Official History of New Zealand
in the Second World War
1939–45
in the Second World War
1939–45
R. E. Owen, Government Printer,
eastern mediterranean
Official History of New Zealand
in the Second World War 1939–45
in the Second World War 1939–45
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Distributed by
whitcombe & tombs ltd.
Geoffrey Cumberlege
oxford university press
IT is now six years since I undertook to write this history and
four years since I felt I had a sufficient command of the evidence
to begin a first draft. Meanwhile new facts have kept on appearing
and frequently the treatment of particular detail has had to be
modified; less often, a more general conclusion has had to be
reconsidered. The exigencies of a daily profession, moreover, made
it impossible to bring to the task the continuity of reflection ideally
desirable but so seldom the fortune of the historian in these
nagging times. And this was a particularly unlucky circumstance,
since the battle of
Far more trying, however, was the fact that I, a very junior and ignorant subaltern in that battle, was forced by the nature of the historian's role not merely to try and discover what happened and present it in a lucid and logical way, but also, by considering the decisions taken and the alternatives possible, to imply or express judgment on the actions of men immeasurably my betters in courage, military capacity and experience: among them men under whose command I had served and whose personal friendliness to me in times past reinforced the loyalty a junior officer owes to his commanders long after the temporary ties of discipline have been severed; among them also men of whom death during or since the war has deprived us and whose testimony, if we had it, might make plain a great deal that is obscure.
The only possible course seemed to be to treat loyalty to the
truth of the facts so far as they could be ascertained as overriding.
The historian's is also a duty and men who died generously for
theirs would be the last to reproach another for trying to do his.
I hope therefore that this history will be read as one written in
the earnest belief that nothing should be set down in malice; and
I hope also that the reader will keep it in his mind, as I have
tried to keep it in mine, that the commanders whose actions are
being subjected to such close consideration took their decisions in
grim conditions of urgency; that they were pitifully lacking in
equipment which later in the war would have been considered
essential; that much now clear was then hidden; that the time to
ponder the facts which is the privilege of the historian and his
readers was not theirs; and that consequences which seem to us
Many parts of this book have been written and rewritten with the most anxious consideration lest inaccuracy steal in or lest by faulty emphasis injustice should lay an ambush. Even so, wrong reasoning or hasty presumptions may still lurk beyond immediate detection.
That such blemishes are not as numerous as they might have been is largely due to the invaluable help of Mr. W. E. Murphy. In acting as the filter to me of information from New Zealand he very soon made himself an authority on the battle, saved me from countless errors of detail, and many times, by adducing considerations overlooked or insufficiently weighed, compelled me to modify a conclusion. In particular, the book owes to him the excellent appendices which appear under his name. Without the help of the General Editor and such an assistant, the difficulties of writing a history 12,000 miles away from one's main sources might have proved insuperable.
My debt, indeed, to the whole of the
Help from persons outside the Crete News; Mr. W. G. McClymont, who compiled
the invaluable narrative of events which was the basis of my own
book; Mr. Wynne Mason, formerly Staff Captain of 5 Brigade;
and Mr. Angus Ross, the historian of 23 Battalion.
In England there have also been many who lent willing aid: in
particular, The Second World War; The
Campaign in Crete, I have leaned heavily in the earlier sections of
this work;
Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to the New Zealand
Government which, through the High Commissioner's Office in
oxford
The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on
enlistment. The ranks are those held on discharge or at the date
of death. In Crete some men temporarily held higher rank than
that recorded by 2 NZEF Records.
ON the morning of
To make such a history intelligible the historian must do more than merely relate the course of the fighting. For, just as a move in chess is conditioned by what has gone before and is seen in its full implications only through its consequences, so this battle arose out of and was largely determined by circumstances that long preceded it; and its outcome involved far more than local success or failure.
But the task of tracing causes backwards is as infinite as that of
tracing their consequences; and, unless limits are accepted, both are
ultimately vain. In both the historian must address his judgment
to the problem of what is immediately relevant. The preliminaries
of this history will therefore be confined to a summary account of
This central position has made
About this very time developments of air power had begun
in
So long as
It was obvious, however, that if General Wavell to Admiral Cunningham, 15 May; Cs-in-C to COS, 21 May; WO
to ME, 7035. WO to ME, 15 May; C-in-C
The
July and August passed in arguments for and against occupation by a British force. At first it was the arguments against that seemed the stronger: the British did not wish to be the first to violate Greek neutrality and in any case did not have the troops available. And so on 27 July the existing plan was cancelled.
During September evidence of projected Italian action against
Cs-in-C to WO, 25 Sep. It is interesting to notice that this message mentions the
possibility of parachute attack.
On 9 October
October the 28th brought matters to a head. For on that day
the delivery of the Italian ultimatum, its rejection by the Greeks,
and the Italian invasion of
The same day General Headquarters Middle East conferred to
see what could be done, finally deciding to send a reconnaissance
party to
But, though the Italian invasion of The Greeks at once became strongly in favour of a British naval base at
At the meeting in
Reports from the island soon indicated that anti-aircraft defences
and ground troops would be needed if the naval base were to be
defended, and as the authority from the Chiefs of Staff for sending
a brigade had now been received and the Greek attitude was
welcoming, 2 Yorks and Lancs were ordered to move on 30 October.
The occupation of the island was planned to take place in two
phases of which this was to be the first, ACTION. The second,
ASSUMPTION, was to consist of the move of Headquarters 14
Infantry Brigade, Light Anti-Aircraft. Heavy Anti-Aircraft.
Meanwhile, both in the ME JPS Paper 30, 30 Oct. In the event a brigade would have been hopelessly little.
Back in
The point is an important one. For if this line of action had
been adhered to in the circumstances later to develop, the focus of
British attention would have been
Meanwhile, policy having been decided for the present in its
broad lines, the problem became one of making PM to General Ismay, 3 Nov. The
The plan at this stage was that immediate reinforcements in AA
should be found from the
The actual position at this time in Terror. Because
of the presence of the latter and the quiet prevailing, the Chiefs of
Staff decided on 20 November that the 6-inch guns of MNBDO
need not be sent and recommended that the 16 HAA and 12 LAA
needed to make up the smaller complement should be sent from
the
General Wavell, however, had his own shortages; and these no
doubt lay behind his message to the War Office of 26 November,
which recommended that no more AA be sent to The Prime Minister disagreed with the first of these propositions.
The Prime Minister now called for definite proposals, and on
1 December the Chiefs of Staff again considered the matter. They
provisionally earmarked 32 HAA and 36 LAA guns for
In January General Wavell, amid his many preoccupations,
found time to counsel that the policy of holding
It is no part of this book to discuss the decision to send an
expeditionary force to
On 6 April See volume Greece, NZ War History, for a complete account of this campaign.
It is now time to turn to For fuller account see Naval Intelligence Report on Greece and Crete (
The position of these mountains determines the direction and fall
of the rivers, the character of the coastlines, the forest and
vegetation, and even to some extent the climate. The main watershed is on the whole nearer to the south coast, with the result
that the harbours there are few and small, have little hinterland
and are exposed to sudden winds of gale force. Their anchorages,
The descent to this north coast is, however, more gradual and
along the coast itself are strips of plain, especially near
The importance for an island of its harbours needs little emphasis
and it will be of advantage to discuss them more closely.
Apart from these only the two south coast fishing ports of
At the outset of the fighting the airfields were in an even rawer
state of development. Report on Air Operations in
It followed that even if aircraft should be available for defence,
as in the event they were not, the air effort would be hampered by
Communications were as primitive, a fact of no less prime importance. For airfields might help determine the amount of air protection; ports how fast troops, equipment, and supplies could be landed; but it was communications which would govern not merely the distribution of what was landed but the efficiency with which battle, once joined, could be fought.
Thus the fact that the important roads, like the ports and airfields, were in the north not only determined the enemy's probable objectives but forced the defenders to concentrate in a few quarters at a shallow depth from the coast. Even so, the roads along which they could move were so few that the enemy had no difficulty in keeping a continual air cover.
The same inadequacy in roads made it inevitable for the defence
to be divided into sectors from which it would be impossible to
concentrate the whole force should attack come in any single
quarter; and should attack come in all quarters the various sectors
could be cut off from one another with relative ease. There was
only the one lateral east-west road, and along it at considerable
distances from one another were strung out the main vulnerable
points:
Again, the road itself, though the best in the island and having a metalled surface, was markedly inferior by the standards of Western Europe. It could not take more than one line of heavy traffic at a time (even had that traffic been available); it had frequent sharp bends, especially where it cut through hills; none of its bridges was safe for vehicles over seven tons; and for the greater part of its length it was vulnerable from the sea.
There were other disadvantages. There was no mesh of subsidiary
roads running parallel with the main road which might have
relieved the pressure of traffic; and its scope was shallow since the
roads running south were few and bad. Of these latter the principal
ran south from
Even of the roads that did run south not all went right across
the island. Those that did so were
There was no hope of supplementing roads by railways. Only
three narrow-gauge lines existed. And these were purely local and
of no use to the defence. Telephone and telegraphic facilities were
little better. Even in normal battle conditions where troops have
their full complement of signal services, the presence or absence of
civilian fixtures is important. Where, as in
Climate need not detain us: clear skies and bright sun characterise the early summer, and April and May of 1941 were to be no exception. The weather could usually be relied on to be good for flying—for those who had aircraft. The nights were clear but cold, a trial to troops who had no blankets.
The forest and vegetation were those characteristic of a rugged
island in
Finally, it should be added that the country between
Such then were the conditions and the country which the first
British troops found when they landed on 1 November. A summary
The prevailing strategic conception in
This being his task, it was natural that he should concentrate
on the first part of his orders and dispose his force in and around
But resources in the
Operationally Brigadier Tidbury had appreciated that any attack
would most probably be airborne, with
Even for this limited role, which was all he considered his limited force capable of, Tidbury favoured a policy of night and day digging on defensive positions. On 8 January, however, he was succeeded by Major-General M. D. Gambier-Parry, MC, a change of command which must have entailed further delays to any forward policy.
No fresh operational line followed a second visit by General
Wavell on 17 January, and the attention of the new commander
seems to have been engrossed by plans for the administrative
build-up which would be an essential preliminary to any enlargement
of the garrison. Nor was he allowed much time even for that.
On 2 February he was recalled to command 2 Armoured Division
in the
The new commander's instructions gave him a sufficiently complex
task: he was to be Fortress Commander, DCGS to OC British Troops in
He, too, was to have less than a month in which to shoulder
these responsibilities. For the situation in
Time was running out, but the situation from a planning point
of view became no clearer. On 17 March OC Signals Creforce
reported that, because of the ill-defined operational policy, he could
have no clear signals policy. His report suggests that, on the
island at least, the current view was scarcely dynamic:
The situation was improved somewhat by the appointment on
19 March of Brigadier B. H. Chappel to command 14 Infantry
Brigade. But as he remained in doubt whether or not his
commitments included the defence of
He and his perplexity were soon to be relieved. The Vice-Chiefs
of Staff had decided on 4 January to send at least the AA component
of MNBDO to the
The defence measures taken up to this time, apart from the
administrative, may be summarised as follows: by 12 February a
defence scheme for
Thus, it is plain, the occupying garrison had come by March to appreciate correctly the kind of attack to be expected and some likely targets, even although the garrison had increased very little since Tidbury's time.
General Weston had learnt of the destination of MNBDO and
his own role as GOC
Weston therefore thought the defence required an infantry
brigade at
Now that the loss of
The planners appreciated that a garrison of three brigade groups
would be needed, composed of fresh and fully equipped British
troops. A further brigade group should be sent at once and artillery
to bring the group already there up to strength. Troops evacuated
from
But by this time the enemy offensive in the
This decision or, more fairly, the shortage of troops that dictated it, was probably responsible ultimately for the presence of the New Zealand Division in the battle of Crete. For events were to move too swiftly from now on and there would be no better opportunity of bringing in fresh troops, however bad the present occasion might be.
Meanwhile General Weston's own position was none the clearer.
He had been warned of the impending evacuation of General Weston's report; GS to BGS, 25 Apr.
All this time the build-up had been going on, rather too slowly.
When General Wavell came on 13 November the garrison consisted
of HQ
The 2nd Black Watch was duly sent and disembarked on
19 November. Meanwhile the Greek garrison had begun to leave
for the mainland and their departure occasioned a request from
Though no further infantry was promised, the possibility that
Report of conference, 26 Nov. CD, coast defence.
From this time till the evacuation of The basis of the garrison envisaged seems to have been fairly constant at a strong brigade
capable of reinforcement by a further brigade. The last Greek troops left on 4–5 February.
Such then was the strength of the garrison measured in terms
of units. The build-up in guns was hardly better. Ever since the
decision had been taken on 28 October to secure
The minimum envisaged by Middle East HQ in November and
approved by the Chiefs of Staff was 32 HAA guns, 24 LAA guns, and
72 searchlights. When evacuation from
In the event, the need for coast defence guns was to prove of less importance. But they, too, were scarcely adequate for what might have been. They consisted of 15 Coast Defence Regiment with one battery of two 12-pounders, two batteries of two 6-pounders, and two batteries of two 4-inch guns. The arrival of MNBDO added two batteries each of two 4-inch guns.
Administrative preparations went on concurrently with the rest.
The difficulties of administration were to play a considerable part
in both the early and later stages of the campaign and became
apparent from the beginning. Local supplies were found inadequate
even for the first troops to arrive, as Brigadier Tidbury in his
After 23 November, when ultimate reinforcement to the strength
of a division was contemplated, planning and construction of a
suitable base became the garrison's main preoccupation: for without
it the reception of large reinforcements, if ever they became
available, would not be possible. Planning even for this, however,
was not made any easier by the absence of a clear operational plan
as the difficulties of the OC Signals already referred to show. See page 13.
The reconnaissance party sent to Report on reconnaissance for a base in the area
The reconnaissance party recommended a plan which entailed
the fullest use of existing buildings, and this was approved. The
maintenance tonnage of the existing force was to be reduced from
the 350 tons a day estimated by the reconnaissance report to 300
tons, and the difference between this amount and the 500 tons a day
which was the maximum to be spared would go towards the
stocking of the base. Decisions on Crete Base, 20 Dec. The reconnaissance had estimated
By 6 January Tidbury was able to report that all sites except that of the hospital (it was part of the plan to make this one of 600–800 beds) had been decided, that 4000 square feet of the workshop site were already in use, and that work on the Decauville track had begun. The building of huts, the laying of ammunition standings, and work on other storage facilities had been held up by transport shortage and bad roads.
These handicaps to progress were felt throughout the preparatory
period, but in spite of them progress was made and by the end
of March the administrative base for a single division was reported
to be 80 per cent complete. There was still uncertainty about just
what the strength of the defence was likely to be, and on 18 April
Middle East HQ ordered that the island should be stocked for a
figure of 90 days' supplies for 30,000 men; but on 25 April it
was ruled that this figure would be temporary and that when the
The prospect of having to deal with supplies on this scale and
men in these numbers now raised the question of transport in an
even more acute form, and Brigadier Chappel, the commander
of the moment, sent an appreciation to GHQ Middle East which
stressed the need for more MT. Mechanical transport. Commander Royal Engineers. Report on visit to
Since the absence of fighter defence proved so major a factor in the enemy's success, this preliminary chapter may close with an account of the developments in the air defence in these early months of the ‘build-up’.
From the first
Indeed, the contrast between the desirable and the possible is
implicit in the whole preparatory period. On 4 January, for
example, the Joint Planning Staff accepted a memorandum from
the Chief of Air Staff which ran: ‘The foundation on which we
should base our assistance to Interservices Committee Report, I. 18.
In consequence, by 27 March the
Thus the situation found by Wing Commander Beamish on
17 April when he arrived Presumably a direct consequence of Weston's report on 15 April which recommended
that fighters and bombers should be located there and full-scale operational aerodromes constructed with due regard to ground defence. Gp Capt Beamish, Report on RAF Operations in Crete.
Of the two aerodromes,
At Air Ministry Experimental Station. Radio telephony.
Staff also, Beamish found, was inadequate, though he was able
later to improve it from the evacuated personnel arriving from
Wireless telegraphy.
By 21 April, if we are to judge by JPS Paper 49 which
recommends the retention of the existing two
Thus, whatever the reasons and however good, it could not
be said that the six months since British troops had first landed
on
British and German Preparations 25 April – 19 May
New Zealand Arrivals fromGreece
AT four o'clock in the morning of This account treats only of the evacuation of NZ troops. It should be borne in mind
that the Calcutta, Perth and
Glengyle, left
Only less serious than the loss of men—perhaps more serious,
since many of those not evacuated made their way out of C-in-C Med to Fleet, 4.20 p.m., 24 Apr. 23 Bn, for example, brought out 31 LMGs, two A-Tk rifles, 26 SMGs, two 2-inch
mortars, and 499 rifles. One man reached
Few troops at this time could have been so much concerned with
where they were going as with what they were going away from,
and the continual attacks of the Supplement to The London Gazette, The London Gazette,
Thus, when the first convoy arrived in Not all the battalions did this and their reluctance was justified in the sequel. See
page 28. 28 Bn was apparently lucky: ‘We did move by Coys and foregathered at Refreshment
Point. We thought the people who supplied the refreshments the best ever.’—Lt-Col
Dittmer.
The New Zealand camp, Camp A, was about half-way between
That night no New Zealand units were evacuated from Tank Landing Craft. Glengyle evacuated
Nubian, Decoy, and Hasty—in
support; and the Salween evacuated Kandahar and Kingston and the cruiser Carlisle.
The plan on this occasion was for the transports to go direct to
Egypt and for the naval vessels to go to Glengyle and the Salween. They would thus have
reached Egypt and been available for service in North Africa.
This plan bad weather to some extent frustrated: at Salween, and the remainder, boarding the naval
vessels, ended up in Glengyle and arriving safely in
Egypt. Some 700 troops—200 of them New Zealanders—were
left behind.
Of Salween. Those that
did not came off in naval vessels and were ultimately made up into
the MG company that fought on Crete. In much the same way a
large part of the Divisional Cavalry left on the Salween for Egypt;
about 150 men, of A and B Squadrons, were left behind, however,
and one whole squadron, C Squadron, was in the
On the same night another evacuation was taking place at
Reserve Mechanical Transport Company. Slamat
and picked up by the destroyer Diamond, was again sunk with that
ship, was picked up by the destroyer Wryneck, and was again sunk.
Only one member of the group survived. The RMT section was
luckier and reached
Meanwhile the convoy from Glengyle and the Salween went
on to
From NZ Division there were now still in Some of these had made their way to D Beach and embarked on Ajax and the destroyers Kingston, Kimberley, and Havock.
The last named was then sent to C Beach at Havock meanwhile embarked
those who had remained at C Beach. Ajax; others commandeered a boat and, leapfrogging from island to island, reached
The convoy seems to have got off to a quicker start than its
predecessors and reached
Last of the Division to leave Ajax and four destroyers— Havock,
Hotspur, Griffin and Isis—and, leaving about a quarter to four
in the morning of 29 April, reached
At this stage Thurland Castle
and Comliebank, and at midday these two ships joined others in
convoy and set off for Egypt, which they were to reach on 2 May.
The troops from the New Zealand reinforcement camp near
The remarkable feature about the operation of which this is
only a summary and partial account was its success—as an
evacuation. That so large a proportion of the expeditionary force,
with outnumbering German columns close on their heels and the
But, this said, the evacuation had its less fortunate aspects.
The individual accidents, the confusions of detail, were inevitable
in a combined operation carried out by night and in grave difficulties.
But it was unlucky that orders for the abandonment of weapons
were so strictly interpreted by embarkation staffs, and it would
have been worse if the troops had not evaded the order wherever
possible. And it was unfortunate, too, that men of the first convoy
to reach
For these misfortunes the divisional command was not
responsible. Headquarters NZ Division had no part in making the
plans for evacuation and, indeed, had no inkling of the role in
store for the Division. It was not until 30 April that
Dispositions of New Zealand Force
In spite of some preliminary uncertainties See p. 16. It is not clear that Weston knew this, but it seems reasonably likely that he would have
been told. The London Gazette,
Till shipping was available for the onward move of the evacuated
troops it was obvious that he must not only make the best provision
he could for their reception but also utilise them to help make
good the gaps in the defence; for, with Brig J. Hargest, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, m.i.d.; born Gore,
The details of this order were to be modified by the arrival of further troops and by the later change in command; but it is interesting in so far as it reflects the situation as seen by Weston at this time and because it embodies an outline appreciation of vulnerable points which did not alter.
The order states that the Commanders-in-Chief Middle East
had decided
In these circumstances the order allotted the defence of the
While these orders were being prepared and issued the New
Zealand troops already on the island were being organised under
Hargest's command. He formed a headquarters staff, delegated
command of his brigade to Lieutenant-Colonel Falconer (CO
‘Of the Bren guns and mortars left in the wharf shed, 28 Bn received back less than
it left there.’—Lt-Col Dittmer. MO, Medical Officer; ADMS, Assistant Director of
These arrangements inevitably took up the whole of 26 April
and it was not till the following day that the troops were able to
move into their sectors. According to Operational Instruction No. 5
they were to go to the Brig Hargest's diary, as copied from original by
Back at
Administrative arrangements went forward, meanwhile. A supply
dump was arranged for at
On 28 April, while 4 Brigade was still making its way towards
A notable feature in this process was the reorganisation of the
ASC and artillery. Since the former was without transport for
its normal role it had to be diverted to the primary task of the
soldier. And so the 1100-odd men not employed on ASC duties
had been formed into infantry companies under Major ‘NZA on Thus 5 Fd Regt brought off all its dial sights and clinometers. See p. 54.
By 29 April New Zealand Force was already taking a more
formidable shape. Brigadier Puttick, Lt-Gen Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Greek), Legion of Merit
(US);
Defensive Decisions
The decision to evacuate
On the same day RAF HQ Middle East assured the Air Ministry
that the best air protection possible would be provided, and on
22 April Air Marshal Longmore himself flew to
Meanwhile the attack itself became more and more likely. On
27 April the War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
presented an appreciation. According to this, attack was certain and
soon; as soon in fact as the conclusion of operations in JIC 181. The substance of this was passed on in a War Office telegram to General Wavell on 29 April.
In this view the Prime Minister at the
None the less and properly enough, there were still doubts
whether the effort to hold the island should be made. The Chief
of Air Staff, Air Marshal Portal, thought that if the
Wavell had already been asked by the Prime Minister in his
message of 28 April for a report on forces and plans, and on 29 April
Admiral Cunningham was asked for the information already
specified. In a further message of the same day from the Admiralty
he was asked what importance he attached to holding
To this message Cunningham replied on 1 May with an
appreciation that may have decided the matter. He pointed out that
the
It is curious that, while Cunningham felt and expressed in this
message an uneasiness about supplying
But, whatever the outcome of these considerations, arrangements
had to proceed meanwhile on the assumption that the island was
to be held, and the Prime Minister's message of 28 April to General
Wavell had not indicated any doubts that the Chiefs of Staff
might feel. Indeed it seems likely that they expected that whatever
reply they got from Admiral Cunningham would be in favour of
a stand. They therefore now began to consider whether General
Weston, a Marine, had the right kind of experience to fit him for
such a difficult command. In a message of 29 April they put this
question to Wavell and asked him to report if he thought a change
necessary. COS to General Wavell, 29 Apr; CIGS in 64174 to Wavell on 30 Apr definitely
suggested that
On 30 April Wavell duly flew to See p. 31 and next para.
The figures for the probable scale of air attack had in fact been
relayed to General Wavell on 29 April and were impressive enough:
the enemy was estimated to have about 285 long-range bombers
in the
Wavell, while he agreed that early and simultaneous attack by
land and sea was probable, repeated in an answer to this appreciation
on 1 May his view that the whole threat might be merely a cover
plan for operations in
On 2 May the Chiefs of Staff were confronted with a further
view, that of the PM NZ to PM UK, 2 May; Documents, Vol. I, No. 394.
Faced with this clear alternative the Chiefs of Staff decided to
postpone decision until they had had an appreciation from General
Wavell. It ought perhaps to be said that every such delay made the decision more inevitable;
for with every day that passed evacuation of the island became more difficult—if it
was not already too late.
Wavell's appreciation came with his next message and was not
reassuring. The defence of
Nevertheless, all these difficulties were being tackled and if time
allowed would be overcome. But the air, he foresaw, would always
be a difficult problem. Wavell to CIGS, 2 May.
On the following day the Chiefs of Staff again deliberated.
They ended by deciding that they must reach a decision soon, and,
no doubt to have the material for it, they instructed the Joint
Planning Staff to include a consideration of policy for the defence
of
Meanwhile PM to PM NZ, 3 May; Documents, Vol. I, No. 396.
It was at this stage, too, that the problem of whether or not to
arm the Cretan population came up again. But that question
brought its difficulties: danger to the Government was feared;
and, perhaps more important, the weapons might not be available.
The
From now on the question of whether or not to try and hold
Circumstances so largely deciding the question of the ground
garrison, there was still the inadequacy of air force that Sir Michael
Palairet had drawn attention to. Air Marshal Portal was emphatic
that it would be dangerous to maintain an active air defence over
the island at the expense of the Air Marshal Portal's last point throws some light on the decision not to destroy the
airfields. See p. 51.
The Chiefs of Staff may have had before them at this meeting
a spirited message from
Air Marshal Portal's view was strengthened on 8 May when
Longmore gave further particulars of the Cretan airfields. Their
state was such that casualties would be high from lack of repair
facilities; and lack of cover made dispersion of aircraft difficult.
He was against the permanent stationing of squadrons but thought
that the airfields might be used as advanced landing grounds for
fighters. And he stressed the losses incurred in
The Chiefs of Staff had also considered a proposal for the
dropping off in COS 101 to Cs-in-C ME and Med, 9 May.
Wavell replied next day that he had already arranged for the
sending of six I tanks and fifteen light tanks which should reach
See p. 32. The campaign in
Meanwhile the existing air defence was supplied by the mixed
squadron of Gladiators, Hurricanes and
General Wavell went on to give the present garrison, and to repeat that the minimum garrison necessary was three brigade groups and that he hoped to relieve the Anzacs eventually with British formations, which might themselves be relieved ultimately by the 11,000 Greek troops on the island, though the Greeks needed three months' training and re-equipment
The tendency to think in terms of ‘eventually’ was continued in his approach to the question of armament. Guns and tanks were being sent; but for anti-aircraft defence three heavy and two light batteries would eventually be required in addition to the 16 HAA and 36 LAA then in the island and the MNBDO armament intended for it. But at present AA could not be diverted from other vital needs.
Tension by now was rapidly mounting. One of the questions much
debated was whether or not the See Appendix II.
The Prime Minister in these days was able to devote some of
his energies to the problems of the defence. He rather favoured
at one point a plan for letting the enemy take the dromes and then
fiercely counter-attacking with tanks and assault parties, and Wavell
reported on 12 May that he had sent a special officer to present
PM's minute to First Sea Lord, CIGS, and CAS, 10 May.
On the same day the Prime Minister told General Wavell that all the evidence pointed to SCORCHER taking place any day after 17 May and that enemy preparations were going forward very deliberately. Reinforcements sent now might well arrive in time, and even if they were late would be useful in case the enemy won a bridgehead. In this message also he dwelt on his hope that the three Commanders-in-Chief were working in close concert. And he returned to the theme on 15 May, saying that the scale of threatened attack impressed him more and more and that he hoped all possible reinforcements had been sent.
To this General Wavell replied that he had done his best.
Amongst other reinforcements he had sent 16 light tanks and six
I tanks, 18 AA guns and 17 field guns, and a battalion of troops.
Further, he was preparing a small force of one or two battalions
to land on the south coast as a reserve. He had concerted plans with
the other two Commanders-in-Chief on 12 May. He knew the
job was going to be hard, but the troops and their commander were
stout-hearted and the enemy would find that SCORCHER would burn
his fingers. Wavell to PM, 15 May.
At this point we may leave the higher strategy, with the decision—
now irreversible and perhaps more enforced by events than clearly
taken—that the attempt to hold Air Marshal Longmore returned to the
General Freyberg Takes Command
On 28 April General Wilson arrived from Maj-Gen Sir Iven Mackay, GOC 6 Aust Div. He left Mideast to
General Wilson's appreciation was that seaborne attack was not
difficult and could be covered from the air in a way that would
make it hard for the Appreciation by General Wilson and Appendix C to it.
Wilson's view of the points that must be held and the garrison
needed is also interesting.
In fine, holding the island was a dangerous commitment unless all three services were ready to face the strain of maintaining an adequate force. An immediate decision was necessary.
This same day Wilson was present at a meeting in Minutes of meeting, 28 Apr. The Greek units appear to have been partly locally
formed and partly evacuees from the mainland, or troops from the mainland who were
temporarily stationed in
On 30 April General Wavell himself arrived by air and at once
summoned a conference of all the senior commanders. We may
quote
We met in a small villa between
Two other points that emerged may be summarised here. There would be no additional air support, though Air Vice-Marshal D'Albiac said he was asking for some Glenn Martin planes; and the C-in-C undertook to discuss with Admiral Cunningham the question of naval action against seaborne attack.
His first problem was that of a Headquarters. Force HQ in
Australian Corps HQ and 6 Aust Div had been evacuated to Egypt almost complete.
Thus there were few Australian senior officers and these were mostly required for
operational duties with 19 Aust Bde.
But there was much else to be done. He had to glean from
questioning, from maps, and from what personal reconnaissance he
could spare time for, some notion of the island's geographical
character. And this as we have seen was not reassuring.
With a rough idea of the general problem, he next turned to the
garrison. ‘It was not unusual to find that the men had no arms or
equipment, no plates, knives, forks, or spoons, and they ate and
drank from bully beef or cigarette tins. There was no unit
transport and no tools for most of the battalions. The morale of
some of the odds and ends was low.’ Ibid, p. 4.
At the end of this survey he was in a better position to appreciate
the force of the message on 29 April that had given the War Office
WO 54141, 29 Apr, apparently sent to See p. 33.
Documents I, No. 388.
But, as a good commander, Crete News, edited by 2 Lt G. S. Cox. See Appendix I.
The withdrawal from
Today, the British forces in
On 2 May came a reassuring response from General Wavell, in
a message full of concern. The Commanders-in-Chief all thought
the War Office appreciation exaggerated, though the scale of attack
Mideast to Documents I, No. 392. The message reflects Wavell's
anxieties. Pressed as he was for troops, it was perhaps all the easier for him to accept
the view of Middle East Intelligence about the scale of attack. The War Office estimate
turned out to be correct, but meanwhile it was hardly possible for
Wavell did his best to redeem his promises. ‘The C-in-C Middle
East did everything that was humanly possible to get us every
available bit of equipment, artillery, and defence stores. They did
their utmost to send us every bit of equipment they had.
Now that he had made his attitude clear
This was succeeded by
Creforce Operation Instruction No. 10
Ref. Map of
-
HERAKLION SECTOR—
-
Comd Brig Chappel
-
Tps 14 Inf Bde less 1 Welch
-
7 Med Regt RA (rifles)
-
2/4 Aust Bn
-
156 Lt AA Bty, less two tps (in support)
-
One tp and one sec 7 Aust Lt AA Bty (in support)
-
One sec B Bty 15 Coast Regt (in support)
-
Two Greek Bns
-
-
RETIMO SECTOR—
-
Comd Brig Vasey
-
Tps 19 Aust Bde HQ
-
2/1 Aust Bn
-
2/7 Aust Bn
-
2/11 Aust Bn
-
1 Aust MG Coy
-
Two Greek Bns
-
Left boundary all incl: armyro (askifou,
B 2362).
-
SUDA BAY SECTOR—
-
Comd Maj-Gen Weston
-
Tps MNBDO
-
1 Welch
-
NH
Northumberland Hussars . An anti-tank unit now serving as infantry. -
2/8 Aust Bn
Two rifle companies only, with an improvised headquarters.
-
151 Hy AA Bty
-
234 Hy AA Bty
-
129 Lt AA Bty
-
7 Aust Lt AA Bty, less two tps and one sec
-
304 S/L Bty
-
15 Coast Regt, less one sec Base Sub Area
-
1 Greek Bn
-
-
MALEME SECTOR—
-
Comd Brig Puttick
-
Tps NZ Div
-
4 NZ Bde
-
5 NZ Bde
-
Oakes Force -
Two tps 156 Lt AA Bty (in support)
-
One tp 7 Aust Lt AA Bty (in support)
-
Three Greek Bns
-
-
Force Reserve SUDA BAY sector and 4 NZ Bde less one bn inMALEME sector are inForce Reserve . They will be administered by respective sector Comds, but will be kept concentrated and ready to move at short notice on orders from Force HQ. Comd 1 Welch will be in close touch with Comd 4 NZ Bde.General Freyberg hoped ultimately to have a full brigade group in each sector and another in reserve.
At
In the
It is evident from a message sent by Documents I, No. 395.
None the less, there were pressing problems of all kinds. By
no means the least was that of maintenance. A force of 30,000
British troops and 11,000 Greek, together with 15,000 Italian
prisoners and a population of 400,000, which even in peacetime
could not be fed from the island's own resources and which had
not yet got in its harvest, had somehow to be supplied. Moreover,
if the inadequacies of the defence were to be built up, additional
warlike stores and reinforcements had to be got in. The various
other pressures on the
But between 20,000 and 30,000 tons a month were required to
maintain the force.
Moreover, there were still further difficulties even when ships
were got to the dockside. In the face of air attack the task of
unloading was a dangerous one and volunteer stevedores from the
Australian and New Zealand engineer units did most valuable
Despite all these difficulties, by the time battle began 60,000
rations and 10,000 gallons of POL Petrol, oil, and lubricants. Report on Supply and Transport Services in
Another serious problem was that of signals communications.
The rapid increase in the garrison put a far greater strain on an
already inadequate system. What could be done was done. The
signals of MNBDO amalgamated with those of 52 LAA Regiment
and took over the
Medical arrangements were another difficulty. The only
equipped units were
A further worry was the presence of large numbers of troops
who had been evacuated from
Most of the New Zealand troops concerned were of the specialist
type and belonged to the artillery, engineers, or service corps. At
Finally there were the problems arising from the presence of the Greeks themselves. Not only had the Greek civil population to be provided for. The 11,000 Greek troops on the island had to be integrated into the defence scheme. They were for the most part untrained, ill-equipped, and unorganised. They had no transport, and they were armed with five different types of rifle and an average of less than 20 rounds of ammunition per man. A Greek army headquarters had to be formed and a General Staff. And Freyberg had to drain off from his own inadequate forces officers and NCOs to cope as best they might with the language difficulty and to try and help bring the force into shape.
Nor did the presence of the King himself make matters much
easier; for his personal safety had to be provided for and was
to prove a continual source of worry to See Appendix II.
From the first it had been apparent that the garrison's deficiencies
were more in material and supplies than in men. When, therefore,
General Wavell cabled on 7 May offering to make 16 Infantry
Brigade available if shipping allowed but suggesting that it would
probably be best to equip the unarmed troops already there,
None the less some reinforcements did arrive before the battle
and it will be convenient to summarise these here. On 10 May
came 1 Light Troop RA with four 3·7-inch howitzers; this troop
was put under command of 4 NZ Brigade. The same day arrived
the main body of MNBDO: HQ
A second echelon of MNBDO arrived on 15 May, consisting of 23 LAA Battery, without guns, the HQ of 11 S/L Regiment, and a searchlight battery.
In his reply to General Wavell Formerly CO 64 Med Regt RA.
In the same message ad hoc forces.
But, apart from these reinforcements in weapons and more or
less specialist personnel, the chief addition to the garrison consisted
of
Wavell had first mentioned these to War Diary C Sqn, 3 H and WD B Sqn, 7 RTR. Lt Roy Farran, Winged Dagger (Collins,
Of the light tanks six were sent to
In the Greek evacuation the prime concern of the
Such defensive measures on the ground as were possible were
hurried forward. As there were no military forces to spare from the
garrison for the landing ground at
By 13 May Report on Air Operations in
No one, even of the troops whom this decision left without air
support, would dispute that it was just; for if stronger forces
could not be put up against the A letter from the Air Historical Branch of the Air Ministry, dated
While in these preparatory days the tiny air force in
The Later Vice-Admiral Sir Anthony Morse, KBE, CB, DSO; Flag Officer,
Besides this, however, it had to take its own measures against
the expected attack; for the garrison on land depended on it for
dealing with invasion by sea. The most probable date for invasion
was thought at first to be 17 May. As
The most likely landing places were thought to be Composition of naval forces from 15 to 20 May: Force A: 2 battleships, 5 destroyers. Force B: 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers. Force C: 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers. Force D: 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers. Two islands west of Queen Elizabeth and Barham, west of Warspite and
Valiant, the aircraft carrier Formidable (with only four serviceable
aircraft), the cruisers Orion and Ajax, and a number of destroyers.
The forces at sea would carry out sweeps at night, a submarine was
to operate round Lemnos, the minelayer Abdiel was to lay
mines between Cephallonia and Levkas,
Preparations of 2 NZ Division: 30 April–19 May
With
On the tactical side there were the dispositions to be considered.
The background of these is best considered in the light of
Brigadier Puttick's appreciation, drawn up after the event but no
doubt a true reflection of his views at this time. Airborne attack
was to be expected any time after 14 May. Landing from the
sea would follow. To control
Making the initial positions as strong as possible was the more necessary for three reasons: for movement the defence would have to rely largely on its legs and, therefore, once on the move would not be able to take with it weapons that could not be manhandled; entrenching tools were so scarce that once prepared positions were left new ones would be very difficult to dig; the enemy's air superiority was so great that any movement by day would be subject not only to observation but to so much interference as to make it virtually impossible.
None the less troops must be made available for immediate
counter-attack against the landing areas, and at the same time
be far enough away not to come under the heavy fire to which these
landing areas were bound to be initially subjected. At the same
time these same troops, or other troops, must be so disposed as to
be able to protect the coast between
Besides
By the time Brigadier Puttick was able to get out and reconnoitre
his sector on 1 May some defensive pattern already existed. Fifth
Brigade was disposed between Since the general picture of the dispositions was to be settled within a few days into
its more or less final form, details are left to that stage.
The immediate result of Puttick's reconnaissance was two
important modifications to the existing situation.
Puttick's reconnaissance had also convinced him that the main
body of 5 Brigade was lying too far back. Moreover, as Brigadier
Hargest pointed out,
Already on 30 April Lieutenant-Colonel
The next two or three days were taken up with moves that arose
out of these modifications. Fourth Brigade moved into its reserve
position with HQ at
A detailed account of final dispositions is at pp. 68–9. See also map, p. 158.
A further development was the decision to close 5 Brigade up
towards
The same day brought two Greek regiments at The order, like many other contemporary references, calls them battalions. But so
far as their rudimentary organisation went they seem to have been regiments of two
battalions each.
The publication of this order, which would reach recipients only
4 May, did little more than confirm arrangements and dispositions
Operation Order No. 5, 5 May.
The Division consisted of 4 Brigade, 5 Brigade,
Of these, 4 Brigade was to remain in
The
These dispositions may fairly be said to have been dictated by three main considerations: the nature of the expected attack, the forces available for defence, and the ground to be covered.
To take the first one first: the expected attack might come by
air or sea separately or, in the worst case, simultaneously or close
together. It followed that
For this purpose, to move to the next point, only the equivalent of two brigades was available, since 4 Brigade was to form Force Reserve. Yet some reserve had to be held back for immediate counter-attack at divisional level.
Finally, the area to be defended was determined on its eastern
limit by the presence of General Weston's
In short, the garrison had somehow to be so disposed as to
cover
In the circumstances Puttick could claim to have made a fair
attempt at the impossible. The weaknesses in the scheme—a single
line of communication towards
Although the main pattern of the defence was now established some important developments were still to take place, and it will be best to summarise them first from the divisional point of view before going on to treat the sectors in detail.
The most important developments were in the For the role of
The 6th Greek Regiment by 13 May had already been placed in
a position south of For a more detailed account of this line see p. 70 and map facing p. 133.
On 13 May also was issued NZ Division Operation Instruction
No. 6. This attempted to meet the weakness of organisation by
forming a new brigade, 10 Brigade. It would come into existence
at six o'clock next morning and would consist of
This new arrangement meant that the whole front line from the
coast through the
Perhaps as a final effort towards getting cohesion on this front
Infantry Brigadier (
There was one other weakness in the defensive system that gave
Puttick great concern at this time. This was the ground west of
But before The invasion was expected for any day on or after 14 May.
It is now time to examine the three brigade sectors in rather closer detail and to notice any significant changes that took place in their strengths or dispositions between this period and the opening of the battle. We may begin with 4 Brigade which, as has been seen, had begun to move back into reserve on 2 May.
Though 4 Brigade, as mobile reserve to
Then on 12 May 4 Brigade lost
Fourth Brigade Operation Instruction No. 7 of 16 May gives
a clear idea of the brigade's composition, task and dispositions. See map facing p. 133.
The brigade's counter-attack role was now definitely stated: it
might have to counter-attack towards
In accordance with this view of their probable role the battalions were warned that, though they must be dug in against air attack and be ready to fight from their positions, they must not open fire on aircraft unless located and attacked or unless aircraft were about to land. In this way they would avoid being pinned down too soon. The artillery likewise, though sited to cover the beaches, was told that its primary role was counter-attack and quick movement. And a touch of optimism, if not fantasy, is introduced with the statement that troop-carrying transport was available to lift the whole brigade.
These orders were further amplified by 4 Brigade Operation
Instruction No. 8, issued now for Maj-Gen
The only further developments on the brigade front between
now and the opening of battle were of minor importance. B
Reports by Capt C. L. Pleasants and
The moves of 3 May See p. 56 and map facing p. 97.
Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew took advantage of the airfield's
proximity to fly low over Neither of these attempts to cope with the problem was practical. 23 Bn's responsibility was later cancelled, no doubt because it was seen to be fantastic. The observation
post was not heard from after 20 May—no matter for surprise.
Hargest was still concerned, as well he might be, at the mixed
nature of the command at
On 12 May there was set up in the brigade area a Field
Punishment Centre that was to play later a not unimportant part.
Situated just north-east of Report by Lt Roach.
Even at this late stage able-bodied men were still prized and
so when 5 Brigade Band arrived on 14 May, though as a band
its presence seemed untimely, its members were promptly given
rifles and formed into a defence platoon for Brigade HQ under
the Bandmaster, Lieutenant
At this time the attack was expected for about 16 or 17 May and
the tempo of digging and wiring was hotter than ever. Brigadier
Puttick arrived on 15 May to spur the work on, and Brigadicr
Hargest stopped all leave to the same end. By now he felt some
confidence in what had been done so far. ‘We should now be
ready to receive the enemy; our defences are nearly as good as
we can make them but material promised us has not come to hand—
wire and carriers, etc. With it and a few days we shall be ready.’ Brig Hargest's diary.
To the troops on the ground without access to high-level
intelligence reports the signs of invasion impending were becoming
plain.
But while the troops speculated about when the attack would
come and promised themselves revenge for
The artillery situation improved a little in this time of waiting.
The first step was the organisation in the second week of May of
two troops of gunners from the unarmed men of
A third troop (C Troop under Captain See map facing p. 97, for dispositions. Colonel Frowen, CRA
For C Troop the problem of observation posts did not arise.
A and B Troops were sited for indirect fire. Eventually the two
troop commanders selected an OP on Point 107, in
The composition, locations, and role of 5 Brigade are all set out in 5 Brigade's Operation Instruction No. 4 of 18 May. As there were no important developments between then and battle, a summary of the document will give a fair picture of the situation when battle began.
Besides the four infantry battalions (21, 22, 23, and 28 Maori)
there were under command
In support, but still not under command, were a troop and a
half of 156 LAA Battery (six guns), one troop of 7 Australian LAA
Battery (four guns), and a troop of C HAA Battery, RM (two
3-inch guns). And the
The tasks of the brigade were threefold, and in view of the importance of subsequent events in the sector the relevant part of 5 Brigade Operation Instruction No. 4 may be quoted in full:
-
5 Inf Bde will maintain a defensive line running east and west from
Platanias TavronitisRiver, with special regard to the defence ofMaleme -
In the event of the enemy making an airborne or seaborne attack on any part of the area, to counter-attack and destroy him immediately.
-
The whole essence of the bde's work is a spirited defence.
The order then deals with the method by which these tasks were
to be carried out. The 28th Battalion was to remain round
The 21st Battalion was to remain in position ready, should the
enemy organise movement from west of the Tavronitis, to move up
to the line of the river from the left flank of
The primary task of In fact, Lt-Col Andrew did not feel able to spare a company from manning his large
perimeter and so had no reserve company. See p. 98.
The order also laid down the task of the MG Company: the
platoon with
One troop of
The order also announced that twenty Bren carriers were
expected, of which it was hoped to give four to The full number never reached 5 Bde. Those with 22 Bn had no opportunity for
useful action and had to be disabled and left behind when the battalion withdrew.
None seem ever to have reached 21 Bn. Those with 23 Bn were used for communical
tions and transport of wounded and those with 5 Bde seem to have been similarly used.
The order also stressed the necessity of thorough concealment in the preliminary stages and of controlled fire against enemy aircraft only after troops' landings had obviously become imminent. Any lull in aircraft attack was to be used for mopping up.
It will be seen from these orders and from an inspection of the
map that the brigade plan was dictated by the dual character
of its task: the defence against invasion by sea and invasion by air.
The threat of the former made Hargest dispose his forces in such
a way that every part of the long coastline between
Tenth Brigade came into existence on 14 May and grouped
together under command 20 Bn, however, was operationally at the disposal of Division and, on 13 May, had
been relieved by 6 Gk Regt, moving to a reserve position.
The role of 10 Brigade was to hold a defensive position, facing
west and running from the cape of Kolimvithra southwards via
The names
At this time 1 Battalion of
Between 7 and 8 May See p. 79.
Reorganisation was therefore necessary and was complete by 15 May, the force—from now on officially called the Composite Battalion—being now much weaker in numbers and even more mixed in character, the subdivision into three battalions being tacitly dropped.
The command after the departure of Major Oakes devolved upon
Major H. M. Lewis. The force kept its tripartite organisation, the
sub-units being: RMT Group or 1 Company, commanded by
Captain This bare statement of the theoretical organisation ought not to be allowed to give
an exaggerated impression of coherence: the tie between the components of Sprosen's
group was very loose and he does not seem to have known that the two ASC groups
were under his command. And, in general, there was not enough time before battle
or any opportunity during battle for the battalion's organisation to function effectively.
The RMT Group was responsible for the sector extending from
the sea to See map, p. 158.
Work had been going on in these positions ever since Oakes
Force had been taken over; and indeed work had been done before
then by 1 Welch, on
On the left of the line occupied by the
The supply of ammunition improved a few days before the battle but not all of it was distributed to the companies before battle began.
The position of
One more unit in 10 Brigade remains to be discussed, the
Divisional Cavalry. This unit had moved to the area of Lake
The account of the situation in the brigade sectors is now
complete. But a word must be said about the position of 1 Greek
Regiment at Kisamos
Bedding soon had his force organised into two battalions,
A and B. A Battalion, with 500 men and 300 rifles, held the
sector from the Factory as far as the Beach Road but excluding it,
and from the coast to the main road, including it. B Battalion,
with the same number of men and rifles, held the sector from the
Petrol Dump to White Road, which it included, and from Rock
Point south to the Platanos road. It was also B Battalion's task
to destroy the petrol dump if a landing were successful and to
hold the pass across the hills to the west. See map, p. 290.
In addition to these two battalions there was a mobile reserve
formed by the New Zealand party and a group of the local
gendarmerie, who were well armed, well officered, and well trained—
‘worth the two battalions put together in action’. Report by Maj Bedding. Bedding wrote: ‘There was a military college at Kalembare
some 18 miles away with some 400 Officer-Cadets in training for both
Ammunition was a great difficulty, and since supplies that were
obtained did not fit the rifles the troops had only three rounds a
man. The same was true of the ammunition that was obtained
for some antique machine guns acquired from
The foregoing may suffice for a general picture of the position in the brigade sectors. But how these would fare once battle was joined largely depended on the organisation in the rear. For on this they had to rely both before and during the battle for their supplies, their information, and their orders. To complete the picture of the general situation of the New Zealand Division as it developed up to the outbreak of battle, therefore, some space must be devoted to the activities not only of Divisional HQ but of its supporting troops and services and the problems with which they had to struggle.
So few were the guns that the account already given of the
artillery under the various brigades need scarcely be amplified. Nor
need we dwell further on the engineers with 5 Brigade. But
something must be said of NZE Headquarters itself and of 5 Field
Park Company. The former, under Major Hanson, MM,
Apart from NZE HQ and the group with 5 Brigade, the only
other New Zealand engineers to arrive from Rodi for Egypt
on 9 May. The 5th Field Park Company had a preliminary period
For one further important task volunteers were recruited from
all the New Zealand engineer units. As air raids increased in
intensity it became more and more difficult to ensure sufficient
unloading in
The organisation of even an approximately efficient signals
system was not the least of the problems that the Division had to
face at the outset. Here the difficulty was not so much one of
men as of equipment. The supply of this was so meagre that
upwards of a hundred men were sent back to Egypt with the Rodi;
for, had they remained, they would have had to be used as infantry,
a role for which their specialised training both unfitted them and
made them too valuable.
By 3 May those that were to remain had been organised into
two main parties. One party, 45 men under Major Maj C. R. Ambury, m.i.d.; Paremata; born
This organisation was not established without struggle and to establish it at all heroic efforts had to be made at making do. Its weaknesses were considerable and serious, partly because it was so difficult to replace scarce material once it had been put out of action and partly because of the conditions in which the battle was to be fought. These things will become sufficiently evident when the time comes to treat of the fighting.
Little has been said as yet of the medical services, and this
seems an appropriate place for a brief sketch of their development
up to the beginning of the battle. When the first troops were
being evacuated from
The evacuation of
It is only the New Zealand units that concern us here. But
it should be remarked of the other new arrivals that they, like the
New Zealand units, were all very badly off for all kinds of
equipment and brought with them only what their devoted members
had been able to carry out of
With the New Zealand units had come the matron and 51 nurses
of 1 NZ General Hospital. As soon as they arrived they put
themselves at the disposal of 7 General Hospital, which in these
early days was overwhelmingly busy with the flood of wounded
from the Greek campaign. But it was clear that for all their
courage and usefulness Ionia on 29 April and
The 5th Field Ambulance soon after its arrival moved to Ay
Marina and set up an MDS to serve 5 Brigade, 4 Field Hygiene
Section moving with it. Here both remained until 17 May, when
they moved to a more forward position at
The 6th Field Ambulance had at first established two MDSs,
one at
The New Zealand force also supplied help to the higher
organisation. On 7 May Colonel
Wherever one turns, in fact, at this stage of the preparations for
battle one encounters this same problem, supply. We have already
seen how much it governed what could be done in the forward
sectors, and it was as prominent in the perplexities of Division
as it was in the minds of those at
At first supplies of clothing and blankets had been at least as
urgently required as supplies of more warlike stores. But with
the establishment of a clothing dump at
As early as 30 April Detail Issue Depot—moved to
The arrival of such artillery as the Division was to get has already been dealt with. On 4 May the Division received its allotment of 2800 coils of wire, 5800 pickets and 200 shovels, and these were shared out to battalions as fairly as might be, the supply to be supplemented by later allotments, of which enough did reach the various sectors for each unit to have the protection of some wiring.
Hopes were high at one stage for 35 Bren carriers for the
divisional sector. But an untimely raid on
The weakness in transport was to some extent remedied by the allotment to the sector on 17 May of 36 15-cwt. trucks and seven motor cycles. The latter were of use mainly for despatch riders, while of the former four were retained at Divisional HQ and the others distributed. They proved of very great use at awkward moments in the battle but were, of course, too few to make the troops independent of marching.
In any battle much of what happens is explicable only if we take
into account not only the strength and plans of each side but also
what each side took to be the strength and plans of the other.
This is the province of military intelligence. It has already been
shown that in
In fact, if inference from unit war diaries is safe, the enemy's
general intention was broadly known at a very early stage. On
30 April the war diaries of 5 Brigade, HQ NZA, and Divisional Operation Order No. 5, 5 May. Operation Instruction, No. 3, 4 May.
Nor was what had already been learnt about the methods of
enemy paratroops neglected.
So far as 5 Brigade was concerned at least, these notes were accompanied by a visit from Brigadier Puttick, who again dwelt on the probable character of the attack and warned everyone to be alert and ready to counter-attack.
The attack by this time was expected for any day between 17 and
19 May by an intelligence report communicated to the battalions on
the 16th. According to it the enemy forces available were Names of enemy formations and units are in italics.11 Corps
and 22 German Air Force Division;
May the 17th came and went without invasion. Lest anyone
become optimistically sceptical 5 Brigade warned its units next day
that the enemy was nearly ready with his preparations. But 18 May
also passed without attack. When on 19 May it still had not come
there were some among the more sanguine, both in the front line
and back in
It will be seen from all this that the nature and strength of the invasion was not only appreciated with remarkable accuracy, but that by the time the battle was to begin there was little chance that even the obscurest fatigue man could be ignorant of what he was about to face. Thus whatever else the enemy might have in his favour he would not be able to claim surprise; nor should the defence be able to use it as excuse. Unluckily, however, though an accurate appreciation of enemy intentions is always invaluable and was so on this occasion, its full value largely depends on the defence's having time and material with which to prepare counter-measures. And in these respects, as has already been shown and as will appear only too often in the sequel, the defence was bitterly handicapped.
Little now remains to be said of Divisional HQ itself. From its formation on 30 April with Brigadier Puttick in command and Lieutenant-Colonel Gentry as his GSO 1, it had been trying to grapple with a thousand problems and at the same time build itself out of little or nothing into the smooth-running engine needed to operate a fighting machine. The main features of this process will have already emerged from the narrative so far. The machine in action we shall see in the subsequent story. But for the sake of tidiness it will be convenient to give at this point a short account of its dealing with one of the problems that dogged its early days: that of evacuating the troops who would not be required in action.
At first it had been the understanding at WD A/Q 2 NZ Div.
No records of the conferences in which the problem must have
been discussed are extant, however, and the underlying policy is
best inferred from what in fact took place. The first step was a
warning order sent out to the brigades on 1 May that all unarmed
artillerymen would be under three hours' notice to move from
2 May. And on the following day most of those in this category
began to make their way to Transit Camp A; while the Divisional
Troops Supply Officer and a small advance party went to
On 8 May there were further movements of unarmed or specialist
troops towards the transit camp, notably of the Divisional
Ammunition Company from
Embarkation took place on the two following days on the Rodi
and Belray, which sailed on 9 May, and on the City of Canterbury,
which sailed on 10 May. These three vessels evacuated the unarmed
men of Nieuw Zeeland on 14 May carrying the Divisional
Ammunition Company and all the remaining elements of Divisional
Supply, except 1 Echelon which was left in the transit camp and
2 Echelon which had stayed with 10 Brigade. This ship also
arrived safely in Egypt. As it turned out, there were to be no
further evacuations, and on 19 May the men of 1 Echelon
Divisional Supply were organised for defence under Captain W. S.
Page of 44 RTR, along with other miscellaneous troops left in the
transit camp.
German Preparations
All the features that made 12 12 Army Strategic Survey puts it: ‘If
the English were driven from it the Constanza-Army's Campaign in the Balkans: A Strategic Survey.
Indeed, on General Greiner's General Halder's diary.Entwurfe, Vol. 1, p. 167.
The British occupation of Col-Gen Alexander Löhr; then aged 56; C-in-C Report by 4 Air Fleet, which was responsible for the operations
against 11 Air Corps, and the GOC of 7 Air Division. And on
15 April as a result of these General Löhr, 4 Air Fleet,
submitted a plan to Goering who in turn submitted it to
In the preliminary discussions with Goering, Student Col-Gen Kurt Student; then aged 51; GOC Interrogation of General Student, Assault Regiment, 20 May
On 25 April
At this stage Commanded by General (later Field Marshal) Wolfram Freiherr von Richtofen; then
aged 46; GOC 22 Airborne Division was to be used; but on
28 April it was decided that, to avoid delay to the invasion of
Seventh Air
Division would supply the paratroops, and 11 Air Corps would be
used as it was not required for the first stages of the invasion of
8 Air Corps,
There were difficulties, however. Greek airfields and ground
organisation were inadequate and would have been so even without
such damage as the withdrawing British force had been able to
inflict. The trained units which would normally have been
responsible for creating that efficiency on the ground without which
efficiency in the air is impossible were earmarked for Fourth
Air Fleet, therefore, was dependent on civilian and prisoner-of-war
labour for much of what had to be done.
Then, again, the meagre Greek railways had been made useless
by the Germans' own bombers or by the retiring British. Sea
traffic was the only practicable alternative for supply; for the roads
were poor and the bridges often blown, while all air transport that
could be spared from
The individual formations also had their problems. Eighth Air
Corps was to provide fighter and bomber support for the attack.
But while getting itself into a state of readiness it had other tasks:
protection of supply ships, sea reconnaissance, and preparatory raids
on Crete. Its success in these tasks was considerable, though perhaps
less than might be expected when the British weakness in aircraft
and AA is taken into account.
Unlike 8 Air Corps, 11 Air Corps was able to give all its attention
to preparations for the main attack. As it would have to carry
through the actual landing of glider troops, paratroops, and
airborne forces, considerable preliminary concentrations were
7 Air Division, the chief
component, was not in
The Commander of Lt-Gen Wilhelm Suessmann; then aged 50; served in 7 Air Division, Lieutenant-General Suessmann,Bluecher in Oslo Fiord; killed when his glider crashed
on the island of Aegina, 2 Parachute Regiment which he was to
have ready for an attack on Lemnos. This proved unnecessary, and
in the event the regiment was used for the descent on the 3 Parachute Regiment, near
On 20 April the rest of the division was still in 11 Air Corps. Advance elements left
for Roumania within the next week and by 8 May the whole force
was concentrated there. Thence it moved by road and under
12 Army command down to
The normal infantry component—as distinct from paratroops—of
11 Air Corps, 5 Mountain Division and elements of 6 Mountain
Division which were already in 5 Armoured Division, by an engineer battalion
and two AA units.
Under command of 11 Air Corps also were nine bomber groups
specially adapted for transport duties and one for glider operations.
These groups, after action in
While 4 Air Fleet and its two corps were busy with their
preparations, the sea component of the invasion also had its
preliminary measures to take. Admiral South-East's main task was
to get together the vessels which would ferry arms, men, and supplies
to the support of the troops landed by air. To this end he
succeeded in assembling two flotillas of motor vessels or caiques
which were to carry the first wave of heavy arms and supplies; two
steamer flotillas which were to take further heavy weapons, tanks
and AA; and a number of German and Italian minesweepers.
By 14 May the troops had been assembled and were ready for
action. But the ground and supply organisation without which
they could not function was not yet complete. The first necessity
was the seizure, allotment, and preparation of airfields. Those on
11 Air Corps getting 8 Air Corps.
The High Command had estimated that the battle would be
of ten days' duration. Major-General Seibt, in charge of supplies at
11 Air Corps, accordingly planned for the provision of 2,500,000
gallons of fuel and lubricant, a sufficient quantity of rations, medical
equipment, jumping gear, and the thousand and one other items
required. All this had to be brought from bases in
German military and air intelligence had been active in this
interim. As soon as the conquest of 8 Air Corps were ordered to keep continuous watch on
shipping movements round the island, to discover what shipping
was in the ports, and to locate the 11 Air Corps, was to ascertain the
whereabouts of airfields, fortifications, artillery positions, and troop
locations. At the same time agents were set to work to get similar
information and prisoners taken in
As a result the Germans built up the following picture. The
garrison they appreciated to be the equivalent of a British division
of two infantry brigades, one artillery regiment, and an unknown
number of troops evacuated from
The three main airfields were identified without difficulty, though
the number of aircraft using them was overestimated. Anti-aircraft defences were considered to be strong round
The attitude of the Cretan population was also of some interest.
The High Command, with a characteristic German misjudgment
of immaterial forces, was inclined to believe that the Greeks either
sympathised with the Axis or, for the sake of better terms, would
at least be neutral. According to ‘Operation Crete’ (Battle Report of 11 Air Corps an attempt was even
made on 10 May to make contact with pacifist circles on the island
through the intelligence service of Admiral Canaris.
The plan that lay behind these preparations was not reached
without argument. At first two alternatives were canvassed, one
favoured by 4 Air Fleet and the other by 11 Air Corps. The first
favoured concentration of both 7 Air Division and 5 Mountain
Division on the 8 Air Corps to devote all its effort to the protection of the ground
forces in a single area.
General Student, however, favoured simultaneous descents at the
seven most important points, of which four were
There were, of course, disadvantages in both proposals. If the
first plan met difficulties and the attack was held up in the hills,
the defenders would have the opportunity to use their airfields
in the east of the island. But the second plan had the weaknesses
implicit in any dispersion of forces; and not only would the troops
on the ground be divided into a number of different and widely
separated groups which could not give one another mutual support,
but the air effort of 8 Air Corps would be divided as well.
The High Command of the 8 Air Corps could bring its full weight to
bear at one time in each sector, while all the airfields would be
denied to the defence.
Available to carry out this plan were the following:
-
11 Air Corps Assault Regiment 7 Air Divisionwith its three parachute regiments and divisional troops;5 Mountain Divisionwith three mountain regiments (one from6 Mountain Division); and corps troops consisting of an armoured battalion, a motor-cycle battalion, and two AA batteries. -
8 Air Corps Also under command
4 Air Fleet were aircraft for minelaying in theSuez Canal , sea reconnaissance and sea rescue. -
Admiral South-East. Under his command were two flotillas of motor vessels and two of steamers; two destroyers; twelve torpedo boats; speedboats and minesweepers.
Eleventh Air Corps had a total of about 22,750 men available
for landing. Of these, 750 men from the élite Assault Regiment
were to land by glider, 10,000 were to land by parachute, 5000 were
to be airborne, and 7000 were to go by sea (5 Mountain Division). The
various transport groups of aircraft gave a total of about 500.
And in addition to these were 70 or 80 gliders with an appropriate
number of Junkers 52 adapted to tow them.
To support these 8 Air Corps had a total of about 650 aircraft:
280 bombers, 150 dive-bombers, 90 twin-engined fighters,
90 single-engined fighters, and 40 reconnaissance aircraft.
The roles of the formations were laid down in accordance with
the general plan. Eleventh Air Corps was to operate in two waves,
one in the morning and one in the afternoon. The first wave was
to occupy the airfield at 11 Air
Corps would be ashore.
Eighth Air Corps had the tasks of preliminary air reconnaissance
and softening attacks. On the morning of the actual invasion it
was to renew these preparatory attacks, destroy what remained of
11 Air Corps and
support them in their ground fighting. Finally, it was to cover
the seaborne troops and destroy any British naval forces in Cretan
waters.
The preparatory attack by List of ships sunk or damaged in 8 Air Corps had already begun on
14 May with the object of destroying the York in WarshipsSalviaWidnesKos 23
In addition five motor torpedo boats were sunk by aircraft, destroyed, or beached in
For the main battle on 20 May 8 Air Corps had its timetable
worked out with the greatest possible precision and detail. Fighters
and bombers were to protect the approach of the transport aircraft,
their unloading of paratroops and their return, against attack from
the air. British ground defences were to be kept down and
weakened by bombing, dive-bombing, and strafing until just before
the first invasion wave arrived. And special instructions were
issued for co-operation thereafter between ground forces and
fighters. The whole complicated operation was worked out to the
most meticulous standards of German staff planning.
The ships under Admiral South-East also had a role which was
considered essential. For it was thought that communications
between the mainland and
The preparations for mounting this formidable assault took longer than was originally expected, and so the intended date of 15 May had first to be changed to 17 May and then to the 20th. By the evening of 19 May all arrangements were complete, the paratroops duly briefed were bivouacked not far from the aircraft which were to drop them next day on the other side of the water, the aircraft themselves were all in readiness, and only the dawn had still to be waited for.
First Day of Battle: 20 May
Maleme and 22 Battalion
The dawn of Tuesday, 20 May, like many earlier dawns on
Nevertheless, it was the day. Already by half past seven the
attack from the air was intense enough for those in the vital areas
between
The cry of ‘Gliders!’ had hardly passed from mouth to mouth when the gliders themselves had circled swiftly in and disappeared from the view of all but those who overlooked their landing places, and who now, with no time to waste on wonder, looked down the sights of their weapons to see if a bullet fired had reached its mark or to fix the target for a second.
One portent succeeded another. Hard on the heels of the gliders
came the Junkers 52 transports—some of them already hovering
Even as they dropped they were within range and the crackle
of rifle fire and Bren guns rose to a crescendo Wildly waving their
legs, some already firing their Schmeissers, the parachutists came
down, in the terraced vineyards, crashing through the peaceful olive
boughs, in the yards of houses, on roofs, in the open fields where
the short barley hid them. Many found graves where they found
earth. Others, ridding themselves of their harness, crept cautiously
in search of comrades, only to meet enemies. East of the airfield
or in
These were the enemy of the first wave, that attacking the sector
from Eleventh Air Corps had been divided into
three groups:
The Gen Eugen Meindl; then aged 49; Comd Assault Regt; GOC 13 Air Corps, A group consisted of four squadrons, each of 12 Ju52s together with additional aircraft
for HQ personnel, supply, and reconnaissance.
The plan of the enemy attack in the
If the landing places tabulated are compared with the map it will
be seen that the main weight of the Assault Regiment was to be so
distributed round the airfield that a heavy converging attack could
quickly be brought to bear. The plan also allowed for exploitation
by the glider parties of their superior speed in coming into action.
Thus Major Braun's glider party, landing just south of the
Tavronitis bridge, was to seize it and prevent its destruction. It
would then be used to bring up the paratroops landed farther west.
Similarly 3 Company of Major Koch's party, landing at the
Tavronitis mouth, was to destroy the AA positions there and thus
ease the way for the transport aircraft. And 4 Company, if
successful in taking Point 107, would have secured the feature which
Since the paratroops would require more time and freedom to
form up, their landing places were evidently intended to be far
enough away from the defence to provide these conditions.
II Battalion, south of
Similarly IV Battalion, landing west of the Tavronitis and out
of range to the main defences, would be quickly available to give
artillery support for the main attack. Protection from the south
would be provided by 16 Company, which was to move towards
Palaiokhora as soon as it was safely landed. The objectives of the flank guards may seem odd. The most likely explanation is
that the enemy feared that reinforcements might come by
The enemy also assumed that the area east of the airfield would
be as clear of defenders as that west of it proved to be. Thus by
dropping III Battalion there he hoped that it would be able to
form up without difficulty, send its main body to attack the airfield
from the west, and send out other forces east to make contact with
Such, then, was the plan for To reconcile the two time systems, all German times as given in enemy sources will
hereafter have an hour added.
The map of intended and actual landing areas will reveal the
strength and the weaknesses of this plan. III Battalion, landing east
of the airfield, was bound to get into trouble with
The enemy had, however, the advantage of one circumstance that must have been a blessing, partly unconvenanted. This was the condition of the AA defence on the airfield, which the plan reveals to have been the main objective.
The airfield was defended by the six mobile Bofors and the four
static Bofors of 156 LAA Battery RA, and 7 LAA Battery RAA; and
the two 3-inch AA guns of C HAA Battery,
The two 3-inch guns were sited on a hill about 300 feet high and had difficulty in engaging aircraft which flew in at heights of from 300 to 600 feet—a task for which guns of this calibre are in any case unsuited.
Finally, there was some confusion in the orders—the absence of
local unity of command has already been mentioned—if we are to
judge from the various reports and war diaries. The most probable
explanation seems to come from Captain Johnson
For the ground troops, then, in the general area of 5 Brigade
the air bombardment began shortly after six o'clock in the morning,
varying in intensity in different places but reaching its maximum
on Report by Lt-Col Andrew. Various times are given and no doubt are approximately true for particular areas.
But 7.30 a.m. may be taken as a useful average.
Breakfast had hardly finished, however, when the second and more intense phase of the air attack broke out, about ten minutes to eight. The whole of the area occupied by 5 Brigade forward battalions was savagely worked over; and although the airfield itself, for obvious reasons, was not bombed, its perimeter took the heaviest pounding of all, until the rising clouds of dust and smoke, themselves visible for miles, made visibility in the immediate neighbourhood very restricted.
It was not only the bombers that were so busy. To the men on the ground the air seemed full of fighters and fighter-bombers and many a man that day felt as if particular planes had been told off to give him particular attention. Movement outside cover was so difficult that in the course of a hundred yards a runner might have to go to ground a dozen times. And even within deep gullies or covered by the kindly olives a man outside his slit trench stood more than a sporting chance of being hit by the hailing machine-gun bullets.
While this attack was still at its maximum, and under cover
of it, the first gliders came in to land. Both their numbers and the
exact time of their landing are difficult to ascertain precisely,
because the defending troops were prevented by the dust or the
rough character of the ground from exact observation and because
memories differ. New Zealand eye-witnesses say between forty
and one hundred came down in the
Eleventh Air Corps states that one group of gliders landed at
the time ordered—by our reckoning 8.15 a.m.—and another a
quarter of an hour later. Reports from
The main landing place, the bed of the dry Tavronitis, was well chosen. Much of it was dead ground to the troops on the slopes above, and in some cases the crews—ten to a glider—were able to form up and either go straight towards their objectives or take up positions on the high ground west of the river. One crew landed more or less on top of a machine-gun post and destroyed it. Others, as will be seen, were able to put the AA guns on the west edge of the airfield out of action. Those that landed east and south were fewer and less dangerous.
Nothing in the German orders suggests that the paratroops were
to be landed later than the gliders. The same zero hour is given
for the whole Assault Regiment. It is probable enough, however,
that within the regiment different units had different times; and it
is possible that the glider troops, whose specific tasks may well have
had a time priority, were landed earlier than the paratroops and
were able to give them some covering fire. At all events the
bombing had not ended and it was still only a quarter past eight
when the big Junkers 52 began to drop their loads, each between
twelve and fifteen men from heights of from 300 to 600 feet; and
west, south, and east of the airfield the first wave of paratroops
landed.
Paratroops, like glider crews, landed with weapons. But whereas
the glider troops could go into action as a formed body as soon as
they got themselves and their heavier weapons out of the glider,
the parachutists landed as individuals, depending for the most part
on the Schmeissers and grenades that they carried, and needed time
before they could collect and fight as a team. Their heavier
equipment, moreover, had to be got from separately dropped
canisters and so there was an initial period of vulnerability—perhaps
ten minutes, though not always as long. The defence took full
advantage of this and the still more vulnerable moments before
landing, when the parachutist still dangled and wriggled in his
parachute and floated downwards. All accounts agree on the
slaughter that took place at this stage. Nevertheless, enough
survived, particularly to the west of the airfield and out of small-arms range, for a strong attack to develop quickly against the
In the broad sense the pattern of the enemy landings followed the plan already tabulated, though exceptions will be noted; but the collisions with the defenders that followed soon forced many adjustments to the original programme.
The gliders of Lieutenant Plessen's 3 Company came down at the
river mouth, according to plan, and overwhelmed the AA crews
Lt R. B. Sinclair, who commanded 22 Bn's 15 Platoon on this front, says that the crews
of the four Bofors in his area had rifles but no ammunition, and that their commander
had rejected his proposal to put them in positions where they would have tied in with
his defences. Capt Johnson, OC C Coy, says that although these four guns may have
been knocked out by glider troops the other AA guns in the area kept on firing till
guns or crews or both were knocked out.
Major Koch, with the HQ of I Battalion and 4 Company, had less success. Their gliders landed along the south-east and south-west slopes of Point 107 and the crews could not give one another the necessary support. They lost heavily to the defenders dug in above them and Koch himself was severely wounded. Only remnants made their way to the area of the road bridge where they joined the main body. The ‘tented camps’ on which they had been directed were found to be more or less empty.
The nine gliders of Braun's detachment—carrying a party from
Regimental HQ and elements of III Battalion—were landed
according to plan directly south of the road bridge in the bed
of the Tavronitis. There they came under heavy fire from
D Company
While these glider landings were going on the paratroops also
had begun their descent. II Battalion landed south of See p. 173.en route. The detachment put down east of
In addition to these three companies he could rely on some
support from 13, 14, and 15 Companies of IV Battalion. These
three companies landed west of the Tavronitis, and therefore
without ground opposition. Many of their heavy weapons and
Thus Meindl had no great reason to be dissatisfied with the
initial situation of his forces to the west of the aerodrome. The
weakness of his plan, however, had lain in the division of his
forces. If anything went wrong with the landing of III Battalion
to the east of the airfield it would be difficult for him to pull his
regiment together. And something had indeed gone wrong. The
battalion was duly landed on the rising ground south of
Meindl had jumped at half past eight and taken command. He must at once have appreciated that, since Koch had failed to seize Point 107, the best prospect of progress lay in exploiting the success at the road bridge and trying to develop it into an attack which would take Point 107 from the north-west. At the same time he evidently felt that a flanking move from the south might be worth attempting. He could assume that his own flanks to the west and south were reasonably safe and, in any case, if he were to get on with his task would have to do so. It is not known how soon he had news of III Battalion, but obviously his best course was to press home the attack from the west with or without support from the east. For forces with which to launch it he had Braun's group already engaged; the remnants of Koch's group if they had yet begun to make their way down into the riverbed; the remains of Plessen's company from the river mouth, which cannot have had many casualties; 5, 7, and 8 Companies from II Battalion; and the heavy weapons of IV Battalion with 15 Company as well.
He therefore sent 8 Company and the available troops of
IV Battalion to support Major Braun at the bridge by attacking
on either side of it; and ordered 5 and 7 Companies under Major
Stentzler to cross the river south of
It is now time to turn to See map. The platoon of 21 Bn on the Tavronitis bed to the south will be treated for this day as part of 22 Bn.
The 22nd Battalion, then, on the day the battle opened had a strength of 20 officers and roughly 600 other ranks. It consisted of Battalion HQ and five rifle companies; for Headquarters Company fought as a rifle company. Battalion HQ was a little to the north of Point 107 and had with it a small reserve consisting of a platoon of A Company and miscellaneous HQ personnel. This, with the two I tanks and the carrier platoon, was the only reserve available to Colonel Andrew.
The greater part of Headquarters Company was posted round
A Company, commanded by Captain
D Company, commanded by Captain
Also under command were two platoons of
Two 3-inch mortars covered the airfield also, both without base-plates and both short of ammunition. And the two I tanks, also under command, were hidden north of Battalion HQ, ready for counter-attack towards the airfield.
In the battalion perimeter, but not under command, were the ten Bofors guns sited round the airfield, the two 3-inch AA guns sited near Point 107, and the two 4-inch naval guns of Z Battery RM, both sited on the slopes above D Company's right centre.
As soon as the landings began the battle broke up into a number
of separate actions in separate areas, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Andrew, handicapped by hopelessly bad communications, found it
more and more difficult to operate his battalion as a unit. Our
best hope of offering an intelligible account of the day's events
is therefore to take each group separately, distinguishing D Company
along the bed of the Tavronitis; C Company on the airfield;
Headquarters Company fighting round
To Captain Campbell, the commander of D Company, parachutists
and gliders seemed to arrive simultaneously, the latter coming down
‘with their quiet swish, swish, dipping down and swishing in’. Interview with Capt Campbell (
Of the gliders six were counted in 17 Platoon area and few of
the crews lived to congratulate themselves. Paratroops landing
inside the perimeter met equal severity. 2 Lt J. W. C. Craig, OC 17 Platoon, says that Interview with Capt Campbell. Lt Craig is critical of the MMG performance, but
has probably not made enough allowance for shortage of ammunition and a range
limited by makeshift mountings (
Where gliders landed, as many did, too far from the defenders'
lines or defiladed, the crews were a more difficult target as they
made for cover. And paratroops landing on the far side of the
river were mostly out of effective small-arms range. A suggestion
from D Company that the two 4-inch naval guns should undertake
targets across the river was rejected on the ground that the guns
were sited for targets at sea. Report by 2 Lt Craig.
Meanwhile Braun's glider party at the bridge had forced back the two sections of 18 Platoon holding that flank to a new line on the canal where there were prepared positions. This was the only part of D Company's line that was strongly attacked, and the enemy kept infiltrating men across the riverbed under cover of the bridge pylons so as to drive a wedge between D Company and C Company.
Unfortunately, this area round the bridge was vulnerable as
well as valuable. The bridge was a D Company responsibility and
Campbell had one section of 18 Platoon north of it. But its
positions here were too far forward to give a good field of fire
and yet could not be brought back to a better line without basing
it on the Reports by Lt-Col Andrew, Maj J. Leggat, Capt Johnson, Capt Campbell, and Lt
T. R. Hawthorn.
The result was that Braun's glider force was able to get a strong foothold in this quarter very early in the attack, and one which Meindl appreciated and exploited with speed and determination.
South of D Company there was also trouble. Paratroops and at
least two gliders had landed near the positions of the
No doubt because of the firing caused by all this, Campbell felt
uneasy about his left flank. But 16 Platoon reported that it had
checked a thrust into the company area from this quarter, 16 Platoon may have mistaken the attempts of the 21 Bn platoon to make contact for
enemy infiltration.
In the afternoon D Company's right flank became more and
more uncomfortable and at one point Campbell decided to call
upon the They seem to have got drawn into fighting on their own account. See p. 109.
Yet by about three o'clock D Company was reasonably happy. No. 18 Platoon, though reduced to nine men, was holding on in its canal positions; 17 Platoon had adjusted its own positions by moving higher up the slopes; and 16 Platoon in the centre had disposed of a possible enemy attempt to infiltrate from the south. The troublesome features of the situation were that the forward platoons were more or less isolated from Company HQ, and Company HQ itself had been quite out of touch with Battalion HQ even by runner since midday; that the volume of MG and mortar fire from the west on the company positions was getting steadily heavier; and that the threats from the flanks might at any time become serious.
On C Company front the situation, though worse, was not altogether dissimilar. When the day began the company had been reasonably strong with 117 rifles, 7 Brens, 1 MMG, 6 Browning MGs, and 9 tommy guns. The troops were all well dug in. No. 13 Platoon, between the north end of the airfield and the sea, was sited to repel beach landings and cover the airfield itself with fire; 14 Platoon, between the south edge of the airfield and the canal, was to cover the airfield with fire and deal with attacks from the south-east and south-west; 15 Platoon, on the west edge of the airfield, had 13 Platoon as its right boundary and the road bridge as its left. Its task was to defend the airfield against attacks from the west.
Neither the company commander nor his platoon officers were quite happy about these dispositions, however. There was too much dead ground on the front of 15 Platoon, and yet it had been impossible to cross the riverbed and take this in without spreading the front still farther and accentuating the existing difficulty that it would be very hard for the three platoons, separated by the flat expanse of airfield, to give one another mutual support. And there was also the radical weakness already discussed at the road bridge between C Company and D Company.
The battle began for C Company, as for the others, with the second phase of the bombing. So intense was this round the airfield that from C Company HQ it was impossible to see more than a few yards for the dense clouds of dust and smoke. This no doubt explains why no gliders were seen.
When the bombing ceased—having killed five men and wounded
one in 14 Platoon and Company HQ—and visibility returned,
parachutists could already be seen landing towards Report by Lt Sinclair.
It was on 15 Platoon, in fact, that most of the pressure at this
stage came in C Company. The front was some 1500 yards long
and Sinclair had only 22 men. Apart from the fire he describes,
there was very persistent firing from a drain near the south-west
corner of the airfield, and from this we may guess that the enemy—
having pushed back the section of 18 Platoon—had already secured
a lodgment east of the road bridge. No. 15 Platoon must have
given a good account of itself, however, since the attempt at an
assault on the airfield after taking the AA guns was repelled. The gallantry of L-Cpl J. T. Mchaffey in this action should be recorded. According
to Sinclair, he jumped on a grenade and thus prevented it from hitting several of his
comrades. He lost both feet and died in consequence.
There was nothing the company commander could do to help. All telephone lines had been cut during the bombing, and when they were relaid they were at once cut again. No runner could have crossed the flat, fire-swept airfield.
By ten o'clock it seemed to Captain Johnson that the enemy was infiltrating through the north flank of 15 Platoon towards 13 Platoon. He asked the CO for permission to counter-attack with the two I tanks which were dug in not far from his own HQ. But Andrew, anxious to conserve his trump card for a more desperate situation, refused.
To Sinclair the morning did not seem to be going so badly.
His later comment no doubt reflects his spirits at the time: ‘Plenty
of good targets and an interesting attack provided all the diversion
one needed.’ Report by Lt Sinclair. Sinclair states that 8 men of his platoon were killed and 15 wounded (including himself).
It was still mid-morning when other worries developed for Captain
Johnson. At about eleven o'clock the thrust from the bridge area
threatened to cut him off from D Company. The enemy was in
possession of the Report by Capt Johnson.
There was a new job waiting for Sergeant Ford when he got
back. He was to cross the airfield with two men and order the
commander of 13 Platoon, Sergeant
In the earlier part of the afternoon the situation on C Company front did not greatly change, and the most notable event was the arrival at Company HQ of an English officer from 156 LAA Battery and about eight of his men. These men—except two bomb casualties—hastened to join the strength of the company and were duly armed. A little later they were to join, at their own earnest request, a counter-attack with 14 Platoon. But, as this attack was important for its effect on Andrew's view of his battalion's situation, an account of it is best left until Battalion HQ comes to be considered. It will be sufficient to say now that after this attack had failed C Company, like D Company, was cut off from contact with Battalion.
The third company isolated from Battalion HQ was Headquarters
Company with three officers and about sixty men. But in its case
The gap between Company HQ and the section post of Sergeant
The only three LMGs with HQ Coy were with the northern sections and covered the
beach. The following account is by one of the platoon: ‘… just before 8 a.m….
over comes the Hun with Stukas, Junkers, and gliders, not mentioning the 109s. My
section was stationed between the canal and
For Lieutenant Beaven, too, contact was a prime concern. His
only friendly visitors during the day were a party of men from
A Troop,
The runner from the pioneer platoon, Private
Beaven was now so worried about the lack of news that he
decided to send Wan with another message to Battalion. The
message gives a useful picture of the situation on the front: Wan was later captured but concealed the message in his boot and brought it out from
prison camp with him at the end of the war.
Paratroops landed East, South, and West of Coy area at approx 0745 hrs
today. Strength estimated 250. On our NE front 2 enemy snipers left.
Unfinished square red roof house south of sig terminal housing enemy MG
plus 2 snipers. We have a small field gun plus 12 rounds manned by
Aussies. Mr. Clapham's two fwd and two back secs OK. No word of
Troops in HQ area OK.
Mr. Wadey reports all quiet. No observation of enemy paratroops who landed approx 5 mls south of his position.
Casualties: killed Bloomfield.
wounded Lt Clapham, Sgt Flashoff, Cpl Hall, Pte Cowling, Brown.
Attached plans taken off Jerry.
G. Beaven, Lt
OC HQ Coy
Finally, however, Beaven decided he had better wait till dark before sending this message. By then it was too late.
An attempt was made to get in touch with B Company. But the runner sent failed to return and a patrol sent after him met an enemy patrol, failed to get through, and had to return with casualties.
It is now time to see how the situation was developing with the
central group of the battalion, A and B Companies and Battalion
HQ. The two companies, although they had been heavily pounded
by the bombing and had their share of trouble from the paratroops
and glider crews in the area, were not at first in the front line
in the same sense as were the other companies nor so heavily
engaged. In the afternoon the effect of Stentzler's activities from
the south-west began to be felt, with his 5 and 7 Companies
Battalion HQ had come in for a particularly heavy share of
the bombing. Headquarters itself was not hit, though Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew received a nick from a splinter while forward
observing. ‘The immediate countryside, before densely covered by
grape vines and olive trees was bare of any foliage when the
bombing attack ceased and the ground was practically regularly
covered by large and small bomb craters.’
Soon there were more serious worries. The battalion telephone
lines, which shortage of tools and time and the difficult character
of the country had made it impossible to dig in, Lt-Col Andrew thinks that they would have had to be dug in to a depth of six feet if
they were to escape damage from the bombs.
Within the battalion therefore the CO was from the first
dependent on runners, at all times a slow and clumsy means of
communication. In these particular circumstances the runner had
the additional handicap that his route was endangered by snipers,
and even if he succeeded in getting through he was bound to have
lost time in detours or in fighting. Yet, while runners were still
getting through to all companies except HQ Company—where
In the morning, however, one thing soon became clear enough.
The main enemy concentrations were to the west of the Tavronitis.
Accordingly, before half past ten Andrew asked Brigade HQ to have
the area Ropaniana-Tavronitis searched with artillery fire and sent
his Intelligence Officer to the detachment of 4-inch guns of
Z Battery RM with the request that they should engage the mortars
and MGs which were by this time harassing his battalion area.
The 4-inch guns were unable to do this because of their siting;
but A and B Troops of
By the time these guns were brought to bear, however, the enemy
attacks were already well under way, and something of Andrew's
concern can be seen in his message to Brigade HQ at 10.55 a.m.
that he had lost communication with his companies and that he
would like See p. 124
As the morning wore on Report by Maj Leggat. The evidence of Capt Johnson and Lt Hawthorn among others
suggests that at least in the early part of the day the
Shortly after midday
In the early afternoon these pressures grew stronger. About
four o'clock—or perhaps earlier—mortar fire from the
A message sent by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew to Brigade at 3.50 p.m. indicated his growing anxiety. His left flank had given ground—either an allusion to adjustments in D Company area or a mistake for his more seriously endangered right flank—but he still thought that the situation was in hand, although he again asked for contact to be made with Headquarters Company because he needed reinforcements.
All this time, in fact, in common with the rest of his battalion,
he had been expecting Attempts to get in touch by means of flag signals were also made without success,
according to Sgt Twigg.
Accordingly, at a quarter past five, the two tanks with 14 Platoon
in support moved off down the road about 30 yards apart, making
for the Tavronitis bridge. Almost at once the second tank found
that its two-pounder ammunition would not fit the breech block
and that its turret was not traversing completely. It therefore
withdrew. The leading tank went forward until it reached the
riverbed, passed under the bridge from the southern side and went
north about 200 yards. There it bellied down in the rough bed of
the river and, its turret having jammed, was abandoned by its
crew. Capt Campbell says the enemy later used its gun against D Coy, but it is more likely
to have been one of their own infantry guns.
No. 14 Platoon, under Lieutenant
Captain Johnson reported to the CO that the counter-attack had
failed and asked for reinforcements. His own position was rapidly
worsening. No. 15 Platoon and the west section of 13 Platoon
had been overrun. No. 14 was now practically destroyed. Company
HQ with its cooks, stretcher-bearers, and runners could not hope
to hold the inland perimeter of the airfield long. Johnson therefore
told Andrew that he could probably hold on till dark but would then
have to be reinforced. Andrew replied that he must ‘hold on at
all costs’. Report by Capt Johnson.
Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew now had to make up his mind what
to do. He again got in touch with Brigade HQ by wireless and
told Brigadier Hargest that the counter-attack with tanks had
failed. He said he had no further resources and that as no support
from
This conversation seems to have taken place about 6 p.m., and in
the course of it or another conversation about the same time Hargest
told Andrew that he was sending two companies to his support—
A Company of ‘I expected the coys almost immediately from the gist of the message.’—Lt-Col
Andrew.
While waiting for them to come Andrew would have had leisure to contemplate what must have seemed a very grim situation. He had had no contact with Headquarters Company all day, and since paratroops had been seen to land in its area in considerable numbers there seemed grounds for assuming that the company had been overrun. A Company, though it had had fighting, was on the whole intact. B Company also was intact but was threatened with a thrust from the south-west. C Company had lost at least part of 13 Platoon, 14 Platoon was almost destroyed, and it seemed probable that 15 Platoon was wholly lost. D Company had been out of touch since midday and according to at least one report had been wiped out. Colonel Andrew could therefore count certainly on only two out of his five companies.
The tactical situation seemed to answer this apparent weakness in forces. The enemy had torn a hole at the road bridge and could be expected to reinforce success from the ample strength that he had built up undisturbed across the river and out of range. The line of the airfield north of the bridge was destroyed with the loss of 15 Platoon. If D Company had been wiped out there was nothing to prevent the enemy crossing the Tavronitis at any point along its length. And the attack from the south-west against B Company front suggested that if the battalion remained in its present positions it might be cut off by morning.
Moreover, mortars and machine guns were by now out of ammunition or knocked out. The tanks and the infantry reserve were gone. There was no sign of reinforcement, unless the two companies from 23 and 28 Battalions arrived soon.
In such a situation Andrew evidently felt that if he did not use the cover of darkness that night to adjust his positions he could not hope to withstand the renewed attack that was bound to come the following day; for if the enemy had been able to make such progress against his full battalion, starting from scratch, what might he not be able to do with his forces fully organised on the ground and the tactical advantage against a battalion reduced to less than half its strength?
Considerations such as these were in Andrew's mind when he
spoke to Brigadier Hargest of limited withdrawal after the failure
Lt-Col Andrew. The ridge was also called RAP Ridge and Eastern Ridge. The
time given is Andrew's, but see p. 134.
Andrew was in the HQ of B Company when he took this decision.
Messages about the projected move were sent out to all the other
companies by runner, including C, D, and Headquarters Companies.
The runners to the last three did not get through.
Meanwhile Captain See p. 116.
Between nine and ten o'clock Watson reached B Company ridge
and found Battalion HQ there. At this point the narrative is
confused. Watson says he was told that D Company had been
wiped out and that he was to take over its position. But
Sgt Twigg, who helped guide the company, also says it was to A Coy's positions. Lt-Col Andrew may have intended to use Watson's company as a temporary screen.
At all events Captain Watson and Lieutenant McAra duly set
about placing the platoons. As 8 Platoon was being put into
position there was a burst of fire which killed McAra and wounded
several others, including Lieutenant Out of 25 all ranks in Gorrie's platoon, three were wounded, one missing, and one
(Lt Anderson) killed.
Meanwhile a further conference had been going on at
It is in such terms that we must explain his next decision: to
withdraw to 21 and 23 Battalions while he still had the cover
of darkness. His mind made up, he asked Watson, who had
meanwhile come back to report, to provide a guide to
Captain Watson agreed to do so, went to warn his men of
their new role, and returned to The members of the carrier platoon were in this withdrawal, their Bren carriers having
been rendered useless.
The first phase of the battle for As events turned out; but it should be remembered that had
The withdrawal falls into two parts: that from Point 107 and that from B Company ridge. Was the first necessary? When he made up his mind to leave Point 107 Andrew thought that he could count certainly on only two companies, A and B. This, as will be seen in the sequel, was to despair of the others too soon. True, runners had failed to get through; but it was not unprecedented for companies to be cut off and yet continue fighting. Had he remained where he was it should have been possible to push through patrols during the darkness, find out the true state of affairs with HQ, C and D Companies, bring in what remained of them, and build up a new tactical position on Point 107.
Again, even had he been right in thinking his outlying companies
destroyed, he still had A and B Companies almost intact and he
had been told that there were two further companies on the way to
reinforce them. Even if, when Hargest had first promised these,
in the late afternoon, Andrew had assumed their almost immediate
arrival, he must presumably have learnt when he spoke to the
Brigadier again about nine o'clock that they had not left till
dusk. cf. p. 112, note 2, message received by Maj Hanton.
That this new perimeter would have been exposed to powerful attacks by ground and air forces next day is certain. And it might well have been completely cut off from 21 and 23 Battalions. But there would have been good hope of counter-attack, and so long as it held out the enemy could not have secure possession of the airfield or give his undivided attention to driving farther east.
But, even supposing the case for withdrawing from Point 107 had been stronger than in retrospect it now seems, it is hard to see how a withdrawal to B Company ridge would improve matters. If, as his placing of Watson's company suggests, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew intended to put the two reinforcing companies on Point 107 as they arrived and hold A and B Companies on B Company ridge, this seems a much weaker plan than to concentrate his whole force on and around Point 107 itself.
In fact, however, now that he had made his first move he was forced to consider a second: withdrawal to 21 and 23 Battalions. As we have seen he decided in favour of this; and indeed it is likely enough that he could not have held out next day with B Company ridge as the basis of his defence. But since he had first retired to it Watson's company had arrived, and he might have taken this as increasing the probability that Royal's company would also appear. There was still time to change his mind and go back to Point 107. The only two companies which seemed to have got his orders were with him; to have reversed these orders would not have been difficult. If the other companies were not wiped out or had not received the orders they would be none the worse for the change in plan. Even if they had received them and were planning to join him later, they would have had no difficulty in finding him.
Failing such a reversal of plan, he had no course but to go on withdrawing; and how unfortunate for the future of the defence that course was, the story of the events that followed will make plain in due time. But it would be unfair to pass on from this isolation of alternatives open to Andrew without a reminder of the hard conditions in which he had to make his choice.
He had spent a most exacting day trying to control a battle
where all the circumstances were inimical to control. Communications within his battalion had failed him almost completely; and
outside it they had proved extremely bad. He and his HQ had
been severely harassed by bombing and strafing throughout the
day to an extent for which neither training nor experience had
It should be borne in mind throughout that this was
The non-appearance of B Company
Captain Royal, like Captain Watson, received orders to set off
at dark and report to
At The officers at the head of the column are Major R. L. C. Grant (left) and
Capt D. M. Burns, Adjutant Divisional Signals A GROUP OF 20 BATTALION ON THE DAY OF ARRIVALLANDING STORES FOR THE BRITISH GARRISON IN
AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT LEWIS GUN OVERLOOKING SUDA BAY,
General Sir Archibald Wavell, GOC-in-C Middle
East, during his visit to
NEW ZEALANDERS FROM GREECE ENTER SUDA BAY
MARCH TO THE TRANSIT CAMP
MEAL-TIME UNDER THE OLIVES
CLEANING UP
MEN OF 19 ARMY TROOPS COMPANY RESTING
From left to right the officers in the foreground are: Lt M. G. O'Callaghan,
Capt C. Wilson (back to camera), Lt J. D. Aiken, Lt G. A. Brown, Maj
J. T. Burrows (back to camera), Lt D. J. Fountaine, 5 NZ INFANTRY BRIGADE HQ AT PLATANIAS
Back row: Lt D. M. McFarlane (holding helmet), Capt R. B. Dawson,
Maj E. A. Harding, Lt-Col L. W. Andrew, Lt-Col A. S. Falconer, Capt
N. L. W. UniackeFront row: Capt G. H. Hea, Brig J. Hargest, Lt-Col G. Dittmer,
NEW ZEALANDERS IN A VILLAGE STREET
7 GENERAL HOSPITAL WEST OF CANEA, SHOWING RED CROSS
GROUND SIGN
GERMAN PARATROOPS PREPARING TO EMPLANE ON A
GREEK AIRFIELD
THE LANDING AT
Wrecked Junkers 52 troop-carriers
‘For each man dangling
carried a death, his own if
not another's.’
page 89A crashed German glider
Junkers 52s dropping
paratroops
A dead paratrooper in
LOOKING TOWARDS CANEA FROM THE WEST
SMOKE CLOUDS OVER CANEA AFTER BOMBING
SMOKE PALL OVER SUDA BAY
TROOPS OF 5 GERMAN MOUNTAIN DIVISION READY TO
EMBARK FROM GREECE IN JUNKERS TROOP-CARRIERS AND
IN CAIQUES
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF MALEME AREA AND AIRFIELD
INFANTRY
COUNTERATTACKING
JUNKERS TROOP-CARRIERS BURNING AT MALEME
Crete NewsACK-ACK FIRE SCORES A HIT AT HERAKLION
Bombing at
It has been indicated that Andrew accepted a pessimistic view of the fate of his other companies. The day's events on this front must now be rounded off with an account of each of them.
At last light D Company were not altogether displeased with the day's operations, in spite of the lack of communication with Battalion HQ. The nine survivors of 18 Platoon on the canal were still in position. No. 17 Platoon had only about a dozen men left unwounded, but these were still full of fight, though their ammunition supplies were lower than their spirit. No. 16 Platoon had had only light casualties.
Captain Campbell knew there were enemy on his left and right, but for the time being at least—especially after dark—these seemed content to count the day's evil sufficient. Like the rest of his company he expected to take part in a general counter-attack. A story brought by a marine that the battalion had gone he did not believe, and he had solved the food problem by breaking into a ration dump. Water was a serious difficulty because the enemy lay athwart the only source of supply.
It was while searching for water that Campbell and his CSM discovered that the battalion had gone. This revelation and the shortage of ammunition and water was a shock to the men and dashed their spirits. It also altered Campbell's view of the situation: he had to decide whether to follow or to stand fast in the hope that his positions might be used as the pivot of a counter-attack from the south, this being one of the tentative plans considered before the battle. After interrogating wounded he met in the battalion area he found that none of them knew the new location. He concluded that the withdrawal was a complete one and decided he must follow suit.
His plan was to send the remnants of 18 Platoon, under Sergeant
Campbell says this plan for the wounded had been formed before the attack. He
cannot now understand why, since there had been no talk of evacuation or of
The plan, like most plans, worked out only in parts. Sargeson got
his party safely through to the coast and turned east to
Campbell's party consisted of 80 or 90 men, of whom 26 were
D Company and the rest RM and
Shortly afterwards—about four o'clock—a runner arrived from C Company with a message for Battalion HQ. Campbell sent him back with orders that Captain Johnson should withdraw his company and join D Company. This therefore seems a good point to take up the story of C Company.
At the end of the day 13 Platoon still held the beach and
C Company HQ, with the few survivors from 14 Platoon, still held
a copse on the inland side of the airfield. ‘The surviving men
were in excellent heart in spite of their losses. They had NOT had
enough. They were first rate in every particular way and were
as aggressive as when action was first joined.’ Capt Johnson.
But by 4.20 a.m. Captain Johnson, having sent out patrols which
found only enemy on the site of Battalion HQ and having tried
continually and vainly by other patrols between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m.
to get in touch with A, B, and D Companies, concluded that the
battalion had withdrawn. He knew that while he held his position
he could stop any aircraft from landing on the aerodrome. But
he also knew that his small force could not withstand the inevitable
dawn attack. Already the Germans shared the airfield with him,
holding the western edge formerly defended by 15 Platoon and
the bridge end of the southern edge. Their patrols, of about
ten men each, were active from dark till midnight all round his
positions, on the airfield itself, and on the road towards
-
At 0420 hrs when I ordered withdrawal I despatched a runner to advise 13 Pl of this order. At the same time I ordered every man to remove his boots and hang them about his neck.
-
The wounded men who were unable to move were made as comfortable as possible in sheltered positions and provided with food and water and informed that we were about to depart.
-
At 0430 hrs we moved off in single file, the wounded interspersed along the line of our march, through the southern wire of the copse, past the snoring Germans on our right, through the vineyards which separated C Coy from A Coy's reserve platoon and HQ area up to A Coy's deserted HQ, on to the road, up the hill past a grounded glider, until we reached the forward boundary of B and A Coy's position.
-
By this time it was getting light and there was no sign of any opposition so I gave orders to put on boots and then we struck east across country towards where I hoped the 21 Bn was situated. On this stage of our journey we picked up two or three sleeping members of 22 Bn who were unaware that any withdrawal had taken place.