BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC ‘The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.’— Winston S. Churchill in , Vol. II.

ONE OF THE MOST VITAL battles of the Second World War, and certainly the longest, was that fought at sea against the German U-boats. The island fortress of Britain had to be supplied with both food and war materials so that its survival depended upon the maintenance of supremacy at sea. The Germans realised this, and after their failure in the Battle of Britain they sought by sea and air attack to close the supply routes by which the British people could carry on the war and thus bring about their starvation and surrender.

The U-boat was by far the greatest menace. In the First World War it had brought Britain to the verge of defeat; but the lesson had been forgotten. In 1939 the Royal Navy was woefully short of escort vessels while Coastal Command

The name was retained throughout the war although it soon became an Ocean Command with bases extending from Iceland to West Africa.

of the Royal Air Force, whose main task was to aid the Navy, was equipped with a handful of aircraft, most of them obsolescent types whose weapons were hopelessly inadequate for dealing with the modern U-boats which the Germans were constructing. Airborne radar and the other technical aids that were later to play such an important part in the battle were still in the experimental stage. Only gradually was this state of affairs remedied, and it proved most difficult to keep pace with the expansion of the German U-boat fleet and the extension of its activities to the wider spaces of the Atlantic as well as to the many focal areas of Allied shipping. Indeed, during 1942, when over six million tons of Allied merchant shipping were lost through U-boat attacks, the situation became critical, and it was not until the end of the following year that the Allies could be said to have taken the measure of the U-boat threat.

A deciding factor in this favourable turn of events was the success achieved by aircraft over the Bay of Biscay and the convoy routes in the North Atlantic during 1943. Of 145 U-boats sunk in these areas during that year, 94 were destroyed by attack from the air. Even so the Germans were not beaten and they later returned to the attack with new weapons and devices which were never completely countered. The battle continued to the end and ceased only when the last German U-boat at sea had been escorted to a British port, flying a black flag of surrender.

New Zealand airmen flew with the anti-submarine squadrons of Coastal Command during the war as pilots, navigators, wireless operators, and gunners, while a small number did useful work in various ground duties. Two New Zealand squadrons were formed in Coastal Command: No. 489 Squadron, which served mainly in an anti-shipping role along the Norwegian Coast and in the North Sea, and No. 490 Squadron, which did valuable work over the West African convoy routes. But the large majority of the New Zealanders in Coastal Command were scattered among Royal Air Force units and often among the crews of squadrons. In fact, as in Bomber Command, many of them flew in crews made up of men from various parts of the Commonwealth. Altogether, New Zealand airmen took part in the destruction of twenty-four German U-boats, and in seven of these cases a New Zealander was captain of the aircraft which made the attack. But it is outside the scope of this account to describe all their experiences during the long years of the war at sea. What is attempted in the following pages is a few glimpses of various phases of their work during the period from November 1942 to November 1943 when the Battle of the Atlantic was at its height and when aircraft played a decisive part in the struggle.

Aircraft, however, had not been ineffective in the war at sea before this period, even though the actual number of U-boats destroyed by them was small. Their defensive work in protecting convoys and in keeping U-boats submerged had been invaluable, so that many a ship owed its safe arrival to the vigilant watch maintained from the air. When independent offensive patrols were increased during the second half of 1941, aircraft were largely responsible for driving the German submarines from the Western Approaches to operate farther out in the Atlantic where targets were more difficult to locate. Prisoners taken towards the end of that year spoke with feeling of the air patrols which forced them continually to dive, while Grand Admiral Doenitz, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, complained that ‘aircraft were locating and attacking the U-boat dispositions so that their patrol areas were avoided by convoys’. One U-boat even surrendered to a Hudson aircraft after the latter's depth-charge attack. The vessel was subsequently towed to port and provided valuable information.

Nevertheless, inefficient weapons and the lack of suitable technical aids rendered the early air attacks more of a harassing nature. They inflicted a certain amount of damage and often forced U-boats to lose touch with convoys, but were only occasionally successful in completely destroying the enemy. The U-boat was an elusive and difficult target to attack from the air and its construction was so tough that the depth-charge then in use had to fall within a few feet of the hull in order to split it.

Throughout 1942 the air offensive had continued, but with the limited range of the aircraft then available the U-boats were able to play havoc with convoys in mid-Atlantic. However, by the end of the year, science and industry had begun to provide aircraft of longer range, an improved type of radar, and better weapons, such as the torpex-filled depth-charge and the Leigh Light for attacks by night. Along with these technical aids, new tactics were evolved which enabled air power to be employed with much greater effect in the following year.

During 1943, the main types of operational U-boats used by the Germans were vessels of 517 and 740 tons, carrying crews of about 45 and 55 respectively, although they were also building 1600-tonners for long cruises and for supply. These craft were specially constructed to withstand the underwater blast of depth-charges and had an extra pressure hull of high tensile steel. They had two sets of machinery: Diesel engines for propulsion on the surface and electric motors for use when submerged, the latter also serving as dynamos for re-charging batteries on the surface. Maximum speed on the surface was about seventeen knots but the normal cruising speed of eight knots gave an endurance of some 10,000 miles. When travelling submerged on both motors, top speed was about 7½ knots, but then battery endurance was only two hours. At lower speeds a U-boat could remain submerged much longer, but the air became so foul that normally the vessel would not stay down for more than twenty hours at a time. Towards the end of the war this handicap was overcome by fitting U-boats with the Schnorkel device—air intake and exhaust tubes that could be raised at perscope depth, enabling the air to be changed and the batteries recharged whilst the vessel remained submerged.

When on patrol the U-boat's lookout was of a high order, four men on duty at a time standing back to back in the conning tower, each searching an arc of 90 degrees. They were supplied with excellent binoculars and the watches were changed frequently. In clear weather they would often sight an aircraft at such a range that the boat could dive in time to avoid attack, but the skilful use of sun and cloud cover would defeat them. Furthermore, in a heavy sea, the watch could never be fully efficient because of the rolling of the U-boat and the spray.

U-BOAT FOUNDERING black and white photograph of submarine

The principal weapon employed in the air attacks on U-boats during 1943 was the 250 lb. depth-charge set to explode at twenty-five feet below the surface. Aircraft carried from four to eight according to their type and the length of their patrol. They were aimed visually by the pilot but were released by an electrical distributor so that they fell in an evenly spaced stick, the idea being to straddle the U-boat so that one depth-charge fell near enough to cause lethal damage. Aircraft usually patrolled at heights up to 5000 feet according to cloud cover but the actual attack was made from about fifty feet. This had to be a short and sharp affair before the U-boat crash- dived, yet it was not easy to manoeuvre a heavy four-engined aircraft into the correct position for a successful attack while the target was still visible.

COVERING THE NORTH AFRICAN LANDINGS

AN INDICATION of the more effective role aircraft were soon to play in the U-boat war was provided during the North African landings in November 1942. During that month, of nine U-boats destroyed in the Western Mediterranean, four were sunk by air attack alone, four by surface vessels, and another by combined assault.

Several New Zealanders flying with No. 500 Hudson Squadron had very successful hunting during this period. Their unit was one of several sent to Gibraltar to hunt U-boats in the sea lanes through which the convoys were passing to invade North Africa. This was a welcome change of activity as for the previous nine months the squadron had been based at Stornaway, in the Outer Hebrides, whence it patrolled over the bleak waters to the north of Scotland. On arrival at Gibraltar, after a 1200-mile flight from Cornwall, they found the air base at the ‘Rock’ very crowded, every inch being taken up by either an aircraft or a can of petrol. D-day for the North African landings was close at hand and this was the only place available as a jumping-off point, for, in November 1942, the Allies possessed no other single piece of ground in all Western Europe and the Mediterranean west of Malta. In fact, Britain's possession of Gibraltar made possible the invasion of North Africa. The development of a flying-boat base there had been difficult enough, but the construction of an airfield with an adequate runway extending into the sea was a much harder task. Gibraltar is only three miles long and varies from 600 yards to one and a half miles in width, but more than three-fifths of this area is high rock tunnelled for military purposes and useless for an airfield. The small sandy plain, a racecourse in former days, which joins Gibraltar to Spanish territory, was converted into an aerodrome at the outbreak of war. Later it was ex tended so that, by the end of 1942, a tarmac strip extended well out into Algeciras Bay.

As the first convoys were already approaching the Straits, the Hudsons began operations immediately. During the next three weeks No. 500 Squadron flew over 200 sorties and attacked thirty-four U-boats; three of these have now been confirmed as destroyed. Two of these successful attacks were made by New Zealand pilots. Throughout the month flying conditions were generally good with visibility almost unlimited except during heavy but infrequent storms which passed quickly. On most days conditions were ideal for carrying out surprise attacks, since aircraft patrolling at heights between 5000 and 8000 feet were, with few exceptions, flying either through or over broken cloud with excellent visibility down sun.

On 6 November, two days before the landings began, anti-submarine patrols were flown to the east of Gibraltar ahead of the convoys, and it was while engaged in one of these missions that Pilot Officer H. A. Poole1 made the squadron's first attack. In fact, he had the unusual experience of attacking two U-boats in the course of a single patrol. The first was sighted in the act of diving, and by the time the Hudson reached the spot it had been submerged for some twenty seconds. Nevertheless, the four depth-charges that were dropped must have shaken the submarine as its stern immediately rose above the surface for a few moments before it finally disappeared. In the second attack the submarine had dived about a minute before the aircraft reached it and no results were seen.

On the following day the convoys were nearing the landing points. Strong air cover was provided, including many patrols and sweeps flown by the anti-submarine aircraft from Gibraltar. Just before midday Flight Lieutenant H. G. Holmes2 sighted a U-boat ‘travelling at high speed on the surface a few miles south of the Fleet’. He achieved complete surprise in his attack, the depth- charges straddling the enemy vessel while it was still on the surface. A piece of metal was seen to fly into the air in the midst of the explosions and subsequently large quantities of oil appeared on the surface of the sea. About the same time, Squadron Leader I. C. Patterson3 saw a German submarine on the surface some fifteen miles ahead. He was able to approach unobserved, but in his first attack the depth-charges failed to release. A second attempt, a few seconds after the enemy had dived, brought air bubbles to the surface but no other sign of damage was seen.

The next day, 8 November, twelve aircraft from No. 500 Squadron, four of which were piloted by New Zealanders, were employed in protecting the naval forces and convoys landing troops on the beaches in the vicinity of Oran and Algiers. The work of guarding this shipping against submarine attack was continuous from dawn to dusk, the Hudsons flying perimeter patrols outside the destroyer screen in excellent weather. No submarines were seen and no enemy aircraft attempted to hinder the landing.

During the next two days, while anti-submarine patrols continued, a detachment of Hudsons moved to the airfield at Tafaroui, near Oran, to provide closer protection to the large concentrations of shipping in the approaches to the landing areas. The ground crews had already landed with the Americans, spending two days and nights on the beaches sniping and being sniped at. When the airfields were captured they exchanged tommy-guns for spanners and immediately began servicing the Hudsons as they flew in from Gibraltar. Tafaroui had good runways but servicing the aircraft proved difficult during the first few days. Nevertheless the ground crews were adept at improvisation. For instance, refuelling with the American four-gallon petrol tins was a problem until someone produced the spinners

The conical hub on some types of airscrews.

off several abandoned French aircraft and with the aid of a short length of pipe soldered to the bottom made a very serviceable petrol filler. Aircrews slept on the hangar floors without any covering except their flying clothing, and as there was some danger from snipers and also of sabotage one member of each crew slept in the aircraft.

So far most of the patrols had been uneventful, but the next week there were many sightings and attacks as the U-boats made strenuous efforts to intercept the supply convoys. On 12 November Flight Lieutenant I. R. Mitchell's4 aircraft attacked a diving U-boat and brought oil to the surface, while Holmes put destroyers on the scent of another which had submerged before he could attack it. Patterson had three sightings in the course of one patrol during the following morning. His first was made at a distance of nearly twenty miles, but evidently the U-boat lookouts spotted the Hudson as the submarine dived before an attack could be made. However, employing the skill and patience derived from long experience in hunting U-boats, Patterson flew away from the area and returned later, using cloud to conceal his approach. His perseverance was rewarded when, shortly after his return, a U-boat was seen surfacing. Still using cloud cover, Patterson manoeuvred his machine into a position from which he was able to deliver a surprise attack. The stern of the submarine was blown out of the water and the vessel assumed a vertical position with some twenty feet of its hull above the surface. It remained like this for nearly a minute and then went down at the same angle. Soon afterwards gushes of air and oil came to the surface and continued to rise for some minutes. The same afternoon another Hudson pilot, Flight Lieutenant M. A. Ensor,5 while flying just above broken cloud, saw a fully surfaced U-boat below him through a clear patch. He immediately dived to attack and was able to release his depth-charges just as the enemy submarine submerged. They were well aimed, as a few moments later the U-boat reappeared midst a mass of foam and air bubbles. Several of the crew then appeared on the conning tower and opened fire on the aircraft. This fire was silenced but unfortunately the Hudson was compelled through shortage of fuel to leave the scene before assistance arrived. The damaged U-boat was then circling slowly on the surface.

On 14 November Mitchell took part in an attack on another German submarine which was eventually forced to beach itself near Oran after concentrated attacks by several Hudsons from No. 500 Squadron. Further successes followed. On patrol the next morning Holmes saw a target on the surface ten miles away. By stalking his quarry with the aid of cloud, he was able to make a surprise attack which brought oil and air bubbles to the surface although no further evidence of damage was seen.

Ensor had better luck the same morning, some forty miles off Algiers, when he literally blew a German submarine to pieces in what was one of the most spectacular attacks of the whole war. After the initial sighting about ten miles away, an approach through cloud enabled him to attack while the U-boat was still on the surface. The four depth-charges appeared to straddle the vessel just ahead of the conning tower, but one of them must have struck the hull for immediately there was a terrific explosion, followed by two more inside the U-boat, which flung the forward gun into the air and ripped the conning tower wide open. When the upheaval had subsided, the bows of the U-boat were seen on the surface for a few seconds amidst an area of bubbles before it sank. The Hudson itself was blown several hundred feet into the air and badly shattered by the first explosion. The rudders and elevators were torn off and the ailerons damaged; the turret and cabin floor were blown in and several feet of each wing tip was bent almost vertically upwards. In this condition the aircraft was climbed to 1500 feet and flown towards Algiers, Ensor using the crew as moveable ballast and steering on the engines. However, after fifteen minutes, one engine suddenly gave out and the Hudson became uncontrollable so that the crew, were forced to abandon it by parachute. Only two of them, Ensor and his wireless operator, were picked up, a most unfortunate sequel to a very successful attack and a superb display of airmanship.

‘The trip back was a nightmare,’ Ensor said afterwards. ‘Sometimes the plane's nose would dip steeply and I had to signal the crew to run into the tail to balance it. Then the tail would drop, whereupon they would have to run to the nose. It was when we were nearly home and congratulating ourselves that all was well that the engine gave out.’

Misfortune of a different kind attended another successful attack by Squadron Leader Patterson two days later, when he caught an enemy submarine unawares on the surface. The U-boat's stern was lifted clean out of the water and the conning tower stove in by the explosions of the depth- charges which straddled it. Attempts by the crew to man the machine guns were prevented by fire from the aircraft. Smoke was coming from inside the vessel and some of the crew leapt over the side. Others came on deck waving white objects in token of surrender. As it was now certain that the submarine was disabled and as other aircraft had reached the scene, Patterson flew to a nearby airfield to report the opportunity of capturing a valuable prize. A destroyer was sent out from Algiers and Patterson refuelled his aircraft in order to act as guide, but just before the destroyer reached the scene a naval aircraft torpedoed the U-boat, which exploded and sank.

The last patrols from the airfield at Tafaroui were flown on 18 November, in the course of which two more attacks were made, one of them by Holmes, after which a large amount of oil and air bubbles came to the surface for over half an hour before the Hudson was forced to leave the scene.

No. 500 Squadron now moved to Blida airfield, about thirty miles south-west of Algiers. This was an established base, and as the French had not sabotaged any of their equipment the squadron fared better as regards the maintenance of their aircraft. There were no runways, however, only a surface of hard mud. The aircrew were quartered in a large barrack block which had two tiers of solid iron bedsteads. ‘The place,’ according to one pilot, ‘resembled the interior of a prison.’ All forms of insect life were rampant and most of the men were more or less severely bitten. However, the liberal use of blowlamps and disinfectant gradually improved the conditions.

Operations were continued without a break and during the following days patrols were flown continuously from the new base. During the first flights from Blida, Holmes made another attack on a U-boat, his fifth in thirteen days. Very large air bubbles were observed as if the vessel was attempting to resurface and subsequently a patch of oil appeared, approximately thirty yards in diameter. Thereafter, sightings and attacks became noticeably fewer and before the end of the month it was clear that the enemy had decided to reduce the scale of his attack in the Western Mediterranean. In fact, most of the U-boats withdrew and moved to the Northern Atlantic. In their operations against the North African convoys, amply provided with air cover, they had suffered heavy casualties and sunk comparatively few ships. The wear and tear of constant crash- diving was extremely severe on the U-boat crews and had intensified the dislike felt by their captains for the narrow waters of the Mediterranean. Therefore it was with considerable relief that they returned to their old hunting grounds on the convoy routes in the North Atlantic, where the main battle was being fought under conditions more favourable to them.

THE FORMATION OF No. 75 (NZ) SQUADRON

A LTHOUGH DURING THE FIRST few months of the war most of the New Zealand aircrews were scattered among Royal Air Force squadrons, there were a few who formed part of a ‘New Zealand Flight’. The Flight was formed in England on 1 June 1939 to fly out to New Zealand a number of Wellington bombers for the Royal New Zealand Air Force. When war broke out there were eighteen New Zealanders in the Flight—twelve pilots and six ground crew. Their Commanding Officer was Squadron Leader M. W. Buckley.10

The New Zealand Government immediately placed the six Wellingtons in the flight at the disposal of the British Government. The men themselves were for some weeks uncertain about their future. They wanted to stay and fight but were keen to remain a complete unit. With this desire the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, was in complete agreement.

The New Zealand Government approved the formation of a New Zealand Bomber Squadron within the RAF on 1 March 1940. A month later the Air Ministry decided that a squadron to be known as No. 75 (NZ) Squadron should be formed around the existing New Zealand Flight, then stationed at Feltwell in Norfolk, and that a second flight should be formed on 29 May 1940 to complete establishment. In the meantime the Flight continued training and was even able to make a few operational sorties. The first—a reconnaissance and leaflet-dropping operation—took place on 27 March 1940.

Three aircraft took off captained by Squadron Leader C. E. Kay,11 Flying Officer J. N. Collins,12 and Flying Officer. J. Adams;13 with them were Pilot Officer T. O. Freeman,14 Pilot Officer D. J. Harkness,15 and AC1 E. P. Williams.16 The remainder of the crews were made up from men of the Royal Air Force. The area they covered extended over Brunswick, Ulzen, and Luneberg. The flight was far from comfortable: the cold was intense and the aircraft dropped sickeningly from time to time as they met down-currents of air. All three aircraft returned safely

From this time until the invasion of France and the Low Countries, few operational sorties were carried out by the New Zealand Bomber Squadron, as it was unofficially known. Those made included leaflet-dropping operations, the bombing of Stavanger airfield (Norway) and Aalborg airfield (Denmark).

The most important sortie during this period was made on 12 April by Flight Lieutenant A. A. N. Breckon17 who, accompanied by Pilot Officer D. J. Harkness, LAC E. P. Williams, three RAF men and a Royal Navy observer, flew from Wick to Narvik on reconnaissance. The flight, which lasted 14½ hours, established what was then a record in the RAF for its length. The following is an abridged version of the captain's report:

Landfall was made at the Lofoten Islands at 1305 hours. The visibility on the coast was approximately 2-3 miles, 10/10 cloud at 800 feet, with an extremely strong wind blowing which caused the most unpleasant conditions. Great difficulty was experienced in controlling the aircraft while flying alongside the mountains in the Fiord. A reconnaissance of Vestfjorden was made and photographs were taken between 1330 and 1430 hours. As we proceeded into the Fiord, weather conditions rapidly deteriorated, clouds came down to about 300 feet and to almost sea level in places, causing visibility at times of 500 yards and less. A great effort was made to reach the town of Narvik at the head of the Fiord, but although we were nearly at our objective, we had to turn back for our own safety as we were flying at 200 feet in a heavy snow storm, with the clouds closing in on us, making us wonder if we could make a safe exit. During the entire reconnaissance of the Fiord, we had extremely bad flying conditions and the most terrific bumps the members of the crew had ever experienced. An enemy aircraft, believed to be a Ju88 appeared to be doing a reconnaissance in the Fiord too. It made no effort to attack although we had prepared for action.

At this time it was known that the enemy held Narvik in force. The First Battle of Narvik had been fought two days before and the Royal Navy was to sail up the fifty-mile-long fiord on 13 April to complete the destruction of German naval units in the Narvik area—seven enemy destroyers and one submarine were sunk in the Second Battle of Narvik. Breckon's reconnaissance flight was part of a plan to ensure that no enemy warships or submarines would ambush our forces from the many inlets off the main fiord.

THE CAMPAIGN IN NORWAY

DURING THE NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN Bomber Command was unable to give direct support either to the British or Norwegian armies. There were no bomber bases nearer than in Britain, a distance of some four hundred miles, and it was impossible with the aircraft available to keep up continuous bombing in the battle area. British bombers could only harry the enemy's communications by sea and air, attacking convoys and warships between Germany and Norway and bombing airfields in Denmark and Norway which the Germans were using for their bomber, fighter, and transport aircraft.

Crews from the New Zealand Bomber Squadron were among the first to see signs of the impending invasion of Norway. On the night of 6 April they reported seeing numerous motor vehicles, their lights blazing, streaming along the Autobahn from Hamburg to Lubeck.

The following day Pilot Officers O. H. Keedwell18 and J. D. Murphy19 sighted a strong enemy naval force in the North Sea. They attacked a battleship but scored no hits. Sergeant M. H. S. Innes-Jones in the leading aircraft of one flight saw his bombs overshoot and hit one of the escorting destroyers. Unfortunately the German warships were later lost sight of until they were located and attacked at Bergen two days later.

From the time of the German invasion of Norway on 9 April the greater part of the British bombing effort was directed against enemy airfields in Denmark and Norway. The attacks were concentrated especially on Stavanger, the principal air base in Norway from which the Germans attacked Allied shipping. This airfield was first attacked by Bomber Command on 11 April. Preceded by two Blenheim fighters, six Wellingtons made their attack at a very low level in the face of intense anti-aircraft fire. One Wellington was seen to crash in flames and the second pilot, Pilot Officer D. A. Rankin,20 was lost.

During the middle of April British troops landed at Namsos and Aandalsnes, but, in the face of heavy German air attacks, were forced to withdraw a fortnight later. At Narvik, where local air superiority was achieved by British fighters, the town was captured and held until the beginning of June.

There is some evidence that the attacks on his airfields did force the enemy to reduce his bombing in the Aandalsnes and Namsos areas, but attacks on shipping and the mining of Kattegat and Skagerrak had no apparent effect upon the flow of German reinforcements into Norway. They could hardly have been expected to do so. It was still winter in Norway, and the weather, the distances from bases, the limited force available, and the lack of fighter protection made it impossible for Bomber Command to intervene effectively in the campaign.

PROLOGUE

THIS account of the great days of 1940 which have become known as the Battle of Britain is limited to the story of the part played by New Zealanders who served with Fighter Command squadrons during the period 10 July to 31 October 1940. Much of the individual achievement of these men—nearly 100 served with Fighter Command at some time during the period—can be referred to in only general terms in a narrative of this length; it follows that those whose names appear are selected in the main because their actions serve best to illustrate the general account and not for any reasons connected with later achievement of high rank or position.

This narrative is confined to the deeds of fighter pilots, but although their gallantry has by now become a household word, the work of Coastal Command in the protection of sea-going convoys, and of Bomber Command in the destruction of the enemy's embarkation ports, barges, and other craft needed to transport an invading army to Britain, played no small part in frustrating the enemy's invasion plan.

Nor was the battle fought exclusively in the air, a point which was made by the Secretary of State for Air on 18 September 1940 in these words:

…. The battle is being fought not only in the air. It is being fought in the Maintenance Command, in the workshops, and at the dispersal points of the squadrons of the Royal Air Force. It is being fought in the Flying Training and Technical Training Commands of the Royal Air Force, whose hard work and devotion to duty, often under the enemy's fire, is greatly increasing the flow of aircrews to our fighting squadrons. It is being fought, too, in the aircraft and aero-engine factories and in our other munition factories.

The staunch resistance to the blitz of the citizens of London and the great provincial towns should also be remembered.

THE STAGE IS SET

WHEN FRANCE, overrun in some six weeks by the full weight of the German forces, finally capitulated on 25 June 1940, Winston Churchill had already foreseen the next stage in world events. On 18 June, in an address to the House of Commons, he said, ‘What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin.’

Although an invasion of Great Britain had been considered by the German Naval Staff as early asthe late autumn of 1939, Hitler had not been approached with the idea until the last day of May 1940, when the collapse of France and the subsequent occupation of the Franco-Belgian coastline appeared imminent. Nor did Hitler become patently interested in the idea until 2 July, when he first gave orders for the three Services to initiate preparations for such an undertaking, and further stipulated the achievement of air superiority as an indispensable condition. A fortnight later Hitler had decided that preparations for a landing between Ramsgate and the Isle of Wight were to be completed by the middle of August. On 31 July he approved 15 September as the earliest D-day but reserved his final decision pending the results of the projected intensified air operations.

Briefing pilots and gunners of a Defiant Squadron black and white photograph of group of airforce officers

Had the Germans followed Dunkirk with a speedy invasion of Britain, there was little organised ground defence to stop them, for the British troops evacuated from the French beaches had been forced to abandon all but their rifles. But an immediate invasion was not possible, for the German Navy, faced with the problem of transporting some forty divisions, the number Hitler considered necessary for the assault, had first to assemble all the array of small ships, barges, tugs, and steamers necessary to transport an invading army across the Channel, equip them for their task, and then move them to the assembly ports. The ports themselves nearly all needed repair; in addition, sea routes had to be swept clear of mines and German mines laid as a precaution against interception by units of the Home Fleet. Finally the entire force had to be trained and co-ordinated for the task. But, equally important, the prerequisite for invasion was command of the air, for even if a bridgehead could be taken by weight of numbers, the problem of supplying an army ashore in a foreign land had to be solved. Thus the aim of the German strategy was so to weaken the British fighter defences that the Luftwaffe would be able to give adequate support to an invasion of the British Isles.

* * * * * * * *

The strength of Fighter Command when the issue was joined on 10 July was fifty-two operational squadrons, all but three of which had already been heavily engaged in the Continental fighting. This force was composed of twenty-two squadrons of Hurricanes, twenty of Spitfires, eight of Blenheims, and two of Defiants. It had always been assumed that any attack on Great Britain would be heaviest in the South-east, i.e., the area directly opposite Northern France, and accordingly the majority of the fighter squadrons were disposed there under the control of No. II Group, commanded by the New Zealand airman, Air Vice-Marshal K. R. Park.1

Throughout the battle Air Vice-Marshal Park had some twenty-two squadrons under his control, though his effective fighting force was restricted to about twelve Hurricane and six Spitfire squadrons. The balance was made up of Blenheim squadrons not suitable for daylight interception. This meant that, assuming every squadron could put its full complement of aircraft into the air, the fighting strength available to him at any time was limited to about eighteen squadrons, or less than 220 aircraft–the normal squadron formation being twelve aircraft. The situation, then, was extremely grave, for against this small force the Germans had available in the West on 10 August a total strength of 1808 bombers and dive-bombers and 1223 single-engined and twin-engined fighter aircraft. It was true that unless the other three Groups composing Fighter Command were heavily engaged they could be called upon to replace tired and depleted squadrons in No. II Group—as indeed they were—but here the Germans had one outstanding advantage. They could mass a heavy attack in one sector, where only a proportion of the British fighter strength was available, and at the same time by threats to other parts effectively compel Fighter Command to keep considerable forces away from the main zone of attack. Thus it was vital that the defenders should have sufficient warning of an attack so that the fighter squadrons could be airborne on their patrol lines in time to make an interception. This warning was achieved by means of a series of coastal radar stations sited at intervals around much of England, Scotland, and Wales.

Herein lay the essence of Fighter Command's defensive strategy, for had the Group Commanders been compelled by the absence of early warning to man their patrol lines constantly, they would have found themselves as often as not at the disadvantage of having to make interceptions with fighters low in fuel. In addition pilots, engines, and maintenance crews would have been subjected to severe strain by the long hours of wasteful flying. Over land the early type of radar was not effective and raid intelligence was supplied by a chain of Observer Corps posts whose members tracked enemy formations by sight or sound and reported the information to Fighter Command Headquarters.

This system, working progressively downwards from Fighter Command through the Groups to the Sectors, enabled the Command to identify approaching formations and allot the interception of raids to particular Groups, also to reinforce one Group by another if necessary. The Group Commander decided which Sector would meet each specific raid and detailed the strength in squadrons to be used. The Sector Commander decided which fighter units were to be employed and operated the machinery of interception by using the position, course, height, and speed of the enemy aircraft and of his own fighters, which were concurrently displayed on his plotting table in the operations room. He controlled his fighters by a series of courses broadcast over the radio telephone until, on making interception, tactical control passed to the fighter leader in the air who then directed his pilots into battle.

This was the system under which the battle was fought. Dependent on painstaking attention to detail by hundreds of men and women, it had been organised by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding in the pre-war years, and because of its inherent quality and flexibility it enabled the German mass attacks to be beaten.

THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE

THE BATTLE fell into four main phases. During the first phase from 10 July to 18 August a series of raids was directed against Channel shipping and ports on the South coast. Between 10 July and 7 August the Luftwaffe was engaged in testing the fighter defences to ascertain their strength, dispositions, and capabilities. In the meantime, the German units in France were being brought up to strength in readiness for the main assault. From 8 to 18 August the Luftwaffe sought to eliminate Fighter Command by sheer weight of numbers. A lull of five days followed. The second phase opened on 24 August when the attacks began again; although Fighter Command had not been eliminated, these attacks were directed on the airfields covering the approach to London. In the third phase, the full day and night offensive against London opened on 7 September and lasted roughly until the 27th. From that date until 31 October the Germans were forced by heavy casualties to abandon mass daylight raids by long-range bombers. In their place, as the fourth phase of the battle, were substituted high-level fighter-bomber attacks with the sprawling mass of London still the primary target. In effect, the attempt to gain the air superiority necessary before an invasion could be launched had been abandoned.

* * * * * * *

On 2 July German squadrons began regular daylight attacks against targets in Great Britain. From the 10th these attacks were designed principally to exhaust the British fighter force, for on that date the first really large enemy formation (70 aircraft) was employed. This date, then, marks the real opening of the battle.

On 10 July two large formations of enemy aircraft attempted to attack convoys off Margate and Dover. The larger attack was made by about twenty-four Dornier bombers escorted by forty Me109s and Me110s, the enemy's standard single-engined and twin-engined fighters. Aircraft from five RAF fighter squadrons scrambled to intercept this raid, but most of the fighters arrived after the bombers had left and consequently fighting took place mainly between fighter and fighter. Only one enemy bomber was shot down. This aircraft was singled out by Pilot Officer D. G. Cobden,2 who was leading a section of No. 74 Squadron Spitfires; it was the first kill for a New Zealander. Cobden led the eight-gun Spitfires into the attack at high speed and immediately picked out a straggling Dornier for an attack from astern. Black smoke poured from the starboard engine of the enemy aircraft, but at that moment Cobden, then alone, was attacked from above by Me109s, several of whose pilots combined to seriously damage his Spitfire. Despite this, Cobden was able to evade the enemy and make a landing with wheels up on a coastal airfield. The Dornier was claimed as destroyed. Altogether during the engagement seven enemy aircraft were shot down for the loss of one pilot, while the convoy lost only one 400-ton vessel.

The attacks on convoys on the 10th and the following day confirmed Air Chief Marshal Dowding's opinion that if the Channel convoys became the chief German objective a great strain would be put on the squadrons based near the South coast. Because of the small number of available squadrons, in comparison with the wide territory they were responsible for protecting, only small fighter escorts could be provided for the coastal convoys, for whose protection Fighter Command was responsible. Thus there was always the danger that an escort might be suddenly attacked by superior numbers, for although the radar stations usually detected approaching enemy formations, they did not always do so in time for the controllers to take effective action before bombing began. This was especially true in the region of the South coast. Enemy aircraft from the Cherbourg area could form up in the central Channel outside effective radar range, so that by the time a resolved track appeared on the operations room tables the raiders were already flying directly to their targets. Nor were the Germans lacking in versatility, for in quick succession they might alter their timing and direction of attack, or, having assembled a formidable force, they might wheel it away after the defending squadrons had scrambled, only to return half an hour later when the Spitfires and Hurricanes were landing and refuelling.

THE BATTLE QF BRITAIN PHASE I: 10 July–18 August 1940 Attacks on Channel shipping and South Coast ports

For the next ten days the Germans used tactics similar to those already discussed, in that they launched two or three raids, suitably separated in time, either in the central Channel or the Straits. In every case the targets were convoys, and the attackers, having built up a strong force of aircraft over the French coast, moved quickly to the target without any attempt at concealment. Consequently the defending squadrons, arriving one by one over the area, were often too late to interfere with the bombers, who retired as quickly as possible, leaving their escort of Me109s and Me110s, who normally held the advantage of height, to act as rearguard. These conditions prevailed on the 19th when Fighter Command suffered unusually heavy casualties in beating off an attack on shipping in Dover Harbour by Junkers 87 dive-bombers. Defending fighters were late off the ground, and it was fifteen minutes after the first report of bombing had been received that nine Defiants of No. 141 Squadron came into the area. Three of these aircraft were captained by New Zealanders—Pilot Officers J. R. Gard'ner,3 J. R. Kemp,4 and R. Kidson.5 The Defiants, each mounting a four-gun turret in the mid-dorsal position, were flying towards Cap Gris Nez when they were attacked at 5000 feet off Folkestone by a large number of escorting Me109 fighters. The turret fighters stood no chance against the initial attack from out of the sun and almost immediately two Defiants were shot down. The fight then swung northwards. Hurricane pilots despatched to support the Defiants were prevented from reaching them by a wall of enemy fighters. In the subsequent fighting the Defiants' inferiority was sadly shown. Their free guns could not be brought to bear directly astern beneath their tails, and, profiting from the lessons of Dunkirk when the Defiants caused heavy casualties to the enemy, it was from this position that the German fighter pilots attacked. In this unfortunate action all three New Zealanders were shot down and only one, Gard'ner, was rescued from the sea. Altogether six of the Defiants were lost. After this engagement No. 141 Squadron was moved up to Scotland, well out of range of the Me109.

The events of the next few days indicated that the Germans were possibly not yet agreed on the policy of staying behind to fight after each attack had been made. Indeed on several occasions when Fighter Command aircraft were early in the air, strong German formations turned before the defenders. However, on 24 July the enemy launched heavy attacks on convoys both in the Straits and off Portland regardless of opposition.

No. 54 Squadron, a flight of which was commanded by Flight Lieutenant A. C. Deere,6 and which also included Pilot Officer C. F. Gray7 among its pilots, was heavily engaged throughout the day. The squadron regarded the operations as ‘the biggest and most successful since Dunkirk’. In a morning patrol Gray and five other pilots distinguished themselves when, although heavily outnumbered, they beat off a German bombing attack on a convoy near Dover, forcing the enemy aircraft to jettison their bombs prematurely. Later that day Deere led the squadron through heavy rain to intercept eighteen Dornier 215s, escorted by at least two squadrons of fighters, which were attacking a convoy in the Thames Estuary. The enemy formation was first sighted flying up the Estuary at between 5000 and 10,000 feet. Deere immediately ordered one flight to attack some of the fighters while he led his section above after more Me109s. At that moment he was attacked from the rear by nine enemy aircraft. Subsequently Deere reported:

I managed to stall turn on to their tails and fire a burst into the centre of the formation. Me109s then came down from above and a dogfight ensued. I had general wild bursts at various aircraft but was unable to get a decent bead because of constant attacks from behind. I managed, however, one long burst at an Me109 at close range and he went down with glycol pouring from his machine.

Meanwhile Gray was engaged with two of the enemy fighters. Having damaged the first, he set fire to the second and saw the German pilot jump by parachute and fall into the sea. Altogether under Deere's leadership the squadron was credited with five enemy aircraft definitely destroyed and a further nine probably destroyed or damaged. Only one pilot from the squadron was lost.

This testing phase had made it clear that the Germans were frequently able to bomb targets in the Straits before being intercepted and that the large protecting umbrella, plus the advantage of height which their fighters almost invariably enjoyed, gave them tactical superiority; but the main German advantage was that they could concentrate before an operation whilst Fighter Command's aircraft could not. Thus, intercepting Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons often found that they were each required to engage anything from 20 to 30 enemy aircraft. Against this were the willingness of the fighter pilots to accept any odds and to attack the enemy whenever and wherever possible, and the deadly effect of the eight-machine-gun armament of both Spitfires and Hurricanes against the German bombers—at that time unarmoured.

THE ALL-OUT BLOW AGAINST FIGHTER COMMAND

BY THE END OF THE FIRST WEEK in August the Luftwaffe had completed its preparations for mounting mass daylight attacks, and accordingly, in the next phase from the 8th onwards, it attempted nothing less than the complete elimination of Fighter Command. This ten-day period was one of the most crucial phases of the battle. Attacks on coastal towns and convoys were continued on an increased scale, and to these were added particular targets including radar stations, Fighter Command airfields, balloon barrages, and aircraft factories. It is clear from the tactics employed and from the objectives selected that the Luftwaffe was attempting to gain air superiority by exhausting and swamping the Fighter Command defences. During this phase the enemy used the Junkers 87 dive-bomber and, less often, the long-range Heinkel and Dornier bombers, to make preliminary attacks against coastal objectives in Kent to draw the fighter defence, followed some 30 to 40 minutes later by the main attack against ports or airfields on the South coast between Brighton and Portland. Of these tactics Air Vice-Marshal Park wrote:

The main problem was to know which was the diversionary attack, and to hold sufficient squadrons in readiness to meet the main attack when this could be discerned from the very unreliable information received from the radar stations after they had been heavily bombed.

To meet the attacks against coastal objectives it was necessary to keep nearly all the readiness squadrons at forward airfields, such as Lympne, Mansion, Rochford, and Hawkinge, from which Air Vice-Marshal Park sent half his available squadrons, including the Spitfires, to engage the enemy fighters and the remainder to attack the enemy bombers flying at 11,000 to 13,000 feet. As the fighter screens to the main bombing formations flew in large unwieldy masses some 5000 to 10,000 feet above the bombers, the Spitfires had to climb to well over 20,000 feet to intercept them. Hence they rarely had the advantage of height. On the other hand, this fact often allowed fighter pilots to do severe damage to the bombing force before general dogfighting developed between fighter and fighter.

The first really heavy attack on a land target since July was made on the morning of 11 August against Portland. On this occasion the Nos. 10 and 11 Group controllers were in hardly any doubt as to the target, since three enemy forces were plotted in the central Channel on course for Portland and no convoy was in the area at the time. Accordingly, during the next fifteen minutes the greater part of eight squadrons was ordered to that area. Amongst these was No. 213 Hurricane Squadron from Exeter, led by Squadron Leader H. D. McGregor.8 In the early stages the top cover of Messerschmitt fighters, which were some distance east of the main formation, was brought to battle by other squadrons, but it fell to McGregor to make the only interception of the bombers before they reached their target. He had been ordered to patrol at 10,000 feet and had just arrived over Portland when the enemy was sighted. He counted about fifty Junkers 88s and thirty Me109s between 10,000 and 15,000 feet and immediately attacked the head of the enemy formation. This attack was so successful that some of the bombers were compelled to jettison their bombs near Portland Bill, wide of any target. In reporting his own share in the action McGregor said:

Attacked Junkers 88 in leading section from beam and gave two-second burst and rear gunner stopped firing. Put a second burst in the starboard engine which caught fire and aircraft crashed in flames on the west side of Portland Bill….

That little very serious damage was done in this attack was largely due to the efforts of Squadron Leader McGregor's pilots, who altogether claimed seven enemy bombers and one fighter destroyed.

For the next few days there was intensive enemy activity between the Isle of Wight and the Thames Estuary. Targets attacked included radar stations, convoys, and coastal towns. According to a German account of the air war against Great Britain, 13 August was chosen as Adlertag (Eagle Day) and marked the opening of an all-out four-day offensive designed to smash the fighter defences in Southern England. Once this goal was reached the offensive was to be extended northwards, sector by sector, until all England was covered by day attacks and Fighter Command was irreparably broken. The way for invasion would then be open. It is interesting to note, however, that at this date (13 August) the German High Command were still undecided amongst themselves on important details of the invasion plan. It was the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, Navy, that in view of the limited means available for naval warfare and transport, an invasion should be attempted only as a last resort if Britain could not be made to sue for peace in any other way. However, it is not at all certain that Reich Marshal Goering shared these pessimistic views, for on 15 August he launched a series of most highly co-ordinated and intensive attacks against England which were to result in the greatest number of German aircraft being destroyed by Fighter Command in any day throughout the entire course of the battle.

THE GREATEST DAY—15 AUGUST 1940

THIS DAY was outstanding in many respects. Five major operations were fought; the activity ranged over a front of 500 miles from Plymouth to the Tyne; the fighting continued all day and included, in the North-east, one particular victory which had a lasting result.

The first major attack was launched by two waves, totalling about 100 enemy aircraft, against the fighter station of Hawkinge, in Kent. Pilot Officer J. A. A. Gibson9 led a section of No. 501 Squadron Hurricanes from Hawkinge to intercept the attack. Gibson sighted one formation of about twenty Junkers 87 dive-bombers approaching from the south, and attacking from out of the sun he sent one into the sea in flames. He then noticed other dive-bombers attacking his home airfield. Returning at speed he was in time to intercept two and damage one of them. Their rear gunners, however, set his Hurricane on fire, but, noticing that he was near the town of Folkestone, Gibson stayed with the aircraft in spite of the flames and steered it clear of the town before finally jumping from a height of 1000 feet. For his courage he was awarded an immediate DFC.

Then followed an unusual attack in that it was directed not against the South or South-east coasts but against targets in the North-east. The attack came shortly after noon and was split into two thrusts, one directed at Sunderland and Tynemouth and the other against the airfield at Driffield, 100 miles to the south. This raid was a rash tactical move on the part of the Germans, for the area attacked was well out of range of the Me109 and the long-range bombers had to be escorted by the twin-engined Me100, already proved to be no match for the British fighter pilots.

It was Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding's opinion that:

The sustained resistance which they (the Germans) were meeting in South-east England probably led them to believe that fighter squadrons had been withdrawn wholly or in part from the North to meet the attack… the contrary was soon apparent and the bombers received such a drubbing that the experiment was not repeated.

In fact, instead of having an easy passage, the Germans were met by nine squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes which considerably thinned their ranks.

Pilot Officer J. N. MacKenzie10 was with one of the four squadrons which intercepted the main attack against the Tynemouth area. His squadron encountered an arrowhead formation of fifty bombers flying at 18,000 feet, escorted by forty Me110s a little astern and above. These escort fighters retained their formation when attacked and the combat resolved itself into a dogfight with the escort and a few loose bombers. MacKenzie singled out a Junkers 88 for attack and closed to within 80 yards of the enemy aircraft before breaking away. He last saw the Junkers entering cloud with smoke pouring from one engine.

The Germans cannot have been well pleased about the effectiveness of this raid, for in the Tyneside area no military damage was caused and industrial damage was insignificant. Meanwhile some 30 to 40 bombers and escorting fighters were attacking the aerodrome at Driffield. The airfield was extensively cratered and many buildings and hangars destroyed. But the fighter pilots exacted a heavy price from the Germans, for as a result of these attacks in the North-east, no fewer than fifty-six enemy aircraft of an attacking force of about three times that number were claimed destroyed. Not one British aircraft was lost although a few were damaged.

In the afternoon large formations of enemy aircraft attacked a fighter airfield and four radar stations in the South-east; an aircraft factory was also dive-bombed. This was followed by two attacks in the evening. The first was launched against Portsmouth and Plymouth and the Middle Wallop airfield by about thirty dive-bombers, escorted by approximately 100 fighters. Squadron Leader T. G. Lovell-Gregg11 led No. 87 Hurricane Squadron, which included Flying Officers D. H. Ward12 and K. W. Tait,13 to intercept this raid and the ensuing combat was described as the fiercest the squadron had experienced. The enemy fighters on being attacked formed themselves into two main defensive circles while the squadron set about them with good results. Squadron Leader Lovell-Gregg was shot down during this hectic engagement, but his loss was avenged by Ward and Tait, who each claimed the destruction of an Me110.

This attack against the South coast was hardly over when the pilots were called upon to intercept yet another heavy raid directed against an airfield in Kent and against Croydon aerodrome. The enemy succeeded in making the Kent airfield unserviceable for four days and also caused minor damage at Croydon. This latter attack was noteworthy as the first occasion when bombs were dropped in the London area, and also because all the aircraft which actually bombed the aerodrome were shot down. In intercepting this attack Flight Lieutenant Deere claimed an enemy fighter destroyed before he was himself shot down over Kent. He baled out at 1500 feet and escaped with a sprained wrist. This was the famous occasion when Deere, sideslipping his parachute to miss a farmhouse, landed in the middle of a fully laden plum tree and brought the whole crop to the ground. This tree was the only one in the orchard which still bore fruit and had been specially saved, a point which the irate farmer was not slow to point out to the New Zealander.

In all, as a result of the day's operations, it is now known that the German Air Force lost seventy-six aircraft. Fighter Command losses that day were thirty-four aircraft. In spite of this the enemy effort was only slightly less on the following day, when in three major attacks four Fighter Command airfields were heavily bombed.

On the 17th, despite the fact that good weather prevailed over England, there was a general lull in operations. The Luftwaffe's strenuous efforts to knock out Fighter Command ended on Sunday the 18th, when the Junkers 87 dive-bombers operated for the last time in any strength and London's anti-aircraft guns went into action for the first time. Again airfields and radar stations were the main targets; in all, three major attacks were made.

At Biggin Hill, where Pilot Officers W. S. Williams14 and R. M. Trousdale15 were stationed with No. 266 Squadron, the pilots were ordered off the ground shortly before their aerodrome was bombed and by determined attacks against the enemy force were able to mitigate substantially the severity of the attack, so that the only damage to the airfield was light cratering. Both the New Zealanders were engaged, Williams climbing back to 15,000 feet for a second attack after having chased an enemy fighter in a dive before opening fire and sending it crashing into the sea five miles from the French coast. There was an aftermath to this engagement, however, for having returned to their base to refuel, the Squadron's Spitfires were attacked on the ground and Trousdale's aircraft, amongst others, was destroyed.

These attacks brought this phase of the Battle of Britain to an end. The strain had been enormous. By 19 August ninety-four British pilots had been killed or were missing plus about sixty more or less seriously injured. During the period Fighter Command lost outright 183 aircraft, and although it is now known that 367 German aircraft were destroyed, the situation was serious and the ratio of losses much too high.

THE ATTACK ON THE AIRFIELDS

IN THE FOLLOWING five days there was none of the fire that had characterised the German effort throughout the preceding week. Indeed the Germans seemed to be resting after their exertions, and there is no doubt that the pause gave Fighter Command, too, a much-needed breathing space. Nevertheless, across the Channel the German commanders were not without hope of ultimate victory, for on 20 August the battle order of the German Commander-in-Chief was as follows:

Continue the fight against the British Air Force until further notice with the aim of weakening the British fighter strength. The enemy is to be forced by ceaseless attacks to bring his fighter formations into operation….

In accordance with these instructions intensive operations were renewed by the Germans on 24 August, and for the next fortnight they sought by heavy attacks on airfields to the north and south of London, and on targets in the Thames Estuary, to clear the approaches to the capital.

Above the Clouds

HURRICANES ON PATROL

RE-ARMING AN EIGHT-GUN HURRICANE

PILOTS SCRAMBLING

ADJUSTING PARACHUTE HARNESS

SPITFIRES IN FORMATION

COMBAT

WAVES OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT—120 Plus over the Thames Estuary

RAF FIGHTERS IN PURSUIT

EFFECTIVE FIRE AT CLOSE RANGE

ENEMY AIRCRAFT EXPLODING

DAMAGE BY RAIDERS A photograph taken from a German aircraft of the enemy attacks on oil storage tanks at Newhaven on the Thames on 7 August 1940

A Heinkel over London on 7 August 1940

COASTAL RADAR STATION

OBSERVER CORPS POST

HIS MAJESTY THE KING CONGRATULATES FLIGHT LIEUTENANT A. C. DEERE after decorating him with the Distinguished Flying Cross

Pilot Officer C. F. GRAY

Air Vice-Marshal K. R. PARK

PHASE II: 24 August–5 September 1940 Attacks on Airfields covering London

On a typical day in which heavy attacks were launched at intervals, activity over the Dover Straits was almost constant. Out of a maze of plots in the operations room would emerge anything from three to six formations heading for the coast of Kent. The amount of warning thus available to the defenders was limited—indeed it was remarkable that in this phase the Germans showed little interest in the highly important radar stations which were thus allowed to recuperate somewhat from the damage they had received during the previous phase—and the Germans further added to the difficulties of identification by splitting into several groups immediately the coast was crossed. Moreover, their general bombing tactics changed during this phase, in that instead of using massed formations of bombers, the enemy used small formations of 20 to 30 aircraft, strongly escorted, and flying higher than previously. Often the bombers were completely boxed in by close fighter escorts, a number of which flew slightly above on a flank or in rear, while others flew slightly above and ahead, with a third formation of fighters weaving in amongst the bombers.

To deal with these new tactics Air Vice-Marshal Park arranged that some of his fighter squadrons should meet the enemy as far forward as possible. Other squadrons, including reinforcements from the neighbouring sectors of Nos. 10 and 12 Groups, patrolled the all-important fighter airfields near and around London. he instructed his controllers to send the Spitfire squadrons against the higher fighter screens and the Hurricanes to attack the bombers and their escorts, but in practice these roles were often reversed, much depending on the state of readiness of the squadrons at the time an attack developed.

On occasions Squadron Commanders would send one flight against the bombers whilst the other attempted to contain the enemy fighter aircraft. These were the tactics adopted by the Commanding Officer of No. 87 Squadron on the 25th when he led his squadron from Exeter to intercept 100 enemy aircraft making an attack against Warmwell airfield. Although six other fighter squadrons were airborne in the area this squadron made interception alone. The trend of the action is admirably described by a squadron report, as follows:

‘B’ Flight went for the Junkers 88s and the Me110s went for ‘B’ Flight. ‘A’ Flight then attacked the Me110s.

Flying Officer Tait, who was leading a section in ‘A’ Flight, attacked approximately thirty Me110s at 18,000 feet and saw the leader fire two red Very lights, evidently calling for the top cover of Me109s to come down. His report continues:

They did. Attacked one 110 trying to enter a vicious circle. After three bursts he dived away with one engine stopped and crashed into the sea. Attacked a 109 from directly above with full deflection—a Spitfire also attacked it from the beam. The 109 crashed on land.

It subsequently transpired that this squadron, although heavily outnumbered, had accounted for no less than nine enemy aircraft. In spite of their losses the bombers got through to Warmwell, where they dropped twenty to thirty bombs, doing damage to hangars and buildings. The enemy fighters at heavy cost carried out their duty of protecting the bombers: thirty-six German fighters were claimed destroyed but only four bombers were claimed to have been shot down in the entire engagement.

It was during this phase that Flight Lieutenant Deere and Pilot Officer Gray established themselves as outstanding fighter pilots. Both had been decorated a few days previously, Deere receiving a bar to the DFC he won at Dunkirk. In the ten days to 3 September, Gray claimed no less than seven victims. Deere also had numerous successful combats and on several occasions led his squadron into battle. In addition he had two narrow escapes, being bombed on the ground while taking off from Hornchurch, and once again being forced to bale out, an art at which he was rapidly becoming expert.

Many of these combats were in direct defence of the vital airfields protecting London, against which the Germans turned their full attention from the 28th. On the serviceability of these airfields depended the efficiency of the defences, and it needed all the Group Commander's skill to beat off the attacks. One method instituted about this time which aided the fighter controllers in their task of keeping track of enemy formations was the ‘sighting report’. This meant that pilots were given permission to break radio silence and transmit the position of the enemy as soon as they were sighted. Later, single high-flying Spitfires were placed on patrol for this purpose. In the air Squadron Commanders were experimenting with new methods of attack to counteract the rear armour which the Germans were fitting to their fighters and bombers. The head-on attack was thus evolved and, as the following example shows, was used with striking success on the 30th by Pilot Officer W. H. Hodgson16 and other pilots of No. 85 Hurricane Squadron.

All through the early morning of that day the Germans had simulated attacks, thereby necessitating wearying standing patrols over fighter airfields. However, by 10.30 a.m. it was obvious that the enemy was preparing in earnest and accordingly upwards of nine fighter squadrons were ordered into the air. The weather was fine and clear, although there was some cloud between 5000 and 7000 feet. Altogether between 150 and 200 aircraft participated in this attack. Part of this force crossed the coast near Dungeness and steered north-west. Within a few minutes it had been intercepted by No. 85 Squadron pilots, who reported that it consisted of about fifty Heinkel 111s at 16,000 feet, with numerous escort fighters still higher. The Squadron Commander had previously led his pilots inland well in front of the Heinkels, before turning about so as to make a diving head-on attack out of the sun. These tactics were extremely effective for the bomber formation was dispersed, many jettisoning their bombs. In this engagement Hodgson shot down two escorting Me110s, probably destroyed a third, and also damaged a Heinkel 111. Hodgson in reporting the combat said that in the initial head-on attack he fired at a Heinkel 111 which broke away and disappeared. His report continues:

I then pulled up to 23,000 feet, dived on a straggling Me110 and gave a long burst from the beam through to line astern…. I pulled away and climbed to 25,000 feet and dived on another straggler and did the same attack with the same result. I then climbed up to 26,000 feet and dived through a circle of Me110s and pulled up underneath one. I shot into his belly at about 100 yards, closing to 50 yards range, and he rolled over with white smoke pouring out from underneath him and went down in a controlled glide. I had to break away as I had run out of ammunition and about seven Me110s dived on me so I hit out for home base….

As a result of this day's operations thirty-seven German aircraft were destroyed. But twenty-six Fighter Command aircraft were lost and fourteen pilots killed or wounded. This was a severe blow to the fighter strength, especially at a time when losses in pilots and aircraft substantially exceeded the reinforcements available. In respect of aircraft, the needs of the squadrons were being met by using reserves built up during quiet periods, so that although the gross output was not keeping pace with the casualties, the supply of aircraft never became a factor limiting the scale of operations. It was the supply of pilots that caused most concern, for at the beginning of September there was an average deficiency of about ten operational pilots in each Fighter Command squadron, although No. 11 Group squadrons were maintained at an average of nineteen operational pilots.

The establishment of a fighter squadron was 26 pilots.

In fact, by 6 September there were no fresh squadrons available in the country to replace the battered units serving in the South-east and the Commander-in-Chief was compelled as a desperate expedient to institute the ‘stabilisation scheme’. This scheme, by committing a number of squadrons in back areas to the task of training new pilots to operational standard, enabled squadrons in No. 11 Group and on its immediate flanks to be kept supplied with trained replacement pilots without the necessity for moving entire units out of the battle area.

This phase then, marked the crisis of the Battle of Britain, a point which was made by Air Vice-Marshal Park, who later wrote:

There was a critical period between 28 August and 5 September when the damage to sector stations and our ground organisation was having a serious effect on the fighting efficiency of the fighter squadrons. Had the enemy continued his heavy attacks, the fighter defences of London would have been in a parlous state during the last critical phase when heavy attacks have been directed against the capital.

From Tropics to Sub-Antarctic

IN A CABLE MESSAGE dated 8 September 1939, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs informed the British High Commissioner in New Zealand that ‘by placing HMS Achilles

It was not until September 1941, when the King approved the proposal that the New Zealand Naval Forces should be designated the Royal New Zealand Navy, that the Leander and Achilles were styled as HMNZ Ships.

and two escort vessels [Leith and Wellington] under the orders of Admiralty, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have made the maximum possible strategic contribution at sea under the present circumstances, since HMS Leander requires to be retained on the New Zealand Station to guard against the threat of attack on shipping by armed raiders’. That was indeed a true statement of the position, but there were many young New Zealanders in HMS Leander at that time who thought otherwise. They had said farewell to the other ships a few days before and felt that their Leander had been relegated to a backwater of the war, a feeling that was intensified three months later when news was received of the part played by her sister ship at the River Plate. But they need not have worried. This was to be the greatest maritime war of all time, and the Leander was destined to serve in many seas during the next four years.

On 30 August 1939, barely twenty-four hours after the Achilles had departed for South America, the Leander sailed from Auckland for Fanning Island, an important mid-Pacific link in the submarine cable connecting New Zealand with Canada. The cruiser, which was wearing the broad pendant of Captain J. W. Rivett-Carnac, DSC, RN,1 Commodore Commanding the New Zealand Squadron, carried New Zealand's first expeditionary force of the Second World War, a detachment of two officers and thirty other ranks, whose task was the defence of the cable station on that tiny island lying north of the Equator, more than 2800 miles from the Dominion. Almost exactly twenty-five years before—on 7 September 1914—a landing party from the German light cruiser Nurnberg, a unit of Admiral Graf Spee's Pacific Squadron, had cut the cable and wrecked the equipment of the station. Proceeding at high speed, the Leander called at Suva to refuel and arrived at Fanning Island on 5 September. After disembarking the troops and sixty tons of stores, the Leander returned via Suva, where she landed two dummy coast-defence guns, and arrived at Auckland on 13 September.

Before the end of the month the Leander was in sub-Antarctic waters on a cruise to Campbell Island and the Auckland Islands, which were uninhabited and possible bases for enemy raiders. Nothing suspicious was seen in either locality, but a heavy gale with poor visibility between the rain squalls prevented a close examination of all the anchorages in the Auckland Islands. The Leander returned there six weeks later and anchored in Carnley Harbour, several inlets of which were visited by her boats. Port Ross and other anchorages were reconnoitred by the ship's aircraft, but again no sign of any recent human activity was seen.

There is no doubt, however, that a German ship was lying in a remote anchorage in Carnley Harbour at the time the Leander made her first visit to the Auckland Islands. This was the Norddeutscher Lloyd steamer Erlangen, 6101 tons, which had sailed from Dunedin on 28 August 1939, ostensibly for Port Kembla, New South Wales, where she was to have filled her coal bunkers for the homeward passage to Europe.

The Erlangen was ordered by radio from Germany not to go to Australia, but she had insufficient coal to enable her to reach the neutral waters of South America, 5000 miles distant. She went south to the Auckland Islands and lay concealed at the extreme head of North Arm, the innermost inlet of Carnley Harbour, for five weeks while her crew toiled at cutting rata wood, of which some 400 tons was loaded to eke out her meagre coal supply. A suit of sails was fashioned from hatch covers and spare canvas. The Erlangen put to sea again on 7 October and arrived in a Chilean port thirty-five days later. She subsequently made her way into the Atlantic where, on 24 July 1941, she was intercepted by HMS Newcastle and scuttled by her crew.

Leander on Foreign Service

ON 5 JANUARY 1940, HMS Leander, commanded by Captain H. E. Horan, DSC, RN,2 left Lyttelton with the troopships Dunera and Sobieski which had embarked the South Island section of the First Echelon, 2nd NZEF. Next morning they joined company in Cook Strait with the four transports carrying the North Island troops. The convoy consisted of the Empress of Canada, Strathaird, Orion, Rangitata, Dunera, and Sobieski, escorted by HMS Ramillies, HMAS Canberra, and HMS Leander. After an uneventful passage across the Tasman Sea, the New Zealand ships met the Australian transports Empress of Japan, Orcades, Otranto, Orford, and Strathnaver, escorted by HMAS Australia. The combined convoy then sailed southward and the Leander went into Sydney, whence she returned to New Zealand ten days later. The Leander was at the Bay of Islands on 6 February representing the Royal New Zealand Navy at the ceremonies celebrating the centenary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi.

HMS Achilles having returned to Auckland on 27 February 1940, it was arranged that the Leander should proceed overseas for service at the disposal of the Admiralty. In company with the Australian cruisers Australia and Canberra, she sailed from New Zealand on 2 May 1940, escorting the Aquitania, Empress of Britain, Empress of Japan, and Andes, which carried the troops of the Second Echelon. The convoy was joined off Sydney by the Queen Mary and Mauritania, and in Bass Strait by the Empress of Canada from Melbourne, and arrived at Fremantle on 10 May, the day on which Germany invaded the Low Countries. On 16 May, when it was halfway from Fremantle to Colombo, the convoy received orders to 'steer toward the Cape of Good Hope’. The Leander was detached and proceeded independently to Colombo and thence via Aden to Alexandria, where she arrived on 26 May.

Five days later the Leander was at Port Sudan, where she was joined by Rear Admiral A. J. L. Murray, DSO, Senior Officer, Red Sea Force, who flew his flag in her till the end of June, when his office was established on shore at Aden. The Admiralty signal to commence hostilities against Italy was received in the early hours of 11 June. During the afternoon the Italian liner Umbria,

hms leander at sea near auckland, 1939

10,076 tons, which had been brought into harbour in charge of an armed guard from HMS Grimsby, scuttled herself in the outer anchorage. For the remainder of the month the Leander patrolled in the southern area of the Red Sea and the approaches to Aden, where Italian U-boats from Massawa were cautiously active. On 27 June the Leander adn two destroyers searched for and found the submarine Evangelista Torricelli

Evangelista Torricelli, 880–1230 tons displacement, eight 21-inch torpedo-tubes, two 3.9-inch guns, 17 knots (surface), 8½ knots (submerged); sister ship to Galileo Galilei, captured near Aden on 18 June 1940. Evangelista Torricelli, Italian mathematician and philosopher (1608–47), was disciple of Galileo and inventor of the mercury barometer.

a ground on the coast of Eritrea, opposite Perim, after being attacked with gunfire and depth-charges. The U-boat, which was bombed by the Leander's aircraft and well holed by her gunfire, was the fifth Italian submarine accounted for in the Red Sea area in eight days. Italian aircraft made three unsuccesful attacks on the Leander and her destroyers which were undamaged by near misses.

Control of the Mediterranean was a decisive factor in the Second World War, and Great Britain maintained that control by the effective use of sea power. For more than three years the main effort of British arms was exercised in the Mediterranean area, where sea, land, and air operations were sustained by the constant flow of ships carrying men and supplies through the narrow defile of the Red Sea which, from the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb connecting it with the Gulf of Aden, extends for a length of some 1200 miles to the isthmus of Suez. At its southern end, the Red Sea was flanked for more than 400 miles on its western side by the hostile coastline of Italian Eritrea, about midway along which was the defended port and naval base of Massawa.

A MILITARY LIABILITY ‘The key to our position in the whole Mediterranean lay in Malta.’ Cambridge University, 1947

ON A CLEAR DAY from the Grand Harbour of Malta the coast of Sicily is visible as a faint blue line on the horizon only sixty miles away. Throughout 1939, with the Italian Air Force well established in Sicily and able to assemble up to 900 first-line aircraft, Malta lay under the threat of Axis air power. It was officially believed that little use could be made of the island as a naval or air base should the war spread to the Mediterranean, a belief which had prevailed since sanctions against Italy were mooted in 1935. Moreover, there was some justification in the assumption that, in the Central Mediterranean, French forces from the West could co-operate adequately with the Royal Navy and Imperial forces from Egypt, while Italy itself could be attacked from the Tunisian airfields.

Three years of war in the Mediterranean were to pass before this strategy became possible.

The difficulty of holding Malta might therefore have no grave consequences. The island's long history, which had seen it as the military fortress of the Knights of St. John and as Nelson's ‘important outwork to India’, now seemed temporarily to be closed. As the year 1940 opened, Italian intentions became clear; accordingly, the Royal Navy withdrew its Mediterranean Fleet to Gibraltar and Alexandria, and the Royal Air Force dispersed its squadrons. There were plans for four fighter squadrons based on Malta but the Battle of France was approaching; no squadrons were sent and His Majesty's Aircraft Carrier Glorious was withdrawn with her squadrons of fighters to take part in the Norwegian campaign. In the shadow of the airfields of Sicily and Southern Italy, it was difficult to see how Malta, which had been held in turn as a fortress and a naval base, could persist as an aerodrome.

In the three eventful years that followed, during which the Royal Air Force both defended the island and demonstrated its unique value in the Mediterranean campaigns, Malta's airmen made a proud record. By the end of 1942 the defensive years in the Mediterranean were over; it is with those years that this account is concerned. The airmen who made up this small force on the island came from every part of the British Commonwealth. New Zealand representation was necessarily not large—a total of 84 New Zealanders served in Malta during this period—but two of the three Air Officers Commanding were New Zealanders.

On 26 January 1940 Air Commodore F. H. M. Maynard, AFC,1 a New Zealand officer in the Royal Air Force, was appointed to Malta as Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Mediterranean. Maynard had had long service in the air arm. He had joined the Royal Naval Air Service in 1915, and in the inter-war years had spent two tours of duty in the Middle East and had held various commands in the organisation for the Air Defence of Great Britain. He came to Malta from the Air Ministry.

Air Commodore Maynard's contribution to the new chapter in Malta's history was his conviction that the island could be held. The record of his sixteen months in command at Malta is not so much one of dramatic air successes as of difficult strategic decisions made on the most tenuous resources. Determined to offer some opposition, Maynard was fortunate to find four Gladiator biplanes still in their packing cases which the Glorious had left behind. On 19 April he formed a fighter flight at Hal Far airfield, where three of these obsolete fighters were assembled, given the names of ‘Faith’, ‘Hope’, and ‘Charity’, and flown by members of his personal staff and surplus flying-boat pilots.

Malta could do little but wait for the Italians to begin the fight. At midnight on 10 June 1940 Italy declared war. The Regia Aeronautica was not slow to start. The island had its first air raid at dawn, followed by seven more before nightfall and by forty-nine before the month ended. Air Commodore Maynard also succeeded in retaining four Hurricanes which were in transit through France to Egypt; his total of seven fighters, backed by the Army's anti-aircraft defences and an efficient radar warning system, enabled the island to survive. Under the Governor- General, Sir William Dobbie, air-raid precautions were well organised and the morale of the Maltese remained generally high. Maynard was assisted by a lack of real enemy aggressiveness, for from the Italian point of view there was no need for haste: Mussolini's attention was attracted to Albania, where unbeknown to his Axis partner he was preparing an invasion of Greece. But on 25 June 1940 the whole strategic picture abruptly darkened. France fell, a German Armistice Commission visited Tunisia, and the entire Mediterranean coastline, save Egypt, Palestine, and the islands of Cyprus and Malta, was closed to the British Fleet. Malta, lying in the Narrow Seas of the Central Mediterranean, was now the Royal Air Force's loneliest command, for the nearest British base at Alexandria was some 800 miles away and Gibraltar almost 1000. Italy could cut the Mediterranean in two if she could eliminate the island airfield.

Malta offered special problems for an Air Commander. From the air it was a compact and seemingly easy target, measuring only seventeen miles by nine, with an area of about ninety- five square miles. Two islands, Comino and Gozo, lie conveniently off the north-west tip to orient any incoming pilot. The four military targets, the Grand Harbour and the three airfields, were confined in the eastern half of this small area and linked only by dusty and tortuous lanes. The condition of the airfields was poor. Hal Far on the south coast was a narrow strip, limited by rocky outcrops and ravines. Ta Kali to the north, dominated by hills on three sides and familiar to Italian civil pilots, had been built on the site of an ancient lake and its grass surface bogged easily. But despite the unpromising future, Air Commodore Maynard persisted with the building of a bomber airfield at Luqa, in the centre of the island, overlooking Valetta and the Grand Harbour. Its construction was a triumph of ingenuity, since the whole area had to be levelled from hills, quarries, and nullahs. Villages, each with its large church, crowded upon the airfield. There were no tools for airfield construction, yet the most primitive Maltese labouring methods with horse and cart succeeded in building the longest runway on the island, 1200 yards of tarmac. Aircraft dispersal was a major problem, since every yard of the island's poor soil was needed for food crops. But Malta's stone-walled roads were put to good use in forming the celebrated Safi strip, which linked Luqa and Hal Far airfields in a unique dispersal area.

THE AIRFIELDS OF MALTA

One natural advantage was the island's pale limestone which was soft to work and yet hardened quickly on exposure. The fact that it was an island of rock contributed largely to Malta's survival. Given the labour, bomb damage could be readily repaired, and fire, which devastated the bombed European cities, was no real danger. The people went underground. Natural caves and the old tunnels of a defunct railway were enlarged by British coalminers, now working as Royal Engineers' tunnellers, to form adequate air-raid shelters. When raiding aircraft were close to the island, ships in the Grand Harbour were put on the alert by a yellow flag while the congested population were warned by a red flag and siren. The 270,000 inhabitants prepared for a state of siege. The ancient underground granaries of the Knights of St. John were a safe store for the island's supply of grain. But Malta, which had depended for its existence on peacetime Service establishments, was virtually unproductive, and stocks of food and all war material had to come by sea. Above all, petrol, the bugbear of every Mediterranean commander, was at a premium. Public transport stopped; horses, it was true, pulled carozzins for hire, but were marked down as ‘reserve meat ration’.

For these first seven months of Italian attack Malta continued unexpectedly to survive. Convoys came through under cover of the Battle Fleet, and gradually Air Commodore Maynard built up a Hurricane fighter defence, obtaining reinforcements from Egypt or by aircraft-carrier through the Western Mediterranean, in spite of the pressing need for these fighters in Great Britain. Maynard carefully husbanded his forces. On a coloured chart in his office was plotted every type of operation against the weekly allowance of petrol. There was soon a complete Hurricane squadron, of which Flight-Sergeant R. J. Hyde2 was a member, and formations of up to twenty Italian Fiat fighters and Savoia-Marchetti bombers were met and dispersed by seldom more than two Hurricanes and one Gladiator. By the beginning of August Maynard's view that Malta could not only be held but used to tremendous advantage was definitely accepted. While Royal Air Force aircraft supplied accurate reconnaissance, Royal Naval surface craft, submarines, and torpedo-bombers were increasingly successful in their attacks on Italian merchant vessels running to North Africa. Equally valuable was the island's use, with Gibraltar, as a vital link in the aircraft reinforcement route to the Middle East.

By October Italian plans in the Mediterranean were beginning to go awry, and the German High Command, which had originally intended to leave the Mediterranean area in the hands of Italy while concentrating on the Russian offensive for the summer of 1941, was forced to adopt a more positive role in the Central Mediterranean. By January 1941 Italian forces were ignominiously retreating in North Africa, while the Italian Navy was proving incapable of commanding the Mediterranean, with the losses at Taranto and, later, at Matapan, as outstanding instances. Malta was unsubdued, and the German decision to reinforce the Italian Army in North Africa required the neutralisation of this island base. Accordingly, a complete coastal air group, Fliegerkorps X, was transferred from Norway to Sicily with some 260 first-line aircraft, mostly Stuka dive-bombers and Messerschmitt 109 fighters. On 10 January His Majesty's Aircraft Carrier Illustrious limped back into the Grand Harbour after being heavily hit, and the period which became known as the ‘Illustrious blitz’ had begun. But Malta stood firm, as it had against the Italian Air Force. Its shipping offensive, however, practically ceased, while the Luftwaffe forced the re-routing of Middle East convoys around the Cape of Good Hope, thus impeding the supply of war material to the British forces in Greece and allowing the free running of Axis convoys to North Africa. Again other campaigns produced distractions, and in April 1941 the Luftwaffe, after transferring its dive-bombers to Rommel's Afrika Korps, left Sicily to support the Balkan and Russian campaigns. Enemy operations over Malta devolved again upon the Italian Air Force, and there was a general lull.

Air Vice-Marshal Maynard,

In February 1941 Maynard's post in Malta was regraded from Air Commodore to Air Vice-Marshal. By a special award, in recognition of the defence of the island, he was created a Companion of the Order of the Bath.

who had guided Malta through the Italian and German offensives in turn, could now be relieved. His achievements had been considerable. In the face of superior types of enemy aircraft and immensely superior numbers, his handful of fighters had been credited with fifty aircraft destroyed and as many damaged. The island now boasted two complete Hurricane squadrons. Maynard initiated plans for a swift build-up of the fighter defence in preparation for the island's coming offensive role. During May and June 185 Hurricanes, some of which were destined for the Middle East theatre, were flown into Malta from aircraft-carriers. Maynard's development of Luqa airfield was proving invaluable, and in the attack on the Axis sea lanes the Royal Air Force, whose function to date had largely been reconnaissance, could share the offensive with the Royal Navy. It was clear that Malta was not the ‘military liability’ which it had appeared at the outbreak of war. On 1 June 1941 Air Vice-Marshal Maynard handed over his command to Air Vice-Marshal H. P. Lloyd.3