Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War <date from="1939" to="1945">1939

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DOCUMENTS Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War By Authority: R. E. Owen, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand 1963

Title page DOCUMENTS Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939–45 VOLUME III WAR HISTORY BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRSWELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND1963Distributed bywhitcombe & tombs ltd. Christchurch New Zealand

Preface

This volume, the third and final of the ‘Documents’ series is, like its predecessors, complementary to the campaign and political volumes of the war history programme. It is based on documents held in the Prime Minister's Department and the Service departments, to which access, for the purpose of producing this collection, has always been entirely unrestricted. Their bulk is formidable, and publication in full quite impracticable; indeed, many of them are only of minor importance.

In order, therefore, to present a reasonable picture of the problems which confronted the Government of New Zealand in particular, and also those of her Allies, in the prosecution of the war in the Pacific with which this volume is primarily concerned, a selection of documents had to be made. Every care has been taken to include all executive and enough informative documents to provide an adequate coverage of each subject; but the number published comprises only a small proportion of the whole, especially in the sections dealing with relations with Japan and Thailand before the outbreak of war in the Pacific.

As with previous volumes, the documents are presented chronologically within various subject headings. The telegrams reproduced contain the errors and mutilations in transmission which exist in the originals. No effort was made at the time, except with gross errors, at any elucidation, and none has been attempted since. Most of the documents therefore appear in the form on which the Government acted: the chief exceptions are General Freyberg's telegrams, which have been corrected with the file copies of the originals, and the telegrams published by Mr Churchill in his volumes on the Second World War.

The requirements as to the paraphrasing of messages, which applied to Volumes I and II, have now, because of effluxion of time, been waived. Where, however, multiple addresses were used, as is common practice between Commonwealth countries, only the New Zealand address is reproduced. Annotation, again for reasons of space, has been restricted.

The research for the three volumes in this series has been the work of Mr L. S. Hart and Mr C. R. McColl, formerly of the staff of the War History Branch, and of Mr W. A. Glue, who also prepared the documents for publication. Mrs M. M. Fogarty compiled the index.

M. C. Fairbrother,Editor-in-Chief, New Zealand War Histories

Contents

Page PREFACE V RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, JUNE–OCTOBER 1940 1 RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND THAILAND, 1941 32 OUTBREAK OF WAR: JAPAN AND THAILAND 79 COMMAND IN THE PACIFIC: ABDA AND ANZAC AREAS 110 EXTENSION OF ANZAC AREA 159 DIVISION OF STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 169 DEFENCE OF NEW ZEALAND 206 DEFENCE OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC 267 RELIEF OF NEW ZEALAND GARRISONS IN FIJI AND TONGA 318 FANNING ISLAND 334 FORMATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF 3RD NEW ZEALAND DIVISION 349 WITHDRAWAL OF 2ND NZEF IP 430 PROPOSALS FOR PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN 458 THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 497 PARTICIPATION IN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 510 APPENDICES I: Appreciation of Probable Japanese Policy in the Far East, November 1939 531 II: Memorandum on Australian and New Zealand Naval Defence, November 1939 535 III: Note of Hon. P. Fraser's Views, November 1939 538 IV: Appreciation by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on the Situation in the Far East, August 1940 540 V: Major-General H. E. Barrowclough's Charter as GOC 2nd NZEF in Pacific 553

Relations with Japan, June–October 1940

1 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Secretaries of State for Dominion Affairs in the United Kingdom Government during the war were:

28 Jan 1939–3 Sep 1939Rt. Hon. Viscount Caldecote, PC, CBE, KC (then Sir Thomas Inskip).3 Sep 1939–12 May 1940Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, PC, MC.12 May 1940–3 Oct 1940Viscount Caldecote.3 Oct 1940–19 Feb 1942Rt. Hon. Viscount Cranborne, PC.19 Feb 1942–28 Sep 1943Rt. Hon. Clement Attlee, PC, CH.28 Sep 1943–3 Aug 1945Viscount Cranborne.3 Aug 1945–7 Oct 1947Rt. Hon. Viscount Addison, KG, PC.

On 2 Jul 1947 the title of this office was changed to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

to the Governor-General of New Zealand

Governors-General of New Zealand during the war were:

1935–41Rt. Hon. Viscount Galway, PC, GCMG, DSO, OBE; died 27 Mar 1943.1941–46Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril Newall, GCB, OM, GCMG, CBE, AM. (Created Baron, 18 Jul 1946.)

26 June 1940

Circular telegram. Following for your Prime Minister:

Prime Ministers of New Zealand during the war were:

28 Nov 1935–death, 26 Mar 1940Rt. Hon. M. J. Savage, PC.1 Apr 1940–13 Dec 1949Rt. Hon. P. Fraser, PC, CH. (Died 12 Dec 1950.)

1. His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo

Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Craigie, PC, GCMG, CB; Ambassador to Japan, 1937–41.

has suggested that some readjustment of our Far Eastern policy which takes account of the impact on Japan of recent developments in Europe is now urgently necessary.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador has expressed his doubts whether the aim of preventing Japan from being drawn into the war on the side of her former Axis partners can be achieved without the adoption of some more positive methods than those followed hitherto. He feels that the United States policy, designed so to wear down Japanese resistance that the Army in Japan would be deposed from its paramount position, is now in view of the French collapse certainly ineffective.

3. Sir Robert Craigie considers that the issue by the United States Government of a declaration to the effect that they will not tolerate any change in the territorial status quo in the Pacific area would be valuable if it means more than a repetition of non-recognition of the aggressor, but that if an eventual head-on collision between the United States and Japan is to be avoided there should also be a more positive side to Anglo-American policy in the Far East. Hence it is important to know without delay:

(1)

Whether in the growing emergency in the Far East the United States are prepared to co-ordinate policy and to act with us more closely than in the past.

(2)

If so, whether it is possible to discover some common policy capable of dealing with the German drive to secure Japan's involvement in the European war. As to (2), he considers our object should on no account be to involve the United States in the war in the Far East on our behalf. Such involvement would be disastrous to our most vital interests since it would divert United States attention from Europe and seriously diminish the extent of United States material assistance at a crucial point. On the contrary he feels that we should seek a plan which would lessen the chance of United States involvement in the Far East by offering some alternative to that policy of stark aggression for which extremists and younger officers in Japan are now pressing so strongly.

4. He believes that if Great Britain and the United States were to agree upon it promptly an understanding might yet be reached with Japan along the following lines:

(a)

Joint assistance to Japan in bringing about peace with the Chinese Government on the basis of the restoration of China's independence and integrity.

(b)

Japan formally to undertake to remain neutral in the European war and to respect to the full the territorial integrity not only of the Netherlands East Indies, but also of British and of French and of American possessions in the Pacific so long as the status quo of these territories is preserved.

(c)

The United States and the members of the British Commonwealth to give Japan all financial and economic assistance and facilities in their power, both now and during the post-war reconstruction period.

(d)

The Allied Governments to receive full guarantees against reexport to enemy countries.

(e)

The question of the future status of settlements and concessions in China to be left in abeyance until the restoration of peace in Europe and China.

5. On the present procedure he thinks that such proposals should emanate from the Japanese themselves, and he has reason to believe that this might be quickest if Japanese intermediaries were to be definitely assured in advance that a settlement on these lines would be acceptable in principle both to the United Kingdom and United States Governments.

6. If, however, the United States answer to both questions in paragraph 3 were to be negative, and if the United States Government were unable to give us more active support, even as regards the International Settlement at Shanghai, he feels that at best we could seek to gain time by concessions on the points not considered of capital importance.

7. A telegram has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington

Lord Lothian, PC, KT, CH; British Ambassador at Washington, Aug 1939 – death, 12 Dec 1940.

suggesting that there seem to be two courses of action open to the United States:

(a)

To increase their pressure either to the extent of a full embargo or of the despatch of ships to Singapore, in full realisation that this may result in war with Japan.

(b)

To seek to wean Japan from aggression by a concrete offer on the lines suggested by Sir Robert Craigie.

8. The United Kingdom Government appreciate that if the United States of America were involved in war with Japan she would be unable to furnish the material assistance which we require in Europe at a crucial moment (though it is not known to what extent this would apply to fleet action only). If the United States Government share this view then we are anxious to know whether they are prepared to give early and serious consideration to the second alternative mentioned in paragraph 7.

9. While there is no doubt an element of bluff in the Japanese attitude, and wiser elements in Japan cannot but be conscious of the adverse effects upon their economy of an extension of the policy of aggression, we cannot ignore the possibility that interventionists may before long gain complete control. If anything can be done to prevent this it must be done soon.

10. In the meantime we are faced with the necessity of returning a reply to the Japanese demands which we understand have just been presented through the Ambassador:

(1)

To withdraw our garrison from Shanghai;

(2)

To close the Hong Kong frontier;

(3)

To close the Burmese frontier to supplies to Chiang Kai-shek.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of Chinese Supreme National Defence Council, 1939–47; President of China, 1943–49; resumed presidency, Taiwan, 1950.

11. As to (1), we feel that as the United States are not in a position to promise armed support, and as our own territories in the Far East are now in some danger of attack, we may well desire to withdraw troops to reinforce the garrisons of our colonies. We should, however, prefer not to appear to be giving way to a Japanese demand and to take this step in return for definite undertakings by the Japanese, possibly as a part of a general settlement on the lines of paragraph 7 (b). It is questionable, however, whether we could delay our reply for very long.

12. As to the second demand, we may be able to satisfy Japan without in fact making any concession in principle. But the third demand presents serious difficulties and is one which we feel we should endeavour to resist. At the same time we have to recognise that the Japanese, if they persist in their intention, have the means to enforce it. The situation is further complicated by the fact that by far the greater part of the traffic to which objection is taken is United States. Put bluntly, our problem is whether we are to incur both United States and Chinese odium by stopping traffic or face the consequences of refusal without United States support.

13. His Majesty's Ambassador has been asked to put these considerations before the United States Government at the earliest possible moment and to invite their observations.

His Majesty's Ambassador has been authorised to add that if there is war in the Far East we shall resist it to the best of our ability. The slenderness of our resources must however already be apparent to the United States Government, and the effect upon our operations in Europe of the severance of our communications, the loss of supplies and possibly also of shipping, would be obvious. If, on the other hand, the United States Government feel able either to come to our assistance or to undertake a policy directed towards the termination of hostilities between China and Japan, then we should be prepared to offer our full contribution. If conciliation is the alternative to be adopted then it is obvious that reinstatement of our position [group mutilated–with?] Japan renders it undesirable that we should take the initiative in the matter.

2 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand 2 July 1940

Reference my Circular telegram of 26 June.

The following telegram has been received from His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia:

‘The Commonwealth Government has given prolonged consideration to the questions in issue, and is in full agreement with the conclusion of the British Ambassador at Tokyo that a readjustment of Far Eastern policy is urgently necessary.

‘From reports and information from various quarters it seems to us that Japan will take advantage of the present European situation to further her extreme interests, even to the extent of war with the Empire, if immediate steps are not taken to meet the new position.

‘To our mind it is imperative at the outset to have a clear indication of United States policy, how far she is prepared to act beyond her recent negative policy and, at the same time, her intentions regarding the future disposition of the fleet. From the point of view of holding our position in the Pacific and the Far East, the continued maintenance of the fleet on Hawaii is essential, and so long as the British Fleet, the main defence of America on the Atlantic, remains undefeated, there would seem no reason outside American sentiment for it to be transferred to the Atlantic.

‘We consider that the present three Japanese demands do not in themselves vitally affect the future or present security of the Empire. French acceptance of similar demands has further strengthened the Japanese position, and we can only arrive at the conclusion that if the United States is not prepared to give most complete support, these demands should be conceded. The alternative is a grave risk of war against Japan, which cannot be contemplated in our present position.

‘As to the suggestions of Craigie for a general settlement, the basis of negotiation so far as they visualise the complete independence and integrity of China appears to us as quite impossible of acceptance by Japan. They would put her in a worse position than at the commencement of hostilities in 1937.

‘We cannot believe that Japan would herself make an approach to the United States of America and the United Kingdom on such a basis. In this respect it is strongly urged that if there is to be mediation, the [group mutilated–original?] proposal should go to the limit of concessions at the outset of the [group omitted–negotiations?] rather than raise the stakes when it is too late.

‘At the same time, we see virtue in this proposal of mediation for the termination of the Sino-Japanese war, only if the specific object and result is a tripartite declaration regarding the status quo in the Western Pacific and guarantees as to respective territorial integrity in the designated spheres, to which the United States must be definitely committed.

‘This latter may in fact prove difficult to obtain but, failing it, the United Kingdom herself should not offer to mediate.

‘Generally we agree with the view that it would be contrary to the successful prosecution of the war for the United States to become involved in war in the Pacific, and policy therefore must be based on the realities of the situation and the common sense that we should not at the moment take such action, or by omission of reasonable action, as will cause Japan to become involved in this war.’

The following reply has been sent:

‘War Cabinet this morning considered the Far Eastern situation and had before it your telegram of 27 June, for which we are much obliged.

‘After full consideration the War Cabinet came to the conclusion that it would be desirable to reply as follows to the Japanese demands:

(a)

To agree to the withdrawal of the Shanghai garrison provided the Italians also withdraw, and on the assumption that British lives and property will be protected and that the Japanese Government will not seek to alter the status of the Concession except in consultation with the parties concerned.

(b)

To make inquiry as to the precise grounds for complaint at Hong Kong, and,

(c)

With regard to the Burma Road, to point out that the passage of arms and ammunition to Chungking does not offer any very material contribution to the armed strength of China, that war material from the United Kingdom has been insignificant in recent months, and that owing to their own war effort His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are in fact unable to supply China with munitions of war. As to the stoppage of fuel, fuel oil and petrol, trucks and railway materials, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would state that in making this request the Japanese Government was asking them to take action inconsistent with their obligations to India and Burma, for whom the Burma Road constitutes a legitimate trade route. Relations with the United States would also be affected, inasmuch as the route is largely used for United States products. It is proposed to [group mutilated–say that?] in strict neutrality [group mutilated–compliance with a?] request to cut off these materials from China should involve a similar stoppage of supplies to Japan, though of course this is in no way the intention.

On the recommendation of Sir Robert Craigie, who considered that ‘there would be a serious risk that a reply on these lines would lead to a state of war with Japan’, its terms were subsequently modified.

‘Finally, it is proposed to say that, far from being instrumental in prolonging hostilities, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have always deplored them and have on various occasions expressed their readiness, should both parties so desire, to use their endeavours to bring the conflict to a close.

‘In arriving at the above conclusion His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been influenced by the fact that, while it is obviously desirable to avoid trouble with Japan at this moment, it is doubtful if concessions from Burma on points of principle, apart from other considerations, would bring any lasting improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations. Furthermore, in any attempt to find a way of accommodation with Japan, care must be taken not to destroy confidence in the United States and China in British policy.

‘As the Commonwealth Government are aware, the United States have indicated that they are prepared neither to increase pressure which might involve them in war nor to take the initiative in a policy of conciliation. On our part we are quite prepared to adopt the latter policy if it is capable of producing any results. But the United States Government appear to hold the view, which we are inclined to share, that the Japanese nation is in no mood to be weaned from a policy of aggression, and in these circumstances it seems more than likely that any concessions which we may [group mutilated–be?] ourselves ready to make will fail to deter Japan from her objective.

‘We are inclined to agree with Sir Robert Craigie that a refusal to close the Burma Road will not directly lead to war, and that the Japanese will in the first place have recourse to less violent measures. Unless Great Britain were to be defeated in Europe, moreover, it seems to us doubtful whether Japan would have recourse to total war. Japan's resources are not inexhaustible and, should she ultimately resort to hostilities, it seems much more probable that they would be limited and local and that, provided we ourselves did not declare a state of war, she would terminate them whenever it became apparent that a further advance would tax her resources beyond their machinery. If Japan is bent on a policy of this kind it is unlikely that anything can be done at this stage to deflect her. Nevertheless, Sir Robert Craigie is being authorised to explore the possibilities, and if these exist His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will naturally do what they can in consultation with Dominion Governments to exploit them.

‘In the light of the above, and in view of the very bad effect which the closing of the Burma Road would have upon India, Burma and Malaya, which would be directly affected, we feel that we should not close the Burma Road.

‘We fully appreciate the considerations advanced by the Commonwealth Government from the point of view of Australia. It will be understood that it is necessary for us to take into account all relevant factors, and we hope that in the light of the wider considerations mentioned above the Commonwealth Government will feel able to concur in the terms of the reply which it is proposed to send to Japan. We should be grateful for a very early reply.

‘We are repeating your telegram and this reply to His Majesty's Governments in Canada, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa with a request for any observations so far as they are concerned.’

We should be grateful if we could be informed as soon as possible whether His Majesty's Government in New Zealand concur in the terms of the reply which it is proposed to send to Japan.

3 The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 3 July 1940

With reference to your Circular telegram of 26 June [No. 1], my Ministers ask me to convey to you the text of a telegram which has today been despatched to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia

Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth of Australia during the war were:

26 Apr 1939–29 Aug 1941Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies, PC, CH, QC.29 Aug 1941–7 Oct 1941Rt. Hon. A. W. Fadden, PC.7 Oct 1941–death, 5 Jul 1945Rt. Hon. J. Curtin, PC.6 Jul 1945–13 Jul 1945Rt. Hon. F. M. Forde, PC.13 Jul 1945–19 Dec 1949Rt. Hon. J. B. Chifley, PC. (Died 13 Jun 1951.)

as follows:

‘I thank you for your telegram of 28 June

Repeated in No. 2.

with reference to the Far Eastern situation. We entirely agree with you on the following points:

(a)

The delicacy and danger of the situation.

(b)

The desirability of obtaining a clear indication of United States policy in the Far East.

(c)

The desirability, if circumstances allow, of retaining the United States Fleet in the Pacific.

(d)

The extreme undesirability of any act or omission on our part which might have the effect of unnecessarily precipitating trouble with Japan in our present situation.

(e)

The undesirability of any attempt to haggle with Japan.

(f)

The undesirability in the best interests of the British Commonwealth of the involvement of the United States in a war in the Far East.

(g)

The probable futility of the suggestion that in the present circumstances Japan might be induced on the lines proposed to offer to restore the territorial integrity and independence of China.

‘On the other hand we are most sceptical as to whether Japan could in the existing situation be persuaded to make a satisfactory tripartite declaration as to the status quo in the Pacific, or whether such a declaration if made would have any value at all unless accompanied by a full United States guarantee, which would seem unlikely at the moment.

‘Again we cannot bring ourselves to believe that the offer of mediation that you propose, in the absence of United States collaboration, offers any substantial promise of successful results. Nor are we convinced that a simple acceptance of the present Japanese demands would be morally right or even politically expedient. Indeed, we are inclined to feel that an acceptance of the Japanese demands or an offer of mediation between Japan and China might well be interpreted by the Japanese as a plain indication of our realisation of the weakness of our position and of our readiness on that account to sacrifice the Chinese and the principle of resisting aggression for the purpose of endeavouring to protect our own interests. We are at present inclined to feel that an appearance of continued confidence is more likely to be effective with the Japanese than any step which might be interpreted as a display of weakness. On the whole, however, we are inclined to defer the formation of any definite judgment on this most difficult problem until it has been possible to ascertain the result of the approach which has already been made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the United States Government.

‘A copy of this telegram has today been despatched to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.’

4 The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 3 July 1940

My Ministers desire me to inform you that their general views on the Far Eastern situation and on your Circular telegram of 26 June are set out in a telegram sent this morning to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, a copy of which was communicated to you.

My Ministers are in general agreement with the point of view expressed in your telegram of 2 July (Part 2 of which was received in a mutilated condition and was not deciphered or considered before the despatch of the above-mentioned telegrams). At the same time my Ministers feel that it would be preferable to await the result of the approach made to the United States Government before any reply is made to Japan, and they themselves propose to reserve any final decision on the points at issue until the United States attitude is known to them.

The New Zealand Government on 5 July telegraphed its concurrence with the terms of the reply to be sent to Japan.

A copy of this telegram is being sent to Canberra.

5 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand 11 July 1940

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 10 July, D. 327.

Not published. In this telegram the Dominions Secretary reported that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr Hachiro Arita) had expressed disappointment at the British reply to the Japanese demands and requested an assurance that exports of war material from the United Kingdom to China via the Burma Road ‘would remain insignificant’. Mr Arita had emphasised that the Japanese people were ‘in no mood to put up with “procrastination”’.

Following for Prime Minister:

In view of the attitude of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr Arita was Minister for Foreign Affairs from 16 January to 21 July 1940.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo has suggested that the best course as regards the Burma Road would be an agreement on our part to suspend the transit of war material through Burma for a period of three months, on the understanding that during this period special efforts will be made to bring a just and equitable peace in the Far East. Should these efforts fail, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would remain free to permit the transit of trade to be resumed at the end of three months.

2. Sir Robert Craigie has pointed out that the possibility of the resumption of traffic in October would be a lever for ensuring adequate Japanese attention to any suggestions which we and the United States might make meanwhile for the settlement of the China dispute, and would give time for the elaboration of concrete proposals for British and United States economic and financial assistance to Japan which would prevent her [group mutilated–falling?] wholly under the influence of Germany. The loss to China through the closing of the route during the rainy season would be inconsiderable. Last year during the corresponding period traffic fell to one tenth of the normal figure.

3. After further consideration of the situation it has been decided to inform Sir Robert Craigie as follows:

4. The solution which we should prefer if it could be obtained would be that for a period of three months, and on the understanding referred to in the latter part of paragraph (1), the transit of the materials in question should be not banned, but limited to the quantities during the corresponding period last year.

5. If Sir Robert Craigie cannot obtain this solution or thinks it unwise to attempt it, he is being authorised at once to put forward the proposal in the form which he suggests. He has been informed that the more restricted the list of war materials is the better. He will be at liberty to add at his discretion that we assume the Japanese Government will utilise the interval to discuss the suspension of the export of munitions to China with the third Powers from which they emanate.

6. Sir Robert Craigie is being instructed to add that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are making this very considerable concession to Japanese opinion in face of great opposition, but that they do so in the confident hope that it will lead to a genuine improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations. Their position will become very difficult if, nevertheless, there is to be a continuance of hostility on the part of the Japanese public and press. He will point out that His Majesty's Government have never accepted the view that they are in any way responsible for the prolongation of hostility between Japan and China, that the gesture they are now making is evidence of their good intentions, and that they look to the Japanese Government to take prompt action to put an end to the anti-British campaign which so far they have done little to suppress. He has given us to understand that once this difficult corner in Anglo-Japanese relations is turned there will be an end to threats and [group omitted–demands?]. It is for the Japanese Government to ensure that this forecast is correct.

7. The United States Government are being informed of our decision and of the reasons for reaching it.

6 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom (Wellington)

Sir Harry Batterbee, GCMG, KCVO; High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in New Zealand, 1939–45.

14 July 1940

Your telegram of 12 July, No. 285.

Not published. Sir Harry Batterbee reported a conversation with Mr Fraser in which the latter had expressed his concern that concessions to Japan would not prevent aggression and might have an effect on public opinion in the United States.

We entirely sympathise with the general attitude of the Prime Minister of New Zealand; in particular, the importance of not taking any action which would antagonise United States opinion has been fully present in our minds. The situation with which we were faced was one in which we were advised by His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo that there was a serious risk that a reply to the Japanese demands which would be interpreted by the Japanese Government as tantamount to a refusal would gradually lead to war with Japan. Even if the present Japanese Government were to shrink from this course, there is the possibility that, if it were considered to have failed in upholding the Japanese position, it might at any moment be succeeded by a more extreme and pushful Government which would feel no similar hesitation. In that event it is clear from discussions which have taken place with the United States Government that we should not have their active assistance, and in the present phase of the war the possibility of having, single-handed, to carry on hostilities, including the serious threat to vital Imperial communications, against Japan, in addition to our other enemies, is one which our military advisers consider must be avoided if at all possible.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has moreover expressed the view that United States opinion would probably regard action as to the Burma Road of the kind now proposed as imposed upon us by the necessities of the European situation. He has been asked, when informing the United States Government of the action contemplated, to point out to them that in arriving at our decision, which although only temporary is distasteful to us, we have been influenced by their attitude as described above, and that, in the circumstances, we assume that they would not wish us to expose ourselves to war between Great Britain and Japan with all its complications. He has also been asked to make it clear that we should welcome any assistance which they may feel able to offer in making clear our difficulties, and it has been suggested that it might be possible to let it be known that the United States Government are concerned about supplies from the United States being cut off from China and are seriously considering whether, from the point of view of strict neutrality, they should themselves take steps to stop supplies from the United States going to Japan.

Please speak to the Prime Minister in the above sense.

7 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand 18 July 1940

Circular telegram. The Prime Minister

Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom during the war were:

28 May 1937–11 May 1940Rt. Hon. Neville Chamberlain, PC.11 May 1940–26 Jul 1945Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, PC, OM, CH.26 Jul 1945–25 Oct 1951Rt. Hon. Clement Attlee, PC, OM, CH.

made the following statement in the House of Commons this afternoon:

On 24 June the Japanese Government requested His Majesty's Government to take measures to stop the transit to China via Burma of war material and certain other goods. A similar request was made in respect of Hong Kong. The continuance of the transit of these materials was represented as having a serious effect on Anglo-Japanese relations. An agreement has now been reached with the Japanese Government as follows:

Hong Kong. The export of arms and ammunition from Hong Kong has been prohibited since January 1939 and none of the war materials to which the Japanese Government attach importance are in fact being exported.

Burma. The Government of Burma have agreed to suspend for a period of three months

From 17 July to 17 October 1940.

the transit to China of arms and ammunition as well as the following articles: petrol, lorries and railway material. The categories of goods prohibited in Burma will be prohibited in Hong Kong. In considering the requests made by the Japanese Government and in reaching the agreement to which I have referred, His Majesty's Government were not unmindful of the various obligations accepted by this country, including their obligations to the National Government of China and to the British territories affected. His Majesty's Government were, however, also bound to have regard to the present world situation, nor could they ignore the dominant fact that we are ourselves engaged in a life-and-death struggle. The general policy of this country towards the Far Eastern troubles has been repeatedly defined. We have persistently asserted our desire to see assured to China a free and independent future, and we have as frequently expressed our desire to improve our relations with Japan. To achieve these objectives two things were essential—time and a relief of tension. On the one hand it was clear that the tension was rapidly growing owing to the Japanese complaints about the passage of war material by the Burma route. On the other, to agree to the permanent closure of the route would be to default from our obligations as a neutral friendly power to China. What we have therefore made is a temporary arrangement in the hope that the time so gained may lead to a solution just and equitable to both parties to the dispute and freely accepted by them both. We wish for no quarrel with any nation of the Far East. We desire to see China's status and integrity preserved and, as was indicated in our note of 14 January 1939,

Not published.

we are ready to negotiate with the Chinese Government after the conclusion of peace the abolition of extra-territorial rights and rendition of concessions and the revision of treaties on the basis of reciprocity and equality. We wish to see Japan attain that state of prosperity which will ensure to her population the welfare and economic security which every Japanese naturally desires. Towards the attainment of the aims of both these countries we are prepared to offer our collaboration and our contribution, but it must be clear that if they are to be attained it must be by a process of peace and conciliation and not by war or threat of war.

8 The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 30 July 1940

My Prime Minister asks me to convey to you the text of the following communication which has today been despatched to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia:

‘I am very much obliged to you for your telegram of 27 July

Not published. In this telegram the Commonwealth Government expressed its views on the Far Eastern situation and requested the observations of the New Zealand Government and, if it concurred, its support.

and for the opportunity of perusing the instructions you have forwarded to your High Commissioner in London

Viscount Bruce of Melbourne, PC, CH, MC (then Rt. Hon. Stanley Bruce); High Commissioner for Australia in London, 1933–45; Australian representative in United Kingdom War Cabinet and on Pacific War Council, 1942–45; created Viscount, 1947.

with reference to the Far Eastern situation. Our own views remain very much as expressed in my telegram of 3 July,

Repeated in No. 3.

and while we entirely agree that it is in the highest degree advisable to avoid hostilities with Japan in our present circumstances, we have never felt that concession to aggression and threats is the best or indeed at all a promising way of achieving that end. We have never believed, and we do not now believe, that it was either wise or proper to attempt to placate Japan on the question of the Burma Road, especially as any concession in this respect was necessarily at the expense of China, was a violation of international undertakings to which we are a party, and involved a grave risk of misunderstanding and resentment in the United States of America.

‘We have never understood why the policy set out in the Secretary of State's telegram to us of 2 July

No. 2.

(containing the British reply to your telegram of 27 June), which seemed to us to be as reasonable and sensible as circumstances would allow, and with which we, and I believe you also, expressed agreement, was changed without further consultation with us to one of retreat and concession. The policy of “appeasement” is in our view no more likely to be successful in the Far East than it was in Europe, if indeed, as evidenced for example by the recent change of government in Japan,

On 16 July the Japanese Cabinet resigned. Prince Konoye became Prime Minister and Mr Matsuoka Foreign Minister.

it has not already failed; and we would be most reluctant to associate ourselves with any further attempts of this nature which would we feel be wrong in principle, and in practice more likely to precipitate aggression even against us than to provide a solution of the difficulties between Japan and China, or still less form a foundation for a better international order in the Far East. It may well be, however, and we say it with regret, that having now adopted a policy of concession, any alteration, and particularly any reversal of that policy, may now have become very dangerous.

‘In short, while we neither understand nor sympathise with the policy that has been adopted vis-à-vis Japan, we are nevertheless unwilling, by stressing this view, to add unnecessarily and perhaps uselessly to the difficulties of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, whose decision on this difficult and delicate matter we have accepted in the past and will no doubt accept in the future.

‘We have no specific comments and no objections to make to the considerations set out in your telegram, except that we gravely question the possibility of enlisting United States support for any concession to Japanese aggression, and while we would support your suggested attempt to obtain United States and Russian collaboration in this matter, we would not feel that this offers any substantial promise of success.

‘We warmly endorse your suggestion that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should be requested to afford to us in future the opportunity of considering and commenting upon any further proposed action in the Far East and, particularly in respect of any further negotiations with Japan, in ample time to allow the expression and consideration of our views before the position is compromised.

‘Finally, we attach the greatest importance to the fullest possible exchange of views in this matter between New Zealand and Australia, of which we for our part fully assure you and which we confidently assume is the policy of Australia also.

‘In our opinion the position in the Far East, whatever its day to day fluctuation, is very serious.’

9 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand

Repeated to the Commonwealth of Australia.

3 August 1940

Your telegram of 30 July repeating the message sent to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia concerning relations with Japan.

We are sorry to learn from your telegram that the New Zealand Government do not view with sympathy the policy which we adopted in relation to Japanese demands regarding the Burma Road.

We realised throughout that the New Zealand Government were in principle opposed to a policy of concession to the aggressors, but we had gathered, after the full explanation as to the particular case which was communicated to you through our High Commissioner in our telegram of 14 July [No. 6], that the New Zealand Government acquiesced in the line which we were taking.

We do not regard our yielding to the Japanese demands in relation to the Burma Road as in the nature of ‘appeasement’ but rather as a retreat under force majeure in accordance with general advice which, it will be remembered, was given to us by the United States Government.

It is our constant endeavour to consult and inform Dominion Governments as fully as possible on questions of major policy affecting the Far East, and we welcome an expression of the New Zealand Government's views at all times. But it will be appreciated that occasions arise, especially under the present conditions, when the need for immediate action precludes our consulting the Dominion Governments as fully as we should wish.

10 The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 7 August 1940

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand much appreciate your most secret telegram of 3 August. They fully realise that in the existing circumstances there must arise occasions upon which action must be taken by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom without consulting the Dominions, and in such cases the New Zealand Government may be relied upon to understand the situation and in general to accept the decision that is made. But they entirely agree with His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia that in matters affecting the Far East, which so directly concern the Dominion of New Zealand and the Commonwealth of Australia, every possible opportunity should be taken of obtaining the views of the Governments of those Dominions before action is taken, and this is especially the case where the policy adopted is subject to marked fluctuation. They find it difficult to understand your statement that you ‘had gathered after the full explanation as to the particular case which was communicated through our High Commissioner in our telegram of 14 July, that the New Zealand Government acquiesced in the line which we were taking’, and, solely with the object of clearing the record, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand wish to point out that they have never at any time expressed acquiescence in the line that was taken in respect of the Burma Road and that, in any case, the message to which you refer was dated 14 July, three days after you had informed them of the altered policy in connection with the Burma Road.

No. 5.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have now had an opportunity of perusing the telegram of 6 August from the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia to the Australian High Commissioner in London

Not published. This telegram contained the Commonwealth Government's views on British proposals concerning retaliatory action for the recent arrest of British subjects in Japan. The Commonwealth Government recommended further consideration – and consultation with the United States – before such action was taken.

with reference to your Circular telegram M. 45,

Not published. Reported a British decision to arrest certain Japanese nationals in British territory against whom there was a prima facie case on the grounds of espionage.

in connection with which they have the following comments to make:

(1)

They fully agree as to the desirability of consultation.

(2)

They warmly support the policy of making every possible effort to avoid hostilities with Japan. Their feeling, however, is that continued concession at the expense of our friends, our rights, and our principles is not the best way of achieving this object, which is more likely to be attained by a reasonable and discreet display of confidence and determination. In short, they feel that the policy now being adopted, though it would have been much more likely to be effective and much less likely to be dangerous if applied earlier, is nevertheless still the right one.

This telegram has been repeated to Canberra.

11 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom (Wellington) 11 August 1940

Please communicate to the Prime Minister the following personal and most secret message from the Prime Minister:

The Combined Staffs are preparing a paper on the Pacific situation, but I venture to send you in advance a brief foreword. We are trying our best to avoid war with Japan, both by conceding on points where the Japanese military clique can perhaps force a rupture and by standing up where the ground is less dangerous, as in the arrests of individuals. I do not think myself that Japan will declare war unless Germany can make a successful invasion of Britain. Once Japan sees that Germany has either failed or dare not try, I look for easier times in the Pacific. In adopting against the grain a yielding policy towards Japanese threats, we have always in mind your interests and safety.

2. Should Japan nevertheless declare war on us, her first objective outside the Yellow Sea would probably be the Dutch East Indies. Evidently the United States would not like this. What they would do we cannot tell. They give no undertaking of support, but their main fleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to the Japanese Admiralty. In this first phase of an Anglo-Japanese war we should of course defend Singapore, which if attacked—which is unlikely—ought to stand a long siege. We should also be able to base on Ceylon a battle-cruiser and a fast aircraft carrier which, with the Australian and New Zealand ships which would return to you, would exercise a very powerful deterrent upon hostile raiding cruisers.

3. We are about to reinforce with more first-class units the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. This fleet could of course at any time be sent through the Canal into the Indian Ocean, or to relieve Singapore. We do not want to do this, even if Japan declares war, until it is found to be vital to your safety. Such a transference would entail the complete loss of the Middle East, and all prospect of beating Italy in the Mediterranean would be gone. We must expect heavy attacks on Egypt in the near future, and the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet is needed to help in repelling them. If these attacks succeed, the Eastern Fleet would have to leave the Mediterranean either through the Canal or by Gibraltar. In either case a large part of it would be available for your protection. We hope, however, to maintain ourselves in Egypt and to keep the Eastern Fleet at Alexandria during the first phase of an Anglo-Japanese war, should that occur. No one can lay down beforehand what is going to happen. We must just weigh events from day to day and use our available resources to the utmost.

4. A final question arises: whether Japan, having declared war, would attempt to invade Australia or New Zealand with a considerable army.

See Defence of New Zealand, p. 206 ff.

We think this very unlikely, first because Japan is absorbed in China, secondly, would be gathering rich prizes in the Dutch East Indies, and thirdly, would fear very much to send an important part of her fleet far to the southward, leaving the American fleet between it and home. If, however, contrary to prudence and self-interest, Japan set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale, I have the explicit authority of Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid, sacrificing every interest except only the defence of the safety of this Island on which all depends.

5. We hope, however, that events will take a different turn. By gaining time with Japan, the present dangerous situation may be got over. We are vastly stronger here at home than when I cabled to you on 16 June.

Not published. In this message to all the Dominion Prime Ministers, Mr Churchill reviewed the position of the United Kingdom in view of the impending French surrender and expressed his Government's determination to carry on the war.

We have a large army, now beginning to be well equipped. We have fortified our beaches. We have a strong reserve of mobile troops, including our Regular Army and Australian, New Zealand and Canadian contingents, with several armoured divisions or brigades ready to strike in counter-attack at the head of any successful incursions. We have ferried over from the United States their grand aid of nearly 1000 guns and 600,000 rifles, with ammunition complete. Relieved of the burden of defending France, our army is becoming daily more powerful and munitions are gathering. Besides this, we have the Home Guard of 1,500,000 men, many of them war veterans, and most with rifles or other arms.

6. The Royal Air Force continues to show the same individual superiority over the enemy on which I counted so much in my aforesaid cable to you. Thursday's important air action in the Channel showed that we could attack against odds of three to one and inflict losses of three and a half to one. Astounding progress has been made by Lord Beaverbrook

Lord Beaverbrook, PC; Minister for Aircraft Production, 1940–41; Minister of Supply, 1941–42.

in the output of RAF machines. Our fighter and bomber strength is nearly double what it was when I cabled you, and we have a very large reserve of machines in hand. I do not think the German Air Force has the numbers or quality to overpower our air defences.

7. The Navy increases in strength each month and we are now beginning to receive the immense programme started at the declaration of war. Between June and December 1940 over 500 vessels, large and small, but many most important, will join the Fleet. The German Navy is weaker than it has ever been. The Scharnhorst

Scharnhorst, battle-cruiser, 32,000 tons, nine 11-inch guns, speed 30 knots. Sunk in action 26 Dec 1943.

and the Gneisenau

Gneisenau, sister ship to Scharnhorst. Scuttled in harbour at Gdynia, 28 Mar 1945.

are both in dock damaged, the Bismarck

Bismarck, battleship, about 45,000 tons, eight 15-inch guns, speed 30 knots. Sunk in action 27 May 1941.

has not yet done her trials, the Tirpitz

Tirpitz, sister ship to Bismarck. Attacked by midget submarines in September 1943 in Aalten Fiord and put out of action for six months. Eventually sunk by RAF on 12 Nov 1944.

is three months behind the Bismarck. There are available now in this critical fortnight, after which the time for invasion is getting very late, only one pocket-battleship, a couple of 8-inch Hippers,

Heavy cruisers, about 15,000 tons, eight 8-inch guns, speed 30 knots. The first of the five ships of this class was named Admiral Hipper.

two light cruisers, and perhaps a score of destroyers. To try to transport a large army, as would now be needed for success, across the seas virtually without naval escort in the face of our Navy and Air Force, only to meet our powerful military force on shore, still more to maintain such an army and nourish its lodgments with munitions and supplies, would be a very unreasonable act. On the other hand, if Hitler fails to invade and conquer Britain before the weather breaks, he has received his first and probably fatal check.

8. We therefore feel a sober and growing conviction of our power to persevere through the year or two that may be necessary to gain victory.

In a message sent through the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom on 15 August Mr Fraser said: ‘Your sober yet confident and courageous summing-up of the position is not only most heartening and inspiring to us, but will … be of material assistance to the Dominion's war effort and will enable us to apply all our strength with a full knowledge of the situation and what it requires.’

12 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom (Wellington) 12 August 1940

My following message, Circular Z. 214,

See Appendix IV.

contains a full summary of an appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff of the situation in the Far East.

2. The appreciation is based on the following important assumptions:

(1)

That the military situation in other theatres, i.e., in Europe and the Middle East, will not change in our favour to any marked degree in the immediate future. For the present, therefore, we shall have to retain a fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(2)

That the attitude of the United States remains as at present, i.e., that we can rely upon a measure of economic and material support but cannot anticipate active United States co-operation.

(3)

That we should go to war with Japan if she attacked the Netherlands East Indies and provided that the Dutch resisted.

3. The third assumption above is arbitrary and, in fact, the question whether we should or should not go to war with Japan in the event of Japanese aggression against the Netherlands East Indies is now receiving further consideration by the Chiefs of Staff. As assumption (3) has a far-reaching effect on the whole appreciation, the passages to which it particularly applies are prefaced by the words ‘(Assumption 3 begins)’ and end with the words ‘(Assumption 3 ends)’.

4. We fully appreciate the strategic disadvantage of a failure to take up the Japanese challenge in such circumstances, and the main point for further examination is whether our limited resources in the Far East, in combination with the Dutch resources in the Netherlands East Indies, would justify our taking action, in the event of a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies, which would lead us into war with Japan. If our joint resources would justify such action, it would clearly be to our advantage to accept the consequences of war with Japan in the attempt to dispute a Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies. If not, it remains to be considered what would be the consequences of an endeavour to avoid war with Japan on this issue. The assumption adopted on this question in the appreciation, namely, that we should go to war on this issue, should not of course be regarded as in any way prejudging the political decision. Please inform the Prime Minister that we should be glad to receive any views which he may wish to express on this question.

5. In the light of the third assumption above it would be logical that the appreciation should recommend immediate staff conversations with the Dutch in the Far East in order to concert a combined defence plan. As the Prime Minister will see from the appreciation, the Chiefs of Staff have had this in mind but consider that it would be inadvisable to initiate such conversations until we have strengthened our position in Malaya and are able to offer effective military assistance to the Dutch. Here again we should welcome any views which the Prime Minister may wish to put forward. If it is decided that such staff conversations should be held with the Dutch, it would be of the greatest assistance if the New Zealand Government would agree to send Service representatives to take part in them when the time arrives. I should be glad if you would invite the Prime Minister to consider this suggestion, which is also being made to the Prime Minister of Australia.

6. It will be seen from paragraph 34 of the appreciation that an attempt has been made to assess, on the basis of such information as is at the Chiefs of Staff's disposal, the scale of a possible Japanese attack on Australia and New Zealand. No suggestion, on the other hand, has been included in the appreciation as to the defence arrangements which would be required locally to meet such an attack. His Majesty's Governments in the Commonwealth of Australia and in New Zealand will, however, wish to consider the matter in detail in the light of the Chiefs of Staff's estimated scale of attack, if they find themselves in agreement with the appreciation generally.

7. As regards paragraph 34 of the appreciation, the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, like the New Zealand Government, have reached the conclusion that the existing garrison at Fiji must be regarded as quite inadequate in the circumstances of hostilities with Japan. Please refer in this connection to my telegram of 9 August

See Defence of the South Pacific, No. 240.

stating that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider that the action which His Majesty's Government in New Zealand propose to take with regard to the early reinforcement of Fiji is a most valuable contribution to the common cause.

8. In paragraph 50 of the appreciation certain conclusions are drawn as to the garrison required in Malaya in addition to the troops already there. The Prime Minister will wish to know that, as in the present circumstances it is impossible for us or for India to provide even one further division, we are renewing our invitation to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth to consider as a matter of urgency the possibility of the early despatch of such a force to Singapore from Australia.

13 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand 3 September 1940

Circular telegram. Following for Prime Minister:

1. Thailand. Anglo-Thai non-aggression pact was ratified on 31 August.

2. Japan. There appears to be a danger of the broad issues involved in the Burma Road question becoming obscured by a Japanese manoeuvre to make it appear that we have not fully carried out our undertakings. In order to clear the way for us to drop the agreement if after the three-months' period we should wish to do so, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo has been instructed, as opportunity offers, to develop the following general line with the Japanese Government:

(1)

The spirit of the agreement is to forbid the transit of certain articles but to place no obstacle in the way of traffic in non-prohibited goods.

(2)

The agreement is temporary and does not therefore justify measures designed to forbid the accumulation of goods in Burma.

(3)

The Japanese are trying to expand the agreement in various ways incompatible with its general spirit and in particular with (1) and (2) above.

(4)

What are the Japanese doing for their part to fulfil their side of the bargain, i.e., special effort to reach a general settlement in the Far East?

14 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand 4 September 1940

Circular telegram. Following for your Prime Minister:

Burma Road. Less than two months remain before the Burma Road agreement is due to expire, and we have been considering what steps should be taken to meet the situation which will arise at the end of that period.

2. Nothing has happened to suggest that the Japanese Government are seriously prepared to fulfil their part of the bargain. Public opinion here would make it difficult to justify extension of the agreement. The American public is out of sympathy with us on this subject, while the Chinese can be relied upon to stimulate interest should it show signs of flagging.

3. The United States Government have indicated willingness to discuss with us what measures of support the United States could give. Nevertheless, we do not feel it possible to depend on any promises of support from the United States in advance of the decision which we shall have to take regarding the opening of the road, though we shall naturally do everything to pave the way for any support from the United States. We regard the prospect of support from the USSR as negligible in the existing circumstances.

4. Our decision will obviously have to depend on our war position at the end of the intervening period. Any setback would still further prejudice our position in the Far East, and it may well be that in any case the situation will not have cleared sufficiently to permit us to disregard the considerations that led us to accept the present compromise.

5. On the other hand, the failure of Germany either to make a full-scale attack on Great Britain or to succeed in one if made would presumably have a powerful influence on the Far Eastern situation and might render it easier for us to reopen the Burma Road.

6. To do so without due preparation, however, would doubtless be the signal for a fresh anti-British agitation in Japan which might compel the Japanese Government to take some kind of face-saving action against us.

7. Preparatory action must (i) avoid allowing the Japanese to make it appear that, if we do not keep the Burma Road closed to military supplies, we shall ourselves be breaking our undertakings towards Japan; (ii) keep the responsibility of proposing the lines of general settlement in the hands of the Japanese: continued lack of any indication that the Japanese Government are prepared even to consider with us the question of a general settlement would provide further justification for our reopening the Burma Road; (iii) enable us to maintain a position where we can demonstrate, if necessary, that certain Japanese authorities have met our concession by instigating intensified anti-British agitation in Japan.

8. With these considerations in mind His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo has been instructed, unless he sees any objection, to develop the lines foreshadowed in Circular telegram of 3 September. If the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr Y. Matsuoka, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 22 Jul 1940–16 Jul 1941.

attempts to place upon us the responsibility of making concrete suggestions for a general settlement, Sir Robert Craigie has been instructed to take the line that, before we could [group mutilated–make?] any approach to the Chinese or decide on the contribution to a general settlement which would be appropriate on our side, we should of course have to know on what precise basis Japan was prepared to deal with China. Meanwhile we are considering whether we can devise any plan for a general settlement which could be kept in reserve for production should an appropriate moment arise.

9. We should be grateful for your views.

A telegram on 5 September from the Dominions Secretary advised that paragraph 9 ‘should be read as referring to the general question of the Burma Road and not to the last sentence of paragraph 8.’

15 The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 7 September 1940

My Ministers have now had an opportunity of considering your most secret and personal telegrams to your High Commissioner [Nos. 11 and 12] and Circular Z. 214 of 12 August

Appendix IV.

with reference to the Far Eastern situation.

In the first place my Ministers would like His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to know how warmly they welcome and appreciate the assurance as to naval protection in Eastern waters, should the necessity arise, which is contained in the Prime Minister's message conveyed in your telegram [No. 11].

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand offer the following immediate comments on those aspects of the matter upon which specific requests for their views have been made:

1. The main problem as it appears to them is not so much (as set out in your telegram [No. 12]) ‘whether our limited resources in the Far East, in combination with the Dutch resources in the Netherlands East Indies, would justify our taking action in the event of an attack on the Netherlands East Indies’, as whether we can afford not to take action.

2. They do not believe that this can be considered solely or even primarily as a military problem.

3. The political aspects seem to them to be of even greater importance than the military, and the problem involves also the question of honour and of that indefinable which for want of a better word might be referred to as prestige. Our honour, and our reputation for fair and generous dealing, they feel, are among the most valuable attributes of the British Commonwealth—so valuable that without them our cause might not prevail. We must bear in mind that, in the event of a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies in respect to which we took no action, there is a danger that the neutral world, and particularly the United States of America, would be gravely disturbed by what they would regard as another instance in which we have considered ourselves unable to assist our friends against piecemeal attack and destruction. This would, they feel, be highly disadvantageous to us, especially if it militated, as it well might, against the possibility of our receiving assistance from the United States.

4. Turning now to the military aspects of the matter, they agree that for the time being there is little that the British Commonwealth, and particularly New Zealand, could do, other than by example and encouragement, to support the Dutch, and they agree also that the Dutch refusal up to the present to concert plans with us is an embarrassing factor that cannot be ignored. But, as they see it, Japanese control of the Netherlands East Indies would surely and rapidly render untenable our position in Singapore and Malaya, and would thus certainly and perhaps irretrievably jeopardise the security of New Zealand, Australia, and all British possessions in the Pacific.

5. It is their opinion, therefore, that the British Commonwealth cannot afford, on the material side, to allow a Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies, nor on the moral side remain neutral and inactive if our allies, the Dutch, are attacked in that area. Nor do they believe that an attempt to follow such a policy would at best achieve more than a postponement of hostilities with Japan for a short period. Such a postponement they feel would be dearly purchased if it enabled Japan, as they believe it would, to attack us later at her chosen time and—in occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, and perhaps of other areas of strategic value—on still more advantageous terms.

6. It seems to His Majesty's Government in New Zealand therefore:

(a)

That we are bound, both by honour and interest, to act with what vigour we can in the case of Japanese aggression in the Dutch East Indies, which we should let it be known we would regard as a hostile act;

(b)

that we should accept, and as far as possible prepare against, the disadvantageous position (temporary they hope) in which we would be placed vis-à-vis Japan;

(c)

that the Dutch should at once be advised of our attitude to Japan if Japan should attack the Netherlands East Indies and urged to resist discreetly any Japanese commercial advances in the Netherlands East Indies, and to oppose by every means any Japanese aggression on that territory;

(d)

that at the same time the Dutch should be informed of our difficulties in providing immediate powerful military, naval and air force assistance but that steps are already under way to overcome these limitations, and they should be informed also of our firm resolve to do all in our power to come to their assistance if attacked;

(e)

that the Dutch should be suitably warned of the obvious results, as so patently exemplified in Europe, of a failure to consult and concert plans in advance, and urged to enter at once, with the utmost secrecy, into the necessary staff consultations. Should such consultations take place, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would of course be glad to detail suitable officers for this purpose as suggested;

(f)

that the policy outlined above should be explained fully to the United States Government, whose sympathy would be valuable and whose collaboration in such a policy it might not be impossible to obtain.

This telegram has been repeated to Ottawa, Canberra and Pretoria.

16 The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Governments of Australia, Canada and South Africa.

25 September 1940

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have now given careful consideration to your Circular telegram dated 4 September [No. 14] from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs concerning the closing of the Burma Road. As they have already stated in various telegrams to the Secretary of State, and notably in their telegrams of 30 July [No. 8] and 7 August [No. 10], they are averse to the policy of making concessions to Japan on this issue, and they still feel obliged to maintain the view previously expressed that such a course is unwise.

They hold this belief on the grounds that such a concession at the expense of China, whom we are pledged to assist, must constitute a most damaging breach of solemn obligations; that it must incur widespread resentment and loss of sympathy in our own cause among the people of the United States at a time most critical to ourselves; and that it must, by weakening China, contribute in some degree to the further aggrandisement of Japan and thus increase the immediate as well as the ultimate threat to Britain's territories in the Far East and the South Pacific.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand realise full well the difficulties now confronting the United Kingdom and the other countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the manifold weaknesses and deficiencies in their defensive position at this particular time. But they feel that a continuation of this concession would neither conciliate Japan nor turn her from such further aggressive intentions as she might be contemplating against British interests. On the other hand a display of firmness, for which the ground has been adequately prepared by the British Ambassador in Tokyo, on the lines set out in Circular telegram of 3 September [No. 13] and paragraph 8 of Circular telegram of 4 September [No. 14], may prove to be a course of much greater practical worth.

In any case, the war position of the British Commonwealth is no worse than it was in July last and, indeed, prospects seem likely to be better in a few weeks' time than they are today. Should the United States adopt the stronger line which their Secretary of State

Mr Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America, 1933–44.

professes, according to your telegram D. 477 of 20 September,

Not published. On 16 September His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington and the Australian Minister had asked the United States Secretary of State what assurance there would be of United States support, both for the Commonwealth and the Netherlands East Indies, in the event of Britain reopening the Burma Road and encouraging the Dutch to resist unreasonable Japanese demands. Mr Hull's reply had indicated that the United States administration was considering taking a much stronger line against Japan once it became clear that Britain had met the threat of attack from Europe.

to be their immediate intention, then this support, together with our renewal of transit facilities over the Burma Road, should stimulate the Chinese to continue the struggle, and this resistance His Majesty's Government in New Zealand regard as a major safeguard to the remaining British interests in the Far East and in the South Seas.

Since Japan has made no attempt whatever to comply with the understanding that the period of the agreement should be used to explore the terms of a general settlement, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand consider that the Governments of the British Commonwealth are justified in claiming that their concessions have met with no corresponding response. In actual fact, of course, the Japanese have taken, and are continuing to take, full advantage of British and French weakness to make further gains and thereby to prosecute the war against China with greater vigour. It seems, therefore, that any further steps that the Japanese may be permitted to take will merely strengthen them in their determination to press for yet more concessions, and enable them to complete their fixed policy of crushing entirely all Chinese resistance under Chiang Kai-shek.

The danger of adding to the numbers of our enemies at this critical time must obviously be taken into consideration, and it is of course more dangerous to open the road now than formerly it would have been to decline to close it, but His Majesty's Government in New Zealand feel that the risk of converting the enmity of Japan into a form more active than it has now assumed is outweighed by the disadvantages that must result from the continuance of the policy of making concessions.

17 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Governor-General of New Zealand 3 October 1940

Circular telegram. Burma Road. Following for Prime Minister:

We greatly value the views which you have furnished in reply to my Circular telegram of 4 September [No. 14], and these have been most carefully considered. Since my telegram was despatched there have been two major developments, (a) the Japanese entry into Indo-China,

Japanese forces entered French Indo-China on 22 Sep 1940.

and (b) the German-Italian-Japanese pact;

A 10-year pact between Germany, Italy and Japan was signed in Berlin on 27 Sep 1940.

and the matter is also being discussed in the light of these developments between His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and the United States Secretary of State. The latter stated, (a) the United States Government hope that the road will not remain closed after 17 October; (b) cancellation of the agreement before 17 October would be needless provocation; and (c) in order to avoid a second crisis three weeks hence the best course would be to notify the Japanese Government at once of our intention not to renew the agreement.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo is in favour of this course and does not consider that it would lead to war with Japan. His view is that if the Japanese decide to challenge the British Commonwealth to war it will be on a wider calculation of issues than this.

The War Cabinet considered the matter today and came to the conclusion that in the present circumstances there was no alternative to the adoption of this course. We are confident that your Government will concur in this view. It is accordingly proposed that the decision would be announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons next Tuesday in the sense that the agreement was concluded for a [group mutilated–definite?] period and there has been no provision for renewal, and in any case, in view of recent developments, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would have felt unable to agree to a renewal if this had been in question.

18 The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Viscount Cranborne had succeeded Viscount Caldecote as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on 3 October.

5 October 1940

Your Circular telegram of 3 October. My Prime Minister asks me to advise you that His Majesty's Government in New Zealand fully agree with the course that is being adopted regarding the Burma Road.

19 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom (Wellington) 8 October 1940

Circular telegram.

Please give the following message to the Prime Minister:

Recent reports from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington show a stiffening of the United States attitude, and suggest the possibility of arranging for some form of concerted reaction to the German-Italian-Japanese pact.

In a recent conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador, Mr Cordell Hull threw out the idea of private staff talks between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Dominion Governments concerned and the Dutch authorities on the Far Eastern question. We have welcomed this suggestion and have indicated that we should like these to be held at the earliest possible date.

His Majesty's Ambassador has been informed that any other suggestions for co-ordinated reaction to the Japanese-Axis pact which the United States may feel able to put forward will be most sympathetically considered here. We share the view, which is evidently gaining ground among members of the United States Administration, that any steps taken should be such as would not increase Japanese pressure on the Dutch. (Please see in this connection paragraphs 2 and 3 of my Circular telegram D. 503.

Not published. Paragraphs 2 and 3 read:

‘2. Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands Government inform us that the Japanese are now asking for 3,150,000 tons of oil per annum over and above normal exports to Japan of 600,000 tons. These demands are unacceptable to the Netherlands Government and they say they will resist them. They recommend that the attention of the United States Government be drawn to the connection which they and the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies see between the increasing Japanese demands and the United States embargo policy. His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been instructed to inquire of the Netherlands Minister the result of any communication which the latter may have had with the United States on this subject.

‘3. We have pointed out to Lord Lothian that we feel that the Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies is more likely to come from Japanese determination to maintain oil imports than as a counter measure to the opening of the Burma Road. Moreover, since he is satisfied that the United States Government could not stand aside and watch the Japanese absorb the Netherlands East Indies, it would be natural that he should impress upon them that this danger is perhaps more imminent than they seem to suppose in consequence of the evident Dutch determination to resist increasing Japanese demands. In fact the moment has come for the United States Government to decide whether they wish to encourage the Netherlands East Indies to resist Japanese pressure, in which case the Dutch will naturally ask for United States military support: the alternative being for the Netherlands East Indies to reach [group mutilated–agreement?] with Japan, which may well lead to Japanese penetration and economic domination of the Netherlands East Indies.’

)

The question of parallel declarations by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch authorities, giving some form of guarantee for the insular territories in the Pacific south of the Equator, was mentioned recently in the discussion between His Majesty's Ambassador and the Australian Minister at Washington

Lord Casey, PC, CH, DSO, MC (then Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey); Australian Minister to the United States, 1940–42; Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, 1942–43; Governor of Bengal, 1944–46; created Baron, 1960.

with Mr Hull, and we have authorised His Majesty's Ambassador to elucidate this proposal in further discussions with Mr Hull.

The question of a possible visit by a United States squadron to Singapore has also been considered by the United States authorities, but, as indicated in my Circular telegram M. 64 of 5 October,

Not published.

they are not in favour of this at present.

Mr Fraser replied on 9 October welcoming ‘the possibility of still closer relations between the British Commonwealth and the United States’ and expressing the New Zealand Government's agreement ‘that concerted pressure on the Japanese would be desirable’. He said that the Government ‘warmly supported’ the proposed staff talks and was prepared to take part in them.

20 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom (Wellington) 8 October 1940

Circular telegram. For the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

As will be seen from the message in my Circular telegram of today [No. 19] the question of further action in relation to Japan by the United States in conjunction with us is being discussed with the United States authorities. We gather, in this connection, that there is an impression in certain quarters that if, as a result of any such action, the United States were to find themselves at war with Japan, we might stand aside. The War Cabinet has considered this aspect and there is no doubt in their mind that, should the question arise, we should certainly declare war on Japan. May we assume that in the circumstances the attitude of your Government would be similar? We are letting our Ambassadors at Washington and Tokyo know what our attitude would be in case the question should arise, and we should be grateful therefore for your views at the earliest possible moment.

21 The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 9 October 1940

With reference to Circular telegram of 8 October addressed to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in New Zealand, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand wish to make it quite clear that, in the event of the United States finding themselves at war with Japan as the result of a concerted action with the British Commonwealth in the Pacific, they entirely and unanimously agree with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the British Commonwealth should immediately declare war on Japan in alliance with the United States, and they undertake for their part to take the necessary action in such circumstances immediately.

For several months after the reopening of the Burma Road in October 1940, intergovernmental messages about Japan were mainly descriptive of overseas trends and in themselves required little executive action. They are therefore not reproduced in this volume. A generally deteriorating situation was nevertheless indicated, resulting in decisions for preparedness by the New Zealand Government which are recorded, inter alia, in the sections Defence of New Zealand, Defence of the South Pacific and Fanning Island.

This telegram has been repeated to Ottawa, Canberra and Pretoria.

Relations with Japan and Thailand, 1941

22 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 April 1941

Circular telegram.

1. We have been considering possible steps which we could take inter alia in the economic sphere as counter action in the event of further Japanese moves to the south. Two suggestions have been made which seem worth considering as possible reprisals. They are:

(i)

The placing of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, or Okura on the Black List, and

(ii)

Denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty.

Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, signed 3 Apr 1911.

2. Our preliminary views on these two suggestions are as follows:

3. Black-listing of one or other of the above firms might bring home to Japanese industrialists the perils of bad leadership….

A brief comment on the priority for black-listing has been omitted.

A summary listing of all three might have even more adverse effects on the trade of Empire countries than on Japan itself. The same violent reaction might also be anticipated to this step as is to be feared from a complete oil embargo or other extreme economic sanction.

4. The argument in favour of denouncing the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty is that, although a year must elapse before its expiry, a denunciation would have a considerable political effect in Japan, particularly if accompanied by some statement to the effect that, in view of Japanese restrictions on British trade, it has become obvious that the treaty in its present form no longer served any useful purpose. If Japan were to take Indo-China after coming to an agreement with Russia and the treaty were then to be denounced, Japanese industrialists would perhaps feel the sacrifice had been unnecessarily great and the unpopularity of the Government's pro-Russian policy would increase.

5. We have asked His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo for his views on the above suggestions. We realise, of course, that it is not possible to give a precise appreciation of their effect, failing an exact indication of the occasion for their application.

6. We should be grateful for any observations Dominion Governments may wish to offer on these two proposals.

23 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 26 April 1941

Your Circular telegram of 5 April. The views of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are in general as follows:

1. They are and always have been firmly opposed to any policy of appeasement with Japan. In their opinion Japan's attitude towards the Axis and towards us respectively will be governed by her appreciation of her own interests, and will be affected, if at all, only to a negligible extent by any attempt on our part to conciliate. Indeed, it is their view that a resolute show of determination is on the whole more likely to avoid hostilities than any attempt to conciliate.

2. At the same time His Majesty's Government in New Zealand realise that the circumstances are now exceedingly delicate and that any unnecessary irritation at the present juncture would be unwise. They feel, therefore, firstly, that action such as is now contemplated should be taken only in the event of the ‘Japanese move to the south’, which these measures are intended to follow, being sufficiently unequivocal and important, and, secondly, that the action is made in co-operation with or with the knowledge and sympathy of the United States of America.

3. Of the two proposals set out in the Secretary of State's telegram, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand prefer the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty, leaving the question of placing Mitsui, Mitsubishi, or Okura on the Black List for subsequent consideration.

4. Should notice of termination of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty be given, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will undertake to take a similar step with reference to their trade arrangements with Japan, but it will be understood that in the present circumstances New Zealand–Japanese trade has now become negligible.

24 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand

Hon. W. Nash. Mr Fraser had left New Zealand on 3 May on a visit to the Middle East, the United Kingdom and the United States. He returned to New Zealand on 13 September.

to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

This message was repeated to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Commander-in-Chief Far East, and the British Ambassador, Cairo, for Mr Fraser.

21 May 1941

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are in general agreement with the recommendations of the British–United States conversations contained in the report ABC–1.

British and American staff talks began in Washington towards the end of January 1941 and concluded on 27 March. As a result a plan was produced known as ABC–1. Its main point was that in the event of Anglo-American involvement in war with Germany and Japan, the concentration of force should be on Germany first. In the Far East the strategy of both powers was to be defensive, but the United States Pacific Fleet was to be used offensively to weaken Japan's economic power and to divert her strength away from the south-west Pacific.

They appreciate the reasons which necessitated deferring to United States views regarding the strategical situation in the Far East, and particularly the reinforcement of Singapore by capital ships. At the same time they hope that every possible step would be taken to expedite the arrival of the main fleet at Singapore, and that possibly the move of certain United States capital ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, which was visualised in telegram No. 190 dated 10 May from the Secretary of State,

Not published. The United States and British view was that the transfer of part of the United States fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic would be more likely to deter the Japanese from going to war than the maintenance of a ‘very large’ United States fleet at Hawaii. The New Zealand Government on 6 May expressed its doubts as to the wisdom of the proposed transfer of capital ships from the Pacific. In the event, three battleships, four cruisers, one aircraft carrier and nineteen destroyers were transferred to the Atlantic in May and June 1941.

may help to achieve this.

2. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are also in general agreement with the recommendations of the ADB and BD

Meetings between American, Dutch and British service representatives, and between the British and Dutch, took place at Singapore during April 1941.

reports, particularly those for the general strategical direction of the naval and air forces in the Eastern theatre. They would, however, point out that paragraph 41 of ADB states that it is essential to maintain the United States Pacific Fleet in strength at least equal to the Japanese Fleet. This is not in accordance with the views of the Admiralty as expressed in your telegram No. 190 of 10 May, which states that the United States Pacific Fleet could achieve its object with a capital ship strength of not less than six vessels. They would be glad of a further expression of the opinion of the United Kingdom Government on this question.

3. With reference to paragraph 42

Paragraph 42 defined the responsibility of the United States Pacific Fleet.

of ADB, action is being taken by the Chief of the Naval Staff

Admiral Sir Edward Parry, KCB, RN (then Commodore Parry); Chief of New Zealand Naval Staff, May 1940–Jun 1942.

through the United States Naval Observer in New Zealand to ascertain the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet in so far as they affect New Zealand and Australia, with a view to initiating plans for direct co-operation of naval and air forces.

25 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 July 1941

Circular telegram. My telegram of 25 June, Circular D. 373.

Not published. In a brief comment on the likely attitude of the Japanese Government towards the German invasion of Russia a few days earlier, Sir Robert Craigie predicted that the Japanese would remain neutral in the meantime.

Information from most secret … sources shows that the Japanese Government have now reached a decision upon future policy. Their first move will be to secure bases in Indo-China and this move may take place in the very near future. I shall hope to telegraph shortly our views as to the action which we should take.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington

Rt. Hon. the Earl of Halifax, KG, PC, OM, GCSI, GCIE (at this date Viscount Halifax); British Ambassador at Washington, 1941–46; succeeded Lord Lothian, who died at Washington on 12 Dec 1940.

states that when discussing reports also received by the United States Government that the Japanese Government intend to move in the near future, Mr Welles

Mr Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State of United States of America, 1937–43.

informed His Majesty's Ambassador that in the event of Japan embarking on hostilities either north or south, the United States Government would immediately apply all the urgent pressure that they could command. When asked what action the United States Government would take if, without resorting to hostilities, Japan denounced the neutrality pact with Russia, Mr Welles said that it would depend on circumstances whether the United States Government would let the Japanese know confidentially that they would apply economic pressure in the event of the Japanese resorting to hostilities or whether the United States Government would immediately apply such pressure. They would certainly do one or the other.

26 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand [Extract] 9 July 1941

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 5 July.

We have now considered what action should be taken in the event of a further move south by Japan. We have decided to recommend two measures accordingly:

(1)

Restrictions on Japanese shipping facilities in Malaya.

(2)

The possible denunciation of the Commercial Treaty.

2. We will telegraph separately in the near future in regard to (2). As regards (1), the Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, GCVO, KCB, CMG, DSO, AFC; C-in-C Far East, 1940–41.

and China

Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, GBE, KCB, KCMG, DSO; C-in-C China, 1940–41; Eastern Fleet, Dec 1941–Mar 1942; Ceylon, 1942–45.

have represented that we run the risk of ‘Trojan horse’ activities by allowing the Japanese to load iron ore, etc., off the Malayan coast by night. The Commanders-in-Chief have accordingly advised that from sunset to sunrise all tugs and lighters should be required to lie inside harbour mouths on the east coast of Malaya and also on the west coast of Java, and in addition that no vessel over 1000 tons should be allowed to arrive at anchorage off these coasts between sunset and sunrise.

3. We have hesitated hitherto to enforce measures of this kind since, though outwardly non-discriminatory, they will entail heavy loss and delay to Japanese mining companies. The Governor of the Straits Settlements

Sir Shenton Thomas, GCMG, OBE; Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Malay States, 1934–46; interned by Japanese, Feb 1942 – Aug 1945.

has, however, now been authorised to bring the measure into force immediately in consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief Far East and China, if and when the Japanese move towards Indo-China materialises….

In the text omitted the Dominions Secretary discussed the likely effects of this measure on the Japanese iron and steel industry.

27 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 12 July 1941

My Circular telegram of 9 July. Japan.

The possible denunciation of the Commercial Treaty in the event of a further southward move by Japan was one of the suggestions upon which the views of Dominion Governments were invited in my telegram of 5 April [No. 22]. The main points made in the replies received to those suggestions were (i) the importance of suiting action to the circumstances as they arise and avoiding provocative measures which might do more harm than good; (ii) the importance of securing United States co-operation in any retaliatory measures which might be contemplated. As regards the Commercial Treaty, the general view expressed was that in the circumstances envisaged a denunciation might have little to commend it except from the point of view of bringing us into line with the United States. The Canadian Government for their part expressed doubts as to the wisdom of such action if taken as a reprisal and suggested that it might be preferable if notice of termination could be given in a moment of comparative calm. The Commonwealth Government felt that there was some risk of the denunciation being regarded as an irritant and suggested that counter action in an economic role could more effectively be provided by the adoption of a joint policy of import restrictions in co-operation with the United States Government. The alternative suggestion put forward in my telegram that the situation might best be met by placing Mitsui, Mitsubishi, or Okura on the Black or Statutory List was felt to [group mutilated – give?] rise to strong objections, at least as far as the two former companies are concerned, and was generally viewed with disfavour.

2. We have given most careful consideration to these views and suggestions re-examining the possible courses of action open to us. In deciding to recommend the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty, notwithstanding the doubts previously expressed, we have been influenced by the manner in which the situation has developed in recent months, and by the need for meeting any further Japanese move by a measure which could both be put into effect without delay and would at the same time afford unmistakable evidence of our reactions. We fully recognise that the practical importance of this step would be small, but do not consider that it could be regarded as provocative. On the other hand, we have reason to believe that the psychological effects in Japan would be salutary and would bring home, especially to the trading community, the perils of bad leadership. This has also been the opinion of His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo. We further consider it most important to bring ourselves fully into line with the United States in this matter.

3. We very much hope, therefore, that on reconsideration His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions will feel able to concur in our taking this step as soon as the moment is judged opportune. Although we should wish to proceed with the denunciation of the treaty at a very short interval after the Japanese move into Southern Indo-China, we agree with the view previously expressed by the Canadian Government that it should not be represented as a reprisal, and would propose that notice should be based on the grounds that Japanese restrictions on British trade and changing conditions have made continuation of the treaty pointless.

4. A very early reply would be appreciated since the latest indications are that a Japanese move may be imminent. As to the general United States attitude, please see my telegram M.149 today.

Not published. In the event of an ‘overt act’ by Japan, such as the acquisition of bases in Indo-China or action against Russia, the United States Government proposed to impose an immediate embargo on certain exports to Japan, principally metals, cottons and lubricants.

In the meantime we are further exploring possibilities in the direction of import restrictions as suggested by the Commonwealth Government, but the matter is complicated by varying conditions in that there may be needs of different parts of the Empire, and it is clear that preparation of a suitable scheme would not be free from difficulty. His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington is, however, being asked to elicit the views of the United States authorities as to the prospects of their being able to co-operate in this field.

28 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 15 July 1941

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 12 July.

Following for Prime Minister:

Reliable information has now reached us indicating that the Japanese have demanded, or are about to demand, bases in South Indo-China, giving a time limit to the French to comply. In these circumstances we feel that it is of the highest importance that we should be in a position to take the step recommended in paragraph 2, my telegram under reference, at any time. I should be very grateful, therefore, for a most immediate reply.

29 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 16 July 1941

With reference to your telegram of 15 July, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand agree with the proposal to denounce the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty in the event of steps being taken by Japan to obtain bases in Indo-China, and they note from telegram M.149

See p. 38, note 1.

that an overt act of this nature on the part of Japan will evoke retaliatory action of the kind referred to on the part of the United States Government. If and when notice is given, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will, as indicated in paragraph 4 of their telegram of 26 April last [No. 23], take a similar step with reference to their trade agreement with Japan, and they would therefore appreciate the earliest advice possible of the date when it is proposed to serve notice on the Japanese Government.

30 The acting Prime Minister to the Rt. Hon. P. Fraser (London) 16 July 1941

You will have seen from our telegram dated 16 July to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that the New Zealand Government concurred in the United Kingdom Government's proposal to denounce the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty in the event of steps being taken by Japan to obtain bases in Indo-China. In the circumstances it was not possible to consult you before sending this reply. War Cabinet have, however, now given further consideration to the possibility of a Japanese southward move, and in this connection request you to draw attention to the proposal contained in telegram M.93 from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of 22 May,

Not published.

namely, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should make a statement on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom emphasising the identity of interests between the Netherlands East Indies and the British Commonwealth in any move likely to prejudice the security line which runs from Malaya to New Zealand through the Netherlands East Indies, and declaring that any attack on any part of that line equally concerned all affected parties and must be dealt with as an attack on the whole line. You will recall that I telegraphed you in Cairo informing you of this proposal and requested that you should publicly endorse on an appropriate occasion any such statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. We were disappointed to learn from a further telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, M.114 dated 19 June,

Not published.

that the proposed public declaration was being reconsidered in the light of the views expressed by the Commonwealth and Union Governments and on account of the situation which had subsequently arisen between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies. We are not aware of the grounds upon which the apparent objections of Australia and South Africa were based, nor does it appear to us that the ‘delicate situation which has since arisen between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies’ still constitutes a sound reason for withholding the proposed declaration. On the contrary, it would seem that the customary policy of saying or doing nothing which might be construed as provocative by the Japanese has resulted inevitably in the very situation we were at such pains to avoid. It seems therefore that, even at this late hour, the proposed declaration should be made, if possible in conjunction with the United States of America, and we would ask you on behalf of the New Zealand Government to urge the view, which we know you share, that such a joint declaration should make it clear that an attack on one would be regarded as an attack on all. We are telegraphing the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs emphasising these views.

31 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia.

16 July 1941

With reference to your Circular telegram of 15 July [No. 28] and my reply of 16 July [No. 29], His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have given further consideration to the implications of the proposed denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty in the event of steps being taken by Japan to obtain bases in Indo-China, and they have asked their Prime Minister to draw attention to the proposal contained in your telegram M.93 of 22 May

Not published.

which in their opinion merits urgent consideration at the present time. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand hold to the belief that the most effective step at this stage would be a joint declaration by the United Kingdom, Australian, New Zealand, Netherlands East Indies and United States Governments emphasising that any move likely to prejudice the security line which runs from Malaya to New Zealand through the Netherlands East Indies equally concerns all affected parties and must be regarded as an attack on all. Even if the United States find themselves unable to join publicly in this proposed declaration, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are of the opinion that the British Governments concerned, together with the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, should without delay make known their identity of views and interests on this matter.

32 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 17 July 1941

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 12 July [No. 27].

All His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions have now concurred in our proposal to proceed at the appropriate moment with the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty. We are accordingly informing the United States Government that we propose to take this step immediately there is any overt act on the part of Japan.

2. The Commonwealth Government have stressed to us the importance of following up the above action with intensified economic restrictions. We fully agree with this view and hope to telegraph detailed proposals as soon as we have received a further indication of the United States Government's intentions; see my telegram M.158.

Not published. This telegram reported the United States Government's intention to impose an immediate embargo on exports to Japan in the event of ‘the contingency contemplated’. Discussion was to take place between representatives of the British Embassy in Washington and the State Department on the economic measures each government might apply.

3. In the meantime certain further possible measures have also occurred to us. They are:

(1)

The closing of the Japanese Consulate-General at Singapore;

(2)

The placing of Ishihara and Okura on the Statutory List.

4. As regards (1), we have ample evidence of improper activities of the Japanese Consul-General to justify this action and do not consider that it would lead to dangerous reactions in Japan. We are, however, as a first step obtaining the views of the Governor of the Straits Settlements. Subject to his raising no objections, we would propose to include this in the list of measures to be taken in the event of a Japanese move.

5. As regards (2), Ishihara is connected specially with Japanese enterprises in Malaya and has long been suspected. Okura has always had special connections with Germany, and even though the Vladivostok route is at present closed, there would we feel be ample justification for placing this firm on the Statutory List in view of its past behaviour. These firms are, of course, of much less importance than Mitsui and Mitsubishi and action could we think safely be taken against them without risks of adverse effect on the Japanese policy. We have not overlooked the fact that when the listing of Japanese companies was considered earlier in the year as a result of my telegrams [No. 22] and D.237,

Not published.

the proposal was regarded generally with disfavour, but in view of developments since that date (and of the desirability of adding weight to the effect of the proposed denunciation of the Commercial Treaty) we hope that the Dominion Governments will now be willing to agree to this action, which we feel would have a good effect in the United States. We are consulting His Majesty's Ambassador urgently on this suggestion, and should be grateful for an immediate telegram indicating whether, if Sir Robert Craigie's advice is favourable, the Dominion Governments would concur in our taking this step.

On 19 July the acting Prime Minister replied: ‘His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have no objection to offer to the step now proposed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.’

33 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 18 July 1941

My telegram of 17 July. Japan.

We are grateful for your telegram of 16 July [No. 29], and note that in the event of it becoming necessary to proceed with the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would wish to take steps at the same time to terminate the trade agreement between New Zealand and Japan. We greatly welcome this decision, which would add to the effectiveness of our intended action. The effect would, moreover, be further enhanced by the simultaneous denunciation of the Indo-Japanese Convention, 1934, of which the Government of India have authorised us to give notice.

2. As regards procedure, notice of the termination of the Commercial Treaty would be given to [sic] His Majesty's Ambassador, Tokyo, in a formal note addressed to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The formula which would be used is that, owing to present conditions, the treaty did not carry out the objects for which it was concluded. A separate note would be presented at the same time dealing with the denunciation of the Indo-Japanese Convention.

3. If desired by the New Zealand Government, His Majesty's Ambassador could be authorised also to address a note on their behalf giving notice of the termination of New Zealand's trade agreement with Japan, and if this course is desired it is suggested that to save time a telegram (which might be repeated to me) should be sent direct to His Majesty's Ambassador as soon as possible informing him of the exact words which the New Zealand Government would wish to be used.

4. Alternatively, the New Zealand Government may prefer to give notice of termination themselves through the Japanese Consul-General at Wellington,

Mr N. Nakafuji.

and in that event we would propose to telegraph to you at the same time as instructions to act are telegraphed to His Majesty's Ambassador.

5. We should be grateful for a very early reply indicating which of the above courses the New Zealand Government prefer.

The New Zealand Government replied on 20 July that it would give notice of termination, ‘if and when the occasion arises’, through the Japanese Consulate-General in Wellington.

34 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 22 July 1941

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 15 July [No. 28]. Japan.

1. We learn from a most secret source that the new Japanese Government

A new Cabinet was formed on 18 July. Prince Konoye remained Prime Minister, but Vice-Admiral Toyoda replaced Mr Matsuoka as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

are proceeding with demands on Vichy, and that unless the French have previously agreed, bases in Indo-China will be occupied by force on 24 July. The United States Government have similar information….

A security direction has been omitted.

3. The State Department have also informed us that they have learned that eleven Japanese troopships left ports in China on 21 July, and that a convoy of Japanese troopships has left Formosa for an unknown destination.

35 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 22 July 1941

Circular telegram. Japan. My telegram M. 166, paragraph 1 (a) special.

Not published. Paragraph 1 (a) reads: ‘In response to inquiries as to the economic action the United States Government contemplate in the event of Japan committing an overt act, the United States Secretary of State said on 19 July that the necessary orders were now before the President. He expected them to include—(a) the freezing of all Japanese and Chinese assets, the latter at the request of the Chinese Government.’

My immediately following telegram

Not published. This telegram, M.173, despatched on 22 July, was delayed in transmission.

repeats a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington containing an account of detailed steps which the United States authorities propose to take in the event of a Japanese move to the south. Before this information had been received we had considered our general policy in the light of the earlier report summarised in the telegram under reference. We were advised that the freezing of Japanese assets, if rigidly applied, would be likely to result in the stoppage of all current trade between the United States and Japan, and the report contained in my immediately following telegram shows that the United States authorities are themselves prepared for this. The position may thus arise under which the Japanese would be confronted with a choice between the alternatives of reversing their pro-Axis policy or of proceeding with their southward move, if necessary to the point of war with the Netherlands East Indies and ourselves, in an endeavour to obtain control of the sources of raw materials. The question, therefore, which we are called upon to consider is whether we are prepared to act with the United States if they desire to take such drastic action, and if not whether we should attempt to restrain them.

Our policy has hitherto been to do everything possible to avoid war with Japan in the absence of a formal guarantee by the United States that they will support us if attacked. At the same time the danger inherent in our lagging behind the United States in dealing with Japan and thus weakening the ties between us and them is very real. The issue with Japan must be faced sooner or later, and the question is whether we should join the United States in forcing the issue now over Indo-China or whether we should try to dissuade the United States from forcing the issue until Japan makes a further move, e.g., in Thailand or against Russia. We do not, however, know whether the United States would be prepared to go so far in economic action in the last two eventualities; indeed, we have an indication that in the former case they would not.

Weighing these considerations, the conclusions we have reached are:

(1)

That we must on no account discourage action which the United States may wish to take in putting pressure on Japan, and must as far as possible associate our action with theirs.

(2)

That we must in the paramount interest of co-operation with the United States be prepared to follow a United States lead in forcing the issue with Japan over Indo-Chinese bases.

(3)

That if we are called upon to go to lengths which involve a plain risk of war with Japan, every effort should be made to obtain the clearest possible indication from the United States that we can count without reservation on their active armed support.

We hope that these conclusions will commend themselves to His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions.

In view of the expected imminent Japanese move south we are most anxious to make our [group mutilated – intentions?] known to the United States Government at once and should be grateful for the earliest possible expression of views by immediate telegram.

36 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 22 July 1941

Circular telegram. My preceding telegram M. 173.

See p. 43, note 6.

Japan. Following for Prime Minister:

1. While detailed application of United States proposals remains to be clarified, it is now clear that the measures they have immediately in mind are:

(1)

The complete freezing of all Japanese assets, which thereafter would be immobilised except in so far as specific licences might be granted for particular transactions.

(2)

The subjection of all imports from Japan to licensing.

(3)

Further restrictions on exports of petroleum products to Japan. Details of these are awaited and will be telegraphed on receipt.

2. As regards (1), the United States Government apparently anticipate that the immediate effect of the freezing order will be to bring to a standstill all trade between Japan and the United States. But it is clear that they contemplate that some measure of trade will continue thereafter. As we understand the position, all business and trade with Japan will be effectively stopped except that covered by special licences or permissions given under the freezing order. This will mean that transactions could only take place with difficulty on a basis equivalent to barter if so desired by both parties.

3. In accordance with the general conclusions set out in my telegram [No. 35], we think it important that we and other British Commonwealth Governments should follow the United States lead as [regards] (1) as closely as we can, and put into effect similar measures throughout the Empire as soon as possible after the United States Government have taken action. The machinery which we ourselves would propose to use would be that provided by Defence (Finance) Regulation 2A in S.R. and O.

Statutory Rules and Orders.

1329 of 1940 as modified by S.R. and O. 649 of 1941—see my Circular notes 159, 14 August 1940, and 41 of 24 May.

Not published.

(Copies have also been sent by the Bank of England to Reserve Banks.) The application of this regulation to Japan would automatically freeze all Japanese assets in this country, and the position thereafter would be regulated in such a way as to accord with developments in the United States practically as in paragraph 2 above—it should be noted in this connection that Regulation 2A would apply to residents in Japan or concerns controlled for Japan and not to Japanese nationals elsewhere.

4. We should be glad to learn by immediate telegram if possible whether the Dominion Governments would be willing to take similar action simultaneously with us. It will be appreciated that the general conception underlying the United States proposal is that, while the immediate shock to trade would cause a more or less complete stoppage, the licensing system would afford, within limits, opportunities for obtaining essential imports from Japan. If this expectation should be realised such imports could no doubt only be obtained against the equivalent value of exports needed by Japan, and it would, of course, be important that licences granted for such exports should formally be confined to commodities other than strategic commodities such as those already restricted below normal.

5. Application of the regulation to China (on the lines proposed by the United States) raises special questions on which we will telegraph shortly. Apart from the complicated technical aspects involved, it would of course be necessary firstly to obtain the concurrence of the Chinese Government and to make it clear that in the case of China the action proposed would be a friendly action intended to give every support to the Chinese monetary authorities.

6. A further telegram will be sent as regards paragraph 1 (2) as soon as we know in more detail the degree of restriction of imports contemplated by the United States Government.

37 The acting Prime Minister to the Rt. Hon. P. Fraser (London) 24 July 1941

Government and War Cabinet have given full consideration to telegrams [Nos. 35 and 36] of 22 July from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (telegram M.173

See p. 43, note 6.

not yet received). Whilst we recognise the danger of immediate economic action in relation to the contemplated occupation of Indo-China bases, we are of the opinion that the weight of evidence supports the economic sanctions proposed by the United States. We are satisfied that the southward move to Indo-China, if and when achieved, will not end there but will be used by Japan to strengthen bases and to consolidate for yet a further southward move. It does not appear reasonably possible to avoid conflict with Japan if Indo-China is occupied, and this being so we consider that, if the possibility of conflict is extended by the proposed economic measures proposed and taken by the United States, their co-operation in the conflict should be inevitable. For our part we will take whatever economic steps which the policy of the United Kingdom may determine, and feel that we should give full co-operation to the United States if they decide on the freezing of Japanese assets as proposed. If you are also in agreement with this viewpoint I will be grateful if you would on our behalf immediately convey our concurrence to the United Kingdom Government.

38 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 25 July 1941

Circular telegram. Japan.

We have considered our conclusions further in the light of views expressed by the Canadian, Commonwealth and New Zealand Governments. We fully appreciate the vital importance, to which all three Governments have called attention, of securing the clearest possible indication that the active armed support of the United States will be immediately available if the Japanese force the issue to the point of war. The only question to our mind is how can this best be secured.

2. Having regard to constitutional difficulties in the United States, we feel quite certain that to ask the United States Government now to give us such an assurance would be most unwise. Any attempt to attach such a condition to our taking action similar to that which the United States are prepared to take might well discourage the United States from taking action at all and, in any case, would not in our view produce the desired result.

3. We have considered whether it would be possible to inform the United States Government that we are prepared to take action parallel with theirs, and at the same time to make it clear that we are assuming that if, in consequence, an attack on the Netherlands East Indies or ourselves results, they will be prepared to give us armed support. We feel, however, that the United States Government would have no alternative but to make reservations which would seriously embarrass us.

4. In our view the United States Government will in fact be compelled to support us if the need arises. It is clear that if the Japanese are provoked to extreme measures it will be as a result of the drastic effect of action taken by the United States and not of our co-operation therein. Both by reason of the [group mutilated – vigorous?] war policy of the United States towards us and their special interest in the Far East, we do not believe that they would find it possible not to give us their full support.

5. With these considerations in mind we feel convinced that the proper course is to follow the United States lead boldly and without attaching reservations. If this should lead to a tense situation and Japanese threats of hostile action, then will be the time to raise with the United States with the best prospect of success the question of a guarantee of mutual support.

6. We earnestly trust that His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions will feel able to agree to our taking this line with the United States Government. We feel it essential to make known to the United States Government forthwith our willingness to take parallel action with them, and should be grateful, therefore, for a reply by most immediate telegram.

39 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia and to Mr Fraser in London.

25 July 1941

Your telegram of 25 July. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are fully in accord with the viewpoint that, should the United States act in the manner proposed, the Governments of the British Commonwealth must be prepared to take parallel action. The New Zealand Government recognise the force of the reasons put forward in your telegram under reference in favour of giving concurrence without making at this stage any demands for guarantees of assistance. As stated in my telegram to the Prime Minister of 24 July [No. 37], they are of the opinion that the United States must inevitably cooperate with the British Commonwealth in any conflict with Japan resulting from the contemplated action of the United States. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are, moreover, equally of the opinion that there is very real danger of losing American support should there be any hesitancy or failure so to act at the present time.

40 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 25 July 1941

The following is the text of a statement made in Parliament today by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 23 Dec 1940–26 Jul 1945.

I ask the leave of the House to make a brief statement on recent developments in Indo-China. The Japanese Government have presented demands to the Vichy Government for the occupation of naval and air bases in Southern Indo-China.

A pact granting Japan these bases was signed at Vichy on 29 July.

Although there is as yet no official news of the conclusion of a definite agreement between the Japanese and Vichy Governments or of the occupation of further bases by Japanese forces, it is quite evident that both these events are imminent. That this new aggression was meditated by Japan has been clear for some time past. I made allusion two days ago to the cloud of accusations against the authorities in Indo-China and allegations that it was the intention of Great Britain to attack Indo-China, not to mention other assertions of an equally baseless character. Propaganda of this kind is the customary prelude to a fresh act of violence by the Axis and their associates. In the present case the fact that the occupation of bases in Southern Indo-China is taking place with the consent of Vichy does not obscure the fact that Japan has achieved her object by making demands [backed] by threats of force if they were not complied with. The miserable plight of the Vichy Government in the face of these demands provides one further example of the blessings of collaboration with the Axis. To the sorry tale of humiliation to which the Vichy Government have subjected the French people is added the new indignity of having to accept the so-called protection of Japan against a threat which, as everyone knows, does not exist.

His Majesty's Government regard these developments as a potential threat to their own territories and interests in the Far East. In anticipation of them, His Majesty's Government have been in close communication with the United States Government, the Government of the Netherlands and, of course, with His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions. The attitude of the United States has been publicly announced in no uncertain terms by the acting Secretary of State,

Mr Sumner Welles.

and I am sure that the House will join me in welcoming that timely and salutary statement.

I do not propose today to give an account of the measures which His Majesty's Government have prepared to meet these and other possible developments. I will give the House further information at an early date, but I can state at once that certain defence measures in Malaya have already been enforced in view of the plain threat to our territories which the Japanese action implies.

41 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 25 July 1941

Circular telegram. My telegram of 17 July [No. 32], paragraph 1. Following for your Prime Minister:

Japan. Following on statements regarding the action of Japan made yesterday by the United States acting Secretary of State and today by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (see my telegram [No. 40]), we are telegraphing instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador, Tokyo, to proceed forthwith with the denunciation of the Commercial Treaty. It is contemplated that the announcement will be made here early next week.

42 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 25 July 1941

My telegram [No. 41]. Japan.

It would be appreciated if we could be informed as soon as notice of termination of New Zealand's trade agreement with Japan has been given to the Japanese Consul-General.

We should also be glad to learn the New Zealand Government's intentions as to publicity.

43 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia.

27 July 1941

With reference to your telegram of 25 July [No. 42]. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are serving notice of denunciation of the New Zealand – Japan trade agreement on the Chancellor of the Japanese Consulate, Wellington, at 4 a.m., Greenwich mean time, on Sunday, 27 July. Notification that this action has been taken will be published in the press here on Monday morning, 28 July.

44 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 1 August 1941

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram M.199.

Not published. Reported a discussion between the British Minister at Bangkok (Sir Josiah Crosby) and the Prime Minister of Thailand (Field Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram) on likely Japanese moves against Thailand.

Thailand.

Indications have been accumulating that the Japanese may be contemplating an early move into Thailand. Information has reached us from a secret source that the Japanese have already made demands on the Thai Government promising territorial acquisitions in Indo-China in return for military co-operation. Both the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (who is very friendly to us) have assured His Majesty's Minister that they know nothing of any Japanese demands, but the Under-Secretary of State had previously sent a secret warning to His Majesty's Minister that something of the sort might be afoot. He explained that he had done this merely as an intelligent observer of coming events. His Majesty's Minister believes that the denials given him are genuine, but fears the Thai Prime Minister may have received demands from the Japanese but has not disclosed them to all the members of his Cabinet.

2. We are not satisfied that the above information concerning Japanese demands is necessarily reliable, but it is clear that Thai Government circles are seriously apprehensive and this apprehension is no doubt reinforced by the continued agitation about Thailand in the Japanese press. For example, a recent Domei agency telegram from Bangkok alleged increasing British military preparations and pressure on Thailand to which sinister purposes are attributed.

3. Further telegrams from His Majesty's Minister report that both the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made earnest appeal to him to the effect that, if Japan was not to overwhelm Thailand completely, it was imperative that we and the United States should come to their assistance in some open and forcible manner. They were convinced that nothing less would suffice than a public warning to Japan that any attempt by her to violate the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Thailand would involve her in war with the United States and ourselves. They fully realise that with our pre-occupation in the West we could not take the lead in this matter, but they repeated that the remedy lay with the United States Government, who had so far failed to show the requisite firmness in their Far Eastern policy.

4. On 30 July His Majesty's Minister reported that the Thai Prime Minister had not only approved and associated himself with this appeal, but had given him the following urgent and very secret message for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

‘It is to be expected that Japan will press on him to make military and economic concessions and generally to adopt a policy which will be incompatible with the position of Thailand as a neutral power and as a friend of Britain. If he refuses these proposals it is possible that Japan may threaten force and announce her intention of violating the neutrality of Thailand under the pretext of protecting her against ourselves. In that event, what would be the attitude of Britain and what course would His Majesty's Government advise him to follow?’

5. We are consulting with the United States Government at once in regard to the Thailand situation, with special reference to the Prime Minister's message, and will telegraph further as soon as possible.

45 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 2 August 1941

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 1 August. Japan.

1. The possibility that the Japanese may be contemplating early action in relation to Thailand and the message from the Thai Prime Minister have made it imperative that we should take up with the United States Government the advisability of a warning being conveyed to the Japanese before the latter are committed to a further move. We also wish to raise with the United States Government at the earliest possible moment the general question of an assurance that in the event of war with Japan we may count upon their armed support—see my telegram to the Commonwealth Government, No. 515.

Not published. Discussed the difficulty ‘in the present circumstances’ of securing a guarantee of armed support from the United States.

A third approach is also necessary since such information as has reached us as to the manner in which the United States freezing order is to be applied (see my telegram M.193)

Not published. Contained details of the steps being taken by the United States Government to control imports from and exports to Japan.

suggests there has been a departure from the policy outlined to us before the freezing order was issued (see my telegram M.173)

See p. 43, note 6.

with the consequent risk that we and other parts of the Empire may in practice find ourselves ahead of the United States in our restrictions.

2. My three immediately following telegrams

Not published.

contain instructions which have now been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Washington, in regard to each of these aspects, viz:

(a)

The question of an assurance from the United States;

(b)

Warning to Japan;

(c)

The freezing of Japanese assets.

The nature of information reaching us about Thailand and the uncertainty in regard to United States policy over the application of (b) and (c) is very urgent; (a) is equally pressing, but it is a particularly delicate question and informal discussions here with the United States Ambassador

Mr J. G. Winant, United States Ambassador to Great Britain, 1941–46.

have shown that the method of approach is all-important. While, therefore, we have acquainted His Majesty's Ambassador very fully with the point of view of the Dominions and ourselves, we think it necessary as regards (a) to await his observations before giving him definite instructions to take action.

46 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand [Extract] 4 August 1941

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram M.207.

Not published. Reported a further appeal by the Thai Prime Minister for support from the United States and the United Kingdom against ‘intense Japanese pressure’.

Thailand.

On 1 August His Majesty's Minister at Bangkok was instructed to return an interim reply to the message from the Thai Prime Minister (my telegram of 1 August [No. 44], paragraph 4) to the effect that we were in consultation with the United States Government as to measures to restrain further Japanese encroachments, but that our attitude was bound to be affected by the degree of independence which the Thai Government displayed in their dealings with the Japanese. He was also authorised to say that we were proceeding with arrangements for the delivery of oil on the scale previously contemplated (my telegram D.469)

Not published.

without waiting for signature of the economic agreement, but that the continuance of these arrangements would obviously depend on the general attitude of the Thai Government….

The text of telegraphic instructions sent to the British Ambassador at Washington has been omitted. These were to inform the United States Government of the instructions sent to His Majesty's Minister at Bangkok, and to invite its views on the policy to be adopted towards Thailand.

47 The Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia

Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies.

to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Prime Ministers of Canada, South Africa and New Zealand and to the Australian Minister in Washington.

11 August 1941

Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:

My colleagues and I have given anxious consideration to the Far Eastern position. We have, as you know, always regarded Singapore and Malaya as our vital outpost, and have at all times, as I indicated to the Foreign Office when in London, been prepared to join in a guarantee to the Netherlands East Indies.

We have also assumed that in the event of war with Japan naval reinforcements as discussed in London, with a nucleus of five capital ships, would be sent to the Far East. We now say and emphasise that an early despatch of capital ships east of Suez would itself be the most powerful deterrent and first step.

We also once more urge that, having regard to the grave tension at present existing, air and military reinforcements to Malaya should be vigorously expedited. The position of Thailand now comes up for early decision, for events appear to be moving rapidly. Two urgent questions emerge:

(1)

Should we, the British countries, be prepared to make it clear to Thailand and to Japan that any attack upon Thailand by Japan will be regarded by us as a casus belli?

(2)

Should we announce this to the countries concerned independently of United States action or should we make it conditional upon American concurrence and active participation?

We are of the opinion, as the Government of one of the two British Dominions which are most directly affected, that the first question should be answered ‘Yes’, and that while every pressure should be maintained upon the United States it would be an error to condition our action upon American action, though actual objection by the United States of America would of course be fatal.

Thailand's strategic position and resources are such that Japan's occupation of them would gravely imperil the safety of Singapore, the effective control of the waters around the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, and the maintenance of Chinese supplies along the Burma Road.

Having regard to reality in the Far East, we do not believe Japan wants Thailand merely as an end in itself. Its capture or control would be plainly the first step, and it is the first step that counts. In this connection we have noted with regret that Mr Sumner Welles' warning to Japan seemed to indicate that the objectionable matter would not be the occupation of Thailand but only what might happen subsequently.

The attitude of the United States, while constitutionally and politically understandable, is disappointing. We have throughout this period felt that a clear and unequivocal [group omitted – answer?] to Japan by the United States would have stopped aggression. Up to the time of the coup in Indo-China it had not been made. Later on Sumner Welles made a much more vigorous statement to the Japanese representative, though it is subject to the criticism mentioned above. But the Japanese have still not been given a firm warning. Indications of postponed resistance to aggression are merely encouragement.

We feel that if we are prepared to fight, America will not in fact desert us. A bold course might change the whole outlook.

Naturally in all this we are assuming that whatever we do will be done in the closest consultation and agreement with the Netherlands East Indies. Subject to the above, our view can be summed up as being that if Thailand is abandoned and we delay our action we will be one country nearer to war, and that in that war, and in particular in defence of Singapore, Japan will be relatively stronger and we relatively weaker than at present.

We express these views frankly and with the realisation of their implications so that you may see the supreme importance which we attach to them.

48 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of Australia

Repeated to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Prime Ministers of Canada and South Africa.

14 August 1941

Your telegram of 11 August.

1. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand share the anxiety of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia over the deterioration of the situation in the Far East, and they would welcome after full discussion an early definition of some common policy.

2. They concur in the viewpoint that Singapore and Malaya are vital outposts, and it is a matter of the gravest concern to them that the United States Government do not apparently hold similar views as to the vital importance of Singapore. Under certain circumstances they agree that it may be necessary to pursue an independent line of policy without waiting for active United States collaboration, but His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would, for the reasons set down below, much prefer to delay forcing the issue, and in the meantime to continue to exert the utmost pressure on Japan by economic and other means.

3. With the views of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia regarding the issue of a mutual guarantee to and from the Netherlands East Indies, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are in full accord, and they too have on several occasions made representations in support of this proposal to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

4. They have always assumed that, in the event of an outbreak of war, effect would be given to the assurances of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that capital ships would be transferred to the Far Eastern area. While they fully agree that the presence now of British capital ships in Singapore would act as a powerful deterrent upon the Japanese, they are not without doubts as to the wisdom of denuding the British fleets in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the extent proposed, at a time when a number of capital ships are under repair and so long as there remain in existence heavy units of the German and Italian navies. Until the United States have agreed to take over a more active role in the Atlantic and have transferred sufficient capital ships to balance the withdrawal of British naval units, it would in their opinion be dangerous to remove five capital ships from the actual theatres of war.

5. It is agreed that an early discussion concerning the British attitude vis-à-vis Thailand is urgently required. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand fully realise the importance to British interests of maintaining the integrity of Thailand, but here again they are not without doubts as to the practicability and the wisdom of issuing a warning from the British countries alone that any attack on Thailand by Japan would be regarded as a casus belli. It seems to them unwise to take such action unless and until there is available a force sufficiently strong to ensure successful resistance to Japan in the area threatened. The result of any hasty or ill-conceived guarantee might well be a repetition of the circumstances surrounding the British guarantee to Poland in 1939.

See Vol. I, Outbreak of War and Declarations: Germany.

6. It appears to His Majesty's Government in New Zealand moreover that, having encouraged Thailand to resist, the British Commonwealth may in a very short time be called upon to render active assistance, and the time has arrived, if it is not already overdue, to consider whether or not the British nations are in a position to render immediate and effective assistance.

7. The force of the arguments put forward by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth for making a stand is fully admitted but the question of expediency cannot be overlooked. Before any clear definition of policy can be agreed upon, it seems necessary to ascertain what military resources are available in the Far East and whether or not effective assistance can in fact be offered to Thailand.

8. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would therefore welcome a very early appreciation of the strategical position in regard to Thailand. They feel that the result of a defeat in this region such as we experienced in Norway, in Belgium, in Greece and in Crete, arising from any premature or ill-conceived attempt to assist the Thais, could not fail to have the most disastrous results, particularly in the United States.

9. The choice seems to be not so much one of abandoning Thailand or of delaying action against Japan as whether or not it is possible to give effect to a guarantee to Thailand, and until an appreciation of the facts of the position is available, and until there is a clearer definition of the views of the United Kingdom and also the United States attitude in the event of a Japanese move in this direction, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would prefer to wait before deciding on the course of action proposed.

49 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 27 August 1941

Circular telegram.

1. We have received from the United States Government information as to communications made by them on 17 August, i.e., since the President's return from his meeting with the Prime Minister,

The meetings took place on 9–12 August on board HMS Prince of Wales and the United States cruiser Augusta in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland.

to the Japanese Ambassador

Admiral K. Nomura, Japanese Ambassador in Washington, February–December 1941.

in regard to the situation in the Pacific. The United States Government have particularly requested that these communications should be regarded as especially secret.

2. The first communication refers briefly to Japanese action in Indo-China and the attitude of the United States Government thereto, and closes with a warning in the following terms: ‘This Government now find it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government take any steps in pursuance of a policy or programme of military domination by force or the threat of force of neighbouring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take any and all steps which it may deem necessary towards safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals, and towards ensuring the safety and security of the United States’.

3. The second communication indicates the readiness of the United States to seek a general settlement in the Pacific area which would comprise equal opportunity of economic development for all, if Japan is ready to suspend her expansionist policy, readjust her position, and embark on a peaceful programme consistent with the principles to which the United States have long been committed. The communication indicates, however, that before negotiations on this basis could be resumed, it will be necessary for the Japanese Government to furnish a clearer statement than they have yet done of their present attitude and plans.

4. We are considering what further action we ourselves should now enforce in relation to Japan.

50 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 28 August 1941

Circular telegram. My telegram of 27 August.

We have now given further consideration to the question of the action which it would be appropriate for us to take in respect of Japan to reinforce the warning which has been delivered to that country by the United States Government. In his broadcast of 24 August the Prime Minister made it clear that we should range ourselves at the side of the United States if the latter became involved in war with Japan, but we feel it is desirable to warn the Japanese Government on our own part, and directly, that apart from our support of the United States, we should be compelled in the interests of the security of our own territories to take counter measures in the event of further Japanese expansion.

We should prefer to link our own warning specifically with that given by the United States, but this, we feel, would require the concurrence of the latter. We should also prefer adherence to the wording elaborated at the Prime Minister's recent meeting with President Roosevelt unless the United States Government see serious objection. In these circumstances His Majesty's Minister at Washington

Rt. Hon. Sir Ronald Campbell, PC, GCMG, CB; United Kingdom Minister in Washington, 1941–45.

has been instructed to inform the United States Government that we should propose to request His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo to address the Japanese Government in the terms of Formula 1 contained in my immediately following telegram. If the United States Government, on the other hand, would prefer that we did not specifically mention the warning conveyed to Japan by them, we should propose that our communication should follow the terms of Formula 2, the text of which is also contained in my immediately following telegram. In either case it is proposed that communication should be made orally, though an aide-memoire of what is said might be communicated to the Japanese authorities.

We are making it clear to the United States Government that our communication would be subject to the concurrence of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions. We hope the Dominion Governments would agree in principle with the line which we propose to take, and would also be prepared to make similar communication to the Japanese Government or authorise us to do so on their behalf.

We will telegraph further as soon as we receive a reply from His Majesty's Minister at Washington as to the United States Government's attitude. In the meantime I should be grateful to learn whether you concur generally in the action proposed.

51 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 28 August 1941

Circular telegram. My immediately preceding telegram. The following are the terms of Formula 1:

‘His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are aware of the communication which President Roosevelt made to the Japanese Ambassador on 17 August regarding the concern of the United States at Japanese military activities in Indo-China and the steps which the United States Government would be compelled to take if the Japanese Government pursued a similar policy in regard to neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government share the concern of the United States Government and cannot disregard the plain threat to the security of British territories which such a policy on the part of Japan would constitute.

‘His Majesty's Government, therefore, who have for their part no aggressive intentions either against the countries bordering on British territories or against Japan herself, feel it necessary in the interests of peace to let the Japanese Government know that any further Japanese encroachment in the South-West Pacific area would compel His Majesty's Government to take counter measures, even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.’

The following are the terms of the second formula:

‘His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have watched with grave concern successive encroachments of Japanese armed forces in Indo-China and accumulating evidence of an intention on the part of the Japanese Government to continue this policy of expansion by force or threat of force into countries bordering on British territories. They cannot disregard the plain threat to the security of those territories which such a policy would constitute.

‘His Majesty's Government, therefore, who have for their part no aggressive intentions either against these countries or against Japan herself, feel that the time has come for most complete candour. They accordingly find it necessary in the interests of peace to let the Japanese Government know that any further Japanese encroachment in the South-West Pacific area would compel His Majesty's Government to take counter measures, even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.’

52 The acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia.

30 August 1941

Your telegrams of 28 August.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand fully concur in the proposal of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to reinforce the warning issued to Japan by the United States, and for their part they would much prefer that this should be done in terms of Formula No. 1.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are, moreover, willing to authorise His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to make on their behalf a declaration in similar terms to the Japanese Government, but they wish that this should be done in association with and at the same time as similar declarations are made for the other Dominions.

53 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 2 September 1941

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 28 August [No. 51].

His Majesty's Minister at Washington reports that the United States Secretary of State, while showing no reluctance in regard to the proposed warning, indicated his preference for the second formula and the avoidance of mention of the United States lest it should appear that our warning was being given merely at their instance. Mr Hull also suggested:

(a)

That (as had been our intention) our warning should be made confidentially to the Japanese Government and that the text of it, at any rate, should not be made public.

(b)

That our objection to Japanese encroachment should not relate to the ‘South-West Pacific area’ but be made more broadly and take the form of a warning against continuance of the war and expansion policy and the programme of conquest by force. The basis of this suggestion is the desire of the United States to meet the suspicions of China and Russia, the former of whom might read into our formula the possibility that we should leave her in the lurch if our territory were safeguarded, while the latter might think we were seeking to divert Japan from our territory towards Russia. (It appears that the United States authorities have grounds for believing that such apprehensions exist, and that the words ‘neighbouring countries’ in the United States warning were adopted largely to meet the suspicions of the above Governments.)

(c)

That the express mention of the word ‘war’ be avoided on the grounds that public opinion in Japan is in a state of ferment and the situation between the Japanese Prime Minister and the extremists is delicate.

2. As regards United States negotiations with Japan, Hull indicated that the message from Prince Konoye of 28 August had made resumption possible,

Konoye suggested a meeting between himself and President Roosevelt ‘to explore the possibility of saving the situation’.

and he said that if the conversations reached a stage where a basis was found for negotiation of a general settlement of the Pacific situation he would inform us. He was determined to adhere strictly to his basic principles, and he thought the United States negotiations had one chance in twenty-five or fifty of succeeding. If they failed he would perhaps have gained useful time, while if they succeeded so much the better. He was, however, thoroughly alive to the various dangers of his policy, e.g., that Japan after a settlement might break it in a few months' time, in which case the effect on the morale of the Chinese army and people might be serious. He would have to bear such dangers constantly in mind.

3. Recent events such as the President's warning and the Prime Minister's broadcast, the United States Government's oil policy in respect of Russia and Japan, and the despatch of a United States Military Mission to China,

Under the leadership of Brigadier-General John Magruder, the mission arrived at Chungking in November 1941.

had caused violent reactions in the Japanese press and public opinion. Prince Konoye (with what sincerity Hull did not know) had begged that no pretext should be given to Japanese extremists to upset him on a charge of sacrificing Japanese Imperial policy.

4. Further consideration in the light of the above is being given to the question of the action to be taken by us.

54 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand 2 September 1941

Following is a most secret and personal message from the Prime Minister for the Prime Minister:

Events about Japan seem to have taken a favourable turn in the last month. The Japanese were then threatening to invade Siam as well as to make jumping-off grounds in Indo-China on the approaches to Singapore. However, as you will have seen from the telegrams sent you about our Atlantic Conference, I persuaded the President to take a hard line against further Japanese encroachments in the South Pacific, and he was also willing to add the North-Western Pacific. You will have seen the Notes delivered by the United States Government to Japan. The President and the State Department think it a good thing to gain time, be it thirty days or ninety days, so long as there are no further encroachments, and the Japanese seem disposed to parley on this basis. Our interests are served by a [group mutilated – standstill] and the Japanese for their part want to know what is going to happen to Russia.

2. As soon as the President had made these declarations I made the statement in my broadcast which conformed to all we had agreed upon with you and the other Dominions beforehand and has since been endorsed by all. Encouraged by this, Russia comes along with a very stiff answer to the Japanese complaint about American supplies entering Vladivostok. The Russian Siberian Army has been very little diminished so far and their Air Force is capable of heavy and much-dreaded bombing of Japan. We have thus got very heavy forces, to wit, Great Britain and Russia, coming into line, with the United States in the van, and in addition Japan is sprawled in China. They would thus have about three-quarters of the human race against them, and I do not wonder that they are plunged in deep anxiety and hesitation. I cannot believe that the Japanese will face the combination now developing around them. We may therefore regard the situation not only as more favourable but as less tense.

3. Nevertheless, the growth of our battleship strength, the ravages made in the German Navy, which is now reduced, apart from the Tirpitz and the U-boats, to very [group mutilated – modest] proportions, and the measure we now have of the Italian Navy, will make it possible in the near future for us to place heavy ships in the Indian Ocean. The Admiralty are carefully considering what is the best disposition to make. But I should like to let you know that, as they become available, we contemplate placing a force of capital ships, including first-class units, in the triangle Aden – Singapore – Simonstown before the end of the year. All this will be without prejudice to our control of the Eastern Mediterranean. I can assure you we are giving constant attention to all this, and you may be sure that we shall never let you down if real danger comes.

55 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

Mr Fraser arrived back in New Zealand on 13 September.

19 September 1941

My telegram of 2 September [No. 53].

We have now given full consideration to the question whether it would be desirable to convey a formal warning to Japan as to the consequences which would follow any further encroachments on their part in the Far East.

It will be remembered that in his broadcast of 24 August the Prime Minister, referring to the menace created by Japan's latest expansionist activities, said, ‘It is certain that this has got to stop’, and added that if the efforts of the United States to bring about an amicable settlement in the Far East failed, ‘we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States’. This followed communication by the United States Government of a memorandum to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, which closed with a warning in the terms given in my telegram of 27 August [No. 49].

A subsequent discussion with the United States Secretary of State indicated that the United States authorities would prefer that we should not link up any warning on our part with theirs, but that they would prefer us on the other hand to adopt a formula which would be as wide as theirs and would omit mention of the word ‘revised’.

The word revised in the draft formula was ‘war’. See No. 53, paragraph 1 (c).

We have ourselves reached the conclusion that in the present circumstances no useful purpose would now be served by the issue of a warning by us at once so wide and so relatively vague as that of the United States. We feel this would add nothing to the warning conveyed already in the Prime Minister's broadcast and might even detract from its force. The broadcast made clear both our attitude towards the Japanese expansionist policy and our complete support of the United States, and has, we feel sure, been taken by the Japanese Government as complementary to the United States warning. Unless, therefore, events show the need for something more, we consider it better to let the matter rest where it is.

We should propose, therefore, that the United States Government be informed accordingly. It is, however, important that the United States Government should be given no grounds for thinking that we had not taken action in this matter fully corresponding to their own. We propose, therefore, to word our communication so as to indicate that if they thought that we could usefully make any further statement we would do so, but that in our judgment it was undesirable to add anything at this stage to the Prime Minister's broadcast.

We should be glad to learn as soon as possible whether His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions concur in a communication being addressed to the United States Government on the above lines.

56 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 21 September 1941

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand fully concur in the proposal of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to address a communication to the United States Government on the lines set out in your telegram of 19 September.

57 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 24 October 1941

Circular telegram. Japan.

The following is a repetition of a telegram sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Washington, on 18 October:

‘Since your conversation with Mr Hull the Japanese Government have fallen,

In the new Japanese government formed on 17 October, General H. Tojo was Prime Minister and Mr S. Togo Minister for Foreign Affairs.

apparently on the issue of the Washington conversations, and the conduct of affairs has been put into the extremists’ hands. It is therefore necessary in conjunction with the United States Government to take stock of the situation in regard to (a) the stimulus which the German advance on Moscow is giving to those in Japan in favour of early action, and (b) the effective pressure of our economic embargo on Japan.

‘2. It is possible that the direction which the Japanese will take is southward, e.g., into Thailand, and we have had an urgent appeal from the Thai Prime Minister for co-operation. Japan knows, however, that this choice is likely to bring her into collision with the ABCD

American, British, Chinese and Dutch.

front. This risk is less in the north, where Japan has already a strong concentration of military forces. Japan may also hope that the departure of the Government from Moscow

On 16 October it was announced that the Soviet Government was evacuating Moscow owing to the rapid advance of German forces.

and the consequent weakening of its authority may lead to some disintegration of the Soviet forces in Siberia. We have to reckon therefore with the possibility of an attack upon Russia in the fairly near future.

‘3. Even though there is little effective action that we could take in this eventuality (and you should make it clear that we have taken no decision on the point) it is desirable that we should enter into consultation with the United States Government at once. So long as our Russian allies are resisting Germany in the west it is important that we should not weaken or discourage their resistance by a failure to support them to the best of our ability in the Far East. We have also to consider the position of our Dutch allies and the effect on the spirit of the Netherlands East Indies if we were to fail the Russians.

‘4. Still more important is the question whether we can afford to allow Japan to attack us “one by one” and, having disposed of the Russians, be able to turn on us, strengthened and freed from the Russian danger, at the moment which suited her best, and which would no doubt coincide with the moment at which Germany in the West should be free to do the same.

‘5. Indo-China has already gone

See p. 49, note 1.

: Japan has established her bases there, and if she is allowed to free herself by an attack on Russia from the present threat to her rear, the danger to ourselves will be very serious indeed.

‘6. We have been well content to leave the handling of the Japanese problem to the United States and to follow the United States in their policy of maximum economic pressure. The Prime Minister made it clear, moreover, in his broadcast of 24 August, that should their attempt to reach a peaceful solution fail, we should range ourselves by their side. This remains the position. While, as stated above, positive action by ourselves alone is unlikely to be very effective, we are prepared to support any action, however serious, which the United States may decide to take.

‘7. Naturally we should still prefer if possible to keep Japan out of the world conflict and to detach her from the Axis by some means short of war. If there is anything which the United States Government think we can do to deter Japan from war we should be glad to give it immediate consideration.

‘8. Please communicate the foregoing to Mr Hull and ask whether he can inform us of the action which the United States Government contemplates in the event of a Japanese attack on Russia.’

See also my immediately following telegram.

58 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 24 October 1941

Circular telegram. Japan. My immediately preceding telegram.

1. Lord Halifax has reported that he has raised the matter with Mr Hull and we are awaiting a definite and considered reply.

2. In the meantime we have been approached by the Soviet Ambassador

M. Ivan Maisky, USSR Ambassador in Great Britain, 1932–43.

with the request that we and the United States Government should issue a strong warning to Japan now. He felt this would check the Japanese Government and that nothing else might suffice to do so. He was told in reply that we were already in communication with the United States Government about the general situation in the Far East and would communicate with him further on receipt of their reply.

3. We have reason to believe that the United States Ambassador is also raising the matter with his Government.

59 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 31 October 1941

WinchNo. 4.

Personal messages between Mr Churchill and Mr Fraser sometimes carried the distinguishing codenames Winch and Pefra, derived from the christian name and surname of the sender of the message.

My telegram of 2 September [No. 54].

1. I am still inclined to think that Japan will not run into war with the ABCD powers unless or until Russia is decisively broken. Perhaps even then they will wait for the promised invasion of the British Isles in the spring. Russian resistance is still strong, especially in front of Moscow, and winter is now near.

2. Admiralty dispositions had been to build up towards the end of the year with the Rodney,

HMS Rodney, 33,900 tons, nine 16–inch guns, 23½ knots.

, Nelson

HMS Nelson, 33,950 tons, nine 16–inch guns, 23½ knots.

and four R's,

Royal Sovereign class battleships: Royal Sovereign, Resolution, Ramillies and Revenge.

based mainly on Singapore. This, however, was spoiled by the recent injury to the Nelson, which will take three or four months to repair.

3. In the interval, in order further to deter Japan, we are sending forthwith our newest battleship, the Prince of Wales,

HMS Prince of Wales, 35,000 tons, ten 14–inch guns, 27 knots.

to join the Repulse

HMS Repulse, 30,755 tons, six 15–inch guns, 29 knots.

in the Indian Ocean. This is done in spite of the protests of the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, and is a serious risk for us to run. The Prince of Wales will be noticed at Capetown quite soon. In addition the four R battleships are being moved as they become ready to Eastern waters. Later on the Repulse will be relieved by the Renown,

HMS Renown, 32,000 tons, six 15–inch guns, 29 knots.

which has a greater radius.

4. In my view the Prince of Wales will be the best possible deterrent, and every effort will be made to spare her permanently. I must, however, make it clear that the movements of the Prince of Wales must be reviewed when she is at Capetown because of the danger of the Tirpitz breaking out and other operational possibilities before the Duke of York

HMS Duke of York, 35,000 tons, ten 14–inch guns, 30 knots.

is ready in December.

60 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of Australia

Mr Menzies resigned on 29 Aug 1941 and was succeeded by Mr A. W. Fadden, who in turn resigned on 7 October after being defeated in a division on the Budget. A new government was formed by Mr J. Curtin, leader of the Australian Labour Party.

31 October 1941

While His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are largely in agreement with the views expressed in your most secret telegram No. 444 of 31 October,

Not published. The Prime Minister of Australia requested New Zealand's comments on the draft of a proposed warning to Japan that any attack by her on Russia would be resisted by force by the British Commonwealth.

and while in the case of an attack by Japan on Russia it appears inevitable that the British Commonwealth will declare war against Japan, they feel that the decision to be taken in this most difficult and delicate matter is so substantially dependent upon the views of the United States Government that it would be unwise to make the contemplated suggestion until the views of the United States have been obtained in accordance with Dominions Office circular telegrams of 24 October [Nos. 57 and 58]. They are not entirely convinced that it would be wise to make this démarche without the concurrence of the United States, and they are not entirely without apprehension lest such a step without United States co-operation might lead the Japanese to believe that they had successfully driven a wedge between the British Commonwealth and the United States.

Another serious factor of the existing situation which makes them hesitate to agree to the proposed declaration at the moment is our knowledge of the obviously limited scale of operations which, in fulfilment of the declaration, could be launched against Japan without United States assistance—a fact with which the Japanese Government are quite conversant. In such circumstances the New Zealand Government fear that the proposed declaration would fail as a deterrent, that it might in fact be viewed by Japan as a challenge to immediate action, and be considered as premature and too precipitate by the United States. On receipt of the views of the United States Government, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand will review the position and will communicate with the Commonwealth Government. I shall be grateful if a copy of this communication can be shown to the Hon. Mr Nash.

Mr Nash was in Australia for discussions on the trans-Pacific air service.

61 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 1 November 1941

PefraNo. 4.

Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister:

Very many thanks for your telegram Winch No. 4. I quite understand the position and warmly welcome the steps that you are taking.

62 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 1 November 1941

Circular telegram. My telegram of today, Circular D.660.

Not published. Reported a discussion on 29 October between His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on Japanese military infringement of French sovereignty in Indo-China.

Japan.

The following is the text of a further telegram received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo regarding his interview of 29 October with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs:

‘I had intended to confine my remarks about Indo-China to the particular question of recent acts by occupying authorities infringing French sovereignty, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs was clearly anxious to carry the matter further, observing that these were only symptoms of the trouble and that it was important to bear constantly in mind the underlying reasons for the stationing of Japanese troops in Indo-China. These he defined as:

(a)

The defence of the security of Japan and of areas in South-Eastern Asia vital to such defence;

(b)

The defence of Japan's economic position, which had now become a vital matter.

‘2. As regards (a), I said that the plea of a threat to Japanese security simply did not hold water, seeing that Japan's southward advance had now proceeded to a point 1500 miles from Tokyo and only some miles from British territory: on the contrary, the threat was obviously now to our security. As regards (b), I could see no possible necessity for military occupation to secure economic advantages which, in any case, had subsequently been accorded to Japan in full measure by the Vichy Government. On this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs added as a further reason the necessity for ensuring the safety of Japanese troops which had been sent earlier to Tongking as part of the campaign against China. In any case, he added, the important thing was now to prevent any aggravation of the situation, which in the present critical state of affairs might in turn necessitate an extension of Japan's military measures. (While he had mentioned no country other than Indo-China, he was clearly hinting at the possibility of some advance beyond the border of Indo-China.)

‘3. I said that on this question of further southward expansion I thought it best to be perfectly frank and definite, while inviting His Excellency to take my observations in the same friendly spirit in which they were offered. The change in strategical equilibrium brought about by the Japanese occupation of Southern Indo-China had constituted a threat to our neighbouring territory and, given the disposition of Japanese troops and air bases, could only be aimed at us. We had hitherto confined our counter measures to the economic field, but I was personally convinced that any further aggressive action on the part of the Japanese military in these regions would provoke immediate counter action on our part, the time for words and protests having passed. Japan had now pushed forward right up to our vital line running through Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies and Australia and New Zealand: we and other powers concerned in the defence of that line would in no circumstances agree to any impingement on it or to any further weakening of our security in that area. We at the [same] time wished to avoid trouble with Japan, the effects of which for both our countries would be incalculable and from which Germany only would benefit; but let the Japanese armed forces not conclude from this that we were afraid of Japan or insufficiently armed and prepared to meet any further movement imperilling our security in these regions.

‘4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs made no comment on these candid observations beyond acknowledging the friendly purpose of my remarks and repeating that they showed how vitally concerned was Great Britain in preventing any further aggravation of the present situation in South-Eastern Asia.’

63 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 3 November 1941

WinchNo. 5.

Your Pefra No. 4. Nothing is so good as having something that can catch and kill anything. It keeps them bunched. Good wishes.

64 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 17 November 1941

Circular telegram. Reference my telegram of 27 October, M.339.

Not published. Reported proposals to supply assistance to Thailand in answer to the Thai Prime Minister's appeal.

The United States reply observed that it had been the policy of the United States Government to give sympathetic consideration to priority of export applications from the Thai Government, and that the Thai Minister in Washington had been informed that the United States would place Thailand in the same category as China were the former to be attacked and endeavour to defend herself. In so far as we were unable to spare further aircraft for Thailand from Singapore, the United States Government would agree to the release to that country of aeroplanes being supplied to us from the United States should we desire this course. The question of the release to Thailand of aviation spirit and lubricant oil was still under consideration by the United States.

2. In view of urgent representations by the Thai Prime Minister we have felt it desirable not to delay the further offer of assistance, and His Majesty's Minister at Bangkok has accordingly been authorised to inform the Prime Minister in the following sense:

(a)

An attitude of resolute independence will do much to hamper Japanese plans and constitute the surest means of winning external support for Thailand if attacked.

(b)

We are, however, fully alive to the Japanese menace and have a natural interest in frustrating it.

(c)

Military assistance to Thailand must be discussed on a realistic basis. It is on our successful defence of Singapore that the ultimate fate of Thailand depends, and it is essential that this should not be jeopardised by dissipation of forces.

(d)

Should it be necessary for us to meet the Japanese menace in the Kra Isthmus, it is important for us to be assured that we shall not meet with Thai opposition. We hope we may count on active co-operation, since only by our success can the final independence of Thailand be assured.

(e)

We are prepared to authorise the Commander-in-Chief Far East to send an expert adviser in aerodrome defence, and His Majesty's Minister is to offer twenty-four 4·5–inch howitzers and twelve field guns, with British instructors. If the offer is accepted, twelve howitzers with 1000 rounds of ammunition per gun would be released at once from Malaya, other guns being sent in batteries of twelve at intervals of from two to three months.

(f)

In view of the immense calls on our resources, we cannot offer aircraft at present and are doubtful whether a supply of fighter or bomber aircraft can be arranged from any other source, though we are making inquiries. We are also inquiring into the possibility of the supply of [group mutilated – similar?] training aircraft, and are prepared to supply limited quantities of aviation petrol—adequate for the current needs of the Thai Air Force.

(g)

If the reaction of the Thai Prime Minister is favourable we are prepared to consult the United States Government as to what further can be done.

3. Sir J. Crosby reports he is at once communicating with the Thai Prime Minister in the above sense.

4. The Thai Prime Minister has recently accepted our proposal to increase our staff of the Assistant Military Attaché in Bangkok to four, thus raising our military representation to five against eight Japanese officers.

65 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 20 November 1941

Circular telegram. Japan.

Mr Hull sent for His Majesty's Minister on 18 November to inform him of the position of the conversations with the Japanese. The following is the text of a telegram from Sir R. Campbell reporting Mr Hull's remarks, which the latter asked should be treated with a special degree of secrecy and given the most limited circulation:

‘After recapitulating the history of these conversations, their interruption by Japanese action in Indo-China, their resumption with Konoye's message to the President, and re-emphasising their exploratory character and the United States Government's stand on basic principles, he said Mr Kurusu

Mr S. Kurusu, Japanese Minister in Washington, November-December 1941.

had expressed great anxiety to avert a clash of arms, but had said opinion in Japan was such that an explosion might occur if agreement between the two Governments could not be reached. Mr Hull had, in turn, stated the anxiety of the United States Government to avoid war, but had laid stress on principles which the United States Government could not abandon. In the first place, there could be no hitch-up between peaceful settlement between the United States and Japan and the Axis. If Japan had any different ideas on this point he could tell them that they would not get six inches in a thousand years with the United States Government, who would not have anything to do with the greatest butcher in history. In the second place, Japan must withdraw her troops from China. The United States could not find a basis for negotiation of a general settlement unless this was done. Kurusu said that Japanese opinion was such that the Government could not do this, at any rate at once, and Japan would have to have some troops in China. The Secretary of State said in that case no agreement could be reached on this point.

‘2. Mr Hull said Mr Kurusu had been “in a great state” over the breakdown on all these three points and had asked whether there was not some way round the difficulty. Could not some means be found of giving the Japanese Government time to educate public opinion away from its present state of mind towards one in which a basis of negotiation with the United States would be possible? For instance, if the Japanese were now to withdraw their troops from Indo-China, could the United States Government and other countries concerned ease their economic pressure to the point of sending small quantities of rice and oil, far below the full requirements of Japan, the Japanese guaranteeing that nothing would find its way to the Japanese forces? Mr Hull replied that he was ready to think whether this suggestion was attractive enough to warrant its being tried at least.

‘3. The Japanese were now communicating with their Government. In the meantime the Secretary of State wished His Majesty's Government to be informed of the position reached in case they desired to make any comments.

‘4. The Chinese Ambassador

Dr Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, 1938–42.

was received just after me. I saw His Excellency afterwards. He had received similar information and expressed satisfaction over the position taken by Mr Hull.’

We will telegraph further as soon as possible.

66 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 22 November 1941

My telegram of 20 November. Japan.

1. In a further telegram His Majesty's Minister, Washington, says that he should have added to his report that:

‘(a)

When the Secretary of State informed the Japanese representatives that the United States Government required the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, Kurusu advanced the need to retain a certain number of garrisons. This idea Mr Hull rejected out of hand.

‘(b)

The Secretary of State said that as far as he was aware Kurusu had brought no message for the President and had no special instructions.’

2. Sir R. Campbell further understands that the Secretary of State gave the Australian Minister a similar account of the conversations with the Japanese and said that he had maintained a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude. He added that he had made it clear to the Japanese that no ‘arrangement’ that might be possible between Japan and the United States would have much lasting value unless at the same time Japan turns away from the Axis connection and aggressive ambitions. The Secretary of State went on to say that he would regard Kurusu's proposition (evacuation of Indo-China in exchange for limited supplies for Japan) merely as a ‘truce’. If the Japanese Government show signs of agreement with such a proposal it might be useful as giving us all some more time.

67 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 22 November 1941

My telegram of 20 November [No. 65], paragraph 3. Japan.

The following is the text of a telegram giving our comments, which was sent yesterday to the Chargé d'Affaires at Washington:

‘We greatly appreciate the manner in which Mr Hull handled Mr Kurusu, and feel that his forthright statement of the principles on which any settlement acceptable to the United States must be based can have done nothing but good. We are in complete agreement with the United States Government that nothing should be ceded to Japan except in return for recognition of those principles, and concrete action in accordance with them.

‘2. We find it difficult to believe that any Japanese Government could withdraw from Indo-China on the compromise terms suggested by Mr Kurusu, and can only wait the outcome of the matter of reference to his Government. But if the Japanese Government were prepared in fact to move their troops out of Indo-China, this would not only transform the situation to the benefit of all countries now threatened by their presence there, including China, but would also be prima facie evidence of a genuine desire to go some considerable way to meet our point of view. Our first reaction is, therefore, that unless the Japanese offer were accompanied by unacceptable conditions regarding the future position of Japan in Indo-China it would be worth while to respond, provided that this can be done in such a way that there is no semblance of abandoning China or disinteresting ourselves in the ultimate settlement of the China Incident on the basis laid down by the United States Government, which, of course, we entirely support. We should ourselves prefer that no relaxation of economic pressure should take effect, even on a limited scale, without some kind of understanding regarding that settlement, and this seems likely to be the view of the United States Government also.’

68 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 23 November 1941

My telegram of 22 November. Japan.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has reported an interview on the morning of 23 November between the United States Secretary of State, the Australian and Dutch Ministers,

Dr A. Loudon, Netherlands Minister to the United States, Dec 1938 – May 1942; Ambassador, May 1942 – Jul 1947.

and himself, in which they were joined by the Chinese Ambassador.

2. Hull recalled the past history of Japanese talks as reported in my telegram of 20 November [No. 65], and added that in the latest conversation with Kurusu and the Japanese Ambassador he had emphasised the United States view that Hitler's attempt to dominate the world was being supported by a small Hitler group in Tokyo, and that the United States were no more likely to stop giving aid to China than they were likely to stop giving aid to the British Commonwealth.

3. The two governing motives in his mind in regard to these conversations had been: (a) to strengthen the peace party in Japan, (b) to gain vital time. As to the first, Kurusu had emphasised the urgent importance of giving the peace party some evidence of progress, however small, and as to the second, the United States Navy and Army were most anxious to gain time for further strengthening of the Philippines. Hull had, therefore, while standing, as he said, 100 per cent firm in all vital principles, done his best to keep the conversations going. He thought the position had now been reached where little further delay was possible.

4. On the night of 20 November the Japanese communicated to Hull a document, of which the text is contained in my immediately following telegram.

5. Hull said that when he saw the Japanese again his inclination was to make an alternative proposal to them on the following lines:

‘The United States Government, while maintaining their position on fundamental points, would be willing to consider the conclusion of some limited agreement which might give time for wider discussions, but which would probably not last more than two or three months unless progress could be made on the larger questions. The basis of such an agreement might be that Japan should agree to withdraw the bulk of her troops out of Indo-China, leaving in Indo-China only a few thousand, roughly approximating to what was envisaged under their agreement with Vichy in August.’

In return it might be possible by general agreement with the United States, the British Commonwealth and the Dutch, to give Japan some relief from the present economic pressure. At one point Hull spoke of getting Japan to agree to make no aggressive move in any other direction, but His Majesty's Ambassador did not gain a clear impression whether this was to be a specific part of the limited agreement.

6. Hull inquired what view other Governments would be likely to take of this kind of suggestion which, he thought at best, if the Japanese were really seeking for a way out [group mutilated – for the?] new policy, might lead to a wider settlement, and at worst would have the effect of gaining valuable time. He thought that, from the point of view of China, it would be of considerable value to Chiang Kai-shek to have the menace to Indo-China removed. Hull emphasised that the United States Government had as yet taken no decisions and were anxious for comments or suggestions from other Governments before doing so, for they might at any moment find themselves confronted with the necessity for prompt action. Although he thought there was an outside chance of something coming out of it, he was not hopeful.

7. His Majesty's Ambassador informed Hull in reply of the contents of my telegram of 22 November [No. 67]. The Dutch Minister emphasised the importance of any concession in the matter of oil, on which Hull observed that any oil supplied would need to be strictly limited and, in his opinion, should not include the highest grade. In any case, if the Japanese were allowed any oil from the United States, it would take a month for them to fetch it.

8. Subsequent to the foregoing conversation Hull suggested to His Majesty's Ambassador that representatives of the Governments concerned might be given authority to take decisions on the amount of economic relief which their Governments would be willing to concur in giving to the Japanese on the basis suggested. He felt the general situation to be critical, and one that might not permit the delay involved in reference to Governments on all points.

9. His Majesty's Ambassador considers that Hull has in mind a limited and probably temporary arrangement only designed to enable the position for conversations on a wider issue to proceed. These would include a general Pacific settlement, a settlement between China and Japan, and the attitude of Japan under the Tripartite Pact. He thinks the question as Hull sees it is whether the United States should proceed to try and effect some temporary arrangement or should continue to stand out for some larger settlement, and that Hull, impressed by the desirability of gaining time, favours an attempt at the former. The State Department are considering what might be the lines of an all-round Pacific settlement, but Hull realises that this is not yet practical politics and, if and when the time comes, would naturally have to be discussed with the other Governments concerned.

10. The Chinese Ambassador expressed the fullest confidence in Hull, and admitted that it would be a great relief to have the Japanese menace from Indo-China withdrawn, but he made the points that—

(a)

under this plan, Japan would remain free to prosecute the war in China;

(b)

the Chinese Government regard economic pressure on Japan as of vital importance to China, and would be very reluctant to see it seriously reduced at this stage.

His Majesty's Ambassador had the impression that Hull would be very careful of Chinese feelings.

11. Hull emphasised again his desire that this matter should be treated within as restricted a circle as possible in view of the paramount importance of secrecy.

12. We will telegraph further as soon as possible.

69 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 23 November 1941

My immediately preceding telegram.

The following is the text of the document handed over to the United States Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on 20 November:

‘1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advance into any of the regions in South-Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where Japanese troops are stationed at present.

‘2. The Japanese Government undertake to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China, or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area. In the meantime, the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement, which shall later be embodied in a final agreement.

‘3. The Governments of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in the Netherlands East Indies.

‘4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan with a required quantity of oil.

‘5. The Government of the United States undertake to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.’

70 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 24 November 1941

The views of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand on the points raised in your telegrams [Nos. 68 and 69] and M.378

Not published. Contained Mr Hull's personal marginal comments on the Japanese document quoted in No. 69.

of 23 November are as follows:

1. They are, in general, opposed to any steps that would be regarded by Japan as an indication of any relaxation of our determined opposition to further aggression, of any sympathy with the Japanese New Order, or of her continued association with the Axis powers.

2. In particular, they would deplore any step taken in this connection which might have the effect of increasing the Japanese pressure upon China.

3. While they would regard the terms of the document handed to the United States Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on 20 November as entirely unacceptable, they are generally in sympathy with Mr Cordell Hull's comments as set out in Circular telegram M.378, and would favour an attempt being made to reach a temporary understanding on the basis of those comments.

4. They are particularly impressed by the desirability of working in the closest co-operation with the United States Government, and if that Government wish to proceed on these lines they are strongly of opinion that the Governments of the British Commonwealth should concur. If such an arrangement were ultimately found to be possible (as to which they must express some doubt) then the general effect on the world situation of a Japanese withdrawal from Indo-China must be most salutary, while the prospect of a successful attack upon the Burma Road must be materially decreased. If it failed, the time that would be gained would be exceedingly valuable to our cause, provided care is taken to ensure that the negotiations are not accepted by Japan as a mark of weakness.

Outbreak of War: Japan and Thailand

71 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 29 November 1941

Circular telegram. japan.

My immediately preceding telegram M.403, paragraph 2.

Not published. Paragraph 2 read: ‘The Secretary of State told the Australian Minister that nothing of consequence happened at the meeting between the President and Japanese representatives on 27 November. Both sides restated their position. Kurusu had had no instructions from his Government to return.’

1. The [United States] Secretary of State told the Australian Minister that he was depressed by the turn of events. He blamed the Chinese principally for the dropping of the modus vivendi,

This was a proposal by Mr Hull for an interim agreement with Japan, by which, in return for economic concessions, Japan was to withdraw her troops from southern Indo-China and reduce her forces in Indo-China.

but said he would have liked stronger support from the British and Dutch Governments. He did not stress the latter point, but said it would have been impossible to implement the modus vivendi in the face of strong Chinese opposition and that he had now dropped it entirely. The Australian Minister suggested that further discussion with the Chinese might save the position, but the Secretary of State thought it was now too late.

2. The Australian Minister later saw the Under-Secretary of State, who said it was apparent that the Japanese had started their military operations at least some days ago.

3. The Australian Minister tried to draw out both the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State as to what action the United States would take if the Japanese invaded Thailand, but they would not make any commitments.

72 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 29 November 1941

My immediately preceding telegram.

Lord Halifax saw the Under-Secretary of State yesterday and has telegraphed the following account of the conversations:

‘1. I asked Welles whether things had moved at all since the President's interview with the Japanese. Welles told me that nothing further had transpired since the President's talk and the handing over of the general note to the Japanese.

‘2. From intercepted telephonic conversations, the United States Government understood there was an internal crisis going on in Japan, and that communication by cable from Japan had been suspended for some hours today between 10.30 a.m. and 3.30 p.m. They had no information as to the reason for this. Meanwhile, the Japanese here were presumably awaiting instructions.

‘3. He showed me the record Hull had made of the President's conversation with the Japanese. The character of this had been quite general, the Japanese taking the line of regret that no temporary agreement had been found possible, and the President developing the argument that, anxious as the United States were for peace, they could not make any effective advance to this end nor would there be any substantial hope of such efforts being effective so long as the Japanese pursued the policy of aggression in support of Hitler. He emphasised the incompatibility of the Japanese actions with any substantial hope of improvement in relations and of securing peace. He said that the temper of United States' public opinion was such, and the issues at stake in the world were so sharply outlined, that the United States could not bring about any substantial relaxation in the economic situation unless Japan gave the United States some clear manifestation of peaceful intentions. If, however, Japan were able so to act, the United States would respond with concrete steps. If Japan followed Hitler and pursued the course wanted [?] the President was convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan would be the ultimate loser.

‘4. I asked Welles whether he could give me any indication what would be the United States attitude in the event of a Japanese attack on Thailand. He said that he could not answer this question officially until they had further discussion with the President after his return on Tuesday, but speaking for himself he said he felt that Japan had come to [group omitted – realise?] that any further Japanese aggression should be resisted by the United States of America.

‘5. He thought the Japanese were likely to move during the next few days rather than fill up Indo-China with troops and wait.

‘6. Your telegram M.402 just received.

Not published. This telegram to the British Ambassador in Washington, repeated to New Zealand, gave the United Kingdom Government's comments on the proposal by Mr Hull to try to reach an interim agreement with Japan. The main British comments were that the proposal contained terms so favourable to Japan that they left no room for bargaining and that it took too little account of the Chinese position and of probable Chinese reactions.

As you will have seen from my telegrams, the United States Government are at present no longer regarding the modus vivendi as practical politics, contributory causes being the Chinese reaction, the suggestions of His Majesty's Government which did not appear to Hull capable of inclusion in the interim agreement and, I fancy, their own reconsiderations in the light of comments received.’

73 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 30 November 1941

Circular telegram. My telegram of 29 November [No. 72].

1. There are important indications that Japan is about to attack Thailand and that this attack will include a seaborne expedition to seize strategical points in the Kra Isthmus.

2. The Royal Air Force are reconnoitring on an arc 180 miles from Kota Bharu for three days commencing 29 November, and the Commander-in-Chief Far East has requested the Commander-in-Chief United States Asiatic Fleet

Admiral T. C. Hart, USN; Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Jul 1939 – Jun 1942; commanded Allied Naval Forces, ABDA Area, Jan – Feb 1942

at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on the line Manila - Camranh [group mutilated – if possible?] on the same days. The Commander-in-Chief Far East has asked for permission to move into the Kra Isthmus if reconnaissance establishes the fact that escorted Japanese ships are approaching the isthmus, and he is pressing for an immediate decision on this point. Time is the essence of this plan, particularly at this season of the year when the Kra Isthmus is waterlogged. Consequently great tactical advantage lies with the side which gets there first.

3. Our military advisers fear the operation might lead to a clash which might involve us in war, and they have always emphasised that, unless our vital interests were immediately threatened, this should be avoided so long as we have no certainty of United States support. In view [group mutilated – however?] of the United States Government's constitutional difficulties, any prior guarantee of such support is most unlikely.

4. In these circumstances His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been instructed to explain the position at once to the United States Government and to take the following line. To allow the Japanese to establish themselves so near the Malay frontier would be an [group mutilated – obvious?] threat to Singapore, even though at the present season it might not develop at once. We have also to bear in mind the encouragement which the Japanese success would give their extremists. The Japanese appetite would inevitably grow, and other Far Eastern peoples would be correspondingly depressed. It looks therefore as though, to ensure the defence of Singapore and for wider reasons, we might have to take the proposed action to forestall the Japanese.

5. Lord Halifax is to ask for an urgent expression of the United States Government's views and has been reminded of the importance of ensuring ourselves of United States support in the event of hostilities.

6. We should be grateful for your views by most immediate telegram.

74 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 30 November 1941

My telegram [No. 73]. The following is the text of two telegrams received in reply from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

First telegram begins:

‘Have seen Hull who left me in no doubt as to his own personal opinion, which would be to do immediately what we want. He is telephoning the President, who is in the country, and advised me to make our Naval Staff Mission at once see Stark,

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN; Chief of Naval Operations, 1939–42; commanded US Naval Forces in Europe, 1942–45.

asking the latter also to call on the President.’

Second telegram begins:

‘1. After telephoning the President, Stark has told the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet to make the desired reconnaissance flights. Aircraft have been instructed not to approach Japanese ships in a manner to indicate offensive intention, but are authorised to defend themselves if attacked.

‘2. The Secretary of State has given the President the message in your telegram [No. 73] and the President will telephone the Secretary of State tomorrow (Sunday) morning. The President is expected to be back in Washington on Monday.

‘3. You cannot count on the President taking a decision on policy before his return, and he has so far given no indication whether he will feel able to take a decision in favour of supporting us, to which he will undoubtedly feel inclined. The Secretary of State will tell me anything he can after his telephone talk to the President tomorrow (Sunday) morning.’

75 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

This message was repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia.

1 December 1941

Your most secret telegram of 30 November [No. 73]. The views of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are as follows:

1. An immediate approach to the Thai Government would seem to them desirable, informing the Thais of the apprehensions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and of the United States Government, and of the facts upon which these apprehensions are based, calling their attention to the markedly disadvantageous position in which they and we would be placed in the event of an unopposed Japanese landing on the Kra Isthmus, and suggesting that they might consider most urgently the possibility of inviting us, in the circumstances envisaged, to defend this territory in collaboration with Thai forces under the most definite and explicit assurances of respect for Thai sovereignty and independence. In the event of such a request being received from the Thais, then clearly it would be advisable (subject to the general considerations set out in paragraph 3) to forestall any Japanese occupation of Thai territory. Should the Thais refuse to extend such an invitation, then the matter would again be at large and should be decided in the light of the considerations set out below.

2. With or without such a Thai invitation, the New Zealand Government feel that if the United States Government are in general agreement and are willing to proffer such assurances of assistance as the American constitutional situation will allow, then again an attempt should be made to forestall a Japanese occupation. It might, if time allows, be advisable also to attempt to persuade the United States Government to join us in the intimation to the Japanese suggested by the Thai Prime Minister, as set out in your telegram M.400 of 28 November,

Not published.

that if Japan goes to war with Thailand she will find herself at war with us.

3. In the contingency, which they feel is not unlikely, of a Thai refusal to receive assistance and a United States inability to promise co-operation, then the matter must be decided on general considerations of the strength available in the locality, the means available to us to prevent a landing, the undesirability of allowing a territory of such high strategical value to fall into enemy hands without an attempt on our part to prevent it, and the effect on world opinion, both enemy and friendly, of such inaction on our part.

4. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand do not feel that they are in a position to pass any considered judgment of real value on some of the considerations outlined in the last preceding paragraph, and while they assume, of course, that no action will be taken unless and until it is an established fact that Japanese ships are approaching the Isthmus or have, in fact, crossed the ADB line,

As defined in the report of the American-Dutch-British conversations at Singapore in April 1941.

they are prepared to leave the decision to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with the assurance that, whatever the decision of the British Government, the New Zealand Government will adopt it and support it.

5. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand assume that the Netherlands authorities are being taken into full consultation with a view to their maximum co-operation with us.

76 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 1 December 1941

My telegram of 30 November [No. 74].

The following is the text of a further telegram received last night from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington:

‘1. Have seen Hull who tells me that the President will not decide anything in advance of discussions which he will have, it seems, on return to Washington, probably 12 noon, Monday. I will telegraph again as soon as possible thereafter.

‘2. Hull said it would, of course, be helpful if we could possibly get the Thais to invite us in, and also added that he scarcely supposed they would do this until it was too late.

‘3. Even if the President does not give an immediate affirmative answer to our questions and although prophecy is dangerous, I find it very difficult to believe that the United States Government would not support us in the event of hostilities; I know Hull, Stimson

Mr Henry L. Stimson, United States Secretary of War, Jul 1940 – Sep 1945.

and Knox

Mr Frank Knox, United States Secretary of the Navy, Jul 1940 – death, 28 Apr 1944.

would wish to do so. There would be much less difficulty with public opinion over war with Japan than with Germany; and both public opinion and the Government are very sensitive about the Pacific position from the point of view of United States interests.

‘4. The real question to my mind is how quickly the United States would join us. About that we may know more tomorrow.’

In a later telegram Lord Halifax reports that the Japanese are seeing the Secretary of State at their request at 10 a.m. today (Monday). Mr Hull does not know for what purpose.

77 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 2 December 1941

My telegram of 1 December, last paragraph.

The following telegram has been received from Lord Halifax with reference to the meeting of Japanese representatives with the Secretary of State this morning (Monday):

‘1. Hull telephoned that he had seen the Japanese, who had not received any instructions from Tokyo. They had reverted to one or two points in their own interim proposals and Hull reported himself as having spoken very stiffly to them and put them on the defensive.

‘2. He reminded them that [group mutilated – previously?] he had said the United States Government were unable to meet them on three important points of their proposals which covered—

(a)

the stopping of aid to China;

(b)

giving them some oil

(c)

the retention in Indo-China of more than a token number of troops.’

Lord Halifax added that, when he telephoned, Mr Hull had not yet seen the President, but expected a United States Cabinet meeting to be held later in the day.

78 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 3 December 1941

My telegram M.412.

Not published. In this telegram the Dominions Secretary repeated to the Prime Minister the text of a telegram from Lord Halifax reporting on his interview with the President.

After consideration of Lord Halifax's account of his discussion with the President, the following reply is being despatched to Lord Halifax this evening:

‘1. We entirely agree with President Roosevelt that we and the United States Government (and the Netherlands Government) should be clear as to what action we shall respectively take in the various situations likely to arise.

‘2. Of the hypotheses in paragraph 6 of your telegram, the first two seem to us for practical purposes indistinguishable.

Paragraph 6 read: ‘He wished me accordingly to ask you what His Majesty's Government would do in the event of (a) the Japanese reply being unsatisfactory, reinforcements not yet having reached Indo-China, and (b) the reply being unsatisfactory, reinforcements having in the meantime reached Indo-China, and (c) a Japanese attack on Thailand other than an attack on the Kra Isthmus, attack covering in his mind such Japanese pressure on Thailand as to force concessions to the Japanese dangerously detrimental to the general position.’

All our information goes to show that reinforcements have been arriving for some time and are still continuing. The only question, therefore, appears to be what we should do if the Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's inquiry is unsatisfactory. We feel the proper reaction would be simultaneous warnings to Japan by the United States, the Dutch and ourselves to the effect that if she uses Indo-Chinese territory as a base for further aggression, she will do so at her peril. If such warnings are given it is necessary to be clear as to the action which we shall all take if they are ignored. We read the President's assurance of support recorded in paragraph 8 of your telegram to mean armed support,

The reference to support in paragraph 8 read: ‘On the immediate question asked in your telegram [No. 73] he said we could certainly count on their support, though it might take a short time, he spoke of a few days, to get things into political shape here….’

and on this assumption we should ourselves be prepared to put into effect the operation referred to in my telegram [No. 73] if there were a [group mutilated – direct?] Japanese attack or threat of immediate attack on the Kra Isthmus. Under hypothesis (c) the threat to Singapore might be less immediate, but we should still think it wise to put into operation the same plan, provided we had a similar assurance that we would have the armed support of the United States if our action resulted in hostilities with Japan. If the President's wishes suggested any other form of action in which he would be disposed to participate, we should of course be glad to consider it. We note particularly the President's statement that in any direct attack on ourselves or the Dutch we should all be together.

See p. 91, note 1.

We fully endorse this statement.

‘3. We have already been considering the possibility of some arrangement with the Thai Government under which our entry into the Kra Isthmus, at whatever stage it might take place, would be by their invitation. The difficulty at present is that we are not militarily in a position to give direct assistance to the Thai Government in the protection of the rest of their territory. The proposal to occupy a very small part of the Kra Isthmus is therefore unlikely to appeal to them, and we fear the same applies to an undertaking from us to guarantee their ultimate full sovereignty and independence. It would, we feel, be asking a good deal of them to expect them to accept the virtual certainty of partial extinction in order to ensure their ultimate independence.

‘4. The Thai Prime Minister has forcibly represented to us that the only way to save Thailand is by a public warning to Japan by the United States and ourselves that if she went to war with Thailand she would find herself at war with us both as well. If he knew a warning of the type suggested in paragraph 2 above had been delivered, even though it were not made publicly, his outlook might change. We feel, however, that any communication to him about our plans in the Kra Isthmus would be useless until such a warning has been delivered, and there is in addition a very great risk of leakage to the Japanese. For the moment we are confining our action to informing Sir J. Crosby of our plan so that he may be able to make a communication at short notice.

‘5. We would propose to make it clear in any such communication or in any announcement which might accompany our [group mutilated – plan?] that we should restore in full to Thailand any territory which we might occupy, and that our aim is to ensure the full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand.’

79 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 3 December 1941

My telegram M.412, paragraph 3.

Not published. Paragraph 3 read: ‘He [President Roosevelt] then discussed at great length the Japanese reinforcement of Indo-China and said he had been considering the possibility of some concerted parallel statement with us. He thought, however, that the wiser course was to begin by making a communication to the Japanese in the form of a question, which he proposed to instruct Welles to give to the Japanese this evening (Monday) or tomorrow morning. I saw Welles when I had finished with the President and he undertook to let us have a copy….’

The following is the text of a document given by the President to the Under-Secretary of State, and handed over by the latter to the Japanese representatives yesterday morning, 2 December.

‘I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to Southern Indo-China. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indo-China.

‘It was my clear understanding by the terms of the agreement, and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement, between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indo-China was very considerably less than the total amount of forces already there. The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to imply the utilisation of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya, or the whole through coercion or through actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the actual aggression already against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government.

‘Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indo-China. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon territory and the rights of free and independent peoples through utilisation of military enterprise of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of United States defence that I should like to know the intentions of the Japanese Government.’

80 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 4 December 1941

My telegram [No. 78].

The following reply, dated 3 December, has been received today from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington:

‘I saw the President with the Under-Secretary of State this evening and read to him your telegram.

See No. 78.

The President agrees with the [group mutilated – interpretation in your?] second paragraph that the first two hypotheses are, in practice, indistinguishable. Before giving a definite reply on your suggestion of a simultaneous warning, he wished to be clear on the following points:

‘1. Do you mean by the words, “If she uses Indo-China as a base for further aggression”, some actual act of jumping-off by Japan or the building-up of a base which clearly must be intended for further aggression?

‘2. I said I read your telegram to mean the first, although it was plain that the building-up of a base would pro tanto diminish Japanese dependence on vulnerable supply lines. The President was much alive to this, but I think his own mind leant in favour of making a warning, if given, [group mutilated – conditional on?] actual jumping-off.

‘3. The point also arose in the discussion whether your wording, “as a base for further aggression”, was or was not intended to cover the hypothesis of intensified attack on the Burma Road from Thailand. The President, however, said he thought that was academic as the concentration of troops in Southern Thailand could hardly be intended for attack on the Burma Road by land except through Thailand, in which case the issue would be clear. The only practicable alternative in his view would be for the Japanese to bomb Rangoon, when again the issue would be clear.

‘4. The President assented to the interpretation of support as recorded in paragraph 8, my telegram M.412,

See p. 86, note 2.

as meaning armed support. The character of this armed support must be decided by the staffs.

‘5. In the circumstances of hypothesis (c), the President indicated assent to our putting the Kra Isthmus plan into operation in this eventuality, and I have no doubt in this case you can count on the armed support of the United States.

‘6. I read the President the last two sentences of paragraph 2 of your telegram,

See No. 78.

to which he gives assent. In this connection he said their information led them to think it probable that Japanese attacks might be directed against the Netherlands East Indies, particularly against some islands north of Sumatra. He made the comment on this that any action of the kind would prove more easy of presentation to United States' public opinion on the ground of threat to the Philippines by encirclement.

‘7. He recognised the force of your paragraphs 4 and 5 concerning the proposed guarantee to Thailand, and the intimation at the present moment to the Thai Prime Minister of [group omitted – our?] intention. He thought, however, that you might consider two other suggestions. First, that we should make a private communication to Thailand that we had no intention of invading them but that if the Japanese, with or without Thailand's agreement, went in, we should immediately do the same in our own self-defence. Second, that in view of Japanese-inspired propaganda intimating that we intended to invade Thailand, you might make a public statement now to the effect that His Majesty's Government had no intention of committing aggression against Thailand and were only concerned to see her sovereignty and independence preserved.’

A further telegram will be sent as soon as possible.

81 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 4 December 1941

Your telegram of 1 December [No. 75].

We were most grateful for your timely and valuable telegram and have had very fully in mind the considerations you mention.

You will since have seen from my telegrams M.412

Not published.

and [No. 78] the substantial advance which has been made in our discussions with the United States.

We have considered most carefully the suggestion made in paragraph 1 of your telegram, but have come to the conclusion that, for the reasons given in paragraphs 3 and 4 of my telegram [No. 78], any immediate approach to the Thai Government would involve serious risks. As however there indicated, we are explaining the position to His Majesty's Minister at Bangkok in order that he may be able to make an approach to the Thai Government at short notice as circumstances may require.

82 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 December 1941

Circular telegram. My telegram of 4 December [No. 80].

The following telegram dated 5 December has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Washington:

‘1. Your telegram of 3 December (Action in the event of further Japanese aggression).

See No. 80.

‘2. I should like you to express our very deep appreciation for the President's prompt and helpful response. We are particularly grateful for his confirmation of our interpretation of his assurance of support in the circumstances contemplated in my telegram of 30 November [No. 73].

‘3. As regards the scope of the warning, it would apply to an attack by Japan on Thailand, Malaya, or the Netherlands East Indies, and also to an attack on the Burma Road from Indo-China.

‘4. We are dealing with the Netherlands East Indies aspect (your paragraph 6) separately.

‘5. Our proposed action with regard to Thailand must of necessity be of a forestalling nature. Consequently we cannot technically give the Thais a guarantee of non-aggression. But we do wish to encourage them to resist Japanese encroachment, and we should like therefore to assure them that in the event of attack by Japan we will both help them to the best of our ability.’

83 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 December 1941

Circular telegram. netherlands east indies.

In view of President Roosevelt's attitude as indicated in paragraph 7 of my telegram M.412

Not published. Reporting on his interview with President Roosevelt, Lord Halifax in paragraph 7 of his telegram of 2 December said inter alia that he thought that President Roosevelt would be disposed to support whatever action His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were prepared to take in the event of the Japanese reply to the Note of 2 December being unsatisfactory or of a Japanese attack on Thailand. Halifax added: ‘At one point he [Roosevelt] threw in an aside that in the case of any direct attack on ourselves or the Dutch, we should obviously all be together….’

and confirmed by paragraph 6 of my telegram [No. 80] and in face of the present Japanese threat, we feel that we should go beyond the previous oral assurance given to the Dutch (my telegram of 6 September, M.295).

Not published. This assurance, at first given orally and then supported by a Note on 5 September from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Netherlands Minister in London, stated that the United Kingdom Government ‘consider themselves to have already assumed the duty of safeguarding and restoring the possessions and rights of the Netherlands to the best of their ability’, and that ‘an attack upon the Netherlands East Indies would lead them to do the utmost in their power to this end’. The British Government, however, reserved the right to decide whether military action was practicable.

We are therefore communicating with them today proposing a military understanding whereby each party would undertake to co-operate immediately to the fullest extent of its available resources in the event of the other party being forced to take military action to repel an attack upon any of its territories in the Far East. We are adding that we have reason to believe that our views are shared by His Majesty's Governments in the Commonwealth of Australia and in New Zealand, and that if the Netherlands Government are prepared to enter into such an understanding with us we will at once suggest to those Governments that they should also participate. The text of the Note will be telegraphed as soon as possible. President Roosevelt is being advised of the communication which we are making to the Netherlands Government, and informed that we feel sure he will agree that the Dutch should from now on be brought fully into our discussions of the measures to be taken to counter further Japanese moves.

84 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 December 1941

My telegrams of 4 and 5 December [Nos. 80 and 82].

The position is that we have now received an assurance of armed support from the United States:

(a)

If we find it necessary either to forestall a Japanese landing in the Kra Isthmus or to occupy part of the Isthmus as a counter to Japanese violation of any other part of Thailand;

(b)

if the Japanese attack the Netherlands East Indies and we go at once to the support of the latter;

(c)

if the Japanese attack us.

2. We have accordingly instructed the Commander-in-Chief Far East that he should take action as he has suggested (see paragraph 2 of my telegram of 30 November [No. 73]) without reference to us if either:

(a)

He has good information that a Japanese expedition is advancing with the apparent intention of landing on the Kra Isthmus, or,

(b)

The Japanese violate any other part of Thailand.

3. The Commander-in-Chief Far East has also been authorised, in the event of a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies, to put into operation without further reference to us the plan already agreed with the Netherlands authorities.

85 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 December 1941

thailand.

My telegrams [Nos. 78], paragraphs 3–5, [No. 80], paragraph 7, and [No. 82].

1. We have explained to His Majesty's Minister at Bangkok for his most secret and personal information the nature of the Kra Isthmus plan and the circumstances in which it would be put into operation. We are also consulting him on the following lines:

(1)

It is important that, if and when the operation is carried out, it should not meet with Thai resistance. It is in our view our best first strategical move in the circumstances envisaged, not excluding further possibilities, and represents the best means of helping Thailand.

(2)

We have it in mind, therefore, in order to prepare the way, to give Thailand an assurance that in the event of a Japanese attack we will help them to the best of our ability.

(3)

We hope this promise to assist might encourage Thailand to resist Japan, and that the Thailand Government, if compelled to abandon Bangkok, would transfer themselves to British territory while their troops retired southwards to link up with our own.

(4)

We understand the Thai position to be that no military arrangement of any kind is practicable without a definite warning to Japan by the United States and ourselves. We are consulting the United States Government about the possibility of a warning, but Sir J. Crosby should make no approach to the Thai Government pending further instructions.

2. A further telegram will be sent on receipt of Sir J. Crosby's reply. In the meantime we have informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington that we are consulting Sir J. Crosby in this sense. We hope (see paragraph 5 of [No. 82]) that the United States Government may feel able to join with us in the assurance as in paragraph 1 (2) above.

86 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 5 December 1941

Circular telegram. My telegram of 5 December [No. 83]. netherlands east indies

The following is the text of the Note handed to the Netherlands Minister

Jonkheer E. M. van Verduynen, Netherlands Minister to the United Kingdom.

today:

‘In my Note of 5 September

See p. 91, note 2.

I explained to Your Excellency the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom towards an attack on the Netherlands East Indies. The Note stated that His Majesty's Government considered themselves to have already assumed the duty of safeguarding and restoring the possessions and rights of the Netherlands to the best of their ability during the war and at the peace. It followed therefore that an attack upon the Netherlands East Indies would lead them to do the utmost in their power to this end, though His Majesty's Government must remain the sole judge of what action or military measures on their part were practicable and likely to achieve the common purpose.

‘2. His Majesty's Government have again reviewed the position in the light of recent developments, and they feel it is of urgent importance to provide the firmest basis for effective co-operation in meeting the present Japanese threat. They are accordingly, for their part, prepared to enter at once into a mutual understanding with the Netherlands Government whereby each party will undertake to co-operate immediately with the other to the fullest extent of its available resources in the event of the other party being forced to take military action to repel an attack upon any of its territories in the Far East.

‘3. His Majesty's Government have reason to believe that their views are shared by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, and if the Netherlands Government are prepared to enter into such an understanding, His Majesty's Government will at once suggest to the Governments of the two Dominions that they should also participate.

‘4. The question of the form in which the understanding should be recorded and the further question of whether, and if so, at what moment, publicity should be [group omitted – given?] to it can be further discussed if the Netherlands Government accept the suggestion in principle.’

87 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 6 December 1941

My telegram of 5 December [No. 82]. The following reply has been received from Lord Halifax this afternoon (Friday):

‘1. I had a long talk with the President this evening (Thursday) and gave him the message in your second paragraph.

‘2. On the question of warning in your third paragraph, he was very doubtful about the wisdom of including attack on the Burma Road. Apart from the fact that the Chinese war stood on a different footing to some new aggression, his recollection was that in the summer of 1940 the Japanese had blocked the Indo-Chinese route to China at Hanoi, where the United States had supplies for China, which had consequently been obstructed without, he thought, any serious protest in the United States. This precedent made it difficult for him to take so much stiffer a line now as regards an attack on the Burma Road. Moreover, if hostilities come he will have to make his case solely on defence grounds, which he feels he can well do on the other cases you mention but not on the Burma Road issue. He hopes, therefore, that you may not think it necessary to include this in the warning.

‘3. Subject to the above and to paragraph 5 below, he agrees to the warning covering any attack by Japan on Thailand, Malaya, or the Netherlands East Indies. He thinks that if warning is given by the United States, ourselves and the Dutch, we should act independently all within twenty-four hours, using different language to mean the same thing. I read him again the language in the second paragraph of your telegram [No. 78], which he thought quite all right. He would prefer the United States to get in first. On account of the political consideration here it was important that their action should be based on independent necessities of United States defence and not appear to follow on ourselves. He assumed you would be concerting with the Dutch

‘4. He said, however, that he had received an indirect communication from Kurusu that matters were not yet hopeless and that a direct approach to the Emperor

Emperor Hirohito.

might produce result. Kurusu had also said that if the President would make the move it still might not be impossible to secure a truce and even a settlement between Japan and China. Kurusu had sketched possible lines of a meeting provided the President would endeavour to act as “introducer” between China and Japan with a view to their dealing directly with each other. These possible lines of [group mutilated – action?]: a truce and withdrawal of the bulk of the Japanese [group mutilated – troops?] in Indo-China and withdrawal of the Japanese troops [group mutilated – from?] North China on a timetable to be agreed between the Japanese and Chinese military, with an American assessor or arbitrator (he was not clear which). The President said that the Japanese would obviously want some economic relief. He did not attach too much importance to this approach, but was naturally reluctant to miss any chance and thought a communication to the Emperor would strengthen his general case if things went wrong. He asked my opinion.

‘5. In answer, I said in the question of the approach to the Emperor the main point seemed to be the danger of delay in putting in a warning on the assumption that Kurusu's approach was worthless. Could he make his communication to the Emperor if he made it serve as a definite warning? The President agreed and said he could, and would include such a warning, if he decided to do it, tomorrow morning after he has received the Japanese reply to his question two days ago. As to the treatment of Kurusu's approach generally, I said no doubt he would be particularly careful not to put a foot wrong with the Chinese after last week's experience, and, therefore, it might be wiser to avoid any detailed suggestion at the first stage, merely confining the message and warning to a hint; if the Emperor gave him any reason to think it would be helpful he might be able to make a suggestion that would assist the maintenance of peaceful relations. The President agreed.

‘6. He will decide whether he does or does not communicate with the Emperor tomorrow (Friday) morning, and meanwhile wishes us to suspend delivery of the warning while making all preparation for it with the Dutch. If he does approach the Emperor he would hope that the three-power warning might be deferred till he had the Emperor's reply, for which he would ask urgently.

‘7. Your paragraph 5.

No. 82.

He agrees on the proposal in the last sentence, and promised to instruct the State Department to give Thailand the assurance there suggested. But he still thinks it would be useful if you told Thailand that whatever happens now, and even if their sovereignty is temporarily destroyed by Japan, His Majesty's Government in conjunction with the Allies would restore it.’

88 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 6 December 1941

Circular telegram. My telegram [No. 87]. The following reply was sent to Lord Halifax last night:

‘1. I am greatly relieved to hear that the President agrees to the warning and I accept his procedure. I understand his difficulties about making the warning apply to the Burma Road and I am content to accept his guidance in this respect.

‘2. We will at once concert with the Dutch the wording of our respective warnings and have them ready.

‘3. We shall be interested to hear whether the President decides to make a communication to the Emperor and the form it will take. I approve of what you said as reported in paragraph 5 of your telegram.

‘4. We shall wait for word from the President before communicating our warning to the Japanese.

‘5. We will also give an assurance to Thailand as proposed.’

89 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 6 December 1941

Circular telegram. japan.

My telegram [No. 87], paragraph 7, and my telegram [No. 88], paragraph 5.

The following further telegram dated 5 December has now been received from Lord Halifax:

‘Welles has just telephoned to say that the President has changed his mind and wished to suspend decision about conveying assurances to Thailand, in the sense of paragraph 7 of [No. 87], until he has decided about the message to the Emperor. He will discuss the question with me again when he has made up his mind about the Emperor. I am trying to see someone to whom I can point out the dangers of delay, both of the assurance to Thailand and of a communication in some form to the Japanese.

‘2. This is most annoying. Nevertheless, in view of the urgency of the situation revealed in recent Bangkok telegrams,

Not published.

I do not think you need hesitate about giving an assurance to Thailand on behalf of His Majesty's Government if you want to, since the United States attitude to a Japanese invasion of Thailand is, in my opinion, now sufficiently clear.’

90 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Extract] 7 December 1941

My telegram of 6 December [No. 89]. The following is the text of a further telegram from Lord Halifax dated 5 December:

‘I saw Hull this evening (Friday). He told me he had seen the Japanese this morning, who had given him a reply, which was brief, to the President's inquiry about troops in Indo-China. The substance of the reply was that the Chinese had been reinforcing opposite Indo-China and the Japanese felt primarily on that account obliged to add to their own strength. Hull had asked them whether it was really intended that the United States should believe in the defensive character of this Japanese move and a good deal more in the same sense. The conversation produced no result and the Japanese [group mutilated – informed?] Hull that their view had not moved an inch….

Text omitted reported Halifax's discussion with Mr Hull on proposals that the President should send a message to the Emperor of Japan and that the United States should send Thailand an assurance of support.

91 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 7 December 1941

1. A report was received by the Admiralty from the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet

Admiral Sir Tom Phillips commanded the Eastern Fleet from 3 to 10 Dec 1941. He lost his life when his flagship, the Prince of Wales, was sunk by Japanese air attack.

on the afternoon of 6 December, to the effect that two Japanese convoys comprising thirty-five transports escorted by eight cruisers and ten destroyers had been sighted at between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. GMT by reconnaissance aircraft off Cambodia Point.

The southernmost point of French Indo-China.

The convoys were preceded by an advance guard of three destroyers and were steaming westwards.

2. A later report from the Commander-in-Chief stated that the advance guard had altered course north-west.

3. A further telegram on this movement will be sent as soon as possible, but the information available is not yet sufficient to establish whether the Japanese are making for:

(1)

Kra Isthmus,

(2)

Bangkok,

(3)

An anchorage in Indo-China between Cambodia Point and the Thailand border.

The Admiralty advise that the last-mentioned possibility can by no means be excluded.

92 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 7 December 1941

My immediately preceding telegram

1. Since the possibility remains open that the immediate destination of the Japanese convoys is another port in Indo-China, there may still be time for a warning to Japan by the United States, the Dutch and ourselves on the lines contemplated in the recent exchange with President Roosevelt. We have therefore thought it desirable to continue preparations for delivery of such a warning in order to be in a position to proceed with it if and when the President should give the signal to do so.

2. We have not yet heard whether the President has decided to send a message to the Emperor or not. If he has not yet made up his mind, his decision may now be influenced by the news of the sailing of the Japanese convoys. We must assume in any event that he may wish to proceed with some form of warning at any moment, in which case warnings from ourselves and the Dutch may be required to follow almost immediately afterwards.

3. It would, we feel, add greatly to the impressiveness of the warning (if the President should wish us to proceed with it) if it could be delivered on behalf of all His Majesty's Governments jointly. We very much hope His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions will feel able to concur with this course and identify themselves in this manner with the warning proposed.

4. In view of the urgency of the matter, as explained in paragraph 2, we have thought it desirable to prepare and telegraph to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo a draft note to the Japanese Government conveying a warning in the sense agreed in recent discussions with the President. The text is contained in my immediately following telegram, and it will be seen that, in the hope that the suggestion made in paragraph 3 above will be acceptable, it has been drafted as a joint communication. Sir R. Craigie has been instructed to hold this draft note in reserve, pending receipt of further instructions, and it has been explained to him that the text as well as the form is subject to the concurrence of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions. The draft has been telegraphed simultaneously to His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington for the observations of the President. It has also been shown to the Netherlands Government, which is entirely in agreement with the line taken in it and is preparing to act similarly.

5. We should be grateful if we could be informed by most immediate telegram whether you concur in the terms of the draft note and in the procedure suggested. In the circumstances it would be helpful if you would cause your reply to be repeated to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo.

6. It will be appreciated that in drafting the note we were presented with a special difficulty owing to the desire of the President that the Burma Road should be omitted from the warning (see my telegrams [No. 87], paragraph 2, and [No. 88], paragraph 1). In the circumstances we have thought it would be best to relate the warning directly to the concentration of troops in Southern Indo-China. The draft note thus brushes aside the Japanese explanation about North Indo-China and leads logically to the Japanese threat to Thailand as well as, of course, the Netherlands East Indies. This has the merit of being in accordance with immediate realities, and the fact that the Philippines are also omitted (in accordance with paragraph 3 of my telegram [No. 87]) should, we feel, make the absence of mention of the Burma Road less noticeable.

93 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 7 December 1941

My immediately preceding telegram.

The following is the text draft of the note:

‘I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have been instructed to make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government on behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, who have followed closely, in consultation with the United States Government, the negotiations in which the latter have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a view to relieving the present tension in the Far East. His Majesty's Governments view with the same concern as the United States Government the rapidly growing concentration of Japanese forces in Indo-China, which prompted the inquiry addressed by the United States Government to the Japanese Government on 2 December.

See No. 79.

They have found the Japanese reply to that inquiry extremely disquieting.

See No. 90.

Whatever [group mutilated – may be?] the explanation in regard to [two groups mutilated – this concentration?]—as to which they expressly reserve their views—the reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of the Japanese forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and heavily augmented.

‘There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China, and this concentration is only explicable on the assumption that the Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive move directed against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand.

‘The relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands Government are too well known for the Japanese Government to be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on the territories of the Netherlands. In the interests of peace His Majesty's Governments feel it incumbent upon them, however, to remove any uncertainty which may exist as regards their attitude in the event of an attack on Thailand. His Majesty's Governments have no designs against Thailand. On the contrary, the preservation of the full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is an important British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that independence or sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malaya, and His Majesty's Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel bound, therefore, to warn the Japanese Government in the most solemn manner that if Japan attempts to establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do so at her own peril, and His Majesty's Governments will at once take all appropriate measures. Should hostilities unfortunately result, the responsibility will rest with Japan.’

94 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 7 December 1941

thailand.

My immediately preceding telegram.

1. The Prime Minister is proposing in accordance with President Roosevelt's suggestion (see my telegrams [No. 80] and [No. 87], paragraph 7) to send an immediate personal message to the Thai Prime Minister warning of imminent Japanese danger, urging him to fight if attacked, and saying we will come to his assistance to the utmost of our power. The text has been telegraphed to Washington for the President's observation.

2. In the meantime, His Majesty's Minister at Bangkok has been authorised to let the Thai Prime Minister know privately that we are in consultation with the United States Government in regard to warning Japan in the sense he has been pressing.

95 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the British Ambassador, Tokyo.

7 December 1941

Your most secret telegrams of 7 December [Nos. 91–94]. On the assumption that the Government of the USA take prior and similar action, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand agree with the course proposed, and fully associate themselves with the text of the contemplated communications to the Japanese Government.

96 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 7 December 1941

Circular telegram. japan. My telegrams [Nos. 88 and 92].

The following telegram, dated 6 December, was received from Lord Halifax this morning:

‘1. I communicated your telegram [No. 88] to the President when I saw him this evening (Saturday). He is sending a message to the Emperor for delivery, by Japanese time, on Sunday morning. If no answer has been received by Monday evening, Washington time, he will publish here. As at present advised, if no reply is made or if the answer is unsatisfactory, he will send a warning note to the Japanese Government on Tuesday afternoon or evening, and suggested that we and the Dutch should act similarly on Wednesday morning. All this timetable is subject to speeding up if the Japanese move faster. The President does not think they will, but Hull does.

‘2. He told me the best information the United States could obtain was that the Japanese had about 105,000 troops in Indo-China, 30,000 in the north and 75,000 in the south. These figures did not include the numbers on troop transports that the President thought might be another 20,000 or 30,000.

‘3. He told me that he thought seriously of a possible Japanese threat to Rangoon from land or air.’

97 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 7 December 1941

Circular telegram. thailand. My telegram [No. 94].

1. Lord Halifax has reported that the President welcomes also the proposal to send a message to the Thai Prime Minister.

2. The President was himself sending a message to the Thai Prime Minister in confidence last night (Saturday), on the following lines:

(a)

That the United States will regard it as a hostile act if the Japanese invade Thailand, Malaya, Burma, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(b)

That when peace comes, no matter what happens meanwhile, unless the Thais aid the Japanese, the United States and Great Britain would work for the complete restoration of Thailand's independent sovereignty.

98 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 7 December 1941

japan. My telegram [No. 96].

The following is the text of the President's message to the Emperor:

‘Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers, have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

‘Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel that I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

‘Developments are occurring in the Pacific which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

‘The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that the unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favour of any nation.

‘I am certain that it will be clear to your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seems essential to the attainment of the high [group omitted – objectives].

‘More than a year ago, Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which 5000 or 6000 Japanese troops were permitted to enter Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this spring and summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter Southern French Indo-China for the common defence of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made on Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.

‘For the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

‘Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions, and because they extend now to the south-east and the south-west corners of that peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make an attack in one or more of these many directions.

‘I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offence.

‘It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

‘None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

‘There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

‘I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

‘I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighbouring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.’

99 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 8 December 1941

japan.

Although hostilities have now broken out

At 7.55 a.m. on 7 December Japanese carrier-borne aircraft launched a surprise attack on the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour, Hawaii. Simultaneously, Japanese forces landed at Kota Bharu in Malaya and at Singora in Thailand.

we do not intend ourselves to declare war on Japan immediately.

We understand the United States Congress has been summoned to meet this morning, 8 December, when the President will recommend an immediate declaration of war by the United States.

We contemplate that our own declaration should then follow at once, and the House of Commons is being summoned to meet at 3 p.m. In the meantime we are taking immediately all operational and security measures as if a formal state of war already existed.

100 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 8 December 1941

Hostilities have now broken out with Japan. War is inevitable and will be formally declared this afternoon, 8 December. All security measures appropriate for the war stage are being taken at once.

101 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 8 December 1941

His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo has been instructed to make the following communication at once to the Japanese Government:

‘On the evening of 7 December His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom learned that Japanese forces, without previous warning either in the form of a declaration of war or of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war, had attempted a landing on the coast of Malaya and bombed Singapore and Hong Kong.

‘In view of these wanton acts of unprovoked aggression committed in flagrant violation of International Law, and particularly of Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention relative to the opening of hostilities,

Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention (18 Oct 1907) reads:

‘The contracting parties recognise that hostilities between themselves must not commence without a previous explicit warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.’

to which both Japan and the United Kingdom are parties, I have the honour to inform the Imperial Japanese Government in the name of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that a state of war exists between our two countries.’

102 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 9 December 1941

The existence of a state of war with Japan has been declared here as from 11 a.m. New Zealand summer time on 8 December 1941.

The text of the Proclamation, published in a New Zealand Gazette Extraordinary on 9 Dec 1941, was as follows:

His Excellency the Governor-General has it in command from His Majesty the King to declare that a state of war exists between His Majesty and the Emperor of Japan, and that such a state of war has existed in respect of New Zealand, from 11 a.m. New Zealand Summer time, on the eighth day of December, 1941.

Given at Wellington this ninth day of December, 1941.

C. L. N. Newall,Governor-General.

103 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 9 December 1941

thailand. My telegram of 7 December [No. 94].

The following is an extract from a telegram from His Majesty's Representative at Bangkok of 8 December:

‘I have just come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He tells me that under duress the Thai Government reports an agreement with the Japanese Ambassador this morning allowing the passage of Japanese troops across Thailand to attack Malaya or Burma. The Prime Minister expresses to us the deepest regret. In response to a specific inquiry from myself he has given me a verbal assurance that if we resist the Japanese on Thai territory, Thai forces will not oppose us.’

104 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 19 December 1941

Circular telegram. thailand.

The situation in Thailand is obscure. Secret information tends to confirm the sequence of events as described in my telegram of 9 December, but whether the Thai Government's attitude as reported in that telegram was genuine or purely tactical must remain a matter of opinion. From a broadcast by the Thai Prime Minister on 12 December, the full text of which is not available, and from other indications, it seems probable that a more far-reaching agreement has since been signed between the Thai and Japanese Governments providing for active military co-operation by Thailand. There is as yet no definite evidence of such co-operation, but a report has been received from Burma to the effect that there are indications that the Thais are making some concentration on the border of Burma.

2. Until the situation is clearer we are inclined to consider it premature to declare that a state of war exists with Thailand. We intend, however, to attack Japanese forces wherever we find them, and since they are in occupation of Thailand, we shall not hesitate to operate in or over that country and its territorial waters if it were desirable for military reasons to do so. We think, therefore, that our policy should be as follows:

(a)

Our forces should take no unprovoked action against the Thais; but

(b)

if the Thais attempt to obstruct the operations of our troops, or if in the opinion of local commanders the presence of Thai forces constitutes a threat to their security, they should be treated as enemies; and

(c)

that if any concentration of Thai forces indicates the possibility of a threat to the security of Burma, the Thai Government should be warned that such action will be regarded as a hostile act.

3. For the time being we are treating Thailand for economic warfare and other purposes as enemy-occupied territory and we deeply regret that the next step should be to withdraw His Majesty's Minister with his diplomatic and Consular staffs. The Swiss Government, who are prepared, subject to the consent of the Thai Government, to assume the protection of our interests, informed us on 13 December that His Majesty's Legation was closed and under guard of Japanese troops and that telephonic communication with the Legation was cut off.

4. The Netherlands Government informed us on 15 December that they were proposing to break off diplomatic relations with Thailand, but we understand that they are postponing action pending the clarification of our own attitude and that of the United States Government.

5. His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been instructed to consult the United States Government urgently and ascertain whether they have any further information or comments on our attitude and what action they have taken or propose to take.

105 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 29 January 1942

Circular telegram. thailand.

My telegram of 19 December.

As stated in paragraph 5, His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been instructed to consult with the United States Government urgently, who have now replied that they [group omitted – agree?] generally with our views as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of my telegram under reference. Meanwhile, however, there have been three main developments:

(a)

Reports, officially confirmed, of the entry of Thai troops into Burma territory in co-operation with Japanese forces.

(b)

Reports, not as yet officially confirmed, of the participation of Thai aircraft in attacks on British territory.

(c)

Reports from Japanese sources that in [group mutilated – Bangkok?] the Thai Government formally declared war against the United Kingdom and the United States. No official intimation of such a declaration has as yet been received, but this may be due to the fact that the Thai Government have not yet asked any foreign power to take charge of their interests in this country.

We are now considering what action we could suggest might be appropriately taken in consultation with other interested Governments and hope to telegraph our considered views to you shortly.

106 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 4 February 1942

Circular telegram. thailand.

My telegram of 29 January. The Swiss Government state that the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Swiss Consulate that ‘by Royal Command declaration of war on Great Britain and the United States of America has been made as from noon of 25 January.’

107 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 6 February 1942

Circular telegram. My Circular telegram of 4 February.

We announced in today's official Gazette that in view of this communication a state of war exists between the United Kingdom and Thailand. We shall regard this state of war as having existed as from 5 a.m. GMT on 25 January 1942.

108 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

This telegram was repeated to the Prime Ministers of Australia and South Africa.

16 February 1942

The existence of a state of war with Thailand has been declared from 5 p.m. New Zealand summer time on 25 January 1942

Command in the Pacific: ABDA and Anzac Areas

109 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of Australia

Repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

11 December 1941

Your telegram of 8 December, No. 778.

Not published. The Australian Government had asked for an up-to-date appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff on the situation in the Pacific now that war had broken out with Japan.

We fully understand your wish to have a general review of the new war situation which has now developed, but things are moving so fast that a telegram drafted in the morning is often out of date by the evening. We are hard at work examining the position and considering what re-disposition of our naval forces should now be made and what and how reinforcements can be sent to the Far East.

2. We are of course in for an anxious time in the Pacific. Sir Earle Page,

Rt. Hon. Sir Earle Page, PC, GCMG, CH; Special Australian Envoy to British War Cabinet, 1941–42; Member of Australian War Cabinet, 1942–43.

who attended a meeting of the War Cabinet yesterday evening, will no doubt tell you how we view the general situation confronting us. We must not forget that Germany, who is still the main enemy, is in serious and increasing difficulties both in Russia and in Libya.

3. It is not considered that there is any immediate large-scale threat to the territory of Australia and much less of New Zealand. There is the possibility of raids by enemy cruisers accompanied by seaborne aircraft, generally under conditions similar to those set out in paragraph 34 of the Far East appreciation contained in my telegram of 12 August 1940, Z.214,

See Appendix IV.

to the United Kingdom High Commissioner.

4. The potential threat to our sea routes in the Far Eastern area has of course greatly increased and the situation is largely that set out in paragraphs 30 to 33 of telegram Z.214 already referred to. Admiralty instructions with regard to convoying and routing are contained in Admiralty telegram 1915/10 to the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board and the New Zealand Naval Board.

Not published.

5. As regards local Australian defence, until we know more of the Japanese intentions we do not recommend any changes in those dispositions decided on as a result of consideration given to the subject at the time of Mr Menzies' visit (see paragraphs 23 to 26 of our reply of 18 April).

Not published.

6. A further telegram will be sent to you as soon as the new situation has been fully examined.

110 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 13 December 1941

The following is a report prepared for our military advisers on the methods open to Japan and those likely to be adopted:

‘1. Russia's continued neutrality is, for the purpose of the report, assumed.

‘2. Japan's object is to gain complete control and freedom of movement in East Asia by eliminating Allied power in that area. The capture of Singapore and Manila are necessary, and control of the East Indies area providing vital economic resources, particularly oil, would follow.

‘3. Japan's main course of action must therefore be:

(a)

Denial to us and the Americans with a view to the easiest possible capture of:

(1)

Malaya, particularly Singapore;

(2)

The Philippines, particularly Manila, to protect sea communications;

(3)

Hong Kong.

(b)

Repetition of air attacks on Hawaii to impede the repair of naval units and dockyard.

‘4. Other operations.

(a)

Operations which might be carried out simultaneously with or independently of the above:

(1)

Attack on the Dutch submarine base at Sourabaya;

(2)

Attack on the Panama Canal by carrier-borne aircraft—difficult and risky, but prize very great;

(3)

Occupation of islands near the Equator on which air bases are being constructed, e.g., [group omitted–Christmas?] Island (Pacific) and Canton Island;

(4)

Raid by cruisers and minelaying of ports and their approaches in the Pacific Islands, Australia, New Zealand and India, and attacking shipping in the Pacific and Indian Oceans;

(5)

The acquisition of a refuelling base in Madagascar is a remote possibility.

(b)

Developing from the main operations, Japan may attempt the occupation of:

(1)

Key points in Borneo.

(2)

Sumatra and Java, to close the entrance from the west to the China Seas.

(3)

Air bases in the Celebes and Halmahera.’

111 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 29 December 1941

Following from my Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand:

I send you subjoined the all-important agreement between the President and myself

Mr Churchill conferred with President Roosevelt at Washington between 22 Dec 1941 and 14 Jan 1942.

which has been approved by Cabinet. The President proposes to announce that it was at his suggestion, endorsed by his advisers, that General Wavell was chosen.

Fd Mshl Earl Wavell, PC, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, CMG, MC (then General Sir Archibald Wavell); GOC-in-C Middle East, 1939–41; GOC-in-C India, 1941–43; Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific, Jan-Mar 1942; Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 1943–47; died 24 May 1950.

I have the fullest confidence in General Wavell, who has unique experience in handling three or four separate theatres simultaneously. It is necessary that the announcement should be made by 1 January at the latest, and I hope that I may have your early agreement to an arrangement designed to be a help and security for New Zealand and to enable the war against the Japanese to be prosecuted with the utmost vigour.

Text of the agreement is contained in my immediately following telegram.

112 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 29 December 1941

My immediately preceding telegram. Text of agreement:

(a)

That unity of command shall be established in the South-West Pacific. Boundaries are not yet finally settled, but presume they would include the Malay Peninsula, including Burma, to the Philippine Islands, and southwards to necessary supply bases, principally Port Darwin, and supply line in Northern Australia.

(b)

That General Wavell should be appointed Commander-in-Chief, or if preferred, Supreme Commander, of all United States, British, Empire and Dutch forces of land, sea, and air who may be assigned by the Governments concerned to that theatre.

(c)

General Wavell, whose headquarters should in the first instance be established at Sourabaya, would have an American officer as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. It seems probable that General Brett

Lt-Gen George H. Brett; appointed Deputy Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific Area, Jan 1942; appointed Commander of all United States troops in Australia, Mar 1942; Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces in Australia, 1942.

would be chosen.

(d)

That American, British, Australian and Dutch naval forces in the ‘theatre’ should be placed under the command of an American Admiral, in accordance with the general principle set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b).

(e)

It is intended that General Wavell should have a staff in the South Pacific portion, as Foch's

Marshal Foch was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France in April 1918.

High Control Staff was to the great [group mutilated–General?] Staffs of the British and French armies in France.

In the draft manuscript of the British official history, Grand Strategy, Vol. III, Chap. 16, this sentence reads: ‘It is intended that General Wavell should have a staff in the same sort of proportion as Foch's High Control Staff was to the great Staffs of the British and French armies in France.’

He would receive his orders from an appropriate joint body, who will be responsible to me as Minister of Defence and to the President of the United States, who is also Commander-in-Chief of all United States forces.

(f)

Principal commanders comprised in General Wavell's sphere will be Commander-in-Chief Burma, Commander-in-Chief Singapore and Malaya, Commander-in-Chief Netherlands East Indies, Commander-in-Chief Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of Southern Communications, via South Pacific and North Australia.

(g)

India, for which an acting Commander-in-Chief will have to be appointed, and Australia, who will have their own Commander-in-Chief, will be outside General Wavell's sphere, except as above mentioned, and are the two great bases through which men and material from Great Britain and the Middle East on the one hand and the United States on the other can be moved into the fighting zone.

(h)

The United States Navy will remain responsible for the whole Pacific Ocean east of the Philippine Islands and Australasia, including United States approaches to Australasia.

Rapid changes in the Far Eastern situation during the next fortnight resulted in modifications in this proposed organisation. Headquarters of the Supreme Commander ABDA area were set up near Bandoeng on 10 Jan 1942, on the arrival of General Wavell from Singapore, and he took over the command (with the exception of the Philippine Islands) on 15 January. Major-General Brett was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander. On 22 February (six days before the Japanese invaded Java) General Wavell discussed with the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies a proposal that Headquarters of the ABDA area should be dissolved. The Chiefs of Staff concurred and the headquarters accordingly closed down on 25 February, when command was handed over to the Dutch.

(i)

A letter of instruction is being drafted for the Supreme Commander safeguarding the necessary residuary interests of the various Governments involved and prescribing in major outline his tasks.

113 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia.

30 December 1941

Your telegrams of 29 December [Nos. 111 and 112].

Following for your Prime Minister:

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are in cordial agreement with the proposal to appoint General Wavell, in whose capacity they have every confidence and for whose character and standing they have the highest regard, to the supreme command of that portion of the Pacific to which the proposed arrangement relates.

2. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand the proposals do not go far enough. The defeat of Japan is essentially a question of sea power. Our object must be to regain that command of the Western Pacific Ocean which is now completely in Japanese hands. Once we can cut the Japanese sea communications, we shall regain any possessions which we have lost and can ensure the defeat of Japan by economic pressure as well as by military means. To attain this object the New Zealand Government feel that it is essential that all naval forces in the Pacific Ocean, including the United States Pacific Fleet and the British Eastern Fleet, should be under one unified command, which might well be exercised by an American Admiral working in the closest possible co-operation with General Wavell.

3. Until the above policy can be implemented, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are willing to concur with the proposals in general. At the same time, they are not without doubt on certain aspects on which they have made the assumptions set out below. They would be glad to have confirmation of these assumptions or further information.

(a)

It is assumed that General Pownall

Lt-Gen Sir Henry Pownall, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC; Commander-in-Chief Far East, Dec 1941 – Jan 1942; Chief of Staff ABDA Command, Jan – Feb 1942; GOC Ceylon, Mar 1942 – Mar 1943; Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, 1943–44.

now becomes ‘Commander-in-Chief Singapore and Malaya’, and that the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet is to be superseded by the ‘American Admiral’ referred to in paragraph (d), who is to be subordinate to General Wavell.

(b)

It is noted that naval command in the area ‘east of the Philippines and Australasia’ is to be American. They presume that the ambiguous term ‘Australasia’ is intended to include New Zealand, and that the line of demarcation is intended to follow the line of the ABC–1 Report.

See p. 34, note 3.

If this is so it appears that New Zealand must be dependent upon the joint resources of the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy for naval defence within this area, and that the land and air defence of Fiji will remain a New Zealand commitment. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand are particularly concerned that this point should be clarified, and that a definition should also be given of naval responsibility for the protection of the line New Hebrides – Fiji – Tonga, which is at present apparently protected only by an inadequate air patrol operating from Fiji and such small naval forces as can be made available from Australia and New Zealand.

See Defence of the South Pacific, p. 267 ff.

(c)

It is assumed from paragraph (f) that General Wavell's authority is to include lines of communication from America to the area in question, and the New Zealand Government are not without doubt as to whether this would give him authority over Fiji, which is one of the essential bases for these lines of communication. They would raise no objection if this is the proposal, but they would call attention to the paramount importance of sea power to the safety of Fiji, which would appear to depend upon the American Fleet at least until Fiji is powerfully reinforced.

(d)

No reference is made in paragraph (d) to New Zealand naval forces. It is presumed that they are intended to be included.

4. His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have two further observavations to offer:

(a)

While they fully realise the necessity in time of war of making very urgent decisions, they feel that it will be realised in London and in Washington that the short time at their disposal may not have given them adequate opportunity to study the proposals with the care that they require, and that further observations may become necessary after further study.

(b)

If General Wavell's proposed command impinges directly or indirectly upon the defence of New Zealand or Fiji they would wish to institute from the outset some form of direct liaison between them and the General, perhaps by representation on the joint staff referred to in paragraph (e), and they would also wish to be represented on the ‘appropriate joint body’ also referred to in paragraph (e), as to the constitution of which they would be glad of further information.

114 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

4 January 1942

My telegram of 29 December [No. 112]. The following is the directive sent to General Wavell:

Mutilations in the text of this telegram as received in New Zealand have been corrected from the version published in the British official history, The War Against Japan, Vol. I, Appendix 20.

‘By agreement among the Governments of Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, hereinafter referred to as the ABDA Governments—

‘1. Area: A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas including the general regions of Burma – Malaya – Netherlands East Indies and the Philippine Islands: more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA area.

‘2. Forces: You have been designated as Supreme Commander of the ABDA area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore and in the air, of the ABDA Governments, which are or will be:

(a)

stationed in the area;

(b)

located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective Governments for service in or in support of the ABDA area.

You are not authorised to transfer from the territories of any ABDA Government land forces of that Government without the consent of the local Commander or his Government.

‘3. The Deputy Supreme Commander, and if required a Commander of the combined naval forces and Commander of the combined air forces, will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

‘4. No Government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your area [group mutilated – nor] any commitment made by it for reinforcing its forces in your area except after giving to other Governments and to you timely information pertaining thereto.

‘5. Strategic Concept and Policy: The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest moment through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimised. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive.

‘6. General Strategic Policy will be therefore:

(a)

To hold the Malay barrier, defined as a line of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA area, and to operate sea, land and air forces in as great a depth as possible forward of the barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

(b)

To hold Burma and Australia as essential support positions for the area, and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defence of India.

(c)

To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon, and to support the Philippine Islands garrison.

(d)

To maintain essential communications within the area.

‘7. Duties, Responsibilities and Authorities of Supreme Commander: You will co-ordinate in the ABDA area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; where desirable, to arrange the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for executing specific operations; and appointing any officers, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

‘8. While [group mutilated – you should therefore] have no responsibilities [group mutilated – in respect of the internal] administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorised to direct and co-ordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

‘9. You will dispose of reinforcements which from time to time may be despatched to the area by the ABDA Governments.

‘10. You are authorised to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in discharging your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

‘11. You are authorised to control the issue of all communiqués concerning the forces under your command.

‘12. Through the channels specified in paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furthering of your mission.

‘13. Limitations: Your authority [group mutilated – and control] with respect to the various positions of the ABDA area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the Commanders duly appointed by their respective Governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective Governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organisations of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own Commander and will not be subdivided into small units for [group mutilated – attachment to] other national components of task forces, except in cases of urgent necessity. In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for the effective co-ordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

‘14. Relations with ABDA Governments: The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercising of authority herein delegated and limited. The Commanders of all sea, land and air forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective Governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such Commanders as emanating from their respective Governments.

‘15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representation to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardise the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own Government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious methods, and copies of the appeals will be communicated simultaneously to you.

‘16. Staff and Assumption of Command: Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA Powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with national Commanders in the area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through the channels of communication described in paragraph 18.

‘17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of the Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

‘18. Superior Authority: As Supreme Commander of the ABDA area you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.

Annex 1—Boundaries of the ABDA Area

‘The ABDA area is bounded as follows:

‘On the north: by the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to latitude 030 degrees north, thence along the parallel 030 degrees north to meridian 140 degrees east. (Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included in this area.) On the east: by meridian 140 degrees east from 030 degrees [north] to the Equator, thence east to longitude 141 degrees east, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence east along the southern New Guinea coast to meridian 143 degrees east, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia. On the south: by the northern coast of Australia from meridian 143 degrees east, westward to meridian 114 degrees east, thence north-westward to latitude 015 degrees south, longitude 092 degrees east. On the west: by meridian 092 degrees east.

‘2. Forces assigned to ABDA and adjacent areas are authorised to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

Annex 2

‘(1) On all important military matters not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA area, the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for [group mutilated – developing] and submitting the recommendations for decisions by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Amongst the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:

(a)

Provision of reinforcements.

(b)

Major changes in policy.

(c)

Departures from the Supreme Commander's directive.

‘(2) This agency will function as follows:

(a)

Any proposals coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA Governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.

(b)

The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinion.

(c)

On the receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President and by telegraphing to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

‘(3) Since London has the machinery for consulting Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement and for including these in the final telegrams to Washington.

‘(4) Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be despatched from Washington in the name of both of them.’

115 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia.

6 January 1942

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have noted the directive sent to General Wavell as Supreme Commander of the ABDA area. They are, however, particularly concerned with the situation in that part of the South-Western Pacific which is not included in this area. In this connection they observe that General Wavell's command does not include the communications across the Pacific from the American continent to Australia, notwithstanding the reference to the matter in your telegram dated 29 December [No. 112].

They assume, therefore, that the larger question of unification of the whole Pacific Ocean with the ABDA area, particularly as regards the naval forces, raised in my telegram of 30 December [No. 113], and also that of the Prime Minister of Australia to the Australian Minister, Washington, on 30 December,

Not published.

is still under discussion.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be grateful if specific information could be given as soon as possible of the measures contemplated to ensure co-ordination of naval, military and air defence in the whole of the Pacific area, including New Zealand and Fiji, as the apparent isolation of New Zealand at the present time is causing them considerable anxiety.

116 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 8 January 1942

Following from Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand:

Your telegram of 31 December to Washington.

See Defence of the South Pacific, No. 262.

We are trying our best in consultation with the United States authorities to meet your most urgent requirements. A list of what we and the Americans can do will have reached you already from London.

2. You will see that we have been able to make up a fairly good [group mutilated – instalment?] and will try and do more as soon as we can.

3. It was not possible to consult you more fully about the South-West Pacific Supreme Command as speed of execution was essential, but I hope the results are satisfactory to you.

4. I am trying hard to get the Americans to assume naval responsibility for the area south of the Equator and west of 180 degrees up to the east coast of Australia, and I think they will probably agree. The Australian and New Zealand naval forces in the area would, of course, come under American operational command.

5. I am doing my utmost to build up and restore the Allied position in the Far East as soon as possible. We are all deeply grateful for the splendid courage and loyalty to the mother country shown by New Zealand under stress of danger.

117 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia.

12 January 1942

The following is from the Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:

We have been considering with the greatest of care the present position of the war, especially the situation that has arisen in the Pacific as the result of the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, and I am setting out in this telegram, as fully and frankly as I know you would wish me to do, our reflections and, so far as they can at present be formed, our conclusions on this matter which so vitally affects the people of this Dominion in particular and those of the British Commonwealth in general.

1. General Observations:

(i) The New Zealand Government have, throughout the whole course of hostilities, endeavoured to consider the problems of the conflict from the widest point of view, and we have we think succeeded, generally speaking, in looking upon the situation as a whole. We have never deviated from a complete recognition of the fact that the critical theatre of war has, up to the present at any rate, been the European theatre, and we have never allowed our preoccupations and apprehensions for the safety of this Dominion to interfere with what we considered to be our primary duty of applying the greatest force that we could provide at the most useful point. We feel that our efforts in this direction have not been less than those of any other portion of the British Commonwealth.

(ii) We have never, however, allowed our attention to be entirely monopolised by the European theatre. Though we still accept the principle that the continued defence of the United Kingdom is the most vital necessity in our conduct of the war, we have throughout attached great importance to developments, for example, in the Atlantic and in the Middle East, where indeed New Zealand's main forces are at present employed.

(iii) While the remarkable successes of the Russians over the Germans and the comparatively encouraging results so far of the battle in the Western Desert

On the night 17–18 Nov 1941 the Eighth Army under Lt-Gen Sir Alan Cunningham crossed the Egyptian frontier to begin the Second Libyan Campaign. By the end of the first week of January the enemy had been driven back to El Agheila, from which on 21 January he launched a counter-offensive which, in turn, drove the Eighth Army back to the Alamein line.

have removed any immediate fear of untoward developments in the Middle East, nevertheless we retain our apprehensions as to the situation that may before long develop there. We cannot believe that Hitler, having assumed the command of the German forces, will be content to retire into winter quarters. It seems to us most probable that he will endeavour to regain his lost prestige by some lightning blow in another area, and a likely field for this attempt is in the direction of North Africa. He would certainly have the troops available for a considerable adventure in this part of the world, and he has at his choice several methods of approach. We have noted the opinion of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff that such a move need not be anticipated for some lengthy period to come, but this does not entirely allay our apprehensions.

(iv) The Battle of the Atlantic seems for the moment to be going strongly in our favour, and we hope will continue to do so, though it would not appear to be improbable that the attention of the United States will now be diverted to some extent to the Pacific, and this may consequently increase the burden upon British forces in the Atlantic.

(v) By far the most serious development in recent months has been the outbreak of hostilities with Japan. Clearly the intervention of America, which this has brought about, is of the utmost importance to our cause and will almost certainly prove to be the decisive factor, but the crippling of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and the success of the Japanese attacks upon the Philippines and Malaya have produced what is now, and must for some time to come continue to be, an extremely critical situation in this theatre of war.

(vi) It is clear that this is recognised by yourself and your colleagues, and of course we greatly appreciated the attempt that was made to help us by the despatch to these waters of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. But, to be completely frank, we have not always felt that the potential problems of the Pacific have had the importance attached to them in London which we, more intimately concerned therewith, have considered that they have perhaps deserved. Whether this be so or not, it seems essential that the position in the Pacific should be treated now as one of at least equal importance to that in Europe and in the Middle East, and we are most concerned to see that the very best means are adopted to retrieve the early and most serious reverses that we and the Americans have met with in this area.

2. The Pacific Area generally:

(i) We have noted with the greatest of interest your discussions on this matter with President Roosevelt, and I must at once say that, though we fully endorse the desirability, indeed the necessity, of the unity of command which was the principal objective of those talks, we have felt that there were many aspects of the arrangements proposed in Washington which we did not fully understand or of which, as far as we understood them, we did not fully approve. We certainly assumed, however, that these proposals were the first of a series designed to provide for the fullest co-operation, at least throughout the whole Pacific area if not in all theatres of war, and not to be confined to the particular area referred to in the Secretary of State's message to us of 29 December [No. 112] as the ‘South-West Pacific’ (a phrase which we consider to be inaccurate and likely to be misleading in view of the problems that will have to be considered in connection with what we conceive to be the South-West Pacific proper, namely, the Southern Pacific Islands, New Zealand, and Australia).

(ii) We did make in connection with these proposals, and conveyed to the Secretary of State in my telegram of 30 December [No. 113], certain assumptions on which we have had as yet no further information, but we are not without doubt, as the result of a subsequent communication on the subject, whether similar collaboration in other areas is intended or will be found to be possible.

(iii) On the actual proposals for the ABDA area as set out in the directive to General Wavell contained in the Secretary of State's telegram of 4 January [No. 114], we have the following comments to make:

(a)

As it seems to us, there is one main problem and one alone in the whole area of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and that is the defeat of Japan, and that object in our opinion cannot be attained except with great delay and at great expense in life and treasure unless the problem is treated as one whole and not piecemeal.

(b)

As we see it, any attempt, such as the ABDA proposal, to divide this area into smaller areas must have the effect of dissipating our efforts. General Wavell is to command in the ABDA area at sea, on land, and in the air. At the moment there is a general understanding that an American Admiral is to command in the remainder of the Pacific and a British Admiral to command in the Indian Ocean. Frankly this seems to us to be a step in the wrong direction. If it is not possible to have one strategic command of the whole Pacific and Indian Ocean area then at least it becomes completely essential in our opinion that there should be means established for the fullest co-operation not only within the ABDA area itself, but also between the ABDA area and (i) the remainder of the Pacific, and (ii) the area of the Indian Ocean, as well as a more clearly defined and practicable means of co-operation in the remainder of the Pacific.

(c)

We observe that New Zealand is not to be concerned in any way with the ABDA area, and I must say at once that we are not content to accept this position. It is a fact that we have very few troops in that area, but it is similarly a fact that our safety in New Zealand depends to a very real extent upon operations and conditions in that area, and there must, I suggest, be some means found of associating New Zealand with the conduct of affairs in that area.

(d)

The means proposed for consultation with the Dominions, namely through the Chiefs of Staff in Washington and London via the British Government to the Dominions, seems to us to be quite inadequate for any decision of emergency and importance.

(e)

We note that as the result of the appointment of General Wavell the position of Resident Minister at Singapore

Viscount Norwich, PC, GCMG, DSO (then Rt. Hon. Alfred Duff Cooper); Resident Minister for Far Eastern Affairs, Singapore, 10 Dec 1941–10 Jan 1942.

has now been considered superfluous, and I am bound to say that here also we wonder whether this is correct. In addition to the operations that will be necessary in that area, there must arise in the very nature of things innumerable problems of a highly political order which it would seem could most conveniently be dealt with there, as in similar circumstances they are dealt with by the Minister of State in Cairo.

Capt the Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, PC, DSO, MC; Minister of State in the Middle East, Jul 1941 – Feb 1942.

If not there they must certainly be dealt with somewhere, and wherever they are dealt with this Dominion would wish to be represented.

(f)

The problems of the ABDA area will spill over from that area into the Indian Ocean area and into the Pacific area proper, and there must be some body established somewhere to deal with these wider and, in our opinion, even more vital problems. Wherever this body is established New Zealand will wish to be represented.

(g)

Our main criticism of the ABDA proposal is shortly this: that it professes to provide, and does provide, for only one portion of the problem, and by isolating that problem from the rest of the Pacific fails to deal with the situation as a whole.

(h)

I cannot too strongly express the strength of our view that the very first step to be taken to defeat Japan is to obtain naval supremacy in the Pacific, and our belief that this object cannot be obtained by setting up one command in the ABDA area, another command with a strong (though, in comparison with the Japanese, inferior) fleet in the Indian Ocean, and still another command with a strong (though, in comparison with the Japanese, probably inferior) fleet in the remainder of the Pacific Ocean. It seems patently obvious to us that we must concentrate our forces or we will run a serious risk of being defeated piecemeal, as the tragic history of Europe has recently indicated.

(iv) Finally, on this aspect of the matter I wish to say this, that during the period when the war, though world-wide, had its principal manifestations in Europe we were content very largely to abide by the decisions of the British Government and the British Chiefs of Staff, who were not only closer to the problems but more vitally affected by the repercussions of any immediate decision that was taken. Now, however, that the war has moved to our doorstep, I am sure you will agree that where the matters under discussion are of immediate and direct concern to us there must be some method devised by which we can intelligently form and explicitly express our views before action is taken. How this is to be brought about is, of course, a most difficult question. It may well be that some supreme directing body must be set up either in London or in Washington, but whether this be so or not we are all convinced here that some means for the better co-ordination of the views of the various Allied powers, including the Dominions, now engaged in this struggle must be established and that New Zealand must have some method of association. I notice that Mr Eden has recently announced that Canada and New Zealand are satisfied with the existing situation in this connection, but this is not strictly accurate. What I said in London was that I did not consider it feasible for the Prime Ministers of the Dominions to be constantly or substantially in session in London, and thus be away from their own more immediate responsibilities, or for one Prime Minister to represent all the Dominions. I did, however, make it plain that I would be ready to consider any other method that could be devised to improve consultation, and I am more than ever ready to consider this problem now, as I say, that the war is on our doorstep.

3. New Zealand's own Position:

(i) You are already aware in some detail of the deficiencies in the armaments necessary to defend this Dominion and also Fiji

See Defence of the South Pacific, p. 267 ff.

which, as you know, we are defending not only as an outpost of the defence of New Zealand but as a vital link in the connecting line of reinforcement from the American continent. We are, as you will have realised, exceedingly short of the implements of war, in many cases as a result of denuding ourselves to strengthen Fiji. This we feel is not our fault. We have for a very lengthy period past requisitioned for what we have considered to be necessary, and have from time to time, within what we considered to be the limits of propriety, pressed our needs to the utmost. We have, however, always been restrained in the past by a knowledge that the war was after all as yet many thousands of miles away from us and that other portions of the British Commonwealth and the Allied countries might well have more pressing claims.

(ii) Now, however, all this is changed. We have seen within a few short weeks the United States Pacific Fleet crippled. We have seen the Philippines practically captured.

The Japanese landed in the Philippines on 10 Dec 1941. The garrison on Corregidor held out for five months before surrendering on 6 May 1942.

We have seen Malaya in dire straits and Singapore in the greatest peril. We have seen the two magnificent ships which were sent out destroyed by the air arm in a few minutes.

HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk off Malaya by Japanese air attacks on 10 Dec 1941.

And we foresee for a considerable period ahead the Japanese in complete command of the Pacific and, for all practical purposes, without restraint on further activities except the use already being made of their resources and their estimate of the value to them of any further operations. Such being the case, we are bound by our duty to our own people to consider most carefully the situation in this part of the world, always having, we hope, due regard to larger issues.

(iii) I am sure you will agree with me that we have in the course of this war seen tragic instances in which the most competent opinion has been rapidly falsified by the event, and I am sure you will agree with me also that, as those responsible for the lives and safety of the people of this Dominion, we cannot wholly divest ourselves of this responsibility in favour of expert opinion, however authoritative, though of course we would wish to attach all due weight to such opinion.

(iv) In considering the military opinion so far as it affects ourselves, we have noted in the first place that in New Zealand itself we have been told by the highest military authority only a few months ago that New Zealand and Fiji were in no danger of serious attack unless in the ‘unthinkable’ contingency of the British and American Fleet being driven from the Pacific and Singapore having fallen, and that this could not happen under six months. Our reflection on this is that the unthinkable is now in everybody's mind. We have been warned that the Japanese are preparing for a southward advance and, as you know, the Joint Staffs in Washington have expressed the unofficial opinion that an attack on Fiji may be expected at any time after 10 January. So far as New Zealand is concerned, our own Chiefs of Staff have reduced the six months' period in respect of this Dominion to three months.

(v) We have noted also the opinion constantly expressed in the past by the Chiefs of Staff, both in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand, that there is no ‘immediate large-scale threat to the territory of Australia and much less of New Zealand’, a phrase taken from the Secretary of State's telegram of 11 December last [No. 109]. Frankly we do not accept this, and, even if we did accept it, prudence and the demands of our own people would oblige us to prepare against the worst. This we are doing without dismay, but we do feel entitled to ask of you what we know you are—and are confident you will continue to be—very willing to grant, namely, the utmost degree of assistance in the provision of implements of war that is consistent with necessary demands elsewhere.

4. To sum up, we have very little knowledge indeed of the intentions of the higher direction of the war, whatever be the authorities now responsible for it, either in London or in Washington. Indeed, so far as American intentions are concerned, we have practically no knowledge at all. We feel that we must be informed. We feel that we must have an eye, an ear, and a voice wherever decisions affecting New Zealand are to be made, and we are by no means happy with the arrangements, so far as we know them, for the conduct of the war against Japan. And, finally, we feel that both in Fiji and in New Zealand we must prepare urgently for a possible attack on a substantial scale.

5. I do most earnestly apologise for adding this additional burden to your shoulders, which I know are very much strained with other and more immediate perplexities, but I am sure were you in our place here you would feel much as we do, and I do hope that you will find time at an early date to let us have your comments on this communication.

118 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

This message was also sent to the Prime Minister of Australia.

13 January 1942

It is felt to be very important that Wavell should exercise supreme command without delay, as soon as he reports himself ready to do so. So far as United Kingdom forces are concerned, the Commander-in-Chief Far East has already relinquished command and Wavell has assumed command.

See p. 114, note 1.

We accordingly suggest that as soon as Wavell reports himself as ready he should be formally authorised to assume supreme command without prejudice to further discussion of the machinery for consultation outlined in Annex 2 of the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree. A similar suggestion is being made to the Dutch.

3. We should be grateful for your earliest reply.

Mr Fraser replied on 14 January that the New Zealand Government had no objection.

119 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 14 January 1942

winch No. 1

Following are proposals which have been agreed to by the United States of America Naval Staff and by the President for establishing a new naval area to be known as Anzac:

‘1. Definition of Area: A new naval area to be called Anzac area is to be established. The boundaries of this area will be as follows:

(a)

From longitude 141 degrees east eastward along the Equator to the longitude of 170 degrees east; thence south-eastward to latitude 020 degrees south, longitude 175 degrees west, thence south along meridian 175 degrees west.

(b)

From a point on the Equator southwards along meridian 141 degrees east to the south coast of New Guinea, thence east along the southern New Guinea coast to the meridian 143 degrees east, thence in sea areas south along this meridian to the Pole.

‘2. Designation: This area is designated as an adjunct of the Pacific Ocean area, and naval forces operating therein will be considered to be an adjunct of the United States Pacific Fleet.

‘3. Command Relations:

(a)

The command of naval forces of associated powers operating in the adjunct area will be vested in a United States Flag Officer directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet,

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN; Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area, 1942–45.

and under his strategic direction.

(b)

The Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet will exercise general supervision over the operations in the adjunct area and will correlate them with operations when adjacent to the areas; but he may not change the allocation of the vessels assigned to the adjunct [area].

‘4. Allocation of the Forces within the Area:

Proposed initial assignments of forces located in the adjunct area:

(a)

by the British—one aircraft carrier;

(b)

by the United States—one heavy or light cruiser;

(c)

by Australia—two heavy cruisers, one old light cruiser, three armed merchant cruisers, three destroyers, three sloops, two anti-submarine patrol vessels;

(d)

by New Zealand—two light cruisers, one armed merchant cruiser.

Note: (1) The remainder of Royal Australian Navy vessels other than local defence forces to be assigned to ABDA area.

(2) All local defence armaments to remain at the disposal of Australia and New Zealand.

(3) The United States will undertake to furnish to the Australian and New Zealand Governments all practical assistance in ships, planes, munitions, etc., to be manned by Australia and New Zealand.

‘5. Assignment of Tasks:

The tasks assigned to the forces of the associated powers in the adjunct area are:

(a)

to cover the eastern and north-eastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand;

(b)

to safeguard by all practicable escorting and covering operations convoys in the adjunct area;

(c)

to support the defence of islands in the adjunct area, with particular emphasis on its key points; to attack adjacent enemy key points;

(d)

to correlate operations with the forces in the ABDA area and with the United States Pacific force.

‘6. Forces assigned to the adjunct and adjacent areas are authorised to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.’

You will realise that decisions had to be taken at once, and I hope you will agree that this is a valuable step forward to meeting the position which you have represented to us. I have communicated in the same sense to Mr Curtin.

120 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of Australia 16 January 1942

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has conveyed to me the proposals agreed to by the United States Naval Staff and by the President for the establishment of a new naval area to be known as Anzac, and has informed me that he has communicated with you in the same sense.

In general, we consider that the proposals have the following advantages:

(a)

They indicate the importance attached by the British and the United States Governments to the problems of the area in question.

(b)

They make some provision for necessary co-operation with the adjacent areas.

(c)

They make some provision for reinforcements which are urgently required.

(d)

They provide some measure of direct American naval assistance.

From these points of view, therefore, the proposals are a distinct advance on any which have yet been put forward.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand propose to reply at the earliest possible moment in the form set out below. Before doing so, however, they would be grateful to be advised without delay of the tenor of the reply to be sent in this connection by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia, and they would be glad also of the Australian Government's very early comments

On 22 January Mr Curtin sent to New Zealand a copy of his own reply to Mr Churchill. This telegram is not reproduced.

on the following draft reply:

‘My colleagues and I have studied the proposals put forward in your telegram WINCH No. 1 of 14 January, which we welcome from the point of view of the closer association with the United States Forces which they will necessarily involve. We accept the proposals in their entirety. We assume that the technical disadvantages of operating a fleet which is predominantly British under the command of an American Admiral have received full consideration, and that this has been accepted because of the close American co-operation which it ensures.

‘We assume also that the present proposals are an interim measure to cover immediate requirements while Allied forces in this theatre of war necessarily remain on the defensive.

‘We feel that you are well aware that from the broadest aspect the present proposals leave untouched the main problem to which we have previously drawn attention. These proposals, with those for the ABDA area, divide the theatre of operations into individual and to some extent artificial areas. Unified command over all naval forces engaged in the war against Japan, and the eventual formation of a fleet superior to the Japanese, capable of wresting from our enemies the command of the Western Pacific, remain, in our opinion, essential to the defeat of Japan.

‘I take it that you will by now have seen my telegram of 12 January,

No. 117.

and I do hope that when you have the time to comment on that communication you will let us know why it has not yet been found practicable to adopt the course which is so necessary for conducting operations in this part of the world.’

121 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 17 January 1942

Your telegram of 12 January [No. 117]. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:

1. I am grateful to you for your telegram. I welcome, as always, the frank expression of your views, with which, in the main, I am much in sympathy, and the well-balanced reasoning with which you have presented them to me.

2. I fully endorse the remarks in your opening paragraphs. The Government and people of New Zealand have always adopted a helpful and realistic attitude to this war, which, beginning in the narrow confines of Europe, has gradually spread over almost the entire world and is now at the doorstep of New Zealand.

3. If you have thought us unmindful of your necessities in the past, although indeed we have never been so, I can assure you that the vast distance in miles which separates London from Wellington will not cause us to be unmindful of you or leave you comfortless in your hour of peril.

4. You will, I am sure, forgive me if in the time at my disposal I do not take up each of your points in detail. From the telegram which you have now received since sending your telegram to me, you will know of the army and air reinforcements which we and America are sending to you.

Not published.

The establishment of a new Anzac naval area will, I hope, also be agreeable to you. Moreover, the United States contemplate the despatch at an early date of considerable land and air forces to the Far East area.

5. Nevertheless, you would not expect me to make promises of support which cannot be fulfilled, or of the early redress of a situation in the Far East which must take time to rectify, as rectified it will be.

6. I sense your [reproach at our]

The words in brackets are not included in the copy of this telegram on the Prime Minister's Department file but are included, in square brackets, in the version published in Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, p. 12. See also No. 124.

having been misled by a too complacent expression of military opinion in the past on probable dangers in the Pacific area in general and to New Zealand in particular. But who could have foretold the serious opening setback which the United States Fleet suffered on 7 December, with all that this, and the subsequent losses of our two fine ships, entails? The events of this war have been consistently unpredictable, and not all to our disadvantage. I am not sure that the German General Staff have always forecast events with unerring accuracy. For example, the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Russian resistance must have shaken Hitler's faith in careful calculation of military appreciations.

7. Turning now to the strategic areas in the Pacific, you suggest that the establishment of the ABDA area under General Wavell is too narrow in conception, and should be extended to cover the whole of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Frankly, I find this idea more attractive in theory than, in my view, it could work out in practice, unless it were possible for the United States Navy Department and the British Admiralty, with the Naval Boards of Australia and New Zealand and of the Dutch Government, to be merged into one large United National Navy Department.

8. As at present arranged, the United States Navy will have control in the Pacific, Anzac and, under General Wavell's general direction, the ABDA areas. This is no rigid line of responsibility and ensures that the predominant Allied naval power in the Pacific, i.e., the United States, exercises naval control in all three areas.

9. In establishing the ABDA area there was no intention to ignore or to starve the other Pacific areas, but to ensure a virile defence, and in due time offence, in the area which must bear the first shock of the attack and, if held, will secure the vital lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand.

10. Our object, and in this I include all the ABDA powers, is to hold Singapore and to build up a fleet in the Pacific which will wrest naval control from the Japanese. All this is being worked out with the greatest despatch and in ceaseless consultation with our American allies.

11. I and my advisers have given much thought to the question of Dominion representation on our war councils, and in this connection I am not referring to the larger question of an Imperial War Cabinet. In considering this we have not been free agents. We have had to take into full account the views of the United States and Dutch Governments. It would be lamentable if, after appointing General Wavell to his great responsibilities, we were at the same time to impose a controlling machine which, by its ponderous workings, would make rapid decisions virtually impossible. I am, however, entirely sympathetic to your feelings that New Zealand should have its rightful place in the framing of major military policy in the Far East. I have therefore suggested to my colleagues that a body should be formed in London, with representatives, on a Ministerial plane, of the Australian, New Zealand and Dutch Governments, to which major [group mutilated – Pacific?] problems, and in particular, problems raised by General Wavell in accordance with his directive, would be referred. I would propose myself to preside over this body. Our view would, of course, have to be concerted with the President and the United States Staff in Washington. In the Staff sphere it has already been proposed that the service representations of Australia and New Zealand and the Dutch should be given [group mutilated – expression?] in London.

12. I have had a preliminary report from General Wavell, whom I expect to assume supreme command any day now. Whilst acknowledging the gravity of the present situation, he takes a robust view of the final outcome, and I am most anxious he should feel at the outset of his difficult task that he will receive our unstinted and united confidence.

122 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia.

18 January 1942

Your telegram No. 28 of 14 January.

Not published. This message contained General Wavell's plan for the organisation of ABDA headquarters. Australian and New Zealand agreement was asked for.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand have no observations to offer, other than that they consider an effective method of liaison should be established between them and General Wavell's headquarters and hope that this can be arranged.

123 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand 19 January 1942

Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:

In amplification of my telegram [No. 121], following are proposals for the machinery in London to secure the full and continuous association of the Australian, New Zealand and Netherlands Governments with the whole conduct of the war against Japan. A Far East Council shall be established on a Ministerial plane. I would preside, and other members would be the Lord Privy Seal

Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee; Lord Privy Seal, May 1940 – Feb 1942.

(who is my Deputy on the Defence Committee), Duff Cooper, and representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands. The Australian member would presumably be Earle Page, and the New Zealand representative might be the High Commissioner

Rt. Hon. Sir William Jordan, PC, KCMG (at this date the Hon. W. J. Jordan); High Commissioner for New Zealand in the United Kingdom, 1936–51.

to begin with. There would also be a Dutch Cabinet Minister. The Council would be assisted by a staff group of Dominions liaison officers in consultation with the United Kingdom joint planners. The duties of the Council will be to [group mutilated – focus?] and formulate the views of the represented powers to the President, whose views will also be brought before the Council. Do you agree? I am also consulting Curtin and the Netherlands Government.

124 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 20 January 1942

From Prime Minister for your Prime Minister:

I am most grateful to you for your telegram in reply to mine of 12 January [No. 117]. I fully realise how impossible it is for you to traverse at once and in detail the points that we have thought it desirable in complete frankness to raise, but there are, we feel, matters of substance in our comments which we trust will be considered in London and will in due course form the subject of a further consultation whether by telegram or otherwise.

I should like at once to remove what appears to be a misconception as to our reaction to the military appreciations we have received from time to time as to probable developments in this part of the world. The fact is that we have never been ‘misled’ by these appreciations which have, generally speaking, seemed to us to be more optimistic than the situation as we saw it warranted.

We are fully appreciative of the measures that are now being taken to provide us from both United Kingdom and American sources with the equipment that is necessary for the defence of New Zealand and of Fiji, but our needs are still great and urgent.

See also Defence of New Zealand and Defence of the South Pacific.

I shall not in this telegram touch upon the division of this theatre of war into separate areas under separate commands or upon the vital necessity, as we see it, of concentrating our forces at the earliest possible moment to regain naval supremacy in the Pacific. I have no doubt that a further opportunity will arise for the discussion of these and the other points referred to in my telegram, and I propose now to set out our tentative views on your proposal for a consultative body in London.

We warmly welcome the object which the proposal is intended to serve, and particularly what we earnestly ask you to believe we regard as the inestimable advantage of your presence and chairmanship, and we will willingly pursue with you and the other Governments interested the possibilities involved in your proposal. Probably no perfect solution can be found of this most intricate and perplexing problem. But I am bound to say at once that we do not regard this proposal as meeting fully the point of view expressed in Part 2 of my telegram of 12 January. As it seems to us, such a consultative body should include not only, as you suggest, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and the Netherlands, but all the powers at present actively associated in the conduct of the war against Japan, and particularly the United States of America. In this connection you will, of course, readily recognise the fact that the United States are now charged with the sole responsibility for the naval defence of the Pacific and Anzac areas, including, of course, this Dominion, and in view of this fact it seems to us to be quite essential—and I cannot too strongly impress upon you the firmness of our conviction in this sense—that some means must be found by which New Zealand can be brought at a conference table into direct touch with representatives of the United States and the other associated powers in the Pacific.

We assume (and would be glad of confirmation) that, as contemplated by you, the proposed body would have authority to deal not only with all major Pacific problems and with those questions raised by General Wavell in accordance with his directive, but also with any points that might arise from time to time in connection with the co-operation between the ABDA area and the Pacific area, or between the ABDA area and the Anzac area, or between the Anzac area and the Pacific area.

I should make it clear that, even after the establishment of the proposed body, we could not feel that we would be sufficiently in touch with affairs in the ABDA area unless, as we have already suggested, we can be afforded some means of permanent liaison with General Wavell's headquarters.

Let me say finally how fully we realise the necessity for quick decisions and of avoiding any unnecessary restrictions on the powers and authorities of General Wavell and the Commanders of the other areas.

In view of the similarities of circumstances between this Dominion and the Commonwealth of Australia, I should really be very much obliged if you would give me permission to forward your telegram and my reply for the personal and confidential information of Mr Curtin.

125 The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 22 January 1942

peeraNo. 1.

My colleagues and I have studied the proposals put forward in your telegram WINCH No. 1 of 14 January,

No. 119.

which we welcome from the point of view of the closer association with the United States forces which they will necessarily involve. We accept the proposals in their entirety. We assume that the technical disadvantages of operating under the command of an American Admiral a fleet that is predominantly British have received full consideration, and that this has been accepted because of the close American co-operation which it ensures. As the Anzac squadron will include New Zealand naval units, it will be essential for New Zealand to be represented by a suitable liaison officer on the staff of the American Admiral.

We note that the proposals are purely naval, and we feel it desirable to point out that, in our opinion, the problem is not solely naval and that, as in the case of the ABDA area, some form of unified control—land, sea and air—in the Anzac area might well be established with American, British, Australian and New Zealand association.

We assume that the present proposals are an interim measure to cover immediate requirements while Allied forces in this theatre of war necessarily remain on the defensive. We feel that you are well aware that from the broadest aspect the present proposals leave untouched the main problem to which we have previously drawn attention. These proposals, with those for the ABDA area, divide the theatre of operations into individual and to some extent artificial areas. Unified command over all naval forces engaged in the war against Japan, and the eventual formation of a fleet superior to the Japanese capable of wresting from our enemies the command of the Western Pacific, remain, in our opinion, essential to the defeat of Japan.

126 The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand [Extract] 24 January 1942

Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister:

I have carefully studied your telegram of 20 January [No. 124]. Like you I will deal in this telegram only with the proposal for a Far Eastern Defence Council in London. I cannot but think that there may have been some misunderstanding as to the precise scope of the arrangement which was discussed by the President and myself, and I think it will be best if I set out in fuller detail the whole scheme as we arranged it.

The President proposed to me the appointment of a British General as Supreme Commander in the ABDA area. As part of this arrangement the orders to the Supreme Commander on major strategy and policy will finally emanate from the President, acting on behalf of the ABDA Governments. The President will be advised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. This committee consists of three United States Chiefs of Staff sitting with the British Joint Staff Mission, at the head of which I propose to place Field Marshal Dill.

Fd Mshl Sir John Dill, GCB, CMG, DSO; Chief of the Imperial General Staff, May 1940 – Dec 1941; Head of the British Joint Staff Mission to Washington, Jan 1942 – death, 4 Nov 1944.

In London there will be a Far Eastern Council presided over by myself as Chairman and comprising one Ministerial representative each from Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands, other Ministers and advisers being summoned to attend as necessary.

2. The arrangements for inter-working between the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington and the Far Eastern Council in London will be as follows:

Any proposals emanating either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA Governments will be forwarded simultaneously to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington and to London for consideration by the Far Eastern Council. I shall be responsible as Chairman of the Far Eastern Council for focussing and formulating the views of the Governments represented on the Council and for presenting them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. If there are differences these will be reported. The members of the British Joint Staff Mission sitting in Washington, who are of course throughout in the closest touch with the British Chiefs of Staff in London, would be responsible not merely for bringing the views of