Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45
The authors of the volumes in this series of histories prepared under the supervision of the
By Authority:
R. E. Owen, Government Printer,
From left: Brigadiers C. E. Weir (CRA), W. G. Gentry (6 Brigade) partly obscured, Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. H. Hanson (CRE), Brigadiers
Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War1939–45
Alam Halfa and Alamein
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Distributed by
r. e. owen, government printer
wellington, new zealand
wellington, new zealand
THIS volume was intended to be an account of the part played by the New Zealand Division in the two battles from which the title is drawn. Work on it was commenced by Battle for Egypt, published in
I found, on beginning my task, that a picture of the New Zealand share in the battles could only be drawn in its true perspective against a clear background of the events occurring to all the forces concerned, both Allied and Axis. This I have attempted to do, so that, although the Division remains in the foreground, I have mentioned the names of only those New Zealanders whose actions affected operations or illustrate the conditions under which the battle was fought. For a detailed record of the gallant actions of officers and men, I would refer the reader to the numerous unit histories published by the
My acknowledgments are due to
I would take this opportunity of paying a tribute to the first Editor-in-Chief of the New Zealand War Histories, the late
The maps were drawn by the Cartographic Branch of the Lands and Survey Department and the index was prepared by Mrs M. Fogarty of the Historical Publications Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs.
Finally, though the story told is as close to the facts as detailed research can shape it, the views and opinions expressed are my own.
Ronald Walker
wellington
The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The ranks are those held on discharge or at the date of death.
The Opposing Armies
THE heat of the summer sun beating down on the Egyptian desert, the fine dust that rose with any wind or movement, and the legions of flies made August in the Panzer Army of Africa, facing one another across an ill-defined no-man's land, were settling in to a period of static warfare as the several inconclusive actions of July petered out.
On
Tour FDLs and examine minefields. Troops a bit lethargic but cheerful enough. Slit trenches shallow but men show no concern. Say that rock is hard and compressors few…. Dearth of information criticised…. Weather very hot. Visibility bad. Little activity….
2000 hrs mild shelling of Bde HQ area, followed by quiet night.Diary, 6 NZ Inf Bde.
The men of 6 Brigade were fortunate in that they faced the enemy across a no-man's land measured in miles. In 5 Brigade's sector and further north, where the fronts converged until they were in easy range of mortars and small arms, lethargy was less evident. Here, movement in daylight was hazardous but, with the fall of darkness, the desert became alive as men rose from cramped slit trenches to arm themselves with picks and shovels. Some worked on their own ‘slitties’, deepening them to the four to five feet laid down in orders; others worked with the sappers who brought up their compressors and truckloads of barbed wire, pickets and mines; while, behind the front, still others worked on gun positions, headquarters, supply dumps, medical aid posts—all the various tasks of digging that occupied the soldiers' time more than the actual fighting.
On the low ridges,
All through the night, in the no-man's land between the two lines of toiling men, patrols crept quietly about their missions of observing and interrupting the other side's work. At intervals a sudden staccato outburst of rifle and automatic fire and the crump of mortar bombs would break the silence as real or imagined foes were seen by the men protecting the working parties. Possibly another corpse would be added to those already lying unburied and untended between the lines.
From the dark sky overhead came the rhythmic pulse of bombers searching for gunflash or other telltale sign on which to drop their bombs. Then the gunners, unhurriedly loading and firing the field or medium guns to harass an unseen enemy, would pause in their task, as the aircraft passed close overhead, to listen for the first faint whisper of a bomb.
It was during the hours of darkness that reinforcements and reliefs moved into the front line, passing the lightly wounded and the sick, sufferers from the prevalent desert sores, ‘Gyppo tummy’, jaundice, or malaria, who were making their way back to the medical aid posts. Trucks criss-crossed the desert, each with its plume of dust to thicken the gloom into which the drivers peered for signs of minefield or slit trench, as the army services went about their business of replenishing rations, water and ammunition.
Before the first hint of dawn appeared, all this nocturnal activity slackened off. Patrols, working parties, and their guards moved quietly back to their own lines, the infantrymen slipping into their narrow slit trenches, often to wake their more fortunate comrades who, not detailed for nightly tasks, had managed to get a few hours' sleep in the cool of darkness.
As the sun rose behind the Eighth Army, the men of both sides ‘stood to’, ready for a dawn assault. One observant diarist noted that the flies stayed abed for twenty minutes after the official ‘first light’; after this short respite, they appeared in their myriads to add their unpleasant attentions to the heat and the dust and the discomforts of the day until the sun set behind the Panzer Army.
Throughout the day the British artillery fired on known, observed, or suspected targets such as gun and infantry positions, groups of
Except for the unequal artillery duel, and the occasional local vendetta with mortars and machine guns between opposing frontline posts, the hot days dragged on uneventfully for most of the men in the Luftwaffe to come and do battle, but many a day passed when only the occasional Axis fighter or reconnaissance plane was seen. The British fighters usually gathered in strength as the summer sun sank over the western horizon, the time when Stuka and Messerschmitt preferred to come roaring out of the sun for a hit-and-run raid.
Water was one of the biggest problems for both sides. Eighth Army had the pipeline from German water supplies were officially divided into three categories, each carried in marked containers to prevent contamination:
Medically tested fresh water for drinking. Untested fresh water for washing and cooking. Salty or brackish water for washing (with an issue of salt-water soap). Panzer Army. The Germans also complained that the distribution at the water points
The medical authorities suspected a connection between sea bathing and dysentery and forbad bathing other than a short immersion every second day.—German Military Documents Section,
The Panzer Army also suffered from a steadily deteriorating transport system as the captured British trucks which had made up for its own losses became unusable from lack of spare parts. Replacements from
The Italians were nominally in charge of the supply system and there is a suspicion that they overestimated their own needs at the expense of the Germans; one German left a record of his humiliation at having to beg food and water from his Italian companions-in-arms. In the Italian army, the requirements of other ranks took a very second place to those of the officers, while their standards of hygiene made their defence positions much more unpleasant than they need have been, besides providing breeding grounds for the flies that the men of the Eighth Army, a few hundred yards away, were trying with considerable trouble and ingenuity to eliminate.
In one particular respect the troops of Eighth Army were more fortunate than their opponents. Both sides were too thin on the ground, with too few reserves, to be able to release their front-line troops for more than short spells of leave. The Germans and Italians set up rest camps on the coast within a day's journey of the front where their men could enjoy swimming in the Panzer Army rest camp.
Even had the men of Eighth Army been generally aware of their advantages over the Axis troops, this would not have been enough to lift the weight of frustration and uncertainty that had increased since the July fighting died down. When Rommel had moved forward to the attack at
Though co-ordination between his two corps and between the formations within those corps was far from complete, General Auchinleck had managed during July to regain a measure of control over his command. This he did more by his determination to hit the enemy ‘whenever and wherever possible’ Report to CIGS, 24 July.
In the space of seventeen days up to 27 July, when Operation MANHOOD Battle for Egypt, p. 375.
If, as Auchinleck implied in his despatch, the July operations were designed to withhold the initiative from the enemy, they were successful. But, with this simple aim, they could have been just as great a success with much less loss. Designed as they were with a much wider aim, they demanded a degree of co-ordination which the formations within the Eighth Army were unable to offer. Though minor criticisms of the handling of brigades and divisions at this period might be made, they would have little value, as the conduct of the operations was strictly conditioned by the plans issued by Army Headquarters and accepted by the two corps.
Several commentators on this period B. H. Liddell Hart, The Tanks, p. 209, inter alia.
The July battles roused considerable criticism within the army, criticism not confined to the three Dominion divisions involved. For the New Zealanders' part this culminated in the statement by Major-General Report by Inglis to Battle for Egypt, p. 376.
On the enemy side, Rommel was more than once doubtful if his line would hold. In most cases his Italian infantry absorbed the brunt of the attack, allowing time for detachments of the German Africa Corps, trained in the co-operation of all arms, to be thrown in at the danger points. From the information available it seems clear that Eighth Army was unaware of the extent of the strain put upon the Panzer Army, nor did it realise how desperate were the methods by which Rommel had maintained his line.
Once the troops on both sides learnt of their commanders' decisions to remain on the defensive for a period, they settled down to making the best use of the ground they were occupying until the two front lines began to take on a definite design, each with its epidermis of wire and mines covering the forward section and platoon weapon pits, and each company sector with an inner skin mined and wired for all-round defence. From the section posts a maze of tracks like fine veins ran through the defences back to
On the British side of the defences, the white sand dunes along the coast to the west of the
Life on this rocky ridge was uncomfortable, wearing and dangerous. Being overlooked by the Germans and Italians, the troops lived an underground existence. No one in the forward positions could move with safety during daylight, and the men sat cramped in their trenches. Dusk and nightfall afforded a relief, and the men took exercise and stretched their limbs. By night, reconnaissance and fighting patrols had to be found to report on the enemy dispositions and activities and to deter enemy mine-laying parties.
Maj M. I. Qureshi ,The First Punjabis, p. 288.
The Australian, South African and Indian divisions made up 30 Corps under the command of Lieutenant-General W. H. Ramsden.
On the south of the ridge in the stretch of desert over which it had advanced and retreated in July, the New Zealand Division, under the command of Major-General Inglis, had already begun to construct what became known as the
All the infantry divisions were to some extent under strength through losses by sickness and battle during July, though none was quite so low in numbers as the New Zealand Division. With all three battalions of 4 Brigade 4 Brigade in
The British armour was reorganising along lines proposed by Auchinleck, with 22 Armoured Brigade in process of becoming the heavy armoured formation manning all the available Grant tanks and completing its strength with Crusaders. The Valentines were concentrated in 23 Armoured Brigade, and 4 Light Armoured Brigade was being equipped with Stuarts and the remaining Crusaders. The exact total of ‘runners’ available at the end of July is not known but, excluding the light Stuarts or ‘Honeys’, the Eighth Army could have mustered and manned considerably more than the Panzer Army, which had about 150 German and 50 Italian tanks in running order at this time. During the reorganisation, the bulk of the British armour was held close behind the centre of the line, handily placed to move to the assistance of either corps. General Auchinleck, since taking over direct command of Eighth Army from General Ritchie on 25 June, still combined the duties of Army Commander and Commander-in-Chief,
In view of our present strength in relation to the enemy's, I have reluctantly decided that Eighth Army must adopt a defensive attitude until we have so built up our strength as to enable us to resume the offensive.
The date by which we will be able to resume large-scale offensive operations will depend on such factors as the speed of our own and the enemy's reinforcement. We must, however, meanwhile, be prepared to take advantage of any mistake made by the enemy and to inflict on him the maximum inconvenience and loss, by local offensive operations, active patrolling, and ‘deception’ schemes. It is of supreme importance that the enemy shall NOT be allowed to develop his plans for offensive or defensive action unhindered.
In the same document, Auchinleck estimated that Rommel might before long regain air superiority and, reinforced by an airborne regiment, might then take the offensive by a sweep round the south end of the line. He warned that the Eighth Army's southern flank should not be mined so indiscriminately as to hinder a counter-attack in strength against the enemy's flank by the British armour, ‘to be husbanded until the opportunity for a major offensive arises’. Following this instruction, the Army Commander issued an amended version of the previous plans for defence in forward and main zones.
Though the Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, p. 386 et al.Panzer Army's intentions were at this period extremely meagre. While the Axis intelligence organisation had many opportunities for checking on British shipping making the long journey between the
The Eighth Army therefore had to rely to a great extent on information to be gained in the front line. Visual observation and wireless interception, though valuable, were far from capable of drawing a clear picture of the complicated interlacing of German and Italian units. It was necessary for this picture to be drawn in detail before any significant alterations, possibly presaging an offensive, could be understood. To this end the Army Commander ordered a policy of vigorous and constant patrolling by all front-line troops, both to reconnoitre the extent of the new defences being laid out and to learn the identity of the Axis troops holding each sector.
The Germans and Italians then had to cope with a constant stream of British patrols who watched, listened to, and often attacked, their working parties. Every night more details of the Axis defences, newly dug trenches, stretches of wire and minefields were collected and plotted on Eighth Army's maps. But prisoners for identification of the Axis units in the line were rarely secured as the policy of day and night harassing kept the enemy constantly alert.
Facing Eighth Army across a no-man's land which became daily more clearly defined as the fixed defences grew, the Panzer Army of Africa under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had a nominal strength of four corps, one German and three Italian. As the Italians' martial ardour and reliability in defence varied unpredictably, Rommel allocated sectors of the front to the three Italian corps with responsibility for administration, but by
The dispositions of the German and Italian infantry were being altered daily at the beginning of August as Rommel fitted the available infantry into the front in order to release the three Africa Corps formations, 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions and 90 Light Division, to rest and reorganise as his mobile reserve. Elements of the German 164 Light Division had been arriving for some time and they were put into the coastal sector to relieve infantry of 90 Light Division. These troops shared with 21 Italian Corps the sector which ran from the sea south to
The next sector, from 10 Italian Corps, bolstered by infantry detachments from all three Africa Corps divisions. South of the Trieste Division of 20 Italian Corps shared the front with the remaining infantry of 90 Light Division. The main body of the armour was held in the central sector.
Reinforcements received during August included the rest of This division was intended to be re-formed as a 164 Division,Light Africa Division, but owing to the piecemeal arrival, especially of its equipment, this procedure was delayed.Ramcke Parachute Brigade and the Italian Folgore Parachute Division, the German parachutists being placed in the central sector and the Italian in the southern.
The Panzer Army had been so close to the limit of its endurance after the Eighth Army's MANHOOD operation of 27 July that it was unable even to think in terms of ‘offensive defence’. To allow its reserves of men and material to be built up, it was forced to take as passive a role as its opponents would permit. A steady trickle, though still only a trickle, of German infantry reinforcements was coming over by air, but the Allies' sea and air offensive against the supply routes was preventing vehicles, heavy weapons, ammunition, petrol, and food being shipped over in large quantities. On 2 August the quartermaster of the Panzer Army reported that his stocks in hand were sufficient for only two days of heavy fighting, and that this reserve would not increase until more supplies were shipped over to him than the mere replacement of daily usage.
Rommel, however, was only a field commander. For all his requirements he had to travel the ill-defined and complicated path of German-Italian relations, in which politics and personalities loomed larger than strategy.
The Italian supply organisation, on which Rommel had therefore to rely for almost all his needs except for the few German troops brought in by air, was corrupt at its source and inefficient throughout. Unable to provide their own fighter cover and, in the clash of interests, unable to persuade the Germans to do the job for them, the Italians had tried to avoid the ports of
Perhaps not all the fault can be laid on the Italians for, from the German records, it is hard to avoid the impression that the two men who might have helped Rommel, Kesselring and the liaison officer in Luftwaffe in the
The stalemate on the 164 Division and the promise of a brigade of paratroops, but the airlift, by a fleet of some 500 planes, was leaving much essential equipment still on the north shores of the
No charge of ignorance or disregard of logistics can be sustained against Rommel in this period. As he faced the decline in importance of his own command, he was fully aware that the African front was the only theatre of operations in the west in which the British were actively engaged. He had had word through German intelligence sources that the See also Chapter 4.
With characteristic energy, Rommel set to work to build up a striking force from the means to hand. He knew that Allied convoys were expected to reach Panzer Army was soon able to draw a reasonably correct picture of the Eighth Army front.
So the Axis infantry, under orders to maintain a passive defence and keep the expenditure of warlike stores down, endured the British harassing, only retaliating when directly attacked. The
The point where the pipeline, built by the British to serve the
From the ridge the pipeline, or what was left of it, ran southwest out of the British positions to enter the
South of 23 Battalion, 6 New Zealand Infantry Brigade under Brigadier
This expanse of open ground, while it made conditions in 6 Brigade's sector less uncomfortable than in the northern sector, also brought the need for constant reconnaissance in case the Axis troops should try to edge their line forward. Brigadier Clifton, assisted by the relative security of his sector, took Auckinleck's policy of ‘offensive defence’ to heart and quickly arranged a full programme of nightly patrolling and daylight harassing. With the incentive of a direction from Inglis that identifications of the enemy on his front were urgently needed, he instructed his three battalion commanders to step up their patrol activities on the last night of July.
An unrecorded number of patrols, but no less than three or four from each battalion, set out this night. Most of them failed to encounter the enemy but brought back useful scraps of information on areas of mines, wire and unoccupied trenches. A few got close to enemy working parties but, coming under fire from covering troops, had to withdraw. Only one was successful in bringing back an identification.
Working north-west across 5 Brigade's front, a 26 Battalion patrol of about a dozen men from 14 Platoon, C Company, led by Lieutenant 115 Infantry Regiment of 15 Panzer Division. According to the German records, a New Zealand raiding party of over fifty men was driven off this night with difficulty.
Encouraged by 26 Battalion's success, a strong patrol from 25 Battalion was sent out the following night to attack a post near the
This immediate and co-ordinated reaction to the British patrolling was the result of instructions given by the Panzer Army to tighten up its defensive measures by the use of stronger covering patrols, together with armoured cars and light tanks, for the working parties. By 2 August New Zealand patrols were reporting that they were unable to get within striking distance of the enemy working parties because of the heavy machine-gun and mortar fire let loose at any suspicious sound or movement.
The Axis troops had also begun to thicken up their minefields with anti-personnel ‘S’ mines, a device about the size of a Mills grenade set to spring out of a container buried in the ground and then explode in shrapnel at chest height. These ‘S’ mines were activated by three thin wire prongs which rose a few inches above ground and were extremely difficult to distinguish even in daylight from short vegetation or battlefield litter. They could also be worked by trip-wires attached to ‘push-pull’ igniters so that the slightest movement of the wires set off the ejecting mechanism. Some hundreds of these mines were laid in the Ruweisat and El Mreir sector at this time. The Axis troops also tried the use of searchlights mounted on trucks, the beams being swung across the front at ground level at irregular intervals, and the trucks constantly changing position to avoid being fired on.
The continuous pressure of Eighth Army's patrolling, added to the constant day and night harassing fire, thus had the result within a few days of causing the Axis troops to improve their defences and maintain such a state of alertness that small hit-and-run patrols were more likely to suffer casualties than gather prisoners. When this became clear, Eighth Army's thoughts turned towards planned raids in place of opportunist patrols. With the greater freedom from enemy interference enjoyed in his sector, Clifton was one of the first to turn this planning into action by sending out raiding parties whose routes were covered by standing patrols equipped with wireless linked to the artillery. The idea was that the raiders
A new gadget was received at this time which, it was thought, would provide a means of dealing with the armoured vehicles used by the Axis to cover the working parties in the front line. This was a parachute flare to be fired from the standard infantry 2-inch mortar. Experiments by armoured car crews of the Divisional Cavalry using derelict vehicles in no-man's land showed that the flare could illuminate a tank at night at a distance of 400 yards for sufficient time for several shots to be fired from an anti-tank gun. Danger lay in the wind drifting the flare back over the gun. After watching these experiments, Clifton fostered a plan for adding an anti-tank gun and a 2-inch mortar to a raiding party. However, the large element of luck necessary for the success of this scheme remained elusively absent and never, as far as is known, did any men of the brigade manage to site a gun, unobserved, within 400 yards of an enemy tank—with the wind in the right quarter.
Daylight activity in the first week of August was confined mainly to exchanges by the artillery, the weight of fire coming from Eighth Army. In the New Zealand sector, 5 Brigade's area was too exposed to allow much activity beyond standard firing by the 25-pounders, but 6 Brigade's distance from the enemy permitted Clifton considerable scope for experiment in ‘offensive defence’. Observers in the brigade area reported that, with the lightening dawn sky behind them, they were able to see numbers of Axis troops appearing above ground to shake out blankets and perform
This plan was given its first major trial on the morning of 2 August. Two six-pounders of 31 Anti-Tank Battery and Vickers guns from the machine-gun companies were driven out overnight and carefully sited behind a screen of infantry and Bren-gun carriers. As soon as the dawn light gave sufficient visibility, the Vickers gunners opened up on Axis troops they could observe in the
Though this experiment was repeated later with variations, the anti-tank gunners never managed to get their sights on a tank within range. Clifton maintained his routine of visiting the artillery and machine-gunners' observation posts at first light to spur them to action, and the Axis troops must have found the regular dawn harassing very unpleasant, but from the complete lack of reference in the German unit records, it seems unlikely that the shooting caused much damage. It was probably accepted in the same way as the British troops accepted the occasional Axis strafing, as one more unpleasant desert condition to be endured.
As the New Zealand troops went about the job of ‘rotating’ the enemy, in the current slang, the Australians, South Africans and Indians were also experimenting with similar methods of offensive defence. No sector of the Axis front was secure from probing patrols at night, while during the day observers in Eighth Army watched continuously for targets on which the artillery, mortars, or machine guns could be laid. With no real shortage of ammunition, the British guns used ten or more shells to reply to each one fired by the Axis. Only in small-arms ammunition and Very lights did the enemy practise no economy for, all along the front, the hours of darkness were punctuated with soaring flares and the sudden chattering of machine guns.
The Alam el Halfa Defences
ALAM EL HALFA ridge lay some 12 miles behind the New Zealand Division's line and ran generally west-south-west about ten miles from, and roughly parallel to, the coast. The terrain was common to that of most of the
The highest point, Alam el Halfa itself, was some 132 metres (433 feet) above sea level. For some miles each side of this point the ridge maintained a height of over 100 metres. Immediately south of the ridge lay a wide shallow depression, the
Halfway between the Alam el Halfa ridge and the coast another parallel ridge, the
The New Zealand Division's interest in Alam el Halfa began as early as the first week in July when
An operation instruction
To complement this Eighth Army instruction,
The last complete instruction signed by General Auchinleck for the Eighth Army, issued on 31 July, Despatch in London Gazette,
No large bodies of reinforcements were expected in the De Guingand, Operation Victory, Operation Victory, p. 123.
Whether the implications in the plan were clearly seen or not is uncertain, but Gott of 13 Corps took the liberty, when passing on the army instruction, of altering the terms ‘forward’ and ‘main’ to ‘main’ and ‘rear’ respectively for the two zones, and of otherwise changing the emphasis to a strong defence on the present front, with armoured counter-attack to drive back any enemy penetration of the New Zealand area, and a withdrawal to Alam el Halfa as merely a possible later contingency.
On 27 July Inglis was being asked by his two brigadiers if they could increase their local mining to cover all-round defence, but had to withhold permission until he could get 13 Corps to tell him the general policy. Two days later he drew from Gott the information that the policy was ‘defensive’ and that he could mine
Confirmed in his belief that, under the state of training then existing in Eighth Army, an infantry division had to remain intact as a division and rely on its own strength in men and guns rather than on promised support by other formations, he was averse to breaking up the New Zealand Division into the small battle groups that the Alam el Halfa plan required. He therefore proposed to Gott that the position, which would have to withstand the initial impact of an enemy drive round the south, should be designed as a divisional defence area with the artillery under central control. For this he would need another brigade.
Gott agreed in principle and asked for a plan. Intensive reconnaissance of the ridge was begun by infantry, gunner and engineer parties. Meanwhile 21 Indian Infantry Brigade was called from reserve to work on Alam el Halfa and put under the New Zealand Division's command on 2 August. By 7 August the Division was able to issue a plan acceptable to 13 Corps with some minor amendments. This divided the ten-mile stretch of the ridge, from
The discussions and arguments that culminated in the acceptance of Inglis' plans for Alam el Halfa also brought to an end his command of the Division. He had been far from well for some time, and now the combined effects of jaundice, dysentery and an
On 4 August he was called to the tactical headquarters of the Army, where the staff and senior officers were holding discussions on organisation and planning. Among those present was General Sir Ronald Adam, the Adjutant-General of the British Army, lately arrived from the
A test of the combined plans for the armour and infantry of 13 Corps was held at Corps Headquarters on 7 August, attended by Inglis and senior officers of the Division. The principal item in this staff exercise dealt with the withdrawal of the infantry, after an enemy penetration of the forward positions, to the main zone defences of Alam el Halfa under cover of a limited counter-attack by 22 Armoured Brigade. Details of this exercise show that the implication in 13 Corps' plans, of a main zone to be strongly defended and a rear zone for a withdrawal in an emergency, had been subordinated to the original army plan of a forward zone likely to be overrun and a main zone into which the infantry would retreat and reorganise for the principal action of the defence. Inglis was not too happy with the result of the exercise as it showed weaknesses both in the time taken for the armoured counter-attack and in the difficulties of reorganisation in the main zone.
Having received news that
The Days of Decision
IF any point in time could justifiably be taken as the turning point of the war in the west, the phrase should be applied to the first half of the month of
By the end of July the joint Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 408.gymnast, then torch, for a landing in French North Africa had been given priority over all proposed landings on the mainland of
Auchinleck's replacement was apparently accepted as a foregone conclusion, for there is no record of a single voice being raised on his behalf. Churchill, however, appeared unwilling to promulgate a flat dismissal of a commander who, whatever limitations he might have shown, had at least the right to claim that he had stopped the enemy at the gates of Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 414.
Gott's appointment was confirmed and left to Auchinleck to announce at the end of the staff exercise at 13 Corps Headquarters on 7 August. With the promise of a few days' leave before assuming his new role, the general left the exercise to board a plane on the nearby airstrip. As the aircraft, a Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. III, Appx 6.
Although Churchill commented that, by the death of Gott, ‘All my plans were dislocated’, Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 418. ‘He was the youngest major-general in the Army when he was promoted on Churchill's visit also brought about the return of Naval Headquarters from Alexander of Tunis, p. 66.
General Alexander reached Montgomery, Memoirs.
With a clear and incisive mind of his own, and no
It is clear that the present, static, phase of hostilities will last only until one side or the other feels itself strong enough to launch a decisive attack. The problem is thus largely one of reinforcements. For a number of reasons, of which the chief is probably the heavy German commitments in
Russia , the Germans inAfrica do not seem to be receiving men and materials on the scale which the magnitude of the stakes might have led one to expect. On the other hand, they will probably resume the offensive at the first opportunity. They may very well apply again the tactic employed atGazala , trying to contain thegreater part of our line with their less mobile elements while the armour and the more mobile infantry formations seek to break through and swing around to attack our main positions from the rear. The execution of such a manoeuvre would require less preliminary regrouping than was the case on the Gazala line, where the distances involved were much greater than they are here. In fact, the preliminary moves could be carried out overnight, and we cannot count on receiving from aerial reconnaissance much warning of an impending enemy attack.
As all these far-reaching decisions took shape, the mass of the Eighth Army went about its daily and nightly duties of digging, wiring, mining and patrolling, only vaguely aware that changes were in the offing. Churchill's visits to the forward areas were naturally kept as quiet as possible and, though a few New Zealanders saw him in person, most of the men were unaware of his presence in the area until days later. The changes were in fact heralded for the Division by the arrival on 10 August of Maj-Gen Sir William Gentry, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Bronze Star (US); Panzer Army, which included a division ‘from 164 Division), 5000 parachutists used as lorried infantry, and ‘an enormous number of recruits’ for 90 Light Division. On Eighth Army's defence preparations, Gentry pointed out the dangers of an enemy thrust along
With Inglis' forceful reports on the July fighting fresh in his mind,
From these talks the GOC went to visit his two brigade commanders,
The following day In his book El Alamein to the River Sangro (p. 3) General Montgomery stated that he found Alam el Halfa ‘virtually undefended’.
On 13 August the new army commander paid a visit to the headquarters of 13 Corps and then, with Letter to
On 14 August
The new policy considerably simplified the New Zealand Division's tasks. Responsibility for the Alam el Halfa positions was to be handed over to 44 (Home Counties) Division, ordered forward urgently at Montgomery's request from its task of preparing defences in the
Montgomery gave a rousing talk the following day to a gathering of officers at Eighth Army Headquarters, which at his instigation had been removed from its uncomfortable situation in the bare desert Placed there in reaction to criticism similar to General Gordon's remark, ‘If you wanted to find Her Majesty's forces you would have to go to Shepheard's Hotel at General Gordon's Khartoum Journal.
On 16 August General Horrocks arrived to take over 13 Corps, ‘full of optimism and ready to consider changes in the plans’. Diary of GOC Horrocks, article in Picture Post,
In the week after General Gott's death, before the changes in command had become fully effective, daily life in the New Zealanders' forward positions varied only in detail. On several mornings a heavy mist covered the desert, limiting visibility to a few hundred yards and lifting only when the sun was well above the horizon. As the mist dispersed, the sun beat down from a brassy, cloudless sky. Then, around midday, the wind often arose to bring a dust-storm that might last for some hours, the fine sand penetrating into every crevice of weapons, trucks and tanks and caking the sweat-stained faces of the troops. One of the worst of these storms occurred on the day
The nights were spent on defence works and patrols. Movement noticed in and to the rear of the enemy's front line brought an exhortation from Eighth Army to all formations that prisoners were needed for identification as it was suspected that considerable changes were taking place among the Axis front-line troops. Though the New Zealand battalions responded with numerous patrols every night in the week of 7–14 August, they failed to bring back a single prisoner, though their efforts cost several men wounded, two officers and one man killed and two men lost as prisoners to the enemy. Patrols from 7 Armoured Division operating further south suffered even greater casualties for the same lack of success.
On the night of 12–13 August there occurred what was probably the last illustration of the old methods of the army before the new influences began to be felt. In an operation hastily and locally arranged, with a lack of effective liaison between neighbouring troops and even between the two corps,
The raid commenced just before midnight but the assaulting troops found the enemy posts on their objective had been vacated. While waiting for reconnaissance to decide if they had in fact reached the correct objective, the troops came under heavy fire from front and flanks. It took the raiders two hours to extricate themselves and they returned with five men wounded and thirteen missing. Of those missing, the Italians manning this sector of the front claimed five as prisoners.
While the Indians' raid was on, at least six New Zealand patrols were out on the front to the south of the ridge but, though they blew up a derelict tank used by the enemy as an observation post
At first light on the 13th, enemy troops seen in the area of the Indians' raid were subjected to heavy concentrations by the Indian and New Zealand 25-pounders. Enemy gunners then retaliated by shelling both 21 Battalion's lines and the headquarters of 6 Brigade. In the afternoon they fired one of the heaviest concentrations seen for some time into the unoccupied hollow of
With Horrocks' arrival,
The coincidence of
Once back in the saddle, and accoutred with the spur of Montgomery's directives,
If, therefore, Rommel should attack within the next week or so, the situation would be difficult and much would depend on the outcome of the armoured battle. Until the mining of the
For every week the enemy's attack was delayed, the Division's defences and the army's reserves would be so much the stronger, to the point when the British armour, free of any commitments to the infantry, could block a thrust round the flank and rear. As both the Australians and South Africans were holding strong defences, little danger was expected on their fronts, but the rocky
The General ended his talk by repeating the new terminology laid down by the Army Commander to replace certain expressions which had acquired undertones of meaning antagonistic to good morale. ‘Consolidating’, for example, had come to mean ‘sitting down and doing very little’, so was to be replaced by ‘reorganising’, with the meaning of gathering strength for further action. A ‘box’, in the Army Commander's opinion, was something with a lid on it to hold the occupants down; in future it would be known as a ‘defended area’, a secure base from which to operate. The term ‘battle group’ was to be entirely forgotten now that divisions were to fight as divisions, and any force approximating the old battle group was now to be called a ‘mobile reserve’ intended for offensive purposes. ‘Notes’ on GOC
Habit dies hard and, though ‘box’ and ‘battle group’ were banned from official use, the terms remained in common usage for some time to come.
The impact of the new Army Commander was quickly felt throughout all ranks of the Eighth Army. His clear orders and simple definitions were such as could be passed down the chain of command to reach the men in the ranks without the usual mutilation in the process. The simply stated policy of a determined defence to cover the period needed to prepare the offensive brought morale up at once, for it permitted numerous minor decisions, previously withheld in case of a change of plan, to be made on the small matters which affected the ordinary soldier. Each man's slit trench, for example, ceased to be a temporary expedient, to be filled in and abandoned for another every few hours or days; it became a permanent fortification to be designed and improved with care, at least until Rommel's attack had been beaten off. To the New Zealanders particularly, who had been so constantly on the move since they left
The June and July operations and the hard desert conditions had since brought severe losses in both battle casualties and sickness and, though only two brigades were left in the field, it had been necessary to comb the base camp in
Faced with the situation that the Division would either have to be withdrawn from active operations or be reinforced, the
But between March and August much had happened in the GOC
Army Headquarters in
Yet, against the logical arguments submitted from esprit de corps that there might have arisen strong resentment within the Division if one veteran formation—6 Brigade was tentatively chosen for the block—should be eliminated in favour of a formed body of newcomers with fixed ranks and appointments. Furthermore,
While these proposals and counter-proposals were being cabled back and forth, Montgomery had taken over the Eighth Army and announced his scheme of establishing a mobile armoured reserve similar to the German panzer formations. His first choice for the infantry component of this reserve had fallen on the British 44 Division but, on learning that the New Zealand Division might soon acquire its own armour, he changed his plans, indicating to
With such a measure of agreement following the protracted negotiations, Lt-Gen Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US); CGS file, ‘Recommendations to Minister of Defence and CGS file, ‘Recommendations to Minister of Defence and Canberra, had been lost, while there were signs that the Japanese efforts to retake
Although this decision cut across their previous plans, both Puttick and
The cable giving the For further details of the reinforcement and manpower problem see Documents, Vols II and III; Gillespie, The Pacific; Wood, The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs; Stevens, Problems of 2 NZEF; CGS files, ‘Recommendations to Minister of Defence and
Axis and Allied Plans
AS the British leaders were diagnosing the ailments of the Panzer Army might soon be forced to dance to the Allied tune.
In the top levels of command in the Panzer Army there was no need for any sweeping changes. Rommel had the confidence of Panzer Army, though it had recovered from its low level of July, still ranged over a wide scale. The mass of Italian infantry was far from happy with the conditions of heat, discomfort, and danger in the front-line trenches, but the armoured troops and the newly arrived Folgore parachutists were in much better heart. Of the German troops, the new reinforcements were generally keen to show their mettle—though Rommel himself complained that too many of them were not up to the standards of physique and training of his original men. The old hands of the Africa Corps were showing signs of strain after their long spell in the desert, for few of them had managed to get leave to
Even before the fresh wind of change had begun to blow in the Eighth Army, Rommel was completing the plans for his next offensive. Churchill's visits seem to have passed unknown at the
Panzer Army but on 7 August, the very day that success and tragedy came to General Gott, Rommel called his senior commanders together to be briefed on his intentions. By setting the full-moon period at the end of the month as his deadline, he gave a sense of urgency to the Axis preparations.
Rommel chose to continue the land offensive into
But Rommel's reasoning was sound. He was an army commander only and, though debates on strategy might be swayed by his forceful arguing, the final decisions were not his. Admittedly he had earlier in the campaign forced a decision against the seaborne operation, in which he was likely to play a subordinate part, by continuing the land offensive in which he was the de facto commander, but this had only been possible because of indecision in the command structure above him. Now, in August, to add to the forcefulness of his character, he had logic on his side. The sum of his information was that the British were preparing to pour men and materials into the Panzer Army taking a share or at least forgoing reinforcements and supplies it might otherwise receive for the land advance.
The situation in ‘This was the high water mark of the German advance in the East’.—The Fatal Decisions, p. 78.
The further Rommel progressed round the shores of the
In short, any operations against
Through Axis intelligence and other sources Rommel must have had more than an inkling of
So, while Rommel left the problem of Luftwaffe and the Italians and turned his mind to his land offensive, the promised convoy, code-named pedestal, passed Gibraltar on 10 August. On the same day a dummy convoy sailed westwards from 21 Panzer Division the task of repelling any landings in the forward zone. By the evening of the 13th the convoy's destination was obvious and the state of alert called off.
Although four warships of pedestal were sunk and several damaged, and only five of the original fourteen merchant ships reached Furious. This reinforcement of the air defences, together with the stores landed by the five surviving ships, revived Panzer Army at Alam el Halfa and pedestal was the last major convoy to run the gauntlet to the island.
Apart from the courage and determination of the men of the Royal and Merchant Navies, the failure of the Axis to destroy or repulse the whole convoy was due in great measure to
Rommel soon felt the effects of See Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 454; Roskill, The War at Sea, Chs II, XIII; Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers; Thompson, New Zealanders with the RAF, Vol. III; Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. III; and Panzer Army and Africa Corps diaries and reports.
Troops of the Ramcke Parachute Brigade, being flown to 15 Panzer Division who were still holding front-line positions in the El Mreir sector. To get them there was only possible by calling
Panzer Army. Crammed into spare spaces in supply columns and in trucks borrowed from other units, the parachutists were ferried to the front with their light equipment and none of their own vehicles or artillery. Once at the front, their daily supply and their normal transport needs presented a continuing problem which could only be met by improvisation. They were even short of field kitchens.
Since the beginning of July, when the Axis shipping losses of merchantmen of over 500 tons sunk in the Panzer Army had reached its lowest ebb, its strength had grown, reinforcements offsetting losses, by some 10,000 Germans and a like number of Italians by the middle of August. Each new arrival was adding to the burden of a supply organisation that, in its whole length from
Over the same period 17 vessels of less than 500 tons were sunk. In October, Italian losses alone were 29 ships of 56,169 tons. Considerably more than half of the sunken tonnage was Italian.—Playfair, Vol. III, and Roskill, Vol. II.
One unfortunate result of the increased Allied action against Axis shipping was the torpedoing, on 17 August, of the transport Nino Bixio which was carrying British prisoners of war from North Africa to
The relief of the assault formations from the front line was complete about 16 August when most of Ramcke Brigade and units of the Italian Bologna Division took over from the remaining infantry of 15 Panzer Division. The assault formations, 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions, 90 Light Division, and the Italian 20 Armoured Corps, were then spread out behind the front, with counter-attack roles in an emergency but occupied mainly with general reorganisation, servicing vehicles, and collecting the reserve stocks of ammunition, stores, and petrol needed for the coming offensive. Under the circumstances, this was a slow process in which German organisation was continually falling foul of Italian inefficiency. The need for economy in daily expenditure was carried to the stage where the New Zealand Division could report that, between 17 and 26 August, hostile shelling was ‘practically non-existent’.
Once General Montgomery had simplified Eighth Army's battle policy, reserves and reinforcements previously allocated to rear lines of defence became available for the main battle and planning could proceed to greater purpose. The two corps of the army faced differing tasks. In the north, 30 Corps was not expected to have to fight a battle of manoeuvre and, apart from the placing of reserves to deal with a penetration of the front, its main task was to make its defences as impregnable as possible.
The southern part of the line under 13 Corps had, however, to anticipate an assault of greater variety. The New Zealanders' defended area—which in spite of repeated admonitions from above continued to be known as ‘The Box’—had to be prepared to withstand attacks from west, south, and east, and possibly from the north as well. The two brigades of 44 Division on Alam el Halfa had a similar task, while the rest of the corps dealt with the enemy's manoeuvring. The essence of the new corps plan was for the
On the open ground to the south of the box, the light tanks and mobile columns of 7 Armoured Division were to harass and delay the enemy's advance across a series of minefields that were already being laid with all speed on a design intended to block the easy routes and increase the natural hazards of this part of the desert.
Extensions were planned to take this field as far as the edge of the
By the third week in August the three main fields from the box to the depressions had been finished for all practical purposes, each some 200 to 1000 yards wide according to the terrain and of a varying pattern of a core of ten or so rows of closely spaced mines inside two belts more widely spaced. From the depressions to
A week after sic] of 7 Armoured Division’ as the route of the Panzer Army's advance. It summarised intelligence reports to offer the opinion that Rommel was not as confident of the outcome as he had been in the past but was prepared to ‘take a very hazardous chance’ before the mounting British reserves swung the odds too heavily against him. Further influence of the new leadership showed in a paragraph: ‘The importance of this battle and the way we propose to fight it should be explained to all ranks …. This is vital. We have a good plan with every chance of success and provided the men realise this they will fight with confidence and intelligence ….’ The pernicious practice of internal criticism, such as the infantry had become accustomed to expend on the armour, was to cease, while staff officers were forbidden ‘to bellyache’, an expression used by Montgomery to describe a habit developed in Eighth Army whereby, for example, a divisional staff
When
From 16 August, when 44 Division relieved the New Zealand Division of the responsibility of the Alam el Halfa positions, the defences of 13 Corps improved daily. The Alam el Halfa feature itself was occupied by 133 Brigade and
The three battalions of 132 Brigade were in their positions within the
Following Montgomery's order for the removal of inessential vehicles from the front, all the trucks not needed for the daily servicing of the box were sent away, eventually to settle in an area
The headquarters of 132 Brigade took over the dug-in position which had been occupied by
The sense of purpose that now had permeated through Eighth Army was heightened at this time by the reappearance of Mr Churchill who, on his way back from
I am very glad to have this opportunity of visiting the Desert Army and I certainly would not dream of going away without seeing the New Zealanders commanded by my old friend of many years' standing,
General Freyberg .In England not long before I left I heard someone say the New Zealanders were ‘a ball of fire’. It was said by someone quite impartial who had a great opportunity of assessing your worth. You have played a magnificent part, a notable and even decisive part, in stemming a great retreat which might have been most detrimental to the whole cause of the British Empire and the
United Nations .I know that on the other side of the world in your homes in New Zealand all eyes are fixed on you. But even more eyes in England watch you fighting here with equal solicitude. I wish you good luck in the great days that lie ahead—perhaps not so far ahead—of you.
We share the pride that your Dominion feels in the great services you are rendering and in the contributions you have made in this war as in the last, to the pages of British Imperial history. You will be cherished by future generations who, through your exertions and sacrifices, will go forward to a better and a fairer and a brighter world.
GOC
2 NZEF /25, p. 80. This speech was published as a ‘Special Order of the Day’ and circulated within the Division.Churchill's heavy lunch of oysters and Montgomery's spartan sandwiches, as recorded in Churchill,
, Vol. IV, pp. 464–5, were eaten at HQ 13 Corps, not asThe Second World War Freyberg 's guests.
At the time Churchill was speaking to his desert audience, Rommel and his officers were gathering not many miles away to the west to hold a staff exercise on their proposed offensive. No date was yet settled for the attack, though it was known that it would have to start before the end of August or wait for the September full moon. Plans, however, were made to concentrate the mobile formations over a series of nights in such a way that movement would be as inconspicuous as possible.
Patrols and Raids
THROUGH the time of 39 Regiment of Bologna Division.
At daybreak next morning observers in 28 Battalion's front-line posts saw an estimated 200 men moving in the area of the position attacked and, thinking a reprisal was being prepared, called on 6 Field Regiment for defensive fire. The field guns opened up within a few minutes of the call being sent, demonstrating how quickly and effectively defensive fire could now be provided. After the dust had subsided, there was no sign of the enemy troops who, it was later thought, were merely a reinforcement or relief party that had been caught by daylight before they had settled in to their allotted trenches.
The wide expanse of unoccupied desert facing 6 Brigade's sector, besides allowing patrols from both sides to wander almost at will, also offered considerable scope for experiment by enterprising members of the brigade. Patrolling was one way, and almost the
The width between the opposing lines in this sector is illustrated by the fact that 25 Battalion was able to maintain, day and night, a standing patrol at
After dark it was customary for a relief section of carriers to drive out escorting a truckload or more of infantry, who used partly prepared defences around the point as a listening post or as a base for further patrolling. Three-inch mortars on carriers, Vickers guns in trucks or carriers, and anti-tank guns towed by jeeps were also driven out at night to lay harassing fire on the enemy working parties which were pushing their defence works closer to the point on the north and west. Although similar listening posts were set out elsewhere on the brigade front, none was manned so strongly or consistently as
The success of 5 Brigade's first attempt to bring back a prisoner by garnering one relatively unimportant Italian did not satisfy the demands of the army's intelligence staff, who were keen to confirm the persistent rumours and scraps of information that German paratroops had been brought into the front line. It was left to 6 Brigade to confirm the rumours, for on the night of 16–17 August a small patrol from C Company, 26 Battalion, returned triumphantly with a man from the Ramcke Parachute Brigade. The patrol, under Lieutenant
The artillery fire which brought this paratroop prisoner by accident rather than design was being laid down for a raid by a 23 Battalion patrol on a troop of enemy guns believed to be situated on the south side of El Mreir. With extra support from 3-inch mortars in 28 Battalion's lines, a platoon had set out, its advance carefully timed to reach the objective as the supporting fire ceased. All went according to plan except that no guns were found, only empty pits with ammunition boxes scattered around.
The success of Galloway's patrol encouraged Brigadier Clifton to try out a method which, it was hoped, might recapitulate the same conditions by design. This involved the firing of a ‘backwards barrage’ whereby the 25–pounders commenced by laying a barrage on the rear of an enemy position and then gradually reduced the range, thus encouraging any of the enemy who did not appreciate the shelling to walk forward from their trenches into the arms of a patrol waiting hidden close to the finishing line of the barrage. In the first, and it is believed only, trial of this scheme, the patrol, comprising two platoons of A Company, 26 Battalion, was able to get within sight of the objective where a number of troops were busily digging defences, but, when the ‘backwards barrage’ had only just commenced, the enemy hastily downed tools and ran back through the shelling. Through lack of communications the patrol was unable to tell the artillery to lift its range or cease fire.
While 6 Brigade was experimenting, 5 Brigade continued with more orthodox methods. With artillery fire on previously selected targets, two strong fighting patrols were sent out with instructions to make for the area where the shells were bursting and attack as the fire ceased. Both patrols, however, encountered heavy defensive fire from positions outside the target area and were repulsed with the loss of two men killed, and an officer and another two men wounded.
With a certain ennui from the lack of activity during the long hot days, men of the
The Maoris' enterprise might have been allowed to continue had not the same day been chosen for a counter-attack exercise for dealing with an enemy penetration along
The failure of the ‘backwards barrage’ did not exhaust Clifton's ingenuity and he now proposed to 18 Battalion that it experiment with a patrol equipped with its own support in the shape of 3-inch mortars mounted on carriers. A fighting patrol from the battalion was followed by two carrier-borne mortars, moving in bounds, until the leading men reported enemy ahead. The patrol then closed up quietly on the enemy, the mortars were brought within range and, at a given signal, opened fire. Owing to an overestimation of the range, the mortar bombs, about sixty fired at a rapid rate, all fell behind the target. The enemy quickly manned his defences and swept his front with machine-gun fire, so the patrol leader discreetly withdrew his men before their presence was discovered.
Greater success was anticipated by 18 Battalion on the night of 20–21 August for a raid which had been planned with a great amount of care. Previous reconnaissance had discovered that an enemy post in course of preparation was relatively isolated and could be outflanked. The post was pinpointed with some accuracy and ranged by the artillery in daylight. At dusk a patrol from B Company set out and, unobserved in the bright moonlight, reached the chosen outflanking position. Here the men waited for the artillery concentration, which was timed for moonset to give them the cover of darkness during their assault and withdrawal. From
A similar plan was tried the same night by 25 Battalion further to the south. This time the patrol successfully infiltrated round the flank of its objective, only to find itself sandwiched between the working party it intended to attack and a covering patrol. In a brisk engagement, the officer leading the patrol, Second-Lieutenant Budd, 2 Lt B. H. Budd; born NZ
While these raids by 18 and 25 Battalions were taking place, 26 Battalion was busy with a scheme for daylight harassing. During the night signallers extended the telephone cable for a mile or so ahead of the lines to a point overlooking the Khawabir Depression and established an exchange in touch with battalion headquarters, 5 Field Regiment, and the Vickers guns of 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion. At the same time a six-pounder anti-tank gun was towed out by a jeep and two 3-inch mortars taken up in carriers. With an artillery observation officer at the telephone and a covering force of a platoon of infantry, the harassing party waited for dawn. As soon as it was light enough for movement in the enemy's lines to be seen, fire was commenced but, by some misunderstanding of the plan or of the observation officer's instructions, the field artillery opened its shooting with the smoke shells intended to cover the withdrawal. The enemy's line was quickly shrouded in smoke so that no results of the fire could be observed and, under heavy but fortunately ill-directed enemy retaliation, the force had to retire in some haste. No casualties were sustained, but on the way back the jeep towing the anti-tank gun ran over a mine in a newly laid but as yet unmarked extension of the perimeter minefield, one man being killed and another wounded.
A curious incident occurred on the following night, 21–22 August, when a patrol from 18 Battalion, reconnoitring from north to south across the front, returned with the uncommon news that it had seen a large enemy patrol moving in the opposite direction. The light from parachute flares being dropped by
The extensive use of parachute flares, whose light discommoded the men on patrol and added another hazard to their activities, inaugurated an offensive by the
On 22 August a practice was held of a plan in which A Squadron, 46 Royal Tank Regiment, carrying Vickers guns on its Valentines and accompanied by six-pounder guns and two troops of the Divisional Cavalry, made a mock counter-attack against an assumed enemy breakthrough in 6 Brigade's sector. This exercise was watched by
It was on 23 August that General Montgomery made his first detailed inspection of the
We had the new Army Commander around my area yesterday and he was most impressive—looked as if he knew his own mind and meant to see things were carried out on the dot. Small, quiet-spoken and tightlipped with an eye that saw more than the obvious so I shall be surprised if he does not produce the bacon. This W.D. has certainly produced a number of bowler hats for British Generals and by the process of elimination we must get the goods soon ….
As well as visiting all the brigade areas, Montgomery toured the front lines of both 25 and 18 Battalions, but an extension of the tour further north along the front, into the area under close enemy observation, was discouraged by
The New Zealand troops, however, had begun to find their night patrolling for prisoners a frustrating experience in which luck played a large and elusive part. Enemy working parties could be located with comparative ease by the noise of picks and shovels ringing on the rocky ground in the still night air. In fact, the Axis troops seemed to dislike working in silence and were inclined to talk loudly, shout and sing, especially the Italians who obviously found company in noise. But the patrols could seldom get within assaulting distance without alerting a sentry and running the gauntlet of a deluge of machine-gun fire from covering troops who were often supported by tanks or armoured cars. Even an idea that had seemed so promising, a raid with wireless-controlled artillery support, had by now been shown to make too many difficult demands, its principal requirements being a more reliable wireless set and better navigation, neither of which could be obtained at short notice. However, one last effort was tried on these lines on the night of 24–25 August. Having found by earlier reconnaissance an unprotected route round to the rear of a position on which the enemy was working, Lieutenant
Montgomery's visit to the New Zealand Division and his discussions with
The Indians on the ridge itself were badly placed to conduct such a raid, for their sector was confined and difficult to operate in and might at any moment have to bear the brunt of the Axis attack. The 5th New Zealand Brigade sector immediately to the south offered fewer difficulties and
The sum of information brought back by the brigade's nightly patrols indicated that the enemy's defences projected in a small salient around the eastern lip of El Mreir, with a line of wire, in some stretches as thick as three coils of dannert, covering groups of weapon pits on the top of the escarpment. Down in the depression there were other groups of pits not so strongly wired.
It was almost inevitable that he should choose 28 Battalion to carry out the raid. Having sat in their defences overlooking the area for so many days and patrolled over it at night, the men of the battalion knew the ground well. Moreover, they did not take happily to their forced inaction and were only too ready to let off steam.
On the previous night, 23–24 August, a mixed patrol from 23 and 28 Battalions had reconnoitred a site for an advanced observation post to the south of El Mreir and had helped signallers lay a telephone line to the post. On the evening of 24 August a platoon from A Company, 23 Battalion, manned this post in telephone communication with the brigade network while the commander of the
In general terms, the plan was for two companies of 28 Battalion to march out along the south of the enemy salient, form up facing north and follow the artillery fire through the tip of the projection before turning east back home. A patrol from 23 Battalion was to occupy the observation post and thus provide a screen on the west of the start line. The final artillery arrangements provided for 104 guns to fire 6000 shells on the path and flanks of the line of assault, while other guns laid harassing fire elsewhere on the divisional front as diversions.
At 9 p.m. on 25 August, 23 Battalion's covering party, consisting of 7 and 12 Platoons under the command of Lieutenant I. M.
Meanwhile A and B Companies of 28 Battalion began to assemble in C Company's area. Here they were joined by Lieutenant Hamilton Col P. H. G. Hamilton, OBE, m.i.d.; Waiouru Military Camp; born
The quiet of the night was broken sharp on 4 a.m. as the supporting guns opened fire. The men walked steadily forward until halted by their officers as they reached the edge of the shellfire, where one or two shells, falling wide of the target, caused the first casualties. Soon the burst of smoke shells indicated that the guns were lifting to their second target area further north and the troops prepared to advance. As the smoke, added to the dust raised by the shelling, had by now completely obscured the coils of dannert wire marking the enemy's defences, the Maori officers called on their men to make for the flash of the exploding Bangalores. The sappers went steadily ahead into the murk, to lay their torpedoes so well that gaps up to twenty feet wide were blown in the wire. As each explosion lit up the night, the nearest of the assaulting troops charged through the resulting gap with yells and
The men of A Company, working their way along the lip of the escarpment, found a thin line of sangars just inside the dannert wire manned by Italians with rifles and light automatics. Resistance practically collapsed at the sight of the Maori bayonets, so that the company caught up with the supporting artillery fire and had to wait until the guns lifted to their next task. Within half an hour of leaving the start line, Captain Porter found himself on the company's objective and set to work to gather up his men and their prisoners. A distinctive flare he had arranged for his own defence headquarters in the box to fire at intervals gave him a guide for direction and, crossing the dannert wire at a place where it was only one coil thick, he led the men to the east. The supporting artillery fire had now ceased and enemy mortars from further west came to life, laying defensive fire on no-man's land and causing some casualties among the men of A Company and their prisoners.
On the left flank, B Company advanced down to the floor of the depression where the artillery fire had raised a pall of dust. Fire from a strongpoint on the left, quickly overcome, drew the company off its true northerly course, and it was not until Captain Pene noticed that he was on the left of a small knoll on which artillery fire was falling, when he should have been on its right, that he realised how far his company had been drawn off course. Unwilling to slow the impetus of the advance, especially as there were machine-gun posts ahead, he continued to lead his men forward until they met the pipeline, overcoming several groups of sangars on the way. By following the pipeline to the north-east, he regained his correct objective, where he was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Baker. The two officers then decided to return down the correct line of advance to pick up any wounded and stragglers. Back on the start line, B Company withdrew through the enemy's defensive mortar fire, followed by 23 Battalion's covering party. By 5 a.m., an hour after the opening of the artillery support, all the troops taking part in the raid were back in the box.
Casualties in 28 Battalion, caused as much by the men overrunning the supporting fire or by shells falling short, were reported as two killed, fourteen wounded and six, including an officer, missing; of these six it was later ascertained that the officer and four men had died and one wounded man was taken prisoner. The
In return for their losses the Maoris estimated that they had left behind them about sixty enemy dead and they brought back forty-one prisoners, of whom about half a dozen were wounded.
The fit prisoners were hurried back to ‘Many officers, again, considered it unnecessary to put in an appearance during battle and thus set the men an example.’—Liddell Hart, ed., 10 and 12 Companies of 39 Infantry Regiment of the Italian Bologna Division. Most of them were described as ‘poor physical types’ and, shaken by the heavy shellfire and the Maori bayonets, were willing to tell all they knew rather than stand on their rights under the Geneva Convention. But the information they offered of surrounding dispositions or Rommel's plans was disappointingly scant. The absence of any officers among such a large batch of prisoners was surprising and none of the men who took part in the raid could clearly recollect seeing any Italian officers during the action, though some thought they had seen officers running to the rear. The prisoners took the absence of officers as a matter of course. The Rommel Papers, p. 262. The story mentioned by Rommel (Ibid., p. 282) that a senior Italian officer captured about this time gave away the plans cannot be confirmed in any New Zealand records.
In spite of its seemingly meagre intelligence results, the raid had at least proved that an important sector of the Axis front was held wholly by Italian troops who, moreover, had not yet made any preparations for a share in an offensive. One certain result, judged by the number of prisoners and the estimated total of killed and wounded, was the elimination of two full companies of Italian infantry.
The raid, one of the first major engagements undertaken under the new army command, was considered a model on which future operations of this sort should be based. Messages of congratulation to all concerned in the planning and execution of the operation were received the following morning. Captain Porter was awarded a bar to his Military Cross for his leadership and Sergeant
The raid had in fact been more successful than anticipated. The following morning observers in the box reported that ambulances were moving in the depression, but no attempt appeared to have been made to bring up reserves to man the overrun defences.
Infantry Brigadier, pp. 203–4.
The opportunity for the operation was decreasing with every hour of daylight so it was decided to send one platoon only, to be reinforced if it succeeded. No. 12 Platoon of B Company was chosen, led by Lieutenant
Burdened with weapons, picks, shovels, and the other impedimenta necessary to enable them to consolidate defences, the men of 12 Platoon passed through gaps in the Maori wire and, well dispersed, set off for the depression. Their way lay over a flat expanse of desert, overlooked by enemy positions on the higher ground to the north-west. As soon as they started, enemy machine guns came to life, to be joined later by mortars which laid a belt of defensive fire behind them. By the time the leaders had reached the enemy's wire, most of the platoon had been forced to ground in the scanty cover available. The three officers agreed that it would be impossible to dig defences in daylight under the enemy fire and that little purpose would be served by keeping the platoon in the open. Major Lambourn accordingly called by wireless for artillery fire on the enemy mortars and machine guns. As the 25-pounders opened up, assisted by fire from the Vickers guns in 28 Battalion's lines, the enemy fire slackened sufficiently to allow 12 Platoon to filter back without serious casualties.
All this activity on 5 Brigade's front brought very little retaliation from the enemy. His artillery, seldom in evidence lately, shelled 28 Battalion's area in the morning with some heavy concentrations which fell mainly on A Company without causing any casualties, but by midday the whole front had settled down to its normal torpor which lasted throughout the heat of the afternoon. Nor was the enemy apparently in a hurry to reoccupy his forward posts, for a patrol from 21 Battalion out after dark found the gaps blown in the wire by the Bangalores unrepaired and the sangars on the lip of the depression unoccupied.
On the morning of 27 August, without warning, extremely heavy shellfire commenced to fall on the Maori positions, so heavy that the whole Division and most of Eighth Army were called to the alert in case the shelling was a prelude to the expected offensive. After an estimated
Whatever the reason behind this shelling, patrols on the following night found the gaps in the enemy's wire still open and no troops in the forward posts. Accordingly, for the night of the 28th–29th, it was arranged that 21 Battalion should send out three fighting patrols in the hope that they might catch the enemy off guard and bring back some prisoners to identify any new units in the line. A powerful artillery support programme was arranged, with the four field regiments in the box and one from
The night of the Maoris' raid saw unusual activity in the rear part of the box when, after unidentified aircraft had been heard overhead, several reports came in, principally from men in the headquarters area of 25 Battalion, that suspicious objects had been seen silhouetted against the moon. As this was before the era of flying saucers, and as the presence of German paratroops had lately been confirmed, a parachute alert was ordered in 13 Corps' sector. Headquarters staffs and the NZASC troops manning the replenishment points east of the box stood to and both 22 Battalion and 132 Brigade sent out search parties. The floating objects were quickly found to be nothing more than small pamphlets carrying a message unintelligible to the New Zealanders; written in Urdu, it was an Axis exhortation to Indian troops to change sides. At this period, in spite of the New Zealand Division's activities, which included the loss of several prisoners from patrols, the Africa Corps intelligence staff believed that the Division was further to the rear and that the box was occupied by Indian troops.
Although on this same night, 25–26 August, most of the artillery had tasks in support of 5 Brigade's action, 6 Brigade sent out several reconnaissance patrols while 25 Battalion's standing patrol at
The next night the standing patrol was reinforced and an ambush was laid west of the point in the hope of catching the enemy if he repeated his tactics. A clear sky with a bright moon and flares dropped by the
The following morning, the 28th, Brigadier Clifton's harassing of the enemy continued as all three battalions sent out Vickers guns, mortars and anti-tank guns into no-man's land before dawn to catch the enemy at his early morning chores. This morning, however, enemy retaliation was quicker and stronger than previously and a considerable number of smoke shells had to be fired by 5 Field Regiment before all the weapons were brought back into the lines. As on most mornings, armoured cars of 7 Armoured Division were operating across the southern part of the front, coming as far north as the line of Ramcke Brigade to fear an attack. The brigade reported to Africa Corps that up to thirty armoured cars were advancing from Corps artillery, the parachute brigade having no field or medium artillery of its own.
With 5 Brigade's raiding parties occupying so much of the supporting artillery on the night of 28–29 August, 6 Brigade confined itself to reconnaissance patrols, who noted that the enemy troops were keeping close in their defences, with very few of the customary chattering working parties above ground. They also observed an unusual number of enemy patrols on the front. The next night, while patrols from 26 and 18 Battalions reconnoitred the ground for future operations, 25 Battalion's standing patrol on
The standard of patrolling in the New Zealand Division during the August lull was not of a very high quality if it is judged by the results in terms of the efforts involved. The main reason for the nightly patrolling was the gathering of information; minefields, wire, and enemy trenches were plotted by rough and ready surveying by means of compass and pacing; the identity of the enemy troops in each small sector was sought through the capture of prisoners, the discovery of discarded equipment, uniforms, or
There was, however, a secondary purpose, fulfilled to some extent by the very number of patrols sent out each night. It was essential to dominate no-man's land and to deter the enemy if possible from extending his defences towards the east by constant interference with his working parties. This was all part of Eighth Army's harassing policy, a policy which, as far as the New Zealand Division was concerned, had its value in maintaining morale among the infantry, for whom it was the only aggressive activity offering.
This was the first time in the war that the New Zealand Division had experienced anything approaching static trench warfare and, although the men had developed an aptitude above the average for activity at night, they had not been given the training that could have put a sharp edge on their patrolling. The customary procedure was for a patrol to be taken by truck to some known point in the desert where a landmark such as a burnt-out tank, or even a less conspicuous object, had been surveyed in with reasonable accuracy. Then, on a compass bearing and counting paces, the patrol would set off for an objective which had been observed by day or reported by a previous patrol, in either case probably with a considerable degree of inaccuracy. If the patrol was for reconnaissance only, the results of its night's wanderings depended mainly on the leader's ability to march on an exact bearing and record the pacing, and especially to bring back a connected record of the route followed, without gaps caused by alarms and excursions when bearings and counted paces were likely to be forgotten. Early patrol reports at this period were so bad that special forms were devised to get patrol leaders to remember and record the essential points of time and distance. Surviving reports, even on these forms, seldom allow the course of a patrol to be traced with any certainty. Similar reports during the Italian campaign are models of accuracy in comparison and show how much had to be learnt.
For fighting patrols, sent out to make contact with the enemy and gather identifications from the dead or from equipment, or by capturing a prisoner, the need for such accurate recording was not so great, but good navigation, to bring a patrol to the point previously observed where a weakness in the enemy's defences could be exploited, was often the main factor in success or failure.
One drawback, and one over which the men themselves had little control, was inherent in all patrolling. The desert here was relatively flat, surfaced with patches of hard stones alternating with
It was partly because of the noise, unavoidable when a patrol was wearing standard army equipment, that the system of covering fire from artillery, mortars or machine guns was first tried out; though such fire often kept the enemy alert, it drove his pickets to ground and lessened the chance of their attention being drawn to suspicious sounds.
Covering fire, however, had to be closely co-ordinated with a patrol's movements and for this purpose much experimentation was carried out with the two standard types of radio transmitter-receivers used by the Division. The No. 18 set, compactly designed to be carried by one man and issued to infantry battalions for internal communications, proved to have too many inherent weaknesses to overcome the climatic and atmospheric conditions peculiar to the desert, especially over the distances involved on 6 Brigade's front. Even the vehicle-borne, and more powerful, No. 11 set could not be relied on. To overcome the problem of distance, trials were made of relay sets between patrols and their bases, but even this method failed to provide certain communication. Moreover, at the rare times when communication was clearly established, the accuracy of the supporting fire depended wholly on the accuracy of the patrol's navigation and, with all the chances involved in night navigation over the almost featureless desert, it is not surprising that the supporting fire seldom fell exactly where the patrol wanted it—and Clifton could write in his diary, ‘Our patrolling did damn-all as usual’.
The fundamental faults of training and equipment could not be remedied on the spot so that it was only natural that commanders, continually pressed to produce prisoners, should consider ways of eliminating the hazards of poor navigation and uncertain communications. The only means at hand lay in organisation and planning and it was thus that the small fighting
For a comparison of patrolling techniques, see Aitken, Gallipoli to the Somme.
At a conference held at Headquarters 6 Brigade on the 27th and attended by Maj-Gen Sir Stephen Weir, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, m.i.d.;
The operation began early on the evening of 30 August when 25 Battalion sent out two platoons of infantry, two anti-tank guns, six carriers, three 3-inch mortars in carriers, and a platoon of Vickers guns, all under the command of Captain Weston Capt C Weston, m.i.d.;
Similarly, 26 Battalion sent out a patrol to cover two 3-inch mortars and two platoons of Vickers guns to a selected point about 1000 yards west of the FDLs. These weapons were laid on the rising ground along the northern edge of the
Meanwhile, A Company of 18 Battalion, under the command of Captain
The movement of all three battalion parties was timed so that they would be ready for action by 9.30 p.m. At this moment one battery of 5 Field Regiment started firing on the Brescia and Folgore divisions, and one German of Ramcke Brigade, to balance only three men at all seriously wounded in A Company.
While the main raid was in progress, two batteries of 5 Field Regiment switched their fire to 26 Battalion's objective and at 10.20 p.m., when all supporting fire ceased, Second-Lieutenant Hansen led his patrol through the enemy wire, only to encounter an enemy tank under whose fire he wisely withdrew.
The expenditure of ammunition for this one operation amounted to a total of 400 rounds from the medium guns, 4000 25-pounder shells, 410 3-inch mortar bombs, and 36,000 rounds from the Vickers guns.
Rommel's Offensive Opens
THE troops taking part in 6 Brigade's raid and the two diversions were back in their lines before midnight, leaving various small listening posts and the standing patrol on
As early as 29 August General Montgomery had decided that the Army's front was sufficiently manned and secure to deal with the type of attack he expected Rommel to attempt. The Alam el Halfa position was mined and dug and the mobile reserve had been built up to three brigades of tanks. Already he had begun the collection of reinforcements, supplies, and equipment in the rear areas in preparation for his own offensive, and now, concurring in the general opinion that the time for action by Rommel had passed, he directed that the formation of the special reserve he needed should commence. For this the New Zealand Division had to be withdrawn from its front-line position. Plans had already been prepared for a cautious exchange, spread over several nights, of the two New Zealand brigades by the two brigades of 44 Division on Alam el Halfa. When this relief was complete, 44 Division would resume command of its third brigade, 132 Brigade, already in the box. Although this division was less experienced and possessed fewer guns than the New Zealand Division, it was expected to hold without trouble the extensive and well designed ground defences that the New Zealanders had prepared. The two New Zealand brigades were to remain on Alam el Halfa, handily placed for any emergency, until the moon had waned and major action by the enemy was unlikely. After that reserve troops were to be brought up from the Delta to free the Division for its special training.
Just before he received Montgomery's decision for the exchange to commence,
The relief by 22 Battalion was therefore cancelled and Brigadier C. B. Robertson of 132 Brigade was instructed to start thinning out his positions immediately so that his three battalions would be ready to move into 5 Brigade's sector as soon as dusk fell. The method of relief meant that the southern front would be left unoccupied for some hours, but this was felt to be less important than the need to keep the El Mreir defences continually manned. The headquarters of the two brigades changed places in the afternoon, the system of communications built and manned by the New Zealand Divisional Signals enabling them to keep in touch with their battalions throughout. Before evening many of the English troops were on the march and, as soon as dusk gave cover from enemy observation, all available trucks of the few still kept in the box were pressed into service to shuttle back and forth between the two sectors.
As this exchange was in progress, 18 Battalion's raid took place and the staff at
But even before the prisoners had all been questioned,
The enemy shellfire also caught the artillery reliefs. Careful liaison had been made on the CRA's direction to ensure that the exchange of gun positions between 58 Field Regiment, RA, and 6 New Zealand Field Regiment should take place in such a way that the maximum possible number of guns would be able to fire in support of the front at any moment. One of the New Zealand batteries, the 29th, had been set a task in 6 Brigade's raid and its relief was to wait until this task had been completed. With the other two batteries, the 30th and the 48th, the exchange of guns with 58 Field Regiment had begun on time and was proceeding smoothly when shells began to drop around 30 Battery's gun pits. Some of the relieving guns had just been wheeled into the pits, others were still on tow, while several New Zealand guns and quads were being lined up in convoy ready for the journey out. The first shells caught many of the gunners above ground, causing several casualties, principally among the drivers standing by their vehicles. New Zealand casualties were two killed and four seriously wounded, but this total might have been higher had not two of the gunners, C. P.
Having got away before the enemy fire started, both 21 and 23 Battalions had reached their new positions on the southern front by midnight, 21 Battalion taking over the sector due east of 25 Battalion and 23 Battalion manning the south-eastern corner of the box. On the eastern side, 22 Battalion, having unpacked its gear and reoccupied its trenches after the cancellation of the relief order of the morning, now came under 5 Brigade's command. As this southern front had been left unguarded for some time, listening posts were immediately established outside the perimeter wire while the troops ‘shook down’ and settled in their new trenches. A strong force of carriers was sent out by 21 Battalion to cover the front, particularly of the central sector left unoccupied by the delay to 28 Battalion's relief. It was not until shortly before dawn that the Maoris eventually arrived in this sector.
About the same time as the fire began on
Half an hour after midnight
All other signals traffic throughout the Division was suspended to allow the alarm code, TWELVEBORE, to be sent to all units in the box. On this signal, trenches, weapons, and command posts were fully manned, while the engineers supervised the closing of the patrol gaps in the outer defences with mines and wire.
As the troops took station within the box, the men on
About the same time a small patrol was sitting in
The Division, however, had already heard from 7 Armoured Division's patrols that the enemy was lifting the mines in
After about an hour had passed quietly, the patrol on
On receipt of twelvebore, 21 Battalion tried to call up its carrier patrol on the wireless but could not establish contact. As the minefield gaps were being closed everywhere and the defences were alert and ready to fire on any unheralded arrivals, the officer in command of the carrier platoon set out to find the patrol. His carrier, however, ran over a mine, he was mortally wounded, and his crew had difficulty in returning. The patrol in fact stayed out until nearly daylight, observing from the eastern end of
The opening of Rommel's bid to regain the initiative from the British on the evening of Sunday, 30 August, thus coincided with a night of more than usual activity for the New Zealand Division. While the Panzer Army was crossing its start line, one New Zealand brigade was embarking on a major raid involving all three of its battalions, with up to 200 of their fighting men out in no-man's land engaged on the main operation and its diversions. The other two brigades, of about
GOC
The Sunday, a very hot and windless day, was occupied with detailed discussion with his own staff on the relief plans, rearrangements necessary if reinforcements were not quickly forthcoming from New Zealand, and such points as seaside camps for bathing and canteens in the training area. In expectation of leaving 13 Corps' command,
A certain amount of apprehension was naturally felt when the first news of the heavy shellfire on, and south of, Ruweisat reached twelvebore had been signalled and the general pattern of Rommel's plan began to emerge that the activity on Ruweisat could be seen in perspective. Gentry's comments to Panzer Army into the middle of Eighth Army's static defences.
Rommel, unaware of the strict doctrine of caution and immobility imposed by Montgomery, had felt it necessary for the initial movement of his right hook to be covered by a series of diversions on the main front, designed to pin down troops who might otherwise be transferred to help block his striking force. He had therefore ordered all sectors of his front to prepare hit-and-run diversionary raids, the first waves to go forward just before midnight, and the second and third at approximately two-hourly intervals. In the event only one raid, that against the Indians on Ruweisat, was repeated according to the information available.
In the northern part of the front, German troops of 164 Division set off on their first raid before midnight but, on reaching the Australian defences, were met by such devastating fire that they were driven back in disorder with numerous casualties and the loss of several prisoners to the Australians.
Similar raids planned against the front further south were upset by aggressive action by the South Africans, who themselves had chosen this night for a raid to gather prisoners on the same pattern as 18 Battalion's operation. This overran a sector held by Italians of Trento Division and brought in some fifty-six prisoners at a cost of nineteen casualties. Diversionary patrols to the north and south of the main raid encountered enemy patrols which withdrew when attacked.
In the central sector, Germans of the Ramcke Parachute Brigade and Italians of Bologna Division set out about 11 p.m. to create a diversion across Panzer Army had relaxed its restrictions on the expenditure of ammunition and Ramcke Brigade took advantage of this by arranging artillery support on a lavish scale. Not much is known of the Italians' part in the action but it would appear that, after advancing through Guastatori, attached to Bologna Division, but softened any repugnance which might at this period of the war have attached to his calling by adding that none of the flame-throwing equipment had yet reached the front.
The German parachutists, on their first aggressive action in
The guns were stopped as soon as it was seen that no enemy had penetrated the shellfire, and when the dust had settled, the desert appeared empty. After a period of relative quiet, a platoon from Ramcke Brigade parachutists without Italian assistance.
That diversions were planned against the New Zealand front is certain, but what happened to them does not emerge from either British or enemy records. It was fortunate for the Division that the parachutists concentrated on their raid along Ruweisat and did not attack further to the south, where they might have caught 5 and 132 Brigades in the middle of the relief. It is more than probable that 18 Battalion's raid and the diversionary fire supporting it upset any plans made by the Italians on this part of the front, while the movement seen and fired on by the standing patrol on
In spite of private opinion that the Axis operations had been postponed until the next full moon, vigilance in Eighth Army had not been relaxed to any extent. The warning that brought all formations to the alert was in fact received with some relief, for the tension of anticipation felt before the defences had been completed had given way to a mild state of anti-climax as the troops saw another month of the heat and discomfort of the static war stretching ahead of them. Action was now welcome, especially as there had been time for Montgomery's energy and crisp decision to permeate his army thoroughly. Morale was high, though not at that imprudent level of self-confidence prevailing before the Libyan and
The last intelligence summary issued by GHQ Middle East before the battle opened, and based on information received up to the evening of 27 August, listed the signs of the imminence of an
Panzer Army's known fuel shortage had been eased if not overcome.
The summary drew the obvious parallel between the Africa Corps would lead the mobile force, leaving 164 Division and the Ramcke Brigade to bolster the Italian infantry on the static front. Nothing in the nature of airborne operations was expected of the paratroops, German or Italian, known to be in the front, at least not immediately, as ‘it is difficult to see what effective part the dropping of a small unit of parachutists could play in the first phase of a desert battle’.
The estimate of enemy strength in this summary gave the Germans a striking force of 25,000 men with 230 tanks and a holding force of 18,000 men. The Italian striking force, ‘if that title can be granted to those who follow after’, was thought to be about 17,000 with 200 tanks, most of them mechanically unsound, and a holding force of 22,000 men. The total strength of the Panzer Army was thus thought to be 82,000 men and 430 tanks.
This summary is evidence that British intelligence had managed to draw a remarkably close picture of Axis intentions and strengths. The enemy records show a front-line strength at this time of approximately 41,000 Germans and 33,000 Italians, of whom about half the Germans and less than half the Italians belonged to the formations of the mobile force. Of the Axis total of 514 tanks, 233 were German under Africa Corps' direct command, and 281 Italian. A number of the Italian tanks were retained to support the infantry defences and did not take part in the advance.
Against these enemy totals, the Eighth Army could now muster in the front areas about 693 tanks, of which 517 were in the armoured and motorised brigades and the remainder with the
Comparisons of the qualities of British and Axis tanks are extremely difficult to make as there are so many factors involved. In most points of armour and armament, the Grant was a reasonable match for the German Mark III Special, Mark IV and IV Special, and the Crusader and Valentine for the lower Marks, while the Stuart could stand comparison with the Italian tanks. On this basis, a table of comparison of numbers and quality on v 109 Mk III Sp, IV and IV Spv 124 Mk II, IIIv 281 Italian
The exact numbers of ‘runners’ recorded in both Eighth Army and the Panzer Army vary, but the variations are too small to have had any effect on operations. It will be noted that both sides more than doubled their tank strengths during August.
90 Light Divisionand
10 Italian Corps, disposed of over 300 guns of 75 millimetres and above, of which more than fifty were the dreaded 88s.
In men, including those manning the front and easily available in reserve, the Eighth Army had a two-to-one superiority, together with a handy base from which, in an emergency, further reserves of men and over 200 tanks could be mustered and equipped. In comparison, Rommel had few reserves on African soil, either of men, tanks, ammunition, transport, or petrol; even his food and water supplies were not over plentiful. For the rather complicated pattern of comparitave air strengths, see Playfair, Vol. III. See also pp. 176–80.
The Battle Develops
THE Panzer Army of Africa was not accustomed to attacking in darkness and Rommel did not in fact plan the
As each night passed after the moon reached the full, the period of darkness between sunset and moonrise was increasing while the hours of moonlight and the brightness of the moon both decreased. By 30 August the moon was appearing about three hours after sunset, so that the Panzer Army, setting off after daylight had completely faded, had to start its trek in darkness in which both contact and control were difficult. There was then a limited period of moonlight in which any confusion could be sorted out and the columns could reach their destinations before daylight revealed their positions and intentions. The planners on Rommel's staff held that the night of 30–31 August was the last on which the operation stood a chance of success.
To postpone the operation until the September full moon was, in Rommel's opinion, to give the battle away to the Eighth Army, for by this time he knew he could not rely on any large addition of German troops to offset the arrival of men and equipment known to be flowing in to the British base in
At a meeting on 27 August, Rommel discussed his Panzer Army's needs and chances with Kesselring and Cavallero. The Italian marshal was obviously infected with Rommel's enthusiasm, if Ciano's diary can be accepted as evidence, but Kesselring's opinion is difficult to unravel from comments after the event. Both of them, however, gave sufficiently earnest promises that the one real shortage, of petrol, would be overcome within forty-eight hours. On the basis of these promises, Rommel set the date of the offensive tentatively for the 29th.
It seems strange that Rommel had not grasped that the Italian commander, in spite of his lip service, was incapable of galvanising the Italian supply organisation into action, and that Kesselring could not or would not use his influence with the
Kesselring's attitude to Rommel and his plans is enigmatic. Through his position and rank he should have been able to exert considerable influence on the planning and supply for the African campaign. Yet in the records and reminiscences of this period, he emerges in a negative light. He does not appear to have encouraged Rommel, at least very positively, or to have acted as a restraining influence of any strength. Though his role of Commander-in-Chief South placed him theoretically above Rommel, the latter's personal repute and favour with Luftwaffe, though his control over the Italian air force was limited by the Italians' intransigence.
The explanation of Kesselring's equivocal attitude may be that, while Rommel was
Much of the story of the two men is told in the letters Rommel wrote home to his wife. When he was able to take his mind off the battle at the end of July to consider why his German requirements were not being met, Rommel initially chose to put the blame on Italian self-interest rather than inefficiency and thought the solution lay with the liaison official in Liddell Hart, ed., Ibid., p. 263. The Rommel Papers, p. 263. Panzer Army headquarters on 9 August, when the problems of the coming offensive and its supply were discussed, he received such encouragement that he wrote, ‘We reached agreement over what is to happen. Now it's a question of making full use of the few weeks to get ready. The situation is changing daily to my advantage.’
Arising from this same meeting, Rommel sent a proposal to the
Kesselring had a personal interest in helping us at
Alamein ; he had considerable strength of will, a first-class talent for diplomacy and organisation, and a considerable knowledge of technical matters.Kesselring had the
Luftwaffe and Goering behind him and could thus command sufficient support at the highest level to enable him to tackle questions of high policy in relation toItaly .Ibid., pp. 268–9.
Although, according to Rommel, his suggestion was not acted on early enough or in the form he wanted, Kesselring did in fact make a show of exerting his influence, but only to the effect that, just before the meeting on 27 August, Rommel wrote home:
Kesselring is coming today for a long talk over the most acute of our problems. He, too, often has a tough job in
Rome . He gets plenty of promises, but few are kept. His over-optimism concerning these blighters has brought him bitter disappointments.Ibid., p. 272.
From his diplomatic connections, Kesselring must have been aware that the African campaign stood on a low priority and that it would never be treated with the importance Rommel demanded, unless Nehring, Young, Rommel Papers, p. 283. Luftwaffe lifted some 400 cubic metres of fuel but delivered less than 100 at the front, the balance being consumed on the journey.Der Feldzug in Afrika, Union of South Africa War Histories translation, p. 65. Panzer Army staff officers were doubtful of Kesselring's intentions, Rommel, p. 168.
Rommel had the impatience of the enthusiast so that, in the realms of supply over which he had no direct control, he was willing to accept promises at their face value. His own army, by restricting its activities and hoarding supplies, was rested, reorganised, and sufficiently equipped with almost everything except petrol for a short, but possibly decisive, action. Much was made for British propaganda purposes of Rommel's stated intention to reach the
Many of my worries have been by no means satisfactorily settled and we have some very grave shortages. But I've taken the risk, for it will be a long time before we get such favourable conditions of moonlight, relative strengths, etc., again…. If our blow succeeds, it might go some way towards deciding the whole course of the war. If it fails, at least I hope to give the enemy a pretty thorough beating….
Rommel Papers, p. 275.
The original plans made out by the Panzer Army staff provided for the concentration of the various formations of the striking force in their assembly areas behind the start line over a period of five nights. With the petrol situation uncertain, the initial movement was postponed day by day until Rommel gave his decision after the meeting on 27 August. The bulk of the armour set off for the assembly areas that evening but the journey was delayed by the Africa Corps dispersed and halted while flares and bombs were falling and, though little
Africa Corps headquarters suspected that the movement had been observed, but it seems more likely that the British aircrews failed to realise what a target they had missed.
The following night, 28th-29th, the assembly was continued, but it soon became obvious that the original five-night plan could not successfully be condensed into two nights. It was with considerable relief, therefore, that the army learnt from Rommel on the morning of 29 August that the offensive would not start until the evening of the 30th.
Rommel's decision, though possibly influenced by the delays encountered, was primarily based on news he received shortly after the meeting, that three ships carrying petrol had been sunk or damaged. The vehicles of his mobile formations had been ‘topped up’ by the expedient of draining the forward dumps of practically every gallon, and it was only after he had been assured again by Kesselring and Cavallero that more tankers were on the way and that the Luftwaffe would assist in the transport from the rear to the forward dumps, that Rommel gave his final decision. Even then, the offensive might have been postponed again had not news reached the Panzer Army headquarters on the 30th that a tanker had arrived safely in
Throughout the 30th, the Luftwaffe flew constant patrols over the southern part of the front to drive off British reconnaissance planes while the German and Italian formations sorted themselves out after their hurried assembly. With a last-minute distribution of petrol which had just been brought up, the two German panzer divisions recorded that they had enough fuel to take their tanks about 100 miles and their other vehicles about 150.
The start line from which the German-Italian offensive was to drive to the east ran practically due south from the Reconnaissance Group formed up. This force comprised 3, 33, and 580 Reconnaissance Units of Africa Corps and a composite reconnaissance group from the Italian 20 Corps, the whole under the command of the headquarters of 15 Rifle Brigade of 90 Light Division. It appears to have had about fifty armoured cars, some light tanks, and a considerable number of other vehicles including tracked troop-carriers and mobile guns, and was about
Along with the Reconnaissance Group there was a battalion of Italian parachutists from Folgore Division which had the limited task of occupying
In the area around Africa Corps lined up with 15 Panzer Division on the right and 21 Panzer Division on the left. These two divisions commanded most of the German tanks, and each division with its motorised infantry regiment about 2500 strong, tank crews, engineers, artillery, anti-tank and other units, mustered slightly over 6000 all ranks.
Still further north, slightly to the left rear of Africa Corps, the Italian 20 Armoured Corps congregated on the Ariete and Littorio Armoured Divisions. Its infantry component was the Trieste Motorised Division. As much of the Corps' artillery and about six infantry battalions for which there was no transport remained behind, the effective strength of the Italian mobile force is difficult to assess, but it was probably about half 20 Corps' paper strength of some 16,000 men.
The 90th Light Division, with a strength of just under 4000, formed up immediately south of the Ramcke Brigade, two Italian battalions from both Folgore and Brescia divisions and a group of the artillery and men from the infantry battalions of 20 Corps without transport, the whole under the nominal command of 10 Italian Corps.
The design of the advance was simple. Moving out of their assembly areas at dusk, the armoured and motorised formations were to form up and cross their start lines at ten o'clock of the evening on a course slightly south of east. After passing the Reconnaissance Group was allowed five and a half hours by the plan to complete a journey of about 40 miles to reach its dawn objective. At the hub, the Italian Ariete Division, with only 20 miles to go, was allowed five hours. By 5 a.m. the whole striking force was expected to be lined up facing north along a front of some 15 miles, with the left flank resting on the depression known as Reconnaissance Group with another long journey to cut the coastal road and railway between Africa Corps, 15 Panzer Division still on the right and 21 Panzer Division on the left, crossed the Alam el Halfa and 20 Corps, with Littorio right and Ariete left, moved on to the western end of Alam el Halfa. In order to guard the lines of communication, 90 Light Division was
20 Corps, and the mixed force under 10 Italian Corps was to fill the gap between 90 Light and the
sketch taken from a map on which rommel marked his intended movements towards cairo and the suez canal should he break through at alamein
Had the initial plan succeeded and brought the British forces to a sufficient state of confusion as at 90 Light and 15 Panzer divisions were to drive south-east direct for 20 Corps was to cut the 21 Panzer Division was to encircle Panzer Army was to invest
It was an ambitious plan but Rommel was probably justified in attempting it. The disparity in strength was not so widely dissimilar from that prevailing at
Much has been made of the fact that, in comparison with the situation at
The general dispositions of Eighth Army had not been changed when the Panzer Army advance commenced. The fixed defences from the coast to
On paper 7 Armoured Division appeared much stronger than it was. With a front of over 15 miles, it had insufficient infantry and guns to man a continuous line, so that its various groups occupied temporary bases inside the minefields through which patrols were sent out into no-man's land to watch and harass the enemy. The division's orders were to impose the maximum possible delay on any enemy advance without getting so involved that any of its columns should become surrounded or overwhelmed. In short, its role was to harass and run. In the rear of its sector there were two dummy tank brigades and a partly completed dummy infantry position, manned by a few troops whose task was to demonstrate against any light columns in the hope of turning them to the north against the forces disposed on and around Alam el Halfa.
The true rearward defences of Eighth Army consisted of the two brigade boxes of 44 Division on Alam ei Halfa ridge, 133 Brigade on the west and 131 Brigade on the east.
The open desert south of 131 Brigade was guarded by
There was still another tank formation in the army, the Valentine-equipped 23 Armoured Brigade, which had been rebuilt
For reserves, there were in the
The reaction to the start of the Axis offensive by Eighth Army on the ground has already been described. In the air, the Allied Air Force had been prepared for some time to lay on heavy assaults, with plans closely co-ordinated with those of the ground troops through Montgomery's insistence on close liaison between the army and air headquarters.
Small signs during the preceding days, such as reports from all reconnaissance aircraft that enemy vehicles tended to move from north to south, the enemy's own air patrols against reconnaissance and general lack of aggressive air activity over the front, all went towards convincing the
In the early part of the night of 30 August, 20 Corps was assembling. By the time these particular bombers had returned to their bases and reported their activities, Air Headquarters had heard from the army that the Axis attack was on its way and all available night bombers were got ready to take to the air. By 3 a.m. searching aircraft had picked up three main enemy columns and kept them under observation by successions of flares to guide the bomber squadrons. From then until dawn, according to observers in the
The German records make it plain that much of the delay in the planned night march was caused by air action for, although material damage was probably not great for the weight of bombs dropped, the morale effect on men trying to break a way in unknown desert through minefields on a hostile front was considerable. Many vehicles and even tanks received minor damage, while one bomb landed close to the headquarters group of Africa Corps, wounding the corps commander, General Nehring, and causing several casualties among the staff.
Ground action on the southern front commenced as early as 10 p.m., when heavy shelling began to fall on various points along the outer or ‘first’ minefield. This shelling itself was unusual, and, when the small patrols which normally stayed overnight on the west of the minefields began to fall back to the main laagers of the various 7 Armoured Division columns with reports of large and aggressive enemy patrols, it was obvious that something was afoot. A good half hour before 13 Corps called its troops to the alert, 7 Armoured Division ordered its columns to instant readiness. Following their orders not to get too closely involved and cut off, the columns opened fire on any of the enemy who approached the minefield, until retaliation became too heavy, when they disengaged and withdrew. The Germans found this fire particularly accurate and were considerably delayed by it in their attempts to lift the mines. No sooner had the ground forces disengaged than the Air Force appeared in strength overhead. The German method of dealing with minefields was simple but effective. Each advance guard, led by engineers with infantry and tanks in close support, drove forward until a minefield was either recognised or suspected, or until one of the vehicles was blown up. The engineers then debussed and, providing their own immediate protection, started to search the ground and clear a lane through the field. The rest of the advance guard deployed and increased the covering fire until
the panzer divisions break through the minefields, 31 august 1942—a trace from a 21 panzer division sketch map
The widest part of the British minefields, between the 90 Light Division and the left flank of the Italian armour. The two panzer divisions broke through at points between Munassib and 15 Panzer Division led it through two more isolated minefields, but 21 Panzer Division passed round the northern extremities of these fields, which were not completed.
The Panzer Army's advance fell behind schedule right from the start. Difficult going in the early part of the journey in the moonless period split Africa Corps, 15 Panzer Division diverging to the
21 Division to the north. This caused 15 Division to cut across the Reconnaissance Group's line of march, and at one time 33 Reconnaissance Unit found itself on the panzer division's left flank instead of on the right. Appeals by wireless to the panzer division's headquarters to check direction were useless as the division's wireless broke down until well after dawn.
On Africa Corps' left, 21 Panzer Division's infantry, in the lead, kept going on too northerly a course and met the minefields where they were thickest, while the tanks led by divisional headquarters swung back on the correct south-east line and hurried ahead to catch up with the sister division. The commander, Major-General Georg von Bismarck, a descendant of the Iron Chancellor, then returned to find the infantry, only to meet his death by British fire. The position of his grave and other evidence points to the cause of his death as mortar fire from 25 Battalion's patrol on
The Italian armour, trailing Africa Corps' left flank, also travelled too far north and, halted by the minefields and British fire, found itself being crowded from the rear by 90 Light Division. By turning south along the minefields instead of cutting straight across, the Italians lost so many of their engineers that they had to call on 21 Panzer Division for assistance.
So great was the confusion, aggravated by the ground and air attack, that even Rommel himself was unaware of how his striking force was faring until dawn began to break and his liaison officers could bring him reports based on visual observation. He only knew that, at 5 a.m., when his troops should have been lined up south of Alam el Halfa ready to start the main assault on Eighth Army's rear, the formations were spread out over some miles of desert and well short of the first objective. The vanguards of the two German divisions were in fact by this time clear of the main minefields, but each gap was creating a bottleneck behind which columns were bunching, with supply vehicles strung out all the way back to the start line. A great deal of petrol had been used, many vehicles had either broken down or become bogged in soft sand, and others had been damaged by shellfire or bombing. The 21st Panzer Division alone had received the attentions of eighteen flights of bombers during the night. The only part of the mobile striking force to reach its dawn objective was the group from Folgore Division, which followed the wake of the Reconnaissance Group to occupy
On the British side, 7 Armoured Division's columns maintained field, anti-tank, and small-arms fire for as long as they thought wise, claiming—over-enthusiastically—as many as twenty-four
Panzer Army was uncertain at dawn, with conflicting messages coming from the various columns, but the
By nine o'clock on the 31st, after regaining communication with most of the elements of his army, Rommel found that the Reconnaissance Group and 15 Panzer Division were some way to the west of 21 Panzer Division was still further west with its tail only just emerging from the minefields, while Littorio Division, the only Italian division to keep up with Africa Corps, was still threading its way through the last field on 21 Division's left rear.
The strength of the German enthusiasm for this offensive may be gauged from entries in the diaries of both the Panzer Army and Africa Corps. Whoever made the entries clearly had a feeling that the success of the operation was doubtful and suggested various alternatives, down to a complete and immediate withdrawal to the start line. Rommel, however, was not easily deterred, especially as his army had advanced so far without any real opposition from the British. He accordingly gave orders that the advance was to be resumed direct for Alam el Halfa, with the old telephone line that ran north-east as the centre line of the march. The immediate objective was to be the feature itself, to be assaulted by the two panzer divisions, with the Reconnaissance Group covering the eastern and south-eastern flanks and the Italian armour the western.
German reconnaissance aircraft had already reported this morning that an extensive infantry position existed on the Alam el Halfa ridge, but they appear to have failed to notice the hull-down tanks of 22 Armoured Brigade. No mass movement of tanks or transport vehicles had been observed in the British lines and this tied in with information Rommel had received from agents in
alam halfa, 31 august–1 september 1942
The extent of the disorganisation caused by the night march became apparent as soon as Rommel gave his orders. All units had taken the opportunity of the morning halt to refuel and start running repairs to their vehicles, and this delayed the assembly for the correct order of march. Then, about 11.30 a.m. the dust-storm thickened so that visibility at times was only a few hundred yards. Rommel's orders, given at 9 a.m., had allowed four hours for the panzer divisions to get ready, an exceptional length of time for German troops, but by 2 p.m. only 15 Division was on its way. On the left flank, Littorio Division, trying to make up for its previous tardiness, had pushed up into the area chosen by 21 Panzer Division for its assembly, thus bringing another hour of confusion as in the murk of the dust-storm Germans and Italians were sorted out, a task made no easier by the constant bombing and machine-gunning from the air. The management of the assembly was also delayed by the need for several changes in command caused by the wounding of Nehring and the death of von
15 Panzer Division's commander taking over the Corps, both panzer divisions started the day with new commanders and a subsequent reallocation of the subordinate posts.
As the Panzer Army was reorganising in the morning of the 31st, two of the light squadrons of 22 Armoured Brigade were sent out some three to four miles south of the brigade's position to observe and to act as a decoy to draw the enemy towards the prepared defences along Alam el Halfa. From ground and air observation and from wireless intercept, the Eighth Army had already begun to draw a fairly exact picture of the dispositions and composition of Rommel's forces, though for a time 21 Panzer Division could not be satisfactorily accounted for and the New Zealanders particularly feared that it was waiting in El Mreir ready to break through along
Though some of 7 Armoured Division's columns were in contact with the Reconnaissance Group and appeared to have directed some harassing fire on the panzer formations, there was little action during the day until the dust-storm began to subside in the late afternoon. By this time 15 Panzer Division had progressed some miles along the eastern side of the telephone line and, as visibility increased, the light squadrons of 22 Armoured Brigade found themselves within range of the leading German armour and boldly took it on. The two-pounders of their Stuarts and Crusaders were no match for the enemy tanks and, after losing four tanks and a number of men, the light squadrons disengaged to drive rapidly back to the armoured brigade's protection.
Their role as a decoy was however not fulfilled, for 15 Panzer Division did not follow but swung out to the east. About the same time 21 Panzer Division, coming up on the west of the telephone line, appeared on the south of 22 Armoured Brigade, and it also began to turn east across the brigade's front. On this, the British commander ordered the tanks on his left flank to show themselves and open fire. The German tanks then turned straight at the armoured brigade's positions and joined in a tank versus tank battle that lasted until darkness fell. Twelve Grants, in spite of their hull-down positions against the Germans in the open, were knocked out, and the infantry protecting the tanks were caught in the cross-fire, losing several anti-tank guns and thirty-two men, of whom 21 Division claimed twenty as prisoners. The precise German losses in this action cannot be assessed but they were undoubtedly lighter.
As this engagement was in progress, 15 Panzer Division had turned to a northerly course and its leading tanks were probing at the infantry defences on Alam el Halfa. The headquarters of 21 Panzer Division on the south, the brigade called for help from 23 Armoured Brigade, which sent two squadrons of Valentines to assist. Before this assistance arrived, darkness had begun to fall and both 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions broke off the battle and withdrew. However, of the two dozen tanks of 15 Division on the east of the armoured brigade, six did not fall back with the others, possibly because of empty petrol tanks or minor damage, but remained overnight across the rear of 1 Royal Horse Artillery's gun lines and less than a mile from the headquarters of 22 Armoured Brigade. Apparently these six were either unobserved or not recognised as enemy for they were not fired on until they were moving off in the dawn light next morning, when they lost two of the number in the process.
While the opposing armoured forces were joining battle well to their rear, the New Zealanders in their box remained relatively undisturbed except for the medium, field and anti-aircraft gunners. Save for a short period in the worst of the dust-storm, the noise of aircraft was almost continuous throughout the day as the Air Force attacked the enemy on the south and the Luftwaffe passed directly overhead on call from the panzer divisions to the east. The Bofors gunners of 14 New Zealand Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, spread among the gun lines and headquarters areas, had one of their busiest and most successful days on record, with a final bag of three Stukas, and three Me109s shot down for certain and one ‘probable’. Two of the German pilots, parachuting in or close to the lines, were taken prisoner.
The field and medium guns were also kept busy firing on targets passed to them by patrols and OPs in the south, who watched the enemy columns moving through the line of the three depressions, the deirs twelvebore was signalled and the fall of darkness on 31 August.
To the infantrymen in the box the day was comparatively restful. After their busy night, either in exchanging positions or taking part in the raids and patrols, followed by a long stand-to from the receipt of the alarm until well after dawn, the men were glad to snatch what rest they could in the heat, the dust, and the continual noise of gunfire and bombs.
Towards evening the Divisional Cavalry patrols and OPs, watching from the northern rim of 21 Panzer Division, and the infantry were part of 90 Light Division.
This movement gave Africa Corps. Their absence left the eastern front, occupied by 22 Battalion, and the south-eastern corner, where 23 Battalion had just settled in, uncovered except by the Cavalry patrols. This was the weakest part of the box, with no minefields extending beyond the perimeter belt.
On
With this arrangement
August passed into September with a night of little incident. On the coast the Australians were busy with preparations for a daylight raid and neither invited nor received much attention from their opponents. The South Africans scored an unexpected success when a patrol of the
The New Zealand Division's southern front was more lively. A request had been made by the Corps Commander for ‘substantial raids’ to the south-west and south to harass the enemy's line of communication and to deter him from pressing overnight closer to the defences. This demand, however, reached the two New Zealand brigadiers rather late for the detailed planning they had come to see was the best insurance for success in such raiding, but on
Shortly after dusk a strong infantry patrol set off from 18 Battalion's sector with three tanks of A Squadron, 46 Royal Tank Regiment, to raid Folgore Parachute Division.
Similar raiding parties with Valentine tanks were sent out to the south by 21 and 23 Battalions but both failed to find the enemy. The 23 Battalion patrol incurred casualties to men and vehicles in a minefield which had either been laid by the enemy or, more probably, by one of 7 Armoured Division's columns and not recorded. Although the ‘third’ minefield leading south from the
Not very long after these patrols had returned to the box, a column of some fourteen vehicles, moving up between the routes taken by the 21 and 23 Battalion patrols, stopped within a few hundred yards of the defences held by D Company of 28 Battalion. The Maoris watched while the occupants, estimated at about 100 men, debussed to search for and lift mines. Once the troops were identified as hostile, the Maoris opened up with rifles and Bren guns, and sent up the light signal for the Vickers and 25-pounders to lay defensive fire on their sector. The enemy troops replied with automatics and anti-tank gun fire until the field guns got the range, when they withdrew, leaving behind the bodies of two men, three burnt-out trucks, and a light anti-tank gun. A patrol from D Company identified the dead as men from 90 Light Division and brought in the gun to add it to the battalion's arsenal of assorted weapons. The fact that the enemy could approach so close to the Division's defences before being observed caused considerable concern and brought orders from
Throughout this night single enemy bombers droned overhead, occasionally letting loose a stick of bombs without causing much damage, while away to the south-east of the box Air Force flares lit the sky for long periods at a time and the rumble of heavy bombing could be heard distinctly by the New Zealanders.
Withdrawal of the
Panzer Army
SEPTEMBER opened with the Panzer Army lined up across the south of Alam el Halfa in a good position to commence the assault on Eighth Army's rear, as envisaged in Rommel's plan, but exactly twenty-four hours behind schedule. The element of surprise had thus been lost but no major regrouping had been made by the British, so that an opinion was growing among the Panzer Army staff that the Eighth Army was short of reserves and unlikely to attempt a large-scale counter-attack. In spite of the delay, the opportunity was in fact still waiting for the Panzer Army to give the British the ‘pretty thorough beating’ of Rommel's secondary hope.Rommel Papers, p. 275.
In detail, the two panzer divisions were well poised to give 22 Armoured Brigade some fairly rough handling, even to the extent of eliminating it as a fighting force, for 23 Armoured Brigade's Valentines could have offered only limited assistance, while 15 Panzer Division and were so far away that they could have been dealt with separately later. The line of communication from the spearhead to the Panzer Army to open its assault.
But Rommel had already begun to lose his customary confidence. Petrol was not reaching the front in anywhere near the promised quantity, the constant air bombing was having a noticeable effect on morale, and this, coupled with the delay in reaching the first objective, had brought him to issue on the evening of the 31st an order for his army to go over temporarily to the defensive. This order was obeyed by 21 Panzer Division after it had disengaged from 22 Armoured Brigade, and by the Italians, but it was not
15 Panzer Division, whose commander believed he was on the point of occupying the Alam el Halfa feature and that only 21 Division's failure to help was jeopardising his success. The extremely sanguine reports emanating from 15 Division led Rommel to modify his order to allow action to continue if the feature (
Dawn on 1 September brought news which added to Rommel's misgivings. First, the Reconnaissance Group sent in a report that it was scarcely battle-worthy. In the approach march its vehicles had suffered severely from ground and air action, mines, and mechanical trouble. In its laager overnight near
After this Rommel learnt that a strong force of tanks with infantry in support was attacking 164 Division in the coastal sector, while 15 Division reported a force of British tanks approaching from the east.
Meanwhile, Diary of 15 Division, renewing its attempt to take 21 Panzer Division, whose commander countered by questioning the accuracy of 15 Division's reports. This led the Corps Commander himself to drive out on a reconnaissance in which he discovered that the two divisions were separated by a much wider expanse of unoccupied desert than their situation reports indicated. His arrival at 15 Division caused further confusion for, according to messages sent out by him, he accepted the accuracy of the division's obviously inaccurate map-reading of its own position and the position of 21 Division to send tanks at once to assist in the attack on the point, only to receive the curious reply that the latter division's tanks were needed ‘for special duties’. The only explanation of this reply is that the divisional commander feared to give over the radio his true situation, which was that his tanks were out of petrol and that he did not dare to manoeuvre his vehicles more than necessary until his supply columns, ‘expected hourly’,21 Pz Div,
By mid-morning 15 Panzer Division was claiming, with the Corps Commander present to corroborate the claim, that it had beaten off a tank counter-attack and had occupied
While the tanks were skirmishing on the south of Alam el Halfa, there occurred ‘one of those little actions customarily described … as a “bad show”’,History of 2/7 Australian Field Regiment, p. 192.bulimba. This operation had originally been planned over a week earlier as one in the sequence of major raids for harassing and information ordered by Montgomery. The Australian contribution, however, had somehow developed on a greater scale and with a somewhat different conception from the raids already laid on by the South Africans and New Zealanders. According to its operation order, bulimba was intended as an ‘immediate counter-stroke to enemy attack or as a diversion prior to enemy attack’. Set in motion some thirty-six hours after the enemy had attacked, its immediacy as a counter-stroke could be questioned. That it was intended as ‘a diversion prior to enemy attack’, that is to harass and deter a possible enemy assault in this sector to link up with the spearhead, seems unlikely. It appears to have been allowed to proceed purely in the hope of either diverting forces from the enemy's main advance or preventing the Panzer Army troops in defence from being used to reinforce the striking force. However, reports and despatches remain vague as to the operation's exact purpose.
It was on the afternoon of the 31st that 9 Australian Division received orders from 30 Corps to start the raid at 5.35 a.m. the following day. Extremely detailed plans had been in existence for some time—so detailed and widely distributed as to offend all the theories of security—and many of the necessary preparations had already been made. The method proposed for the raid was of a
In short, an infantry force was to push forward a salient into the enemy's lines, clear it, and hold it as a firm base from which tanks would advance to ‘exploit’—a military term which meant many things to many men. The exploitation was to cease about 3 p.m., when the tanks would retire through the firm base, to be followed after dark by the infantry. No material gain of ground was intended.
The infantry, four companies of Queenslanders of 2/15 Infantry Battalion, crossed the start line on time. As they approached the area chosen to be occupied as the firm base, heavy artillery concentrations kept the enemy in cover, but as soon as the shelling lifted to its next targets, the enemy came vigorously to life with automatics and mortars. Most of the Australians reached their objectives but they had struck an area held by German troops, who resisted tenaciously and mounted immediate local counter-attacks whenever they were driven from their positions. For some time communications broke down, battalion headquarters losing touch both with its companies and with the squadron of Valentines of 40 Royal Tank Regiment which was to come up in support and start the exploiting.
The tanks themselves experienced difficulty in negotiating the narrow gaps cut in haste by the engineers through the British and enemy minefields. Before they got through the enemy mines, the Valentines came under fire and, with several of their number ablaze and others immobilised by mines or gunfire, halted well short of the infantry.
The second-in-command of the Queensland battalion, Major Grace, taking charge when his commanding officer was wounded, decided that the uncertain communications and lack of close co-ordination between tanks and infantry made the task of securing a firm base practically impossible and the likelihood of the tanks going on to exploit remote. Using the one reliable means of communication, the wireless link between the artillery's forward observation officer and the guns, he called for covering fire from all available weapons and sent word by runners to the infantry for them to retire as soon as the fire commenced. Four hours after the operation started, the companies were on their way out.
It is difficult to assess whether this raid had any value or not. Rommel may have been influenced, if only to the extent of calling back some of his Africa Corps tanks to form a mobile counter-attack force in case a similar attack was repeated. It may, on the
A tally of casualties showed that the Australians lost 15 men killed and 120 wounded, and nine tanks were knocked out. Against these losses, the enemy lost probably 150 killed, while the Australian infantry maintained their reputation by bringing out of the disorder and confusion nearly 140 prisoners, most of whom were Germans of 382 Infantry Regiment.
While this early morning local battle was being fought far away near the coast, another isolated and inconclusive skirmish by British forces had begun off the south of Alam el Halfa. On orders to make contact with 22 Armoured Brigade, the regiments of 15 Panzer Division, whose eastern flank was covered with a gun line in which were several 7·62-millimetre self-propelled guns of Russian origin. Under fire from these guns, which the brigade thought were the dreaded 88s, the tanks halted while the brigadier made arrangements with 44 Division for covering fire under which he intended to lead his brigade northwards and thence, in the shelter of the infantry minefields, on to the west. No sooner had this movement started than a heavy Stuka raid came in on the area between the two el Halfa boxes, where the headquarters of 13 Corps, 15 Panzer Division's tanks moved up and forced the brigade to withdraw to the east. A later repetition of the same manoeuvre was no more successful so that, by the end of the day, 15 Panzer Division was still sitting squarely between Eighth Army's two heavy armoured brigades. Thirteen Grants and three Crusaders of
For the New Zealanders in their box, this second day of the battle was hardly more eventful than the first. Artillery observers who had gone out before dawn to the high ground overlooking
The enemy's movement was in fact not a concerted operation but a number of only loosely related activities. The tanks were mainly those of Littorio Division, with no immediate aggressive task other than to protect 21 Panzer Division's left flank and link the spearhead with the infantry covering the line of communication rearward. To Littorio's left, that is, somewhere south of 23 and 28 Battalions, troops of 90 Light Division with a few tanks in support were attempting their original task of forming a line across the south of the British defences in preparation for a possible attack to the north in conjunction with the armoured spearhead.
Two prisoners of 90 Light Division who were gathered in by a 23 Battalion patrol just after dark told a story of a hard day. Two parties, of about thirty-six men altogether, had set off that morning from the vicinity of
The second day of the battle, which saw the Australian raid and some minor skirmishes on the Alam el Halfa front, ended with the bulk of the two armies in much the same positions as they had occupied at dawn. The three British armoured brigades had already lost some fifty tanks, more than half of them Grants, in the inconclusive skirmishing, apart from losses sustained by the columns of 7 Armoured Division. The Panzer Army's tank strength was down by about ninety German tanks and an unknown number of Italian, but many of these had suffered mechanical breakdown or minor damage from shelling and bombing and were repairable. The total German and Italian losses by actual encounter appear to have been no greater, and may have been less, than the British losses by the same cause, while the loss of so many of the Grants made it plain that the British armour was still no match for the German panzer divisions.
By the morning of 1 September the Eighth Army had garnered sufficient information to account for all the major formations of the Panzer Army. Patrols, air reconnaissance and other sources confirmed that there was no ominous gathering of forces along the static front, so that General Montgomery could confidently assume that the drive on Alam el Halfa was the only threat to be dealt with, at least in the immediate future.
During the day he was joined at the Panzer Army from Alam el Halfa to defending its own lines of communication, the northern attack to catch the defences without an adequate armoured reserve and make Rommel withdraw some of the armour from the spearhead. It is worth considering that the Panzer Army was able to hold its static defences securely and at the same time provide a strong striking force, but the Eighth Army, with a paper strength at least equal to that of the enemy, was hard put to it to find even sufficient forces sufficiently well trained for the southern operation alone. The ‘exploitation to
Unaware that the stringency of supplies had already brought Rommel's offensive to a stop, Montgomery was concerned about the defences between Alam el Halfa and the sea. He therefore arranged to combine the strengthening of these defences with the gathering of his reserves. One brigade of the newly arrived 51 (Highland) Division was brought from its training and acclimatisation in the Delta defences to take the place of 151 Brigade in the
Towards the evening of 1 September
But while Montgomery was planning slowly and cautiously, the opportunity to strike really hard at the Panzer Army was passing. About the time that the corps' order reached 15 Panzer Division and had made his final decision to withdraw. Only the arrival of almost unlimited quantities of petrol in the front line could have persuaded him to change his mind. The long advance and heavy going of the first night had so drained his reserves that supply could not keep level with the demand, even though his army had spent two days of relative inaction. Kesselring's air lift had proved a broken reed while British air and sea action had taken such toll of shipping and land transport that only extreme efforts could get enough petrol up to the Panzer Army to permit it to withdraw, let alone manoeuvre in an attack.
At this point, when the Panzer Army has been taken to the limit of its advance, it is worth considering the much publicised story of the ‘going map’ which was supposed to have deceived Rommel into choosing the worst possible route that led him into a trap of soft sand. A New Zealand officer who was concerned in the actual preparation and printing of the map has given his story, and various other versions have appeared in print telling how the idea was conceived, and how the fake map was printed in great secrecy, marked and stained to give the appearance of use, and finally left in an abandoned vehicle for the enemy to find. Evidence that the map was found and used by Rommel's staff in their planning was given by General von Thoma on direct questioning after his capture later in the year, but this officer did not arrive in Panzer Army reached on the morning of 31 August. On Rommel's original planning, the advance should then have continued in an easterly direction for some distance before turning north. As it was, the failure to keep to the time schedule caused Rommel to order an advance from this point in a north-easterly direction and, although Africa Corps met some bad going, Rommel's choice of this route was plainly influenced by the circumstances and not by any map. Had the advance gone according to plan, some of the Panzer Army might have been drawn in to areas of bad going, but it should not be forgotten that, in the Panzer Army's tactics, the planning of routes across the desert had been simplified to the point where subordinate commanders were given objectives and expected to reach them. Difficulties of terrain were treated as forms of opposition, in the same way as minefields or points of resistance, to be discovered by quick reconnaisance and either overcome or avoided. The first night's crossing of the southern minefields illustrates these tactics, for it is plain that the Panzer Army made the most cursory of reconnaissances and then proceeded to feel its way across. More than anything else, the importance laid on the false going map indicates that not only those responsible for the ruse but those who later extolled its improbable success still had only a hazy idea of German tactical methods.
On the night of 1–2 September, with the enemy's situation well reconnoitred during daylight, the Air Force stepped up its bombing programme. For the first time in the desert war, a 4000 lb bomb Bombs of this weight had been used earlier on enemy harbours in
New Zealand patrols brought back news of considerable activity in the two depressions, Angar and Munassib, where the Axis troops were obviously digging positions of some strength. Between the depressions and the box there were numerous groups of trenches, fully or partially dug but unoccupied. Several of the slit trenches were found to contain booby traps, which were disarmed by engineers with the patrols. No one knew whether the Axis troops intended to occupy these positions when they were completed, or whether they had abandoned them as too close to New Zealand observation.
With Liddell Hart, Africa Corps patrol reports offering no hint of British night activity between Alam el Halfa and the The Rommel Papers, p. 274.
Rommel prefaced his withdrawal orders with the explanation that British air supremacy and the sinking of several tankers made a continuation of the offensive impossible. Accordingly the Panzer Army was to retire in bounds to positions behind the British minefields that ran north from
For the first stage of the withdrawal proper, the troops covering the line of communication on the north were to stand firm, 21 Panzer Division was to move to the south of Littorio with its rearguard facing east, while 15 Panzer Division fell back to 21 Division's right flank. The Reconnaissance Group was to conform and cover the southern approaches. Then, as the two panzer
Littorio, Trieste and 90 Light divisions, were to leapfrog back until the new line was reached. Once the defences of the new line had been suitably prepared, they were to be manned by Italians with the German formations in reserve.
Observers in Eighth Army, though unaware that a major withdrawal was commencing, were quick to note that outlying columns and patrols were being pulled in on the morning of 2 September. On renewing its advance at dawn 15 Panzer Division's troops had laagered overnight had been vacated but, when they tried to follow up, were met by the gun line of the rearguard. Well to the south a column of Reconnaissance Group, shooting up several trucks and taking some prisoners.
By the middle of the morning the field guns of 10 Armoured and 44 Divisions were falling silent as few targets remained within range. The armoured division then took some of its batteries from their dug-in positions and set them up further to the south. By midday a thick dust-storm was raging, hindering observation both from the ground and the air. Several New Zealand artillery observation officers took advantage of the dust to settle themselves in better vantage points overlooking the line of the depressions on the south of the box and, when the dust began to settle about two o'clock, reported a wealth of targets as numerous enemy columns, also taking advantage of the low visibility, were moving to their positions for the withdrawal. On orders from Eighth Army for maximum harassing fire, all British guns within range maintained constant fire until dusk, several batteries expending over 1000 rounds each during the afternoon and evening.
A curious incident occurred this day in the sector north of the Ramcke Brigade, demanded immediate surrender on the grounds that Rommel had surrounded the Eighth Army. The two optimists were escorted back to parlementaires without official approval.
Early on 2 September
One patrol, under Second-Lieutenant
While these patrols were out, the British guns, on Montgomery's instructions, harassed the enemy constantly throughout the hours of darkness, while seventy-two sorties were flown by the Air Force between dusk and dawn. Two 4000 lb bombs were dropped this night, both causing large fires to show that they had found targets of some kind. According to the German records, 300 aircraft dropped 2400 bombs and caused such damage to transport that some units were nearly immobilised.
Operation BERESFORD
THE third day of September ushered in the third year of the war in the west. In the rear areas and in some of the Eighth Army headquarters the day was observed by prayer services. For the troops in the front line there was little opportunity to join in the observances for, though there was relatively little ground activity, no one was yet sure of the Panzer Army's intentions and all positions were fully manned. In the air 200 bombers and 574 fighter sorties were flown by the Panzer Army.
Patrols from all three of the brigades of
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There was to be no forward movement from the main battle positions except by patrols.
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The armoured car ring was to close round the enemy and picquet him.
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Strong patrols were to operate against any enemy MT.
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13 Corps was to proceed vigorously, methodically and carefully, with the plan for closing the gap from the N.Z. Box to
Himeimat .
Under these orders, the British heavy armour was content to keep the enemy under observation and fire. The light armour and armoured car columns were more vigorous but, with no plan or direction to follow up success, they did not seek for weak spots in the anti-tank gun screen but merely probed forward until they drew
Panzer Army stood firm until the British columns retired.
Later in the day 7 Armoured Division was offered the opportunity of more aggressive action as its share in the closing of the gap between Panzer Army's southern flank. Air reconnaissance was already indicating that the enemy might be withdrawing, though General Horrocks himself felt that it was yet too early to assume that such a withdrawal was a ‘definitely established fact’.
When Horrocks passed the orders on to 7 Armoured Division with the detail that both 7 Motor Brigade and 4 Light Armoured Brigade were to take part, the value of the scheme for a two-pronged attack meeting at
Such a light force, operating in difficult country and with no infantry or gun support, was not likely to make much impression on the Panzer Army's flank. In fact, in one of the first engagements, a column of Stuart tanks was attacked and driven off by tanks of Ariete Division which had been directed to help cover this southern front.
During Eighth Army's methodical and careful, but not very vigorous, preparations for closing the gap, the Panzer Army took full advantage of its opponents' caution to stage a leisurely and ordered withdrawal. In the early dawn of the 3rd, 15 Panzer Division and the Reconnaissance Group, pivoting on 21 Panzer Division, swung steadily back until their front ran in a north-south line facing east. Behind an anti-tank gun line the three groups then continued to retire to the west. By midday Africa
Corps felt safe in ordering Littorio Division, then left on the extreme eastern end of the line of troops covering the northern flank, to thin out and eventually withdraw into reserve. The Italian motorised division, Trieste, holding the front west of Littorio, was then to conform with the withdrawal of the eastern flank by stepping back into the 90 Light Division.
As had happened before, the Italians failed to act with German efficiency. In spite of attempts by 21 Panzer Division to co-ordinate the Italians' withdrawal with its own, Littorio reacted with unexpected alacrity to its orders, prompted possibly by the fact that, in holding the north-eastern corner of the Panzer Army's front, it was coming in for more than its share of British fire. The Italian tanks, in fact, withdrew so smartly that they triggered the next phase of the retreat, Trieste's relief of 90 Light Division, well ahead of schedule, so that, when 21 Panzer Division's patrols tried to find contact with the troops on their north, they found only empty desert.
By the evening of the 3rd, when Eighth Army was getting ready for its counter-attack, the Panzer Army's retirement had progressed even further than its plans demanded. The Reconnaissance Group was falling back on Folgore Division's positions around 21 and 15 Panzer Divisions' rearguards were on a north-south line running from the south-east corner of 21 Division's reconnaissance and anti-tank companies, who were out of touch with any troops on their west. In the western end of the depression there were some guns of the army artillery, including some 88-millimetre, and scattered troops of 90 Light Division, all awaiting relief by Trieste Division. In the neck of desert between Trieste had surprised 90 Light Division by its early arrival and the relief was under way, one battalion group of the Germans having already moved out before dusk.
Between the north-west of Munassib and Ramcke Brigade and Folgore Division. Two battalions of Brescia Division held Angar, with other units of this division linking the defences with the
Two armoured regiments of 21 Panzer Division, with up to sixty tanks in going order, were laagering immediately to the south of 90 Light Division were forming up in Munassib on relief and travelling back to laager about two miles further west.
The main route used followed the track through Trieste, the transport of 90 Light and the tanks of Littorio all converging on this route as soon as dusk offered cover from air attack, the minefield gaps along the way caused numerous traffic jams throughout the night.
Opinion in the Eighth Army on the evening of 3 September, according to the records of the time, ranged from the hypercautious, in which the enemy's withdrawing was seen as a gathering of his forces prior to a further advance, to the extremely sanguine view that Rommel had had enough and was getting out while the going was good. Either to hinder the preparations for a renewal of his offensive or to hasten his going, a hearty blow struck at this time seemed indicated. Although the commander of 7 Armoured Division had made clear his inability to take effective action from the south, Montgomery decided to proceed with the attack from the north, through the
The development of the plans for this northern prong of the pincers is of interest. As soon as the probability of an enemy advance round the south of the box had been accepted, planning included numerous suggestions for cutting off the Axis spearhead or disorganising the lines of communication. For any such operation the Panzer Army's advance was less than twenty-four hours old before Horrocks had warned
With no specific task or objective given him,
Montgomery, however, saw the proposed operation as something more than limited action by a mobile column and had already developed his scheme for a pincers movement from north and south.
This matter was discussed on 1 September, when the Panzer Army was so placed that it could have turned all its strength against the
Horrocks replied to the objections with a vague offer of armoured assistance to protect the eastern flank and a concrete offer of another infantry brigade placed under
Agreement set going the ‘general post’ of brigades between the Delta and the front as already recorded.
As the planning proceeded on its various levels, enemy tanks and infantry had been closing in on the south-eastern corner of the New Zealand position, thus cutting off access to the first objective except through the already crowded and congested box. This brought to light the misunderstanding mentioned earlier, for
Panzer Army's armour could easily be loosed at the narrow salient that one
With these points in mind, the morning's conference evolved a plan which, with some minor modifications, was eventually approved by Corps and Army. It started with the relief by 5 Indian Infantry Brigade not only of 132 Brigade but of 6 Brigade's northern sector held by 26 Battalion. This battalion was then to extend 6 Brigade's front to the south of
Horrocks, on receiving details of this plan, telephoned
This conversation took place in the late afternoon of 2 September and before nightfall Horrocks had learnt from Eighth Army that the headquarters of 50 Division would not be available, and that
All the discussions and arrangements leading up to what was first called Operation wellington and later beresford indicate that it was intended as a probe to test the enemy's reactions. No plans were prepared in advance for the powerful force of the British armour to assist, either before or during the action, by containing the German panzer divisions or by warding off counterattacks. Nor were the armoured formations briefed to action should the infantry advance open the way to greater success. The New Zealand infantry, thrusting forward into the lifeline of an as yet undefeated enemy, was given two squadrons of Valentine tanks.
On the morning of the 3rd, the Corps Commander held a conference at the New Zealand headquarters attended by the commander of
A divisional conference was held immediately afterwards when the plans emerged in their final form. On the right, 26 Battalion was to extend 6 Brigade's western front for about two miles south from
Fifth Brigade was to send one battalion down the line of the third, or so-called ‘dummy’, minefield to occupy the neck of desert between Munassib and
To avoid letting the enemy be forewarned of the advance, no artillery barrage or concentration was to precede the infantry though the guns prepared tasks to cover the newly gained front.
The English brigade's guns were still sited in the north of the box with tasks mainly to cover the western front, so 4 New Zealand Field Regiment was placed in support of 132 Brigade while 6 Field Regiment continued to support 5 Brigade.
As the Air Force had been bombing the depressions regularly since the beginning of the offensive, it was not expected that air activity would give the enemy any warning of the infantry operation but would rather draw attention away from it, so the Corps Commander arranged for air action in the early part of the night to be concentrated on the objective and the ground further south.
All this, however, did not complete the plans. It was known from observation and patrols that the main part of the advance would cover ground that had not yet been occupied in any strength by the enemy, but 26 Battalion's new front would lie close to the east of
To most of the New Zealand troops, seeing things in simple patterns and buoyed by the new spirit of decision in the army, Operation beresford was the opening move of the awaited and logical counter-attack that had to be made against the Panzer Army. To Montgomery at the head of affairs the operation was a minor or limited manoeuvre to test Rommel's reactions. Between these two extremes there was an area of confusion of thought which led to some extent to a confusion of aim.
While the Africa Corps tanks remained in force to the east of the southern minefields, any major advance to the south of the Panzer Army. In the varying attitudes, the first stage of Operation beresford lost some of its relative importance and was accepted as a simple advance, likely to be only lightly opposed if at all, from which a major attack might, or might not, be launched. This explains much in the planning, including the employment of an untried brigade.
Fifth Brigade's plans were drawn with care by
At dusk on the 3rd, sappers of 6 Field Company, assisted by men of B Company, 22 Battalion, were to start cutting the 12-foot lane in the wire and minefield on 28 Battalion's front. Then A Company of 23 Battalion was to move through and cover the start line on the south of the gap against surprise by enemy patrols. Next, 21 Battalion was to pass through and line the eastern side of the objective, where little or no opposition was expected, and the Maoris were to follow and proceed due south to the edge of the two depressions. Meanwhile 22 Battalion was to leave its defences and bivouac close to the new tactical headquarters as immediate reserve, and all the various vehicles—the tanks of B Squadron, 50 Royal Tank Regiment, anti-tank guns, mortar and Bren carriers, engineers' trucks with mines, and similar transport needed for the operation—were to form up in groups ready to be despatched through the gap like trains in a marshalling yard. In fact, most eventualities that could be foreseen from past experience were covered by 5 Brigade's plans.
Brigadier Robertson of 132 Brigade had been visited by
The final plan was for the brigade to travel in all available transport through 25 Battalion to a start line parallel to and about half a mile outside the defensive minefield on the south of
The share that 6 Brigade took in the operation was larger than would appear in the orders. It had the task of preparing sufficient routes through its sector for the passage of 132 Brigade and 26 Battalion. This included clearing and taping gaps in the inner minefields surrounding 25 Battalion's area, marking the routes with coloured lamps, clearing three gaps in the perimeter minefield, two between the first and second minefields and one east of the second, and surveying and marking the start lines. There were also the two diversions to be provided by 18 and 25 Battalions, as well as the major task entrusted to 26 Battalion of following the English brigade to form a front facing west along the inner side of the first minefield.
Many of the preparations had to be started in daylight in areas over which the enemy held observation of some degree. The start lines were laid out during the day and work started on the gaps in the inner minefields. The sappers in charge of the clearance had earlier stated that they would find it difficult to open the gaps in the outer minefields between the fall of darkness and 132 Brigade's scheduled time of arrival, so some preparatory work was started on these gaps before the sun had set.
Operation beresford, on the extreme south-western corner of Eighth Army's front, took place on an arc over ten miles in length along the northern edges of the four depressions, Angar,
The night was probably the noisiest experienced by the New Zealanders in the box. Dusk had hardly fallen before the glowing orange flares of the Air Force's Albacores commenced to blossom over the depressions, followed by the thump of bombs. As if in retaliation, but in fact under arrangement between Rommel and Kesselring to help cover the night's bound of the Panzer Army's withdrawal, Axis aircraft flew over the Eighth Army in greater strength than previously. Although this effort spread past Luftwaffe was sending over a succession of lone bombers, each of which circled until its stock of bombs, mostly dropped singly rather than in sticks, was exhausted, when it would give way to its successor. Some of the bombers were equipped with ‘Banshee wailers’ which screamed as they dived, and most of them interspersed their bombing with haphazard bursts of tracer.
Damage sustained in the box was negligible. Though some of the newcomers among the Division were affected by the Banshee screams, the haphazard bombing and the tracer fire, seasoned troops were hardly disturbed. The greatest nuisance value came from the canisters of butterfly bombs dropped in some profusion, those that fell on tracks or defence positions presenting a hazard until found and exploded. Fortunately many of these were duds and others exploded prematurely on impact. Of the Banshee bombers the
Of the Luftwaffe's effort the Panzer Army's diary records:
The
Luftwaffe attacked the enemy concentrations at and east ofAlam Nayil with good effect. It also made a night attack on10 Indian Division which seemed to have considerable effect. It was believed to have smashed a large troop concentration intended for an attack southwards against Brescia Division….
But Africa Corps was less enthusiastic about Kesselring's assistance with an entry, ‘From observation, the attacks did not seem comparable with the enemy's night bomber raids’.
Possibly because of observation of unusual activity in the
At 8.30 p.m. the
The infinite variations that the human element can play on the most carefully laid plans appeared early.
However, by the appointed time, 10.30 p.m., 21 Battalion had set off, leaving guides to wait for B Company, while 28 Battalion had shaken itself out and was on its way to the south. As the final details of 132 Brigade's plans had not been received, no method of contact had been arranged between the Maoris' right flank and the Buffs on 132 Brigade's left.
Similar troubles beset 132 Brigade but did not straighten themselves out so simply. As the troops reached 25 Battalion's sector, each group was supposed to select its respective lighted route to one of the three main gaps. Inexperience in night travel under such conditions, the customary congestion at the gaps through the inner fields, as well as the sporadic fire and bombing brought considerable delay and confusion. The Buffs' column was least affected and reached the gap east of the second minefield on time, to pass through and wait for word that the rest of the brigade was ready. The two West Kent battalions became considerably disorganised, with trucks on the wrong routes and often, in losing the way, becoming stuck in the soft sand or in the minefields. Several casualties to men and vehicles from the enemy fire or mines stretched the delays so that, at 10.30 p.m., when the battalion columns should have been lined up on the start line, there was a confused mass of men and trucks on both sides of the gaps, with officers and NCOs, both English and New Zealand, working hard to get order out of the chaos. The leading troops of 26 Battalion, coming up behind, found the centre gap, through which their vehicles were supposed to pass, completely blocked, and the commander then gave orders for the transport to try to follow the infantry through the right-hand gap.
Some order was being gained and the assaulting battalions of 132 Brigade were beginning to form up on the start line when the field and Vickers guns opened up in support of 18 and 25 Battalions' diversionary raids, causing the enemy to retaliate with increased fire on the perimeter minefield. Fortunately the start line was out of the main area of fire. The brigade hastily completed its deployment and, almost an hour behind the scheduled time, set off away from the enemy fire into the open desert to the south. The Valentine tanks, with which all contact had been lost for some time, eventually found their way through the centre gap and followed on behind the brigade. Two squadrons of the Divisional Cavalry, whose task was to follow the brigade with a possible exploitation role into
The increase in enemy fire caught many men and vehicles of the rear elements of 132 Brigade still on both sides of the minefield. The confusion was not helped by several drivers who left their vehicles or tried to drive back into the box. The infantry of 26 Battalion, marching in file close to the tape on one side of the western gap so as not to interfere with the passage of vehicles, got through with only minor casualties until a salvo of mortar bombs landed among the battalion headquarters group bringing up the rear. The commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Peart, Lt-Col J. N. Peart, DSO, m.i.d.; born
Meanwhile the companies had reached the start line to find the area still occupied by confused groups of the tail of 132 Brigade. As these groups moved on, the battalion followed, keeping to the right of 132 Brigade's route, and only a half hour behind its planned starting time. The transport column, led by the adjutant, brought up the rear, to halt about a mile south of the gap where a temporary headquarters was established.
The two diversionary raids had been timed to meet the enemy at 11.30 p.m., that is, one hour after 132 Brigade should have passed over its start line and half an hour after 26 Battalion's start. Any postponement, with all its alterations in timing for the supporting fire, would have been difficult and, in the event, with the uncertainty over the possible length of the delay of the main advance, virtually impossible. The raids, therefore, were set going on the original plan, and though the enemy's retaliation did not help the confusion in which 132 Brigade had already fallen, the intention behind the diversionary action was probably achieved. The defences prepared in the Panzer
Army since the commencement of the offensive had been gradually extended to a point within a mile of the south-west corner of the
The 18 Battalion force started on time but B Company, 25 Battalion, was held up at the patrol gap for some minutes to allow the enemy's searching fire along the perimeter to move on. Owing to this delay, this company, under the command of Captain Weston, was still some 300 yards to the north of the depression when the supporting fire lifted. Further advance was met by such a volume of fire from all types of weapons that Captain Weston, deeming the necessary element of surprise lost, ordered an immediate withdrawal. Through a curtain of mortar bombs falling across their line of retreat, the men reached the box with four wounded and twenty-eight missing. Several of the missing turned up later but about twelve, including several wounded, were taken prisoner.
The 18 Battalion force reached the edge of the depression just as the supporting fire lifted to find itself between two defensive positions. Charging the posts nearest to them, the men broke into small groups and for some time a mêlée of hand-to-hand fighting developed. When the three officers of C Company became casualties the company sergeant-major, WO II Brescia Division brought back as prisoners. From A Company's action on the opening night of Rommel's offensive and this engagement, it was plain that 18 Battalion had mastered the art of night raiding. Together the two actions, according to acceptable estimates, brought the enemy a loss of nearly 400 men, of whom over eighty were prisoners, against a loss to the battalion of fewer than fifty.
As the two diversionary raids were taking place, the initial stages of the main advance continued unchecked. Away on the left flank, C Company of 21 Battalion had already, by 11.30 p.m., reached the area of its objective without finding any enemy and the other companies of the battalion were close behind.
The Maoris, unaware that
A few minutes before midnight C Company encountered the first opposition, a group of three machine-gun posts whose fire was quickly subdued, the men of the company then passing on. It so happened that battalion headquarters followed through this area and, coming under rifle fire, made a search which brought in several of the enemy missed by the screen ahead. From this point on the speed of advance slowed as the battalion found itself crossing a stretch of desert dotted with newly constructed but unoccupied weapon pits and sangars, all of which had to be examined. This search caused C Company to lose any of the cohesion that it might still have maintained, so that it was no longer the evenly spaced advance guard of the commander's plan.
By this time C Company had ceased to exist as a formed body. Some of the men may have obeyed orders to go to ground and engage the enemy by fire, but few could have resisted joining in as the other two companies charged by. The company commander himself, Captain
About this time there occurred one of those unfortunate actions that are probably the basis for the complaints noted in German reports that the New Zealanders did not ‘fight fair’. Keiha's small group had been almost overwhelmed by enemy troops who wanted to surrender, and had had some trouble discriminating between those leaving their trenches with the intention of offering themselves as prisoners and those merely moving to better cover to continue the fight. In the heat of the battle a party of prisoners collected by one man was fired on by the others, several being killed or wounded. Eventually the surviving prisoners were sent back in charge of two of the riflemen, but the escort lost direction and ended up in the enemy lines.
In a quick search around, in which he gathered up another ten men, mostly of his own company and some wounded, Keiha discovered that he was close to the lip of the depression, on the floor of which vehicles were on the move. Thinking they might be from 21 Battalion, he led his small party down the slope towards the nearest trucks only to be met by fire from automatics.
See p. 137.
On the initial impact with the main enemy line, D Company's commander, Captain
Eventually, with several men killed and most of the survivors wounded in greater or lesser degree, the impetus of the advance slackened. The enemy then rallied and brought up mortars which, from behind a ridge, laid down a heavy barrage. Awatere, realising that his men's enthusiasm had carried the company too
With about thirty-two fit men left, Awatere followed after his runner, eventually finding Baker in process of setting up his headquarters close to the point where the track from the north entered the
This company, under Captain W (‘Ben’) Porter, had been within sound of Baker's whistle when the first opposition was met. It had immediately charged through the middle of an Italian defence position, collecting fifteen prisoners on the way, and had then been called to a halt by Porter as he estimated he was on his objective, the neck of ground between 2
Following up the retreating enemy, the men of A Company swarmed down over the floor of the depression, attacking all who tried to oppose them and destroying numerous trucks with grenades or Bren fire. During the course of its advance so far, the company had had remarkably few casualties, but numerous men had lost contact with the headquarters in the darkness. Among these was Second-Lieutenant
Porter had already sent runners to follow the escarpment back to battalion headquarters and report his position. About half an hour after the D Company platoon arrived, the runners reappeared guiding the rest of D Company, which had been sent by Baker to link up and form a defensive position ready for daylight. Both Porter and Awatere, however, agreed that the knoll was well to the west of the battalion's proper objective, so they decided to move back at once to the east so that their men could dig in before the day broke. On the way they gathered in several stragglers and added a few more wandering Italians to their bag of prisoners. After a conference with Baker, they set out their company positions across the track at the point where it ran down into the
As the Maoris were playing havoc with the enemy in Munassib, 21 Battalion had marched on to its objective along the inner side of the fourth minefield with very little incident. Defence positions had quickly been laid out, the men commenced to dig in, and
The carrier force moving up behind 28 Battalion and met by Keiha had been despatched by
A route having meanwhile been found that avoided the mines, the remaining carriers drove on until they were halted by Keiha and his men. Two of the vehicles were then left to take the wounded back while Hayward led the rest down into Munassib.
This column had been sent off about an hour behind the carriers after
The column, which kept good contact with Brigade Headquarters through the powerful wireless sets in the tanks, was led by Captain portées, trucks with the battalion's mortars, reserve ammunition and rations, as well as the mine trucks of the 6 Field Company detachment, who were to mine the new front, and the sappers' escort, B Company of 22 Battalion.
Captain Bennett at first followed the shaded lights already set out by the provosts along the brigade axis, which ran due south from the minefield gap. For a reason never explained, the lights which should have continued for about two miles were not visible much beyond half that distance, but Bennett continued to lead by compass after the last light had been passed. At one time aircraft dropped flares over the column, causing many of the soft-skinned vehicles to scatter. No bombs were dropped on the column itself but it took some time to get the vehicles reassembled in order.
Just before 4 a.m. both Bennett and Hughes became worried because they had not yet found any signs of 28 Battalion, so they halted the column and called up Brigade Headquarters on the wireless. Their call coincided with one of the rare moments when 28 Battalion's wireless worked successfully and Baker himself came on the air. In a conversation, relayed between the two wireless links and much of it in Maori, Baker offered to fire two white
A short distance had been travelled when one of the leading tanks ran over a mine. Hardly had the others halted when heavy fire from anti-tank and machine guns swept over the column. The trucks in the rear immediately dispersed into the sheltering darkness, but the carriers, and Bennett in his jeep, sheltered behind the line of tanks.
The role of the Valentines, in the brigade plan, had been to support the infantry at first light and to do any exploiting that might be feasible, but Major Hughes must have felt that his main task was to reach the infantry. Whatever his thoughts, he engaged the enemy until several of his tanks had been put out of action either by mines or by enemy fire. He then led the remainder off to the south as if to outflank the enemy position, but in doing so took them into that part of the fourth minefield that lay in and around the
Meanwhile, Hayward and Bennett, with no communication with the tanks and uncertain what action Hughes contemplated, directed the carrier force to follow the tanks and help if possible while they turned back to round up the transport convoy. With the vehicles re-formed in some sort of order, Bennett was preparing to lead them on a roundabout route to avoid the enemy position when some of the carriers returned to report that there were mines and more enemy on this route. He therefore turned the column about and dispersed it some distance to the rear.
Of the tanks' first engagement, Captain Bennett later recorded:
I cannot speak too highly of the courage of Major Hughes and the men of his tanks…. It was night time and there was very little they could see.… Yet I saw Major Hughes' tank gather up speed and charge straight into the unseen enemy positions with every tank doing likewise. The last I saw of them they were charging with all guns blazing.
This was in fact the last seen of most of the squadron. What exactly happened, as well as the location of the engagement, has been difficult to determine, but it is known from the German records that the squadron came up against 7 Troop of 25 AA Battalion, manning two 88-millimetre and several 20-millimetre anti-tank guns. This troop had somehow been missed in the advance, though the Maoris had overrun all the 88-millimetre guns of its companion troop, No. 8. The diary of 135 AA Regiment states:
7 and 8 Troops were involved in heavy fighting after enemy troops broke into our lines. During the action all the 88mm guns of 8 Troop were knocked out and their crews fell into enemy hands temporarily. 7 Troop came into action with all its guns and cleared the enemy off the battlefield before daybreak. At 0700 hours the enemy launched more infantry and tank attacks which were beaten off. Before 1000 hours eight enemy tanks were knocked out…. Casualties (nearly all in 7 and 8 Troops) 28 killed, 26 wounded, 11 missing….
GMDS 79009/79002.
Just before daybreak some of the Valentines were seen still in action down in the
While the carriers formed a screen, Bennett re-formed what he could find of the transport column and, on orders from Brigade Headquarters, withdrew the column about a mile and dispersed it. Meanwhile the sapper party and B Company of 22 Battalion had broken out of the column with the intention of moving west and
At the same time as B Company was ordered forward,
At the time the Maoris met the enemy line, the main force of 132 Brigade, having run the gauntlet of the fire round the minefield gaps, was advancing unopposed southwards over the open desert. Anticipating that the enemy would not be met in any strength, at least until they reached the northern edge of
The Maoris' battle, some two or three miles off to the south-east, was hidden by the contours of the ground and its noise was overlaid by the Air Force bombing and enemy anti-aircraft fire along
The headquarters column, brought to a sudden halt just behind the crest, found itself at first sheltered from the direct fire of machine-gun and anti-tank tracer. Possibly for the same reason, the brigade commander was not fully aware of what was happening over the crest for his first reports to
A picture of the action emerges from an account given by Major
We were under intense m.g. and s.a. fire and the tracer was coming through them and over our heads…. We stayed on the ridge all night being mortared and shelled all the time. Every time another truck went up in flames, we moved just far enough to get out of the worst of the light. This was fairly frequently and there were not many trucks left by morning. The situation in front was very obscure. Brigade had no communication with any of its three battalions, no phone, no wireless, no runners, until after dawn. The Brigade wireless trucks were not hit and they must have been in touch with N.Z. Div. all the time. I was in touch with my battery and regiment throughout.
After the brigadier was wounded, the brigade major, believed to have been Major R. J. Murphy of the Buffs, took command, and of him Bevan wrote:
It was bad luck for him that his first action should have been such a mess. He was willing to take any advice except that he would not move off that ridge. I wanted him to move back a few hundred yards on to the back slope where his vehicles—and mine—would be safer from observation and gun fire, but he would only say ‘I won't retreat’. A few infantry straggled back during the night with wild tales that the battalions were wiped out and it seemed pretty certain they were in a bad way, or at least pinned down in the open, and I suggested artillery concentrations on the enemy positions as marked on the map and actually fired at least two Div. concentrations. I hope they helped….
During the night parachute flares were dropped…. and we expected bombs but none came…. The flares showed us up to the enemy gunners however. About half an hour before first light I at last convinced the brigade major that unless he moved off the ridge he would lose all his vehicles at dawn and that he was useless without his wireless trucks. He agreed to move … and asked me to lead…. I got them lined up and led them to a position about 400 yards from the minefield gap and dispersed as it got light. I had wirelessed for ambulances and they were there to pick up our wounded…. There we were with a brigade headquarters and no brigade….
Part of the brigade major's reluctance to move his headquarters may have stemmed from a belief that some of his brigade, though out of touch, was still in action. The enemy's defensive fire abated considerably after the first outburst but never quite ceased for some hours, while at times some real or imagined alarm would set the whole Axis front to sudden outbursts of fixed-line machine-gun fire and mortaring. The enemy records do not indicate that the defences here were broken into or that casualties were suffered to any extent, but they claim 200 prisoners for this night, of whom about 150 must have been men of 132 Brigade. Such a number cannot be accounted for merely by stragglers who, inexperienced in desert movement at night, wandered into the enemy lines, and it seems probable therefore that more than one group of the brigade broke through the enemy outposts to be surrounded further back.
About 3.30 a.m. Chaplin, The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment.
The column of
The subsidiary operation by 26 Battalion to protect 132 Brigade's western flank went off smoothly at first. Two of the companies, A and B Companies detailed to establish the northern and central sectors of the battalion front along the first minefield, reached their positions without meeting opposition and quickly started to prepare defences. Enemy posts to the west, where 18 and 25 Battalions' raids had just finished, were jittery and sweeping the
As 26 Battalion was settling in, stragglers from 132 Brigade commenced to drift into the area in ever increasing numbers, causing considerable concern to the depleted staff at battalion headquarters, who had already spent much time earlier helping to sort out the brigade's transport confusion. Patrols scouting to the south, both to find C Company and obtain first-hand information of 132 Brigade, returned to say that no organised bodies of men could be found between the battalion and enemy defences to the south, though the commander of
News had come in that the supporting weapons, including some New Zealand anti-tank guns, which were to follow 132 Brigade's column, had run into mines or been otherwise delayed. Major Walden then decided that he would have to provide the protection for his own southern front, so called up all the anti-tank guns, 3-inch mortars and Bren carriers that could be spared, to form a screen across the south of A Company's sector as far as possible towards the second minefield. The carriers, patrolling to the east, found the headquarters of 132 Brigade, so that direct contact was at last established between the brigade and 26 Battalion. Some of the Valentines of A Squadron, 46 Royal Tank Regiment, were also found, as well as other parties of troops of various arms, all of whom were brought into the defensive screen.
The ground over which 132 Brigade had advanced remained under shell, mortar, and machine-gun fire of varying intensity, with aircraft circling overhead to drop flares and a few bombs, until about 4 a.m., when the enemy's activity began to die down. By dawn of 4 September the whole front was relatively quiet.
Just prior to dawn, Brigadier Clifton set off from the box to visit 26 Battalion and from there was directed on to 132 Brigade headquarters. Returning to give 26 Battalion instructions for providing extra cover for the southern front, he took Major Walden in his jeep to reconnoitre the front, and particularly to find C Company. Seeing some khaki-clad troops above ground off to the south, Clifton told his driver to make for them, only to discover the troops were Italian parachutists of See also Liddell Hart, Folgore Division. The two officers, the driver, and the wireless operator were all taken prisoner and with them the enemy collected a number of documents and marked maps. The latter's value was lessened by the action of the driver who, when he realised capture was imminent, did his best to obliterate the chinagraph markings on the talc overlay of the brigadier's situation map. The operator, attempting a last-minute call, had his set smashed by a rifle butt. The only witness to this capture on the New Zealand side was an artillery observation officer, who saw the jeep surrounded by troops but did not realise who the occupants were. Clifton was renowned for his mobility so that it was some time before the staff at 6 Brigade Headquarters became concerned over his absence. The Rommel Papers, p. 281, and Clifton, The Happy Hunted.
Apart from the story of C Company, 26 Battalion, to be told later, the actions during the hours of darkness of all the main parts of Operation beresford have now been described. At dawn, most of the stragglers of the 18 and 25 Battalions' raiding parties who had not been taken prisoner were back, the wounded seen to, prisoners sent back to
Some way further south and immediately east of the second minefield, with two of their attached Valentines in running order and with few casualties to either men or vehicles,
Shortly after McPhail joined
From B Company's positions, a fairly solid and well-supported front ran through
Enemy Counter-Attacks
NEARLY two miles to the south of 22 Battalion's line on the
After he had fired the flares to direct the tanks, Lieutenant-Colonel Baker sent off a patrol to meet them and then returned to the battalion defences. Soon, however, he realised that dawn was not far off and the tanks had not yet put in an appearance, so decided to search for them himself. In his jeep he set off in a northerly dir