E Section arrived on 26 March and bivouacked with 4 Field Regiment in a dispersal area near Kato Melia, about seven miles from Katerini. On the following day L Section, with Headquarters 6 Infantry Brigade, arrived at Sfendhami, and C Section was in bivouac with Headquarters Divisional Cavalry at Gannokhora, a few miles north of Katerini. Until the establishment of Headquarters 6 Brigade at Sfendhami, where it was to take over a defensive position held by 19 Greek Motorised Division, the principal divisional communications lay between Advanced Headquarters New Zealand Division at Kalokhori and Headquarters 4 Brigade at Palionellini. So far line and despatch-rider services comprised the only means of communication, a rigid wireless silence having been imposed over the whole area. An improvised service was provided by the civil telephone system, the use of which demanded the most stringent security precautions because of enemy agents in the neighbourhood. A place-name code for use on civil telephone circuits was brought into use to conceal movements and locations of units as much as possible. Athens, for example, became Aldershot, and Katerini became Kent.

With all wireless unusable for obvious reasons of security, and with only one or two lines to 4 and 6 Brigades, the despatch riders at Divisional Headquarters had few idle moments. The country in which they had to manoeuvre their motor-cycles was vastly different from the open stretches of sand and gravel desert on which they had trained in Egypt. It was most unusual for a despatch rider to complete a run without having to ford at least two streams, and it was not long before the first casualty occurred. Signalman Marriott

Sigmn S. O'D. Marriott; Helensville; born Wellington, 25 Oct 1911; motor driver and butcher.

Road conditions in Greece were very bad. There were few main roads, and most of these passed through mountainous country. There were often sheer drops on the outside of hairpin bends and deep ditches on the inside, leaving only the crown on which it was safe to ride. The surface of most roads was generally poor, especially away from the main towns, and the verges were often built up of soft, lightly rammed earth. Even main roads varied in width from as little as ten feet to as much as thirty, and approaches to culverts and bridges usually narrowed dangerously. In the area around Katerini, where despatch riders did most of their riding, the roads were often merely clay tracks which followed the easier contours of the rolling country between Divisional Headquarters at Kalokhori and 4 Brigade at Palionellini, and 6 Brigade at Sfendhami, farther away to the north-east.

In the area forward of Palionellini, where slopes densely wooded with slender oak saplings rose to a sharp ridge across 4 Brigade's front, J Section was intent on running down enemy agents suspected of tampering with the lines to 18, 19 and 20 Battalions. A number of interruptions to line communications had led to the discovery of several breaks plainly made by pounding the wire between two heavy stones. On two occasions the stones were found beside the break with the stains of bruised cable insulation still adhering to their surfaces. The Field Security Section was entrusted with the task of laying the saboteurs by the heels. With tremendous zest it organised a system of line patrols, and in two days brought the culprit to book, although not altogether in the way expected. The exchange operator reported that 19 Battalion's line was ‘out’, and in a short time away went two field security men, one with a D Mark V telephone slung over his shoulder, followed by the other, who nursed in his right hand an enormous pistol which looked like a young 18-pounder without wheels—a Webley. 455 service revolver. In due course a report came back from the man with the telephone. The break and its cause had been found. The culprit was a Greek shepherd who had cut out a section of cable from the line and used it to tether a bell-wether to keep the rest of his flock from straying while he slept in the sun.

By 27 March the Division, less 5 Brigade, was deployed in its positions to the north of Katerini. The general defence line, of which the coastal sector was held by 19 Greek Motorised Division, extended from Skala Elevtherokhorion, on the coast near the head of the Gulf of Salonika, through Paliostani, in 6 Brigade's area, through Mikri Milia and Radhani, where 4 Brigade lay in prepared positions, to Elafina, where the sector held by 12 Greek Division on the left nominally commenced. From there the Aliakmon line, which was the name by which the system was known, passed through Polidhendri and then north-west towards the Yugoslav frontier. Sixth Brigade was preparing to take over the coastal sector on the right from 19 Greek Motorised Division, which was to move to the north-east, where it was urgently required to reinforce the Greek garrisons in eastern Macedonia.

The New Zealand Division's front from Radhani to Paliostani consisted of 16,000 yards of rough spurs and re-entrants, on which the laying of line communications presented tremendous difficulties. By 30 March there were two good line circuits between Divisional Headquarters and 4 Brigade, and both had been strengthened and secured throughout their length. In addition there was the civil-line route between Katerini and Palionellini, but this circuit was not expected to survive long under air and artillery bombardment.

The country between Divisional Headquarters and Headquarters 6 Brigade, at Sfendhami to the north-east, was unsuitable for building a good field-cable route in the limited time available, so a line was started immediately from 4 Brigade to 6 Brigade and made as secure as possible. The country through which it passed was still very steep and difficult, but the length of circuit was reduced to less than half. Later, when this cable had been made reasonably secure, the long field-cable route from Kalokhori to Sfendhami was commenced. The coastal sector on the right held by 19 Greek Motorised Division, however, was open country, and as it was expected to be taken over by 6 Brigade, the difficulties of carrying lines forward would be eased considerably.

On 30 March E Section opened a signal office at Headquarters 4 Field Regiment, at Sfendhami. The regiment's role was to cover the divisional front until the arrival of 5 and 6 Field Regiments. Lines were immediately laid out to batteries and communications established. The country was extremely difficult and E Section's linemen had to take all cable out by hand.

At this time only two units of 5 Brigade had arrived in the Katerini area—23 Battalion and 28 (Maori) Battalion, both of which were quartered in Katerini Park. Two days later Brigade Headquarters and 5 Field Regiment arrived by rail and road in the divisional area, and the former was established at Kalokhori. Next day, however, the brigade moved into its battle positions on the pass road 12 miles from Katerini, where F and K Sections commenced immediately to lay out regimental and brigade communications.

Meanwhile G and H Sections had embarked at Alexandria, G with 6 Field Regiment on SS Cameronia on 25 March, and H with 7 Anti-Tank Regiment on SS Corinthia the following day. On their arrival in Greece both sections went to Kifisia, from which G Section moved with 6 Field Regiment on the 29th to join the Division at Katerini. H Section followed on the 31st. On its arrival in the forward area 6 Field Regiment took up positions near Palionellini in support of 4 Brigade, and within a short time G Section had laid out cable and established communication with batteries.

On the arrival of 7 Anti-Tank Regiment in the divisional area, H Section immediately established a signal office, but the regiment moved the same day to Ay Ioannis, five miles north of Katerini. H Section again set up its signal office, and communication with Divisional Headquarters was established. The regiment remained at Ay Ioannis until 10 April, when it moved back into the pass area in the vicinity of Ay Dhimitrios. In the meantime, however, the three batteries of the regiment had been dispersed to brigades, and with each went an H Section wireless detachment.

In the days that followed these wireless detachments were to have a particularly trying time endeavouring to maintain communication with the regimental headquarters at Ay Dhimitrios. None of H Section's sets was provided with high-power units, and the abnormally long ranges over which the low-power No. 11 sets attempted communication during the April battles for the northern passes considerably exceeded the equipment's rated performance. In an anti-tank regiment wireless was the only means of communication; the half mile of D Mark III cable which the signal section carried on its war equipment scale was provided for the installation of short internal lines at regimental headquarters.

In April 1941 the strategic situation in the Balkans was not promising for the Allies. In the north-west the Greek Army was waging a heroic fight against the Italians in Albania. Conditions on that front were appalling. The Greeks were dreadfully handicapped by lack of equipment, but were making a magnificent effort and achieving great successes. These advantages on the Albanian front, however, were overshadowed by the darkening outlook in the east, where Thrace stretched narrowly between the sea and the ever-increasing threat of attack from the north, where German infiltration was already complete in Bulgaria. The signs of preparation for a rapid German thrust into Thrace and eastern Macedonia were unmistakable. Although the Greek Army had sustained enormous losses in the long winter campaign in the north-west, its morale remained high. The Greek garrisons at the Rupel Pass, in eastern Macedonia, and at other places in Thrace, were also in good heart, and when the storm broke they gave a good account of themselves. German gains there were not won cheaply.

The Allied forces mustered to aid the Greeks in northern Greece were woefully thin on the ground; nor were they equipped with modern implements of war, the most disquieting shortages being in tanks, aircraft, and anti-aircraft guns. The weather and the reports of Intelligence on the stage to which German preparations in Bulgaria had progressed brought the probable trend of events in April into closer perspective. There was a tremendous amount of defensive preparation still to be achieved, and so little time in which it might be done. The limitations imposed on the supply of men and war material by the dangerously vulnerable lines of communication passing close to enemy bases in the Dodecanese Islands were intensified by insufficient shipping and the limited capacity of Greek ports, of which Salonika, the principal and certainly the most useful, was now eliminated because of its accessibility to the expected German drive from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In no circumstances was Salonika considered to be a secure base into which to bring men and equipment.

By the end of the first week of April the New Zealand Division's line extended from Skala Elevtherokhorion on the coast to Elafina, a front of 28,000 yards. To the south, covering the passes east of Mount Olympus, was 5 Brigade. Forward of 4 and 6 Brigades' defensive positions north of Katerini, the Divisional Cavalry maintained a covering position by active patrolling just south of where the Aliakmon River took a wide, semi-circular sweep to the north. Strict limitations on the use of wireless were still in force, so that all communications continued to be provided by line circuits and despatch riders.

On 2 April Divisional Signals went forward to Ay Ioannis, where Advanced Headquarters New Zealand Division had opened and set up a forward signal office. The original office at Kalokhori became Rear Signals. This signal office was closed when Rear Headquarters joined Advanced Headquarters four days later, but the majority of Rear Signals remained at Kalokhori owing to the lack of suitable space for dispersion at Ay Ioannis, and also because of the usefulness of the buildings occupied by M (technical maintenance) Section and 14 LAD at Kalokhori.

By this time about 65 miles of ground cable were laid between Advanced Divisional Headquarters and 4 and 6 Brigades. Numerous interruptions to these circuits were caused by the heavy volume of tracked and wheeled traffic which passed along the narrow and tortuous roads beside which the lines lay in several places. Owing to the ease with which these lines could be tapped by enemy agents, they were regarded as non-secret from the security point of view. Accordingly, a system of unit and place-name codes similar to that introduced at the time the Division first arrived in the area was employed in all telephone conversations. There were also special codes for appointments, guns, ammunition and vehicles. The telegraph components of the line circuits in most cases were superposed channels provided through coils in the universal call ten-line switchboards at terminals, and were operated by Fullerphones Mark IV, thus enabling a considerable amount of traffic to be transmitted in Morse in clear. The strictly enforced wireless silence was broken for brief and infrequent test calls between the control station at Advanced Divisional Headquarters and the terminals at brigades.

Germany declared war on Greece and Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941. German troops attacked the Greek line in eastern Macedonia, but the fortifications withstood the initial assaults and the enemy sustained serious losses and was obliged to slacken his frontal attacks. Unfortunately, however, owing to the political seesawing which had engrossed Yugoslavia in the tense period just before Germany's declaration of war, the Yugoslav forces were in a state of almost complete unpreparedness and in no shape to withstand the German attacks which engulfed them in the first day's fighting. The Germans very soon swept down into Greece east of the Axios River, and so outflanked the Greeks' eastern Macedonian defences. This penetration also constituted a serious threat to the strong defensive line running in a semi-circular pattern from Neon Elevtherokhorion, near the coast above Katerini, to the Yugslav frontier. This defensive system—the Aliakmon line—utilising as it did the precipitous mountain country of the Vermion and Olympus ranges, was a natural fortress barring the way to a German drive from Bulgaria through eastern Macedonia and the narrow way between Salonika and the Yugoslav frontier. Along this line the road passed through Edhessa and Veroia, the only points of entry by which the enemy armour could move onto the Aliakmon defences, of which the right flank covered the road pass skirting the northern slopes of Mount Olympus from Katerini to the northern threshold of the plain of Thessaly.

Meanwhile renewed German attacks had overwhelmed Greek resistance along the Bulgarian frontier, and by 9 April all of western Thrace and Salonika were in enemy hands. Farther west German penetration had opened the way for their armour to pass down the main highway from Yugoslavia to Florina and Kozani, threatening the Aliakmon line from the rear. Immediate adjustments were made to the Allied positions. The Aliakmon line was abandoned and temporary positions occupied while an effort was made to regroup all Greek and British forces on new permanent defensive positions. Fourth New Zealand Brigade was sent to Servia to hold the pass there and to act as a pivot for the move from the temporary to the permanent positions. The left flank of the Aliakmon line was withdrawn from the Yugoslav border to link up with the hastily formed force south of Florina, while 6 Brigade was withdrawn behind 5 Brigade's positions on the Olympus Pass for use there or elsewhere as circumstances demanded. Only Divisional Cavalry remained in the New Zealand Division's sector of the Aliakmon line, patrolling and preparing to offer sufficient resistance to allow the temporary positions time to settle down. First Australian Corps, redesignated Anzac Corps on 12 April, now commanded all British troops on the new temporary line, the Olympus-Aliakmon River line, which ran from the coast at Platamon through the Olympus and Servia passes, along the Vermion range, and astride the pass at Vevi to the south of Florina.

The afternoon of 9 April brought to an abrupt end the pleasant activities in which the men of Divisional Signals had spent their brief hours of leisure during the preceding fortnight. There had been much work to do, but most of the men had found a little time in which to move around the town of Katerini and the surrounding villages. They watched the Greek peasant folk going about their daily occasions, and spent many a pleasant half hour drawing water from village wells for the Greek women. They wandered through the narrow cobbled streets, inspecting the quaint dwellings and accepting shyly the wine and oat cakes which the peasant women brought forth from their cottages for the ‘English’. Here and there in the cobbled lanes groups of soldiers and children stood deep in study of the English-Greek phrase books which the men had eagerly sought on their arrival in Athens.

There were many incidents which brought home to the New Zealanders the quality of the Greeks' war effort. There was no highly organised publicity machine to tell these people of their country's prodigious efforts against the invader, but they were content that this was so because few of them were even dimly aware that the noble art of self-glorification had become such an important ingredient of martial ardour. In 1941 that other great invader, ballyhoo, had not yet reached the shores of Greece. In the fields and in the towns and villages women and young boys were doing the work of men, while in the homes young girls had become the nation's ‘little housewives’. It was all a wonderful example of national fortitude and a source of sober reflection to many thoughtful New Zealanders who watched these women, ranging in age from sixteen to the middle forties, bent in toil over their roadmaking implements from dawn to dusk.

From 9 April pleasant excursions were lost in the hurry and tumble of preparations for sudden moves to take up new positions to meet the enemy threat approaching from the north. At 8 p.m. that day a Divisional Battle Headquarters was established at Sfendhami and connected to 6 Brigade's exchange. In the afternoon OC A Section, Captain Smith, had gone forward to Sfendhami to spy out suitable sites for wireless detachments and the signal office, and to find a house to serve as headquarters' office and quarters for the GOC and his staff. He was joined later in the day by two wireless detachments and a number of despatch riders, and in the evening by Lieutenant-Colonel Allen, who had moved up from Ay Ioannis with G staff. The next day, however, 6 Brigade was withdrawn from its positions in the Aliakmon line to divisional reserve at Dholikhi. Battle Headquarters closed at Sfendhami and withdrew to Dholikhi, where Advanced Divisional Headquarters had moved the night before from Ay Ioannis.

Shortly before midnight on the 9th Advanced Signals moved back with Advanced Divisional Headquarters over the pass road to Dholikhi. Rear Signals joined the convoy on the road at Kalokhori. It was atrocious weather for a night move in which the darkened convoy had to negotiate the tricky hairpin bends and slippery road surfaces up to Ay Dhimitrios near the summit of the pass and then down to Dholikhi.

Immediately on arrival at the new area Signals set up Advanced and Rear Signals camps about half a mile apart. Only one signal office, that at Advanced Divisional Headquarters, was established, and from there a network of lines soon spread out to the Division's battle positions where 5 Brigade was firmly ensconced across the northern end of the pass, where the road began to reach steeply towards the summit at Ay Dhimitrios, the ‘Christmas Card’ village of grey slate roofs, cobbles, and storks. The brigade's position faced east, with 23 Battalion on the right of the road at Yabadi, on the north-western slopes of Olympus, 22 Battalion in the centre astride the road, and 28 (Maori) Battalion on the left in the Mavroneri valley. K Section had run out cable from Brigade Headquarters to 22 Battalion and established there a forward exchange or signal centre, from which lines extended to 23 and 28 Battalions and to 4 and 5 Field Regiments. This signal centre, manned by K Section men under Lance-Corporal Davis,

L-Sgt G. M. Davis; Dunedin; born Mititai, Northern Wairoa, 12 Aug 1912; p.w. 1 Jun 1941; escaped Jun 1941; recaptured 5 Apr 1943 (on Crete).

Meanwhile 6 Brigade had come into its reserve positions above Dholikhi and about two miles south of Ay Dhimitrios. From this position a civil permanent line ran westwards along a secondary road for about a mile and a half and continued around a steep mountain spur to the village of Livadhion, from which L Section took a field cable down the valley of the Smixi River northwards for about five miles to Headquarters 24 Battalion, in the rear of 28 (Maori) Battalion's positions in the Mavroneri valley. It was 24 Battalion's intention to run a line along the road, on which its foremost defended localities were sited, to the Maori Battalion. This arrangement would have given lateral communication between the two brigades, but was never completed because of the probability of 6 Brigade moving from its reserve positions within a few days to prepare for a new task.

Advanced Signals established a signal centre at the summit of the pass on 12 April to strengthen the communications forward to 5 Brigade. Meanwhile 4 Brigade Group had moved to 1 Australian Corps' command, first to corps reserve at Kato Filippaioi and then to a defensive position on the general line Kastania-Servia-Prosilion to prevent enemy penetration from the north and west. Actually, the brigade did not pause at Kato Filippaioi, but passed straight through to the Servia positions, so rapid were the changes in tactical deployment at that time. As the brigade had passed from the command of New Zealand Division, Advanced Signals had no communication with it except by line through Headquarters 1 Australian Corps at Yerania, in the low-lying country near the main highway running north from Elasson, through the road junction at Elevtherokhorion to Servia.

An extensive system of permanent civil lines radiating out from Advanced Divisional Headquarters served as alternative means of communication to the cable circuits. Two of these poled lines went to Katerini and Neon Elevtherokhorion, and from the latter place another permanent circuit ran on to the village of Kolindros, from which C Section had put out cable to Headquarters Divisional Cavalry at Kitros, above Katerini. From Katerini another civil route ran south on the railway along the coastal plain to the east of Olympus and then on to Larisa.

On 12 April a direction went out from Advanced Divisional Headquarters to 5 Brigade, Divisional Cavalry, and Headquarters New Zealand Engineers that all civil-line installations forward of the Division's battle positions were to be destroyed. The demolition of aerial circuits was to be the primary task. Later, if time and circumstances permitted, poles were to be felled or damaged so as to deny the use of the circuits to the enemy. On the morning of 13 April Lance-Sergeant Pierce,

Sgt C. S. Pierce; Oamaru; born Eltham, 11 Jun 1906; senior P and T lineman.

Pierce, McIvor and Pemberton, in their 15-cwt cable truck and accompanied by a Bren carrier from 5 Brigade, worked along the road towards Katerini, destroying the lines as they went. Hanrahan, with Sergeant Jay,

Sgt J. I. Jay; Reporoa; born Petone, 12 Sep 1911; clerk; p.w. Apr 1941.

While Jay was still busy on this exhilarating task, Pierce, McIvor and Pemberton pushed on towards Palionellini, wrecking the lines as they went. Two days later they arrived at Headquarters Divisional Cavalry, near Kitros, after destroying circuits at Sfendhami, Aliki, Stavros, and Koukos.

At Kitros, in circumstances best known to themselves, they encountered some good cheer in the shape of three bottles of champagne and a quantity of fresh eggs, which fortified them sufficiently to send them back hot-foot to Stavros to see if by some mischance any portion of the civil lines there had escaped destruction. During their depredations at Stavros a despatch rider sent from Divisional Cavalry came to tell them to clear out quickly as enemy armour had penetrated to within a mile of the village. They moved back to Katerini and spent some time there with Captain Pryor and Second-Lieutenant Stevenson, who were busy smashing the telegraph and exchange installations at the post office. That night they bivouacked near Kalokhori with some Maoris from a carrier platoon of 5 Brigade. Next morning they picked up Sergeant Jay again and some sappers who had been sent down from 5 Brigade to mine culverts and bridges in the approaches to the pass.

Near Neokaisaria the party halted while Jay and his sappers prepared to blow the bridge. Jay told Pierce to wait five minutes for him but no longer. After the five minutes had elapsed there was still no sound of Jay's demolition, but German armour and infantry were clearly visible pushing up the road from the direction of Kalokhori. The last of the Divisional Cavalry was then passing through to withdraw behind 5 Brigade's positions farther up the pass, and one of its officers instructed Pierce to move back. They did not see Jay and his sappers again.

Fighting commenced early on 15 April, when advanced elements of the enemy penetrated right up the pass and attacked 22 Battalion's positions astride the road. A few hours later 28 (Maori) Battalion on the left and 23 Battalion on the right were in contact with enemy armoured fighting vehicles and infantry. The 5th Field Regiment was putting down a steady, accurate fire on the German concentrations. Enemy transport continued to move up during the night, and next morning (16 April) dawn revealed a large force deploying for an attack along the road and across the flat country at the entrance to the pass. The guns of 5 Field Regiment opened a fierce bombardment, which continued throughout the day as the fighting intensified. During the afternoon a light drizzle and mist enabled the enemy to achieve some penetrations of 23 and 28 Battalions' positions on both sides of the road, but by evening the area had been cleared by fierce bayonet fighting and small-arms fire. Throughout the heavy fighting on the road, where 22 Battalion beat off a number of determined attacks, Lance-Corporal Davis, with his two exchange operators and two linemen, continued to man the forward exchange near Headquarters 22 Battalion, in a gully about fifty yards off the road. This small party laid the ground cable to both 23 and 28 Battalions by hand, and made it as secure as possible from damage by shellfire and bombing. Fortunately there were few interruptions to the circuits, probably because of the limited wheeled and tracked vehicle movement in the area where the lines were laid. From the forward exchange two lines ran back two and a half miles to Brigade Headquarters, where the remainder of K Section's linemen kept them in operation throughout the battle.

By this time fighting had broken out at Platamon tunnel, where German armour and infantry were attempting to force a passage through the narrow gap between Olympus and the sea. On 9 April an A Section wireless detachment, consisting of Signalmen Laurie

L-Sgt G. Laurie; Tawa Flat; born Newcastle-on-Tyne, England, 16 Oct 1908; radio technician.

A reconnaissance for a possible road route to the Platamon tunnel had previously been made by Captain Pryor, but he had been unable to find a vehicle approach to 21 Battalion's positions. Although the tracks in this area—there were no formed roads—were fit only for horse-drawn vehicles, it was possible with care to take an 8-cwt truck over the route from Katerini down the coast to the Pinios Gorge beyond Platamon. From Katerini to the tunnel the track followed the flat coastal strip, there being no large natural obstacles until the Platamon ridge itself was reached. In wet weather, however, the muddy surface of the track was quite impassable to wheeled traffic. Even in dry weather it was impossible to take a vehicle on the seaward side of the Platamon tunnel, but some little distance to the west a low saddle offered difficult but negotiable access to the Pinios Gorge, from which a road traversed undulating country down to Larisa. Thus the Platamon railway tunnel provided a difficult obstacle to any attempt by enemy columns to reach the vitally important communications centre of Larisa and so outflank the Olympus defences from the east.

After two days had passed without communication of any sort being established with 21 Battalion at Platamon, Second-Lieutenant Foubister, now temporarily in command of A Section, was instructed by OC No. 1 Company to attempt to reach Platamon tunnel with a wavemeter and ascertain why nothing had been heard from the wireless detachment there. He set out, accompanied by his driver, Signalman Silvester,

Sigmn L. G. Silvester; Bluff; born Bluff, 28 Dec 1911; labourer.

Foubister decided that before he began his return journey he should try to raise Line of Communication Signals at Larisa on the poled-line civil circuit which ran alongside the railway, and so get through to Advanced Divisional Headquarters. He took ‘Bully’ Hayes' remote-control unit and rang vigorously on the line. For some time he listened to a medley of answers from Greek voices, but there was no response from L of C Signals. Suddenly an English voice came on the line. It was Signalman Norwood,

Sigmn R. D. Norwood; Auckland; born England, 22 Jul 1918; draughtsman.