To Greece

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Title Page

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 The authors of the volumes in this series of histories prepared under the supervision of the War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs have been given full access to official documents. They and the Editor-in-Chief are responsible for the statements made and the views expressed by them. By Authority: R. E. Owen, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand 1959

Mount Olympus, a post-war photograph

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 TO GREECE W. G. McCLYMONT WAR HISTORY BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRSWELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND1959Distributed bywhitcombe & tombs ltd.Christchurch, New Zealand

Preface

THIS volume deals with the formation of 2 NZEF, with the movements and experiences of its brigade groups before they assembled in Egypt, and finally with the operations of the New Zealand Division in Greece. The central theme has always been the history of the fighting units, but it has often been necessary to explain and discuss Government policy, the decisions of the senior commanders and the problems of Commonwealth co-operation. For the vital issues of this period of the war were often political as well as strategic.

Every effort has been made by the War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs to collect the necessary information. Many records were destroyed in Greece or, as sometimes happened, were taken off only to be lost or destroyed during the campaign in Crete. Reports were afterwards prepared in Egypt but they could not always be exact or complete. Many who fought in Greece had been killed or made prisoners of war in Crete; others who could have explained certain vague statements were later killed in North Africa. To establish the facts and to check the conclusions, the manuscript, or parts of it, has been read by many participants in the campaign, but it is possible that due attention has not been given to certain incidents. Nor was it always possible for me to record the names of those who took a prominent part in several important actions. At Kalamata, for example, the men who advanced along the waterfront were assembled in the dark and under the command of any natural leader who happened to be available. Twelve hours later the majority of them were prisoners of war. An apology is therefore offered to those whose work would otherwise have been described with more accuracy and in greater detail.

The officers and men who answered questions and checked sections of this narrative are so numerous that I cannot name them all. I am, however, very grateful for the most generous manner in which they assisted me. I wish, particularly, to acknowledge the help I have received from Lieutenant-General Lord Freyberg, the late Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, Major-General Sir Harold Barrowclough, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Puttick and Major-Generals Sir Keith Stewart, Sir William Gentry, and C. E. Weir.

I must also acknowledge how much I owe to the patience and co-operation of the Editor-in-Chief, Brigadier M. C. Fairbrother, and his staff, in particular to the assistance given to me by Mr I. McL. Wards, whose narrative was the basis for the Greek section of this volume.

Chapters 1–5 owe much to the researches of Mr W. A. Glue, who also prepared this volume for publication. The majority of the German documents quoted in the text were translated by Mr W. D. Dawson. Mr A. E. Monaghan, when Archivist, answered numerous letters, searched his files for papers and, by examining each personal card in Base Records, prepared the final list of casualties. His successor, Mr R. L. Kay, has been equally helpful and considerate, and I am also grateful to Mrs W. G. Woodward for her index.

I am also indebted to Mr A. D. McIntosh of the Department of External Affairs, Wellington; to Mr D. G. Esplin and Dr Angus Ross of the University of Otago; and to the Cartographic Branch of the Lands and Survey Department.

Overseas there are many to whom thanks must be expressed for their always willing assistance. In Australia there is Mr Gavin Long, the Australian Official Historian. In Britain there are Major-General I. S. O. Playfair, Brigadier H. B. Latham and Professor Sir James Butler of the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office; Lieutenant-Colonel E. E. Rich, who prepared for the War Office the narrative on the campaign in Greece; and the officers who supplied information about the action at Kalamata: Lieutenant-Colonel Basil Carey, 3 Royal Tank Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Geddes, Royal Army Service Corps, and Major G. A. F. Kennard, Shropshire Yeomanry.

Contents

Page PREFACE v 1 THE FIRST ECHELON 1 2 THE SECOND ECHELON 25 3 THIRD ECHELON JOINS THE FIRST 43 4 THE FIRST LIBYAN CAMPAIGN, 1940–41 62 5 ASSEMBLY AND TRAINING OF THE NEW ZEALAND DIVISION 79 6 THE BALKAN FRONT 86 7 W FORCE MOVES INTO POSITION 117 8 THE GERMANS INVADE GREECE 157 9 THE MONASTIR GAP 189 10 THE GREEK FRONT BEGINS TO CRUMBLE 215 11 THE NEW ZEALAND DIVISION GOES INTO ACTION 235 12 THE DEFENCE OF THE PASSES, 14–17 APRIL 254 13 THE CRITICAL DAYS, 17–18 APRIL 285 14 THE PINIOS GORGE 315 15 THE PREPARATION OF THE THERMOPYLAE LINE 347 16 THE EVACUATION FROM GREECE BEGINS 362 17 THE DEFENCE OF BRALLOS AND THERMOPYLAE PASSES, 24 APRIL 384 18 THE FIRST STAGES OF THE EVACUATION 400 19 THE CORINTH CANAL 413 20 THE EVACUATION CONTINUES 432 21 KALAMATA 448 22 2 NZEF IN NORTH AFRICA, APRIL–MAY 1941 464 23 CONCLUSION 471 APPENDICES: I: Strengths and Casualties. 486 II: Inter-Services Committee's report. 489 III: Mr Fraser's Questionnaire to the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on the Campaigns in Greece and Crete 491 GLOSSARY 515 BIBLIOGRAPHY 519

List of Illustrations

The photographs in the W. G. McClymont collection were taken during a visit to Greece in October–November 1945. Mr McClymont was then the Official Archivist, 2 NZEF

Frontispiece Mount Olympus, a post-war photograph W. G. McClymont collection Following page 102 Trentham Camp, 1939 C. Boyer First Echelon recruits at Hopu Hopu receive their web equipment Weekly News Visitors' Day, Trentham, before the departure of the First Echelon in January 1940 C. Boyer Second Echelon farewell parade at the Auckland Domain, April 1940 Weekly News First Echelon troops on board the Dunera, Lyttelton, 5 January 1940 Green and Hahn Railway Construction sappers board the Andes at Lyttelton, 1 May 1940 Green and Hahn Submarine lookout, Mauretania NZ Army (G. R. Bull) First Echelon and AIF convoy in the Indian Ocean, January 1940 R. D. Coats collection Mess-deck General Freyberg welcomes the First Echelon at Port Tewfik, 12 February 1940 20 Battalion arrives at Maadi Camp, February 1940 G. L. Lawrence Battalion lines, Maadi G. L. Lawrence Second Echelon disembarks at Gourock Central Press Mytchett Place, Headquarters of 2 NZEF in the United Kingdom C. W. Hawkins Mr Churchill takes the salute from D Company of the Maori Battalion Gale and Polden Loading spruce. New Zealand Forestry Group in the United Kingdom C. H. Chandler collection Following page 202 General Freyberg at his desk, Maadi Camp A 4 Field Regiment gun crew trains at Maadi on an 18-pounder British Official 19 Battalion at work on the anti-tank ditch at Wadi Naghamish, June 1940 D. W. Sinclair collection New Zealand trucks carry back Italian prisoners from the First Libyan Campaign, December 1940 J. T. Burrows collection River-crossing training on the Nile, February 1941 R. L. McGaffin collection The Marit Maersk arrives at Piraeus, Greece, 17 March 1941 V. C. Gordon Athens welcomes the New Zealanders D. A. Hawkins Hymettus Camp J. Forsyth Athens from the Acropolis C. R. Ambury 21 Battalion men break their train journey north N. L. Macky collection The motor transport convoy on the road between Elevtherokhorion and Dolikhe J. M. Twhigg collection On the Aliakmon line: General Freyberg and his G1, Colonel K. L. Stewart J. C. White GOC's conference J. C. White General Sir Archibald Wavell—from a sketch by Peter McIntyre NZ Army General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson British Official General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, visits Maadi Camp NZ Army Following page 302 Bishop Gerard conducts a service near Katerini, March 1941 D. M. Burns Vevi. Looking north-west towards the Yugoslav border from a New Zealand machine-gun post B. W. Bayly collection Blown bridge over the Aliakmon River J. F. Potter collection New Zealand positions at Platamon castle under bombardment —from a German magazine The coastline north of Platamon from the castle E. K. S. Rowe Looking west towards Pandeleimon from the castle R. B. McClymont Preparing gun positions in the Olympus Pass J. C. White Looking towards Katerini from the Maori Battalion positions in Olympus Pass—a post-war photograph W. G. McClymont collection New Zealand engineers build a road in the Olympus Pass E. K. S. Rowe Servia, looking towards the Aliakmon River—a post-war photograph W. G. McClymont collection 19 Battalion's first German prisoners, Servia NZ Army Mist covers the withdrawal through the Servia Pass I. C. Macphail New Zealand provost on point duty, Olympus Pass T. A. Goodall The Pinios ferry—a post-war photograph W. G. McClymont collection German tanks ford the Pinios River —from a German magazine Following page 400 German forces cross the Pinios River —a page from a German magazine German reconnaissance plane in the Molos area J. A. Carroll collection Thermopylae J. L. McIndoe collection Sunrise near Kriekouki J. C. White Shelling disperses the enemy advanced guard at Kriekouki S. N. S. Crump Brigadier Puttick's map of Attica showing 4 Brigade positions at Porto Rafti Athens waves goodbye. A convoy passes through the city during the withdrawal N. Blackburn Porto Rafti H. K. Kippenberger collection Corinth Bridge A Sunderland flying boat lies off the coast of Greece British Official Commanders' conference near Monemvasia J. C. White New Zealand troops arrive at Suda Bay, Crete HMAS Nizam, carrying troops from Greece, arrives at Alexandria British Official The Salween disembarks troops at Alexandria L. C. Smart collection

List of Maps

Facing page The Mediterranean Theatre 17 Central and Eastern Mediterranean 51 Greece 85 The German Plan of Attack and Allied Positions on 5 April 1941 119 Planned Positions, 11–14 April 1941 169 The Planned Withdrawal to Thermopylae, 14–18 April 1941 219 The Pinios Gorge Action, 17–18 April 1941 253 Southern Greece. Situation on 26 April 1941 after German Paratroop landings at Corinth 367 In text Page The opening attacks of the First Libyan Campaign, 9–11 December 1940 64 The Aliakmon Line. The New Zealand Division s early positions in Greece, 5 April 1941 143 21 Battalion at Platamon, 14–16 April 1941 174 4 Brigade positions at Servia Pass, 10–17 April 1941 185 Mackay Force rearguards, 10–13 April 1941 191 Dispersion of Greek Forces and Withdrawal of 1 Armoured Brigade, 14–17 April 1941 220 Withdrawal of 16 and 19 Australian Brigades, 15–16 April 1941 239 5 Brigade holds the Olympus Pass, 14–17 April 1941 256 Enemy attack on 19 Battalion, morning 15 April 1941 274 4 Brigade at Servia, 15–18 April 1941 278 4 and 5 Brigades withdraw to Thermopylae, 17–19 April 1941 289 The Rearguard at Elevtherokhorion, morning 18 April 1941 300 6 Brigade rearguard action at Elasson, 18 April 1941 304 Withdrawal through Larisa, morning 19 April 1941 338 The Germans approach Thermopylae, 19–21 April 1941 350 The Thermopylae battlefield, 480 BC and 1941 353 The Evacuation Beaches 373 Brallos Pass and Thermopylae, 24 April 1941 385 Thermopylae, 24 April 1941 388 Corinth Canal positions, 26 April 1941 414 4 Brigade rearguard in the Kriekouki Pass, 26 April 1941 433 4 Brigade positions, Porto Rafti, 27 April 1941 438 The battle for Kalamata waterfront, 28–29 April 1941 452

Draft of message from General Freyberg to General Blamey, 23 April 1941 379

The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The ranks are those held on discharge or at the date of death.

CHAPTER 1 The First Echelon

AT dawn on 1 September 1939 the Luftwaffe attacked the Polish airfields and the Wehrmacht crossed the Polish border. That day, and again on 3 September, the British Government asked Germany for immediate assurances that her aggressive action would be suspended and her troops withdrawn from Polish territory. Unless this was done Britain would, without hesitation, fulfil her obligations to Poland. At the same time the Dominions, warned that Britain was preparing for war, were asked to co-operate and to take precautionary measures.

This was a necessary procedure. In 1914 it had been natural to think that because Britain was at war the rest of the Empire was at war. In 1939 the Dominions, as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, ‘in no way subordinate one to another’, were free to act as they individually thought fit.

New Zealand declared war on Germany on 3 September; South Africa on 6 September; Canada on 10 September. Australia on 3 September stated: ‘Great Britain has declared war … Australia is also at war ….’

In New Zealand's case the Government entirely concurred with, and warmly endorsed, what was virtually the issue of an ultimatum.

Some precautionary measures had already been taken. On 30 August No. 1 Platoon, A Company, a small detachment of two officers and thirty other ranks from the Regular Force, had been sent in HMS Leander to garrison Fanning Island, a coral atoll 3° 54′ north of the Equator and an important trans-Pacific cable station. The Government now went further. All Regular reservists and some of the Special Reserve (Class 2)

Ex-Regulars and returned soldiers, aged 35 to 55.

were mobilised, the coastal defences were manned and vital points placed under guard.

When no reply was received from Germany it was announced in a New Zealand Gazette Extraordinary that ‘a state of war … existed from 9.30 p.m. New Zealand Standard Time on the third day of September 1939.’ This made the Dominion's proclamation simultaneous with that of the United Kingdom. It was forwarded to the German Government by the United States Ambassador in Berlin.

There is no copy of this note, which is the first declaration of war made by New Zealand as an independent member of the Commonwealth. The greater part of the archives of the United States Embassy in Berlin was destroyed by fire during the war.

The despatch to London stated that ‘His Majesty's Government in New Zealand desire immediately to associate themselves with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in honouring their pledged word. They entirely concur with the action taken, which they regard as inevitably forced upon the British Commonwealth if the cause of justice, freedom and democracy is to endure in this world…. The New Zealand Government wish to offer to the British Government the fullest assurance of all possible support. They are convinced that the step that has been taken will meet with the approval of the people of this Dominion, and they will in due course give the fullest consideration to any suggestion of the British Government as to the method, or methods, by which this Dominion can best assist in the common cause.’

The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 4 Sep 1939 (Despatched 1.55 a.m.).

So far as land forces were concerned, the first step was the decision by Cabinet on 6 September to mobilise 6600 men, a Special Force for service within and without New Zealand. This was the first echelon of what from 12 December 1939 was known as 2 New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Enlistment would be entirely voluntary and would be restricted according to age. Other ranks and non-commissioned officers had to be between the ages of 21 and 35 years, subalterns under 30, captains under 35, majors under 40 and lieutenant-colonels under 45 years.

The forces from which these recruits could be drawn were not relatively as strong as those which were available in 1914 when there was a system of compulsory training. There were the Regular Force and the Territorial Force, both under the control of the Army Board.

The Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Army Secretary. Up to 13 May 1939 the appointments of Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General had been combined in the one appointment of Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.

But in actual practice the former was only a small instructional and administrative staff of 100 officers and 478 other ranks. The latter, though it was organised to protect the main ports and to provide a field force that could be expanded in time of war, was not based upon any system of compulsory training. The compulsory clauses of the Defence Act 1909 had been suspended in 1930, and the Territorial Force when re-established in 1932 had been based upon a system of voluntary enlistment. In 1930 there had been 17,500 trainees; in 1939 under the voluntary scheme there were on 31 March only 778 officers and 9586 other ranks. This was disappointing, but the system did at least provide the essentials for a scheme of training, even if its successful application was dependent upon the patriotic services of a small number of officers and non-commissioned officers, many of whom had served in the First World War. Without them there would have been no Territorial Force; without the Territorial Force it would have been impossible to organise the Expeditionary Force in any reasonable length of time.

There was one other training cadre, the Territorial Special Reserve which had been formed in 1937. Single men between the ages of 18 and 30 had the opportunity of enlisting for five months' military training, during which time facilities would also be provided for vocational training. They were afterwards given the opportunity to join the Regular Force or be posted to Territorial units. In 1939, however, there were only 374 other ranks in this unit.

These groups with their different standards of training were allowed for when more detailed plans were prepared. Army Headquarters gave preference to single men in the following order: serving members of the Territorial Force; members of the infantry section of the Special Reserve; members of Class I

Men with not less than two years' Territorial training.

of the National Military Reserve; other single men with or without military experience. The period of training was to be for a maximum of three months in special camps. If their services were not required at the end of this period, all ranks would be granted leave without pay and allowed to return to their civil occupations until called up again. Enlistment would be for the duration of the war and twelve months thereafter or until lawfully discharged.

At 9 a.m. on Tuesday 12 September the recruiting offices were opened, and when the doors closed that night 5419 men had enlisted. Thereafter the figures were rather disappointing, no doubt because of uncertainty as to the role of the Special Force, but by 5 October, when the First Echelon was assembling, the total was 14,983. Even so, it was difficult to bring the new units up to strength and quite unnecessary to have any system of priority, for the somewhat high medical standards had already caused many rejections. Consequently on 11 April 1940 the age limit for other ranks was raised to 40 years and by May the justice of conscription

See Chapter 3, pp. 44–5.

was being hotly debated throughout the country.

To prevent these enlistments from upsetting the economic structure of the Dominion, the National Service Department was established with a Manpower Committee of the Department of Industries and Commerce. It drew up a Schedule of Reserved Occupations, which was afterwards replaced by the Schedule of Important Occupations. The Social Security Department compiled a register of every male resident in the Dominion over the age of sixteen, and the placement officers of the Department of Labour scrutinised the lists of volunteers and recommended that the military service of certain essential workers be postponed. Married men with more than two children, men engaged in primary industries, and those who were essential in secondary industries were withdrawn from the Special Force. In this way it was intended that the manpower of the Dominion should be conserved and directed into those industries essential for the successful prosecution of the war.

Meanwhile, throughout September, the British and New Zealand Governments had been discussing the best means by which the land forces of the Dominion could co-operate in the common cause. They decided that New Zealand should raise a division,

The Gazette of 11 January 1940 revoked the Special Force Emergency Regulation. That formation became part of the Expeditionary Force provided for by the Expeditionary Force Regulations of 11 January 1940 under the Defence Act 1909.

as in 1914–18, and despatch it for operations overseas wherever it could be employed most usefully. Plans were therefore made for the first echelon

The term ‘echelon’ was first used by Army Headquarters on 28 August 1939. Although HQ 2 NZEF, Middle East, announced on 23 September 1940 that the title would in future be ‘contingent’, the term remained in official use in New Zealand and in everyday conversation by all ranks in the Middle East.

of this division to enter camp on 3 October, for the second echelon to assemble two months later, and for the third echelon to be called up another two months later. Within eight months there would be a complete division. But it was doubtful if there was in New Zealand the necessary equipment for training in mechanised warfare. And there was also the question whether troops in training should be held in the Dominion until the Division was complete, or whether they should be sent overseas as and when the echelons became available.

Any action by New Zealand was, moreover, governed by the attitude of Japan. Until that country played her first card no confident decision could be made. If she remained neutral and friendly then a force could be sent to serve in France, or perhaps to replace British troops in India, Burma or Singapore. On the other hand, if Japan maintained ‘an attitude of reserve’ towards the democratic powers it would be most unwise to send an expedition outside the Pacific area. This was the preliminary decision in September 1939. The problem could be studied again when the Division or one of its echelons had completed its training.

In the meantime the Division would be organised and trained for service overseas. The first echelon would consist of some staff for an overseas base, part of Divisional Headquarters and one infantry brigade group. The second echelon would have the rest of Divisional Headquarters and another infantry brigade group. The third echelon would be the remaining brigade group. Each brigade was to be drawn in approximately equal proportions from the three military districts. In 4 Infantry Brigade, for example, 18 Battalion came from the Northern (Auckland), 19 Battalion from the Central (Wellington) and 20 Battalion from the Southern (South Island) Military District.

The First Echelon was assembled and organised at Ngaruawahia, Trentham and Burnham.

Papakura: 18 Bn (from 7 November), Div Amn Coy, 4 Res MT Coy (details). Ngaruawahia: Div Cav Regt (13 LAD attached), HQ Div Arty (details), 4 Fd Regt (9 LAD attached), HQ NZE (details), 5 Fd Pk Coy (10 LAD attached), 6 Fd Coy. Trentham: HQ NZ Div (details), Div Int Sec, Div Sigs (14 LAD attached), HQ 4 Inf Bde (11 LAD attached), 19 Bn, HQ Div ASC (details), Div Pet Coy (details), 4 Res MT Coy (details), Div Provost Coy (details), Div Postal Unit (details), Div Employment Pl, GHQ 1 and 2 Ech (details), Base Depot (details), Base Pay Office (details), Base Post Office (details).

Burnham: 20 Bn, 27 (MG) Bn (12 LAD attached), Div Supply Column (details), 4 Res MT Coy (details), 4 Fd Amb, 4 Fd Hyg Sec.

On 27 September courses began for officers and non-commissioned officers. The main drafts marched in on 3 October and the battalions were organised with members of the Regular Force as adjutants, regimental sergeants-major or company sergeants-major.

The nomenclature of these units had presented an unexpected problem of army organisation and regimental tradition. The major formations had not been difficult to number. First New Zealand Division with its three infantry brigades was for home defence. The formation to go overseas would, therefore, be 2 New Zealand Division with 4, 5 and 6 Brigades.

2 NZ Division did not become the official title in 2 NZEF until 29 June 1942.

With the smaller units it was not so simple. The Adjutant- General, Colonel Mead,

Maj-Gen O. H. Mead, CBE, DSO, m.i.d.; born Dunedin, 24 Jan 1892; Regular soldier; Canty Regt 1914–20 (comd 1 Bn and 3 (Res) Bn); Commander, Southern Military District, Oct 1940–Feb 1942; GOC Pacific Section, 2 NZEF, Feb–Jul 1942; lost at sea in aircraft accident, 25 Jul 1942.

wished to avoid the duplication of numbers held by earlier or existing units. So with a deplorable disregard for tradition it was decided that the regimental numbers should follow on after those of the Territorial Force. As there were seventeen Territorial infantry regiments in existence or in suspension, the numbering of the Expeditionary Force battalions started with 18 Battalion; there had been a 3 Field Regiment so the new artillery units began with 4 Field Regiment; and in succession to 4 Field Company, New Zealand Engineers, came 5 Field Park Company.

At this stage, in addition to the First Echelon, units were also being organised from the Maori volunteers and from the New Zealanders in Britain. Two days after the declaration of war the Maori members of Parliament had suggested that the race should have its own unit in the Special Force, an infantry battalion rather than the pioneer and labour unit of the First World War. The Government, however, did not announce its decision until October. Thereafter, Maoris who had enrolled in the force were given the option of remaining in camp with their original units or of being transferred to 28 (Maori) Battalion, which would train at Palmerston North and leave with the Second Echelon, giving the Division ten infantry battalions instead of the nine in the current establishment. In 1914–18 conscription had been applied to the Maoris, but throughout the Second World War enlistment in the battalion was always voluntary. At this stage it was limited to single men between 21 and 35, but by the end of the war married men with two children were being accepted. Recruiting began on 9 October and by the end of the month there were 895 volunteers, from whom a selected group entered Army School, Trentham, there to be under the command of Major Dittmer, MBE, MC,

Brig G. Dittmer, CBE, DSO, MC, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Maharahara, 4 Jun 1893; Regular soldier; Auckland Regt 1914–19 (OC 1 NZ Entrenching Bn); CO 28 (Maori) Bn Jan 1940–Feb 1942; comd 1 Inf Bde Gp (in NZ) Apr 1942–Aug 1943; 1 Div, Aug 1942–Jan 1943; Fiji Military Forces and Fiji Inf Bde Gp, Sep 1943–Nov 1945; Commander, Central Military District, 1946–48.

and trained as future officers and NCOs.

Those New Zealanders who enlisted in Britain formed the nucleus of what was to be 7 Anti-Tank Regiment. As recruits they were perhaps more sophisticated than the men on the parade grounds of Burnham or Trentham. They did not belong to the four main groups of the Special Force: general and seasonal labourers; public servants; professional and white-collar workers; farmers and skilled tradesmen. Among them were artists and architects, musicians and journalists, students from Kew Gardens and, for New Zealanders, many odd specialists such as a floor manager from a Lyons Corner House, a colonial servant from North Borneo, idealists from the Spanish War and a cook from the Savoy Hotel. Aldershot absorbed them all when they marched in on 26 October to become the New Zealand Anti-Tank Battery (later 34 Battery, 7 Anti-Tank Regiment), with Major Duff

Brig C. S. J. Duff, DSO, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Wellington, 19 Nov 1898; Regular soldier; comd 34 NZ A-Tk Bty 1939–40; CO 7 A-Tk Regt, Oct 1940–May 1941; 4 Fd Regt, Aug 1941–Apr 1942; CRA 3 NZ Div, Aug 1942–Oct 1944; NZLO Melbourne, 1947–48.

as commanding officer.

In New Zealand, by this time, the First Echelon had been in camp for several weeks. The new recruit was being trained, clothed and equipped; he was being made dentally fit; he had received his paybook and had been inoculated against many diseases. He may have spent many hours on the parade ground, enchanted by the spell of orderly movement, but he was just as likely to have spent them in a queue waiting to receive issues of clothing that neither matched nor fitted. And very probably he had suffered in the influenza epidemic that had disrupted the organisation of all four camps in late October and early November. Nevertheless, the camps were expanding rapidly, wet canteens had been established in November and there were encouraging signs of possible service overseas.

The majority of the senior officers in camp, those with the First Echelon and those waiting for appointments with the Second Echelon, were civilians who had served in 1914–18 and had been members of the Territorial Army during that depressing period between the wars when it was fashionable to decry any interest in military affairs. They may have lacked some of the qualifications of the trained professional soldier, but they had actually held commands, which few Regulars had done, and they were still young enough to train the raw recruits and to command the battalions in the field. In some cases their civilian occupations had indirectly prepared them for this new adventure. To quote General Freyberg: ‘Our Medical Corps and Engineers, for example, are drawn entirely from civilian life with civilians occupying all the senior appointments. Their outlook is different from that of their military counterparts in the British Army. They are more original in thought and more experienced in practice, with the result that many new ideas have developed which have proved of benefit to the whole Army.’

Army Quarterly, October 1944, p. 33.

The brigade commander, Colonel Puttick, DSO,

Lt-Gen Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Timaru, 26 Jun 1890; Regular soldier; NZ Rifle Bde 1914–19 (CO 3 Bn); comd 4 Bde Jan 1940–Aug 1941; 2 NZ Div (Crete) 29 Apr–27 May 1941; CGS and GOC NZ Military Forces, Aug 1941–Dec 1945.

was a Regular officer who had commanded a battalion of the Rifle Brigade in 1917–18. He was to show that he had administrative ability, a very high standard of soldierly conduct and the useful gift of knowing, apparently instinctively, what was going on throughout his brigade. It went into action for the first time in Greece in April 1941, a well-disciplined and well-trained formation, a credit to his efficiency and common sense.

His brigade major at this stage was Major Hunt,

Brig F. L. Hunt, OBE, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Leeston, 30 Nov 1890; Regular soldier; Otago Regt 1915–16; 2 NZEF, Egypt, 1940–41; comd 8 Bde, 3 NZ Div, May–Jul 1942; 16 Bde Gp (Tonga) Feb 1943–Feb 1944; Adjutant-General, 1946; Quartermaster-General, 1946–48.

another Regular officer. Eighteenth Battalion, drawn from Auckland Province, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Gray,

Brig J. R. Gray, ED, m.i.d.; born Wellington, 7 Aug 1900; barrister and solicitor; CO 18 Bn Sep 1939–Nov 1941, Mar–Jun 1942; comd 4 Bde 29 Jun–5 Jul 1942; killed in action 5 Jul 1942.

an Auckland lawyer; 19 Battalion, enlisted from Wellington, Taranaki and Hawke's Bay, by Lieutenant-Colonel Varnham, MC,

Brig F. S. Varnham, MC, ED, m.i.d.; Gisborne; born Wellington, 1 Nov 1888; newspaper manager; Wellington Regt 1915–19 (Staff Capt 1 Inf Bde); CO 19 Bn Oct 1939–Apr 1941, Jun–Oct 1941; comd 7 Inf Bde Gp (NZ) May 1942–May 1943; injured 15 Apr 1941.

a company manager from New Plymouth; and 20 (South Island) Battalion by Lieutenant- Colonel Kippenberger,

Maj-Gen Sir Howard Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, ED, m.i.d., Legion of Merit (US); born Ladbrooks, 28 Jan 1897; barrister and solicitor; 1 NZEF 1916–17; CO 20 Bn Sep 1939–Apr 1941, Jun–Dec 1941; comd 10 Bde, Crete, May 1941; 5 Bde Jan 1942–Jun 1943, Nov 1943–Feb 1944; GOC 2 NZ Div, 30 Apr–14 May 1943, 9 Feb–2 Mar 1944; comd 2 NZEF Prisoner-of-War Reception Group (UK) Oct 1944– Sep 1945; twice wounded; Editor-in-Chief, NZ War Histories, 1946–57; died Wellington, 5 May 1957.

who had been a lawyer at Rangiora. Lieutenant-Colonel Pierce, MC,

Lt-Col C. J. Pierce, MC, ED, m.i.d.; born Inglewood, 5 Feb 1893; farmer; Wgtn Mtd Rifles, 1914–19 (Capt); CO Div Cav Sep 1939–Feb 1941; died NZ 31 Jul 1941.

a farmer, commanded the Divisional Cavalry Regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel Inglis, MC,

Maj-Gen L. M. Inglis, CB, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, VD, ED, m.i.d., MC (Gk); Hamilton; born Mosgiel, 16 May 1894; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde and MG Bn, 1915–19; CO 27 (MG) Bn, Dec 1939–Aug 1940; comd 4 Inf Bde, 1941–42, and 4 Armd Bde, 1942–44; GOC 2 NZ Div, 27 Jun–16 Aug 1942, 6 Jun–31 Jul 1943; Chief Judge of the Control Commission Supreme Court in British Zone of Occupation, Germany, 1947–50; Stipendiary Magistrate.

a Timaru lawyer, commanded 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion. Varnham, Pierce and Inglis had all been commissioned in 1914–18 and had served with distinction; Kippenberger had been an infantry private. All were commanding or had recently been commanding Territorial units, Inglis a Territorial brigade.

Fourth Field Regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Parkinson,

Maj-Gen G. B. Parkinson, CBE, DSO and bar, m.i.d., Legion of Merit (US); Christchurch; born Wellington, 5 Nov 1896; Regular soldier; NZ Fd Arty 1917–19; CO 4 Fd Regt Jan 1940–Aug 1941; comd 1 NZ Army Tank Bde and 7 Inf Bde Gp (in NZ) 1941–42; 6 Bde Apr 1943–Jun 1944; GOC 2 NZ Div 3–27 Mar 1944; CRA 2 NZ Div Jun–Aug 1944; comd 6 Bde Aug 1944–Jun 1945; Quartermaster-General, Army HQ, Jan–Sep 1946; NZ Military Liaison Officer, London, 1946–49; Commander, Southern Military District, 1949–51.

a Regular officer who had served as a gunner officer in France. Few of the civilian specialists had as yet appeared, so 5 Field Park Company was commanded by Captain Sanders,

Col G. P. Sanders, DSO, m.i.d.; Auckland; born England, 2 Sep 1908; Regular soldier; BM 4 Bde 1940–41; GSO II NZ Div Apr–Dec 1941; CO 26 Bn Jun–Jul 1944; 27 (MG) Bn Nov 1944–Oct 1945; 27 Bn (Japan) Oct 1945–May 1946; Director of Training, Army HQ, 1949–53; Commander, Fiji Military Forces, Oct 1956–Dec 1958.

a Regular officer, and 6 Field Company by Major Rudd,

Col L. F. Rudd, DSO, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Christchurch, 13 Jan 1898; barrister and solicitor; 1 NZEF 1917–19; wounded and p.w. Apr 1918; OC 6 Fd Coy 1939–41; Military Secretary, 2 NZEF, Jul 1941–Mar 1944; comd 2 NZEF Reception Group (UK) Aug–Oct 1944; British legal mission to Greece, 1945.

another Auckland lawyer. Fourth Field Ambulance, however, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Will,

Lt-Col J. H. Will, ED; born Scotland, 1 Feb 1883; medical practitioner; CO 4 Fd Amb Oct 1939–Sep 1940; SMO Ngaruawahia Camp Sep 1941–Jan 1943; died Auckland, 19 Aug 1954.

a medical practitioner from Auckland, 4 Field Hygiene Section by Major Wyn Irwin,

Maj B. T. Wyn Irwin, m.i.d.; born Christchurch, 12 Oct 1905; Medical Officer of Health, Wellington; OC 4 Fd Hyg Sec Oct 1939–Sep 1941; OC Maadi Camp Hyg Sec Sep–Dec 1941; died 12 Mar 1942.

the Medical Officer of Health for Wellington. The standard of the junior medical officers with 4 Field Ambulance was high; five were afterwards to command field ambulances and one was to be Assistant Director of Medical Services of 2 New Zealand Division in Italy.

Under the command of these officers the units of the First Echelon began their elementary training. In November 18 Battalion moved from its bell tents at Hopu Hopu, near Ngaruawahia, to the incomplete but relatively palatial camp at Papakura, where there were wooden huts and bitumen roads, hot water and electric lights. The other units spent several weeks in the field. Nineteenth Battalion, the Divisional Cavalry and 4 Field Regiment went to Waiouru; 20 Battalion and 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion enjoyed an idyllic existence at Cave but trained very seriously. The exercises may have been too advanced but the men were enthusiastic, even if there was a shortage of such modern equipment as mortars, anti-tank rifles, Bren carriers and transport.

In November 1939 while the echelon was doing this training, the deputy Prime Minister, the Hon. P. Fraser, was in London attending a conference of Commonwealth ministers and discussing with the British authorities the future movements of the Expeditionary Force. They decided that the international situation and the attitude of Japan in particular justified the despatch of a complete division. In organisation it would be similar to a British infantry division with an additional battalion, though New Zealand had no objection to its conversion into a motorised formation after its arrival overseas. In the first instance its destination would be Egypt, on account of the training facilities in that country and because of its strategic importance in the Middle East. The First Echelon would leave in January 1940. It was thought that the early despatch of Dominion troops might possibly have a good effect upon world opinion and would most certainly alleviate New Zealand's problem of equipment and accommodation. The Division was to be complete by the beginning of August and fully trained by the end of September; the first section

Though this was the first section of the reinforcements to go overseas, it was, in succession to the three echelons, always known as the 4th Reinforcements.

of the reinforcements would arrive in July 1940.

These decisions had not been easy to make, nor had they been just a matter for discussion between the representatives of Great Britain and New Zealand. In many cases the respective interests of Australia and New Zealand had to be considered. There had been no difference of opinion about their forces being sent to the Middle East. Much would have been gained, ‘particularly from the psychological point of view’, by sending the Australian and New Zealand troops to Britain. But they would have arrived in winter to occupy unprepared quarters and, at this juncture, it was essential to build up a strategic reserve in the Middle East. This was the deciding factor, important at the moment and still more important in the future history of the Dominion.

There was a difference of opinion between the two Dominions as to the date on which the forces should be sent to the Middle East. The Australian Government could see no reason why Dominion troops should be transferred to the unruffled battle front in France, nor could it understand how transports and naval convoys could be found when there was a shortage of shipping for Australian exports. More important still, it was not convinced that Japan would remain neutral and that the Admiralty could maintain the security of Singapore. For these reasons the Government with a continent to defend did not wish to make any hasty decision. New Zealand, on the other hand, wished to send her First Echelon overseas as soon as its elementary training was completed. This would enable the Second Echelon to enter camp and the First Echelon to train overseas with the modern equipment which did not exist in New Zealand. The opinion of the Government was ‘that the retention of our voluntary system of recruiting is to some extent dependent on the knowledge and the fact that the men will serve overseas.’

Documents relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War, Vol. I, p. 44.

Therefore New Zealand on 20 November, without consulting Australia, informed Great Britain that the First Echelon would be sent to the Middle East in January 1940.

The following day the Australian Government suggested that ‘we should watch developments of the next three or four weeks before committing ourselves to the despatch of our division overseas.’ The New Zealand Government, having assumed that the question was one of ‘common arrangement’ with their respective ministers in London, now regretted that there was no longer time to discuss the question. Arrangements had already been made by the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. M. J. Savage, on 23 November to announce that the Division would be sent overseas. The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr Menzies, made a similar announcement on 29 November. His hand may have been forced by the New Zealand announcement and he may have been embarrassed politically,

Mr Curtin, Leader of the Opposition in the Australian Federal Parliament, had stated publicly that he was opposed to the despatch of a force overseas. See Documents, Vol. I, pp. 48–9.

though at the conference in London Australia had made it quite clear that she had every intention of sending a force overseas. The important lesson for the future was his gentle reminder to New Zealand that the two Dominions had, at her suggestion,

Documents, Vol. I, Appx III, pp. 338–9.

agreed in 1938 to exchange opinions about defence policy, and in time of war to supply each other with the fullest possible information.

An equally important subject was the appointment of a commander for the Expeditionary Force. So much depended upon this decision that Mr Fraser had been considering the subject ever since he landed in Britain. In 1914 it had been perfectly natural that the commander and senior staff officers should come from the British Army. Sir Andrew Russell, a Hawke's Bay sheep-farmer of ‘very remarkable and outstanding qualities’,

Colonel H. Stewart, The New Zealand Division in 1916–19, p. 614.

had certainly commanded 1 New Zealand Division in 1916–18, but he was an ex-regular and the Expeditionary Force as a whole had been commanded throughout the war by a British officer, Sir Alexander Godley.

But Gallipoli and the long campaigns in France, Flanders and Palestine, the Balfour Report and the Statute of Westminster

Although the Statute of Westminster was passed in 1931 it was not fully adopted by New Zealand until 1947. Its principles, however, had influenced New Zealand's policy long before that date. As a self-governing Dominion, the country had her responsibilities and naturally moved in step with the more mature members of the Commonwealth.

had changed the status of the Dominion. The Division in 1939 would be more than a component of the British Army; it would be the national army of New Zealand. This meant that Fraser had to do more than recommend an officer who could command the Division in action. He had to select an able administrator who could conduct the affairs of an independent army and carry out the policy of the Dominion Government.

At any other time it might have been difficult to find such a commander, but fortunately there was a New Zealander with all these qualifications. He was Major-General Bernard Freyberg, VC, CB, CMG, DSO, LLD,

Lt-Gen Lord Freyberg, VC, GCMG, KCB, KBE, DSO and 3 bars, m.i.d., Order of Valour and MC (Gk); born Richmond, Surrey, 21 Mar 1889; CO Hood Bn 1914–16; comd 173 Bde, 58 Div, and 88 Bde, 29 Div, 1917–18; GOC 2 NZEF Nov 1939–Nov 1945; twice wounded; Governor-General of New Zealand Jun 1946–Aug 1952.

who had offered his services to the Dominion and expressed the hope that he might serve with his compatriots. At the moment he was commanding the Salisbury Plain Area, but General Sir William Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, intended in the very near future to give him the command of a British division. If the New Zealand Government was to utilise his services, the most suitable position for him would be that of commander of the Expeditionary Force. The organisation and training of the units in New Zealand would be the responsibility of Major-General Duigan,

Maj-Gen Sir John Duigan, KBE, CB, DSO, m.i.d.; born NZ 30 Mar 1882; served South Africa, 1900–1; 1 NZEF 1915–18; Chief of General Staff, NZ Military Forces, 1937–41; died 9 Jan 1950.

then Chief of the General Staff.

General Freyberg's contemporaries did what one's contemporaries do not always do—they spoke highly of him. And Mr Fraser was impressed by the importance the General attached to the welfare and health of his soldiers. His offer was accepted and, on 23 November, Mr Savage announced that the force would be sent overseas to an undisclosed destination under the command of General Freyberg. From Britain Fraser afterwards said, ‘Indeed, I think it proper to say that I have heard no criticism of the appointment and nothing but praise, and that I am entirely satisfied that the right thing has been done.’

The soldier who won such respect from the prudent Mr Fraser was born in Surrey in 1889 and brought to New Zealand at the age of two. As Bernard Cyril Freyberg—Freyberg Tertius—he attended Wellington College, where he was prominent as a natural athlete, a magnificent swimmer. Since then he had moved in many different worlds and played too many distinctive parts for him to be described as a typical New Zealander.

In 1912 he had left for North America and did not reappear until 1914, when he became an officer in the Hood battalion of the Royal Naval Division. With that formation he took part in the expedition to Antwerp and won the Distinguished Service Order at Gallipoli for an individual exploit ‘as gallant as it was picturesque.’

Brigadier-General C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, History of the Great War: Gallipoli, pp. 164–5.

On the night of 25–26 April he had swum ashore to a beach in the Gulf of Xeros and lit oil flares to divert the attention of the Turks from the landings made elsewhere on the peninsula. This was typical of his service throughout the war, at the end of which he was 29 years of age and an acting Major-General in command of 29 Division.

He had won the Victoria Cross for most gallant conduct at Beaucourt in 1916, been awarded two bars to his DSO, been mentioned in despatches six times and wounded nine times. In 1916–18 he had commanded a battalion or a brigade in almost all the great battles on the Western Front: on the Somme, at Arras and Bullecourt, at Third Ypres, on Passchendaele, in the German offensive in Flanders in 1918. And on the morning of Armistice Day he had been leading the pursuit, just as he was to be doing in Venezia Giulia when the fighting in Europe ended in 1945.

Having found the profession to which he was perfectly adapted, it was natural that he should join the Regular Army, this time as an officer in the Grenadier Guards. He rose to command 1 Battalion, The Manchester Regiment, from 1929 to 1931, to be Assistant Quartermaster-General, Southern Command, 1931–33, and General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, at the War Office, 1933–34. In July 1934 he was promoted major-general, the youngest to hold that rank in the British Army.

But in spite of this record he was no conventional soldier. As the friend of Sir James Barrie

Denis Mackail, The Story of J. M. B.; Sir James Barrie, Courage.

he was familiar with the world of authors and playwrights; he had made two determined attempts to swim the Channel; as a Conservative candidate he had fought an unsuccessful election campaign; and he had written ‘A Study in Unit Administration’ for the guidance of regimental officers.

In this manual the author showed that he had common sense, an interest in administration and the ability to write a readable treatise on what could have been a dull subject. He argued that ‘The running of an army unit is really the same as carrying on any business. There is a definite objective in business, i.e., to make money. In the Army administration it is to feed, clothe and keep the man fit and as happy as possible. And to hand over to him at the pay table each week his pay intact.’ With due care this could be done. Mess accounts for a complete year should be studied to ensure a uniform standard of living, irrespective of fluctuations in the cost of food and the expense of extra meals during training periods. The NAAFI

Navy, Army and Air Force Institute: ‘an Army institution and the only monopoly I know of that works.’—General Freyberg.

should be supported, not only because of its rebates but because its books could be used to see how the men spent their money. If they spent it on foodstuffs then something was wrong. His theory was that a high incidence of crime in a unit was due to the financial problems created for the rank and file by faulty administration.

In 1937, however, it looked as if General Freyberg would no longer be free to apply these theories. For medical reasons which now seem incredible he was placed on the retired list when Mr Hore-Belisha was making his changes in the War Office. From then until he was recalled to the Army at the outbreak of war he was free to play a part in the world of business. The value of this experience was seen when he visited France in 1939 and had the following comments to make about the defence system:

During my year as a civilian I had been working as a director of a large combine of companies in the Midlands which had expanded very quickly and built a large number of new factories. I had worked on these in a minor way with business men and had learned what was the cheapest and best method of excavating and moving large quantities of earth and building in ferro concrete. I also learned the value of machine power tools and how they should be used—bulldozers, angle dozers, steam navvys, Decauville railways and the like. My feelings at seeing the British Army trying to build an area of ferro concrete pill-boxes, involving the handling of hundreds of tons of material, without light railways and power-driven concrete mixers must be experienced to be understood. It made me unhappy to see the men trying in many cases to do with shovels and wheelbarrows what was plainly a job for machinery…. The trouble about military engineering is that in this class of work we are all amateurs in the Army, and there is a rooted objection to being taught by civilians.

General Freyberg, Historical Review, 3 September 1939–September 1940, p. 8.

In his own case this was not correct. His foray into the industrial world of the Midlands had left him with the greatest respect for the civilian experience of his engineers, signallers and medical officers.

He had, moreover, been observing, learning and readjusting his life ever since he left New Zealand in 1912. This long apprenticeship had given him the knowledge and the experience which were essential if he was to be the successful commander of 2 NZEF. He understood New Zealanders and they, in turn, admired him for his courage, respected him for his integrity and were grateful for the unremitting care with which he watched over their welfare. He was familiar with the ways of the War Office, an invaluable qualification for the commander of a semi-independent army.

Shortly after this appointment the Army Board selected the staff of Divisional Headquarters. The majority of them were Regular officers with records that usually began with training at Duntroon Military College in Australia and went on to service in the First World War; that over, it was service in New Zealand and, in some cases, a staff course in England. Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart

Maj-Gen Sir Keith Stewart, KBE, CB, DSO, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US); Kerikeri; born Timaru, 30 Dec 1896; Regular soldier; 1 NZEF 1917–19; GSO I NZ Div 1940–41; Deputy Chief of General Staff Dec 1941–Jul 1943; comd 5 Bde Aug–Nov 1943, 4 Armd Bde Nov 1943–Mar 1944, 5 Bde Mar–Aug 1944; p.w. 1 Aug 1944; comd 9 Bde (2 NZEF, Japan) Nov 1945–Jul 1946; Chief of General Staff Apr 1949–Mar 1952.

was GSO I and Major Gentry

Maj-Gen Sir William Gentry, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Bronze Star (US); Lower Hutt; born London, 20 Feb 1899; Regular soldier; served North-West Frontier 1920–22; GSO II NZ Div 1939–40; AA & QMG Oct 1940–41; GSO I May 1941, Oct 1941–Sep 1942; comd 6 Bde Sep 1942–Apr 1943; Deputy Chief of General Staff 1943–44; comd NZ Troops in Egypt, 6 NZ Div, and NZ Maadi Camp, Aug 1944–Feb 1945; 9 Bde (Italy) 1945; Deputy Chief of General Staff, Jul 1946–Nov 1947; Adjutant-General, Apr 1949–Mar 1952; Chief of General Staff Apr 1952–Aug 1955.

GSO II. Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens,

Maj-Gen W. G. Stevens, CB, CBE, m.i.d.; England; born London, 11 Dec 1893; Regular soldier; NZ Fd Arty 1915–19 (Maj); AA & QMG, NZ Div, 1940; Officer in Charge of Administration, 2 NZEF, 1940–45; GOC 2 NZEF, 22 Nov 1945–6 Jul 1946.

who had been Secretary of the Defence Council in New Zealand and of the Organisation for National Security, was Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.

The Commander Royal Artillery was Colonel Miles, DSO, MC,

Brig R. Miles, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, ED, m.i.d.; born Springston, 10 Dec 1892; Regular soldier; NZ Fd Arty 1914–19; CRA 2 NZ Div 1940–41; comd 2 NZEF (UK) 1940; wounded and p.w. 1 Dec 1941; died Spain, 20 Oct 1943.

a very able artilleryman and a highly trained Regular officer who was to enforce rigid discipline. The foundations he laid were largely responsible for the high standard of support which the infantry always received from the New Zealand artillery. Lieutenant- Colonel Crump, OBE,

Brig S. H. Crump, CBE, DSO, m.i.d., Bronze Star (US); Lower Hutt; born Wellington, 25 Jan 1889; Regular soldier; NZASC 1915–19; Commander NZASC, 2 NZ Div, 1940–45; comd 2 NZEF, Japan, Jun–Sep 1947; on staff HQ BCOF and NZ representative on Disposals Board in Japan, 1948–49.

who had commanded the New Zealand Army Service Corps in Egypt in 1918, was to command it throughout the whole of the war in the Middle East and Italy. Major S. F. Allen,

Brig S. F. Allen, OBE, m.i.d.; born Liverpool, 17 May 1897; Regular soldier; CO 2 NZ Div Sigs and OC NZ Corps of Sigs Jan 1940–Sep 1941; CO 21 Bn Dec 1941–May 1942, Jun–Jul 1942; comd 5 Bde 10 May–12 Jun 1942; killed in action 15 Jul 1942.

with experience on the North-West Frontier, commanded Divisional Signals and the Commander Royal Engineers for a short period was Major Clifton, MC,

Brig G. H. Clifton, DSO and 2 bars, MC, m.i.d.; Porangahau; born Greenmeadows, 18 Sep 1898; Regular soldier; served North-West Frontier 1919–21 (MC, Waziristan); BM 5 Bde 1940; CRE NZ Div 1940–41; Chief Engineer 30 Corps, 1941–42; comd 6 Bde Feb–Sep 1942; p.w. 4 Sep 1942; escaped Germany, Mar 1945; NZ Military Liaison Officer, London, 1949–52; Commander, Northern Military District, Mar 1952–Sep 1953.

a graduate of Duntroon Military College, who had been in India in 1919–20. The only civilian in the group, as yet, was Lieutenant-Colonel MacCormick, DSO,

Brig K. MacCormick, CB, CBE, DSO, ED, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 13 Jan 1891; surgeon; 1 NZEF 1914–19; Egypt, Gallipoli, France—OC 2 Fd Amb Dec 1917– Jan 1918; DADMS 1 NZ Div Jan–Oct 1918; ADMS Northern Military District, 1930– 34; ADMS 2 NZEF Jan–Oct 1940; DMS 2 NZEF Oct 1940–May 1942, Sep 1942–Apr 1943.

the Assistant Director of Medical Services, an Auckland surgeon who had served on Gallipoli and in France. The others were appointed shortly afterwards from the ranks of the senior Territorial officers. Lieutenant-Colonel Falla, CMG, DSO,

Brig N. S. Falla, CMG, DSO, m.i.d.; born Westport, 3 May 1883; managing director Union Steam Ship Coy; NZ Fd Arty 1914–19 (Lt-Col comd 2 and 3 NZ FA Bdes); comd 2 NZEF Base, Feb 1940–Jun 1941; NZ repve on Ministry of Transport, London, 1941–45; died 6 Nov 1945.

manager of the Union Steam Ship Company and commander of 2 (Army) New Zealand Field Artillery Brigade in 1918, was appointed Commandant, New Zealand Overseas Base; Colonel Sir Stephen Allen, KBE, CMG, DSO,

Col Sir Stephen Allen, KBE, CMG, DSO and bar, VD, m.i.d.; Morrinsville; born Cheadle, England, 2 Aug 1882; Auck Regt 1915–19 (CO 2 Bn); Administrator of Western Samoa, 1928–31; Military Secretary, 2 NZEF, Mar 1940–Jul 1941.

a lawyer who had commanded 2 Battalion, Auckland Regiment, in 1918 and had been Administrator of Western Samoa, became Military Secretary.

Another problem of this period was the sailing date of the First Echelon. It was to have been 20 January 1940 but the War Office, because of shipping problems and the provision of escorts, had either to advance the sailing date three weeks or postpone it for six. The Government chose the earlier date because it meant training in Egypt with more modern equipment, a possible stimulus to recruiting in New Zealand and accommodation in the camps for the Second Echelon. The one concession it asked for was a week's delay in order to give General Freyberg at least ten days in New Zealand before the troops left the country. This meant that the sailing date had to be 6 January.

The only escort for the convoy would have been HMS Leander had not Mr Fraser persuaded Mr Churchill to provide more substantial protection. The first addition was HMAS Canberra, and when Fraser suggested that the Admiralty could do better still, HMS Ramillies was added to the escort. As he explained to Mr Churchill, no battleship had ever visited New Zealand and this was a splendid opportunity of ‘intensifying the already high morale of the New Zealand people.’

If all went according to plan the troops would be taken to a training area in Egypt, the theatre of operations would be in western Europe, and the permanent base for the Division would be in the United Kingdom. In preparation for this General Freyberg had already approached the War Office. He wanted good modern barracks, a train service with cheap fares to London, and a site within which he could group all hospitals and base organisations. The reply was that Aldershot had already been allotted to the Canadians, otherwise 2 NZEF could have any base that it desired. The authorities would open any area for it ‘on the same principle that room in the garage is always found for the guest's car’.

General Freyberg, Historical Review, p. 12.

General Freyberg chose Colchester because it had modern barracks and was reasonably close to London.

Then, after a short visit to France to see conditions for himself, he left on 4 December for a hurried flight out to New Zealand and back to the Middle East. On the way he selected in Egypt the sites of the temporary camps in which the echelons were to assemble, be equipped and trained as a complete division. With suitability for health, training and recreation as the important factors he chose Maadi and Helwan. They were comparatively free from mosquitoes, had suitable training space and were within easy

The Mediterranean Theatre range of Cairo. Arrangements were made for their preparation and the General continued on his flight, now travelling with the Australian delegation headed by Mr Casey and the New Zealand delegation led by Mr Fraser.

In Australia there was time for him to discuss past problems with General Sir Brudenell White,

The officer who had played ‘the outstanding part’ in building 1 AIF. ‘No one more learned in the problems that faced the leaders of a Dominion expeditionary force could have been found’.—Long, To Benghazi, p. 84.

who had been Chief of Staff with General Birdwood in 1914–18, and to study the latest variations of them with General Blamey and the Australian Military Council. They agreed, for instance, that Dominion troops should accept British rations provided that their commanders had the authority to increase them when necessary. The General then sailed from Sydney, reaching Wellington on Christmas Day.

His first duty was to meet the Minister for Defence, the Hon. F. Jones, and describe the work that had already been done in Britain and the Middle East. He then tabled some of the questions which would have to be discussed when he met the full Cabinet after the New Year.

He suggested that the Government should always have direct access to his opinion, that the administration, discipline, promotion and pay of officers should be completely under its control, that the force must be adequately equipped and always employed as a complete formation, never split up and used piecemeal. He agreed that whenever possible it should be built up with New Zealand officers and emphasised the necessity of its having a permanent base in England.

General Freyberg brought up one other very important subject. The New Zealand Division would in many ways be an army within an army. To avoid possible friction with the Higher Command, it would be wise to define very clearly the powers which the Government should reserve to itself and the special powers with which it should invest its GOC. He himself desired such administrative and financial powers as the right to vary the ration scale and to incur unforeseen expenses for the protection of the health of his troops. In a state of emergency—and he must be the sole judge of what was such a state—he must be able to use the Division as he thought fit and then to communicate his decisions direct to the Government.

The final decision could not be given at this stage. For the next few days there were public receptions and a visit to the Prime Minister, Mr Savage, staff conferences and the inspection of troops of the First Echelon at their camps. It was not until 5 January that he met the full Cabinet to discuss the future of 2 NZEF.

The fundamental fact was that the Dominion had come of age. The Expeditionary Force was not an integral part of the British Army. In time it would be ‘a citizen force with its own complete freedom of administration, its own training establishment, its own hospitals and medical services staffed by New Zealand doctors, dentists, sisters and VADs and its own welfare workers.’

General Freyberg in Army Quarterly, October 1944, p. 33.

No common policy to meet such a situation had been drawn up by the Dominions, but it was understood that their respective forces would operate as national units. Nevertheless, there were to be interesting variations in procedure. Canadian troops operated under British command in Britain or for raids across the Channel, but their participation in major operations had to have the approval of the Canadian Government, and that depended upon negotiations between Churchill and Mackenzie King. South Africa followed much the same line. Her troops were under British command, but their spheres of operation depended upon the close association which soon developed between Smuts and Churchill. Australia, on the other hand, decided that her commander must have a charter

Based on that drawn up in 1914–18.

defining his powers, giving him the right of direct communication with his government and stating that no part of the Force was to be ‘detached or employed apart from the Force without his consent’.

The New Zealand Government was of much the same opinion. The conditions of service were therefore based upon an agreement between the British and New Zealand Governments. All major decisions, such as the employment of the force, were to be made by the New Zealand War Cabinet, and the force would be under the command of an Allied Commander-in-Chief for operational purposes only, but not for training, organisation, administration or discipline. In other words, General Freyberg was to take his instructions from the general under whose command he was serving, but his actions were subject to the wishes of the New Zealand Government. The Government in its turn had the right to discuss with the British Government all questions of policy and, if necessary, the right to consult General Freyberg when any question was being discussed with the War Office.

The situation was not without precedent in military history; when commenting on the problems of the American Army in France in 1917–18, General Pershing said:

The attitude that the French assumed toward us in the World War was in marked contrast with the views held by them when their troops so generously came to America to aid us in the Revolution. The French Commander at that time received very explicit instructions from his Government on this subject, as the following sent to Rochambeau shortly before he sailed for America will show:

‘It is His Majesty's desire and He hereby commands that, so far as circumstances will permit, the Count de Rochambeau shall maintain the integrity of the French troops which His Majesty has placed under his command, and that at the proper time he shall express to General Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Congress, under whose orders the French troops are to serve, that it is the intention of the King that these shall not be dispersed in any manner, and that they shall serve at all times as a unit and under the French generals, except in the case of a temporary detachment which shall rejoin the main body without delay.’

John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, p. 386.

The British commanders, French and Haig, Plumer and Milne, when serving under Allied commanders-in-chief had been in the same position. The last-named, in Macedonia in 1916–17, had to ‘comply with the orders of the Commander-in-Chief with respect to military operations, “subject to the right of direct communication with, and reference to his own Government.”’

Cyril Falls, Military Operations, Macedonia, p. 256.

The special powers desired by and granted without limitation to General Freyberg were along similar lines, and the following memoranda in which they were stated can, therefore, be termed his charter of authority:

5 January 1940

The General Officer for the time being

Commanding the 2nd New Zealand

Expeditionary Force Overseas

The General Officer Commanding will act in accordance with the instructions he receives from the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, subject only to the requirements of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. He will, in addition to powers appearing in any relevant Statute or Regulations, be vested with the following powers:

(a)

In the case of sufficiently grave emergency or in special circumstances, of which he must be the sole judge, to make decisions as to the employment of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and to communicate such decisions directly to the New Zealand Government, notwithstanding that in the absence of that extraordinary cause such communication would not be in accordance with the normal channels of communication indicated in the following paragraphs and which for greater clearness are also indicated in an attached diagram.

Not reproduced.

(b)

To communicate directly with the New Zealand Government and with the Army Department concerning any matter connected with the training and administration of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force.

(c)

To communicate directly either with the New Zealand Government or with the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, in respect of all details leading up to and arising from policy decisions.

(d)

In all matters pertaining to equipment, to communicate with the War Office through normal channels, and through the liaison officer of the High Commissioner's office in London, the former to be the official channel.

(e)

In matters of command, to adhere to the normal military channels between the War Office and the General Officer Commanding the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force overseas.

(f)

To establish such administrative headquarters and base and line of communication units as are necessary for the functions of command, organisation [including training], and administration with which he has been invested.

(g)

To organise, [train],

The references to training in square brackets in paragraphs (f) and (g) have been added at General Freyberg's request. They are not included in the text of this memorandum in the files of the Prime Minister's Department, but were later added to the memorandum at the GOC's request.

change, vary, or group units and formations in such manner as he considers expedient from time to time.

(h)

To fix and alter the establishment and composition of units and formations as the exigencies of service may in his opinion require from time to time.

After the Third Echelon has left New Zealand no officer above the substantive rank of captain will be sent overseas without the concurrence of the General Officer Commanding.

This provision had the unforeseen result of making 2 NZEF a ‘closed shop’.

M. J. Savage, Prime Minister

5 January 1940

Major-General B. C. Freyberg, General Officer Commanding, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force Overseas, Wellington

The General Officer Commanding is hereby vested with the following powers:

(1)

Authority to increase the scale of ration, if necessary.

(2)

Authority to procure equipment (shown on equipment tables) that cannot be supplied through official channels. Such equipment to be bought through Ordnance channels where possible.

(3)

Authority to incur expenditures which cannot be foreseen at present, and which the General Officer Commanding considers necessary, for protection of the health of the Force.

(4)

Authority to incur expenditure, not exceeding £500 for any one transaction, for the recreation or other amenities of the Force.

(5)

Authority to disburse, at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding, from an entertainment fund which will be provided, to an amount not exceeding £1000 per annum.

F. Jones, Minister of Defence

On the same day as this Cabinet meeting, the First Echelon was embarking on the transports

Dunera (1355 all ranks, including 20 Bn, 4 Fd Amb, 4 Fd Hyg Sec, 3 members of the NZANS and 307 all ranks, including Div Sigs, 14 LAD and Base Details from Wellington); Sobieski (1145 all ranks, including 27 (MG) Bn, Div Sup Coln); Empress of Canada (809 all ranks, including HQ 2 NZ Div and 4 Fd Regt); Strathaird (1350 all ranks, including 19 Bn, 6 Fd Coy, 5 Fd Pk Coy); Orion (1428 all ranks, including 4 RMT Coy, A Section Div Amn Coy, Div Pet Coy); Rangitata (442 all ranks, including A and B Sqns Div Cav Regt, Base Details). The total number embarked was 6529 all ranks.

then assembled at Lyttelton and Wellington. In spite of all precautions the public was aware of the imminent departure of the convoy. There was a huge crowd at Lyttelton on the afternoon of 5 January when HMS Leander left with the Dunera and the Sobieski; next morning a still greater number of spectators watched from the slopes overlooking Port Nicholson when HMS Ramillies and HMAS Canberra steamed out with the Empress of Canada, Strathaird, Orion and Rangitata. The groups met in Cook Strait shortly after sunrise on 6 January and late that same afternoon New Zealand faded into the haze behind them.

The next few weeks passed by without the strain and the sense of urgency felt by those who sailed in later convoys. Italy and Japan were still neutral and there was no thought of the impending collapse in northern France. The living quarters on the transports were quite luxurious. The Dunera was an army transport with all the simplicity and most of the discomforts of such ships, but the others, being converted passenger liners, provided superb quarters with many of the amenities expected by peacetime tourists. There may have been parades and inspections, fatigues and anti-aircraft duties, but there were also cabin quarters, large dining saloons and an amazing area of deck space.

The convoy, with ships from Sydney

On 10 January the Empress of Canada escorted by HMS Ramillies left the convoy and paid a short visit to Sydney, where General Freyberg and the ADMS, Lt-Col Mac- Cormick, disembarked to go by air to Egypt.

and another great liner from Melbourne, went on to Fremantle and Colombo and from there, with a French transport and the aircraft-carrier HMS Eagle, sailed into the Gulf of Aden. Here it divided, the Orion and the Rangitata with three of the Australian transports refuelling at Aden, the French ship going to French Somaliland and the remainder entering the Red Sea.

The first ship to anchor at Port Tewfik on the morning of 12 February was the Empress of Canada. There was an official welcome by Mr Anthony Eden on behalf of the King and the British Parliament; General Freyberg replied and soon afterwards 4 Field Regiment disembarked into the lighters. Later that morning the Dunera and Sobieski arrived, the Orion steamed in that night and the Rangitata appeared next morning.

By 15 February the disembarkation was complete and the units were establishing themselves in Maadi Camp, some 90 miles from Port Tewfik. From the crowded troop trains the men had studied the already monotonous desert, the dusty sun-soaked villages and the feluccas coming down the Nile with their cargoes of vegetables and livestock. The trains stopped at the level crossing outside the camp, and the battalions tumbled out to march in column of route behind the pipe band of the Cameron Highlanders, past General Freyberg and into Maadi Camp.

Here the New Zealanders were eight miles from Cairo, within sight of the Pyramids across the Nile and immediately east of the Abbassia-Tura railway line. A sandy plateau was overlooked by a rock-strewn hillock

This holy of holies was known to the irreverent soldiery as ‘Bludger's Hill’.

on which were the huts and tents of Divisional Headquarters. Around this hill and below it the advance party, with British and Indian engineers supervising Egyptian labour, had laid out a camp that was in time to have hundreds of huts, miles of tarmac roads, miles of drains and miles of water pipes. The cookhouses, messrooms, canteens and shower-houses of the great encampment were still being constructed; it was, as yet, a world of small tents camouflaged to blend with the reddish-brown sand. In this mushroom town the echelon was to establish itself and begin its final training.

The Divisional Cavalry received Bren carriers and light tanks (Mark VIB) and 4 Field Regiment 18-pounders and 4.5-inch howitzers. Fourth Infantry Brigade endured route marches, sent its specialists away for courses of instruction and its senior officers to TEWTs

Tactical exercises without troops.

in preparation for large-scale manoeuvres. The Divisional Signals, not having the equipment to operate the signals office and the telephone exchange, trained as infantrymen or attended courses. The Army Service Corps units—4 Reserve Mechanical Transport Company, Ammunition Company (A Section), Petrol Company and Divisional Supply Column—were given courses in desert driving and trade tests and were allocated a proportion of the vehicles arriving from Britain. Within a few months they were providing the transport for Maadi Camp, the Base Supply Depot and the Field Bakery.

Equally important were the questions of ration allowances and well-trained cooks. For a short time the ration scale was larger than that allowed for in the field and considerably better than that of other British units. So before long General Freyberg was advising his Government that, although the troops might be used to a different proportion of butter and meat, he could not ask for larger amounts when Europe was short of food and Allied troops were fighting alongside his Division. ‘Anyway butter is not available in such quantities and secondly it makes a rather invidious comparison which no one would welcome.’ He made arrangements to reduce this disparity and the troops, curiously enough, noticed no difference.

The success of the changeover was probably due to the improved standards of cooking. The graduates from the School of Cookery in Trentham were not qualified cooks under Middle East conditions. They had to be given instruction in the breaking down of bulk rations and in the handling of food in the field. For this there was the 2 NZEF School of Cookery modelled on that of the RASC at Aldershot. General Freyberg had consulted the manager of Lyons' chain of restaurants, who was adviser to the War Office on army catering, and the War Office had agreed to send four non-commissioned officers as the nucleus of a staff. They were delayed when the Oronsay was attacked

See p. 40.

off the coast of Scotland and forced back into port, but an urgent appeal for instructors in the Middle East brought over an expert from 7 Armoured Division, a master cook, who directed the school until the regular staff arrived in December.

At the same time the medical and dental units were taking over their duties. Fourth Field Hygiene Section became responsible for the sanitation of Maadi Camp and 4 Field Ambulance established a camp hospital, though the more serious cases were sent to 2/10 British General Hospital at Helmieh, Cairo, where some of the medical staff of 4 Field Ambulance and the eighteen New Zealand nurses were responsible for the New Zealand patients. Second New Zealand General Hospital was to have taken over these cases, but other arrangements had to be made when that unit was diverted to Britain with the Second Echelon. Fourth New Zealand General Hospital, with Lieutenant-Colonel Button

Col E. L. Button, OBE, ED; Wellington; born London, 9 Mar 1903; surgeon; CO 4 Gen Hosp Jul–Sep 1940; in charge surgical division 3 Gen Hosp, Mar 1941–Sep 1943; CO 1 Mob CCS Oct 1943–Aug 1944.

in command and Miss Brown

Matron Miss D. I. Brown, RRC, m.i.d.; now Mrs R. G. Milne, Wellington; born Napier, 24 Apr 1905; sister; sister-in-charge Camp Hospital, Ngaruawahia, Oct 1939–Jan 1940; Matron 4 Gen Hosp Jul–Oct 1940; Matron 2 Gen Hosp Oct 1940–Jun 1943.

as matron, was then established in the Grand Hotel at Helwan, a fashionable health resort about 18 miles up the river from Cairo. To it the patients from Maadi Camp and from 2/10 British General Hospital were transferred on 31 July.

The next step was to arrange for the movement from Britain of some members of the medical staff who had travelled with the Second Echelon. In the August convoy

See p. 35.

which arrived in Egypt on 15 September there were twelve members of the New Zealand Army Nursing Service, officers and staff from 1 General Hospital and 5 Field Ambulance, and 1 Convalescent Depot as a complete unit. These detached personnel joined the staff of 4 General Hospital; in October 1 Convalescent Depot took over a British establishment at Moascar, near the Suez Canal.

The dental officers were fully occupied attempting to solve the problems of a temporary dental hospital and insufficient equipment when the echelon provided as many dental cases in one month as did the two British divisions in Egypt in three months. They had to persevere until the Mobile Dental Section arrived in September with the Third Echelon.

Divisional Headquarters and the First Echelon were thus laying the foundation upon which the Division was to expand and train for the next five years. As some compensation for the monotony and discomfort of this pioneer work, every effort was made to provide the more simple amenities. In the camp itself were Shafto's picture theatre, the NAAFI canteens, and a laundry service for all clothing. The Maadi swimming bath was built by 6 Field Company within five weeks of the camp's being occupied; it was officially opened when General Freyberg, the most notable swimmer in 2 NZEF, took the first plunge.

Outside the camp there was, within a fortnight of the echelon's arrival, that wonderful institution, the Maadi Recreation Tent, organised and operated for other ranks by the British women in the European suburb of Maadi. And beyond the shaded avenues of Maadi township there was always Cairo.

The New Zealand Services Club was opened on 5 February 1941. Until then, and afterwards, New Zealand troops were always welcomed by other clubs and entertained in different institutions organised by the British community in Egypt.

Liberal leave was granted, the railcars were numerous, and the fare to Bab-el-Louk station was one piastre. Later, if one was so fortunate, there was long leave up the river to Luxor or north into Palestine.

Such were the conditions for training and recreation at the end of April 1940. By then the first exercises at brigade level had been held at El Saff and the first reinforcements had arrived—not from New Zealand but from Britain. Thirty-fourth Battery, 7 Anti-Tank Regiment, having completed its training at Aldershot, had sailed from Southampton to Cherbourg, crossed France by rail to Marseilles and from there travelled in HMT Devonshire to Egypt.

CHAPTER 2 The Second Echelon

ON 12 January 1940 the main drafts of the Second Echelon assembled

Papakura: C Sqn Div Cav Regt, 21 Bn, HQ NZE (details), 7 Fd Coy, Div Amn Coy (details), Forestry Coy.

Ngaruawahia: HQ NZA (details), HQ and two batteries 7 Anti-Tank Regt (15 LAD attached), 5 Fd Regt (16 LAD attached).

Palmerston North: 28 (Maori) Bn.

Trentham: HQ NZ Div (details), Div Sigs (details), 22 Bn, HQ 5 Inf Bde (4 and 5 Anti- Tank Coys, 17 LAD attached), Div Pet Coy (details), Div Provost Coy (details), GHQ 2 Ech (details), 1 General Hospital, 1 Convalescent Depot.

Burnham: 23 Bn, Div Supply Column (details), 5 Fd Amb, HQ Railway Construction and Maintenance Group, Railway Construction Coy, Railway Survey Coy.

and were taken over by their officers and NCOs who had already been in camp for some weeks. In general the new echelon was much the same as its predecessor. The men were no different; the Regular Force, trained for the work and immediately available, still provided a proportion of the staff. There may have been fewer lawyers among the senior officers but the majority of them, as was the case with 4 Brigade, were civilians who had served with distinction in the First World War and then given devoted service in the Territorial Army.

Brigadier James Hargest, DSO, MC,

Brig J. Hargest, CBE, DSO and bar, MC, m.i.d., MC (Gk); born Gore, 4 Sep 1891; farmer; Member of Parliament, 1931–44; Otago Mtd Rifles, 1914–20 (CO 2 Bn, Otago Regt); comd 5 Bde May 1940–Nov 1941; p.w. 27 Nov 1941; escaped Italy, Mar 1943; killed in action, France, 12 Aug 1944.

a farmer and Member of Parliament, had in 1917–18 commanded most ably 2 Battalion, Otago Regiment. With 5 Brigade he was to be equally impressive, particularly during the withdrawal across Crete in 1941. Unfortunately he was captured by Rommel at Sidi Azeiz and, after a classic escape from Italy in 1943, was killed in Normandy while on a visit, as an observer, to 50 (Northumbrian) Division. His Brigade Major was Major Clifton. The battalion commanders had all served with distinction in 1914–18. Twenty-first Battalion was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Macky, MC,

Lt-Col N. L. Macky, MC, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 20 Feb 1891; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde 1915–19 (Capt 1918); CO 21 Bn Jan 1940–May 1941.

an Auckland lawyer, 22 Battalion by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew, VC,

Brig L. W. Andrew, VC, DSO, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Ashhurst, 23 Mar 1897; Regular soldier; Wellington Regt, 1915–19; CO 22 Bn Jan 1940–Feb 1942; comd 5 Bde 27 Nov– 6 Dec 1941; Area Commander, Wellington, Nov 1943–Dec 1946; Commander, Central Military District, Apr 1948–Mar 1952.

of the Regular Force, and 23 Battalion by Lieutenant-Colonel Falconer, DSO, MC,

Brig A. S. Falconer, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, m.i.d.; Dunedin; born Mosgiel, 4 Nov 1892; tobacconist and secretary; Otago Regt 1914–19 (BM 2 NZ Inf Bde); CO 23 Bn Jan–Aug 1940 and Mar–May 1941; comd 7 and 5 Inf Bdes in UK, 1940–41; NZ Maadi Camp Jun 1941–Oct 1942; 5 Div (in NZ) Dec 1942–Aug 1943; Overseas Commissioner, NZ Patriotic Fund Board, Nov 1943–Feb 1945.

farmer and businessman. The senior artillerymen were Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser,

Lt-Col K. W. Fraser, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Edinburgh, 1 Nov 1905; asst advertising manager; CO 5 Fd Regt, 1940–41; wounded and p.w. 27 Nov 1941.

a Wellington businessman, who commanded 5 Field Regiment, and Major Queree,

Brig R. C. Queree, CBE, DSO, m.i.d.; born Christchurch, 28 Jun 1909; Regular soldier; Brigade Major, NZ Artillery, Oct 1940–Jun 1941; GSO II 2 NZ Div Jun–Aug 1941, Jan–Jun 1942; CO 4 Fd Regt Jun–Aug 1942; GSO I 2 NZ Div Sep 1942–Dec 1943, Jan–Jun 1944; BGS NZ Corps 9 Feb–27 Mar 1944; CO 5 Fd Regt Jun–Aug 1944; CRA 2 NZ Div, Aug 1944–Feb 1945, Mar–Jun 1945; QMG, Army HQ, 1948–50; Adjutant- General 1954–56; Vice-Chief of the General Staff Apr 1956-.

another professional soldier, who was second-in-command of 7 Anti-Tank Regiment (31 and 32 Batteries).

The specialist units had several of those civilian authorities of whom General Freyberg was afterwards to speak so highly.

See p. 7.

The commander of 7 Field Company was Major Hanson, MM,

Brig F. M. H. Hanson, DSO and bar, OBE, MM, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Levin, 1896; resident engineer, Main Highways Board; Wellington Regt in First World War; comd 7 Fd Coy, NZE, Jan 1940–Aug 1941; CRE 2 NZ Div May 1941, Oct 1941–Apr 1944, Nov 1944–Jan 1946; Chief Engineer, 2 NZEF, 1943–46; three times wounded; Commissioner of Works.

a graduate of Duntroon but at this time with the Public Works Department and an expert on road construction. Colonel McKillop

Col A. C. McKillop, m.i.d.; born Scotland, 9 Mar 1885; Superintendent, Sunnyside Hospital, Christchurch; medical officer, 1 NZEF, 1914–16; CO 1 Gen Hosp Jan 1940– Jun 1941; ADMS Pacific Section, 2 NZEF (Fiji) Aug 1941–Jul 1942; ADMS 1 Div (NZ) Aug 1942–Mar 1943; died Christchurch, 5 Aug 1958.

of 1 General Hospital had directed Sunnyside Hospital; Lieutenant- Colonel Kenrick

Brig H. S. Kenrick, CB, CBE, ED, m.i.d., MC (Gk); Auckland; born Paeroa, 7 Aug 1898; consulting obstetrician; Otago Regt 1916–19 (Capt); wounded Apr 1918; CO 5 Fd Amb Dec 1939–May 1940; acting ADMS 2 NZEF, Jun–Sep 1940; ADMS NZ Div Oct 1940–May 1942; DMS 2 NZEF May–Sep 1942, Apr 1943–May 1945; Superintendent-in- Chief, Auckland Hospital Board.

of 5 Field Ambulance and Major Boag

Lt-Col N. F. Boag, ED; Christchurch; born Leeston, 13 Aug 1897; medical practitioner; CO 1 Conv Depot Mar–Dec 1940.

of the Convalescent Depot were medical practitioners. The Senior Chaplain to the Forces was the Rt. Rev. G. V. Gerard, MC,

Rt. Rev. G. V. Gerard, CBE, MC, m.i.d.; Rotherham, England; born Christchurch, 24 Nov 1898; Lt, The Buffs, 1918–19 (MC); SCF, 2 NZEF, May 1940–Nov 1941; p.w. 1 Dec 1941; repatriated Apr 1943; SCF, 2 NZEF (IP), Apr–Dec 1944.

Bishop of Waiapu.

In a month's time the battalions were joined by forestry and railway experts who had been called up to meet an urgent request from Britain for men with experience in the operation of sawmills and the construction of railways. On 14 February 6 officers and 185 other ranks marched into Papakura Camp to form 11 Forestry Company. The commanding officer, Captain Eliott,

Lt-Col J. G. Eliott; England; born NZ 8 Jan 1899; company manager; CO Forestry Gp Nov 1940–Jul 1943.

had been the manager of a box factory; his officers were sawmillers and, in one case, a forestry graduate from the mahogany forests of the French Cameroons. The men, who had been chosen by the Forestry Department from hundreds of volunteers, represented all grades of general logging and sawmilling experience.

The same day 16 officers and 371 other ranks from the thousand volunteers of the Public Works and Railway Departments entered Burnham Camp to become Headquarters Railway Construction and Maintenance Group, 9 Railway Survey Company and 10 Railway Construction Company. The officers, whose lists of university degrees were just as impressive as those of any medical unit, were yet another proof of the accuracy of General Freyberg's contentions that one of the important features of 2 NZEF was the civilian experience of so many senior officers. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, MC and bar, Croix de Guerre,

Lt-Col J. E. Anderson, OBE, MC and bar, Croix de Guerre; born NZ 7 Dec 1890; civil engineer; CO NZ Ry C and M Gp 1940–42; later served with Royal Engrs; died Wellington, 5 Nov 1945.

who was to command the Group, had begun as a Public Works Department cadet and had been studying railway construction and bridge building in Canada when the First World War broke out. By 1918 he was with a division as acting Commander Royal Engineers. Since then he had worked in Mesopotamia and had been resident engineer for the Public Works Department in Christchurch. Ninth Survey Company was commanded by Major Packwood

Col R. H. Packwood, OBE; Auckland; born Kaiapoi, 11 Apr 1892; district engineer, Public Works Dept; OC 9 Ry Svy Coy 1940–41; Asst Director of Works (Docks), GHQ MEF, 1941–43; Director of Planning, Engr-in-Chief's Branch, GHQ India, 1943–46.

of the Public Works Department, who had been with the New Zealand Tunnelling Company in France. Major Rabone

Lt-Col T. C. V. Rabone, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Blenheim12 Sep 1891; civil engineer; OC 10 Ry Constr Coy Jan 1940–Nov 1941; OC Engr and Ordnance Trg Depot, Maadi, Nov 1941–Apr 1942; CRE Central Military District 1942–43.

of 10 Railway Construction Company, an engineer of the last war, was well known for his work on railway construction and hydroelectric projects.

Both groups, railway and forestry, were immediately instructed in the elementary grammar of military training.

The battalions, having endured similar instruction, were now graduating to more technical exercises. General Freyberg had prepared a syllabus based on the eight weeks' training given to the militia in Britain and emphasising training for war as the keynote of all instruction. The shortage of equipment was just as curbing as it had been for the First Echelon but conditions in the camps were rapidly improving. There was more parade space, the rifle ranges had been extended and more huts erected for recreation and accommodation.

At the same time there was always that atmosphere of haste and improvisation which suggests an early departure. The original plan had been for the second convoy to leave towards the end of March, with the divisional troops landing in Egypt and the railway and forestry companies going straight to France. Consequently all units were declared on active service and sent away for final leave by 14 March. But the date of departure was changed because it was found advisable to split the great convoy into a slow group and a fast group. The former would leave first with an Australian brigade; the latter would take the rest of the Australian contingent and the New Zealand echelon.

The only New Zealand unit sent with the first or slow convoy was an advance party

Five officers and 29 other ranks from the Railway Construction and Maintenance Group; one officer and 15 other ranks from the Forestry Company.

from the railway and forestry companies under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson. They left Wellington for Sydney on 17 April and sailed from there in the Orcades for Port Said on the 27th. Their movements from that port were left as a problem for the Admiralty.

The rest of the echelon continued its training throughout April, with more vaccinations and such diversions as recruiting parades through the cities of the Dominion. There was, by then, a greater sense of urgency; the storm had broken and changed overnight the character of the war. Denmark and Norway had been invaded on 9 April; the naval engagements at Narvik had been fought; the British Expeditionary Force had landed in Norway. And in the Mediterranean theatre there was that wavering neutral, Italy.

In these circumstances the Admiralty insisted upon a concentration of naval forces in the Mediterranean. To this end the escort for the second or fast convoy had to be reduced, even though New Zealand had requested the maximum protection for the convoys in which her troops were despatched. The Admiralty explained that because of the Norwegian operation the units of the German fleet, including the pocket battleships, had been located. The only possible danger would be from a merchant raider, for which the lighter escort would be adequate. Nevertheless, there still remained the possibility of Italy declaring war and closing the entrance to the Red Sea.

The Australian Government thereupon suggested that the troops should not embark until the situation had been clarified. The New Zealand Government did not think that the departure of the convoy should be postponed but it did ask for further information, including an indication of the ‘probable steps that would be taken’ should the convoy have to be diverted. Such information was already on the way. The convoys, the slow one already at sea and the fast one about to leave, would not, unless the situation improved, enter the Red Sea, nor would the troops be landed at Basra in the Persian Gulf. The ships would be diverted to Britain, where the troops would have better training facilities. The Dominions were asked to accept this suggestion and to continue with their plans for embarkation.

New Zealand agreed to this proposal but the Australian Government asked for a full appreciation of the situation from the Chiefs of Staff. The Australians wanted to know their part in ‘the scheme of things’, and they reminded the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that such a possibility had ‘long been referred to in Committee of Imperial Defence documents.’ They also pointed out that their 6 Division would be split, with one portion in Palestine and another in Britain. Though it was imperative that they should be united for future operations, there was no certainty as to when this would take place. Moreover this diversion of troops to a theatre of war other than the Middle East ‘might contravene the fulfilment of the decision as to the theatre in which an Imperial Force should serve.’

At this stage there was no time for any answer to reach New Zealand before the departure of the fast convoy. The Government adhered to the programme but appreciated the Australian point of view and the embarrassment that would result were ‘Australia to take one course and New Zealand another.’ It asked Britain for immediate advice and, as it always did, insisted upon receiving ‘the most explicit assurances’ as to the safety of the convoy. The Australian Government eventually decided that its troops should embark in the fast convoy. The appreciation of the Chiefs of Staff could be expected to arrive in time to allow the destination of the convoy to be altered when it reached Fremantle. As for the slow convoy, already at sea, there would be time for it to be diverted before it entered the Red Sea.

In the meantime the fast convoy had already left New Zealand with the Second Echelon, the railway construction and forestry companies and several hundred naval ratings. With them were Brigadier Barrowclough, DSO, MC,

Maj-Gen Rt. Hon. Sir Harold Barrowclough, PC, KCMG, CB, DSO and bar, MC, ED, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US), Croix de Guerre (Fr); Wellington; born Masterton, 23 Jun 1894; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde 1915–19 (CO 4 Bn); comd 7 NZ Inf Bde in UK, 1940; 6 Bde, May 1940–Feb 1942; GOC 2 NZEF in Pacific and 3 NZ Div, Aug 1942–Oct 1944; Chief Justice of New Zealand.

his Brigade Major, Brooke,

Col J. I. Brooke, OBE, m.i.d., Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Dunedin, 20 Nov 1897; Regular soldier; BM 6 Bde May 1940–Aug 1941; GSO 13 NZ Div 1942–44.

and other members of the headquarters staff of 6 Brigade. They were to observe the methods used by the other brigades and be ready to train the brigade as soon as it arrived in the Third Echelon. The brigadier was an Auckland lawyer who, in 1914–18, had risen from private soldier to battalion commander. He returned to New Zealand early in 1942 after the campaigns in Greece and Libya to command 2 NZEF in the Pacific, leaving the imprint of his high character on his brigade.

The troops had embarked, those at Lyttelton on the Andes, those at Wellington on the Aquitania, the Empress of Britain and the Empress of Japan.

Andes: 23 Bn, HQ Ry C and M Gp, 9 Survey Coy, 10 Ry Constr Coy–1396 all ranks. Empress of Japan: 21 Bn, 135 all ranks RN—958 all ranks.

Empress of Britain: HQ 5 Bde, 22 Bn, 5 Anti-Tank Coy—1622 all ranks.

Aquitania: 28 (Maori) Bn, 5 Fd Amb, Div Supply Column, 243 all ranks RNVR—2862 all ranks. The total number embarked was 6838 all ranks.

At 6 a.m. on 2 May the great liners, together with HMS Leander and HMAS Canberra, slipped quietly away from their berths at Wellington, with the Trentham Camp Band playing to each ship in succession. They linked up in Cook Strait with the Andes and HMAS Australia from Lyttelton and set out for Sydney. Here they were joined by the Queen Mary and the Empress of Canada and sailed south to be joined by another transport from Melbourne and to arrive at Fremantle on 10 May, the very day that the slow convoy left that port for Colombo. The voyage, so far, had been without incident, living conditions were luxurious and the reception in Fremantle and Perth as enthusiastic as it had been and ever was to be for all New Zealand convoys.

The war situation was still serious but no worse than it had been when the convoy left New Zealand. On 4 May, when the Second Echelon was steaming across the Tasman Sea, the Dominion parliaments had received the promised appreciation of the war situation as seen by the Chiefs of Staff in Britain. They had reviewed the situation on all fronts and had considered that the possibility of a direct attack by Japan upon Australia and New Zealand was very remote. If the convoys were diverted and formations split, all possible steps would be taken to reassemble the forces. Neither India nor Kenya was suitable for training so the diversion, if it should take place, would have to be to the United Kingdom. The situation, however, was being watched from day to day and at the moment no diversion was necessary. This was a more confident statement than the Dominions expected. The Governments were reassured though both made several reservations. They still demanded full information, they wanted the opportunity of deciding the ultimate destination of the convoys and they insisted upon strong escorts should the ships have to enter the more dangerous Atlantic. Once again it was apparent that the Dominions were not subordinates but members of a Commonwealth with equal status and equal rights.

On the basis of this appreciation the convoys left Fremantle for Egypt. The fast convoy left on 12 May and made steady progress towards Colombo, with the more serious soldiers listening to the wireless reports, well aware that the international situation was changing every hour. The 5 Brigade war diary records that, ‘What news we did get was most disquieting.’

Germany had made an unexpected move across the European chessboard and the Allies had not been able to make any effective counter move. On 10 May Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg had been invaded. Mr Chamberlain had resigned and a Coalition Government had been formed with Mr Churchill as Prime Minister. On 13 May Churchill told the House of Commons and the world: ‘I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.’ Next day the War Office announced that Local Defence Volunteers

From July 1940 they were known as the Home Guard.

were to be raised in Britain and that Holland was about to capitulate. Italy, the political barometer of Europe, was showing no immediate change, but the British Government decided that no more ships were to come through by way of Aden and the Suez Canal. The two convoys in the Indian Ocean—the slow and the fast—therefore turned south-west towards Capetown.

The fast convoy swung round from its course on the night of 15 May. The men, whose paybooks had been made out for a day in Colombo, learned of this change by observing that the morning sun was shining from another angle. The slow convoy went through to Colombo, left there and was diverted south on 19 May. Instead of being the advance party it was now four days behind the other convoy. In this order the ships moved south, with the Governments of two Dominions very apprehensive about the presence of German raiders in the South Atlantic and the Admiralty calling together for that portion of the voyage the most formidable escort it could assemble.

On the morning of 26 May the fast convoy and its escort were seen like another Armada by the surprised inhabitants of Capetown.

The Queen Mary and the Aquitania went to Simonstown, about 25 miles from Capetown.

For five days the city showered upon the troops every hospitality it could offer. The Maori Battalion paid a visit from Simonstown and, as 5 Brigade's war diary records, ‘They were a credit to their people and a marked example for the remainder of our troops.’ The Empress of Japan was going no farther so her troops were trans- ferredtransferred to the other ships, which by the incredibly luxurious standards of 1940 were already classed as overcrowded. The naval unit went to the Empress of Canada; 21 Battalion to the Empress of Britain. Finally, on 30 May the slow convoy came into port.

Next day the fast convoy put out to sea, calling at Freetown and steaming on with increased precautions against attacks from U-boats and aircraft. The troops crowded about the loudspeakers and listened to the news from the BBC. The announcers were describing the evacuation that was taking place at Dunkirk and the approach of the panzer units towards Paris; on 10 June they announced the declaration of war by Italy. These tremendous events caused no alteration to the route. The convoy rounded Cape Verde at midnight and steamed north for the Irish Sea and increased naval protection. The war was closer now. The wreckage from torpedoed ships drifted past, a tanker stood on its stern with its bow above water, ‘blazing like a torch’. The convoy, however, was not attacked, and on 16 June the ships anchored in the Clyde. The reception given to the Australian and New Zealand forces was genuinely warm, even pathetic in its expressions of gratitude. Their arrival after a voyage of 17,000 miles was dramatic enough to be classed as a triumph and to be featured as an example of unity within the Commonwealth. It was the opinion of General Freyberg, who had not wanted the Second Echelon diverted to Britain, that ‘the arrival of the New Zealanders and Australians in the circumstances had been most opportune and had steadied the nation considerably.’ There was little else to be confident about. The British offer of an Anglo-French union had been rejected, M. Reynaud had resigned, Marshal Pétain had formed a government to negotiate peace with Germany.

The men of the Second Echelon, however, were not unduly excited by the gravity of the international situation. They were too interested in the last stages of their Grand Tour, which began with a train journey to Edinburgh and ended in southern England with a march along tree-lined avenues to the tented camps of the Aldershot Command. The units of the brigade, now together for the first time, were in and about Mytchett; 1 General Hospital took over Pinewood Sanatorium near Wokingham and 1 Convalescent Depot staffed a camp reception hospital near Farnborough.

The railway and forestry companies went to Woolmer, where the advance party left behind with the slow convoy at Capetown was already in quarters. This party's ships had left a day after the fast convoy, had called at Dakar and Casablanca, and on the collapse of France had been diverted from Brest to Plymouth. From there it had gone straight to Woolmer to receive the companies on 20 June.

This concentration in the Aldershot area was contrary to the original plan in which the base camp for 2 NZEF (UK) was to have been in Colchester in Essex. But the senior officers

On 14 June HQ 2 NZEF (UK) had the following officers from the Middle East: Brig R. Miles (Commander), Maj C. S. J. Duff (GSO II), Maj A. W. Greville (AA & QMG), Brig N. S. Falla (Brig i/c Administration), Col K. MacCormick (ADMS), Lt-Col S. H. Crump (CRASC), Lt-Col T. J. King (DADOS). Colonel Sir Stephen Allen (Military Secretary) had been in Britain since the declaration of war. The GSO I, Colonel Stewart, who left Egypt on 26 June, had a difficult and hazardous journey by air and sea and did not take over until 25 August.

who had been sent over from Egypt to prepare the camp and to organise the base had found the situation very different from that envisaged by General Freyberg in 1939. The defences in northern France had collapsed and Colchester was classed as a ‘Battle Area’, within which battalions would be dispersed as garrison troops in the coastal towns. As this would have been detrimental to their discipline and training, General Freyberg had suggested an area in the Southern Command. The War Office gave him the choice of Winchester with billets or Aldershot with tents. The General preferred Winchester, but the whole force could not be accommodated so Aldershot it had to be.

These plans had been made when the convoys were moving up the African coast and when the policy of the British Government was to give overseas troops every facility to complete their training. They were changed when the succession of disasters in Europe left the Germans free to plan the invasion of Britain. Thereafter, partly trained though it was, the echelon became part of the defence of the country. The New Zealand Government recognised this state of emergency but stipulated that the troops should have adequate equipment and be a separate formation, under the command of the GOC of the war area in which they were placed and not under the command of any British divisional commander. So, from 17 June, 2 NZEF (UK) was a separate formation,

Brigadier Miles, who had been sent over from Egypt, commanded 2 NZEF (UK) unti the arrival of General Freyberg on 24 June.

under the operational control of the War Office and, from 24 June, responsible for No. 3 section of the Aldershot defence system.

In the meantime General Freyberg had been waiting in Maadi until he was certain that Italy's entry into the war did not mean an immediate threat to Egypt and the immediate use of the First Echelon. He was then able to leave Brigadier Puttick in command and fly to Britain to take over 2 NZEF (UK). With France crumbling, all regular air routes were blocked but a place was found for him in an aircraft that was taking some very important diplomatic mail. In it he was taken up the Nile to Khartoum, westwards to Kano and north via obscure petrol points in the Sahara to Oran, and thence to Lisbon, Exeter and, on 24 June, to London.

Until then his policy had always been that his force should not go into action unless it was adequately equipped and thoroughly trained. But after a visit to the War Office he informed the New Zealand Government that ‘There is a desperate shortage of equipment and for some time to come we shall be short of many of our weapons. This is the common lot of most troops here; nevertheless in spite of this I feel, and I am sure that Cabinet will agree with me, that New Zealand troops must be prepared to accept battle upon uneven terms in defence of Great Britain.’ He knew that should there be an invasion the first question the people of New Zealand would ask would be, ‘What part did our men take?’ After this correspondence all questions concerning the role of 2 NZEF (UK) were left to him. He returned to the War Office to say, ‘My Government want you to give us as much equipment as you can spare, and would wish you to cast the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the role in which you may consider us to be of greatest assistance at the present moment.’ Thereupon the force became part of GHQ Reserve. ‘The great hunt for stores and equipment was also on forthwith. We found conditions infinitely worse than in New Zealand—no new weapons, no ammunition, no transport. The BEF had lost everything in France and, naturally, had priority in refitting. It was almost heartbreaking but we carried on for the first week and the equipment started trickling in.’

5 Brigade war diary, June 1940.

The first issue of equipment was received on 28 June; next day 2 NZEF (UK) was placed at eight hours' notice because an invasion was thought possible that coming weekend.

There was no suggestion that the First Echelon should be brought over from Egypt. Such plans had been shelved when Italy entered the war and challenged Britain's control of the Mediterranean. The echelon would stay where it was and there be joined by the Third Echelon, which was due to leave New Zealand in August. The Second Echelon would remain in Britain until mid-August at least, or until the danger of attack on England was over. Until then only those units not actually required in the defence of Britain would leave in the convoys that were being so boldly despatched to the Middle East.

Shortly after this decision the Convalescent Depot and Railway Construction and Maintenance Group were warned to prepare for a move overseas. The former had to hand over its hospital to 1 General Hospital and that unit, in its turn, had to select some of its staff for immediate service in the Middle East. They entrained for the Clyde on 3 August, the railwaymen embarking at Gourock on the Franconia and the medical staffs at Glasgow on the Andes. This convoy, taking the route via Capetown, did not reach Egypt until mid-September.

The rest of the echelon spent their time training for their role in the defence of Britain. General Freyberg had given the officers an inspiring survey of the military situation; the press and Mr Churchill warned everyone that each weekend was a potential crisis. And history seemed to be repeating itself with some romantic variations. On 6 July the battalions were inspected by King George VI, and men with imagination and some slight knowledge of history thought of Elizabeth I at Tilbury or of George III reviewing his regiments when they were waiting for the forces of Napoleon.

At this stage the battalions and detachments of reinforcements with the Second Echelon had been organised into 2 NZEF (UK), with a Force Headquarters and three groups. Headquarters Covering Force (Brigadier Miles) had C Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry Regiment, a machine-gun company and an infantry battalion commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser and made up of the men from the two batteries of 5 Field Regiment and the two batteries of 7 Anti-Tank Regiment that were still without guns. The Mixed Brigade

From 7 August known as 7 Infantry Brigade.

(Brigadier Barrowclough) was formed from 28 (Maori) Battalion and 29 (or Composite) Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel McNaught

Lt-Col G. J. McNaught, DSO, ED; New Plymouth; born Wanganui, 26 Nov 1896; schoolmaster; NZ MG Corps 1916–19 (2 Lt, 1919); CO 29 Bn (UK) Jun 1940–Mar 1941; 25 Bn Sep–Dec 1941; wounded 23 Nov 1941; headmaster, New Plymouth Boys' High School.

) organised from the unattached infantry reinforcements. The third group was 5 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Hargest). Fourth Anti-Tank Company was attached to the Mixed Infantry Brigade and 5 Anti-Tank Company to 5 Infantry Brigade.

There was still an acute shortage of arms, vehicles and equipment. Fifth Field Regiment had only one battery: a collection of 18-pounder guns and 4.5-inch howitzers. The anti-tank companies had been given the Bedford 30-cwt trucks, sheeted with ⅝ inch steel plate and equipped with Bren guns and anti-tank rifles. C Squadron Divisional Cavalry had six light tanks and six Bren carriers. The Army Service Corps details, men from the Petrol and Ammunition Companies, had motor lorries, but for the transportation of troops 8 and 9 Motor Coach Companies had been attached from the Royal Army Service Corps. With their enormous camouflaged buses they could lift the whole force in one move.

On 17 July, when the force was finally organised, it came under the control of the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces and with 1 Canadian Division and 1 Armoured Division formed 7 Corps under the command of Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton. Their allotted task was ‘to counter-attack and destroy any enemy force invading the counties of Surrey-Kent-Sussex-Hampshire which was not destroyed by the troops of the Eastern and Southern Commands.’

As this landing was thought likely to take place at any moment the training of 2 NZEF (UK) had to be unconventional. Instead of the regular stages of section, platoon, company, battalion, brigade and finally divisional exercises, the order was reversed. The syllabus began with divisional training on the assumption that the troops were already trained soldiers. They practised moving by motor transport to their defence areas and trained by doing tactical exercises on the spot.

The first large-scale exercise took place on 18–22 July. Three convoys of buses moved off in drizzling rain for Ashdown Forest to the south-west of Tunbridge Wells. The brigades then had to cover the southern approaches to Crowborough and to counter-attack any landings on the south coast east of the River Ouse. With wind and rain to encourage them, they dug in and learnt by unpleasant experience how to bivouac in the open. They repelled hypothetical assaults on the beaches or overwhelmed imaginary parachutists landing on the South Downs. The exercise ended with a solid route march, a night embussing and a move back to Aldershot.

General Freyberg then went ruthlessly through all the mistakes with his officers and NCOs. Everyone had learnt something; he was certain that his force could move by MT, deploy into position and have behind it an organisation that ran sufficiently smoothly to keep the fighting troops from starving or running short of ammunition. Altogether he thought the exercise had been ‘a remarkable performance.’

It was repeated on 28–31 July with the Mixed Brigade (7 Brigade) as an enemy who was advancing towards London. Fifth Brigade, assisted by I tanks but harried by low-flying aircraft, fought its way eastwards towards Crowborough and ended the exercise with a dawn attack in the East Grinstead area.

The infantry then marched through the area they were to hold should the invasion take place. For another week of that sunlit August they marched over the Downs and across the Weald. Those who remembered the distance from New Zealand, the youth of the Dominion and the past history of the counties they were detailed to defend realised that they were taking part in a great romance. The General thought that, as a spectacle, nothing equalled this long march across Sussex. Through his ‘méthode naturelle’ the battalions had become magnificent instruments of war. He afterwards could say: ‘Perhaps the most extraordinary part of this English adventure was the rapid and successful training of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force…. I am certain that in two months they had become a fully trained fighting force, capable of taking their part in any offensive. This is a tribute to their excellent qualities and their natural adaptability. In any case … although the times were hard, and the move of our men interfered with the concentration of the Division, I am very glad they went to Great Britain. They saw the people at a time of crisis, and in their small way inspired confidence in England at a time when the Homeland had few friends, if any, other than her people from overseas.’

At the same time the force was steadily acquiring greater fire power. Seventh Anti-Tank Regiment had two-pounders; 5 Field Regiment had the new 25-pounders and some French 75-millimetre guns; the Army Service Corps units had at least 50 per cent of their regular transport; and the infantry had almost 100 per cent of their equipment. Once strengthened, the brigades were tested again, on the South Downs on 27–29 August. The troops returned to Aldershot, expecting soon to leave for the Middle East.

They did not know that the relative importance of the Pacific and the Middle East had just been decided,

See Chapter 3, pp. 48–9.

or that the Third Echelon had left Wellington on 27 August. But they did know that Headquarters 6 Brigade

HQ 6 Brigade had travelled with the Second Echelon. Brigadier Barrowclough relinquished command of 7 Brigade on 26 August and, with some of his staff, left by sea for Capetown. From there he went to Durban by rail and thence to Cairo by air, arriving on 13 October, two weeks after his brigade had arrived with the Third Echelon. The others of his party went by sea from Capetown to Egypt.

was about to leave for Egypt, and that the War Office had stated that the echelon would leave Aldershot on or after 15 September. The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces, General Sir Alan Brooke, inspected the force preparatory to its departure; Mr Churchill appeared on 4 September to fulfil a promise of a similar inspection. Both were impressed and said so.

But to everyone's surprise, on 4 September all preparations for departure were abruptly halted. Late that night General Freyberg was asked by GHQ Home Forces if the echelon could be retained in an operational role. The Intelligence Staff was almost certain that a landing on the south-east coast was imminent. For days the Luftwaffe had been attempting to eliminate the Royal Air Force, there was an ominous concentration of shipping across the Channel, and September was the month with favourable tides and phases of the moon. To meet the threat every available unit was being transferred to the southern counties.

In this emergency the Second Echelon was an obvious choice, for it had been training for the last two months as a mobile force, complete with all reserves of ammunition and three days' supplies. General Freyberg consequently gave his consent and thereby postponed the concentration of his Division in the Middle East.

The order from GHQ Home Forces ran as follows: ‘Emergency Move. NZ Force and 8 R Tanks under command General Freyberg will move to area EAST of TUNBRIDGE WELLS to be selected by Commander 12 Corps. On arrival this area FORCE will come under command of 12 Corps and will be held in reserve for counter offensive role.’ For further information the General went to GHQ Home Forces, where he learnt what the commander had not been willing to say over the telephone—that after the heavy bombardment of Dover from Gris Nez, Mr Churchill had ordered that if an invasion took place and Dover was captured it must be retaken at all costs. To take part in this all-important counter-attack the New Zealand brigades were being transferred to the outskirts of the Dover-Folkestone area. The signals strength for this role was increased by 100 British signallers who had served in France or Norway, 8 Royal Tank Regiment came under command and, after 12 September, 157 Anti-Aircraft Battery.

The brigades left Aldershot late on 5 September, stopping and starting all through the night, listening to the drone of aircraft on their way to bomb London and eventually settling down under cover in the woods before first light. East of Maidstone there was 5 Brigade, north of the Maidstone-Charing road was 7 Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier Falconer, and at Charing there was Milforce, an armoured group, commanded by Brigadier Miles and formally constituted the following morning.

Their instructions were specific and detailed. Seventh Brigade would deal with airborne landings in the Chatham-Maidstone area; Milforce and 5 Brigade would prepare to counter-attack in the direction of Dover and Folkestone. They immediately carried out exercises along all possible routes. There was no need to emphasise their importance. With the Battle of Britain then reaching its climax, the exercises were obviously rehearsals for what might take place in the next few hours. The days began with stand-to at dawn; the training exercises went on with bomber formations roaring over towards London and fighter screens weaving their vapour trails across the autumn skies; and then dusk came down with all troops standing-to again.

The week passed by with the air battle increasing in intensity, but the echelon still expected that it would be withdrawn in time to leave for the Middle East with an October convoy. On 12 September, however, Churchill postponed the date of sailing for a week and the actual withdrawal from Kent until 19 September. The culminating date was 15 September. ‘On this day the Luftwaffe, after two heavy attacks on the 14th, made its greatest concentrated effort in a resumed daylight attack on London.’

Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II, p. 293.

Mr Churchill thereupon decided that the force must remain in Kent; only when all dangers of an invasion were over was it to go overseas. He has since stated that, ‘By the middle of September the invasion menace seemed sufficiently glaring to arrest further movement of vital units to the East, especially as they had to go round the Cape. After a visit to the Dover sector, where the electric atmosphere was compulsive, I suspended for a few weeks the dispatch of the New Zealanders and the remaining two tank battalions to the Middle East.’

Ibid., p. 410.

This decision forced General Freyberg to choose, for the second time that year, the theatre of war in which it was most necessary for him to be. In Kent he had the Second Echelon, nearly 7000 men, waiting to counter-attack a German landing. In the Middle East the Italian Tenth Army had crossed the Egyptian border on 14 September and was advancing towards Sidi Barrani. This meant that the First Echelon (4 Brigade Group), only partially equipped and strung out along the line of communication, was presumably about to be engaged in a major battle.

See Chapter 3.

The Third Echelon (6 Brigade) was on its way to the Middle East to be trained and equipped. Convinced that any invasion would fail

In his cables to the New Zealand Government General Freyberg had always stated that a German invasion would be an act of desperation, doomed to failure.

and confident about the ability of the Second Echelon, he decided to return to Egypt. With the somewhat reserved permission of Mr Churchill, General Freyberg and Colonel Stewart left by air on the night of 22–23 September. The forecast for the night read, ‘No wind in Channel, sea calm, invasion imminent, all precautions to be put into effect.’ In spite of a crash landing on Malta airfield, they reached Divisional Headquarters at Baggush in the Western Desert on 25 September.

The units left in Kent carried on as before. On 8 October 7 Brigade was disbanded

28 (Maori) Battalion went to Milforce, 29 Battalion to 5 Brigade. Milforce was commanded by Lt-Col E. C. N. Custance, 8 Royal Tanks, and after the attachment of 28 Battalion, by Lt-Col Dittmer. Lt-Col Falconer took over 5 Brigade from Brig Hargest.

so that 2 NZEF (UK), commanded first by Brigadier Miles and then by Brigadier Hargest, consisted of 5 Brigade and Milforce. Otherwise there were few changes. The battalions still stood-to at dawn and at dusk. There were several casualties during the air raids but more from accidents during the ‘blackout’. Those on leave could be in London during the raids; others in Canterbury were thanked by the Chief Constable for their assistance, and in another town an NCO with a small party was thanked for recovering bodies from wrecked buildings.

Even so, 5 Brigade's war diary records that October 1940 was ‘one of the happiest months spent overseas.’ The troops were billeted with private families or lived in barns, oast-houses and requisitioned dwellings. Games

23 Battalion was informed through Routine Orders that the right to kill rabbits in Milgate Park had been sold to a man who earned his livelihood as a trapper. There was to be no more snaring, ferreting or shooting of rabbits in the battalion area.

were organised and enjoyed, even if Routine Orders could read: ‘Final Match at Watchett's Recreation Ground, … 23 Bn to provide AA defence, medical personnel and to mark and clear the ground.’

There was no suggestion of any major move to the Middle East. The only New Zealand troops to go with that month's convoy were the staff of 1 General Hospital, detachments from different headquarters, small sections of artillerymen, engineers and Army Service Corps drivers, all under the command of Captain Grigg,

Maj A. N. Grigg, MC, m.i.d.; born NZ 16 Nov 1896; Member of Parliament, 1938–41; killed in action 29 Nov 1941.

and a group of senior officers, Brigadiers Miles and Falla and Lieutenant- Colonel Crump. Their convoy left the Clyde on 7 October and was attacked from the air, the Oronsay being hit by bombs and escorted back to Greenock. The 363 New Zealanders on board, none of whom was hurt, had a week's survivors leave and then by leisurely stages in different camps appeared again at Aldershot. The other two ships rounded the Cape with the convoy and reached Port Tewfik on 16 November.

The next convoy was due to leave in November, but there were 100,000 competitors and capacity for only 30,000 men. In any case, priority was being given to armoured regiments, artillery and anti-aircraft units. Everything was based on the precise requirements in the Middle East and they could not be assessed until the date of sailing. Consequently the British Government would not promise that the echelon would leave even with the December convoy.

But there was some suggestion of the move. October was now drawing to a close, winter was approaching and the Germans could not attempt an invasion until the summer of 1941. The echelon, with billets cleaned and all accounts paid, moved from Kent to the Aldershot area, there to continue training and await orders to embark.

No one left in November, but the artillery and the advance parties from the battalions were selected for the December convoy. Guns and equipment, trucks and Bren carriers were taken to the transports at Liverpool; detachments, each of one NCO and thirteen other ranks, went with LMGs to the different ships as anti-aircraft gunners. They sailed on 17 December: 7 Anti-Tank Regiment, less 33 and 34 Batteries already in Egypt, from Avonmouth in the Rangitiki; 5 Field Regiment in the City of London and advance parties in the Elizabethville, both from Liverpool. With congested living conditions, winter weather and the close proximity of enemy raiders it was not a pleasant voyage. On Christmas Day the convoy was attacked and had to scatter for a time; at Freetown the troops, in spite of the oppressive heat, slept below deck to escape from the mosquitoes. There was no further trouble along the route to the Cape, to Durban and to Port Tewfik, and on 18 February 1941 the regiments marched into Helwan Camp and the artillery of the Division was complete for the first time.

In the Aldershot area there now remained HQ 2 NZEF (UK), 5 Brigade, and several specialist units still training, still marching and still being inspected. On 27 November HRH the Princess Royal, as Colonel-in-Chief, Royal Signals, reviewed the Divisional Signals unit at Mytchett and set a standard of thorough inspection that was remembered until the end of the war. The other two events for which all were preparing were Christmas in Britain and the approaching embarkation for the Middle East. Leave for all was not practicable but 50 per cent of the men had leave before Christmas, a small number dined at the New Zealand Services Club and others went to private homes. For the rest there was Christmas dinner in camp and parcels from the New Zealand Patriotic Council as some consolation for the severity of the weather. New Year saw similar hospitality, more frozen pipes and more skating, the same draughty billets and a mild epidemic of influenza. But in the first four days of January baggage was loaded and the battalions left for Newport or Liverpool.

The Duchess of Bedford took 2781 all ranks from Newport on 7 January and steamed up the Irish Sea and into Belfast Lough off Bangor the next day. The Athlone Castle, with 1480 all ranks, left Liverpool on 7 January but remained anchored off the coast of North Wales until the 11th, when she joined the convoy that was assembling in Belfast Lough. In several other ships 112 other ranks sailed as anti-aircraft defence parties and 10 officers and 404 other ranks sailed in the ships carrying the transport vehicles. The only troops left in Britain were the Base Details,

On 22 February 1941 Base Details went to Aldershot and thence to Avonmouth, en route for the Middle East. But, after their ship had touched a derelict and put into the Clyde, they were transferred by sea to Liverpool and so to a nearby military camp. They sailed again on 23 April from Liverpool. At Durban they spent a month in another military camp, met a New Zealand detachment of 200 men who had come south as guard on a ship with Italian prisoners of war and left on 10 June, reaching Port Tewfik on the 20th.

approximately 90 all ranks.

With a strong air and naval escort the convoy of over twenty ships left on 12 January, calling at Freetown and sailing south, one section steaming on to Durban and the other, which included the New Zealand ships, berthing for five delightful days in Capetown. The convoy eventually reassembled off Durban and reached Port Tewfik on 3 March. The men from the Athlone Castle entered Helwan Camp the next day. The majority of those in the Duchess of Bedford disembarked on 5 March, but rough seas for the next two days kept 21 Battalion on board until 8 March.

By then the other battalions had endured their first route march, even though many of them did not have such tropical equipment as shorts, hose-tops and sun helmets. They were being reorganised. Twenty-ninth Battalion

As late as 1943 beer was being drawn for this disbanded battalion.

was broken up, some men going to the units of 5 Brigade, others to the training battalions. The Reconnaissance Battalion, the core of which had been formed in Britain from 4 and 5 Anti-Tank Companies, was disbanded and the men drafted to the training battalions.

Still more important, on 7 March Brigadier Hargest told all ranks that their stay in Egypt would be short. In fact, some of the transport vehicles had not yet come up from the ships at Port Tewfik when the brigade received its warning orders. The battalions left Helwan on 17 March, this time for Alexandria and the campaign in Greece.

CHAPTER 3 Third Echelon joins the First

IN May–July 1940, when the Second Echelon was at sea or being hurriedly equipped at Aldershot, the Third Echelon had been assembling in New Zealand. The officers and NCOs, having trained with the Second Echelon, were already in camp when the main drafts

Trentham: HQ NZ Div (details), 8 Fd Coy, Div Sigs (details), HQ 6 Bde (details, with 19 LAD attached), 6 A-Tk Coy, 25 Bn, Div Provost Coy, Overseas Base (details), Base Pay Office (details), Base Post Office (details), Base Depot, 2 Gen Hosp, Reinforcements (1228 all ranks).

Papakura: 6 Fd Regt (18 LAD attached), 33 Bty 7 A-Tk Regt, 24 Bn, Overseas Base (details), Base Pay Office (details), Reinforcements (1136 all ranks).

Burnham: 26 Bn, C Section Div Amn Coy, Div Pet Coy (details), Div Sup Coln (details), 6 Fd Amb, Overseas Base (details), Base Pay Office (details), Reinforcements (1167 all ranks).

marched in on 15–17 May to form 6 Infantry Brigade, the attached units and some 3000 reinforcements.

With Brigadier Barrowclough and his staff in Britain, the new formation was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilder, DSO, MC,

Maj-Gen A. S. Wilder, DSO, MC, m.i.d., Order of the White Eagle (Serb); Te Hau, Waipukurau; born NZ 24 May 1890, sheep-farmer; Major, Wgtn Mtd Rifles, 1914–19; CO 25 Bn May 1940–Sep 1941; comd NZ Trg Group, Maadi Camp, Sep–Dec 1941, Jan–Feb 1942; 5 Bde 6 Dec 1941–17 Jan 1942; 5 Div (in NZ) Apr 1942–Jan 1943; 1 Div Jan–Nov 1943.

of 25 Battalion. He had served with distinction on Gallipoli and in Palestine and had then returned to civilian life—in his case to sheep-farming. The other commanders represented the younger generation of New Zealanders who had to provide the possible replacements in what was obviously going to be a long war. Lieutenant-Colonels Shuttleworth

Lt-Col C. Shuttleworth, DSO, m.i.d.; born Wakefield, Nelson, 19 Jan 1907; Regular soldier; CO 24 Bn Feb 1940–Nov 1941; p.w. 30 Nov 1941; died UK, 15 May 1945.

and Page,

Brig J. R. Page, DSO, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Dunedin, 10 May 1908; Regular soldier; CO 26 Bn May 1940–Nov 1941; wounded 27 Nov 1941; Commander, Northern Military District, 1950–52; Adjutant-General, 1952–54; QMG 1956–.

both graduates of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and members of the New Zealand Staff Corps, commanded 24 and 26 Battalions respectively; Lieutenant-Colonel Weir,

Maj-Gen C. E. Weir, CB, CBE, DSO and bar, m.i.d.; Wellington; born NZ 5 Oct 1905; Regular soldier; CO 6 Fd Regt Sep 1939–Dec 1941; CRA 2 NZ Div Dec 1941–Jun 1944; GOC 2 NZ Div 4 Sep–17 Oct 1944; 46 (Brit) Div Nov 1944–Sep 1946; Commander, Southern Military District, 1948–49; QMG, Army HQ, Nov 1951–Aug 1955; Chief of General Staff Aug 1955–.

once in the Survey Department and afterwards a graduate of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, commanded 6 Field Regiment.

The medical officers were, as usual, a strong group with military experience and impressive civilian qualifications. Lieutenant-Colonel Bull,

Brig W. H. B. Bull, CBE, ED; Wellington; born Napier, 19 May 1897; surgeon; CO 6 Fd Amb Feb 1940–May 1941; ADMS NZ Div May 1941; p.w. 28 May 1941; DGMS, Army HQ, 1947–57.

a Wellington surgeon, commanded 6 Field Ambulance, and Lieutenant-Colonel Spencer,

Col F. M. Spencer, OBE, m.i.d.; born Rotorua, 3 Oct 1893; medical practitioner; NZMC, 1 NZEF, 1914–19 (Capt); CO 2 Gen Hosp Apr 1940–Jun 1943; died North Africa, Jun 1943.

of Wellington, was in charge of 2 General Hospital.

For them and for the men they were to command there were more comfortable quarters and better facilities for training than there had been for the other echelons, but the greatest difference was the sense of urgency aroused by the disastrous course of the war in Europe. The officers and NCOs had marched into camp shortly after the German invasion of Norway and Denmark; they were training on 10 May when the German armies entered the Low Countries and began the campaign that was to end with the evacuation from Dunkirk and the capitulation of France.

The general public was sensitive in its turn. People were now expressing their opinions about the war effort in greater volume and with more asperity. The newspapers, public bodies and the Returned Soldiers' Association called for drastic measures; on 23 May news was received of the British Emergency Powers Bill which placed all persons and property at the disposal of the state. The following day Mr Fraser

Prime Minister since 1 April after the death of Mr Savage on 26 March 1940.

announced that similar measures would be introduced in New Zealand. They would mean compulsory national service, civil, military and financial. He thought that the country would welcome such a decision; the serious nature of the war demanded it and no other means would be effective. The Government and the Parliamentary Labour Party were discussing the necessity of a ‘national’ Government.

These statements restored public confidence, even when the ensuing week saw the surrender of the Belgian Army and the evacuation of Dunkirk. But they meant two startling changes in the traditional policy of the Labour Government—the introduction of conscription and the admission

On 16 July Mr Fraser announced the agreement to form a War Cabinet of five members, three from the Labour Government, two from the Opposition. This body would decide and direct the war effort; the general Cabinet would continue to function in the normal way.

of the National Party to some share in the direction of the war effort. The Prime Minister who had the strength of mind to make such important decisions was equally resolute when stating his reasons for them. On 30 May, when Parliament was discussing the Emergency Regulations Bill, he made the following statement:

Provision will be made for the compulsory system right away. The question of when it will be applied will depend upon the conditions in regard to the Forces; it will depend entirely on the conditions in regard to the number at present volunteering, and the number that will be available during the next few months. Apart from everything else, however, the country feels at the present time in this crisis that the voluntary system, even if completely successful, does not apply fairly and does not embody that spirit of service that the country demands. There is that feeling—a feeling that must be shared by all, including even some of us who were strong anti-conscriptionists under ordinary conditions, for it is the life of the Commonwealth for which we are fighting at the present time. If I am aboard a sinking ship and I am asked to go to the pumps, and if another chap does not want to go to the pumps I will certainly compel him to do his best at least to save the ship. That is how I look upon the matter and that is how the Government looks upon it. If the house is on fire, we cannot start arguing about whether the other chap will help or not, but we can do our best to induce him to help. I am not going to reflect upon those who have conscientious objections to killing and would rather be killed than kill … but … it is quite impossible to carry on efficiently without compulsion; I say that quite definitely.

The 22nd July 1940 was the last day for voluntary enlistment in 2 NZEF. By then the total number of voluntary enlistments was 59,644.

Another result of the collapse of France and the declaration of war by Italy was the formation of several new units. Britain had asked if ‘in the present grave situation’ the Dominion could provide, in addition to those non-divisional troops already overseas,

11 Forestry Company and the Railway Construction and Maintenance Group had sailed with the Second Echelon, reaching Britain in June. The Railway Group left for the Middle East in August.

more foresters, railwaymen and engineers. The Government had immediately called for volunteers from the Forestry, Railway and Public Works Departments. By the end of June 14 and 15 Forestry Companies were at Trentham; Headquarters Railway Operating Group,

There was to have been 12 Railway Survey Company but there was no immediate need for it in the Middle East. The men were used to form 36 Survey Battery, part of the 3rd Section of the 4th Reinforcements. (See Documents, Vol. I, pp. 227–8.)

16 and 17 Railway Operating Companies and 13 Railway Construction Company were at Ngaruawahia. To form the required companies of engineers 8 Field Company

8 Field Company, when re-formed, went to Fiji and then to the Middle East with the 3rd Section of the 4th Reinforcements. Its place in the Division during the Greece campaign was filled by 19 Army Troops Company, a non-divisional unit.

had been more or less disbanded; the men were still at Trentham but they had been redrafted according to qualifications into 18 and 19 Army Troops Companies.

To command these specialist units there were again civilians with invaluable technical experience. Major Lincoln

Lt-Col L. A. Lincoln, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 14 Sep 1902; civil engineer; OC 18 Army Tps Coy Jul 1940–Jan 1942; 7 Fd Coy Jan–Sep 1942; DCRE No. 8 Works, RE, Sep 1942–Aug 1943; CRE No. 56 Works, RE, Aug 1943–Nov 1944.

of 18 Army Troops Company was an engineer from Auckland; Major Langbein,

Maj C. Langbein, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Nelson, 12 Oct 1894; Public Works Dept engineer; 1 NZEF 1914–19; OC 19 A Tps Coy Aug 1940–Jul 1942; OC NZ Engr Trg Depot 1942–43.

who commanded 19 Army Troops Company, was an engineer in the Public Works Department. The Railways Department was the natural source for the officers of the Railway Operating Group. The Group's commander was Lieutenant-Colonel Sage, MM;

Lt-Col A. H. Sage, OBE, MM, m.i.d.; Wellington; born NZ 1 Dec 1893; railway officer; Auck Regt, 1915–19 (Lt); CO NZ Ry Op Gp Aug 1940–Jun 1943.

Captain Aickin

Maj F. W. Aickin, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Onehunga, 7 Jul 1894; barrister and solicitor (Law Officer, NZ Govt Rlys); NZE, Sigs Coy, 1914–19 (2 Lt, 1918); OC 16 Ry Op Coy Aug 1940–Jun 1943; past General Manager, NZ Govt Rlys.

had 16 Railway Operating Company and Major Poole

Maj G. T. Poole; born NZ 3 Jul 1896; railway clerk; NZ Rifle Bde, 1915–19 (2 Lt, 1919); OC 17 Ry Op Coy 1940–42.

17 Railway Operating Company. The additional construction company that was being sent over, 13 Railway Construction Company, was commanded by Captain R. T. Smith,

Lt-Col R. T. Smith, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Thames, 4 Jul 1895; civil engineer; 1 NZEF, 1915–18; OC 13 Ry Constr Coy Jun 1940–Dec 1942; CO NZ Ry Constr Gp Dec 1942–Jun 1943; CRE Indian Works Unit in India, Burma and Malaya, 1944–46.

a civil engineer. All four commanding officers had served for several years with 1 NZEF.

The movement and ultimate destination of these companies was not decided for some weeks. The railwaymen, being required in the Middle East, could travel with the Third Echelon. The engineers and forestry men, both urgently needed in Britain, were to have travelled there by way of Canada but the plan was shelved because no naval escort was available in the North Pacific. In the end it was decided that only the Forestry Companies would go to Britain; they would travel with the Third Echelon as far as Colombo and there be transferred to a homeward-bound convoy. The engineers would go no farther than the Middle East, 19 Army Troops Company with the Third Echelon, 18 Army Troops Company with the 4th Reinforcements.

By July, however, there were serious doubts about the wisdom of sending any troops away from New Zealand. In the original plan the New Zealand Division was to operate from a base in Britain, and by the unpredictable chances of war the Second Echelon was already there. But it was now extremely unlikely that the First Echelon could ever be sent over from the Middle East. Nor was there any promise that either the First or the Third Echelon would on its arrival in Britain be fully equipped and thoroughly trained. To the New Zealand Government the wisest move seemed to be to divert a brigade group to Fiji and retain the remainder of the Third Echelon until more equipment was available in Britain.

This cautious attitude was due to the rapid deterioration of the situation in the Far East. Relations between Japan and the British Commonwealth were now unstable and there were indications that Japan, in order to achieve her ambitions in Asia and throughout the Pacific, was carefully estimating the possible advantages to be gained by calculated aggression. Moreover, Britain admitted that the fall of France and the declaration of war by Italy had wrecked the balance of naval strength in European waters. Without the French Navy she could not blockade the German and Italian fleets and, at the same time, despatch a fleet to the Far East. This gave Japan ‘a chance which could only occur once in a thousand years.’

Foreign Secretary Matsuoka to Adolf Hitler, in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 166.

Fortunately such aggression required preparation and preparation required time. The Japanese hesitated and Britain was able to consolidate her position in western Europe before she was challenged in the Far East and the Pacific.

Her policy

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom (Wellington), 13 Jul 1940.

was clearly stated on 13 July. ‘The immediate threat is to the United Kingdom, the security of which is vital. At present our policy must be a short-term one with the primary object of avoiding defeat at Home, and all resources must be devoted initially to this purpose. It is hoped that by September this phase will be over and that any attempt at invasion will have been defeated. The attention of the enemy is then likely to turn to the Middle East: this may happen simultaneously with the attack on this country, but owing to climatic conditions it is doubtful if the enemy will embark on large-scale operations from Libya or North Africa … until the end of September. Therefore, as soon as the situation at Home permits, it will be necessary to reinforce the Middle East, and it is hoped that it will be possible to reconstitute the 6th Australian Division and the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Middle East by the autumn or early winter of this year.’

This meant that the Division would assemble in the Middle East and not in Britain; that the Second Echelon would not be released before September. On the other hand, the Third Echelon could travel with the convoy due to leave Sydney on or about 23 August. In fact the transports were now assembling and space for the New Zealand troops had already been allocated. The New Zealand Government, however, was not convinced that the Third Echelon with its reinforcements and auxiliary troops should leave the Pacific zone. It asked for more information about the dangers of the route and the availability of equipment, and pointed out that if a brigade group went to Fiji the number of reinforcements travelling with the echelon would have to be reduced in proportion. To these questions the Government received carefully worded but reasonable answers—and the hope that they would send the forces as proposed.

After carefully weighing all the known factors the Government decided to send the troops to the Middle East. On 3 August in a cable to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs it retraced the steps by which it had reached this decision and elaborated the policy from which it was never to deviate at any future stage of the war.

The Government realised that the situation in the Far East had been deteriorating and that war with Japan had to be accepted as a probability. With the long and complicated coastline of the Dominion offering scores of landing places to any invader, there was every reason to defer the departure of the echelon. It was the only body of trained troops in the Dominion; if it left it would take with it arms and equipment from supplies that were already inadequate.

On the other hand, the collapse of France had doubled the possible weight of attack in the Middle East. It was therefore essential to build up the forces already in that area, even if the half-equipped troops might have to fight on unequal terms. The proposed escort for the convoy was lighter than it had been for the earlier echelons but the Government realised that, if the departure of the convoy was postponed until a stronger escort could be provided, the First Echelon would be left unsupported and the concentration of the Division would be delayed. The Chiefs of Staff, in their turn, had emphasised the vital necessity of safeguarding the sources of oil and of maintaining the lines of communication through the Middle East. They thought that the best contribution the Dominion could make to the common cause would be to despatch the Third Echelon to the Middle East.

For these reasons, the Government ‘fully accepted the fact that a large view must be taken, that in the last resort this Dominion must stand or fall according to the decision in the main theatres of war, and that as a corollary it would be wise to have all possible forces at decisive points rather than to disperse them in reserves all over the world.’ The Third Echelon would go to the Middle East, but in view of the threatening attitude of Japan the Dominion would retain such troops as were necessary for the defence of Fiji. The 3050 reinforcements who were to have travelled with the Third Echelon were consequently retained in New Zealand and organised for service in Fiji.

To this decision there was, on 9 August, a characteristic response from Churchill: ‘I read the Governor-General's telegram … with the greatest interest and sympathy. I appreciate fully the great responsibility which you and your colleagues cannot but feel in taking the decisions which you have reached as to the disposition of the available New Zealand forces. For our part we are greatly heartened as ever by New Zealand's readiness to meet the needs of the situation both in the Middle East and the Pacific. I feel sure of the absolute soundness of your decision.’

Documents, Vol. I, p. 175.

Having made this decision, the Government arranged for the concentration of 2 NZEF in the Middle East. The Third Echelon would sail in the August convoy; Brigadier Barrowclough

See p. 37, note 2.

and his staff would leave Britain and prepare for its arrival; General Freyberg and the Second Echelon would remain until after the Battle of Britain.

The Middle East to which they were going had been the scene of much activity since the arrival of the First Echelon in February 1940. In case Italy came into the war, the Western Desert Force had screened the Libyan frontier and maintained a series of carefully chosen but inadequately manned positions along the desert road. Fourth Brigade Group, as part of the reserve force, had remained in Egypt but in May, when the front in France was disintegrating and Mussolini was waiting for the psychological moment, it was given a more definite role in the defence system. Eighteenth Battalion was rushed into the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, leaving 19 and 20 Battalions to deal with fifth-column activities in Cairo. Later in the month the brigade had become responsible for the security of Cairo, with General Freyberg in command of all operations in the city and its suburbs. The battalions in turn did spells of duty at the barracks; the machine-gunners had detachments at the Citadel and about the airfields at Heliopolis and Helwan; the rest of the brigade group was at Maadi on short notice to move. The plan was afterwards amended by the provision of a motorised reserve and anti-parachute detachments at Bulac bridge and Gezira Sporting Club.

The really serious problems of the period were the detachment of units and the gradual dispersion of the brigade. Faced with a dangerous shortage of guns and transport, of signallers and railway operators, General Headquarters Middle East had asked General Freyberg if he could provide troops for the operation of railways and communications. General Wavell appreciated his desire to have the New Zealand Division working as a complete formation, but stressed the fact that adequate communications were absolutely essential. With some misgivings Freyberg authorised the detachment of signallers, Army Service Corps units and, in the event of a crisis, officers and men to operate the Egyptian State Railways. The whole arrangement was to be of a very temporary nature.

The first to leave were 7 officers and 122 other ranks who, on 9 June, became Advanced Corps Signals, Western Desert Force. They operated from Baggush under the command of Major Agar,

Lt-Col G. L. Agar, DSO, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 18 Jun 1905; telegraph engineer; OC Corps Sigs, WDF, Oct 1940–Feb 1941; DCSO Anzac Corps Apr–May 1941; CO 2 NZ Div Sigs Sep 1941–Sep 1942, Nov 1942–Jun 1943; OC NZ Corps of Sigs Sep 1941–Jun 1943; SSO Sigs, Army HQ, Sep 1943–Dec 1944.

providing despatch riders and controlling all line and wireless communication between Headquarters British Troops in Egypt and the formations in the desert.

Two days later Italy entered the war. Officially it was at 0001 hours on 11 June; in Maadi Camp the news spread on the evening of 10 June. At the cinema, at the NAAFI and at the Maadi Recreation Tent the announcement was received with prolonged cheering. A blackout was ordered throughout the camp, anti-aircraft posts were manned, slit trenches were dug in case of air raids. To prevent sabotage and to meet airborne attacks, small detachments went out to guard the ammunition dump

On 13–29 June a platoon of B Company 18 Battalion went from Cairo to Khartoum as the guard with some ammunition stores.

in the Tura caves, the Maadi water supply and the grounds of the Gezira Sporting Club, the most suitable landing area for paratroops in Cairo. In Alexandria New Zealanders on leave from the Sidi Bishr rest camp joined the street patrols of the Coldstream Guards but there was little trouble. The Fascist leaders of the Italian colony had been arrested and life in the cities went on as before.

In the Western Desert the Italians were no more aggressive than they had been in Cairo, so it was soon evident that they would not attack until the cooler weather of the late autumn or early winter. General Freyberg was therefore free to join

General Freyberg left by air on 17 June; see pp. 33–4 for an account of his journey.

the Second Echelon in Britain, leaving Brigadier Puttick in command of 2 NZEF (Middle East) and Lieutenant-Colonel Inglis as the commander of the brigade.

The understanding was that the force would not take part in any active operations until the arrival of the Second and Third Echelons. But the General had agreed to the employment of the battalions in the rear areas and of the transport units in the desert.

Central and Eastern Mediterranean This explains why on 18 June, after only twenty-four hours' notice, 18 and 19 Battalions with an Advanced Headquarters from 4 Brigade were transported by 4 Reserve Mechanical Transport Company to Garawla, a rock-strewn waste near Mersa Matruh. Here they were 200 miles west of Alexandria in an area of some strategic importance and under the command of Western Desert Force.

The battalions then continued their training or improved the local defences. A new landing ground was required at Baggush, patrols had to watch the beaches at night, guards were wanted for the Italian prisoners at Mersa Matruh. The Wadi Naghamish, which stretched inland for several miles, was to be converted into a tremendous anti-tank ditch. With little mechanical equipment

Telegram, Puttick to Prime Minister, 2 Aug 1940: ‘In conversation with General Wilson I suggested New Zealand might be willing to provide power machinery and after consultation with General Wavell he asked me to cable you.’ See Documents, Vol. I, pp. 228–31, for correspondence leading to the formation of 21 Mechanical Equipment Company.

this was a laborious task, remembered by all who were there for the intense heat, the plague of flies and the moonlight nights when Italian aircraft droned overhead searching for targets on the railway and at Mersa Matruh. The tours of duty, however, were not long. The battalions were replaced on 5 July by 20 Battalion and a composite unit of artillerymen and signallers, who in their turn were relieved on 29 July by 18 Battalion and another composite force.

Fourth RMT Company remained in the desert at Smugglers' Cove, attached to Western Desert Force and close to Mersa Matruh, an Egyptian watering place with white houses and a mosque, palm trees and a perfect beach. As the terminus of the desert railway, Matruh was the base from which the company took supplies along the coast road to the forward depots in the Sidi Barrani area. On occasions there were variations in the routine: from July to October C Section was at Sidi Barrani attached to 7 Armoured Division; in November B Section was there directly under orders from Western Desert Force; and from 14 August to 4 September A Section, more fortunate than the others, had a leave period in Maadi, its work being done by a detachment from the Divisional Supply Column.

This work along the coast road and inland to the desert outposts was most exacting. The drivers were enduring their first Egyptian summer, the hours were long and roads dangerous because of air raids by day and blackouts at night, but there were no serious injuries until 12 July when Corporal Pussell

Cpl O. T. Pussell, m.i.d.; born Feilding, 12 Feb 1917; battery assembler; twice wounded; died of wounds 25 Dec 1940.

was wounded during an air raid. This was the first battle casualty in the Division.

For those who remained in the Maadi-Cairo area there was the more prosaic life of pickets and training exercises. The Egyptian summer was an unending succession of blistering days, each so like the others that odd incidents of the period stand out in the war diaries like islands in an ocean of dull detail. The engineers constructed 200 dummy tanks

R. J. Collins, Lord Wavell, p. 268: ‘By means of dummy tanks … it was made as difficult as possible for the whereabouts and, what was more, the somewhat diminished strength of the 7th Armoured Division's two brigades, to be ascertained.’ Telegram, Puttick to Freyberg, 8 July: ‘at the best they might prove very important. At the worst they provide excellent shade.’

and motor vehicles that were urgently required at Mersa Matruh. The Divisional Cavalry, the anti-tank battery and the machine-gunners provided officers and men for the Long Range Desert Patrol. Nos. 1 and 2 Patrols were complete by the end of July, the cavalry war diary recording their detachment from the Division and stating that ‘What is known of their destination and the scope of their mission may not as yet be committed to paper.’ Parties of selected officers and other ranks who had been attached to Western Desert Force for operational experience took part in patrol work which was now being carried on energetically behind the Italian lines. On returning to their units they were able to pass on accounts of their experiences, to the benefit of both training and morale.

At the same time this practice of detaching units for service with other formations could easily have been abused, especially when Wavell on 3 July suggested that the units in the Middle East be regrouped. As part of an Egypt Corps, 16 Australian Brigade and 4 New Zealand Brigade would form a ‘6th Australian Division’; the Divisional Signals and 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion would be Corps troops; and the Divisional Cavalry Regiment would come under the command of 4 Indian Division. As this would have wrecked the organisation of the New Zealand Division, Brigadier Puttick cabled to General Freyberg, who promptly explained to General Wavell the rights and responsibilities of a Dominion commander:

In August General Blamey had to state the case for Australia when Wavell proposed to take two brigades from 6 Australian Division.

Have just received your proposals for reorganisation with its repercussions upon the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Egypt. As no such change can be made without the approval of the New Zealand Government, I hope these proposals will not be proceeded with. I do not wish to disclose to the New Zealand Government the proposals as outlined by you to break up the New Zealand Force, as they would make a most unfavourable impression in New Zealand official circles with repercussions you probably have not foreseen. The answer to any such proposals would, I am sure, be an uncompromising refusal.

Documents, Vol. I, pp. 187–8.

This decided the question; Egypt Corps was organised but the Australian and New Zealand groups were included as self-contained formations.

There had, of course, been some very good reasons for the suggested reorganisation. In July 1940 the situation in the Middle East was no more encouraging than it was in Western Europe. The French commanders in Syria and Somaliland were obedient to the Vichy Government; the Italians in East Africa, having forced the evacuation of eastern Sudan and British Somaliland, were threatening Kenya Colony; in Libya the Italian Army had already made reconnaissances towards Sollum. To meet these threats Wavell had to use every available unit and, above all, had to gain time until men, tanks, aircraft and equipment arrived from Britain by way of the Cape of Good Hope.

If the Italians entered Egypt he proposed to retire to his defences about Mersa Matruh. Being short of both troops and mechanical transport, he had to employ the small New Zealand group, even though it was incomplete and partially equipped. In the event of an Italian attack, 4 Brigade Group would take over from 11 Indian Infantry Brigade the protection of the lines of communication between Alexandria and Mersa Matruh. The warning order about a probable move was received on 19 August, a week before the date of departure.

The guards at the Tura caves, the detachments picketing the Cairo Sub-area and the battalions digging the anti-tank ditch at Garawla were recalled and, as far as was possible, equipped for active service. That completed, the New Zealand Division as it then existed—Divisional Headquarters, 4 Infantry Brigade and the supporting units—would move to the heat and the sand of Baggush, a coastal oasis with some palm trees and a beach. The Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General for the Division, Colonel W. G. Stevens, would remain with his staff in Maadi Camp to control the base units necessary for the maintenance of the Division and the reception of the Third Echelon.

The move began on 27 August and the units, after much shuffling and reshuffling, were dug in and camouflaged by the end of September. Headquarters New Zealand Division, with 5 Field Park Company and 4 Field Ambulance, was at Burbeita; Headquarters 4 Brigade was at El Daba. Along the line of communication were 18 and 19 Battalions, 4 Field Regiment and 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion in No. 3 sector at Baggush, the Divisional Cavalry Regiment in No. 2 sector at El Daba and 20 Battalion in No. 1 sector at Ikingi Maryut. At the end of September 20 Battalion moved to Baggush and the sector was taken over by 16 Australian Brigade.

The work to be done in the Baggush Box was explained to the senior officers by Lieutenant-General R. N. O'Connor, commander of the Western Desert Force. There was to be an elaborate defence system under the control of 4 Indian Division, which would take care of the western and southern approaches while 4 Brigade Group, with 4/6 Rajputana Rifles under command, would prepare the eastern sector. The Mediterranean would be the northern flank of the Box. Within it trenches and living quarters, pillboxes and gunpits had to be constructed; unfortunately, the New Zealand engineers who could have simplified the work were required elsewhere. Fifth Field Park Company had to maintain the workshop and control the water supply within the Box. Sixth Field Company, when it returned from some defence work west of Alexandria, was needed for the construction of a pipeline from Baggush to Mersa Matruh. This demanded its attention until December, when it handed over the pipeline to 126 E and M Company, Royal Engineers, and went to Gebel Maryam in the Canal Zone for a course in floating bridge training. The units of 4 Brigade, with few compressors or power tools, had therefore to construct the eastern sector as best they could. And this, with intervals for training, they continued to do until they were recalled to Helwan Camp in January 1941.

The units which had been attached to the Western Desert Force in the anxious days of June were not released to join the group in the Baggush Box. The signallers were actually in the same area, but they could not be replaced as they were operating the signals for Force Headquarters and repairing the cable system when it was damaged during the air raids on Mersa Matruh. As there was a shortage of qualified linesmen in the Middle East, the New Zealand detachment often worked for long and dangerous periods re-establishing these communications.

The trucks of 4 RMT Company were usually far to the west of Baggush. Convoys did on occasion go south to Siwa oasis and in October the company, assisted by the Petrol Company, moved an Indian battalion from Baggush to near Garawla. But, for the most part, the unit had become too important a link in the desert supply system for it to be withdrawn to the Box. Supplies were now coming out steadily to the western railhead so two sections were working from the depot near Fuka, with another, usually C Section, in the forward area with 7 Armoured Division.

The Italian answer to this increased volume of transport was more air activity. There were showers of shaving sticks and pencils, tooth-paste, innocent lumps of wood and thermos-flask bombs which became active after touching the ground. They were the novelty of the period; in fact a thermos bomb provided the Division's first ‘killed in action’ casualty. On 13 September, when a convoy from 4 RMT Company was moving past Kilo 91, it ran into a sprinkling of thermos bombs and Driver Osborn

Dvr G. R. Osborn; born London, 27 Jan 1907; truck driver; killed in action 13 Sep 1940.

was killed from the resultant explosions, as were several British drivers.

With 4 RMT Company so occupied in the Western Desert, the Petrol Company and the Supply Column were brought out in September from Maadi to El Daba. They built up a DID (Detail Issue Depot) at Abu Haggag or carried supplies to the Box and, on occasions, to Siwa oasis.

This historic resort, being of some strategic importance, was now a military outpost to which supplies were taken from Mersa Matruh. The battalions at Baggush supplied small anti-aircraft detachments to protect the convoys against the occasional air attacks, and the only New Zealand casualties for November occurred when the oasis was bombed and three men from 18 Battalion were wounded.

Along the line of communication between Mersa Matruh and Cairo there were equally urgent transport problems. If the troops in the desert were to be maintained and if supplies for the First Libyan Campaign were to be accumulated, the Egyptian State Railway line had to be operated more efficiently. And the line had to be extended westwards from Mersa Matruh as quickly as possible. The 80-mile stretch between Daba and Matruh was particularly important, but the Egyptian authorities would not hand it over to a British staff. They were quite satisfied with a daily service of three or four trains, often hours or even days late. But if any counter-offensive was to be organised there had to be, in spite of the blackout, the bomb damage and the drifts of wind-blown sand, a regular service each day of ten or more trains.

To bring about such a change the non-divisional troops from New Zealand were available. The first to arrive were 9 Survey Company and 10 Railway Construction Company, who had sailed with the Second Echelon and had been diverted to Britain. They had left there in August and arrived in Egypt

See pp. 34–5.

on 16 September when the movement authorities were facing a minor crisis. The Egyptian railway staff on the El Daba–Mersa Matruh section had been so disturbed by Italian bombers that they were proposing to cease work. Consequently the first task for the New Zealand railwaymen in the Middle East was to send a small detachment to Daba, where British engineers were hurriedly preparing to take over the railway system. And there the detachment remained until the Egyptians could be persuaded to carry on.

Meanwhile the companies had left for the Western Desert on 29 September, only a fortnight after their arrival in the Middle East. Ninth Survey Company had to select and survey two routes, one from Kilo 243 towards Minqar Qaim and the other an extension of the main line. Until this work was complete and the necessary equipment could be found, 10 Construction Company was employed with 4 Brigade Group in the Baggush Box, its men enduring the seasonal sandstorms and suffering from attacks of dysentery.

These two surveys were not the only tasks for the Survey Company. As they were, until the arrival of Australian and South African companies, the only survey experts in the Middle East, their services were very much in demand. War material was accumulating with the arrival of every convoy; supply depots had to be surveyed and hundreds of miles of railway line had to be selected, surveyed and mapped. Before long there were survey parties throughout the Middle East, often 2000 miles apart and very often in different countries. By 1945 9 Survey Company had surveyed many of the railways, sidings and depots used by the army in North Africa; its detachments had worked in Palestine and Transjordan, Syria and Turkey, Iraq and Iran, Sudan and Eritrea. The first of these detachments spent October and November in the Sudan surveying bridge sites across the Atbara River; another was recalled to survey depots in Palestine; and another came back to work in the Canal Zone.

In Maadi Camp, on the other hand, there was none of this dispersion and disintegration. The autumn of 1940 was notable for the organisation of a permanent base and the simplification of the administration of 2 NZEF. On 1 October HQ 2 NZEF, with Colonel Stevens as Officer in Charge of Administration, came into being to control all reinforcements, the base depots

Reinforcement, Reception and Discharge Depots to replace the General Base Depot formed in New Zealand; a Composite ASC Company; Base Signals and Provost Companies; Base Kit Store; Base Hygiene Section; Port Detachment at Suez; Base Ordnance Depot.

and the administration of 2 NZEF as a whole. The force in the field, which was the concern of Headquarters New Zealand Division, would, when recalled, concentrate at Helwan, leaving Maadi for the Base Camp and the training depots.

The first troops to enter this newly organised base were the units of the Third Echelon. Their convoy had left New Zealand on 27 August, the Orcades

Carrying 26 Bn, 6 Fd Amb, C Sec Div Amn Coy—1465 all ranks.

from Lyttelton, the Mauretania

25 Bn, 6 Fd Regt, 33 Bty 7 A-Tk Regt, 2 Gen Hosp, Mobile Dental Section—2334 all ranks.

and the Empress of Japan

24 Bn, 19 A Tps Coy, HQ Ry Op Gp, 16 Ry Op Coy, 17 Ry Op Coy, 13 Ry Constr Coy, 14 and 15 Forestry Coys—2635 all ranks. Total for the convoy, with reinforcements, 6434 all ranks.

from Wellington. They had met next morning in Cook Strait and set off for Fremantle, escorted by HMS Achilles and HMAS Perth. On 31 August they were joined by the Aquitania and HMAS Canberra from Sydney. After calling at Fremantle, the convoy reached Bombay on 15 September and broke into different groups destined either for Britain or the Middle East.

As the Orcades was going on to Britain, 14 and 15 Forestry Companies went aboard from the Empress of Japan while 26 Battalion left for the humid atmosphere of the racecourse and eventually for the crowded decks of the Orion. As there was no accommodation for 6 Field Ambulance and some 500 reinforcements they were sent to the stadium. When flooded out from there by the monsoon rains, they were quartered at the racecourse and finally at Deolali, a rest camp 100 miles from Bombay.

This small detachment remained in India until 9 October when it left Bombay for a grimy but exciting voyage in the French motor-vessel Felix Roussel. In the Red Sea the convoy was bombed by aircraft from Eritrea and, when east of Massawa, had to face units of the Italian Navy. The Kimberley, one of the escort vessels, put an Italian destroyer out of action, engaged the shore batteries and ended the day as a disabled vessel towed astern of the convoy. In Port Sudan, where the Felix Roussel had put in for water, there was another air attack with a near miss on the wharf-side. Finally, unlike most reinforcements, they passed Port Tewfik and steamed up the Suez Canal to disembark at Port Said.

The main body of the echelon had a less exciting voyage from Bombay. The troops in the Mauretania went to the Ormonde, a ship that had just arrived from Britain. She had been left in a filthy condition by another contingent, the living quarters were crowded and the meat which was being taken aboard was already tainted from exposure on the wharves. Consequently, when the large convoy was due to sail on 19 September some of the troops got out of control and the Ormonde had to be retained in port. Many excuses can be made for the men; their officers could be criticised for not explaining the urgency of the convoy system. Nevertheless the incident was regrettable. In the end, after order was restored, arrangements were made for some of the men to sleep on deck and the Ormonde was able to catch up with the waiting convoy on the afternoon of the 20th. Nine days later the ships were in Port Tewfik.

Within a few days Headquarters 2 NZEF had decided the future of the different units. Sixth Anti-Tank Company was disbanded and its personnel transferred to the Reinforcement Depot; C Section Ammunition Company joined the rest of the unit at Abbassia. Sixth Brigade, 6 Field Regiment, 33 Battery of 7 Anti-Tank Regiment and the 600 reinforcements in the depot began a course of individual training, stiffened with long marches and leading up to the higher realms of tactical exercises in the desert. Nineteenth Army Troops Company endured some weeks of elementary training before leaving for the Canal Zone and an intensive course in field engineering. This was not its normal role but it was necessary if the company was to be the substitute

See p. 45, note 3.

for 8 Field Company.

The non-divisional units were absorbed without any waste of time. On 8 October 2 General Hospital, with Colonel F. M. Spencer as CO and Miss D. I. Brown as matron, took over the hospital at Helwan, relieving the members of 4 Field Ambulance who had established it in July and the advance party from 1 General Hospital which had been attached ever since its arrival from Britain in September. The other members of 1 General Hospital who arrived in November established their unit at Helmieh, a dusty suburb of Cairo and the camp site of 1 NZEF in 1915. The hospital was opened on 15 December with Colonel A. C. McKillop in charge and Miss E. C. Mackay

Matron-in-Chief Miss E. C. Mackay, OBE, RRC, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Porangahau, 13 Feb 1902; Sister; Matron, Gen Hosp 1940–43; Principal Matron Nov 1943–May 1945.

as matron.

The railway companies were required so urgently that the Director of Transportation, Middle East, wanted them in the desert ten days after their arrival. One hundred operators and plate-layers were away within a fortnight; the others were needed but they had first to complete an intensive weapon-training course. All the same, they were out in the Western Desert only a few months after they had entered camp in Ngaruawahia. On 21 October 16 Railway Operating Company went out to El Daba to assist the Egyptian staff on the line from there to Mersa Matruh; 13 Construction Company went to Qasaba and became responsible for the maintenance of the track; 17 Operating Company went on 7–8 November to control the yards and railway station at Burg el Arab.

Their immediate task was to eliminate the delays in the movement of wagons and to increase the daily number of trains without completely taking over from the Egyptians. ‘The Company had to make 10 trains run where a couple ambled along in a maleesh fashion before.’ The Director of Transportation had been very careful to explain the delicacy of the situation and the necessity of avoiding any friction whatsoever. The solution was to have men at each station along the line and spare engine crews at danger points or regular target areas. The engines were run without headlights and the water, which had to be brought out from the Nile, was issued most carefully. In time the trains whose arrival had once been unpredictable were so regular that officials with short memories were known to pay the indirect compliment of complaining when there were any delays.

But there was another side to this swift absorption of the Third Echelon. It was very evident that GHQ Middle East was making no effort to assemble the scattered units of the Division. Divisional Headquarters and 6 Brigade Group were at Maadi, but most of the other detachments were over 200 miles away. Divisional Signals and 4 RMT Company were with Western Desert Force; B and C Sections of the Ammunition Company were with the Cairo Area; the men with the Long Range Desert Patrol were on the Libyan frontier under British officers; the Divisional Cavalry Regiment was under Headquarters Lines of Communication; 4 Brigade Group, 27 (MG) Battalion, 5 Field Park Company and 6 Field Company were controlled by Western Desert Force; and about fifty artificers were scattered from Khartoum to Alexandria.

In September, soon after his arrival from Britain, General Freyberg had asked for the return of all these units as he now could, with Headquarters and two infantry brigades, begin training on a divisional scale. The answer from GHQ, Cairo, had been that they could not be released; General Wilson had suggested that they would not be available until 1941; and Headquarters British Troops in Egypt had stated in writing that it was ‘out of the question for the time being.’

These unsympathetic replies forced Freyberg to explain to the Middle East Command the status of 2 NZEF. In a letter on 19 October he said:

The New Zealand Forces are not an integral part of the British Army—they are a distinct New Zealand force, proud of their own identity. They cannot be split up and used piecemeal, except with the consent of the New Zealand Government. The past I know has been unfortunate, and for that I must take my share of the blame. We came over here in February, keen and willing to help everybody, and have never refused a request of any sort. It has been a mistake, and the efficiency of the Division has suffered grievously. Now, because we are insisting on concentrating as a force, we are most unpopular. I feel I let our force in for this by not saying ‘No’ right at the beginning, as I believe did the AIF.

For your information I send you a copy of the special powers

See pp. 19–20. A few weeks earlier the Australian charter was produced when Wilson, Wavell, and finally Churchill ordered the movement of a brigade without the authority of Blamey and contrary to the information he had given his Government. See Long, To Benghazi, p. 109.

vested in me by the New Zealand Government. They will put you in the picture. They were granted to me when I accepted command of the NZEF….

The position is quite clear; in an emergency we will all work under anybody's command, and do any job for which we are trained and equipped. The Division meanwhile cannot be used piecemeal.

Documents, Vol. I, p. 190.

This cleared the air and the future concentration of 2 NZEF was soon settled with General Wavell. He was planning the counterattack which opened the First Libyan Campaign, so 4 Brigade Group, as a reserve in the Baggush Box, would have to remain in the desert until it could be relieved by an Australian division.

See pp. 72–3 for Wavell's explanation.

But the other detached units

In October 6 Field Company, 5 Field Park Company and the Divisional Cavalry Regiment all became part of 4 Brigade Group.

were to come under the command of Headquarters 4 Brigade in order to maintain some connection between them and the Division. With the Long Range Desert Patrol, however, the only concession that could be granted was the right to provide substitutes for those already in the desert.

This still meant that the New Zealand forces in the Middle East would not be assembled for divisional training until January 1941. If the necessary equipment was then available the Division would be enlarged and reorganised on the lines of the Bartholomew Report.

This was prepared after the fighting in France in 1940 by a committee under the chairmanship of General Sir William Bartholomew.

There would be a reconnaissance unit, increased mobility and much greater fire power. The Division would not, however, be mobile enough either in attack or in defence, so General Freyberg thought that there should be an armoured brigade.

It was not until November 1943 that 2 NZ Division went into action with its own tanks of 4 Armoured Brigade.

‘With such a brigade the Division would be a most formidable fighting formation, well fitted to undertake any operation in the Western Desert with undoubted reduction in casualties.’ The authorities agreed in principle but pointed out that the plans were dependent upon the volume of equipment arriving in the Middle East. At the moment the Division was receiving its share of the supplies which Churchill was so boldly despatching to the Middle East. The infantry were fully equipped and 4 Field Regiment had new 25-pounder guns.

The greatest problem was that of reinforcements. The decision to garrison Fiji had meant that instead of 2900 men only 600 reinforcements had come over with the Third Echelon. To allow for casualties when the Division went into action, the Government decided that the trained troops in Fiji should be replaced by recruits from New Zealand and sent as soon as possible to the Middle East. They would be needed in the spring of 1941, when the Division as part of GHQ Reserve might be moved at short notice to any part of the Middle East.

This, however, was still in the realms of possibility. The problems of the moment were those of the units at Maadi and Baggush. In the former camp 6 Brigade and the men in the different reinforcement depots were training in comparative comfort. With the scattered units in the desert it was very different. They were doing urgent work as well as regular training. The great anti-tank ditch was still being excavated, for the most part by 10 Railway Construction Company, with hundreds of native labourers and a party from 19 Army Troops Company to operate the compressors, power shovels and bulldozers that had arrived with the Third Echelon. Signallers, engineers and ASC drivers were still with the British units; the battalions of 4 Brigade, released from the anti-tank ditch, were now training according to the latest theories of desert warfare.

This life in the desert was monotonous and often Spartan in its simplicity. The hot, clear days and sharp, brilliant nights followed in endless succession. Meals seemed to consist of tinned food and chlorinated tea. Self-control was needed when the water allowance was one and a half gallons per man per day and resignation when sandstorms paralysed all movements. Milder days did come with the approach of winter but they meant colder nights and heavy showers, such as those of 26–27 November when water rushed down the wadis, flooding dugouts and anti tank ditches. As compensation there were fewer flies and less dysentery, football matches and leave to Alexandria. But there was one obvious and unpleasant fact—the brigade group would remain in the desert until the Italian Army was no longer a threat to Egypt.

CHAPTER 4 The First Libyan Campaign, 1940–41

IN December, three months after they had crossed the Egyptian frontier, the Italians were still only a few miles past Sidi Barrani with a line of fortified camps that ran south-west across the desert from Maktila, near the coast, to the outposts at Tummar West, Tummar East and Point 90, thence to Nibeiwa and eventually to Sofafi on the southern escarpment. Behind this screen they were busily bringing forward the motor road and the pipeline from Bardia.

The British were also building up their defences and planning a big attack. General Wavell proposed to exploit a gap between Nibeiwa and Sofafi where the defences were not mutually self-supporting, and through which it was possible to strike north towards the sea. The Tummar positions could then be attacked from the rear; it was even possible that an armoured force might be able to cut the coast road and so isolate the Italian force in Sidi Barrani. Success depended upon surprise, and surprise depended upon the attacking force being able to move unobserved across some 70 miles of desert. This was a gamble but the dazzling prize was well worth the risk.

In the plan there was no task for 4 New Zealand Brigade Group. Wavell had hoped to use it during the initial stages of the attack, but the New Zealand Government wanted the troops to go into action as a complete division under their own commander. If he had pressed for it permission would doubtless have been granted, but the request would have gone through too many channels and required so much explanation that his plans for the strictest secrecy could have been jeopardised. He preferred to use 4 Indian Division in the gap, a British brigade for the attack upon Sidi Barrani, and the Australian divisions when he was bustling the Italians out of Cyrenaica.

In view of this decision it is surprising how many New Zealand units or detachments from units took part in the campaign. The signallers who had been with Western Desert Force headquarters since June had handed over their Advanced Corps Signals to the Royal Corps of Signals in November, but the majority of them were still there doing much the same work; in fact Lieutenant-Colonel Agar was now commanding Corps Signals, Western Desert Force, with No. 1 Company (Lines) commanded by Major A. E. Smith

Maj A. E. Smith, MBE, ED; Auckland; born England, 6 Mar 1903; cable-jointer foreman; Div Sigs 1939–42; OC 1 Coy Corps Sigs, WDF, 1940–41.

and No. 2 Company (Signals Office and Wireless) commanded by Captain Feeney.

Capt J. Feeney; born Scotland, 17 Jul 1905; civil servant; wounded 29 Nov 1941; died at sea 5 Dec 1941.

The signals traffic had been increasing with the arrival of stores and the preparations for the counter-attack. Lines had to be adjusted, underground cables installed and miles of field cable laid along the secondary routes. This meant that when the attack opened the signalmen were working three shifts every twenty-four hours in order to control the communication system for the whole force.

Equally essential to the success of the campaign were the companies of railwaymen. The 80 miles of permanent way between El Daba and Mersa Matruh were still the responsibility of 13 Railway Construction Company and 16 Railway Operating Company; at Burg el Arab 17 Railway Operating Company still controlled the yards and railway station. The necessary number of trains was getting through to the forward railheads from which supplies were taken to the desert depots. No exact date could be given to the men, but a few days before the attack opened all station detachments were warned that the smooth running of the service was now so imperative that it had to be maintained, Egyptians or no Egyptians.

The engineers were also needed to deal with the water problems of the desert army. In October 6 Field Company had been brought out from Alexandria to Garawla to construct underground reservoirs, pumping stations and some 18 miles of pipeline through Mersa Matruh to Charing Cross. The campaign opened just as the last work was being done at the different water points. Fifth Field Park Company, which had gone to Burbeita as part of 4 Brigade Group, was now employed taking machinery to Charing Cross, operating the water pumps and supervising pipelines and reservoirs.

Then, in the last week before the attack was launched, the acute shortage of vehicles and drivers brought all the New Zealand transport units into the forward areas. Fourth RMT Company had been there for months but the others had been with 4 Brigade Group at Baggush. On 4–5 December, however, the Petrol and Supply Companies and A Section of the Ammunition Company were sent up to Qasaba and detailed to transfer stores from the railway siding to the depots which were being built up along the desert tracks.

Fourth RMT Company was given a more exciting task: the transportation of 5 Indian Brigade, which as part of 4 Indian Division was to strike through the Bir Enba gap. B Section was recalled from 7 Armoured Division and at Smugglers' Cove the company, in the obscurity of a sandstorm, overhauled or replaced the vehicles which it had been using for the last five months. In the evening of 5 December, under the command of Major Whyte,

Lt-Col G. H. Whyte, OBE, ED, m.i.d.; Te Puke; born Pahiatua, 23 Aug 1895; company representative; 3 Auck, 4 Bde, and ASC, 1 Bde, 1917–19; OC 4 RMT Coy Nov 1939–Jan 1941; CRASC 5 Div (in NZ) Dec 1942–May 1943; CO Trg Bn, Trentham, Nov 1943– Oct 1944.

it joined the Indians at Garawla. A Section (Captain Muller

Capt F. H. Muller, MC; Hamilton; born NZ 18 Mar 1905; engine driver; wounded and p.w. Apr 1941.

) went to 1 Royal Fusiliers, B Section (Captain Good

Maj G. G. Good, OBE, m.i.d.; Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia; born New South Wales, 14 Nov 1913; dental mechanic; OC 6 RMT Coy Feb 1942–Sep 1943; NZASC Base Trg Depot Sep 1943–Apr 1944; Pet Coy May–Jul 1944.

) to 4/6 Rajputana Rifles, and C Section (Captain McAlpine

Capt J. A. McAlpine, MBE, MC; born Ashburton, 26 May 1910; farmer; OC 4 RMT Coy 19 Jan–10 Feb 1941; killed in action 18 Apr 1941.

) to 3/1 Punjab Regiment.

the opening attacks of the first libyan campaign, 9–11 december 1940

Next morning 4 Indian Division drove off along the Siwa track, ostensibly for another full-scale exercise. In a cold wind and shrouded with thick dust, the widely dispersed vehicles bumped some 50 miles across the desert and halted well to the south of Mersa Matruh. Next day while they waited, every gun and every vehicle camouflaged, orders were issued for the attack.

Along the coast a British force, assisted by the Navy, would demonstrate against Maktila; in the extreme south, part of 7 Armoured Division would cover the Sofafi camps. The rest of the force would strike through the Bir Enba gap, tanks and infantry circling east to take Nibeiwa and the Tummar outposts while another force of tanks and artillery drove north to cut the coast road.

The first stage was another 50-mile move across the open desert on 8 December, a clear day perfect for ground navigation but disturbing for those who feared Italian air attacks. The Royal Air Force, however, kept the skies clear and the long columns halted about 15 miles south-east of the Nibeiwa camp. The I tanks (Matildas) rolled up amidst clouds of dust and night foll with the artillery pounding away along the coast and nervous flares glowing in the distance over the Italian camps.

Before first light on 9 December 4 Indian Division was edging through the gap, hundreds of vehicles in orderly confusion steering through the haze of a rising sandstorm. Before 9 a.m. Nibeiwa camp and 4000 Italians had been captured by 11 Indian Brigade, another force was racing north to cut the coast road and the first steps were being taken to encircle the Tummar encampments.

Fifth Indian Brigade in the trucks of 4 RMT Company was being driven through the now swirling sand to a point west of Tummar West. But at 10 a.m., when the stage was set for the assault, the sandstorm made it impossible to find that objective. There was a pause until 1 p.m., when the barrage opened up and tanks, Bren carriers and then lorry-borne infantry moved off towards Tummar West. The dust and the smoke from burning dumps limited visibility, but before long the armoured vehicles were lumbering through the outer lines. ‘The infantry followed up in lorries to within 150 yards of the walls. The drivers of these lorries were New Zealanders who showed great bravery under fire in bringing their vehicles so close to the enemy position; many of them accompanied the infantry in the assault after debussing.’

Tbe Tiger Strikes, p. 27—a history of 4 Indian Division.

First Royal Fusiliers (A Section 4 RMT Company) began the mopping up and 3/1 Punjab Regiment (C Section) carried on, methodically capturing strongpoints, dugouts and over 3000 Italians.

At the same time 4/6 Rajputana Rifles (B Section 4 RMT Company), who had remained in their vehicles, edged along the north side of the camp to attack Tummar East. As they approached they met a counter-attack of infantry and tanks. The infantry debussed and another bewildering action developed, with clouds of dust, roving tanks, infantry digging in and trucks being hurriedly withdrawn. As before, some of the 4 RMT drivers attacked with the infantry, Sergeant Thomson

WO I R. H. Thomson, DCM, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Port Chalmers, 19 Feb 1912; school-teacher; p.w. 1 Jun 1941.

leading an LMG section of Indians and capturing a machine-gun post. The 3/1 Punjab Regiment came up in support, the Italian tanks were knocked out and by nightfall the counter-attack had faded away. As it was then too late to resume the advance upon Tummar East, patrols were sent out to screen the eastern approaches and the battalions were warned to be ready to move at first light.

To the rear the Advanced Dressing Station with 5 Indian Brigade was receiving hundreds of cases—Indian, British and Italian— casualties from the Tummar camps and casualties sent over from the Sidi Barrani sector. The medical staff, among them 4 RMT Company's medical officer, Lieutenant Lomas,

Maj A. L. Lomas, MC, m.i.d.; Hamilton; born Wanganui, 30 Jun 1916; medical practitioner; RMO NZASC Jan 1940–Jun 1941; 4 Fd Amb Jun 1941–Jun 1942; OC Maadi Camp Hosp Jun 1942–Apr 1943; DADMS 2 NZ Div Aug 1943–Apr 1944.

had to work in the open, often under fire, all that night and most of the following day, until the Main Dressing Station was established.

The following day, 10 December, the Italian defences began to crack. The great encampment of Sidi Barrani fell that afternoon and in the central sector 4/6 Rajputana Rifles, transported by B Section 4 RMT Company, took Tummar East. In the rear areas there was a period of comparative quiet when convoys of lorries, including many from 4 RMT Company, were sent back with Italian prisoners. They left late in the afternoon; the wind had then died down and in the clear moonlight they groped through the minefields and reached the prisoner-of-war cages next morning.

All that day, 11 December, mopping-up went on in the forward areas. Whole divisions were surrendering in the coastal sector while others, pursued by the armoured units, retired in disorder towards Sollum. In the Tummar sector an isolated force at Point 90 surrendered after little opposition; there had been concentrations of shellfire, the initial approach by the tanks, and the entry of 3/1 Punjab Regiment in the lorries of C Section 4 RMT Company.

That evening, 11–12 December, preparations were made to attack Sofafi, the only outpost in the original defences still held by the Italians. Fourth Indian Division was hurriedly assembled; the New Zealand drivers who had taken the Indians into Point 90 and those who were returning from the prisoner-of-war cages were given no time to rest. The division was away and had been moving for some hours before an intelligence report was received to say that the Italians were pulling out and that the harrying of their retreating columns was now a task for the armoured units. There and then a halt was ordered, leaving everyone free to get some sleep.

‘This last manoeuvre was probably the most brilliant performance of the [4 Indian] Division; without a single written order, after three days continuous fighting and moving in a thick duststorm, the units disengaged themselves from the aftermath of a battle, replenished with petrol, food and water, and moved through the dark for 25 miles over previously unreconnoitred country.’

The Tiger Strikes, p. 34.

Fourth Indian Division took no further part in the campaign. Some of the units returned next day to the Baggush area; others followed after salvaging equipment and guarding prisoners of war. Fourth RMT Company remained to evacuate prisoners and transport fuel until 15 December, when it returned to work along the coast road.

By this time the Italians had organised a rearguard and were holding the escarpment that runs inland from the coast at Sollum to Fort Capuzzo and to Halfaya Pass. The immediate problems for the Western Desert Force were, therefore, the evacuation of the 40,000 prisoners of war and the accumulation of men and supplies for the inevitable offensive. Mersa Matruh with its railhead and field depots was now 140 miles from the forward area and sections of the coast road had still to be cleared of mines. The desert tracks, however, were still available, so the question was more one of transport than of highways. Every available transport unit, including those of the New Zealand Division, had to be brought forward to relieve the strain.

The Supply Column, the Petrol Company, and the Ammunition Company (A Section) became links in the endless chain that ran out with supplies and came back loaded with Italian prisoners. The transport vehicles from 4 Brigade came up from the Baggush Box and, on 12–20 December, Major Burrows

Brig J. T. Burrows, CBE, DSO and bar, ED, m.i.d., Order of Valour (Gk); Christchurch; born Christchurch, 14 Jul 1904; schoolmaster; CO 20 BnMay 1941, Dec 1941–Jul 1942; 20 Bn and Armd Regt Aug 1942–Jun 1943; comd 4 Bde 27–29 Jun 1942, 5 Jul–15 Aug 1942; 5 Bde Mar 1944, Aug–Nov 1944; 6 Bde Jul–Aug 1944; Commander, Southern Military District, Nov 1951–Oct 1953; Commander K Force, Nov 1953–Nov 1954; Commander, SMD, Jan 1955-.

with a convoy of 220 lorries took out petrol and oil and brought back prisoners. Fifth Field Park Company at Baggush and 19 Army Troops Company (1, 2 and 3 Sections), who had gone out from Maadi to Baggush on 14 December, had to release every available driver for the movement of trucks and road machinery to Charing Cross.

The salvaging of enemy vehicles was another way of relieving the shortage of transport. The Italians had abandoned a large number of 10-ton diesel-engined lorries, so 4 Brigade had to supply mechanics who could operate them. From 18 to 25 December a party of 3 officers and 120 other ranks was at Smugglers' Cove, and afterwards in the Mersa Matruh–Garawla area, repairing damaged vehicles and instructing Royal Army Service Corps drivers. Any men from 19 Army Troops Company who had diesel-engine experience were sent to Sidi Barrani to salvage Lancia and Fiat lorries; others searched the captured positions for any of the 2000-litre water trucks.

At this stage the railway line and the New Zealand railway companies waiting to extend it westwards from Mersa Matruh were still far to the rear. The railwaymen had received their warning orders on 8 December, the day before the offensive opened. Group Headquarters had moved up from Baggush to Mersa Matruh and 9 Survey Company had begun to survey sidings at Similla and possible routes to the south of Sidi Barrani. By mid-December 13 Railway Construction Company had a detachment working on the escarpment above Garawla; another was with 10 Railway Construction Company at Similla. In the original plan they were to have constructed four miles of track each day, but this was impossible without certain mechanical equipment, of which there was none in the Middle East, and some thousands of tons of railway plate which were reserved for the supply lines feeding the depots of the Nile Valley. Their activities were restricted to preparatory work which would obviate any delays in plate-laying when the material did arrive. But even then the engineers had their problems. The Arab labourers were difficult to handle and the weather, until the New Year, brought rain, cold winds and swirling sandstorms.

In the meantime the British had prepared to attack the rearguard at Halfaya Pass, but the Italians had wilted once again, withdrawing from their strongpoints and halting about 20 miles away at Bardia, a small town with white-walled houses set on the cliffs above a miniature harbour. Mussolini had called it a bastion of Fascism, but over 40,000 Italian soldiers were now trapped behind its minefields and its barbed-wire perimeter. Unable at this stage to risk a dramatic but possibly costly victory, Wavell was content to maintain the siege and patiently prepare for a full-scale assault. So with 7 Armoured Division screening the western flank and probing along the highway towards Tobruk, 16 British Brigade was assembled to the south-east and 6 Australian Division brought up to attack Bardia from the south-west.

In these preparations the New Zealand transport units had many different roles to play. Fourth RMT Company on 17 December transported 16 Australian Brigade from Sidi Haneish to an assembly point near Sidi Barrani, but its regular work was the conveyance of supplies from the port of Sollum to the dumps along the escarpment. As speed of delivery was essential the company worked on a twenty-four-hour schedule, with half the trucks operating during the day and the other half at night.

The essential item for transport at this stage of the advance was the water brought up by sea from Mersa Matruh. Two water barges, each operated by crews of four from 19 Army Troops Company, came up to Sollum on the night of 22–23 December. The men then began a succession of difficult days. Air raids had to be endured, 40-gallon water drums had to be filled for transportation by 4 RMT Company and, at night, the barges had to be taken back along the coast to meet naval craft bringing more water. At all costs they had to be back before dawn, when the guns in Bardia began to shell the escarpment above the waterfront.

On the morning of 24 December there was no air raid, but the hours dragged on and the atmosphere had that intensity which suggests the approach of violent action. The barge crews were filling the water drums and a mixed group of British, Australian, Cypriot and New Zealand troops was unloading two other barges which had come in with oranges and tinned beer for Christmas Day, when suddenly about midday Italian aircraft came over to bomb with unusual and devastating accuracy.

The bomb which hit one of the supply barges and those which burst on the wharf caused the most serious loss yet experienced by the Division. Six men from 4 RMT Company and one from 19 Army Troops Company were killed and six from 4 RMT Company wounded.

Corporal O. T. Pussell, the first New Zealand soldier to be wounded, was one of those who were killed.

There was, however, no pause in the work. The great problem of the moment was the shortage of transport for the creation of forward supply depots and the conveyance of troops to attack Bardia. Fourth RMT Company worked all through Christmas Day

The majority of the units, including 4 Brigade in the Baggush Box, had a Christmas Day with simple extras provided by the National Patriotic Fund. As the weather in the desert was cold and bleak, all ranks paraded for church services in greatcoats.

and all through that night on the run from Sollum to the desert depots. After that it was recalled to the main stream of traffic between Sollum and Sidi Haneish, where the work was long and arduous, drivers loading and off-loading, engines being replaced and aged vehicles being coaxed to remain on the road.

This meant that the conveyance of the Australian infantry to the outskirts of Bardia was a task for the other transport units. In two journeys—on 26–28 and 29–31 December—the Petrol Company and the Supply Column brought 17 Australian Brigade from Sidi Haneish to an assembly point beyond Sollum. On 30 December 4 Brigade Group sent its transport under the command of Major Burrows to convey 19 Australian Brigade from Burg el Arab to the outskirts of Bardia, a 350-mile journey with two nights on the road and two days travelling to the debussing point beyond Fort Capuzzo. Major-General I. G. Mackay, at whose urgent request the brigade had been brought forward, reported to General Freyberg that it was ‘a wonderful piece of work by your men for they moved us in two days, instead of the three ordained, right from Burg el Arab to Capuzzo. Your drivers were untiring and were determined to get my men here in spite of the heavy traffic on indifferently surfaced roads.’ The commander of the Western Desert Force, Lieutenant- General O'Connor, was more comprehensive in his praise. He thanked General Freyberg for the ‘excellent work’ of his 4 RMT Company and the first- and second-line transport; he did not know what he ‘should have done without them.’

In other words, the pieces upon the chessboard were now so placed that General O'Connor could make a full-scale attack upon Bardia. On 3 January British tanks and Australian infantry broke through the outer defences and by 5 January had the town and 45,000 prisoners. At the same time 7 Armoured Division was rattling up the coast road encircling the port of Tobruk and forcing the Italians to abandon the airfields at Gazala, Tmimi and Bomba.

The New Zealand units took no part in these swift thrusts, but they were called forward when 13 Corps

On 1 January 1941 Western Desert Force had become 13 Corps.

assembled its forces for the assault upon Tobruk. The first to arrive were the engineers of 5 Field Park Company, who entered Bardia on 6 January, the day after its capture. Only a week before, after four months in the Baggush area, they had been grouped with three British field companies to form Corps Troops, Royal Engineers. Since then they had been moving up to the forward area, practically following the sound of the guns.

In Bardia, and elsewhere, the British field companies were given the larger tasks such as road maintenance and dock work; 5 Field Park Company was given a variety of duties calling for more specialised skill. It had to re-establish the water system, salvage diesel-engined lorries and prepare tank trailers for the transportation of water to the forces that were now collecting 75 miles away outside Tobruk.

That town was twice the size of Bardia, with an adequate water supply, strong ground defences and the best harbour between Alexandria and Benghazi. Within it were 25,000 Italian soldiers, and patrolling outside was a small force from 7 Armoured Division which had to be reinforced without delay. In readiness for such an emergency 4 RMT Company had been withdrawn from the Sollum area and warned to prepare for troop-carrying duties. On 6 January the sections were out in the desert taking supplies to the field depots when a Lysander flew over and dropped orders to report to Headquarters 6 Australian Division in Bardia. That evening the company assembled in the town, 19 Australian Brigade embussed and a difficult journey commenced. There was no moon and several vehicles ran off the tarsealed road, but by midday on 7 January the Australians were debussing a few miles east of Tobruk. The operation was repeated on two successive nights until the brigade was in its pre-arranged position east of Tobruk.

This was not the prelude to any headlong attack. The Italians in Tobruk were trapped and 7 Armoured Division was now far beyond the port, driving the rearguards along the coast road to Derna or across the desert to Mechili. But Tobruk with its minefields and coastal defences could not be assaulted without careful reconnaissance and adequate resources. There still had to be a period of aggressive patrolling and of uninterrupted activity along the lines of communication.

In this phase the more forward of the New Zealand units were those in and about Sollum. Fourth RMT Company after its dash to the outskirts of Tobruk with the Australian infantry brigade was now moving supplies from the wharf to the depots along the coast road. The engineers from 19 Army Troops Company still operated their two barges, not for the conveyance of water—for the wells at Fort Capuzzo were now in working order—but as lighters to carry supplies from the ships in the bay to the jetty below the escarpment. The barges had become important links in the supply line, important enough by mid-January for the naval authorities to protest to Headquarters 13 Corps when orders were received for the crews to return to Maadi Camp with the rest of the company. As a result General Freyberg, in spite of his desire to collect all his scattered units, agreed that the men should remain with the barges until new crews could be obtained.

The other New Zealanders at Sollum were volunteers with seafaring or waterfront experience who had been sent up from the railway companies. Those who worked on the miniature waterfront checking cargoes and arranging for the movement of stores to the field depots were attached to 199 Railway Operating Company, Royal Engineers. The tug crews were seconded to the Navy for duty and controlled by the Naval Officer in Command, Sollum. The port, having only one jetty, was used as an open roadstead, the ships anchoring in the bay and cargoes being ferried ashore in Jaffa lighters, which carried about ten tons each and resembled double-ended surf boats. The tugs had to tow these lighters, and, as there were only the four tugs and sometimes as many as twenty vessels in the bay, the crews worked very long hours. Italian prisoners and hospital cases were taken out and stores brought back.

The other units were farther back along the highway to Cairo. Nineteenth Army Troops Company had some men lifting minefields and salvaging equipment about Sidi Barrani and others at Mersa Matruh putting the water system into working order. Beyond them again, with Qasaba as their base, were the Petrol Company, the Supply Column and A Section of the Ammunition Company. Their trucks were in the endless stream of vehicles now taking supplies from the railhead at Mersa Matruh to the field depots and returning with Italian prisoners and salvaged equipment. This work, apart from some convoys to Siwa oasis and the transportation of a Polish battalion from Mersa Matruh to Sidi Barrani, was to occupy them until February, when they were recalled to Helwan Camp to prepare for the campaign in Greece.

The last group of New Zealanders were 4 Brigade and the attached units who were still working and training in the Baggush Box. They had been given a negative, colourless role in the campaign; in fact they were standing in the wings, still waiting for their cue. And now, late in December, after a bleak Christmas, orders were received to move back to Helwan Camp. To explain why they had not been given a more active part to play, General Wavell on 27 December wrote a note for the New Zealand Division. It was marked confidential and may not have been for the rank and file, but as an explanation and an apology it is useful to historians:

note for the new zealand division from general wavell

27 December 1940

I feel that I owe an explanation to the New Zealand Division, and especially to the 4th Infantry Brigade, regarding the recent operations in the Western Desert. I know that they are disappointed at not having taken part in the advance on Sidi Barrani or beyond, and perhaps feel hurt that they have been used for all the hard work of making defences and then have not been detailed to take part in the attack when attack became possible.

I therefore give you the reasons which influenced the decision not to use them in the advance. It was my original intention to do so. But the New Zealand Government, quite naturally and quite rightly, has always wished that the New Zealand Division should be employed in active operations only as a complete division under its own Commander. I am sure that if I had been able to explain the situation to the New Zealand Government, they would have granted permission for the 4th Infantry Brigade to be used, as they have granted permission for the special use of a part of the forces they have supplied. At the time when the decision had to be taken, however, it was still several weeks before the operations were to take place, the strictest possible secrecy was being maintained, and the number of those who knew that an operation was to take place at all was extremely limited. To consult the New Zealand Government would necessarily have involved the communication of some details of the plans to several people and possibly some discussion of them. It would have been necessary to place the Brigade under the command of the Commander of the 4th Indian Division. I felt that I could not do all this without some detailed explanation to the New Zealand Government which might have jeopardised secrecy. I therefore decided, somewhat reluctantly, not to use the New Zealand Brigade, and to use instead the 16th Infantry Brigade which I could do without reference to anyone.

As regards the use of the Australian Division for the second stage of the operations, I required a whole division, and if I had sent forward the New Zealand Brigade it would have been necessary to form a composite division of Australian and New Zealand troops, which I had been given to understand was contrary to the wishes of the New Zealand Government. It would have either broken up the New Zealand Division or would have involved a further relief at a later stage with loss of time and waste of transport. It had always been my intention that the Australian Corps should eventually take over the Western Desert, and that the New Zealand Division when complete should become the General Headquarters Reserve. This explains why I was unable to send forward the New Zealand Brigade in the second stage of the operations.

As you know, however, the assistance that has been given by the New Zealand Division to the operations in the Western Desert has been invaluable, and the recent success could not have been gained without it. The New Zealand Division has supplied its Signals, its transport, its Engineers, Railway and other personnel who have made up our shortage in these very necessary services. I should like to refer also to the magnificent work done by the Long Range Patrols who relieved me of any anxiety about the Southern Libyan Desert, from which the Italians might have threatened Upper Egypt or the Sudan.

I take this opportunity of thanking the New Zealand Division for all the assistance they have so willingly provided during the very difficult period when the defence of Egypt was dangerously weak, and I very much regret that it was not possible for them to take an even greater share in the advance from Matruh. Their turn will come before long, and I have every confidence that their leadership, training, and spirit will win them great distinction in any operation in which they take part.

A. P. Wavell

For units other than 4 Brigade, the period between the capture of Bardia and the assault upon Tobruk, 5–21 January, was one of intense activity. In the extreme west the two main groups of the Italian Army, still harried by the forward elements of 7 Armoured Division, had withdrawn still farther. The more northerly group stopped at Derna, a coastal town on the eastern edge of a fertile area dotted with the neat houses of Italian colonists. From here the main highway and a small-gauge railway turned westwards across Cyrenaica and through the Vale of Barce to Benghazi. The other group was more to the south at Mechili, where there was a Beau Geste fortress and the desert crossroads from which routes ran north across the hills to the valley or due west by a desert track to Benghazi.

For some days the only threats to Italian security were the patrols from the armoured division. The greater part of 13 Corps was still outside Tobruk in readiness for the attack, which was first held up by the slow arrival of supplies and then postponed by a succession of sandstorms. It was not until 21 January that 6 Australian Division made the assault which broke through the outer perimeter and led to the formal surrender of the town the following afternoon.

The first New Zealanders into the captured town were engineers. On 22 January Lieutenant Pollock,

Maj G. D. Pollock, MBE; born Temuka, 16 Jul 1906; sales manager.

who commanded 10 Light Aid Detachment, now attached to 5 Field Park Company, entered behind the Australian infantry to establish an Advanced Ordnance Workshop. The following day a detachment from 5 Field Park Company was working beyond Tobruk with the British engineers who were lifting mines from the main highway. The rest of the company entered the town with 10 Light Aid Detachment on 25 January. The engineers set about lifting mines, salvaging Italian vehicles and repairing the town's water system; the LAD men salvaged trucks and then went forward two days later to Tmimi, close by the seaplane base at Bomba.

Using the harbour and water supply of Tobruk, 13 Corps could now direct its strength towards Derna, another 100 miles along the highway that was still unfolding itself like an interminable liquorice strap. Reinforcements were being rushed forward to the units which were in touch with the Italian rearguard. In fact, 4 RMT Company had been withdrawn from the Sollum area and kept standing by for orders, which came immediately after the capture of Tobruk and sent it to carry first 19 Australian Brigade and then 17 Australian Brigade to the outskirts of Derna. On the company's return it joined Rear Headquarters and F Section (Workshops), who had in the meantime been moving from Smugglers' Cove to Fort Capuzzo, and finally to the fringe of the airfield at Tobruk. With the harbour cleared for shipping, the company was employed transferring stores from the waterfront to the field depots.

The main thrust against the Italian rearguards was not, however, at Derna but in the south near Mechili, where 7 Armoured Division had crossed the rolling stretches of semi-desert, fought a sharp engagement with the Italian armoured units and was now preparing to overwhelm the whole force. The Italians avoided this by withdrawing through the hills to the main highway west of Derna.

Plans were then made for a mobile force to strike westwards along the desert track from near Mechili. As this could not be attempted without supply depots and armoured reinforcements, pressure was maintained in the Derna sector in order to distract attention while the mobile force assembled to the south.

In this dash across the desert, the most dramatic movement in the whole campaign, the only New Zealanders to take any active part were the signalmen with Advanced Headquarters 13 Corps, who had been moving across North Africa much more sedately than the forward units. After the collapse of the Italian defences at Sidi Barrani, they had shifted to Halfaya Pass. On New Year's Day some of the long-expected Royal Signals detachment had arrived from Britain, but there had been no attempt to send the New Zealanders back to Egypt. After Bardia fell they went with Corps Headquarters to Gambut, and now, after the fall of Tobruk, they were at Bomba with Lieutenant-Colonel Agar as the senior New Zealand officer. From here, during the pause before the drive across the desert to Benghazi, the first New Zealand signalmen were released. Captain Feeney and 66 other ranks were withdrawn to Tobruk and, as escort for 1500 Italians, returned by ship to Alexandria. They were back in Helwan Camp by 4 February. At Corps Headquarters the Royal Signals took over all office duties; the only New Zealanders left were Colonel Agar, Major A. E. Smith and four wireless detachments, with a detachment from the maintenance section. They remained with Headquarters 13 Corps for another two weeks, long enough for them to see the abrupt conclusion to the campaign.

The final stage began with the Italians on 30 January pulling back from Derna. Sixth Australian Division immediately gave chase, bustling the enemy rearguard along the highway which curves its way through northern Cyrenaica. In the south 7 Armoured Division and the units assembled at Mechili were ordered to cross the desert to Msus, and from there to reach the highway south of Benghazi. By striking along the chord of the circle this highly mobile force would make possible the capture of Benghazi and prevent the escape of the Italian Tenth Army as it fell back before the Australians. The margin of error was rather fine: the strength of 7 Armoured Division had been whittled down to that of one brigade; the supply depots along the desert route were only partially stocked. The force, however, was carrying two days' supply of food, petrol and ammunition so the chances of success and the magnitude of the prize justified the risk.

The columns moved off on 4 February, bumping over the desert all that day and on throughout the moonlit night to reach Msus next morning. One force then turned north-west towards Soluch; the other pressed on as before, cutting the highway about 60 miles south of Benghazi and collecting, that same evening, over 5000 prisoners.

On 6 February the issue was decided. The Australians who had been driving the Italians through the Vale of Barce entered Benghazi. South of the town at Beda Fomm the Italians attempted to break through the road block. The day ended with their tanks out of action and a confused column of vehicles jamming the Benghazi road for nearly 20 miles. Next day, after another attempt to extricate his force, General Bergonzoli surrendered. The way was then clear for a British group to drive through south-west Cyrenaica to El Agheila, the gateway to Tripolitania.

Advanced Headquarters 13 Corps, having moved up through Msus behind 7 Armoured Division, went north to Benghazi, where the New Zealand signalmen were immediately given the task of repairing and operating the local telephone exchange.

No other New Zealand unit had taken part in this last drive across Cyrenaica. C Section 4 RMT Company, led by Captain Broberg,

Maj R. E. Broberg, ED; Wellington; born Wellington, 5 Mar 1909; mechanical engineer; wounded 24 Apr 1941; senior inspector of munitions, Army HQ, 1943–45.

had been the nearest to it. It had spent several days running petrol from Bomba to 18 Field Supply Depot, the most advanced dump along the track to Msus. The rest of the company had entered Derna in the wake of the Australians and found it to be a small town with trim white villas and tree-lined avenues, nestling under a steep escarpment and fringing a small harbour. There were hot baths and Italian wines, furnished flats and the many amenities of civilised life that the men had not enjoyed since they left New Zealand. From this elysium the drivers now had to operate a regular service to Benghazi.

The only other New Zealand unit to enjoy these conditions were the engineers of 5 Field Park Company, who had come up close on the heels of the forward troops, repairing roads, lifting mines and re-establishing water supplies. They had erected a water tank at Tmimi, operated the pumping station at Martuba, and had then gone on to Derna to repair the power-house and restore the municipal electricity service.

This pleasant interlude did not last very long. The Italians who had built excellent highways before the war were now equally efficient with their demolitions, for over 100 miles away on the road to Barce they had destroyed the bridge across a deep, wide gully. The company was ordered to construct another one, so an advance party moved out on 7 February to begin the operation. The rest of the unit, following three days later, established a base in the vaults of the great monument on Gebel Akhdar, the mountainous region overlooking the red fields and white homesteads in the Vale of Barce. Having little equipment, they improvised as best they could. Tubular steel scaffolding was brought up from the wrecked airfield at Tobruk and, despite air raids, the bridge was constructed within four days.

There were very good reasons for this haste to repair the main highway. The naval authorities at Benghazi were finding it difficult to clear the harbour and very inconvenient to be operating so close to the Italian airfields in Tripoli. Supplies and reinforcements for the units in western Cyrenaica had therefore to be landed at Tobruk and hurried through by motor transport.

This harbour, which had been cleared for shipping immediately after its capture on 22 January, now received a greater tonnage of shipping than did Sollum. Allied soldiers, Arab and Palestinian labourers, were busy handling the shipping in the harbour and the cargoes along the waterfront. With them were some New Zealanders, men from the railway operating companies, who had been brought up by sea from Alexandria.

Some ships ran straight through from Alexandria to Tobruk but others, more particularly Egyptian ships, were not taken out of Egyptian waters. They were unloaded at Sollum by the New Zealanders who had been left there to operate the tugs and the two water barges. Italian prisoners were taken out to the ships, reinforcements disembarked and were ferried to naval vessels waiting to rush them into Tobruk, and supplies were taken back to the waterfront. To disrupt this routine the enemy dropped acoustic mines into Sollum harbour. All that could be done was to mark their approximate positions, call up minesweepers from Alexandria and leave the crews to carry on as before, with the hope that the cards would be stacked in their favour.

On the morning of 3 February, however, No. 2 water barge, manned by men from 19 Army Troops Company, exploded a mine and disintegrated with the loss of all the crew and many Italian prisoners. Then, in the evening, an engineer from 16 Railway Operating Company was washed off the deck of one of the tugs and drowned in a choppy sea.

No. 1 barge had been more fortunate. The previous night, with one of the tugs in tow, it had set out for Tobruk in company with HMS Ladybird and five of the Jaffa barges. They had a rough trip, the tug twice broke away and they were late in arriving outside Tobruk, so late in fact that they nearly missed their chance of following the Ladybird through the minefields. A third tug and still more men came up from Sollum within the next week. Those actually working on the water barge and tugs were part of ‘Y’ Docks Operating Company and under naval control, but later they joined the New Zealanders of the shore staff as part of 1018 Docks Operating Company.

For these New Zealanders this was the beginning of an exacting but exciting period of the war. The work was no different from that at Sollum: lighters had to be towed and unloaded, stores had to be sent to the different depots. But the air raids were more severe because Tobruk, as the port through which 13 Corps was supplied, was the natural target for enemy aircraft. And the Luftwaffe was now supporting the less aggressive Regia Aeronautica. In a very short time their bombs, acoustic mines and low-level strafing had converted the busy harbour into a nautical graveyard that was famous for its sunken ships and its battered waterfront.

In other parts of Cyrenaica the enemy was less aggressive, but it is now possible to be wise and to say that the position of 13 Corps was not as sound as it looked. Its units were reduced in strength and working with worn-out transport. And, throughout February, 6 Australian Division and the different New Zealand units were being withdrawn to join the expeditionary force that was about to sail for Greece. The way was thus being cleared, quite unsuspectingly, for the counter-attack which Rommel was to launch on 31 March 1941.

CHAPTER 5 Assembly and Training of the New Zealand Division

IN December 1940, when it was clear that the Italian Army was withdrawing along the North African coast, permission was granted for the New Zealand units to assemble in Maadi and Helwan camps and there prepare for the spring campaign. The Division was to be in General Headquarters Reserve ready to move at short notice to any theatre of war. There was no certainty just where this would be. The battalions could be sent to Libya, to Abyssinia, or to any other country in the Middle East in which the German High Command chose to play its next card. In November General Freyberg had informed the New Zealand Government that Germany, having failed to invade Britain, might attack either Russia or Turkey; in December he thought that the Italian disasters in Greece would affect ‘German plans for next spring’ and that Greece as well as Turkey was a possible theatre of war.

The immediate problem, however, was the assembly of the scattered Division. There were even doubts about the arrival of reinforcements, though they were essential if the Division was ever to go into action. In August the reinforcements who were to have sailed with the Third Echelon were retained for service in Fiji. Since then the position in the Pacific had deteriorated, and in October the Government warned General Freyberg that the growing tension in the Far East made it necessary for it to revise its plans for reinforcements to the Middle East and to consider whether a proportion of those available should not be sent to Fiji at the earliest possible moment. The Government eventually decided that only a section of the 4th Reinforcements should leave in November. Later on, to the consternation of the General, a shortage of shipping made it necessary to send the remainder in two sections. In the end, however, he was able to act on the assumption that the original total of reinforcements would be adhered to ‘without any deficiency’. From December onwards a succession of convoys was to come in from Britain and New Zealand.

To make way for these reinforcements, 6 Brigade and those units of the Division already in Maadi Camp moved out during 9–14 December to Helwan, the desert camp near which 2 General Hospital was already established and from which 6 Australian Division had just moved to the Western Desert. Henceforward Maadi was left as the Base Camp for HQ 2 NZEF base units and the training units of the Reinforcement Depot.

The first to enter Maadi Camp under this new system was the first section of the 4th Reinforcements, 1487 all ranks, who left Wellington on 8 November in HMTs atory and Maunganui and after an uneventful voyage arrived at Port Tewfik on 16 December. They were joined by a small detachment from Divisional Headquarters and Headquarters Divisional Artillery which arrived from England on 29 December.

As the Italian army in North Africa was then in full retreat, there was no reason why several of the units which had been attached to Western Desert Force should not return

There were two exceptions to this policy of withdrawal. From 4 January to 1 February 1941, A Company 6 Field Ambulance had a casualty clearing station with the Australian troops at Ikingi Maryut. During 21–30 January a small convoy from the Ammunition Company (B Section) made a return journey of 1340 miles from Helwan to a field depot beyond Gambut, taking out urgently needed MT stores and motor engines for 6 Australian Division and returning with Italian equipment and prisoners of war.

for divisional training. The long-awaited orders came through and, by 17 January, despite sandstorms and the more urgent transport requirements of the desert army, the battalions of 4 Brigade were in Helwan Camp. Sixth Field Company was recalled from the Canal Zone, B Section of the Ammunition Company came in from Abbassia, and GHQ Middle East at last agreed that the New Zealand units still advancing with 13 Corps should be recalled as soon as it was convenient for General O'Connor to release them.

For the rank and file of 4 Brigade the important fact was that, during their absence in the desert, efforts had been made to introduce some of the amenities of civilisation to the tented camps at Maadi and Helwan. The meals were better cooked and had more variety now that the cooks had taken courses at the School of Cookery from the instructors who had, at last, arrived from Britain.

See p. 23.

Sports competitions had been organised, the best known being that for the Freyberg Cup, for which rugby teams struggled on such dusty grounds as ‘Eden Park’ and ‘Carisbrook’. Bands had been organised within each brigade and in March the Kiwi Concert Party became an official unit of 2 NZEF. There was the change-of-air camp at Alexandria for those who had leave. And in Cairo itself on 5 February, at the corner of Sharia Malika Farida and Sharia Emad el Din, the New Zealand Club was opened to 600 men representing all units, and probably enjoying the New Zealand beer sent over by the Patriotic Fund Board, whose Commissioner in the Middle East was now Colonel Waite.

Col the Hon. F. Waite, CMG, DSO, OBE, VD, m.i.d.; MLC; farmer; born Dunedin, 20 Aug 1885; NZ Engrs (Capt) 1914–17 (DSO); Commissioner, National Patriotic Fund, Middle East; died Balclutha, Aug 1952.

The other side to the story is one of training and organisation. Training schemes were drawn up and warnings issued about divisional exercises in February and active operations in March. By then it was hoped that 5 Brigade would have arrived from Britain and that the rest of the expected reinforcements would have come over from New Zealand.

In Maadi Camp elaborate arrangements were being made for the reception and training of these new drafts. The Artillery Training Regiment, the NCOs' School, and the Composite Training Depot for engineers, signallers and Divisional Cavalry had already been established. On 15 January 9 Infantry Brigade, with Northern, Central and Southern Training Battalions and a Maori Training Company, was formed under the command of Brigadier L. M. Inglis, promoted from command of 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion.

At the same time much was done to perfect the organisation and administration of the Division. Groupings for the three brigades

With 4 Inf Bde: 4 Fd Regt, 34 Bty 7 A-Tk Regt, 6 Fd Coy, 2 Coy 27 (MG) Bn, 4 Fd Amb. With 5 Inf Bde: 5 Fd Regt, 32 Bty 7 A-Tk Regt, 7 Fd Coy, 3 Coy 27 (MG) Bn, 5 Fd Amb. With 6 Inf Bde: 6 Fd Regt, 33 Bty 7 A-Tk Regt, 8 Fd Coy, 1 Coy 27 (MG) Bn, 6 Fd Amb.

were settled; 27 (MG) Battalion, originally a non-divisional unit, was absorbed into the Division; 19 Army Troops Company was temporarily attached to 6 Brigade Group to take the place of 8 Field Company, which did not leave New Zealand until 1 February. The plans for a Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment were scrapped when it was realised that a colossal amount of special equipment not then available was necessary.

There was, however, less shortage of the more regular items of clothing and equipment. The authorities were making every effort to issue the troops with the full G1098

The synopsis of the complete equipment of a unit, itemised and enumerated.

equipment. Supplies were coming in through the Red Sea ports and the quartermasters, free to adopt war accounting, were no longer hoarding their treasures. By February it was fashionable for the well-dressed soldier to be wearing khaki drill by day and the new battle-dress uniform at night. Motor vehicles were being issued to replace those ruined in the desert; 25-pounder guns replaced the old 18-pounders and the 45-inch howitzers; the Divisional Cavalry Regiment received Marmon-Harrington armoured cars and the Signals Corps was issued with many tons of equipment. In fact, the only major unit still working under difficulties was the Base Training establishment at Maadi. Here a shortage of transport and the employment of men on guard duties at the Tura caves, 2 General Hospital and Helwan prisoner-of-war camp made it difficult to prepare the reinforcement drafts for the Division.

2 NZEF was not relieved of these guard duties until mid-March 1941.

The task for the brigades was to complete the basic training of the men and then, by intensive day and night marches, to have them so fit that they could cover 40 miles in twenty-four hours. By February this was possible and the monotony of the work was then broken by more advanced exercises. The battalions attacked behind the supporting fire of machine guns and mortars or advanced in extended line behind smoke screens to capture imaginary defences in the sandhills; on the route marches they were harried by the Royal Air Force or diverted to test the brains and the efficiency of the brigade staffs.

The actual role which the Division was to play had not been defined, but General Freyberg had been able to tell his brigadiers that their theatre of war was no longer likely to be the Western Desert. He gave them a general directive envisaging a landing from the sea, and along these lines a considerable amount of training was carried out, the desert escarpments providing the stage setting for actions at the foot of sea cliffs. The battalions practised river crossings, using kapok bridges for the canals and assault boats for the river. The final event was a regular ‘Henley on the Nile’ in which a spectacular variety of craft took part.

All this time reinforcements had been arriving from New Zealand and units returning from the desert. The second section of the 4th Reinforcements, 2301 all ranks, which had left Wellington on 20 December on HMTs Dominion Monarch, Empress of Russia and Awatea, arrived at Port Tewfik on 28–30 January.

The next to appear was 19 Army Troops Company, whose sections had been working between Mersa Matruh and Sidi Barrani. They had constructed camps, laid pipelines, perfected a water system about Mersa Matruh, salvaged equipment and lifted Italian minefields. Small detachments had been with 708 Construction Company and with the water barges at Sollum and Tobruk. In fact, one barge crew was still in Tobruk for lightering duties, the naval authorities having asked if the crew could be retained and General Freyberg having agreed on condition that the men were replaced as soon as possible. They rejoined the company during the last week of February, in time to leave for Greece.

The rest of the company, however, was at Sidi Barrani by 31 January with orders to return to Helwan Camp. That night the SS Sollum with 500 Italian prisoners ran aground on an outer reef. There was a strong wind with high seas, but men from the ship swam ashore with lines to the foot of the coastal escarpment. They were assisted through the breakers by Sergeant Cookson,

Sgt T. N. Cookson; born England, 26 Oct 1905; road engineer.

who organised the rescue work after hawsers had been attached to some heavy trucks. Relays of men spent hours in the bitterly cold surf dragging the Italians to safety; others assisted them into slings and those on the escarpment hauled them to the crest. The wounded had to be brought ashore on Carley floats, so the last stages of their journey were extremely hazardous, but groups of volunteers brought them through the breakers and had everyone ashore by first light. The company was then free to move back to Helwan on 3 February.

The railway construction companies, lacking mechanical equipment and dependent upon unreliable native labour, had lost touch with the advancing forces, but the limitations of the railway system had by now been balanced by the capture of Tobruk and the acquisition of Italian motor vehicles. The companies were therefore withdrawn for more urgent work in the Canal area. They left early in February: the detachment from 9 Survey Company to join the unit at Almaza; Group Headquarters and 13 Railway Construction Company for Moascar and Geneifa respectively; 10 Construction Company for Qassassin and 17 Operating Company to Geneifa, where it was to control the shunting yards. The only New Zealand railway unit left in the desert was 16 Operating Company on the line from El Daba to Mersa Matruh.

The next moves in the assembly of the divisional troops now began to take place in swift succession. On 16 February 5 Field Regiment, 7 Anti-Tank Regiment (31 and 32 Batteries) and the advance parties from the other units of 5 Brigade arrived from Britain. More important still, General Freyberg, on the following day, was told

See p. 99.

by General Wavell that his Division would move to Greece as the advanced guard of an Imperial force commanded by General Maitland Wilson.

As if further proof was required to support this verbal order, the units which had been advancing to Benghazi with 13 Corps now began to return. The last of the signalmen—3 officers and 17 other ranks—who had been in the desert ever since the worrying days of June 1940, marched into camp the very same day. The Engineers of 5 Field Park Company and 10 Light Aid Detachment, who had lifted their last mines and completed the construction of their bridge in the Barce valley, were moving east along the great highway. They were in Helwan Camp by 21 February.

The transport companies were also on the move. The Petrol Company, the Supply Column and A Section of the Ammunition Company came in to Helwan from the railhead at Qasaba on 21 February. Fourth RMT Company sent its last convoy from Derna to Benghazi on 22 February, had one driver wounded during an air attack and was back in Helwan by the 28th.

For the New Zealand Division this was the end of the Libyan campaign, the last paragraph of a brief introduction. It had not gone into action as a complete formation, for neither the infantry nor the artillery had been engaged. But the signals, engineer and transport companies had gained invaluable experience. The work of all these units was acknowledged and praised in farewell messages from Lieutenant-General O'Connor and the heads of services in Western Desert Force (13 Corps). This was the praise which everyone appreciates—praise from the fellow members of one's own craft.

But the men from the desert had little time to appreciate these messages or to enjoy the now well-organised camps at Maadi and Helwan. The stage was already being prepared for the next act in the drama, for on 28 February when the last trucks were moving into Helwan the advance parties from the Division were leaving the camp to join the first convoy to Greece. Fourth Brigade Group, went first, then 6 Brigade Group and, finally, 5 Brigade Group,

See p. 42.

which had reached Egypt with very little time to spare. On 3 March, when the main body of 4 Brigade left Helwan, the first ships of the convoy from Britain steamed into Port Tewfik, and within a few days the battalions of 5 Brigade, after receiving equipment and completing their training, were preparing for their own move to Greece.

The third section of the 4th Reinforcements brought four units which had been in camp with the Third Echelon, and the several thousand reinforcements without whom it would have been unwise for the Division to begin the campaign in Greece. Eighth Field Company, commanded by Major Currie

Lt-Col A. R. Currie, DSO, OBE; Wellington; born Napier, 12 Nov 1910; military engineer; OC 8 Fd Coy Oct 1940–Jul 1942; CO NZ Engr Trg Depot Apr–Jul 1943; OC 7 Fd Coy Jul–Nov 1943; three times wounded; Director, Fortifications and Works, Army HQ, 1946–49; Chief Engineer, NZ Army, 1951–.

of the Regular Force, had come over from Fiji; 36 Survey Battery was commanded by Major Rawle,

Maj F. C. Rawle, ED; Auckland; born Auckland, 26 Jun 1905; asst county clerk; OC 36 Svy Bty 1940–41; bty comd 14 Lt AA Regt 1941; wounded 27 Nov 1941.

18 Army Troops Company by Major Lincoln and 21 Mechanical Equipment Company by Major Tiffen.

Maj J. H. Tiffen, m.i.d.; Wanganui; born Gisborne, 15 Mar 1903; civil engineer (British Colonial Service, Fiji); OC 21 Mech Equipt Coy Nov 1940–Nov 1943.

With 3 General

Greece Hospital were two well-known medical officers: Colonel Gower,

Brig G. W. Gower, CBE, ED, m.i.d.; Hamilton; born Invercargill, 15 Apr 1887; surgeon; medical officer, 1 NZEF, 1915–19; surgeon, Christchurch Military Hospital, 1919; CO 3 Gen Hosp Oct 1940–May 1945; DMS 2 NZEF May–Oct 1945.

the commanding officer, who had been with 1 NZ General Hospital in 1916–18, and Major Russell,

Lt-Col J. Russell, m.i.d.; born Scotland, 28 Oct 1896; Deputy Director-General, Mental Hospitals, Wellington; Capt, 1 Gordon Highlanders, First World War; Registrar 3 Gen Hosp Oct 1940–Aug 1941; DADMS 2 NZEF Aug 1941–Nov 1945.

the registrar, who was afterwards for some years Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services, 2 NZEF.

These units and the mass of unattached reinforcements had left New Zealand on 1 February in HMT Nieuw Amsterdam as part of a large convoy that reached Bombay on 22 February. Here they had been broken into sections. One of 1196 all ranks, including 8 Field Company, had boarded HMT Nevassa and reached Port Tewfik on 15 March. The other section of 2492 all ranks, including 21 Mechanical Equipment Company, 18 Army Troops Company, 36 Survey Battery and 3 General Hospital, had gone to Deolali Camp for two weeks before sailing on 11 March in the Empress of Australia, Windsor Castle, Nieuw Zeeland and Indrapoera. The convoy reached Port Tewfik on 22–23 March and the troops were transferred by train to Helwan and Maadi camps.

By then the movement

See Chapter 7.

to Greece was almost complete and the two great camps were clear for the training of the new arrivals. Some were soon required for service in the Western Desert; others took over the work of units which had left for Greece; all waited for news of the Division and the appearance of their own movement orders.

CHAPTER 6 The Balkan Front

Britain's Policy

IN April 1939, shortly after the Italian forces had landed in Albania, Mr Churchill warned the Prime Minister, Mr Chamberlain, that the ‘whole of the Balkan Peninsula’

Churchill, Vol. I, p. 274.

was at stake. Already convinced that the Axis powers meant war, the British Government guaranteed to support Greece and Rumania should their independence be threatened. And in May Turkey was assured

On 19 October 1939 a treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed by Britain, France and Turkey.

that she would be supported should any act of aggression lead to war in the Mediterranean.

Once war was declared Churchill was able to enlarge upon the strategic importance of the Balkans. In his opinion the course of events and the ‘quenchless antagonism’ between Germany and Russia would create not only an eastern front but also a south-eastern one. For the ambitions of Hitler and the traditional interest

See Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–41, documents from the archives of the German Foreign Office, and Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 27–9, for evidence of the distrust with which Russia was to observe German activity in the Balkans.

of Russia in the Balkans were almost certain to be conflicting. Britain had therefore been ‘fostering this front’, strengthening it and ‘endeavouring to throw it into simultaneous action should any part of it be attacked….’

From a paper prepared for the War Cabinet in September 1939: Churchill, Vol. I, p. 352. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series, Volume V, edited E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, show that the Russian proposals for a mutual assistance pact in April 1939 were both concrete and sweeping.

After the collapse of France in June 1940 this was no longer possible. Encouraged

In the secret protocols of the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 Hitler had agreed that Russia should take Bessarabia. To his annoyance she also took Bukovina.

by Hitler, Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary stripped Rumania of her frontier provinces. In consequence she was soon to be, with Bulgaria and Hungary, one of the subsidiary allies of Germany.

In August Mussolini, without consulting Hitler, attempted to intimidate Greece. At this stage Britain could offer little assistance. Mr Churchill, ever conscious of the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, had already suggested

At the Supreme War Council in Paris on 31 May. See Churchill, Vol. II, p. 112.

that if Italy attacked Greece, then Britain and France should become responsible for Crete. But now that Britain stood alone her forces were hopelessly inadequate. Consequently, when General Metaxas (Greek Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs) on 22 August asked what assistance he could expect, he was told that until Egypt was secure no land or sea forces were available for service in the Balkans. This did not mean that Britain intended to desert Greece. Churchill, who was then completing his ‘Destroyers for Bases’ deal with Roosevelt, stated that the business was urgent, that it might indirectly save Greece from invasion. And to reassure Greece, the guarantee of British protection was renewed on 5 September.

But no close understanding developed between Greece and Britain. The former had only two aims in view: ‘(1) not to become involved in the disputes between the groups of Great Powers, and, (2) to forestall any attempt to use her territory as a theatre of war.’

The Greek White Book, p. 64, diplomatic documents relating to Italy's aggression against Greece.

The British Chiefs of Staff took just as realistic a view of the situation. Troops might possibly be sent to strengthen the garrison in Crete but no support could be given to the Greeks on the mainland. By October conditions had improved, for the invasion of Britain had not been attempted and Churchill had risked the despatch of reinforcements to the Middle East. But the Chiefs of Staff were still convinced that ‘The front line defence of Egypt did not lie in Greece.’

Hitler's Plans

As it was, the Italian invasion of Greece had been postponed, not because of British action but because Hitler had called a halt all along the line. He had decided that, if the invasion of Britain proved impracticable, his next move must be the invasion of Russia and not, as many thought, a thrust south-east to the Suez Canal or the Persian Gulf. In preparation for this venture he hoped to isolate his Russian victim, bring Spain and Vichy France into the war on the side of Germany and encourage the Balkan states to adhere to the Tripartite Pact. If they would permit the movement of his armies through their territories he could avoid an unnecessary campaign in the Balkans; the British would not dare to intervene; and he would have another secure front from which to attack Russia.

In his efforts to arrange this he now had several months of delicate negotiations, sometimes brilliantly successful, sometimes rather frustrating. After the Tripartite Pact between Berlin, Rome and Tokio

Japan would enter the European war and support the Axis powers if the United States entered on behalf of Britain.

had been signed on 27 September, Russia was faced with the possibility of war on two fronts, and the United States, under the threat of the Japanese Fleet, would ‘not dare to move.’

Ciano's Diary, 1939–1943, p. 291.

Spain and Vichy France, when approached, were sympathetic but sympathetic only; Hungary and Rumania gave their support but would not, as yet, admit definite obligations; Bulgaria hesitated and, as she was a Slav state with Russian sympathies, Hitler did not force her to make any immediate decision.

At this point Mussolini became impatient and reminded the Germans that there was still the problem of Greece and Yugoslavia. But they took no action and, to make matters worse, Hitler when he met Mussolini in the Brenner Pass on 4 October did not mention that his troops were about to enter Rumania. The occupation which took place three days later was a complete success but the secrecy of the move aroused the jealousy of Mussolini. Objecting to the fait accompli, he decided to make his own decisions. So, without mentioning any fixed date, he informed Hitler that he would soon invade Greece. It was ‘one of the strong points of British strategy in the Mediterranean’

Mussolini to Hitler, 19 Oct 1940 (German Foreign Office archives).

and had to be liquidated. Now thoroughly alarmed and determined ‘to prevent under all circumstances an expansion of the conflict in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean,’

International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg. The Trial of the Major War Criminals, Vol. IX, p. 334. Hereafter this source will be referred to as N.D., Nuremberg Documents.

Hitler suggested a conference, but when he met Mussolini at Florence on 28 October he was told that Italian divisions were already moving from Albania into Greece. ‘Führer, we are on the march.’

N.D., Vol. X, p. 287.

Plans for Barbarity Force

The position of Britain was quite clear. As she had already warned the Greeks not to expect intervention on the mainland, Mr Churchill was perfectly justified in telling the House of Commons that ‘We have most carefully abstained from any action likely to draw upon the Greeks the enmity of the criminal dictators. For their part, the Greeks have maintained so strict a neutrality that we were unacquainted with their dispositions or their intentions.’

Speech, 4 November 1940. Quoted from The Greek White Book, pp. 8–9.

Nevertheless, when the Greeks invoked the guarantee of April 1939, Britain was morally bound to give some assistance. In fact King George VI, by the advice of the War Cabinet, cabled to the King of the Hellenes: ‘Your cause is our cause: we shall be fighting against a common foe.’

On the other hand it was doubtful just what Britain could do. General Metaxas wanted the Navy to defend Corfu and the Royal Air Force to cover Athens, but the only assistance possible was the despatch on 1 November of a force to occupy the naval base at Suda Bay in Crete. The battalions were intended for Malta, but Churchill held that the loss of Crete would be ‘a grievous aggravation of all Mediterranean difficulties.’ The British Minister in Athens

Sir Michael Palairet, KCMG.

suggested, however, that although Greek morale was high the non-appearance of British aircraft was encouraging some criticism. So, without waiting for instructions, the Air Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, had No. 30 Blenheim Squadron in Greece by 3 November. His statement was a good explanation of the whole problem: ‘It seems that it has become politically absolutely essential to send a token force to Greece even at the expense of my forces here.’

Major-General I. S. O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. I, p. 230.

Churchill considered this move to be both wise and bold. In his opinion, every effort must be made to assist the Greeks. They were determined to resist the Italians; prolonged fighting in the Balkans was inevitable; and the ‘collapse of Greece without any effort by us will have deadly effect on Turkey and on future of war.’ The commanders-in-chief in the Middle East were still inclined to worry about the security of Egypt, which was essential if the support of Turkey was to be retained, but Churchill was convinced that the forces with General Wavell were more than sufficient for the defence of that country and for the offensive in East Africa. ‘No one will thank us for sitting tight in Egypt with ever-growing forces while Greek situation and all that hangs on it is cast away. Loss of Athens far greater injury than Kenya and Khartoum….’

Churchill, Vol. II, p. 476.

Such being the case, the Government decided, as a long-term investment, to send still more assistance to the Greeks. On 4 November General Wavell was instructed to give Greece all possible moral and material support at the earliest possible moment. As soon as properly defended airfields were ready, Barbarity Force—five squadrons of the Royal Air Force with all equipment and ancillary services—must be sent to Greece.

Suggestion that New Zealand Troops be Sent to Crete

Britain also offered to be responsible for the security of Crete, an important strategic point in the Eastern Mediterranean; ‘failure to hold it would be a military and political disaster of the first order.’

Documents, Vol. I, p. 193.

British troops were already in the Suda Bay area, but if additional battalions were sent the Greeks could transfer their own garrison to the Albanian front. As he was then preparing for the First Libyan Campaign, General Wavell could not withdraw any troops from the Western Desert but he could send over some of the units which had been left in Egypt for purposes of internal security.

Consequently, the New Zealand Government on 8 November was asked if some of the battalions in Maadi Camp could be sent to Crete. As Wavell was working with inadequate resources, General Freyberg considered that the wishes of Britain should willingly be met. The Government thereupon agreed to the proposal, provided the troops were fully equipped and sufficiently trained. But it again reminded the British Government that the New Zealand Division was still split into three groups: 6 Brigade in Maadi Camp, 4 Brigade in the desert and 5 Brigade in Britain. If they were to operate as a complete formation in 1941 they must be brought together for advanced training. This mild protest possibly had some effect for the plan was dropped and United Kingdom troops

2 York and Lancaster Regiment landed on 1 November, HQ 14 Brigade and an anti-aircraft regiment on 6 November and 2 Black Watch on 19 November.

were sent to Crete.

Cautious Attitude of British Government

At the same time every care was taken to give the Greeks no reason to hope for immediate relief. The staff officer sent over as an observer was warned that he must not make any promises or give any undertakings to the Greek General Staff. No. 27 Military Mission to Greece, established by the Chiefs of Staff, Middle East, which had to report upon the situation was given similar instructions: ‘You will not commit His Majesty's Government even by implication to the provision of any such requirements as may be referred to you by the Greek Government. Nor will you encourage any expectation of specific support without prior sanction in order that false hopes may not be raised.’

Rich, Vol. I, Ch. I, p. 16, para. 26.

An inter-services mission to Greece from London was instructed that the policy was to sustain Greek resistance without committing forces in Greece which were vital for security elsewhere.

After 11 November there was some improvement in the situation, for the naval aircraft which attacked the Italian warships in Taranto harbour decisively altered the balance of power in the Mediterranean. More convoys could sail through the Straits of Gibraltar, the Navy had greater security along the North African coast and the protection of convoys to Malta and to Greece had been simplified. As an Italian army had still to be dealt with in North Africa, this increased security did not mean that greater assistance could now be offered to Greece, but it did mean that a campaign in Greece in 1941 was not impossible.

Nevertheless the British Government, unwilling to open another front and anxious to respect the wishes of the Greeks, still acted very cautiously. The base for Barbarity Force had to be capable of expansion to accommodate two divisions, but the Greeks were on no account to be informed of this possibility. The best site for it, strategically, was the flat country near Salonika, but as aircraft from that area could bomb the Rumanian oilfields the Greeks feared that its establishment would provoke direct action by Germany. The force after it reached Greece on 16 November was accordingly dispersed, the bombers to airfields near Athens and the fighters to whatever grounds could be found near the fighting line.

First New Zealand Troops in Greece

In Barbarity Force there were about 4000 men, half of whom came from the Royal Air Force and half from the Army. They had been collected very hastily, so hastily that General Freyberg did not know that on HMAS Sydney and SS Nieuw Zeeland there had been No. 3 Section 9 New Zealand Railway Survey Company (Captain Nevins

Maj T. H. F. Nevins; Wellington; born NZ 23 Nov 1903; civil engineer.

), which a week before had been quietly doing survey work in Palestine. As its arrival was immediately noticed by newspaper correspondents and radio commentators, the New Zealand Government naturally inquired as to the truth of their reports. Headquarters 2 NZEF, however, knew nothing about the movement because the railway companies were under the control of the Director-General of Transportation, Middle East. General Headquarters, Middle East, flatly contradicted the reports. The New Zealand Government made inquiries in London but nothing was known there about the surveyors. The news was repeated, further inquiries were made, and in December General Headquarters, Middle East, was apologising for its misinformation and admitting that a section had actually been sent to Greece. Thereafter the New Zealand Government insisted that Headquarters 2 NZEF or the High Commissioner in London had to be informed of the employment of New Zealand troops in any theatre of war in which 2 NZEF was not itself engaged.

The section worked about Piræus and New Phaleron, prepared camp sites, surveyed minor railway extensions, and finally a base depot to the west of Athens, at which it was working when the Germans eventually invaded Greece.

Hitler Decides to Attack Greece

By this time Hitler had made several important decisions. As a result of the Italian invasion of Greece no panzer divisions would, as yet, be sent to Libya. Support would be given to the Italians in Albania

The Italians did not accept this proposal.

and a German force would occupy northern Greece. Air cover would be provided for the Rumanian oilfields, Bulgaria would be assisted against possible attack by Turkey, and in the Western Mediterranean, with Franco's assistance, Gibraltar would be occupied.

Unfortunately for Hitler the problem soon became more complicated. In November, the British, by bombing the Italian warships in Taranto harbour, gained greater prestige in the Balkans and a much better strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean. The further reverses of the Italians in Albania were even more important, for the minor powers were then encouraged to await the outcome of events or to raise the price for their support. Hungary and Rumania were still sympathetic, but neither Spain nor Vichy France was certain that the last word had been spoken. In the opinion of Hitler's naval staff, the campaign was clearly a regrettable blunder which had created the greatest strategic, political and psychological difficulties. And Hitler himself now informed Mussolini that he wished ‘Above all’ to have delayed the invasion of Greece ‘until a more favourable time, at any rate until after the American Presidential Election.’

N.D., Vol. III, p. 137. See also p. 93, note 1.

To meet the situation he now decided that every possible effort must be made ‘to turn Russia away from the Balkans and to direct her towards the Orient.’ Russia was therefore offered her share of the British Empire and a political and economic alliance with the countries of the Tripartite Pact—Germany, Italy and Japan. But the discussions with Molotov when he was in Berlin on 12–13 November were not encouraging. His questions were often difficult to answer. When Molotov wanted, for instance, to know something about the fate of Hungary and Rumania, of Greece and Yugoslavia, Hitler had to admit that he was interested in the southern Balkans: ‘The idea was intolerable to Germany that England might get a foothold in Greece’ for the establishment of air and naval bases. Molotov returned to Moscow and the formal reply to the German proposals came from Stalin on 26 November. He made it quite clear that Russia wished to increase her influence in the Baltic, the Black Sea and the oilfield areas about Iraq and Iran. As such designs ran contrary to his own, Hitler sent no definite reply; he preferred to warn his commanders-in-chief on 18 December that ‘The German Armed Forces must be prepared even before the end of the war against England, to overthrow Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign (Operation Barbarossa).’

With Greece, on the other hand, there was no suggestion of negotiations. The Mediterranean situation had to be liquidated ‘that winter’, so Hitler, although he complained about the Italian disasters in Albania, was prepared to give Mussolini every assistance, for the British, by using bases in Greece, were quite likely to attack

In a proclamation issued on 6 April, the day Greece was invaded, Hitler gave an additional reason: ‘From the beginning of the struggle it has been England's steadfast endeavour to make the Balkans a theatre of war …. We shall never … tolerate a power establishing itself on Greek territory with the object at a given time of being able to advance thence from the south-east into German living space.’—Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I, p. 787.

the oil refineries in Rumania. Decisive counter measures had therefore to be taken. With the assistance of Spain the western gateway to the Mediterranean must be closed; the Luftwaffe had to block the Suez Canal and destroy the British fleet. After these opening moves there would be a spring campaign in Greece for which it was essential to have the positive collaboration of Yugoslavia. He told Mussolini that the German divisions would have to be out of Greece by 1 May, but he did not tell him that they were wanted for the campaign in Russia.

Hitler then hastened to complete his system of alliances. Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia adhered to the Tripartite Pact but Bulgaria would do no more than promise to permit the passage of German troops to the boundaries of Greece. Shortly afterwards, the plans for the capture of Gibraltar were abruptly postponed

The British victories in North Africa during December 1940–February 1941, the bombardment of Genoa by the Navy and the passage of the aircraft-carrier HMS Illustrious through the Mediterranean decided the matter. On 26 February Franco informed Hitler that the Protocol ‘agreed upon in October must now be considered outmoded.’

by General Franco. The British Navy was still intact and the economic condition of Spain was such that she could not enter the war until Britain was on the point of collapse. This was a disappointing but not a major setback. Determined to be secure in at least the Eastern Mediterranean, Hitler confirmed on 13 December his orders for Operation MARITA. Twelfth Army supported by 8 Air Corps was to take north Greece and, if necessary, all Greece in order to prevent the British opening up a Balkan front from which they could bomb both Italy and the Rumanian oilfields.

Britain Decides to Assist Greece

The British throughout these months, November–December 1940, had been attempting to deduce just what Hitler intended to do. With his army massing in Rumania, and with Bulgaria apparently willing to permit the passage of his troops, he might be preparing to assist the Italians in Greece or he might be planning to strike through Turkey towards Persia or the Suez Canal. The authorities in London thought that the loss of Greece would weaken the naval position but would not be altogether disastrous. If the thrust was south-east through Turkey the situation would be more serious, for such an advance could jeopardise the security of the whole Middle East. Efforts were therefore made to persuade Turkey that her best policy would be to declare war as soon as German troops entered Bulgaria. And Mr Churchill pointed out to General Wavell the importance of the attack which he was soon to open in North Africa. If successful it might determine the attitude of Yugoslavia and Turkey. ‘One may indeed see possibility of centre of gravity in Middle East shifting suddenly from Egypt to the Balkans, and from Cairo to Constantinople.’

Churchill, Vol. II, p. 483.

Within a few weeks Churchill could be more definite, for in Albania the Greeks had continued to advance and in North Africa there had been the victory at Sidi Barrani, the capture of Bardia and, on 6 January 1941, the encirclement of Tobruk.

The destruction of the Italian forces in Cyrenaica and the capture of Benghazi were now the natural objectives. But it was quite possible that Wavell might have to be satisfied with the capture of Tobruk, for once the western flank of Egypt was secure he would have to send some support to Greece. If her forces failed to capture the port of Valona she could possibly be ‘in the mood for a separate peace with Italy.’

Ibid., Vol. III, p. 9.

If they were successful it might be possible, with Yugoslavia and Turkey, to form a Balkan front, and that in turn might persuade Russia to challenge German aggression in the Balkans. In any case Hitler, whether he liked it or not, must be preparing to support Italy. In fact the Foreign Office already had a mass of information all pointing to a German attack upon Greece.

So on 8 January the Defence Committee of Cabinet agreed that, from ‘the political point of view’, all possible support must be given to Greece. To support this decision there was a telegram from General Smuts suggesting that Tobruk should be the ‘terminus’ of the advance and that a large part of the desert force be transferred to meet a German attack in the Balkans. He did wonder if Germany could ‘afford to set the Balkans ablaze with Russia an incalculable factor and Turkey hostile’; he even thought that her troop movements might be an effort to ‘lure the British forces from Britain.’ But, not having all the facts, he left the subject for the General Staff to consider.

The commanders-in-chief in the Middle East were now warned that the Germans would probably advance through Bulgaria towards Salonika. Once Tobruk was taken all other plans would have to be subordinated to the needs of Greece. General Wavell and Air Chief Marshal Longmore were therefore ordered to visit Athens to discuss the situation with Generals Metaxas and Papagos (Commander-in-Chief Greek Army). These firm instructions seem to have surprised the commanders-in-chief. Wavell suggested that the German concentrations in Rumania were possibly designed to weaken the offensive in North Africa. He asked the Chiefs of Staff to ‘consider most urgently whether enemy's move is not bluff.’ In any case, if it was genuine, little could be done to prevent it.

On 10 January Mr Churchill replied—and wasted no words when he did so. The available information contradicted any possibility of ‘bluff’; a thrust towards Salonika would endanger the Greek divisions in Albania. ‘But is this not also the very thing the Germans ought to do to harm us most? Destruction of Greece will eclipse victories you have gained in Libya, and may affect decisively Turkish attitude, especially if we have shown ourselves callous of fate of allies. You must now therefore conform your plans to larger interests at stake.

‘Nothing must hamper capture of Tobruk, but thereafter all operations in Libya are subordinated to aiding Greece, and all preparations must be made from the receipt of this telegram for the immediate succour of Greece up to the limits prescribed…. We expect and require prompt and active compliance with our decisions, for which we bear full responsibility.’

Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 16–17.

There was no suggestion, as yet, of a complete army being sent to Greece but the offer would at least cover a squadron of infantry tanks, a regiment of cruiser tanks, ten regiments of artillery and five squadrons of aircraft. And Wavell when he met the Greeks was to stress the fact that if the British had not arrived before the Germans entered Bulgaria the move would almost certainly be too late.

The decision having been made, Churchill sent an explanation to General Smuts. ‘Naturally Wavell and Co. heart-set on chase but Wavell is going … to concert reinforcements with Greeks. Cannot guarantee success; can only make what we think best arrangements. Weather, mountains, Danube crossing, fortified Greek-Bulgarian frontier, all helpful factors. Turkey, Yugoslavia, Russia, all perhaps favourably influenced by evidences of British support of Greece.’

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 19.

The discussion in Athens on 14–15 January found the Greeks reluctant to accept this offer, Metaxas pointing out that the problem of south-east Europe could not be ‘faced with the forces now at their disposal in the Near [Middle] East.’

Rich, Ch. 1, p. 35. para. 64.

He thought that ten

Memorandum, Koryzis-Eden, 22 Feb 1941, recapitulating the attitude of Metaxas on 15 January. Cf. ‘History of the Preliminaries to Greece’, reproducing telegram in COS 12 (O), 15 Jan 1941, where nine divisions is the number stated.

divisions was the minimum aid required to give a reasonable chance of withstanding a German attack. The assistance suggested by Wavell would be strong enough to provoke German intervention but not powerful enough to offer any hopes of successful resistance. He insisted that it should be despatched only if the Germans entered Bulgaria, but he emphasised, once again, that Greece would not conclude a separate peace with the Axis powers. Hoping that a British success in Libya and a Greek success in Albania would release sufficient troops for the defence of Salonika, Metaxas also suggested that a joint plan be drawn up and ‘steps taken by Greece to carry out the necessary preparations for the arrival of British troops.’

These staff talks began immediately and continued until 13 February 1941. See Rich, Ch. 1, p. 35, para. 64.

This refusal was accepted with relief by General Wavell, who returned to Cairo and cabled a report to London. The suggested plan had been ‘a dangerous half measure.’ Now that the Luftwaffe was operating in the Mediterranean the first task for the British was to secure Benghazi and make Egypt safe from an attack. No promise should be made to send troops to Greece, but he did think that preparations should be made for a force to defend Salonika.

The Chiefs of Staff accordingly modified their policy for the near future. On 17 January Wavell was warned that British aid must not be forced upon the Greeks. If the Germans made a serious attack upon Greece the British, at this stage, ‘could do no more than impose a small delay to their occupation of the country.’

COS 14 (O), 18 Jan 1941.

In any case it was quite possible that British troops would be sent not to Greece but to Turkey. Their final conclusions, issued on 21 January, were that Benghazi should be captured, that three ‘Glen’ ships should be sent to assist in the capture of Rhodes

The attempt was never made but the ‘Glen’ liners converted for use as assault landing ships were afterwards used in the evacuation of W Force from Greece.

and that a reserve of four divisions should be assembled for operations in Greece or Turkey within the next two months. The commanders-in-chief agreed, and the desert forces which had just captured Tobruk continued on their way to encircle the Italian army in Cyrenaica.

At the moment any information coming in to the Foreign Office suggested that it was Turkey and not Greece which would have to be supported. The efforts of the British Liaison Mission

The report from this mission was received in London on 22 January.

to persuade the Turks to accept British assistance, especially air forces, had not, however, been successful. Lacking the resources with which to challenge the Axis powers, they preferred to remain neutral. This forced Mr Churchill to send a personal appeal to the President of Turkey and to advise the Chiefs of Staff that ‘the Greek-Turkish situation must have priority.’

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 32.

As explained to General Wavell by the Chiefs of Staff, it was more important than the capture of Benghazi.

Within a week this was all too clear. On 6 February, three weeks earlier than expected, Benghazi was occupied and the desert flank, the peg on which all else hung, had become relatively secure.

The landing of the Afrika Korps at Tripoli had begun early in February but Wavell received no definite reports until mid-February.

On 8 February M. Koryzis, the new President

General Metaxas had died on 29 January 1941.

of Greece, sent a note to the British Government reaffirming the determination of his country to resist any German attack but repeating the statement by Metaxas that no British force should be sent into Macedonia until the Germans had entered Bulgaria. Staff talks

Defence plans had been discussed; No. 27 Military Mission had studied harbours and possible bases (not the Salonika area).

had, however, been taking place for the last three weeks, so Koryzis now suggested that the size and composition of the British expeditionary force be determined. It would then be possible to decide whether the combined Greek and British forces could resist German aggression and encourage the support of Turkey and Yugoslavia. If they could not, then the premature appearance of insufficient forces in Macedonia ‘would do no more than provoke German intervention.’

The British Government was thus forced to make a major decision—should the desert army which had just taken Benghazi complete the conquest of North Africa or should the force be halted in preparation for a move to the Balkans? In the words of Mr Churchill: ‘Now the moment had come when the irrevocable decision must be taken whether or not to send the Army of the Nile to Greece. This grave step was required not only to help Greece in her peril and torment but to form against the impending German attack a Balkan Front comprising Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, with effects upon Soviet Russia which could not be measured by us…. It was not what we could send ourselves that could decide the Balkan issue. Our limited hope was to stir and organise united action. If at the wave of our wand Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey would all act together, it seemed to us that Hitler might either let the Balkans off for the time being or become so heavily engaged with our combined forces as to create a major front in that theatre. We did not then know that he was already deeply set upon his gigantic invasion of Russia. If we had we should have felt more confidence in the success of our policy. We should have seen that he risked falling between two stools, and might easily impair his supreme undertaking for the sake of a Balkan preliminary. This is what actually happened, but we could not know at the time.’

Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 83–4.

All that the Government could appreciate was the importance of arresting the movement of German forces into south and south-east Europe. It had been its desire ever since Churchill had made his report

See p. 86.

to Cabinet during the first week of the war, and now that Benghazi had been captured the Government was prepared to send all possible support to Greece. So on 12 February Wavell was told that his forces in Cyrenaica must be halted; his major effort had now to be in the Balkans; and if that was a failure Crete must be held ‘at all costs.’ The Middle East Command was to initiate such preparations as it could, including the assembly of ships for the movement of the maximum forces at the earliest possible moment. To obtain concerted action Mr Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, and Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, were to visit Cairo, study the situation and then go to Athens and Ankara.

These instructions forced General Wavell to search his rather bare cupboard to find a force to go to Greece. The best that he could do was to suggest a brigade from 2 Armoured Division, the Polish Brigade,

Because of Rommel's counter-attack in North Africa the Polish Brigade and 7 Australian Division were not sent to Greece.

6 and 7 Australian Divisions and the New Zealand Division.

On 17 February he told General Freyberg that his division would be the advanced guard of the Imperial Force.

See also F. L. W. Wood, The New Zealand People at War, Chap. 14.

The troops would disembark at either Piræus or Volos, move up to a defence line in Macedonia, and, when the Australians arrived, withdraw into Force Reserve for movement north to hold the Monastir Gap or possibly the front north-east of Salonika. And there the subject was closed, leaving Freyberg in a very difficult position. As he afterwards said: ‘The decision to go to Greece was taken on a level we could not touch…. I was never in a position to make a well informed and responsible judgment…. Wavell told me our Government agreed…. Wavell had established the right to deal direct

As Freyberg thought. Actually Eden - Churchill - Dominions Office-New Zealand Government was the line of communication.

with the New Zealand Government, without letting me know what was happening…. We should have cabled them.’

Freyberg to Kippenberger, 10 Sep 1956.

With General Blamey it was somewhat different. On being given his instructions on 18 February he suggested that the matter should be referred to the Australian Government. He was told that the proposal had already been discussed with Mr Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, who had just passed through Cairo on his way to London. General Wavell had found him ‘very ready to agree to what he suggested.’

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 59.

By then Mr Eden and General Dill were on their way to Cairo. The Foreign Secretary had to gather together all the threads and propose the best solution to the problems of the Middle East. His principal task was to initiate any action he thought fit for the swift relief of Greece, with whom it was ‘our duty to fight, and, if need be, suffer.’ His second task was to make both Turkey and Yugoslavia ‘fight at the same time or do the best they can.’ And his third was to arrange for military aid to Turkey since her interests were, in the long run, ‘no less important to us than those of Greece.’

Ibid., p. 61.

General Dill, as Chief of the General Staff, would give advice on military affairs and, if there was any difference of opinion, his views were to be given to the Government.

The delegates arrived in Cairo on 19 February where, almost immediately, Eden received a telegram from Churchill in which there was a rather cautious note: ‘Do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek enterprise if in your hearts you feel it will only be another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made please say so. But of course you know how valuable success would be.’

Ibid., p. 63.

The replies from Eden on 20–21 February stated that after discussions in Cairo it had been decided to offer the fullest possible support to Greece. The argument was that if Greece was not successfully supported Turkey might not fight—and that would mean that Yugoslavia might not fight. That being so, the only way to prevent Hitler's gradual absorption of these states and to build up a Balkan front was to help Greece with everything that was available. They all admitted that it was ‘a gamble to send forces to the mainland of Europe to fight Germans at this time. No one can give a guarantee of success, but when we discussed this matter in London we were prepared to run the risk of failure, thinking it better to suffer with the Greeks than to make no attempt to help them. That is the conviction we all hold here. Moreover, though the campaign is a daring venture, we are not without hope that it might succeed to the extent of halting the Germans before they overrun all Greece.’

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 65.

They might have to play the cards of their ‘evacuation strong suit’

Long, p. 9; Rich, Vol. I, p. 45. Cf. Churchill, Vol. III, p. 65, which says ‘to play trump cards’.

but the stakes were big, so big that intervention was safer than inactivity.

The forces available were not strong; at the very most Lustre Force

The code-name given to the proposed British force during the negotiations.

would have no more than three and a half divisions; and they could not all be deployed until mid-June. Moreover, there would be problems of supply which would tax the resources of the Navy and a weakness of air cover that could never be remedied. However, as a guarantee to the Greeks that Britain was sending her best, the commander would be General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, who had a high reputation after his recent successes in Libya. The Australian Corps and the New Zealand Division would both of them ‘be led by strong personalities who are also senior soldiers.’

Mr Eden, Generals Dill and Wavell, Air Chief Marshal Longmore and Captain R. M. Dick, RN, representing Admiral Cunningham, then went on 22 February to Athens to confer with the King of Greece, M. Koryzis and General Papagos. Before the conference the King insisted that Mr Eden should receive from M. Koryzis an appreciation

Two documents had been given to the British Minister earlier in the month; the third is summarised in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 66.

of the situation as it appeared to the Greeks. Greece was determined to continue the war against Italy and, if attacked by Germany, to resist with or without British assistance. But the Government was not certain that the available Greek and British forces were sufficiently strong to resist the enemy. The British were prepared to despatch two or three divisions but the minimum support, according to the late General Metaxas, must be ten divisions. Otherwise the appearance of a small British force would precipitate German intervention and discourage Turkey and Yugoslavia. Such being the case, no British troops should be despatched until Germany had entered Bulgaria. The problem for the conference was ‘what reinforcements should be sent to enable the Greek Army to resist the German.’

In the discussions which followed the British explained that their victories in North Africa had made it possible for them to offer considerable assistance.

Major-General Sir F. de Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 57, gives an account of how this assistance was described in the best possible light.

The Greeks welcomed the suggestion but emphasised the danger of precipitating German action and the need for the Allies to calculate whether their combined forces were, because of the dubious attitude of Turkey and Yugoslavia, strong enough to make an effective resistance. General Papagos explained that the choice of a defence line depended upon the policy of Yugoslavia. If she joined the Allies they could hold either the Metaxas or Strimon line, both

Metaxas line: forts from Mt Beles near the junction of the Greek, Yugoslav and Bulgarian frontiers to the Rupel Pass and east to the Mesta River—in all 100 miles. Strimon line: from Mt Beles to the Rupel Pass and south down the Strimon River to the sea—in all 70 miles.

of which covered the port of Salonika. If she did not the left flank would be open for a German advance through Bulgaria and down the Vardar valley.

The political appreciation at this stage was that Yugoslavia could not be counted on as an ally. Prince Paul had already declined a suggested visit by Mr Eden and the antagonism between Serb and Croat was such that if war was declared the latter would possibly support Germany. The only safe policy was to assume that Yugoslavia would remain neutral.

In that case the best policy for the Allies was to hold the Aliakmon line, which lay to the west of Salonika along the mountain barrier of Mount Olympus - Veroia - Edhessa - Kaimakchalan. The main danger would be the exposure of the left flank should the Germans invade Yugoslavia and approach the Monastir Gap, a natural avenue into northern Greece. There was every chance, however, that Yugoslavia would resist such violation of her neutrality so the military experts, remembering Serbian resistance in 1914–18 and the mountainous nature of the country, decided that the flank was reasonably safe. If the Germans did break through there would always be time to establish a line from Mount Olympus through Servia to the Greek positions in the west.

Time was all important, but General Papagos had already asked the Greek Government for permission to withdraw

In future discussions General Papagos stated that it had been permission to withdraw his troops ‘if necessary’. See p. 105.

his troops as soon as possible from Thrace and Macedonia. Once they had reached the Aliakmon line he could adjust his right flank in Albania and prepare for defensive action. The line was naturally strong and the thirty-five Greek battalions, with the British forces, as offered, should be able to hold it. Papagos had already said that he thought that eight divisions with one in reserve was the requirement and Dill agreed. Wavell and Dill now thought that the plan offered a reasonable chance of success but they were worried about the inevitable air superiority of the Germans, although quite definite that the movement of Imperial troops from Egypt to Greece should begin immediately.

The question then arose as to when the Greeks in Thrace and eastern Macedonia should be recalled to the Aliakmon line. From a military point of view their immediate withdrawal was the only answer. On the other hand, it might be a political error to abandon Macedonia because all contact would be lost with the Turks and Salonika would be left undefended. As the main supply line to Yugoslavia would be from that port, its Government might then decide not to join the Allies. Nevertheless the outcome of the discussion, so far as the British understood it, was that the Greeks would immediately withdraw. And because of the doubtful attitude of some Yugoslav ministers there was to be no official statement to that country, otherwise the Germans might be told of the British expedition. Mr Eden was to approach Prince Paul, the Regent of Yugoslavia, pointing out the likelihood of Germany attacking Greece and asking him for his opinion on the subject of Yugoslav intervention. Before the conference broke up in the early hours of 23 February, M. Koryzis, at Eden's request, stated formally that the Greek Government accepted with deep gratitude the offer of assistance made by the British Government, and that the military plan was completely acceptable.

The authorities in London accepted these decisions. The Chiefs of Staff saw the possibilities of the campaign in the Balkans but thought that the risks were great. On the other hand, the desertion of a minor ally already fighting one enemy and determined to fight another would be a major political error. Moreover it was a sound move to have the Germans fight for what they wanted rather than to grant them a victory by default. In the War Cabinet Churchill pointed out that the men on the spot had not been forced to support the venture. Eden had already been warned

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 63.

that there

Trentham Camp, 1939

First Echelon recruits at Hopu Hopu receive their web equipment

Visitors' Day, Trentham, before the departure of the First Echelon in January 1940

Second Echelon farewell parade at the Auckland Domain, April 1940. A small Navy contingent sailed with this echelon

First Echelon troops on board the Dunera, Lyttelton, 5 January 1940

Railway Construction sappers board the Andes at Lytelton, 1 May 1940

Submarine lookout, Mauretania

First Echelon and AIF convoy in the Indian Ocean, January 1940. The ships are: Nearest line (from left), Otranto, Sobieski; second line, Strathnaver, Strathaird; third line, Orion, Orford, Dunera; fourth line, Empress of Canada, Empress of Japan; fifth line, Orcades, Rangitata; at rear, an escorting cruiser

Mess-deck

General Freyberg welcomes the First Echelon at Port Tewfik, 12 February 1940. General Wavell (carrying cane) is behind him and to his left are Mr Anthony Eden and Sir Miles Lampson

20 Battalion arrives at Maadi Camp, Februay 1940

Battalion lines, Maadi

Second Echelon disembarks at Gourock

Mytchett Place, Headquarters of 2 NZEF in the United Kingdom

Mr Churchill takes the salute from D Company of the Maori Battalion

Loading spruce. New Zealand Forestry Group in the United Kingdom was not to be another Norwegian fiasco; General Wavell had naturally been eager to complete his North African campaign; and General Dill had, hitherto, been doubtful about the chances of a Greek campaign. Now they were all in favour of it. Churchill himself thought that the relief of Greece might convince Yugoslavia and Turkey and impress the United States. In the discussion which followed this statement Mr Menzies, who was present, wanted reassurances about shipping and equipment. The venture had to be more than a forlorn hope; he had to be able to tell his cabinet in Australia that there was a reasonable chance of success. Churchill thought that the expedition could hardly be avoided. ‘If we should be pressed back, our troops might well have to be evacuated’,

British Historical Section, Cabinet Office.

but the majority of them could be brought back to Egypt. The only serious loss could be one of equipment. In the end the War Cabinet gave its unanimous approval, with one important reservation: the Governments of Australia and New Zealand had to agree before their divisions were employed. Churchill on 24 February advised Eden that there was ‘No need anticipate difficulties in either quarter.’ ‘Therefore’, he continued, ‘while being under no illusions, we all send you the order “Full steam ahead”.’

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 69.

But this was perhaps too confident a statement.

New Zealand Division to go to Greece

In New Zealand there was a certain amount of confusion. On three previous occasions

Conferences with Major-General Sir John Duigan, Chief of the New Zealand General Staff, who was in the Middle East, 28 November. Cable to Minister of Defence, 2 Dec 1940, Documents, Vol. I, pp. 200–1. Cable to Chief of the General Staff, 13 Jan 1941, Documents, Vol. I, pp. 204–5.

General Freyberg had mentioned Greece as a possible theatre of war, and on 23 February, the very day General Wavell returned from Athens, he had, without mentioning Greece, given the New Zealand Government ‘an appreciation of the situation and our likely role and fitness for it.’ As soon as 5 Brigade had arrived from Britain, been refitted and hardened up, the Division could take the field. ‘Therefore, I feel that should the British Government request the release of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force for a full operational role the New Zealand Government can now do so with confidence.’

Ibid., pp. 206–7.

The result was that when a cable

Ibid., pp. 241–2.

was received from Britain on 26 February stating that the despatch of the Division was an essential part of the plan to assist Greece and that Mr Menzies was advising his Government to permit the use of the Australian divisions, the Government naturally assumed that General Freyberg had been consulted; in fact his words, ‘full operational role’, were repeated in the cable which gave its consent. Had the Government not made this assumption it would certainly have asked for his opinion, and had there been no reference to the acceptance of the plan by Menzies a more detailed statement would have been asked for.

After the receipt of another cable

Documents, Vol. I, pp. 242–3. Cables No. 335 and 336 had been sent to New Zealand on 25 February but the consent of the New Zealand Government had been given before the more detailed statement of No. 335 had been received.

with reasons and plans for the expedition the Government was more critical and less confident. Thinking that the force was small and anxious about its chances of being reinforced, it asked if these features had been given full consideration. It was told that the plan was not without hazard, but the general tone of the reply

Ibid., pp. 245–6, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand, 2 Mar 1941.

was surprisingly confident, even though it was known that Greece was now feeling the strain

See p. 151.

and that Turkey had not changed her attitude. Indeed, Mr Eden, who had been in Ankara with General Dill during 26 February–1 March, had already informed

Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 85–6: Eden to Prime Minister, 28 Feb 1941.

Mr Churchill that, unless the Turks were deliberately attacked, their inadequate resources would force them to remain neutral.

1 Australian Corps to go to Greece

The Government in Australia had more detailed information than the Government of New Zealand. On 25 February Mr Menzies sent a cable to Mr Fadden, the acting Prime Minister, with a summary of the plan and the note that most people were in favour of it, the argument being that Wavell and Dill were ‘able and cautious’ men whose advice must be respected.

Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 15.

Churchill had also said that if Japan attacked them ‘adequate naval reinforcements would at once be dispatched to Australian waters.’

Ibid.

This was a statement which Menzies was inclined to discount. The risks were very apparent and a forced evacuation was quite possible, but his final opinion was that Australia should agree to the expedition.

The War Cabinet in Australia, though worried about the size of the expedition and the problem of supplies, eventually agreed that 6 and 7 Divisions should go to Greece. But it made one interesting proviso—its consent was ‘conditional on plans having been completed beforehand to ensure that evacuation, if necessitated, will be successfully undertaken and that shipping and other essential services will be available for this purpose if required.’

See Documents, Vol. I, p. 243, note 1, cable of 28 February sent to the British Government, repeated to the New Zealand Government.

The Misunderstanding about the Aliakmon Line

At this point the difficulties of Mr Eden were increasing. Having failed to persuade the Turks to enter the war he had now, on the instructions of Mr Churchill, to make his main appeal to Yugoslavia. An attack by her upon the Italian flank in Albania would produce a ‘disaster of the first magnitude, possibly decisive on whole Balkan situation.’ If Turkey declared war at the same time the effect would be incalculable. ‘I am absolutely ready,’ said Churchill, ‘to go in on a serious hazard if there is reasonable chance of success.’

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 86.

At the moment, however, it was very difficult to decide just what these chances were. The Government of Yugoslavia had long since declared that any aggression would be resisted and that the movement of foreign troops through the country would be refused. But it had never declared what its attitude would be if the German forces in Rumania began to cross the Danube into Bulgaria.

On 1 March this question was answered. The crossing began, there were no protests from Yugoslavia and the Germans were free to approach the borders of Greece. Next day Mr Eden and General Dill returned from Turkey to Athens, where the British Minister from Belgrade was waiting to explain the hesitant attitude of Yugoslavia. He was sent back to the Regent with a verbal message pointing out that as Britain had decided to help Greece it was also possible for her to assist Yugoslavia.

Still more disturbing was the fact that General Papagos had not withdrawn to the Aliakmon line any units from Thrace, eastern Macedonia and Albania. After the conference at Athens the British had thought that they and the Greeks would immediately begin to occupy the Aliakmon line without waiting to hear what Yugoslavia had decided to do. General Papagos, however, had understood

General Alexander Papagos, The German Attack on Greece: ‘It is natural that General Papagos should desire it to be quite clear to British readers that the said change of plan was due not to any obscure political reasons, but to the delay in receiving an answer from the Yugoslav Government clarifying their intentions.’ (from Preface) Eden, Dill and Wavell had understood that there would be an immediate withdrawal; de Guingand, who was present, thought that the move would be made ‘as early as possible’ (Operation Victory, p. 58). For the political problem see p. 115, note 1.

that he could wait until a reply was received from Yugoslavia. He had done so but it was now too late. For should he order a withdrawal there would be despair among the Greek people of Macedonia and every chance of his troops being caught during the withdrawal. He therefore proposed to hold the Metaxas line and not to withdraw any of his divisions from Albania. The British on their arrival would have to move up piecemeal to the Macedonian front. This was so entirely different from the original plan, and strategically so unsound, that Sir John Dill would not accept it. General Wavell was called over from Egypt and a series of anxious discussions then took place.

To General Dill it appeared hopeless for the Greeks to attempt to hold the Metaxas line with three divisions when they knew that it would require nine. Nor was he any more confident when Papagos thought that four divisions might be found for the task. The transportation of British troops to Salonika would be too dangerous; the three or four Greek divisions would be overwhelmed before the British arrived; and even if they did get there in time resistance would be hopeless. So, while admitting the difficulty of the situation and praising Greek valour in Albania, he stated, very firmly, that he was not going to throw away the only British reserves in the Middle East.

If risks had to be taken in the Balkans they would be taken along the Aliakmon line. Nine divisions had once been considered necessary for its defence but he was now prepared to carry on if three Greek divisions could be assembled to support the three and a half British divisions. The transfer of troops from Albania would have simplified the task, but Papagos thought that the morale of his force would decline and that any move would be too late. The national pride of the Greeks was such that they would not withdraw from the Italian front, even if it meant a stab in the back from the Germans. In his opinion the situation had no solution, for Germany had the initiative in the Balkans. Nevertheless he offered to provide seven or eight battalions for the Aliakmon line, but Dill and Eden, remembering the original plan for thirty-five Greek battalions,

See p. 102.

wanted a better military proposition.

After further study another conference was held, this time in the presence of the King, for the attitude of Papagos had hitherto been ‘unaccommodating and defeatist.’

Documents, Vol. I, pp. 247–9: Eden and Dill to Churchill, 4 Mar 1941.

Dill once again stated that he would not send troops to the Metaxas line; the Aliakmon line gave the Germans another 100 miles to advance, was difficult to approach, was shorter and naturally stronger. Papagos still did not favour any dispersal of his forces, but he finally offered to provide three divisions and seven battalions—in all about twenty battalions.

The British now had to make one of three decisions. They could accept the Greek plans for the Metaxas line, which were hopeless; they could leave the Greeks to their fate, but that was politically impossible and dangerous to the safety of the Royal Air Force and those supporting units already in Greece; or they could defend the Aliakmon line, supported by twenty Greek battalions instead of the thirty-five they had been promised at the earlier conference. With considerable misgivings, the third plan was accepted shortly after midnight on 4 March. The command and organisation of the Aliakmon line was to be the responsibility of General Wilson; the overall command was to be retained by General Papagos who, once the decision had been made, was confident and determined.

So far as the army was concerned the Aliakmon line was not altogether hopeless; at the worst there could always be a fighting withdrawal ‘through country eminently suitable for rearguard action.’

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 88.

No reference was made to the other services, but Admiral Cunningham that same day informed the Admiralty that the only possible decision had been made, although it meant that great risks would have to be taken. The convoys and the ports of disembarkation would have insufficient air cover; one convoy would be sent to Malta but, apart from that, the fleet for the next two months or more would be concerned with the movement of troops to Greece. This meant less protection for the supply line to Tobruk and no attempt, as yet, to capture the island of Rhodes.

The expedition was thus hazardous from every angle, but those on the spot were certain that the abandonment of Greece would in the end be more costly. A year later, after the fall of Singapore and when the occupation of Java by an Australian corps was suggested, Wavell informed Churchill that had the terms been reasonable he would have unhesitatingly recommended that risks be taken as he had done in the matter of aid to Greece. ‘I thought then that we had good fighting chance of checking German invasion, and in spite of results still consider risk was justifiable.’

Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 125.

Nearly ten years later he was of the same opinion and explained the situation as he saw it: ‘I think that it may have been psychological and political considerations that tilted the balance in the end over the military dangers. To have withdrawn at this stage, on grounds which could not have been made public, would have been disastrous to our reputation in the U.S.A. and with other neutrals, would have ended all hope of Yugoslavia joining the Allies and would have shaken our ally Turkey. Our plan had been endorsed

This was hardly correct. See pp. 103–5.

by the Dominion Governments whose troops were involved. And there were political difficulties in any reversal of plan; the troops were on the move and a change would have caused confusion.

‘I was sure at the time, and I am sure still, in spite of what resulted, that the decision we took at our Embassy in Athens in that first week in March, 1941, was the only one consistent with the political requirements of the moment, with military strategy and with our national honour.’

Field Marshal Earl Wavell, ‘The British Expedition to Greece, 1941’, Army Quarterly, January 1950.

The authorities outside the Mediterranean area had still to be convinced of the wisdom of this decision. The Chiefs of Staff in Britain pointed out that the hazards of the operation had increased considerably. The Greeks were too heavily involved in Albania; the force might not be able to reach the Aliakmon line in time to halt the German advance. The Navy was worried about the safety of convoys, the air defences of the ports in Greece and the blocking of the Suez Canal by mines.

The two Dominions concerned, particularly Australia, were not happy about the decision. With Mr Menzies attending the War Cabinet, the Australian Government was receiving a detailed analysis of the situation in the Middle East. The British raid on the island of Castelorizzo had failed, German aircraft were operating over Cyrenaica and German armour was said to be in Tripoli. The Australians felt it necessary to point out that, although Australia was not afraid to take ‘a great risk in a good cause’,

Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 17.

the delegation had signed a written agreement with the Greeks; they doubted whether a minister not authorised by them could make a binding agreement

The accepted version in French of the discussions of 4 March was signed by Generals Dill and Papagos.

which substantially modified a proposal already accepted by them.

This forced Mr Churchill to reconsider the whole enterprise. On 6 March he sent Mr Eden, who was now back in Cairo, a most prudent despatch with the warning that he might expect an adverse decision from the War Cabinet. The delegation had done its best to create a Balkan front and, having failed, must leave the Greeks free to make their own choice. In any case the loss of Greece and the Balkans was not a major catastrophe so long as Turkey remained genuinely neutral. Moreover, grave Imperial issues were ‘raised by committing New Zealand and Australian troops to an enterprise which, as you say, has become even more hazardous.’

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 90.

The Dominions had been given all the information but he could not forecast their agreement to the operation, as now proposed.

In the next cable Eden received an admirable analysis

Documents, Vol. I, pp. 253–5.

of the problem that had been prepared by the Chiefs of Staff in Britain. The attitude of General Papagos was bound to react unfavourably upon the fighting spirit of his army and the failure of the Greeks to withdraw to the Aliakmon line was most serious. The British had expected that some Greek troops could be transferred from Albania to this line, but Papagos now reported that his army was ‘exhausted and outnumbered.’ With enemy aircraft operating from the island of Rhodes, some of the Royal Air Force would have to be used to protect the sea route to Greece. The mining of the Suez Canal was another serious problem. And if the German thrust from Bulgaria was unchecked it was possible that the attack might open with two German divisions attacking one armoured brigade and one New Zealand infantry brigade. Their conclusion was that the hazards of the enterprise had considerably increased. But, in spite of their misgivings, they felt that they were not as yet in a position to question ‘the military advice of those on the spot’ who had described the position as not by any means hopeless.

These two statements, the first from the once hopeful Mr Churchill and the second from the ever cautious Chiefs of Staff, mark a new stage in the negotiations. In future there were to be fewer references to a Balkan front and more emphasis upon the moral aspects of the problem.

The British Minister in Athens, Sir Michael Palairet, was most distressed by the suggestion that the agreement between Britain and Greece need not be kept. The Greeks had decided to fight Germany, alone if necessary. ‘We shall be pilloried

Churchill, Vol. III, p. 91: Palairet to Eden, 6 Mar 1941. The same point was made by General Smuts at the conference held that night in Cairo.

by the Greeks and the world in general as going back on our word.’ The King of Greece was still confident of Allied success and General Wilson had been greatly encouraged by the marked improvement in the attitude of General Papagos, who was now most hopeful and anxious to co-operate.

At 5 p.m. on 6 March Mr Eden, Sir John Dill and the three commanders-in-chief met in Cairo. They were worried by the evident reluctance of the Dominions to tempt fortune with their divisions, but General Wavell reassured them. He had not yet seen General Blamey but he had informed General Freyberg of the new situation. ‘General Freyberg though he realises the added difficulties was not perturbed and was prepared to go ahead.

Actually Freyberg had been informed rather than consulted, had told Wavell that he had no illusions about the difficulties ahead, and had been told once again that the New Zealand Government was prepared to engage in the venture.—Freyberg to Kippenberger, 10 Sep 1956.

He had made no suggestion that his Government might be unwilling to go ahead.’

British Historical Section, Cabinet Office.

In any case, the Foreign Secretary and the three commanders-in- chief still thought that an expedition must be sent to Greece. Eden argued that a withdrawal at this stage would remove, once and for all, any chance of bringing Yugoslavia into the war and might have incalculable effects upon the Turkish position. Air Chief Marshal Longmore doubted whether the Royal Air Force could hold the Luftwaffe in Greece but he still thought that assistance must be given. Admiral Cunningham was anxious about air attacks on his convoys at sea and in the ports of disembarkation, but he too agreed that the decision they had made in Athens was the only possible one.

The military authorities were more confident. Sir John Dill admitted that the situation was worse than they had originally considered it but thought that if the British reached the Aliakmon line before the Germans there was a reasonable chance of holding it. Should the Germans get there first, he thought it possible to withdraw without great loss. General Wavell was convinced that the expedition should be sent; success offered such chances that the course of the war could be changed.

Major-General R. J. Collins, Lord Wavell, Appx VII: The Pros and Cons of Intervention in Greece.

Eden then suggested that a resolute note be sent to Churchill stating that they thought, in spite of the risks involved, that their decision to send the expedition had been correct.

Their firm attitude impressed Mr Churchill but he made it quite clear that he was not going to support any hazardous scheme just because it was his moral duty to do so. They were reminded

Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 92–3.

that the Greeks must not be urged against their better judgment to a hopeless struggle. If, however, they were determined, aided or unaided, to fight it out to the end, then their ordeal must be shared. He also pointed out, obviously because of Mr Menzies' suggestions, that the Dominions had to be told that the hazardous venture was being undertaken, not because of the agreement signed in Athens but because the commanders saw ‘a reasonable fighting chance.’ So far there had been too many references to moral obligations; a precise military appreciation was now indispensable.

In Cairo at 10.15 p.m. the subject was again discussed, this time in the presence of General Smuts, an international statesman who had long since learnt that military and political action must go hand in hand. He realised that everything depended upon the divisions' being able to reach the Aliakmon line in time to halt the German advanced guard but, like the others, he failed to see how the expedition could now be held back. The Greeks had been so successful in Albania that any failure to assist them would leave Britain discredited before the world. Some might argue that a German victory in the Balkans would almost wreck the cause but, in his opinion, the damage would be greater if Britain stood aside and did nothing. Nevertheless, as Australia and New Zealand were to provide the greater proportion of the fighting troops, there could be repercussions if things went wrong.

General Wavell then reported that since the meeting at 5 p.m. he had seen General Blamey and told him of the increased risks which might now have to be taken. He, like General Freyberg,

See p. 99.

had not expressed any wish to withdraw. At the suggestion of Mr Eden a note about the determined attitude of the Dominion commanders was immediately cabled to the War Office. The discussion then swung back to the ground already covered that afternoon, with Eden, Dill and Wavell still convinced that the expedition should be sent, and Longmore and Cunningham certain that they should not turn back but doubtful of their ability to give adequate support.

On 7 March the decisions of this second conference were received by Churchill. The envoys had seen no reason to reverse their previous judgment. They pointed out that there had been no attempt to persuade Greece ‘against her better judgment.’ Britain had already been giving assistance to Greece. Squadrons of the Royal Air Force, ground defences and anti-aircraft guns had been in action there for several months. ‘Collapse of Greece without further effort on our part to save her by intervention on land, after the Libyan victories had, as all the world knows, made forces available, would be the greatest calamity. Yugoslavia would then certainly be lost; nor can we feel confident that even Turkey would have the strength to remain steadfast if the Germans and Italians were established in Greece without effort on our part to resist them. No doubt our prestige will suffer if we are ignominiously ejected, but in any event to have fought and suffered in Greece would be less damaging to us than to have left Greece to her fate….’ They trusted that the Dominion troops could be used in Greece and emphasised the fact that, if the Royal Air Force was adequately reinforced, ‘most of the dangers and difficulties of this enterprise will disappear.’

Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 93–4.

In this statement Mr Churchill was not given that military appreciation which he had described as indispensable. Time may have prevented its preparation but, even so, it was most unusual for the War Cabinet to be left without a joint and detailed appreciation from the three services. Nor was anything said about a Balkan front. Emphasis was now given to the moral and political importance of a campaign in Greece. In fact Admiral Cunningham, when writing of this last meeting, has said: ‘I gave it as my opinion that though politically we were correct, I had grave uncertainty of its military expedience. Dill himself had doubts, and said to me after the meeting: “Well, we've taken the decision. I'm not at all sure it's the right one.”’

Admiral of the Fleet Viscoun Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, p. 315.

Their unanimity is therefore all the more remarkable. Apparently they realised that every opportunity must be seized, that the Balkans could not be abandoned without a struggle, that the good will of Russia and the United States was worth cultivating,

Hitler had similar views. Dönitz afterwards reported that U-boat activities off Halifax were restricted because Hitler wished ‘to avoid every possibility of friction with the United States.’ N.D., Vol. XIII, p. 265. See also ‘The Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–1945’, published in Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948, and F. H. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy.

and that there was always the Navy and the chances of a successful evacuation.

The urgency of the situation had, as it happened, forced the War Cabinet to make its decision before the receipt of this last appreciation. With Menzies present, it had decided that because of the consistent attitude of General Dill, the commanders-in-chief on the spot, and ‘the commanders of the forces to be employed’,

Two cables had been sent to London on 6 March, one giving the decision of the first conference (see p. 110), the other stating that Generals Blamey and Freyberg had been consulted (see p. 111).

Eden should be authorised to proceed with the operation, the War Cabinet having accepted full responsibility and arranged to communicate with the Dominion Governments. In one way this was a surprising decision for no detailed military appreciation had been received. On the other hand, the definite attitude of the once hesitant commanders-in-chief was very convincing and the Government itself was anxious to support Greece if it was administratively possible.

The New Zealand Government Makes its Decision

The exact orders for the departure of the first flight of Lustre Force cannot be found but the fact is that the ships were already on their way to Greece.

This refers to troops. Supplies and motor transport had been in earlier convoys. For most units, transport was at Piraeus when the troop disembarked.

They had left Alexandria at noon on 6 March, before Mr Eden and his advisers held their afternoon and evening conferences, one day before the War Cabinet in Britain finally decided to send the expedition, and two days before the New Zealand Government agreed to the proposed course of action.

The reply from New Zealand was sent on 9 March after a long sitting of the War Cabinet in Wellington. The Government realised that the operation, always dangerous and speculative, was now distinctly hazardous. The margin was narrow and the risks considerable, so, remembering Norway and Dunkirk, the Government prepared its own analysis

Documents, Vol. I, pp. 257–8.

of the problem. In the first paragraph it was clearly stated that the formation of a Balkan front was no longer the dominant reason for the expedition: ‘There seems to be little prospect of Yugoslav or Turkish assistance, and consequently the possibility of such assistance should be disregarded entirely as a factor in the consideration of the matter.’

After listing all possible dangers, the Government made this memorable statement:

Nevertheless, having regard to all these considerations, His Majesty's Government in New Zealand look upon the first and last of the alternatives set out in the fifth paragraph of the Secretary of State's telegram as completely unacceptable. In particular they cannot contemplate the possibility of abandoning the Greeks to their fate, especially after the heroic resistance with which they have met the Italian invader. To do so would be to destroy the moral basis of our cause and invite results greater in their potential damage to us than any failure of the contemplated operation. Therefore, in the circumstances, they find themselves in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as now approved by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom—a decision which they consider to have been correct in a most difficult situation.

His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, with a full knowledge of the hazards to be run, align themselves with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and agree with the course now proposed. They are confident that New Zealand troops in this dangerous enter