General Freyberg called on 21 Battalion during the afternoon with the news that successful resistance so far north was not now possible and that another withdrawal, this time to the Thermopylae line in southern Greece, was under way. Twenty-first Battalion, which need expect only infantry patrols, was to hold Platamon until instructed to the contrary, and was to blow the tunnel when circumstances required it.

Circumstances required it shortly after the General's departure, when sun glinting off glass windscreens denoted the approach of an enemy force and the tunnel was blown forthwith.

The ridge rocked with the explosion and smoke poured from the tunnel openings, but on inspection it was not a satisfactory job, partly from insufficient charges and partly because cavities behind the concrete lining had absorbed some of the shock. An emergency reserve of 50 lb of gelignite was placed in a breach in the roof and brought down a lot of debris, but even so Jones estimated that the damage could be repaired within six hours. In point of fact the roof was still falling four days later, and 2 Panzer Division's diary states that the German movements were seriously hampered thereby.

No. 1 Section packed up and set out for the Pinios Gorge about six miles to the south, where the railway line crossed the river on a steel arch bridge at the far end and where road and railway track ran on opposite sides of the gorge.

In front of 5 Brigade the enemy, after the withdrawal of the cavalry screen, crossed the Aliakmon River and began making paths over the anti-tank ditches and repairing the cratered roads and blown bridges. A ‘blow and go’ job does not hold up engineers for long, and as it was beyond the capacity of the cavalry to impose further delay they were recalled. Lieutenant Chapman's section and Major Rudd's headquarters retired with the cavalry, the former blowing the prepared demolitions to cover the retreat. They passed through the infantry at the mouth of the pass in the late afternoon and carried on to Dholikhi. There were a few ‘recce’ planes overhead but nothing offensive, and for the sappers in the gorge the position was unchanged. The decision to retire had not yet been announced there.

It was still very lively on the Servia sector, with enemy columns approaching in plain view across the flats below the infantry positions. The New Zealand guns, plus some British mediums which had arrived the previous day and given the engineers a job of roadmaking, tore holes in the lines of vehicles making for the shelter of villages. By nightfall, the Kiwis were in contact with the enemy from the sea to Servia and were rather looking forward to the prospect of action on the morrow. But at 10 p.m. the brigadiers were told that the Division was not going to fight. On the contrary, 6 Brigade would cover the withdrawal of 5 and 4 Brigades and become the rearguard.

At first light (15th) 21 Battalion was attacked by infantry and later by armour and infantry, but the steepness of the ridge defeated the tanks and the fighting died down.

It is not too much to say that messages from 21 Battalion, at first thought to be bogus, describing the armour arrayed on the plain in front of Platamon ridge gave Corps Headquarters, as Colonel Clifton wrote in his diary, ‘One Hell of a shock’.

There was, however, nothing bogus about the tank, infantry and motor-cycle units which tried to take possession of Platamon ridge and 16 Australian Brigade was sent to reinforce. Clearly the German intention was to push, in spite of its drawbacks, along the shortest route to Larisa and so isolate any force north of that badly battered town. And that force at that time was the main bulk of Anzac Corps.

On the other side of Mt Olympus 5 Brigade spent the day watching the enemy build up, and at Servia, after a cheeky attempt to rush the defences in the early morning, the position was much the same as previously. Behind the fighting troops the sappers began moving again.

Fifth Field Park was instructed to take over an RE dump a few miles south of Larisa.

Seventh Field Company ceased work on the access road; the narrow track from the main pass road to Kokkinoplos had been metalled and widened where necessary and the new road formed and metalled for a distance of approximately five miles. But the gorge still remained to be crossed. The Company went by independent vehicles to Tirnavos, halfway between Elasson and Larisa. Lieutenant Hector's

Lt J. R. M. Hector, m.i.d.; born Wellington, 17 May 1913; civil engineer; killed in action 20 May 1941.

Sixth Field remained dispersed; Company Headquarters moved three miles south of Elasson. No. 2 Section reported to 6 Brigade in the Elasson area; No. 1 was at Servia with 4 Brigade. No. 3 was still with the Divisional Cavalry along the Elasson-Dheskati road disposing of a ton and a half of explosives and 200 anti-tank mines in and around four road blocks.

Nineteenth Army Troops Company moved again. Lieutenant Smart repacked his workshop and the section set out for Lamia where, after some vicissitudes, it arrived safely the following day. The rest of the company, less Lieutenant Jones's section at Platamon, concentrated five miles south of Larisa and took possession of a deserted tented area.

The enemy attacked 21 Battalion again at dawn on the 16th and the battalion, attacked frontally by tanks and with its left flank turned, was forced off the ridge. The first Lieutenant Jones knew of the disaster was the arrival of Colonel Macky

Lt-Col N. L. Macky, MC, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 20 Feb 1891; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde 1915–19 (Capt, 1918); CO 21 Bn Jan 1940-May 1941.

As soon as Colonel Macky's message concerning the withdrawal had been received at Divisional Headquarters, Colonel Clifton sent 19 Army Troops Company post-haste to blow the bridge at the south end of the gorge, and prepare demolitions on the road back to Larisa and on two bridges on the northern outskirts of the town. Major Langbein sent Lieutenants Page and Collins with 2 and 3 Sections to look after the Larisa bridges while he took the rest of the company to the Gorge. When he found that Jones was out of explosive he sent Sapper Les Condgon

Spr L. A. Condgon; Wellington; born NZ 6 Dec 1906; service-car driver; wounded May 1941.

In the meantime parties of 21 Battalion withdrawing from Platamon had concentrated at the mouth of the gorge, but the only way to cross the river there was by a hand-operated barge and it was late in the afternoon before the men were across. The guns of the supporting section of 25-pounders were also ferried over, but the artillery quads and the battalion carriers had to bump along the railway tracks and cross over the bridge Major Langbein was working on.

The pursuing enemy had been expected momentarily, and the reason why contact had been so easily broken was because the tanks had not only run on to the mines Jones had scattered along the track but those that did manage to struggle to the top of the ridge had been marooned there by the steepness of the descent. Third Panzer Division supplies the enemy version:

‘The tanks pressed forward along narrow mule path. Many of them shed their tracks on the boulders or split their assemblies and finally the leading troop ran on to mines. A detour was attempted. Two more tanks stuck in a swamp and another blew up on a mine and was completely burnt out. After strenuous exertions a track was cleared while the engineers carried out a very successful sweep for mines.’

After the troops had passed through, the barge was sunk and the road blown in two places. They were, Lieutenant Jones wrote, ‘reasonably effective demolitions but presented only temporary obstacles unless covered with fire as they were in such positions that they could be fairly easily bridged.’

When the last of the unit vehicles had crossed the rail bridge it was blown and dropped into the river and both sapper parties returned to Larisa. Meanwhile 2 and 3 Sections, after sharing a bale of contraband tobacco with passers-by and dining off a young porker allegedly killed by bomb blast, had begun their jobs on the Larisa bridges. Sundry German pilots, judging by the attention they were lavishing on the project, were anxious to assist. Jerry, however, wanted the bridges destroyed at once and thus sorely inconvenienced the Anzac Force north of the Pinios River. One great consolation was that the sections had the free run of a deserted canteen, and between dodging streams of machine-gun bullets and whistling bombs secured ample supplies of beer, cigarettes and tinned foods, much of which was handed over to convoys passing through.

Fifth Brigade was to vacate the Olympus Pass that night and Lieutenant Hector, with sappers standing by the prepared demolitions on the pass road, worked on the best remaining site with compressor and explosives to lessen the chances of an early pursuit. The section, working in relays non-stop for twenty-four hours, blasted a fourteen-foot hole through the solid marble and then filled it with two cases of gelignite, half a ton of ammonal and the packing. All this was done to the accompaniment of the echoing roar of guns and the explosions of searching enemy shells, while faintly in the distance crackling noises rose and fell.

The last of the troops coming out by that route passed about midnight and the forward road blocks were fired. It was hoped that the charges would blow the whole road into the gorge below, but the result was only a series of craters of varying depths. Unless covered by fire they would not give the German engineers much trouble to repair.

The Maori Battalion had difficulty in disengaging and had not shown up at 3 a.m., at which time it should have been in a defensive position at the mouth of the gorge. It was to come off the hills into the gorge near Hector's last demolition, where Brigadier Hargest

Brig J. Hargest, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, m.i.d.; born Gore, 4 Sep 1891; farmer; MP 1931–44; Otago Mtd Rifles 1914–20 (CO 2 Bn Otago Regt); comd 5 Bde May 1940-Nov 1941; p.w. 27 Nov 1941; escaped, Italy, Mar 1943; killed in action, France, 12 Aug 1944.

Fourth Brigade had a relatively quiet day; perhaps the enemy's success in forcing 21 Battalion off the Platamon ridge had been encouraging enough to leave the unpromising Servia area alone for the time being. The brigade was, however, in a most precarious situation for 16 Australian Brigade on its right had departed to reinforce 21 Battalion and 19 Australian Brigade on its left was also moving back, followed by 26 NZ Battalion which was under its command. Farther to the left Greek divisions were dispersing under the weight of enemy air and ground attacks, so that actually 4 Brigade had both its flanks open. Lieutenant Kelsall's section stopped filling bomb craters and began preparing demolitions instead.

At this stage it should be mentioned that the withdrawal timetable had been altered and 5 Brigade was to move back from Olympus a day earlier, to take advantage of the continued misty weather in the foothills which made it possible to use the roads in daylight. Accordingly 5 Brigade began to move during the afternoon. No. 3 Section, 7 Field Company, went with the brigade. A last-minute change of route from the coastal road, which had been reported as impassable, on to the central route, which was more than full of Australian traffic, resulted in a night of stopping and starting before Lamia was reached.

With the departure of 5 Brigade the enemy was free, if the blocks in the gorge did not prevent it, to get his vehicles as far as the Elevtherokhorion crossroads, five miles north of Elasson.

The Elasson area, where 6 Brigade was preparing a rearguard position, requires some description. The roads from the Olympus and Servia passes, the only practicable routes for wheeled traffic, met at Elevtherokhorion a little to the north, on the edge of the plain that surrounds Larisa. Elasson itself was also a junction with the road from Dheskati almost due west (some of the Australian troops and 26 Battalion came out that way). From Elasson to Tirnavos, about halfway to Larisa, there were two roads, the direct eastern route winding over hills and through a pass while the longer and easier western road followed the Xerias River for some distance. From Tirnavos the one road led direct to Larisa.

Seventh Field Company, less No. 3 Section, had arrived at Tirnavos before daylight, and Major Hanson was given a number of bridges and road blocks to get ready around Tirnavos and the two roads north to Elasson. Of course, there were insufficient power tools for so many jobs to be done simultaneously. Lieutenant Wildey describes how to demolish a road in constant use by transport and under continual attention by enemy bombers:

‘I prepared a demolition on the hill route and placed it about a quarter of a mile down the road from the crest on the slope facing the enemy approach. I had a sub-section of men from Lindell's section, I think, and Sergt I. Larson.

Sgt I. Larson; born NZ 23 Nov 1901; mechanic; died Dunedin, 11 May 1955.

‘We were straffed by fighters while loading these holes and it was very disconcerting having to crouch in a hole with some hundreds of pounds of explosive while the Jerries had their fun. While we were filling in these shafts the withdrawal of vehicles nose to tail was so continuous that we bobbed down while they straddled us and continued the work of tamping as soon as a gap occurred. Lt Wheeler had a demolition on the other side of the hill and it was arranged that he fire both.’

Besides the bridge at Elevtherokhorion where Lieutenant Thomas was working, other parties were in the Elasson Gorge between the two places, at the Elasson bridge where the track from Dheskati crossed the river, at the Black Bridge where the western fork crossed the Xerias River, and in the Tataritsos Gorge between the bridge and the town.

The 17th was a day of excursions and alarms around Larisa. It was also a slaughterous day in Larisa for the enemy air force expended great energy in trying to block the only exit for the retreating Anzac Corps. By this time, with the rain and the tremendous traffic, the roads were breaking up beyond repair and mud was the prevailing feature.

A big strain was taken by the Postal Section with units drawing rations in advance, and in consequence not being where the Divisional Postal Unit thought they were. The previous day 144 bags of mail had arrived but it had not been possible to deliver 46 bags, which were brought back to Larisa. Those postal sappers, like the field engineers, were fairly versatile types and did not always restrict themselves to delivering mail. The war diary of the Divisional Postal Unit contains the following entry dated 17 April:

‘Larissa heavily bombed, train abandoned by Greek railway officials. Cpl Sangster,

S-Sgt J. A. Sangster; Invercargill; born NZ 10 Aug 1901; postal clerk; p.w. Jun 1941.

The first bad news that reached Divisional Headquarters was of the premature blowing of a bridge on the Trikkala-Larisa road. It was to have been destroyed after the Australians had crossed the winding Pinios River, but was accidentally demolished before they arrived. What happened is best told by one of the actors in the drama.

‘While I was there I was in rather a poor show. I went out on a bridge on the Larissa/Trikkala road to prepare it for demolition. It was a fairly big one of about 5 spans each 100 ft about 40 ft above water level and was of steel struss construction—about 16 ft roadway and about 14 or 15 ft high. Well I found a fellow from the 6th Fd Coy. on the job and I was talking about some of the steel I struck on a reinforced concrete bridge I had trouble with the previous day. The result was that he put on a test cut to try the steel on one of the struts. After the explosion you can imagine our consternation when we found that we had blown up the bridge by accident…. I was extremely upset but nothing could be done except divert the traffic on a 10 mile detour. It caused a devil of a lot of trouble and was made much worse when later in the day the dive bombers blew up another big bridge on the detour and the fresh detour had to be increased to about 30 Miles.’

Letter, Capt J. B. Ferguson.

What actually happened was that the decking of the bridge was set on rollers on top of the piers, with the usual allowance for expansion and contraction. The shock of the test charge, a mere five plugs of explosive, was sufficient to make the span jump the rollers and drop into the river. The result of this accidental demolition, probably the cheapest on record, was that the Australians had to feel along the Pinios River for fords and crossings with the enemy at no great distance behind them. There was another bridge farther north but an unlucky, or according to the point of view, a well aimed bomb sent it up before their arrival. The troops had to cross by punts and fords while the vehicles continued on to Tirnavos and thence to Larisa.

Fifth Field Park Company had found nobody to take over from at the RE dump, which was being hammered by enemy planes. So in the absence of further orders, Captain Morrison on his own initiative sent the bulk of his company south to Lamia, while he with fifteen sappers returned to Larisa, where he met a very disturbed Australian officer wondering how he was to get his men across the river at the demolished Trikkala bridge. There was a punt nearby but the ropes were wearing, and it was feared that they would part and leave the troops stranded.

The upshot was that Captain Morrison was asked to fill a ninety-foot span in the bridge with no material and no men to do the work. There was a pile of bridging cribs in the engineer dump and he set about improvising a footbridge across the gap with the makeshift materials. For the non-technical reader a bridging crib is a box of steel angles 6 ft by 2 ft by 2 ft which may be fastened together with metal couplings. These were cantilevered out from one side as in the normal method of erecting a Bailey bridge, which at that time had not been invented. The crib was three feet from the far side when a defective coupling broke and the bridge folded up like a jack knife. This was being repaired when the Australians sent a message that they were all across and thank you very much. Engineers are fairly vocal in such a situation and they departed blasphemously for Lamia.

The enemy did not catch up with 21 Battalion until evening, when the first tanks were stopped by the box-car in the tunnel and the removal of the barge. Sixteenth Australian Brigade had arrived and taken up a position supporting the New Zealanders.

An idea, or perhaps a suggestion, the source of which, in spite of much inquiry, it has not been possible to ascertain, resulted in Sappers Hoot Gibson

Spr R. C. Gibson; Wanganui; born England, 16 Mar 1906; locomotive driver.

Fifth Brigade was moving south and 4 Brigade in the Servia Pass disengaged that night (17–18 April) and moved through 6 Brigade at Elasson en route for Molos. Two companies of 18 Battalion were the last troops to come off the silent ridges and climb aboard the waiting vehicles. Behind them were Lieutenant Kelsall's sappers, a section of carriers and the CO 20 Battalion, whose job as rearguard commander included ordering the firing of the demolitions.

The brigade was to be well clear of the Servia Pass before dawn but it was broad daylight when the engineers emerged into the open country. Behind them was a series of blown bridges, cratered roads, mined creeks and delayed action mines in ammunition dumps.

The vehicles were soon spotted from the air and the men were several times forced to halt and shelter from a plane that swooped along the road with blazing machine guns. There were no casualties from this attack but the extra delay was fatal. The blow fell at the moment that safety seemed assured.

‘400 yds from intersection at Elevetherokhorion and a shell landed in front of the truck and SA fire was heard behind us. Jumped out, looked back and saw two tanks on the road in the middle of the convoy; coming over the hills to the NE were 6–7 vehicles bringing motorised infantry. Looking back along the convoy of which only four trucks were visible I suddenly saw away to the right coming over the ridge motorised infantry sitting up in their tracked vehicles in row of forms like toy soldiers. Forward of me at the X roads I saw two Div Cav officers Col Carruth

Lt-Col H. G. Carruth, ED, m.i.d.; Whangarei; born Whangarei, 6 Nov 1895; solicitor; CO Div Cav Feb-Jul 1941; Comp Trg Depot Jul 1941-Apr 1942; wounded Apr 1941.

Colonel Kippenberger, describing the catastrophe from the rear of the column, wrote:

‘… we received a particularly determined attack from the plane and we were forced to halt and take cover. I noticed that there seemed to be more fire than one would expect from a single plane attacking and then saw that one truck was ablaze about 500 yards ahead of me, and ahead of it again and about the road junction was a medium tank which I recognised as German, and I also saw another tank shooting in a southerly direction from a point about 500 yards north of the cross roads and quite close to where I stood on the road…. two or three planes were now attacking the road and the sappers both with bombs and machine guns and making it very difficult to get a clear view of what was happening.’