Battle for Egypt

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Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 Battle for Egypt By Authority: R. E. Owen, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand 1955

Looking north-east from 5 Brigade HQ at Minqar Qaim on 27 June 1942 black and white photo of camouflaged truck

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 BATTLE FOR EGYPT The Summer of 1942 Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. SCOULLAR WAR HISTORY BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND1955

Preface

THIS is a story of occasional victory, but more often of the trials and tribulations of war in that part of the campaign in North Africa in 1942 when Field Marshal Rommel and his German-Italian Panzerarmee Afrika drove the British Eighth Army from the gate to Tripolitania at El Agheila to the gate to Cairo and the Middle East at El Alamein. How and why the 2nd New Zealand Division became involved and the part it played is the core of the story.

The first purpose of the work is to place on permanent record a substantial part of the Dominion's contribution to the war through the operations of the Division in North Africa. As these stirring and arduous days are recalled to officers and other ranks of the Division, they are told why they were moved here and there, why this and that were done, why, so often in this campaign, circumstances deprived them of the full fruits of their labour, valour and skill. The third purpose is to draw from the campaign, for civilians and soldiers alike, such lessons in the art of war as may have permanent value.

The facts have been compiled from the Division's official documents and those of the corps, army, and theatre headquarters under which it served, and from the corresponding records of Panzerarmee Afrika, the latter through the courtesy and co-operation of the Historical Division of the Department of the Army of the United States of America, Washington. Valuable help has also been given by the Historical Sections of the War Office, London, and of the Union of South Africa. The documentary evidence has been illuminated as occasion required by the personal narratives of many officers and other ranks.

The author would not have attempted the task, indeed he could not have done so, without the excellent briefs, each one almost a volume in itself, compiled by the War History Branch. Every movement of every unit has been extracted, sorted, collated and verified by cross-references. The author is especially grateful to the narrator with whom he has been closely associated, Mr Ronald Walker, for the thoroughness of his original work and his patience in answering questions. He is also greatly indebted to Mr W. D. Dawson, who translated many of the German documents, and to the staff of the Cartographic Branch of the Lands and Survey Department who were responsible for the maps and sketches.

For material not to be found in any written record the author has had the most willing co-operation of the Division's senior officers he consulted. Special mention should be made of Lieutenant-General Lord Freyberg, VC, Major-General L. M. Inglis, Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, Major-General W. G. Gentry, Brigadier C. E. Weir and Brigadier F. M. H. Hanson.

In freely acknowledging all this indispensable help, there remains to be stated only the fact that the conclusions drawn, the deductions made, and the opinions and views expressed in the work are the author's own.

Contents Page PREFACE vii 1 AFTERMATH OF LIBYAN CAMPAIGN 1 2 A HAZARDOUS PROJECT 7 3 ALTERNATIVE ROLES 22 4 DIVISION IN SYRIA 28 5 ROMMEL STRIKES 44 6 FORCED MARCH TO THE DESERT 50 7 PREPARATIONS FOR DECISIVE BATTLE 59 8 AUCHINLECK TAKES COMMAND 69 9 ROMMEL'S BATTLE PLANS 77 10 GERMANS BREAK IN 81 11 NEW ZEALAND DIVISION ISOLATED 90 12 TWENTY-FOUR TENSE HOURS 103 13 EIGHTH ARMY IN LAST DITCH 136 14 THE ENEMY PLAN 149 15 EIGHTH ARMY HOLDS THE LINE 155 16 DEFEAT OF ARIETE DIVISION 167 17 THRUSTS, PARRIES, AND PLANS 178 18 BOTH ARMIES PREPARE ATTACKS 195 19 BATTLE OF TELL EL EISA 204 20 ARMIES SPAR FOR POSITIONS 213 21 PLANNING FOR RUWEISAT 220 22 CAPTURE OF RUWEISAT RIDGE 232 23 THE FIRST DISASTER 249 24 FIGHTING ON THE RIDGE 264 25 ENEMY PREPARES COUNTER-ATTACK 276 26 FOURTH BRIGADE OVERRUN 287 27 REFLECTIONS 299 28 RAIDS, PATROLS, CONSOLIDATION 308 29 PLANS FOR EL MREIR 319 30 ADVANCE OF SIXTH BRIGADE 338 31 SUCCESSION OF DISASTERS 352 32 PRICE OF BAD PLANNING 364 33 REORGANISATION 370 APPENDIX I Commanders and Staff, June 1942 381 APPENDIX II 22 Battalion in Captivity 385 APPENDIX III Casualties, June–August 1942 387 GLOSSARY 389 BIBLIOGRAPHY 391

List of Illustrations Frontispiece Looking north-east at Minqar Qaim W. A. Whitlock Following page 102 Wire for defensive positions in Syria NZ Army (M. D. Elias) Machine-gunners digging in, Syria W. G. Judd collection Sappers digging a gunpit, Syria R. S. Wait collection Convoy at the ruins of Palmyra NZ Army (M. D. Elias) On the Damascus road W. G. Judd collection Dumps on fire at Mersa Matruh Unloading on the escarpment at Minqar Qaim W. A. Whitlock Digging in on the rocky escarpment NZ Army (H. Paton) Looking east from 5 Brigade HQ W. A. Whitlock Shells bursting on gun positions W. A. Whitlock Observing shellfire NZ Army (H. Paton) A 25-pounder in action at Minqar Qaim NZ Army (H. Paton) Lieutenant-General Freyberg wounded NZ Army (H. Paton) The break-out—painting by Peter McIntyre Wrecked vehicles—painting by J. Crippen Headquarters 5 Infantry Brigade halted F. G. Ross After early morning conference at Munassib F. G. Ross The northern edge of the Qattara Depression NZ Army (W. Timmins) 19 Battalion advancing against Ariete Division F. V. England collection Enemy shells on Alam Nayil ridge F. T. Allan Some of the guns captured by the CRA's column and 19 Battalion F. T. Allan Following page 102 German 88-millimetre guns captured on Alam Nayil NZ Army (H. Paton) Ruweisat Ridge J. C. Holmes collection 18 Battalion transport bombed 25-pounders firing on Ruweisat Ridge—painting by C. Hansen 21 Battalion Signal Office R. B. Abbott collection El Mreir Depression—painting by J. Crippen Following page 298 28 Battalion RAP C. N. D'Arcy collection The hard summer of 1942 NZ Army (H. Paton) Lieutenant-General W. H. E. Gott British Official General Auchinleck and Major-General Freyberg NZ Army Brig G. H. Clifton and Col W. G. Gentry F. G. Ross Rommel, with staff, and Brig Clifton captured German photograph Brig H. K. Kippenberger F. G. Ross Maj-Gen L. M. Inglis NZ Army (H. Paton) Brig C. E. Weir NZ Army Lt-Col G. L. Agar Lt-Col R. C. Queree NZ Army (G. R. Bull) Lt-Col K. W. R. Glasgow NZ Army (M. D. Elias) Lt-Col C. L. Walter NZ Army (G. R. Bull) Lt-Col J. M. Mitchell NZ Army (G. F. Kaye) Lt-Col F. M. H. Hanson NZ Army (G. R. Bull) Lt-Col A. J. Nicoll General Auchinleck and Lt-Col R. J. Lynch NZ Army Lt-Col C. L. Pleasants NZ Army (G. R. Bull) Lt-Col S. F. Hartnell British Official Lt-Col J. T. Burrows NZ Army (G. R. Bull) Brig Kippenberger and Lt-Col S. F. Allen F. G. Ross Lt-Col J. T. Russell T. E. Champion Following page 298 Lt-Col R. E. Romans NZ Army Lt-Col A. W. Greville NZ Army Lt-Col C. D. A. George Lt-Cols J. Gray and J. N. Peart The NZ Herald Lt-Col F. Gwilliam G. V. Turnbull Col S. H. Crump NZ Army Brig H. S. Kenrick NZ Army (G. R. Bull) Capt C. H. Upham NZ Army (H. Paton) Sgt K. Elliott NZ Army (H. Paton)

List of Maps Facing page The Axis Approach to the Oilfields 1 Syria and Lebanon 19 Minqar Qaim and Alamein: Dispositions on evening 26 June 1942 53 El Alamein 135 Ruweisat Ridge: Plan of Attack and Dispositions on 14 July 1942 201 El Mreir: Plan of Attack and Dispositions on 21 July 1942 315

In text Page The Advance of Panzerarmee on Matruh, 26–27 June 1942 46 21 Panzer Division's Encirclement of New Zealand Division at Minqar Qaim on 27 June 1942 84 Withdrawal of New Zealand Division from Minqar Qaim on night 27–28 June 1942 106 The Rout of Ariete Division, 3 July 1942 168 4 and 5 New Zealand Brigades from 3 to 7 July 1942 174 Ruweisat Ridge: The Morning of 15 July 1942 238 Ruweisat Ridge: Afrika Korps' Attack on 4 New Zealand Brigade, 15 July 1942 288 El Mreir: The Advance and Dawn Counter-attack, 22 July 1942 329 El Mreir: 23 Armoured Brigade's Advance and final New Zealand Dispositions, 22 July 1942 356

The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The ranks are those held on discharge or at the date of death.

The Axis Approach to the Oilfields Colour map of surrounding oilfield areas

CHAPTER 1 Aftermath of Libyan Campaign

THE New Zealand Division felt injured, puzzled, and to some extent ill-used, but yet was proud of itself as it recuperated in the rest and refitting area of Baggush in December 1941. After twelve days of arduous fighting in Cyrenaica the Division—less its 5th Brigade, the Divisional Cavalry Regiment and the Reserve Mechanical Transport Companies, left temporarily with Eighth Army for further operations—had been withdrawn because, in the words of General Auchinleck,

General (now Field Marshal) Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck, GCB, GCIE, CSI, DSO, OBE, Commander-in-Chief Middle East Forces, 1941–42.

‘two-thirds of the New Zealand Division had been cut to pieces.’

No man doubted that a round had been won against the Germans or that the Division had acquitted itself well. But experienced officers knew, and their junior officers and other ranks suspected, that the best had not been made of the Division's capabilities. Assertions of bungling and of avoidable losses were put against the sum of achievements. A victory had been won but the fruit had a bitter flavour.

In the isolation his thoughts imposed, Major-General Sir Bernard Freyberg,

Lt-Gen Lord Freyberg, VC, GCMG, KCB, KBE, DSO and 3 bars, m.i.d., Order ofValour and MC (Greek); born Richmond, Surrey, 1889; CO Hood Bn 1914–16; commanded 173 Bde, 58 Div, and 88 Bde, 29 Div, 1917–18; GOC 2 NZEF Nov 1939–Nov 1945; twice wounded; Governor-General of New Zealand 17 Jun 1946–15 Aug 1952.

commanding the Division, considered the campaign had been a failure. The German Afrika Korps under Rommel had escaped ‘when he should have been caught like a rat in a trap.’

GOC's papers, report on New Zealand Division in Syria.

Failure and cost were due, in Freyberg's opinion, to the British Army Command's persistence with faulty ideas. These had been the greatest factor in the Division's losses, then estimated at 4000 in killed, wounded and prisoners.

New Zealand Division casualties in the second Libyan campaign (Nov 1941–Feb 1942) were later officially recorded as: Killed, 671; died of wounds, 208; died on active service (sickness, accident, etc.), 202; wounded, 1699; prisoners of war (includes 201 wounded and prisoners of war and 5 died of wounds while prisoners), 2042; total, 4822.

True, other divisions had suffered heavy losses, in some cases more severe than those of the New Zealand Division. But that was no consolation. It did not ease General Freyberg's mind concerning his responsibility to the Government and people of New Zealand for the welfare of their Division.

Freyberg's meditations on this and previous campaigns and his experiences led him to the conviction that in the interests of New Zealand he should do his utmost to get the Division away from the Desert Command.

The belief of the junior officers and other ranks that their part in the campaign had been successful was firmly based. They knew they had acquitted themselves well in battle. The intimate personal doubts which affect the soldier when he first comes under fire had been resolved. Men who had served in Greece and Crete had found that the long period out of battle had not affected their nerves. Gaps in the ranks and losses in equipment proclaimed that the price of victory had been high. But the fighting had been severe and heavy toll had been taken of the enemy. The balance, in the general opinion, was in favour of the British.

Moreover, it was argued, the campaign must have been successful because the enemy was retreating. In Norway and France, in Greece, Crete and North Africa, the British forces had been compelled to retreat in the face of the enemy's superiority in numbers, equipment and tactics. Now the tables had been turned. The Afrika Korps, then believed to be a specially trained force and the élite of the German Army, was withdrawing to the security of El Agheila. To ensure its own safety, the Korps was abandoning its Italian allies. For this there could be only one reason. It was beaten. At long last the British Army had been trained and provided with the tools for the job. With more and better tools and further training and experience there should be greater and more clear-cut victories.

The Division did not know that the Commander-in-Chief would report that ‘two-thirds of the New Zealand Division had been cut to pieces, and had had to be withdrawn to refit’,

Despatch, London Gazette, 15 Jan 1948, p. 313.

and that the Division was ‘exhausted but in good heart.’

Ibid. p. 341.

Even had the men known that the Commander-in-Chief would thus describe their losses, their good heart was such that morale would not have been adversely affected. The New Zealanders, at this period, had that peculiar quality of good troops—a grim pride in their ability to take hard knocks. They were not aware of being exhausted. They were tired, but not beyond the swift and easy remedies of regular meals and sleep.

Satisfaction with the campaign was not confined to the Division's own part. Letters to New Zealand from Baggush were generous in praise of the British troops, especially of the tank units and the Royal Air Force. The men listened to the German radio broadcasts and scoffed at assertions that Britain was using only colonial forces in the field. ‘We are one division out of a whole army,’ a soldier wrote to his parents. ‘We have suffered certainly and so have the South Africans, but nothing much is said of the glorious work of our tank boys…. There is not a better band of men in the world.’

Middle East Field Censorship Summary, December 1941.

‘I take off my hat to those Tommy tank chaps,’ another soldier wrote. ‘They certainly are wonderful scrappers and the best of chaps.’

Ibid.

Men who had complained of the lack of air support in Greece and Crete now extolled the Royal Air Force. ‘The Air Force did a great job.’ ‘We hardly saw any enemy planes.’ ‘Not once were we troubled from the air.’ ‘This time the Huns are getting more than they ever gave us and I hope they like it.’ These were typical comments in letters examined by the Field Censorship Section and recorded in the weekly summary. They permitted the censor to report: ‘There can be no question of NZEF morale being anything but of the highest order.’

Ibid.

This attitude was gratifying. But it reflected the truth of the saying that often the soldier cannot see the battle for the bullets. The men had no inkling of General Freyberg's analysis of the campaign and of the thoughts that troubled him.

General Freyberg was more than the commander of a division. He was the representative in the field of the Government of New Zealand and its adviser on the employment of the Division. He had a dual responsibility. He was responsible to the commander-in-chief of the theatre in which the Division was deployed and also, primarily, to the Government for the manner in which it was used.

This problem had been discussed by him with the Government on his appointment at the outbreak of the war. In illustration of difficulties that might arise he had cited the possible loss of a brigade. If such a misfortune befell the Division, to whom would he be responsible—the commander-in-chief of the theatre or the Government? The Hon P. Fraser, to whom the question was addressed in London, had replied that account would have to be made to the Government.

Freyberg thereupon had had prepared a directive which defined the powers of the commander-in-chief, reserved the rights of the New Zealand Government concerning the use of the Division, gave the commander of the Division direct access to the Government and the commander-in-chief, and vested in the divisional commander full authority in organisation and training. The directive was accepted by the New Zealand Government and was incorporated in an agree- ment with the Government of the United Kingdom. It was signed by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon M. J. Savage, on 5 January 1940.

For full text see Documents, Vol I, No. 39.

In brief, the directive placed the Division under the command of the theatre commander-in-chief only for operations and then only with the previous consent of the New Zealand Government, although General Freyberg, or his successors, could act on the Government's behalf ‘in the case of sufficiently grave emergency or in special circumstances, of which he must be the sole judge’. The directive was similar to those given by the Government of the United Kingdom to commanders-in-chief taking British forces overseas.

At Baggush General Freyberg had to refer to his directive, his ‘charter’ as he was wont to call it. He used his discretion ‘in special circumstances’ to permit the Divisional Cavalry to operate with 2 South African Division at Bardia. Fifth Brigade, under Brigadier Wilder,

Maj-Gen A. S. Wilder, DSO, MC, m.i.d., Order of the White Eagle (Serb); Te Hau, Waipukurau; born NZ 24 May 1890, sheepfarmer; Major, Wgtn Mtd Rifles, 1914–19; CO 25 Bn May 1940–Sep 1941; comd NZ Trg Group, Maadi Camp, Sep–Dec 1941 Jan–Feb 1942; 5 Bde 6 Dec 1941–17 Jan 1942; 5 Div (in NZ) Apr 1942–Jan 1943; 1 Div Jan–Nov 1943.

was left with Eighth Army for the pursuit to Gazala. The RMT companies and other transport were also placed at the disposal of Eighth Army. And as the Division would not be required for further active operations for some time, a low priority for replacing lost and damaged equipment was accepted without question.

These, however, were minor matters compared with General Freyberg's reflections on the campaign. He disagreed with the Army policy of dividing divisions into brigade groups in battle. Brigade groups were suitable only for movement in the desert. Armour ‘in support’ of infantry had proved to be a myth. The Army had not been correctly disposed in the first days of the campaign to deal with the armoured forces the enemy could concentrate against it. On the way to the frontier he had told the Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Cunningham, that he would fail with the forces he was deploying. Freyberg had been so apprehensive that he had told Cunningham he would not take the New Zealand Division over the frontier until the armoured battle had been won. Wrong deductions by Army concerning that battle had sent the Division on its way to suffer at Bardia and Sidi Rezegh.

Statement to author, 3 May 1948.

General Freyberg's disquiet was not a product solely of the current campaign. It had a background of Greece and Crete. He had also seen Operation BATTLEAXE, an affair on the frontier in June of that year in which the British forces had fared badly. This had seriously disturbed him. Nor was he alone in his thoughts. From Baggush he visited Lieutenant-General G. E. Brink, of the South Africans, to find Brink ‘in despair over dissipation of his forces and manner in which his Bdes are employed even without reference to him.’

GOC's diary, 12 Dec 1941.

Middle East Command's reception of General Freyberg's draft report on the Division's operations and the lessons they taught reinforced his doubts of the Command's wisdom and skill. General Auchinleck asked that the report should be sent to him before it was circulated ‘as he feels that it is most important that nothing should go into it that is not in accordance with the policy he wishes adopted in tactical operations.’ The report was returned with the note: ‘The only item I disagree with is the comment on battle-groups. Also it shows how badly we handle our “I” tanks.’

Auchinleck ordered the deletion of a remark that ‘the dangerous mistake of committing our small force piecemeal was gradually being corrected’, and also references to the ineffectiveness of the binary, or two-brigade, division and the brigade-group organisation.

GOC's papers.

The sum of these reflections and the decision they inspired are expressed in Freyberg's own words:

‘While I was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief in operations, my primary responsibility and loyalty were to the Government and people of New Zealand. No other loyalty could come before that. I had their Division and I was responsible for it.

‘I had seen what had happened in Greece and Crete and in the desert at Sidi Barrani and Battleaxe. I had seen the Desert Command under Auchinleck. I knew their ideas and how faulty they were. I became firmly convinced that the only way to safeguard the interests of New Zealand and of the Division was to get the Division away from the Desert Command.’

Statement to author, 3 May 1948.

Accordingly, General Freyberg revived with Middle East Headquarters the project of August 1941 for the transfer of the Division to Syria. Other reasons supported the move. Turkey and Syria might become an active theatre if the fortunes of war flowed against the Soviet Union. The Australian divisions then in Syria were likely to be withdrawn for service in the Pacific and would have to be replaced. The New Zealand Division's experiences in similar terrain in Greece and Crete made it specially suitable for operations in Turkey and Syria. Syria offered a more congenial climate in which to rest, refit and train. There were defensive works to be completed. Further, while Syria remained a non-operational theatre, the Division would be readily available should it be required for the Pacific.

General Freyberg would not have pressed for the transfer without these supporting arguments. His was not the nature to avoid battle or seek only the easiest tasks. Nor was this the spirit of the Division. The Government's policy was one of fullest co-operation. Although events proved that the danger of a German invasion of the Middle East through Turkey was exaggerated, Auchinleck and his staff were apprehensive of the northern flank.

Despatch, p. 309.

Freyberg shared these views. He believed there was a substantial role for the Division in Syria.

It was with relief, therefore, that on 13 December Freyberg cabled the Government: ‘Division is now to refit and train for future operations on the Syrian front. I consider it will take two months' hard training to get units and formations up to the requisite pitch.’

CHAPTER 2 A Hazardous Project

REST and recreation, refitting, reorganisation and training were quick-acting specifics in the revival of the Division at Baggush. There were 5000 trained men in the reinforcement pool at Maadi to fill gaps in the ranks. Reorganisation was eased by the fact that the administrative portions of the units and formations had escaped comparatively lightly in the recent fighting. Casualties among the officers

Fifty officers were killed in action, 13 died of wounds, 122 were wounded, and 144 were taken prisoner. Two COs were killed in action, two brigadiers and three COs taken prisoner, and four COs wounded.

and non-commissioned officers, however, had been heavy. But the Division, at this period, was fortunate in the wealth of material available for promotion. Nevertheless, time was required to make the selections and to accustom the promoted officers and non-commissioned officers to their new responsibilities. The tactical lessons of the campaign had to be assimilated and put into practice. The two months' period suggested by General Freyberg for the restoration of the Division was not too long.

Excitement was aroused by the return of officers and men who had been taken prisoner but who had escaped and made their way back to the Division, some after many vicissitudes. This excitement reached a peak early in January with the capture of Bardia by the South Africans and the recovery of about 800 New Zealanders, mostly from 5 Brigade. The recaptured men reported that all the officers who had been taken with them, including Brigadier Hargest,

Brig J. Hargest, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, m.i.d.; Member of Parliament for Invercargill 1931–35, Awarua 1935–44; born Gore, 4 Sep 1891; farmer; served 1 NZEF 1914–20, comd 2 Bn Otago Regt, 1918; comd 5 Bde May 1940–Nov 1941; p.w. 27 Nov 1941; escaped Mar 1943; killed in action, France, 12 Aug 1944.

the brigade commander, and Brigadier Miles,

Brig R. Miles, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, ED, m.i.d.; born Springston, 10 Dec 1892; Regular soldier; NZ Fd Arty 1914–19; CRA 2 NZ Div 1940–41; comd 2 NZEF (UK) 1940; wounded and p.w. 1 Dec 1941; died, Spain, 20 Oct 1943.

the commander of the New Zealand Artillery, had been shipped away by the enemy. Among the returning officers were Lieutenant-Colonels Dittner,

Brig G. Dittmer, CBE, DSO, MC, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Maharahara, 4 Jun 1893; Regular soldier; Auckland Regt 1914–19 (OC 1 NZ Entrenching Bn); CO 28 (Maori) Bn, Jan 1940–Nov 1941; wounded 23 Nov 1941; comd 1 Inf Bde Gp (in NZ) Apr 1942–Aug 1943; 1 Div, Aug 1942–Jan 1943; Fiji Military Forces and Fiji Inf Bde Gp, Sep 1943–Nov 1945; Camp Commandant, Papakura Military Camp, 1946; Commandant, Central Military District, 1946–48.

of 28 (Maori) Battalion, and Kippenberger,

Maj-Gen Sir Howard Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, ED, m.i.d., Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Ladbrooks, 28 Jan 1897; barrister and solicitor; 1 NZEF 1916–17; CO 20 Bn Sep 1939–Apr 1941, Jun–Dec 1941; comd 10 Bde, Crete, May 1941; 5 Bde Jan 1942–Jun 1943, Nov 1943–Feb 1944; 2 NZ Div 30 Apr-14 May 1943 and 9 Feb-2 Mar 1944; Prisoner of War Reception Group (UK) 1944–45; twice wounded; Editor-in-Chief, NZ War Histories.

20 Battalion, who had separately escaped after their capture in the New Zealand medical centre near Point 175. The latter on his arrival at Baggush found some compensation for his wounds and trials in General Freyberg's greeting: ‘You're a brigadier!’

The sick and wounded of the recovered prisoners were sent to hospital and the remainder to Maadi.

Innocuous rumour and gossip based on the war communiques and commentaries, scraps from the intelligence reports and letters from New Zealand also varied the routine. The Pacific war aroused the keenest interest and was the basis of many rumours concerning the Division's future. These were coloured by the Government's request for experienced officers and non-commissioned officers for the home defence forces then being rapidly expanded. Brigadier Barrowclough, DSO,

Maj-Gen Rt Hon Sir Harold Barrowclough, PC, KCMG, CB, DSO and bar, MC, ED, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US), Croix de Guerre (Fr); Wellington; born Masterton, 23 Jun 1894; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde 1915–19 (CO 4 Bn); comd 7 NZ Inf Bde in UK, 1940; 6 Bde, 1 May 1940–21 Feb 1942; GOC 2 NZEF in Pacific and GOC 3 NZ Div, 8 Aug 1942–20 Oct 1944; Chief Justice of New Zealand.

commanding 6 Brigade, was specially asked for to command a division. Other senior officers released at this time and later were Brigadier Wilder and Lieutenant-Colonels Andrew, VC,

Brig L. W. Andrew, VC, DSO, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Ashhurst, 23 Mar 1897; Regular soldier; Wellington Regt, 1915–19; CO 22 Bn Jan 1940–Mar 1942; comd 5 Bde 27 Nov-8 Dec 1941; Area Commander, Wellington, Nov 1943–Dec 1946; Commandant Central Military District, Apr 1948–Mar 1952.

Dittmer, Satterthwaite

Col S. M. Satterthwaite, m.i.d.; Timaru; born Timaru, 7 Jan 1897; Regular soldier; Bde IO (Lt) NZ Rifle Bde, 1917–19; CO 26 Bn Dec 1941–Apr 1942.

and Duff.

Brig C. S. J. Duff, DSO, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Wellington, 19 Nov 1898; Regular soldier; comd 34 NZ A-Tk Bty, 1939–40; 7 A-Tk Regt, Oct 1940–May 1941; 4 Fd Regt, Aug 1941–Apr 1942; CRA 3 NZ Div, Aug 1942–Oct 1944; NZLO Melbourne, 1947–48.

6Maj-Gen C.E. Weir, CB, CBE, DSO and bar, m.i.d.; Wellington; born NZ 5 Oct 1905; Regular soldier; CO 6 Fd Regt Sep 1939–Dec 1941; CRA 2 NZ Div Dec 1941–Jun 1944; comd 2 NZ Div 4 Sep-17 Oct 1944; 46 (Brit) Div Nov 1944–Sep 1946; Commandant Southern Military District, 1948–49; QMG Army HQ Nov 1951–.

The transfer of these officers meant more to the Division than occasion for gossip or colour for rumour. Added to the loss of other senior officers in Cyrenaica, their departure created anxiety for the Division's efficiency in command and staff.

In Divisional Headquarters, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Weir6 moved up from the command of 6 Field Regiment to become CRA and a brigadier in place of Brigadier Miles. The three field regiments and the anti-tank and light anti-aircraft regiments all had new commanding officers. In the infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Kippenberger succeeded to the command of 5 Brigade and Colonel Clifton

Brig G. H. Clifton, DSO and bar, MC, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Greenmeadows, 18 Sep 1898; Regular soldier; served North-West Frontier 1919–21 (MC, Waziristan); CRE 2 NZ Div 1940–41; Chief Engineer 30 Corps 1941–42; comd 6 Bde Feb–Sep 1942; p.w. 4 Sep 1942; escaped, Germany, Mar 1945; NZ Military Liaison Officer, London, 1949–52; Commandant Northern Military District, Mar 1952–Sep 1953.

to 6 Brigade. Of the ten infantry battalions, no fewer than seven had new commanding officers. In its command structure the Division was thus to some extent immature in spite of the battle experience of the officers who had assumed greater responsibilities and duties.

The principal appointments in the Division in June 1942 with some notes on the units are given in Appendix I.

This immaturity applied also to many of the units. In the artillery, 6 Field Regiment had suffered extremely heavy casualties at Sidi Rezegh and Belhamed, and new officers and other ranks far outnumbered the old hands. To a slightly lesser extent this was also the case with 7 Anti-Tank Regiment. In 4 Infantry Brigade, 18 Battalion's losses had not been severe and 19 Battalion had come out of the campaign almost intact. The 20th Battalion, now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Burrows,

Brig J. T. Burrows, DSO and bar, ED, m.i.d., Order of Valour (Gk); Christchurch; born Christchurch, 14 Jul 1904; schoolmaster; CO 20 Bn Dec 1941–Jun 1942; 20 Bn and Armd Regt Aug 1942–Jul 1943; comd 4 Bde 27–29 Jun 1942, 5 Jul-15 Aug 1942; 5 Bde Mar 1944, Aug–Nov 1944; 6 Bde Jul–Aug 1944; Commandant Southern Military District, Nov 1951–Oct 1953; Commander K Force Nov 1953–Nov 1954.

on the other hand, had been practically destroyed at Belhamed. It was rebuilt with a team of new officers, some 600 reinforcements and a stiffening of about 150 old hands still to be found in Egypt. So also with 21 Battalion in 5 Brigade and 6 Brigade's three units, 24, 25, and 26 Battalions. All were rebuilt on a nucleus of survivors and of officers and other ranks left out of battle.

All this involved many psychological adjustments. On the return from Cyrenaica the survivors moved into the dugouts they had occupied before the campaign. The dugouts, in which each man had his neatly cut bed in the wall, his patent stove, his ‘pin-ups’, might have been regarded in other circumstances as ‘home’. But now they created a mood of sadness. They contained too many reminders of friends who had not come back from the battle. Besides the vacant places, there was the listing of details concerning friends known to be missing, the collecting and packing of the effects of comrades who had been killed, and then the pitiable battalion musters of the first days when the remnants of companies lined up—ragged, aggressive, resentful of anything suggestive of ‘paradeground stuff’: all part and parcel of war. Many had experienced it before and would go through it again and again before they became hardened but never callous to it.

The absorption of the reinforcements was a study in individual and mass psychology. Veterans on the one side and reinforcements on the other were sufficiently numerous to make distinct classes. Each class was slightly resentful of the other. The reinforcements carried a chip on the shoulder when they were dubbed ‘Coconut Bombers’ because their service in Fiji had been bloodless. They felt the depression of the older hands, but could not share it. If any of them appeared to be stepping too easily into a dead comrade's shoes, or oblivious of the honour done him in admission to the sacred ranks, he was coolly received. There was little that anybody could do about it except wait for the two groups to settle down together.

This settling-down process was hastened at the New Year with a celebration big enough to pass into tradition as the ‘Battle of Baggush’. At midnight on the last day of the year, pent feelings were loosed with a display of fireworks on a grand scale. German and Italian flares were fired in abundance. Machine-gun and rifle fire was almost continuous. The artillery added bass tones to the celebrations with their 25-pounders. So many Very lights, parachute flares, tracer bullets, and shells and weapons of all kinds heralded the New Year that adjacent Navy and Air Force commands made emergency calls asking if the Division was being attacked.

General Freyberg noted in his diary that it was a ‘regrettable waste of ammunition and enemy flares, etc., but, being New Year's Eve, only to be expected.’ If, however, there was material waste, there was moral gain. All ranks, old and new, now had something in common. From that moment morale took a distinct upward turn.

Thus 1941 ended on a high note and gave way to 1942 with all the confident hopes associated with the change of the calendar. But, as so often happens, the New Year was to bring the unexpected.

Only three days after General Freyberg had advised the Government of the move to Syria, he was warned of another projected role for the Division. The enemy was then resisting stubbornly on the Gazala line in Cyrenaica, but Middle East Headquarters was confident of victory and thought that some time in February it would be possible to mount a battle for the key defensive area at El Agheila. The New Zealand Division would be required for this operation. Instead of going to Syria, the Division would move into General Headquarters Reserve at Maadi and the Combined Operations Training Centre at Kabrit, on the Suez Canal, to complete refitting and to train for its revised role.

GOC's papers, messages Lt-Gen A. F. Smith (CGS, ME) to Freyberg of 16 and 19 Dec 1941.

Agheila loomed large in the appreciations of Auchinleck and his staff. The remnants of Graziani's Italian Army had escaped to the shelter of this naturally strong position the previous January. From Agheila, Afrika Korps and the reorganised Italians under Rommel had debouched on 30 March to recapture the whole of Cyrenaica except Tobruk and establish themselves on the frontier of Egypt. In the current operations the destruction of the enemy forces, especially of the armour, was given its customary place as the main objective of Eighth Army, but always in mind there was the additional objective of preventing a withdrawal to Agheila in organised strength.

The new strategic situation created by the entry of Japan into the war gave further importance to Agheila. While Auchinleck hoped to continue the offensive through Agheila to Tripoli, he was compelled to recognise that transfers and diversions of formations and equipment to the Far East might force him to halt at the western frontier of Cyrenaica. Therefore he was as anxious to secure Agheila as he judged the enemy would be to hold it. Agheila had to be traversed to invade Tripolitania. It was equally essential to control the area in order to hold Cyrenaica. Otherwise, Auchinleck feared, Eighth Army would have to retire to the Egyptian frontier if the enemy became strong enough to launch an offensive in force.

Despatch, p. 348.

Looking well ahead, Middle East Headquarters prepared a plan for the capture of Agheila and, in the middle of December, assigned troops and equipment for the project as well as for intermediate operations to clear Bardia and Halfaya and thus improve the administrative situation. The general idea was that a lightly equipped brigade group would be landed on the coast at Ras el Ali to the west of the enemy positions at Agheila, while a motorised brigade would move round the positions to the south and then turn north to join the seaborne forces in the enemy's rear. The combined forces would then prevent reinforcements from reaching the enemy from Tripoli and close his only avenue of escape from a frontal attack to be made at the same time.

A New Zealand brigade group (later the 5th) was cast for the role of the landing force and the 22nd (Guards) Motorised Brigade, accompanied by Headquarters New Zealand Division, was assigned the encircling move through the desert. The desert column was to be commanded by Freyberg.

Credit for the plan, known successively as ‘Acrobat Minimus’, ‘Blood Orange’ and ‘Graduate’, was claimed by Combined Training Centre at Kabrit. The plan may have been inspired by Mr Churchill's constant urgings that the enemy's long communica- tions along the North African coast were vulnerable to amphibious operations,

Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Cassell), p. 374.

and to the natural desire of the Training Centre to see its theories and teachings expressed. Like most plas for placing forces astride the enemy's communications it had superficial attractions.

When, however, the project was submitted to General Freyberg he did his utmost to dissuade Middle East Headquarters from pursuing it. In his view, the plan had nothing to commend it. It was based, he thought, on too scant information and faulty appreciation of the enemy's strength and resourcefulness. Freyberg told Middle East Headquarters that they did not know what reserves Rommel had behind Agheila and that, in any case, it would be a simple matter for Rommel to turn on the landing force and destroy it.

It would seem obvious that General Freyberg, holding such views, should refuse the assignment. He could do so within the terms of his ‘charter’. Alternatively, he could use his right to refer the matter to the Government for its decision. The obvious course, however, was not open to him. Certainly it was not one to be taken at that early stage of the project. Nor, at that stage, could he give the Government all the information and advice it would need in reaching a decision. There were, however, other factors which, consciously or subconsciously, would weigh with any commander of Freyberg's experience and sense of responsibility. Of these, perhaps the most important was morale.

In spite of all that has been said and written about morale, few laymen and not over-many soldiers really understand how important it is and the calculations which may be based on it. The morale of the fighting forces and the civil population of Britain was the ‘real test’ on which the Government decided to fight on alone in 1940. See Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 78–9.

General Freyberg's decision could enhance or weaken the morale of Eighth Army. If Middle East Headquarters abandoned the operation because of his refusal to undertake it rather than because of the merits of his arguments against it, the fact was almost certain to become known and, with repetition, to become distorted. The army in the field might rejoice in the decision; it might also lose confidence in a high command apparently willing to be dictated to by a subordinate.

There would have been an even worse effect on the British divisions in Eighth Army if there were the slightest suspicion that the New Zealanders had the right to pick and choose their tasks; that they were willing to accept the easy and spectacular and leave the difficult and hazardous to others. Already there was some discontent among the British troops concerning the publicity given to the Dominions' forces in operations in which British units had played an equal part. After the capture of Bardia in January 1942 a battalion of the Royal Armoured Corps, which had been particularly valorous in five assaults on the enemy in one day, heard in the official report and comments by the BBC all the credit being given to Dominion troops. The absence of even passing reference to the role of the British tank crews provoked, among other remarks, the ironical comment: ‘The worst part of the Statute of Westminster is that the United Kingdom did not acquire Dominion status.’

The New Zealand Division, too, would resent any suggestion that it would not essay dangerous operations. Again, the high reputation of the New Zealanders in two world wars would be undermined if, in spite of Freyberg's misgivings, another division accomplished the mission. It could also be argued that refusal to comply with the Commander-in-Chief's plans would not be in keeping with the Dominion's policy of full co-operation with Britain, a policy precisely stated by the Prime Minister, Mr Savage, in September 1939: ‘Where she goes, we go.’

Strategically, it was highly desirable that the enemy should be prised out of Agheila at the earliest moment and the way cleared for an advance into Tripolitania. And, on the vital tactical side, it was a matter of opinion whether the project was feasible or not. Against Freyberg's doubts and apprehensions, Middle East Headquarters could array the views of other experienced officers whose judgment had to be respected.

General Freyberg had a test question he used as an aid in reaching a decision when he doubted the worth or feasibility of an operation. ‘If the New Zealand Division does not accept the assignment, will some other division which cannot refuse be ordered to undertake it?’ If the answer were in the affirmative, the New Zealanders should accept the task and do their best to ensure success.

Statement to author, 3 May 1948.

Reflection on these factors persuaded Freyberg that he could not refuse the assignment and orders were issued for the moves to Maadi and Kabrit. His apprehensions were not allayed, but he could still press Middle East Headquarters not to go on with the project as planned. He could also supervise the detailed planning, particularly co-operation among the three services and the provision of air cover.

Throughout the remainder of December and in early January Freyberg urged his views on Middle East Headquarters, asking questions, examining the answers and raising still further objections. Finally, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief, he referred the matter to the Government. The Government asked for details, but when a fuller explanation was submitted to Middle East Head- quarters for approval its transmission was refused on the grounds that the secret might be endangered. The Minister of Defence then informed Freyberg that if it was impossible to consult the Government for security reasons or the necessity for immediate action, the Government would rely on his judgment.

Documents, Vol II, Nos. 116–19.

Thus the matter stood until the final planning conference, which was attended by about thirty officers from the three services. At this conference Freyberg was so forthright in his comments and so argumentative that at length Admiral Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief Eastern Mediterranean Fleet, beckoned him out of the room. Cunningham advised him not to worry. He said he had told Middle East Headquarters that the Navy would not go into the Gulf of Sirte unless air cover for twenty-four hours was guaranteed. As the aircraft were not available ‘the show was off’ so far as the Navy was concerned.

General Freyberg to author, 3 May 1948.

But unknown to the planners and completely unexpected by them, a more decisive factor was to make an end to the project. ‘On the 21st January the improbable occurred, and without warning the Axis forces began to advance.’

Despatch, p. 348.

Rommel once more was on the rampage into Cyrenaica. Neither the New Zealanders nor any other British troops except captives were to see Agheila until nearly a year later.

Doubts and discussions concerning the Division's participation in the Ras el Ali project did not hold up the moves and training incidental to the operation.

On 4 January 5 Brigade, the last of the brigades to return to Baggush from the battle area, with 28 (Maori) Battalion attached, moved to Kabrit. Under the direction of the Combined Training Centre, units practised the details of landing operations item by item, including rowing, use of scaling ladders, embarking in and disembarking from assault landing craft, assembling and loading handcarts, and the art of crossing beach wire defences.

From these elementary practices the brigade moved to combined training exercises under the direction of Divisional Headquarters, which had followed the brigade from Baggush and had been established at Fayid, on the west side of Great Bitter Lake. The object was to practise the brigade in landing on a beach in darkness against light opposition, as well as in the use of air support and signals. Using a Glen ship moored in Great Bitter Lake as brigade headquarters, the units embarked in various types of assault craft at the Kabrit landing stage in the early hours of the morning. Just before dawn landings were made on assigned beaches, and at dawn the Royal Air Force bombed targets ahead of the landing parties.

The training of the brigade culminated in the first week in February in a landing operation in the Red Sea. The men thought the exercise was mainly for the benefit of the Combined Training Centre, which had not previously attempted the landing of a full brigade. Actually it was a full-dress rehearsal for the assault at Ras el Ali which had not then been abandoned. The exercise was watched by General Auchinleck.

At the jetties at Fanara and Fayid four Glen ships—Saint Essylt, Glengyle, Princess Marguerite and Derwentdale—were loaded with guns, vehicles and men, and on 4 February they sailed in convoy to Port Tewfik. Next morning the ships moved into the Gulf of Suez to a point opposite Ras el Sudr on the east coast. At 11 a.m. the first waves of assaulting troops reached the beach. They were followed by heavier landing craft with guns and vehicles. Beachheads and communications were established.

The principal errors reported in a generally successful exercise were the grounding of a tank landing craft too far out for the guns to be unloaded and the failure for some time of communications with the mobile tank column. Units bedded down in the positions they were holding and next morning re-embarked in preparation for a similar exercise by night.

At this date, however, Middle East Headquarters was convinced by events in Cyrenaica that the enemy's emergence from the Agheila stronghold was more than a reconnaissance in force. By 4 February the advanced divisions of Eighth Army had been forced back to the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line. The Ras el Ali operation, therefore, was cancelled and the Division was given another new role.

Apart fom General Freyberg, perhaps no one in the Division was more relieved by the abandonment of the landing than Brigadier Kippenberger, who had assumed command of 5 Brigade on 17 January in succession to Brigadier Wilder, who was returning to New Zealand for duty. Kippenberger had disliked the project from its inception and, although he was urged to the task by General Freyberg, privately doubted whether Freyberg would permit it to go on.

Kippenberger, Infantry Brigadier (Oxford), p. 113.

In December 1942 when he studied the ground at Ras el Ali he became firmly convinced that the operation would have been disastrous, for the simple reason that landing craft would have grounded some distance off shore and no tanks, guns, or vehicles could have been landed. This information was supplied by a naval officer unloading supplies at the single small jetty at Ras el Ali. While 5 Brigade was doing its advanced training and 4 Brigade was performing elementary landing exercises at Kabrit, 6 Brigade and groups from the base units at Maadi under Brigadier Falconer

Brig A. S. Falconer, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, m.i.d.; Dunedin; born Mosgiel, 4 Nov 1892; tobacconist and secretary; Otago Regt 1914–19 (BM 2 NZ Inf Bde); CO 23 Bn May–Aug 1940 and Mar–May 1941; comd 7 and 5 Inf Bdes in UK, 1940–41; NZ Maadi Camp Jun 1941–Oct 1942; 5 Div (in NZ) Dec 1942–Aug 1943; Overseas Commissioner, NZ Patriotic Fund Board, Nov 1943–Feb 1945.

took part in an incident which was seriously to disturb AngloEgyptian relations in the post-war years.

At the beginning of February the New Zealanders moved into Cairo for security duty. Contact was made with British and South African forces similarly employed and brigade battle headquarters was established in the leave and transit camp at Abbassia. The 24th Battalion was lodged at Abbassia, the 25th at Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, and the 26th was quartered in the Citadel.

All ranks were vaguely aware of a crisis in the affairs of the Egyptian Government, but most contented themselves with the official explanation for such a display of force. This was that the crisis might precipitate demonstrations and rioting, which could not be allowed to get out of hand to prejudice the security of the British forces.

The 24th Battalion's announced role was to prevent mobs from crossing the main railway bridge, to maintain order in Sharia Shubra, and to disperse demonstrators forming elsewhere in the Shubra area. The 25th Battalion had orders to patrol part of Sharias Abbas and Bulac and to prevent mobs from assembling in and breaking out of the Bulac area.

In the evening of 4 February a New Zealand detachment some 800 strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gray,

Brig J. R. Gray, ED, m.i.d.; born Wellington, 7 Aug 1900; barrister and solicitor; CO 18 Bn Sep 1939–Nov 1941, Mar–Jun 1942; comd 4 Bde 29 Jun-5 Jul 1942; killed in action 5 Jul 1942.

joined British and South African troops in enclosing Abdin Palace where King Farouk was in residence. By nine o'clock the palace was completely surrounded by infantry shoulder to shoulder, with carriers, light machine guns and rifles. Light tanks were deployed in the palace yard and further tanks and artillery in Abdin Square, opposite the main entrance to the palace. Orders were given that no Egyptians were to be allowed to enter or leave the palace until the cordon was withdrawn.

These operations were prepared and carried out with such secrecy that no hitch occurred. All orders were given verbally and contained only enough information to permit commanders and junior officers to carry out the roles assigned to them. The mounted and dis- mounted bodyguard whose barracks adjoined the palace did not offer any opposition.

Shortly after nine o'clock the British Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, accompanied by military representatives, had audience with King Farouk. Upon his withdrawal the cordon about the palace was also withdrawn. Later, the units deployed elsewhere in the city returned to their camps.

No official record of the Ambassador's audience with the King was issued in London or Cairo nor, in the post-war years, was any effort made to challenge or contradict highly coloured and somewhat dramatic accounts which purported to be records in the first person of the meeting. The background and the result of the audience, however, are not in dispute.

Early in January trouble arose between King Farouk and the Prime Minister, Hussein Sirry Pasha, when the Government broke off diplomatic relations with Vichy France. Although the King did not object to the Government's decision, he challenged the method in which it had been made. He claimed he had not been consulted and that the Royal prerogative had been infringed. The disagreement appeared to be capable of settlement, but the King pressed the affair to the point of demanding the resignation of the Foreign Minister, Salim Samy Pasha. The Prime Minister interpreted this as an effort to undermine his position and, although he was conciliatory, he made it known at the end of the month that he no longer enjoyed the King's confidence. On 2 February his Government resigned.

Hussein Sirry Pasha had been loyal to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and the British Government, therefore, was concerned with his fate. The interest quickened when it was learned that the King was negotiating with politicians who might not be so favourable in observing the terms of the treaty. Consequently, on 4 February the British Ambassador, on instructions from London, entered the palace for the audience at which he persuaded the King to send for Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafdist Party, to form a Government. The display of armed force was to support the Ambassador in his representations.

Nahas Pasha accepted the King's commission and, as the decision received popular acclaim, no further trouble was expected and the troops were withdrawn from Cairo.

The occurrence passed into Egyptian history as the ‘Incident of 1942’. It loomed large in demands by Egypt after the war that Britain should withdraw her garrison of the Suez Canal zone and for the removal from the treaty of the clauses giving Britain rights of occupation. Egyptian Governments contended that it was not consistent with the independence and dignity of Egypt that foreign troops should have occupation rights. When the British Government denied that these rights prejudiced Egypt's independence, pointed reference was made to the ‘Incident of 1942’ as an example of direct interference with Egypt's internal affairs.

Rommel's advance from Agheila was halted on the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line. General Auchinleck ordered Eighth Army to make a stand there to preserve Tobruk as a forward supply base. He hoped to fight a decisive battle on the Gazala line and to convert the British retreat into another offensive. As an insurance against misfortune, the defences of Tobruk and of the frontier at Sollum and Halfaya were to be strengthened.

Headquarters New Zealand Division was then at Fayid, 4 Brigade at Kabrit, 5 Brigade on Great Bitter Lake and 6 Brigade at Maadi. The Divisional Cavalry Regiment, which had carried on with 2 South African Division in Cyrenaica, had rejoined the Division and was refitting at Maadi. The only units still to rejoin the Division were companies of the Army Service Corps serving British formations of the Eighth Army. One of the companies, 4 Reserve Mechanical Transport, had the ill-luck to be in a convoy which ran into the enemy advancing from Agheila. The New Zealanders had men of the 1st Battalion Welch Regiment in twelve trucks and were taking them forward from Benghazi. The convoy was surrounded. The New Zealanders destroyed their trucks and, with the British troops, set out on foot in small groups in an attempt to slip through the enemy columns. Only four of the New Zealanders escaped, although another, Driver Oswald Martin,

Dvr O. Martin, MM; Wellington; born NZ 11 Dec 1918; labourer.

later organised an escape from a prison compound near Benghazi and got through to the British lines in April.

On 6 February General Freyberg cabled the Prime Minister, Mr Fraser,

Mr Fraser had become Prime Minister on the death of Mr Savage in March 1940.

that he had received orders for the Division to move to the desert for a full operational role, the move to be completed by the 22nd. The Division was to relieve troops coming out to rest and refit. Equipment was being made up completely in the next two days and the Division was up to strength in officers and men and in good condition. Freyberg said he expected a defensive role but this depended on the Commander-in-Chief's future policy, which had not yet been divulged to him.

Documents, Vol II, No. 121.

Syria & Lebanon Colour map of countries

The Government's response was swift and left no doubt of its feelings in the matter. ‘While we must accept the position,’ Freyberg was advised the following day, ‘we are most disappointed that circumstances now apparently require further operations by the New Zealand Division so soon after its recent heavy losses. We assume that nothing but the serious nature of the emergency has necessitated this step, and we would wish this communication to be shown to the Commander-in-Chief.’

Documents, Vol II, No. 122.

At the same time the Government took up the matter with Mr Churchill.

Ibid, No. 123.

After repeating the information received from Freyberg and stating that ‘we have of course told him that we must accept the position’, Mr Fraser said that ‘ill-informed comments emanating recently from America and elsewhere concerning the very large forces retained inactive in the United Kingdom as compared with the needs elsewhere, the despatch of American troops to Northern Ireland, and the use of Dominion forces in the Middle East have been taken up with some force in this Dominion and were indeed reflected, with some degree of embarrassment to us, at the secret session of Parliament yesterday.’

Mr Fraser recalled that the Division had had a full share of heavy fighting and had suffered grievous losses. ‘I greatly fear,’ he continued, ‘that their renewed employment will add weight to this point of view, especially since their employment now will be misrepresented here as an indication that their last campaign was useless and that the job must be done again. Indeed, point may well be added to a demand that the New Zealand forces should be returned to the Pacific area to meet the danger nearer home…. Such consensus of sentiments may have mischievous results.’

Mr Fraser added that to counter any such propaganda and to allay any possible public feeling, he would be most grateful if Mr Churchill would let him have, as far as possible for public use, a full statement of the number of troops then held in the United Kingdom and the reasons for their retention—‘ reasons which I do not for a moment suggest are not completely conclusive.’

Mr Churchill immediately supplied the information sought.

Ibid, No. 124.

He said that only shortage of shipping held troops in Britain, but that every month for more than a year past the equivalent of one New Zealand division had been sent from Britain to the Middle East. He was anxious to get the Australian and New Zealand troops into the Japanese theatre, and ‘night and day we work to find more tonnage: all is continually filled.’

‘Do not allow anyone therefore,’ he said, ‘to reproach the Mother Country with an undue regard for her own security.’

The correspondence is an example of the wide repercussions that may follow exploitation of an opportunity in a theatre of war. The defeat of Eighth Army was Rommel's principal object, but the enemy's cause was also assisted by ill-based comments and recriminations which his operations inspired amongst the people of the British Commonwealth and America. These, as Fraser mentioned to Churchill, were even reflected in the secret session of the New Zealand Parliament. Similar incidents occurred at other stages of the war. While they did not prejudice relations between the Governments concerned, they point to some of the difficulties of leading democracies in war. Students may contrast the democratic system which fosters a healthy interest in the conduct of war, even to the extent of permitting every man to be his own strategist, with the blind obedience exacted by totalitarian regimes.

In the event, the New Zealand Division was not called for further operations in the desert. Concurrent with Mr Churchill's reply another message was received from Freyberg stating: ‘Our proposed move forward was due to the fact that some of the formations which took part in the more recent operations in Western Cyrenaica will have to be replaced and brought back to refit …. The Commander-in-Chief …. sympathises with the point of view expressed in your telegram and has now altered his plans by bringing in another division in our place. There will be a short time-lag … and to tide over this period he has asked me to place the 5th Brigade Group at the disposal of Eighth Army. I have agreed to this course.’

Documents, Vol II, No. 125.

The Government accepted Freyberg's decision, and on 11 February the brigade group, brought up to strength in transport by drawing on other formations, moved back to the desert by rail and road. It comprised:

Headquarters 5 Infantry Brigade 21, 22, and 23 Battalions 5 Field Regiment 7 Field Company 32 Anti-Tank Battery 42 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery 4 Company, 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion 5 Field Ambulance 2 Section Ordnance Workshops C Section Ordnance Field Park 5 Brigade Group Army Service Corps detachment 6 Reserve Mechanical Transport Company

Brigadier Kippenberger was ordered to report to Eighth Army near Gambut, where he was further instructed to place the group with the utmost despatch at the disposal of Lieutenant-General ‘Strafer’ Gott,

Lt-Gen W. H. E. Gott, CBE, DSO, MC; GOC 7 Armd Div Sep 1941–Feb 1942; comd 13 Corps Feb–Aug 1942; killed in action 7 Aug 1942.

commanding 13 Corps, who in turn ordered him to prepare and occupy a brigade box, ‘an unhappy device fashion- able at that time,'

Infantry Brigadier, p. 114.

at El Adem. The box, or strongpoint, was to be part of the defence in depth of the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line and was to cover the Corps' main artery, the Trigh Capuzzo, against raids and attempts by the enemy to establish himself in rear of Eighth Army's forward positions and the El Adem airfield.

All units were on the position by 16 February, and they dug, wired, and mined mutually supporting battalion boxes within a group perimeter of 14,000 yards. In ten days the engineers put down 16,944 mines, of which 13,000 were lifted from the outer defences of Tobruk. The mines were lifted with full authority as it had been decided that Tobruk would not be held if the enemy broke through the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line. This particular weakening of the mine defences of Tobruk was thought in the Division, and elsewhere, to have been a factor in the rapid fall of the fortress in the following June.

On the completion of the defences at El Adem, a mobile column was formed to operate in the triangle Acroma-Tobruk-Sidi Rezegh. It was to hunt raiding parties and harass armoured groups should they break into the box. The column was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Russell,

Lt-Col J. T. Russell, DSO, m.i.d.; born Hastings, 11 Nov 1904; farmer; CO 22 Bn Feb–Sep 1942; wounded May 1941; killed in action 6 Sep 1942.

22 Battalion, and comprised a battery of the field artillery, a detachment of 44 Royal Tank Regiment in Valentine tanks, a carrier platoon, an infantry company, anti-tank and antiaircraft troops, a machine-gun platoon and a signals detachment. The column acquired considerable skill in its exercises but its role was not taken seriously by the brigade commander.

‘The idea was that while we were beleaguered in our nice little box it would cavort around outside, biting at the rear of our besiegers. I thought that war should be taken more seriously.’—Infantry Brigadier, p. 115.

The brigade remained at El Adem until 22 March, when it was relieved by South African units. The box was later referred to by 29 Indian Brigade, which occupied it effectively in the June fighting, as being ‘particularly strong’.

The Tiger Kills (English edition, HMSO), p. 127.

The diary of 90 Light Division for the period 12–16 June also made references to the strength of the position.

CHAPTER 3 Alternative Roles

THE thrice-deferred transfer of the Division to Syria began on 26 February with the closing of advanced headquarters at Fayid and its reopening at Wavell Barracks, Baalbek, next morning. Oftrepeated rumours among the troops of a move to green fields at last were coming true.

Shortage of transport due to the needs of 5 Brigade Group at El Adem and to other demands from Eighth Army made a tactical move impossible. It was in fact unnecessary. The camps along the Canal were tented, and each unit's tents and camp stores had to be taken to Syria with its normal stores and equipment. Scarcity of trucks compelled as many men and as much of the baggage as possible to be sent by rail.

In general, each unit loaded its trucks to capacity with stores and sent them off with guards as an advance party. Heavy baggage was put on railway trucks with guards to each truck. The main body of each group, with such equipment as would be needed immediately on arrival, moved by passenger train. Thus the transfer was more akin to a gigantic house-moving than to a military operation.

Traffic on the roads and railways between Egypt and Syria was heavy. In addition to the excess traffic normal to war, the Australian 6th and 7th Divisions were being concentrated on the Canal from Syria and Palestine for their return to Australia, and the New Zealand Division, less 5 Brigade Group, was preparing to move north. The concentration of the Dominions' forces on the Canal did not escape the notice of the Germans although they made wrong deductions from the fact. On 25 February Berlin radio reported that the New Zealanders had left for home.

In the sum of its travels the Division saw part of Sinai, over which the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade had fought in 1916, the coastal regions of Palestine, Lebanon, and finally Syria to the border of Turkey. Halts at staging points, some only overnight but others up to two and three days, permitted inspection of various areas in detail and enlarged acquaintance with the people. There was general awareness among the troops that they were passing over storied ground, but, whatever else they had in their equipment, a wide knowledge of biblical and military history was not included. But men who could fit modern place names to biblical stories found ready audiences.

Such were the piecemeal methods enforced by the transport situation that nearly three weeks were required for the transfer, the last main group, Rear Divisional Headquarters, leaving Kabrit on 12 March. The leisurely move was in marked contrast to the speed with which the Division returned to the Western Desert in the following June when, within a week of receiving orders, it was in battle positions at Mersa Matruh.

On completion of the shift to Syria, Divisional Headquarters was at Baalbek, 4 Brigade was in the right sector of Djedeide fortress, and 6 Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier Clifton, was deployed in and about Aleppo, near the Turkish frontier. The Division was in 10 Corps and under Ninth Army, commanded by General Sir H. M. Wilson. It had a fourfold task: (1) Demonstrating strength in Syria to obscure the real strength of the Allies now seriously depleted in the theatre by transfers and diversions to the Far East; (2) completing the construction of Djedeide fortress and demolition schemes north to the frontier; (3) preparing to advance into Turkey to the Hellespont or to a defensive line in the Taurus Mountains and, alternatively, an advance into Persia; (4) training.

General Auchinleck had devoted considerable thought to the northern flank which, with the necessity of destroying the enemy in North Africa, he placed high above all the numerous other problems of the Middle East command.

Opinions, strengths, and plans attributed to General Auchinleck in this chapter are taken from his Despatch.

The danger he saw was the possible, if not probable, collapse of Turkey under a German attack. The enemy's deep advance into Russia also created a threat to the northern flank from the Caucasus. However, in November 1941 Auchinleck considered himself strong enough in forces and equipment in the theatre, and in promised reinforcements, to conduct an offensive in the Western Desert and to turn in time to stave off an attack from the north.

He intended, if the need arose, to stand on the defensive in the west and to hold the general line of the Tabriz-Mosul-Syrian-Turkish frontier with Cyprus and to despatch a force to help Turkey in northern Anatolia. For this comprehensive task he estimated he would need a minimum of 5 armoured divisions, 17 infantry divisions, and 34 heavy and 55 light anti-aircraft regiments. On 28 December he reviewed the forces available and promised, and submitted to the Chiefs of Staff an estimate of deficiencies as on 1 April, the earliest date he thought a threat from the north was likely to reveal itself.

Within a month of making these calculations, diversions of formations from the Middle East and of reinforcements required the Commander-in-Chief to make a further estimate of shortages which, in turn, compelled drastic revision of plans for the northern front. On 20 January, incidentally the day before Rommel unexpectedly debouched from Agheila to upset again the estimates of forces needed to hold him and Cyrenaica, Auchinleck reported that on 1 April he would be short of one and a half armoured divisions, 5 infantry divisions, and 19 heavy and 37 light anti-aircraft regiments. Besides this deficiency in formations and anti-aircraft artillery, there were indications that deliveries of armoured fighting vehicles and trucks would fall so far short of requirements that some formations in the Middle East would not be complete in transport and therefore would be unable to take part in active operations.

This situation led Auchinleck to decide that ‘our only course will be to fall back on defences in rear in Persia, Central Iraq and Southern Syria and to fight a defensive battle, thus surrendering to the enemy all air bases and landing grounds north of this line, the effect of which will be greatly to increase the scale of enemy air attack on our bases.’

A fortnight later, on 4 February, when Middle East Headquarters was examining its resources for a resumption of the offensive in the Western Desert, it was decided that all available tanks and armoured units could be withdrawn from the northern front. ‘There is a risk,’ Auchinleck observed in a note for the Middle East Defence Committee, ‘but one which can be taken, unless there is a rapid change on the Russian front, as it now seems most unlikely that Germany will be able to mount an attack against Syria and Iraq through Anatolia, or against Persia through the Caucasus, before the beginning of August.’

Many opinions were held concerning the date when the enemy could attack the Middle East from the north. In February 1942 the first Russian winter offensive was coming to an end. Early in May, the Russians launched a ‘spoiling offensive’ on the South-Central front from Kharkov sector. It was not until June that the Germans resumed their large-scale operations which carried them to Stalingrad and the foothills of the Caucasus. In his despatch General Auchinleck says, ‘We were always handicapped in our calculations by lack of knowledge of Soviet capabilities and intentions.’

An operation instruction issued on 23 February to Ninth and Tenth Armies was of more immediate interest to New Zealand Division, then moving into Syria. Once more Auchinleck had to note still further diversions and projected transfers of troops which, if completed, would reduce the infantry strength for the whole of the Middle East theatre to eight divisions and five brigade groups. After providing three infantry divisions and one brigade group to secure the western front and one division for Cyprus to deny the island to the enemy as an air base, there would remain only four divisions and, at most, four brigade groups to meet the requirements of Ninth and Tenth Armies and a general reserve.

General Auchinleck thereupon stated that ‘this force would be inadequate to stop an enemy attack in strength through Persia and Syria, directed on the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal.’ But this did not mean that the British and Allied forces were to throw in their hand. In General Wilson Ninth Army had a commander to whom the norm of war was scarcity of everything usually considered essential for success. In the early years of the First World War he had experienced the vicissitudes of scarcity. He knew scarcity again when he commanded in Greece and in the advance into Syria against the Vichy French. The New Zealand Division, then coming under his command, and 9 Australian Division of Tobruk fame, had been trained to do much with little. Scarcity was the accustomed lot of the two Free French brigade groups, the Polish Brigade and the Greek brigade group, the last of which was to be under New Zealand command.

Ninth and Tenth Armies were ordered in the instruction of 23 February to impose the greatest possible delay on an enemy advance and thus gain time for the arrival of reinforcements. The Turks were to be supported if they resisted and if the necessary air forces were available. Airfields in northern Syria and Iraq were to be held as long as possible to permit attack on the enemy's communications through Turkey. When retreat became imperative, the withdrawing forces were to destroy communications and oil installations north of the line Dizful–Paitak

Probably another spelling of Taktak.

(in the highlands of western Persia)–Little Zab River (Upper Mesopotamia)–Ana–Abu Kemal (Iraq) and Damascus–Ras Baalbek–Tripoli (Syria). While withdrawing to prepared positions on this general line, the forces available were to be used boldly in attacking the enemy in flank and rear. If the armies were forced off the Dizful–Tripoli line, they were to fight a series of delaying actions on ground of their own choosing back to positions in southern Iraq and southern Palestine covering the ports on the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal.

Auchinleck emphasized that ‘it is of paramount importance that we avoid disclosing our weakness or our intentions to the enemy, to Turkey, or to the local populations, because by so doing we may encourage the enemy to attack, drive Turkey into submission, and bring about a serious internal security situation.’ Troop movements in the northern frontier area were to be maintained on the same scale as in the past to avoid giving an impression of a change in plans. Construction of roads in the northern areas on which a start had been made was to be continued but only slowly. No new works would be started. The main effort was to be concentrated on the completion of the defences on the Dizful–Tripoli line, local labour being used to the greatest possible extent ‘to free formations for the training in manoeuvre which will be so essential to success.’

In the first six weeks of its sojourn in Syria the New Zealand Division did duty conforming to the policy of the Commander-in-Chief. However, by the close of April, the outlook for troops and equipment had improved a little and Auchinleck amended his operation instructions to provide for more aggressive action against an enemy attack from the north. In the new plan the Division was allotted a hazardous role.

If Turkey resisted, an air striking force with an army component from Ninth Army would move into northern Anatolia to airfields which the Turks had permitted the British to build and equip. At the same time, Ninth and Tenth Armies would advance into Turkey to the general line El Aziz (Kharpur)-Malatya-Taurus Mountains to improve communications, prepare demolitions on the main Turkish communications, and cover the withdrawal of the British forces from Anatolia should this become necessary.

If Turkey acquiesced in German aggression or collapsed quickly, Ninth and Tenth Armies were to enter Turkey and seize and hold the general line Diyarbekir-Siverek-Gaziantep (Aintab)-Bulanik (Baghche)-Payas to demolish communications and delay the enemy as far forward as possible. Should the Turks openly side with the Germans or strengthen their forces on the Syrian frontier with the evident intention of co-operating with the Germans, the British armies were to carry out demolitions as far forward as possible and delay the enemy's advance.

Although General Auchinleck still considered that the forces likely to be at his disposal could not prevent an enemy penetration of northern Iraq and Syria, he believed the enemy could be kept away from the ports of southern Palestine, the Canal and the Persian Gulf. Accordingly he gave an explicit direction to the Army commanders that ‘the enemy will not in any event be allowed to establish himself south of the general line Little Zab River-Ana-Amman-Jericho-Nablus-Haifa.’

In these plans New Zealand Division was marked for the advance into Anatolia with the air striking force and the alternatives of delaying actions in and south of Turkey. The positions on the left of the line of last resort, Little Zab River-Haifa, were about 120 miles south of the Djedeide fortress which the New Zealanders were completing.

Similar instructions aimed at holding the enemy in north Persia were given later to Tenth Army. These concerned New Zealand Division to the extent that it was assumed the attack would come only through the Caucasus and that the Division could be spared from Ninth Army for an offensive role in Persia.

CHAPTER 4 Division in Syria

DJEDEIDE fortress was one of a series of five areas in the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges intended to be made into keeps designed to deny the enemy the use of the main arteries of communication in southern Syria, Palestine and Transjordan. The others were about Tripoli on the coast, Barada Gorge and Qatana-Bourouch near Damascus, and Merdjayoun, south-west of Mount Hermon on the central highway. Sorties were to be made against the enemy's communications should he bypass the keeps, which were also to be the bases for counter-attacks when the enemy had expended himself in his efforts to press forward.

Djedeide fortress covered the northern entrance to the Bekaa valley between the two ranges and was centred on the village of Djedeide, about five miles north of Laboue and 20 miles north of Baalbek. The fortress was designed for four infantry brigades and an army tank battalion, an army field regiment and a medium battery. Tripoli fortress was held by 9 Australian Division with, under command, Free French Troupes Speciales to guard the rugged Lebanon range between Tripoli and Djedeide. This area could be traversed by infantry but was considered to be almost tank-proof.

Administrative instructions reveal the type of defence being developed against a fast mechanised attack likely to bypass the main points of resistance which the enemy was expected to leave to be mopped up later. The division within the fortress was to be selfcontained for sixty days. Five days' supplies were to be held in each company area, five days' reserves with each brigade, and the remaining fifty days' supplies were to be under divisional control. Every man was to have a four-gallon water container at his post and a series of water cisterns was planned, including one to hold 6000 gallons in each brigade sector. The main dressing station at Divisional Headquarters was to have an operating theatre so that, if the fortress were invested, surgical operations could be done. All transport was to be dug in and cages made for prisoners of war.

An elaborate system of section posts, protected dugouts for sleeping, pillboxes, gun emplacements and observation posts was designed within a perimeter of anti-tank ditches, minefields and barbed-wire entanglements. Each section post was to be self- contained in sleeping accommodation, sanitation, stores, rations and water. The extent of the works and the nature of the terrain made concealment impossible and the deception principle was adopted for camouflage. The whole area was to be roaded and a network of mule tracks built to connect the less accessible parts.

Some work had already been done at Djedeide but there was still much to do, and at speed, to comply with an order by the Commander-in-Chief that the fortress should be completed by 15 May. Continuous rain and cold winds made conditions most unpleasant during the first few weeks of the Division's tenure of the fortress. Roads became bogs, signal lines were broken, and camps were flooded and blown down. The weather reached its worst on the night of 22 March when, after three days of heavy rain and gales, snow fell over the whole of the area and blocked all roads out of the valley. The temperature in 18 Battalion's huts was three degree below freezing point. In 19 Battalion's tents in the hills, water, limejuice and even eggs froze. The Maori Battalion had three to four inches of snow on its positions and the wind reached gale force on exposed hill faces. Statements by the inhabitants that such cold weather had not been experienced for sixty years were poor consolation for the arduous conditions. The troops appreciated the more solid comforts of rum, extra blankets, balaclavas, mittens and leather jerkins that were issued.

The storm was winter's parting gesture. By 25 March the mountain passes were clear of snow, and at the end of the month the valley was enjoying mild spring weather.

Construction of the fortress was mainly a job for the engineers but one infinitely more complex than any the field companies and field park had previously been called upon to undertake. Most of the weapon pits and gun positions had to be dug in solid rock in high, hilly country exposed to the weather and often difficult of access. The infantry's picks and shovels were inadequate for such work and the engineers had to use compressor drills and explosives. Tools, equipment, and rations were taken as close as possible to each area by truck and were then manhandled to the company sites or packed in on mules of 6 Cypriot Pack Transport Company.

Besides supervising and helping the infantry battalions and artillery batteries in their battle positions and camps, the engineers employed 600 Bechuana pioneers and 600 civilian labourers, the latter working mostly with civilian contractors. The contractors had been engaged before the New Zealanders moved in. Examination showed that some of their work was so unsatisfactory that non-commissioned officers were detailed to make daily rounds of the contracts. Occasionally, work was held up by labour troubles among the villagers and the engineer officers became adept at settling disputes.

There was ample scope for ingenuity in Djedeide although not to the same extent as in the more urgent and trying conditions of the later campaign in Italy. Owing to the shortage of timber in the Middle East, the engineers designed a model dugout requiring only corrugated iron and sandbags. A machine for curving the iron was borrowed from Ninth Army and the model was shown to units so that they could copy it for section posts in the outer defences.

Again, a deviation on the Laboue—Arsal road presented an awkward filling problem at a dry watercourse along which the road was to be built. An engineer officer found a simple solution. He placed rows of natives on the hillsides to work down to the watercourse, pitching stones ahead of them as they moved. His report adds a picturesque note to an otherwise prosaic military file:

It made a colourful picture with the hillside streaked with lines of gaudy colours and a perpetual rain of stones coming through the air. The formation appeared like magic in the watercourse as holes became filled and large boulders disappeared into the roadway. The strangest sight was the women who squatted in the rows, holding and suckling their babies in one arm and throwing rocks with the other.

In northern Syria 6 Brigade, and later 5 Brigade which rejoined the Division and relieved 6 Brigade in mid-April, had a more varied role. The brigade's primary responsibilities were frontier control and the preparation of demolitions on the main approaches from Turkey. These were the main road and railway in the Kara Sou valley in the north and a road from the coastal plain at Alexandretta through Harim in the west. Should withdrawal become necessary, the brigade was to cover demolition parties and fight delaying actions back to its allotted position in Djedeide fortress.

The brigade's secondary role was more difficult to carry out. Over an area of more than 10,000 square miles from the western border of Syria at Antioch to Deir ez Zor on the Euphrates, the brigade was required to simulate Allied strength and the omnipresence of British forces as part of Auchinleck's deception plan. In addition, the brigade was called on to suppress banditry, thefts of military stores and the activities of fifth-columnists, and also to cultivate the goodwill of the inhabitants. The last was considered most important.

The troops soon became conscious that the British forces in Syria were in an invidious position. Although the fact did not disturb them, they were aware that they represented a nation which had conquered the country but which had no desire to appear as a conqueror. Nor could the forces assume the guise of liberators. Syria and Lebanon had been separated from the control only of Vichy France, not of France as the people desired. The liberation, if it could be so called, had been in the larger interests of the Allies, not those of the native people. No promises could be made concerning their political future other than that Britain would use her good offices with the French post-war government on their behalf. In the meantime, French laws were upheld and enforced through French officials, who were kept in office so long as they were not proved to be pro-Vichy or pro-Axis, even although they might not be ardent supporters of the Free French movement. The population could see little difference between the new administration and that of the past which they disliked.

Nor was there any liking for the British except perhaps by the Christian minority of 530,000, a fifth of the total population. It was even questionable whether this liking was genuine or whether it was inspired by hatred and fear of the Moslem majority. The Moslems, who hated the French and despised them after the collapse of 1940, were firmly convinced that Britain had betrayed the Syrian-Arab cause after the First World War. They also mistrusted the British attitude to the Jewish-Arab rivalries in Palestine. In general, the Moslems were pro-Axis. Homs, an important communications centre north of Djedeide, was a hotbed of their nationalist and anti-Ally activities.

Two political groups fostered attitudes and action inimical to Allied interests. A sovereign Syria as part of an Arab empire was envisaged by the nationalist bloc parties. The bloc was opposed to the Government and was both anti-French and anti-British. An independent Syria within Hitler's new order was hoped for by the Syrian Popular Party, which was definitely pro-Nazi and had been declared illegal. The party worked underground and it was from its adherents that most fifth-column activity was feared. Although some 3000 German and Italian agents and agitators had left Syria as the British entered, there was reason to believe that others had gone underground to organise and stir up feeling against the Allies.

As if these opposition elements were not enough, the British forces had to contend with the peculiarities of the Syrian outlook. ‘The Levantine, generally speaking, is suspicious, dishonest and very greedy,’ the New Zealand Division's field security officer noted. ‘Life is cheap, justice the prerogative of the highest bidder, business methods are shady, and intrigue, whether for personal gains or for the advantage of particular sections of the community, is the sauce of existence. This outlook is bred in the bone, and for that reason, the local inhabitants impute the very lowest of motives to everyone else, and, in particular, refuse to admit that the occupying army or administration can have different ideals and methods from their own.’

This official appreciation to the contrary, the troops saw that the Syrian and Lebanese Arabs were superior in intelligence, had greater stamina and were more independent than the mobs of Cairo, the hangers-on around Maadi, and the fellaheen of the Delta. An officer reporting on the labourers employed on roadmaking described them as ‘splendid workmen—and women. In all their work and play they conduct themselves with a dignity, a reserve and courtesy which are in marked contrast to the servility of the Arabs in Egypt.’

The Division had to learn to distrust the Syrians and, in their distrust, to differentiate between the indigent native who succumbed to the temptation to steal from the Allies' seeming abundance, the thief to whom theft was the normal way of life, and the aggressive bandits and marauders inspired by political motives. When villages were raided for stolen army equipment and suspects against security, the security officers, Provost Corps, and supporting troops had difficulty in deciding whether the non-cooperation of the headmen and inhabitants was due to a natural desire to protect blood relatives, political animosity, fear of starting a feud, or to the Syrian predilection for intrigue. In such circumstances, cultivation of the good will of the population was not easy.

There soon was evidence of the existence of an active and often efficient fifth column. At Laboue, which was within Djedeide fortress, a man was arrested while inciting the populace with anti-British propaganda. Reports of the dropping of enemy agents were confirmed when three parachutes were found not far from the Division's southern boundary. Prices far in excess of market values were offered to soldiers by civilians for army stores and equipment, suggesting that the goods were sought not for profit but to inconvenience the army or to equip enemy agents and supporters.

Thefts of equipment, especially arms and ammunition, were numerous, serious and often daring. A train was held up at Ras Baalbek, about four miles north of Djedeide, and 25-pounder ammunition was stolen. Almost every unit reported losses of rifles, including thefts from huts in which men were sleeping. Tommy guns, pistols, gelignite, detonators and tents were favoured loot, but the thieves would lift anything not closely guarded.

The daring of enemy agents and the need for vigilance were emphasized in a Ninth Army report of a raid on an ammunition dump under the care of a New Zealand unit. The report was circulated as a warning to all British forces and said:

A man dressed as a British warrant officer and speaking perfect English drove up in a civilian lorry at 0100 hours. He had a pass and stated that he was going to a certain officer's quarters to get authority to draw 36,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. He was allowed to go in that direction and returned shortly afterwards saying it was all right and producing an army form with a signature and stamp on it. He was allowed to enter the depot. The lorry was loaded with 36 boxes of ammunition.

The suspicions of the guard were aroused but nothing was done in the way of waking an officer. On the lorry coming to the exit gate the alleged warrant officer went off again towards the officers' quarters to get an exit pass, came back, said it was OK and was allowed to leave the depot. Neither he, the lorry nor the ammunition have been seen since.

This blot on the Division's escutcheon stimulated action against the enemy agents and thieves. Since this action was at the expense of construction, training, leave and recreation, and as comparatively little of the stolen property was recovered, the enemy, on balance, was the beneficiary. Fourth Brigade had to maintain a complete company on mobile duty in the Bekaa valley between Baalbek and Homs. In one raid on a suspected village, no fewer than 240 men were required as supporting troops. The reserve battalion at Aleppo was a reserve only in name, as one company had to be sent to the frontier post at Azaz, some 30 miles north, and another to Nirab airfield. The battalion also had to supply guards for a number of dumps and installations, including the main railway station, the engineers' dump, a petrol dump at the quarries, and the ammunition caves outside the town.

Thieves and marauders quickly learned, however, that it was unwise to molest patrols camping out overnight. The patrol bivouacs were laid out as if in the presence of the enemy and sentries were ordered to shoot without hesitation. Some did.

As another means of impressing the natives with Allied strength and efficiency, the troops were ordered through talks and routine orders to be on their best behaviour at all times, the high standard of conduct of 20 Australian Infantry Brigade which the New Zealanders had relieved at Aleppo being cited as an example to be followed. Where guards were posted in public places the reliefs were made with ceremony and units made ‘flag’ marches wherever possible. Hospitality was exchanged with local officials and sheikhs.

In safeguarding the physical health of the Division, the Medical Corps could not ignore the incidence of such diseases as malaria and typhus in the civilian population. As far as possible the doctors assisted civilian practitioners and officials in control and curative measures. This work, and the establishment of medical posts, was one of the most practical methods of encouraging the natives to trust and show friendliness to the Allied troops. Once suspicion was overcome, the villagers took full advantage of the benefits of free medical treatment and co-operated in the inspections and other measures taken to control malaria.

An account of the work of a medical detachment at Djerablous, a village on the Euphrates near the Turkish border, described the medical post as a hut

with a bevy of children around it while inside the RAP orderly treats sores, cuts and all the ailments found in such villages. After the first visit they bring him along as a present a few eggs which the orderly accepts if the ‘kids’ seem well off. Later he will visit his other patients in the village. There is, however, plenty of need for discretion as it is foolish to take on anything beyond his capabilities, but, even so, this is possibly one of the best ways of winning the villagers' goodwill.

The New Zealand Division, while making its own traditions, could claim that in Syria it fulfilled the traditions of the British regular soldier. There was much hard work, but such was the contrast to conditions in the desert that the troops looked upon their sojourn in Syria as a rest. What they could have done against an attack from the north is a matter for speculation. It is enough that when the enemy was at the gates of Cairo, in the Caucasus and penetrating Burma towards India, when, in brief, the enemy appeared to be triumphant everywhere and the northern front was bereft of troops to meet the dangers elsewhere, Syria remained quiet.

Although Divisional Headquarters was relieved of the pressure concomitant with close contact with the enemy, its ease was offset by the volume of work to be done. Besides directing the construction of the defences and controlling the normal activities of the Division, General Freyberg and his staff had three important problems to study. These were:

Possible roles for the Division in Turkey or Persia.

The future of the Division in relation to the Japanese advance in the South Pacific.

Organisation and training to knit the Division into a fighting entity.

In a detailed appreciation for the Prime Minister, General Freyberg

Documents, Vol II, No. 136; General Freyberg was promoted to temporary Lieutenant-General on 1 Mar 1942.

said the evidence showed that Germany had made administrative arrangements to resume the offensive on several fronts either simultaneously or in succession. The possible fronts were: (1) Russia; (2) Turkey by land, sea and air; (3) Cyprus and Syria by sea and air; and (4) North Africa.

Everything would depend on the results of the battle in Russia in the approaching summer, as Germany's first objective must be the removal of the threat of the Russian Army. If this were achieved, Japanese successes in Burma would tend to draw the German effort south as soon as possible to break the Allied hold on the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Germany would aim at a winter campaign attacking Iraq, Syria and the Western Desert.

General Freyberg estimated that from the start of a German offensive in Russia, 14 to 15 weeks would elapse before the enemy could place four divisions on the Persian frontier for an attack on Iraq through the Caucasus. He allowed a month for the advance to and capture of Stalingrad, two to three weeks for consolidation and regrouping, and another eight weeks for the advance through the mountains to the frontiers of Turkey and Persia. Assuming the offensive started in mid-May, as then seemed probable, the enemy would be on the Persian frontier at the end of August.

For an attack on Syria through an acquiescent Turkey, a month was again allowed for the capture of Stalingrad, another month to withdraw troops from Stalingrad and concentrate in Thrace, and a further two and a half months to move four divisions through Turkey to the Syrian frontier, making the date of arrival mid-September.

Freyberg warned the Prime Minister of the difficulties facing the Allies, of the need to be prepared for loss of territory, and of the possibility of very heavy fighting during the late summer. ‘Come what may,’ he said, ‘we must be prepared to fight very hard during 1942, either in defence of the Middle East or in attacking the Axis wherever possible to support our ally Russia and possibly Turkey.’

The assistance to be given Turkey on the appearance of German concentrations in Thrace was named, somewhat aptly, Operation SPRAWL. The New Zealand Division with, under command, an additional brigade, probably from 4 Indian Division, was to advance some 700 miles to a road and railhead at Ishmid in northern Anatolia. From this point detachments were to be sent up to 250 miles further on to provide ground defence of airfields then under construction for the Royal Air Force, and on which there was already Air Force equipment. Thus sprawled over the landscape, the Division was to secure the landing fields against airborne attacks and possible land raids across the sea of Marmora. From these fields the Royal Air Force was to bomb the Roumanian oilfields and enemy concentrations in Thrace.

Middle East Headquarters expected no more of these operations than that they would delay an enemy advance and gain time for reinforcements to reach the theatre. The three services, in a joint appreciation, estimated that the Germans would need three weeks to acquire control of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus and that a Turkish capitulation would not accelerate their movement to any extent. Assuming that the enemy moved unopposed through Turkey, a ‘blitz’ attack by three divisions against Syria could not be developed in less than five weeks from the date the enemy obtained possession of the straits. The alternative to a ‘blitz’ of three divisions was a deliberate offensive calling for ten divisions which, for their deployment, would need three and a half months from the date control of the straits was obtained.

Freyberg did not like the plan for operations in Turkey. He also doubted whether it would be put into force as the Royal Air Force did not have sufficient bombers in hand or in sight. Consequently, when he was asked to obtain the Government's reactions to the proposed employment of the Division, he replied that as it was fully occupied with local defences and the plan might never be put into operation, the matter should not be pursued.

Middle East Headquarters, however, pressed for the Government's views. It suggested that even if the Russians were not defeated, the Turks might let the Germans into their country. In that event, the plan might have to be put into operation without time for consultations. Moreover, an immediate move might stiffen the Turks if they showed indecision.

General Freyberg had already stipulated that the Division must be made fully mobile with the transport under his command before he would take it into Turkey. Experience in Greece, where civilian train crews had often decamped whenever a bomb was dropped near a train, had convinced him that he could not depend on the railways for troop movements and supply.

This condition and the terms of the Government's consent illustrate the manner in which the reserved powers were exercised. The Government's reply

Documents, Vol II, No. 139.

said:

We have given most careful thought to the considerations to which you call attention. On the following assumptions, namely:

(1)

that the move is undertaken only with the full support and approval of Turkey;

(2)

that an assurance is given by the Commander-in-Chief (a) that adequate air support is provided sufficient to ensure that the Division does not have to go through another Greece or Crete, and (b) that adequate forces will be available to protect the Syrian flank and, if necessary, to assist in supporting and extricating the Division, we agree that the Division should be used for the operational role proposed.

The Japanese advance southwards in 1942 created a five-fold political, military, logistical, manpower and morale problem concerning the Division.

By March, when the Division had settled down in Syria, the Japanese had captured Singapore and were in Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea and Rabaul in New Britain. Darwin in Northern Australia had been bombed and the enemy was reaching for the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides. Australia had been chosen by the Americans as their main army base in the Pacific. In consultation with the United States Navy, the American Army had given priority to the security of the communications between the United States and Australia. To this end, New Zealand had been incorporated in the United States South Pacific Command. There was a project to develop Auckland as a battleship and cruiser base. Supply authorities in the United Kingdom gave New Zealand first call on equipment for the defence of the Dominion and its approaches.

News bulletins posted the Division and the public on the enemy's advance. Counter-measures necessarily had to be kept secret. The Government was deeply concerned for the security of the Dominion. The Territorial Force had been mobilised and expanded. Extensive and increasing demands were being made by the American forces on the manpower and resources of the country. By March it was clear that, after meeting requirements for home defence, the Royal New Zealand Navy, the Royal New Zealand Air Force, the Empire Air Training Scheme and of the American forces, there would be considerable difficulty in reinforcing the Division in the Middle East.

In this situation, the Government had to notice a growing public agitation for the return of the Division to New Zealand, but for security reasons could not reply clearly and convincingly to it. The recall of two Australian divisions and the strain beginning to be felt by the Dominion were substantial arguments in favour of its return. So also was the contention, which could not be refuted, that the Division, fully equipped and trained, would be a considerable accretion to the Pacific forces.

Opponents of the recall, who probably were better informed on the problems of a nation at war and the difficulties of the situation, had to argue their case only in broad terms as they, also, were restricted by security requirements. They were not helped by the reports supplied to the newspapers of the Division's activities in Syria. These emphasized the Division's garrison role, its recreation and rest, its sightseeing tours and hostels. Even the ski-ing schools were referred to more as a sport than as military training. New Zealand as a whole was pleased that the Division was having a change in a non-operational role in more or less congenial surroundings. But it did not seem to be in keeping with the gravity of the crisis that the Dominion's best fighting force should appear to be kicking its heels on garrison duty.

In the circumstances the Government was courageous in agreeing to leave the Division in the Middle East. The war in the Pacific at this period was not in the balance. It was almost wholly in favour on the enemy. As later events were to prove, the only Allied division available in the South-West Pacific, the 1st Division United States Marines, had to be sent to the Solomons to halt the Japanese advance. Such was the narrowness of the margin of the Dominion's safety.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States urged with all the power at their command that the Division should be left in the Middle East. They submitted that for its fighting qualities alone the Division in the Middle East was more valuable to the Allied cause than it would be in the Pacific. Mr Churchill emphasized that the presence of Dominion forces in the Middle East would help to maintain the morale of the British troops in the theatre. They also were fighting away from their homeland. They had been sent from the United Kingdom when their homes and kin were in grave danger.

On the other hand, the Government had to consider the effects on the morale of the Division of its retention in the Middle East. Week by week from January, the Field Censorship Summary noted increasing anxiety among all ranks and a growing desire for the return of the Division. The consensus of opinion, as revealed in soldiers' letters, was that the defence of New Zealand was a task for New Zealand troops. If more forces were needed at home, the Division should be recalled. The letter writers argued that if shipping could be found for the Australians and Americans it should also be available for the Division.

Anxiety in the Division was not allayed by reports that American forces were being sent to the Dominion. Married and affianced men said their womenfolk should not be subjected to the hazards which the troops, with remarkable frankness, associated with occupation forces. Their regard for the well-being of New Zealand women was also expressed in adverse comments on the policy of sending New Zealand VADs to the Middle East.

The future of the Division and the defence of New Zealand were discussed at length in correspondence between Britain, the United States, New Zealand and the Middle East.

Documents, Vol II.

Eventually the Government yielded to the outside pressure and accepted a promise that an American division would be sent to the Dominion.

To allay apprehension in the Division, General Freyberg issued a circular letter pointing out that the Dominion was being adequately defended, that there were no forces other than New Zealanders stationed there for defence purposes but that the Dominion was being used as a base for American operations. Emphasizing that the Division was giving much better service to New Zealand and the Allies in its present role overseas, the letter continued:

It is natural for us to want to be at home while there is a threat of any kind but even if the threat to New Zealand became much greater the return of the NZEF might not be practicable. There are shipping problems…. We have also to realise the importance of the Middle East…. This spring she [Germany] will without doubt launch an offensive against Russia and possibly against the Middle East with every man, gun, tank and aeroplane she possesses…. If our Division… trained and experienced in fighting Germans both in the desert and in hill country such as Syria, were to be moved from the Middle East at the present juncture we would be doing exactly what the German Higher Command wanted….

The letter stilled rumours and did much to restore confidence. Incidentally, the admission of the troops into the sphere of higher strategy and the councils of Governments showed how far the Army had departed from its older attitude of ‘Their's but to do or die.’

General Freyberg, his brigadiers, and senior staff officers were united in opposition to the brigade-group and battle-group theories which dominated British tactics in the Western Desert. In this they clashed with the opinions and directives of Auchinleck and Middle East Headquarters, ‘who believed they had a right to break up divisions and that it was the right thing to do.’

General Freyberg to author, 3 May 1948.

At the reorganisation and training conferences in Syria, the divisional command had before it further directives outlining brigade and battle-group organisation and tactics and orders for their adoption. The conferences firmly resolved that brigade groups should be used only for movements and that in battle the Division should fight as a division. Freyberg intimated that never again, if he could avoid it, would he permit the Division to be committed to action piecemeal.

Although New Zealand Division cannot claim that it alone was responsible for the subsequent abandonment of brigade-group and battle-group tactics in North Africa, it was a most active pioneer of the opposition. The decision to oppose the theatre commander and the considerable body of expert opinion which supported him was not made lightly. It was based on study of theory and practice. Nor could the decision have been made effective had not organisation and training been reserved to Freyberg in his ‘charter’.

The origin of brigade groups as tactical entities is difficult to trace. Several factors appear to have influenced their evolution. Probably the most important was pre-war apprehension of the effects of air reconnaissance and bombardment on large concentrations of ground forces concurrent with, or followed by, assaults by armoured formations. Dispersion, the obvious counter, was not merely a matter of increasing the distances and intervals between battalions of infantry and batteries of artillery. The dispersion had to be made in self-contained groups capable with their own resources of defending themselves against air or armoured attack, and so organised that they would fit readily into higher formations for larger operations.

The brigade group of two or more infantry battalions, a regiment of field artillery, a battery of anti-aircraft artillery, two or more troops of anti-tank guns and a proportion of the ancillary services was thought to be the solution of the problem. The theory proved to be sound. Later, however, the overriding principles appear to have been forgotten or disregarded. These were that the brigade group was a device to ensure safe movement and manoeuvre, and that the three groups provided by a standard infantry division should always be within mutual support of each and under the close control and direction of the divisional command.

Pre-war economies imposed on the Army were probably another factor. Because of the shortage of troops and equipment and the cost of assembling divisions and corps, field exercises were generally restricted to brigade groups pitted against each other by their divisional commander. Repeated exercises with the groups created the habit of thinking in terms of the groups rather than in those of divisions and corps. In Britain, divisional and corps training was largely a matter of theory to which only a few officers with vision appear to have given thought. In New Zealand even brigade training was more nominal than real.

Operations by brigade groups in the early days of the war, some of them outstanding, led to a widespread belief in their value as tactical formations. The British actions in Norway were fought largely by brigade groups. At Furnes in May 1940 the 7th Guards Brigade Group held the enemy for three days to keep open the road to Dunkirk and successfully extricated itself against seemingly overwhelming odds. The defence of Britain in the first critical months after the evacuation from Dunkirk was organised on a brigadegroup basis, although the groups were under divisional control. In North Africa Wavell carried the pursuit of Graziani's Italians into Cyrenaica with brigade groups. General Cunningham's victories in Abyssinia were won mostly with swift-moving columns of brigadegroup strength and under. The pursuit of Rommel to Agheila had been made with brigade groups. When Rommel advanced again into Cyrenaica he had been held on the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line by brigade groups. The brigade-group battles, however, were generally directed by the divisional headquarters of the several groups.

Thus there was a formidable amount of combat experience to be challenged by the Division in its opposition to the group theory. The Division's case was based chiefly on its experiences in Greece, Crete, and at Sidi Rezegh and Bardia, but it might well have pointed out that organisation was not the sole or even the dominating factor in the successes claimed for brigade groups. The Division did not object to the use of a brigade group when it was sufficient for a specific operation or when, as with Wavell's pursuit, Cunningham's operations and the early defence of Britain, there was no alternative. It did challenge the theory held stubbornly by Auchinleck, supported by Gott who was later designated commander of Eighth Army, that the brigade group was the ideal tactical formation.

In his original report on the operations in Cyrenaica, Freyberg said:

The Brigade Group organisation is necessary for movement in the desert, but is unsuitable for attacking organised positions in daylight as it has insufficient field artillery to cover an adequate frontage of attack. Further, a Brigade Group gets into immediate trouble if it is attacked. The normal divisional organisation should therefore be reverted to if possible as soon as organised opposition is met.

These passages leave no doubt as to Freyberg's views. Auchinleck's attitude was made equally clear by his order that the remarks should be deleted from the report with other comments on the danger of committing small forces piecemeal and the inadequacy of reserves.

In December 1941 Middle East Headquarters produced ‘Lessons from Operations in Cyrenaica, No. 6.’ There was no comment, favourable or otherwise, on the use of brigade groups, but there was an interesting paragraph on reserves. This said:

Lack of reserves was seriously felt on a number of occasions. Any det of Bde Gps from Div should be avoided whenever possible. The operations of NZ Div westwards towards Tobruk were seriously hampered by the fact that only two Bdes were available throughout the operation. The 5 NZ Bde which was of necessity temporarily detached was never able to rejoin the Div.

These remarks led Freyberg to make the bitter comment, ‘Our operation was sabotaged.’ He was convinced that had he had the complete Division at Sidi Rezegh, Rommel would have been decisively defeated.

New Zealand Division continued to receive brigade-group and battle-group directives and with equal persistency ignored them. Middle East and Army Headquarters in the desert did not force the issue, possibly in the knowledge that Freyberg could and would defy them in the matter and that if he appealed to the New Zealand Government he would receive support which might embarrass the theatre command with the British Government.

By the middle of May sufficient progress had been made in reorganisation and training and on the Djedeide works to permit the withdrawal of formations for advanced exercises. These were planned on a divisional scale as the culminating effort in freeing the Division of the idea of brigade groups as fighting entities. Shortage of transport, however, prevented the training of more than one brigade at a time. But the exercises were so arranged that the participating brigade operated within a divisional plan as if the other brigades were on the flanks, in support or in reserve. Although short of the ideal, the exercises were the nearest approach to divisional training since the Division was formed.

The desert formations for movement which the Division used so successfully in later campaigns in North Africa were improved and practised in moving to and from and within the training area at Forqloss, a few miles east of Homs. Advances and withdrawals, wheels, turns, and day and night formations were practised until the drivers reached near perfection in keeping station. Officers and men became accustomed to the sight of a brigade group spread in orderly array. They learned how to locate any company, troop or headquarters by reference to the position of their own trucks. Despatch riders by day or night had merely to establish their own identity and that of the occupants of any truck or car to find their way immediately to their destination.

Rapid movement and keeping station on the roads were also practised. Sixth Brigade, in moving from the Bekaa valley to Aleppo to relieve 5 Brigade for the divisional exercises, did unit training to perfect attacks at speed. Each unit moved in its vehicles to within a short distance of chosen objectives, when the men debussed to complete the assault on foot. Drivers learned to maintain uniform speeds and to keep fixed distances according to the nature of the country. The infantry learned to debus quickly and to deploy from long columns for attack. The experience was to prove valuable.

Forqloss was a milestone in the history of the Division's field artillery. Hitherto, except on two brief occasions at Molos in Greece and at Belhamed in Cyrenaica, the artillery had fought only on regimental levels. At Forqloss the field and medium guns were concentrated to fight as a division. Brigadier Weir, who had succeeded Brigadier Miles as CRA, became more than an advocate of the concentration of the fire power of the artillery. He was a wrathful opponent of the dissipation of the fire power in the brigade-and battle-group tactics.

With General Freyberg's encouragement and full support, Weir took each field regiment in turn into the desert, where it was initiated into a divisional artillery manoeuvre and deployment drill, communication drill and, most important, a divisional artillery fire drill. Quick barrages, the putting down of smoke screens, and other forms of close support of the infantry were also practised. In this training the foundations were laid of the ‘stonk’ and ‘murder’ concentrations of artillery fire, which were later widely adopted throughout the British Army and which became the joy of New Zealand infantry especially when they were hard-pressed in defensive positions. Although these early exercises were carried out by regiments, each regiment as it passed through the training camp had to learn its part and place in the divisional artillery machine. They were well practised by the time they took their places in the divisional training at Forqloss.

The New Zealand Engineers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hanson,

Brig F. M. H. Hanson, DSO and bar, OBE, MM, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Levin, 1896; resident engineer Main Highways Board; Wellington Regt in First World War; comd 7 Fd Coy, NZE, Jan 1940–Aug 1941; CRE 2 NZ Div May 1941, Oct 1941–Apr 1944, Nov 1944–Jan 1946; Chief Engineer, 2 NZEF, 1943–46; wounded three times; Deputy Commissioner of Works and Chairman National Roads Board.

also made substantial contributions to the theory and practice of a division in modern battle, besides developing many techniques peculiar to their arm. The engineers believed that in spite of the experiences in Cyrenaica, the Division was not sufficiently conscious of the value of mines, of the formidable obstacles they were against attack. For the Forqloss exercises, the sappers made and laid practice mines loaded with small charges of black powder which exploded with a bang and a lot of smoke. Clearing drills for antipersonnel and anti-tank mines devised before the Cyrenaican campaign were improved and practised. Drills were also devised for laying minefields rapidly from trucks. The practice mines and drills were later adopted throughout Eighth Army.

Thus there was much to absorb, to practise and to polish when, on 21 May, Divisional Headquarters, 4 Brigade (with 28 (Maori) Battalion under command), 4 and 6 Field Regiments, the Divisional Cavalry and 6 Field Company moved into the desert. Over the next three weeks these and most other formations and units manoeuvred in realistic set and encounter battles, often with live ammunition and supported by 451 Squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force. Fifth Brigade was on its way to the training area, and Brigadier Weir was about to take all the artillery and 64 Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery, on a final combined exercise, when the Division's sojourn in Syria was brought to an abrupt end by an urgent call to the Western Desert.

In little more than a fortnight the refreshed and spirited Division was for the fourth time to be in peril of its existence.

CHAPTER 5 Rommel Strikes

THE lull at Gazala-Bir Hacheim ended on 27 May when Rommel attacked on plans which called for the destruction of Eighth Army and the capture of Tobruk in four days. Eighth Army lost the battle. It was decisively defeated, but not in the contemptuous fashion Rommel envisaged. Tobruk did not fall until 21 June, twenty-five days later.

For Eighth Army the battle ended in disaster. A crisis was created with far-reaching strategicl and tactical repercussions which, incidentally, involved the New Zealand Division and the Dominion's subsequent contribution to the war in North Africa and Europe. From the crisis, all that followed in eastern North Africa was inevitable.

Yet within the disaster that befell Eighth Army there was victory. The valour and endurance of the British, Indian, French and South African troops at Gazala-Bir Hacheim and in the fighting back to the Egyptian frontier, rather than the last-ditch stand at Alamein, saved the Middle East base. Rommel refreshed himself with the loot of Tobruk and received there the incentive to push on into Egypt. But such heavy toll was taken of his divisions in Cyrenaica that, when they arrived at Alamein, they lacked the strength to burst through to Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal.

Indecisiveness in the British command contributed to the defeat. Auchinleck's direction of the campaign developed at times into detailed direction of phases of the battle. When he was not at Eighth Army Headquarters, he sent signals, letters, and staff officers to convey his views to the Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Ritchie.

Appendices to Despaatch and also Operation Victory, de Guingand (Hodder and Stoughton), pp.118–19.

Events often outpaced the signals and instructions. Doubts and hesitations at Army Headquarters concerning the Commander-in-Chief's ideas and wishes added to the normal confusion of the battlefield. The fighting formations sensed the indecision and envied the enemy not only his equipment and tactical skill, but also the apparent firmness of his direction. To the regimental officers the battle lacked a theme. The legend of Rommel's invincibility, of his superiority over British generals, became firmly grounded at Gazala-Bir Hacheim.

Eighth Army's confidence was also shaken by the manner in which formations were broken and their components shifted from command to command. In the vital set-piece attack of 5 June in the ‘Cauldron’, an operation intended to turn the scales against the enemy, units and formations from no fewer than four divisions and two corps were committed on a plan prepared by two divisional commanders who were to succeed each other in command during the fighting. Neither Army nor corps headquarters co-ordinated the operation.

The speed and number of these moves dazed brigade, division and corps headquarters. The cohesion and unity of purpose and practice that transform individual men and their equipment into the welltried entity of a division were again deliberately forfeited. The multiplicity of formations in which the British and Indian units of the Indian divisions found themselves baffles their historian. ‘Some-times [5th Division] had two brigades, sometimes one, on occasions none at all. Brigades of the 4th and 10th Indian Divisions also came under command, only to disappear again, while the gunners were for ever changing.’

The Tiger Kills, English edition, p.117.

Eighth Army lost the battle although Rommel's plans were presented to it as if on a platter. It had ample warning of the imminence of the attack. The enemy's approach march to the open southern flank of the Gazala-Bir Hacheim position was observed from the air and by armoured-car reconnaissance squadrons. On the night 26–27 May the enemy's armoured divisions were seen in laager 15 miles south-east of Bir Hacheim. And in the early stages of the battle captured documents revealed the complete plan of attack.

Despatch, p.354.

Yet Rommel won the battle. He won against an army that out-numbered him by nearly two to one in men, was stronger in field artillery, and whose numerical superiority in tanks and anti-tank guns was expected to offset the superior mechanism and fire power of the enemy's equipment. He won against an army encouraged by its command to believe that the approaching battle would be a welcome prelude to its own crushing and possibly final offensive. Rommel won because, in spite of his apparent dispersions, he concentrated superior forces against isolated British formations.

One such formation was the staunch 150 Brigade of 50 Division. The brigade, with field and anti-tank artillery, held the Sidi Muftah box between the Trigh el Abd and Trigh Capuzzo, along which the enemy cut supply lines through the British minefields. The brigade kept the supply lines under artillery fire and, although it was unable to stop the flow of traffic, it made the route so ineffective that the enemy armoured divisions to the east of the minefields were reduced to a parlous state for petrol, ammunition and food. Their water ration was down to half a cup a man.

The Advance of Panzerarmee on Matruh, 26-27 June 1942 Black and white map of advancing troops

Against this isolated brigade, the enemy committed parts of 15 Panzer, Trieste Motorised and 90 Light Divisions, supported finally by heavy bombing attacks. ‘The encircled enemy, supported by numerous infantry tanks, again resisted most stubbornly,’ Panzerarmee Afrika said in its daily battle report. ‘Each separate element within the fortress-like strengthened defences had to be fought for. The enemy suffered extraordinary heavy, bloody losses. Eventually the operation, which also caused considerable losses to our troops, ended in complete success.’

Battle report Panzerarmee Afrika, 1 Jun 1942. See also Rommel, Desmond Young (Collins), pp. 266–7.

Mention may also be made of 9 and 10 Indian Brigades which, with four regiments of field artillery, were overrun in the enemy's armoured counter-attack following the uncoordinated attack referred to earlier in this chapter. They went under in a ‘mournful and unmitigated disaster’, redeemed only by the heroism of the British and Indian soldiers who, ‘confronted with every mischance of battle, thirst, wounds and isolation, matched their bare flesh against steel machines and stood to their duty to the last.’

The Tiger Kills, p. 123.

When Rommel cleared his supply lines through the minefields and made an end to the ‘Cauldron’, he proceeded from success to success and Eighth Army from disaster to disaster. Although out-numbered on the field as a whole, the enemy commanders produced concentrations which gave them local superiority. Eighth Army's brigades and units, armoured and infantry, were truthful when they said they had yielded only to vastly superior force. The evacuation of Bir Hacheim, the Gazala positions and El Adem box, stubbornly defended by 29 Indian Brigade, led to the final disaster of Tobruk and the invasion of Egypt.

Rommel's offensive had been limited to clearing Cyrenaica and pursuit into Egypt with light mobile forces to prevent British air interference with a projected German-Italian assault on Malta. He had been given six weeks for this task, and the Malta operation was to be undertaken by mid-August at the latest. The German naval staff in Rome disagreed with an advance deep into Egypt because of supply difficulties, but Rommel's confidence carried the day.

The Malta project and the German and Italian navies' difficulties in supplying North Africa are discussed in considerable detail by Vice-Admiral Weichold, Chief German Naval Liaison Officer at Rome and Flag Officer, German Naval Command, Italy, in an essay, The War at Sea in the Mediterranean, written for the British Admiralty and issued on 24 Feb 1947 under serial number 12.

On 22 June Rommel reported to Rome that the first object, that of ‘smashing the enemy's field forces and taking Tobruk’, had been completed. In the same message he said: ‘The condition and morale of our troops, the supply position (as a result of the quantities captured), and the enemy's present weakness, all make it possible for us to pursue him deep into Egypt. I therefore request the Duce to release me from the limitations so far imposed on my liberty of movement, and to make all the troops now under my command available for the continuation of the campaign.’

Message No. 558, Rommel to GHQ, 22 Jun, appendices to German War Narrative (African Campaign), Jun–Jul 1942.

In the early hours of 24 June, General von Rintelen, the German general at Italian General Headquarters, advised Rommel that the ‘Duce is in agreement with the Panzerarmee's plan of following the enemy into Egypt’ and that General Count Ugo Cavallero, Italian Chief of Staff, would return to Africa next day to issue further instructions.

Message No. 644, Rintelen to Rommel, 24 June, ibid.

Hitler agreed that ‘now is the historic moment in which Egypt can be conquered and that it must be seized.’ On instructions from the Italian Supreme Headquarters, the attack to capture Malta was postponed until September, but Mussolini impressed on Hitler that ‘the neutralisation of Malta was unconditionally necessary if supplies were to be kept up to the Panzerarmee and the advance to the Nile Delta assured.’ He stressed that the resumption of Royal Air Force operations from Malta had led to a critical supply situation in Africa.

Cavallero, accompanied by Field Marshal Kesselring, German Commander-in-Chief South, met Rommel at Sidi Barrani shortly before midday on 26 June, by which time Panzerarmee was assembling for the attack on Matruh. He passed to Rommel the following orders from Mussolini:

(a)

The main body of Panzerarmee is to occupy the defile between the Arabian Gulf and the Qattara Depression [otherwise the Alamein Line or bottleneck] immediately. These positions must be the base for all future operations.

(b)

The first step is to capture the fortification in the Matruh-Baggush area and to destroy the enemy garrison of Mersa Matruh. The advance cannot go on until these fortifications are taken.

(c)

Further operations from the base mentioned in (a) are to be coordinated with the general situation in the Mediterranean.

Cavallero also told Rommel that the utmost advantage should be taken of the successes to date but warned him that the supply situation was difficult. As a result of air activity from Malta, the route to Tripoli must be abandoned in the meantime and the route to the Cyrenaica ports was threatened. Plans had been made to neutralise Malta again and air formations were being moved from Germany to that end. This would take time ‘and a period of crisis [concerning supplies] in the immediate future cannot be avoided.’

Report by General Rintelen to German War Ministry, 26 June.

In the light of later developments, the importance should be noticed of the instructions to seize the Alamein Line as a base for further operations and of the warning concerning supply problems.

Next day, while the attack was being made on Matruh, the Italian Supreme Command gave Rommel the following additional orders:

Ibid, 28 June.

After the enemy now opposing our advance is defeated, operations from the base between the Qattar Depression and the Arabian Gulf will be continued on the following lines:

(1)

Objective: the Suez Canal. Advances will be made on Suez and Ismailia and from Ismailia on Port Said as soon as possible. Aim: to block the canal and prevent the enemy from receiving reinforcements from the Middle East.

(2)

If this advance is to be carried out it will first be necessary to occupy Cairo firmly, including the southern front and the airfields in that area.

(3)

The roads from Alexandria are to be blocked to secure us from attacks from there before we can occupy the city.

(4)

The army's rear must be secured against any enemy landings. This will be done by occupying key points on the coast and having an adequate mobile reserve to go to the help of any threatened points.

(5)

The Duce expects German and Italian troops in equal numbers to take part in the advance to the canal. Directives on the behaviour of our headquarters towards the Egyptian Government and people will follow very soon.

CHAPTER 6 Forced March to the Desert

GENERAL Freyberg was reconnoitring the mountains of south-west Persia in view of possible operations there when, in the evening of 10 June, he heard on the broadcast news service that Bir Hacheim had been evacuated. These adverse tidings so impressed him that he remarked to Colonel Gentry

Maj-Gen W. G. Gentry, CBE, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Greek), Bronze Star (US); Lower Hutt; born London, 20 Feb 1899; Regular soldier; served North-West Frontier 1920–22; GSO 2 NZ Div 1939–40, AA and QMG Oct 1940–Oct 1941; GSO 1 May 1941, Oct 1941–Sep 1942; comd 6 Bde Sep 1942–Apr 1943; Deputy Chief of General Staff (in NZ), 1943–44; comd NZ Troops in Egypt, 6 NZ Div, and NZ Maadi Camp, Aug 1944–Feb 1945; 9 Bde (Italy) 1945; Deputy Chief of General Staff, Jul 1946–Nov 1947; Adjutant-General, Apr 1949–Mar 1952; Chief of the General Staff 1 Apr 1952–.

, the G1, that the Division would be wanted in a hurry in the Western Desert. General Freyberg decided to fly to Cairo and to send his staff officers to Syria at once with orders to prepare the Division to move secretly and with the utmost speed.

Arriving in Cairo in the evening of 13 June, Freyberg reported to Middle East Headquarters. He was greeted by Auchinleck with the remark: ‘I want to talk to you. You are to move your division at once to the Western Desert and concentrate near the frontier.’ After the situation had been outlined to him, Freyberg decided that this was a case for exercising his discretionary power to commit the Division without awaiting the prior consent of the Government.

Orders for the move reached the Division next day. As security measures, shoulder titles and hat badges by which the Division could be identified were removed, unit location signs and all tents were left standing, farewell parties were forbidden, and the divisional signs on transport were painted over before each convoy left.

In spite of these precautions, the news leaked out. A Syrian dealer, who had lent furniture to the officers' mess of 19 Battalion, called to collect his furniture and account before many of the officers of the unit knew that a move impended. Natives in the Divisional Cavalry Regiment's area wished the regiment farewell ‘and good shooting in Libya.’ Officers and men in all units speculated concerning their destination. Some asserted they knew officially they were going back to the desert, others guessed their destination, while some optimistically believed the Division was moving to the Canal to embark for New Zealand. As all ranks followed the war news closely it is probable that most suspected the reasons for the move. As a soldier remarked in a letter a few days before, apropos of the battle in the desert: ‘It is about time the Division was invited to the party.’

Stirred by the urgency of the call, the Division showed what it could do when it was in a hurry. Main Headquarters left Baalbek at 6 a.m. on 16 June and reopened a few miles west of Mersa Matruh at 9 p.m. on the 20th, having taken only four days 15 hours to make the journey by road, a distance of approximately 900 miles. Convoys of 4 and 6 Field Regiments and 14 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment left the Bekaa valley on the same day as Divisional Headquarters and, following the same route but with different staging points, reached Mersa Matruh on 21 June, in five days. Fourth Brigade, with 6 Field Company and 7 Anti-Tank Regiment in its convoy, got under way on 17 June and reached the vicinity of Mersa Matruh on the night of the 21st, having taken only four days 18 hours to cover the distance. The 28th (Maori) Battalion did the journey by rail from Haifa and was in Mersa Matruh in about two and a half days.

Fifth Brigade was already on wheels in the desert east of Aleppo carrying out brigade exercises, when it received orders to concentrate in Djedeide fortress. The move to the fortress was a good rehearsal for the days to come, as the brigade had to move in intense heat and find its way over difficult wadis and through many village bottlenecks in making the most direct route to Djedeide, where it arrived on 16 June. Because the roads were fully occupied, the brigade had to stay in Djedeide for another day, which was spent in repairing vehicles, drawing rations and in other preparations. With reinforcements from Advanced Base, the brigade group, including 5 Field Regiment and 7 Field Company, began the move to the desert at 4 a.m. on 18 June in transport supplied by 4 RMT Company. Following the road taken by the previous convoys, the main party reached Smugglers' Cove at Mersa Matruh on 22 June, little more than four days later. Fifth Field Regiment rejoined on 23 June and 5 Field Park on 24 June.

Sixth Brigade, in the Aleppo area, had a company from each of its three battalions in the rest camp near Latakia when the orders for the move were received. These companies had to be recalled and the brigade had then to hand over to 20 Brigade of 9 Australian Division. With the assistance of 6 RMT Company, the relief was completed by 18 June and next day the brigade commenced its move. The 26th Battalion went by rail and arrived at Mersa Matruh on 22 June. The other units of the group travelled by road and were halted at El Amiriya on the 25th.

Middle East Headquarters expected that ten days or more would be required to concentrate the Division in the desert. It is a tribute to the excellence of the staff work, the physical fitness and discipline of the units and the high standard of maintenance in the Division's ageing transport, that the task was accomplished well within the period. As in March 1918 when the New Zealanders in Flanders were called upon in a hurry to help stem an enemy attack, the Division was dispersed over a wide area when the movement orders were received. Several Army units attached to the Division had to be disposed of and arrangements made to leave the Division's two malaria control units, 36 Survey Battery, and the Salvage Unit in Syria. Congestion on the roads and the small facilities of the staging points prevented concentration to move as a Division. Timetables had to be prepared for the movement of units and groups by road and rail, and in such order that they arrived in the concentration area ready to go into battle.

As soon as the Division reached the desert road out of Alexandria, it encountered Eighth Army in retreat. Transport of 1 South African Division, moving head to tail to the Alamein defences, filled the road. The Divisional Cavalry Regiment, which had a particularly arduous journey from Syria and was the last unit to arrive, ran into other Eighth Army convoys seemingly devoid of order and discipline. Hundreds of vehicles were parked along each mile of the road and a constant stream of traffic moving in the opposite direction, estimated at 750 vehicles each hour for the whole day, impeded progress.

The congestion became worse as the units and groups neared Mersa Matruh. Some senior officers bitterly described Eighth Army as a rabble. They were then meeting the flotsam and jetsam of an army in headlong retreat. These troops were at a loss to understand why an army which had been promised victory had been so incontinently defeated. Another factor was the perverse, pawky humour of the British soldier who, in times of stress, finds an outlet for his feelings in the Cockney habit of delighting in the worst possible news and rumour. ‘You are going the wrong way, chum!’ was typical of the greetings given the Division as it moved forward. To the fresh, physically fit New Zealanders the greeting was more irritating than humorous.

Nevertheless, Eighth Army was in a bad way. How bad, the Division had yet to learn.

As the Division moved by road and rail to its concentration area west of Mersa Matruh, it became involved in a situation which was changing rapidly and still deteriorating.

On the withdrawal of Eighth Army to the frontier, General Ritchie relied on Tobruk to hold the attention of some part of the enemy's armour and thus give time to re-equip and reorganise the British armour. Eighth Army would then relieve Tobruk and pass to its counter-offensive. On the night of 20 June, however, when it was apparent that Tobruk was about to fall, Ritchie realised that Rommel would be free to concentrate his full weight against the frontier defences. These positions were untenable without a strong mobile armoured force operating on the open desert flank. He therefore sought permission to withdraw to Mersa Matruh.

Dispositions on evening of 26 June 1942 Colour map of army location

Auchinleck was reluctant to abandon the frontier. He pointed out to Ritchie that the argument that an armoured reserve was essential to the successful defence of the frontier applied with equal force to the Matruh position, which could easily be isolated by a movement past its southern flank. In Auchinleck's opinion withdrawal from the frontier was a question of general policy to be decided in consultation with the other two Commanders-in-Chief. In the meantime, since Ritchie alone was in a position to know whether the immediate situation made it imperative to withdraw, the decision was left to him.

Despatch, p. 362.

Ritchie decided to withdraw to Matruh in the belief that with the time thus gained it would be possible to build up an armoured force. This decision was subsequently endorsed by the Middle East Defence Committee, but ‘he was instructed to prepare to fight a decisive action round Matruh and to delay the enemy as far west as possible with a covering force.

Ibid.

Command of the covering force was given to Lieutenant-General Gott, 13 Corps. Lieutenant-General C. W. M. Norrie, with 30 Corps Headquarters, was sent to organise the Matruh position until he was relieved by Lieutenant-General W. G. Holmes and 10 Corps Headquarters from Syria. Norrie was then to take 30 Corps Headquarters to control the completion and occupation of the El Alamein defences, 120 miles to the east.

General Freyberg left Cairo on 21 June for the desert. He called at Middle East Headquarters to hear that Tobruk had been lost and that the situation ‘was said to be obscure.’ He had no inkling of a change in the plans for the Division and believed it was still to concentrate on the coast ten miles west of Matruh and move to the frontier to come under 30 Corps. Only when he arrived at Matruh and reported to 30 Corps by telephone did he learn that the plans had been altered and that the Division was to go into the Matruh box. Occupation of the box was urgent, but there was then no state of emergency.

The Matruh defences consisted of a fortified perimeter, a covering position to the west of the town at Charing Cross near the edge of the coastal escarpment, and a detached strongpoint about 20 miles to the south on the inland escarpment near Minqar Sidi Hamza. A deep minefield ran south from the coast to Charing Cross and then turned eastward. There were two other minefields separated by a gap of about six miles between Charing Cross and Sidi Hamza.

The defences had been built early in the war against the advance of the Italian Army under Graziani. Since then there had been no occasion to divert labour and materials to keep them in repair. The anti-tank ditch and most of the positions were full of sand and camouflage was almost non-existent, but Army Headquarters was advised by the CRE, Matruh, that once the posts were occupied they could be made defensible within forty-eight hours. Many of the mines were sensitive and all fences, whether marked as minefield fences or not, had to be regarded with the deepest suspicion. Posts were short of water containers, which were stated to have been filched by previous occupants.

Pending the arrival of the remainder of the Division, 4 Brigade Group, under Brigadier Inglis,

Maj-Gen L. M. Inglis, CB, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, m.i.d., MC (Greek); Palmerston North; born Mosgiel, 16 May 1894; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde and MG Bn, 1915–19; CO 27 (MG) Bn, Jan–Aug 1940; comd 4 Inf Bde, 1941–42 and 4 Armd Bde, 1942–44; 2 NZ Div, 27 Jun-16 Aug 1942 and 6 Jun-31 Jul 1943; Chief Judge of the Control Commission Supreme Court in British Zone of Occupation, Germany, 1947–50; Stipendiary Magistrate.

on 22 June took over the defence of the fortress perimeter from the Sidi Barrani road to the coast, and 20 Battalion, with 28 Field Battery and a troop from 31 Anti-Tank Battery, was sent to the outpost at Charing Cross. The battalion was joined next day by a platoon of Bren carriers from 6 Brigade. Orders were given to 4 Brigade to establish road blocks with anti-tank defence in depth, to take full battle precautions with sections dispersed, and, at night, to post double sentries and patrol the front of the positions.

While 4 Brigade was moving into its sector, unit commanders of 5 Brigade Group arrived and with Brigadier Kippenberger made a daylight reconnaissance of the eastern sector preparatory to occupying it by moonlight. Each of the brigades had four battalions, 28 (Maori) Battalion being under 4 Brigade and 26 Battalion, from 6 Brigade, under 5 Brigade. In the completed scheme 6 Brigade, less one battalion, was to take over the western outposts and Divisional Cavalry was to cover the northern and eastern ends of the minefields. Other troops provisionally allotted to Matruh were 5 Indian Division, with one brigade group only, and 151 Infantry Brigade from 50 Division when it should be released from the covering force.

On 23 June all the troops were working with a will restoring the defences. The engineer companies had to meet incessant demands for sandbags, coils of wire and pickets, and their minelaying sections had to mark and improve existing minefields and put down new ones. Divisional Signals took over the communications of the fortress, and 4 and 5 Field Ambulances were called upon to treat casualties from the battle area almost as soon as they opened their stations.

At this period 7 Anti-Tank Regiment was replacing its two-pounder guns with the new six-pounders as they became available, the two-pounders being handed over to the newly formed anti-tank platoons of the infantry battalions. A school to instruct the infantrymen in the use of the guns was opened by 95 Anti-Tank Regiment at Smugglers' Cove, but the course was cut short when the role of the Division was changed.

A light note in an otherwise serious occasion was provided by 4 Brigade Band. The band had been ordered to make its way to Maadi by any available means but could not find transport either by road or rail. It filled in the time with marches through Matruh. This apparent disregard of the prevailing spirit of alarm caused considerable comment, the sight and sound of a band display surprising many of the retreating British and South African troops who, the band's diary notes, ‘seemed to expect the enemy over the escarpment at any moment.’

Until this time, however, the only signs of the approach of the enemy had been the increasing number of bombers over the rear areas and the trains and convoys filled with men and materials being taken to the rear. All the roads leading into and out of Matruh were jammed with traffic moving back. On its way to Charing Cross, 20 Battalion had great difficulty in moving against the solid stream of transport in retreat—‘ a weird mixture of vehicles that were being driven, towed or pushed, nose to tail and four abreast’—that converged from the Siwa and Sidi Barrani roads in a confusion which was increased when enemy bombers appeared over the crossroads.

Although General Freyberg had put the Division into the fortress and had set it at work restoring the defences, he had made up his mind that he would not permit it to be held in the Matruh or any other box. He regarded box defences as traps in which isolated defenders were overrun by the enemy at his convenience. He also doubted whether in the prevailing circumstances Matruh could be held. A suggestion that the Division might support the defence of Matruh from the adjacent Naghamish Box, a wadi incorporated in the ‘Kiwi’ anti-tank ditch dug by 4 Brigade in 1940, was equally disliked.

On more specific grounds, Freyberg thought it wrong to confine the highly trained, mobile New Zealand Division in a fortress. The Division was up to strength in men and arms, it was the only complete division then available in the desert, and in numbers and fire power was the equal of any other two divisions in Eighth Army. Some additional transport, however, was needed to make it fully self-contained.

Freyberg put these views to General Norrie, 30 Corps, and again to General Holmes, 10 Corps, when the latter took command of the fortress on 23 June. That afternoon he went with Holmes to Ritchie's headquarters prepared to bring the issue to a head. He was ready to say that the New Zealand Division would be thrown away if it were kept in the Matruh fortress, and that, if necessary, he would refer the matter to the New Zealand Government. He told Holmes he realised this attitude might precipitate a crisis, but that risk would be taken for the sake of the Dominion and the Division.

Holmes saw Ritchie alone. When Freyberg was called in he was told the Division would be relieved in Matruh by 10 Indian Division, then withdrawing from the frontier, and would have a mobile role in the desert. Freyberg was impressed by Ritchie at this interview. It was obvious that he had had a very trying time, but he was calm and deliberate. If he knew that he was about to be relieved of his command, he showed no signs of the knowledge.

There was another matter that disturbed Freyberg. He had learned the previous day that all infantry divisions were to be reorganised forthwith into battle groups. The basis of each group was to be a battery of 25-pounders and two infantry companies, in which the sections were to consist of one non-commissioned officer and five privates. The groups would include troops of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, carrier, mortar, machine-gun and infantry anti-tank platoons, a sub-section of engineers, and an ambulance detachment. Each group was to be commanded by a battalion or field regiment commander with a skeleton headquarters, three groups to be in a brigade and three of the brigades in a division.

The New Zealand brigadiers and other experienced officers were again at one with their GOC in rejecting this organisation, which was merely a variation of the brigade group.

A South African staff officer later defined a battle group as ‘a brigade group which has been twice overrun by tanks’.

Orders on co-ordination, mutual support and attacking the enemy's flanks and rear, notwithstanding, there was in their opinion no surer way of losing a battle than by dispersing the army's resources in small packets over the landscape. Freyberg advised Army and Corps that if the New Zealand Division was to take part in the approaching battle it would fight as a division. As organisation was expressly reserved to him in his ‘charter’, there was little they could do about this intransigent attitude. The need for the Division in the battle was more pressing than a question of organisation.

The Division, however, had to undergo considerable reorganisation before it could undertake the proposed mobile role. Its own organic transport, that of a standard infantry division, was sufficient to sustain it in a static battle. With its own Reserve Mechanical Transport companies and the supply columns maintaining a shuttle service, the Division could be kept mobile in an advance, or when the enemy was not pressing. But these resources could not lift the Division and its equipment in one load. In the situation then impending, it was imperative that the Division should be completely self-contained in transport.

As a quick solution of the problem, it was decided to borrow vehicles and to reduce the infantry component of the Division to the transport available. At a divisional conference on 24 June, 6 Infantry Brigade, to Brigadier Clifton's undisguised chagrin, was ordered to concentrate at Amiriya and to send 6 RMT Company and as much as possible of its unit transport to the Division at Matruh.

26 Bn was sent back to rejoin 6 Bde at Amiriya.

Each of the seven other battalions of 4 and 5 Brigades and the Divisional Reserve Group was ordered to send one company to Maadi. Headquarters and the signals section of 14 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, 4 Field Hygiene Section (less twelve men distributed between 4 and 5 Field Ambulances), 4 Brigade Band, and the Divisional Postal Unit were also ordered to Maadi. With a number of trucks borrowed from 10 Indian Division, which was to have a static role in Matruh, and some from Eighth Army, the reduced Division was made complete on wheels.

It may be mentioned that experience convinced a number of officers that in the desert, at least, the standard infantry division had too many infantrymen for adequate support by the field and anti-tank guns. In the operations to which the Division was then being committed it could not have achieved more had it had all its infantry and full transport them, and it is certain the losses would have been greater.

For movement only, the Division was divided into four groups:

DIVISIONAL HQ GROUP

HQ NZ Division Divisional Defence Platoon 5 Field Park Company Administration Services, or Rear HQ (to operate from Matruh area)

4 INF BDE GROUP (Brigadier Inglis)

HQ 4 Inf Bde (with Light Aid Detachment) 4 Bde Defence Platoon 19 Bn 20 Bn 28 (Maori) Bn 4 Field Regiment 31 A-Tk Bty 41 Lt AA Bty 6 Field Coy 2 MG Coy 4 Fd Amb

5 INF BDE GROUP (Brigadier Kippenberger)

HQ 5 Inf Bde (with LAD) 5 Bde Defence Platoon 21 Bn 22 Bn 23 Bn 5 Fd Regt 32 A-Tk Bty 42 Lt AA Bty 7 Fd Coy 4 MG Coy 5 Fd Amb DIVISIONAL RESERVE GROUP (Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Gray, 18 Bn) 18 Bn 6 Fd Regt 33 A-Tk Bty 43 Lt AA Bty 1 MG Coy

All surplus gear, including one blanket from every man, unessential kit and clothing, anti-malaria stores brought from Syria, and unwanted secret codes and documents were collected and sent to Maadi. The Divisional Supply Company collected and filled 10,000 water containers and, in the three days from 23 to 25 June, issued 47,777 rations as normal supply and to make up deficiencies in the three-day reserve to be carried by the Division. The daily water ration for each man was fixed at three-quarters of a gallon. Unless wells and cisterns were found, this ration was to meet all requirements—drinking, washing, cooking, vehicle radiators and all other uses.

Relief by 10 Indian Division was to be completed by the night 25–26 June, when the Division would move to the escarpment south of Matruh in the vicinity of Minqar Qaim, carrying water and rations for three days, petrol and oil for 200 miles, and first-line ammunition.

CHAPTER 7 Preparations for Decisive Battle

WHATEVER differences of opinion may have existed in the enemy higher commands concerning the future employment of Rommel's victorious army, Eighth Army had no doubt Rommel would try to advance deep into Egypt. Consequently, when he reappeared in strength on the frontier on 23 June and attacked the British rearguards immediately, the reorganisation of Eighth Army and the preparation of the Matruh defences became matters of great urgency. General Gott was ordered to impose the maximum delay on the enemy, but with the small forces available to him and their condition, little more could be expected than that he would observe or, at the most, harass the enemy advanced guards which were soon operating ten to twenty miles ahead of their main bodies.

General Holmes had explicit orders that Matruh was to be held at all costs. Pending the arrival of Gott with 13 Corps Headquarters and the rearguard, 10 Corps was responsible for positioning the troops and the general policy for fighting the battle. On 24 June the forces at Holmes' disposal, their location and proposed dispositions for the battle were:

10 CORPS:

10 Indian Division, of three infantry brigades and four field and one medium artillery regiments, withdrawing from the frontier to relieve the New Zealand Division in Matruh. The division had been brought from Iraq during the Cyrenaica battle but, although it had suffered some losses, it had not been seriously engaged. In the movement from the frontier, the division was ‘shadowed, harassed and ground-strafed constantly by [the] enemy….’

The Tiger Kills, p. 138.

50 (Northumbrian) Division, also known as the ‘Tynesiders’, withdrawing from the frontier to positions east and west of Wadi el Tawawiya, south-east of Matruh and north of Minquar Qaim. The division was now reduced to 69 and 151 Brigades through the loss of 150 Brigade, which had been overrun in an isolated box at Sidi Muftah in the fighting in the Cauldron. 69 Brigade had been sorely tried in the counter-attacks in the Cauldron and, on 24 June, was rearguard on the coast road. Among its other achievements, 50 Division had made a spectacular breakaway from the Gazala line by advancing westwards through the Italian defences and then wheeling south and east clear of the battlefield. It had two field regiments and some Royal Horse Artillery under command and was to be given any Army tanks which might become available. The division was to have a mobile role based on Matruh and Wadi Tawawiya.

13 CORPS:

5 Indian Division, less two brigades, moving to the Matruh-Siwa Road area to operate in a mobile role in the gap between the Matruh outposts at Charing Cross and the escarpment at Sidi Hamza. The division had suffered severely in Cyrenaica and on 19–21 June had been withdrawn for line of communication duties at Baggush, where it was together for the first time since coming to the desert. 29 Brigade and the Highland Light Infantry of 10 Brigade, organised in three weak battle groups, were given the mobile role, 9 Brigade and the remainder of 10 Brigade being retained at Baggush and later being ordered to the Delta. General Holmes hoped to find another brigade and a third field regiment for the division in its new role.

New Zealand Division, less one infantry brigade and one company of each of the remaining battalions, restoring Matruh defences and reorganising preparatory to handing over to 10 Indian Division and moving to the area south and west of Minqar Qaim for a mobile role.

1 Armoured Division, with 4 and 22 Armoured Brigades, 7 Motor Brigade and Guides Cavalry, to take over from 7 Armoured Division and operate in the area south and west of Bir Qaim on the escarpment west of Minqar Qaim. The division had suffered severely in Cyrenaica and was in the rear areas resting preparatory to moving to the Delta to re-equip when it was given its new role. In the event only its 2 Armoured Brigade was sent to the Delta. When 1 Armoured relieved 7 Armoured, 3 Indian Motor Brigade, which, with 7 Motor Brigade was covering the retreat, was to move to Fuka. For the battle of Matruh, 1 Armoured had 159 tanks, of which sixty were Grants.

Eighth Army's Operation Instruction No. 82, issued close on midnight of the same day, set out five courses open to the enemy in his attack on Matruh and proposed counter-measures. These were:

(a)

Enemy may attack Matruh from the West North of the minefield gap, protecting his flank with mines or an anti-tank screen from an attack by us West through the gap. In this event:

10 corps will hold the enemy frontally and will employ 50 Div in conjunction with 13 Corps to prevent the enemy, by the concentration of all available fire power, from passing through the minefield to Matruh.

13 corps will employ 5 Ind Div to co-operate with 50 Div as above. 13 Corps will employ 1 Armd Div and N.Z. Div to attack the enemy in the rear by moving North and West of the minefield.

(b)

Enemy may attack through the minefield gap. In this event:

10 corps will place 50 Div and 13 corps will place 5 Ind Div and N.Z. Div to bring their combined fire power concentrated on the gap in the minefield to prevent enemy movement to the East.

13 corps will direct 1 Armd Div to strike at the enemy Southern flank, East of the minefield.

(c)

Enemy may attack South of the minefield directed on Sidi Hamza. In this event:

13 corps will employ 5 Ind Div to hold this advance frontally and will move 1 Armd Div and N.Z. Div to strike at the enemy Southern flank.

10 corps will hold 50 Div in readiness to move to support 5 Ind Div.

(d)

Enemy may advance, going wide to the South with the object of making a deep enveloping movement. In this event:

13 corps will strike at the enemy from the North, cut his L of C, and drive him into the Desert.

10 corps will hold 50 Div in readiness to support 13 Corps.

(e)

The enemy may combine any of the above courses and make a feint and a main attack. In this event the above instructions will have to be modified to meet the situation.

The ruling principle will be to employ the minimum force against the feint attack and the maximum against the flank or rear of the main attack.

Notes made by General Holmes also on 24 June show that he had similar ideas of offensive action against the enemy as soon as the battle disclosed Rommel's dispositions and the direction of his main thrust. Among his general conclusions, he said the mobile divisions must be made as strong as possible in artillery and anti-tank weapons, and that they should dig themselves in to withstand heavy shelling but be prepared to move when required.

To complete the picture of 24 June, 30 Corps Headquarters with 1 South African Division, 2 Free French Brigade, and surplus infantry from the formations in the forward area reorganising into battle groups, were re-establishing the defences of Alamein, and 9 Australian Division was being called from Syria.

The orders and plans of 24 June suggest calm, orderly preparation for the battle. The reverse was the case. Communications were poor and there were long delays in transmitting orders and messages. The forward area was cluttered with transport, some moving to the rear and some arduously engaged in the defensive works. With the exception of the New Zealand, 1 South African and 10 Indian Divisions, divisions and brigades were such in name only. They were considerably under strength in men and equipment, they were tired, they had lost faith in the higher command, and they were sceptical of orders that positions were to be held ‘at all costs.’ While moving to battle positions or working on defences, the British and Indian divisions had to reorganise into battle groups and assimilate the tactics prescribed.

It was impossible in the circumstances, even if it were contemplated, to give the units a complete understanding of the position. Orders and counter-orders, marches and counter-marches, works started and stopped were seen by other ranks and many officers only as evidence of the apparent inability of higher formations to make up their minds what was to be done. Even in divisional headquarters the rapid changes from command to command, although provided for in the plans, were bewildering. Thus, on 24 June, 1 Armoured Division passed from General Headquarters' reserve to 10 Corps and then under the direct command of Eighth Army. Next morning it came under 13 Corps. In the move from Matruh, New Zealand Division received orders from 10 Corps, from 10 Corps on behalf of 13 Corps, and finally from 13 Corps.

Nevertheless, on 24 June, the dominant fact impressed on all headquarters and on all men so far as it was possible to tell them was that a decisive battle was to be fought in the Matruh area, that Matruh was to be held at all costs, and that opportunities would be created for the mobile forces to deal the enemy effective and perhaps mortal blows.

Within twenty-four hours, on the very eve of battle when the enemy was making his dispositions to close on the outposts, General Auchinleck was to take personal command of Eighth Army and completely change the plans for the battle.

Relief of the New Zealand Division in the fortress commenced early on 25 June, and as the incoming 10 Indian Division took over the released units moved to their brigade group assembly areas. In the move to Minqar Qaim, 4 Brigade Group was to lead, leaving the fortress at 1.30 in the afternoon, followed by Divisional Headquarters at six o'clock, the Divisional Reserve Group at seven and 5 Brigade Group at 9.30 p.m. Groups were to move in column of route on the Matruh-Garawla road and the Khalda track to the railway, where they would shake out into desert formation for the remainder of the journey.

While the Division was assembling for the move, minelaying sections of 6 and 7 Field Companies were called for an urgent job in closing the gap in the western belt of minefields south of Charing Cross. In conjunction with 5 Indian Division, they were to put down 9000 mines. As a covering force for the New Zealand sappers, 20 Battalion, which had returned from the outposts only that morning, was sent out again with 25 Field Battery and two troops of two-pounder and one troop of six-pounder anti-tank guns.

The work was delayed when an expected supply of mines was not delivered. It was not until 6 p.m. that laying was started, the CRE, Lieutenant-Colonel Hanson, having decided to use the Division's reserve stock and to replenish in Matruh. The minefield was old and, without plans from which to work, the engineers suffered a number of casualties when their vehicles ran over hidden mines. Three trucks of 6 Company and one of 7 Company were destroyed or severely damaged but without loss of men. Just after the laying had been completed, however, a 6 Company truck carrying 350 mines blew up, two men being killed and five wounded. No trace could be found of the eighth man in the party.

Seventh Company completed its share of the work and was back at Matruh by 10 p.m., but 6 Company stayed on to help the Indians, who had run out of mines, and did not leave until early next morning. The covering forces rejoined the Division on the march.

General Holmes was loth to part with the Division while his forces were unbalanced. On 24 June he had asked Eighth Army whether, in view of the rapid approach of the enemy, there would be time for 10 Indian Division to take over. When Army replied in the affirmative, the orders for the relief were sustained. Shortly after midday on 25 June, Holmes again communicated with Eighth Army on the subject. He intimated that 10 Corps was still in command of all forces in the Matruh area and mentioned that a covering party from New Zealand Division was on the western minefield. He asked for a decision concerning the remainder of the Division to be given that afternoon. Should it be held in Matruh, move to Minqar Qaim, or concentrate within 10 Corps' area in anticipation of a new role being given next day? Eighth Army was advised that the relief was going on but that the Division had been stopped from moving out of the Corps' area pending further orders.

The situation facing Holmes was formidable and gave reasons for his apprehensions and desire to retain the Division. Tenth Division was only in the process of taking over Matruh and becoming familiar with the defences. Only one brigade of 50 Division was in position. Its other brigade, the 69th, was still with the rearguard and there was a chance that it might be cut off. It had had one narrow escape already. It was doubtful whether 5 Indian Division, now reduced to one brigade, could hold the Sidi Hamza area. The other brigade he had hoped to obtain for the division, the 18th Indian from Iraq, was being held on the Alamein line. Once the New Zealand Division was gone, the eastern flank of the Matruh position would be open. Moreover, with the exception of the 18th, the British and Indian brigades were little more than weak battalion groups.

General Freyberg became aware of these further discussions early in the afternoon when he was told by 10 Corps that, on relief, the Division was to go into the Naghamish area. He was advised that the Army Commander had promised a decision by midnight whether the Division would stay there or go to 13 Corps. Freyberg stated his objections to Naghamish as a tactical position and the difficulties of recalling 4 Brigade Group, then moving south in desert formation. However, in accordance with Corps' orders, he altered the route for the remainder of the Division to take it east of Naghamish Wadi by way of the Garawla railway station and thence by another desert track to a concentration area at Bir el Sarahna. Difficulties with transport delayed some units, but by 7.30 a.m. on 26 June all the main units of the Division were concentrated in the area Bir el Sarahna and Bir Ali el Qadi. The movement received enemy attention, one man of 21 Battalion and four of 22 Battalion being wounded when 5 Brigade was bombed on the main road near Garawla.

An hour before midnight on 25–26 June the transfer of the Division to 13 Corps was confirmed and the Division was ordered to be in position at Minqar Qaim by 5 a.m., or before first light, on 27 June. Its orders from 13 Corps were:

(1)

Secure a box in the general area Minqar Qaim with the object of

(a)

Denying the escarpment to the enemy,

(b)

Commanding with fire the approaches from the west both north and south of the escarpment;

(2)

Maintain a mobile reserve of columns with the task of

(a)

Delaying any enemy advance from the west,

(b)

Preventing any enemy from moving up the Khalda track from the south, and

(c)

Attacking any enemy within striking distance.

The Division spent the morning of 26 June making itself administratively secure. Ammunition and supply trucks had had to be used for the move from Matruh and fifty more trucks were required to make the Division fully mobile. More six-pounder anti-tank guns and their ammunition were awaited. Field artillery ammunition dumped in Matruh had to be picked up and the Division's stock of mines replenished. The location of rear divisional headquarters and supply lines and refilling points also had to be fixed. The Division could have moved during the morning, but it was deemed better to attend to these administrative details in the concentration area rather than in the tactical position at Minqar Qaim When they were completed the Division would be able to move anywhere quickly.

General Freyberg was given a large measure of discretion in choosing a battle position at Minqar Qaim. For some miles to the west of the Minqar Qaim feature the escarpment was impassable to wheeled transport and there were few places tanks could climb. But the Khalda track, two and three-quarter miles east of Minqar Qaim, and the escarpment east of the track could be easily negotiated by any desert-worthy transport.

In his reconnaissance Freyberg paid special attention to two points. He sought positions which offered natural obstacles to tanks or which could be adequately covered by mines and anti-tank guns. But such positions would be useless if, within them, he could not deploy the field artillery to take the fullest advantage of its range and the concentrations of fire practised in Syria. In addition, the ground, while being defensible, should not retard movement. The CRA, Brigadier Weir, was encouraged by the attention given to the requirements of the artillery. He believed this was the first time in the history of the Division that such a priority had been given to the guns. He regarded it as another milestone in the development of divisional artillery practice.

Fifth Brigade led the move from the concentration area, starting at 2 p.m. and travelling south along a telegraph line until it reached the escarpment. Here a column comprising 21 Battalion, 27 Field Battery, No. 2 Section 7 Field Company, and a troop from 32 Anti-Tank Battery was detached to guard a field maintenance centre at Bir Khalda, 12 miles farther south. The column was placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Allen,

Brig S. F. Allen, OBE, m.i.d.; born Liverpool, 17 May 1897; Regular soldier; CO 2 NZEF Sigs Sep 1939–Sep 1941; 21 Bn 7 Dec 1941–10 May 1942, 12 Jun–15 Jul 1942; comd 5 Bde 10 May–12 Jun 1942; killed in action 15 Jul 1942.

21 Battalion. The rest of the brigade group turned west and the troops were debussed in their defence area close to Minqar Qaim feature, by which brigade headquarters was established at 4.30 p.m.

Fourth Brigade left the Bir el Sarahna area at 5 p.m. and less than two hours later was disposing itself about Bir Abu Batta, a small feature and re-entrant five and a half miles east of Minqar Qaim. While thus engaged, the troops noted with satisfaction a large formation of Royal Air Force Boston bombers pass over their area on the way to attack the advancing enemy. Within a few minutes, however, they themselves were attacked by about twenty-five enemy bombers which, after turning to get the darkening eastern sky behind them, swept in on a medium-level attack on the group's positions. The troops replied with weapons of all kinds, but by bombing and machine-gunning the enemy killed seven men, wounded fifty-five others, and destroyed or damaged a number of vehicles. The anti-aircraft gunners claimed three of the enemy aircraft.

No fewer than eighteen reports were made of this incident, most of them differing in detail. The report given here is from 4 Brigade's Intelligence Log.

Apropos of this attack, it is worth comment that there is no record in the diaries of the German ground forces that the Luftwaffe reported the concentration of British troops and transport in the Minqar Qaim area. After passing over 4 Brigade about Bir Abu Batta, the German airmen must have seen 5 Brigade at Minqar Qaim, while the Divisional Reserve Group and Divisional Headquarters, then moving to the escarpment, should also have been sighted by alert observers. Had this intelligence been conveyed promptly to Field Marshal Rommel or Afrika Korps, it is highly probable the New Zealand Division would have been subjected to much more vigorous attention next morning.

By midnight on 26–27 June the Division was disposed on the escarpment, with 5 Brigade Group on the western flank and Divisional Headquarters and Divisional Reserve Group next to it west of the Khalda track. There was then a gap of over two miles to 4 Brigade at Bir Abu Batta. This gap was considered too dangerous and the group was ordered to shift itself bodily to the west and close on the Divisional Reserve Group. The move was made on foot between 3 a.m. and 6.30 a.m. On its completion, the Division was disposed in six mutually supporting positions in an area approximately five and a half miles long by one and a half to two miles in depth on the top and face of the escarpment.

See map on p. 84.

In detail, 22 Battalion faced north and west on the extreme western flank. Fifth Brigade Headquarters was alongside Minqar Qaim feature, and then came 23 Battalion with two companies facing north and one south. Fifth Field Regiment, less 27 Battery with the column at Bir Khalda, was deployed in this area. The Divisional Reserve Group was given a defensive task adjoining 23 Battalion. Divisional Headquarters was originally located below and to the north of the escarpment between Minqar Qaim and Khalda track, but when advice was received that the enemy had penetrated the minefields on the Siwa road, it was moved three-quarters of a mile south on to the escarpment. This new position also permitted a better deployment of the artillery to meet possible enemy advances from the north-west.

In 4 Brigade Group's new positions, 19 Battalion covered the southern approaches, 28 Battalion the northern and 20 Battalion, on the extreme eastern flank, those from the north-east. Brigade Headquarters was in 19 Battalion's area.

The Division's supply line was from Matruh and other army depots on the coast road through Rear Divisional Headquarters, which was set up in the neighbourhood of Bir Abu el Fakarin, about 17 miles east of Minqar Qaim and due south of Sidi Haneish. Headquarters of the New Zealand Army Service Corps travelled with Rear Division.

While the Division was taking up its positions, advice was received of an enemy attack on the Siwa road minefields and the noise of battle in the distance was heard. These gave urgency to the defensive preparations. Fifth Brigade sent a patrol of carriers from 22 Battalion to make contact with 5 Indian Division to the west, and also sent other patrols 12 miles to the north and northeast to look for signs of an enemy breakthrough. Fourth Brigade sent a column comprising 20 Battalion less one company, 46 Field Battery, and B Troop of 31 Anti-Tank Battery north along the Khalda track for three and a half miles to the junction of the roads and telegraph lines. The column left the brigade area at Bir Abu Batta at 9.30 p.m. On the patrol it passed several groups of British transport which were unaware that the enemy might be near at hand. Parties bringing six-pounders to the Division were met and given guides to Minqar Qaim. As no contact had been made with the enemy by 11. p.m., the column took up a defensive position for the remainder of the night.

In the meantime, the troops on the escarpment toiled with a will to make weapon pits and gun positions. The hard, rocky ground made the work laborious. Where it was impossible to dig, the men scraped shallow holes and built parapets of stones. Few of the guns could be sunk into pits. In the dark, 7 Field Company put down a minefield covering the northern approach to 5 Brigade's area. This was prolonged by 5 Field Park to cover 28 Battalion's west and north flanks, and 6 Field Company carried the minefield north and east of 20 Battalion to Bir Abu Batta.

Although there was still much work to do in improving the minefields and other defences, the Division greeted the dawn of 27 June with confidence. At long last, after more than two and a half years of war, it was disposed to fight as a division. Each infantry battalion felt it had tried and trusted comrades on its flanks, and there was the utmost faith in the gunners. True, there was an air of novelty in the anti-tank defences. The anti-tank batteries were still receiving the new six-pounders. These had not been zeroed and parts were missing from some. But the gunners took them over and prepared them for action in their allotted battle positions. Waiting infantrymen who had had a course on the two-pounder in Syria took over the two-pounder guns for the anti-tank platoons then being formed in each battalion. They knew that the gun made the German panzer divisions a little more cautious in attack, that in favourable circumstances it could knock out a tank, and with a hint or two on tactics, the infantrymen went off triumphantly to reinforce their battalion defences.

The men were vaguely aware that 1 Armoured Division and 5 Indian Division (how little of the latter they did not know) were west of them. Seven miles north, 151 Brigade of 50 Division was in the area where the New Zealand Division had concentrated on 25–26 June, and beyond the 151st was the same division's 69th Brigade. Above all, however, the men knew the battle had started and, in the élan of well-found troops, they were certain that the enemy was about to receive a knock which would change the tide of fortune.

Freyberg considered one really hearty blow was all that was needed to put the enemy off his balance and Eighth Army on top again. But the idea was not put to the test. Last-minute changes in the British plans reduced, if they did not eliminate, the chances of giving a knockout blow. Indecisive, spiritless command on the day of battle made its delivery impossible.

CHAPTER 8 Auchinleck takes Command

IN the evening of 25 June, when the enemy was a day's march from the Matruh outposts, General Auchinleck took direct command of Eighth Army. He had decided that day ‘the position of the Eighth Army was so critical and the danger to Egypt so great’,

Despatch, p. 327.

that he must assume personal command. With the change, he also reversed the decision that a decisive battle should be fought round Matruh.

Reasons for the altered policy are given in Auchinleck's despatch. ‘I realized that we were so weak in tanks and field artillery, two of the essentials for success in desert warfare, that it was very doubtful whether we could hope to hold the Matruh position, any more than we could the positions on the frontier,’ he reported. ‘With his superiority in tanks, it seemed that the enemy might either envelop our open southern flank or pierce our centre, which we could hold only lightly. In either event, he was likely to isolate part of our forces and defeat them in detail, and this I was determined to avoid. I was convinced that it was necessary above all to hold together the much depleted Eighth Army and to keep it as a mobile force, retaining its freedom of action. I decided, therefore, that I could not risk its being pinned down at Matruh.’

Ibid, p. 328.

After discussing the disadvantages of yielding Matruh and the advantages of the Alamein positions, including the shortening of Eighth Army's supply lines, the despatch continues: ‘I therefore cancelled the orders to stand at Matruh and gave instructions for Eighth Army to withdraw on El Alamein, delaying the enemy as much as possible in its retirement.’

Shortly after midnight on 25–26 June, General Holmes, his Brigadier General Staff (Brigadier Walsh), and Brigadier Erskine (BGS 13 Corps) were informed of the new plan at Headquarters Eighth Army at Baggush. Detailed orders were set out in Eighth Army Operation Instruction No. 83 which was being prepared while the conference was being held. This instruction, and an addition to it issued by Auchinleck personally on 26 June, are important in understanding much that happened in and about Matruh and are quoted here in full.

26 June 42

EIGHTH ARMY OPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 83 Ref Map MATRUH 1/500,000

INTRODUCTION.

1. eighth army Operation Instruction No. 82

See pp. 60–1. This instruction dealt chiefly with possible enemy courses of action and proposed counter-measures.

was based on the intention to fight a decisive battle on the Matruh position.

This intention has now been changed and a new plan formulated to take effect as soon as the necessary orders can be promulgated.

INTENTION.

2. eighth army will stop the enemy's eastward advance and defeat him in the area matruh-el alamein-naqb abu dweis-ras el qattara….

Map references omitted throughout.

METHOD.

3. eighth army is divided into two elements:—

(a)

The Forward element comprising 10 and 13 Corps in the matruh area.

(b)

The Rearward element comprising the formations in the el alamein area.

4. The role of the Forward element eighth army is ‘To seize any opportunity which may arise of delaying and defeating the enemy but to withdraw from the matruh position should the enemy threaten to overwhelm our forces in this area.’

5. The principles on which the actions of the Forward element of eighth army will be based are as follows:—

(a)

Formations will be mobile and will maintain in the forward area the whole of their Fd and R.A. A/Tk arty assisted by the minimum of infantry and the other supporting arms.

(b)

matruh will NOT be held as a fortress, and steps will be taken to ensure that formations will NOT be cut off by an enemy thrust to the coast about maaten el garawla….

(c)

Units and stocks NOT required for the battle in the matruh area will be evacuated forthwith to positions east of el alamein.

6. The Forward elements eighth army will comprise the following:—

10 CORPS.

(a)

Div HQ and Sigs, equivalent of one Bde Gp and all the Div Fd and R.A. A/Tk arty of 50 Div and 10 Ind Div.

(b)

64 Med Regt.

13 CORPS.

(c)

Div HQ and Sigs, equivalent of one Bde Gp and all the Div Fd and R.A. A/Tk arty of N.Z. Div and 5 Ind Div.

(d)

1 and 7 Armd Divs.

The remainder of 50, N.Z., 5 Ind and 10 Ind Divs will be sent to EL ALAMEIN position as follows. On arrival they will be met and be given instructions by 30 Corps.

(e)

Remainder 50, N.Z. and 10 Ind Divs by desert route to DEIR EL QATTARA….

(f)

Remainder 5 Ind Div by desert route to NAQB ABU DWEIS….

(g)

On arrival on the EL ALAMEIN position all elements of the forward echelon of eighth army will be received by 30 Corps which will come under comd BTE from 1200 hrs 26 June.

(h)

This movement from MATRUH to the EL ALAMEIN position will be dispersed and spaced evenly over the hours of daylight by 10 and 13 Corps. It will be started immediately on receipt of these orders.

7. During the hours of daylight on 26 June the policy governing the action of 10 and 13 Corps in the event of an enemy attack will be as laid down in eighth army Operation Instruction No. 82 except that 10 Ind Div will NOT be required to hold MATRUH but will fight in a mobile role West and South of the MATRUH perimeter defences.

8. After 2100 hrs 26 June the policy governing the action of 10 and 13 Corps will remain the same but the inter-Corps boundary will be: ….

The boundaries are fixed by map references and are not material to this discussion.

DEMOLITIONS.

9. It is most important that installations and stores, which can NOT be evacuated, are destroyed.

10 Corps are responsible for arranging for the demolitions at MATRUH port, MOHALFA, QASABA and the stocks within the MATRUH perimeter including water supply.

Acknowledge.(Sgd.) J. F. M. Whiteley, Brigadier, General Staff.

Time of signature 0415 hrs.

Method of issue. 10 & 13 Corps by SDR [Special Despatch Rider].

To this Operation Instruction, General Auchinleck issued the following ‘most immediate, most secret’ addition over his own signature on the same day:

1. Although para 4 of this instruction [No. 83] says that forward troops of the eighth army now in the area matruh, minqar qaim, sidi hamza, will withdraw from the matruh position should the enemy force threaten to overwhelm them, this does not mean that the strongest possible resistance is not to be offered to the enemy around the minefields which constitute the major part of the defences.

2. Should the enemy attack it is my intention to inflict the heaviest possible losses on him in this area and, if possible, so cripple him as to make him incapable of further offensive action for a considerable time.

3. The means at our disposal include:—

(a)

The divisional artilleries of four divisions with an infantry brigade from each division organised into mobile battle-groups strong in field and anti-tank guns.

(b)

An armoured force comprising two tank bdes with their artillery regiments.

(c)

A covering force comprising motor and light tank (Stuart) units.

4. The principles on which the battle will be fought are:—

(a)

The fullest use will be made of the minefields to embarrass and fix the enemy. Mobile battle-groups are to watch the minefields closely and prevent enemy interference with them, inflicting the maximum loss on him should he try to do so.

(b)

Should the enemy pass round the SOUTH flank of the minefields or penetrate them, he will be at once engaged with all available artillery by the division or divisions nearest the threatened spot. Other divisions, while continuing to watch their own allotted front and flanks, will move at once to the threatened front and attack the enemy boldly and quickly with all available artillery, this movement being co-ordinated by Corps Commanders.

(c)

If battle-groups have to give ground it should be with the object of coming into action again at the earliest possible moment on the flank or rear of the enemy. There must be NO continued rearward movement. The enemy must be attacked by artillery fire continuously from all sides until he is brought to a standstill.

(d)

The armoured force will be in Army reserve and will not be committed to battle against enemy armour until a really favourable opportunity has been created for it by the action of the infantry divisions.

(e)

The covering force will operate vigorously from the SOUTH against the enemy flanks and rear doing its utmost by bold and rapid action to destroy the enemy's transport and dislocate his supply organisation.

5. An essential part of this method of defence is close control and co-ordination of the action of battle groups by divisional commanders who must make their direct personal influence felt on the battlefield. It is their duty to supply the driving power necessary to enable the artillery to ATTACK the enemy wherever he is and whatever he does.

6. The Corps Commanders must be in the closest possible touch so as to ensure that if one Corps or part of it has to give ground the other is immediately able to take advantage of this situation by rapidly and boldly attacking the enemy in flank.

7. This system of battle calls for the maximum of mobility on the part of the troops concerned and the greatest alertness and quickness of decision on the part of all commanders. I hope to confront the enemy with a situation new to him and to cause him heavy loss, perhaps even destroy him, before he can accustom himself to these new conditions.

8. The contents of this instruction are to be impressed most firmly at once on ALL commanders.

Acknowledge. (Signed) C. J. Auchinleck, General, Commander-in-Chief, Comd. Eighth Army.

However clear Auchinleck may have been in his own mind concerning his plans, these instructions made a difficult situation still more confusing. The intention to withdraw on Alamein is precisely stated in the despatch. It was the keynote of the midnight conference. It is the dominant note in paragraphs two and four in Operation Instruction No. 83. Certainly there is a caveat that previous orders would hold good should the enemy attack during daylight on 26 June. An intention to fight in the Matruh area may also be deduced from the order to ‘stop the enemy's eastward advance and defeat him in the area Matruh-El Alamein-Naqb Abu Dweis-Ras el Qattara.’ But neither caveat nor deduction overruled the principal idea of packing up and getting out of Matruh and of fighting a delaying action back to Alamein.

Auchinleck's additional instructions expressed another view. The forward elements were to withdraw only ‘should the enemy force threaten to overwhelm them’, and then only with the object of coming into action again at the earliest possible moment. There was to be no continuous rearward movement. In brief, there was to be mobile defence based on the minefields to inflict the heaviest possible losses on the enemy ‘in this area’ and ‘if possible,…cripple him’. An important proviso was that the armoured force was to be held in Army reserve and not committed to battle against the enemy armour until a really favourable opportunity had been created by the infantry divisions.

There was a still further view of the impending operations. According to Brigadier Whiteley, the ‘whole plan was that 13th Corps should attack northwards to help 10th Corps out of Matruh’ in the event of enemy penetration between the two corps.

Evidence before Court of Inquiry into encirclement of 10 Corps at Matruh.

Again, at the midnight conference, Brigadier Erskine arranged with Brigadier Walsh that 13 Corps would stay on the escarpment as long as possible to give 10 Corps somewhere to make for when it broke out of Matruh.

This confusion, of course, was not apparent, but nevertheless it was characteristic of Middle East and Eighth Army administration at this period. The vital necessity of checking and re-checking to ensure harmony of ideas and orders had still to be learned.

In addition to this feature of the planning, there was the obvious question of whether there would be sufficient time to promulgate the new orders and make them effective. When the change was made, the movements and reorganisation called for in Eighth Army orders from 22 to 24 June were still uncompleted. Now the infantry divisions had to undergo further reorganisation and assimilate new plans and new battle tactics. Moreover, 10 Indian Division in Matruh had to be converted from a static role to a mobile one.

Eighth Army Headquarters had ample information concerning the proximity of the enemy and no doubt of his intention to attack. Its own intelligence reports stated that the enemy could be expected to reach the minefields at 6.30 a.m. On 26 June. Orders issued by 5 Indian Division to its battle groups in the outpost line at 4.30 p.m. on 25 June, on the authority of a 13 Corps' order, reported an enemy concentration of mechanised transport a short distance to the west, and stated that an enemy advance against the minefield was expected ‘possibly this afternoon.’

Mention has already been made that communications were poor and that there were long delays in transmitting orders and messages. General Holmes did not get back to his headquarters at Matruh until 5 a.m. after the midnight conference. He at once put in hand plans for making 10 Indian Division mobile and for demolitions and evacuation. There is no record that 10 Corps received a copy of Instruction No. 83, but it is possible it was destroyed with other secret documents during the battle. Brigadier Erskine returned to 13 Corps Headquarters about four o'clock, when he gave the news to General Gott. Their copy of Instruction No. 83 did not reach them until 1.10 p.m. on 26 June.

What happened to the instruction after that is not clear. Fifth Indian Division appears to have received it, as its own operation order issued at 5.30 p.m. on 26 June makes the definite statement that ‘The Commander-in-Chief has decided NOT to hold Matruh at all costs but to use it to delay the enemy as long as possible and then to withdraw to the El Alamein position.’ There is no reference, however, to the instruction in a detailed log kept by 1 Armoured Division.

There is no record in division or corps documents that NewZeland Division received Instruction No. 83, although a copy of Auchinleck's additional instruction was preserved in the Division's archives. Four years after the war the instruction was brought to the notice of General Freyberg and Brigadier Gentry but, important as it was, it did not strike a responsive chord in their memories. On the contrary, they insisted from their records at the time and their recollections of this decisive occasion, that the first they heard of a general retreat from Matruh to Alamein was when they received an order to move during the battle on 27 June.

In this they are supported by a contemporary document. In the early hours of 27 June 13 Corps issued Operation Order No. 133 in which the ‘intention’ paragraph said: ‘13 Corps will delay enemy as long as possible in present position and stop his advance in area Matruh-El Alamein-Naqb Abu Dweis-Ras el Qattara. Special determination is required at the present time and a personal message from the Commander-in-Chief has been received calling on all ranks for a supreme effort to achieve this intention.’ Divisional tasks were those set out in an order of 25 June. These, in brief, were that the corps, in conjunction with 10 Corps, would destroy any enemy forces which penetrated the area between them.

The order then named axes of retreat and new concentration areas ‘in the event of a withdrawal from the forward positions becoming necessary.’ Withdrawal was to be controlled by Corps Headquarters by means of a special code included in the order. In other words, there was to be no withdrawal unless it was authorised by Corps.

To sum up the position on 26 June:

At the top, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army had been removed from his post and his place taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the theatre. In some circumstances, such action emphasizes the seriousness of the situation and the change restores confidence. In Eighth Army, the lack of confidence in the higher command due principally to the disasters of the previous month, extended beyond Army Headquarters Few, if any, of the units, however, were aware of the change in command.

The Army's new orders were contradictory. At the midnight conference and in Operation Instruction No. 83 the emphasis was on further withdrawal to Alamein to avoid the risk of the Army being split by the enemy and defeated in detail, and to secure the benefits of flanks which could not be turned and of shorter supply lines. In Auchinleck's additional instruction the Army was ordered to offer the enemy the strongest possible resistance with the object of crippling him in the area about the minefields. The Army's chief staff officer envisaged a battle on a corps basis in which the mobile 13 Corps would be a hammer to crack the enemy against the anvil of 10 Corps in the Matruh defences. The Commander-in-Chief thought in terms of artillery battle groups whose actions would be directed by divisional and corps commands.

In 10 Corps the previous plans for the approaching battle were being reversed and stores were being collected for evacuation or destruction. The former suggested indecision in the higher command; the latter expectation of further defeat. But all were working with a will in a race against time.

In 13 Corps 5 Indian Division's small battle groups on the outpost line awaited the decisive hour, but as it neared, they were told that Matruh was not to be held ‘at all costs’ and that the Army was to withdraw to Alamein. First Armoured Division had absorbed the armour of the covering force in the retreat from the frontier. The advanced units, 7 Motor Brigade's armoured cars, were in contact with the enemy west of the Siwa road. The division had a precise role in counter-attacking the enemy should he penetrate the minefields. New Zealand Division was concentrating in defensive positions at Minqar Qaim. It was confident of its ability to hold its own against the enemy and expected to play a decisive part in a co-ordinated corps counter-attack when the enemy committed himself against Matruh.

In all the Army area there was more than the usual friction of the battlefield. Much of it was inevitable as a result of the retreat. The greater part was due to attempts to impose new organisation and tactics while preparing to give battle to an enemy bent on denying his opponent time to reorganise and deploy.

On 26 June, while it was yet light, Rommel's spearhead, 90 Light Division, pierced the minefield defences. The Battle of Matruh was on.

CHAPTER 9 Rommel's Battle Plans

WHEN the attack on the frontier defences revealed that Eighth Army was withdrawing to Matruh, Rommel, now a field marshal as a reward for his recent prowess, ordered ‘ruthless pursuit.’ Afrika Korps and 90 Light Division were given as their objective for 24 June the general area south-east of Sidi Barrani, some 60 miles east of the frontier and 35 to 40 miles from the regrouping areas after the attack on the frontier defences.

Afrika Korps' orders to 21 Panzer Division illustrate the emphasis placed on speed, with the object of overtaking Eighth Army and denying it time to reorganise at Matruh. Shortly after starting the pursuit, the division reported that it had only one-third of a fuel unit as the fuel supply columns had not come up.

The Germans reported their petrol position in terms of fuel, or consumption units. One unit was sufficient petrol to move the whole formation 100 Kilometres, roughly 65 miles.

Korps Headquarters promptly responded with the order: ‘Division will advance in such a manner that shortage of fuel will not impair its fighting power. Set yourself an interim target you can reach. There you will form a pursuit group composed of all weapons. This group will be supplied with all the fuel still in the division. Division will advance after refuelling.’

21 Division diary, 24 Jun 1942.

Next day 21 Panzer was further advised that, if it was short of fuel, it must push forward at least parts of the division.

For the advance the Italian XXI Infantry Corps, partly motorised, was placed on the coast road and was followed by X Italian Infantry Corps which also had a motorised component. The Germans had the inland route on top of the escarpment, with 90 Light Division on their left flank in contact with the Italians, and 21 Division was south of the railway. The latter was followed by 15 Panzer Division. Still further in rear came the Italian XX Corps, comprising Ariete and Littorio Armoured Divisions and Trieste Motorised Division. The whole were grouped under the title Panzerarmee Afrika.

The enemy knew at this stage that the New Zealand Division had returned to the desert but his intelligence service erred concerning the dispositions of Eighth Army. It placed ‘2 NZ Div in Mersa Matruh along the Siwa track, next to it 10 Ind Div and 1 South African Div, and on the southern flank 7 Armd Div. In the area Garawla and south probably the remains of 50 British and 1 Armd Divs.'

Panzerarmee report to GHQ, Rome, 24 June.

Owing to lack of fuel, Afrika Korps (15 and 21 Panzer Divisions) could not pursue at the speed demanded and by the evening of 24 June was only in the area south-east of El Hamra. The 21st Panzer, however, had formed and pushed forward a pursuit group. This group appears to have been responsible for a further severe blow suffered by 3 Indian Motor Brigade of the covering force. The brigade was caught off balance near Sofafi and lost most of its field and anti-tank guns. The best progress was made by 90 Light Division whose reconnaissance units reached the area south-east of Sidi Barrani by nightfall. On the coast road, motorised units of XXI Corps got as far as six miles from Sidi Barrani.

Panzerarmee's daily report for 24 June had a note of regret that, in spite of the rapid advance, ‘it had not been possible to bring the enemy's main body to battle.’ But the headquarters consoled itself with the thought that ‘a deep penetration had been made into the west Egyptian area without appreciable loss’ and that ‘the enemy divisions in Matruh had been denied the time for the organisation of the defence.’

Vigorous reconnaissance by Eighth Army's covering force was reported by Panzerarmee on 25 June, but the numerous skirmishes between advanced and rear guards did not impede the march of the enemy's main body. Most of the enemy's difficulties were created by Royal Air Force bombing and by petrol shortages due to lack of supply vehicles. Panzerarmee made light of the bombing, reporting that, generally speaking, the losses suffered were inconsiderable. Most of the divisions, however, were more explicit with details of supply columns destroyed or dispersed. For example, 21 Panzer Division reported that because a supply column had been dispersed, the division had been reduced to half a fuel unit, or enough for little more than 30 miles. Continuous bombing attacks were reported by 90 Light Division, whose diary for 25 June has the ironic entry: ‘At 0915 hours, welcomed with great joy, the first German fighters appear.’

Concurrently, indirect but deadly pressure was being applied against Panzerarmee by the Royal Air Force in another part of the theatre. Aided by the withdrawal of considerable units of the German Air Force from Italy and Sicily for a new offensive in Russia, the British temporarily recovered air supremacy over the Central Mediterranean. Vice-Admiral Weichold noted an immediate result. In June, supplies to the German forces in North Africa dropped to barely 5000 tons, compared with 34,000 tons in May. Against 2000 vehicles delivered in May, only 400 got through in June.

‘Once again the threatening monster of reduced supplies for Africa loomed on the horizon,’ Weichold laments in his essay. ‘While at the front the soldiers of Afrika Korps fought and conquered, far from the decisive area of the land fighting the British were systematically throttling the supplies of the German-Italian Panzerarmee.’ Weichold regarded this revived Royal Air Force activity over his domain as a shrewd and timely British counterstroke to the defeat in North Africa.

There was another ominous cloud on Rommel's horizon as he closed on Matruh. When, after Tobruk, he had advised Rome that his supply vehicle situation was ‘very critical’, he had asked for more trucks and ‘continuation and reinforcement of the German naval protective forces in North Africa.’ A steady flow of munitions and equipment from Italy was vital. It was equally essential in Panzerarmee's march to Cairo and Suez that the strain on land transport should be relieved by lighters operating between the small ports of Cyrenaica and Egypt.

On 25 June Rommel reported to Rome that he had been advised by German naval headquarters that it was intended to remove the German naval forces soon for special duty. He asked that all these, but especially the supply lighters, should be left with him ‘at least for the duration of the operations because, if they are lost, all sea transport east of Benghazi will be stopped and the supplying of Panzerarmee in its present area will become impossible.’

This was probably the first hint Rommel received that the German Supreme Command did not intend to exploit his success to the full. His reflections on the North African campaigns

Rommel, p. 259 et seq.

suggest that he anticipated difficulties with the Italian supply authorities, but that ‘All that was wanted was a man real personality to deal with these questions in Rome, someone with the authority and drive to tackle the problems involved.’ Rommel could not believe that the German Supreme Command would not see the glittering prizes awaiting Panzerarmee and fail to give his forces every help in seizing them. His opponents in the field had similar views.

If Rommel had cause to doubt the future, he did not check the speed of Panzerarmee's advance or revise his administrative arrangements. On 25 June he issued orders designed to convert the pursuit without pause into a decisive battle. His plan, simple and elastic enough to cope with the unknown, was based on the belief that ‘the beaten enemy has withdrawn with what remains of his forces into Matruh which he intends to defend stubbornly with a New Zealand Division and the remainder of his troops, as has been learned from captured enemy documents.’

90 Light Division diary, 25 June.

In the north, on Panzerarmee's left flank, the Italian X and XXI Corps were ordered to attack the fortress perimeter defences from the west and south-west. The 90th Light Division was instructed to cross the Siwa road midway between Charing Cross and the inland escarpment and advance to Minqar Abu Gabr. East of that height, the division was to turn north-east and find the quickest route down the coastal escarpment to cut the main road about Garawla. Thus the garrison of the fortress would be encircled.

Afrika Korps, commanded by Lieutenant-General W. Nehring, was ordered to move on 90 Light Division's right on and below the inland escarpment. The Korps placed 21 Panzer Division below the escarpment with Bir Shineina, east of the Khalda track, as its objective. The 15th Panzer Division was to climb the escarpment about the Siwa road and move along the top to Bir Abu Shayit, a well which, unknown to Panzerarmee, was to be included in the New Zealand area at Minqar Qaim.

The Italian XX Corps, which had been following Afrika Korps from the frontier, was brought forward and ordered to have two divisions, Ariete and Trieste, in line on the inland escarpment three to four miles west of Kanayis and Sidi Husein ready to attack by five o'clock the next afternoon. The corps was thus placed on Panzerarmee's right flank and was instructed to contain the British forces on the escarpment by infantry attacks and heavy artillery fire. It was also to be ready to follow Afrika Korps, at first with elements and later with its main body. As a further guard on the right flank, 3 Reconnaissance Unit was instructed to reconnoitre to the southeast of the escarpment. Littorio Armoured Division was taken from XX Corps into army reserve under orders to fill its tanks and be prepared to exploit the breakthrough.

The plan was not bold in the sense Rommel used the term. Nevertheless, it complied with the core of his definition of a bold operation in that, in case of failure, he would be left ‘with sufficient forces in hand to be able to cope with any situation.’

Rommel, p. 255.

As will be seen, he had sufficient forces in hand to cope with the situation when 1 Armoured and the New Zealand Divisions were unexpectedly encountered on the inland escarpment.

CHAPTER 10 Germans Break In

PANZERARMEE completed its advance to the assembly area during the night 25–26 June and next morning. On the ground, it was lightly opposed by the squadrons of 7 Motor Brigade operating against the enemy's southern flank on a wide front on the inland escarpment. These squadrons and patrols from 29 Indian Brigade were then the only British forces west of the Siwa road.

Zero hour for the attack on Matruh was five o'clock

All times quoted in enemy reports are altered to local British Army time which, at this period, was one hour ahead of the time used by Panzerarmee.

in the afternoon of 26 June, which would give about two and a half hours of daylight to reach and reconnoitre the defences. The moon would then provide enough light for 90 Light Division and Afrika Korps to make their encircling moves but not sufficient to disclose them fully to Eighth Army.

From the assembly area, Afrika Korps and 90 Light Division fanned out south-east in a triple thrust against the Siwa road and inland escarpment defences. The 90th Light Division, which had advanced one of its groups earlier to secure the small height Nizwat Qireida, west of Siwa road, moved on a front of four miles to a point midway between Charing Cross and the inland escarpment where it expected to find a gap in the minefield. The 21st Panzer Division was to breach the defences between 90 Light Division and the inland escarpment, and 15 Panzer Division was sent to turn the minefield on and below the escarpment.

The two pitifully small columns of 29 Indian Brigade covering the minefield were quickly and valiantly in action against this formidable array. Each group had a company of infantry, a field battery, a troop of anti-tank guns and two troops of light anti-aircraft guns. In the fashion of the time they were named after their commanders, ‘Gleecol’ (Lieutenant-Colonel Gleeson) and ‘Leathercol’ (Major Leather). They had a fluid role but definite, although impossible, orders to ‘prevent passage of the enemy through the southern minefield.’

The columns conducted a running fight with 90 Light Division until, at a quarter past seven, Gleeson reported that ‘100 tanks have broken through the minefield and are moving eastward.’ Leathercol had been completely overrun, only a few men and guns getting away. Gleecol, according to a 5 Indian Division report, fared little better.

In the dusk, dust and confusion, Gleecol appears to have mistaken 90 Light Division's tracked and other transport for tanks or associated 21 Panzer Division with the breakthrough. The German records carry no indication that 90 Light Division had any tanks at this stage. Besides the opposition of Leathercol and Gleecol, 90 Light Division was fired on from the outposts at Charing Cross and from 29 Brigade's other positions on the inland escarpment. The German engineers, however, quickly cleared a passage through the minefield and the division sped eastwards. It was next heard of near midnight when it was held up by 151 Brigade about Bir el Sarahna. What had happened was not appreciated by any headquarters save that of 29 Indian Brigade, upon whom the blow had fallen.

The 21st Panzer Division, commanded by Major-General von Bismarck, a cousin of the ‘Iron Chancellor’, made a more cautious approach to the Siwa road. The hard core of the division was 5 Panzer Regiment with thirty tanks. Eight of these were damaged in the Siwa road minefields. One was repaired during the night, thus giving the regiment twenty-three tanks, the majority of them Mark IIIs, for the resumption of the advance next morning.

The 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of three battalions, with a total strength of under 1000 all ranks, provided the division's infantry component.

The exact strength of the regiment at this date is unknown. The estimate is based on the number buried at Minqar Qaim, about 300, and a strength return of 300 on 1 July. The regiment was also known as Infantry Regiment 104 (I.R. 104) and as Rifle Regiment 104 (R.R. 104). Panzer Grenadiers was at first an honorary title used to distinguish the infantry serving with panzer, or tank, divisions, although the Germans were not consistent in this. In North Africa the Panzer Grenadiers did not appear to be armed differently from other infantry regiments, but in Italy and Normandy there were marked differences in equipment.

Each battalion had its own anti-tank guns and a small number of field guns, including self-propelled guns. Some of the field guns were captured 25-pounders. The main artillery strength was concentrated in 155 Artillery Regiment of three batteries equipped with light and heavy guns. The division also had an anti-tank unit, a panzer engineer battalion and a signals unit.

In contact with 90 Light and 15 Panzer Divisions, the 21st reached the minefield at a quarter past seven, sufficiently close to the escarpment to see British troops in position and to come under what was reported as strong artillery fire. The nearest British troops were 1 Mahrattas of 5 Indian Division on Bir el Hukuma, on the Siwa road near the face of the escarpment. They appear to have been responsible for holding up 15 Panzer Division, but about half-past eight they were pushed off their positions by 21 Division's infantry, supported by artillery. At the same time, the division's tanks probed for gaps in the minefield. After having eight tanks damaged, the division went into hedgehog positions for the remainder of the night while its engineers cut gaps through the minefields.

There was some other fighting in the neighbourhood that night. A battle group of the Highland Light Infantry at Sidi Hamza, and the remainder of the battalion and the headquarters of 29 Brigade near Bir Sidi Hamza, were scattered by tanks said to have appeared on both sides of them. The assailants were probably from 15 Panzer Division. The 90th Light Division reported that during the night march part of its right battle group and the whole of the rear group had remained behind, having encountered enemy forces coming from the south. The Germans claimed that these forces had been pushed back and that 400 prisoners had been taken.

These engagements provided the ‘noises off’ heard by New Zealand Division at Minqar Qaim. They permitted Panzerarmee to report to Rome at midnight that the British forces had been pushed east of the Siwa road, and also encouraged another faulty appreciation of the situation. The enemy still had no inkling that the New Zealand Division had moved out of Matruh fortress and that it, or any other large infantry formation, was on the escarpment about Minqar Qaim.

New Zealand Division, however, was alert to the possibilities. Prompt advice had been received of the enemy breakthrough on the Siwa road and a number of patrols were sent out to the west and north as already mentioned. Under this protection against surprise, the Division worked throughout the night on its defences. The first contacts with the enemy were fortuitous encounters by parties making their way to Minqar Qaim.

When the Division moved out of Matruh, the Divisional Cavalry Regiment was still without its tanks and carriers, which were being railed from Syria and had been held up at Alexandria. It was decided, therefore, to equip B Squadron with carriers and transport available in Matruh and to send the remainder of the regiment to Fuka to reorganise. B Squadron left Matruh late in the afternoon to join the Division. Heavy traffic on the road and enemy air raids made progress so slow that Garawla was not reached by the first carriers until nine o'clock. There a halt was made for two hours to permit the squadron to close up. The march was resumed shortly before midnight, and at 1.40 a.m. the squadron in the dark ran into a ‘German column which included 15 Mark IV tanks.’

21 Panzer Division's encirclement of 2 NZ Division at Minqar Qaim on 27 June 1942 Black and white map military movement

Two carriers were damaged by fire from this column and had to be abandoned before the squadron could disengage by a rapid detour to the east. When clear, the squadron turned south again. On this stage of the journey it encountered British field artillery, later identified as 293 Battery of 74 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery. The battery was urged to accompany the squadron to the Division but stayed in the area to support the Durham Light Infantry of 151 Brigade. Later in the morning the battery was knocked out by 90 Light Division and its personnel taken prisoner.

B Squadron's positive identification of fifteen Mark IV German tanks illustrates the tank consciousness of the British troops at the period. The only enemy in the vicinity at the time of the encounter was 90 Light Division, which did not have any tanks on its establishment. Nor, according to the division's diary which gives the composition of the battle groups, were any tanks attached to it for the attack on Matruh. Moreover the two panzer divisions had thirty-nine serviceable tanks all told on 27 June, of which no more than half a dozen were Mark IVs.

Unquestionably, the squadron had a fight. It is possible that in the dark it was mistaken for the enemy by a British Crusader tank command. British tanks were in the neighbourhood. The 293rd Field Battery lost some men when its gun positions were overrun by Crusader tanks withdrawing under enemy anti-tank fire at 2 a.m. on 27 June. It is also possible that the squadron was the victim of German anti-tank guns fired from portées or perhaps of self-propelled guns, but it is doubtful whether any part of 90 Light Division was so far east at the time.

In some conditions of visibility, self-propelled guns were mistaken for tanks. The 90th Light Division's records of the period, however, contain only one reference to these guns, three being credited to 288 Special Force on 29 June.

A party of twenty-eight drivers from 6 Field Regiment traversed the same area as B Squadron without any vicissitudes, except the trials of searching the depots at Matruh and on the coast for twentyeight six-pounder anti-tank guns for the Division and of a prolonged journey for which it had not been prepared with clothing and rations. Another group of seven men and an officer from the regiment was not so fortunate in its attempt to rejoin the Division from Matruh. It ran into Germans driving British anti-tank portées and was made prisoner.

When B Squadron and the anti-tank guns party reached the Division they could merely confirm happenings then apparent from Minqar Qaim. From this grandstand, the Division could see forces moving across its northern front with signs of battle beyond.

The 21st Panzer Division left its hedgehog positions west of the Siwa road at 7.30 in the morning of 27 June. An hour later it was through the gaps cut in the minefields and had reached Bir el Gibb. There it turned south-east towards Abar Zahya. On the way the division noted and reported what it took to be British tanks on the inland escarpment. It was also advised that 15 Panzer Division was involved in a battle with strong British tank forces well up on the escarpment. This engagement is not mentioned in 1 Armoured Division's detailed log of the day.

Reports of British tanks on the escarpment appear to have given Afrika Korps Headquarters some concern. Instead of finding only reconnaissance units of the British armour west of the Khalda track, as it expected, the Korps headquarters had a report of forty to fifty tanks with six batteries in the neighbourhood of Karima, six miles west of Minqar Qaim. This news was flashed to 21 Panzer Division with the additional note: ‘We are worried about 21 Pz Div.’ Afrika Korps Headquarters, however, had little cause for anxiety as, at that time, Rommel was travelling with the division. He appears to have been satisfied with the progress and position of the division for he extended its orders to include cutting the ‘escarpment descent’ south-west of Bir Shineina. This was a preliminary move to cut the line of retreat of the British armour on the escarpment. It was also an example of taking advantage of circumstances as they developed.

These additional orders were given more than half an hour before the divisional headquarters learned there was something substantial on its right flank on the escarpment. Although flanking artillery and tanks had come into action some time before, it was not until eleven o'clock that the division reported to Afrika Korps that a large concentration of motor transport of approximately divisional strength had been sighted. The significance of the concentration apparently did not strike General von Bismarck for, after passing on the suggestion that ‘this would be a promising Stuka target,’ he left further action to his flank guard while he carried on with the main body to Bir Shineina, which was reached by his infantry half an hour after midday.

From dawn, the New Zealand Division had been paying special attention to the activity on its northern front. It had seen considerable movement in the neighbourhood of Raqabet el Sikka where 151 Brigade still held up 90 Light Division. British tanks which passed through 28 Battalion on their way westwards, and other sources, gave news of the presence of the enemy north of the Division and of the fighting.

An interesting report, and also a small but useful reinforcement, was brought to the Division by Major D. J. M. Smith, second-in-command of 1/4 Battalion, The Essex Regiment, who during the night had traversed the greater part of the battle area and had had some tense moments with the enemy.

With an infantry company and section of carriers from his battalion, a troop from 121 Field Regiment, a troop of anti-tank guns, an ambulance car and a wireless link, Major Smith was sent from 5 Indian Brigade of 10 Division in Matruh to patrol the minefields south of Matruh, harass the enemy and establish contact with 5 Indian Division and its 29th Brigade. Moving from the fortress down the Siwa road, the column found that the minefield had been penetrated and ran into 90 Light Division. It broke clear of artillery and machine-gun fire and then passed eastwards along the south face of the fortress. Moving south again, it was attacked a little before dusk by enemy aircraft and at the same time was fired on by enemy mortars. The mortars were silenced by the column's guns. The column carried on after dark and encountered two enemy laagers, from one of which it captured a German officer.

This band of stalwarts, after searching in vain for 5 Indian Division, came into the New Zealand lines at 7 a.m. The Division was happy to advise 10 Indian Division: ‘Your Smith column reported here 0700 intact except for 2 anti-tank guns broken down— remaining under command.' The column was ready to join the New Zealanders. The infantry and carriers went to 19 Battalion and the guns to 4 Field Regiment.

Thus spurred to increased vigilance and activity in completing the defences, the Division awaited events. At 8.30 the enemy opened the Battle of Minqar Qaim with artillery fire from a column about five miles north of the escarpment. Although it was not positively identified, the column was almost certainly from 90 Light Division, then completing the overrunning of 151 Brigade's forward positions and moving eastwards preparatory to descending to the coast road. The 21st Panzer Division at that hour was still at Bir el Gibb, 15 miles to the west.

The enemy action against the Division provoked suitable counter-measures. The defences on the face of the escarpment were strengthened with a troop from 4 Field Regiment, and a column comprising 30 Battery of 6 Field Regiment and two sections of carriers from 18 Battalion under the battery commander, Major Lambourn,

Lt-Col A. E. Lambourn, DSO, ED; Petone; born Aust 7 May 1906; clerk; 2 i/c 6 Fd Regt Sep 1942–Jun 1943; CO 32 Fd Regt Jun 1943–Mar 1944; 7 A-Tk Regt Mar–May 1944.

was sent towards Bir el Haswa to engage the enemy guns at closer range.

Upon the appearance of a German tank column, the enemy battery yielded the target to it and moved off to the east. Under the fire of the tanks, Lambourn conducted a fighting withdrawal troop by troop back to the Division. The foray cost 30 Battery five men killed.

The tanks heralded the arrival of 21 Panzer Division. Increasing heat haze and dust raised by the artillery action and movement of transport over the desert deprived the Division of its grandstand view of the lower ground, but it was left in no doubt of the proximity of considerable enemy forces. About 10.30 a.m. a 28 Battalion carrier patrol sighted an enemy column of up to a thousand vehicles, carrying lorried infantry and led by tanks, moving on a front a mile wide. At a range of roughly three miles, the enemy opened fire on the Division with captured 25-pounders, their own 210, 105, and the notorious 88-millimetre guns.

In spite of the vigour of the artillery on both sides, casualties numerically were light. The 21st Panzer Division did not record or report the action, and its diary makes no reference to three tanks put out of action and three others damaged which 30 Battery claimed. Most of the enemy fire fell in 5 Brigade and Divisional Headquarters' areas. One shell which destroyed the signals' remote control wireless-telephone annexe also killed five and wounded seven of Divisional Headquarters' staff. Among the killed was Lieutenant- Colonel Ross,

Lt-Col A. B. Ross, MBE, ED, m.i.d.; born NZ 25 Apr 1899; civil servant; DAQMG NZ Div Jul 1941–Jun 1942; AA and QMG 1–27 Jun 1942; killed in action 27 Jun 1942.

the AA and QMG, a highly-skilled staff officer whom the Division could ill afford to lose.

Another serious effect of the enemy's fire was felt by 5 Brigade. The brigade's B echelon transport, with two platoons of 6 Reserve MT Company and headquarters of 7 Field Company, was dispersed forward of the escarpment under orders to move if shelled. The enemy action impelled departure at high speed east across the Division's front and up the escarpment near Bir Abu Batta to a supposedly safer spot. In their haste, the officers failed to note that they were taking with them an essential part of 5 Brigade's fighting equipment, the battery-charging plant of the brigade's signals.

The action at this period is perhaps given better perspective by the phlegmatic manner in which it was treated by the engineers of the field companies and field park. They carried on to complete their minelaying across the Division's northern front and eastern flank. The steadfastness of the Field Park Company was especially meritorious, as minelaying was an unusual task for the unit and dangerous for men not fully trained in the work. Inspiring examples were set by Major Anderson,

Lt-Col J. N. Anderson, DSO, m.i.d.; Te Awamutu; born Okaihau, 15 Apr 1894; civil engineer; OC 19 Army Tps Coy May–Jun 1941; 5 Fd Pk Coy Sep 1941–Oct 1942; 6 Fd Coy Oct 1942–Jul 1943; CRE 2 NZ Div Sep 1942, Apr–Jul 1944, Aug–Nov 1944; Engr Trg Depot, Maadi, Jan–Aug 1945.

the company commander, and Sergeant Duckworth.

S-Sgt A. J. Duckworth, MM; Cambridge; born Rotorua, 9 Apr 1916; cheesemaker.

Neither they nor their men were deterred even when a shell exploded a truck of mines, damaging other trucks and causing casualties.

A section of 7 Field Company on 5 Brigade's front was equally calm under a severe trial. It was fired on by the tanks which had forced the 30th Battery column to withdraw. Although five sappers were killed and four wounded in a few minutes, Lieutenant Foster

Lt F. E. Foster, MC; Auckland; born NZ 24 Sep 1903; engineer; three times wounded.

encouraged the others to continue the work. When at length the section was ordered to withdraw, Foster sent the survivors to safety but stayed behind himself to bring in a truck of wounded and equipment.

Although enemy lorried infantry had been seen lining up as if for attack, the artillery fire slackened towards midday and the main enemy forces passed to the north-east of the Division. This was in accordance with the order received by General von Bismarck to reach Bir Shineina. Some artillery, tanks and infantry were left on and west of the Khalda track fronting the New Zealand Division and flanking 21 Panzer Division's axis of advance. From Bir Shineina the division commanded the descents from the escarpment east of Minqar Qaim. Von Bismarck appears to have thought this was enough, for he contented himself with a report for transmission to Rommel that the ‘descent between the road and Bir Shineina has been cut’ and that an ‘enemy group of considerable strength is on the escarpment track.’ This lack of enterprise may be contrasted with the attitude of 90 Light Division, whose commander and chief staff officer had decided before the advance that, if stubborn resistance were encountered, they would push on without awaiting army orders. No attempt seems to have been made by von Bismarck even to learn which British formation had been found from Eighth Army's resources to sit in obvious strength at Minqar Qaim.

CHAPTER 11 New Zealand Division Isolated

UP to this stage, midday, nothing had occurred within the knowledge of New Zealand Division, 13 Corps, or Eighth Army Headquarters to justify apprehension concerning the position of the Division. General Freyberg, in his wide experience of artillery action, dismissed the bombardment with the comment: ‘Proceedings opened with a searching strafe of the area early with the usual lack of success for amount of shooting.

GOC's diary, 27 June.

Fifth Brigade, which had sent its vehicles away, got no shelling of consequence.

No fearful significance had been given to the subject matter of a divisional conference which broke up two minutes before the disastrous shell fell on headquarters. The brigade and other formation commanders were given 13 Corps' instructions for the battle, and a provisional plan was made for withdrawal eastwards should this become necessary.

Details of this plan, later confirmed in a written order, are given in more appropriate perspective on pp. 103–5. Here it may be said they afford ample confirmation of the fact that the Division received 13 Corps Operation Order No. 133, signed at 1.20 a.m. on 27 June, and discussed on pp. 74–5.

The withdrawal plan was thought to be merely a precautionary measure, something to be considered while there was time for unhurried reflection on all possibilities. The emphasis was on fighting the enemy and inflicting the maximum damage on him.

Within a few minutes of the conference General Gott and Brigadier Erskine visited the Division. No record was made of the conversation with General Freyberg and post-war recollections it are at best hazy. It seems unlikely that Gott did not discuss the corps plan, but if he suggested the probability of an early withdrawal, the fact left no impression on Freyberg. The latter's recollection of the talk was that it was concerned mainly with combined action by New Zealand Division and 1 Armoured Division with which, he informed Gott, he had been unable to get into touch. Brigadier Erskine's recollection that a plan was made for 1 Armoured to close on and support New Zealand Division gives some confirmation. Colonel Gentry, upon whom rested responsibility for taking executive action, was certain after the war that he was given no further orders concerning a change in plans or the possibility of early withdrawal.

These differences, which are material to subsequent developments, were of course not apparent at the time. The visit was cordial and ended in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. The only trying point was the fact that enemy shelling made it advisable to talk in a slit trench.

Gott, however, on his return to 13 Corps Headquarters, telephoned Brigadier Whiteley at Eighth Army about 12.30 ‘that the situation of New Zealand Division was not satisfactory as it was being heavily shelled by the Germans and was suffering considerably. He had refused Freyberg's request for some infantry tanks as he wished to concentrate his armour. He had, however, told Freyberg to side-step if necessary and not to regard the ground which he was at present holding as vital. Freyberg intended to attack the enemy tonight should this prove possible.

Eighth Army war diary, 26 June.

On receiving this news, Whiteley said he would arrange with 10 Corps to attack south to relieve the pressure on the New Zealand Division.

Ibid.

Even if Gott had had an inkling of all that was impending, there was no cause for worry. But on the information then available to him and to Eighth Army, and, indeed, on that possessed by the divisions in contact with the enemy, the battle was developing on lines for which provision had been made in the Army and 10 Corps' appreciation of 24 June. Panzerarmee had struck in the centre between 10 and 13 Corps, with a holding attack against Matruh fortress and its armour protecting the southern flank. The known situation was sufficiently near to the expected to warrant the belief that the time was approaching, if it had not already arrived, for 13 Corps to counter-attack northwards against either the enemy's fighting formations or his soft-skinned transport, perhaps both.

The decision to call on 10 Corps to help the New Zealand Division was the product of an unrealistic appreciation by Gott and Whiteley. Freyberg certainly expected the co-operation of 1 Armoured Division in beating off an enemy attack and he had asked if heavy infantry tanks we available. But he had not sought any other assistance, least of all relief from 10 Corps. On the contrary, he believed it to be part of the New Zealand Division's task to attack under 13 Corps' direction to help the garrison of Matruh. He did not consider that the attacks so far made on the Division had prejudiced this plan.

General Holmes was not consulted. He was given an order to attack south between defined boundaries which left him no alter- native but to use 50 Division, whose 151 Brigade was still engaged with 90 Light. The 69th Brigade, although free at the moment, was handily placed to deal with the enemy should he debouch on to the coast road. No attention appears to have been given to the extension of 90 Light Division's operations east and then north-east to the coast. Even although the Army and the two corps headquarters might have been unaware of the threat from 90 Light Division, Holmes had more than enough to do with his meagre resources without being asked to help a corps which was free to move anywhere in the desert against or out of reach of the enemy.

There was yet another weakness in the new plan. Gott had told Freyberg ‘to sidestep if necessary and not to regard the ground which he was at present holding as vital.’ This suggests the possibility that 10 Corps might find itself deeply involved in operations for the relief of a division which, in the meantime, had moved away. Finally, it does not seem to have occurred to the higher commanders that a division pinned to its ground, and suffering so considerably that it needed relief, could exercise little influence on the battle. There was no suggestion that by standing at Minqar Qaim New Zealand Division was easing the pressure elsewhere, or that it was depriving the enemy of freedom of manoeuvre and so paving the way to his destruction by other forces.

In sum, on a faulty appreciation of the situation, resort was had to counter-attack as a matter of habit rather than of judgment. There is no consolation in the fact that the Germans were prone to this habit.

Although the enemy was still labouring in the dark concerning some important matters, a succession of orders given about the same time by Rommel in person and by the headquarters of Panzerarmee and Afrika Korps revealed a clearer conception of the battle than that held by Eighth Army.

From 21 Panzer Division Rommel went forward to 90 Light Division and, after repeating congratulations he had telegraphed to the division on its fast advance, discussed its next operations. He agreed that the division ‘should swing further to the east on its drive to the coast so as to avoid artillery fire and losses, asking only that the division should reach the coastal road by night and cut it.

90 Light Division diary.

Rommel also ordered Littorio Armoured Division, still in army reserve and then moving eastwards, to hold the positions won by 90 Light Division astride the Garawla-Khalda track. In this area, Littorio would be a barrier against an attempt by 10 Corps to break out from Matruh between the escarpments, an additional guard against a counter-attack from the south, and would also be well placed to continue the advance to Alamein. Incidentally, although Rommel was unaware of the projected movement, the division would be fairly astride the route of 10 Corps' relief operation.

Other orders by Panzerarmee and Afrika Korps were more portentous for New Zealand Division. At eight minutes past one 21 Panzer Division received an urgent instruction by wireless from Afrika Korps to operate against the enemy on the escarpment. Within half an hour, at 1.37, the division was ordered to cut the road [the Khalda track] immediately and to move parts of the division on to the escarpment at Bir Slayim, roughly four miles east of Bir Abu Batta. The division's artillery was instructed to operate on both sides of the road and, in conjunction with 15 Panzer Division, carry out a flanking move. Afrika Korps also advised that it had asked for a Stuka attack.

Half an hour later, at ten minutes past two, Panzerarmee sent XX Italian Corps an urgent order that it had been placed under the command of Afrika Korps ‘to clear the area ahead of 15 Panzer Division and surround the enemy groups.’ Again, at 2.20 p.m., XX Corps was ordered by Panzerarmee to ‘attack the enemy to the south-east immediately in co-operation with Afrika Korps.’

Such was the enemy action provoked by the New Zealand Division's presence at Minqar Qaim. Instead of waiting at Bir Shineina ready to continue the advance to Fuka and Alamein, 21 Panzer Division was diverted to an enclosing attack from the north, east and south. A squeeze on the defenders from the west was to be applied by 15 Panzer Division, then being engaged some eight to ten miles to the west of Minqar Qaim by 1 Armoured Division. To facilitate the progress of 15 Panzer, XX Italian Corps was placed at the disposal of Afrika Korps and given a task against 1 Armoured Division. The Italian corps had moved at dawn from its overnight positions west of the Siwa road to an area approximately the same distance east of the road, under orders to ‘organise in depth ready for battle with divisions one behind the other.’

Thus, because 13 Corps thought only in terms of relief and further retreat, the initiative was left to the enemy. Rommel and Nehring used their freedom to organise an attack by four armoured divisions on 1 Armoured Division and the New Zealand Division.

Although unaware of the attention it had attracted in the higher levels of Panzerarmee, New Zealand Division soon knew that more vigorous enemy action was under way. The volume of the enemy artillery fire increased, the New Zealand batteries being the target. Then, as further enemy forces assembled to the north of Minqar Qaim, the infantry defences, including the headquarters of 4 and 5 Brigades, were subjected to shell and mortar fire. Next, tanks approached from the north on a line directed at the centre of the Division. These and lorried troops debussing and deploying to the east of the tanks were engaged by 4 Field Regiment.

By two o'clock there was every indication of a full-scale attack developing. At five minutes past two the Division reported to 13 Corps that enemy infantry were debussing all along the front. The message was followed a quarter of an hour later by a situation report stating that ‘eight possible tanks’ moving south from a point a mile and a half north-east of Bir Shineina had been joined by other vehicles from the west, but had been driven off by artillery fire.

The report was unduly optimistic concerning the results of the shoot. The target comprised tanks and lorried infantry then making the turning movement southwards to gain the escarpment as ordered by Afrika Korps. Little more than an hour later, at 3.40 p.m., the enemy column, now seen to comprise 20 tanks and about 200 other vehicles, turned westward on and below the escarpment towards the Division. A section of 19 Battalion carriers was sent to investigate. Divisional Headquarters advised caution in opening fire until the column was identified, as supply convoys for the Division were expected from that direction.

Almost concurrently with the receipt of this advice, 20 Battalion signalled 4 Brigade Headquarters that swastika flags could be seen on the vehicles. At the same time heavy firing broke out in 19 Battalion's area. The three batteries of 4 Field Regiment had opened fire on the tanks. Their fire was later supplemented by that of four two-pounder anti-tank guns which 19 Battalion was ordered to send to strengthen the eastern flank.

On the Division's north-eastern flank, 20 Battalion revealed the high standard of its morale and training. It calmly awaited the descent of the enemy infantry in their trucks until the leading vehicles were within a range of about 400 yards. Then the infantry and anti-tank gunners opened fire, which put a number of the enemy vehicles out of action and halted the advance. To the credit of the Panzer Grenadiers, the fire was returned in considerable volume from the cover of low scrub into which they dropped when their trucks were halted.

This action proved the value and enterprise of the newly formed infantry anti-tank platoons. Lieutenant Moodie

Maj J. F. Moodie, MC; Nelson; born Dunedin, 3 Jan 1917; student; twice wounded

had command of crew that had had little experience with the gun but which, under his direction, destroyed two trucks before the gun was damaged by enemy fire and he was wounded. Leaving the gun on its portée, Moodie directed the crew to the safety of slit trenches and then returned under fire to retrieve the gun, which he drove up the escarpment, had repaired, and then taken back to the forward positions for further action. Sergeant McConchie,

2 Lt P. A. McConchie, DCM; Atawhai, Nelson; born Taihape, 21 Aug 1916; builder; p.w. 1 Dec 1941; escaped Jan 1942; wounded 27 Jun 1942.

directing another of 20 Battalion's guns, was responsible for destroying or immobilising a captured two-pounder on portée, a light tank, a troop-carrier and two trucks. When fire from the infantry in the scrub wounded some of his crew and damaged the firing mechanism of his gun, McConchie coolly walked out to the captured portée and salvaged the firing mechanism, which he fitted to his own gun. Thereupon Moodie and his sergeant drove out to the captured portée and brought it into the battalion's lines. Only then did Moodie report to the regimental aid post to have his wound treated.

While 20 Battalion was bearing the brunt of the attack, another enemy column advanced down the Khalda track against 28 (Maori) Battalion. The column had been seen forming up much earlier and had been engaged by the New Zealand artillery. The haze created difficulty in assessing its strength until it neared the Division. Even then it was impossible to determine whether nine or ten suspected light tanks covering the infantry advance were in fact tanks, armoured cars, or half-track troop-carriers. As 4 Field Regiment was fully engaged with the enemy attack from the east, 6 Field Regiment in the Divisional Reserve Group was called on to assist in arresting the advance of the new arrivals.

This spirited response by 4 Brigade and the supporting artillery was noted by the enemy. At twenty minutes past four the Panzer Grenadiers reported that ‘the attack does not go well owing to strong enemy artillery fire.’ Another message a few minutes later said: ‘The enemy pulls out in front of 1/R. Regiment 104 [1 Battalion, 104 Panzer Grenadiers] but the artillery fire remains as strong as ever.’ The battalion was deployed on a front opposite 20 Battalion and the right flank of the Maoris, about a mile and three-quarters from the face of the escarpment. The reference to a withdrawal on the battalion's front was probably to the movement of some of the Essex men who were being severely shelled and who were given a wrong order to move back. When the order was corrected, they reoccupied their posts and continued the fight. Hard on the heels of the report, the German battalion asked that it should be reinforced by the 3rd Battalion and that a flanking movement should be made from the east. Engineers were also asked for to clear gaps in the minefield which the Grenadiers reported they had located all along the front.

Summarising the situation about this time, 21 Panzer reported that it had encircled a large concentration of transport on the escarpment. After noting the position of the Grenadiers, the report added that ‘units of the enemy resist most stubbornly; our tank attack gains ground slowly.’ The division was encouraged by Afrika Korps' recognition that the measures it had taken were correct and was advised that 15 Panzer Division would attack at six o'clock. Korps Headquarters wished to know whether 21 Panzer would be able to give direct support to this attack at the time stipulated. At 4.30 the division also recorded receipt of a message from Rommel that ‘the enemy seems to try to withdraw in the Khalda area; the division will prevent his doing so.’

The claim that the division had encircled the motor transport on the escarpment was hardly correct. On reaching the escarpment, General Bismarck directed one tank column almost due west against the New Zealanders' eastern flank and sent another one on a southwesterly course to attack from the south. Fifth Brigade's B echelon transport was between these columns and some of 4 Brigade's vehicles were a short distance to the south, outside the enemy movement, at Qabr Abu Raiyat, where the Division's replenishment point was to have been located. Both groups of transport were fired on by the German tanks, but quickly broke clear. The 300 to 400 vehicles in the 5 Brigade group made off at high speed and in confusion to the south until they were brought under control again some nine miles from the scene of action. The 4th Brigade transport, which had not been in such a hazardous position, made a more orderly withdrawal to the east towards Rear Division Headquarters. Among the prizes thus snatched from the enemy were three six-pounder guns on their portées which Lance-Sergeant Mantle

Sgt P.I. Mantle, MM; Hamilton; born London, 18 Jun 1914; driver.

of 5 Field Regiment saw were being abandoned. With Gunners Mullooly

Sgt K. M. Mullooly; Hamilton; born NZ 12 Sep 1919; driver.

and Watkins,

Gnr A. W. Watkins; Pairere, Tirau; born Cambridge, 13 Jun 1917; farmhand; wounded 1 Dec 1941.

with whom he was escaping from the tanks, Mantle took over the guns and drove them to safety.

From this encounter with the transport, the southern column of tanks and lorried infantry continued westward until it crossed the Khalda track about two miles south of the Division. Here the column turned north against the Divisional Reserve Group's positions, defended in the area by C Company of 18 Battalion. Fire from the tanks identified them as hostile and anti-tank guns were turned upon them. The crossfire placed in jeopardy yet another group of transport, that of Divisional Reserve and Divisional Headquarters. The vehicles were parked outside C Company's area and, on the alarm that tanks were upon them, the drivers lost no time in moving to the west out of the danger zone. Some of this transport returned to the Division later, but many of the vehicles, which included Bren carriers, were taken in a circle to the south and east until they were clear of the battlefield.

This thrust from the south was dangerous as penetration of the defences would have carried the enemy tanks and infantry on to Divisional Headquarters and bisected the Division. The enemy, however, was vigorously engaged by 30 Field Battery, which had made the sortie to Bir el Haswa in the morning, and by 33 Anti-Tank Battery, which now fledged itself with its six-pounders. Also in the area were six of the new guns for 32 Battery, which had been too busy to make the change from two-pounders. Five of these guns were removed to safety and the sixth was manned by a scratch crew from the battery headquarters, 6 Field Regiment, and No. 1 Machine Gun Company. This crew claimed one tank destroyed and direct hits on a number of other vehicles. The 30th Battery devoted most of its attention to the tanks, one troop alone claiming at least four victims.

Events now hurried upon each other to reveal that the Division was in a serious position, one which might become precarious.

While the attack from the south was developing but before the enemy's intentions had become clear, General Freyberg at last managed to make radio-telephone contact with 1 Armoured Division, whose two brigades were then six to seven miles west of Minqar Qaim. To his astonishment and alarm, he learned that the Armoured Division had no knowledge of the attack on the New Zealanders and that it was withdrawing independently without thought of supporting or co-ordinating its movements with the Division. He protested that the armour should come to the support of the Division.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. Peake, GSO 1 of 1 Armoured Division, replied that the division had orders to concentrate at Bir Khalda that night and that, in the circumstances then prevailing on the division's front, he could not see how a regiment or a brigade of tanks could be disengaged to help the New Zealanders. He was sure, also, that the divisional commander would not agree to send a ‘few tanks’ to the New Zealand Division.

General Freyberg was under the impression he was talking to Major-General Lumsden, commanding 1 Armoured Division. The latter, however, was not at his headquarters at the time. The conversation is recalled in notes supplied by Brigadier Peake to the British Historical Section.

Although Colonel Peake could not divert 1 Armoured to the New Zealanders' assistance or promise help of any nature, never- theless he acted promptly on Freyberg's representations. At 4.15 p.m.

The time is taken from 22 Armoured Brigade's diary and helps to fix the hour at which Freyberg established contact with 1 Armoured Division, of which there is no precise record.

he advised 22 Armoured Brigade that the New Zealand Division was being attacked and required immediate assistance. The brigade forthwith despatched 3 Sharpshooters followed by 4 Sharpshooters

Tank squadrons of the County of London Yeomanry.

to Minqar Qaim. Nearing Minqar Qaim, the leading squadron found New Zealanders between them and the enemy tanks. A patrol was sent forward to find a way to the target, but was unfortunately engaged by New Zealand field gunners who were unaware of the proximity of British tanks. One tank was knocked out in this untimely incident. ‘Owing to poorness of information and lack of suitable targets,’

22 Brigade diary.

the British tank attack was not pressed. The appearance of the British armour, however, added to the determined fire of the field and anti-tank gunners, caused the enemy tanks to withdraw. They were followed back by the German infantry, but not before C Company of 18 Battalion had made a sharp counter-attack in which eleven prisoners and two trucks, both ex-British, were captured.

Concurrently with the attack from the south, the light tanks which had been seen forming up on the track to the north of 28 Battalion opened heavy fire, under cover of which the infantry advanced. The Maoris' fire discipline was good. Itchy fingers were kept off the triggers of rifles, Brens and tommy guns during a trying period of waiting until the enemy was close enough to make the fire effective. Then, when bursts of controlled small-arms fire stopped the advance, B and C Companies made a sortie with the bayonet. Ten prisoners, including three non-commissioned officers, of 1 Battalion 104 Panzer Grenadiers were collected and many dead were seen. The Maoris lost only one man killed and two wounded.

This, so far as the Division was aware, was the last attempt of the day to penetrate the defences.

In the meantime, General Freyberg took fresh stock of the situation. He now had cause to be apprehensive. The Division was being attacked on three sides and enemy armour was astride the line of retreat to the east. The enemy was also astride the route which the ammunition columns should take to replenish the field regiments which, in the expectation of supplies, had used their guns freely. No further orders or information had been received from 13 Corps since Gott's visit in the morning. This was disturbing, although not alarming. The significance of the lack of interest by 13 Corps became apparent only when it was learned that 1 Armoured Division had not been advised of the attacks and that it was withdrawing independently.

These facts forced Freyberg to the conclusion that if the Division was to retain its power of manoeuvre, indeed if it was to avoid being overrun or cut off from the remainder of Eighth Army, it would have to break clear. Moreover, it would have to rely on its own resources for the operation. Accordingly, at 4.40 p.m. detailed orders were issued defining assembly areas, the rearguard, order of march, speed by night and day, and fixing Deir el Harra, 90 miles east, as the final divisional rendezvous.

Having given the basis of these orders, General Freyberg left his headquarters to make a personal appreciation of the enemy attack from the south, which he regarded as the most serious threat. At five o'clock, while he was watching the attack from a forward position, he was wounded in the neck by a shell splinter. As his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Griffiths,

Maj J. L. Griffiths, MC, m.i.d.; Feilding; born NZ 9 Apr 1912; bank officer; ADC to GOC 1941–45.

was attending to the wound and assisting the General back to his car, other shells landed close by, but fortunately in soft ground and without causing further casualties. At Divisional Headquarters General Freyberg was attended by Colonel Ardagh,

Brig P. A. Ardagh, CBE, DSO, MC, m.i.d.; born Ngapara, 30 Aug 1891; surgeon; 1 NZEF 1917–19, Capt 3 Fd Amb; wounded three times; in charge surgical division 2 Gen Hosp, Aug 1940–Oct 1941; CO 1 CCS Nov 1941–May 1942; ADMS 2 NZ Div May 1942–Feb 1943; DDMS 30 Corps Feb 1943–Apr 1944; died (England) 6 Apr 1944.

the Assistant Director of Medical Services, and made as comfortable as possible in a slit trench. Brigadier Inglis was called to command the Division, Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. Burrows, of 20 Battalion, taking over 4 Brigade.

At five minutes to five 13 Corps sent a curious message to 1 Armoured Division. It said: ‘As far as I can see New Zealand Division has fallen out of the bedstead. I advise you to Iodine as soon as possible at your discretion.’ Decoded, the message meant that so far as could be seen, New Zealand Division had either been pushed out of Minqar Qaim or had withdrawn, and that 1 Armoured Division should withdraw east of the Khalda track as soon as it could do so. The corps' log does not say who sent the message but Major-General Lumsden ascribed it to General Gott. Lumsden interpreted the message as, ‘the battle was all over and that the New Zealand Division did not exist.’

Court of Inquiry, Vol. II, pp. 328–9.

Another curious message follows this one in the corps' log: it is addressed to New Zealand Division and is not timed. It reads: ‘Bedstead [i.e., withdraw east of Khalda track] at your discretion. I require an acknowledgement from a senior officer.' There is no acknowledgment, but there is no doubt this message was received.

The possibility of a withdrawal was envisaged in 13 Corps Operation Order No. 133. Each division was given an axis of retreat, a rendezvous at Alamein, and was told it would have to furnish its own rearguard. On the other hand, the order stated specifically that the battle would be fought on the lines previously agreed upon. There was no mention that Auchinleck had taken command of Eighth Army and had changed the plans—only his exhortation to all ranks to make a supreme effort.

13 Corps Operation Order No. 133. See also p. 74.

Essential detail for the retreat was taken from this order for the Division's own precautionary instructions issued that morning.

NZ Division Operation Order No. 9. See also p. 103.

It is difficult to understand the pessimistic report to 1 Armoured Division or the reason for allowing that division to continue under the impression that the New Zealanders had been knocked out. At six minutes past five New Zealand Division asked: ‘Shall we join you at second destination [i.e., Deir el Harra]?’ The question carried in itself an implication that the Division was master of its fate and therefore available for an intermediate task in the retreat. Moreover, Gott was at Corps Headquarters at the time and was aware of the message and the reply. If any doubts remained they should have been dispelled by the Division's message to Corps at 6.30: ‘Have we got any further orders?’ The answer was: ‘No fresh orders.’

13 Corps' diary.

At 7.20 p.m. 13 Corps sent the following to all of its formations:

lounge, bedstead, iodine. A rearguard posn will be held for as long as possible on the line escarpment four miles west of Fuka…. Right 5 Ind Div left 1 Arm Div…. If 10 Corps arrive Fuka area they will be responsible from right…. This line will be known as HERRING.

Lounge, was an instruction to 5 Indian Division to withdraw east of the 710 grid which ran north and south through Minqar Sidi Hamza, an area then well behind the enemy's advanced formations and over 20 miles west of the positions 5 Indian Division had occupied since dawn. BEDSTEAD was an instruction to New Zealand Division to withdraw. The Division was already supposed to have fallen out of the ‘bedstead’, had been given permission to Bedstead at its discretion and, when the instruction was sent, was making ready to move. When 1 Armoured Division received its order to IODINE over the Khalda track, it was already on the track on its way to Bir Khalda to refuel.

At the same time as these orders were given, Gott reported to Eighth Army that he had given permission to the New Zealand and 1 Armoured Divisions to withdraw, that he was attempting to carry out PIKE,

The code name of a possible development of the battle. Looking ahead during the morning of 27 June, Auchinleck sent a personal, most secret message to his corps commanders saying that, should it become necessary, both corps were to disengage and resume the fight on the general line of the escarpment four miles west of Fuka. They were to ensure that during the disengagement and withdrawal their corps acted in concert.

and that he hoped things would work out as in his operation order of the early morning.

To this it may be added that Lumsden called on New Zealand Division at 9.15 p.m. His purpose, according to his recollections later, was ‘to ask which way the New Zealanders proposed going out if they had the order’ and if there was anything he could do to help. In the recollection of a staff officer who accompanied him, however, ‘it was just to be a sort of friendly visit with nothing particular to discuss except to see where the New Zealanders were and what sort of day they had had.’ Brigadier Inglis told Lumsden of the Division's intention to break out that night and suggested that the armoured division might co-operate in the operation. As 1 Armoured Division's brigades were then separated and the division had to go to Bir Khalda to refuel, Lumsden could not agree to the suggestion. However, he agreed to see out the B echelon and troop-carrying transport of 5 Brigade, the Divisional Cavalry and 21 Battalion, which were then south of the Division in the area in which he had to refuel and separated from the Division by enemy armour.

There was also some confusion on the enemy's side. The warm reception given tank and infantry attacks by the artillery and the firm front presented by the infantry surprised 21 Panzer Division. On the frontier and in the advance to Matruh, the British rearguards had given way before firm pressure. The Germans appeared to have forgotten the many examples of determined defence up to the fall of Tobruk. Notwithstanding the size of the concentration at Minqar Qaim, they appeared to think that, on deployment and assault, the defence would yield as other rearguards had done.

Experienced New Zealand officers, although aware that the Division was being placed in a hazardous position, were not awed by the enemy attacks. They saw that the attacks were not pressed with determination. They appeared to be more in the nature of probes for weak spots on the Division's eastern flank, both tanks and the infantry assailants withdrawing when heavy fire was maintained against them.

The Germans had different ideas. Their divisional log records that at five minutes past six ‘the attack of the rifle regiment is stopped’, but the entry does not say whether this was due to the vigour of the defence or a voluntary action upon higher orders. However, ten minutes later, the Panzer Grenadiers advised that they regarded their position as critical. They said their right wing needed support and their left wing required flank protection. Just on seven o'clock they pleaded for immediate artillery and tank support. If nothing more, these reports are at least testimony to the aggressive defence that was offered.

Also at this time, seven o'clock, Bismarck was encouraged by a message from Afrika Korps that it ‘regards the chances of the attack by the division as extremely promising.’ He replied that he intended to launch an attack from the east that evening ‘and to destroy the enemy.’ He gave the location of his battle headquarters as 10 kilometres south-south-west of Bir Shineina', a position about a mile and a half from 19 Battalion. Further encouragement was given about an hour later by a ‘most immediate’ message from 15 Panzer Division that, since a quarter past six, it had been attacking and would continue until it linked up with 21 Division. The message was accompanied by a request for details of 21 Division's foremost lines.

Shortly afterwards, however, Bismarck received information which seems to have induced him to change his mind about the projected assault ‘to destroy the enemy’ that evening. At 8.15 he advised Afrika Korps that interrogation of prisoners had confirmed the presence of the New Zealand Division. The next entries in the divisional log record a series of orders and movements designed to place the division in defensive positions ‘with the intention of preventing the enemy from breaking out.’ Korps Headquarters was advised that the attack had been discontinued. It, in turn, approved the division's intention ‘to destroy the enemy next day.’ The destruction of the New Zealanders, however, was to be effected under Korps' direction, the main attack being launched by 15 Panzer Division and the Italian XX Corps from the west, with 21 Division standing by to take up the pursuit.

In favour of Bismarck it should be said that his divisional log records at nine o'clock that the division was short of ammunition and fuel. But convoys were on the way and arrived half an hour later.

Wire for defensive positions in Syria Black and white photo of soldiers

Machine-gunners digging in, Syria Black and white photo of soldiers digging

Sappers digging a gunpit, Syria Black and white photo of soldiers digging

Convoy at the ruins of Palmyra Black and white photo of trucks in front of ruins

Leaving Syria on the Damascus road Black and white photo of vehicles

Dumps on fire at Mersa Matruh after a raid Black and white photo of fire

Uploading on the escarpment at Minqar Qaim. Dispersion is bad on the first return to the desert Black and white photo of soldiers and vehicles

Digging in on the rocky escarpment Black and white photo of soldiers moving rock

Looking east from 5 Brigade HQ during the artillery duel Black and white photos of soldiers with guns

This photograph makes a panorama when joined with the one on the opposite page Black and white photo of shelling

Shells bursting on New Zealand gun positions Black and white photo of explosion

Observing shellfire Black and white photo of man on truck

A 25-pounder in action at Minqar Qaim Black and white photo of soldiers loading gun

Lieutenant-General Freyberg in a slit trench after he had been wounded Black and white photo of wounded soldier

The break out - from the painting by Peter McIntrye Black and white painting of vehicles

Wrecked vehicles at the foot of Minqar Qaim - from the painting by J. Crippen Black and white painting of damaged vehicles

Headquarters of 5 Infantry Brigade halted after the break-out at Minqar Qaim. The 3-ton truck held German prisoners Black and white photo of vehicles

After an early morning conference at Munassib, July 1942 - Majors M.C. Fairbrother and R.B. Dawson, Brigadiers H.K. Kippenberger and C.E. Weir Black and white photo of soldiers

The northern edge of the Qattara Depression Black and white photo of desert

19 Battalion advancing against Ariete Division on 3 July 1942 Black and white photo of soldiers

Enemy shells falling across 4 Field Regiment observation posts on Alam Nayil ridge Black and white photo of explosion

Some of the guns of Ariete Division captured by the CRA's column and 19 Battalion Black and white photo of weapons

German 88-millimetre guns captured on Alam Nayil. New Zealand engineers have blown the barrels Black and white photo of weapons

Ruweisat Ridge, photographed in September 1944 Black and white photo of desert

18 Battalion transport bombed south of Ruweisat Ridge Black and white photo of explosion and soldiers

25-pounders of 6 Field Regiment firing on Ruweisat Ridge - from the painting by C. Hansen Black and white painting of soldiers firing weapons

21 Battalion Signal Office on 16 July Black and white photo of tent

El Mreir Depression - from the painting by J. Crippen Black and white painting of scenery

CHAPTER 12 Twenty-four Tense Hours

A TIDY, orderly withdrawal in desert formation was envisaged in the tentative precautionary order issued by Headquarters New Zealand Division in the morning as the battle opened, and in the instructions of late in the afternoon before General Freyberg was wounded. Fifth Brigade was to be in the van, followed by Divisional Headquarters and the Reserve Group. Fourth Brigade and the Divisional Cavalry carrier squadron were to be the rearguard. Guides were to be sent to the Alamein Line for information on the minefields and brigade sectors and were to meet the Division at the rendezvous at Deir el Harra.

Some important differences in emphasis marked the two orders. The first stressed delaying the enemy as long as possible at Minqar Qaim and inflicting the maximum damage on him. Withdrawal would be made only if it were forced. While the Division's ultimate destination was a prepared position in the Alamein Line, there was no suggestion it would go straight there or that it would not have further action in the retreat. The second order was precise that the move to Deir el Harra was to be made in one bound unless opposition was encountered. Against this possibility, the groups were ordered to take full tactical precautions while on the move.

The situation at dusk compelled a review of the plans which Brigadier Inglis discussed with the formation commanders and senior staff officers at a conference. As the road to the east on the projected line of withdrawal was barred by the enemy, the question was raised whether the Division should fight its way out on this line over Bir Abu Batta or bypass the enemy by moving south and then east. A disadvantage of the latter course was that it would take the Division in the dark with unreliable maps on a tortuous route over unknown country. The east route was over known ‘good-going’ to well-defined tracks. On these and logistical grounds Inglis decided that, although a fight to break out would be necessary, the eastern route was preferable.

A more important factor, and the decisive one, was the relation of the problem to the general Army plan. Brigadier Inglis considered that while a wide detour around the southern flank would ensure the safety of the Division, it would take the Division too far from the fighting area. Thus it would be side-stepping its task of halting the enemy's advance. Moreover, like General Freyberg, he believed it was high time the Germans received some discouraging punishment. They were at their thickest immediately east of 4 Brigade. A blow there would do them most harm and could be inflicted without jeopardising the Division's move.

Having decided on the route, the next most important question was the nature of the attack to break out. There was not much choice. The artillery was down to thirty-five rounds a gun, including smoke and armour-piercing shell, and there was no possibility of additional supplies being received that night. Because of the shortage of ammunition, the enemy concentration at Bir Abu Batta, an attractive target, had not been engaged. The high-explosive shell left was not sufficient to support an attack, and if it were used it would do little more than advertise the Division's intentions. Moreover, it was desirable to husband the artillery resources against the dangers of the march to Alamein and until contact was re-established with the supply services. Mortar ammunition was also short.

The alternative, a silent approach and then assault with bayonet, bullet and grenade, was accepted. Inglis gave the task to 4 Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Burrows. The brigade was experienced in the art of silent night attack which the Germans hated. Inglis had no doubt that the enemy could be taken by surprise or about the final issue. To attack and break through, doing all the damage possible on the way, was to his mind clearly the proper course.

Burrows was ordered to attack with the whole brigade on a narrow front and punch a hole through the enemy positions on a neck of ground between Bir Abu Batta and Mahatt Abu Batta. When the hole had been made the remainder of the Division would follow him. Zero hour was fixed at half past eleven, but at Burrows' request a little later it was altered to half past midnight. He had little time to spare for making his detailed plans, issuing orders, and concentrating the brigade and its associated units.

Even with the breakout attack, the Division might have withdrawn tidily by groups but for another complicating factor. Fifth Brigade's troop-carrying transport was ‘out in the blue’ and contact could not be established with it. Nor could contact be made with 21 Battalion at Bir Khalda. To preserve the thread of the main narrative, these matters will be dealt with in detail later. The problem was how to overcome the difficulty the brigade commander had reported. General Lumsden's agreement to pass on word that the Division was withdrawing and to see out 21 Battalion and the transport solved one part of the problem. The other part was met by ordering 5 Brigade Group to put as many men as possible on its first-line transport and anything else that would carry them, including the guns, and to bring the remainder on foot to the assembly area where they would be distributed among the Divisional Reserve Group vehicles. An inevitable consequence was that while transport would be provided for all men, 5 Brigade Group would not be mobile as a group and, therefore, it could not operate tactically.

Fifth Brigade was again unfortunate when moving to the Reserve Group's area where the distribution among other transport was to be made. In order to avoid broken ground south of Minqar Qaim feature and to give the transport from the most western positions a clear run, it was necessary to clear a passage through the mines laid north of the defences. As only a few engineers were available, the mine-lifting had to be done by the infantrymen, many of whom had never lifted mines before, much less searched for them in darkness. They were not wholly successful and several vehicles were damaged when crossing an uncleared area. The explosions caused a number of casualties, C Company of 22 Battalion alone losing about twenty-five men when a carrier belonging to 5 Field Regiment was blown up.

Lieutenant-Colonel Burrows' plans and orders for the attack were relatively simple in view of the heavy responsibility placed upon him and 4 Brigade Group. His task was considerably lightened, however, by the brigade's experience in night attacks, the confidence and, strange as it may seem, enthusiasm for the operation. There were no obvious loose ends in plans or orders but, on the other hand, none of his commanders or staff had need to press for that attention to detail which wastes time when every fleeting minute has value.

The neck, or col, between Bir Abu Batta and Mahatt Abu Batta was about a quarter of a mile wide, a front suitable for a battalion but no more. The enemy, however, were also known to be in the Bir Abu Batta re-entrant on the face of the escarpment and might be expected on Mahatt Abu Batta. These were the decisive factors in choosing the dispositions for the attack, a broad arrow formation with 19 Battalion in the centre as the point, and 20 and 28 Battalions echeloned slightly to the left and right respectively to support the advance by flanking movements.

The brigade's first-line transport was ordered to assemble in tight night formation behind the infantry, with the B echelon and attached units farther in rear. The field and anti-tank batteries of the group were placed on the flanks and across the rear of the transport column. So placed, they could give quick protection to the transport. Time would not be lost in deploying, and in the moonlight the guns could be fired over open sights at the close targets which, in the circumstances, would be available. The batteries would also be handy to take up their positions for the march across the desert after the attack. The potential fire screen was further strengthened by mounting the Vickers guns of No. 2 Machine Gun Company in trucks and dispersing them around the transport column. Brigade Headquarters was to move in the centre behind 19 Battalion, and a field ambulance car was detailed to follow each battalion. The start line for the infantry, to be laid out and marked with screened lights by the brigade intelligence officer, was set across the forward defended localities of 19 Battalion.

Withdrawal of 2 NZ Division from Minqar Qaim on night 27-28 June 1942 Black and white map of army movement

Being closest to the forming-up area, 19 Battalion was first in position. It was deployed with A and D Companies in the front line. B Company was to the right rear of A Company, and Major Smith with his men of the Essex Regiment behind D Company. The battalion covered a front of between 300 and 400 yards, with a depth of 200 yards.

A period of anxiety then developed. The 20th Battalion was only beginning to show up and there was no sign of the Maoris. Zero hour approached and passed with 20 Battalion still moving into its assembly area. It was not ready until 12.45, a quarter of an hour after zero. The battalion was deployed in column on a front of 200 yards with A Company in the lead, followed by C Company and part of Headquarters Company, with D Company in the rear. Each rifle company put two of its platoons on the left so that the greatest part of the battalion's fire power was concentrated on the brigade's northern flank.

Burrows had now to meet one of the sternest tests that can face a commander in battle. Should he wait for his remaining battalion or attack with what he had in hand? Further delay involved the risk that the Division would not be clear of the gap before daylight and might be caught by enemy tanks in the open and without adequate ammunition. On the other hand, an attack by two battalions might not be successful, in which case the whole Division would be trapped. There was the further danger that if the Maoris were left they might be lost.

Once before, at Maleme in Crete, Burrows had had to meet a like situation. His problem there was whether he should evacuate a vital area to reach another point at a decisive hour or await the relief whose arrival had been delayed? Then higher authority had told him to stay and try to make up the lost time with speed in movement after the relief. On the present occasion, part of the lost time might be retrieved through the impetus of an attack by three battalions. There would be less chance of making up lost time if the plans were revised and new dispositions made for an attack by only two battalions.

Burrows decided to wait and, because there was little else to engage his mind, suffer the additional anxiety of wondering whether the decision was the right one.

Commenting later, General Inglis said: ‘Burrows was absolutely right in waiting for 28 Battalion.’

The Maoris were not to blame for being late. The brief interval between the receipt of the brigade order and zero hour was a factor. Patrols on their front had to be recalled and also parties which were destroying abandoned enemy vehicles. The battalion had a long way to come. It is possible, too, there was something in a rumour that more than a few men were making an ‘investigation’ of what the enemy had left behind. Eventually, however, the battalion reached its assembly area but not until a quarter to two, an hour and a quarter after zero hour.

By this time Brigadier Inglis had become very concerned at the delay in launching the attack. He, also, was worried lest the Division would not be clear of the area before daylight. As time passed without any sign of action, he went forward to investigate, but as he reached 4 Brigade the advance started. He thereupon returned and brought forward the remainder of the Division until the head of the column was level with and to the south of 4 Brigade transport.

In 4 Brigade company and platoon commanders spent the waiting time in giving final instructions and checking details. But many of the men were so nonchalant that they dozed in their positions. A non-commissioned officer of 4 Field Regiment recalled later that Minqar Qaim was one of the two places in the war where he felt perfectly happy. The other place, strangely, was Sidi Rezegh. His duty done for the time being, this young NCO climbed into his truck and promptly went into a deep sleep, from which he did not waken until the transport was passing through enemy fire. Then he woke with a start, to the relief of the driver who thought his passenger surely must have been killed.

As soon as the Maoris reached their start line, 4 Brigade advanced. Probably definite orders to move were received by the companies poised on their lines. No one remembers them. The start seemed to be automatic, as if a familiar spirit had whispered that there was a rendezvous to keep and it was time to be on the way. With bayoneted rifles at the high port and Bren and tommy guns ready for action, the brigade stepped forward. An occasional rattle of equipment, an occasional slither over an outcrop of rock, sounded above the muffled tread of heavy boots in the sand and dust. Each man was aware of the presence of his neighbour and of the march of a host.

A hundred yards passed, then two hundred; now five hundred and then a thousand yards were gone. The slit trenches and the defence positions which had spelt security during the day seemed distant in the rear. The brigade was in the open, naked and exposed. The ‘point of no return’ was passed. Whatever happened, the brigade must go forward. There was now no alternative.

Then the enemy sprang to life. A few odd shots swelled rapidly into a cacophony of fire from rifles, automatics of all types, and anti-tank guns. Lines of tracer bullets crossed and recrossed with the appearance of a perfect fire pattern. Apparently the Germans had been waiting. It seemed impossible for any troops to get among the enemy without suffering heavy casualties. What would happen? In the face of such a blaze of fire would the brigade check? Would it falter? There was only one chance. Close with the enemy as fast as possible.

Fourth Brigade did not falter. To quote from Lieutenant-Colonel Burrows' report, ‘a most amazing and thrilling thing happened. To a man the whole brigade charged forward. No orders were given; no urging forward by officers and non-commissioned officers. With shouting, cheering and war cries every man broke into a run as if he knew exactly what was expected of him.'

The shouting and cheering were more of a frenzied yell. The pent-up emotions of the last minutes on the assembly line and of the steady march were freed. The yell was heard above the din of the fire. It carried 4 Brigade as on a wave into the defences. With a few yards to go, some men checked as if to return the enemy's fire and beat it down. What was their purpose, no one knows precisely, for check and sweeping on to close with bayonet, bomb and bullet were almost simultaneous.

On the right flank, the Maoris swung a little further out and drew level with 19 Battalion. From column, the companies changed into line and made short work of some machine-gun posts. On the main objective, the neck between Bir and Mahatt Abu Batta, little opposition was found by 19 Battalion. In a splendid exhibition of the characteristics of spirited troops, 19 Battalion immediately turned down into the Bir Abu Batta re-entrant to give 20 Battalion a hand. There, among the parked German transport, the greatest resistance was met.

Using bayonets, rifles, tommy guns, Brens fired from the hip and the newly-issued bakelite grenade, the two battalions penetrated into the centre of the close-parked laager. Here, for a few minutes, there was the ‘impassioned drama’ of war. No chances could be taken. Kill or be killed. The bayonet was used with terrifying effect. The German slumped in the corner of a trench or lying on the ground might be shamming. He might fire a shot or throw a grenade when backs were turned. A thrust or a bullet eliminated the risk.

In the slit trenches, most of the Germans had their boots off. Some were undressed. While some Germans attempted to surrender and some to make off by foot and in trucks, others fought hard. Machine-gunners who used the light of burning trucks or of deliberately lit petrol fires to help their aim were dealt with by the simple process of assault from all points except on the line of fire. Truck drivers used wheeled and half-tracked vehicles as tanks in efforts to overrun the attackers. Some got away, but most fell victim to bullets and bombs, including the sticky grenade.

The flashes of explosions, the blaze of burning vehicles, the smoke, dust and the yells and screams made an inferno through which 19 and 20 Battalions fought their way to the far side of the laager. They had punched the required hole. On the eastern side of the wadi, the companies and battalions reformed while the transport came up in response to the success signal. As the advance had been drawn off its axis by the greater resistance on the left, the majority of the troops were some distance to the north of the embussing point. Spasmodic fire caused a number of casualties while the troops were marching to the transport and in embussing, but the now calmer troops quickly got into the trucks and the whole brigade moved off in night formation to the east.

In this climax to the Battle of Minqar Qaim, 4 Brigade added unfading lustre to the story of New Zealand arms. Proof was given, if proof were needed, that the New Zealand citizen soldier, adequately trained and equipped, was equal to any situation. Physical fitness was a factor. The men of 4 Brigade, since leaving Matruh on 25 June, had been travelling in trucks, marching or digging defences, with little time for sleep or even rest until the morning of 27 June. During that day they had stood the strain of continuous attack under a broiling sun. Their discipline—the discipline expressed in the willing subordination of the individual for the good of the whole—made them a proud command. This discipline, and their confidence, also made it relatively easy to impose on them one of the severest tests of battle—the evacuation of secure defensive positions for the hazards of open warfare attack.

Major Smith's company of the Essex Regiment shared equally in the glory of the breakout as it had been steadfast in the trials of the day. Lieutenant-Colonel Burrows' report closes with a special paragraph on the company. ‘I should like to pay a tribute to the company of the Essex Regiment which attacked with the leading battalion,’ he wrote. ‘The conduct of the men throughout was excellent. They attacked with the same fury that was shown by all troops and this assistance contributed considerably towards the success of the operation.’

For an action in which so many men distinguished themselves, decorations had to be sparingly awarded. But there were no two minds in the Division that it had the right to claim on behalf of one of its officers the most jealously guarded award, a bar to the Victoria Cross. Neither wounds nor enemy fire deterred Captain Upham

Capt C. H. Upham, VC and bar, m.i.d.; Conway Flat, Hundalee; born Christchurch, 21 Sep 1908; Government land valuer; wounded three times; wounded and p.w. 15 Jul 1942.

from carrying out what he conceived to be merely his duty. That was the case in Crete when he had been given the Cross. In Bir Abu Batta he entered the thickest of the fighting and his men followed him. He saw a truck full of the enemy trying to escape. In spite of heavy automatic fire, he approached close enough to destroy the truck and all of its occupants with grenades. Although wounded in both arms, he continued to lead and control his company. The highest award for bravery, however, was not made for this action alone. It came later for like conduct at Ruweisat. But the foundation of the Division's claim to the signal honour was laid at Bir Abu Batta.

Other awards for the action included the DSO to Lieutenant-Colonels Burrows and S. F. Hartnell (19 Battalion), the MC to Captain D. S. Thomson (19 Battalion), and the MM to Driver C. C. Robinson (NZASC, attached to 4 Field Ambulance).

While waiting for 4 Brigade to move and the remainder of the Division to assemble, Brigadier Inglis gave further thought to the problem of the breakout. His reflections led to the conclusion that while there was no doubt 4 Brigade would cut a gap and pass its own transport through, the alerted enemy might trap the remainder of the Division in the gap. By the time the divisional column entered the gap, the enemy on the flanks should be aware of what was happening. Whatever else they might do, they should at least be pouring fire into the gap.

The delay in getting 4 Brigade's assault under way was also disturbing. Brigadier Inglis did not know how deeply the enemy was disposed about Bir Abu Batta and therefore how long 4 Brigade would take in breaking through. The midsummer night was short. The desirability of the Division's being clear of the area by daylight presented itself as an imperative necessity when it was related to 5 Brigade's dispersion in the transport of other formations. If a further emergency arose it would be difficult to put the brigade on the ground to fight. Certainly the operation could not be carried out with the speed an emergency would demand.

Inglis decided that while the enemy was apparently fully engaged about Bir Abu Batta, the remainder of the Division should bypass the battle area by moving south for about two miles and then turning east parallel with the route to be taken by 4 Brigade. The column would move in tight formation on a front of about 80 yards, and if any enemy were encountered it would crash through them on wheels.

This solution of the problem appears to be so bold, indeed so potentially risky, as to call for examination of the factors which led to its adoption. If nothing else, they emphasize the truth that almost every tactical problem is unique and must be solved on its merits, and that the art of war has no traffic with rules to be slavishly followed in every situation.

Inglis had not been impressed with the weight or vigour of the enemy's attacks during the day. It was not likely, therefore, that resistance to the breakout would be stronger. Probably it would be weaker. As the enemy appeared to have disposed most of his forces for the night about Bir Abu Batta, his defences elsewhere should be thin. A surprise, solidly packed punch should break them.

The divisional column was suitably composed to deliver such a punch. It comprised about 900 vehicles and guns assembled nine abreast on a front of about 80 yards, with 18 Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Gray) leading. The battalion had its Bren carriers and its platoon of two-pounder anti-tank guns deployed across the front. There was thus a front rank capable of delivering a heavy volume of fire if it were needed. The battalion's troop-carrying vehicles were disposed in rear of this front line. The flanks of the column were held by 5 Field Regiment on the right and 6 Field Regiment on the left. Their guns and vehicles were disposed head to tail with the leading vehicles tucked in behind 18 Battalion's flanking trucks. Some Vickers machine guns in their 15-cwt trucks were also on the flanks of the column.

Inside this array were packed Divisional Headquarters, the Divisional Reserve Group, two field ambulances, the detachment of American Field Service ambulances, some three-ton vehicles carrying the less severely wounded and 5 Brigade's infantry on their A echelon, and the Reserve Group's trucks. The mass was manoeuvrable but was far from a homogeneous entity like a brigade group which had practised night and day battle-manoeuvre on wheels. Control of the column was given to Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, whose car had a shaded guiding light fixed to its differential casing. This car, and that of Brigadier Inglis carrying the divisional commander's flag on the bonnet, were the only ‘soft-skinned’ vehicles in the front rank.

Because no orders were given for a reconnaissance of the route and for advanced and flank guards, it may be thought that important principles of security were disregarded. This was not so. The enemy was quiet. If he were probed either by reconnoitring patrols or an advanced guard, he would be roused and thus the vital element of surprise would be lost. The hour was late, and any useful reconnaissance by patrols would have taken more time than could be spared. Again, in the dark, it would be difficult to maintain contact with an advanced guard sufficiently far ahead to give the main body real protection. If, as might be expected, the route had to be changed, advanced guard and main body most likely would lose touch with each other. Moreover, there was no question of giving the main body time to deploy and fight if the enemy were encountered, a course also made impracticable by 5 Brigade's dispersion. Finally, as it would be necessary to know instantly whether any obstacle met was friend or enemy, it was essential to keep the projected route clear of any troops not readily identifiable in the dark.

It is somewhat ironical that a week later the Division was to deal the Italian Ariete Division a devastating blow because its commander ignored the orthodox principles of security on the march in circumstances when they should have been closely observed.

These comments on the factors which influenced Brigadier Inglis are based on a discussion with him on his return to New Zealand in 1952 after serving with the Allied Military Government in Germany. They are given fully because a bare narrative of this phase of the breakout based on reports, logs, diaries and some personal accounts can lead to a complete misconception of the operation. As a further contribution to the adaptation of principles to particular circumstances, it may be added that when 6 Brigade was confronted with a somewhat similar situation at Wadi Matratin, a small advanced guard disappeared. It was replaced by another with more strict instructions about reporting. While this one functioned, the procedure was far too slow to meet conditions at Minqar Qaim.

A few minutes before 4 Brigade made contact with the enemy, Inglis warned the brigade's staff captain of his intentions and then told Gray: ‘I am going to take this column two miles south and then turn east and make a break parallel to the 4th Brigade one. If we strike the enemy, we will charge straight through on wheels. Pass that to your own battalion and the rest of the column. All vehicles to follow the head of the column whatever it does. Tell me as soon as you are ready to move.’

Unfortunately, these orders did not go right down the column. The staff officer responsible for passing them found he had time only to shout them to the next unit and jump into his truck as it moved off. As the head of the column swung away from 4 Brigade's transport, some of the brigade's drivers mistook the movement for that of their own group and joined up. Prompt intervention by Major Pleasants,

Brig C. L. Pleasants, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Halcombe, 26 Jul 1910; schoolmaster; CO 18 Bn and Armd Regt Jul 1942–Mar 1944; comd 4 Armd Bde Sep–Nov 1944; 5 Bde Nov 1944–Jan 1945, May 1945–Jan 1946; twice wounded; Commander Fiji Military Forces, 1949–53; Commandant Northern Military District, 1953–.

leading the brigade transport, prevented a merging of the two groups and thus confusion, but a few of 4 Brigade's vehicles went with the divisional column. Their absence caused some difficulty when the brigade embussed after the attack.

Again, as the rearmost units came up to the turning point they became aware of 4 Brigade's battle ahead. Under the impression that their own column had run into opposition, they halted and sent forward carriers and guns. When, however, they found the route was clear they reformed and hurried after the column.

The head of the column had moved about a mile and three-quarters when Gray halted to intimate: ‘There is something just in front. I am sending a carrier section forward to see what it is.’ That ‘something’ was extra shadows in the dark about 80 to 100 yards ahead. Gray's words were hardly spoken when the shadows opened fire to disclose themselves as tanks. In the light of their gun flashes and of a hit by one of 18 Battalion's anti-tank guns which fired off its portée, Brigadier Inglis saw a closely packed laager of tanks and trucks. The column had run into 21 Panzer Division's tank laager.

The flanks of the laager could not be discerned and the tanks and trucks were so closely parked as to suggest a reef on which the divisional column would pile up if the laager were charged. Inglis thereupon ordered Gray to'turn the whole show left', in other words to make the contemplated turn to the east. Under Gray's lead, 18 Battalion conformed at once. Looking back across the angle of the wheel, Brigadier Inglis saw some burning trucks and strings of pink and green tracer shells floating over the column and gained the impression that the column was following in orderly array. This was not wholly correct, although there was not the confusion suggested in some contemporary accounts.

When the leading vehicles halted, those in rear continued moving forward until they could go no further. Thus the mass of transport became more compact. To many of the men in this mass the enemy appeared to be pouring on them a heavy volume of tank tracer shells and tracer machine-gun bullets. General Freyberg, who was a stretcher case in his caravan, which incidentally was hit, looked out to remark: 'Another Balaclava.' Some men jumped from their trucks to hug the ground. Some attempted to return the fire with their rifles and automatics.

It was soon noticed that the enemy fire was on clearly defined fixed lines. Most of the shells and bullets passed over the vehicles or down the lanes between. The men who hugged the ground in the lanes did so without hurt and regained their trucks by crawling or rolling to them. Even when burning vehicles, including petrol wagons, illuminated the scene, the Germans did not take advantage of the light to destroy the compact target. Losses were extremely low but included some of the vehicles, personnel and patients of 5 Field Ambulance, which was carrying about 300 wounded.

An exact total cannot be given as the records were destroyed in the encounter.

Although the enemy failed to use the opportunity to inflict a heavy blow, the encounter caused the column to break into three more or less distinct parts. Most of the vehicles in the centre and on the left followed the command into the turn across the enemy's front. Gray set a moderate, steady speed, but he had not moved very far before he was passed by the leading trucks, whose drivers appear to have put their feet hard down on the accelerators. The actual speed was not very high, but it was too great for the darkness and the rough ground and led to a stringing out of the column. It was probably this burst of speed and the efforts of the drivers in rear to travel even faster to catch up, that gave diarists the impression that the column was thrown into confusion.

‘We scrambled back and followed the trucks ahead, all bolting like wild elephants. For a few moments we ran on amid a pandemonium, overtaking and being overtaken by other frantic vehicles….’—Infantry Brigadier, p. 135.

Order, however, was soon restored when Brigadier Inglis pressed to the head of the column in his car and weaved to and fro across the front shouting to the drivers to slow down. When the column was well clear of the enemy it was halted and closed up, and a rearguard was formed under Brigadier Kippenberger with the main task of collecting stragglers and directing them. Most of these rejoined the column at a long halt made about seven o'clock for breakfast and attention to the wounded. It was then found that 5 Field Regiment and 5 Brigade's A echelon had not arrived. They represented only a small proportion of the Division, but their absence caused considerable anxiety. With the reorganisation of the column after breakfast, the march to Alamein was resumed and completed without further incident.

Although separated from the Division, 5 Field Regiment was in excellent shape. It was on the right flank of the column in the move south from Minqar Qaim and was brought to a halt almost exactly opposite a point where the left flank of the enemy laager turned southwards. Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow

Col K. W. R. Gasgow, DSO, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Wellington, 15 Nov 1902; headmaster; CO 14 Lt AA Regt May–Dec 1941; 5 Fd Regt Dec 1941–May 1943; OC Tps 6 NZ Div May–Aug 1943; GSO 1 NZ Maadi Camp 1944; Rector, Scots College, Wellington.

quickly saw that if he remained immobile under the enemy fire, the Germans would have time to recover from their confusion and at the close range would probably devastate his formation. Burning and disabled vehicles on his left precluded a turn to the east with the remainder of the Division. A turn to the right was also impossible owing to the tight packing of his trucks and guns and the probability that his exposed flank would be raked by the machine guns he could see were firing on fixed lines.

The bend in the enemy line suggested the solution of the problem. Glasgow climbed to the top of his command car and gave the order and signal to advance and then ‘Right Take Ground.‘ Drivers in his vicinity grasped the intention and acted promptly. This quick move was accompanied by rifle and revolve fire and so disconcerted the enemy in the immediate front that they abandoned their machine guns, thus permitting the column to make the ‘Right Take Ground‘ manoeuvre without coming under enfilading fire. Other vehicles followed and a large body moved off at a rapid pace. As in the Divisional Headquarters column, the vehicles became strung out. Glasgow thereupon pressed through to the front and within a few minutes the drivers picked up his signals and formed themselves into five compact columns behind his car. Speed was reduced to four miles in the hour and exceptionally good battle discipline was displayed.

Colonel Glasgow subsequently reported that the casualties were extraordinarily light, mainly because of the fact that the enemy tank and anti-tank gun fire which was maintained from the remainder of the laager during the turning movement was too high. To the best of his knowledge only two German prisoners were left behind and none of his own troops who had gone to ground at the halt had been run over on the resumption of the advance. In his view, the success of the desperate manoeuvre was due to the skill and nice judgment of the drivers and the steadiness of all under fire.

Breaking clear was one thing. What to do next was another. Glasgow first thought his best course would be to turn round and lead the group through the gap being made by 4 Brigade. Noises from that area, however, suggested that the fight was still going on, while enemy signal flares indicated that there were enemy groups between him and the gap. But the flares also showed that the German positions were not continuous. Glasgow decided that if the group travelled quietly and slowly it should be possible to slip between the posts to the neighbourhood of the Bir Khalda telephone line. Guided by the enemy flares, the group changed course no fewer than five times before it got clear. At one stage it passed a laager estimated to contain twelve to twenty German tanks only 20 yards away. The group was not challenged and Glasgow was tempted to attack, but as he did not know precisely what troops he had with him, he decided that the better course would be to get the group safely away and organised tactically before risking an engagement.

Shortly afterwards, Glasgow encountered an Indian unit disposed in a defensive position. He had some difficulty in establishing his bona fides with the Indian sentries who did not speak English, but eventually was permitted to pass. Two miles further east, the group was halted and all officers were called to the command car. Glasgow then discovered the composition of the force that had followed him. He had 22 field guns of his regiment, 6 anti-tank guns, 4 light anti-aircraft guns, 4 machine guns, 14 Bren carriers and 3 ambulances, all with their crews, and about 300 of 5 Brigade's infantry disposed in trucks and the other vehicles of the group. In the faint moonlight, this mixed force rapidly reorganised into a powerful unit in desert formation. The advance was then resumed until first light when a halt was made in a deir for breakfast.

During this halt some twenty tanks of an unknown type appeared to the south and east. Major Stewart

Col G. J. O. Stewart, DSO, ED, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 22 Nov 1908; importer; CO 4 Fd Regt Aug 1942–Mar 1943; Dec 1943–Mar 1945; CRA 2 NZ Div 22 Feb– 16 Mar 1945; wounded 3 Mar 1943.

was sent in a carrier to investigate and the group was ordered to take up defensive positions. Glasgow said later that the preparation for action was one of the quickest and most efficient he had ever seen. The tanks were Honeys and were part of a battle group of Green Howards, field artillery, and South African anti-tank guns from 7 Motor Brigade.

After breakfast the march to Alamein was continued on a route a little to the north of the Qattara escarpment. In the late afternoon the group was met by Brigadier Inglis and Colonel Gentry and directed into a bivouac outside Kaponga.

This phase of the withdrawal was marked by an incident which increased the already high regard in which officers and other ranks of the New Zealand Medical Corps were held for their devotion to the care of the wounded. The regimental aid post vehicles of 5 Field Regiment, consisting of three trucks, were in the group carrying the more severely wounded. The regiment's medical officer, Captain Bryant,

Maj A. L. Bryant, MC, m.i.d.; Otokia, Taieri; born NZ 25 Apr 1917; medical practitioner; MO 5 Fd Regt Dec 1941–jun 1943; 5 Fd Amb Jun 1943–Jul 1944; 1Mob CCS Jul–Dec 1944; 1 Conv Depot Dec 1944–Aug 1945.

had distinguished himself at Minqar Qaim by keeping his aid post open within a few hundred yards of the gunline and by moving round the gun positions to attend the wounded. He now decided that his patients in the trucks could not bear the jolts of a swift movement over the desert. He consulted Colonel Glasgow and it was agreed that he should take over the ambulances and any trucks needed and bring the wounded on slowly in his own time. Although there were cases of severe internal wounds and haemorrhage, Bryant saved the lives of all his patients.

The third of the groups into which the divisional column had become divided was not so well-found. It comprised trucks and other vehicles from the rear of the column which had turned about on the encounter with the laager and made a hasty departure from the scene. They were followed by Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, commanding 22 Battalion, who spent the remaining hours of darkness in collecting stragglers before setting out to the east.

The size and composition of this group are not available in the Division's records.

An historian of the Peninsula War says that the deep French attacking columns broke up from the rear, almost never from the front, when they came under the British fire. Those in front could see what was happening and feel they could do something about it, while those in rear could only sense the check, hear the noise, see the smoke, fear the worst and feel helpless to do anything useful. The situation among the rear vehicles that night was probably very similar to that in the rear ranks of a French column.

It will be recalled that the order to charge through on wheels if the enemy were encountered did not go down the column when it was leaving Miniqar Qaim, and also that the rear vehicles were halted at the turning point until it was established that the battle noises ahead were being created by 4 Brigade. After this the rear vehicles hurried on to catch up with the divisional column. To do so they would have to travel at considerable speed, a task which at night calls for concentration on driving to the exclusion of thoughts on the tactical situation. In this frame of mind they closed on the remainder of the column.

A characteristic of night moves by large bodies of transport was probably another factor in leading to disorganisation. When a large column moves at night, all vehicles do not start simultaneously. The order to advance, as it were, trickles down the column, and it often happens that the leading vehicles have gathered speed and have moved a considerable distance before those in rear realise what has happened. This occurred in the encounter with the tank laager. The onward move of the head of the column and its turn to the east were almost concurrent with the outbreak of the enemy fire, but for varying periods the vehicles behind the leaders were immobile.

To the drivers in the rear the strings of tracer bullets and shells, the noise, the glare of burning trucks and the apparently prolonged halt seemed to have made it appear that the head of the column had run into a holocaust. But whatever the cause, some driver or drivers turning about created a general withdrawal of a block of vehicles. It was fortunate that there was a leader of Colonel Russell's calibre on the spot to regain control.

At first light Russell led his party south-east and met 1 Armoured Division whose GSO 1, Lieutenant-Colonel Peake, gave him the location of 5 Brigade's B echelon. Russell informed the transport officers of the events of the night, and taking command of the combined group, led it eastwards to find the Division.

The picture of the Division on the morning of 28 June was not attractive. Only a few hours before it had been a compact fighting formation ready for anything. Now it was dispersed in groups varying in size and composition far and wide over the desert.

Tactical Divisional Headquarters, with the greater part of the Divisional Reserve Group and portions of 5 Brigade Group, was making its way eastwards on the grid line prescribed by 13 Corps. At daylight Brigadier Inglis had sent General Freyberg to an airfield near the coast from which a pilot hurried to Cairo to obtain an air ambulance. By evening General Freyberg was in 2 New Zealand General Hospital at Helwan. At midday Inglis sent a brief situation report to 13 Corps and then, handing over the column to Brigadier Weir, pressed on to make the Division's dispositions on the new defence line.

Rear Divisional Headquarters was an entity at large in the desert rather than part of the Division. From midday on 27 June it had been cut off from the Division at Minqar Qaim and had been unable to push the supply columns through to the troops. From about five o'clock it had been completely out of touch with Tactical Divisional Headquarters. Rumours abounded, but it could not obtain any definite information about the Division's position or intentions. In the circumstances Colonel Crump,

Brig S. H. Crump, CBE, DSO, m.i.d., Bronze Star (US); Lower Hutt; born Wellington25 Jan 1889; Regular soldier; NZASC 1915–19; Commander NZASC 2 NZ Div 1940–45; comd 2 NZEF (Japan) Jun–Sep 1947; on staff HQ BCOF and NZ representative on Disposals Board in Japan, 1948–49.

commanding the New Zealand Army Service Corps, and Major Barrington,

Brig B. Barrington, DSO, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Marton, 2 Oct 1907; insurance inspector; SC 6 Bde Mar 1940–May 1941; BM 6 Bde May 1941–Jan 1942; DAQMG 2 NZ Div May–Nov 1942; AA and QMG 2 NZ Div Nov 1942–Dec 1944; DA and QMG NZ Corps Feb–Mar 1944; died 17 Apr 1954.

who had tried unsuccessfully to reach Minqar Qaim to replace Lieutenant-Colonel Ross at headquarters, decided to hold their overnight position. At daylight Rear Headquarters packed up and moved eastward toward Alamein and to find the Division.

Fourth Brigade Group was tactically complete except for gun ammunition. After embussing, the group had moved eastwards in tight night formation. Twice it had deviated from the planned route to avoid parties of the enemy, one of which shelled the group. After breakfast the march was resumed in desert formation, initially towards the first rendezvous near Fuka until contact was re-established with Division and orders were received to take the group to the Alamein Line.

Also making their way to Alamein by various routes were the columns led by Glasgow and Russell, the 21st Battalion group (now in two parties), B Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry which had been sent to relieve 21 Battalion at Bir Khalda, and some companies of the Army Service Corps near the coast. Finally, there was Captain Bryant's pathetic convoy of wounded. These were the organised groups. In addition, there were some isolated trucks whose occupants had but one thought, that of finding their comrades at the earliest moment.

Thus during daylight on 28 June the Division was not available for operations. It could play no further part in the battle then reaching its climax at Matruh, where 10 Corps was preparing to break out. General Gott had no knowledge of its fate until after midday. The Division's departure from the scene was unknown at Eighth Army Headquarters, which believed it was still available under 13 Corps for action near Fuka to cover 10 Corps' withdrawal. Army Headquarters was surprised to learn that Gott had sent it to Alamein.

Although the Division was widely dispersed and withdrawing, it was not making the retreat of defeated men. There was no thought anywhere of defeat. Rather, the firmly held belief was that the Division had given Rommel a hard knock and had upset his plan to encircle and wipe it out. Possibly each of the several groups and parties thought that it alone was separated from the Division and that it was only a matter of forming up again for another round. Thanks to the warning order of early on 27 June and the precaution of asking General Lumsden to pass on the information concerning the withdrawal, the group leaders knew in which direction to head. The Division's discipline was well able to withstand the stresses being put on it.

All the fighting formations of the Division, including 6 Infantry Brigade, reached the rendezvous on the Alamein Line by midnight on 28–29 June, and the rear services were being re-established. The late afternoon and evening were hours of happy reunions and tales of adventure as group upon group and individuals came in and rejoined units and brigades. The arrival of 4 Brigade Group, its great mass of trucks moving in perfect formation, was a thrilling experience. It represented a solid core, the Division again in being. Fifth Brigade, too, was glad to see its transport come home but was even more pleased to greet 21 Battalion, concerning whose fate rumour had been rife.

That night the New Zealanders bedded down content, once more a fighting division ready for aught the morrow might bring.

An evil spirit bent on frustration seemed to hover over the 21 Battalion column on the Khalda track. Enthusiasm could hardly be expected for the prosaic task of guarding another formation's field maintenance centre in the depths of the desert when the Division was about to engage in thrilling enterprises. Consequently, the column shared the reluctance with which the command of 5 Brigade detached it for the duty.

The column soon learned that it was still within the battle area. Near Bir Khalda, when transport was congested after climbing an escarpment, the column was bombed and machine-gunned by enemy aircraft which probably broke off from the formation which attacked 4 Brigade at Bir Abu Batta a few minutes later. The transport scattered in all directions, but not before 14 men were killed, 45 wounded, and 14 vehicles, including three ammunition trucks of 27 Battery, destroyed. A further result of the attack was that only three of the battalion's three-inch mortars could be provided with complete crews. Some of the wounded were evacuated in the two ambulances with the column and the remainder were removed by six more ambulances sent by the Division during the night. The losses were the heaviest suffered by any single battalion of the Division in one bombing attack.

The column was relieved in the afternoon of 27 June by B Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry Regiment under Major Sutherland,

Lt-Col J. H. Sutherland, MC; Masterton; born Taieri, 10 Dec 1903; stock inspector; 2 i/c patrol of LRP and LRDG; CO 2 NZ Div Cav 1942–43.

who also took the anti-tank guns and a troop of the field guns under command. With 21 Battalion and the remainder of 27 Battery, Lieutenant-Colonel Allen set out shortly before four o'clock to rendezvous with 5 Brigade's B echelon, then believed to be still on the escarpment near Bir Abu Batta.

After travelling roughly five miles, the column was met by Captain Dugleby,

Maj L. W. Dugleby, m.i.d.; born Wairoa, 6 Jun 1914; clerk; SC 5 Bde Jun–Nov 1942 killed in action 13 Apr 1943.

Staff Captain 5 Brigade, who was following the brigade's now dispersed transport. His information, by the time it reached Lieutenant-Colonel Allen, was to the effect that the brigade had been driven from Minqar Qaim by enemy tanks. When this news was proved false through the wireless link and by the timely arrival of 23 Battalion's transport officer, who was also looking for the fugitive vehicles, the column got under way again. As it moved off, advice was received through a British armoured unit nearby that enemy groups were now in both front and rear, the latter probably being 3 Reconnaissance Unit.

As if this were not disturbing enough, it was found a few miles further on, when the column was halted to reconnoitre the ground ahead, that tactical formation had been lost. Most of the battalion's carriers and some of the leading trucks had turned with the carrier commander, Captain Dee,

Capt K. G. Dee; born Onehunga, 6 Apr 1914; farmer; wounded 4 Jul 1942; killed in action 24 Oct 1942.

when he had come down the column for orders. They were now in rear instead of leading the march. While tactical formation was being restored, the battalion intelligence officer, Lieutenant Abbot,

Maj R. B. Abbott, MC; Ngaruawahia; born Auckland, 16 Feb 1919; insurance clerk; wounded 6 Jul 1942.

returned from a reconnaissance with a report that he had been fired upon by the enemy. Major McElroy,

Lt-Col H. M. McElroy, DSO and bar, ED; Auckland; born Timaru, 2 Dec 1910; public accountant; CO 21 Bn 4 Jun 1943–21 Jun 1944; wounded four times.

commanding A Company, who had tried to push on to the brigade from the first halt, also came back with information supplied by the commander of an Indian unit with 7 Armoured Division

Probably 3 Indian Motor Brigade.

that the brigade was moving south from Minqar Qaim. Although the information was given in good faith, it had no foundation. It may be surmised that it was the sum of reports and deductions gleaned from the movements of 5 Brigade's dispersing B echelon and 1 Armoured Division's intention to move south to Bir Khalda. As it was then only about six o'clock, the information could not have been in response to the Division's request to Major-General Lumsden to advise the units south of Minqar Qaim of the projected withdrawal.

Lieutenant-Colonel Allen's cogitations on these matters were interrupted by the arrival of enemy armoured cars, trucks, and small guns which deployed for action. They were not identified but, again, were probably from 3 Reconnaissance Unit. Allen decided to turn west to seek the protection of the Indian column. To cover the turning movement, he sent forward the only two sections of carriers which had come up. Travelling fast and in line, the six carriers opened fire with their machine guns. The enemy permitted them to approach to within 200 yards and then subjected them to heavy fire from small arms, anti-tank guns and mortars. Four of the carriers were quickly put out of action. The remaining two picked up survivors and then withdrew to the battalion.

As the action opened, A Company wheeled to the left under fire. Seeing this movement and the return of the carriers, the rest of the battalion turned about and withdrew rapidly southwards, leaving Allen, two carriers under Dee, and one anti-tank gun and the troop of 27 Battery as the sole occupants of the field. While the battalion adjutant hurried off to stop the withdrawal, Allen directed the guns on to the enemy, their fire being supported by the two carriers. He then broke off the action and withdrew his small party to the area the battalion had occupied the previous night. There he was joined by McElroy and most of A Company. There was no sign of the rest of the column.

On learning from Major Sutherland that he was out of contact with the Division and intended to withdraw to the Alamein Line, Allen tried in vain to re-establish a wireless link and then decided to follow the cavalry squadron. About midnight he encountered the B echelon of 7 Motor Brigade, with which he harboured for the remainder of the night. Next morning he moved eastwards in its company. At a halt about eight miles south of the Fuka escarpment, he received news that the Division was on its way to the Kaponga Box, to which point he then directed his course and arrived without further incident.

The remainder of the column had turned up about four hours earlier. It had been rallied by Major Adams,

Maj R. W. Adams; born NZ 4 Jan 1909; company manager; killed in action 4 Jul 1942.

commanding B Company, who, after a fruitless effort to find battalion headquarters, set out eastwards and sheltered for the night with 5 Brigade's B echelon and some British armour. Lieutenant-Colonel Hanson, CRE of the Division, who had been prevented from returning to Minqar Qaim after reconnoitring the southern front, travelled with the party. South of Fuka they met Major Crisp,

Maj A. J. Crisp, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born NZ 9 Mar 1906; accountant.

a New Zealander on the staff of 10 Corps, on whose advice they continued to the Kaponga Box.

Major Sutherland took the cavalry squadron on a more circuitous route to rejoin the Division. Leaving Bir Khalda shortly before eight o'clock after handing over A Troop of 27 Battery to Lieutenant-Colonel Allen, he travelled all night along the northern edge of the Qattara Depression. Soft sand impeded progress, but on the morning of 28 June the squadron was on the firmer ground of the Taqa Plateau, from which it moved north to the divisional area.

The Divisional Cavalry Regiment, however, was not reunited until 30 June. The men left in Matruh when B Squadron moved to the desert moved from the fortress on the morning of 27 June and, at Baggush, met a detail with twelve new carriers. The combined parties then withdrew to Fuka, where the new carriers were prepared for use. In the early hours of 28 June, they gathered from reports and rumours that the Division had withdrawn and, accordingly, they also made their way to Alamein. The regiment's rail party which had reached Amiriya on 26 June was caught in the confusion of congested railway sidings, but finally managed to extricate itself and unite with the last detail of the regiment, which had been drawing new equipment at Abbassia, and so rejoin the regiment.

Fifth Brigade's B echelon is the last substantial section of the Division to be accounted for in the dispersion of 28 June. The precipitate withdrawals and failure of the transport to rejoin the Division were criticised at the time, and some inferences were drawn which fuller knowledge of all the circumstances would have corrected. The term B echelon may convey the impression of an organised and controlled entity. The composition of such an echelon, however, varied from time to time, as did the personnel within it. At Minqar Qaim 5 Brigade's B echelon comprised trucks of the Reserve Mechanical Transport, the engineers and infantry battalions, a heterogeneous collection of some 300 to 400 vehicles driven by men who were accustomed to acting on their own initiative rather than as a group.

There can be no doubt that exercise of individual initiative saved the transport when it was attacked in front of 5 Brigade on the morning of 27 June and again in the afternoon near Bir Abu Batta. Had the drivers moved in formation they would have presented the enemy with a target of his dreams. By rapid dispersal and moving at varying speeds they disconcerted the enemy gunners. Their discipline showed up in the manner in which they rallied on both occasions when seemingly clear of the enemy.

It was a misfortune that the transport took with it the battery-charging set of 5 Brigade's signals. Batteries were being recharged when the first attack was made and the apparatus was driven away in a truck. Counsel of perfection suggests that the signals officer, Second-Lieutenant Sidey,

Maj T. K. S. Sidey, m.i.d.; Dunedin; born Dunedin, 8 Oct 1908; barrister and solicitor; company commander Div Sigs Sep 1944–Feb 1945.

might have returned the charging set and batteries from Bir Abu Batta. But he was not to know that the transport would be driven still further away from the brigade. He knew, however, that there were fully charged spare batteries at Brigade Headquarters which should suffice until the brigade and transport were reunited. It was again unfortunate that the truck driver in whose care the batteries reposed was unaware they were wanted. Such things happen in battle, as indeed they may in even the best regulated business.

When the transport was brought under control after the second dispersal, it was formed into a convoy to return to the neighbourhood of the Division. On this occasion there was indiscipline on the part of a few drivers. When some armoured cars appeared across the route these drivers broke away without orders, producing a disorganisation which was not straightened out until about five miles to the east had been covered. The assistance of a British armoured unit was sought to cover the return journey to the Division but it was unable to comply with the request.

After repeated attempts to get into touch with the brigade for orders, wireless contact was established at seven o'clock when the Brigade Major, Major Monty Fairbrother,

Col M. C. Fairbrother, DSO, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Carterton, 21 Sep 1907; accountant; BM 5 Bde Jun 1942–Apr 1943; comd in turn 21, 23, and 28 (Maori) Bns, Apr–Dec 1943; GSO 2 2 NZ Div Jun–Oct 1944; CO 26 Bn Oct 1944–Sep 1945; comd Adv Base 2 NZEF Sep 1945–Feb 1946; Associate Editor, NZ War Histories.

instructed the transport to return by the most direct route. However, before the convoy could move it learned from 21 Battalion that the route was held by the enemy. When reconnaissance revealed that a battle was in progress to the north, it was decided not to move until further information could be had from 5 Brigade.

Then followed the period when both Brigade Headquarters and transport tried in vain to get into touch with each other. Even a high-powered set borrowed by the transport from an armoured car failed to make contact. Eventually about midnight, when the men of 5 Brigade had been allocated to other vehicles, faint touch was re-established. The wireless link at 5 Brigade Headquarters was so weak that it was impossible to discuss the situation, use a code, or give the customary verification numbers. The best the Brigade Major could do in the circumstances was to give the simple order, ‘Go east to Amiriya’, a point well known to the transport, and the signals officer instructed the operator to use ‘Monty says so’, as verification.

This order was received with the deepest suspicion by the officers with the transport. They had no knowledge of the impending withdrawal of the Division. Only a few days before a warning had been circulated that the Germans were sending false messages in English on Eighth Army wave-lengths. Now, when the customary verification code numbers did not come back, the officers suspected an enemy ruse to misdirect the transport and so immobilise the brigade. Some imaginations were vivid enough to picture the brigade staff as captured and sending the order under the duress of German revolvers in their backs. The fact that anyone could possibly think the brigade staff would be so amenable did not contribute to calm appraisal of the circumstances when the events of the day were discussed later.

In view of the doubts and suspicions, it was decided not to move the transport until confirmation of the order was obtained. This was given early next morning on the appearance of Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, and the two groups then proceeded in company to join the Division.

German reactions to the escape of the Division from Minqar Qaim were philosophical concerning its effects on the campaign, but were bitter towards the New Zealanders. There was a somewhat whimsical idea that the Division should have recognised it was trapped, and that it had not played the game fairly in depriving Afrika Korps of the victory the Korps had arranged to garner next morning. Prisoners of war gathered the impression that some of the troops had celebrated the expected victory in advance. The bitterness was a reaction to the carnage in Bir Abu Batta. All formations and even Rommel himself were affected.

The diary of 21 Panzer Division records that at 28 minutes past two a ‘most immediate’ wireless message was received from regimental headquarters of the Panzer Grenadiers ‘that, after an unexpected artillery preparation, the enemy attacked regimental headquarters and penetrated into the positions of the right wing of 1/R Regiment 104.’ The report clearly refers to 4 Brigade's attack. The reference to an artillery preparation, of course, was wrong but may be attributed to the confusion. By the time the headquarters was alarmed there would have been enough grenade and other explosions to suggest a bombardment.

At first, divisional headquarters regarded the attack on Bir Abu Batta as a feint, ‘but,’ the diary continues, ‘it soon develops into a number of violent assaults launched on all parts of the front. The enemy tries, with all the forces at his disposal, to break through to the south in the direction of Khalda.’

An hour later General Bismarck reported to Afrika Korps that ‘all attacks have been completely repulsed. In some places, however, the enemy, supported by tanks, succeeded in breaking out. It is very likely that he escaped through these gaps with the bulk of his forces.’ This diary entry adds that the Panzer Grenadiers had been ordered to comb and mop up the terrain to the north of the escarpment, and that 1 Battalion ‘has suffered very heavy casualties as the enemy succeeded in surprising the battalion and cutting it to pieces in a hand-to-hand fight.’

The report is an unconscious tribute to the violence of the divisional column's unexpected collision with the German laager south of Minqar Qaim. No comment is needed on the obvious errors in the report other than that they are normal to the confusion of a night action. It is striking, however, that Bismarck does not appear to have been concerned that, on top of his failure to carry out his intention of the previous evening to destroy the encircled enemy, he had now failed in his second intention of preventing a breakout. The confession that 1 Battalion had been surprised and cut to pieces is naive. But neither Rommel nor Afrika Korps took the division to task for permitting the prize to escape or dealt with 1 Battalion for the cardinal sin of being surprised in a battle position. Afrika Korps closes its diary note of the occasion with the laconic comment: ‘The encirclement was not a success.’

There was no philosophical consideration of the carnage which daylight revealed in Bir Abu Batta. The last sounds heard by 4 Brigade as it embussed after the breakthrough were the cries and calls of the wounded enemy. They came over the still air like the pathetic bleating of sheep disturbed in the night. But the agonising appeals for help aroused the Grenadiers to anger, which deepened when they found that many of their stricken comrades had multiple wounds plainly showing they had been bayoneted or shot, often both, several times.

Perhaps in the circumstances calm acceptance of the situation could not be expected of the rank and file. The division, however, had had considerable experience and had fought many night actions. At least its senior officers might have known that multiple wounds were common to hand-to-hand fighting, especially at night. If in the comradeship of arms, they were affected by the distress of their men and thus shared their feelings, a more detached view might have been taken by Afrika Korps' headquarters. On the contrary, the Korps' diary placed on record for all time the false charge: ‘During these actions violations of International Law, such as slaughter of the wounded, occur.’ Had the entry been made for propaganda purposes, or to arouse the fighting spirit of all ranks, it might be understood, although not condoned. There is nothing to suggest it was made otherwise than as a solemn statement of fact.

This view is supported by other circumstances. A belief which Rommel shared spread through Panzerarmee that the New Zealanders fought like gangsters, with no thought or understanding of chivalry. Discriminatory action was immediately taken against New Zealanders captured in the battle. They were separated from other prisoners, stripped of personal possessions and made to stand in the hot sun for six hours without rest. Personal indignities were also heaped on some of them. In subsequent battles on the Alamein Line, the Germans fought with an intensity strongly suggestive of a desire to ‘get even’ with the New Zealanders. The feeling was different from that usually held towards a foe whose fighting qualities are respected. Broadcasts from Berlin referred to the New Zealanders as ‘Freyberg's butchers’.

It is strange that Rommel did not make a personal investigation of events in the breakout as he had a high regard for the ethics and chivalry of war. He appears to have accepted the reports without question. When Brigadier Clifton was brought before him on his capture in the following September, Rommel gave vent to a harangue about the ‘gangster’ methods of the New Zealanders at Minqar Qaim. Clifton has recorded that Rommel listened to his explanations and, in the end, replied, ‘Well, that is reasonable and could happen in a night battle, but ….’

Rommel, pp. 156–7.

There is no need to defend let alone apologise for the actions of 4 Brigade in the breakout. Let it be repeated, it was a glorious feat of arms. But a false charge incorporated in the enemy archives cannot be passed over by anyone having access to all the facts, lest default in meeting the charge should be taken as an admission of guilt and thereby leave a stain on the proud record of a hard-fighting yet chivalrous division.

It should be added that the Division was not disturbed by the broadcasts from Berlin. The attitude was: ‘When the Germans bleat, you know you have hit and hurt them.’

Rommel had another wrong impression of the breakout. In his notes on the campaign in North Africa he made brief reference to meeting the New Zealand Division at Matruh and of his headquarters becoming involved in the breakout.

Rommel, p. 269.

The details supplied, however, show conclusively that the honour of disturbing him and of compelling him to move hastily to a safer area belongs to 50 Division which, during the night 28–29 June, broke out southward from the coastal escarpment.

Panzerarmee's battle report of the day also erred in reporting that the New Zealand Division had broken out southwards from the fortress of Matruh.

Although the New Zealand Division had no further part in the battle of Matruh and the fighting up to the enemy's arrival at Alamein, the principal features of the operations from 28 June to 1 July must be understood to appreciate the drama of the Alamein Line.

On the morning of 28 June the enemy quickly recovered his tactical aplomb after the confused events of the night. The Italian X and XXI Corps, attacking Matruh from the west and south-west, and 90 Light Division, which had cut the coast road five miles east of Garawla at 8.30 the previous evening, were ordered to close in on the fortress. Afrika Korps was directed to take up the pursuit eastwards, with orders to reach the area 25 miles south-west of Daba and to cut off the British motorised forces by a push southwards. The 3rd Reconnaissance Unit was instructed to advance south-east through Khalda. The Italian XX Armoured Corps, which had been under the command of Afrika Korps for the operations against 1 Armoured and the New Zealand Divisions on 27 June, was ordered to protect the supply routes on the escarpment about the Khalda track.

In contrast to the enemy's grip of the situation, obscurity still reigned at all headquarters in Eighth Army. Auchinleck, at 6.15, greeted the morning with an urgent inquiry of both corps for their situation, and two hours later 10 Corps asked through Air Support Control for news of 13 Corps. But the perilous position in which his corps had been placed was apparent to Lieutenant-General Holmes. At 10.35 a.m. he sent a signal to Eighth Army giving the location of 50 Division as east of Wadi el Huraiqa, and stating that the two brigades of 10 Indian Division were being concentrated in the area north of Wadi el Zarqa. He also said the enemy was astride the coast road. Holmes then stated that he was faced with the choice of an organised attack to open the coast road which would have to be made that night, a breakout to the south and then east, or the concentration of both his divisions to ‘fight it out.’ He said his choice was governed largely by the help he could expect from 13 Corps and asked if that corps could come as far north as Shararid. If not, was any other course possible? Holmes added that, in any case, it was impossible to expect organised bodies from 10 Corps to arrive at the Fuka line. If Eighth Army expected to reorganise on the Fuka line, a screen must be provided west of it. This was in reference to the ‘Pike’ plan of a further stand at Fuka.

The signal was not received at Eighth Army until 12.40, over two hours after its despatch. In the meantime, at 11.45, Auchinleck had sent the following message to his corps commanders: ‘1. The enemy intention today clearly is to attack north of Matruh and Baggush. Enemy detachments are reported to have reached Baggush. 2. 10th Corps will on no account be cut off in Matruh area but will withdraw towards the Fuka line keeping south of Qasaba [the coastal] escarpment. Immediate and bold action by both of you is essential.’

Even when Eighth Army received Holmes' alarming signal of 10.35 a.m., more than two hours elapsed before a reply was sent. At ten minutes to three the following message was sent to 10 Corps: ‘No question of fighting it out. No time to stage a deliberate attack along the road for which there is probably no objective. You will slip out tonight with whole force on a broad front, turn east on high ground and rally El Daba. 13 Corps will cover you.’

The details of the last phase at Matruh are outside the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that a fighting breakout was made that night and that the remnants of 50 and 10 Indian Divisions with Corps Headquarters set a course for Alamein. On their way they were set upon by 21 Panzer Division with further heavy losses. The fate of the corps was unknown to the Eighth Army until parts dribbled into Alamein, from where they were sent to the Delta to rest, reorganise and refit.

With the overrunning of the last gallant handful of 29 Indian Brigade by 21 Panzer Division at Fuka the previous evening, only 1 Armoured Division, with the addition of 7 Motorised Brigade, was now left to oppose the enemy's advance. On Army orders, three columns of the division had moved north from Khalda to help 10 Corps and strengthen the defence of Fuka, but they had arrived too late to intervene. The division, however, was effective in what proved to be its final role as rearguard. Fighting as brigades rather than as a division, the three brigades, 4 and 22 Armoured and 7 Motor with its armoured cars, harassed Afrika Korps so much that Panzerarmee acknowledged that the delay in the arrival of the Korps at Alamein was due to the actions, ‘sometimes heavy and costly’, which had to be fought.

Panzerarmee battle report, 30 June.

The armour also engaged the Italian XX Corps to such effect that its divisions ‘were thrown into considerable disorder’, and ‘eventually it was necessary for the C-in-C to give a very sharp order to get the corps to move on.’

Ibid.

In the meantime, 90 Light Division and the Italian X and XXI Corps moved eastwards from Matruh. After its strenuous performances, 90 Light decided it was entitled to rest and bathe in Matruh's pellucid waters. But while the men were luxuriating in their first spell since the campaign opened a month before, Rommel appeared and ordered the division to resume the pursuit immediately.

At 6.15 a.m. on 30 June, Auchinleck, having realised the impossibility of halting the enemy further west, ordered the final withdrawal to the Alamein Line. At approximately the same time, Rommel gave his orders for the day's march of Panzerarmee to assembly positions from which it was to attack the Alamein defences at four o'clock next morning.

Eighth Army's stand at Matruh, and particularly that of the New Zealand Division at Minqar Qaim, created a belief that these were decisive influences in arresting the enemy's advance at Alamein. Discussions of advantages gained at Alamein because of the supposed delay and casualties imposed on the enemy at Matruh generally neglect the reverse side of the picture, which shows Eighth Army as suffering another serious defeat.

Panzerarmee was occupied from two and a half to three days at Matruh, that is from about three o'clock in the afternoon of 26 June, when it left its assembly positions, to 1 p.m. on 29 June, when 90 Light Division resumed the advance on the coast road after the fall of the fortress. The net loss of time by the enemy, and by corollary Eighth Army's net gain, was less. Allowance must be made for the time Panzerarmee would have required to traverse the area had its movement been opposed only by a rearguard. Afrika Korps' operations suggest that up to one day might have been needed.

On this hypothesis, Afrika Korps would have been clear of Matruh and on the way to Alamein in the afternoon of 27 June instead of 28 June as was the case. The Korps provided the spearhead of the advance for Matruh and, assuming similar delaying action by 1 Armoured Division to that which occurred, it would have arrived before Alamein on 29 June, or one day ahead of the actual time. This supposition may be challenged by the suggestion that even had the enemy armour reached Alamein on 29 June, Rommel would have had to await 90 Light Division and the Italian X and XXI Corps before making his attack. The facts are that, in spite of the fighting for the fortress of Matruh, these formations arrived in Alamein about the same time as the armour.

The battle of Matruh gained for Eighth Army at the outside a day and a half for manning and improving the defences on the Alamein Line. The price paid was heavy. Tenth Indian Division, which had arrived at Matruh in fairly good order, was so shattered that it had to be withdrawn to the Delta to refit. Only three eight-gun battle groups were left of 50 Division. Fifth Indian Division's 9th Brigade was available for a small fortress role, but there was little left of the remainder of the division. The enemy claimed from the battle ‘more than 6000 prisoners and, in addition to large supply dumps, war equipment of all sorts sufficient for about one division.’

Panzerarmee battle report, 29 June.

Even though it may be idle speculation, reflection is inevitable on the difference the presence of these divisions and their equipment might have made to the opening phases of the battle on the Alamein Line when the enemy was stretched to the limit of his resources.

Major-General de Guingand records contemporary impressions concerning the value of the action at Minqar Qaim. ‘The New Zealand Division,’ he says, ‘had come straight up against the crack German Panzer 15 and 21 divisions, south of Matruh. Here a memorable engagement took place, and I believe this mauling of the enemy's spearhead probably went a long way to saving the situation.’

Operation Victory, p. 124