New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force (Vol. II)

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Title Page

Per ardua ad astra

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 The authors of the volumes in this series of histories prepared under the supervision of the War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs have been given full access to official documents. They and the Editor-in-Chief are responsible for the statements made and the views expressed by them. By Authority R. E. Owen, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand 1956

Bomber crew being interrogated Black and white photograph of pilots in uniform sitting around a table, under interrogation

New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force Volume II: EUROPEAN THEATRE January 1943–May 1945 Wing Commander H. L. THOMPSON WAR HISTORY BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRSWELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND1956 Distributed bywhitcombe & tombs ltd.Christchurch, New Zealand Geoffrey Cumberlege oxford university press London

Preface

This volume, the second of three recording the services of New Zealand airmen who flew and fought with the Royal Air Force, completes the history of the European theatre of operations. It covers those later years during which the battle for air supremacy was finally won and in which Allied air power was able to play such an important part in the victories on land and at sea. It is, therefore, largely a story of achievement and success, but one hopes the reader will note what the mounting air offensive cost in young lives, especially in Bomber Command, and then ponder the words of Sir Arthur Harris which are recorded at the end of Chapter 14.

As in the first volume, the activities of both the Dominion squadrons and airmen are recorded against a background of the air war; for without this background the narrative would lack perspective and appear rather as a series of unrelated, and at times repetitive, episodes. It has been far from easy to hold the balance. Moreover, the scale of air operations was so vast and the number of men involved so large that selection and summary have been inevitable. One would like to have included many more names and exploits and also to have discussed certain aspects of the air war more fully. But while this is an official record in which detail may rightly be expected, one felt it should also be made as readable and interesting as possible by including some impression at least of the life and work of all those whose battlefield was the ‘blue dome of the sky’.

The documents and other sources of information on which the history is based have already been described in the Introduction to Volume I. I wish again, however, to record my appreciation of the very great help received from many officers of Air Ministry, London, and especially from Mr J. C. Nerney and his staff of the Historical Branch. My thanks are also due to Flight Lieutenants B. G. Clare and N. W. Faircloth for their research on Bomber and Fighter Commands, and to Sergeant S. W. R. Holmes for his valuable assistance in many directions, including preparation of the biographical notes. I should like to add a particular word of thanks to the many men who have answered our requests for information and also to those who have read and commented upon the text.

H. L. Thompson

London,August 1954

ERRATUM Page 196, line 3, for They read White. Rae only was taken prisoner.

Contents

Page PREFACE vii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 Strategic situation at opening of fourth year of war – Growing Allied power in the air – Success of Commonwealth Air Training Plans – New Zealand contribution to increasing RAF strength – Outstanding leaders and personalities – The task ahead. CHAPTER 2 AIRCRAFT AGAINST U-BOAT 15 Most critical period in the Battle of the Atlantic – Uncertainty about counter-measures – The renewed bombing of U-boat building, ports, and bases – No. 75 Squadron's part. Air patrols in the North Atlantic – New Zealanders fly with Coastal Command from Iceland and United Kingdom – Victory in the North Atlantic – Patrol and attack in Bay of Biscay – Changing German tactics – Success of this air campaign – Patrols from Gibraltar and West Africa – No. 490 Squadron's work – Doenitz threatens new type of U-boat war. CHAPTER 3 BOMBER COMMAND AND THE BATTLE OF THE RUHR 40 Bomber Command's campaign against Germany during earlier years – Allied strategy for 1943 – Stronger British force now available – Harris in command – Prominent New Zealanders and the part of No. 75 Squadron – Advent of new technical aids – The sustained assault on the Ruhr, March – June 1943 – Some exploits and experiences – Attacks on other German towns – The Dam raids – Some difficulties in the development of the combined bombing offensive. CHAPTER 4 LONGER-RANGE ATTACKS 83 The Battle of Hamburg – Bomber Command's inability to repeat this success – Raids against Italy – Deeper into Germany – Attacks on enemy aircraft industry – New Zealanders and the work of No. 75 Squadron – German counter-measures to heavier RAF raids – The Battle of Berlin – Renewed attacks on German aircraft industry – The Allied bombing achievement by March 1944. CHAPTER 5 WITH MINE, BOMB, AND TORPEDO 114 Growth of the air assault on German sea communications in North-West Europe – Minelaying by Bomber Command during 1943 – The increasing German defences – Development of high-level minelaying – Major effort by No. 75 (NZ) Squadron – New Zealanders with other bomber squadrons. Coastal Command's attacks on ships at sea – The work of No. 489 (NZ) Squadron – New Zealanders with other squadrons – Development of Beaufighter Strike Wings – Some typical attacks – Formation of Anzac Strike Wing and the part of No. 489 Squadron. CHAPTER 6 DAYLIGHT RAIDS BY THE LIGHT BOMBERS 137 Development of RAF daylight raids – New Zealanders with No. 2 Bomber Group – The part of No. 487 Squadron – A memorable mission to Amsterdam – Mosquito crews and their work – Some notable attacks – Reorganisation – Bombing raids during latter half of 1943 – The opening attacks on flying-bomb sites – No. 487 Squadron and the raid on Amiens prison. CHAPTER 7 DAY-FIGHTERS AND FIGHTER-BOMBERS 169 The British fighter force at the beginning of 1943 – Its changing role – Two fighter support missions – New Zealand wing leaders – Exploits of Jameson, Deere, and Compton – Other prominent personalities – No. 485 Spitfire Squadron – An active period at Biggin Hill – Some typical missions – Checketts' escape from France – No. 485's work under Hume – No. 486 Typhoon Squadron and the interception of coastal raiders – Change to offensive patrols under Scott – An interesting air-sea rescue mission. Fighter operations during early months of 1944. CHAPTER 8 NIGHT FIGHTERS 210 Decline of the Luftwaffe's night-bomber force – Hitler's demands for reprisals – Renewed German effort during 1943 – The British night-fighter force, its equipment and technique – New Zealanders with this force – Their part in both defence and ‘intruder’ patrols – The work of No. 488 Mosquito Squadron – The ‘Baby Blitz’ against Britain and its failure – Decline of the German Air Force and its effect on Allied preparations for invasion. CHAPTER 9 PRELUDE TO INVASION 234 Maturing plans – Reorganisation of the Allied air forces – Coningham in charge of Second Tactical Air Force – Other New Zealanders holding senior posts – The pre-invasion air campaign – Bomber Command's attacks on transport and the German aircraft industry – Fighter and fighter-bomber assault on V-weapon sites and transport – The part of the New Zealand squadrons – Typical missions and some individual exploits – Air operations at sea against enemy ships and U-boats – The eve of the landings. CHAPTER 10 NORMANDY 282 The landings succeed – Strong Allied air support – Weak Luftwaffe reaction – Enemy uncertainty – Covering the advance inland – Highly effective attacks on communications – Crisis in the Allied build-up – Progress of the land battle – The supporting air operations. New Zealanders play their part with Second Tactical Air Force – Achievements of New Zealand squadrons – Attacking enemy ships and U-boats – With Bomber Command in close support, bombing, and minelaying – No. 75 Squadron's varied operations – Allied air power is decisive. CHAPTER 11 FLYING BOMBS AND ROCKETS 318 German plans are upset – Eventual opening and development of the attack – Its relative failure – Allied counter-measures to the V-1 – The fighter patrols – Their difficulties and achievements – Notable part played by No. 486 Squadron – New Zealand pilots with RAF units – Bombing the launching sites and supply depots – Raids by No. 75 Squadron – The campaign against the V-2 rocket. CHAPTER 12 FORWARD TO THE RHINE 339 Progress of the land campaign – Marked contrast in Allied and German air support – Bomber Command's missions – The part of No. 75 Squadron – Second Tactical Air Force – Mobile Wings – Fighter and medium-bomber operations – New Zealanders with 2nd TAF – Prominent personalities – The work of Nos. 485, 486, 487, and 488 Squadrons – New Zealanders with Fighter Command. CHAPTER 13 TRANSPORT AND SPECIAL DUTIES 369 Achievements of Transport Command – Its early development – New Zealanders with the RAF organisation – Operations with No. 44 Group – Atlantic ferrying with No. 45 Group – Transport and supply with Nos. 38 and 46 Groups – Normandy, Arnhem, and the Rhine – Supporting the final advance – Special duties with No. 38 Group and Bomber Command – Dropping supplies and landing agents over Europe – Hazards involved and the success achieved. CHAPTER 14 BOMBER COMMAND AND THE BATTLE OF GERMANY 387 The battle is renewed – Bomber Command operates at greater advantage – German cities, especially in the Ruhr, heavily attacked – Effect of this onslaught – Enemy communications also bombed – The Dortmund-Ems canal blocked – Controversy over oil targets – Heavier attacks by British bombers – Tirpitz is sunk – The climax. New Zealanders with Bomber Command – Some remarkable experiences – The work of the Mosquito crews – Radio counter-measures – No. 75 Squadron's prominent part. What the bomber offensive achieved – Harris's tribute to his men. CHAPTER 15 COASTAL COMMAND PATROLS 413 A notable contribution to victory – Last phase of the U-boat war – German plans frustrated – New Zealanders in patrol and attack – The part of No. 490 Squadron – Attacking enemy ships – Prominent New Zealand leaders – No. 489 Squadron in action – New Zealanders share in photo-reconnaissance, air-sea rescue, and ‘met’ flights. CHAPTER 16 THE LAST PHASE 428 The advance into Germany – Supporting operations by 2nd TAF and Bomber Command – Operation exodus – Last weeks of the war at sea – Final missions of the New Zealand squadrons. CHAPTER 17 MISSION COMPLETED 442 APPENDICES— I Principal events of the Second World War (1943–45) with particular reference to air operations in Europe 447 II Strengths and Casualties 455 III Notes on the New Zealand Squadrons 456 IV Principal types of British and German operational aircraft (1943–45) 463 V Glossary 467 VI Bibliography 469

List of Illustrations

Frontispiece Bomber crew being interrogated Air Ministry Following page 100 Flying Officer L. A. Trigg, VC Royal New Zealand Air Force U-boat under air attack Air Ministry U-boat foundering Air Ministry Coastal Command Beaufighter Royal New Zealand Air Force No. 490 Squadron group, West Africa, July 1943 Air Ministry Aerial mines Topical Press Air Vice-Marshal C. R. Carr Imperial War Museum Air Commodore A. McKee Sport and General Bombing up Imperial War Museum A Halifax about to take off Imperial War Museum Radar screen shows features in the Flensburg area Imperial War Museum Navigator plotting course Imperial War Museum The Eder Dam breached Air Ministry Bomb aimer Imperial War Museum Marshalling yards at Hamm Imperial War Museum A Halifax landing after a long night raid Imperial War Museum Briefing crews of No. 75 Squadron Sport and General The damaged tail unit of a Stirling Sport and General The Amiens prison raid Imperial War Museum Squadron Leader L. H. Trent, VC Royal New Zealand Air Force Above a railway yard in Belgium Imperial War Museum Before and after attack on a flying-bomb installation in Northern France Imperial War Museum Wing Commander W. V. Crawford-Compton Sport and General Squadron Leaders R. J. C. Grant and E. P. Wells Sport and General Squadron Leader J. M. Checketts Air Ministry Dispersal huts of No. 486 Squadron Sport and General Six stages in the destruction of a Messerschmitt 109G Air Ministry Pilot and navigator of a Mosquito night fighter Imperial War Museum Flight Lieutenant G. E. Jameson and his navigator Air Ministry The night-fighter patrol takes off Imperial War Museum Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham Imperial War Museum D Day Imperial War Museum Lancasters of Bomber Command in daylight attack Imperial War Museum Enemy strongpoint obliterated Imperial War Museum German army headquarters attacked, Normandy Imperial War Museum Attack by Coastal Command Beaufighters, Normandy Imperial War Museum Following page 344 Rocket-firing Typhoons at the Falaise Gap Imperial War Museum German transport Imperial War Museum Flying bomb on launching platform and in flight The V-1 flying bomb Imperial War Museum A V-1 launching site near Almelo Imperial War Museum A Spitfire tips over a flying bomb Imperial War Museum V-2 rocket leaving the firing table Imperial War Museum An airfield in Holland, with Spitfires in the snow Imperial War Museum Attack on a railway bridge in Holland Imperial War Museum Servicing a Spitfire on a Belgian airfield Imperial War Museum A Lancaster over Heinsburg Imperial War Museum Low-level attack on Gestapo headquarters, Denmark Royal New Zealand Air Force Airborne landing at Arnhem Imperial War Museum Brunswick burns Imperial War Museum Pathfinder target indicators over Pforzheim Imperial War Museum Destruction of the Dortmund-Ems Canal Imperial War Museum The Tirpitz capsized Imperial War Museum Attacking a synthetic oil plant in the Ruhr Imperial War Museum Machine-tool shop wrecked in Dusseldorf Imperial War Museum Gutted buildings of a synthetic oil plant at Bohlen Imperial War Museum The heart of Berlin, May 1945 Imperial War Museum A strike against enemy shipping by Coastal Command Imperial War Museum Intense flak in the Den Helder Roads Imperial War Museum Attacking cargo ships in a Norwegian fiord Imperial War Museum Bomb damage in a U-boat pen at Brest Imperial War Museum

List of Maps and Diagrams

Facing page Europe 17 Principal Targets attacked by Bomber Command, 1942–43 35 Fighter and Light-bomber Operations, 1943 133 Pre-invasion Air Attacks 231 Principal Targets attacked by Bomber Command, 1944–45 377 Battle of the Atlantic, June 1943–May 1945 411 In text Page Atlantic Air Patrols 20 Biscay Patrols 27 Targets in West Germany 42 Attacks on German Sea Communications by Bomber and Coastal Commands 116 Air Operations – the Invasion of Normandy 284 Defence against the Flying Bombs 320 The Pursuit to the Rhine 340 The Ardennes Battle 342 Airborne Assault at Arnhem 379 Royal Air Force Bomber Command—Distribution of Effort by Bomb Tonnages, June 1944 – April 1945 398 Overrunning Germany 430

The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment.

CHAPTER 1 Introduction

The closing months of 1942 had brought a distinct change for the better in Allied fortunes. In the North African desert the British Eighth Army under General Alexander and General Montgomery had won a notable victory at El Alamein and was pursuing Rommel's beaten and battered Afrika Korps and Italian Army across Libya towards Tripoli. Farther west surprise landings in French North Africa by American and British forces had brought the whole of Algeria and Morocco and part of Tunisia under Allied control. In the Far East the Japanese had been halted and were now on the defensive. Heavy blows were being struck in New Guinea, and American naval successes were restoring to the United States the predominant position at sea. British troops under General Wavell were advancing from India into Burma and provided further evidence of the growing Allied strength in South-East Asia.

Tidings of remarkable victories also came from Russia, where Soviet armies, having trapped some 300,000 Germans at Stalingrad, were sweeping forward along the caravan trails of the Kalmuck steppes towards the Sea of Azov and Rostov. Indeed, the Red Army, helped by arms from Britain and America, was now on the offensive along its whole vast front. Finally, in Europe, ever-increasing pressure was being exerted against Germany from the west. Heavy RAF raids had begun to spread devastation in the industrial cities of the Rhineland, and every week the power of the air offensive was growing. Although far from beaten, the Luftwaffe seemed unable, for the time being at least, to hit back. Raids on Britain had dwindled to insignificant proportions, and with the peoples of the Commonwealth, in company with powerful allies, now armed, organised, and equipped for war as never before, the prospects seemed more hopeful. Only the shadow of the ever-growing U-boat menace darkened the outlook in the United Kingdom.

Such, briefly, was the war situation when Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met with the Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca in January 1943 to carry their war plans a stage further. The defeat of Germany and Italy had already been declared the primary objective, and now that Great Britain and the United States possessed powerful and growing forces the problem was how best to bring these forces into action. Both nations had oceans and seas to cross before they could close with their enemies. Apart from the daring and complicated enterprise of landing on defended coasts, there was the need to build up all the supplies and communications necessary for vigorous campaigning once a foothold had been gained. Yet the Germans still held the initiative at sea. Indeed, during the last few months of 1942, sinkings of Allied ships had reached alarming proportions, and even though shipbuilding, as a result of prodigious efforts, bid fair to balance losses, Churchill and Roosevelt recoiled from planning ahead in cold blood on a basis of losing hundreds of thousands of tons a month; the waste of precious cargoes, the destruction of so many noble ships, the loss of heroic crews, combined to present a sombre picture. Therefore came the first decision at Casablanca: ‘The defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations.’

Once the measures to be adopted against the U-boat menace had been discussed, the Allied leaders turned their minds to the problem of attacking the Axis countries. Agreement was finally reached on essentials. First, the enemy was to be driven from the Mediterranean. This was to be followed by ‘the assembly of the strongest possible forces in the United Kingdom in readiness to re-enter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.’ Meanwhile, ‘the heaviest possible air offensive against the German war effort was to be launched.’ United States Air Forces were to be built up in England as fast as possible and later formations would be based in Italy, from where they would also attack Germany. This would introduce a new element into the air offensive, for while the British heavy bombers were designed for night work the American aircraft were built for daylight flying - they carried a smaller bomb load but were faster and more heavily armed. Thus a combined bomber offensive would be launched in which Germany would be attacked continually ‘round the clock’ and her air force compelled to engage in a war of attrition.

The Casablanca Conference did much to clear the strategic atmosphere especially with regard to the use of air power, and it was thereafter possible for Allied strategists to plan with new assurance. But most of the work of the conference was done on the level of general policy, and although it laid down guiding principles it did not prepare specific plans; even the directive for the bomber offensive provided only a general indication of policy and gave only tentative direction. It therefore became the task in the succeeding months to translate the Casablanca decisions into terms of specific commitments and detailed objectives. This proved far from easy: for while the conquest of Sicily was accepted as a logical step after the occupation of the North African seaboard, there soon appeared considerable divergence in Allied views as to the next stage. British strategy favoured further exploitation of the successes in the Mediterranean even beyond driving Italy out of the war, but the Americans were more inclined to an early invasion of western France. There was much debate on these matters before it became clear that with the men, supplies, and equipment available, the only continental landing possible in 1943 would be in Italy. The cross-Channel assault was therefore further postponed until the spring of 1944. But under pressure from the Americans this opera- tion, as its code-name overlord implied, now assumed a paramount position in Allied planning, with particular emphasis on development of the combined attack on Germany by Royal Air Force Bomber Command and the United States 8th Air Force.

In Berlin the opening of the fourth year of war was regarded with far less optimism. However, while an early victory now seemed remote, the Nazi leaders felt that they could defeat an invasion of the Continent, upon which the discouragement and distress of the Allies might be such that the attempt would not be repeated. Meanwhile the war at sea was going well for the Germans and, in spite of severe reverses on the Eastern Front, Hitler still hoped to deal Russia so hard a blow that even if she could not be conquered her aggressive power would be restricted. Further, German scientists were now pressing forward the development of long-range weapons with which they hoped to pound London and other British cities to rubble. One of these weapons was the flying bomb, another a huge rocket missile, and there were variations on these two main themes. Experiments with the still more deadly possibilities of atomic weapons were also being made in Germany.

But in the meantime the war had to be fought and, both in the air and on land, the immediate prospects were less favourable for the Germans. The Luftwaffe in particular was in serious difficulties. A long period of air fighting on three widely separated fronts, culminating in the major effort at Stalingrad first to force a decision and then to extricate the surrounded German Army, had imposed a severe strain and raised urgent problems of manpower and equip- ment. On top of this there was the imminent threat of heavier Anglo-American air attacks. Far-sighted officers of the German Air Staff had already seen the imperative need for a radical change of policy to meet this new threat, but any attempt on their part to present the facts realistically was liable to be castigated as ‘defeatism’. Only when it was too late did their arguments secure grudging support. At the beginning of 1943 both Hitler and Goering refused to accept proposals that the Luftwaffe should sacrifice its offensive power to the requirements of defence, and it was only as the Allied air attack on German industry developed that, under pressure of circumstances, fighter production was given priority, and even then Hitler was still disinclined to accept any reduction of bomber output in favour of fighters. Eventually Germany was compelled to devote the greater proportion of her aircraft industry to the building of fighters, and her offensive power was further weakened by the transfer of some bomber types to the role of night fighter.

Many of the Luftwaffe's current difficulties were the result of persistent optimism and lack of firm direction on Goering's part during the early years. Udet, his old comrade in arms from the First World War to whom the task of building up the Air Force had originally been entrusted, had committed suicide in despair at the end of 1941, and his successor, Milch, had also failed to secure sanction for expansion programmes. Thus, during the critical period of 1942 while the Allied war potential was being rapidly mobilised and built up, the fighting value of the Luftwaffe had considerably declined. By 1 January 1943 its operational strength, the barometer of fighting capacity, had sunk to some 4000 aircraft, while its initial reserves, previously an important adjunct, had fallen away to almost nothing. Little provision had been made to meet the possibility of a major setback such as now occurred. Indeed, the German leaders had resolutely declined to consider the possibility of being compelled to wage a defensive war in the air. From the beginning they had planned for a series of blitzkriegs of short duration and, in spite of reverses, had clung to their belief in a rapid victory even as late as the second half of 1942. Yet now, when this hope could no longer be entertained and it was imperative to lay down a new programme for a long war, decisions were made with reluctance and hesitation.

Goering, although still Reitchsmarshall and head of the Luftwaffe, was fast losing his grip on events. The successive failures over Britain and in Russia had badly shaken Hitler's faith in the Luftwaffe and its chief, and he now took it upon himself to make important decisions on air matters. Relations between the two Nazi leaders became more and more strained, with Goering as doubtful about Hitler's genius as Hitler was of Goering's ability as air com- mander. Already there had been many dramatic interviews, and to escape the tension of such meetings and the reproaches of his Fuehrer Goering had withdrawn into a fantastic world of his own and taken less and less interest in affairs. General Jeschonnek, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, eventually broke down under the strain of the confusing and contradictory tasks he was set and shot himself in August 1943.

As the months passed there was some evidence of a loss of fighting spirit in the German squadrons and the transfer during the fourth winter of the war of 200,000 trained men from the German Air Force to the Army can scarcely have improved morale. While suicide was apparently a popular item in the Nazi code, the rise in the suicide rate in the Luftwaffe from a modest 45 a month in 1941 to 70 a month in 1943 also tells its own tale. It was probably for the purpose of keeping up the morale of their air services that the German High Command credited certain fighter pilots with successes which now seem incredible. For example, by the autumn of 1943 four pilots had been awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross for the destruction of two hundred Allied aircraft each.

Yet despite the struggle of the German Air Staff against the obstinacy of Hitler, the incompetence of Goering, and the failure of the High Command to appreciate the consequences of losing air supremacy, the Luftwaffe, particularly its fighter arm, remained a substantial force to be reckoned with in all military calculations up to the closing months of the war. Each stage of what was, from 1943 onwards, a losing battle was bitterly contested.

In marked contrast to the increasing difficulties which faced the German Air Force at the beginning of 1943 was the steady growth of Allied air power. The build-up in the United Kingdom of American strength was now reaching significant proportions, and earlier plans for the expansion of the RAF were also bearing fruit. A vast mass of weapons and machines poured from the busy factories of Britain, the United States, and Canada. They included more powerful bombers, faster and more efficient fighters, together with reconnaissance aircraft of greater range that would reach out and strike the U-boats in mid-Atlantic. The American output, which by the end of 1943 rose to more than 8000 machines a month, included large numbers of transport aircraft; Britain devoted less attention to this type, but her output of heavy bombers was as notable in relation to her productive capacity as that of the United States, while her production of such smaller machines as the Spitfire was prodigious.

Few completely new aircraft were introduced into the Royal Air Force during the second half of the war, technical superiority over the Luftwaffe being maintained by the steady development and progressive refinement of existing types such as the Lancaster and Halifax, the versatile Mosquito with its varied combat and photographic reconnaissance duties, new marks of Spitfire for both high and low-altitude work, and the Typhoon fighter and fighter-bomber. American types continued to add to the strength of the RAF, but the bulk of the aircraft in service in all commands continued to be of British design and construction.

To fly the larger number of machines now available a great army of aircrew, pilots, navigators, and wireless operators and air gunners was ready, and more would follow from the training establishments in an ever-increasing flow. As regards the Royal Air Force, this had been made possible by the extension and expansion of the Commonwealth Air Training Plans during 1942. Such was the success of the various schemes that towards the end of 1944, when the German Air Force was cutting down its training programme in a desperate attempt to provide sufficient front-line aircrew, the Royal Air Force, partly it is true because likely casualties were over- estimated, found itself embarrassed by the flow of trained men arriving in the United Kingdom. The squadrons were unable to absorb all of them before the war in Europe came to an end.

Throughout the second half of the war New Zealand continued to make a substantial contribution towards the achievement of Allied supremacy in the air. The training organisations in the Dominion had been expanding continuously since the beginning of the war, so that in spite of the increasingly important part played by the RNZAF in the Pacific area, New Zealand was able to continue sending airmen to the Royal Air Force through the Empire Air Training Plan. Pupils of each category received their preliminary ground training in New Zealand. Then the observers and air gunners, together with a proportion of pilots, were sent to Canada for further training, the balance of the pilots completing their course in New Zealand. By the middle of 1943 the number of New Zealand airmen under training was 20,000 and the total with the RNZAF and the RAF was some 42,000, of whom one-third were overseas serving in the United Kingdom, the Middle East, in India and Burma, as well as in the Pacific. Seven New Zealand squadrons had now been formed in the Royal Air Force, three of them with Fighter Command, two with Coastal Command and two with Bomber Command. Yet, splendid though their record was to be, these seven squadrons represented but a small part of the Dominion's contribution, for the majority of its men serving with the Royal Air Force were scattered among RAF units.

This continued dispersal was inevitable however undesirable some considered the submergence of the identity of the Royal New Zealand Air Force. The main difficulty was that New Zealanders on completing their training reached the RAF in small groups, sometimes all of the same aircrew category, and therefore could not easily be formed into separate operational units without dislocation of training and frustrating delays to the men themselves. So while efforts were made to see that the seven New Zealand squadrons already formed in the RAF received their full quota of Dominion aircrew, and Air Ministry endeavoured to post New Zealanders to squadrons in which their fellow countrymen were already serving, no further New Zealand squadrons were formed in the Royal Air Force after 1943. In any case, the policy of concentrating men from a particular part of the Commonwealth in separate units, strongly advocated in some quarters, was far from being universally popular among the aircrews themselves, many of whom when given the choice preferred to serve with RAF units. Moreover, it was the considered opinion of some who were in a position to see both sides of the problem that the more flexible arrangements adopted by New Zealand were not only of the greatest help to the RAF in securing the best possible employment of all trained aircrew but also had a broadening effect on all concerned. Administrative difficulties were reduced to a minimum by close co-operation between the Air Ministry and the New Zealand Air Headquarters in London on such matters as the employment of the New Zealand squadrons, the posting of senior RNZAF officers, and the general welfare of Dominion airmen attached to the Royal Air Force.

By the beginning of 1943 some of the New Zealanders who had served with the RAF in Britain during the early campaigns had been posted to the Middle or Far East and a few had returned to serve with the RNZAF in the Pacific. Nevertheless, the main contribution continued to be in the European theatre, and it is with the services of New Zealanders in this sphere of operations that the present volume is primarily concerned.

Here the Dominion was to be represented during the second half of the war by such distinguished leaders as Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham,

Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, DFC, AFC, Legion of Honour (Fr.), Distinguished Service Medal (US), Order of Leopold (Bel.); Croix de Guerre with Palm (Bel.); born Brisbane, 19 Jan 1895; 1 NZEF 1914–16; entered RFC 1916; permanent commission RAF 1919; AOC No. 4 Group, Bomber Command, 1939–41; AOC Western Desert, 1941–43; AOC 1st TAF, N. Africa, Sicily, Italy, 1943–44; AOC-in-C 2nd TAF, invasion of NW Europe and Germany, 1944–45; lost when air liner crashed during Atlantic crossing, Jan 1948.

who commanded the Second Tactical Air Force in its preliminary operations from Britain and subsequently in support of the Allied armies on the Continent; Air Marshal Sir Roderick Carr,

Air Marshal Sir Roderick Carr, KBE, CB, DFC, AFC, Orders of St. Stanislas and St. Anne (Rus.), Croix de Guerre (Fr.); RAF (retd); born NZ 31 Aug 1891; 1 NZEF 1914; transferred RNAS 1915 and RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1926; served in France, 1939–40, with Advanced Air Striking Force; AOC N. Ireland, 1940–41; AOC No. 4 Group, Bomber Command, 1941–44; DCAS, Supreme HQ, Allied Expeditionary Force, 1944–45; AOC Base Air Forces, SE Asia, 1945; AOC-in-C India, 1946.

who continued in command of a Bomber Group; Air Vice- MarshalVice-Marshal Maynard

Air Vice-Marshal F. H. M. Maynard, CB, AFC, Legion of Merit (US); RAF (retd); born Waiuku, 1 May 1893; served with RN Divisional Engineers 1914–15; transferred RNAS 1915; RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1919; AOC RAF Mediterranean, 1940–41; Air Officer in Charge of Administration, Coastal Command, 1941–44; AOC No. 19 Group, Coastal Command, 1944–45.

at Headquarters, Coastal Command; and Air Vice-Marshal Russell,

Air Vice-Marshal H. B. Russell, CB, DFC, AFC; RAF (retd); born Hastings, 6 May 1895; commissioned Royal Field Artillery, 1914; seconded RFC 1915 and RAF 1918; permanent commission RAF 1919; SASO No. 21 Training Group, 1939–40; SASO No. 2 RAF Component, France, 1940; served with Fighter Command, 1940–41; AOC No.215 Group, Middle East, 1942–43; AOC No. 70 Group, United Kingdom, 1943–45; Air Officer i/c Administration, HQ FTC, 1946–49.

in charge of a Training Group in Fighter Command. Many RAF stations and bases in Britain and on the Continent were to be commanded by New Zealanders, notably Air Commodores A. McKee,

Air Vice-Marshal A. McKee, CB, CBE, DSO, DFC, AFC; RAF; born Oxford, Canterbury, 10 Jan 1902; joined RAF 1926; permanent commission 1936; commanded No. 9 Sqdn, 1940; Wing Commander, Training, No. 3 Bomber Group, 1941; commanded RAF Station, Marham, 1941–42; RAF Station, Downham Market, 1942–43; Base Commander, Mildenhall, 1943–45; AOC No. 205 Group, Italy, 1945; SASO HQ Mediterranean and Middle East, 1946–47; Commandant RAF Flying College, Manby, 1949–51; AOC No. 21 Group 1951–53; SASO Bomber Command 1953-.

S. C. Elworthy,

Air Commodore S. C. Elworthy, CBE, DSO, DFC, AFC; RAF; born Timaru, 23 Mar 1911; permanent commission RAF 1936; commanded No. 82 Sqdn, 1940–41; Ops Staff, No. 2 Bomber Group, 1941; Group Captain, Operations, HQ Bomber Command, 1942–43; commanded RAF Station, Waddington, 1943–44; Air Staff, HQ Bomber Com- mand, 1944; SASO No. 5 Bomber Group, 1944–45; commanded Royal Pakistan Air Force Station, Drighroad, 1945–49; RAF Stations, Tangmere and Odiham, 1951–53.

and G. T. Jarman,

Air Commodore G. T. Jarman, DSO, DFC; RAF; born Ashburton, 20 Feb 1906; joined RAF 1930; permanent commission 1936; CGI No. 2 FTS, 1939-40; commanded No. 77 Sqdn, 1940–41; No. 76 Sqdn, 1941; 19 OTU, 1941–43; RAF Station, Wigtown, 1943; DCAS, RNZAF, 1943–44; AOC No. 229 Group, ACSEA, 1945.

Group Captains G. J. Grindell

Group Captain G. J. Grindell, DFC, AFC and bar; RAF; born Geraldine, 20 Aug 1910; joined RAF 1932; permanent commission 1938; flying duties No. 5 FTS, 1939–40; Air Staff, HQ FTC, 1940–42; commanded No. 487 (NZ) Sqdn, 1942–43; RAF Station, Fiskerton, 1943-44; SASO RAF Mission to Australia and New Zealand, 1944–46.

and L. E. Jarman

Group Captain L. E. Jarman, DFC; RAF; born Christchurch, 17 Aug 1907; joined RAF 1929; permanent commission 1934; CFI No. 23 OTU 1941; commanded RAF Station, Litchfield, 1941–42; SASO No. 93 Group, 1942–43; commanded RAF Station, Kir- mington, 1943; RAF Station, Wyton, 1943–44; SASO No. 205 Group, Italy, 1944–45.

in Bomber Command; Group Captains P. L. Donkin,

Group Captain P. L. Donkin, CBE, DSO; RAF; born Invercargill, 19 Jun 1913; Cranwell cadet; permanent commission RAF 1933; commanded No. 225 Sqdn, 1939–40; No. 4 Sqdn, 1940; No. 239 Sqdn, 1940–42; No. 33 Wing, 1942–43; No. 35 Wing, 1943–44; Member of RAF Delegation, USA, on visit to Pacific and Indian theatres of war, 1944; CI, School of Air Support, 1944–45.

P. G. Jameson,

Group Captain P. G. Jameson, DSO, DFC and bar, Norwegian War Cross, Silver Star (US), Order of Orange Nassau (Hol.); RAF; born Wellington, 10 Nov 1912; joined RAF 1936; commanded No. 266 Sqdn, 1940–41; Wing Leader, Wittering, 1941–42, and North Weald, 1942–43; Planning Staff, No. 11 Fighter Group, 1943–44; commanded No. 122 Wing, 2nd TAF, 1944–45; Air Ministry 1946–48; commanded Wunsdorf Station, 2nd TAF, 1952–54; SASO No. 11 Group, 1954-.

H. N. G. Isherwood,

Group Captain H. N. G. Isherwood, DFC, AFC, Order of Lenin (USSR); born Petone, 13 Jul 1905; served with NZ Mounted Rifles, 1924–30; joined RAF 1930; permanent commission 1936; flying duties, Aeronautical and Armament Experimental Establish- ment, 1936–41; Sector Commander, No. 9 Fighter Group, 1941; Controller, HQ No. 9 Fighter Group, 1941; commanded No. 151 Hurricane Wing in Russia, 1941; commanded RAF Stations, Church Stanton, Valley and Woodvale, 1942–44; RAF Station, Mauripur, India, 1944–45; commanded No. 342 Wing, SE Asia, 1945; killed in aircraft accident, 24 Apr 1950.

R. L. Kippenberger,

Air Commodore R. L. Kippenberger, CBE; RAF; born Prebbleton, Canterbury, 3 Dec 1907; joined RAF1930; permanent commission 1936; commanded No. 142 Sqdn, 1941; RAF Station, Feltwell, 1942; RAF Station, Swanton Morley, 1943; Group Captain, Operations, HQ No. 2 Bomber Group, 1944; commanded No. 137 Wing, No. 2 Bomber Group, 1944–45; RAF Mission to Aust and NZ, 1946–49; commanded RAF Station, Upwood, 1950–52; AOC No. 64 Group, 1953–54.

and D. J. Scott,

Group Captain D. J. Scott, DSO, OBE, DFC and bar; born Ashburton, 11 Sep 1918; salesman; joined RNZAF Mar 1940; commanded No. 486 (NZ) Sqdn, 1943; Wing Leader, Tangmere, 1943–44; commanded RAF Station, Hawkinge, 1944; No. 123 Wing, 2nd TAF, 1944–45.

and Wing Commanders R. F. Aitken

Wing Commander R. F. Aitken, OBE, AFC; RAF; born Outram, 15 Sep 1913; joined RAF 1937; a pioneer of air-sea rescue; commanded No. 3 Sqdn, 1941–42; Wing Commander, Night Ops, No. 11 Fighter Group, 1942; commanded RAF Station, Hawkinge, 1942; RAF Station, Bradwell Bay, 1942–43; No. 150 Airfield, Bradwell Bay, 1944–45.

and J. S. McLean

Wing Commander J. S. McLean, OBE, DFC; RAF; born Hawera, 19 Feb 1912; joined RAF 1932; commanded No. 111 Sqdn, 1941; Wing Leader, North Weald, 1941; commanded RAF Station, Hunsdon, 1941–42; RAF Station, Catterick, 1943; Staff duty, Organisation, No. 10 Fighter Group, 1944; commanded RAF Station, Preddanack, 1945.

in Fighter Command and the Second Tactical Air Force; and Group Captains A. E. Clouston

Air Commodore A. E. Clouston, DSO, DFC, AFC and bar; RAF; born Motueka, 7 Apr 1908; joined RAF 1930; test pilot, Experimental Section, Royal Aircraft Establishment, 1939–40; served with Directorate of Armament Development, MAP, 1940–41; commanded No. 1422 Flight, 1941–43; No. 224 Sqdn, 1943–44; RAF Station, Langham, 1944–45; BAFO Communication Wing, 1945–47; RNZAF Station, Ohakea, 1947–49; RAF Station, Leeming, 1950; Commandant Empire Test Pilots' School, 1950–53; AOC Singapore, 1954–.

and D. McC. Gordon

Group Captain D. McC. Gordon, OBE, AFC; RAF (retd); born Waverley, 7 Apr 1905; joined RAF 1930; permanent commission 1936; CFI No. 7 FTS, 1938–40; commanded an Initial Training School, Canada, 1940–41; Control duties, HQ No. 18 Group, 1941–42; commanded No. 119 Sqdn, 1942–43; RAF Stations, Invergordon, Castle Archdale and Lagens, Azores, 1943–46.

in Coastal Command. In addition, sixteen New Zealanders were to lead RAF wings and a further seventy-two were to command RAF squadrons for periods during the second half of the war; many more served as flight commanders or in similar posts of responsibility with the flying units. But it was upon the ordinary aircrew that the success or failure of operations ultimately depended. And here the New Zealand pilots, navigators, wireless operators and air gunners, many of them fresh from the training units, continued to uphold the reputation for quiet efficiency and loyal service established by their fellow countrymen during the earlier years. By the end of the war just under 11,000 New Zealanders had served with the RAF, and of this number 3290, or nearly one-third, lost their lives. These heavy casualties were due to the fact that the majority of the men served as aircrew, approximately half with Bomber Command where losses were particularly severe.

There was, however, a significant group, some nine hundred in all, who worked in various ground trades, servicing and repairing aircraft or sharing the vast network of ancillary services upon which the air operations depended. Indeed, New Zealanders were to be found in almost every branch of the service and in widely scattered units from Air Ministry in London to the radar station sited at a remote spot on the north-east coast of Scotland where Flight Sergeant Kennard,

Flight Sergeant R. G. M. Kennard, BEM; born Ashburton, 19 Jun 1919; radio mechanic; joined RNZAF Dec 1940.

in charge of the technical maintenance, won commendation for his efficiency. Some men held responsible posts in the various commands as administrative, training or technical officers, and a relatively large group of New Zealand doctors served with the RAF medical branch.

Of particular interest is the contribution made by Group Captain Watt

Group Captain G. E. Watt, CBE, AFC, Legion of Merit (US); RAF (retd); born Frankton, 10 Feb 1908; permanent commission RAF 1933; test pilot, RAE Farnborough, 1939–40; research duties with MAP, 1940–43; Deputy Director Special Projects, MAP, 1943–45; CEO Fighter Command, 1950–51; CTO RAF College, Henlow, 1953–54.

who was intimately connected with the research and development of jet aircraft engines for the greater part of the war. A graduate in engineering in New Zealand and London, Watt had been appointed to a permanent commission in the Royal Air Force six years before the war. After service with a light bomber squadron and a further period of advanced specialisation in aeronautical engineering, he had been a test pilot at Farnborough where he did over a hundred ‘blacking-outs’ in the air to assess the value of various appliances. Then he continued on research and development work with the Ministry of Aircraft Production, where for the last two years of the war he was Deputy Director of Special Projects. Watt's work in stimulating progress and getting co-operation between the various industrial firms concerned with the new invention is regarded by those with whom he was associated as particularly valuable. A few months after the war an American observer, nothing the success of this collaboration in Britain, declared that ‘The great progress made in the few years of war and the present excellence of British gas turbines could not have been achieved but for the wholehearted way in which the various firms interchanged “know-how” through the medium of the collaboration committee.’

Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences, February 1946 – Ninth Wright Brothers Lecture on ‘British Aircraft Gas Turbines’.

Watt was associated with this committee from its formation in 1941 and was chairman in the later stages. His knowledge and ability were also of the greatest assistance in the decisions that had to be made regarding the forward types of engine that were to be built. The tremendous expansion of British engineering activities under the stimulus of war produced a shortage of technical talent which was acutely felt in the aircraft gas-turbine sphere. Group Captain Watt thereupon proposed a scheme whereby young air force engineer officers from the Dominions should come to England to help the work, obtaining at the same time training in the new art. This proposal started a training school which continued after the war with reciprocal advantages. When the United States was given the results of British research in order to speed up the development and production of jet engines, Watt was largely responsible for the happy liaison established with the Americans. He was made an officer of the Legion of Merit in recognition of ‘a very high contribution to the common effort.’

* * * * *

At the beginning of 1943, although eventual victory seemed more certain, hard battles had still to be fought. The tide had turned, but it had a long way to go back. And while the Allied leaders, cheered by the remarkable victories on land and apprised of the enemy's increasing difficulties, could see the way ahead more clearly, to the ordinary aircrew member of a squadron, and perhaps even more to the airman who worked on the aircraft in hangars or at dispersal points on airfields in Britain, the grand strategy of the war seemed remote and meant little. True, the fighter pilots saw tangible evidence of the favourable progress of the war as in ever larger formations they escorted bombers to attack targets deeper and deeper in enemy territory, but to the men with Coastal Command the war against the German U-boats was for the most part a dull routine of patrols over the sea in which only a few saw action. The bombing offensive was also an impersonal sort of war and monotonous in its own peculiar way. Night after night as weather and equipment permitted, the Lancasters, Halifaxes and Stirlings went out, dropped their bombs, and turned homeward. The immediate results of their attacks could be photographed and assessed by skilled interpreters but rarely was a single raid or series of raids decisive; whatever earlier theory had taught of the sudden paralysis of a nation by strategic bombardment, it was now clear that the effects of bombing were gradual, cumulative, and during the course of the campaign rarely measurable with any degree of assurance. Thus there was little visible progress, such as Allied soldiers could sense as they pushed Rommel's forces back from El Alamein to Cape Bon, to encourage the men of Bomber Command. The crews went out time and again to hit targets which they had seemingly demolished before, and it was only towards the end that the full results of the bombing attacks became apparent. As drama the ‘big show’ tended to be flat, repetitive, and without climax.

However, as the months passed, with the Allies moving towards mastery of the air over Europe, preparations for the invasion of the Continent brought a quickening of interest on all sides. Even to the humblest airman it then became clear that his particular job, however small its scope, had meaning as part of the overall plan. And when finally the Allied armadas set sail and were able to cross the Channel unhindered by enemy air or naval craft, and then the armies, with a minimum of casualties from enemy bombing, were able to secure a lodgment on enemy territory, the men of the Allied air forces could justifiably feel a deep sense of achievement.

Those who worked and flew with the Royal Air Force in these later years of the war continued to show the same enthusiasm, courage, and devotion to duty that had been a feature of the earlier campaigns. They also displayed great skill in the handling of new and highly technical weapons and in applying the subtlest and most intricate devices of modern science. Young and adventurous, they were capable of sudden and wild bursts of gaiety and high spirits when the tension of their work was momentarily relaxed. Sometimes these outbursts were spontaneous – like summer lightning – but often it was a particular success or an unexpected survival that called for a ‘party’, for letting off steam in an atmosphere of ‘eat, drink and be merry for to-morrow we may not be so lucky.’

Typical of this lighter side of service life were the visits to the ‘local’. For in town or village near most stations there was always the ‘King's Head’ or ‘Rose and Crown’ to which men roared along, packed in cars of ancient vintage and with ruffled hair and scarves flying, to pass an hour in gay banter, song or darts. There would be much talk of ‘wizard types’, ‘binding jobs’, ‘duff gen’ and ‘bad prangs’, and amid the laughter and clatter of glasses lots of ‘natter’ about ‘pressing on regardless’ in ‘ropey kites’ and some good ‘line- shooting’. On such occasions deep underneath was hidden the real men who had ‘seen their comrades fall from the skies and knew too well the look in dead men's eyes.’ Some observers, deceived by the apparent light-hearted and carefree attitude shown by the air- crews, were inclined to frown at such frivolity and the ‘indiscipline’ of the service. They failed to realise that these men, shining youth on the threshold of life, were living under circumstances of intense and continual strain and that, in Bomber Command particularly, they were faced with the very strong possibility of death in one of its least pleasant forms.

Yet these same young men could be both grim and purposeful when occasion demanded. There was much pride in squadron achievement and a fine spirit of comradeship among the members of individual crews. And if the effect of their sorties was seldom evident at the time, many men found ample compensation in the exhilaration of speed, in the sense of elation which came from flying a high-powered machine, and even in such small things as the sight of a familiar beacon or landmark at the end of a long flight. In spite of inevitable periods of frustration when for various reasons things did not go well, and periods of inaction when men became ‘browned off’, as they put it, there was quiet determination to see the job through and an underlying contentment in the knowledge that difficult tasks were faithfully carried out. Many of the brightest and best of those who served in the air arm did not survive to see the crowning success. Yet all played their part in winning the air supremacy that was to prove the cornerstone of victory.

* * * * *

Air operations during the second half of the war were many and varied. They also passed through many different phases, but throughout there was steady development of new tactics, expanding strength, and heavier offensive by the Allied forces. In the European theatre the outstanding feature of the early months of 1943 was the successful campaign against the U-boats in the Atlantic. Attention then turned to the aerial assault on Germany, which offensive tended to be divided into two steadily increasing phases – night operations by the Royal Air Force and daylight attacks by the USAAF, although medium bombers, fighter-bombers, and fighters of the RAF kept up a steady, if less spectacular, offensive by day throughout the year.

By the end of 1943 the combined Allied air attack was gaining momentum, and as the heavy bombers penetrated to the heart of Germany more and more of German air power was deployed to protect vital war industries. The defence was strong and vigorous and the Allies suffered severe casualties. But after the heavy attacks on German aircraft factories and the fierce battles over enemy territory during the early months of 1944, the outcome of the air war was no longer in doubt. With the Luftwaffe seriously weakened and driven back almost entirely on to the defensive, the concentration of invasion forces in Britain could proceed without fear of serious air attack. The domination by Allied air power of the beaches of Normandy was also assured.

In March 1944 the air campaign in preparation for the assault on Europe entered its final stage and a sustained attack was begun by the heavy bombers upon the railway system in France and Belgium. Meanwhile the Second Tactical Air Force had been formed in Britain to give close support to the Allied armies when they landed on the Continent. Drawing on experience gained in the Middle East, where the co-operation between the ground and air forces during the North African campaigns had been highly success- ful, its squadrons had joined in the wide pattern of operations by which Allied air power was exercised to help the armies establish themselves on the Continent.

With the successful landings in Normandy the role of air power in conjunction with land forces again came into full play. The breakout from the bridgehead was preceded by saturation bombing of the enemy positions. The medium and heavy bombers, fighters and fighter-bombers then joined in attacks on concentrations of troops and armour, on road and rail communications, and on vital crossroads and supply dumps. Enemy aircraft were engaged in battle wherever they appeared and there were raids on airfields, reconnaissance and transport flights as the land-air team pursued the Germans to the Siegfried Line. They fought it out over Holland and Belgium, met the enemy's counter-attacks in the Ardennes with determined ground and air action, and pushed forward again up to and across the Rhine and into the heart of Germany. Meanwhile, behind the enemy lines, air power played a vital role with attacks on communications by land and sea and on the enemy's dwindling resources of oil and power. And so effective were these attacks that when the end came the collapse of the whole German economy was imminent.

Partner with the Navy over the sea lanes; partner with the Army in ground battles; partner with both on the invasion beaches; reconnaissance photographer for all; mover of troops and critical supplies; defender of the home base; attacker of the enemy air force and vital strength far behind the actual battle line – this in brief is the broad sweep of the many roles which air power was to be called upon to play in the achievement of final victory. And these various roles were not played in separate scenes, but rather almost all of them would be going on at the same time. The menace of the submarine was never ended; support of the ground troops went on from day to day; the war in the air continued to the end, and while the weight of the bombing attack was sometimes directed against oil, sometimes on aircraft factories, sometimes on transport or other target systems, each had to have continual attention. Since the first outstanding achievement of the second half of the war was a notable victory against the U-boats in the Atlantic, it is appropriate to turn first to the war at sea.

CHAPTER 2 Aircraft against U-boat

The last months of 1942 had been a virtual paradise for the German U-boats. Within the space of twelve weeks they had sunk no fewer than 271 ships, totalling just over one and a half million tons. Provided with greater resources and a more efficient organisation than they ever possessed in the First World War, the German U-boat command was now making a supreme effort to sever the Atlantic supply lines and frustrate the launching of an Allied offensive in Europe. Hitherto the tonnage of shipping lost in 1917 had been deemed an astronomical figure unlikely ever again to be approached, yet the total losses for 1942, over six million tons, had far exceeded it. ‘In the U-boat war we have England by the throat,’ boasted Goebbels, the Nazi Minister for Propaganda. And if further indication of the enemy's intentions were needed it came with the appointment in January 1943 of Admiral Doenitz, previously in charge of the U-boat arm, to succeed Admiral Raeder as Commander- in-Chief of the German Navy. Doenitz immediately subordinated the requirements of the surface ships to the U-boat flotillas so that, in the fourth year of the war, production continued to outpace losses and more U-boats than ever before put to sea.

On the part of the Allies, while the gravity and extent of the German threat were now realised, there was some uncertainty as to how air power might best be used in meeting it. Attacks on the U-boats at sea were coming to be recognised in some quarters as the most direct and possibly in the long run the most effective method, but, as things were, it was felt that they needed to be supplemented by attacks on the submarines at their point of origin. The factories making component parts, the construction yards, and the operational bases on the French coast were suggested as suitable targets.

Bomber Command had already expended a not inconsiderable effort against the first two objectives but, in accordance with the RAF policy of area bombing, the attacks had been directed principally against the cities themselves rather than against port facilities and factories; apart from the damage to the plant at Augsburg, which had been attacked in daylight during April 1942 with heavy loss, the raids had been without noticeable effect on U-boat production. The plants making component parts for U-boats were many, widely scattered, hard to identify, sometimes inaccessible from the United Kingdom and difficult to destroy except by very heavy attacks, while a surplus of suitable productive capacity still existed in Germany. The shipyards also presented small targets, often isolated from other suitable objectives and of the type not easily put permanently out of action by bombing. Nevertheless, the submarine menace had become so serious that further attacks on these difficult targets seemed warranted.

As regards the bombardment of the main U-boat bases on the Biscay coast - already undertaken on a limited scale by Bomber Command and the USAAF - both British and American observers entertained profound doubts. Apart from a strong reluctance to cause further damage to French civilian life and property, it was generally conceded that the roofs of the submarine shelters, constructed of reinforced concrete, sometimes over a dozen feet thick, were impervious to any projectiles then available. But many still hoped that, by disorganising the various installations and facilities in the port areas, the turn-around of U-boats at the bases might be slowed down to such an extent that their activity along the Allied shipping lanes would be effectively reduced. The British Admiralty in particular, deeply concerned at the inability to deal with the increasing numbers of U-boats at sea, was most anxious for the Biscay bases to be attacked. At Bomber Command, on the other hand, Air Marshal Harris

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris, Bt, GCB, OBE, AFC, Order of Suverov (USSR); Legion of Merit (US), Order of Polonia Restituta (Pol.), National Order of the Southern Cross (Bra.), Distinguished Service Medal (US); born Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, 13 Apr 1892; served 1st Rhodesian Regiment, 1914–15; RFC 1915; transferred RAF 1918; permanent commission 1919; AOC Palestine and Transjordan, 1938–39; AOC No. 5 Bomber Group, 1939–40; DCAS, Royal Air Force, 1940–41; Head of British Air Staff, Washington, 1941–42; AOC-in-C Bomber Command, 1942–45.

protested vigorously against ‘the employment of his force on a type of operation which could not achieve the intended object.’ However, after a controversy confused by lack of accurate intelligence information, the Admiralty view prevailed, and British and American bombers were directed to continue their attacks on the Biscay bases until it might be conclusively determined whether or not they constituted profitable objectives.

Bomber Command renewed its offensive against U-boat bases with a heavy raid in mid-January on Lorient which, as the largest, had been given first priority. In a series of nine area attacks on this port in little over a month, some 3630 tons of bombs were dropped. The United States 8th Air Force also attacked Lorient in daylight and as a result of the combined attack the town was heavily damaged and few buildings in the dock area remained standing. Then, at the end of February, the British bombers turned against St. Nazaire, which had already been subjected to a daylight raid by American

EUROPEColour map of Europe bombers. Three heavy attacks were launched in which 2720 tons of bombs were dropped. The first of these attacks, by 400 Lancasters, Halifaxes, Stirlings and Wellingtons, was reported as more concentrated than any of the raids on Lorient; at least 1000 houses were destroyed and fires were still burning a week later. After the subsequent attacks, which were almost as heavy, the town was devastated.

Meanwhile major attacks aimed at U-boat construction in German ports commenced at the beginning of February with a Bomber Command attack on Hamburg, but the principal targets for the British and American bombers were the two great naval bases of Wilhelmshaven and Kiel. The RAF raids were particularly heavy. On four nights during February more than 800 bombers went to Wilhelmshaven, while in a single raid on Kiel early in April the force used exceeded 550 aircraft. Bremen was also raided in February, a second attack was made on Hamburg at the beginning of March, while simultaneous raids were delivered against Stettin and Rostock during April. Altogether these six German ports were subjected to ten night attacks in addition to the daylight raids by the American bombers.

New Zealanders flew with RAF squadrons in each of Bomber Command's attacks. In addition, crews from No. 75 Squadron took part in five raids on Lorient, the three major attacks against St. Nazaire, and in both raids on Hamburg; they also flew to Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, and Rostock. Five New Zealand Stirlings failed to return from these missions. Pilot Officers Blincoe

Pilot Officer K. H. Blincoe; born Nelson, 3 Nov 1909; telegraph faultman; joined RNZAF Apr 1941; killed on air operations, 3 Feb 1943.

and McCullough,

Pilot Officer J. McCullough, DFC; born Timaru, 5 Aug 1912; clerk; joined RNZAF Jan 1940; killed on air operations, 3 Feb 1943.

two of the most experienced pilots serving with the squadron, were lost with their crews in the first attack on Hamburg. Another captain, Sergeant Kidd,

Flight Lieutenant R. M. Kidd; born Christchurch, 29 Sep 1919; apprentice fitter and turner; joined RNZAF May 1941.

whose aircraft was shot down in a January raid on Lorient, managed to evade capture and after a series of adventures returned to England four months later. The other members of his crew were either killed or made prisoner. Kidd had landed unconscious in a ploughed field after baling out from his burning machine, but the Germans missed him in their search. French people helped him with food, clothing, and shelter and eventually ‘arranged’ his journey down through France and over the Pyrenees into Spain.

Other crews reported eventful flights. Over Rostock one Stirling was damaged in a collision with a Lancaster. The rudder was jammed and the fin bent and it was only when the bomber had gone down to within a few hundred feet of the ground that the pilot, Sergeant Dalzell,

Flying Officer H. J. Dalzell, DFM; born Christchurch, 31 Jul 1918; truck driver; joined RNZAF Jul 1941.

regained control. He was then faced with a return flight of some 400 miles, but although the aircraft proved extremely difficult to keep straight and level he succeeded in reaching base. Another New Zealander who displayed determination and fine airmanship that same night was Flight Lieutenant Becroft

Flight Lieutenant K. H. Becroft, DFC; born Helensville, 6 Jul 1915; carpenter and joiner; joined RNZAF Apr 1941.

of No. 218 Squadron. Over Denmark his Stirling was hit by flak which damaged the engine and the elevator controls. However, Becroft decided to continue to the target, which was duly reached and bombed, and then under trying and difficult circumstances he flew his damaged machine back to base and landed safely.

In April 1943 Bomber Command was relieved of its commitment to attack the U-boat bases and specific construction facilities, although the offensive was continued for a time by the United States 8th Air Force. There was, particularly in the British Air Staff, a growing feeling that the heavy bombers would achieve a greater overall result and still contribute to the U-boat war if their attacks were concentrated against the main industrial centres in Germany. And while the Admiralty continued to press for further attacks, particularly against the French ports, there were soon more serious doubts in other quarters as to whether bombing could achieve any immediate effect on the operations of the enemy submarine fleet. Fortunately by June the U-boat menace had greatly subsided and the main effort of the Allied bombers could be directed elsewhere.

This brief campaign and the controversy which accompanied it constituted a somewhat melancholy episode in the opening stages of the combined British and American air offensive, for it now appears that the comparatively heavy attacks on factories and building yards by both the RAF and the USAAF during the first half of 1943 had little effect on the German production of sub- marines. Indeed, not until the last months of the war did the U-boat production fall off seriously, and then the paralysis came partly from the vastly increased weight of attack and partly from the general disruption of transport facilities which in those later days affected all enemy industry. Even more frustrating to the Allied hopes were the attacks made against the operational bases on the French coast, for it seems that they had practically no effect on the activity of the U-boat fleet at any period. According to Admiral Doenitz, who as Commander of the German U-boat fleet was in a position to speak with authority, not only were the U-boat shelters impervious to anything but the very heavy bombs dropped occasionally in the later stages of the war by the RAF, but they housed virtually all the necessary repair and maintenance facilities. Bombing of surrounding installations did not therefore seriously affect the rate of turn-around of the U-boats. What slowed it most effectively, he claimed, was the necessity for repairing the damage done to hull structure by aerial depth-charge attacks delivered at sea. In fact, it was the air attacks at sea in particular that stopped his desperate bid for victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. A similar conclusion was reached after the war by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey: ‘In wresting victory from the enemy submarine strategic bombing can at best be considered to have been only an incidental contributing factor.’

* * * * *

As regards the aerial campaign at sea there was, at the beginning of 1943, some difference of opinion on the relative merits of giving close escort to all convoys and, on the other hand, of maintaining offensive patrols in areas of U-boat concentration such as the Bay of Biscay, where the German submarines passed to and from their bases in the French Atlantic ports. But the heavy losses then being suffered in the North Atlantic demanded that the major effort of RAF Coastal Command should be directed to the protection of shipping in this area.

The next few months were to see the peak of the German assault on the North Atlantic convoys and a most determined attempt to cut off Britain's supplies from the United States and Canada. There were now approximately one hundred U-boats at sea at any one time.

During 1943 the main types of operational U-boats used by the Germans were vessels of 517 and 740 tons carrying crews of about 45 and 55 respectively, although they were also building 1600-tonners for longer cruises and supply. The U-boats had two sets of machinery; diesel engines for propulsion on the surface and electric motors for use when submerged, the latter also serving as dynamos for recharging batteries on the surface. Maximum speed on the surface was about seventeen knots, but the normal cruising speed of eight knots gave an endurance of some 10,000 miles. When travelling submerged on both motors top speed was about seven and a half knots, but then battery endurance was only two hours. At lower speeds a U-boat could remain submerged much longer, but the air became so foul that normally the vessel would not stay down for more than twenty hours at a time.

Spread in long lines across the shipping routes, one or other of them would sight and shadow a convoy while others assembled, and then would follow a series of ‘wolf-pack’ attacks which might continue for several days. During February and March 1943 some of the most bitter and prolonged engagements of the whole war were fought round convoys in the North Atlantic between U-boats and Allied air and surface escorts. Unfortunately, this critical period

ATLANTIC AIR PATROLSBlack and white map showing locations of air patrols came at a time when the surface escorts of the Royal Navy were feeling the effects of their long periods at sea during the winter months, and some were absent from their groups owing to damage sustained in the heavy winter gales. However, vigorous counter measures planned a few months earlier soon began to have their effect. The provision of more aircraft, particularly American-built Liberators and Fortresses, flown by British crews, and the opening of new airfields in Northern Ireland, the Hebrides, and in Iceland made possible fuller protection of ships from the air. The first of the small aircraft carriers and additional surface escorts began to accompany some convoys while a highly efficient control organisation – the Area Combined Headquarters at Liverpool in which naval and air staffs worked side by side – was keyed to full pitch.

Land planes and flying boats of Coastal Command were now employed to the limit of their range and endurance in order to give the fullest possible protection to threatened convoys, sorties averaging from ten hours in the case of Wellingtons to seventeen hours with the very-long-range Liberators, and even longer with Catalinas. The patrols flown were of three main types. First, there was the ‘close escort’ in which the aircraft, after meeting the convoy and exchanging recognition signals, remained in its vicinity carrying out searches on the orders of the senior naval officer on one of the escort vessels; secondly, there were offensive patrols sweeping on parallel tracks over the convoy's path and along its flanks. Such patrols were usually timed so that some aircraft reached the ships at dawn while relieving aircraft later in the day flew beyond the convoy, returning over or near it about dusk, the U-boat's favourite hour for attack. These tactics proved highly successful. Sometimes it was a shadowing U-boat that was depth-charged from the air or a pack gathering for the assault would be found and attacked; on several occasions German submarines were destroyed as the result of close co-operation between patrolling aircraft and the surface vessels of the escort, signals being exchanged by radio telephone or, when radio silence was deemed essential, by Aldis lamp. A third type of air patrol was the independent hunt over areas of the ocean where U-boats were known to be lurking, their presence revealed by sightings or by directional fixes from their radio transmissions. Information obtained from such sources was sent to the operational units so that crews could be briefed before setting out on their missions.

The principal weapon employed in the air attacks at this time was the 250-pound depth-charge set to explode at twenty-five feet below the surface, and from four to eight were carried by aircraft according to type and the length of their patrol. The depth-charges were aimed visually by the pilot but released by an electrical distributor so that they fell in an evenly placed stick, the intention being to straddle the U-boat so that one depth-charge fell near enough to cause lethal damage. In order to achieve surprise the aircraft usually patrolled at heights up to 5000 feet according to cloud cover, but the actual attack, which had to be a short and sharp affair before the U-boat crash-dived, was made from about fifty feet. Yet it was not easy to manoeuvre a heavy four-engined aircraft into position for successful attack while the target was still visible. Moreover, the German submarines with their extra pressure hull of high-tensile steel were specially constructed to withstand the underwater blast of depth-charges. Nevertheless as training, tactics, and experience improved the air attacks became more accurate, inflicted greater damage, and more frequently resulted in the complete destruction of a most difficult and elusive target.

Particularly effective during the early months of 1943 were the patrols flown by the Liberators of No. 120 Squadron from Iceland and Northern Ireland and by the Fortresses of Nos. 206 and 220 Squadrons from a base in the Outer Hebrides. Stripped of unessential armament and carrying maximum fuel, these machines were able to reach far out into the Atlantic and cover the area in which the U-boats were concentrating their attacks. Apart from the enormous deterrent value of their patrols the three squadrons had, by the end of March, completely destroyed ten U-boats, which was almost half the total sunk by the combined Allied air and surface forces in the North Atlantic during the same period. Indeed, while the efforts of those who flew the aircraft of shorter range were successful in keeping the U-boats away from the British coasts, it was the handful of crews flying VLR Liberators and Fortresses who played the more spectacular and decisive part in the North Atlantic battle at this time.

New Zealanders who flew from Iceland with No. 120 Liberator Squadron at this time included two pilots, Sergeants Bennett

Flying Officer H. J. Bennett; born Tuatapere, 11 Oct 1915; farmer; joined RNZAF Aug 1941; killed on air operations, 3 Feb 1945.

and Turnbull,

Flying Officer B. W. Turnbull, DFC; born Wellington, 11 Jul 1915; teacher; joined RNZAF Jan 1940.

together with Flight Sergeant McKeague,

Warrant Officer V. B. McKeague; born Timaru, 27 Jan 1910; clerk; joined RNZAF Dec 1940.

navigator, and Sergeant Tingey,

Flying Officer N. R. Tingey; born Wellington, 4 Feb 1920; salesman; joined RNZAF Oct 1940.

wireless operator. Of particular interest is the part played by these men in the protection of one large convoy of sixty-four ships which crossed the Atlantic to the United Kingdom early in February. Bennett and McKeague flew in the first Liberator from Iceland to reach the ships in mid-Atlantic after an urgent call for air cover. Although the convoy was more than 800 miles from the air base in Iceland, the Liberator found the ships and remained with them for seven hours, sighting and attacking three U-boats during its escort patrol. The following day Turnbull and Tingey were in the crew of another Liberator which attacked a U-boat in the path of the same convoy. A second U-boat was attacked near the ships that day by a Fortress of No. 206 Squadron which had flown far out from the bleak and windswept airfield at Benbecula in the Outer Hebrides. Sergeant Easton

Warrant Officer W. M. Easton; born Wellington, 27 Dec 1918; factory hand; joined RNZAF Jul 1940.

was a member of the crew. Rain and low cloud enabled the Fortress to achieve complete surprise and the four German lookouts were still on the conning tower as the depth-charges fell. Their explosions engulfed the U-boat, which disappeared, leaving a large patch of oil on the surface.

The passage of this particular convoy provides a good example of the important part now being played by aircraft in the Atlantic battle. The ships had left New York for the United Kingdom on 25 January and the first week of the voyage, during which air cover was provided from West Atlantic bases, was uneventful. On the morning of the ninth day, however, the ships were sighted by a patrolling U-boat, which soon assembled a pack, and during the next few days five vessels were lost. Although one U-boat was sunk in counter-attacks by the surface escorts, intercepted messages indicated a growing concentration in the vicinity. Therefore, during the next few days, in spite of rough weather which at one time caused the convoy to be spread over fifty square miles of ocean, the maximum possible air cover was provided from bases in Iceland and later in the United Kingdom; four more ships were lost, but ten U-boats were sighted and depth-charged from the air, one being sunk outright. Thereafter no further attacks were made on the remaining ships of the convoy, which reached port safely a few days later.

During the early months of 1943 the efforts of crews who flew patrols over the Atlantic were more frequently rewarded by sighting and attack, but few New Zealanders with Coastal Command were as fortunate as Pilot Officer Ackerman,

Flight Lieutenant J. D. Ackerman, MBE; born Masterton, 6 Jul 1921; civil servant; joined RNZAF Oct 1940.

navigator of a Fortress bomber which sank two U-boats within the space of a few weeks. The second attack was one of several made in the middle of March when two inward-bound convoys, routed close together, were being trailed and intermittently attacked by a pack of some thirty U-boats; thirteen vessels had been sunk during one day while the convoy was outside the range of air cover. The surface escorts were hopelessly outnumbered and unable to repel the mass attacks that took place. During the next few days every long-range aircraft that could be spared joined in the battle; nineteen U-boats were sighted and attacked, and finally the enemy's effort was broken. The intensity of the air cover and frequent depth-charging proved too much for the German U-boat commanders.

Among the aircraft which took part in this action were Liberators from No. 86 Squadron, recently converted to this type of bomber. One crew, with an Australian captain and a New Zealander, Sergeant Lloyd,

Flying Officer J. Lloyd; born Auckland, 5 Jan 1920; storeman; joined RNZAF Nov 1941.

as second pilot, attacked two U-boats after they had flown nearly 800 miles from an airfield in Northern Ireland to cover the convoy in the early stages of the enemy assault. On their next three sorties this same crew attacked four more U-boats – a remarkable experience even in this period of intense activity. On the third patrol early in April, when they were again escorting a convoy at extreme range from their base, a U-boat which they depth-charged near the ships is known to have been destroyed.

It was to the crew of another Liberator of No. 86 Squadron that 120 survivors from a torpedoed British ship owed their rescue early in May. The bomber, in which Flying Officer Robinson

Flight Lieutenant J. N. Robinson; born Milton, 21 Sep 1918; railway porter; joined RNZAF Nov 1940.

was wireless operator, was flying five hundred miles from land when a large patch of oil and wreckage was sighted. Nearby were six lifeboats roped together and drifting with the wind in a choppy sea. A signal brought a destroyer racing to the scene and in the meantime the Liberator circled the lifeboats, flashing messages and dropping food and supplies; then finally it placed markers to guide the rescue vessel on its approach six hours later.

During April, when altogether seven U-boats were destroyed by air attack, one of the most dramatic encounters was that reported towards the end of the month by Sergeant Gamlin

Flying Officer A. P. Gamlin; born Manaia, 31 Aug 1922; clerk; joined RNZAF Jun 1941.

and his crew of No. 206 Squadron. Their Fortress was sweeping along the flank of a large convoy when a U-boat was sighted surfacing. By the time the bomber had turned and commenced its run in to attack, the submarine was fully surfaced and had opened fire from machine guns mounted on the conning tower. Undeterred, the aircraft continued its approach and the crew were elated to see their depth-charges fall in a perfect straddle. When the explosions subsided the bow of the U-boat was jutting out of the water at a steep angle, and a few moments later it sank almost vertically. The Fortress circled and prepared to make a second attack with its two remaining depth-charges but it was soon obvious that this would not be necessary. A large patch of oil covered the sea, in which were pieces of the U-boat and some twenty to thirty members of its crew.

The months of April and May 1943 brought a remarkable change in the situation in the North Atlantic as the balance of advantage swung in favour of the Allies. In April merchant shipping losses fell to fifty-six vessels totalling 328,000 tons and in May they dropped further to fifty vessels of 265,000 tons. On the other hand, fifteen U-boats were destroyed in April and thirty-eight in May.

Several factors contributed to this favourable turn of events. At the end of March an Atlantic convoy conference in Washington had considerably strengthened and reorganised the available Allied resources, both naval and air. It had also adopted a new system of providing air protection for convoys crossing the Atlantic. There had been a reorganisation of Eastern Air Command in Canada and closer integration of its operations with those from the United Kingdom and Iceland. Each morning, after a long-distance telephone conference, convoys to be covered were given an order of priority; this was at once transmitted to all concerned on both sides of the Atlantic and in Iceland, then each Group replied stating what cover it could provide, and details were arranged accordingly. Coastal Command was now receiving steady reinforcements of crews, the surface escort groups had been strengthened, and several more small aircraft-carriers had begun sailing with convoys. Finally, the gap in mid-Atlantic was at last being bridged by very-long-range aircraft flying from bases on both sides of the ocean.

This closing of the gap, which had long been the aim of RAF Coastal Command, is well illustrated by a patrol flown towards the end of April by a Liberator of No. 120 Squadron. Two New Zealanders, Flight Sergeant McKeague and Sergeant Bennett, were among its crew. The bomber took off from its base near Reykjavik in Iceland early on the afternoon of 21 April, met a convoy in mid-Atlantic and remained with it for nearly five hours, during which time a U-boat was sighted and attacked. Then, after receiving a message from Iceland reporting a deterioration in landing con- ditions, the Liberator flew on across the Atlantic and landed the following morning at Goose Bay airfield in Labrador after a flight of nearly eighteen hours.

Gradually the increase in the range and strength of the Allied forces began to have its effect. There were still well over a hundred U-boats at sea at any one time and the German building yards were producing more than sufficient new vessels to make up for their losses, but for the first time the U-boat captains showed definite signs of losing heart, failing to press home their attacks even when favourably placed for doing so. The air patrols continued relentlessly, and the constant harassing from the air was a very strong deterrent. No longer could the enemy submarines approach convoys and remain immune from counter-attack. The time when a U-boat could stay on the surface shadowing a convoy while it homed others to form a pack was now passing. The assembling packs would be broken up and forced under by air attack often many miles from the convoys, and on occasion the shadowing U-boat itself destroyed before it could even begin transmissions.

At the end of May 1943 there was a notable achievement when a slow convoy of thirty-seven ships crossed the North Atlantic without the loss of a single vessel, in spite of the fact that throughout most of its passage it was shadowed and trailed by a large pack of U-boats. ‘This success,’ says an official Admiralty report, ‘was achieved largely through the excellent co-operation between the surface escorts and the accompanying aircraft, particularly the strong support provided by the long range Liberators from Iceland operating at great distances from their bases.’

Throughout the following weeks convoys came through with negligible losses and it was soon clear that the Allies had won a considerable victory. This was confirmed by the virtual withdrawal of the German U-boats from the North Atlantic at the beginning of June. Merchant shipping losses in that month fell to 96,000 tons, the lowest figure for nearly two years. The growing despondency of the German U-boat Command was reflected in various statements and in comments of the enemy press and radio. ‘At present it is more and more difficult for U-boats to attack convoys nor may we hope that the U-boat campaign will lead to a quick decision,’ wrote Admiral Gatow on 9 June, and a few weeks later another German naval expert openly declared that: ‘The increased air support given to the Allied convoys has neutralised the U-boat's most powerful weapon – invisibility.’

* * * * *

The main centre of interest in the U-boat war now shifted to the Bay of Biscay where squadrons of Coastal Command had long maintained offensive patrols from bases in the south-west of England. During the first half of 1943 New Zealanders continued to fly with the Sunderlands, Whitleys, Wellingtons, Halifaxes and Liberators which kept a constant watch by day and by night over the waters from Cornwall to the north coast of Spain. They also protected shipping in the south-western approaches. One Liberator squadron based at St. Eval in Cornwall was led by Wing Commander A. E. Clouston, who had come to Coastal Command after a distinguished career in experimental flying, while Squadron Leader Brass

Wing Commander D. M. Brass, DSO; born Otautau, 1 Dec 1916; joined RAF 1937; served on Atlantic Ferry, 1941; Instructor, No. 3 School of GR, 1941–42; commanded No. 612 Sqdn, 1943–44; CI No. 3 School of GR, 1945.

commanded a flight of Leigh Light Wellingtons

The Leigh Light was a two-million candlepower searchlight, named after the officer responsible for its development; it was fitted in the under-turret of the aircraft. With pilot and radar operator working together, it was possible to locate and home on to surfaced U-boats at night; then at a range of approximately one mile the searchlight would be switched on to illuminate the target, which could then be attacked with depth-charges as by day. The Leigh Light in a modified form was later fitted to Liberators and Catalinas.

and Squadron Leaders Marshall

Wing Commander T. O. Marshall, DFC; born Stratford, 25 Nov 1914; joined RAF 1937; Flying Instructor, No. 4 OTU, 1942; Staff duties, D of AT, Air Ministry, 1943; killed on air operations, 8 Jul 1944.

and Baggott

Wing Commander S. G. Baggott, DFC; born London, 25 Nov 1916; joined RAF Jun 1938; commanded No. 95 Sqdn, W. Africa, 1945.

held senior posts in Sunderland flying-boat squadrons.

The theory upon which the Biscay offensive was based was both simple and direct. For a long time most of the U-boats operating in the Atlantic had been based at ports on the west coast of France; indeed, practically the entire German submarine fleet passed backwards and forwards across the Bay of Biscay so that there was often a high concentration in that relatively restricted area. Moreover, in

BISCAY PATROLSBlack and white map showing location of German Fighter Interception Bases and U-Boat Bases in Bay of Biscay their passage across the bay the German U-boats were obliged to spend appreciable time on the surface in order to recharge batteries, when they were particularly vulnerable to attack from the air. It was therefore argued that a sufficiently large force consistently employed over these waters might eventually strangle the German submarine campaign. But the difficulty was to secure the necessary force and to balance it so that the area could be effectively patrolled both by day and by night.

The introduction of the Leigh Light Wellingtons in the middle of 1942 had made the night patrols more effective, but towards the end of that year, just when Coastal Command's effort began to bring an increase of sightings and attacks, the Germans countered the type of airborne radar then in use by fitting their submarines with a receiver that could detect approaching aircraft. The U-boat commanders were then able to evade attack by crash-diving. The result was that in spite of much patient and persistent effort the campaign against the U-boats in the Bay of Biscay was largely nullified. In fact it did not become really effective until March 1943, when the German U-boat commanders apparently began to lose faith in their search receivers. By that time improved radar was being fitted to Allied machines, and the provision of additional aircraft made possible more frequent patrols by night as well as by day, which gave the U-boats little respite during their passage. The chances of aircraft catching them on the surface were further increased by the careful selection of patrol areas after sightings were reported or on the receipt of information from other sources.

Even so the Biscay patrols continued to demand much patience and steadfast endurance from the aircrews concerned. The amount of monotonous flying involved is difficult to imagine. There was not even the meeting of a convoy and the subsequent exchange of signals to break the long spell of flying over the sea. After five hours in the air the men might catch a glimpse of the coast of north Spain only to have to turn and begin the long flight northwards again. It was only on rare occasions that a sudden shout from one of the lookouts that he had sighted a possible U-boat provided welcome relief. Yet these alarms sometimes proved disappointing since the efficiency of patrols was marred by the presence of French and Spanish fishing vessels in the Bay of Biscay; much time was often wasted in following up radar contacts or distant sightings of these vessels. On other occasions a German submarine would be sighted when the aircraft was not in a position to make an immediate attack, and before it could turn and reach its target the U-boat would have submerged.

The night patrols during the winter months had been particularly dreary for the crews of the Leigh Light Wellingtons, but towards the end of March 1943, by which time many of the machines had been fitted with improved radar, the patrols began to show better results. A typical attack was made one night towards the end of the month by Flying Officer Lewis,

Flight Lieutenant W. Lewis, DFC; born Wellington, 25 Feb 1922; salesman; joined RNZAF May 1941.

captain of a Wellington from No. 172 Squadron. His crew of five included four other New Zealanders. They were nearing the end of the southward leg of their patrol when the radar operator reported a possible target ten miles to starboard. Lewis immediately turned and homed on the contact, losing height at the same time. When the radar operator called the range as just under one mile the Leigh Light was switched on to illuminate a U-boat almost straight ahead; the Wellington swept in to attack and, as the depth-charges exploded, the vessel appeared to heel over on one side before it was lost in the darkness. It was not seen again.

As such attacks by the Leigh Light aircraft increased, U-boats crossing the bay began to appear more frequently on the surface by day rather than face the sudden and unexpected attacks at night. The battle thereupon entered a new phase in which the German U-boats attempted to fight it out on the surface. To this end they were fitted with extra machine guns to drive off aircraft that surprised them or at least to upset the accuracy of the attacks. Some aircraft were shot down and others damaged, but in spite of this opposition and the chance of coming down in the sea hundreds of miles from land the crews persisted in low-level attacks and showed great courage in pressing them home. A Sunderland flying boat was so badly holed in one encounter that it could not alight on the water at its base without sinking. Its captain decided to land in a ploughed field and achieved this feat without injury to his crew. Another crew were at sea in a dinghy for eight days before they were rescued by a destroyer to which they had made signals by Very pistols and lights. But they had got their U-boat before they were shot down. Indeed, most of the U-boats which attempted to fight it out on the surface fared badly for the density of the patrols was now such that additional aircraft could be summoned to the scene of a sighting to support and continue the attack. Coastal Command's No. 19 Group, with headquarters at Plymouth, soon became exceedingly efficient in organising the ‘hunt to exhaustion’.

Encounters with surfaced U-boats gave the air gunners more opportunities for proving their skill. Typically, one day towards the end of May a Sunderland from No. 228 Squadron sighted a U-boat, which opened fire and zigzagged as the aircraft approached. The front gunner, Flight Sergeant Armstrong,

Flight Sergeant R. C. Armstrong; born Te Kuiti, 19 Oct 1911; labourer; joined RNZAF Dec 1940; killed on air operations, 12 Jul 1943.

directed his fire with such good effect that several of the German gunners were seen to crumple up on the conning tower. The flak slackened and his captain was able to take accurate aim. As depth-charges exploded the U-boat shuddered violently; soon afterwards it sank, leaving a large patch of oil and some thirty survivors on the surface of the sea. Before joining Coastal Command, Armstrong had flown in the crew of a Wellington bomber in raids on Germany. He had been shot down over the North Sea and picked up by a destroyer an hour later. On a subsequent raid his machine was badly damaged by flak when flying high over Germany. The Wellington went down almost to ground level before the captain could regain control. Armstrong's ears were affected and he was told he could not fly at high altitudes again, but he refused to be repatriated and transferred to Coastal Command Sunderlands, which did not fly at great heights. After taking part in several attacks on U-boats, Armstrong was lost with his crew early in July 1943 when their Sunderland was shot down over the Bay of Biscay after a gallant combat in which the flying boat was heavily outnumbered by enemy fighters.

A remarkable episode occurred towards the end of June when a Wellington, desperately damaged by intense and accurate flak as it approached to attack a 1600-ton supply U-boat, crashed on the submarine's deck, setting it on fire and wrecking the guns. By chance, two depth-charges from the aircraft lodged on the U-boat and these were later thrown into the water by the German crew; one exploded and severely damaged the stern of the submarine so that it was forced to remain on the surface. Within the hour the vessel was sighted and attacked by another Wellington captained by Flying Officer Whyte.

Flying Officer J. Whyte; born Killarchan, Scotland, 6 Sep 1917; clerk; joined RNZAF Jul 1941; killed on air operations, 15 Aug 1943.

The U-boat now began to settle by the stern and the crew was seen to pour out of the conning tower and abandon ship. Shortly afterwards there was a violent explosion as the U-boat blew up and debris was hurled high into the air. Prisoners said afterwards that their commander, after ordering his crew to leave, had himself set the scuttling charges and gone down with his ship. Then, as the Wellington circled, it came upon a small dinghy a few miles from the scene containing the rear gunner from the first aircraft, who had miraculously survived the crash. Supplies were dropped, the position reported, and both he and the survivors from the U-boat were subsequently picked up.

In a desperate attempt to counter the growing air offensive Doenitz began to send his outward-bound submarines across the bay on the surface in small groups, so that they could give mutual anti-aircraft support. One of the first sightings of such a group was made by a Liberator of No. 53 Squadron, captained by Flight Sergeant Anderson.

Flying Officer W. Anderson, DFC; born Aberdeen, Scotland, 1 Mar 1920; clerk; joined RNZAF Mar 1941.

During its approach the bomber was heavily hit by concentrated cannon and machine-gun fire from three submarines travelling in ‘V’ formation; one of the crew was seriously wounded and holes were torn in the fuselage and in one wing. Nevertheless, Anderson persevered and in a second approach was able to depth-charge a U-boat on the outside of the formation. The other two then dived, leaving the third damaged and wallowing on the surface.

More fighters were also sent by the enemy to intercept anti-sub- marine aircraft. Flying in formations averaging from five to eight machines, they achieved some success until methods were devised of warning aircraft of their approach and patrols by British fighters were increased. Meanwhile there were some spirited engagements in which lone British aircraft frequently gave a good account of them- selves. One Sunderland managed to beat off repeated attacks by eight Ju88s, destroying three of them. On another occasion a Liberator returning from patrol was attacked by five Messerschmitts. In a running fight, two of the fighters were damaged while a third was seen to crash into the sea. The Liberator, however, fared badly, and with two of its engines damaged and gaping holes in the fuselage it just managed to reach its base. All four of its gunners were New Zealanders – Flight Sergeants Bailey,

Flying Officer F. E. Bailey; born Blenheim, 13 Feb 1910; carpenter; joined RNZAF Nov 1941.

Heays,

Flight Sergeant I. R. Heays; born Napier, 7 Jul 1920; shepherd; joined RNZAF Oct 1941; died of wounds 21 Sep 1943.

Mills

Flying Officer H. J. Mills, DFM; born Gisborne, 26 Dec 1921; railway porter; joined RNZAF Jan 1942.

and Thomson.

Warrant Officer I. R. W. Thomson, DFC; born Christchurch, 31 May 1921; miner; joined RNZAF Jun 1941.

Heays was badly wounded in the engagement and died later in hospital.

In July 1943 came the climax of the Biscay campaign, when, in spite of the enemy's new tactics, no fewer than twelve U-boats were sunk in the bay by air attack. Several of these successes were achieved by the Leigh Light Wellingtons which had continued to maintain pressure by night, some of them now flying on to Gibraltar, while a detachment there flew patrols to the north-west to link up with those from the United Kingdom. Towards the end of the month Flight Sergeant D. E. McKenzie,

Warrant Officer D. E. McKenzie; born Masterton, 21 Apr 1922; farmhand; joined RNZAF Jun 1941.

who was with No. 179 Wellington Squadron at Gibraltar, had the unusual experience of taking part in three night attacks within a fortnight. In the third encounter the U-boat was so badly damaged that it had to be towed into a Spanish port.

Of the daylight attacks in which New Zealanders took part during this month one of the most successful was that made by Wing Commander Clouston and his crew in a Liberator of No. 224 Squadron. There was a strong New Zealand representation in this squadron, both on the ground and in the air throughout the second half of the war. One of the flight commanders was Squadron Leader Ensor,

Wing Commander M. A. Ensor, DSO and bar, DFC and bar; born Rangiora, 5 Jan 1922; shepherd; joined RNZAF Jul 1940; commanded No. 224 Sqdn, 1945.

who had already had notable success in attacks against U-boats both from the United Kingdom and during the North African campaign; two New Zealand navigators, Flight Lieutenant Kay

Squadron Leader J. R. Kay, DFC; born Onehunga, 29 Apr 1913; school teacher; joined RNZAF Jan 1941.

and Flying Officer MacAvoy,

Flight Lieutenant P. J. MacAvoy, DFC; born London, 7 Apr 1916; clerk accountant; joined RNZAF Oct 1940.

also achieved particular distinction in their work with No. 224 Squadron. In the three months from May to July 1943 the Liberators attacked no fewer than fourteen U-boats, completely destroying three of them.

Early in August the Germans abandoned the disastrous practice of fighting back during air attacks and resorted once again to a policy of evasion. Fewer U-boats crossed the bay, and those which made the passage travelled submerged, hugging the north coast of Spain more closely than before, sometimes even within the limit of Spanish territorial waters, an area crowded with fishing craft which made radar detection, particularly at night, extremely difficult. Nevertheless the hard-won advantage that the aircrews had gained was not allowed to slip from their grasp. The patrols were continued relentlessly both by day and by night and any U-boats sighted were hunted to exhaustion.

The tactics to which the Germans now resorted were eloquent evidence of the final success of the Biscay offensive. Moreover, the effect of the air patrols cannot be measured solely by the amount of damage directly inflicted on the enemy. The constant patrolling forced the German submarines to travel so slowly across the bay that their efficiency in the open sea was considerably reduced and the morale of their crews thereby impaired. In terms of submarines sunk the campaign inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. During the period from the beginning of June to the middle of August, twenty-seven U-boats had been sunk in the Bay of Biscay and its approaches, all but four of them accounted for by aircraft. Rear-Admiral Godt, Commander-in-Chief of the German U-boats at this time, has since declared: ‘July 1943 brought about the collapse of U-boat warfare in its previous form. What happened after this point cannot be compared with the early operations and nothing remained but plans, preparations and hopes, which at the end of the war were only about to be a reality.’

* * * * *

While the main air battle against the U-boats in 1943 was fought along the North Atlantic convoy routes and in the Bay of Biscay, activity was by no means confined to those areas. Both from Gibraltar and from bases along the West African coast RAF squadrons continued to maintain patrols, and during this fourth year of war New Zealand pilots, navigators, wireless operators and gunners flew with these units. For the Hudsons and Catalinas at Gibraltar the main tasks were the protection of convoys from both the Mediterranean and the Cape and the hunting of U-boats in their area. Flight Lieutenant Le Couteur

Flight Lieutenant C. J. H. Le Couteur, DFC; born Dunedin, 1 Oct 1913; builder; joined RNZAF Nov 1940.

and Flight Lieutenant Kilgour

Squadron Leader F. W. Kilgour; born Dannevirke, 7 Oct 1920; shipping clerk; joined RNZAF May 1941.

were prominent in these duties as captains of aircraft with No. 202 Squadron whose Catalinas, because of their low speed and great endurance, were able to escort ships over long distances.

During the period of the North African landings in November 1942, the Straits and their approaches had been the scene of con- siderableconsiderable U-boat activity, but with the successful Allied counter-attack in which nine U-boats were sunk within three weeks the German submarine concentrations had moved elsewhere. Opportunities for attack had thus become less frequent, and among the squadrons at Gibraltar Flight Sergeant Cox

Warrant Officer J. E. A. Cox; born Gisborne, 3 Jan 1918; bank clerk; joined RNZAF Feb 1941.

and his crew were considered lucky when, early in February whilst escorting a convoy off the coast of Portugal, they sighted and depth-charged two U-boats within the space of one hour. The second attack was remarkable in that it was made with a single remaining depth-charge, which fell directly beneath the stern of the U-boat and caused such damage that it later sank. With the opening of the assault on Sicily and later against the Italian mainland, many ships passed through the Straits, but they were seldom molested by enemy submarines, largely owing to the continued protection given by the aircraft from Gibraltar.

In West Africa New Zealanders were with each of the squadrons based at intervals along the coast. Some were among the crews of the Catalina and Sunderland flying boats and there was a small group with the Hudsons of No. 200 Squadron flying from airfields near Freetown and Yundum in Gambia. Wing Commander Evison,

Wing Commander C. E. W. Evison; born Invercargill, 27 Mar 1916; joined RAF Jan 1938; commanded No. 204 Sqdn, W. Africa, 1943; seconded BOAC, 1944–45.

who had captained one of the first three Sunderlands to operate from West Africa, was now in command of No. 204 Sunderland Squadron. He was later succeeded by another New Zealander, Wing Commander Hawkins,

Wing Commander H. J. L. Hawkins; born New Plymouth, 8 Dec 1904; joined RAF 1930; commanded No. 204 Sqdn, W. Africa, 1943–44.

who had begun his career with flying boats some years before the war. Prominent captains of aircraft were Flying Officer Steer,

Flight Lieutenant J. R. Steer; born Hobart, Tasmania, 19 Jan 1912; asst sales manager; joined RNZAF Mar 1941.

who saw long service with No. 95 Sunderland Squad- ron, and Sergeant Umbers,

Flying Officer D. T. Umbers; born Dunedin, 1 Aug 1922; clerical cadet; joined RNZAF Oct 1941.

who was with No. 270 Catalina Squad- ron. The Dominion's contribution in the West African area was to be considerably increased with the formation early in 1943 of a New Zealand unit, No. 490 Squadron.

German U-boats had been particularly active off West Africa early in the war, but as air bases were established and surface escorts increased merchant shipping sinkings had diminished steadily. Nevertheless, continued air patrols were necessary to prevent a recurrence of heavy losses, although the routine defence work in an area far removed from the main centres of the war naturally proved irksome and monotonous to the aircrews concerned. The patrols now flown practically closed the gap on the shipping route from Gibraltar to the Cape. Convoys were met as they entered the area and escorted by relays of aircraft from base to base along the coast. In addition, there were offensive sorties against U-boats patrolling in the region or on transit to the Indian Ocean, and extensive searches for survivors from torpedoed vessels.

During 1943 enemy activity off the West African coast was only intermittent and the U-boats, captained by experienced officers, operated with great caution on the fringe of the area swept by aircraft. Consequently many patrols were without incident and the routine flying over vast stretches of sea did little to relieve the boredom of life in isolated tropical bases. The climate was unhealthy and treacherous, sudden storms of great violence being frequent at certain seasons of the year, when it was not uncommon for aircraft on patrol to be forced down almost into the sea or to return to find their base almost blotted out by heavy clouds and tropical rain. Jui, near Freetown, from which No. 490 Squadron began operations at the beginning of July 1943, was not a particularly pleasant spot. The name itself meant ‘Swamp of Death’ and the humidity, especially in the wet season, was excessive. The station was built on the low spur running out into the estuary where the flying boats were moored. Surrounding it were dense, steamy, mangrove swamps, while farther back lay high hills which cut off the sea breezes that would have freshened the heavy, stagnant atmosphere.

The New Zealand squadron had originally been intended for service in the Indian Ocean but the need to reinforce West Africa had caused the change of location. The ground staff reached Freetown towards the end of March, by which time the first crews who were to fly out Catalinas from the United Kingdom had begun to assemble and train at the flying-boat base near Stranraer on the west coast of Scotland. Among them were several New Zealanders who had already distinguished themselves in operations with Coastal Command, notably Flight Lieutenant Godby,

Wing Commander P. R. Godby; born Christchurch, 27 Aug 1914; joined RAF Mar 1939; transferred RNZAF Jan 1945; navigation instructor, No. 9 OTU, 1942–43; staff duties, Navigation, HQ No. 19 Group, 1944.

who had flown Ansons during the early days of the war, and Flight Lieutenant Foster,

Squadron Leader A. M. Foster; born Blenheim, 22 Jun 1917; joined RAF Aug 1938; transferred RNZAF Jan 1945.

who had been with the Fleet Air Arm at the outbreak of war. The first commanding officer was Wing Commander Baird,

Wing Commander D. W. Baird, AFC; born Bangor, N. Ireland, 23 Dec 1910; served RAF 1931–37; joined RNZAF Mar 1938; commanded RNZAF, Fiji, 1940–41; No. 490 (NZ) Sqdn, W. Africa, 1943; RNZAF Station, Ardmore, 1945.

who had already had an interesting career, first with RAF flying boats before the war and subsequently in photographic survey duties with the RNZAF. He came to No. 490 Squadron after further service in New Zealand and the Pacific.

PRINCIPAL TARGETS ATTACKED BY BOMBER COMMAND, 1942–43 Colour map of Europe showing areas were bombs dropped

The squadron's Catalinas were named after the New Zealand provinces and the first two flying boats, piloted by Wing Commander Baird and Flying Officer Patience,

Flight Lieutenant H. K. Patience; born Wellington, 6 Oct 1913; school teacher; joined RNZAF Apr 1941.

flew to West Africa in the middle of June, others following during the next few weeks. Anti-submarine patrols and convoy escorts were begun at once, and before long the unit had achieved an enviable reputation for good serviceability and general efficiency which it was to maintain throughout its sojourn in West Africa to the end of the war, in spite of the fact that much of its later work was exacting and very monotonous.

Several incidents in which New Zealanders were to play a prominent part occurred during August 1943. The first was the rescue of survivors from a merchant ship torpedoed some 400 miles off Freetown during the night of 6 August. Flying Officer Grant

Flying Officer R. M. Grant; born Wellington, 27 Jun 1920; bank clerk; joined RNZAF Jul 1941; killed in flying accident, 18 Nov 1943.

and his crew were sent out upon receipt of the vessel's distress signal and within a few minutes of reaching the reported position they sighted two lifeboats and three rafts, containing thirty-nine survivors. Emergency packs, a wireless transmitter, and clothing were dropped to them, the clothing being supplied by the crew of the Catalina from what they were wearing at the time; it was a group of tired and nearly naked men who returned to their base after remaining with the lifeboats for five hours. As a result of their signals a corvette had been directed to the rescue but before it reached the survivors a second 490 Squadron Catalina, captained by Flying Officer Ward,

Flight Lieutenant N. A. Ward, DFC; born New Plymouth, 16 May 1913; draper; joined RNZAF Apr 1940.

had succeeded in leading a merchant ship to the scene to pick them up. This vessel was then escorted to port by a third aircraft from the New Zealand squadron.

A few days later Ward was flying as second pilot to his squadron commander and happened to be at the controls when a German U-boat was sighted. Although only three miles away it was barely visible in the fairly heavy sea that was running. Ward immediately went in to the attack and four depth-charges fell slightly astern of the submarine. As the explosions subsided its bows appeared to rise out of the water; then after turning in small circles as if its steering had been damaged, and exchanging fire with the Catalina, the U-boat finally submerged. During the attack the fifth depth-charge, which might have fallen nearer the target, unfortunately failed to release, but the crew were considerably relieved when it also held fast on landing back at base.

By a rather remarkable coincidence it was on the same day and almost at the same hour that a particularly gallant attack was made on another U-boat about ninety miles farther north by Flying Officer Trigg

Flying Officer L. A. Trigg, VC, DFC; born Houhora, 6 Jun 1914; salesman; joined RNZAF Jun 1941; killed on air operations, 11 Aug 1943.

of No. 200 Squadron. It was Trigg's first operational sortie in a Liberator aircraft. His unit was, in fact, only in process of conversion from Hudsons to the new type, but as several U-boats were known to be in the outer area it was essential that a Liberator be despatched on patrol that morning. The bomber took off from Rufisque, near Dakar, shortly after dawn. Four hours later a surfaced U-boat was sighted and Trigg prepared to attack. But the submarine did not attempt to submerge; instead, it engaged the Liberator with its anti-aircraft guns, scored repeated hits and set the bomber on fire during its approach. However, Trigg continued on his course and aimed his depth-charges so accurately that they straddled the U-boat; it sank a few minutes later. Unfortunately the Liberator, immediately after making the attack, crashed in to the sea. There were no survivors.

When Trigg and his crew failed to return to their base a search was organised, and during the next afternoon a Sunderland sighted a dinghy containing several men who were reported as survivors from the missing Liberator. It was not until a corvette reached the scene on the following morning that they were found to be seven Germans, the only survivors from the U-boat. A dinghy which had floated free from the Liberator at the moment of the crash had been found and inflated by one of the Germans shortly after the U-boat sank. Among the survivors was the German commander, who expressed his admiration of Trigg's courage in not allowing the submarine's accurate fire and the precarious position of his machine to deter him from pressing home his attack. Only a few weeks earlier Trigg had received the Distinguished Flying Cross for two skilful attacks against U-boats whilst protecting a West African convoy in March 1943. He was now awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously.

* * * * *

In September 1943 the Germans staged a brief renewal of pack attacks on convoys in the North Atlantic. They had little choice in the matter since it was only here that their U-boats could materially affect the Allied build-up in the United Kingdom for invasion of the Continent. Yet with the persistence and tenacity that were typical of their operations throughout the war, the U-boat command now began to try out new methods of attack and new weapons such as the acoustic torpedo. This particular weapon, drawn towards its target by the sound from a ship's propellers, was intended primarily for use against the escort vessels. Each of the U-boats operating against convoys now carried three or four of them, the idea being to destroy as many of the escorts as possible and then use ordinary torpedoes against unprotected merchant ships. However, after a few initial successes these tactics failed dismally for within a matter of weeks counter measures were introduced in the form of small, noisy ‘foxers’ towed by the corvettes and destroyers.

Early in September, anticipating the enemy's change of strategy, Coastal Command had reinforced the squadrons covering the North Atlantic shipping routes, with the result that the U-boats in that area found themselves constantly harassed and attacked from the air. No fewer than fifteen were sunk outright by aircraft in the North Atlantic during September and October. Among the New Zealanders who saw further action during this period was Flight Sergeant Lloyd of No. 86 Liberator Squadron. On 8 October, while he and his crew were escorting a large convoy to the south of Ice- land, Lloyd sighted a U-boat on the surface about seven miles away. The bomber attacked the submarine as it submerged. Returning to the scene an hour later, the crew sighted another Liberator engaging a surfaced U-boat. They joined in the attack and shortly afterwards the vessel blew up, leaving only a few of its crew to be picked up by a destroyer.

A week later another successful attack was made by Warrant Officer Turnbull as captain of a Liberator of No. 120 Squadron. His crew, typical of many in the RAF at this time, consisted of an Australian, two Canadians, two Englishmen and another New Zealander, Flight Sergeant Tingey. They were sweeping ahead of a large convoy when they sighted their target. As the Liberator approached, the Germans opened fire, but this ceased when the gunners began to score hits on the deck and conning tower. Then, as the depth-charges exploded, a large jagged piece of metal flew into the air and soon the U-boat began to settle by the stern, surrounded by foam and bubbles. In a second attack depth-charges straddled the U-boat, and a few minutes later the Liberator crew saw it break in half; the stern and bow rose well out of the sea and then sank inwards almost vertically.

By the end of October all attempts by the German submarines to stage co-ordinated attacks on convoys were being frustrated, and in the following month not a single ship was lost on the North Atlantic convoy routes while nine more U-boats were sent to the bottom. In fact, such was the strength of the joint air and sea defences that never again was the enemy able to launch any large-scale attacks on shipping in this area.

See maps facing p. 411.

During the closing months of 1943 the Allies were able to strengthen their position in the Atlantic by an arrangement with the Portuguese Government which enabled aircraft to operate from the Azores. By November two squadrons of Fortress bombers and one of Hudsons were using the airfield at Lagens. Not only were these aircraft able to cover ships in mid-Atlantic but they also protected convoys proceeding between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom. These had now been routed farther westward owing to renewed activity by German long-range aircraft operating from bases in the south-west of France.

The New Zealanders who went with the Fortress squadrons to the Azores found the climate a pleasant change from the gales and storms of the Hebrides, although the conditions under which they lived and operated were at first rather difficult. However, within a few days of their arrival the aircrews were active in escorting convoys and hunting U-boats in that area. No. 220 Squadron also flew meteorological flights to the west, providing information which had previously been denied.

Throughout the winter months the German U-boat Command maintained a policy of the utmost caution, operating their submarines only where the Allied defences were weakest – in the Indian Ocean and the centre of the Atlantic. The air patrols from the United Kingdom now became extremely monotonous for the air- crew, with little incident to break the dull routine of escort and anti-submarine search. Even in the Bay of Biscay the offensive flagged considerably for the U-boats were making the passage to and from their bases either at night or in thick weather and poor visibility. During the whole of December only six attacks were made from the air against U-boats in the Biscay area and of these all but one were at night.

At Gibraltar and along the West African coast the story was much the same, crews spending many hours on uneventful patrols. It was a dull, uninteresting job but, recognising its necessity, the crews continued their work in good spirit, always hoping that some U-boat, less cautious than the rest, would show itself on the surface and provide opportunity for an attack. In West Africa there was a short alarm when a ship was torpedoed off Freetown at the beginning of December, and for a few days an extensive hunt was maintained in which No. 490 New Zealand Squadron played a prominent part and was congratulated on its achievement of record flying during the period. In his December report Wing Commander Nicholl,

Wing Commander B. S. Nicholl; born Christchurch, 5 Dec 1906; joined RAF 1931; transferred RNZAF Jan 1940; commanded RNZAF Fiji, 1943; No. 490 (NZ) Sqdn, W. Africa, 1943–44.

who had now just assumed command of the squadron, rather aptly summed up the role of the anti-submarine squadrons at this time: ‘This game is rather like cricket – the runs saved in the field count just as much towards winning the game as the runs made off the bat. The main thing is that we are helping to keep them under, and sinkings of merchant vessels are very rare.’

Yet while large convoys continued to pass across the oceans unmolested and the steady build-up of supplies and men in the United Kingdom proceeded apace, enemy propaganda, while admitting that Allied counter measures had gained a temporary advantage, suggested that it would not be long before German ingenuity would restore the balance. On 20 January 1944 Admiral Doenitz declared at a conference in Stettin: ‘The enemy has succeeded in gaining the advantage in the submarine war, but the day will come when I shall offer Churchill a first-rate submarine war. The submarine weapon has not been broken by the set-backs of 1943.’ The threat was not altogether without foundation for the Germans were now experimenting with an entirely new type of submarine capable of high underwater speeds. Apart from this a large portion of Germany's war effort was still directed towards new U-boat pro- duction, and in an effort to minimise the effects of bombing parts of the vessels were being prefabricated in factories scattered all over Germany and then rushed to the shipyards for assembly. The Germans had also begun fitting a new device known as the ‘Schnorkel’ to their old U-boats which would enable them to remain submerged for long periods.

The ‘Schnorkel’ consisted of air intake and exhaust tubes which could be raised at periscope depth. The U-boat could then recharge batteries and change the air while it remained just below the surface. The two tubes were within a single casing hinged to the deck just forward of the bridge; when raised and in use the tip of the intake tube was level with the top of the periscope while the exhaust tube, a few inches shorter, discharged the burnt gas downwards. At periscope depth with the Schnorkel raised and diesel engines running a U-boat could charge her batteries and make three or four knots simultaneously.

However, before any new campaign could be launched it became clear to the Germans that, with an Allied invasion of the Continent imminent, their U-boats would have to be preserved for defensive operations against this threat. In the meantime all that could be done was to tie down the Allied forces, keeping them engaged but avoiding unnecessary losses. This meant that the German U-boat fleet was, for the time being at least, virtually immobilised and the Allies, now possessed of greatly increased air and naval power, and encouraged by the enemy's reluctance to renew the Atlantic battle, were able to complete their preparations for the invasion of Europe with their sea communications safe from serious disruption.

CHAPTER 3 Bomber Command and the Battle of the Ruhr

At the beginning of 1943 the British bomber force was still the main offensive weapon in the hands of the Allies. Indeed, for some four years after the withdrawal of the British Army from Dunkirk, the bomber aircraft remained the only means of attacking Germany since the Mediterranean campaigns, although invaluable in bleeding Germany of some of her best manpower and material, were until the later stages essentially defensive. Throughout all those years, apart from the bomber offensive, British forces could do no more than nibble at the fringes of German-occupied territory.

The operations of Bomber Command, however, passed through many different phases before they became a potent factor in the achievement of victory. The earlier years were a long-drawn-out struggle to build up an effective force and to overcome the difficulties associated with night bombing. Frequently the offensive was checked by the diversion of the bomber force to defensive tasks and there was uncertainty both in policy and its application. Many were the authorities who found what they considered ‘essential’ jobs for the bombers to carry out. Experts in economic war thought out one class of industrial target after another, the destruction of which would, they argued, cripple the German war effort. The experts in maritime war called for attacks on the enemy ports, on ships in harbour, on U-boat bases and shipbuilding yards. The experts in land warfare called for attacks on tank factories, on fuel dumps, ordnance depots and so on; even the experts in air warfare had their own target systems as part of their campaign for air superiority. In fact, nearly everyone had vital jobs for the bomber force which, small as it was, could not do all the many things regarded as ‘essential’ but which were otherwise impossible.

Unfortunately the accuracy of the early bombing had been greatly overestimated. Economic intelligence had been seriously at fault, and the ability of the Germans to counter the bombing raids and to repair damage was not fully appreciated. And when the spectacular results which some had been led to expect failed to materialise there were doubts, criticisms, and even opposition in some quarters regarding the whole bombing campaign. The early enthusiasm faded and the bomber offensive became a hard-fought battle in which new and ever-changing tactics had to be hammered out by hard-won experience. Weather, phases of the moon, distance of targets, enemy fighter strength and tactics, defence organisation for guns, searchlights, radar and fighter control; ever-changing techniques of navigation, target marking and bombing — all these factors had played a part in the development of the campaign. The ‘thousand bomber’ raids of mid-1942 and the formation, in August of that year, of the special pathfinder force for target finding and marking were two outstanding achievements of the early period. Nevertheless, to develop the equipment and technique and to train the aircrews to attain a high degree of accuracy in the face of enemy opposition and under all weather conditions continued to be a long and difficult struggle fought at great cost, and it was not until the middle of 1943 that it became possible to deliver a heavy attack in Germany with real precision.

Like the blockade by the British Navy in the First World War and by the German U-boats in the early stages of the second, the effects of the bomber offensive were only gradual, slowly cumula- tive, and therefore difficult to discern. There were no spectacular advances over large tracts of enemy territory; no towns or fortresses were captured with large numbers of the enemy made prisoner. Only by degrees was the enemy's industrial capacity and his ability to make war undermined. Yet the damage inflicted by the bombing was not confined to that which could be seen and photographed. It was reflected with equal significance in the way the German Air Force was driven from the offensive to the defensive both in its operations and in new construction, and compelled to concentrate more and more of its resources on the protection of Germany against bombing attacks from the west to the benefit of the Allied forces engaged on other fronts.

A force of over 600,000 in 1943 and nearly one million in 1944 was maintained to man the anti-aircraft defences – not far short of the peak total strength of the RAF all over the world. Anti-aircraft guns took an ever-increasing part of Germany's total weapon pro- duction,

A United States post-war survey calculated that the strength of the artillery provided for the German Army might have been doubled if it had not been necessary to provide AA guns in quantity for the defence of the home front against air attack.

while the German night-fighter force which had grown from virtually nothing to 150 in November 1940 and 250 by July 1942 now rose to 550 by July 1943, 800 by the spring of 1944, and 1250 by the end of 1944.

A vital battle – the battle for air superiority, for the initiative in the air – was also to be fought out in the skies over German terri- tory. This battle against the German Air Force and the attack on the enemy's production resources and communications were closely interlocked, for as the Allies gradually gained air superiority so

TARGETS IN WEST GERMANYBlack and white map showing targets in West Germany automatically was the power of the bomber force increased for destroying the enemy's means of production and the communications on which they depended. Herein lay the essence of a successful air offensive. And now in the fourth year of war, when the Allies at last possessed the means to put it into greater effect, an attack, massive, sustained and compelling, began to fall upon Germany. To Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force it had fallen to lead the way and blaze the trail in this great but hazardous venture of war. The path which it had opened was soon to become a busy highway along which powerful forces would advance resolutely towards their goal.

* * * * *

Appalling casualties had been suffered in the land battles of the First World War. Of one single day's fighting on the Somme in July 1916 it is recorded that when ‘Night closed over the still-thundering battlefield …. nearly 60,000 British soldiers had fallen, killed or wounded, or were prisoners in the hands of the enemy.’ In the first five days of the Somme battle nearly 100,000 of our best troops were lost and ‘the ground conquered was … so limited both in width and depth as to exclude any strategic results.’

Churchill, The World Crisis, 1916–1918 (Thornton Butterworth), Part I, pp. 179–80.

It was partly to avoid the repetition of such loss and slaughter as took place at Passchendaele, Verdun, and the Somme that the Allied leaders meeting at Casablanca in January 1943 had decided to postpone an invasion of the Continent and to intensify the air offensive from the United Kingdom. The ultimate object of this aerial onslaught was stated as ‘the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the under- miningundermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.’ Europe was a fortress which must be subjected to vigorous bombardment before a final assault by the Allied armies could be practicable. To make that assault before the time was ripe would be suicidal for the Allied cause and of no assistance to Russia.

The bomber offensive planned at Casablanca was to be a joint Allied effort in which the operations of the RAF night bombers would be supplemented by American day bombers. But the American bomber force in Britain was still small and the combined offensive did not really begin until June 1943 when the American forces had been substantially augmented and detailed plans had matured. Meanwhile the operations of the American 8th Air Force continued to be essentially experimental, with its bombers gradually extending the scope of their effort to Germany, adjusting their tactics and techniques, and feeling out the quality of German opposition. There- fore, during the first half of 1943, the main effort against Germany was undertaken by Royal Air Force Bomber Command under Air Marshal Arthur Harris.

Harris had been in charge of the British bomber force for less than a year. Appointed at a time when Bomber Command was at a most difficult period in its development, he was both by training and temperament well fitted to fill this hard post, for he was an expert in air matters and much of his twenty-five years' experience with the RAF had been gained in operating bombers both by day and by night. He sincerely believed that the bombing could shorten the war and save terrible casualties in land battles. His fierce honesty of purpose and singleness of mind drove him to demand the utmost of his crews, but at the same time, with equal vehemence, he strove to move mountains on their behalf and get the weapons and aids they required. He was accused of ruthlessness and frequently blamed for shortcomings of a policy that was not altogether of his making. Yet the respect and admiration which this grim and formidable leader won from his men was well demonstrated not only at various gatherings both during and after the war but also by the confidence with which his directions were followed even when they involved heavy casualties. He bore heavy responsibilities which imposed a strain different from that imposed upon naval and land commanders, for the bombing offensive was continuous and involved the committal to action night after night of a force of some five or six thousand highly trained and skilled men, in machines whose value might well exceed fifty million pounds.

The declarations of the combined Allied Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca regarding the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom were more a statement of policy than a specific directive, and even the subsequent orders to Air Marshal Harris were in the broadest terms. Bomber Command was to proceed with ‘the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system’, giving priority to certain aspects of it, such as U-boat and aircraft construction, transportation, oil production, and targets in the enemy war industry. This was interpreted by Harris as meaning the destruction of principal industrial centres in Germany, and since the Ruhr was by far the most important, he regarded it as a principal objective.

However, for tactical reasons, Harris was forced to conduct the offensive more in accord with the general aim than with any special type of target laid down. Among the factors which affected his choice of targets were the weather in different parts of enemy territory, the disposition of the enemy defences, the radio aids available and their limitations, together with intelligence gained of the effect of operations and the relative importance of various targets. Up to 1943 the choice of target on any particular night had been severely limited by the weather, but with improvement in pathfinder and bombing techniques following the introduction of new radar aids, the weather over the target area became less important. Operations could now be carried out on a greater number of nights and, since moonlight and clear skies were not so essential, it was possible to operate in conditions less favourable to the enemy night fighters. All the same the skill with which the enemy directed his defences and the steady increase in their strength meant that frequent changes of tactics and targets had to be made.

The planning of each bombing raid was a complex affair. Early in the day the Commander-in-Chief would meet his staff officers in the Operations Room of Bomber Command's headquarters on the outskirts of London. The weather forecasts for the Continent and also for bases in England would be considered along with intelligence reports before the night's target was finally chosen. Then the route for the bombers was decided upon, special attention being given to the time that the aircraft would spend over enemy territory, the avoidance of heavily defended areas, and methods of deceiving the German night-fighter force. The Commander-in-Chief finally fixed the aiming point, the size of the force to be despatched, and the bomb load to be carried. After discussion with the groups concerned an operation order was passed to them; then further instructions went to the stations where the detailed plans were worked out according to the pathfinder tactics that were to be used.

During the earlier years the results of bombing had been assessed from crew reports which in the enthusiasm of the moment had often proved inaccurate. By 1943, however, large numbers of night photographs were being taken showing the actual release of the bombs by each aircraft. From these photographs an assessment of the bomb concentration and of the area attacked could be made and immediate lessons drawn as to the advantages of different tactics. For example, it was soon found that aircraft reaching the target in the later stages of a raid tended to undershoot on the markers owing to the large area of fire usually visible by then. This was corrected either by varying the direction of approach of the later waves or by instructing the later marker aircraft to place their target indicators behind the aiming point. Daylight reconnaissance was usually made within a few days of a raid and the interpretation of the photographs taken gave a fair assessment of the damage done. It was then possible to judge whether further attacks on the same target were necessary. Yet owing to the extraordinary speed with which repairs were effected by the Germans, even this judgment was, as post-war investigation reveals, frequently too optimistic.

The British bomber force, with a long-deferred expansion of strength at last becoming effective, was now better equipped for its avowed task of ‘beating the industrial life out of Germany’. During 1942 there had been no significant increase in the number of aircraft but a major part of the force had been re-equipped with heavy bombers. Moreover, subsequent expansion was such that, by the beginning of March 1943, the front-line force included 380 heavy and 160 medium bombers.

There was also the considerable force of light bombers in No. 2 Group but their operations were essentially different from those of the heavier bombers and are therefore discussed in a later chapter.

Within another three months there was a force of nearly 800 aircraft, of which just over two-thirds were heavy four-engined bombers, Lancasters, Halifaxes and Stirlings. Yet while this increase in numerical strength was impressive, the outstanding feature of the period was the substantial rise in bomb lift following the change from medium to heavy bombers, with the Lancasters, superior in both operational height and bomb capacity at long range, emerging as the mainstay of the force. The Lancaster was to prove a magnificent machine. It was subsequently employed in many different roles, in massive saturation raids, in precision attacks such as that which sank the Tirpitz, for low-level raids on German power supplies and the Moehne Dam; it supplied the underground armies of Europe, supported the Allied armies, and in the final stage fed starving Holland and carried home British prisoners of war. Pilots liked the Lancaster's manoeuvrability, the excellent all-round vision from its cockpit, its instant response to the controls, and the rugged construction which enabled it to absorb much punishment in combat and yet bring its crew home. Altogether it was to prove a worthy successor to the faithful Wellington which had been the mainstay of Bomber Command in the earlier years and which, in fact, was still employed on operations until October 1943.

* * * * *

A considerable contribution to the expansion of Bomber Command during 1943 was made by the Commonwealth countries, notably by Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Canada now provided a whole bomber group which was completely maintained by the Canadian Government. The substantial part played by both Australia and New Zealand was less evident, for although certain squadrons were identified with each country the majority of their men were scattered among RAF units. Had the New Zealanders who flew with Bomber Command during 1943 been more concentrated in squadrons, their numbers would have been sufficient to provide crews for more than 200 bombers in any one raid. As it was they were to be found in almost every unit, usually flying in crews made up of men from various parts of the Commonwealth. And in addition to the men engaged in flying duties, there was a substantial number who shared in vital maintenance work on the airfields. New Zealanders were also employed in a wide variety of posts in the vast and complex bomber organisation – of planning, operational control, technical development, training and various staff duties. Several veteran pilots were in command of RAF bomber stations and squadrons, notably Air Commodore A. McKee who was in charge of the large operational airfield at Downham Market in Norfolk, Group Captain S. C. Elworthy who now became Station Commander at RAF Waddington, Lincolnshire, from which three squadrons of Lancasters operated, and Wing Commander Dabinett

Group Captain H. I. Dabinett; RAF; born Taranaki, 11 Jul 1905; joined RAF 1930; commanded No. 115 Sqdn, 1940; No. 12 Sqdn, 1942–43; No. 82 OTU, 1944, and No. 27 OTU, 1945.

who continued to lead No. 12 Lancaster Squadron.

The New Zealand Stirling Squadron was to play a prominent part in the bomber offensive during 1943 and further increase the reputation it had gained in the earlier years. Flying under the apt motto, Ake Ake Kia Kaha – ‘For ever and ever be strong’ – No. 75 was now led by Wing Commander Lane,

Wing Commander G. A. Lane, DFC; born Clapham, London, 13 Apr 1916; joined RAF 1937; CFI No. 22 OTU, 1942; commanded No. 75 (NZ) Sqdn, 1943; served RAF Delegation, USA, 1944–45.

an Englishman with considerable experience in bombing operations. His flight commanders were Squadron Leader Allcock,

Wing Commander G. M. Allcock, DFC and bar; born Wellington, 14 Dec 1916; joined RAF Aug 1939; CGI No. 1651 Conversion Unit, 1942–43; No. 7 Sqdn, 1945.

a New Zealander who had joined the Royal Air Force before the outbreak of war and served in the Middle East before returning to win further distinction with a Stirling squadron, and Squadron Leader Fowler

Squadron Leader G. E. Fowler, DFC; born Chellaston, Derbyshire, 22 Jun 1911; joined RAF Sep 1939.

of Chellaston, Derbyshire, who had previously completed his first tour of operations with No. 75 Squadron. During 1943 just over 300 New Zealanders, aircrew and ground staff, served with the squadron, and while New Zealanders were predominant among the aircrew, the presence of men from Britain, Australia, and Canada preserved the Empire character of the unit which had been a pleasant feature of the earlier years.

At the beginning of 1943 No. 75 Squadron was emerging from a very trying period of three months in which there had been a move to a new base, a change in aircraft and, in relation to the number of operations, heavy casualties, including the loss of a popular commanding officer. But the aircrews were now more familiar with the four-engined Stirling bombers that had replaced the Wellingtons with which the squadron had been associated since its formation. Initial mechanical failures in the new machines, the cause of so much disappointment and frustration to all members of the unit, were being overcome by the ground crews, after much persistent effort, and the men were more accustomed to surroundings which were in direct contrast to those at the peacetime stations of Feltwell and Mildenhall, their previous bases.

There were good reasons for the feeling of strangeness which had been experienced. Indeed, it is doubtful whether any other operational squadron flew from an airfield less warlike than that now occupied by the New Zealand Squadron at the Rowley Mile on the famous racecourse at Newmarket. Some of the aircrew were billeted in a wing of the Jockey Club and their mess was a mile away in the grandstand of the racecourse where the ground staff were accommodated. The grandstand itself was, as a senior officer put it, ‘a rabbit warren of a building with three floors housing billets, dining rooms, kitchens, recreation rooms and workshops. All windows were blacked out and it was quite easy to lose oneself in the labyrinth of rooms, passages and stairs.’ The briefing room was at first in the saddle room, which still retained the large brackets on which saddles had been hung, while the operations room was located in the cream and gilt weighing-in room. When the briefing room was later moved to what had been a lavishly equipped cocktail bar, the serious business of briefing a bomber squadron for action provided a sharp reminder of the gulf which existed between the days of peace and war.

After a quiet beginning in January, when severe winter weather restricted activity, No. 75 Squadron was to operate intensively during the following months, and by the end of July a total of nearly seven hundred sorties had been despatched in eighty-seven raids, during which the Stirlings dropped 1285 tons of bombs and laid 604 mines. Unfortunately the unit again suffered heavy casualties, thirty-five aircraft being lost during these seven months.

When the squadron resumed full-scale operations in February, Nuremberg, Turin, and the Rhineland city of Cologne were among the targets attacked. But the main effort, in common with that of most other squadrons in Bomber Command, was concentrated on enemy U-boat bases in Occupied France and on construction facilities in German ports. By the end of the month aircrews had more confidence in their new aircraft, while the ground staff, in mastering the technical difficulties which had beset them with the introduction of the Stirling, succeeded in maintaining a high level of aircraft serviceability. The squadron was then ready to take a leading part in the offensive against German industry in the Ruhr and Rhineland which was to be the principal feature of Bomber Command's operations during the first half of 1943.

With RAF squadrons in Bomber Command, many New Zealanders were to win distinction during 1943 as captains of air- craft, navigators, bomb aimers, wireless operators and air gunners. Several men were outstanding, notably Squadron Leader Thiele,

Squadron Leader K. F. Thiele, DSO, DFC and two bars; born Christchurch, 25 Feb 1921; journalist; joined RNZAF Dec 1940; commanded No. 3 Sqdn, 1945.

as flight commander and captain of a Lancaster in No. 467 Australian Squadron; Squadron Leader St. John

Wing Commander J. R. St. John, DSO, DFC and bar; RAF; born Nelson, 13 Mar 1917; dental mechanic; joined RAF 1937; CI No. 1656 CU, 1943–44; commanded No. 103 Sqdn, 1944–45.

in similar duties with No. 101 Lancaster Squadron, and Squadron Leader Silcock

Squadron Leader C. K. Silcock, DFC and bar; born Brightwater, Nelson, 4 May 1915; engraver; joined RNZAF Mar 1941.

with No. 44 Rhodesian Squadron, also flying Lancasters. Special commendation for his part in difficult and hazardous missions of which little was heard at the time was won by Squadron Leader Boxer,

Wing Commander A. H. C. Boxer, DSO, DFC, Virtuti Militari (Pol.); Bronze Star Medal (US); RAF; born Hastings, 1 Dec 1916; joined RAF 1938; commanded No. 161 Sqdn, 1944–45.

who led a flight in No. 138 Halifax Squadron. His unit was one of several engaged in supplying the underground armies of Europe and dropping and picking up Allied agents, missions which often involved long flights over enemy territory. Boxer was later to command a squadron engaged in these ‘special duties’, as they had come to be known.

Other bomber captains who established a particularly fine record of achievement at this time were Squadron Leader Starky

Squadron Leader J. B. Starky, DSO, DFC; born Gisborne, 10 Nov 1916; farmer; joined RNZAF 1940.

with No. 115 Lancaster Squadron and Squadron Leader B. G. Wallace

Squadron Leader B. G. Wallace, DFC; born Invercargill, 6 Nov 1914; salesman; joined RNZAF Sep 1940.

with No. 214 Stirling Squadron; Flight Lieutenants D. C. MacKenzie

Squadron Leader D. C. MacKenzie, DFC; born Wellington, 26 Aug 1921; clerk; joined RAF Jun 1940; killed on air operations 12 Jun 1943.

and J. B. Smith

Flight Lieutenant J. B. Smith, DFC; born Dunedin, 23 Aug 1916; optician; joined RNZAF Aug 1941; killed on air operations, 10 May 1944.

and Pilot Officer C. M. Wallace

Flying Officer C. M. Wallace, DFM; born Cooktown, Queensland, 20 Nov 1915; metal polisher; joined RNZAF May 1941.

were also prominent as captains with an Australian squadron and Squadron Leader D. W. S. Clark

Wing Commander D. W. S. Clark, DFC and bar; born Surbiton, Surrey, 18 Jan 1916; joined RAF 1939; transferred RNZAF Aug 1944; commanded No. 77 Sqdn, 1944–45.

with a Canadian unit.

Few brothers probably shared war experience to the same extent as Flying Officers Anthony

Flight Lieutenant A. M. Singer, DFC; born Weybridge, Surrey, 25 Nov 1918; agricultural student; joined RNZAF Jun 1941.

and Peter Singer,

Flight Lieutenant P. L. Singer, DFC; born Weybridge, Surrey, 25 Nov 1918; agricultural student; joined RNZAF Jun 1941.

twin brothers from Gisborne, each of whom now captained a Lancaster in No. 57 Squadron. They had joined up at the same time, trained together in New Zealand and England and then piloted aircraft in the same squadron, very often flying over the same target within a few minutes of one another. They both flew on twenty-nine raids and finished their first tour of operations by bombing Dortmund in May 1943. Both brothers were then awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and went on to take the same instructors' course. Subsequently, they returned to operations with a Lancaster squadron and survived the war to return together to New Zealand.

Navigators to achieve distinction during 1943 were Flying Officer Sheild

Flight Lieutenant H. J. Sheild, DFC and bar; born Patea, 30 Sep 1916; commercial artist; joined RNZAF Dec 1940.

with No. 149 Squadron and Flight Lieutenant Fowler

Squadron Leader L. G. Fowler, DFC; born Auckland, 20 Nov 1912; clerk; joined RNZAF Mar 1941.

with No. 90 Squadron, while among the New Zealand air gunners, Flight Sergeant de Joux,

Flying Officer E. E. de Joux, CGM, DFM; born Edinburgh, Scotland, 27 Jan 1921; joined RAF May 1940; transferred RNZAF Jun 1944.

who was credited with the destruction of five night fighters, continued a most successful operational career with No. 102 Halifax Squadron. He was awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal in November 1943. Pilot Officer Florence,

Pilot Officer R. Florence, DFM; born New Plymouth, 15 Dec 1921; clerk; joined RNZAF Jan 1941; killed on air operations, 18 Nov 1943.

who flew many sorties with No. 214 Lancaster Squadron, was among those who distinguished themselves as bomb aimers. Towards the middle of the year he joined No. 617 Squadron – ‘The Dam Busters’ – only to lose his life in a November attack against the Antheor Viaduct on the Riviera route into Italy. The Lancasters had flown on to land in North Africa and it was during the return flight that Florence's aircraft was lost.

New Zealanders also continued to be prominent in the pathfinder squadrons, which contained picked crews specially trained in target location and whose aircraft were equipped with the newest aids to navigation and bombing as they became available. Among those who were to achieve particular distinction during 1943 were Squadron Leader Barron

Wing Commander J. F. Barron, DSO and bar, DFC, DFM; born Dunedin, 9 Jan 1921; clerk; joined RNZAF Jul 1940; commanded No. 7 Sqdn, 1944; killed on air operations, 20 May 1944.

and Flight Lieutenant Kearns,

Squadron Leader R. S. D. Kearns, DSO, DFC, DFM; born Reefton, 9 Mar 1920; student; joined RNZAF Dec 1940.

who captained heavy bombers, Squadron Leader Ball,

Squadron Leader W. A. C. Ball, DFC; born Palmerston North, 14 Sep 1916; insurance clerk; joined RNZAF Oct 1939; killed on air operations, 9 Mar 1943.

Flight Lieutenants Gray,

Flight Lieutenant E. McL. Gray, DFC; born Cambridge, 22 Mar 1920; clerk; joined RNZAF Dec 1940; killed on air operations, 4 May 1943.

Hilton,

Flight Lieutenant F. Hilton, DFC; born Coventry, Warwickshire, 15 Dec 1918; carpenter; joined RNZAF Jan 1941; killed on air operations, 25 Jun 1943.

Martin,

Flight Lieutenant B. Martin, DFC; born Waiau, 23 Nov 1911; diesel engineer; joined RNZAF Sep 1940; killed on air operations, 2 Feb 1943.

and Flying Officer Barclay,

Flight Lieutenant W. J. M. Barclay, DFC, DFM; born Dunedin, 13 May 1921; clerk; joined RNZAF Nov 1940.

who flew as navigators, and Flying Officer Marshall

Flying Officer J. Marshall, DFC; born London, 1 Aug 1920; engraving apprentice; joined RNZAF Dec 1939.

and Warrant Officer Barnham,

Warrant Officer J. E. Barnham, DFC; born Christchurch, 5 Nov 1920; salesman; joined RNZAF Apr 1941.

wireless operators and gunners. All these men had been with the Pathfinder Force during the pioneering period in 1942. Only four of them survived the war.

Others who won commendation as captains of pathfinder aircraft were Flight Lieutenant Moore

Flight Lieutenant V. S. Moore, DSO, DFC, DFM; born New Plymouth, 15 Dec 1912; diesel engineer; joined RNZAF Dec 1940.

of No. 83 Squadron, Flight Lieutenant Petrie

Flight Lieutenant J. R. Petrie, DFC; born Foxton, 11 Aug 1917; labourer; joined RNZAF Jul 1941; killed on air operations, 16 Dec 1943.

of No. 7 Squadron, and Flying Officer Matich

Flight Lieutenant N. Matich, DSO, DFM; born Te Kopuru, 25 Jul 1917; shop assistant; joined RNZAF Aug 1941.

of No. 35 Squadron. Moore survived many hazardous missions to complete a long period of operations with the Pathfinder Force; Petrie lost his life whilst leading an attack on Berlin in December; Matich was also shot down towards the end of the year but he escaped serious injury, evaded capture, and got back to England.

There was now a relatively large group of New Zealanders with No. 156 Lancaster Squadron, where Squadron Leader Mandeno,

Squadron Leader G. L. Mandeno, DSO, DFC and bar; born Frankton, 5 Jun 1914; engineer; joined RAF 1940; transferred RNZAF Jul 1945.

Flight Lieutenants Sullivan,

Flight Lieutenant M. A. Sullivan, DFC; born Whakatane, 28 Jan 1920; timber yardman; joined RNZAF Aug 1941; killed on air operations, 20 Dec 1943.

Thomson

Flight Lieutenant J. F. Thomson, DFC and bar; born Auckland, 31 Aug 1918; clerk; joined RNZAF Jun 1941.

and Wright

Squadron Leader J. L. Wright, DSO, DFC; born Tirau, 24 Feb 1914; clerk; joined RNZAF Dec 1940.

were prominent as captains, Squadron Leader Hall

Squadron Leader H. R. Hall, DFC; born Palmerston North, 21 Oct 1913; bank officer; joined RNZAF Dec 1939.

and Flight Lieutenant Kelly

Squadron Leader C. W. B. Kelly, DSO, DFC; born Christchurch, 11 Jun 1920; porcelain enameller; joined RNZAF Sep 1940.

as navigators, and Pilot Officer Crankshaw

Flying Officer K. A. Crankshaw, DFC, DFM; born Greymouth, 12 Dec 1921; garage storeman; joined RNZAF Nov 1940.

as air gunner. In No. 35 Squadron Flying Officers Jamieson

Flight Lieutenant H. A. Jamieson, DFC; born Pukekohe, 18 Aug 1918; truck driver; joined RNZAF Nov 1940; p.w. 12 Jun 1943.

and Robson,

Flying Officer T. A. Robson, DFC; born Christchurch, 12 Mar 1914; window dresser; joined RNZAF Aug 1941; killed on air operations, 20 Dec 1943.

Warrant Officer Dowman,

Warrant Officer M. G. F. Dowman, DFM; born Inglewood, 5 Oct 1916; labourer; joined RNZAF Mar 1941; died 2 Jan 1948.

and Flight Sergeant Ridings

Flight Sergeant D. G. Ridings; born Auckland, 12 Sep 1921; grocery assistant; joined RNZAF Apr 1941; killed on air operations, 4 May 1943.

won distinction as wireless operators and air gunners.

The Pathfinder Force, whose formation and early operations have been described in the previous volume, was now organised as a separate group in Bomber Command under its original leader, the Australian pilot Air Commodore Bennett,

Air Vice-Marshal D. C. T. Bennett, CB, CBE, DSO, Order of Alexander Nevsky (USSR); born Toowoomba, Australia, 14 Sep 1910; served RAF 1931–35 and transferred RAAF 1935; a founder of the Atlantic Ferry, 1940–41; rejoined RAF Sep 1941; commanded No. 77 Sqdn, 1941; No. 10 Sqdn, 1942; AOC No. 8 Pathfinder Group, Bomber Command, 1943–45.

and to the initial five squadrons a further Halifax and Lancaster squadron were added in April; then three months later came two more Mosquito squad- rons. There was also a gradual re-equipment of the original units with Lancasters.

The pathfinder crews, it will be remembered, preceded the main force in order to mark the target by means of flares and ground markers. But their early operations had revealed an urgent need for devices that would enable them to find targets on moonless nights or in cloud and then mark them so unmistakably that a large main force could follow and deliver heavy and concentrated attacks. Before the end of the previous year ‘Gee’, of which so much had been expected, had been reduced to a valuable aid to navigation on which limitations of range could be imposed by enemy jamming, but trials with various other bombing aids had so progressed that they were now ready for use on operations. The first, known as ‘Oboe’, had already been tried out towards the end of December 1942 in an attack against the power-station at Lutterade. Then, on 16 January during a raid on Berlin, the long awaited TI ground markers were introduced, followed by a second new radar aid known as ‘H2S’

A code name apparently derived from ‘Home Sweet Home’, because it helped bombers to home on to their targets.

on the night of 30 January when Hamburg was the target.

These new technical aids which began to reach Bomber Command at the beginning of 1943 were of even greater importance to the success of its operations than the increase in its size. The bomber force could now be concentrated both in time and space to produce the maximum effect with a minimum of loss, for it had long been known that the saturation of the German defences – night fighters, anti-aircraft guns and searchlights – was the secret of economy. Moreover, with this concentration, effective radio counter measures could be taken. Specially equipped aircraft and ground stations were now better able to jam the signals of enemy fighters and their control and thus screen the British bombers from identification for part of their flight towards Germany.

Oboe was a system for guiding a pilot to his target along a radio beam, and was so named because the tone of the guiding radio beam was similar to that of the musical instrument. Briefly, its operation depended on the re-radiation by the aircraft of radar signals sent out to it, and from the echoes the position of the machine flying along a certain beam could be calculated. There were two ground stations. One controlled the aircraft by signalling a system of dots and dashes whenever it deviated to the left or right of a given course. Simultaneously, the second station measured at intervals how far the aircraft had proceeded, and when it was directly over the target a special signal would be sent for bombs or markers to be released.

The chief disadvantage of Oboe was that each pair of ground stations could handle only one aircraft at a time, and then the aircraft had to fly on a steady course for a considerable distance as it approached the target. This made the machine extremely vulnerable. Further, the range of the system was limited by the height at which the aircraft could fly because, owing to the curvature of the earth, the transmissions from the ground stations followed a straight line and had therefore to be received at an ever greater height as the aircraft's distance from the station increased. The first difficulty was dealt with by gradually increasing the number of ground stations to control at least sufficient aircraft for marking a target, whilst the risks entailed by the necessary straight and level approach were reduced by using the fast and high-flying Mosquito aircraft.

Oboe had developed out of the methods used by the RAF to interfere with the beams used by the German bombers as navigational aids for the attacks on Britain during the second winter of the war. In the early stages of its development the device had been considered simply as an aid to blind bombing, and the fact that only a handful of aircraft could be guided by it in any one attack seemed a fatal objection. But by the end of 1942 Bomber Command was no longer thinking in terms of thousands of bombers, with each crew finding the target by themselves, but of a smaller force being directed to an area which had been marked by very few aircraft. Thus a navigational and bombing aid which could be used by no more than a single squadron seemed likely to change the whole course of the bomber offensive, which indeed it certainly did.

From the beginning of 1943 No. 109 Mosquito Squadron of the Pathfinder Force which had been experimenting with Oboe from the initial stages was used whenever possible to mark the bomb-release point for the main force. Another Oboe-equipped unit, No. 105 Mosquito Squadron, was added in July, but for the remainder of the year those two squadrons provided the sole Oboe force of Bomber Command. Flying Officers Dray

Flight Lieutenant A. A. Dray, DFC; born Cambridge, 1 Nov 1917; grocery manager; joined RNZAF Aug 1941.

and Leigh

Flying Officer R. E. Leigh; born Auckland, 3 Mar 1921; clothing cutter; joined RNZAF Apr 1941; killed on air operations, 10 Feb 1944.

were pilots and Flight Lieutenant Patrick

Squadron Leader G. A. Patrick, DSO, DFC and bar; born Dunedin, 25 Nov 1919; clerk; joined RNZAF Mar 1941.

flew as navigator with No. 109 Squadron during the pioneering period with this new device.

H2S, the second radar aid, was an entirely different device from Oboe in that it was quite independent of ground stations, the apparatus being carried wholly within the aircraft. It was, in fact, similar to the radar equipment already in use by Coastal Command for the detection of submarines and other vessels at sea. For some time it had been known that radar impulses transmitted from an aircraft gave back varying echoes from water, open country or built-up areas, and the picture given on the screen by these echoes was gradually improved until it was possible to identify coastlines, rivers, towns, and eventually even individual factories; thus targets and navigational pinpoints could be identified in total darkness or through cloud. Nor was this system limited by range. But on the other hand, its operation required far greater experience than did the Oboe and its effectiveness in Bomber Command was therefore not so immediate. Indeed, a considerable period was to elapse before the aircrew operators acquired the necessary experience and before the definition of the reflected picture was sufficiently improved for it to be both accurate and reliable.

H2S largely depended for its eventual success upon the magnetron valve, which was capable of producing far higher power than any other contemporary valve. It was one of the most brilliant inventions of British science and indispensable for many forms of airborne radar, since it enabled a powerful transmission to be made from a piece of equipment small enough to be easily carried in an aircraft. There was at first much alarm at the prospect of it getting into enemy hands for it was proving invaluable in the Battle of the Atlantic. Indeed, a serious controversy which extended to both sides of the Atlantic over the release of the equipment to Bomber Command was settled only by the British War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting under the Prime Minister towards the end of December 1942.

At first the supply of H2S sets was restricted and Bomber Command was unable to take advantage of the fact that this device could be used by an unlimited number of aircraft at the same time. It was not until September 1943 that all the heavy bombers of the Pathfinder Force were so equipped. In the meantime H2S, like Oboe, had to be employed as a pathfinder device and tactics based on its use by a small number of aircraft.

Unfortunately, in the early stages of its use the apparatus was liable to fail even more often than the Oboe equipment, and with so few aircraft equipped with H2S this meant that far too few target indicators were burning at any given moment during an attack. Another cause of early failure was that the special target maps were found in some cases to be out of date. These special maps had been prepared with the built-up areas drawn to look as far as possible like the actual image that would appear on the radar screen in the aircraft, but on several occasions the Pathfinders mistook a newly built-up area which was not marked on their maps for the actual target. Moreover, it was found that the relation between the real shape of a town and the image of it that appeared on the H2S apparatus varied according to the angle or direction from which the town was viewed. Indeed, it was most difficult to predict exactly how any particular town was going to show up on the screen so that only the most experienced and skilful navigators were able to achieve real accuracy. It was soon found that the difference between land and water showed up far more clearly than the difference between built-up areas and open country, which meant that coastal targets could be more easily identified than those inland. Targets in small towns were also more readily found than in large cities because it was fairly easy to identify a town as a whole but much more difficult to distinguish any particular area in a large city from the city as a whole. Altogether it was some time before H2S was used effectively and its tactical development during 1943 was a slow process marked by many disappointments.

Oboe, on the other hand, proved its value immediately. During January, when only a few Mosquitos were equipped with the necessary apparatus, the period when marking could be maintained was limited. Therefore a series of small experimental raids was launched in which these Oboe-equipped aircraft marked the target for a following force of fifty to sixty heavy bombers. Essen was the principal objective of these raids. This large industrial city, home of the huge Krupps armament works and an important centre of the German mining industry, had been the most frequently bombed town in Germany up to this time. Yet because of the industrial haze and smoke which almost invariably covered the Ruhr area and made identification of landmarks extremely difficult, the attacks had caused little damage. This difficult target was therefore an ideal one on which to experiment with the Oboe bombing aid.

The eight small attacks which took place in January 1943 were remarkable for it was estimated that by the despatch of 418 sorties and the loss of only eighteen machines better results were achieved than in all the raids against Essen in the previous year. After the attack on the night of 9 January the photographs revealed that sixty per cent of the bombs had fallen within three miles of the centre of the city, a percentage that was three times greater than the best hitherto recorded. Attacks on Dusseldorf and Duisburg showed similar promise.

Among the New Zealanders to take part in the repeated attacks on Essen was Flight Sergeant Rowsell

Flight Lieutenant A. R. Rowsell, DFM; born Rawene, 7 Mar 1917; timber worker; joined RNZAF Oct 1940.

of No. 207 Squadron who distinguished himself during the first operation on the night of 3 January. The Lancaster in which Rowsell flew as wireless operator was intercepted by night fighters, and during their attacks he acted as fire controller from the astro-dome with good effect and the enemy aircraft broke off the attack. The rear gunner had been wounded and was trapped in his damaged turret but with the aid of an axe Rowsell managed to get him free. As the elevators had been damaged and the Lancaster was difficult to control through being excessively tail heavy, he then helped to rig up the spare trailing aerial on to the control column so that the bomb aimer could pull on the aerial and relieve the pilot of some of the strain. Rowsell then returned to his wireless set to obtain a diversion to an airfield where there was good visibility, and the bomber finally landed safely.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to follow up the success against Essen immediately with further attacks on the Ruhr as for the next two months the effort of Bomber Command was devoted mainly to the U-boat war with attacks on the submarine bases in the Biscay ports and construction facilities at Hamburg, Wilhelmshaven, and Bremen. The reasons for this diversion of effort and the results achieved have already been related in the previous chapter. How- ever, on several nights when weather did not favour the offensive against the U-boats, it was possible to deliver attacks on Cologne and Nuremberg. Cologne, scene of the first ‘thousand bomber’ raid and an important commercial and industrial centre in the Rhineland, was attacked on three occasions during February, altogether 831 sorties being despatched for the loss of twenty-four bombers.

The early months of 1943 were also notable for the resumption of raids against Berlin, which had not been heavily attacked since the end of 1941 owing to the serious casualties suffered by Bomber Command in the early raids. Berlin had been allotted high priority throughout 1942, and in the autumn of that year the Commander- in-Chief was continually pressed to renew the attack as soon as the nights lengthened sufficiently to bring the city within range. But Harris had consistently resisted these proposals for he considered that little damage would result and that there was a serious risk of incurring heavy casualties. He maintained that, with several hours' flying over strongly defended areas, a certainty of strong night-fighter activity and the size of the German capital, not only were heavy bombers needed for a successful raid but also that only Lancasters could be sent there with any reasonable degree of safety and economy of force. In the last attack in December 1941, out of 140 bombers despatched only half of them had reached the target and twenty-one had been lost.

But now that the Command's expansion was becoming a reality it was possible to raise a substantial force of Lancasters; therefore, on two consecutive nights in January, Berlin was attacked by forces of 201 and 187 Lancasters. Unfortunately haze and snow, which always made it more difficult to see the outlines of a built-up area, prevented the Pathfinders from identifying the aiming point, and although several important factories were hit the damage was scattered. On the first night the enemy's fighters made scarcely any interception, and though the flak was heavy and the force too small to saturate it, only one Lancaster was missing. The next night the weather and the light proved favourable to the enemy; night fighters operated in strength and twenty-two bombers were lost.

Flight Lieutenant Keith Thiele captained a Lancaster from No. 467 Australian Squadron on both these raids against Berlin. On the first night during the approach to the target his rear gunner lost consciousness through lack of oxygen. Thiele went on to attack whilst two of his crew endeavoured to assist the rear gunner out of his turret and render first aid. As soon as the bombs had been dropped, Thiele took the Lancaster down through the flak and searchlights in an attempt to save his gunner's life. This action did not succeed in reviving the gunner so Thiele carried him to the pilot's seat, no mean feat in a Lancaster in flight. Artificial respiration was then continuously applied during the return flight which Thiele maintained at low level. Unfortunately the crew's efforts were unsuccessful and the squadron diary records ‘an unfortunate loss to a very gallant crew after a very successful sortie.’

Among the aircraft which returned damaged that same night was a Lancaster of No. 101 Squadron captained by Sergeant Ralph.

Flight Lieutenant J. C. Ralph, DFM; born Christchurch, 26 Dec 1919; motor-parts salesman; joined RNZAF Jul 1941; killed on air operations, 3 Jan 1944.

Over Berlin his bomber was hit by flak and the starboard petrol tanks holed but Ralph got clear and completed the long flight back, landing the damaged machine safely, despite very poor visibility. Ralph had already completed twenty sorties with his squadron. Early in the previous December when returning from an attack on Frankfurt, he had displayed outstanding skill and airmanship in landing his machine safely at base with both port engines failing.

Three further heavy raids on Berlin were made during March 1943 in an effort to follow up victories on the Russian front and, with the effort of the Lancasters supplemented by Stirlings and Halifaxes, a total of just over eight hundred sorties was despatched. In the second attack on 27 March one of the Stirlings from No. 15 Squadron carried a ‘National Savings’ bomb from London. The captain was Pilot Officer Renner,

Flight Lieutenant I. W. Renner, DFC; born Gisborne, 26 Jan 1917; farmer; joined RNZAF Jul 1941.

a twenty-six-year-old New Zealander who had been a farmer in Hawke's Bay before the war. His bomb aimer, wireless operator, and gunner were also New Zealanders, and a Canadian navigator and a flight engineer from London completed the crew.

‘I think this trip to Berlin, our twenty-second “op” on Stirlings, gave us most satisfaction,’ writes Renner. ‘A Wings for Victory week had been held in London's Trafalgar Square during which three large bombs had been plastered inches thick with Savings Stamps by the British public on the promise that they would be duly delivered with the bomb. At the end of the week two of the bombs were hurried to our Station and one found its way into our aircraft which we had named Te Kooti, after the famous Maori chief. Three times the raid was postponed. We became quite attached to our bomb and each day the bomb-aimer would go round to make sure it was still loaded on Te Kooti. The third night we were actually on the move when the red light shot up from the control tower and we rolled off the runway and back to dispersal unable to express our feelings of frustration. The next night, amid rain and sleet, we got off. Icy clouds kept us down to two thousand feet until we got over Denmark where we were able to sneak a little more height. Then over the Baltic the clouds broke up and we were able to reach Berlin at a reasonable height to deliver our bomb. The German defences, although formidable, did not seem so concentrated as those we knew so well in the Ruhr, but the searchlights made us feel awfully bare.’

New Zealanders also flew on each of the four major raids that were launched against Italy during the early months of 1943, when the principal objectives were the industrial centres of Milan and Turin and the naval base at Spezia where units of the Italian fleet, including three battleships, were sheltering. A few hours before the first attack on Spezia Flying Officer Pethick

Flight Lieutenant A. F. Pethick, DFC; born Hastings, 19 Apr 1920; retail manager; joined RAF Apr 1940.

of No. 1409 Meteorological Flight carried out a reconnaissance of the area and also took photographs of great value. ‘He flew an unarmed Mosquito and displayed determination and skill in avoiding inter- ception,’ says an official report. ‘On reaching the French coast on the return flight his aircraft developed engine trouble and there was complete failure of all electrical and wireless equipment, but he landed safely in England. His information led to the heavy and successful raid on Spezia that night.’ Between June 1942 and October 1943 Pethick made almost ninety long-range ‘met’ flights, many of which involved deep penetrations of enemy territory in unarmed aircraft.

Although casualties were light the missions to Italy were not without incident. After the raid on Milan in mid-February one Lancaster had just crossed the Alps on its return flight when an engine suddenly caught fire. The pilot, Flight Sergeant Whyte,

Flying Officer J. H. F. Whyte, DFC; born Greymouth, 11 Jan 1917; clerk; joined RNZAF Apr 1941.

put the bomber into a dive in an effort to extinguish the fire by the rush of air. Unfortunately, however, this proved unsuccessful and the flames began to envelop the wing; Whyte was just able to control the aircraft sufficiently for the crew to leave by parachute. He then followed them out and came down in hilly country to the west of Dijon. With the help of the French partisans Whyte was able to evade capture, and after many adventures finally made his way back to England, where he returned to operations and completed a second tour.

Early in March 1943 Bomber Command was able to turn its attention to the Ruhr and the next four months saw one of the most dramatic battles of the air war – a battle in which a veritable fortress was assaulted from the air in a series of short but intense actions of almost incredible ferocity.

* * * * *

The relatively small but compact area of the Ruhr was of vital importance to the German war machine, for within its boundaries lay a great many of the factories that forged the guns, tanks, and engines of war upon which the enemy forces depended. Moreover, as the largest centre of heavy industry and coal-mining in Europe, the Ruhr not only provided finished products of all kinds but almost the whole of the coal and steel needed by other industries in Germany for the production of war material. It was indeed ‘the smithy of the German Reich’, and as such it had always been regarded as an objective of prime importance for the British bomber force. However, in the early years, with small and relatively weak forces lacking reliable navigational aids, the odds had been heavily against successful attacks. Apart from the distance to be flown over enemy territory and the strong ground defences in the Ruhr, the hundreds of factory chimneys continuously belching smoke produced a thick and persistent haze which made it almost impossible for crews, even on a moonlight night, to pick out a given aiming point. Moreover, in the important target of Essen situated in the centre of the Ruhr, there was not one prominent landmark, and the city itself was very similar in appearance to others in the valley. Indeed, it was difficult at night, even in clear weather, to see where one Ruhr town ended and the next began because of the many settlements and industrial buildings which covered much of the intervening ground. The Germans also went to considerable trouble to produce effective decoys and to camouflage what few distinctive landmarks there were.

The introduction of Gee as a navigational aid early in 1942 had led to optimistic hopes of achieving a higher degree of accuracy in raids on the Ruhr, but these hopes had been disappointed for at that extreme range and in the face of strong defences its accuracy proved considerably less than expected and the bombing was still very scattered. But now, in March 1943, with Pathfinder Mosquitos equipped with the Oboe device to lead a stronger bomber force, there was better prospect of finding and accurately marking targets so that a large proportion of the bomb load would be concentrated near the aiming point.

This renewed Battle of the Ruhr, as it may well be termed, opened in the first week of March and continued until the end of July. During that period the towns heavily attacked included Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, Mulheim and Ober- hausen; the great Rhineland centres of Cologne and Dusseldorf, which although not in the Ruhr were part of the same industrial complex; Krefeld, Munster, Remscheid and Wuppertal, not primarily concerned with heavy industry but important for the manufacture and transport of vital war materials. Altogether 15,504 sorties were flown in major raids against these towns and 42,348 tons of bombs were dropped for the loss of 718 aircraft.

The initial attacks on Essen were more or less typical of those which followed throughout the Ruhr and Rhineland. In the first raid on the night of 5 March a total of 442 bombers was despatched. In the main force there were 140 Lancasters, 89 Halifaxes, 52 Stirlings and 131 Wellingtons, while the Pathfinder marking force consisted of 22 heavy bombers and 8 Oboe-equipped Mosquitos on which, and on the equipment they carried, the success of the raid almost entirely depended.

The attack, by far the most important carried out by Bomber Command up to this time, followed a carefully prepared plan. After making a landfall at Egmond on the Dutch coast, the bombers flew directly to a point 15 miles north of Essen, which point Pathfinder heavies marked with yellow route markers on the ground as a guide to the main force. From there the crews began the run-up to the target which they were to reach at the rate of eleven a minute, the whole attack being planned to last thirty-eight minutes. Flying in ahead the Oboe Mosquitos dropped red target indicators on the aiming point before the bombing began and then at intervals during the attack. This renewal of the marking was limited by the fact that the Mosquitos could only be guided over the target at the rate of one every five minutes by the ground stations with which they were in communication. There were as yet only two pairs of ground stations in operation and, while they could guide twelve Mosquitos over the target in an hour, there was the risk that there would be intervals when no target indicators were burning on the ground. Therefore, the twenty-two heavy bombers of the Pathfinder Force acted as ‘backers-up’ throughout the attack, dropping a large number of green indicators aimed at the red ones which the Mosquitos had dropped. Thus the bomb aimers of the main force, if they could not see the more accurately placed red target indicators, could at least aim at the more plentiful green ones. In this way it was hoped that there would be a clearly distinguishable mark at which to aim at every moment during the attack.

In the event the marking was most accurately done by the Pathfinders and the bombing which followed was well concentrated. Soon innumerable fires sprang up around the markers until there was an almost solid ring of flame two miles in diameter. The municipal archives of Essen afterwards revealed that half of the bomb load had, in fact, fallen in the centre of the city, and such was the concentration of the bombing force that only fourteen aircraft were missing from this raid.

Five more attacks were launched against Essen in the next few months, and by the end of July both the huge Krupps works covering several hundred acres in the centre of the city and the town of Essen itself contained large areas of devastation. There was also serious damage to gas, water and electricity facilities.

‘The last raid on Essen,’ records Goebbels in his diary on 28 July, ‘caused a complete stoppage of production in the Krupps works. Speer is much concerned and worried.’

This had been brought about by 3260 sorties with the loss of 138 aircraft, as against 3720 sorties despatched during 1942 with the loss of 201 aircraft which did no significant damage to Krupps and little to the town of Essen. After the 1943 attacks, although repairs were pushed forward vigorously, some factories never resumed production. Among them was the largest single unit in the whole Krupps works, the huge Hindenburg Hall where locomotive construction ceased after the second attack in March and was never restarted in spite of the fact that this work then had equal priority with aircraft, tanks and submarines. Other major war requirements whose production was seriously reduced as a result of Bomber Command's attacks at this time included shells, fuses, guns and aero-engine parts.

But Essen was only one of many targets, and from the middle of March to the end of July the attack on the Ruhr was pressed with the greatest vigour, all the chief industrial areas being attacked in turn. Many of the raids were remarkably successful in causing widespread destruction but they did not always go according to plan. Although provision had been made for the unexpected arrival over the target of cloud thick enough to hide the ground markers, there were occasions when even the use of ‘skymarkers’ – a kind of firework which floated slowly down and made a point of aim above the clouds – was not enough to save an operation from failure. This was when the tops of the clouds were so high that the skymarkers fell into them and were quickly lost – as happened one night towards the end of May when there was cloud up to 20,000 feet over Dussel- dorf. Bomber Command was, in fact, not yet wholly independent of the weather.

* * * * *

The Battle of the Ruhr was fought by Bomber Command with mounting casualties in the face of an opposition which grew steadily in strength and skill, for the arsenal of the Ruhr was exceptionally well defended by guns, searchlights, night fighters, observation and radar posts, and decoys of various kinds. By the summer of 1943 the area had well over one-third of the total anti-aircraft guns available in Germany. British crews called it ‘Happy Valley’ – a grim euphemism for a region which could become a better reproduction of Dante's Inferno than any of the other well-defended parts of Germany.

As the battle developed it became a colossal battering match between air and ground, with the ground defences trying to blast the invaders out of the sky and the bombers trying to smother the defence under the weight of their attack. As the first aircraft approached, hundreds of searchlights would come on at once and soon the whole sky would be filled with bursting shells, so that the bombers had to drive forward through a barrage of fire and steel. ‘The searchlights, in huge cones, made a wall of light through the Valley,’ declared one Lancaster captain after the second heavy raid against Essen. ‘Intense flak was being directed into the centre of each cone and one got the impression that the defences were being very intelligently directed. They were certainly ready for us and as we flew in I saw other bombers twisting and turning in the searchlight beams.’ Outside the circle of light night fighters waited to pounce upon crippled machines or the unwary crew. Many bombers returned with parts of their wings or fuselage torn to shreds, flying back, as a popular song of the period put it, ‘On a Wing and a Prayer’. Others were shot down over the target or, mortally damaged by flak and night-fighter attack, crashed on enemy territory; a few struggled gamely back over the enemy coast only to be forced down in the North Sea.

During the attack on Remscheid one Lancaster of No. 50 Squadron was just turning away after dropping its bombs when it was coned by searchlights. The pilot, Flight Sergeant Cole,

Flying Officer M. M. Cole, DFM; born Carterton, 29 Oct 1914; joined RAF Jun 1941.

succeeded in getting clear but a few minutes later the bomber was again caught in the blinding glare of the lights and then hit by flak. The rear gunner was killed. The Lancaster turned over on its back and petrol poured out of one of the tanks. Cole managed to regain control, but shortly afterwards an engine caught fire and became useless. The bomber then proved so unstable in flight that he ordered his crew to stand by to bale out while he struggled with the damaged controls. Eventually, by lashing back the rudder pedal with a leather strap and by careful piloting, Cole managed to keep his machine airborne and get back across the Channel to make a forced landing in England.

Typical of many other eventful flights was the experience of Squadron Leader Thiele and his crew in the attack on Duisburg early in May. When nearing the city their Lancaster was severely damaged by a shell bursting right underneath the fuselage. Thiele carried on to bomb his target, but during his final approach the aircraft was caught in a cone of searchlights. Shells began to burst all around but Thiele maintained his straight run. Then just as the bomb aimer let the bombs go the machine was again hit, one burst completely destroying the starboard outer engine. Almost immediately afterwards the starboard inner engine was hit and put out of action and the side of the aircraft ripped open along the pilot's and bomb aimer's compartments. Although dazed by a shell splinter which had struck him on the side of the head, Thiele managed to keep control and complete the long homeward flight. Unable to maintain height after crossing the British coast, he made a masterly crash-landing without injury to his crew. This was the second occasion on which Thiele had brought his aircraft back on two engines.

There were occasions during the battle when the fury of the onslaught temporarily overwhelmed the German defences. After the attack on 26 April against Duisburg – the largest inland port in Germany – the Air Ministry reported: ‘The Germans seem to have packed the area with heavy anti-aircraft guns and searchlights. Outside the town there was a belt of lights with others inside it, while hundreds of guns put up one of the heaviest barrages which our bombers had encountered. But in spite of their great strength the defences were unable to cope with the attack. Pilots who went in towards the end of the raid reported that the barrage had fallen off considerably.’ By that time the port was ablaze with large red fires and looking, as one observer described it, ‘like a cauldron bubbling with angry molten metal which spurted up every now and then as more and more bombs exploded.’

In the attack against Dortmund on 23 May more than two thousand tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped within an hour, and the effect of this terrific onslaught was to crush most of the life out of the defence. ‘Flak was fairly intense at the beginning of the raid,’ said the RAF bulletin issued the following day, ‘but as the attack developed the flak died down considerably, cones of searchlights split up and single lights appeared to be waving aimlessly about the sky.’ Nevertheless, thirty-eight of the eight hundred bombers despatched were lost. Clear weather in the target area had assisted co-operation between guns and searchlights in the early stages of the raid, and on the return flight from Germany intense fighter activity persisted well out over the North Sea.

Four nights later just over five hundred bombers swept in ten waves over Essen within the space of fifty minutes. Crews reported that the anti-aircraft fire was particularly violent and to reach the target they had to penetrate a thick curtain of searchlights and bursting shells; it was estimated that the intense flak was responsible for at least three-quarters of the 107 aircraft damaged on the raid. This was in addition to the twenty-two bombers which failed to return.

As the battle continued, British crews encountered stronger opposition from the ground defences while the onset of summer, with shorter and lighter nights, gave the German fighters better opportunities for interception. On 24 June, when the industrial centre of Elberfeld was the target for 630 bombers, scores of night fighters were in action and many bitter duels were fought. In addition, the British crews met a very heavy barrage and more searchlights than ever as they approached their objective. ‘Great belts of searchlights, twenty to thirty in each cone, tried to pick us up and intense anti-aircraft fire came up the beams,’ reported one Stirling captain. ‘The defences of Dusseldorf and Cologne appeared to be co-operating in a desperate attempt to beat off the raiders.’ Throughout the return flight the enemy defences were active, and altogether eighty-seven of the bombers came back damaged while a further thirty-three did not return at all.

Night fighters were particularly active a few nights later when another heavy attack was launched against Cologne. There was much cloud over the Rhineland and the searchlights therefore were at a disadvantage, although the guns maintained a powerful barrage and heavy flak came up through the clouds. It was above the cloud bank that the most bitter fighting occurred. The Northern Lights lit up the sky and many of the bombers were silhouetted against the cloud surface below. For the German fighters the conditions were almost ideal and they attacked in strength. One pilot declared that he saw nine combats going on almost simultaneously. Twenty-five British bombers were lost in this raid and a subsequent analysis of crews' observations of aircraft shot down indicated that seventeen of these fell victim to German fighters.

Flight Lieutenant Mandeno and his crew of No. 156 Pathfinder Squadron were in action this night. Just after leaving Cologne their Lancaster was intercepted by a German night fighter and in a typical sudden attack the elevators and tail plane were damaged, one of the engines was hit and a petrol tank punctured. Rear guns were out of action but the fire of the mid-upper gunner and evasive turns by Mandeno were successful in shaking off the fighter. Only a few nights earlier Mandeno had displayed a similar skill when his bomber was attacked on the outward flight. He had then carried on to his target.

The Lancaster of No. 101 Squadron captained by Squadron Leader St. John narrowly escaped destruction towards the end of June. Caught in searchlights over Holland while on the outward flight to Mulheim, the bomber was first attacked by a Junkers 88 which inflicted extensive damage. Then, after diving to 3000 feet, it was again attacked, this time by a Dornier. The German got in a short burst but the Lancaster replied and scored hits. Meanwhile the Junkers which had followed the Lancaster down continued to fire and set the starboard outer engine alight. With his machine still losing height, St. John was forced to jettison his bomb load in order to make good his escape. He then set course for base with one rudder, both turrets unserviceable, and the fuselage and both petrol tanks badly holed. In addition, one of the elevators was partly shot away and the controls almost severed and jammed. This made it impossible to bring the control column further back than the central position. ‘Despite this situation,’ says an official report, ‘Squadron Leader St. John, with great skill and ability, brought his aircraft back and landed it safely.’ When the crew came to leave their machine they found a gaping hole where the door had been and most of the tail unit shot away.

There were many such incidents in which the enemy fighters were cheated of their prey. That same night, for example, Flight Lieu- tenantLieutenant Wilkie

Flight Lieutenant H. C. Wilkie, DFC; born Raetihi, 11 Jan 1923; farmhand; joined RNZAF Sep 1941; killed in flying accident, 18 Apr 1944.

and his crew of No. 15 Stirling Squadron succeeded in evading persistent attacks by a German night fighter and flew on to complete their mission. Only a few days previously when attacking Dusseldorf, they had seen the propeller of one engine shot away. When Pilot Officer Robinson,

Pilot Officer C. H. Robinson; born Christchurch, 16 Dec 1917; civil engineer; joined RNZAF Oct 1941; killed on air operations, 22 Jun 1943.

a captain with No. 158 Squadron, returned from the attack on Bochum he told how, whilst evading continuous attacks by two Messerschmitts, ‘one cannon shell had zipped down the fuselage between his legs, struck the air gunner a glancing blow on the head – literally parting his hair – and then passed out through the perspex nose.’

Inevitably some crews were less fortunate in their encounters with night fighters over Germany. Of those who survived when their machines were driven down, the experiences of Flight Sergeant McLeod

Warrant Officer W. M. McLeod; born Waimate, 24 Jun 1919; livestock clerk; joined RNZAF Aug 1941; p.w. 4 May 1943.

are fairly typical. Early in May while flying out to bomb Dortmund, the Lancaster of which he was captain was attacked by a night fighter shortly after crossing the Dutch coast:

The aircraft's electrically operated equipment and inter-communication were completely put out of commission. The starboard motors both lost all power, the elevators would not respond and consequently the plane went into a dive. It was soon clear that the machine was out of control and being unable to jettison our bomb load did not help matters. At approximately 9000 feet, I roared to the bomb-aimer, who was sitting next to me in the second pilot's seat, to pass the word back to bale out. Unfortunately he had been wounded in the shoulder but managed to pass the message to the crew. Our load, which consisted of incendiaries and 1000 lb. bombs, had been straffed. This caused the cockpit to be filled with smoke which made the abandoning of the aircraft rather difficult. I was eventually assured that the rest of the crew had parachuted out and so, without hesitation, I made the plunge into the darkness. It was only a matter of seconds before I felt the sudden jar and the relief of knowing that the chute had opened – a moment of stress I certainly would not like to happen again in a lifetime.

During my descent I was unfortunate enough to get caught in a searchlight, an experience I should imagine similar to walking down the Strand in the nude. My first thoughts were of being put out of my misery by the night fighter, but luck was with me and the glare passed over. I landed in a Dutch canal and what with endeavouring to find my footing, parachute cords and equipment, I threshed the water for some time before I realised that it was just slightly over my shoulders. At last I waded out on to the bank but unfortunately I had lost my escape equipment in my efforts to reach dry land.

The night was dark and overcast, so I was utterly confused with direction. After about two hours' walking I noticed that further over there seemed to be a small village on the edge of the canal. Everything was in quietness so I stayed about trying to locate a suitable place for cover. Then towards the direction I had come I saw several lanterns moving about so decided to chance knocking on the door of the nearest house. I was rather surprised at the prompt response. A man fully dressed in working clothes called out. I replied “Anglais” and he then went in and after a minute or two returned and gestured to me to enter. This bucked me up considerably as I was sure I had struck help. They offered me a cup of coffee and slice of black bread which were very acceptable. After much waving of the hands I managed to convey to them that I was an airman. It was then that they awoke their son who would be about 12 years old and able to speak a few words of English. Eventually he produced the school atlas. I then pointed from England to Holland but they shook their heads and the boy disappeared to return with a Dutch policeman who could speak fluent English. It was then that my hopes were dashed to the ground; he informed me that they would very much like to assist me but owing to the prevailing control by the Germans and the bad time they had recently undergone, they regretted that they would have to give me over. About an hour later the Germans arrived and that was that.

Fate was kinder to Flight Sergeant Hodge,

Flight Sergeant R. A. Hodge; born Wellington, 16 Jun 1918; cabinetmaker; joined RNZAF Jul 1941; killed in flying accident, 17 Mar 1944.

who flew as wireless operator in a Stirling of No. 149 Squadron. He was the sole survivor when his machine burst into flames after an attack by night fighters during the outward flight to Cologne early in July. Hodge landed in a field near a small village in Holland. He was badly burned and had sprained his ankle. Hearing somebody coming towards him he attempted to run away, but was overtaken by a man who proved friendly and took care of him at his home. Thereafter he received further assistance which enabled him, after a series of adventures, to return to England three months later.

* * * * *

During the Ruhr battle heavy attacks were made against other German towns in order to keep enemy anti-aircraft and fighter defences dispersed. Had attacks been directed solely against the Ruhr the Germans would have been able to concentrate more of their defences in that area and the losses sustained by Bomber Command would have been proportionately heavier. Therefore, in addition to raids on Berlin and the German ports and U-boat bases, targets in southern Germany were attacked, among them the industrial centres of Frankfurt, Mannheim, Stuttgart and the cities of Munich and Nuremberg, both of which had strong political associations with the German Nazi Party. In addition, there were two major raids against the huge Skoda armament works at Pilsen in Czechoslovakia.

Typical of many eventful flights during these raids was the experience of Flight Lieutenant Scott

Squadron Leader A. R. Scott, DFC and bar; born Auckland, 21 Nov 1919; physical instructor; joined RNZAF Aug 1941.

and his crew of No. 90 Squadron in mid-April. Eight miles short of the target their Stirling was attacked by two enemy fighters; one engine was damaged, the rear turret was put out of action, and a flare ignited in the flare chute. But eventually Scott managed to shake off his assailants and make good his course to the target. Then just after the bombs had fallen the Stirling was hit by flak; the controls were damaged and the propeller and part of the damaged engine fell off. After a few hectic moments Scott steadied his machine, got clear of the target area and, after a difficult flight, brought the crippled bomber safely in to land at his base. More unusual was the experience of a New Zealand wireless operator, Flight Sergeant Sibbald,

Flying Officer D. A. Sibbald, DFM; born Christchurch, 14 Jun 1922; clerk; joined RNZAF Feb 1941.

who flew with No. 35 Squadron of the Pathfinder Force. Whilst flying back from the raid against Nuremberg early in March, his Halifax was hit and set on fire and the crew forced to escape by parachute. Sibbald outwitted the enemy search parties, made good his escape, and returned to the United Kingdom seven weeks later. Another successful evader at this time was Sergeant Morley

Pilot Officer N. Morley; born Otane, 23 Dec 1912; driver; joined RNZAF Jul 1941.

of No. 7 Squadron whose Stirling was shot down during its homeward flight from Stuttgart in mid-April. Morley landed safely by parachute in France and after an adventurous journey, partly on foot and partly by train, reached Switzerland three weeks later.

A young air gunner, Sergeant Wilson,

Flight Sergeant H. A. Wilson, GM; born Thames, 13 Dec 1920; farmer; joined RNZAF May 1941.

who flew with No. 214 Squadron, played a gallant part in an episode early in March when his Stirling, while taking off for the attack on Munich, was unable to gain height and crashed near the airfield. The bomber was completely wrecked and burst into flames. Most of the crew were able to scramble clear when the aircraft broke up but the mid-upper gunner was trapped against the main spar, unconscious and hanging head downwards. He was found by the captain of the bomber, who was unable to move him, so Wilson went to assist him. The aircraft, loaded to capacity with high-explosive bombs, was now burning furiously with bullets exploding in rapid succession, but eventually they succeeded in extricating the injured man. In so doing both Wilson and his captain, who had so far escaped with only gashes and bruises, were badly burnt about the face and body. Nevertheless, they succeeded in carrying their comrade through fences and over a deep ditch to a safe distance just before the aircraft blew up. Then, although dazed from the shock of the crash and almost exhausted by his rescue efforts, Wilson staggered off across ploughed fields in search of help and eventually, by blowing the whistle attached to his tunic, succeeded in bringing rescuers to the scene. Only a fortnight previously Wilson had been involved in an incident which necessitated his baling out. He now received the award of the George Medal.

These attacks on more distant targets in southern Germany were led by Pathfinder aircraft using H2S but, because of limited experience with this device, the marking was less accurate and the attacks themselves less spectacular than those against the Ruhr, which was within Oboe range. Nevertheless, they caused considerable destruc- tion. At Nuremberg, for example, in the early March raid by three hundred aircraft, the main weight of the bombing fell upon the industrial districts to the south-west of the town. Serious damage was done to the large MAN factory which made diesel engines; in the Siemens electrical works two-thirds of one workshop, covering five acres, was destroyed and other buildings in the factory were gutted. At the railway workshops one large repair depot covering several acres was destroyed and another area of devastation was revealed in the neighbouring railway siding. In addition, a number of establishments manufacturing tools and engineering supplies were severely damaged, many of the buildings being completely burnt out. Fires were still smouldering when the town was photographed from the air two days after the raid.

Unfortunately, at both Nuremberg and Munich, there was also considerable damage to historic and cultural buildings from scattered bombing. This was regrettable not only for the intrinsic loss but also because it provided material for the German propagandists, whose cries had become much louder as the damage to their war industries increased. Yet both cities had been regarded as legitimate targets because of their important war industries. At Munich there were factories which constructed both submarine and aero engines, tanks, armoured cars, grenades and motor tires. The city was also an important communication centre. Whether these cities could have been left unmolested on account of their particular historic and art treasures is doubtful in view of the considered policy of the Allied leaders.

At the time, the Germans made the most of such damage and the casualties caused by the RAF and, in an effort to restrict the attacks, their propaganda machine was turned on at full blast. The Italian radio also joined in the chorus of misrepresentation and vilification and shrill voices were raised in protest at what were described as ‘terror raids’ having no object but the destruction of cities and the slaughter of women and children. All this was not without its effect in Britain, where it aroused considerable discussion regarding the ethics of bombing and some misgivings as to its use. But the responsible leaders remained firm in their conviction that, however much the sufferings of the civilian population were to be deplored, it was essential for Britain to use her air power – her only weapon capable of hitting Germany directly – to end the war as soon as possible.

And whatever may be thought in these later years, it is well to remember that the German conversion to humanitarian sentiment had come rather late. It should have taken place four years earlier before the bombing of Warsaw, before the massacre of 20,000 Dutch folk in defenceless Rotterdam or the wreaking of a cruel vengeance on Belgrade. It is also worth recalling that in those early days German propaganda films were wont to show rows of their great bombers being loaded up with bombs, then flying in the air in battle array and finally casting down showers of bombs upon towns and villages, choking them in smoke and flame. Glorying in devastating violence, the Germans had sought to impress upon the world that resistance to their will was impossible.

Among the men of Bomber Command many felt deeply on these matters, but they were realists. They knew that the conflict could not be waged without suffering and regarded the loss of life in German cities as a regrettable but inevitable consequence of aerial bombardment under prevailing conditions. Certainly they were far less bloodthirsty than some whose activities were far less intimately concerned with the tragic realities of modern war.

* * * * *

During the five months in which the Battle of the Ruhr was fought the New Zealand Squadron was represented in all the principal raids, with Essen, Duisburg, Dortmund, and Dusseldorf among the targets most frequently bombed. With a third flight of eight aircraft now operational, the squadron was also able to increase its contribution to the offensive. There was a change of command early in May when Wing Commander Lane was succeeded by Wing Commander Wyatt,

Group Captain M. Wyatt, DFC; born High Barnet, Hertfordshire, 24 Nov 1911; joined RAF 1936; commanded No. 75 (NZ) Sqdn, 1943; No. 514 Sqdn, 1944; Asst Director of Navigation (Met.) 1945 and 1946–47; Air Attache, Stockholm, 1948–50.

an English pilot with long experience in bombing operations. After one early raid on Italy he had made a forced landing in Spain, evaded internment, and made his way back to England.

The three flight commanders were Squadron Leaders Andrews,

Squadron Leader F. A. Andrews, DFC; born Auckland, 17 Feb 1919; school teacher; oined RNZAF Nov 1939.

Broadbent,

Squadron Leader R. Broadbent, DFC; born Wanganui, 23 Aug 1919; clerk; joined RNZAF Nov 1939.

and Laud.

Squadron Leader R. H. Laud; born Auckland, 20 May 1916; joined RAF 1938; killed on air operations, 12 Jun 1943.

Unfortunately Laud, who had served with the RAF from the beginning of the war, was lost during a raid on Dusseldorf towards the middle of June. He was succeeded by Squadron Leader Joll,

Squadron Leader J. Joll, DFC, DFM; born New Plymouth, 10 Apr 1920; mechanician; joined RNZAF Jan 1940.

who was on his second tour of operations with No. 75 Squadron. Andrews had also carried out his first tour with the squadron while Broadbent had previously flown with No. 40 Squadron. A move from Newmarket to RAF Station, Mepal, at the end of June was not allowed to interfere with operations, and by the close of the Battle of the Ruhr No. 75 Squadron had despatched 225 aircraft on eighteen major raids to drop 566 tons of bombs. Seventeen Stirlings were missing from this series of missions but three German fighters were claimed destroyed.

The Squadron was particularly unfortunate during attacks against Wuppertal at the end of May and on Mulheim in June when, on each occasion, four aircraft failed to return. Among the crews lost were twenty-eight New Zealanders including six captains, Flying Officer Vernazoni,

Flying Officer R. B. Vernazoni; born Auckland, 20 Feb 1923; clerk; joined RNZAF Nov 1941; killed on air operations, 30 May 1943.

Pilot Officer Bennett,

Pilot Officer R. F. Bennett; born Otahuhu, 20 Oct 1913; clerk; joined RNZAF Sep 1941; killed on air operations, 30 May 1943.

Pilot Officer F. M. McKenzie,

Pilot Officer F. M. McKenzie; born Dannevirke, 18 Nov 1916; printer; joined RNZAF Jan 1941; killed on air operations, 23 Jun 1943.

Flight Sergeants Burbidge,

Flight Sergeant K. A. Burbidge; born Byfleet, Surrey, 15 Apr 1921; assistant surveyor; joined RNZAF Apr 1941; killed on air operations, 23 Jun 1943.

Carey

Flight Sergeant J. H. R. Carey; born Westport, 2 Jul 1915; electric welder; joined RNZAF Nov 1941; killed on air operations, 30 May 1943.

and Thornley.

Flight Sergeant S. R. Thornley; born Invercargill, 1 Feb 1918; upholsterer; joined RNZAF Jan 1940; killed on air operations, 30 May 1943.

Other crews had difficult return flights after encounters with enemy night fighters or when their machines had been damaged by flak.

On the night of 26 April, the second of the squadron's three visits to Duisburg, the Stirling captained by nineteen-year-old Pilot Officer Buck

Flight Lieutenant P. J. O. Buck, DFC; born Wellington, 19 Nov 1923; clerk; joined RNZAF Jun 1941.

was approaching the target when an enemy fighter made a skilful surprise attack. There was a sharp explosion, which Buck took to be flak, and he was for the moment unaware that the rudder and tail of the bomber were damaged and his rear gunner mortally wounded. A few seconds later, however, he realised his mistake when a stream of tracer hit both mainplanes and the upper turret. Buck then found the rudder controls useless, but he managed to evade further attack and jettison his load of incendiaries when he suspected they had caught fire. Without rudder control it was difficult to turn, but with help from his second pilot Buck got the Stirling on course for base some 300 miles away. Then the starboard outer engine failed, the oil pipes having been cut by bullets. The aircraft began to lose height steadily and a crash-landing in the Channel seemed likely. However, Buck ordered the crew to jettison everything movable and by skilful handling of his crippled machine succeeded in maintaining sufficient height to reach base and make a safe crash-landing.

Flight Sergeant Whitehead

Flying Officer W. D. Whitehead, DFM; born Matamata, 5 May 1922; farmer; joined RNZAF Nov 1941.

and his crew had a similar experience when they flew to Dortmund towards the end of May. They had just bombed the target when flak hit the port outer engine and set it alight. By the time Whitehead regained control the bomber had lost 5000 feet. The burning engine acted as a beacon for a cone of searchlights but fortunately the propeller flew off, the engine stopped, and the flames died away. Nevertheless, it was only after prolonged evasive action that Whitehead succeeded in getting clear of the searchlights and heavy anti-aircraft fire.

Pilot Officer H. C. Williams

Flight Lieutenant H. C. Williams, DFC and bar; born Pahiatua, 20 Feb 1917; driver; joined RNZAF Nov 1941.

and his crew were in action with night fighters towards the end of July. Their Stirling, one of sixteen bombers sent by No. 75 Squadron to attack Essen that night, was suddenly set upon during the outward flight. However, by following the directions of his gunners, Williams was able to manoeuvre his machine into a favourable position. Then, after several accurate and prolonged bursts, there was a violent explosion in the German fighter and it was seen to fall away in flames. A few moments later a second fighter approached, but on meeting sustained fire from the Stirling's guns it turned away. Williams and his crew appear to have had more than their share of such experiences. During an earlier attack on Dortmund they had been simultaneously engaged by two Ju88s, but had evaded their attacks and claimed one as damaged.

While the main part of No. 75 Squadron's effort against Germany was devoted to the Ruhr, the aircrews also operated on various missions which called for deeper penetration into enemy territory. In March Stirlings flew in the three raids against Berlin, a total of twenty-one aircraft attacking the German capital without loss. On the first raid the Stirlings encountered only slight opposition from anti-aircraft batteries and although enemy fighters were seen there were no combats. But in both of the later raids the defences put up stronger resistance. After being damaged by flak over Berlin, the bomber flown by Pilot Officer French

Flying Officer R. O. French, DFC; born Feilding, 11 Nov 1910; farmer; joined RNZAF Oct 1941; killed on air operations, 4 Sep 1943.

was intercepted on the return journey by a night fighter which scored hits in one of the port engines. Fire was exchanged for some minutes before the enemy machine broke off the engagement. Sergeant H. J. Dalzell had a lucky escape when a fragment of flak tore into his cockpit. It penetrated his flying kit but was deflected by the cigarette case in his breast pocket. Another crew were fortunate when, after the long flight to Berlin, their Stirling was so short of petrol that two engines failed just as it touched down.

No. 75 Squadron also took part in the series of attacks directed against cities in southern Germany in order to prevent the enemy adding to his defences in the Ruhr. The first two targets were Nuremberg, scene of many of Hitler's great party rallies, and Munich, headquarters of the Nazi movement and an important railway and armament centre. The seven crews who bombed Nuremberg saw large explosions and the glare of fires was still visible when they had covered more than one hundred miles of the homeward flight. During the flight back one Stirling was attacked by an enemy fighter over Saarbrucken. Cannon fire streamed into the cockpit and a shell exploded near the second pilot, Flying Officer Eddy,

Flight Lieutenant C. Eddy, MBE; born Hamilton, Victoria, 31 Jul 1914; joined RNZAF Sep 1939; killed on air operations, 19 Apr 1944.

wounding him in the leg. Then followed seven minutes of violent evasive action before the enemy aircraft was finally shaken off. Another bomber captained by Sergeant Davey

Sergeant C. R. Davey; born Dargaville, 4 Apr 1921; insurance clerk; joined RNZAF Jul 1941; killed on air operations, 8 Mar 1943.

did not return.

Experienced crews reported the attack on Munich as one of the most successful they had seen. Describing a terrific explosion in the target area Squadron Leader Allcock said: ‘Suddenly there was a terrific pillar of flame in front of me. Then we flew through a smoke ring about a mile and a half in diameter caused by the explosion.’ Another captain, Pilot Officer D. L. Thompson,

Pilot Officer D. L. Thompson; born Auckland, 21 Mar 1922; bank clerk; joined RNZAF May 1941; killed on air operations, 29 Apr 1943.

said the explosion lit up the whole of the inside of his Stirling and that ‘the entire town below us was floodlit by fire.’

The April raids on Frankfurt and Stuttgart were particularly eventful for No. 75 Squadron. In the first attack against Frankfurt twelve Stirlings were despatched. All reached their objective, but one was hit by flak when over the target and then pursued by night fighters. A message sent to base brought Spitfires out to escort the ‘lame duck’ from the French coast, but it finally came down in the Channel three miles from the English coast and the crew transferred to their dinghy. A Walrus flying boat which had been standing by to pick the men up collided with their dinghy and threw them into the sea, but they were eventually able to clamber aboard little the worse for their experience.

In a second attack against Stuttgart towards the middle of the month Pilot Officer McCaskill

Pilot Officer D. G. McCaskill; born Wellington, 11 Oct 1923; student; joined RNZAF Jun 1941; killed on air operations, 15 Apr 1943.

and his crew were lost, and two nights later the aircraft captained by Pilot Officer Groves

Pilot Officer K. H. G. Groves; born Waverley, 3 Jan 1913; farmer; joined RNZAF Oct 1941; killed on air operations, 17 Apr 1943.

and Pilot Officer Debenham

Pilot Officer K. F. Debenham; born Oxford, 3 Jan 1917; shop assistant; joined RNZAF Apr 1941; killed on air operations, 16 Apr 1943.

failed to return from Mannheim. From these three crews only one man survived – Debenham's flight engineer. The rest were all killed when their machines crashed in enemy territory. Another crew got back from Mannheim after their bomber had been badly shot up by flak, but when about to land the English pilot, Flight Lieutenant Lowe,

Squadron Leader D. C. Lowe, DFC, AFC; RAF; born London, 14 Mar 1922; aircraft research laboratory assistant; joined RAF Nov 1940.

found the throttle controls had jammed. On crash-landing the aircraft hit a hangar and caught fire but the crew were able to hack their way out of the wreckage. During the homeward flight particular fortitude had been displayed by the navigator, Pilot Officer Carswell,

Flying Officer F. C. Carswell, DFC; born Invercargill, 4 Jul 1916; assistant company secretary; joined RNZAF Dec 1940.

who was badly wounded in the leg. Although weak from loss of blood and in considerable pain, he had remained at his post and guided the aircraft back to base.

One of Bomber Command's most successful raids of this period, apart from those against the Ruhr, was that on the Schneider armament works at Le Creusot, now of greater importance to the Germans following the damage to Krupps at Essen and the Skoda plant at Pilsen. Halifaxes and Stirlings made up the bulk of the force of 290 bombers which made the attack in mid-June – a full moon period when operations against more distant and strongly defended targets would have meant prohibitive loss. As it was, only two machines were lost in this raid and, into the bargain, a Messerschmitt was shot down over the Channel by a Halifax on the outward flight. Although the Schneider plant at Le Creusot was a relatively small target, it was severely damaged and ceased production for a considerable period.

Thirteen Stirlings from the New Zealand Squadron took part in the raid and crews reported a successful attack. One of the bombers lost a propeller as it approached Le Creusot but carried on to drop its bombs and returned safely. Another Stirling, with Squadron Leader Joll at the controls, received a direct hit from a light anti-aircraft shell which burst inside the port mainplane. Shrapnel severed the petrol cock control cables and oil pipelines and oil began to flow into the fuselage. While Joll continued on over the target, his Canadian flight engineer, Sergeant G. Falloon,

Flying Officer G. Falloon, DFM; born Strasbourg, Canada, 28 Oct 1916; joined RCAF Jun 1940.

took an axe, hacked his way through the fuselage and crawled inside the wing. There he investigated the damage and, working by torchlight, made temporary oil repairs which enabled the bomber to return safely.

Another of No. 75 Squadron's targets at this time was the Rhineland town of Aachen. Aachen was on the fringe of the Ruhr and could be reached without deep penetration of the enemy defences; nevertheless, the city itself was well defended by anti-aircraft batteries and night fighters. Several crews reported encounters with night fighters, one of which was probably destroyed. The gunners saw their target emit a flash, spin round and go down through the clouds, after which there was an explosion on the ground. On the other hand, two Stirlings were badly damaged by flak over Aachen. One made an emergency landing and the crew escaped injury but the other crew were not so fortunate. When they crash-landed at Oakington, the undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft turned over and caught fire. The mid-upper gunner was mortally wounded and four other members of the crew badly hurt, including the captain, Flying Officer Eddy. He remained in the aircraft to assist his bomb aimer from the overturned second pilot's seat. Then, finding that the dying mid-upper gunner was trapped in his turret, he went back into the burning aircraft to try to free him. Unfortunately the heat, fumes, and smoke finally drove him back to the ground, where he collapsed as a result of his exertions and injuries.

Meanwhile No. 75 Squadron had continued to play its part in the Battle of the Ruhr. The Stirlings flew in the massive raid against Dortmund on 23 May when over 830 bombers had caused widespread destruction. ‘No district and few industries escaped unscathed,’ says a contemporary report. ‘Two-thirds of the great Hoesch steel plant were damaged and one area of devastation in the centre of the city covered 115 acres.’ Two nights later New Zealand Stirlings were among the 610 bombers which attacked Wuppertal where, following the best concentration of marking yet achieved by the Pathfinders, immense damage was caused.

Then followed the heavy raids on Oberhausen, Krefeld, Mulheim and Dusseldorf in all of which No. 75 Squadron took part. Dusseldorf was the leading commercial city of western Germany and the home of the administration departments of practically all the important iron, steel, heavy engineering and armament industries of the Ruhr and Rhineland, as well as a very important engineering centre in itself. It received two attacks, each by about seven hundred aircraft. The first, on the night of 25 May, was marred by thick cloud which largely obscured the markers. The second attack a fortnight later was made in good weather and achieved a very heavy concentration of bombs around the aiming point. The German ARP services were overwhelmed and an immense conflagration raged almost unchecked over the main part of the city. Many engineering, armaments and rail targets were included in the widespread devastation and some were still smouldering a week after the attack.

* * * * *

The climax of the Ruhr battle came on 25 July 1943 when seven hundred Lancasters, Halifaxes, Stirlings, and Wellingtons made their last attack of the year against Essen. For the loss of twenty-three machines, it was estimated that more damage was inflicted in this raid than in all previous attacks against Essen put together. Photographic reconnaissance revealed that the bombing was concentrated within a relatively narrow strip about one and a half miles wide, stretching back from the aiming point in the centre of the town and including the whole of Krupps Works. Havoc, wrought by fire, was great and some buildings were still burning two days later. A few nights later the industrial centre of Remscheid which specialised in machine tools was raided by 270 bombers, and reconnaissance the next day showed uncontrolled fires sweeping the town, the whole centre of which appeared gutted. A contemporary German report shows that over one hundred industrial concerns, including two steel mills, were affected.

Altogether, the Battle of the Ruhr had given an impressive demonstration of the growing power for destruction of Bomber Command. Not only had a hitherto invulnerable area been severely damaged for the first time but there seemed no reason why this success should not be repeated indefinitely on targets within Oboe range. This had never been the case before. Every previous success had been dependent on a caprice of the weather and had only been won by seizing some opportunity which might never recur. Never- theless, Air Marshal Harris himself regarded his victory in the Ruhr as only the beginning of a serious bomber offensive; not before a very much larger number of cities elsewhere in Germany had been reduced to the same condition and not before the wrecked cities of the Ruhr and elsewhere had been attacked once and even twice again to prevent recovery could there be any decisive effect.

Bomber Offensive, p. 148.

A spectacular incident in the Battle of the Ruhr must now be noted. This was the attack on the night of 16 May 1943 against the dams in the Ruhr and Weser valleys, which supplied water and hydro-electric power for many cities and industries in these regions.

Of some twelve dams the Moehne was the chief. Built to control the River Ruhr, it was 105 feet high, 2100 feet long, increasing in thickness from 25 feet at the top to 112 feet at the base, and its capacity was just over 130 million tons of water. Second in importance was the Eder Dam which protected and fed the large manufacturing centre of Kassel and neighbouring industrial areas. Other large dams were the Sorpe – unusual on account of its earthern construction round a concrete core – the Lister, and the Schwelme.

To attack such formidable targets successfully was an extremely difficult and hazardous task involving months of careful planning, preparation, and training. A special unit, No. 617 Lancaster Squadron, had therefore been formed under Wing Commander Guy Gibson

Wing Commander G. P. Gibson, VC, DSO and bar, DFC and bar, Legion of Merit (US); born Talland, Simla, 12 Aug 1918; joined RAF 1937; commanded No. 106 Sqdn, 1942–43; No. 617 Sqdn, 1943; Deputy Director Personnel (A) 1944; killed on air operations 19 Sep 1944.

and the crews carefully chosen. Gibson himself had already completed three tours of operations, and after pressing strongly to be allowed to remain on operations he had, on account of his outstanding character and achievements, been selected to command No. 617 Squadron. This unit, first under Gibson and later under Wing Commander Cheshire

Group Captain G. L. Cheshire, VC, DSO and two bars, DFC; RAF (retd); born Chester, 7 Sep 1917; permanent commission RAF Oct 1939; commanded No. 76 Sqdn, 1942–43; No. 617 Sqdn, 1943–44; served with RAF Delegation, USA, 1944–45.

– both men won the Victoria Cross – was to establish a splendid record during the second half of the war in carrying out various special missions, of which this successful attack on the Ruhr dams was but the first.

The raid on the dams was made by nineteen Lancasters using specially designed weapons that were detonated by hydrostatic fuses at a chosen depth. Two New Zealanders were among the bomber crews: Flight Lieutenant Munro,

Squadron Leader J. L. Munro, DSO, DFC; born Gisborne, 5 Apr 1919; farmer; joined RNZAF Jul 1941.

who was later to become deputy leader of the squadron, captained one Lancaster, and Flying Officer Chambers,

Flight Lieutenant L. Chambers, DFC; born Karamea, 18 Feb 1919; carpenter; joined RNZAF Sep 1940.

who had been with No. 75 Squadron the previous year, flew as wireless operator in another. Both men were among the eleven crews which survived their mission. The whole gallant action is vividly portrayed in the last chapters of Enemy Coast Ahead, written by Wing Commander Gibson shortly before he was killed in action.

The Lancasters were despatched in three waves, and it was the first wave of nine aircraft, led by Gibson, which achieved the greatest success. Taking off soon after moonrise, these bombers flew low into Germany on a carefully planned course to make the initial attack on the Moehne Dam. Gibson went in first, descending to within a few feet of the water and taking the full brunt of the anti-aircraft defences; then the following Lancasters attacked in turn and as each aircraft swept down the valley Gibson drew the enemy fire in order to give it as free a run as possible. Already during the approach one machine, its pilot blinded by searchlights, had ‘reared up like a stricken horse, plunged on to the deck and burst into flames; five seconds later his mine blew up with a tremendous explosion.’ Then, over the Moehne lake, a second Lancaster was hit in one of its petrol tanks; it caught fire, staggered on apparently trying to gain height so that the crew could bale out, let fall its bomb on the power-house below the dam and then, says Gibson, ‘there was a livid flash in the sky and one wing fell off; his aircraft disintegrated and fell to the ground in cascading, flaming fragments.’ But meanwhile other bombers had reached the dam and in the pale moonlight the crews caught glimpses of the whole valley below beginning to fill with fog from the stream of gushing water. Gibson then led the remaining Lancasters over the treetops, up and down valleys to the Eder Dam where, after their attack, two separate breaches appeared and crews saw a wave of water sweeping down the valley below ‘swiping off power stations and roads as it went. We saw it extinguish all the lights in the neighbourhood as though a great black shadow had been drawn across the earth.’ But two more Lancasters had been lost, one of them blown up by the detonation of its own bomb as it attacked; another damaged bomber crashed into the North Sea during the return flight.

The effects of the breaching of the two dams are described in contemporary German reports. A gap ‘76 metres wide and 21 to 23 metres deep’ was torn in the Moehne Dam, the main power-station below it was destroyed, and all road and rail bridges in the Moehne Valley were swept away. There was further widespread damage to power-stations, waterworks, industries and railways in the Ruhr Valley and ‘the effects of the attack were felt far into the Dusseldorf district.’ Similar destruction and dislocation were reported by the Germans as a result of the breaching of the Eder Dam, below which the whole valley was flooded for 16 miles, including parts of the town of Kassel.

The bombs used in the attack on the Ruhr Dams had been specially designed by B. N. Wallis of Vickers Armstrong, and after the war the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors gave him £10,000. He put it into a fund to educate children of men who died in the RAF, quoting David in Samuel II, Chapter 23: ‘Is not this the blood of the men that went in jeopardy of their lives?’ It was a worthy gesture. The finest bombs ever invented would have been useless without young men of sufficient courage to fight through bitter opposition to drop them and sufficient skill to put them in the right place. The aircrews of Bomber Command were young enough and courageous enough, and this raid on the Ruhr dams was but one of many episodes in which their almost incredible bravery was fully demonstrated.

* * * * *

By the middle of 1943, with Bomber Command sending large forces deeper into Germany and the United States 8th Air Force making an impressive display of its newly acquired strength in daylight attacks, the Allied air offensive was steadily gaining momentum. The advent of the American bomber forces over Germany was to prove a major turning point in the strategic air attack on the enemy war machine. However, as yet, coincidence of effort and objectives was rather fortuitous and for some time the two Allied bomber forces continued to operate along lines not nearly so parallel as had been assumed.

The British and American forces were, in fact, engaged in bombing the enemy in accordance with widely divergent theories. Whereas the RAF still hoped to bring about the general disorganisation of the German economy by area attacks on cities, the Americans preferred precise attacks on selected industries. Moreover, the Americans considered that the key to a successful bombing offensive was air superiority, which meant the destruction of the Luftwaffe, while in the RAF policy of night bombing the tactics demanded were the evasion rather than the defeat of the German fighter force.

This fundamental difference of opinion as to the best method of conducting the strategic bombing offensive had been recognised at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, but it had not been bridged in the subsequent statement of policy issued after that meeting. The commanders of the two Allied bomber forces, Air Marshal Harris and Lieutenant-General Eaker, had been left to interpret an extremely wide directive in their own different ways. As a result subsequent efforts to achieve a common strategy and tactics were to meet with little success until well into 1944.

On the tactical side there was much discussion of the relative merits of day and night bombing. At first the RAF tended to be rather sceptical and the Americans boldly optimistic regarding the efficacy of daylight attacks, but soon both sides had cause to modify their views. It was realised that complementary attacks by day and night had certain advantages as both sides could draw to the full on their previous training and experience, while the enemy fighter force would be kept at full stretch and Germany subjected to a more continuous assault.

The Americans, however, had to pass through a hard school in developing their daylight attacks. Like Bomber Command, they found that penetration over Germany by day without fighter cover was prohibitive in cost; they also discovered that on many days the weather over Northern Europe produced conditions similar to those prevailing at night and thereby rendered precision attacks very difficult.

An American air historian records that ‘On the 11th June 1943 … after being frustrated during ten days of bad weather over European targets the 8th Air Force despatched 252 heavy bombers to attack Bremen and Wilhelmshaven. Finding Bremen obscured by clouds 168 of the bombers attacked Wilhelmshaven and 30 bombed Cuxhaven, a target of opportunity …. Things went very much as expected which is not to say that they went well. As on previous AAF missions to those parts, the German fighters appeared in force but reserved their attacks until the bombing formations were committed to the bombing run …. Bombing accuracy at Wilhelmshaven was consequently poor, few bombs of the 417 tons dropped did serious damage and none hit the target (the U-boat building yards). – A. B. Ferguson in The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume II, p. 669.

But eventually the Americans triumphed over the obstacles to effective daylight attacks, and by mid-1944 tightly packed formations of Fortress bombers under strong escort by long-range fighters were bombing Berlin at high noon.

American ideas on air strategy exerted a strong influence in the discussions that took place during 1943 in an attempt to develop a combined plan for the bombing of Germany. In May of that year General Eaker, in command of the United States 8th Air Force, produced a plan based on the proposition that ‘it was better to cause a high degree of destruction in a few really essential industries than to cause a small degree of destruction in many industries.’ American intelligence experts working in close co-operation with the British suggested six target systems whose destruction it was believed would ‘fatally weaken the enemy's capacity for armed resistance.’ These systems were the submarine construction yards and bases, the aircraft industry, the ball-bearing industry, oil, synthetic rubber pro- duction, and the production of military and transport vehicles. Since the destruction of these targets could only be achieved by a force of considerable size, the RAF could co-operate in the plan by attacking cities by night which were related to the target systems being bombed by the 8th Air Force. However, Eaker pointed out that before his plan could be put into effect it was essential to reduce the growing strength of the German fighter force. This, in fact, was the most important feature of the plan.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff who, acting under the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, were the supreme military authority, accepted this point and signified their approval of the general plan. The defeat of the German Air Force now became mandatory and the achievement of air superiority was accepted as the indispensable prelude to successful strategic bombing operations. A revision, or rather an interpretation, of the Casablanca directive was now called for.

The new directive, which came to be known as the ‘Pointblank’ plan, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and the Commanding General of the 8th Air Force on 10 June 1943. Unfortunately, however, while it stated that ‘first priority was to be given to the attack of the German fighter force and the industry upon which they depended,’ the wording of the directive was rather vague and obviously an attempt at compromise with British views. In particular, it made only very informal provision for what was essential to the success of the plan, namely, the close integration of British and American operations. On this point the directive simply stated: ‘while the forces of the British Bomber Command will be employed in accordance with their main aim in the general disorganisation of German industry their action will be designed as far as practicable to be complementary to the VIII Air Force.’

The result was that the so-called ‘combined bomber offensive’ continued more or less along its already divergent lines. While the 8th Air Force went ahead with daylight attacks upon the more precise sources of German air strength, Bomber Command continued to concentrate mainly on area attacks against German cities.

Air Marshal Harris was, in fact, determined to carry on the attack against German cities and as far as possible to avoid all diversionary activities. He remained convinced that the enemy's capitulation could best be brought about by the destruction of most of his principal towns. As Bomber Command became better equipped for concentrated attack, the British Air Staff argued the merits of attacks on key industries in Germany, but Harris persisted in his view – not without strong political support. As late as 7 December 1943, in a review of the RAF bomber offensive, he declared: ‘it is not possible to dogmatize on the degree of destruction necessary to cause the enemy to capitulate but there can be little doubt that the necessary conditions will be brought about by the destruction of between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the principal German towns.’

By the end of 1943, however, the British Air Staff, already inclined to the American view, was finally convinced that the area bombing offensive was not the best way to win the war. But it was not until February 1944 that, by insisting on an attack against the controversial target of Schweinfurt, they made this clear to Sir Arthur Harris. The official British policy, if not the practice, of area bombing was then discarded. The impending invasion of the Continent for which air superiority was regarded as vital had provided the final and decisive argument in favour of the American policy of attacking the German fighter force and the aircraft industry upon which it depended.

The combined bombing effort did not, however, achieve close integration until late in the campaign when the greater accuracy of the British bombing and the heavier weight of the American attack made the distinction between pinpoint and area bombing a shadowy one, and when the importance of enemy oil and transport had become so apparent as to leave little doubt regarding the primary objectives. Nevertheless, the early stages of the Allied air offensive were not negligible in terms of strategic effects. In particular, they reduced the cushion of potential productive capacity in Germany which had at first absorbed the shock of strategic bombardment. But until 1944 German industry was not fully mobilised. Many industries had surplus space, machine tools, and stocks of raw materials. Some plants had yet to be converted to full war production, while the capabilities of the occupied territories were not fully developed. Moreover, owing to the fact that the Allied attacks were not fully co-ordinated or repeated quickly enough, the enormous recuperative power of German industry had not yet been taxed to the full. In this connection it is well to emphasise that the air offensive did not achieve major power and significance until the spring of 1944. Indeed, of the total tonnage of bombs dropped in the European War by the RAF and the USAAF, no less than 83 per cent was dropped subsequent to 1 January 1944. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that, of all the tonnage dropped on Germany itself, 72 per cent was after 1 July 1944. If the bombing of Germany had relatively little effect on production prior to that time, it is not only because she had idle resources upon which to draw but also because the major weight of the air offensive had not yet been brought to bear.

CHAPTER 4 Longer-range Attacks

Now it was late summer. Dusk came earlier to the airfields in eastern England and, with the longer hours of darkness, Royal Air Force bombers began to penetrate farther into enemy territory. The first of the more distant targets that were heavily attacked during the second half of 1943 was the city of Hamburg. ‘The total destruction of this city,’ declared the Commander-in-Chief in his operational order on the eve of the attack, ‘would achieve immeasurable results in reducing the industrial capacity of the enemy's war machine. But the battle of Hamburg cannot be won in a single night. It is estimated that at least 10,000 tons of bombs will have to be dropped to achieve the maximum effect. On the first raid a large number of incendiaries are to be carried in order to saturate the fire services ….’

Hamburg was the second largest city of Germany and the greatest port in continental Europe. Within its boundaries lay U-boat building yards, aircraft factories, and oil installations of the first importance, as well as many other major war industries. Before the war the town, whose main built-up area was on the north of the River Elbe, had a population of over one and a half million. This important centre of the German economy was one of the most heavily guarded areas in Germany outside the Ruhr and hundreds of guns and searchlights co-operated with squadrons of night fighters in its defence.

Hamburg had already been attacked by Bomber Command on various occasions earlier in the war with considerable loss and comparatively little effect, but the brief series of raids now directed against the city at the end of July 1943 was to provide a remarkable contrast. Within the space of just over one week, four night raids, each by more than seven hundred aircraft, were launched by Bomber Command, and over 8500 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped. Two daylight attacks by American bombers on the port area of Hamburg added a further 254 tons. There were also harassing attacks by small forces of Mosquito bombers in the intervals between the major raids so that the effect on the Germans was one of almost continuous assault. By the beginning of August Hamburg was without water, gas, and electricity supplies, large areas of the town lay in smoking ruins, and between 40,000 and 50,000 people had lost their lives. Economically the great city was for the time being knocked out, since the undamaged parts had to stop work on account of the destruction or lack of essential services.

The second RAF attack on the night of 27 July produced a unique and dreadful phenomenon in Hamburg. The bombing was well concentrated and its main weight fell upon the closely built-up area to the east of the Alster Lake. Within a short time this region was enveloped in a veritable sea of flames which were intensified by firestorms of almost hurricane strength. The overheated air stormed through the streets with immense force, taking along not only sparks but burning timber and roof beams, so spreading the fire farther and farther. According to a German observer, ‘it developed in a short time into a fire typhoon as such was never before witnessed, against which every human resistance was quite useless.’ Another report said that the firestorms were so violent and the suction so strong that trees were uprooted and the roofs of houses carried away. To judge from the many German descriptions of what happened it must have been almost as terrible as the bursting of the two atom bombs over the Japanese cities at the end of the war. Certainly these fire raids at the end of July 1943 were always referred to by the inhabitants of Hamburg as ‘The Catastrophe’.

On each of the big RAF raids the plan of attack was similar. Pathfinders led the way dropping route markers at a given point off the mouth of the Elbe. Since Hamburg was outside Oboe range, aircraft equipped with H2S marked the target and there was a large force of backers-up to maintain this marking throughout the raids. Among them were experts whose duty it was to re-centre the attack when necessary so as to avoid the usual creeping back of the bomb- ing. Except in the last raid, when the bombers met severe thunder- stormsthunderstorms and most of the markers were hidden by clouds, these tactics proved highly successful.

But the outstanding feature of the Hamburg raids which contributed in large measure to the success achieved was the employment for the first time of a new method of countering the very efficient German defence organisation. During each raid British bombers dropped innumerable small strips of metallised paper which caused echoes similar to those produced by aircraft to appear on the enemy radar screens. The effect was remarkable. In the German ground-control stations instruments behaved as though the sky was filled with thousands of hostile aircraft and the controllers had to tell their night-fighter pilots they were unable to help them. Indeed, the whole system upon which the enemy relied for the control of his night fighters and the accuracy of his gunfire was thrown into hopeless confusion. Searchlights waved aimlessly in all directions, predicted gunfire gave way to a heavy barrage, and the German night fighters frequently seemed unaware of the presence of bombers in their vicinity. As a result the RAF casualties in the four attacks on Hamburg were relatively light, 87 bombers being lost from the 3095 sorties despatched.

The lack of direction from the ground and the consequent frustration of the efforts of the German night-fighter pilots may have accounted for a somewhat unusual incident which befell one of the Stirlings from No. 75 Squadron in the raid on 24 July. Just after bombs had been released the captain reported a night fighter approaching from ahead. A second or two later there was a terrific bump as the fighter collided with the starboard wing, tearing away several feet of the wing and damaging the aileron controls. But apparently the German machine got the worst of the collision for it was seen to turn over on its back and go down. The Stirling had meanwhile dropped on its starboard side and began to lose height, but with help from his bomb aimer the pilot managed to pull the aircraft level and then hold it on course throughout the long return flight.

The New Zealand Squadron took part in each of the four major attacks on Hamburg, despatching a total of seventy-nine sorties. This was in addition to the attacks on Essen and Remscheid during the last weeks of July which marked the final stage of the Ruhr battle. ‘It has been a terrific week for everybody – for ground crews as well as for the flying men,’ declared Wing Commander Wyatt. ‘The fitters, mechanics and the riggers have worked without stint to get the bombers ready for the next operation. As a result we have put up more aircraft in the last week than ever before.’

In the first three raids on Hamburg No. 75 Squadron was fortu- nate, all but one of the Stirlings returning safely. In the last attack, however, two of the seventeen bombers which took off failed to return. One was shot down over Germany and the other crashed into the North Sea. All the members of both crews were lost. The last raid was made in very bad weather. One New Zealander with a Lancaster squadron, whose motto appropriately enough was ‘Despite the Elements’, told how his bomber finally reached the vicinity of Hamburg after flying through cloud, rain and electrical storms. ‘The clouds were very dense and miles high and so thick that we had to come down very low before getting under them. A violent thunderstorm was raging and brilliant flashes of lightning lit up the ground. Suddenly we saw the twisting outline of the River Elbe and were then able to fix our position.’ Another crew reported that they flew over the target area six times before they could find a way through the cloud.

Many of the New Zealanders who flew to Hamburg with RAF squadrons also had eventful flights. Pilot Officer Elder

Flight Lieutenant W. E. Elder, DFC, DFM; born Gore, 30 Aug 1912; farmer; joined RNZAF Nov 1941.

of No. 76 Squadron brought back a crippled Halifax with one member of his crew dead and two wounded after one of the raids. German fighters had attacked the Halifax shortly after the bomb load was released, killing the mid-upper gunner and putting the port engine out of action. Other members of the crew fought off the fighters while the bomb aimer took an axe and cut away burning pieces of the fuselage. On reaching the first lighted airfield in England after a difficult flight, Elder ordered the unwounded members of his crew to bale out because he feared a dangerous crash-landing. The navigator, bomb aimer, and wireless operator all left the aircraft and came down safely. After strapping the badly injured rear gunner in the rest position the engineer, who had himself been wounded in the legs, helped Elder to bring the bomber down on the grass outside the runway. The Halifax skidded along to the end of the airfield, jumped a ditch, went through a fence, and finished up by tearing the port engines out on some tree stumps before it finally came to rest.

The raids on Hamburg caused considerable alarm among the German war leaders. ‘We were of the opinion,’ said Herr Speer, Minister of Production, during his interrogation after the war, ‘that rapid repetition of this type of attack upon another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to sustain armament manufacture and war production. I reported to the Fuehrer at the time that a continuation of these attacks might bring about a rapid end to the war.’ It was indeed a critical moment for Germany since it was clear that, for the time being at least, the Luftwaffe was unable either to prevent the raids or to launch heavy reprisals against Britain. Goebbels was ‘sunk in gloom’ and anxiously watching for signs of collapse on the home front which had been the undoing of Germany in 1918. However, the British raids were not repeated with the same weight and frequency, the crisis passed, and the German defence organisation was able to adapt itself to further air attacks as a result of the experience gained at Hamburg.

It was, in fact, a physical impossibility for Bomber Command at this stage of its expansion and equipment to do what in Speer's opinion might have brought the war quickly to an end. Even with the greatest possible luck it would not have been possible to attack in a brief space of time six more great cities as effectively as Hamburg. To find new targets even half or a third of its size the bombers would have to go much farther afield. Hamburg had been more accessible and, because of its position near the coast, more easily located and subjected to concentrated attack. Weather, the size of the force, and lack of experience with the new radar aids prohibited for the time being similar sustained onslaught. To have destroyed Berlin would have been a severe blow, but it was the most difficult target of all to attack. Nevertheless at the earliest oppor- tunity, as soon as the nights were long enough, a series of raids was directed against the German capital. In the meantime there were many other tasks for the bombers.

By the middle of 1943 Italy had become the focus of the Allied attack in the Mediterranean, and Bomber Command was directed to support the efforts being made to drive Hitler's wavering ally out of the war. Therefore, between the middle of July and the end of August there were frequent raids on the industrial cities of northern Italy. In July the nights were too short for the slower types of aircraft and even the Lancasters had to be routed home through the Bay of Biscay. Nevertheless, as early as the night of 12 July, 295 Lancasters delivered a successful attack against Turin.

There were also a number of raids by smaller forces of Lancasters against the transformer and switching stations upon which the electrified railways of Italy depended. After these attacks the Lancasters would often fly on to land in North Africa and then make another bombing raid during their return flight to the United Kingdom. On the night of 15 July when twenty-four Lancasters were despatched in four groups to attack such targets, Flight Lieutenant Stewart

Flight Lieutenant T. A. Stewart, DFC, DFM; born Dannevirke, 30 Aug 1915; shop assistant; joined RNZAF Jan 1941; p.w. 18 Aug 1943.

led the six aircraft from No. 61 Squadron whose objective was the grid and transformer station at Bologna. Stewart went in first and, after dropping sighter bombs, scored hits in a second low-level attack. His gunners then concentrated on the enemy flak posts while the remaining aircraft made their bombing runs. Stewart, who had been with his squadron since 1941 and was on his second tour of operations, was taken prisoner a few weeks later in the famous raid on the German experimental station at Peenemunde.

Flying Officer Head,

Flight Lieutenant M. R. Head, DSO, DFC; born Petone, 14 Sep 1918; engineer; joined RNZAF Jun 1941; p.w. 16 Jul 1943; escaped and returned to United Kingdom, 11 Jan 1944.

who flew a Lancaster of No. 9 Squadron to Reggio the same night, had a remarkable series of adventures. Over the target his machine was involved in a collision and sustained such damage that the crew was forced to bale out. Shortly after reaching the ground Head was captured. A week later he escaped from a north-bound train through a ventilator only to fall into the hands of a German patrol. A second attempt to escape a few weeks later was successful when, along with two army officers, he leapt out of a train in the gathering dusk – the latch outside the door had previously been released while the train was passing through a tunnel. After eight days in the mountains the party moved towards the Allied lines in southern Italy. In a brush with a German patrol one man was captured; Head's left arm was hit and broken but he and a companion got through safely.

Within the space of ten days in mid-August 1380 sorties were flown by Bomber Command against Turin, Genoa and Milan. The great weight of bombs – some 2200 tons which included over five hundred two-ton ‘block-busters’ - fell on Milan in three raids within four nights. Four hundred and eighty Lancasters, Halifaxes, and Stirlings made the first attack; 134 Lancasters the second, and nearly 200 Lancasters were sent on the third raid. The long and difficult flight over the Alps was the chief hazard in these raids on Italy, but there were occasional encounters with enemy fighters usually during the flight across France. On their second flight to Milan, Flight Lieutenant Barley

Flight Lieutenant H. J. Barley, DFC; born Auckland, 14 Aug 1913; jig and tool maker; joined RAF Apr 1940; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944.

and his crew of No. 44 Rhodesian Squadron were attacked in the neighbourhood of Lake Bourget, to the east of Lyons. After a running fight lasting several minutes in which the Lancaster suffered considerable damage, Barley found one engine out of action and a second giving very little power. A strong north-west wind made him decide that the best chance of saving his aircraft and crew was to make for North Africa. By skilful flying he was able to maintain sufficient height to cross the Mediterranean and reach Blida airfield near Algiers.

The last stages in the bombing of Italy were very successful both in causing material damage and in finally destroying what little inclination remained in that country to continue the war. Italy surrendered unconditionally on 3 September 1943 but the German reaction was too quick for the Allies to take advantage of the surrender. German troops were rushed into the country and the Allies faced a long and bitter campaign.

During the following months several attempts were made by Bomber Command to hinder the flow of German supplies and reinforcements to Italy by cutting the railways on the Brenner and Riviera routes. The most successful attack was that delivered by a force of just over three hundred Lancasters in full moonlight on the night of 10 November against the rail centre at Modane near the French border. Tracks were torn up, buildings, including the engine shed were destroyed, and a German goods train standing in the station was completely wrecked. ‘The whole area,’ says a contemporary report, ‘had the appearance of the front line in the First World War.’ On the other hand, three gallant attempts by small forces of Lancasters from No. 617 Squadron to wreck the Antheor viaduct were unsuccessful. By this time, however, Bomber Command was heavily engaged over Germany and air support in the Italian campaign was taken over by the Allied squadrons now well established at airfields in southern Italy.

* * * * *

During the summer months of 1943, apart from several interesting but relatively small raids – notably against the Schneider Works at Le Creusot, the aircraft factory at Friedrichshafen, and the Peugeot Works at Montbelliard – the British bombers had concentrated upon the dislocation and destruction of industries in the Ruhr and Rhineland and in Hamburg. But with the approach of longer nights Bomber Command had begun to extend its efforts against the enemy's industrial system and at the same time make a contribution to the reduction of German air strength. In August Nuremberg, which contained ball-bearing plants, was twice attacked by heavy forces of over six hundred aircraft Leverkusen, which contained one of the vast I. G. Farben chemical and rubber plants, was also attacked. In addition, there were raids on Berlin and the Ruhr. September targets included Montlucon, the site of the French Dunlop works, and Hanover, whose principal importance to the aircraft industry lay in its production of aircraft tires. Kassel was attacked twice during October and there were heavy raids on Stuttgart, Leipzig and Hanover. In Stuttgart there was an important ball-bearing factory as well as numerous small plants manufacturing aircraft components, while Leipzig contained the big Erla group factories which made and assembled Messerschmitt fighters. In November Ludwigshaven and Leverkusen, both of which contained plants of the Farben combine, were attacked; Stuttgart was also raided again.

During the second half of 1943 seventeen attacks, six of them in July and five in October, were delivered by American bombers against specific targets in the German aircraft industry, the main weight of the assault falling upon fighter assembly plants. The centre of the German ball-bearing industry at Schweinfurt – high in the list of primary objectives for the Allied bombers – was also twice raided by the United States 8th Air Force. But in the second attack against this target on 14 October 1943 very heavy casualties were incurred – sixty of the 228 bombers being lost – and it became clear that daylight raids involving deep penetration would have to be adequately protected by fighter escort in order to retain the strength required for continuous operations.

‘For the time being,’ declares the official American Air Historian, ‘the 8th Air Force was in no position to make further penetrations either to Schweinfurt or to any other objectives deep in German territory. The Schweinfurt mission, bad enough in itself, had climaxed a week of costly air battles. Within the space of six days the Eighth lost one hundred and forty-eight bombers and crews, mostly as a result of air action, in the course of four attempts to break through German fighter defenses unescorted.’ – The Army Air Force in World War II, Volume II, p. 705.

As such escort was not yet available the 8th Air Force made no more deep penetrations in clear weather into Germany for the rest of the year. For the time being the daylight assault on long-range targets was left to the 15th USAAF operating from Italy, with the 8th confining itself to the German ports and the Ruhr.

The attacks on Schweinfurt are of more than passing interest for they illustrate both the difficulties and the weakness of the Allied bombing offensive at this stage. The two American raids caused damage in critical departments of the industry, and the testimony of Speer and others acquainted with the situation leaves no doubt that the enemy took a grave view of the matter. In the autumn of 1943 the German ball-bearing industry was concentrated in a few places, all of them known to Allied intelligence, and the machinery was as yet largely unprotected. In the opinion of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, had these two 1943 attacks been followed up the German bearing situation might have become critical indeed. As it was, Bomber Command - owing to Harris's strong aversion to what he termed ‘panacea’ targets - did not take part in this first assault on the Schweinfurt plants at all and no further attempt was made to bomb them by either British or American aircraft for another four months. During that time the Germans were able to reorganise and disperse the industry so thoroughly that any further effort to destroy it was doomed to failure.

However, in spite of the inability to press on immediately with heavy daylight attack and some lack of co-ordination between British and American operations, the 1943 assault on the German aircraft industry had several important results. In particular, it delayed the planned programme for fighter production by approximately three months and the timing of this delay contributed to the victory in the critical air battles of the following winter. The Allied offensive also brought about a heavier wastage of German fighters in action, which led in turn to the adoption by the Germans of new programmes for greatly increased aircraft production, particularly of fighter types. And this growing emphasis by the enemy on fighters was perhaps the best indication of the progress of the battle for air supremacy in Europe.

Of the night area attacks delivered by Bomber Command during the last months of 1943 those which fell on Leipzig, Kassel, and Hanover caused particularly widespread devastation. In the raid against Hanover on the night of 8 October, which followed two heavy raids in the previous eighteen days, the main weight of bombs fell on the central area round the main railway station and the industrial region of Linden to the south-west of the town centre. This attack was considered far more effective than all the previous attacks on Hanover. In the two October raids on Kassel, which had a substantial aircraft industry producing aero-engines and various components, as well as assembling aircraft, a large part of the built-up area was devastated. All three Henschel factories were damaged, the main factory suffering the most, the majority of its smaller buildings being destroyed and the larger workshops damaged. After the second raid against Leipzig early in December the damage covered a wide strip running right across the city from north to south and spreading from the centre into the most densely built-up districts on either side. Much of the area to the south-west of the main station, where lay the old town, was destroyed. Industrial damage was particularly severe in the south where buildings designed to house the Leipzig World Fair had been converted to the aircraft industry and were engaged on the repair of Junkers aero-engines and the assembly of fuselages.

New Zealanders flew with many of the RAF bomber squadrons in the raids on these longer-range targets as captains, navigators, wireless operators, bomb aimers and gunners. Some men survived remarkable experiences. Squadron Leader J. B. Starky was captain of a Lancaster from No. 115 Squadron which took off for Mannheim one evening early in September. It was his forty-seventh trip. Six hours later, with the starboard elevator almost completely shot away, the navigator and wireless operator missing and two more of the crew wounded, the Lancaster force-landed at an airfield in England. Some twenty miles short of the target a night fighter had dived on the Lancaster in a head-on attack. The bomber was badly hit, the cockpit filled with smoke, and the machine went into a violent spiral. Unable to regain control Starky gave the order to abandon by parachute. But on hearing that his rear gunner was trapped in his turret he made a last desperate effort to regain control. Suddenly the stick became a little easier owing to the dinghy, which had become jammed in the tail unit, blowing free. Then as the Lancaster levelled out the German fighter attacked again. But the gunners held their fire until it came close and sent it down in flames. Starky then found that both his wireless operator and navigator had baled out, his engineer had been wounded in the shoulder, and his bomb aimer badly hit in the arm and head. An approximate course was set for England, and with his bomb aimer doing the navigation – the navigator's log had gone and he had no plan to work on – Starky brought the Lancaster back to the coast and across the North Sea.

Shot down over the German-Belgian border, Flight Sergeant Pond

Flying Officer H. A. Pond, DFM; born Matamata, 25 Apr 1922; farmhand; joined RNZAF Nov 1941.

of No. 97 Squadron was back in England in just over a fort- night. Pond captained a Lancaster in the attack on Nuremberg towards the end of August. Just after leaving the target the bomber was attacked by a night fighter and badly damaged. Flying low near the Belgian frontier, Pond turned his machine into cloud to avoid another fighter and a few moments later the aircraft struck high ground, bounced off, and finally finished up in a cornfield, where it caught fire. The rear gunner had been killed in the fighter attack and the bomb aimer in the crash. The surviving members of the crew, believing themselves to be in Germany, split up at once. Actually they were in Belgium, as Pond found out the next after- noon. While hiding in a field a horse ran so near him that he had to stand up. A farmer approached and, recognising him as English, shook hands and warned him that there were Germans in the village and gave him directions. Pond was thus able to evade capture and he soon received help which enabled him, after an adventurous journey, to return to England sixteen days later.

Flying Officer N. J. Matich, who captained a Halifax of No. 35 Pathfinder Squadron during 1943, also owed his escape to assistance received from various underground organisations on the Continent. It was during one of the raids against Hanover that Matich's Halifax was shot down. All the crew baled out safely but the Australian mid-upper gunner, who had been severely injured in the fighter attack, later died of wounds and exposure. The others were taken prisoner, and only Matich got clear. Moving by night he headed for Holland, which was the nearest and most likely place to obtain assistance. He took nine nights to cover the hundred miles to the German-Dutch border. Through taking cover by day, usually in woods and once in a haystack, he had a fairly safe journey, although the day he spent in the haystack was nearly his undoing. The farmer came to cut fodder for his animals and his large knife or saw passed about six inches from the fugitive's head during the process of cutting. Matich reached the Dortmund-Ems canal on the seventh night only to find it guarded. Sentry boxes were at each end of the bridge and a sentry patrolled the area. Creeping into one box, Matich overpowered the guard and got across. Two nights later he reached Holland and made contact with the ‘Organisation’. After spending six weeks hiding in a cellar in a wood, he was taken by train and escorted across the frontier into Belgium. From Brussels he travelled in company with another British pilot to France and eventually reached Paris. After several days there the two men were guided by a French girl - apparently known as ‘the girl with a thousand lovers’ - to Bordeaux. Here Matich's companion nearly ‘gave the show away’ when he spied his rear gunner on the railway station. Eventually came the gruelling walk across the Pyrenees into Spain, which took three days and nights, and finally the men reached Gibraltar from where they were flown back to England.

Flight Sergeant B. Williams,

Warrant Officer B. Williams; born Auckland, 27 Apr 1922; apprentice; joined RNZAF May 1941; p.w. 23 Sep 1943.

who flew as air gunner with a Canadian squadron, was less fortunate. When his crippled Wellington bomber came down in the North Sea, he and his crew spent over eighty hours in their dinghy only to be picked up by the Germans. This was Williams's second crash within a few months. On this occasion the Wellington was returning from a raid on Hanover. Hits from anti-aircraft fire over the target had caused damage and loss of fuel, but the crew had decided to attempt the crossing of the North Sea and at least get as close as possible to England. But before they had got half-way across the sea the engines spluttered out and the pilot was compelled to ditch.

‘The force of the crash,’ writes Williams, ‘had made the escape opening very small and it took considerable exertion to squeeze through and scramble out on to the tail plane. It was as black as pitch, the sea was just covering the fuselage and there was a large swell. In between the rise and fall of the waves I slid down, using a sheath knife to dig into the canvas, missed out on the swell twice, got lifted off the fuselage and was only holding on by the knife handle. By the time I got down the wing was slowly sinking and we were up to our necks. Then a whistle blew from behind us; this turned out to be the pilot who had got the dinghy and brought it up close. He stayed on one side to balance while I pulled the navigator in; was just going to haul in the bomb aimer when the pilot told us Johnny the W'op was going down. He had hit the tail plane and was in a bad way, so {1} turned round and pulled him in while the others acted as ballast on the other side of the dinghy. This left the bomb aimer, who was six feet and a dead weight, but finally we managed to get him in. We baled the dinghy out as much as possible and then slipped into the sleep of the exhausted. Have a vague recollection of waking up twice to bale out and shift around before passing out again. We were soaked to the skin. The next day the sea was rough and we had to be very careful we did not get overturned. During the afternoon when we came up on a crest of a wave we saw a Beaufighter but we had just come up too late. However, it gave us fresh heart. The next night was calmer and although pretty well exhausted we took turns to watch but we got cramp with the cold and had to untangle our legs using our hands to move. We had a mouthful of water the first day, the second day we had two mouthfuls until we were rescued. We remained hopeful of drifting to England and took turns at paddling but night always caught up on us before we sighted land. We began to dread the nights as they brought a succession of horrible dreams, cramped legs and aching bones, and the approach of dawn made us glad. Shortly after dawn on the fourth morning we were sighted by a Junkers 88 and soon afterwards a German Flying Boat flew over and dropped markers. Then about an hour later a German gun boat came and picked us up.’

One further episode, typical of what happened all too often in Bomber Command, must be recorded. It concerns a gunner, Pilot Officer Moon

Flying Officer S. H. Moon, DFC; born New Plymouth, 3 Oct 1919; grocer's assistant joined RNZAF Apr 1941.

of No. 156 Pathfinder Squadron who, after being wounded a second time, was the only member of his crew to survive the war. On the night of 20 December 1943 his Lancaster flew in the attack on Frankfurt and, after bombing the target and passing through its defences, was attacked by a German fighter. Through the commentary and directions given by Moon to his pilot this attack was successfully evaded. About twenty minutes later another fighter made a surprise attack. The bomber was badly hit, an engine set on fire and the mid-upper turret shattered. Moon was badly wounded; a bullet entered his back and passed out through his chest, paralysing his left arm and side. However, he remained at his post, trying as best he could with his right hand to make his guns fire. When the enemy fighter finally broke away, Moon tried to reach the rest position and only when unable to do so did he seek help. Twelve nights later when Moon lay in hospital all the other members of his crew were killed when their Lancaster was shot down on its way back from Berlin.

* * * * *

No. 75 New Zealand Squadron had continued to take a prominent part in the bomber offensive during the late summer and autumn of 1943. In August a total of 169 sorties was reached, which was a record for the squadron up to this time and also the highest number flown by any squadron of No. 3 Bomber Group during that month. In the following weeks the effort was so well maintained that, by the end of September, 313 aircraft had operated on thirty missions in which 538 tons of bombs had been dropped and 132 mines laid in enemy waters. But this excellent contribution was not made without heavy cost in men and machines. On many operations during these two months the Stirlings had to fight their way to and from their targets in the face of bitter and sustained opposition, particularly from the enemy night fighters. Thirteen Stirlings were missing in August; a further six failed to return in September, while others were badly damaged and just managed to limp back to base. How- everHowever, these heavy losses did not go unavenged. Crews who experienced combat displayed skill and great fighting spirit and claimed fifteen fighters as destroyed or probably destroyed, with at least six more damaged; others were driven off before they could press home their attacks.

In mid-August Wing Commander Max

Wing Commander R. D. Max, DSO, DFC; born Brightwater, 23 Nov 1918; joined RAF Aug 1938; transferred RNZAF Dec 1943; served on Atlantic Ferry, 1941; Flying Instructor No. 11 OTU, 1941–42; Deputy Chief Instructor, 1943; commanded No. 75 (NZ) Sqdn, 1943–44; transferred RAF Mar 1947.

became the first New Zealander to command the squadron for over a year. Max had joined the Royal Air Force in August 1938 and at the outbreak of war was serving with No. 103 Bomber Squadron. He was among the small group of New Zealanders who flew with the Battle squadrons in France during 1940 and on one occasion was shot down near Amiens after bombing a concentration of German tanks. On return to the United Kingdom he continued to operate with his squadron and flew Wellingtons until early in 1941, when he was released to fly on the Atlantic Ferry. Before assuming command of No. 75 Squadron, Max did valuable work as an instructor at an operational training unit. Squadron Leaders F. A. Andrews, R. Broadbent, and J. Joll continued as flight commanders with this squadron during the second half of 1943.

The first attack by No. 75 Squadron after the Battle of Hamburg came on the night of 10 August when eighteen aircraft bombed Nuremberg. The squadron's operation record book states that: ‘Large fires were seen glowing below the clouds and some heavy explosions occurred indicating that the attack was a success. Moderate anti-aircraft fire co-operating with searchlights was encountered but gave little trouble. Some enemy aircraft were seen but no combats took place. Weather at the target was poor with thick cloud which prevented identification of detail.’ One crew were fortunate to get back when their navigational aids failed during the return journey and they went off track and ran short of fuel. The crew prepared to abandon the aircraft but eventually reached Manston, where they landed after being airborne for over nine hours.

There was a second attack against Nuremberg on 27 August when eighteen Stirlings reported successful bombing; one aircraft captained by Flight Sergeant Higham

Flight Sergeant F. D. Higham; born Onehunga, 9 Jun 1919; sheep farmer; joined RNZAF Nov 1941; killed on air operations, 28 Aug 1943.

failed to return. Meanwhile the squadron had contributed to the final stages of the offensive against Italy with two attacks on Turin in which twenty-nine sorties were flown without loss.

Two episodes connected with these missions across the Alps indicate the fine spirit which existed in No. 75 Squadron at this time. In the raid against Turin on 12 August, one Stirling was intercepted near Paris on its outward flight by a German fighter. One engine was hit and became useless, but the crew carried on to their target nearly 400 miles away, dropped their bombs and returned safely. After the second raid, four nights later, crews returned to find fog covering their base at Mepal and they were diverted to other airfields, so that they could not return to their home airfield until later the next morning. Consequently servicing, refuelling, and bombing-up were delayed, but through the enthusiastic and high-speed work of the ground crews the Stirlings were prepared for operations that same night against Peenemunde. And although the men did not know it at the time, this attack on Peenemunde was to prove one of the most important bombing missions of the year.

Peenemunde, on the shores of the Baltic, was the principal German experimental station engaged in the development of secret weapons such as the flying bomb and the rocket-bomb for a renewal of the attack on Britain. Bomber Command's raid on 17 August 1943 was launched to retard this development. In order to preserve secrecy and avoid needless alarm, crews were not told what was really going on at Peenemunde; instead they were briefed that the enemy was developing a new radar counter measure against night bombers. The operation was given the code name HYDRA, not altogether a happy thought, since this was the name of the fabled monster who grew new heads whenever one was cut off.

A force of 600 bombers took off for the attack in bright moon- light. Normally a force of this size would only have been sent against such a distant target on a dark or cloudy night, and the danger from night fighters, even after the disruption of the enemy's defence system by the dropping of metallised strips in the recent attacks on Hamburg, was considerable. Therefore, in an effort to deceive the Germans the whole force this night was routed as if Berlin were the target and a small diversionary force of Mosquitos did actually go on to Berlin. The attack was carefully planned and for the first time in a major raid on Germany a ‘master of ceremonies’, circling high above the target, assessed the accuracy of the placing of the target markers and then gave instructions to the whole force by radio telephone. His task was not easy for there were some clouds and a protective smoke screen which shrouded much of the target area. Nevertheless, the bombing appears to have been fairly well concentrated. At first the Germans were deceived by the feint attack towards Berlin but the ruse was detected before the raid on Peenemunde had finished. Night fighters were hastily despatched to intercept the bombers on their return flight to England and the last squadrons to attack suffered heavy casualties. Altogether forty aircraft failed to return. No. 75 Squadron was fortunate in that all the twelve Stirlings despatched returned safely. A few enemy aircraft were sighted but no combats took place. Crews reported that they could see the glow of fires over one hundred miles from the target on their return flight.

Bomber Command's attack on Peenemunde caused considerable destruction of both manufacturing buildings and living quarters, where casualties were heavy and included several important scientists and leading members of the staff of the experimental establishment. The actual delay caused to the opening of the German V-weapon offensive is uncertain but it is significant that after this attack by Bomber Command the German threats of retaliation against the United Kingdom by secret weapons became much less specific as regards dates.

An entry in the Goebbels' diary dated 10 September 1943 states that the raids on Peenemunde and the Todt structures in the West threw preparations back by four to eight weeks. However, the United States Post-War Bombing Survey reports that the attack took place too late to interfere seriously with the development of the V-1 (flying bomb) but estimates that the V-2 (rocket) programme may have been delayed by some two months.

No. 75 Squadron also took part in two of the three major attacks against Berlin during August 1943. On the night of the 23rd when twenty-three New Zealand Stirlings flew to Berlin they met stiff opposition and three aircraft failed to return. Most crews reported sighting enemy aircraft and there were several sustained combats. Flight Sergeant Jamieson,

Flying Officer V. R. Jamieson, DFC; born Waitara, 24 Dec 1918; biscuit machinist; joined RNZAF Nov 1941.

who flew as rear gunner in the bomber captained by Flight Sergeant W. D. Whitehead, claimed two night fighters over Berlin. One was seen to burst into flames and go down and the other to explode and disintegrate in the air. That same night Flight Sergeant White

Flight Lieutenant O. H. White, CGM; born Christchurch, 21 Feb 1914; salesman; joined RNZAF Oct 1941.

and his crew had a particularly hazardous flight. Approaching Berlin their Stirling was coned by searchlights and then repeatedly hit by flak. One shellburst shattered the rear turret and killed the rear gunner. There was also damage to the fuselage and controls. Suddenly the anti-aircraft fire died away and a Junkers 88 came in to attack. White began to make evasive turns but the damaged elevators caused his machine to dive out of control in steep turns. He thereupon ordered his crew to ‘Prepare to abandon aircraft.’ Unfortunately, three members of the crew, including the navigator, apparently mistook the order and baled out. Meanwhile White had jettisoned his bomb load while still in the dive and eventually he managed to regain a measure of control. Then, although still engaged by searchlights and anti-aircraft guns, he succeeded in getting clear of the target area. White and the two remaining members of his crew thereupon took stock of the damage and decided that they would attempt the long flight back – no mean feat without a navigator. Fortunately White had been a keen yachtsman in New Zealand and had some knowledge of navigation. He flew northwards and then across Denmark, where he succeeded in pinpointing the Stirling's position and set course across the North Sea. The crippled bomber finally reached the English coast, but on arrival over his home airfield White found that the radio equipment, undercarriage and flap gear were useless. Despite this he achieved a safe crash-landing clear of the runway.

Altogether nineteen New Zealanders were among the crews of the seven Stirlings lost by No. 75 Squadron in these two August raids on Berlin. One of them, Sergeant Grant,

Warrant Officer J. S. Grant; born Balclutha, 7 Nov 1920; farmer; joined RNZAF Feb 1942; p.w. 31 Aug 1943.

who survived by a miracle when his Stirling was shot down, has given a vivid description of his experiences.

On reaching the target area we found plenty of enemy action. The whole sky was alive with searchlights and anti-aircraft fire and fighters. Cruising in on our bombing run at 15,000 feet, we had to pass through a heavy barrage of flak and a screen of night fighters. With the bomb doors open and on a straight and level course, we were slowed by a shell which hit the port inner engine and we made a sitting target for the fighters. Just as we were about to drop our bombs a Ju. 88 began to tail us and when the bombs had gone closed in with guns blazing. I returned the fire but was unable to give instructions for evasion as I was having trouble with the intercomm. Meanwhile the mid-upper gunner was firing at another enemy aircraft to starboard and managed to drive it off. But another attacked from the port beam and succeeded in putting his turret out of action. The Junkers at our rear scored many hits on the fin and tail plane and knocked out my two right-hand guns, wounding me in the right arm and shoulder, while my face was peppered with shrapnel. Before I could get my remaining guns to bear this fighter closed in on our slow moving aircraft for the kill. I again opened fire and the enemy machine belched forth a cloud of smoke and flame and disappeared. We were further attacked and one fighter came up from below and raked us with fire from stem to stern, completely crippling our aircraft and putting my turret out of action. I had again been wounded and was cut off from the rest of the crew. My intercomm was by this time completely useless but managed to repair it enough to hear what was going on. The crew thought I had been killed during the attacks but after I had signalled by flashing the lights the wireless operator freed me from my turret. We had been flying for about an hour when we ran short of fuel and were ordered to abandon aircraft. On taking my parachute out of its stowage found it had been shot to pieces so I was forced to watch the rest of the crew bale out and sat waiting for the crash which came on the top of some high hills. I managed to scramble out of the burning machine and crawled away and went to sleep, only to be awakened some six hours later by a German search party.

Hanover, centre of the German aircraft industry, and the French town of Montlucon, where there was a large Dunlop factory, were among the many targets attacked by No. 75 Squadron during September. Of the attack on Montlucon on the night of the 15th, the squadron's operations book records that: ‘Sixteen aircraft dropped their bombs in the target area. This was a concentrated attack, large fires and heavy explosions being observed. Smoke from the fires was afterwards seen rising to a height of 12,000 feet. Inaccurate flak from a few guns was the only opposition and no enemy aircraft were encountered.’ There were two raids on Hanover, in the first of which, on 22 September, twenty New Zealand Stirlings took part, again without loss. But from the second attack five nights later two of the thirteen bombers despatched were missing. Bomber Command's losses in these two raids on Hanover were sixty-four aircraft from the 1389 sorties despatched.

Other September targets for the New Zealand Squadron were the important industrial town of Mannheim in southern Germany and the Modane railway centre on the Mont-Cenis route into Italy. It was during the raid on Mannheim on 5 September that Flight Sergeant Batger

Warrant Officer W. H. Batger; born Auckland, 1 Mar 1923; stock clerk; joined RNZAF Feb 1942.

and his crew reported their second success against enemy night fighters within six nights. On this same raid the Stirling captained by Flight Sergeant Whitmore

Pilot Officer R. C. Whitmore; born Pukekohe, 16 Feb 1921; farmer; joined RNZAF Feb 1942; killed on air operations, 28 Sep 1943.

was twice attacked within a few minutes. After concerted fire from his gunners the first fighter was seen to turn over, catch fire, and spin down towards the ground. Attack by a second fighter followed almost immediately but further accurate fire from the gunners caused it to break away. Shortly afterwards the Stirling took over the role of hunter when a German fighter was seen firing on a Lancaster which was burning furiously. Unfortunately, although the enemy machine was driven off, the Stirling's intervention was too late to save the Lancaster, which was seen to break up in mid-air. Pilot Officer Wilkinson

Pilot Officer E. S. Wilkinson; born Havelock, 21 Sep 1917; goods transport operator; joined RNZAF Dec 1941; killed on air operations, 6 Sep 1943.

and his crew, who had twice been successful in combat during the previous month, failed to return from this raid on Mannheim.

When the squadron went to Mannheim again towards the end of the month three more aircraft were lost. Many fighters were up in defence of this important target, the crew of one Stirling reporting no fewer than three separate attacks during their sortie. In other encounters New Zealand aircraft claimed two enemy fighters and a further three as damaged.

Eighteen Stirlings from No. 75 Squadron bombed the marshalling yards at Modane on 16 September as part of the force of almost 350 aircraft. Crews reported that flak was largely ineffective although one aircraft which was hit had to bomb and complete its sortie on three engines. A Junkers 88 was claimed by the gunners of the Stirling captained by Pilot Officer G. K. Williams

Flight Lieutenant G. K. Williams; born Te Aroha, 26 Dec 1920; clerk; joined RNZAF Jul 1940; p.w. 4 Nov 1943.

which was one of two squadron aircraft attacked by fighters on this night.

Both ground and air crews of No. 75 Squadron had worked hard during these months to achieve the maximum effort with their Stirling bombers. But the Stirling, never a really satisfactory machine, was now obsolescent and the men still servicing and flying them could not help but envy their more fortunate comrades in the Lancaster squadrons. Indeed, during the second half of 1943 the superiority of the Lancaster, with its greater bomb load, better performance and lower loss rate, had become even more apparent, and efforts were being made to hasten the re-equipment of as many squadrons as possible with Lancasters. Meanwhile, the rising loss rate among the Stirlings and Halifaxes brought a decision to restrict the operations of these aircraft to the less difficult targets.

Thus there came a change of emphasis in No. 75 Squadron's operations and during October, although attacks were made on targets connected with the German aircraft industry at Kassel, Frankfurt and Bremen, most of the effort was devoted to mine- laying. Mannheim, Leverkusen, and Berlin were the only targets in Germany during November. Then the Stirlings were finally restricted to minelaying and bombing attacks on the sites the Germans were building for launching their ‘secret weapons’ against the United Kingdom. In December and January No. 75 Squadron's effort was divided between these two tasks, with minelaying taking by far the larger proportion, while in February it took the squadron's entire commitment.

After the intense activity of the first three-quarters of 1943, in which the squadron had taken part in many of the most important bombing raids, the enforced restriction of operations against Germany was a keen disappointment for the aircrews. However, in March 1944 the squadron began converting to Lancasters and was ready in time to take a prominent part in preparatory operations for the invasion of the Continent.

While operating over Germany towards the close of 1943, squadron crews had continued to meet heavy fighter attacks during which one Me109 was reported destroyed and two others damaged,

Flying Officer, L. A. Trigg, VCBlack and white portrait photograph of pilot

U-boat under air attackBlack and white photograph of U-Boat under attack

U-boat founderingBlack and white photograph of U-boat foundering in sea, with debris floating in water

Coastal Command Beaufighter, 1943Black and white photograph of a Beaufighter aeroplane flying

No. 490 Squadron group at Jui, West Africa, in July 1943Black and white group portrait photograph of pilots in front of plane

Aerial mimes for enemy watersBlack and white photograph of pilots loading aerial mines onto planes

Air Vice-Marshal C. R. CarrBlack and white portrait photograph of pilot in uniform, seated behind desk and signing documents

Air Commodore A. McKeeBlack and white portrait photograph of airforce Commodore in uniform, seated behind desk

Bombing upBlack and white photograph of pilots loading bombs onto plane

A Halifax about to take offBlack and white photograph of aeroplane about to take off, with air controllers standing on runway

Radar screen (right) shows features in the Flensburg areaBlack and white photograph showing radar screen

Navigator plotting courseBlack and white photograph of navigator in aircraft plotting course of flight

The Eder Dam breachedBlack and white aerial photograph looking down on breached Dam

Bomb aimer in a LancasterBlack and white photograph of mechnanism for aiming bombs inside aircraft

Marshalling yards at HammBlack and white photograph of marshalling yard

A Halifax landing after a long night raidBlack and white photograph of a Halifax aircraft coming in to land

Wing Commander R. D. Max briefing crews of No. 75 Squadron for a night's operations. The map was painted out for security reasonsBlack and white photograph of pilots in uniform sitting around maps and listening to instructions

The damaged tail unit of a No. 75 Squadron StirlingBlack and white photograph of two airforce officers looking at damaged plane

The Amiens prison raid of 18 February 1944 (see pages 164–8)Black and white aerial photograph of prison buildings in snow under raid

Squadron Leader L. H. Trent, VCBlack and white portrait photograph of airforce officer in uniform

A Mitchell of the Second Tactical Air Force above a railway yard in Belgium, 1944Black and white aerial photograph of an aircraft dropping bombs above a railway yard

One of the first flying-bomb installations found by the Royal Air Force in Northern France. A reconnaissance photograph before the attack (above) and after the target had been bombed (below)

Black and white aerial photograph showing target in Northern France before raid

Black and white aerial photograph showing target in Northern France after raid

Wing Commander W. V. Crawford-ComptonBlack and white portrait photograph of airforce officer in uniform

Squadron Leader R. J. C. Grant (left), Station CO (centre), and Squadron Leader E. P. Wells (right)Black and white photograph of three airforce officers standing in front of plane

Squadron Leader J. M. CheckettsBlack and white photograph of pilot in uniform standing in front of plane

Dispersal huts of No. 486 SquadronBlack and white photograph of officers standing and sitting in groups in front of huts

Six stages in the destruction of a Messerschmitt 109G: (1)

The Me. has taken off and is gaining height

(2)

First strikes from the Typhoon have hit the fuselage and port wing

(3)

Cannon strikes on the port wing near the port cannon magazine

(4)

The Me. dives, with its engine on fire and cannon magazine about to explode

(5)

The Me. rapidly loses height and speed

(6)

With its engine and port wing burning, the Me. dives in smoke before exploding

Black and white photographs showing several stages of an aircraft being struck

Pilot and navigator of a Mosquito night fighter prepare to take offBlack and white photograph of two airforce officers in snow underneath aircraft

Flight Lieutenant G. E. Jameson, and his navigatorBlack and white photograph of two airforce officers in flying gear standing against plane

The night-fighter patrol takes offBlack and white photograph of planes taking off at night

Air Marshal Sir Arthur ConinghamBlack and white portrait photograph of air marshal in uniform, holding pencil

D DayBlack and white photograph of planes lined up on runway

Lancasters of Bomber Command in daylight attack on German troops in NormandyBlack and white photograph looking up at mass of planes flying

Enemy strongpoint obliterated by Allied heavy bombersBlack and white aerial photograph looking down on targeted strongpoint

German army headquarters in Normandy attacked by fighter-bombers of the Second Tactical Air ForceBlack and white aerial photograph looking down on army headquarters

Attack by Coastal Command Beaufighters on a German destroyer off Le Verdon in NormandyBlack and white aerial photograph of beaufighter plane attacking German ship but the squadron lost four aircraft. Flight Sergeant Hyde

Warrant Officer J. E. Hyde; born Lockdale, New South Wales, 25 Jun 1921; paper-bag maker; joined RNZAF Nov 1941; p.w. 20 Nov 1943.

was navigator in a Stirling which failed to return from Leverkusen on the night of 19 November. Although hit by flak when crossing the enemy coast, the bomber was able to continue to the target. On turning for home it was attacked by two Me210s. In the running battle which followed the Stirling was subjected to five attacks before the fighters were finally driven off. Ten minutes later the starboard wing caught fire and the crew was ordered to bale out. Just as Hyde left the aircraft there was an explosion and he lost consciousness. ‘The next thing I remember I was floating down thinking myself very high up. I was enjoying the drop when suddenly I hit the ground. How high I was when my parachute opened is a mystery, so I owe my life to providence.’ Hyde had been injured on landing but managed to crawl to a hedge, where he waited until two Belgians came along and carried him to a nearby house. They were members of the Resistance Movement, but a doctor who examined him decided that he should be taken to hospital and they were forced to call in the Germans against their will. Hyde was first taken to a military hospital and later removed to St. Giles' Hospital in Brussels. Here he received excellent treatment from the Germans which was in direct contrast to that received after he was well enough to be removed to a prisoner-of-war camp.

* * * * *

For RAF Bomber Command the last quarter of 1943 had seen the most difficult phase of operations yet carried out, for it was during these wintry months that very large forces first operated against important but distant objectives in central Germany, including Berlin. This was a different proposition from attacking targets in the Ruhr and western Germany since it involved many more hours' flying over heavily defended regions. Nevertheless, in most of the long-range attacks the bomb load had been well concentrated around the selected aiming point and the rate of loss kept at an economic level. The first essential was achieved in the main by constant improvements in the new radar aids, better navigation by crews, and a clearer understanding of methods involved in marking the target. At the same time crippling losses were avoided by such tactics as diversionary and ‘spoof’ raids together with carefully planned routing which kept the enemy guessing until the last minute as to the real target for the night. The diversionary attacks were usually made by small forces of Mosquitos which took the same route as the main force for most of the way to the target. The main force then suddenly altered course and attacked the real target. As a result of such tactics the Germans were often unable to bring their full strength of night fighters into action. The ground controller either divided his forces or else concentrated them at the wrong place. Goering himself took charge one night and made the wrong guess, sending his night fighters to one end of Germany while the main British bomber force went to the other. Renewed efforts were also made to interfere with the system of communications upon which the German defences relied for successful interception, and towards the end of 1943 a separate group was formed in Bomber Command charged solely with this duty. Its aircraft included both heavy bombers and night fighters with crews drawn from among the most experienced men in the Command. The heavy bombers carried special apparatus which enabled them to jam or interfere with the German radar and radio signals and with the ground controllers' radio-telephone instructions, while the Mosquito fighters had equipment for homing on to the radar carried by the German night fighters and on to the beacons over which they circled whilst assembling. Simultaneously the efforts of these aircraft of No. 100 Group were supplemented from ground stations in Britain, so that altogether there was an intensification of the strange ‘war in the ether’ that had been waged by the scientists, technicians, and airmen from the outset.

These various counter measures were very necessary, for the Germans had soon recovered from the shock produced by the dropping of metallised strips by British bombers and the sudden fall in the efficiency of their early-warning radar. Indeed, after the Battle of Hamburg the Germans had reacted with remarkable energy and promptness. A fighter defence system on altogether new lines had been quickly improvised in which greater use was made of the Observer Corps to plot the course of the British bombers. Until the bombers' target had been guessed, the fighters were kept circling round a number of beacons. Then, when the German defence organisation had made up its mind about the target, fighters were sent there to intercept the British aircraft or to follow and attack them during the return flight. Orders were broadcast along with a running commentary giving the height, direction, and whereabouts of the bomber stream and of the probable target for which it was making or the actual target it was attacking.

The German night-fighter pilots were now more dependent on visual interception, and to help them greater numbers of searchlights were deployed in target areas either to catch the bombers in their cones or to light up the cloud base so that the bombers could be seen from above, silhouetted against the clouds. Some of the enemy fighters were also detailed to drop large numbers of flares high over the targets or to lay these in lanes along the bombers' probable route as they approached or left their objective. In addition, a considerable number of single-engined fighters were thrown into the battle and used to intercept the bombers over the target.

Such tactics brought increasing success to the Germans and, in spite of jamming and interference with the instructions broadcast to their fighters and although routes were worked out to cause maximum deception, British losses began to rise sharply towards the end of 1943. By that time fighter opposition was no longer being met only over the target and during the return flight but also on the outward journey. For the enemy had now given up directing his fighters to any particular area. Instead they were sent directly from the beacons they were circling into the bomber stream as it flew across Germany or even when it was still on its way across the North Sea. These tactics were not always successful, but when the German fighters did get into the bomber stream and the weather was reasonably favourable for interception heavy losses were suffered by Bomber Command. On 19 February 1944, for example, of the 820 bombers despatched to attack Leipzig, no fewer than 78 failed to return.

Continued changes and a wide variety of tactics were therefore necessary for Bomber Command to restrict its casualties. Early in the New Year it was discovered that the route markers dropped by the Pathfinders as landmarks and turning points were being used by the Germans as a guide to the movements and whereabouts of the bomber stream. To counter this Mosquitos were despatched to drop misleading markers and fighter flares similar to those used by the enemy. But before long it was found necessary to abandon the use of route markers. Fortunately these were no longer indispensable for by this time the main force was largely equipped with H2S and the general standard of navigation much improved. In February 1944, when the diversionary attacks by Mosquitos were having little effect in deceiving the enemy, it was decided to divide the striking force into two parts and either send the two forces to different targets or to the same target by different routes. The two shorter bomber streams were more difficult to plot and also split and confused the enemy's defence. Again, two separate attacks were sometimes made on the same target on the same night, with long enough intervals in between to ensure that the fighter force which had gone up to intercept the first raid would have landed and dispersed when the second bomber force arrived. Minelaying aircraft were frequently despatched in considerable numbers by routes which would suggest to the enemy that they were coming to attack a city. Forces of several hundred aircraft from the operational training and conversion units were also sent across the North Sea until they would be plotted by the enemy radar. Then they turned back home. A southern route across France into Germany was often used as the enemy's defences were less efficiently organised there than in the north and west. Altogether, the essence of Bomber Command's tactics was variety and as many different methods of confusing the enemy as possible were employed, no one method being used too frequently or for too long a time. Even so, it was a hard struggle to keep down the losses.

* * * * *

Throughout the winter months there was no relaxation of the effort by RAF Bomber Command, and the massive night raids continued in their familiar routine. Night after night, after darkness fell over the airfields in eastern England, the bombers would taxi out one after another, like long strings of ducks, to line up on the runway. Soon the air resounded with the roar of engines as heavily laden aircraft lumbered down the mile-long flare path and took off into the darkness. In many a neighbouring town, village and hamlet, folk paused to watch and listen as, with navigation lights on at their various heights, the bombers flew towards the rendezvous point. Then, with the assembly complete, the lights went out simultaneously and the whole vast armada, like a huge swarm of angry wasps, set course over the North Sea. The gunners cocked their guns, the bomb aimers fused the bombs and they were on their way, a concentrated mass of machines, stretching upwards for several thousand feet and filling the sky in a broad stream for twenty miles along. Soon the Dutch coast loomed up ahead - incredibly soon it seemed.

Until this moment all was quiet at the German searchlight and flak batteries. Yet the flak gunners were ready and the searchlight crews prepared by the movement of a switch to send powerful beams up into the night sky to greet the raiders. And now as they crossed the Dutch coast the warning went out to the German defence posts all over the Continent. Night-fighter units in Holland had already taken off to intercept the incoming bombers and soon the first engagements of the great night battle would be taking place. Simultaneously the crews of other fighter squadrons in the region of central Germany were standing by ready to take off as the enemy control plotted the course of the bomber stream and endeavoured to guess its objective. Sirens sounded in German towns, the bright lights in the railway marshalling yards were switched off and the countryside sank into darkness. Night-fighter units which had assembled in certain areas were now guided closer to the British bomber stream.

Meanwhile the Lancasters droned on deeper into Germany. A hail of shells from heavy flak batteries rushed up to meet them as they passed over the more heavily defended areas. In the brilliant beams of the searchlights some aircraft were clearly visible and night fighters closed in to shoot up as many as possible. Ahead lay the target, still and silent as yet. Then suddenly it would be galvanised into life; searchlights lit up the sky and hundreds of flashes came up from the guns on the city's roofs, in its parks and railway sidings. A few seconds later the leading Pathfinder aircraft dropped the first target marker. It burst and cascaded to the ground - a mass of green balls shining brightly - an unmistakable spot of light. More markers and flares followed, then the main force of bombers sailed in. Above, hundreds of fighter flares lit up the long stream of aircraft all too clearly. It seemed lighter than day, and searchlights usually so bright themselves could hardly pierce the glow of the flares above. Then tracers came up in all colours as combats took place over the target. Here and there bombers blew up as they received direct hits - great slow flashes in the sky leaving a long trail of black smoke as they disintegrated earthwards. There would be flak bursts all around as the leading wave of bombers held their course. The short time they held that course seemed like a lifetime. Then, relieved of their burden, the Lancasters leapt forward, diving, weaving and slithering, but they kept straight on over the burning city with throttles slammed wide open and engines in fine pitch. Down below, a volcano appeared to be raging as more sticks of incendiaries fell across the point where the target markers had first gone down. ‘Cookies’ - huge high-explosive bombs - exploded one after another with their slow red glow. Photo-flashes burst at all heights as each bomber took its photographs. It was a galaxy of light and a living nightmare.

As the last wave of bombers roared over, the fires started by the first arrivals began to take hold. Against their vivid light the last squadrons were outlined flying steadily on over the battered city. The flak died down and the searchlights waved aimlessly. Soon the area was a mass of flames and billowing smoke and the last aircraft had dropped its bombs; the rendezvous was reached and the surviving bombers turned for home.

Berlin was the principal target for the Lancasters of Bomber Command during the winter months and many New Zealanders flew with RAF squadrons in the massive attacks that were launched against the German capital. In addition to its importance as a political target Berlin contained many large plants and factories engaged on war production. The aircraft industry was represented by factories of the BMW, Dornier, Heinkel and Focke-Wulf companies, and there were important electrical and engineering firms such as Siemens, Reinmetal Borsig and Daimler Benz.

The main Battle of Berlin, as it came to be called, began in earnest in mid-November 1943 and continued until the middle of the following March. During that time sixteen major attacks involving 9130 sorties were launched, and in between these big raids Bomber Command Mosquitos kept up harassing attacks - a type of operation they had been carrying out for some time against long-distance targets with notable success. At first the Germans were surprised by the weight and persistence of the RAF attack. Fire-engines had to be requisitioned from cities as far away as Hamburg. On 23 November, the third major raid within the space of five nights, German Minister Ley declared: ‘Hell itself seems to have broken loose over us. Mines and explosive bombs keep hurtling down upon the government quarter. One after another of the most important buildings began to burn.’ And after the big raid three nights later Goebbels wrote in his diary: ‘This is a heavy blow. The Fuehrer too is very much depressed …. the situation has become alarming since one industrial plant after another has been set on fire.’ However, by a rapid concentration of guns, searchlights, and night fighters and by reinforcement of its air-raid defence organisation, the German capital managed to survive the worst of the onslaught and to inflict heavier casualties upon the raiders. In the final attack on 24 March 1944, out of the 810 aircraft sent to bomb Berlin 72 were shot down.

Altogether during the battle Bomber Command lost five hundred aircraft and their crews - some 3000 men - but such losses were not unexpected in view of the distance of the target and its importance to the Germans. Berlin was the city above all which they were bound to defend vigorously, even at the risk of leaving other places un- protected. Apart from the powerful defences the long flights during a severe northern winter were a grim test of physical endurance for the British bomber crews. Moreover, on almost every raid the German capital was covered by thick cloud which necessitated ‘sky- marking’ by the Pathfinders to guide the bombing. Describing the difficulties experienced by his crews Air Marshal Harris writes:

The whole battle was fought in appalling weather and in conditions resembling those of no other campaign … Scarcely a single crew caught a glimpse of the objective they were attacking and for long periods we were wholly ignorant, except from such admissions as the enemy made from time to time, of how the battle was going. Thousands of tons of bombs were aimed at the Pathfinders' pyrotechnic sky-markers and fell through unbroken cloud which concealed everything below it except the confused glare of fires. Scarcely any photographs taken during the bombing showed anything except clouds and day after day reconnaissance aircraft flew over the capital to return with no information. We knew, of course, from what the Germans said that we were hitting Berlin but we had little idea of which attacks had been successful and which had gone astray. Then after six attacks reconnaissance aircraft did bring back some not very clear photographs which showed that we had at last succeeded in hitting the enemy's capital hard; there were many hundreds of acres of devastation, particularly in the western half of the city and round the Tiergarten. Then the clouds closed again over Berlin and the Command made eight more attacks without any means of discovering whether all or any of them had been as successful as the first six raids. It was not until March was far advanced and the nights too short for any but Mosquito attacks on Berlin that an aircraft brought back more photographs and it was possible to assess the results of the Battle of Berlin as a whole.

Bomber Offensive, pp. 186–7.

Although nothing like such an overwhelming success as the attacks on Hamburg at the end of the previous July, compared with the results of all the earlier attacks on Berlin these raids were a severe blow. There was widespread dislocation of essential services and interruption of supplies. Industrial damage was heavy. Contemporary German reports indicate that in the first six raids alone 295 factories were hit and 46 completely destroyed. Nevertheless, it is also clear that under emergency measures production recovered remarkably quickly in the German capital and it was not finally crippled until the assault was renewed later in the year.

Many of the bomber crews who took part in the Battle of Berlin reported eventful sorties. Typical was the experience of Squadron Leader Baigent

Wing Commander C. H. Baigent, DSO, DFC and bar; born Ashburton, 16 Jan 1923; joined RNZAF Mar 1941; commanded No. 75 (NZ) Sqdn, 1945; died 10 Nov 1953.

and his crew of No. 115 Squadron one night towards the end of January 1944. Baigent, now on his second tour of opera- tions, was later to command the New Zealand Bomber Squadron at the age of twenty-two. Of his seventh trip to Berlin since the opening of the battle, he writes:

Our Lancaster, ‘N - Nuts’ was approaching Berlin at about 20,000 feet. There was thick cloud away below, the base lit up by many searchlights giving the effect of an illuminated white sheet on the floor of a dark room. Across this white sheet black insects - aircraft in our bomber stream - were progressing steadily. They stood out clearly and it was a simple matter for the Hun night fighter to stay above and pounce down every so often to pick off a trundling bomber. One of them made a pass at us but my gunners did not see him until the last moment when they yelled a warning and I began weaving smartly. My enthusiasm for weaving was encouraged by a shower of tracer and exploding cannon shells all around. The Lancaster was hit in several places and the port outer engine set on fire. We got it feathered and luckily the fire went out. We made our bombing run. Then just as the bomb aimer called ‘bombs away’, a fighter gave us another sharp shower of cannon shells. The controls went ‘haywire’ but we managed to level up at about 3,000 feet and headed for home. Both the engineer and rear gunner were wounded. Very slowly, it seemed, and very lonely we made our gradual way back, seeing the odd fighter looking for us, but always managing to find a convenient bit of cloud. The elevators had been hit, necessitating a big push forward on the stick for the rest of the flight. We managed to wedge something large between the stick and the seat to stop us from stalling all the time and in this fashion we eventually reached our base near Ely. On landing we found one tyre completely missing which helped to make the landing an interesting one ….

The same night, Pilot Officer Leech

Flight Lieutenant J. S. Leech, DFC; born Westport, 17 Aug 1911; farmer; joined RNZAF Feb 1942.

and his crew of No. 158 Halifax Squadron had an unenviable experience. About 150 miles on the homeward flight from Berlin, the starboard inner engine, which had been hit by flak, caught fire. Soon it became red hot and then the propeller flew off, crashing through the fuselage and tearing along the side from the pilot's to the navigator's compartment. Although it missed both men the propeller severed instrument controls and extinguished all lighting inside the aircraft. Aids to navigation were destroyed and Leech had to navigate his aircraft back to England, working by torchlight in intense cold from the icy blast which whistled through the gaping fuselage.

Among New Zealand airmen shot down over Berlin was Flight Lieutenant Kingsbury,

Flight Lieutenant L. C. Kingsbury, DFC; born Christchurch, 25 May 1916; joined RAF Dec 1938; transferred RNZAF Jan 1944; p.w. 2 Jan 1944.

who captained a Lancaster of No. 7 Pathfinder Squadron. Kingsbury had been with Bomber Command from the outbreak of the war and had survived many hazardous missions, but on New Year's night 1944 his luck failed him. With one engine out of action and the port main plane damaged by flak during the outward flight, he had pressed on through ice-laden clouds to drop his bombs, but over Berlin the Lancaster, unable to maintain sufficient height, was hit again. It began to go down, completely out of control. Kingsbury was the last to leave the crippled machine and his parachute had barely opened before he hit the ground. On regaining consciousness some hours later he found himself lying in slushy snow in a clearing in a lonely wood. His left leg was broken but he managed to crawl to the edge of the wood and find two forked branches to use as crutches. Finally he hobbled to a roadside where, after being ignored by several passers-by, he was finally found by a German policeman.

For men shot down near Berlin there was little chance of evading capture even if they were uninjured. However, many valiant attempts were made. For example, one New Zealand bomb aimer, Flight Sergeant Hunt,

Warrant Officer E.W.D. Hunt; born Rongotea, 20 Mar 1920; farmer; joined RNZAF Feb 1942; p.w. 24 Nov 1943.

of No. 166 Lancaster Squadron, after baling out from his burning aircraft near Berlin, walked for six days and nights before being captured. He had struggled on almost continuously to keep from freezing, only snatching a little sleep when exhausted, and had covered some 90 miles before he walked into the arms of a railway patrol.

One further episode from the Battle of Berlin must be recorded. It concerns a young navigator, Flight Sergeant Lindsay,

Flying Officer R. A. Lindsay, BEM; born Maidenhead, Berkshire, 4 May 1921; clerk; joined RNZAF Dec 1939.

who flew with No. 83 Lancaster Squadron. When his bomber crashed and caught fire on landing one wintry December night, Lindsay was thrown fifty feet in front of the aircraft. He was badly burnt about the face and sustained a broken arm and a broken ankle. Yet despite these injuries he dragged himself back to the wreckage, where he braved both the intense heat and blazing petrol in order to help extricate his bomb aimer and his flight engineer who were trapped and seriously injured. He then helped move them to safety. Such was the standard of courage and comradeship among the bomber crews.

* * * * *

By the beginning of 1944 the combined Allied air attack on Germany had reached formidable proportions, and to meet the mounting scale of the assault radical changes in both the character and disposition of his air force had been pressed upon the enemy. Single and twin-engined fighters were transferred from Russia to Germany at the very moment when the growing superiority of the Soviet Air Force required a strengthening of German fighter oppo- sition. In the Mediterranean there was a reduction of German air strength to a point at which its influence over the course of operations became negligible. In January 1944 some 1650 fighter aircraft, representing no less than 68 per cent of Germany's total fighter strength, were concentrated in Western Europe, most of them inside Germany itself. The enemy was, in fact, being forced to defend his home front at the cost of serious military reverses elsewhere.

Faced with this growing concentration of strength over Germany the Allies decided upon a more vigorous attack against the source of German air power, and on 17 February 1944 directives were sent to the commanders of the British and American bomber forces in England ordering first priority to be given to the attacking of the German aircraft industry.

Two nights later RAF Bomber Command sent 823 aircraft to Leipzig, where four of the Erla group of Messerschmitt factories were situated. The following day 184 American Fortresses attacked the same target and in the two raids five out of ten of the most important factories in Leipzig suffered severe damage. These attacks inaugurated what came to be known as ‘The Big Week’, in which nearly 7000 sorties were flown by British and American bombers against targets of the German aircraft industry. There was close co-ordination of the day and night attack, and in unusually clear and fine weather crews were able to achieve a heavy concentration of bombing on almost every occasion.

Stuttgart, where there were important aero-engine and component factories, was the target for 600 RAF bombers on the night of 20 February. Then came heavy attacks on Schweinfurt, the main centre of the German ball-bearing industry, and Augsburg where there was a large Messerschmitt assembly plant. Both raids followed American daylight attacks a few hours earlier. Bomber Command's attack on Schweinfurt was scattered, but the Augsburg raid by 594 bombers, which attacked in two waves at an interval of two and a half hours, was highly successful even though the target area was covered in snow. Mosquitos which flew over an hour afterwards reported a solid mass of fires, and photographic reconnaissance confirmed that the industrial area had suffered severely, many of the principal factories being heavily damaged.

The effect of this combined and concentrated assault on the sources of German air power, coming on top of the 1943 attacks, was dramatic. German production plans were set back by some months and the German Air Force denied some thousands of aircraft when it needed them most. Nevertheless, prompt action was taken by the enemy to meet the deficiency. Aircraft production which had previously been under the German Air Ministry was now transferred to the organisation controlled by Speer, the energetic Minister of Armament Production. Special flying squads were formed to supervise clearance and repair of damaged plants. A thorough policy of dispersal of the aircraft industry was put into effect and the number of aircraft types in production drastically reduced.

These measures were to prove remarkably effective, and the German aircraft industry was able to continue producing the numbers on the ground. But machines alone were not enough. The loss of experienced pilots and the lack of a thorough system of training were now beginning to have a serious effect on the efficiency of the German fighter force. The Luftwaffe was steadily losing the battle in the air, and Speer's efforts at production, admirable though they were, could not save the situation.

It is also worth noting that, while the dispersal of aircraft production to factories underground or hidden in woods was initially successful in that the Allies were faced with a multiplicity of targets, it was only achieved at great economic expense and eventually the dilution of expert supervision made itself felt. In the end the dispersal increased the load on the German transport system, and when the Allied attack was subsequently concentrated on transport the final assembly plants lacked the necessary compo- nents. ‘It may well be,’ declares the American Post-War Bombing Survey, ‘that more aircraft were lost out of production because of dispersal than because of direct bombing.’

The attack on German cities and factories associated with aircraft production was continued during March 1944 when aircraft of RAF Bomber Command attacked Frankfurt, Nuremberg and Stutt- gart, as well as Berlin and Essen. The two raids on Frankfurt, each by forces of over 800 aircraft, caused widespread destruction throughout the city. In the second attack on the night of 22 March, German night fighters were particularly active and there were many incidents. For Flight Sergeant Windsor

Pilot Officer B. W. Windsor, DFM; born Christchurch, 3 Sep 1914; railway bridgeman; joined RNZAF Nov 1941; killed on air operations, 22 May 1944.

of No. 514 Squadron, who was on his fourth sortie as captain, it proved a particularly hazardous mission. While preparing to make its bombing run his Lancaster was attacked by a night fighter and both the rear and mid-upper gunners were killed. Windsor put his machine into a dive in an effort to escape, but a second burst from the fighter ignited incendiary bombs and set the aircraft on fire. The elevators were damaged and it took the combined efforts of pilot and flight engineer to pull the machine out of its dive. The bomb load was then jettisoned and the fire subdued, but the Lancaster remained extremely difficult to control so orders were given for the crew to bale out. However, after the navigator and bomb aimer had left, the loss of weight in the nose made it seem possible that the machine might be kept airborne. Windsor therefore cancelled the order to the rest of his crew and, helped by his flight engineer, managed to regain some kind of control. It was then discovered that the aircraft was in a balloon barrage but Windsor was able to gain sufficient height to get clear. In the meantime his wireless operator had repaired his damaged transmitter and obtained direction over enemy territory and the coast. This enabled Windsor to establish his approximate position and eventually bring the Lancaster and its three surviving crew members back to their base.

Along with the RAF night raids United States daylight bombers, with powerful long-range fighter escort, continued to make frequent incursions deep into Germany and there were hard and bitter air battles in which the German fighter forces suffered steadily increasing loss. The decisive factor in these battles was the American long-range fighter with a radius of action far in excess of anything previously experienced. Its appearance was, as Goering himself declared, ‘a tragedy for the Luftwaffe.’ Its rapid development during the last months of 1943, after the failure of unescorted daylight bombing missions, had indeed been an astounding feat of energy and production and it took the Germans more or less completely by surprise. When the first Thunderbolts and Mustangs appeared over Hanover, the report of their presence was received by Goering with incredulity and the reporting centre concerned was reprimanded. But shortly afterwards, when his Commander-in-Chief Fighters, General-Leutnant Galland, took off on patrol to observe the performance of the German fighters, he was chased by four Mustangs back to Berlin.

Even so Goering insisted that his fighters should not challenge the American escort but concentrate on their bomber formations. Galland protested in vain against such purely defensive tactics. The result was that the Mustangs and Thunderbolt pilots were soon operating with a marked sense of superiority. German difficulties were further increased when long-range fighter formations began to attack airfields and depots deep inside Germany, thus adding to the destruction caused by Allied bombers in the aircraft factories and assembly plants.

By April 1944 the ability of the Luftwaffe to defend Germany against the mounting scale of the Allied attack had passed its marginal point and was steadily deteriorating whereas the capabilities of the Allies were improving. This trend is revealed in German records of aircraft losses in combat in the West European theatre. From 307 machines in January 1944, losses jumped in February to 456, of which 65 were night fighters of the type directed chiefly against the missions of RAF Bomber Command. The total for the month of March rises to 567, of which 94 were night fighters. The German Air Force was, in fact, being swamped by a force superior both in numbers and in quality. If it was not yet beaten – for it continued to be capable of occasional bursts of extreme energy – it nevertheless suffered a severe defeat in the early months of 1944. That defeat was brought about by attrition of the German fighter forces in the air and on the ground, by the consequent deterioration in quality of the German fighter pilots, and by the attacks on German aircraft production which caused delay in the expansion of the fighter force. A considerable part of the credit must be given to the American long-range fighter escort, but by itself the fighter force could not have carried the battle to the enemy. It was in a desperate and all-out effort to defend the industries of the Reich from both the day and night heavy bomber that the Luftwaffe had been given high, if belated, priority in production and reorganised into an almost exclusively defensive force.

Towards the end of 1943 there had been grave doubts concerning the ability of the Allied air forces to beat down the growing strength of the Luftwaffe sufficiently to make an invasion of Europe possible. But now as the final preparations for the landings in Normandy began it was clear that the Allied air forces were well on the way to achieving the air superiority that would ensure freedom of movement to the Allied armies and navies while denying it to the enemy. Germany had now been thrown almost completely on the defensive in the air. She had heavily reduced her bomber production in order that maximum resources could be devoted to fighters and defensive equipment. Her fighters and flak were deployed not on the critical battlefronts or to oppose a possible landing, but were spread throughout Germany in a desperate attempt to defend vital targets at home. Nearly a million men were tied down to these defences and many more were engaged on repair work in the German industrial centres, many of which had been seriously disorganised. The air war was not yet won but its outcome was no longer in doubt.

On 14 April 1944 the British and American bomber forces were placed under the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, and for the next five months were to be mainly engaged on operations preparing the way for and in support of the Allied armies. This brought some interruption of the strategic bombing of Germany, but during the last months of 1944 the Allied bombers were to return in full strength for the final and overwhelming assault on the sources of German industrial and military power.

CHAPTER 5 With Mine, Bomb, and Torpedo

Throughout1943 the growing power of the Allied bombing offensive and the deadly battle with the U-boats were the dominating features of the air war against Germany. But there were other campaigns that now absorbed a considerable proportion of the available effort and resources and which, while unspectacular in themselves, achieved quite remarkable results. One of these campaigns, waged continuously throughout 1943, was the attack on German sea communications in North-West Europe and the Baltic.

This offensive against enemy shipping had started in the early days of the war but it was not accorded high priority, only such marginal forces being employed as were available after the requirements of other more important operations had been met. Neverthe- less, while the tonnage of merchant shipping available to Germany in these waters at the end of 1940 was adequate, by 1943 the situation had changed to one of considerable stringency. Moreover, the Germans were then forced to deploy in defence of their merchant ships more than 75,000 men, several hundreds of small vessels as escorts and nearly one-quarter of a million tons as Sperrbrechers - converted merchant ships specially equipped as minesweepers and heavily armed escorts.

The greater part of the German and German-controlled merchant fleet was employed in carrying supplies between Germany and Scandinavia; to a lesser extent it conveyed military stores to German forces in Norway and Finland. There was also brisk coastal traffic between German, Dutch, and Danish ports and some coastwise movement of military supplies to the East Baltic.

Most important commodities in the enemy trade with Scandinavia were the import into Germany of iron ore and the export of coal and coke. Indeed, these accounted over the whole war for about 80 per cent of the total German overseas trade in the North-West Europe and Baltic areas. Swedish ore was of a very high grade and of particular value in the manufacture of high-quality steel for armaments; it was also especially suited to the open-hearth process of steel manufacture practised in Germany. The imports from Sweden provided a quarter of Germany's iron-ore requirements for the Ruhr. Much of this iron ore was unloaded at Rotterdam and transferred to barges for its onward journey through inland water- wayswaterways to the steel furnaces of the Ruhr. Indeed Rotterdam, which was reached by a fairly well-defined route along the Frisian Islands, received a large proportion of the total traffic through the Kiel Canal including cargoes from Norway and Finland as well as from Sweden.

Interruption of this traffic was attempted by two distinct forms of air action. The first comprised attacks with bombs or torpedoes, and later with rocket projectiles, by formations of shore-based aircraft against ships at sea or in harbour. Such attacks took place along the continental seaboard from Calais to Trondheim, but until the closing stages of the war they were not pressed eastward into the Skagerrak and the Baltic owing to the limited range and performance of the early types of aircraft. Torpedoes were used in the North Sea and off the south-west coast of Norway with good effect, although north of Stavanger where shipping moved through sheltered channels they were of less value. From December 1944 the rocket took the place of the torpedo in all areas as by that time the enemy seldom exposed his shipping during daylight in those waters where torpedoes could be used. Rockets proved specially effective off the Norwegian coast in the final stages.

The second method of aerial attack was minelaying by heavy bombers of the RAF, which was carried on continuously from April 1940 until the end of the war. It started in a small way but, increasing in scale and extent as the war progressed, aerial minelaying in the end accounted for seven times the number of ships sunk or damaged by mines laid by surface vessels in the North-West European area. Air action as a whole was responsible for by far the largest part of the shipping casualties inflicted upon the enemy in this same region.

By the beginning of 1943 the majority of the torpedo and bombing attacks were being carried out by aircraft of RAF Coastal Command while minelaying from the air was the responsibility of Bomber Command. Minelaying was, in fact, Bomber Command's most consistent and effective contribution to the war at sea. It proved a useful method of giving freshmen crews operational experience and was also a means of employment for at least part of the bomber force when weather was not suitable for operations over Germany. Between January 1943 and February of the following year, when there came a change of tasks in preparation for the invasion of Europe, aircrews of Bomber Command laid 16,668 mines, an average of well over one thousand a month.

All main force groups of the Command took a share in the mine- laying, but No. 3 Group was particularly prominent and its

ATTACKS ON GERMAN SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY BOMBER AND COASTAL COMMANDSBlack and white map showing Coastal Command bases, Areas of British bomber bases, Minelaying by Bomber Command, and Torpedo and Rocket attacks by Coastal Command squadrons laid almost half the total number of mines. As this Group still had a high New Zealand representation among its aircrews and No. 75 Squadron was one of its units, New Zealanders took part in many of these missions. During the fourteen months from January 1943 No. 75 Squadron alone was to lay 1625 mines, which represented one-fifth of the Group's effort and only slightly less than one-tenth of the total number of mines dropped by Bomber Command. To achieve this outstanding result the New Zealand Squadron despatched 460 sorties, during which eighteen bombers were lost with their crews.

The main targets of the minelaying aircraft continued to be the traffic in iron ore from Scandinavia to the Ruhr via Rotterdam, and the movement of troops and supplies to Norway and to the Eastern Front through the Baltic. One ship laden with iron ore which was sunk by a mine in the Kiel Canal blocked it for several weeks. The 18,000-ton liner Gneisenau, used as a trooper for the Russian front, became a total wreck in the western Baltic, while another large troopship carrying ground crews and equipment to north Norway for Luftwaffe units that were attacking Allied convoys to Russia was sunk by a mine in the Kattegat. The train-ferry plying between Sweden, Denmark, and Germany was also a fruitful target. In addition, mines laid by Bomber Command upset the arrival and departure of blockade runners, armed merchant raiders, and other ships using ports on the west coast of France.

With the steady campaign waged against German U-boats entering and leaving their Biscay bases, minelaying also played a part in the Battle of the Atlantic. It is recorded that on one occasion a typical German reception, with a band on the pier, was waiting to greet two submarines returning from a successful Atlantic patrol. One of the captains, anxious to be first in, manoeuvred his ship ahead of the other, and in front of the reception his submarine touched off a mine and was blown to pieces. Mines were also frequently laid in the U-boat exercising grounds in the Baltic, where training of U-boat crews was often interrupted. Altogether, twenty-six German U-boats were sunk by mines during the war, sixteen of them by mines laid by the Royal Air Force. Areas through which German warships might pass were also mined in the hope of causing delay and damage. The whole campaign compelled the enemy to retain large numbers of skilled naval personnel and valuable materials for the sweeping of widely spaced harbours and channels used by his shipping.

At the beginning of 1943 Bomber Command was faced with new problems in its minelaying, as the Germans had reacted strongly to the increased activity of the previous year. Night fighters now made more frequent interceptions while anti-aircraft guns and flak ships placed in the vicinity of the most vulnerable areas took a heavier toll of the British bombers. What the bomber crews had considered a simple mission now became as dangerous as the bombing raids on some land targets, for the successful laying of mines still depended on aircraft flying in low to the dropping point. This was necessary not only to achieve accuracy but also to avoid exploding the mines by the shock of impact, which was likely to happen if they were dropped from a height exceeding 1000 feet. Until the scientists could devise ways for aircraft to drop from higher levels, mining was generally restricted to more open areas where there was less chance of interception by night fighters and the dangers from flak were not so great. Even so, losses continued to be relatively heavy; there were frequent reports of combats with enemy fighters and many machines returned bearing signs of encounters with enemy anti-aircraft batteries.

On the night of 18 January Sergeant Bennett was captain of one of two Stirlings from No. 75 Squadron sent to lay mines in the Gironde estuary. This was his first operation as captain of aircraft. On approaching the French coast the bomber was attacked by a Messerschmitt 110 but, before it could do any damage, the mid-upper and rear gunners had both fired sharp bursts, upon which the fighter pulled over on to its back and disappeared. The Stirling then carried on and dropped its mines in the estuary, but on the way out the crew found themselves flying over several German flak ships. These put up an intense barrage, rocking the Stirling, but it managed to get clear. No sooner had a course been set for base when a Junkers 88 was sighted to port. Bennett took evasive action but the enemy machine hung on without opening fire. Describing this incident later, Bennett said:

The reason for this soon became obvious when my rear gunner gave me directions for turning away from another Junkers from the rear. Each German fighter appeared to be acting as a decoy for the other. Had I adopted my rear gunner's direction we should have been exposed to the fire of the fighter on our port wing.

The rear and mid-upper gunners were able to get in bursts at the enemy on their tail, who was so close that when he returned fire the gunners could actually hear the noise of the German cannon. Bennett continued:

At this stage we were down to almost the level of the sea and must have been silhouetted against reflection of the moon – a sitting bird for the enemy. But luck was on our side and a thick blanket of cloud suddenly appeared and gave us protection. We lost the fighters.

Once more a course was set for base but again the crew found themselves over the flak ships; however, they soon got clear. The action had been so violent that everything movable in the Stirling had been thrown on to the floor and the navigator, who had been sitting behind the pilot, retrieved his maps from well forward over the bomb-sight, down in the nose of the aircraft.

One night in February a lone Stirling of No. 149 Squadron captained by Flying Officer Drummond

Squadron Leader L. J. Drummond, DFC; born Auckland, 10 Aug 1913; solicitor; joined RNZAF May 1941.

ran the gauntlet of search- lightssearchlights and batteries defending the entrance to the port of Bordeaux when it was detailed to drop mines within half a mile of the shore. At first all went well. A pinpoint was obtained in the vicinity of the dropping zone and Drummond began the run to lay his mines at a height of only 800 feet. The night was particularly clear, with a bright full moon which made it easier to find the dropping area. At the same time, however, it enabled the Stirling to be readily picked out by shore batteries, and as no other aircraft were flying in the area at that moment, the bomber soon became a magnet for the enemy defences on both sides of the river. Although sought by numerous searchlights and the target for both heavy and light flak, Drummond held firmly to his course and the mines were laid in the correct position. Unfortunately, as he turned away the Stirling was hit by several anti-aircraft shells which knocked out all three gun-turrets and damaged navigational instruments. Three members of the crew were wounded. During the return flight Flight Sergeant Harvey,

Flying Officer W. L. Harvey, DFM; born Dunedin, 6 Feb 1920; labourer; joined RNZAF Dec 1940; killed on air operations, 14 Jan 1944.

the wireless operator, although bleeding profusely from a deep head wound and suffering considerable pain, remained at his post and obtained a number of fixes and bearings which greatly assisted Drummond in navigating his damaged machine back to its base.

Bomber Command's record lay of mines during 1943 took place in April when 1887 mines were released in all the principal areas. More than half this total was dropped on two successive nights in response to an Admiralty request to drop a new type of mine which employed a combination of acoustic and magnetic fuses designed to defeat current German minesweeping methods. To secure a maximum of surprise it was essential that these mines should be laid in quantity at all the principal minefields within a matter of hours. Therefore on two successive nights towards the end of April when weather over Germany was unsuitable for bombing operations, strong forces were turned to minelaying. The first night a force of 160 Lancasters, Halifaxes, Stirlings and Wellingtons laid 458 mines along the French west coast and Frisian Islands, and on the second a total of 226 bombers dropped 593 mines in the Heligoland Bight, off the Norwegian coast, in the Kattegat and Baltic Approaches, and in channels off the Baltic ports from Kiel to the Gulf of Danzig. On both occasions the mines were laid from low level underneath a layer of cloud. On the 27th when the nearer areas were tackled only one aircraft was missing, but twenty-three bombers failed to return from the more distant and difficult fields.

Many New Zealanders flew in aircraft from RAF squadrons, while No. 75 Squadron was represented on both of these important missions. On 27 April the four New Zealand Stirlings laid their mines and returned safely to base but the following night, when eight aircraft were sent to Kiel Bay, four failed to return. Ten New Zealanders were among the missing crews, including two captains, Pilot Officer D. L. Thompson and Sergeant Halliburton.

Sergeant K. Halliburton; born Ashburton, 14 Oct 1919; butcher; joined RNZAF Sep 1941; killed on air operations, 28 Apr 1943.

The crews who returned reported no sightings of enemy aircraft but heavy anti-aircraft fire came from a flak ship stationed in the mining area.

Progress was now being made in the difficult task of developing a new technique that would outwit the German defences and their methods of assessing the numbers and positions of mines laid. By March the packing material which protected the delicate mechanism of the mines had been improved sufficiently to allow them to be dropped from heights up to 3000 feet. In the following months there was further patient experiment, and although many missions in open areas continued to be carried out at low level, from August onwards mines were laid regularly in some of the more dangerous zones from a height of 6000 feet. As a result there was a substantial fall in the loss rate which had been so severe at the beginning of the year.

The possibilities of high-level minelaying from normal bombing heights between 12,000 to 15,000 feet had been appreciated as early as May 1943, but before this became a practical proposition much research had to be undertaken. Eventually special mines were produced in which packing materials and parachutes had been further improved. Then a pathfinder technique was evolved, so that when necessary a high concentration of mines could be achieved by the use of sea or sky markers accurately placed with the aid of H2S.

But it was not until the end of 1943 that the persistent efforts of all concerned were fully rewarded, and high-level minelaying became an accomplished fact with the first operational trial on the night of 30 December. This was flown by three Stirlings of No. 149 Squadron which were sent to lay mines off Bordeaux from a height of 12,000 feet. The aircraft were opposed by accurate heavy flak but laid their mines successfully. Two New Zealanders, Flying Officer Barlow

Flight Lieutenant H. C. Barlow, DFC; born Opotiki, 3 Apr 1909; clerk; joined RNZAF Jan 1942.

and Flying Officer Stock,

Flight Lieutenant N. F. Stock, DFC; born Nelson, 5 May 1914; mental hospital attendant; joined RNZAF Jan 1942.

were navigator and bomb aimer respectively in one Stirling. Stock was not satisfied with the first approach to the dropping zone and asked for a second run to be made before he was confident the mines would be laid in the correct position. Other experimental missions were to be flown. On 4 January 1944 six Lancasters laid mines off Brest and two nights later six Halifaxes operated in the same area. Thereafter the high-level method was generally adopted for operations in the heavily defended areas. Continuous, large-scale minelaying again became possible in all areas extending from the Franco-Spanish frontier to the Gulf of Danzig and, in particular, in certain of the Baltic areas where for over a year it had been virtually impossible to mine with the low-flying visual technique.

With new weapons it was no longer necessary for aircraft to fly at low heights to search for a pinpoint before beginning their run up to the laying positions, while by using H2S mines could be dropped with precision through thick cloud. Increased safety was also given to the attacking aircraft and the enemy was presented with new problems in plotting the positions of the mines laid.

Now that the enemy's most heavily defended harbours and swept channels were again vulnerable to minelaying there was a rapid increase in the number of sorties carried out, and many New Zealanders were among the aircrews who took part in the operations during January and February 1944 in which this new method of sea warfare was used. New Zealand airmen also took part in a new tactical development introduced on the night of 24 February when 115 aircraft were sent to lay mines in Kiel Harbour, the Kattegat, and Lorient as a diversion for a main-force bombing attack by over 700 aircraft on Schweinfurt. The next night minelaying was again used as a diversion for a main-force attack of almost 600 aircraft on Augsburg, the areas mined being St. Nazaire, The Sound and Kiel. The co-ordination of minelaying and bombing operations in this manner gave additional protection to both forces by confusing the enemy ground organisation and splitting the fighter force available in the area of the attacks.

Although No. 75 Squadron despatched aircraft on minelaying sorties in each of the first nine months of 1943, the greater part of its effort was to be concentrated in the last quarter of that year and the first two months of 1944. This emphasis on minelaying followed the decision taken in September that the Halifax and Stirling squadrons should be restricted to the less hazardous targets, leaving the Lancaster to bear the brunt of the bomber offensive.

In October and November 1943 squadron aircraft laid a total of 176 mines in the Baltic, the Bay of Biscay, in the Gironde estuary, and off the Frisian Islands and the port of Cherbourg. On the night of 24 October one Stirling which laid mines off the Frisian Islands crashed when about to land and was burnt out. Three New Zealanders including the captain, Flight Sergeant Randle,

Flight Sergeant J. R. Randle; born Invercargill, 11 Jun 1922; clerk; joined RNZAF Nov 1941; killed on air operations, 24 Oct 1943.

were among those killed. The 4th November was a particularly unfortunate night for the squadron when, of the four aircraft sent to lay mines in the Baltic, three failed to return. Their captains were Flying Officer Wilson

Flying Officer N. C. B. Wilson; born Auckland, 12 May 1920; electrical draughtsman; joined RNZAF Dec 1941; killed on air operations, 4 Nov 1943.

and Pilot Officers Masters

Pilot Officer W. S. Masters; born Waiuku, 27 Mar 1922; clerk; joined RNZAF Feb 1942; killed on air operations, 4 Nov 1943.

and G. K. Williams; eight other New Zealanders were among their crews. The surviving aircraft, flown by Flying Officer Witting,

Flight Lieutenant E. F. Witting, DFC; born Invercargill, 28 May 1920; clerk; joined RNZAF Sep 1941.

was attacked by an enemy fighter when approaching the mining area and the rear gunner was killed. Witting succeeded in jettisoning his mines during the combat and then skilfully outmanoeuvred the enemy machine. Although the Stirling had sustained severe damage to the port wing, starboard flap and rear turret, and also had many large holes torn in the fuselage, Witting flew back to base and made a safe landing. In December ten minelaying missions, involving twenty-nine aircraft, were flown by No. 75 Squadron and 108 mines laid; unfortunately, during the month two Stirlings crashed on return after laying their mines. One of these machines was flown by Pilot Officer Kinross,

Pilot Officer C. J. Kinross; born Hastings, 7 Oct 1913; carpenter; joined RNZAF Dec 1941; killed on air operations, 16 Dec 1943.

who had Flying Officer Jenkin

Flying Officer R. F. Jenkin; born New Plymouth, 2 Oct 1920; student; joined RNZAF Nov 1941; killed on air operations, 16 Dec 1943.

as his navigator.

The scale of No. 75's effort during January was to be considerably increased, 72 sorties being flown to lay 233 mines in the Heligoland area, the Frisian Islands, in the Gironde estuary and in Kiel Bay The New Zealanders' first experience of high-level minelaying came on the night of 27 January, when thirteen aircraft were sent to the Heligoland area and succeeded in dropping a total of sixty-five mines from heights varying between 12,000 feet and 15,500 feet. All the aircraft got back, but the Stirling captained by Pilot Officer Baker

Flying Officer C. R. Baker, DFC; born Palmerston North, 20 Jul 1922; student; joined RNZAF Feb 1942; killed in flying accident, 16 Apr 1945.

was intercepted by a Messerschmitt 110 whilst on the return flight. The enemy was first sighted on the starboard side and bomber and fighter opened fire simultaneously. Before Baker could take evasive action and gain the cover of cloud his aircraft was hit; the rear turret and intercommunication system were put out of action and the flight engineer and mid-upper gunner wounded. Displaying fine airmanship Baker got the Stirling back to England, but on attempting to land at Coltishall he found the undercarriage would not go down; he succeeded, however, in making a safe crash-landing.

In February the squadron's effort was entirely devoted to minelaying and in twenty operations 120 aircraft were despatched to lay no fewer than 372 mines. Towards the end of the month, when minelaying aircraft were used as a diversion for the bombing attacks on Schweinfurt and Augsburg, the squadron sent fifteen aircraft to Kiel Harbour on the first occasion and the next night the same number went to The Sound. The Stirling captained by Flight Sergeant Bruhns

Pilot Officer H. H. Bruhns; born Dunedin, 27 Feb 1921; wool classer; joined RNZAF Jan 1942; killed on air operations, 24 Feb 1944.

failed to return from Kiel but there were no losses the second night, although Flight Sergeant Willis

Pilot Officer W. J. Willis; born Bulls, 3 Feb 1911; farmer; joined RNZAF Mar 1942; killed on air operations, 22 May 1944.

and his crew reported a brush with several Junkers 88s flying in formation.

The results of the minelaying campaign were difficult to assess at the time owing to the delayed action of mines which might lie for a considerable time before claiming a victim and because of loss or damage to enemy vessels caused by other methods of attack. However, reports of casualties in mined areas were frequent and covered many classes of shipping including troopships, cargo vessels, tankers, train ferries, naval surface craft and U-boats, while the large sweeping force also suffered heavily in its efforts to keep channels and harbours clear of mines. Evidence of the effectiveness of minelaying in the Baltic was provided by the Naval Liaison Officer at German Air Force Operations Division in April 1943. He stressed the shortage of escort vessels which allowed escorts to be provided only for troopships, transports, tankers, hospital ships, and warships in those waters where the greatest danger was from mines and where all ships should have been provided with individual escort. In February 1944 the same officer reported: ‘It is evident that the enemy intends to interrupt, if not destroy, all supply shipping to Norway by the relatively heavy use of mines. It is now being decided whether night fighters in the Jutland area can be reinforced.’

The German anxiety is understandable for it is now evident that the RAF minelaying campaign was more successful than was estimated at the time. Post-war examination of enemy shipping records and reports received by Lloyds of London reveals that, during 1943, some 143 ships totalling just over 103,450 tons were sunk by mines laid by aircraft. In 1944 the Germans lost a further 204 ships of 136,500 tons, and by the end of the war the total had reached 758 ships amounting to 721,700 tons, sunk as a result of aerial minelaying. In addition to these actual losses, which they could not hope to replace, the Germans were deprived of large quantities of badly needed war materials, which delayed production. They were also forced to divert an increasing amount of their manpower and materials to the repair of damaged ships and to the protection of their sea routes.

* * * * *

Bomber Command's minelaying campaign during 1943 was supplemented by torpedo and bombing attacks carried out mainly by Beaufighters and Hampdens of Coastal Command. The torpedo was now the principal weapon and there were two main areas of attack, the Dutch coast from the Frisian Islands to Rotterdam and the south-western coast of Norway. In both these regions there was to be a steady development of aerial attack during 1943. Operations fell into two main classes – the ‘Rover’ patrol flown by small formations of from two to six machines and the ‘Strike’ by larger forces with fighter escort, against targets previously located by reconnaissance aircraft. Rover patrols were more frequently employed along the Norwegian coast where convoys were less heavily defended; Strike Wings were gradually developed for attacks off the Dutch coast where there was usually stronger opposition.

At the beginning of the year No. 489 New Zealand Squadron was one of several Hampden squadrons employed in patrol and attack along the Norwegian coast. This New Zealand torpedo-bomber squadron had been formed at Leuchars in Scotland in August 1941 and during the next twelve months it had experienced a chequered career. The early training was interrupted by shortages of torpedo aircraft and some months elapsed before No. 489 was finally equipped with Hampdens discarded by Bomber Command. Then its role was suddenly changed to anti-submarine work and the first operational sorties were flown over the Bay of Biscay. It was not until July 1942 that the squadron returned northwards to take up its originally intended task of attacking enemy shipping in northern waters. During the closing months of that year there were several successful attacks on enemy ships; the Hampdens also flew escort patrols to naval forces proceeding to and from Scapa, covered convoys bound for Russian Arctic ports, and searched for U-boats travelling to and from bases in Norway.

January 1943 found the New Zealand Squadron based at Wick on the north-east coast of Scotland under the command of an English pilot, Wing Commander Darling.

Wing Commander V. C. Darling, OBE; RAF; born Acton, London, 8 Sep 1915; Cranwell cadet; permanent commission RAF 1936; commanded No. 86 Sqdn, 1942; No. 489 (NZ) Sqdn, 1942–43; duty with Directorate of Ops (Air Staff), 1944.

New Zealanders now made up a substantial part of the aircrew strength of the unit but there was still strong representation from other parts of the Commonwealth, from Canada and Australia as well as from the British Isles. Squadron Leader Evans

Wing Commander G. H. D. Evans, DSO, DFC; RAF; born Poplar, London, 29 May 1917; Cranwell cadet; permanent commission RAF 1937; commanded No. 415 Sqdn, 1943.

of London and Squadron Leader James

Wing Commander R. H. James; born Ross-on-Wye, Herefordshire, 4 Oct 1917; joined RAF 1936; killed on air operations, 8 Aug 1944.

of Ross-on-Wye were the flight commanders, while Flight Lieutenant Mottram

Squadron Leader A. J. Mottram, DFC; born Coventry, Warwickshire, 8 Jun 1920; joined RAF Jul 1940.

of Coventry, the prominent English tennis player, Flying Officer Pedersen,

Flight Lieutenant H. Pedersen; born Copenhagen, 6 Jan 1918; joined RAF Nov 1940.

a Danish pilot, Warrant Officer Dubbery

Flight Lieutenant J. Dubbery, DFC; born Newport, Essex, 2 Dec 1918; aero dynamicist; joined RAF Mar 1940; p.w. 14 May 1943.

from Essex and Warrant Officer Strain,

Flying Officer J. Strain, DFC, AFC; born Glasgow, 9 Dec 1912; joined RAF Sep 1939.

a Scot from Glasgow, all won