the Middle East. In all those negotiations I felt that the New Zealand Government had to be told the full story as, difficult as it all was, I assured General Auchinleck that it was the only way—that you were entitled to know.

The spring here was a difficult period. We were training the Division in desert warfare and planning also for an 800-mile advance up to the Dardanelles. Then, without any warning, I was sent on a reconnaissance of the area in north-west Persia near the Caspian Sea. It was a long, hot, tiring motor journey across the desert, often 120 degrees in the shade, then up into the snows of the Persian Highlands over 10,000 feet up. I sent you cables about this because I do not think it right that an operation should be contemplated without your being informed.

See Syria (No. 141). In a further telegram on 20 Jun General Freyberg reported on this reconnaissance as follows:

The journey across Mesopotamia to the Caspian area and back was very severe. I returned to go down with a touch of sun but am better. Extreme heat up to 120 degrees in the plains but cold on the plateaus and mountain passes up to 10,000 feet and temperature freezing point. Should operations take place we would need an advanced base north of Basra, sending hospitals and reinforcements by the Red Sea and Persian Gulf at the hottest time of the year. The Basra area is very hot and malarial.

It was while I was near the Caspian Sea that we heard that Bir Hacheim had fallen, and then I knew we should be wanted in the Western Desert. I came back by air to Cairo. I arrived on 15 June in time to send the cable which started the New Zealand Division upon the most remarkable military move in history.

See No. 142.

They came down 1200 miles in eight days by MT to Mersa Matruh, ready to fight on 25 June. On arrival I received three separate sets of orders:

(1)

To go on to the frontier.

(2)

To take up a defensive position west of Mersa Matruh.

(3)

To occupy the defences of Mersa Matruh.

This continual vacillation shook me, but not nearly as much as the tempo or condition of the troops coming down the Sidi Barrani road. I was anxious when I sent you my telegram telling you there would be hard fighting.

No. 144.

What I was most anxious about was not to allow panic orders to put us in an impossible position. I was determined to appeal to the New Zealand Government if necessary and I went to see the Eighth Army Commander

Lieutenant-General N. M. (later General Sir Neil) Ritchie, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC; GOC 51st Highland Division, 1940–41; GOC 8th Army 26 Nov 1941–25 Jun 1942; commanded 52nd Lowland Division, 1942–43; 12th Corps, British Liberation Army, 1944–45; GOC-in-C Scottish Command, 1945–47; C-in-C Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia, 1947–49; Chairman and Commander of British Joint Services Mission, Washington, 1949–.

to protest against being shut up in Mersa Matruh. This could only have ended in one way. My next orders were to go into the Naghamish Wadi

First Echelon units had been employed in digging an anti-tank ditch here in June and July 1940.

—also an impossible position. Again I pointed out the inadvisability of committing a highly trained division to such a mission. Eventually I persuaded them to let us meet the full thrust of the German Army head on. We picked an area on the high ground south of Mersa Matruh, where there was room to manœuvre and use our powerful guns to the full.

We had painted out our Divisional sign on the vehicles and taken off our New Zealand badges, and our advent into the battle was electric. We hit the 21st Panzer Division very hard. It was a complete surprise to them to meet us. They turned and attacked us five separate times, twice with all their tanks, and were repulsed each time. It was during the last of these attacks that I was hit. I had gone forward to see how our front troops were faring. In this class of warfare the car is the only method of travel—on foot is too slow. I suppose it is the law of averages that settles these things. It is difficult to command unless you are on the spot to see for yourself. There are times in all battles when a Commander must go forward or be out of touch.

So much for that side of the battle. I am sad about our losses. The loss of Colonel Love was great. I am sure that the losses must be offset against the fact that but for the resolute fighting qualities of our men Egypt would have been in enemy hands at this moment.

The hot weather is now over.

Long before you receive this letter you will have news of further battles. I know the Division will do well. I hope the results will be as good as they should be….

A personal message has been omitted.

I have, &c., B. C. Freyberg

164 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 15 October 1942

The following message is sent with the concurrence of the Com mander-in-Chief, Middle East, to whom it has been shown:

The New Zealand Division has been allotted a role for the forthcoming offensive of Eighth Army in respect of which I wish to give you the following information:

We are at present in 10th Corps, described in my telegram of 3 October (No. 162) as the Desert Corps. The plan provides for the New Zealand Division to take part in the initial attack and operations as a mobile division, with armoured divisions, to exploit success should that be possible.

Full use has been made of the present training period to train the new commanders and staff officers and to co-operate with our armoured brigade. We are, in my opinion, well trained for any operation we may be fighting in.

As reported in my telegram of 3 October, we are better equipped than ever before. Further, the 9th Armoured Brigade with us and the British armoured divisions have been greatly strengthened by the arrival of modern, powerful tanks. The situation has changed completely and we have substantial tank and air superiority.

Secrecy is of course vital. You will be advised of the commencement of operations by General Headquarters in the usual way. It is hoped that strategic surprise will be achieved. Tactical surprise is of paramount importance. I earnestly ask, therefore, that as before no public statement be made concerning your Division before our presence in the line is announced in the official communique. We have no illusions about the hard fighting still to be done, but for the first time it would appear that we will meet the enemy without weakness in vital items of equipment. Would you kindly acknowledge this cable.

165 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 28 October 1942

The great battle in Egypt has opened well, although one cannot yet forecast its result. The enemy are short of ammunition and fuel, and we have just destroyed a most important tanker on which they were counting. Our forces are substantially superior in the air, in armour, including the best armour, in artillery fire, and in numbers, and they have far easier lines of communication. Rommel is seriously ill and has only been brought back as an extreme measure. In Alexander

Field-Marshal Viscount Alexander, KG, GCB, GCMG, CSI, DSO, MC; GOC-in-C, Southern Command, 1940–42; GOC Burma, 1942; C-in-C Middle East, 1942–43; commanded 18th Army Group, 1943; Deputy C-in-C, North Africa, and Allied Forces, Mediterranean, 1943; GOC Allied Forces and Military Governor, Sicily, 1943–44; C-in-C Allied Armies in Italy, 1944; Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, 1944–45; Governor-General of Canada, 1946–.

and Montgomery we have Generals determined to fight the battle out to the very end. Should they succeed, it will be very difficult for the enemy army to make a good retreat on account of his shortage of transport and fuel. It is therefore much better for us to fight him to a finish on this ground than farther west.

You will have seen with pride and pleasure all that your valiant New Zealanders are doing and the part they are playing in what may well be a memorable event.

166 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 30 October 1942

As you know, the Division has again been in action in the Battle for Egypt. In the opening attack on the night of 23 October your Division went forward with the South Africans on one flank and the Highlanders and Australians on the other.

These were the 1st South African, 51st Highland, and 9th Australian Divisions.

It was a very long and difficult night attack against prepared positions and over ground thickly sown with mines and booby traps. While our artillery were firing the greatest timed concentrations yet seen in Africa, our infantry went through to their objective, the vital Miteiriya Ridge, which they captured in company with South African forces. They were followed by the sappers, who cleared gaps in the minefields for tanks and guns. All counter-attacks were repulsed during the succeeding days and our position was made secure by a further night attack.

We have just been withdrawn from our sector for further operations in the course of the next few days. Our casualties to date are as follows:

Killed: 15 officers, 148 other ranks

Wounded: 46 officers, 901 other ranks

Missing: 5 officers, 162 other ranks

I have made it clear to the Army Commander that since June we have had very heavy casualties. For the next attack he has attached to us two British brigades,

The 151st (Tyneside) Brigade and 152nd Highland Brigade from the 50th British Division and 51st Highland Division respectively.

which will enable us to conserve our infantry for a mobile role if and when a gap is made for the armour to go through. As a result of the operations I can report that our present equipment compares favourably with the Germans'. Air support has been on a satisfactory scale.

I am sending this report from the battlefield just before we move into a new position. I hope you will therefore forgive its brevity due to pressure of operational matters. This is a hard battle and I want the New Zealand Government to know that the next phase will also be severe and difficult. I can assure you that the training of your Division has stood the test of a most exacting battle and that the morale of the men is excellent.

167 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 3 November 1942

As forecast in my telegram of 30 October, following the consolidation of the front after the capture of Miteiriya Ridge, the New Zealand Division moved north alongside the Australian Division and took over the line with the 6th Brigade. To conserve our strength two brigades of English and Scottish troops were placed under the command of the New Zealand Division, and at moonrise in the early morning of 1–2 November they launched an attack under an intense artillery bombardment. We finally breached all the enemy minefields and passed through our own 9th Armoured Brigade and one armoured division, which joined battle with the German Panzer divisions. The attack was planned and controlled entirely by the New Zealand Division and was a great success. Approximately two thousand prisoners were captured, the majority being Germans.

The present situation here is shaping well. I feel that it is rash to make a forecast regarding the fighting here in the Western Desert, which has been productive of so many disappointments. For the information of the Government, perhaps it would help if I gave my opinion for what it is worth. I feel that the future here is bright. I believe the German resistance was finally broken by the last attack and the cumulative effect of artillery fire during the last ten days. I feel that the present German position is precarious, that we shall push him back in the near future to the frontier, and later, under certain conditions, I am led to hope we may eventually clear Africa.

168 The Prime Minister to General Freyberg 5 November 1942

The Minister of Defence and I are most grateful for your messages, which we have found most informative and helpful and which we have warmly welcomed. We are delighted to hear of the success of the New Zealand Division under your leadership, and on behalf of the Government and people of New Zealand I should be glad if you would accept and convey to all ranks our warmest congratulations and every good wish.

The operations have been closely followed here from day to day, and we are proud to know that the New Zealand Division has once again proved its qualities and has maintained its world-wide reputation as a fighting force second to none.

169 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 November 1942

The fresh distinction gained by the 2nd New Zealand Division under Bernard Freyberg in the memorable Battle of Egypt calls for my warmest congratulations. They have played a glorious part in what may well become a decisive victory.

170 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 6 November 1942

Thank you so much for the very kind message in your telegram of 5 November. We are delighted at the turn events have taken and are very proud of our Division.

171 The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to the Chief of the General Staff (Wellington) 6 November 1942

In the Eighth Army's victory in the Western Desert, the 2nd New Zealand Division under General Freyberg has played a part worthy of its splendid history. Its fighting spirit and achievements during the decisive battles of the last two weeks have been magnificent.

172 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 8 November 1942

Further to my telegram of 3 November (No. 167), the situation has continued to develop favourably.

On 4 November the New Zealand Division, with the British Light Armoured Brigade

4th Light Armoured Brigade.

and a battery of medium artillery under command, motored out from south of the breach made on 2 November, swung south of the armoured battle then in progress, and thrust north on Fuka. On the evening of 5 November we contacted the enemy rearguard position south of Fuka, covered by a minefield, tanks, and guns. Eight enemy tanks were destroyed during the day and prisoners taken, including GOC Trento Division and his staff. A breach was forced in the minefield by evening and the enemy retired that night. On 6 November the New Zealand Division was directed on the Baggush area. Our forward elements found that the enemy had withdrawn farther west but were holding a rearguard position near Minqar Qaim, where they were engaged by another British armoured formation which destroyed 15 enemy tanks and 12 guns. Meanwhile, dense traffic moving west was reported on the roads west of Matruh.

On the main road, on aerodromes, and in the positions the enemy tried to hold, there is abundant evidence of disorganised retreat. Abandoned vehicles, aircraft, guns and equipment, and groups of disarmed enemy being marched eastward are to be seen from Alamein to Baggush. Some enemy groups are endeavouring to get away westward; others were cheerfully giving themselves up.

It remains to be seen whether the enemy has reserve dumps of ammunition and equipment, &c., on his Lines of Communication to re-equip the disorganised forces he has been able to extricate. The depleted Panzer Corps are reported to be streaming west of Sidi Barrani today. I thought they would endeavour to hold the frontier or go right back to Agheila. I consider the latter course is more likely.

Today, owing to heavy rainfall, we are held up in the waterlogged desert and petrol and supplies have not yet reached us. Tomorrow we have been ordered to take Matruh, if that is necessary, and then press on along the coast road towards Sollum. British armoured formations are moving west with all speed in the south with the intention of cutting off the enemy's retreat, while the RAF batters the coast road and the Halfaya defile.

I am glad to report that during these recent operations our casualties have been light: 3 killed and 17 wounded. This situation will continue until the enemy stands and endeavours to stabilise the front.

Despite the miserable climatic conditions of the last two days, spirits are high in the present atmosphere of victory. I feel that, although optimistic, the forecast in my last cable

No. 167.

may not prove inaccurate.

173 General Freyberg to the Prime Minister 15 November 1942

Your inspiring message of congratulation to the Division from the Government and people of New Zealand has just reached us, having been delayed owing to congestion in signals traffic.

No. 168.

An extract has been published in orders and will, I know, be deeply appreciated by all ranks. We are indeed glad that on this occasion the atmosphere of victory replaces the grim stories of withdrawals and rearguards which the Government and people of New Zealand have borne so unflinchingly for the last two years. May it mark the turning of the tide leading to final victory and our return home. This success has been a proud moment for us all and one which the New Zealand Division deserves after fighting so many gallant battles against very great odds.

I deeply appreciated your personal message to me and am glad my reports before the offensive and from the battlefield have been of help to you.

A brief account of the campaign for publication follows.

174 General Freyberg to the Minister of Defence 19 November 1942

We are now outside Tobruk. Our advance from the Alamein position took just over a week, during which British armoured formations and the 2nd New Zealand Division drove the defeated enemy from Egypt. I am taking advantage of a short lull to cable a brief report for publication in the hope that it will give the people of New Zealand a connected story of the battles in which the 2nd New Zealand Division has been engaged.

When the German attack in August failed to pierce the Allied position at Alamein, the enemy had either to stake all on holding his line with its difficult communications or go right back. Rommel decided to stay, and while Eighth Army trained for the attack the enemy extended his minefields and prepared defences in great depth. The nature of the country, the extent of the minefields, and the number of automatic weapons made a daylight attack extremely hazardous, while a night attack was most difficult owing to the depth to which it had to penetrate. The best solution, therefore, was to attack in moonlight, and the October full moon was fixed for the offensive.

The Division was withdrawn from the line on 11 September after taking part in the battles of Minqar Qaim, Ruweisat Ridge, and Alamein—nearly three months in the front line during the heat of the Egyptian summer. The men were tired, but after a short break they started to train for the next exacting battle. Spirits were high for we were about to attack. On ground similar to the ridge we were to attack, we rehearsed during the September full moon with tanks, artillery, and all infantry supporting arms firing live ammunition. The spirit of optimism increased as the infantry, artillery, and the new heavy tanks trained together. The remaining two weeks were used to correct shortcomings and improve technique. Nobody doubted our ability to capture Miteiriya Ridge. We felt confident the infantry would overcome any opposition in a night attack. The problem was to lift the minefields and get forward the vehicles of the supporting arms and the tanks. If we could achieve this, no enemy counter-attack could succeed against our defences of six-pounder and two-pounder anti-tank guns and heavy tanks in hull-down positions ready to prevent our infantry from being overrun.

On 14 October we ceased training and started to assemble for the attack. For days before the attack the ASC companies under the command of Colonel Crump

Brigadier S. H. Crump, CBE, DSO; CRASC, 2nd NZ Division, 1940–45; commanded rear party organisation in Mediterranean, 1946–47; commanded 2nd NZEF (Japan), Jun-Sep 1947; on staff of HQ BCOF and NZ representative on Disposals Board in Japan, 1948–49.

were bringing ammunition and supplies up to the front line.

To achieve surprise, deception and camouflage played a large part in our preparations. Guns and ammunition were brought up and dug in by night. The guns had been calibrated and surveyed in so that they would not need to open fire to register and thus give away their presence.

The infantry brigades brought up before daylight on the 23rd lay waiting all day for the attack that night while their transport was withdrawn. At dusk on 23 October the routes from the back areas to our front line began to fill up in orderly sequence with anti-tank guns, Bren carriers, mortars, and tanks to support the infantry, and behind them again there rumbled up the heavy tanks and transport of the British armoured divisions. It was brilliant moonlight. Every man was tense as zero hour approached. Suddenly, with a single crash, over 500 guns opened fire in the greatest barrage seen in Africa. The opening roar of the guns was the sign for the assault infantry armed with rifle and bayonet, tommy gun and Bren, to move to the start line, and half an hour later they went forward with the barrage. The 5th Infantry Brigade was on the right, commanded by Brigadier Kippenberger, and the 6th Infantry Brigade on the left, commanded by Brigadier Gentry. The attack was planned in two phases. The 23rd Battalion on the right and the 24th Battalion on the left were to capture the enemy's forward defences. The Maori Battalion had the role of mopping up centres of resistance left in the course of the advance. The 21st and 22nd Battalions on the right and the 25th and 26th Battalions on the left were to leapfrog over the first two battalions to capture the final objective, Miteiriya Ridge. The enemy defences were manned by German infantry, and throughout the 6000-yards advance strongpoint after strongpoint had to be taken at the point of the bayonet. In clouds of dust and smoke the inevitable uncertainty of war prevailed (in some companies all the officers became casualties) but the attack went on. For hours the situation was obscure, but at last signals came back from one battalion and then another, ‘We are on the objective’.

By morning Miteiriya Ridge was in our hands. The infantry assault was magnificiently carried out by our infantry and by the Australians, Highlanders, and South Africans on the whole Corps front. In such an attack casualties must be expected and we had all suffered, but we had driven a great wedge in the enemy line. I pay tribute here to the great work of our Divisional medical services under Colonel Ardagh

Brigadier P. A. Ardagh, CBE, DSO, MC; OC Surgical Division, 2nd NZ General Hospital, Aug 1940 – Oct 1941; commanded 1st NZ Casualty Clearing. Station, Nov 1941 – Jan 1942, Feb–May, 1942; commanded Mobile Surgical Unit, 9 Jan – 27 Feb 1942; ADMS 2nd NZ Division, May 1942 – Feb 1943; seconded to British Army for duty as DDMS, 30 Corps, Feb 1943; died in United Kingdom, 6 Apr 1944.

who looked after the wounded. Many lives were saved by our blood transfusion units and the fully equipped surgical team.

While the infantry assault went forward, our engineers and provost followed close behind. The success of the attack depended on the skill and determination with which they lit tracks on the line of advance and detected and lifted all the mines and booby traps on the whole route from our own front line to the final objective. Great credit is due to the Divisional Engineers under Lieutenant-Colonel Hanson

Brigadier F. M. H. Hanson, DSO, OBE, MM; commanded 7th Field Company, NZ Engineers, Jan 1940 – Aug 1941; Commander Royal Engineers, 2nd NZ Division, Oct 1941 – Apr 1944, Nov 1944 – Jan 1946; Chief Engineer, 2nd NZEF, 1943–46.

and to the provost personnel for their vital work. Anti-tank guns and infantry weapons were rushed along the lit routes to be dug in on the objective before daylight. The tanks followed, and by dawn we were ready to meet the Panzer counter-thrust.

During 24 and 25 October the fighting on Miteiriya Ridge continued, but both brigades, supported by artillery, anti-tank guns, machine guns and tanks, held all ground, and on the night of 25–26 October the 6th Brigade went forward in another determined attack which consolidated the position. I wish to pay tribute to the gallant support of the tank regiments of the 9th Armoured Brigade under Brigadier Currie

Brigadier J. C. Currie, DSO, MC.

who went into action with us for the first time.

We held the line until 27 October, when we handed over the sector to the 1st South African Division for a short relief before returning to the line alongside the Australians, who had been attacking continuously and most successfully along the coast.

On the night of 1–2 November we attacked again to breach the enemy position for our armour to sally out. To conserve the strength of our infantry brigades weakened by losses in the earlier attacks, General Montgomery placed the Tyneside Brigade and the Highland Brigade under command. These two brigades and the Maori Battalion attacked, supported by an even greater concentration of artillery than in the first attack, under the command of our CRA, Brigadier Weir. By the end of the attack the gunners had fired nearly 8000 rounds per gun without rest during the ten days of battle.

The infantry went forward with great dash, admirably supported by our engineers, machine-gunners, signalmen, and the whole Divisional organisation, and captured all their objectives. Despite heavy casualties, tanks of the 9th Armoured Brigade and the Divisional Cavalry broke through the enemy gunline. It was this attack, following so quickly on the first series of attacks, that finally made the breach through which 10th Corps, comprising two armoured divisions and the mobile 2nd New Zealand Division, was passed on 4 November.

The role of the armoured divisions was to seek out and destroy the Panzer divisions, while the 2nd New Zealand Division and the British 4th Light Armoured Brigade, comprising tanks and armoured cars under our orders, were to move west, avoiding the armoured battle to the north, and cut the enemy communications at Fuka, 60 miles behind the enemy line. It was a difficult manœuvre, especially as the majority of our battalions had to embus from positions in the front line. Congestion and shelling at the gap and an armoured battle en route delayed progress, and when darkness came the brigades were still miles apart. Concentration by night in unknown enemy country, 25 miles behind his line, is a difficult operation, and it was not till two hours before dawn on the 5th that all units had concentrated, using as an assembly beacon a blazing ammunition lorry hit by enemy fire in a night skirmish.

Before dawn on the 5th our advance continued, the force moving in desert formation over open desert with armoured cars and tanks ahead. At daylight we encountered a column of the latest type of German Mark 3 and 4 tanks, eight of which the 4th Light Armoured Brigade surprised and disposed of in as many minutes. Fires and explosions from enemy dumps on the coast could be seen during the day as we moved westwards, and reports of precipitate retreat were received. Later in the day our tanks and artillery drove off the rearguard covering the Fuka position.

On 6 November we were directed on Baggush, where unfortunately a heavy storm turned the desert into a morass, and all wheeled transport not using the coastal road was bogged. The enemy made full use of this respite but had to leave behind many guns and trucks caught in the mud.

On the 8th the weather improved and we pushed on, passing within sight of our June battlefield at Minqar Qaim. The enemy at this stage had evacuated Matruh fortress and the Division and attached troops were directed on Sidi Barrani.

Sidi Barrani was occupied on the 9th, and on 10 November we advanced on the heavily defended escarpment at Halfaya. The pursuit continued along roads strewn with all manner of wreckage and abandoned vehicles, eloquent tribute to the RAF, whose fighters and bombers had given the Army magnificent support throughout the battle.

Below Halfaya escarpment our light armoured advanced guard was held up by the enemy covered by a minefield, but as we deployed to attack the enemy withdrew. By dark on the 10th the 5th Brigade moved forward through the minefield to the support of the 4th Light Armoured Brigade. Halfaya, the last of the Axis fortresses to fall last year, is a formidable defensive position. A surprise attack was decided on, and just before daylight on Armistice Day 110 men of the 21st Battalion went in with Bren guns and bayonets. It was a complete success. We had one killed and one wounded and took 612 prisoners, some German but mainly Italians of the Pistoia Division, whose motto is ‘Valiant even unto Death!’ Sollum fell automatically and Egypt was clear of the enemy.

The enemy is still retreating and we are now waiting to go forward to the final objective.

Your Division has again added to its record by a series of battles and operations which reflect the greatest credit on Brigadiers, commanding officers, and junior commanders for the way they have trained and commanded during battle. The courage and tenacity of our fighting soldiers remains of the highest order. The training, equipment, and efficiency of the Force has stood the test of a most exacting campaign

New Zealand casualties in the Battle of Egypt (20 Jun – 21 Nov 1942) were:

Killed866Died of wounds414Died on active service (includes deaths through sickness, accident, &c.)50Wounded3704Prisoners of war (includes 250 wounded and prisoners of war and 36 died of wounds while prisoners of war)1950Total6984

and we look to the future with confidence.

I am sending this from my office truck. An official and detailed account of the campaign with maps, diagrams, and lessons is in course of preparation.

Proposed Withdrawal of 2nd New Zealand Division (November-December 1942)

175 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom (Wellington)

Sir Harry Fagg Batterbee, GCMG, KCVO, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in New Zealand, 1939–45.

14 November 1942

We are very anxious, as you know, to retain the New Zealand Division in the Middle East, in the first place because of the excellent work it has done, more particularly in the present operations. It was also our hope that it would be re-formed into a still more powerful weapon as a result of the promotion of the New Zealand Armoured Brigade in accordance with the arrangements contemplated in the New Zealand Government's telegram of 9 September.

See Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade (No. 92).

The shipping position is growing more and not less difficult and current operations naturally involve increased demands upon shipping, so that very serious embarrassment would be caused by the diversion of further shipping to replace the New Zealand Division in the Middle East. Lastly, however favourably the present North African operations may develop, the threat from the Caucasus to the Persia-Iraq Command will still remain and may become a grave danger, and we cannot afford to neglect our strength there or to weaken it unnecessarily.

At the same time, Mr. Fraser's difficulties as regards manpower are fully appreciated. Having regard to the manpower situation in New Zealand, the repeated requests by the United States authorities for more New Zealand troops for the Pacific theatre are clearly an embarrassment to the New Zealand Government.

See Volume III, Formation and Employment of 3rd New Zealand Division.

It would seem desirable to obtain the considered advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington, who would look at the position in the light of the general situation (including both the North Africa and Persia-Iraq and Pacific theatres) and the shipping position as a whole. Please suggest to Mr. Fraser that the desirability of this course should be urged upon the United States authorities.

A copy of this message was delivered to Mr. Fraser on 18 Nov.

176 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 19 November 1942

I feel that the time has come when I must raise with you the question of the return from the Middle East of the 2nd New Zealand Division. In doing so I assure you that I am fully aware of the exigencies of the war situation both in this part of the world and in the North African theatre. For some considerable time we in New Zealand have been of the opinion that, in view of the growing difficulties of the manpower position and of our increased and increasing commitments in the Pacific area, this request should be made, but both my colleagues and I felt that it would be inappropriate to do so in the adverse circumstances which have existed hitherto in the Middle East and in Russia. However, it was always my intention at the proper time and when the situation in Egypt became easier, to place the whole position before you. It was felt as late as August of this year, when approval was given for the despatch of reinforcements for the Middle East,

See Formation of New Zealand Armoured Brigade (No. 89).

that the urgent needs of that theatre outweighed those of the area in which New Zealand itself is situated. Now, however, with the launching of the most promising Anglo-American offensive,

United States and British forces under the command of General Eisenhower landed in North Africa on 8 Nov.

the immediate security of the Middle East, which we have always regarded as of such vital importance, appears for all practical purposes to have been achieved, and with the accession of large new forces from the United States and Britain the presence of one New Zealand division in this theatre becomes a matter of diminishing importance. Here in the Pacific, on the other hand, we are faced not only with the possibility that Japan may launch further offensive action, both to retrieve the situation resulting from her recent setbacks and to take advantage of the preoccupations of the United Nations in Europe and in Africa, but also with what we regard as the necessity that the United Nations should launch a counter-offensive at the earliest possible date. It is felt that the place of the 2nd New Zealand Division in either case is here in the South Pacific.

Now that, at our own request, the New Zealand land and air forces have been placed under the Commander of the South Pacific Area,

Vice-Admiral W. F. Halsey, United States Navy, had succeeded Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley on 18 Oct 1942 as Commander South Pacific Area. See also Volume III.

we anticipate that increasingly heavy demands will inevitably be made upon the resources of this Dominion, both in manpower and in materials. Already, as you know, in response to requests from the Commander of the South Pacific Area, we have readily and promptly agreed to send a New Zealand division for service in the Islands, and part of it has already proceeded to its several destinations.

See Volume III, Formation and Employment of 3rd NZ Division. The 3rd NZ Division sailed from New Zealand for New Caledonia in November–December 1942. In October the 34th Battalion had been detached from the 3rd Division to garrison Tonga and the 36th Battalion was sent to Norfolk Island.

It has been decided that, in addition to our Army commitments, the New Zealand Air Force also should be trained and equipped to undertake an offensive role in the Pacific, and I should add that for some time now a large proportion of our limited force of modern aircraft has been operating in Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, and other Pacific islands. New Zealand is now endeavouring to complete preparations for an air force of sixteen squadrons to serve in the Pacific, with an ultimate aim of achieving a force of thirty squadrons.

It will be appreciated that with our extremely limited manpower resources, which have now reached straining point, it is impossible for us to maintain two divisions overseas and an adequate Home Defence force in addition to our air commitments, which include of course the Empire Air Training Scheme, and our comparatively small, but increasingly useful, naval units. In fact the limit of our manpower resources in New Zealand has been reached. Up to the present over 163,000 men and 5000 women have been taken from industry. We now find ourselves unable to reach the establishment which our Chiefs of Staff laid down as the minimum force required for the defence of the Dominion.

See Volume III, Defence of New Zealand.

The question of production of food and other supplies, both for the United Kingdom and the South Pacific Area, also arises. The United States Forces are becoming increasingly dependent on New Zealand's resources for those essential supplies and services which we must endeavour to provide under the Mutual Aid Agreement.

On 3 Sep 1942, by an exchange of notes between the United States Secretary of State (Cordell Hull) and the New Zealand Minister in Washington (Hon. W. Nash), New Zealand and the United States agreed to exchange mutual aid.

To maintain production it has already become necessary to strip the Army of a large number of its personnel and return such men to industry, and in considering the needs of essential industry and our commitments in respect of the armed forces, we are now forced to come to the decision to reduce establishment below the level which our military advisers regard as sufficient.

I think that you should be told also of the attitude of the New Zealand people, both Maori and European, towards the return of the 2nd Division from overseas. The First Echelon left New Zealand three years ago next January and the greater proportion of the men now fighting in the Middle East have been away from this country for well over two years. There is general feeling in the country that our men have a strong claim to return, particularly in view of the extremely heavy casualties which our Division has suffered—some 18,500 so far out of a total of 43,500 sent to the Middle East—and further, that our own tried and well-trained troops should be used in the Pacific area for the defence of New Zealand.

Lastly, I must draw your attention to the effect on public opinion in New Zealand of the possible withdrawal of the 9th Australian Division from the Middle East, concerning which Mr. Curtin has now sent me advice.

This telegram, dated 16 Nov, is not published. It contained for Mr. Fraser's information a copy of a telegram from Mr. Curtin to President Roosevelt on the withdrawal of the 9th Division from the Middle East.

It will be appreciated that it would be absolutely impossible for the New Zealand Government to resist the strong feeling to which I have referred should it become known that all three Australian divisions have returned. Therefore, I feel bound to place the whole matter fully and frankly before you and to ask that effect should be given to this request as soon as circumstances permit.

I fully realise that there will be difficulties and embarrassments, particularly in regard to shipping, but I hope that it will be possible to make some adequate and early provision.

The despatch of the reinforcements which we had undertaken to send to the Middle East, and for which transport is already bound for New Zealand is, of course, the urgent question at the moment. It will be necessary, therefore, to give further consideration to this matter upon receipt of your reply to this telegram.

In conclusion, I would like to make it plain that it is not our intention to regard the 2nd NZEF as a force to be stationed permanently in New Zealand itself. We are firmly convinced that a long and difficult conflict with Japan lies ahead, irrespective of the success of any operations against Italy and Germany, and that a forward move against Japan must be made by the United Nations at the earliest possible date. We would wish to participate to the fullest extent of our capacity in any such offensive in the Pacific.

Unmistakable evidence of its fixed determination to fight this war through to the end has, I hope, been given by this Dominion, and the losses we have suffered in successive campaigns are proof of the spirit of the New Zealand people and of their willingness to make every sacrifice to this end.

I know that you will give full and sympathetic consideration to this matter, and that the reasons which induce me to raise it will be appreciated.

177 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 24 November 1942

Your telegram of 19 November.

It would cause me much regret to see the New Zealand Division quit the scene of its glories, but I quite understand your feelings and am aware how embarrassing the withdrawal of the 9th Australian Division would be to you. At my request the whole situation is being reviewed by the Chiefs of Staff in London. In the meanwhile, I send you a copy of the telegram I have today despatched to Mr. Curtin. I am sure that, having regard to the great contribution the United States are now making to the defence of the Southern Pacific and the still greater efforts we must expect from them, it would be a mistake for Australia and New Zealand to ignore the opinion of the United States military authorities.

178 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 24 November 1942

The following is a repetition of my telegram to Mr. Curtin:

We recognise, of course, that the withdrawal of the 9th Australian Division from the Mediterranean theatre rests with the Commonwealth Government. However, the United States Forces are now heavily engaged both in helping to defend Australia and in mastering French North Africa as a prelude to further action in Europe. Therefore, they are entitled to have the opportunity of considering the position as a whole and of making any representations to you which may appear to them desirable.

It appears probable that the Eastern Mediterranean will be the scene of large-scale action in the early spring, and the position of Turkey is therefore of peculiar interest. Should the 9th Australian Division be withdrawn to Australia, it will, of course, have to be replaced in time either by British or American forces. The present acute and aggravated shipping stringency makes it necessary to save tonnage as much as possible. For instance, it might be most economical to move one of the American divisions in Australia or destined for the Pacific direct to Suez, where the 9th Australian Division could be picked up on the return journey. There might be no other way of maintaining the necessary strength in the Middle East. On the other hand, it might be possible to transport the Australians from the Middle East as an isolated shipping operation. This again would necessarily be at the expense of our general power to move troops about the world, and would have to be considered in its relation to the dominating military exigencies. The matter is one on which the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington, who alone have the central point of view, should advise in the first instance.

So far as we are concerned, your wishes, of course, will not be opposed, although we greatly regret the departure from the Middle East theatre of a division which has rendered distinguished service. The object should be to bring the greatest number of United Nations' divisions into contact with the enemy, and certainly it would appear more helpful to the common cause if fresh troops were moved from the United States into the Pacific and into action against Japan, rather than that troops already engaged with the enemy in another part of the world should be withdrawn.

I feel bound to put these points before you as I know the great importance which you have always attached to American opinion, and also how much you value the substantial aid the United States has given to the defence of Australia.

179 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 2 December 1942

Your telegram of 19 November (No. 176).

The following is the text of a further telegram I have sent to Mr. Curtin about the return of the 9th Australian Division:

My professional advisers and I are very sorry that you continue to press for the move of the 9th Australian Division, which we do not consider is in accordance with the general strategic interests of the United Nations.

Nevertheless, to meet your wishes I shall recommend to the President that the 9th Australian Division returns to Australia as soon as shipping can be provided. This will probably be early in the New Year. I may say that a loss to us in personnel shipping-lift of 10,000 men in the WS

WS were the letters used by the Admiralty to designate convoys outward bound from the United Kingdom, as distinct from inward-bound, or US, convoys.

convoys and 20,000 in the trans-Atlantic build-up for the invasion of the Continent will result from this move.

We very much regret that we cannot arrange for the equipment of your division to be returned to Australia. The cost to our offensive operations of the cargo and MT

Mechanical transport.

shipping necessary for this movement could not be faced.

You will like to know that, in response to an urgent request by the Americans for naval help in the Pacific, we are proposing to offer them the two modern armoured aircraft carriers Victorious

HMS Victorious, Fleet aircraft carrier, 23,000 tons, 16 4.5-inch guns.

and Illustrious

HMS Illustrious, Fleet aircraft carrier, 23,000 tons, 16 4.5-inch guns.

, under the command of a British Admiral, for service under American orders in the Pacific. These are among the most vital units we possess, and we have only four of this class. In exchange we are asking for the Ranger from the Atlantic. I hope that an additional and important re-insurance for the safety of Australia will result from this movement.

The fact that we are losing the Australian Division makes the retention of the New Zealand Division in the Middle East more necessary for us though your difficulties are understood. The return of the New Zealand Division would involve a further loss in shipping-lift of 10,000 men in WS convoys and 40,000 in the trans-Atlantic build-up for the invasion of the Continent. The reason for the loss of lift for the move of the New Zealand Division being greater than that for the move of the Australian Division is that the big personnel ships happen to be arriving at Suez at a convenient time for the move of the latter. To move the New Zealand Division they would have to return to Egypt from Australia. I could not, therefore, commit myself to any definite date for the shipping.

180 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia 4 December 1942

For your information I am repeating in my immediately following telegram a message I have sent today to Mr. Churchill regarding the return of the 2nd New Zealand Division from the Middle East.

It will be noticed that we fully realise, and have indicated to Mr. Churchill, that the situation of Australia is not necessarily the same as in New Zealand and, indeed, that in material respects they do differ.

181 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 4 December 1942

We have given most anxious consideration to your telegram of 2 December (No. 179), and the general question was discussed at length yesterday in a secret session of the House of Representatives.

The facts set out in your telegram under reply and the dangers involved in attempting in the present circumstances to move the 2nd New Zealand Division have greatly impressed us, and we have come to the conclusion—unanimously shared by all my colleagues and by all the members of the House of Representatives—that we cannot take the responsibility, in the circumstances that you outline, of pressing for the return of the New Zealand troops at this juncture. We realise that our situation differs in material respects from that of Australia and we feel that we must leave the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Middle East for a further period. At the same time, we feel that we must make it clear that the considerations advanced in my telegram of 19 November (No. 176) retain, in our opinion, their full validity and cogency, and in addition we attach great weight to an aspect which was not then brought to your notice, namely, that it would be neither wise nor proper to allow the offensive against the Japanese in the South Pacific to be conducted entirely by the Americans without substantial British collaboration.

We know that you fully realise the difficulties of these problems with which we have to contend, and the very generous and understanding attitude that you have taken throughout and, in particular, the sympathetic consideration you have given to my telegram of 19 November, have been warmly appreciated.

I am sure that you will understand it if in different circumstances and at a later date we again feel ourselves obliged to raise this matter.

I am sending Mr. Curtin a copy of this telegram.

182 The New Zealand Minister (Washington)

Hon. W. Nash.

to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 December 1942

The following is for the Chief of the General Staff from Brigadier Williams:

Brigadier A. B. Williams, DSO; Commander Royal New Zealand Artillery, Army HQ, Dec 1939–Feb 1942; New Zealand Army representative on British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, Feb 1942–Oct 1943; Commandant, Central Military District, Oct 1943–Dec 1944; Commandant, Northern Military District, Mar 1945–Apr 1947.

At a meeting on 4 December which I attended, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the question of the return of the Australian and New Zealand divisions from the Middle East.

The following is the decision reached:

(a)

Every military argument is against the move, which will involve a definite reduction of impact upon the enemy in 1943 and a major diversion of shipping resources urgently required.

(b)

The ships required for the move would not be available for urgent troop movements for three months at least. This would seriously dislocate United Kingdom and United States movements now in train.

Both the Australian and New Zealand representatives strongly represented the manpower situation, as well as the demands being made for Australian and New Zealand troops in the South-West and South Pacific and the likelihood of them increasing.

The United States Chiefs of Staff spoke bluntly against the move. Marshall

General of the Army the Hon. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1939–45; Special Representative of the President to China (as Ambassador), 1945–47; Secretary of State, 1947–49; Secretary of Defence, 1950–51.

stated that he was fully convinced that the defence of Australia and New Zealand would be weakened by the return of these divisions at this stage. The Combined Staffs were now hard put to find ships for movements already approved. Lack of ships was preventing the reinforcement of Burma and the Far East, where operations under consideration would put troops in contact with the enemy. This would have important repercussions on the defence of Australia and New Zealand. He appreciated the points advanced but expressed grave concern regarding military implications which impeded the war effort as a whole.

It was stated by the Combined Planners that if movement was decided for reasons other than military: (a) shipping could be found for personnel only at the expense of United Kingdom and United States troop movements, but not for the return of divisional equipment; (b) the ship now en route to New Zealand

Aquitania, 44,786 tons, Cunard White Star.

for reinforcements would have to be stopped and returned to South Africa empty.

During the discussion Marshall stated that another United States; division was now en route to Australia; he also suggested that if it was not possible to reinforce the divisions in the Middle East it would be better in the circumstances to reduce establishments. Dill pointed out that maintaining troops with dwindling numbers was bad for morale, but he appreciated that shipping considerations were of enormous importance.

It was also pointed out that the move would weaken the forces, in the Middle East while operations are in progress, and that the reduction of forces for subsequent operations envisaged would have a bad effect on the British and Indian troops who have been in the Middle East for a longer period.

The decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is being submitted to Mr. Churchill and the President.

183 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 6 December 1942

We are deeply grateful to you and to the Government and people of New Zealand for the most generous manner in which you have responded to our appeal to allow the glorious New Zealand Division to represent the Dominion on the African battlefield. Naturally you are free to reconsider your decision at any time, especially if your own situation deteriorates. I am sure that our feelings of admiration for New Zealand and all she stands for will be shared by the President of the United States.

It looks as if Rommel will not stand at Agheila, and by the time this reaches you he may well be taking another big bound backwards. We shall follow hotfoot on his heels. The haunting anxiety that the fortress of Malta would be starved out, which we have endured for so many months and for the sake of which we have made such heavy sacrifices both in warships and supply vessels, has been swept away by the arrival there of a second British convoy from Alexandria. In Tunisia our vanguards have been sharply checked and it will be necessary to go over to the defensive for a week or more while air and armour come up from the main body. While the going was good it was quite right to go on pell-mell, and thereby we have gained an immense amount of territory, including seaports from which we can strike with our surface craft at enemy convoys. Everything will be done to drive the Axis out of Tunisia at the earliest moment. The war in that theatre is very costly for them because of the immense toll we shall levy on their reinforcements.

The United States have preferred to have only one British armoured carrier

HMS Victorious joined the United States Pacific Fleet in March 1943.

and to keep their own Ranger instead of sending us the Ranger and taking two armoured carriers from us. The latter plan would have been preferred by us as it would have given us more say in the tasks we will be set. Still, as a result of the moves there will be two more carriers in the Pacific. All good wishes and kindest regards.

184 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the New Zealand Minister (Washington) 1 December 1942

Your telegram of 5 December (No. 182). The matter referred to in Williams's message to Puttick has been disposed of for the present so far as New Zealand is concerned, as indicated in my telegram of 5 December.

Not published. This telegram from Mr. Fraser repeated for Mr. Nash's information the texts of Nos. 177–9 and 181.

In view of the implication that consideration for the defence of New Zealand was the reason for my raising the question of the return of the New Zealand Division with Churchill, I am most anxious that our attitude should not be misunderstood, and I should be glad if you could find it possible to make it plain to all concerned that this was not the case. The desirability of associating ourselves in some substantial manner with the offensive in the South Pacific was the primary consideration in our minds. Our power to do this is, of course, at present very much limited by manpower difficulties, though we are as you know endeavouring to prepare the 3rd Division for this task. In this connection, and with reference to your most secret and personal telegram of 4 December,

Not published. In this telegram Mr. Nash reported on discussions with Sir John Dill, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, and Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, on the utilisation of New Zealand troops in the Pacific. He stated that Admiral King had said that he ‘was anxious to use our men in the best way possible. He recognised their fighting quality and would see they were used. Some relief was needed for the men on Guadalcanal and we might be able to help.’

you should note that the 3rd Division is at present very much scattered with portions in New Caledonia, New Zealand, Fiji, Norfolk, and Tonga. Until it has been concentrated, strengthened, equipped, and trained as a unit for its task, it cannot be ready for offensive operations. This will, of course, take some time.

185 Letter from the United States Naval Attaché (Wellington) to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 8 December 1942 My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have the honour to transmit the following radio message from the President of the United States of America:

I have been delighted to learn you are leaving the New Zealand Division in the Middle East for the present. This action on the part of your Government is a renewed evidence of our mutual military interests. I believe you have done the right thing. It is altogether generous. Roosevelt.

J. P. Olding, Captain, US Navy, US Naval Attaché

186 Letter from the Prime Minister to the United States Naval Attaché 11 December 1942Dear Captain Olding,

I am very much obliged to you for your note of 8 December conveying to me the text of a message from President Roosevelt. Would you be good enough to forward the following reply from me to the President:

Thank you so much for your kind message. As you know, our one object is to further the common cause to the best of our ability and resources. We are most anxious to assist effectively in due course in the offensive in the South Pacific, and this was our primary motive in raising with Churchill the possibility of the return to this area of our Division in the Middle East.

In the circumstances we have agreed that this is at present impracticable, and though our contemplated co-operation in the Pacific will necessarily be less powerful we will, nevertheless, do all we can.

Yours sincerely, P. Fraser, Prime Minister

187 The Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 14 December 1942

Your telegram of 4 December (No. 180).

In my immediately following telegram I am communicating for your information the text of a message which I have sent to the President regarding the return of the 9th Division to Australia.

Not published. In this telegram Mr. Curtin emphasised the pressing need for the services of the 9th Australian Division in the South-West Pacific Area because of the ‘immense wastage’ in personnel in New Guinea through battle casualties and malaria and the need for the 6th and 7th Divisions to have a prolonged rest after the Buna operations. He also advised President Roosevelt that the manpower position in the Commonwealth necessitated a reduction in the strength of the Australian Army by two divisions.

Although New Zealand and Australia are in separate areas, you will recall from our exchange of telegrams in March, when the proposals for the sub-division of the Pacific theatre were