The Royal New Zealand Navy

Part 1 Royal New Zealand Navy

Chapter 1 Genesis of Royal New Zealand Navy

NEW ZEALAND is rich in naval traditions that reach back for nearly two centuries. On his first voyage to the Pacific in 1769–70 Captain Cook, RN, in HMS Endeavour, circumnavigated these islands and disproved the belief that the country was part of a fabulous Terra Australis. Seventy years later came Captain William Hobson, RN, whose treaty with the Maoris, signed at Waitangi in February 1840, established British sovereignty in New Zealand. That sovereignty was affirmed in the South Island six months later when Captain Owen Stanley of HMS Britomart hoisted the Union flag at Akaroa. Hobson was New Zealand's first Governor and was succeeded in September 1842 by Captain Robert Fitzroy, RN. In 1848 came Captain J. L. Stokes in HMS Acheron and Commander Byron Drury in HMS Pandora on the first detailed survey of New Zealand's coasts and harbours.

In those times New Zealand and Australia were included in the vast East Indies and China Command of the Royal Navy established in 1816. Even more extensive was the contiguous Pacific Command, established in 1819 under Commodore Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, who was Nelson's flag captain at Trafalgar. From the eighteen-twenties onward ships of the East Indies Command made occasional visits to New Zealand to show the flag and enforce some semblance of law and order at the Bay of Islands. The Australian Station, which included New Zealand and many of the South Sea Islands, was established as a separate command in March 1859. Ships of the Royal Navy played a notable part in the Maori Wars, especially in the eighteen-sixties when a flotilla of gunboats operated on the Waikato River and landing parties took part in combined operations elsewhere.

See Appendix I.

Two of the earliest naval Victoria Crosses were won in the fighting of 1860 and 1864.

The Russian ‘war scare’ of 1885 first compelled serious attention to the defences of New Zealand. During the next four years much money was spent on forts and other coastal defences, including submarine mining equipment and two small steamers to handle it.

These vessels were the Ellen Ballance and Janie Seddon.

Four second-class torpedo-boats built in England (the first two arrived in 1887) were allocated to the four main ports.

The torpedo-boats, built by Thorneycrofts, were 170 feet in length and had a fair turn of speed. They were fitted with ‘dropping gear’ to discharge their small torpedoes which had a maximum range of 400 to 500 yards at 15 knots.

These little vessels, as well as the mining organisation, were controlled and operated by the military authorities. In addition to twelve batteries of garrison artillery in the various coastal centres from Auckland to Invercargill, the New Zealand Naval Volunteer Artillery corps was formed to man the coastal batteries in the forts at the four main ports and at several secondary ports.

Popularly known as the ‘Navals’, the officers and men wore uniforms of naval pattern, and ranks and ratings were given naval designations. The volunteer ratings were mainly watersiders and other port workers, and nearly all had seafaring experience. The New Zealand Naval Volunteer Artillery, which was remarkable for its esprit de corps, was disbanded in 1911–12 when the Territorial Forces scheme came into effect.

The problem of naval defence received much attention in Australia and New Zealand during those years. The New Zealand Premier (Sir Robert Stout) in correspondence with Rear-Admiral Tryon, Commander-in-Chief Australian Station, informed him that ‘my Government feel aggrieved that New Zealand should be without direct protection from the Australasian Squadron. …’ The Agent-General in London was instructed to negotiate with the Admiralty for a first-class cruiser to be stationed in New Zealand waters. The vessel was to ‘remain an ordinary Queen's ship’ but her disposition was to be ‘controlled by the Governor on the advice of his Ministers.’ Nothing came of this scheme, but at a conference of colonial premiers in London in 1887 an agreement was concluded for the better protection of seaborne trade in Australian and New Zealand waters. In addition to the existing squadron, an auxiliary force of five third-class cruisers and two torpedo-gunboats was to be provided by Britain, the Australian colonies and New Zealand paying interest on the cost of building and sharing the cost of maintenance of these ships. Two ships were to be stationed in New Zealand waters. New Zealand's part in this scheme was set out in the Australasian Naval Defence Act 1887, her proportional share of the cost being £20,000 a year for ten years. The five cruisers of the auxiliary force were the Katoomba, Mildura, Ringarooma, Wallaroo, and Tauranga. Successive flagships on the Australian Station from the eighteen-eighties to 1913 were the Nelson, Orlando, Royal Arthur, Euryalus, and Powerful.

An event that was to have an important bearing on New Zealand naval policy in later years was the official opening (in which the Australian squadron took a major part) on 16 February 1888 of the Calliope graving dock constructed by the Auckland Harbour Board at Calliope Point on the Devonport shore. In 1892 the Admiralty acquired from the Harbour Board about four acres of reclaimed land adjacent to the dock.

At the Imperial Conference of 1902 a new naval agreement was reached whereby the Admiralty undertook to maintain an Australian squadron of one armoured cruiser, two second-class cruisers, four third-class cruisers and four sloops,

Australian Squadron, 1904: Euryalus, armoured cruiser, 12,500 tons; two 9.2-inch, twelve 6-inch guns; 21 knots. Challenger, second-class cruiser, 5880 tons; eleven 6-inch guns; 20 knots. Cambrian, second-class cruiser, 4360 tons; two 6-inch, eight 4.7-inch guns; 19 ½ knots. Pegasus, Pioneer, Prometheus, Psyche, and Pyramus, third-class cruisers, 2200 tons; eight 4-inch guns; 19 knots. The Powerful (14,500 tons; two 9.2-inch, sixteen 6-inch guns) later replaced the Euryalus and in 1907 the Encounter (sister to Challenger) joined the squadron.

to be employed in time of war anywhere within the bounds of the Australia, China, and East Indies stations. The cost of the squadron was to be shared in the proportions of Britain one-half, Australia five-twelfths, and New Zealand one-twelfth, with the proviso that the Australian payment should not exceed £200,000 a year and that of New Zealand £40,000 a year. This contribution was authorised in New Zealand by the Australian and New Zealand Defence Act 1903. Provision was also made for recruiting seamen to serve in one of the small cruisers, and two annual nominations for cadetships in the Royal Navy were allotted to New Zealand.

Hitherto British naval policy had proceeded on the basis of the two-Power standard, namely, an adequate superiority over the next two strongest Powers, in those days France and Russia. The addition of a third European fleet more powerful than either of these two would profoundly affect the security of the British Empire. In 1901 an alliance between Britain and Japan was signed. In 1902 the British Government embarked upon the policy of settling its differences with France. The military and naval defeat of Russia by Japan produced profound changes in the European situation. Germany felt herself enormously strengthened by the Russian collapse, and her self-assertion in many spheres became pronounced.

Following the Imperial Conference of 1907 at which Australia announced her intention to proceed with the development of her own Navy, New Zealand offered to increase her contribution to the Royal Navy to £100,000 a year for ten years from May 1909. This decision was implemented by the Naval Subsidy Act 1908.

At that time the increasing tensions in Europe and the rapid growth of the German Fleet were causing great uneasiness. The British naval estimates presented on 16 March 1909 were stepped up to provide for the building of eight battleships instead of four. Six days later the New Zealand Government, on the initiative of the Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, made its offer to defray the cost of the immediate building of one first-class battleship and, if necessary, a second ship. This offer was accepted by the British Government with ‘gratitude and appreciation.’ The Naval Defence Act 1909 authorised the borrowing of £2,000,000 to pay the cost of one ship. This was HMS New Zealand,

HMS New Zealand, battle-cruiser, 18,000 tons; eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch guns; two torpedo-tubes; 26 knots. She visited New Zealand in April–June 1913 in the course of a world cruise.

which was laid down in June 1910, launched in July 1911, and commissioned in November 1912.

At a conference in London in July 1909 to discuss the problem of Imperial defence it was agreed that there should be a Pacific Fleet, consisting of the Australian unit, an East Indies unit and a China unit, with HMS New Zealand as its flagship. Part of the China unit was to be stationed in New Zealand waters, the ships to be manned as far as possible by New Zealanders. Australia went ahead with the development of her own unit, which by 1914 consisted of the battle-cruiser Australia, three light cruisers, three destroyers, and two submarines.

The march of events in Europe and the extraordinary increase in the German Fleet provided for by the Navy Law of 1912 compelled the concentration of British naval strength in Home waters and precluded the formation of the proposed Pacific Fleet. The New Zealand joined the battle-cruiser force of the Grand Fleet, in which she served throughout the war of 1914–18 and took part in the actions of Heligoland Bight (28 August 1914), Dogger Bank (15 January 1915), and Jutland (31 May 1916).

In 1913 Mr (later Sir) James Allen, Minister of Defence in the Massey Ministry, attended the Imperial Conference in London at which the problem of naval defence was again discussed. The Admiralty preferred that New Zealand should continue her annual subsidy, but finally agreed to a plan for the establishment of the New Zealand Naval Forces. In a letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr Winston Churchill), Allen said he was guided by the principle of using national sentiment and local patriotism to give the people of New Zealand a personal interest in naval defence which could not be created by the payment of subsidies.

Accordingly, it was decided that New Zealand should train her own men and that the Admiralty should lend her a seagoing training ship (HMS Philomel) and the necessary complement of officers and ratings. The ship would be under the administration of the New Zealand Government and at the disposal of the Admiralty if needed. It was also arranged that the Admiralty would station in New Zealand waters two small cruisers (Psyche and Pyramus) which had formed part of the Australian Squadron.

The Naval Defence Act 1913 authorised the establishment of the New Zealand Naval Forces. They were to be enlisted and maintained on a voluntary basis and required to serve either within or beyond the limits of New Zealand. The strategic principle of unified control of the naval forces of the Empire was accepted by the provision that, in the event of hostilities, the New Zealand Naval Forces passed to Admiralty control for the duration of the war. The Act also provided for the establishment of a New Zealand branch of the Royal Naval Reserve.

HMS Philomel was commissioned at Wellington on 15 July 1914 by Captain Hall-Thompson, RN,

Admiral P. H. Hall-Thompson, CB, CMG; Naval Adviser, NZ, 1914–19; First Naval Member, Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, 1923–26; Vice-Admiral commanding Third Battle Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, 1927–28; commanded Reserve Fleet, 1929–30; retired 1932.

who had been appointed Naval Adviser to the New Zealand Government. The old cruiser was manned for the most part by officers and ratings of the Royal Navy who had volunteered for service in New Zealand. It was proposed to enter sixty or seventy New Zealand boys to complete her complement. She sailed with her first entry of recruits at the end of July on a ‘shake-down’ cruise but was recalled to Wellington on the eve of the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914.

A few days later the Philomel, in company with the Psyche and Pyramus, sailed from Auckland escorting two transports carrying the troops who occupied German Samoa on 30 August. The three little cruisers left Wellington on 16 October as part of the escort for the convoy of ten transports carrying the Main Body of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force for Egypt. From January 1915 the Philomel spent some months patrolling the Gulf of Alexandretta in the eastern Mediterranean. Several landings were made, and in one clash with the Turks the Philomel's casualties were three killed and three wounded, one being the first New Zealander killed in the war. The Philomel took part in the defence of the Suez Canal, in operations in the Gulf of Aden, and in patrols in the Persian Gulf. She returned to Wellington in April 1917 and was paid off.

In August 1919 Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe arrived in the Dominion in HMS New Zealand in the course of a world tour to investigate and report on the problems of the naval defence of the Empire. His report dealing with the defence of New Zealand was an exhaustive and remarkably prescient survey in three volumes.

He pointed out that it was not possible to consider the naval requirements of New Zealand without taking account also of the naval requirements of the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a whole. The total naval forces required for the Far East were on a considerable scale and no reasonable measure of defence could be given by a smaller force. The Home and Far Eastern theatres were so far apart that correct strategy demanded adequate strength in both quarters.

There were elements of great friction between Japanese policy and the interests of the British Commonwealth, and it was almost inevitable that their interests would ultimately clash. Nothing less than equality in modern capital ships could be relied upon to give security in the future against war with Japan, and those ships should be close at hand. The first objective of Japanese strategy undoubtedly would be an attack on British naval bases, and it was clear that such an operation could at the present time be carried out with comparative ease.

The relative naval strengths of the British Commonwealth and Japan in the Far East in 1919 were broadly similar to those in December 1941.

The importance of safeguarding those vital strategic centres was obvious.

Advocating the establishment of an Eastern Fleet, Jellicoe emphasised that its strength in capital ships should not be less than, and as powerful individually as, the Japanese Fleet. The report apportioned the cost of provision and maintenance of such an Eastern Fleet at Great Britain 75 per cent, Australia 20 per cent, New Zealand 5 per cent. It was suggested that New Zealand should maintain as her part of the Fleet three light cruisers, six submarines and a depot ship, and a naval air school — the ships to be provided initially by Great Britain but replaced when obsolete by New Zealand. The regular naval forces were to be recruited for service in peace and war and naval reserve forces established to augment them in time of war.

The report stated that provision should also be made for fixed anti-submarine defences, boom defence vessels, and nets and controlled minefields for the principal harbours to be available in the event of war. A reserve of minesweeping vessels should be built up by fostering the fishing industry. The protection of seaborne trade was dealt with in detail and proposals for escorting ships in convoy were set out. The report also stressed the importance of wireless communications, direction-finding stations, and intelligence and coastwatching services. The report was a fair warning of what was needed for the defence of New Zealand, but in 1939 many things were lacking and had to be improvised at great cost.

The Government decided to give effect to the Naval Defence Act 1913 and adopted the more immediate recommendations of Lord Jellicoe, namely, to acquire and maintain a modern light cruiser, commission HMS Philomel as a training ship, and establish a Naval Board. It was provided by Order in Council dated 20 June 1921 that the force should be designated the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy.

HMS Chatham

HMS Chatham, light cruiser, 5400 tons; eight 6-inch guns; two torpedo-tubes: speed 25 knots (coal-fired boilers); completed 1912.

was commissioned for service on the New Zealand Station and arrived at Wellington in January 1921. The first draft of recruits joined the Philomel in May 1921. Captain Hotham, CMG, RN,

Admiral Sir Alan G. Hotham, KCMG, CB; born England, 3 Oct 1876; served World War I; New Zealand, 1921–24; Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiralty, 1924–27; retired 1929; member of Port of London Authority since 1929.

combined the triple duties of commanding officer HMS Chatham, Commodore Commanding New Zealand Station, and Naval Adviser to the Government. Two escort vessels were also stationed in New Zealand, HMS Veronica arriving in 1920 and HMS Laburnum in 1922. They were maintained by the Admiralty but were under the operational control of the Chief of Naval Staff, New Zealand. The Veronica and Laburnum were replaced in 1934 and 1935 respectively by the newly built sloops Leith and Wellington.

The New Zealand Naval Board was constituted by Order in Council of 14 March 1921, with the Minister of Defence as chairman, the Commodore as First Naval Member, and the Chief Staff Officer as Second Naval Member. The secretary to the commodore acted as Naval Secretary to the Board. In 1926 he was appointed permanent head of Navy Office, but was not then a member of the Board. The secretariat at first was not organised on departmental lines but was drawn from the staff of the Department of Internal Affairs. Control of expenditure was exercised by the appointment to Navy Office of an officer directly responsible to the Treasury.

It was found difficult to administer the naval forces effectively while the first naval member of the board had also to carry out his duties as commanding officer of a cruiser. An effort to remedy this was made in 1936 by the appointment of a flag captain to the commodore in order to free the latter to attend meetings of the Naval Board. In 1938 the administration was reorganised and Navy Office was constituted a Department of State. The Naval Board now consisted of the Minister of Defence as chairman, a Commodore, Second Class, as First Naval Member and Chief of Naval Staff, a Captain RN as Second Naval Member, and a Paymaster Commander RN as member and Naval Secretary.

HMS Chatham was replaced in May 1924 by HMS Dunedin,

Dunedin and Diomede, light cruisers, 4850 tons; six 6-inch and three 4-inch guns; four triple torpedo-tubes; speed 29 knots. Dunedin completed 1919 and Diomede 1922.

an oil-burning cruiser. Included in her complement was a detachment of Royal Marines whose arrival marked the beginning of a long association of that famous corps with the New Zealand Naval Forces. The Admiralty tanker Nucula, of 6500 tons capacity, was hired to the Government to maintain a regular supply of fuel-oil. Two storage tanks with a capacity of 9280 tons were under construction at Devonport but were not completed till 1927. HMS Diomede was commissioned at Portsmouth on 21 October 1925 for service with the New Zealand Division and arrived at Auckland in January 1926.

The cruisers were manned for the greater part by officers and ratings on loan from the Royal Navy. The recruiting of New Zealand boys for continuous service proceeded steadily over the years, but their number increased slowly since for various reasons there was a continuous wastage. With two cruisers in commission it was possible to carry out tactical exercises and competitive training. Periodically, drafts of selected New Zealand ratings were sent to England for more advanced training and wider experience in ships and establishments of the Royal Navy. From time to time the New Zealand cruisers took part in seagoing exercises with ships of the Royal Australian Navy, to the great benefit of fighting efficiency.

Enrolments of officers and men of the Merchant Marine in the New Zealand branch of the Royal Naval Reserve had started in 1922, but the total number was small. The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (NZ) was inaugurated at Auckland in 1925. This service had a strong appeal to sea-minded lads, especially those with experience in yachts and small boats. The Auckland Division of the RNVR expanded quickly, and in 1928 the Wellington, Canterbury, and Otago Divisions were started. At the end of that year there were 405 continuous service ratings in the New Zealand Division and New Zealand reservists numbered 63 officers and 420 ratings.

In January 1925 the chief staff officer recommended to the Naval Board that a trawler fitted with suitable gear and a 4-inch gun be obtained for the purpose of training naval reservists in seamanship, minesweeping, and gunnery. He pointed out that minelaying by enemy raiders would be the greatest threat to shipping in New Zealand waters in war and that the nucleus of a minesweeping organisation, capable of expansion in an emergency, should be formed. The Naval Board accepted this proposal, which was approved by Cabinet in September 1925. A ‘Castle type’ trawler of 429 tons was purchased from the Admiralty for £5000 and commissioned as HMS Wakakura. By the time she arrived at Auckland in January 1927, the costs of purchase, repairs, alterations and additions, and delivery amounted to £24,832. From that time onward, hundreds of New Zealand lads of the RNVR were trained in the Wakakura. Many of them as commissioned officers and ratings had notable records of active service during the Second World War.

In 1927 Parliament passed an Act pledging a contribution to the cost of construction of the great naval base at Singapore. This took the form of an annual subsidy to provide for a total contribution of £1,000,000, the last instalment of which was paid during the year ended 31 March 1936. In 1927 also the Government announced that New Zealand would undertake responsibility for the maintenance of two modern cruisers when the Singapore contribution had been fully paid. From the time the Anglo-Japanese alliance ended in 1922 and the naval centre of gravity moved to the Far East, the establishment of a fleet base at Singapore became a cardinal point in British strategy. Such a base, it was held, would contribute to the security of New Zealand and Australia in the event of Japanese aggression. The importance of the Singapore base was specially emphasised at the Imperial Conference of 1937. But when the testing time came four years later, the Fleet for which the base had been built was not there to hold the ring. Without command of the sea and the air, the strongest base is of little import.

In 1899 an agreement had been reached between the Admiralty and the Auckland Harbour Board whereby, in consideration of a subsidy of £2950 a year for thirty years, the latter undertook to provide facilities at Calliope Dock for the repair and refitting of HM ships. The machinery and other plant were to be maintained in an efficient state and replaced when obsolete. The Admiralty was to have free use of the dock and its equipment, subject to ‘out-of-pocket’ expenses, and the right to set up buildings on certain land owned by the Harbour Board. The works cost much more than had been estimated and in 1903 the Admiralty agreed to increase the subsidy to £5000 a year for thirty years. The Board undertook to provide additional equipment and give the Admiralty free use of two acres of land for a coaling depot.

In 1923 the New Zealand Government agreed to repay the Admiralty the annual subsidy of £5000. This arrangement gave the Government and the Admiralty more or less equal rights to the use of the dock. But by 1927 the machinery in the workshops was obsolete and the dockyard facilities in general were inadequate makeshifts. The cruisers had to be sent to England in turn every two years or so to undergo large refits.

A new agreement was reached at the end of 1935 whereby the Harbour Board transferred to the Crown the area of 8 ½ acres adjacent to the dry-dock occupied by the naval base, together with a section of the seabed in Stanley Bay. The Naval Board was to have the right to extend the wharves and other works by reclamation or other means. Ownership of the dock and its jetty was secured to the Harbour Board. The Calliope wharf was to be extended, the dock lengthened to accommodate cruisers of the Leander class, and additional docking facilities provided by the Harbour Board, which was to maintain the dock in an efficient state. Priority and free use of the dock were secured to HM ships. It was also agreed that the Government would pay the Harbour Board a capital sum of £101,780 for the property transferred, the works to be carried out by the latter, and the balance of subsidy payments accruing to 1939, as well as an annual maintenance charge of £400. The new agreement, which replaced those of 1899 and 1903 and preserved the Admiralty's rights of user and access, was given statutory effect by the Naval Defence Amendment Act 1936.

A three-year plan provided for the modernising and expansion of the Devonport naval base, including new stores and facilities for the refitting of ships, a naval armament depot at Kauri Point, a 12,000-ton oil storage tank on reclaimed land at Stanley Bay, and the construction of barracks and a shore training establishment. These works were completed by the middle of 1940 at a cost of more than £200,000. But by that time the urgent and increasing demands of war exceeded the capacity of the dockyard and base and a programme of major works was undertaken that was not completed till after the cessation of hostilities.

During the period of economic depression in the early nineteen-thirties New Zealand's naval expenditure was cut to the minimum needed to maintain existing services. No provision was made for expansion, and recruiting barely kept pace with normal requirements. A radical change in naval policy was recommended by the National Expenditure Commission set up to ‘review and report on public expenditure in all its aspects, to indicate economies that might be effected and generally, to make recommendations for effecting forthwith all possible reductions in public expenditure.’ In its report the Commission said that ‘if the present arrangements are to be adhered to’ the cost of naval defence ‘must inevitably increase substantially in the future.’

‘We believe,’ said the Commission, ‘that under Admiralty control the cost to New Zealand would be considerably lessened, but consider that any reduction in the amount of the vote must involve a change in policy. We are of the opinion that the present divided control cannot give the best results and that differentiation in the rates of pay in different divisions of the service is anomalous and expensive. We therefore recommend that negotiations be entered into with HM Government in Great Britain for Admiralty to resume control of the NZ Division of the Royal Navy, without any conditions as to the number of cruisers to be stationed in New Zealand waters, in return for a fixed annual subsidy the amount of which must be determined by the policy adopted by Parliament. We feel that reversion to Admiralty control would result in considerable economies which do not appear possible under the present system. If only one cruiser were maintained in New Zealand waters and the maintenance of the Wakakura suspended, a saving of about £200,000 a year might be effected; but the possibility of making the saving would depend upon the policy arrangement entered into between the NZ Government and the Admiralty as, undoubtedly, relief to New Zealand finance would be at the expense of the British taxpayer.’

Nothing came of the Commission's intrusion into the matter of naval policy. However pressing the economic problems were, it was no time to change horses in the turbid stream of international affairs. Hitler and his Nazis were even then taking control in Germany.

Shortly before the London Naval Conference of 1930 it was arranged that the Dunedin and Diomede were to be replaced on the New Zealand Station by two light cruisers of the Leander class which were about to be laid down. Up to that time it was Admiralty policy that the Navy's strength in cruisers should be assessed not merely by that of other navies but by the world-wide duties required of them in the protection of seaborne trade. The British delegates at the Washington naval conference had been firm on this point. Yet the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was one of limitation for Great Britain and left the other signatory nations with such margins for expansion as to constitute no real limitation for them. By January 1935 British cruiser strength, including that of Australia and New Zealand, had been reduced to fifty ships; the fleets of the United States, France, Italy, and Japan showed increases in cruisers, those of Italy having doubled; while Germany was completing her three ‘pocket battleships’, which were essentially large armoured cruisers. Moreover, sixteen of the fifty British cruisers had already passed the age limit and by the end of 1935, in which year six new cruisers were due for completion, six others had reached the age limit.

In June 1931 word was received from the Admiralty that the loan of two Leander class cruisers

Leander, 7270 tons; eight 6-inch, eight 4-inch AA guns; eight torpedo-tubes; one aircraft; speed 32 ½ knots. Achilles, 7030 tons; eight 6-inch, four 4-inch AA guns (six 6-inch, eight 4-inch AA guns after 1943); other features as for Leander. Both ships completed 1933.

to New Zealand in 1934 would not be practicable, and it desired that New Zealand should continue to maintain the Dunedin and Diomede until relieved by the new ships about 1936–37. In October 1935, following representations by the British Government regarding the disturbed international situation caused by the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the Diomede was sailed from Auckland for service on the East Indies Station. Based on Aden, the cruiser spent some months on patrols in the Red Sea.

The Diomede then proceeded to England and was paid off on 31 March 1936. The New Zealand members of her crew transferred to HMS Achilles, which was commissioned on the same day by Captain Glennie, RN,

Admiral Sir Irvine G. Glennie, KCB; born England, 22 Jul 1892; served in destroyers, World War I; Captain, 1933; commanded HMS Achilles, 1936–39; comd NZ Sqdn Jun–Dec 1938; HMS Hood, 1939–41; Rear-Admiral destroyers, Mediterranean, 1941–42; Home Fleet destroyers, 1943–44; C-in-C America and West Indies Station, 1945–46; retired 1947.

for service on the New Zealand Station. Because of the situation in the Mediterranean, however, the Achilles spent about three months there in the Second Cruiser Squadron. She arrived at Auckland on 6 September 1936. The Dunedin was replaced by the Leander, which was commissioned on 30 April 1937 and arrived at Auckland in August of that year. She was commanded by Captain Rivett-Carnac, DSC, RN,

Vice-Admiral J. W. Rivett-Carnac, CB, CBE, DSC; born England, 12 Dec 1891; served World War I (DSC); Captain, 1934; comd NZ Sqdn Dec 1938–Dec 1939: Rear-Admiral, 1943; Flag Officer, British Assault Area, Normandy, 1944; Vice-Admiral (Q), British Pacific Fleet, 1945–47; retired 1947.

who succeeded Captain Glennie as Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron. The Achilles went back to England in 1938 for a large refit and was recommissioned on 27 January 1939 by Captain Parry, RN,

Admiral Sir Edward Parry, KCB; born England, 8 Apr 1893; entered RN Sep 1905; served World War I; Captain, Dec 1934; Chief of Naval Staff, NZ, May 1940–Jun 1942; Rear Admiral, Jan 1944; Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiralty, 1946–48; Chief of Naval Staff and Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy, 1948–51.

under whose command she returned to New Zealand about two months later. In June 1938 Commodore Horan, DSC, RN,

Rear-Admiral H. E. Horan, DSC; born Ireland, 12 Aug 1890; served World War I; DSC, Aug 1914; Chief of Naval Staff, NZ, Jun 1938–Apr 1940; CO HMS Leander, 1940; Combined Operations HQ, 1941–43; Rear-Admiral (retd) commanding Combined Operations Bases (Western Approaches) 1943–46.

was appointed Chief of the Naval Staff and First Naval Member of the Naval Board.

Thus, when war came in September 1939, the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy consisted of two modern cruisers and one minesweeping vessel. Personnel numbered 82 officers and 1257 ratings, of whom New Zealanders comprised 8 officers and 716 continuous service ratings; there were 74 officers and 541 ratings on loan from the Royal Navy. In addition, the New Zealand Naval Volunteer Reserve numbered 70 officers and 600 ratings. In July 1945 the total strength of the Royal New Zealand Navy attained its wartime peak at 10,649 officers and ratings (including 518 Wrens), of whom 3790 officers and ratings were serving in the Royal Navy; the total figure included 70 officers and 500 ratings on loan from the Royal Navy. By the end of 1946 demobilisation had reduced the New Zealand personnel to 150 officers and 1480 ratings.

New Zealand's naval forces entered the war as a Division of the Royal Navy; they emerged as a truly national service. In September 1941 the King approved the proposal that the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy should henceforth be known as the Royal New Zealand Navy.

CHAPTER 2 Outbreak of War: Cruise of HMS Achilles

THE Achilles had returned to Auckland on 18 August 1939 from a cruise in the South Sea Islands and spent the following week in company with the Leander in exercises in the Hauraki Gulf. In the meantime the situation in Europe was deteriorating rapidly, and on 24 August the Prime Minister's Office informed the New Zealand Naval Board that the Government had decided to adopt the ‘Alert Stage’ as prescribed in the War Book, in which was tabulated what every Department of State had to do in the event of war and how and when to do it. Each department had its own chapter arranged on an identical plan in sections, each of which dealt with a successive phase of the preparation for an emergency and for war.

On 23 August a signal was made to HMS Wellington recalling her to Auckland from her cruise in the South Sea Islands, and orders were issued to the Leander and Achilles and the sloops to complete to full war storage. Two days later instructions were received from the Admiralty that the Leith and Wellington were to proceed from Auckland to Singapore with the utmost despatch.

The last days of August were a period of intense activity in the naval dockyard at Devonport. The exercises of the Leander and Achilles had been planned to last a fortnight, but they were cut short on 25 August when the ships returned to Auckland. The Leander entered Calliope Dock that evening for bottom cleaning and painting and the Achilles was docked on the following day. The Leith sailed for Townsville and Singapore in the forenoon of 28 August. At five o'clock that evening the cruisers were reported as ready for service, the war complement of the Achilles having been completed with active-service ratings from the Leander and Philomel. Both cruisers were placed at twelve hours' notice for sea.

Meanwhile, many other steps were being taken, in accordance with the plan laid down in the War Book, to bring the naval forces of the Dominion to a state of immediate readiness. The Government was kept fully informed on the measures that were being taken in the armed forces of Great Britain to meet the rapidly worsening situation. For example, general messages outlined the ‘preparations being pushed forward to counter immediately submarine and mining attack in the event of the present critical situation leading to war’. It was suggested that the New Zealand Government might ‘consider the desirability of any possible similar steps for the protection of their own harbours’. Messages were also exchanged between the governments of New Zealand and Australia outlining the naval preparations in their respective spheres.

An Admiralty message of 25 August informed the New Zealand Naval Board that the ‘defensive arming of merchant ships already stiffened is to be proceeded with now’. The Naval Secretary informed the Minister of Defence that, in accordance with Cabinet approval given on 21 June 1939, the Rangatira and Matua of the Union Steam Ship Company had been stiffened to take defensive armament and the Awatea was being similarly prepared at Sydney. The Maunganui had been stiffened in 1914–18. Preliminary arrangements were being made to mount guns in those ships. The gun crews would be drawn from the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and would be available by the time the ships were ready.

During September 1939 the Rangatira and Matua and three overseas ships were fitted at the Devonport Dockyard with one 4-inch gun for defensive purposes. A 4-inch gun was also shipped to Sydney and mounted in the Awatea.

At 6.30 in the morning of 29 August the Governor-General received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that ‘in view of the critical situation vis-a-vis Germany and for reasons which will be fully appreciated, including the protection of trade’, the Admiralty had requested that ships of the naval forces be held in immediate readiness and, where applicable, should move towards their war stations in accordance with the dispositions previously laid down: one New Zealand cruiser to join the West Indies Force. The message added that similar measures had been taken in respect of ships of the Royal Navy.

Prompt action on this message was taken by Navy Office. The Achilles received her sailing orders for the West Indies at nine o'clock that morning, and five hours later she put to sea on her way to Balboa.

It had been long decided that in the event of war a New Zealand military force would be sent to garrison Fanning Island, an important mid-Pacific link in the submarine cable connecting New Zealand with Canada. Almost exactly twenty-five years before—on 7 September 1914—a landing party from the German light cruiser Nurnberg, a unit of Admiral Graf Spee's Pacific Squadron, had cut the cable and destroyed the equipment of the station on Fanning Island. On 25 August 1939 the Government asked the British authorities whether a preliminary detachment or a full establishment of troops should be sent to garrison the island and at what date this was most desirable. Four days later a reply was received that the British Government ‘would be grateful if the preliminary force could move at once to Fanning Island’ and suggesting that ‘it might be transported in a cruiser of the New Zealand Naval Forces’.

Accordingly, a detachment of two officers and thirty men embarked in the Leander, which sailed from Auckland at five o'clock in the afternoon of 30 August and proceeded at 24 knots on the 3000-mile passage to Fanning Island. In a message to the Governor-General of New Zealand, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs said that ‘His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom much appreciate the action taken and, in particular, the speed with which it was executed’.

The Wellington arrived at Auckland from her interrupted cruise to the South Sea Islands early on 30 August. This vessel was docked for cleaning and painting and, after completing full war storage, sailed for Townsville and Singapore on Sunday, 3 September. Thus, within the week, the two cruisers and two escort vessels on the New Zealand Station had been brought to a state of complete and instant readiness for action and despatched on their several missions – proof of the efficiency and foresight of the naval administration and dockyard arrangements.

On 1 September the Prime Minister's Department informed the Naval Board that the proclamation of emergency, in terms of the Public Safety Conservation Act 1932, had been signed by the Governor-General. In the early hours of next morning the ‘Warning Telegram’ was received from London announcing that the ‘Precautionary Stage’ had been adopted against Germany and Italy. This meant that relations with these countries had become so strained that the Government had found it necessary to take precautions against a possible surprise attack and to initiate preparations for war. The State Departments concerned could now take the action prearranged in the War Book.

Officers for naval control-service duties at Navy Office, Wellington, and at Auckland had already been appointed, as well as the naval officer in charge at Lyttelton and district intelligence officers at that port and at Port Chalmers. Consequent on the adoption of the ‘Precautionary Stage’ in New Zealand on 2 September, the examination services were put into operation forthwith at the defended ports of Wellington, Auckland, and Lyttelton. Arrangements were made for publication in the press of the Public Traffic Regulations, which were also issued as Notices to Mariners. The Army Department vessel Janie Seddon was made the examination steamer at Wellington – a duty she performed almost continuously for nearly six years. The Hauiti and John Anderson were requisitioned for service as examination vessels at Auckland and Lyttelton respectively. Staffs were mobilised for the examination services, port war signal stations, and wireless stations at Auckland, Wellington, and Lyttelton, as well as for Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve headquarters at Wellington and to complete the complement of HMS Philomel at Auckland.

Arrangements were also completed for the immediate establishment of approximately sixty coastwatching stations in New Zealand. Armed guards were placed at vital points at the naval base and armament depot at Auckland, as well as on magazines and oil installations at that and other ports. Cabinet approved that Shipping Control Emergency Regulations be made, and a general postal and telegraphic censorship was established.

Authority to mobilise the naval forces of New Zealand as well as the reservists of the Royal Navy in the Dominion was given by Cabinet in the early hours of 3 September 1939. At the same time authority was granted to institute coastwatching in New Zealand. Navy Office took immediate steps, by the issue of Naval Mobilisation Emergency Regulations, to call up officers and ratings of the New Zealand divisions of the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

The Admiralty signal to all His Majesty's Ships to ‘Commence hostilities against Germany’ was made at eleven o'clock on the morning of 3 September. On that day the Prime Minister's Department informed the New Zealand Naval Board that ‘war has broken out against Germany’ as from 9.30 p.m. (New Zealand time).

The first consideration of the Admiralty was the security of communications and shipping at sea. Shipping tonnage was a cardinal factor in the war. On the outbreak of hostilities, instructions were sent to British merchant vessels in all parts of the world to darken ship by night. They were also warned to avoid focal areas and prominent landfalls as far as possible and to make large divergences from the ocean tracks normally followed. A further warning was issued by the Admiralty that it was vital for the safety of individual vessels that wireless silence should be strictly maintained, except in the case of an emergency. On 3 September Cabinet approved that Shipping Control Emergency Regulations be made, enabling control over merchant shipping to be exercised in New Zealand.

At the outbreak of hostilities the New Zealand Naval Forces included one minesweeping vessel, the Wakakura, which normally was employed as a training ship for the New Zealand division of the RNVR. When the war started three Auckland fishing trawlers – James Cosgrove, Thomas Currell, and Humphrey – the first of six proposed minesweeping craft, were requisitioned and fitted out. Each was armed with a 4-inch gun and depth-charges and fitted with wireless telephone and telegraph equipment and minesweeping gear, the work being carried out in the naval dockyard at Devonport. The James Cosgrove was commissioned for service on 10 October 1939 and the Thomas Currell and Humphrey six days later.

The Achilles had received her sailing orders at nine o'clock in the morning of 29 August. She was instructed to ‘proceed at the best available speed to Balboa’, where she was expected to arrive on 17 September. In the meantime she was to come under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies. During the morning the ship completed her war complement as far as possible. A draft of ratings from the Philomel and two junior naval reserve officers from the Leander joined the Achilles, which slipped from her berth at the Devonport Naval Dockyard at 1.30 p.m. and went to sea. The ship's company then numbered 567, of whom 26 officers and 220 ratings were from the Royal Navy and 5 officers and 316 ratings were New Zealanders.

The Achilles was far out in the Pacific when, at 11.30 p.m. on 2 September, in accordance with orders from the Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies, course was altered for Valparaiso, Chile, and speed increased to 17 knots. She was instructed to consult the British Naval Attaché at Valparaiso and, ‘in the event of hostilities, to take such immediate action as was considered necessary’.

The Admiralty signal ‘Commence hostilities against Germany’ was received in the Achilles at 0.53 a.m. (ship's time) on 3 September. From that time action stations were exercised at dawn and dark and the ship was darkened at night. From 9 September onward, as the Achilles approached the more frequented waters of the South American coast, the ship's company was kept at cruising stations by night and, during conditions of low visibility, by day. No ships were sighted on the passage across the Pacific.

The Achilles arrived in Valparaiso roads at 12.25 p.m. on 12 September. She saluted the country with twenty-one guns and the flag of Rear-Admiral C. K. Garcia in the battleship Almirante Latorre

Almirante Latorre, 30,000 tons, ten 14-inch guns; built in England for Chile, 1912–15; served in Royal Navy as HMS Canada, 1915–19; delivered to Chile1920.

with thirteen guns. Both salutes were returned. During the afternoon Captain Parry called on Vice-Admiral J. Allard, Director of Naval Services, who returned the call in person – a most unusual honour for a ship commanded by a captain – and was saluted with seventeen guns on leaving the ship.

As in August 1914, the outbreak of war had almost completely halted the considerable German trade in those waters, as it had in most parts of the world. German merchant ships lying in ports on the west coast of South America and capable of being armed were a potential threat to British trade. After consultation with the British Naval Attaché to Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, Captain Parry had decided to visit Talcahuano and Puerto Corral and then proceed north to Callao in Peru, making a call at the Juan Fernandez Islands, about which no reports had been received,

The Juan Fernandez Islands lie about 360 miles west of Valparaiso. In the early months of the war of 1914–18, the cruisers of Admiral Graf Spee's Pacific Squadron flagrantly violated the neutrality of Chile by using the islands as a coaling and supply base. The cruiser Dresden, which escaped the Battle of the Falkland Islands, was sunk at anchor there by HMS Glasgow on 14 March 1915. Based on the doctrine of ‘hot chase’, a British apology for this breach of neutrality was accepted by the Chilean Government.

when he received from the Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies a list of ports where German influence was active and German ships were known to call. Parry decided to visit as many of these ports as possible and omit the call at Juan Fernandez. As the arrival of the Achilles had been reported in the Chilean newspapers, his general policy would be to advertise her presence as much as possible.

South America, showing ports visited by the Achilles

During her brief stay at Valparaiso the Achilles took in fresh provisions and 1365 tons of fuel-oil. Parry heard later from the Naval Attaché that the Chilean authorities were impressed by the Achilles' strict observance of their neutrality laws in sailing within twenty-four hours after a long sea passage and a busy day in harbour. Admiral Allard said that, although his country's neutrality laws allowed a belligerent warship to load only sufficient fuel to reach the nearest port of a neighbouring state, he realised that it might be necessary to proceed at full speed and he allowed the Achilles to be refuelled accordingly. As there was a shortage of oil fuel in Chile at that time, this was a particularly friendly action.

During the next six weeks the Achilles patrolled the rugged coasts of Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. She called at many ports and anchorages bearing Spanish names that were well known to British navigators of past centuries. The advent of the Achilles, the sole Allied warship in those waters, sufficed to hold German trade at a standstill and virtually to immobilise seventeen German merchant ships totalling 84,000 tons along a coastline of some 5000 miles from the Panama Canal to Cape Horn. Thus was exemplified the truth of the old saying that nine-tenths of naval warfare is made up of the continuous drudgery and monotony of patrols and the search for enemy ships which are not there but would be if the patrols were not.

After a stay of barely twenty-four hours the Achilles sailed from Valparaiso on 13 September and steamed south to Talcahuano and Puerto Corral. There were three German merchant ships in harbour at Talcahuano – Frankfurt, 5522 tons, Osorno, 6951 tons, and Tacoma, 8268 tons. They had full crews on board and apparently there was nothing to prevent their sailing at any time when the coast was clear. Returning north on 15 September, the Achilles looked in at the anchorage of Caleta de la Fragata at the northern end of Isla Mocha, where Drake had spent two days in November 1578. No ships were seen there or at Isla Santa Maria. It was a few miles to the westward of Santa Maria that the Battle of Coronel was fought on 1 November 1914, when the cruisers Good Hope and Monmouth were sunk by Admiral Graf Spee's cruiser squadron.

On 16 September the Achilles intercepted a wireless message from the Norddeutcher Lloyd steamer Lahn, 8498 tons, informing the radio station at Talcahuano that she was about to enter harbour. At the time the Achilles was about 70 miles to the northward and a radio direction-finding bearing confirmed the Lahn's position at the entrance to Talcahuano and thus well within Chilean territorial waters. The Lahn, which was regularly employed in the Australian trade, had been last heard of at Sydney, whence she was to have sailed on 5 September for Germany. Shortly after midnight of 25–26 August, however, she left her anchorage in Sydney harbour and, without a Customs clearance or a pilot, went to sea. The ship was fully bunkered, but was short of fresh provisions which had been ordered for delivery on 26 August. After clearing Sydney heads, the Lahn had steamed across the Pacific to the Chilean coast.

At that time it was officially computed that 237 German merchant ships totalling 1,204,000 tons were either in or on their way to neutral ports or endeavouring to get back to Germany. By the end of December 1939, at least twenty ships totalling 134,250 tons had been scuttled by their crews after interception by British or French cruisers, fifteen others totalling 74,800 tons had been captured, and forty-eight totalling 381,000 tons had arrived in Germany.

Proceeding north during the next five days the Achilles visited numerous ports and anchorages on the coasts of Chile and Peru, including Coquimbo, Huasco, Antofagasta, and Iquique. A number of neutral ships were sighted at sea or in harbour and one German ship was found at Coquimbo. For the most part the coast was rugged, barren, and uninteresting.

The Achilles anchored at Callao, chief port of Peru, early in the morning of 21 September and saluted the country with twenty-one guns. Less than an hour after her arrival the cruiser intercepted a wireless message from the German ship Leipzig, 5898 tons, reporting her approach to the harbour. Captain Parry at once ordered the Achilles to get under way. The German ship was then seen to be well within territorial waters and it was evident that she could not be captured; she anchored off the entrance to the harbour a few minutes later. Although the departure of the Leipzig from Guayaquil in Ecuador, some 650 miles to the northward, on 19 September had been reported to Callao the same day, the Achilles did not receive this intelligence till after the ship had arrived. ‘This episode was therefore most disappointing,’ remarked Parry. The arrival of the Leipzig brought the number of German ships sheltering at Callao up to five.

The British Minister to Peru was uneasy about the situation in those waters. The Pacific Steam Navigation Company's liner Orduna, 15,500 tons, carrying a valuable cargo and important passengers, was expected to leave Balboa on 25 September, to arrive at Puerto Payta on the 27th and at Callao a day later, on her way to Valparaiso. The renewed activity of the German ships which had been trying to obtain fuel, combined with the sudden arrival of the Leipzig, their suspected supply ship, might indicate a project to seize the Orduna. Parry accordingly made a signal to the Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies suggesting that the continued presence of the Achilles in the Peruvian area was desirable and was instructed to remain on the west coast until further orders. After consultation with the British Naval Attaché, who had flown up from Santiago (Chile), Parry decided that protection of the Orduna was the most important consideration at the moment.

The Achilles sailed from Callao in the afternoon of 21 September and patrolled during the night in search of a ship which had been reported as passing Puerto Payta but which was not sighted. At daybreak course was shaped to the northward at 20 knots in order to arrive before dark off Puerto Chicama, where the British Minister wanted the cruiser to be seen as the town was largely a German colony.

At daybreak on 23 September the Achilles entered Puerto Payta, where she found the German motor-vessel Friesland, 6310 tons, at anchor. She appeared to be fully loaded but no sign of any armament could be seen. Barely two hours after leaving Puerto Payta the Achilles arrived at Talara, where she went alongside to take in 900 tons of fuel-oil. Talara, which has a deep-water harbour, derives its importance from considerable exports of oil and motor-spirit. The wells are at Negritos, a few miles to the south, and the crude oil is carried by pipelines to Talara, where it is refined. Later in the war when supplies from normal sources were cut off, New Zealand drew a considerable tonnage of fuel-oil and motor-spirit from Talara. The Achilles was accorded an enthusiastic welcome by the British community. As few of the ship's company had been ashore since leaving New Zealand, the cruiser spent a night in harbour and shore leave was given freely. A visit to the oilfields, sports, a cinema show, and a dance filled in the brief stay and the generous hospitality was greatly appreciated.

After leaving Talara the Achilles proceeded north across the approaches to the Gulf of Guayaquil. In the forenoon of 25 September she entered Bahia Santa Elena and anchored off La Libertad, the oil port of Ecuador, where she remained for twenty-four hours but got no oil.

As he was still uncertain of the exact movements of the Orduna, Captain Parry decided that on his way north there was only sufficient time to visit Buenaventura, the principal Pacific port of Colombia. The Achilles anchored in the morning of 28 September off Punta Soldado, eight miles below Buenaventura, and sailed about four hours later to meet the Orduna. Actually that ship did not leave Balboa till the afternoon of 29 September, and the Achilles had twice to break wireless silence before a rendezvous about 40 miles west of Cape Corrientes could be arranged for ten o'clock next morning. After contacting the Orduna the cruiser turned to the northward. As soon as the liner was out of sight, the Achilles shaped course to keep within 25 miles of her during the passage south. Both ships arrived at Callao on the morning of 4 October.

In view of numerous reports and rumours regarding the possible movements of German ships, the Achilles sailed from Callao on 5 October about the same time as the Orduna in order to give the impression that the latter was being escorted south. The cruiser remained on patrol in the vicinity of Callao until daybreak on 6 October, when she laid course for Valparaiso.

On 27 September the Achilles had received a signal informing her that the fleet oil-tanker Orangeleaf, 5980 tons, had been placed under her orders, and on 2 October instructions were received from the Admiralty that, after fuelling from her tanker, she was to proceed south about to the South Atlantic. The Achilles was to show herself at Chilean ports as considered desirable and refuel at the Falkland Islands. The passage was to be made with moderate despatch and on arrival the cruiser was to come under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief Africa.

The Achilles arrived in Valparaiso Bay on the morning of 10 October and berthed in the inner harbour. Various urgent engine-room defects were at once taken in hand and repairs were completed by the afternoon of 12 October. The opportunity was taken to give as much shore leave as possible to the ship's company, to take in fresh provisions, and to paint ship. The Chilean naval authorities had given permission for the granting of leave but the Captain of the Port was obviously nervous of possible trouble with the crews of German ships. ‘It was therefore most gratifying when he told us at the end of our stay, that he had heard nothing but praise of the behaviour of our libertymen,’ reported Captain Parry. There were no official entertainments during the ship's stay in port but officers and men received much private hospitality, both from the British community in Valparaiso and the Chilean Navy. The British Naval Attaché reported that the naval authorities were showing greater activity in asserting the neutrality of Chile. This was confirmed by the absence of all the destroyers from Valparaiso and the arrival of one destroyer in company with the Orduna which she had escorted from Iquique.

The Achilles sailed from Valparaiso in the forenoon of 13 October and met the Orangeleaf next morning. They then proceeded into Tongoy Bay, south of Coquimbo, where the Achilles took in 1300 tons of fuel-oil and forty tons of stores, the work being delayed by a heavy swell. Both ships sailed on the morning of 15 October and parted company when clear of the land.

After steaming to the southward for two days, the Achilles entered the Gulf of Coronados at daybreak on 17 October, passed through the narrow channel separating the island of Chiloe from the mainland and steamed up a land-locked gulf for about 25 miles to Puerto Montt, a provincial capital and terminus of the longitudinal railway of Chile which runs northward for 2862 miles. Official calls were exchanged during a brief stay of two hours at Puerto Montt, a large proportion of whose population was German. The Achilles then proceeded south through the Gulf of Ancud and the Gulf of Corcovado. Night was falling when the ship passed out to the open sea between the southern end of Chiloe Island and the northern fringe of the Chonos Archipelago, which comprises a large number of closely packed, rugged islands extending in an unbroken chain for 200 miles to the southward.

The Achilles ran into a strong north-west gale and high seas during the night and experienced an extremely rough and uncomfortable passage. Visibility was poor, and it was with difficulty that a landfall was made about midday on 18 October off Cape Tres Montes, on the western side of the Gulf of Penas. Once inside, conditions improved and the Achilles steamed up the Gulf of San Esteban into St. Quintin Bay, which was found to be deserted. The ship's company was much impressed by the grandeur of the scenery, which included a fine view of the Oliqui glacier. St. Quintin Bay was used by Admiral Graf Spee as a coaling base for the five ships of his ill-fated Pacific Squadron which spent five days there in November 1914 before proceeding round Cape Horn to the Falkland Islands.

The Achilles lost no time in clearing the Gulf of Penas and continued her passage south in heavy weather. The ranges of islands which form the Patagonian Archipelagos extend along the south-west coast of Chile for some 700 miles to Cape Horn. This inhospitable region is mountainous and cut up by deep and tortuous fjords and narrow channels of a complexity unsurpassed elsewhere in the world and as yet imperfectly surveyed and charted. Heavy rains, varied by sleet and snow, prevail throughout the year and furious westerly gales succeed one another with monotonous rapidity.

The weather had moderated when the Achilles made her landfall by sighting the Evanjelistas islets, 19 miles off, in the forenoon of 19 October. Half an hour later Cape Pillar, the northern extremity of Desolation Island, came into view, and at noon the New Zealand cruiser entered the Strait of Magellan. After proceeding for about 120 miles, she anchored for the night in Fortescue Bay, one of the best anchorages in the Strait and known to the early Spanish and other navigators as Bahia de Fuerte Escudo (Bay of Good Shelter). The cruiser got under way at daybreak on 20 October and about two hours later rounded Cape Froward, the headland forming the southern extremity of the Cordilleras of South America and marking the centre of the Strait. Fortunately, the weather was clear and sunny and the ship's company was able to admire the unforgettable scenery of a region where fine days are few. The Achilles anchored at Magallanes (Punta Arenas), where the customary official calls were exchanged during a stay of three hours.

The presence of a single British cruiser on the west coast of South America had exercised a markedly restraining influence on enemy shipping. The only German merchant ships at sea in the South Pacific when the Achilles arrived were fugitives such as the Lahn from Sydney and the Erlangen from New Zealand, which had vanished into the vast spaces of that ocean in the week before the outbreak of war and succeeded in reaching the territorial waters of Chile undetected. Of those already in harbour only the Leipzig had moved, and she barely escaped capture mainly because of the delay in obtaining intelligence and passing signals.

The task of the Achilles in patrolling the western coastline of the continent and keeping watch on German and neutral shipping was the more difficult because she had to be careful not to offend the susceptibilities of four neutral republics. There was no port on the west coast of South America to which she could send any neutral ship for examination and search. On numerous occasions she had had to enter territorial waters to inspect anchorages and ports and such German ships as were found in harbour.

‘On leaving the west coast of South America,’ remarked Captain Parry in his report of proceedings, ‘I do not feel great anxiety regarding the German shipping in this area. Both Chilean and Peruvian navies are anxious to assert their neutrality by every means in their power and I feel that their own feelings are distinctly benevolent to ourselves’. He said that, from Valdivia southwards, Chile was ‘almost a German colony’ and he understood that the majority, even those whose families had been established there for generations, remained German. In view of the nature of the coast, enemy submarines and raiders could easily be supplied by these German-Chileans without the knowledge of the authorities. The German merchant ships in the various ports had not been thoroughly searched and must therefore still be considered as potential raiders or, more probably, supply ships. None of these ships was interned. Captain Parry therefore felt that, when the situation elsewhere permitted, the presence of a warship on this coast was desirable.

After the Achilles left the west coast a number of the German merchant ships, moving furtively from port to port, contrived to make their way into the Atlantic, where several were intercepted and sunk. In the belief that the coast was clear, one left Valparaiso northbound after receiving news of the River Plate action, but was captured two days later by HMS Despatch, which had been sent south on patrol from the Panama Canal. More than two years later, three of the German ships succeeded in reaching Japan, and two others, the Portland and Dresden, made off into the Atlantic to act as prison ships for German raiders and ultimately arrived at Bordeaux.

Sailing from Magallanes soon after midday on 20 October, the Achilles cleared Cape Virgins at the eastern entrance to the Strait of Magellan at dusk. The ship then encountered the full strength of a northerly gale which continued throughout the whole of the following day. Visibility was very poor, but a landfall was made in the late afternoon when Cape Frehel, on the north coast of East Falkland Island, was sighted at a distance of about three miles. When the Achilles entered Port William it was too dark to see the leading marks for entering Stanley harbour. The gale was at its height and the ship anchored about three-quarters of a mile from Navy Point Light. The anchor dragged immediately and the ship went to sea for the night.

By daybreak next morning the weather had moderated and the Achilles anchored in Port Stanley shortly after six o'clock. Captain Parry called on the Governor of the Falkland Islands, the call being returned by his aide-de-camp. The cruiser took in fresh provisions and 835 tons of fuel-oil during her stay in harbour. Shore leave was given freely and the ship's company was most hospitably entertained by the residents of Port Stanley. The 22nd October being a Sunday, special arrangements were made to open the public houses but local opinion would not tolerate a cinema show. At the invitation of Captain Parry, the Governor made an official visit to the ship during the forenoon of 23 October and was saluted with seventeen guns. The Achilles then unmoored and proceeded for the River Plate at economical speed.

CHAPTER 3 The Search for the Admiral Graf Spee

THE broad lines of British naval policy for the protection of seaborne trade in the event of war with Germany and Italy had been laid down in an Admiralty memorandum of January 1939, which also included the dispositions of the British and French naval forces for 1 August 1939. Anticipating attacks by enemy raiders in the Atlantic, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean, the memorandum set out the ‘traditional and well-proved methods’ of protecting trade. These consisted in the dispersal of shipping by evasive routeing, the stationing of naval patrols in areas where cruisers could concentrate in pairs against a superior enemy, and the formation of adequately escorted convoys. Detachments from the main fleet could also be used if required. ‘By such means,’ said the memorandum, ‘we have in the past succeeded in protecting shipping on essential routes, and it is intended to rely on these methods again, adapting them to the problem under review’.

On the outbreak of war, when sufficient forces for escorting ocean convoys would not be available, it was intended to rely on evasive routeing of merchant ships and the patrolling of focal areas. The Admiralty memorandum, however, added that shipping could be escorted if necessary for the first part of the homeward passage. Armed merchant cruisers, when they became available, could escort the convoys the whole way home. If it were absolutely necessary, warships could accompany convoys throughout their passage, though this inevitably would result in a serious slowing down of trade. Though the introduction of general convoy would rest with the Admiralty, commanders-in-chief on foreign stations could institute local convoys. On the outbreak of war on 3 September 1939 this policy was put into effect; but the costly result of the drastic cutting down of British naval strength during the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties soon became evident.

Immediately before the outbreak of war, the designation of Commander-in-Chief Africa Station was changed to Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic, and the Admiral transferred his flag from Simonstown to Freetown, Sierra Leone, and assumed general naval control over British movements in the whole of the South Atlantic Ocean. At the same time the South Atlantic Division of the America and West Indies Squadron, comprising the cruisers Exeter and Ajax, was transferred to the new South Atlantic Station. The Exeter was completing a refit at Devonport when, on 22 August 1939, she was ordered to return to South American waters. Captain F. S. Bell, RN, assumed command of the ship two days later, but she continued to fly the broad pendant of Commodore Harwood

Admiral Sir Henry Harwood, KCB; born 19 Jan 1888; entered RN, 1900; Captain, Dec 1934, Rear-Admiral, 13 Dec 1939; Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, 1940–42; C-in-C Mediterranean, 1942; C-in-C Levant, 1943; retired (ill-health) 1945.

as Commodore, South America Division. The Ajax, commanded by Captain C. H. L. Woodhouse, RN, was already on patrol off the coast of Brazil where on 3 September, less than three hours after the British declaration of war, she intercepted and sank the German steamer Olinda, 4576 tons, homeward-bound from Montevideo with a general cargo. Next day she sank the German steamer Carl Fritzen, 6954 tons. The nearest British territory was more than 1000 miles away and in neither case could the Ajax spare a prize crew. The destroyers Hotspur and Havock sailed from Freetown on 5 September and the 8-inch cruiser Cumberland followed three days later to reinforce the South America Division.

The special care and duty of Commodore Harwood was to protect merchant shipping in the important River Plate and Rio de Janeiro areas. As a precaution against the possible conversion of German merchant ships in South American ports into armed raiders, he ordered the Cumberland to organise and run outward convoys in the Rio de Janeiro area, with the Havock as anti-submarine escort. The convoys were to sail at daybreak and be protected till dusk, when the ships were to be dispersed so that they would be far apart by dawn the following day. At the same time Harwood ordered the Hotspur to join him in the River Plate area so that similar convoys could be started from Montevideo. If a German ‘pocket battleship’ arrived off the coast, the Cumberland was to abandon the convoy scheme and join the Exeter and Ajax. The first local convoy outward from Montevideo on 22 September included the motor-vessel Sussex, homeward-bound with a valuable refrigerated cargo from New Zealand.

Commodore Harwood was constantly faced with the problem of refuelling his ships. They were operating off the neutral coasts of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, which fringed the Atlantic for more than 3000 miles. His nearest British base, the Falkland Islands, was 1000 miles to the southward of the River Plate and the selection of suitable anchorages for refuelling was a difficult matter. The small number of ships available and the limitations on fuelling in neutral waters made it impossible to keep a close watch on German ships in all ports on the coast. The most the Commodore could do was to pay sporadic calls, which would deter the ships for a time but could not be expected to lead to their permanent detention and internment.

August 1939 was a month of great activity in the German Navy. The war plans of the High Command for commerce raiding in the Atlantic were being put into operation. Between 19 and 23 August eighteen U-boats left for their allotted stations; on the 21st the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee, with a complement of 1134 officers and men commanded by Captain Hans Langsdorff, sailed from Wilhelmshaven; on the 24th the pocket battleship Deutschland put to sea, her tanker supply ship having sailed two days earlier. She was to remain east of Greenland until war began, when she was to make the North Atlantic her operational area. The tanker Altmark, carrying three months' supplies for the Admiral Graf Spee, had sailed from Germany as early as 2 August and, having loaded 9400 tons of fuel-oil at Port Arthur, Texas, left there on 19 August for the Atlantic.

The Admiral Graf Spee was to cruise in an area north-west of the Cape Verde Islands until hostilities commenced; afterwards she was to operate on the South Atlantic trade routes. Her orders were to disrupt and damage enemy merchant shipping by all possible means. Engagements with enemy naval forces, ‘even if inferior, were only to be undertaken if this furthered the main purpose of the operation’. By frequent changes of operational areas, dislocation and injury would be caused to enemy mercantile traffic, and the appearance of the raider in distant areas would further serve the purpose of increasing the insecurity of shipping and the uncertainty of enemy naval forces.

Captain Langsdorff carried out his orders with comprehending caution. He carefully timed the passage of the Admiral Graf Spee off the Norwegian coast and between Iceland and the Faeroes, crossed the main North Atlantic shipping routes by night, and on 1 September arrived undetected in the waiting area where he met and fuelled from the Altmark. On 5 September instructions were received from the German Naval staff that, ‘by order of the Fuehrer’, no action was to be taken against passenger ships, even in convoy, and that the pocket battleships were to move well away from their operational areas and maintain wireless silence. Thereupon, Langsdorff decided to move into the South Atlantic. On 8 September the Admiral Graf Spee and the Altmark crossed the Equator at a point midway between West Africa and South America and two days later arrived in the triangular area between Ascension and St. Helena and Trinidada Island, where they cruised and exercised for sixteen days.

It was not until 26 September that Langsdorff received orders to commence raiding operations and the Admiral Graf Spee moved off to the north-westward towards the Brazilian coast. Four days later she intercepted and sank the British steamer Clement, 5051 tons, about 75 miles south-east of Pernambuco, though not before the ship had got off a distress signal. The crew took to the boats and were left to make their way to land, but the master and the chief engineer were taken prisoner. On this occasion, as on several others, the Admiral Graf Spee displayed a name plate of the Admiral Scheer, which accounted for the reports crediting the sinking to that ship. That evening the two prisoners were put on board a Greek steamer which was allowed to proceed on the understanding that her wireless would not be used within 600 miles of her position at that time. The Admiral Graf Spee then headed away to the eastward.

A report that the Clement had been sunk reached the Admiralty the following afternoon and certain preliminary movements of cruisers were ordered immediately. The Achilles was instructed to leave the Pacific and join Commodore Harwood's South America Division. A comprehensive plan to meet the situation was disclosed to the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic in an Admiralty message of 5 October. In addition to the raider reported off Brazil, others must be expected, including armed merchant ship raiders. Enemy activities might be extended soon to the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

The Admiralty pointed out that it was essential to maintain the flow of trade and such losses as were inevitable must be accepted. A full convoy system in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans would result in unacceptable delay, even if full escorts could be provided. Eight hunting groups ‘each of sufficient strength to destroy any German armoured ship of the Deutschland class or armoured cruiser of the Hipper class’ were being formed immediately. The Admiralty stressed that when searching for raiders it was ‘essential that wireless silence should be maintained except when it was known that the presence of the hunting group had been disclosed.’

The strict observance of wireless silence by HMS Cumberland, which on 5 October was informed by the British steamer Martand that a raider had attacked a ship in a given position, left the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic and the Admiralty without news of the raider for three weeks.

Hunting groups were warned to be ‘cautious of being lured away from areas where trade is thick, because the raiders must come to these areas to do serious damage’. It was also to be remembered that raiders were vitally dependent on their mobility, being so far from repair facilities. Hence a weaker force, if not able to effect immediate destruction, might by resolute attack cripple an opponent sufficiently to ensure certain subsequent location and destruction by other forces. Furthermore, the location and destruction of enemy supply ships was an important factor in rounding up raiders, which would more probably meet their supply ships on the high seas than attempt to use out-of-the-way anchorages.

Far-reaching and prescient as the hunting group plan was, the Admiralty went further. The battleships Resolution and Revenge, the battle-cruiser Repulse, the aircraft-carrier Furious and three cruisers were detailed to escort North Atlantic convoys. The battleship Malaya and the aircraft-carrier Glorious were ordered from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean as an additional hunting force in the Gulf of Aden area.

Thus the appearance of a single enemy raider in the South Atlantic had set in motion numerous naval forces directly involving thirty-one powerful ships. These included, from British resources, three battleships, two battle-cruisers, five aircraft-carriers and fourteen cruisers, as well as a flotilla of destroyers and a submarine. The French contribution consisted of two battle-cruisers, an aircraft-carrier, and five cruisers. These elaborate measures recall the similar widespread dispositions which led to the destruction of Admiral Graf Spee's Pacific Squadron in the Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December 1914.

After fuelling from the tanker Olwen in the River Plate area on 2 October, Commodore Harwood in the Exeter joined the Ajax off the south coast of Brazil. When he received an order from the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic to concentrate his division in the Rio de Janeiro area, he instructed the destroyers Hotspur and Havock to join him not later than the morning of 4 October. It was at this stage that the Admiralty informed Harwood that the Achilles was to reinforce his division. On 3 October the Commander-in-Chief directed that, failing any news of further raider activities in the immediate future, the Ajax and Achilles and the two destroyers were to protect shipping in the Rio de Janeiro and River Plate areas. The Exeter and Cumberland were to carry out their initial sweep as a hunting group as far north as their fuel supplies would allow.

The Cumberland, after sweeping for German ships in the Ascension Island area, had arrived at Freetown on 2 October and, having fuelled, left next day to join Commodore Harwood off Rio de Janeiro. On 5 October the British steamer Martand made contact with the Cumberland and informed her that a German raider had attacked an unknown ship – which was in fact the steamer Newton Beech – 900 miles away on the Cape-Freetown route. At the time the Cumberland was about 700 miles to the southward of Freetown and Captain Fallowfield assumed that the report would be intercepted and passed to the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic by ships on the Cape-Freetown route, even if it were not intercepted by a shore station. He also considered wireless silence imperative and decided not to break it. According to the Commander-in-Chief the value of the report, which, if acted upon, might in his opinion have led to the early interception of the Admiral Graf Spee and her supply ship, was apparently not appreciated by the Cumberland. The Admiralty, too, was strongly of the opinion that the report should have been passed on by the Cumberland to the Commander-in-Chief, who heard nothing of it till sixteen days later.

See ante, p.31.

On 9 October the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic informed the Admiralty and Commodore Harwood of his intention to coordinate the movements of three hunting groups – Force ‘G’ (Cumberland and Exeter), Force ‘H’ (Sussex and Shropshire), and Force ‘K’ (Ark Royal and Renown). As this would entail long periods of wireless silence in Force ‘G’, he proposed that Harwood should transfer to the Ajax, leaving Captain W. H. G. Fallowfield of the Cumberland as Senior Officer of Force ‘G’. These proposals were approved by the Admiralty.

The Ark Royal (flag of Vice-Admiral L. V. Wells), in company with the Renown, arrived at Freetown on 12 October. They were followed by the destroyers Hardy, Hostile, and Hasty from the Mediterranean. Next day the cruisers Sussex and Shropshire (Force ‘H’) arrived at Simonstown from the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, and on 14 October the aircraft-carrier Hermes arrived at Dakar from Plymouth to work with a French hunting group.

When the Cumberland, from Freetown, joined Commodore Harwood's division at daybreak on 9 October, the Exeter, being short of fuel, was unable to carry out the sweep to the northward ordered by the Commander-in-Chief on 3 October. He therefore steamed south and fuelled his ships in San Borombon Bay at the southern entrance to the River Plate estuary. On 16 October Harwood was informed that the German steamer Bahia Laura, 8560 tons, had sailed from Montevideo the previous day. When the signal reached him she was far out to sea and, as the whole area was enveloped in dense fog, her interception was not considered possible. The destroyers Hotspur and Havock were patrolling off Rio Grande do Sul with intent to intercept two German merchant ships if they left that port when, on 20 October, the Admiralty ordered their transfer to the West Indies.

Having steamed up from the Falkland Islands at economical speed, the Achilles sighted and closed the Exeter in the southern approach to the River Plate at 7.30 a.m. on 26 October. On completing a twenty-four hours' patrol in the River Plate focal area, the Achilles joined the Cumberland off Lobos Island in the evening of 27 October, under orders to cover the Rio de Janeiro-Santos area with her as Force ‘G’. That morning Commodore Harwood transferred his broad pendant to the Ajax and the Exeter sailed for Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, to carry out some minor repairs.

After sinking the Clement on 30 September, the Admiral Graf Spee made a wide sweep of more than 1800 miles across the Atlantic to the Cape route. On 5 October, about 480 miles east-south-east of Ascension Island, she captured the British steamer Newton Beech, 4651 tons, homeward-bound with a cargo of maize. This vessel made the SOS distress signal instead of the RRRR (raider) report, and it was taken in by the Martand. Two days later the Admiral Graf Spee captured the steamer Ashlea, 4222 tons, whose crew was transferred to the Newton Beech. After a small part of her cargo of sugar had been removed, the Ashlea was sunk. On the following day all the prisoners were taken on board the raider and the Newton Beech was sunk. In the afternoon of 10 October the raider captured the steamer Huntsman, 8196 tons, bound for Liverpool with a general cargo from India and East Africa, and put a prize crew on board. The Graf Spee then proceeded to the south-westward and joined the Altmark, from which she refuelled on 14 October. Two days later they met the Huntsman, which was sunk about 650 miles south-west of St. Helena. All the British seamen were sent on board the Altmark, which then parted company again for ten days. In the absence of distress messages from the sunken ships, suspicion was not aroused till they became overdue at Freetown.

The Admiral Graf Spee moved off to the south-eastward and on 20 October received a message from Germany that two supply ships were on their way to meet her. They were the motor-ship Dresden, which had left Coquimbo, Chile, on 19 October, and an oil-tanker from Tampico, Mexico. The raider, however, was never near the rendezvous arranged for the Dresden. The tanker was intercepted by HMS Caradoc soon after leaving Tampico and was scuttled to avoid capture. In the afternoon of 22 October, about midway between St. Helena and the west coast of Africa, the Admiral Graf Spee captured and sank the British steamer Trevanion, 5299 tons, which was homeward-bound from Port Pirie, South Australia, with a cargo of zinc concentrates.

During the next six days the raider steered to the south-west away from the trade routes and on 28 October met the Altmark in the vicinity of Tristan da Cunha, roughly midway between the Cape of Good Hope and the east coast of South America. After fuelling from the tanker, to which she transhipped the crew of the Trevanion, the Graf Spee shaped course for the Indian Ocean. She passed 400 miles south of Cape Agulhas on 3 November and then worked well to the north-east across the Cape shipping routes.

Nothing was sighted during the next ten days and on 13 November the Admiral Graf Spee headed towards the Mozambique Channel. Late on the 14th the small Dutch steamer Holland, 893 tons, was sighted, but as boarding was impossible in the prevailing high seas she was not molested. Next day the Graf Spee sighted another small vessel in the northern approach to Delagoa Bay. This ship, the British tanker Africa Shell, 706 tons, on passage from Quelimane to Lourenço Marques, was sunk, the crew being allowed to get away in the boats though the master was taken prisoner. Next day, when about 350 miles south-west of Madagascar, the Admiral Graf Spee stopped the Dutch motor-ship Mapia, 9389 tons, but released her. The raider rounded Cape Agulhas at a distance of 300 miles during the night of 20 November and headed out into mid-Atlantic. Six days later she met and refuelled from the Altmark about 600 miles south-west of St. Helena.

The Graf Spee now had more than 2800 tons of fuel in her tanks, enough at a normal rate of consumption to keep her at sea until the end of February 1940. A further 3600 tons was still available in the Altmark. Captain Langsdorff decided that, on completion of minor machinery repairs, he would again operate on the Cape shipping route in the area where he had sunk the Trevanion on 22 October. He parted company with the Altmark on 29 November and proceeded to the eastward.

No news of the South Atlantic raider had reached the Admiralty or the Commander-in-Chief for a fortnight when Force ‘H’ (Sussex and Shropshire) sailed from Simonstown on 14 October to hunt along the Cape-Freetown route as far north as the latitude of St. Helena. On the same day Force ‘K’ (Ark Royal and Renown), with the cruiser Neptune and the destroyers Hardy, Hero, and Hereward in company, left Freetown to search westward towards St. Paul Rocks. Three weeks' silence was broken on 22 October when the Union-Castle liner Llanstephan Castle reported that she had intercepted a signal from an unknown steamer stating that she was being shelled in a position ‘16 deg. South, 4 deg. 3 min. East at 1400 G.M.T.’

This message was probably from the British steamer Trevanion which was sunk by the Admiral Graf Spee in the afternoon of 22 October in position 19 deg. 40 min. South, 4 deg. 2 min. East.

There was no immediate confirmation of the report, but the Commander-in-Chief decided on another and complete sweep of the Cape-Freetown route. Force ‘H’ left Capetown on 27 October and Force ‘K’ sailed from Freetown next day to sweep northward and southward respectively to the latitude of St. Helena. But by that time the raider was far away to the westward in the vicinity of Tristan da Cunha. On 5 November the German steamer Uhenfels, 7603 tons, from Lourenço Marques, was sighted by an aircraft from the Ark Royal and captured by the destroyer Hereward. Both hunting groups returned to their respective bases on 7 November.

Four days earlier the Admiralty had informed the Commander-in-Chief that ‘all German capital ships and cruisers were believed to be in their home waters’. It appeared from this that the pocket battleship raider, which was still thought to be the Admiral Scheer, had returned to Germany and that the enemy ship reported in the message of the Llanstephan Castle on 22 October was no more than an armed merchant cruiser. On 4 November the Admiralty issued orders that Force ‘G’ (Cumberland and Exeter) and Force ‘H’ (Sussex and Shropshire) should exchange areas, an arrangement that would provide Commodore Harwood with the hunting group of long-steaming endurance he so greatly desired.

It had been planned that Force ‘H’ should make a sweep round the Cape of Good Hope towards Durban, arriving there on 16 November. This would have taken the Sussex and Shropshire within 160 miles of the Admiral Graf Spee when she sank the Africa Shell off Lourenço Marques on the 15th. But on 5 November, in accordance with Admiralty instructions, the Commander-in-Chief ordered Force ‘H’ to sail on the 11th and effect, to the westward of St. Helena on the 17th, the exchange of areas with Force ‘G’.

On 8 November the Admiralty cancelled the suppositions in its signal of the 3rd regarding German capital ships and cruisers and informed the Commander-in-Chief that the Admiral Scheer was believed to be in the Indian Ocean. Force ‘H’, however, left the Cape as arranged on 11 November. Bad weather and fuelling difficulties in the River Plate area delayed Force ‘G’, which did not sail till the 13th. When the Admiralty learned on 17 November that the Africa Shell had been sunk by a pocket battleship off Lourenço Marques on the 15th it immediately ordered Force ‘H’ to return to the Cape and Force ‘G’ back to South America. It also ordered the despatch of Force ‘K’ towards the Cape with instructions to carry on, if need be, to Diego Suarez, in Madagascar.

That morning the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic was informed that the German merchant ships Adolf Woermann, 8577 tons, and Windhuk, 16,660 tons, had left Lobito, Portuguese West Africa. He at once ordered Force ‘H’, which was then west of St. Helena, to spend three days searching for them. On 18 November Force ‘K’, with the Neptune and three destroyers in company, sailed from Freetown to sweep west of St. Helena on its way to the Cape. Force ‘H’ saw nothing of the German liners and returned to Capetown on the 23rd.

Early on 21 November, however, the Shaw Savill and Albion motor-ship Waimarama, 12,843 tons, commanded by Captain J. Averne, reported having sighted the Adolf Woermann about 250 miles north of St. Helena and boldly took the risk of shadowing her. Force ‘K’, which was then 150 miles north-east of Ascension Island, altered course to close. The Neptune went ahead at high speed and shortly after eight o'clock next morning intercepted the Adolf Woermann. Despite strenuous efforts to save her, the German ship was scuttled and the Neptune returned to Freetown three days later with 162 prisoners.

The search for the German ship had taken Force ‘K’ nearly 200 miles to the eastward and, to save fuel, it proceeded towards the Cape by the route east of St. Helena. The Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic subsequently expressed the view that this might have been the reason for its missing the Altmark, which was awaiting the return of the Graf Spee in the unfrequented area west of the Cape shipping routes through which Force ‘K’ would otherwise have passed.

On 27 November the Admiralty ordered Force ‘H’ and Force ‘K’ to form a patrol south of the Cape of Good Hope on the meridian of 20 degrees East. The two forces met there early on 1 December. The plan was found unsuitable in practice on account of the weather. This permitted flying from the Ark Royal only once in five or six days, so that the patrol could not be carried far enough to the south to intercept a raider bent on evasion. In any case, the Admiral Graf Spee had passed that way at least a week before the patrol commenced.

Far away on the other side of the South Atlantic Commodore Harwood's cruisers carried on their monotonous round of patrols, safeguarding the passage of Allied merchantmen. The Achilles remained in company with the Cumberland in the Rio de Janeiro-Santos area till the night of 5 November, when the latter proceeded to the River Plate in preparation for the proposed changeover of Forces ‘G’ and ‘H’.

A welcome break in the monotony came on the morning of 10 November when the Achilles arrived at Rio de Janeiro, saluting the flag of Brazil with twenty-one guns as she moved to the anchorage. Leave was granted freely, and about 500 of the ship's company landed during her brief stay, many of them being hospitably entertained by members of the British community. ‘We paid a very pleasant visit of forty-eight hours to Rio de Janeiro, one of the most beautiful cities in the world,’ reported Captain Parry. ‘Here we did our Christmas shopping; we danced and lost money in the casinos and we played golf in ideal surroundings….’

The Achilles went to sea again on the morning of 12 November and resumed her patrol of the shipping routes. In the evening of the 13th she met the French liner Massilia, 15,363 tons, bound from Buenos Aires to Europe with French reservists, and escorted her to the limit of Brazilian territorial waters off Rio de Janeiro, which she entered early in the morning of 16 November. It was arranged to meet the Massilia at sea that evening, but, owing to dense fog, the Achilles failed to find her then or on the following morning.

When the Admiralty cancelled the exchange of areas on 17 November, Harwood sent Force ‘G’ (Cumberland and Exeter) to patrol the Rio de Janeiro area and ordered the Achilles south to refuel. The New Zealand cruiser was off Rouen Bank, in the southern approach to the River Plate, early in the morning of 22 November when she obtained a wireless direction-finding bearing on the German steamer Lahn, which was last reported at Talcahuano, Chile, on 16 September.

See ante, p. 22.

Course was at once shaped at 20 knots to close Cape San Antonio with the object of intercepting the fugitive ship. About half an hour later the Ajax was sighted and the two cruisers spent the day searching for the Lahn and the motor-ship Tacoma, also from Talcahuano. The search was unsuccessful, and both German ships arrived at Montevideo during the afternoon.

The Achilles remained in company with the Ajax until late that night and then proceeded into San Borombon Bay, where she took in 900 tons of oil and three weeks' supply of victualling stores. She sailed the following night under orders to move up to Pernambuco and show herself off Cabadello and Bahia, as a number of German ships were reported ready to sail to Cabadello to load cotton for Germany. This was the beginning of another long, independent patrol which took the New Zealand cruiser more than 2000 miles to the northward.

The Ajax left the River Plate on 25 November and, after her aircraft had reconnoitred Bahia Blanca, where the German steamer Ussukumu, 7834 tons, was lying loaded and ready for sea, proceeded to the Falkland Islands, arriving on the 27th. By this time both the Cumberland and the Exeter were in need of repairs after long periods at sea and Commodore Harwood ordered the Exeter to proceed to the Falklands forthwith. She arrived at Port Stanley on 29 November and her defects were taken in hand.

Steaming northward at economical speed, the Achilles showed herself off Rio Grande do Sul on 25 November to deter the German ships Montevideo, 6075 tons, and Rio Grande, 6062 tons, from putting to sea. While she was approaching the harbour, a Brazilian aircraft flew low over the cruiser. Later, a complaint was made by the Chief of the Brazilian Naval Staff about the movements of the Achilles off Rio Grande. In his report of proceedings Captain Parry said the report of the ship being ‘close inshore’ presumably was made by the aircraft, but if it implied that the Achilles was inside territorial waters it was incorrect. Particular care was taken not to enter territorial waters about any of the Brazilian ports off which the ship showed herself. In a subsequent memorandum to the Admiralty, Commodore Harwood said that when he ordered the Achilles to appear off Rio Grande do Sul he was not aware that the Chief of the Brazilian Naval Staff had complained previously of the appearance of the destroyers Hotspur and Havock in sight of that port. He had asked the British Assistant Naval Attaché at Rio de Janeiro to see the Chief of the Naval Staff and give him a personal message apologising for anything which had been done that caused annoyance to the Brazilian authorities.

After leaving the Rio Grande do Sul area, the Achilles shaped course to the north-eastward for the next four days to a position approximately 200 miles west-south-west of Trinidada Island, which lies about 600 miles from the coast of Brazil. Thence she steamed almost due north, stopping from time to time to examine passing ships. A landfall was made at 8.45 a.m. on 2 December, and about an hour later the New Zealand cruiser arrived off Cabadello, a port in the southern entrance to the Parahyba River, where a German merchant ship identified as the Sao Paolo, 4977 tons, was seen. The Achilles steamed up the coast, arriving off Natal

Natal, capital of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Norte, was originally settled by the Dutch in the seventeenth century.

during the afternoon. Brazilian aircraft flew over the ship about midday. The cruiser reached the northern limit of her patrol off Cape San Roque, the north-eastern extremity of the Brazilian coast, at 6.15 p.m. when she turned south.

Next morning the Achilles arrived off Pernambuco and inspected the harbour from seaward, sighting eight vessels in port, including two German ships. The cruiser then proceeded on a south-westerly course for Bahia, but at 6.45 a.m. on 4 December she received orders from Commodore Harwood to return to Montevideo by 6 a.m. on the 8th to refuel. Course was shaped accordingly and speed increased to 19 knots. The elusive German raider had been located on the eastern side of the South Atlantic where she had sunk the Doric Star on 2 December. The timely concentration of the cruisers of the South America Division was now in progress.

The Achilles arrived at Montevideo early in the morning of 8 December and berthed alongside the mole. The German merchant ships Lahn and Tacoma were at anchor in the roadstead. For the third time since the cruiser's departure from New Zealand, shore leave was granted to as many of the ship's company as could be spared from duty. About 500 men landed and were most hospitably entertained by members of the British community in Montevideo. Permission for a stay of forty-eight hours in harbour had been given by the Uruguayan authorities, but this had to be curtailed to enable the New Zealand cruiser to keep her rendezvous with the Ajax.

For weeks the naval net had been spread far and wide to intercept the German raider. Constantly patrolling and sweeping on both sides of the South Atlantic were more than twenty British and French warships. They included two aircraft-carriers, and all the cruisers had an aircraft apiece. But even the increased range of observation thus afforded the searching forces represented but tiny circles in the immensity of 10,000,000 square miles of ocean. From the Cape of Good Hope to the Falkland Islands is 4000-odd miles, to the River Plate 3700 miles, and to Rio de Janeiro 3270 miles. The shortest distance across the South Atlantic is 1630 miles from Freetown to Pernambuco and from that line southward to the Cape is 3100 miles.

It is in the immensity of the vast, open common of the sea, devoid of natural features and obstructions such as restrict the movements of armies, that naval operations differ from land warfare. The age-old problem of the naval commander is how to intercept an opponent intent on evasion at sea. The evasive routeing of merchant shipping is one of the traditional, well-proved methods for the protection of seaborne trade effectively employed by the Admiralty. Evasive tactics apply equally well in the case of enemy raiders. Provided that they can obtain fuel and other supplies and avoid focal areas, it is possible for them to operate for long periods. Both sides of the picture are seen in the case of the Admiral Graf Spee, which was cruising for nearly four months during which she accounted for only nine ships.

At the beginning of December 1939 no report of the raider had been received since the sinking of the Africa Shell in the Indian Ocean on 15 November. On 2 December Force ‘K’ (Ark Royal and Renown) and Force ‘H’ (Sussex and Shropshire), after refuelling, were returning to their patrol line south of Cape Agulhas when a reconnaissance aircraft of the South African Air Force reported a ship south of the Cape of Good Hope. She was intercepted by the Sussex but her crew set her on fire. She proved to be the German liner Watussi, 9600 tons, and was sunk by gunfire from the Renown, her crew being picked up and taken to Simonstown by the Sussex.

It was on that day that the Admiral Graf Spee intercepted the Blue Star liner Doric Star, 10,086 tons, homeward-bound from New Zealand, via Sydney and Capetown, with a full cargo of frozen meat, dairy produce, and wool. The crew was taken off, as well as quantities of meat and dairy produce, after which the Doric Star was sunk by bombs and a torpedo. The destruction of this ship and her valuable cargo was a considerable success for the raider, but it was shortly to prove her undoing.

The Doric Star had transmitted a raider distress signal giving her position at the time of attack and this quickly reached the Com- mander-in-ChiefCommander-in-Chief South Atlantic.

The Port Line motor-vessel Port Chalmers, commanded by Captain W. G. Higgs, OBE, which was in the vicinity but out of sight, relayed the Doric Star's message, repeating it until it was acknowledged, after which she took drastic evasive action at full speed.

Knowing that the message had been passed, Captain Langsdorff lost no time in moving away to the westward. Early next morning the Admiral Graf Spee intercepted the Shaw Savill and Albion Company's steamer Tairoa, 7983 tons, homeward-bound from Australia with a full cargo of frozen meat, wool, and lead. Captain Langsdorff intended to capture her for use as a tender, but finding that her rudder had been damaged by his gunfire, he sank her with a torpedo after taking off the crew. He then proceeded to the westward with the intention of operating on the South American trade routes.

When he received the Doric Star's distress signal in the afternoon of the 2nd, the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic at once decided to abandon the patrol south of the Cape and ordered Force ‘H’, after refuelling, to proceed north at 20 knots to cover the trade routes between the Cape and St. Helena. His proposal to the Admiralty that Force ‘K’ should sweep direct from the Cape to a position 600 miles south-west from St. Helena and thence to Free-town was accepted. At the request of Vice-Admiral Wells in the Ark Royal, this was changed to a point about 500 miles further south to place Force ‘K’ in a more central position for moving to Freetown, to the Falkland Islands, or to Rio de Janeiro. On the morning of 3 December a report reached the Commander-in-Chief that the ‘pocket-battleship Admiral Scheer’ had been in the approximate position where the Tairoa was sunk, which clearly indicated that the raider was moving westward.

Force ‘H’ left Simonstown that afternoon and Force ‘K’ sailed from Capetown next morning to search for the elusive enemy. When the Sussex and Shropshire reached the area in which the Doric Star had been sunk, the raider was more than 1000 miles away to the westward. The Ark Royal and Renown crossed the line of the raider's track four days too late to intercept her. Once again the evasive tactics of the Admiral Graf Spee had saved her from the hunters.

Although the Commander-in-Chief had been told to assume that the raider would not round the Cape a second time

Admiralty message to Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic, 0144, 3 December 1939.

and there were clear indications that she was moving towards South America, the Admiralty took no chance and ordered the aircraft-carrier Eagle and the cruisers Cornwall and Gloucester from the Indian Ocean to patrol south of the Cape of Good Hope in co-operation with the South African Air Force. In case the raider turned north, the Commander-in-Chief arranged with the Admiral commanding the French Force ‘X’, based on Dakar, which included HMS Hermes, to take the Neptune and her four destroyers under his orders and patrol a line off the north-west coast of Brazil. The submarine Clyde was ordered to patrol an area midway between that coast and Free-town. Force ‘H’ was between St. Helena and the African coast when, on the morning of 9 December, the German ship Adolf Leonhardt, 3000 tons, was intercepted by the Shropshire's aircraft. The cruiser arrived three hours later, but the Adolf Leonhardt was scuttled by her crew.

The submarine Severn left Freetown on 11 December at 15 knots for the Falkland Islands under orders to protect the whaling operations at South Georgia and intercept enemy raiders or supply ships. The cruiser Dorsetshire, which had come down from Colombo, sailed from Simonstown on 13 December for the Falkland Islands under orders to relieve the Exeter, which was to refit at the South African base.

When the Doric Star reported that she was being attacked by a pocket battleship in the afternoon of 2 December, her position was more than 3000 miles from the South American coast. A similar report was broadcast early the following morning by an unknown ship – it was in fact the Tairoa – 170 miles south-west of that position. From this information Commodore Harwood correctly anticipated that the raider, knowing that she had been reported, would leave that area and probably cross the South Atlantic. He estimated that at a cruising speed of 15 knots the raider could reach the Rio de Janeiro focal area by the morning of 12 December, the River Plate focal area by the evening of 12 December or early on 13 December, and the Falkland Islands area on 14 December. ‘I decided,’ he wrote, ‘that the Plate, with its large number of ships and its very valuable grain and meat trade, was the vital area to be defended. I therefore arranged to concentrate there my available forces in advance of the time at which it was anticipated the raider might start operations in that area.’

In order to bring this about, Commodore Harwood in the early afternoon of 3 December made a signal to his ships amending their previous dispositions. The Cumberland was to carry out a self-refit at the Falkland Islands as previously arranged, but was to keep at short notice on two engines. The Achilles was to arrive at Montevideo to refuel at 6 a.m. on 8 December. The Exeter was to leave Port Stanley for the River Plate area on the morning of 9 December, covering the steamer Lafonia returning to Buenos Aires the British volunteers who had served in the Falkland Islands defence forces. The Ajax and Achilles were to meet in the afternoon of 10 December in a position approximately 300 miles east of Cape Santa Maria, and the Exeter was to pass through a position 150 miles east of Cape Medanos light in the morning of 12 December (thus covering the northern and southern approaches to the River Plate). The oiler Olynthus was instructed to remain at her sea rendezvous until the situation cleared, instead of proceeding to the Falkland Islands. All this was contained in a signal of 125 words, after the transmission of which strict wireless silence was kept.

In the early hours of 5 December the British Naval Attaché at Buenos Aires reported that the German merchant ship Ussukumu had left Bahia Blanca the previous evening. Commodore Harwood at once ordered the Cumberland, on passage to Port Stanley, to search the southern arcs of the possible course of the Ussukumu. The Ajax turned south at 22 knots after closing the coast and sighted the smoke of the Ussukumu in the evening, but the Germans scuttled their ship which, in spite of the efforts of the Ajax to save her, sank during the night. The Cumberland arrived early next morning and embarked the German crew. The Ajax went into San Borombon Bay and refuelled from the Olynthus. Thinking that the enemy might attempt some coup on 8 December, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Battle of the Falkland Islands, Harwood ordered the Cumberland to join the Exeter on the 7th and then to patrol off the islands for two days before entering Port Stanley to refit.

The Achilles sailed from Montevideo at 4 p.m. on 9 December and at ten o'clock next morning she joined the Ajax in a position approximately 230 miles east from English Bank in the approach to the River Plate. They met the Exeter at six o'clock in the morning of 12 December about 150 miles east of Medanos light. The three ships then steamed north-east to a position approximately 300 miles east from Rio Grande do Sul. Harwood chose this position from his shipping plot ‘as being at that time the most congested part of the diverted shipping routes, i.e., the point where [it was] estimated that a raider could do most damage to British shipping’.

Harwood informed his captains by two brief signals of the tactics he intended to use in the event of meeting the German raider. ‘My policy with three cruisers in company versus one pocket battleship – attack at once by day or night. By day act as two units, First Division [Ajax and Achilles] and Exeter diverged to permit flank marking. First Division will concentrate gunfire. By night ships will normally remain in company in open order. …’ During the day and after dark the cruisers were exercised in these tactics. It was a full-dress rehearsal of the drama that was staged next morning.

On 6 December the Admiral Graf Spee met the Altmark for what proved to be the last time, most of the raider's prisoners being transferred to the latter and fuel taken in. The tanker parted company next morning and the Graf Spee carried on to the westward. That evening she intercepted and sank the British steamer Streonshalh, 3895 tons, homeward-bound from Montevideo with a cargo of wheat. This was the raider's last success. In all, she had sunk nine British ships without the loss of a single life. Course was then shaped towards the River Plate.

The Admiral Graf Spee was classed officially as an armoured ship (panzerschiffe) of 10,000 tons displacement, the maximum tonnage permitted to Germany by the naval terms of the Treaty of Versailles; but her actual load displacement on her overall length of 609 feet and breadth of 69 ft 6 in was considerably greater, probably about 14,000 tons. She carried a main armament of six 11-inch guns mounted in two triple turrets, one forward and one aft, and a secondary armament of eight 5·9-inch guns, four on each beam. The 11-inch guns had a maximum range of 30,000 yards (15 sea miles) and fired a projectile of 670 pounds. The ship also had eight 21-inch torpedo-tubes in quadruple mountings and carried two aircraft. She was propelled by twin screws driven by eight diesel-oil engines, each of 6750 horsepower at 450 r.p.m. Four engines were geared to each propeller shaft, the gearing reducing the speed of the screws to 250 r.p.m. The full power of the eight engines was 54,000 horsepower for a speed of 26 knots.

HMS Exeter, a light cruiser of 8390 tons displacement, was armed with six 8-inch guns in three turrets, two forward and one aft, each gun firing a projectile of 256 pounds. The Ajax and Achilles, 7030 tons displacement, each mounted eight 6-inch guns in four turrets, two forward and two aft, each firing a projectile of 112 pounds. The secondary guns of the German ship were the equal in weight of the main armament of either the Ajax or the Achilles. She could fire a total weight of 4830 pounds against 3328 pounds from the three British cruisers, though the rate of her 11-inch guns was slower. The British ships had an advantage in speed of about five knots. But against the material superiority of the Admiral Graf Spee was to be set a vitally important moral factor. British naval doctrine, established by long tradition, laid down that ‘war at sea cannot be waged successfully without risking the loss of ships. Should the object to be achieved justify a reasonable loss of ships, the fact that such losses may occur should be no deterrent to the carrying out of the operation’.

CHAPTER 4 The Battle of the River Plate

AT 5.20 in the morning of 13 December the British cruisers were in a position about 240 miles due east from Cape Santa Maria on the coast of Uruguay and some 340 miles from Montevideo. While daylight was breaking, the ships carried out the normal routine of dawn action stations and again exercised the tactics to be employed against an enemy raider. The ship's companies fell out from action stations at 5.40 a.m. and reverted to their usual degree of readiness. The squadron then reformed in single line ahead, in the order Ajax, Achilles, Exeter, zigzagging on a mean course of north-east by east at 14 knots. The sun rose at 5.56 a.m. in a cloudless sky, giving extreme visibility. There was a fresh breeze from the south-east, with a low swell and a slight sea from the same quarter.

At 6.14 a.m. smoke was sighted on the north-west horizon and the Exeter was ordered to investigate. Two minutes later she reported: ‘I think it is a pocket battleship’. Almost simultaneously, the enemy was sighted by the other cruisers and action stations was sounded off in all three ships. When the alarm rattlers sounded in the Achilles, a signalman with a flag under his arm ran aft shouting: ‘Make way for the Digger flag!’, and proceeded to hoist a New Zealand ensign to the mainmast head to the accompaniment of loud cheers from the 4-inch gun crews. For the first time a New Zealand cruiser was about to engage the enemy.

While their crews were hurrying to their action stations, the British ships began to act in accordance with the Commodore's plan. The Ajax and Achilles turned together to north-north-west to close the range and the Exeter made a large alteration of course to the westward. These movements were made in order that the enemy would be engaged simultaneously from widely different bearings and compelled either to ‘split’ his main armament to engage both divisions or to concentrate his fire on one and leave the other unengaged by his 11-inch guns. The enemy's problem was the more difficult because of the wide dispersion of the two targets. According to the German account of the action, the Ajax and Achilles, when first sighted, were taken to be destroyers and Captain Langsdorff assumed that the force was escorting a convoy. He decided to ‘attack immediately in order to close to effective fighting range before the enemy could work up to full speed, since it appeared to be out of the question that three shadowers could be shaken off’. At 6.18 a.m., only four minutes after her smoke was first seen, the Admiral Graf Spee opened fire at 19,800 yards, one 11-inch turret at the Exeter and the other at the Ajax, the first salvo of three shells falling about 300 yards short of the former ship.

The British cruisers were rapidly working up to full power and were steaming at more than 25 knots when the Exeter opened fire at 6.20 a.m., with her four forward guns, at 18,700 yards. Her two after guns fired as soon as they would bear, about two and a half minutes later. The Achilles opened fire at 6.21 a.m. and the Ajax two minutes later. Both ships immediately developed a high rate of accurate fire, the Admiral Graf Spee replying with her 5.9-inch guns. The 8-inch salvoes of the Exeter appeared to worry the enemy almost from the beginning. After shifting targets rapidly once or twice, the German ship concentrated all six 11-inch guns on the Exeter. At 6.23 a.m. one shell burst short of the Exeter amidships. It killed the crew of the starboard torpedo-tubes, damaged the communications, and riddled the funnels and searchlights with splinters.

One minute later, after she had fired eight salvoes, the Exeter received a direct hit from an 11-inch shell on the front of ‘B’ turret. The shell burst on impact and put the turret and its two 8-inch guns out of action. Splinters swept the bridge, killing or wounding all who were there, with the exception of Captain Bell and two officers; the wheelhouse communications were wrecked. The Exeter was no longer under control from the bridge and Captain Bell at once decided to fight his ship from the after conning position. The lower conning position had taken over when communication with the wheelhouse failed. Even so, the ship had started to swing and there was a probability that the two guns of the after turret would be masked and unable to bear on the target. The torpedo officer, Lieutenant-Commander C. J. Smith, RN, who had been knocked down and momentarily stunned, noticed this and got an order through to the lower conning position which brought the ship back to her westerly course.

When Captain Bell arrived aft he found that all communications had been cut. The steering was therefore changed over to the after steering position, orders to which were conveyed by a chain of messengers. For the next hour the Exeter was conned in this difficult manner, the captain and his staff being fully exposed to the blast from the after pair of 8-inch guns and the heavy fire of the enemy. Both aircraft were extensively damaged and one was spraying petrol over the after conning position. Owing to the serious risk of fire, both aircraft were manhandled over the ship's side. During this time the Exeter received two more hits forward from 11-inch shells and suffered damage from the splinters of others which burst short.

All this happened during the first ten minutes of the action. In that brief period, however, the Ajax and Achilles were making good shooting and, steaming hard, were closing the range and drawing ahead on the Admiral Graf Spee. Clearly, the concentrated fire of their sixteen 6-inch guns was worrying her, for at 6.30 a.m. she again split her main armament and shifted the fire of one 11-inch turret on to them, thus giving some relief to the Exeter. The Ajax was straddled three times and she and the Achilles turned away slightly to throw out the enemy's fire. The Admiral Graf Spee was firing alternately at the two ships with her 5.9-inch guns, but without effect, though some salvoes fell close to them. At 6.32 a.m. the Exeter fired her starboard torpedoes, but these went wide when the German ship made a sudden large alteration of course to port and steered to the north-westward. This drastic turn was made under cover of a smoke screen and was probably dictated by the hot and effective concentrated fire of the Ajax and Achilles and the flanking fire of the Exeter, as well as by her torpedoes. The two 6-inch gun cruisers immediately hauled round to close the range and regain bearing. The Ajax catapulted her aircraft away at 6.37 a.m., under severe blast from her four after guns, and it took up a spotting position.

About a minute later the Exeter, while making a large alteration of course to starboard to bring her port torpedo-tubes to bear, was hit by two 11-inch shells. One struck the foremost turret, putting it and its two 8-inch guns completely out of action. The other burst inside the ship amidships, doing very extensive damage and starting a fierce fire between decks. The observer in the Ajax's aircraft reported that the Exeter completely disappeared in smoke and flame and it was feared that she had gone. However, she emerged and re-entered the action.

The Exeter had suffered severely. Both forward turrets were now disabled and only the two after guns were still in action in local control from the after searchlight platform. She was burning fiercely amidships and several compartments were flooded. What little internal communication was possible was being done by messengers. All the gyro-compass repeaters in the after conning position had been destroyed and Captain Bell had to use a boat's compass to con his ship. Nevertheless, the Exeter was kept resolutely in action. Her port torpedoes were fired as soon as the tubes were bearing on the enemy. A minute or two later she altered course towards the enemy and then hauled round to the westward. This brought her on a course nearly parallel to that of the Graf Spee, which she engaged with her two remaining 8-inch guns. The Exeter now had a list of seven degrees to starboard and was down by the head. She was still being engaged by the Admiral Graf Spee, but the latter's fire at that time appeared to be falling a considerable distance over the Exeter.

The Ajax and Achilles had now worked up to full power and were steaming at 31 knots, firing fast as they went. At 6.40 a.m. an 11-inch shell fell short of the Achilles in line with her navigating bridge and burst on the water. The flying splinters killed four ratings and seriously wounded two others in the director control tower. The gunnery officer was cut in the scalp and momentarily stunned. On the bridge Chief Yeoman of Signals L. C. Martinson was seriously wounded and Captain Parry hit in the legs and knocked down. When he came to he noticed that the guns were not trained on the enemy. He ordered cease fire and hailed the gunnery officer up the voicepipe. The latter replied rather shakily that he was regaining control and very quickly the director tower got the guns on the enemy and fire was reopened.

‘I was only conscious of a hellish noise and a thump on the head which half stunned me,’ wrote Lieutenant Washbourn, RN,

Captain R. E. Washbourn, DSO, OBE, RN; born Nelson, 14 Feb 1910; entered RN, 1928; lieutenant HMS Diomede, 1933–36; HMNZS Achilles, 1939–42; Commander, 1944; HMNZS Bellona, 1946–48; Commander Superintendent, Devonport dockyard, 1948–50.

gunnery officer of the Achilles, in his report on the action. ‘I ordered automatically: “A.C.P.

After Control Position.

take over.” Six heavy splinters had entered the D.C.T.

Director Control Tower.

The right-hand side of the upper compartment was a shambles. Both W/T ratings were down with multiple injuries. … A.B. Sherley had dropped off his platform, bleeding copiously from a gash in his face and wounds in both thighs. Sergeant Trimble, RM, the spotting observer, was also severely wounded. … A.B. Shaw slumped forward on to his instrument, dead, with multiple wounds in his chest. … The rate officer Mr. Watts, quickly passed me a yard or so of bandage, enabling me to effect running repairs to my slight scalp wounds which were bleeding fairly freely. I then redirected my attention to the business in hand, while Mr Watts clambered round behind me to do what he could for the wounded. Word was passed that the D.C.T. was all right again. A.B. Sherley was removed by a medical party during the action. Considerable difficulty was experienced, the right-hand door of the D.C.T. being jammed by splinter damage. When the medical party arrived to remove the dead, I learned for the first time that both Telegraphist Stennett and Ordinary Telegraphist Milburn had been killed outright. I discovered at the same time that Sergeant Trimble had uncomplainingly and most courageously remained at his post throughout the hour of action that followed the hits on the D.C.T., although seriously wounded. Mr Watts carried out his duties most ably throughout. … He calmly tended the wounded … until his rate-keeping was again required. … Boy Dorset behaved with exemplary coolness, despite the carnage around him. He passed information to the guns and repeated their reports clearly for my information. He was heard at one time most vigorously denying the report of his untimely demise that somehow had spread round the ship. “I'm not dead. It's me on the end of this phone,” he said. The director layer, Petty Officer Meyrick, and the trainer, Petty Officer Headon, are also to be commended for keeping up an accurate output for a prolonged action of over 200 broadsides. … The rangetakers, Chief Petty Officer Boniface and A.B. Gould, maintained a good range plot throughout the action, disregarding the body of a telegraphist who fell through the door on top of them. …’

Battle of the River Plate, 13 December 1939

About twenty more broadsides had been fired after the control tower was hit when wireless communication with the Ajax failed and the Achilles reverted to single ship firing for the remainder of the engagement. For some twenty minutes the fire of both cruisers was ineffective owing to difficulties in spotting the fall of shot. The Admiral Graf Spee, however, failed to take any advantage of this and continued her retirement to the westward at high speed. After 6.40 a.m. the action became virtually a chase. The Ajax and Achilles hauled round to the north and then to the west to close the range, accepting the fact that this entailed a temporary inability to bring their after guns to bear on the enemy. They were by now doing 31 knots and still increasing speed. The 6-inch gun cruisers were fine on the starboard quarter of the Admiral Graf Spee and the Exeter slightly before her port beam, still fighting gamely with her two after guns.

At 6.56 a.m. the Ajax and Achilles altered course to starboard to bring all their guns to bear. The increased volume of fire appeared to have an immediate effect on the Admiral Graf Spee, which made frequent alterations of course and from seven o'clock onwards made great use of smoke. Her range from the Ajax and Achilles at 7.10 a.m. was still 16,000 yards. Commodore Harwood then decided to close in as quickly as possible. Accordingly, course was altered to the westward and the Ajax and Achilles steamed at their utmost speed.

At 7.16 a.m. the Admiral Graf Spee made a large alteration of course to port under cover of smoke and headed straight for the Exeter as though she intended to finish off that much-damaged ship. The Ajax and Achilles responded with a turn towards the enemy, under ineffective fire from his secondary armament. Their rapid shooting scored a number of hits and started a fire amidships in the Admiral Graf Spee, which turned back to the north-west until all her 11-inch guns were bearing on the two cruisers, on whom she opened fire. The range at that time was 11,000 yards and the Ajax was immediately straddled three times. The enemy's secondary armament was firing raggedly and appeared to be going consistently over between the two cruisers.

The Ajax received her first direct hit at 7.25 a.m. when an 11-inch delay-action shell struck her after superstructure. It penetrated 42 feet, passing through several cabins and then the trunk of ‘X’ turret, wrecking the machinery below the gunhouse and finally exploding in the Commodore's sleeping quarters, doing considerable damage. A part of the base of the shell struck ‘Y’ barbette

The circular steel structure, below the gunhouse, enclosing the lower part of the turret

close to the training rack and jammed the turret. Thus, this hit put both the after turrets and their four guns out of action. It also killed four and wounded six of the crew of ‘X’ turret. The Ajax retaliated by firing a broadside of torpedoes at a range of 9000 yards. All four broke surface after entering the water and probably were seen by the enemy, who avoided them by turning well away to port for three minutes and then resumed her north-westerly course.

According to the German account of the action the Admiral Graf Spee attempted to fire a spread salvo of torpedoes a few minutes before this, but only one was actually discharged because at the moment the ship was swinging hard to port. At 7.28 a.m. the Ajax and Achilles hauled round to port to close the range still more, and three minutes later the former's aircraft reported: ‘Torpedoes approaching. They will pass ahead of you.’ Commodore Harwood was taking no chances and altered course to south, engaging the enemy on the starboard side, with the range closing rapidly. So as to blank the fire of the Achilles for as short a time as possible, the Commodore ordered her by signal to pass across the stern of the Ajax.

The Exeter had had to reduce speed owing to damage forward, but continued to fire her two after 8-inch guns in local control until about 7.30 a.m., when power to the turret failed owing to flooding. She could then no longer keep up with the action and about 7.40 a.m. she turned away to the south-east at slow speed, starting to repair damage and make herself seaworthy. She had taken heavy punishment but, in spite of severe casualties and the almost complete destruction of internal communications, had been kept in action as long as a gun could be fired, while damage control parties laboured to minimise the effects of shellfire and flooding.

The full burden of the engagement now fell upon the Ajax and Achilles. At 7.36 a.m. the Admiral Graf Spee altered course to the south-west in order to bring all her 11-inch guns to bear on the British cruisers. The Ajax and Achilles stood on, however, and by 7.38 the range was down to 8000 yards. The former's aircraft reported that, while the Graf Spee concentrated the fire of her main armament on the Ajax, the Achilles was making ‘beautiful shooting’. The spread of her rapid salvoes was very small and frequent hits on the German ship were clearly seen from the air. Captain Wood-house, commanding officer of the Ajax, also praised the good gunnery of the Achilles. Nevertheless, there was disappointingly little apparent damage to the Graf Spee, and Commodore Harwood remarked to Woodhouse that ‘we might as well be bombarding her with snowballs’.

About this time the Commodore received a report that the Ajax had only one-fifth of her ammunition remaining and only three guns in action, as one of the hoists had failed in ‘B’ turret and ‘X’ and ‘Y’ turrets were disabled. In the circumstances, the prospect of completing a decisive daylight action was not good. Harwood therefore decided to break off the engagement and to try to close in again after dark. Accordingly, at 7.40 a.m. the Ajax and Achilles turned away to the eastward under cover of smoke. While the ships were swinging, a shell from one of the enemy's last salvoes cut the main topmast of the Ajax clean in two, destroyed the wireless aerials, and caused a number of casualties. Jury aerials were soon rigged. It subsequently transpired that the reported shortage of ammunition in the Ajax referred only to ‘A’ turret, which had been firing continuously and had expended some 300 rounds out of a total of 823 rounds fired from all turrets.

The action had lasted exactly 82 minutes. In that brief period the Achilles had fired more than 200 broadsides. All four turrets reported that after firing from sixty to eighty rounds the guns started failing to run out immediately after their recoil, due to heating up, and had to be pushed out by the rammers. ‘The guns’ crews,' said one turret officer, ‘worked like galley slaves, loving it all, with no time to think of anything but the job. The whole of the turret from top to bottom thought the action lasted about twenty minutes. The rammer numbers were very tired towards the end, but did not appear to notice that till it was all over. … Men lost all count of time. They spoke later of “about ten minutes after opening fire” when actually more than forty minutes had elapsed.’

‘Towards the end of the action,’ reported Sergeant F. T. Saunders,

Killed in action off Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, 5 January 1943.

Royal Marines, in charge of ‘X’ turret, ‘the heat in the gunhouse was terrific, even though I had the rear door open and both fans working. The No. 1's of each gun, getting little air from the fans, were sweating streams. Everyone was very dry and thirsty. There wasn't the slightest delay in the supply of shells or cordite, which speaks well for the valiant work of those in the lower compartments. … I was amused watching various men just tear off a garment as opportunity occurred. Some finished up bare to the waist. One of the rammer numbers was completely dressed in only a pair of white silk pyjama trousers, somewhat abbreviated, and a pair of native sandals. Another was clad in a pair of short drawers and his cap, to which he added later a corporal of the gangway's armlet.

‘Everything went like clockwork, drill was correctly carried out, orders and reports passed and so on, just as if it was a practice shoot and nothing at all unusual was happening, except that everything seemed to be done at an amazing speed. The loading was absolutely superb. Marine Russell told me that we averaged seven seconds a round right to the end of the action. When we found we had expended 287 rounds, everyone in the turret was amazed: in fact I re-checked to make sure. The men all thought we'd fired about 40 or 50 broadsides and that was my impression too. There was a spirit of grim determination, concentration and cheerfulness during the whole job. Every man seemed bent on keeping this turret going at full speed. For instance, one number who was normally the butt of the turret's crew, all of whom were somewhat inclined to have a tug at his leg, had that expression that one sees on the face of an athlete going all out. He seemed determined that he wouldn't let his crew down and he really worked like a man possessed. Marine Harrison, having observed the enemy's possibly first fall of shot somewhere in our wake, was heard to say: “Blimey, he's after our heel,” which I thought was rather clever. …’

Not more than one man in ten in the ship's company saw anything of the action. The majority were segregated in groups, and in some cases singly, in gun turrets, in engine- and boiler-rooms and many other compartments below decks where no daylight entered. From the director control tower above the bridge were passed the ranges and much other data from which the calculating machines in the transmitting station, situated in the bowels of the ship and operated by a highly skilled staff, solved the problem of how a ship steaming at up to 31 knots was able to fire accurately, several times a minute, 8 cwt of shells at another ship moving at 24 knots up to nine miles away. The officer in charge of the transmitting station reported that the spirit of his crew was excellent and all were as bright and cheerful as in a practice run. The detonations of the enemy's 11-inch shells were heard distinctly, sounding like the explosions of depth-charges. ‘Nutty (chocolate) was a great help. We missed the free cigarettes, but we did hear that the canteen door had been blown off.’ Another officer remarked that ‘why the entire T.S.'s crew are not ill with bilious attacks, I cannot imagine, as everything edible was grist to the mill regardless of sequence.’ The officer of the after control position reported regarding his crew, Marine Cave and Boy Beauchamp, that ‘they were perfect, the boy going out at one time into the blast of “X” turret to remove some canvas that was fouling vision.’

A major part in this naval drama was played by the men shut in below decks in the engine- and boiler-rooms of the British cruisers. They had a good idea of what was going on, but they saw nothing of the action. The report of the senior engineer of the Achilles gives some sidelights on the action as it was fought in the engine-rooms of the cruisers. ‘The behaviour of all personnel,’ he wrote, ‘could not have been better in any way, including general bearing, endurance and efficiency.’ The remarks of the officer-in-charge of the boiler-rooms are that he was ‘most impressed by the behaviour of the stokers tending the boilers. Many of them were youngsters who never before had been below during full power steaming. … As each salvo was fired, the blast caused the flames in the boilers to leap out about a foot from the fronts of the furnaces; yet the stokers never paused in their job of keeping the combustion tubes clean, or moved back from the boilers.’

The main engines of the Achilles, it was recorded, ‘were manoeuvred with far greater rapidity than would have been attempted under any conditions but those of emergency. All demands on the machinery were met more than adequately, all material standing up to the strain in such a manner that nothing but confidence was felt during the action. … The behaviour of both men and machinery left nothing to be desired. When all the machinery of the Achilles had worked up to full power, readings gave a total of almost exactly 82,000 horse-power, with the four propellers turning at an average of 283 revolutions a minute.’ This tribute to the soundness of design and the excellence of British shipyard workmanship is underlined by the statement of Captain Woodhouse of the Ajax that steam had been shut off the main engines of his ship for only five days since 26 August 1939.

The position in the Exeter was complicated by the extensive damage in the fore part of the ship by enemy gunfire during the first half hour of the action. An 11-inch shell which exploded in the chief petty officers' flat immediately adjacent caused a complete blackout in one boiler-room. Shell splinters came down the air-fan intakes and the starboard air-lock door was jammed. Many important electric power leads were cut, causing a failure of communications, and orders had to be passed to the boiler-room by messengers.

Although the British cruisers had a considerable advantage in speed, the Admiral Graf Spee showed that she was a handy ship to manoeuvre. ‘The rapidity with which the Graf Spee altered course was most striking,’ wrote Captain Parry. ‘She appeared to turn as quickly as a ship one-half her size and she made the fullest use of her mobility. She appeared to be under helm for the greater part of the time. On several occasions, when her situation was becoming unhealthy, she turned 180 degrees away, using smoke to cover her turn.’

Regarding the enemy's tactics, Captain Parry said the ‘outstanding and most satisfactory feature seemed to be a complete absence of the offensive spirit.’ He certainly made skilful use of smoke to conceal himself from the 6-inch cruisers when their fire became effective, while continuing his main engagement with the Exeter. But in the end he retired from the Ajax and Achilles behind a smoke screen without attempting to finish off the Exeter, although he appeared from his subsequent reported statements to have known that she was out of action. ‘The only possible explanation seems to be that he had been severely handled himself. In confirmation, it was noticed that his after turret was not firing for a long time towards the end of the action and that his 5·9-inch gunfire became increasingly ragged and ineffective.’

Yet, according to the German account of the action, the Admiral Graf Spee had sustained only two 8-inch and eighteen 6-inch hits. One officer and thirty-five ratings had been killed and sixty wounded. ‘The fighting value of the ship had not been destroyed,’ the report said. The main armament was ‘fully effective’, but there remained only 306 rounds of 11-inch ammunition, representing about 40 per cent of the original supply. The secondary armament was effective with the exception of one gun on the port side and the ammunition hoists of the forward 5·9-inch guns. In consequence, only the four ammunition hoists aft were available for use and the forward guns would have to be supplied from aft. More than 50 per cent of the ammunition supply for the secondary armament remained. The engines were available for maximum speed with the exception of defects of long standing in the auxiliary engines.

‘The survey of damage showed that all galleys were out of action with the exception of the Admiral's galley. The possibility of repairing them with the ship's own resources was doubtful. Penetration of water into the flour store made the continued supply of bread questionable, while hits in the fore part of the ship rendered her unseaworthy for the North Atlantic winter. One shell had penetrated the armour belt and the armoured deck had also been torn open in one place. There was also damage in the after part of the ship. … The ship's resources were considered inadequate for making her seaworthy, and there seemed no prospect of shaking off the shadowers.’ Captain Langsdorff therefore decided to steer for Montevideo. He signalled his account of the action and his intentions to Berlin. Before the ship had entered Montevideo harbour he had already received from Admiral Raeder the reply: ‘Your intentions understood.’

Almost exactly twenty-five years before – on 8 December 1914 – Admiral Graf Spee's four cruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Nurnberg, and Leipzig, had fought to the last against a greatly superior British force, 1100 miles south of the area from which the powerful ship bearing the name of the German admiral was now retreating at speed from two small cruisers, one of which had only half her guns in action.

When the Ajax and Achilles turned away, the Admiral Graf Spee made no attempt to follow them, but steadied on a course almost due west and proceeded at 23 knots direct for the River Plate. Six minutes later the British cruisers hauled round and began to shadow the enemy, the Ajax to port and the Achilles to starboard, at a distance of about 15 miles. In the prevailing conditions of extreme visibility, the conspicuous control tower and bridge of the Admiral Graf Spee, as well as her continuous funnel smoke, made it an easy matter to shadow her at long range.

The irregular arc on which the Ajax and Achilles had steamed and fought had brought them by eight o'clock to a position barely 20 miles north-west from that in which they had first sighted the enemy. As the Ajax's wireless aerials were still down, the Achilles was ordered to broadcast the position, course, and speed of the Admiral Graf Spee to all British merchant ships in the River Plate area. Similar messages were subsequently broadcast hourly by the Ajax until the end of the chase.

By 8.14 a.m. the Exeter was out of sight to the south-eastward and Commodore Harwood ordered his aircraft to tell her to close. At 9.10 a.m. the aircraft reported: ‘Exeter is badly damaged, but is joining you as best she can.’ Two minutes later the Ajax recovered her aircraft, which had been in the air for two hours and 35 minutes. Captain Bell of the Exeter did his best to rejoin but, having only an inaccurate boat compass to steer by, was unable to make contact. He then decided to steer towards the nearest land, some 200 miles to the westward, and speed was reduced while bulkheads were being shored and the ship's list corrected.

Harwood's objective was the destruction of the Admiral Graf Spee in close action after nightfall and he had to be prepared to meet the situation that would arise if the enemy succeeded in eluding him. The extent to which the German ship had been damaged was not known, but it was evident that her speed was unaffected and her main armament appeared to be fully effective. It seemed evident that the Ajax and Achilles, which had expended approximately 50 per cent of their ammunition, could not, unaided, compass the destruction of the enemy in action.

Accordingly, at 9.45 a.m. Harwood ordered the Cumberland, which had been refitting at the Falkland Islands more than 1000 miles away, to proceed at full speed to the River Plate area. The signal was some time in transmission, for when the Cumberland sailed from Port Stanley at noon it was on the initiative of her commanding officer, Captain Fallowfield, who, up to that hour, had intercepted only very jumbled messages. When the Commodore's signal reached him, he at once increased to full speed.

Meanwhile, the Admiralty had taken prompt steps to close the widespread net that had been set to trap the Admiral Graf Spee. Immediately it was known that Commodore Harwood's division had intercepted the enemy, orders were given for the Ark Royal, Renown, and other ships which had been patrolling some 3000 miles away to proceed at once to the South American coast. Measures were also taken to ensure that adequate supplies of fuel and stores would be available at various strategic points.

The Achilles had overestimated the speed of the enemy and by 10.5 a.m. had closed to 23,000 yards. The Admiral Graf Spee then turned and fired two three-gun salvoes of 11-inch shell at her. That the enemy altered course sufficiently to bring her forward guns to bear seemed to indicate that the after turret was out of action at the time. The first salvo was very short of its target, but the second fell close alongside the Achilles, which probably would have been hit had she not already started to turn away at full speed. She immediately resumed shadowing at longer range, zigzagging frequently to throw out the enemy's gunnery plot. The enemy ceased fire and continued on his westerly course.

At 11.04 a.m. a merchant ship, apparently stopped since she was blowing off steam, was sighted close to the Admiral Graf Spee, from whom a few minutes later the Ajax and Achilles received a wireless signal: ‘Please rescue lifeboats of English steamer.’ Neither cruiser replied to this message. When they came up with her, the ship was found to be the British steamer Shakespeare, 5029 tons. All her boats were stowed and, in response to a signal from the Ajax, she reported all well and that she did not need any assistance. The Graf Spee's signal was apparently a ruse tried out with the object of delaying and evading the shadowing cruisers.

About this time Commodore Harwood received a message from the Exeter reporting that all her turrets were out of action and that she was flooded forward but could steam at 18 knots. She was ordered to proceed to the Falkland Islands at whatever speed was possible without straining her bulkheads. The Exeter later reported that one gun of her after turret could be fired in local control and that she was making 20 knots. She arrived at Port Stanley at noon on 16 December.

The afternoon passed quietly until 3.43 p.m. when the Achilles sighted a strange vessel and made the signal: ‘Enemy in sight bearing 297 degrees.’ ‘What is it?’ asked Commodore Harwood. ‘Suspect 8-inch cruiser, am confirming,’ replied the Achilles, who at 3.59 p.m. signalled: ‘False alarm.’ She had identified the approaching ship as the British motor-vessel Delane, 6054 tons, of the Lamport and Holt Line. The peculiar appearance of this ship, whose funnel was streamlined into the bridge superstructure, gave her at long range a close resemblance to a German cruiser of the Blucher class.

Thereafter the shadowing of the Admiral Graf Spee continued without incident until 7.15 p.m. when she altered course and fired two 11-inch salvoes at the Ajax as that ship turned away under cover of a smoke screen. The Achilles also turned away on sighting the gun flashes, but quickly resumed her westerly course. These were the first shells fired by the enemy for more than nine hours.

By this time it was clear that the Admiral Graf Spee intended to enter the estuary of the River Plate, towards which she had been steering for more than twelve hours. Across the entrance to the Plate, on its northern side, there extends for some 16 miles a shallow bank known as English Bank. Harwood foresaw a possibility that the German ship might attempt to evade his cruisers and get back to the open sea by doubling round English Bank, and took steps to prevent this happening. He ordered the Achilles to follow the Admiral Graf Spee if she passed west of Lobos Island, while the Ajax was to steam to the southward of English Bank to intercept her if she attempted to come out that way. Thus, as soon as the German ship passed Lobos Island, the whole duty of shadowing her devolved upon the Achilles, by whom the Commodore's instructions were ‘perfectly carried out.’

The Admiral Graf Spee made a considerable alteration of course to the north-westward at 7.42 p.m. and, expecting her to open fire, the Achilles made rapid changes of course. As no firing took place, the latter resumed shadowing and increased speed to creep up on the enemy before dusk. The Achilles passed between Lobos Island and the mainland. About 8 p.m., being then off Lobos Island and 50 miles east of English Bank, the Ajax hauled round to the south-westward.

The sun set at 8.48 p.m., leaving the German ship clearly silhouetted against the western sky, and the Achilles altered course to north-westward to keep the full advantage of the after-glow while she remained under cover of the land. A few minutes later the Admiral Graf Spee altered course under cover of dusk and fired three 11-inch salvoes at a range of 22,000 yards. The first two fell short and the third dropped close astern, all being accurate for line. The Achilles replied with five salvoes of 6-inch shell while turning away at full speed and making smoke. The enemy ceased firing and the Achilles, which was then just clear of Punta Negra, turned west again at 30 knots to keep touch. This brief engagement was watched from Punta del Este, the seaside resort of Montevideo, by thousands of Uruguayans who had a ‘grandstand’ view and mistook it for the main action. The Uruguayan gunboat, Uruguay, which appeared to be on patrol duty, closed the Ajax about 9.15 p.m., but was soon left astern.

Between 9.30 and 9.45 p.m. the Admiral Graf Spee fired three more 11-inch salvoes, all of which fell short, the second and third considerably so. The Achilles did not return the fire since the flashes of her guns in the twilight would have given away her position. The loom of the land must have made it extremely difficult for the enemy to have seen the Achilles, if at all, and these Parthian shots must have been merely intended to keep the shadowing cruiser at a distance.

They were the last shells fired by the Admiral Graf Spee. Since 7.40 a.m., when she headed for the River Plate, she had fired ten 11-inch salvoes, five of them from one turret only. They did not deter the Achilles which, by ten o'clock, had closed in to 10,000 yards. She could now estimate the enemy's course as taking him north of English Bank and reported accordingly to Commodore Harwood. It was becoming increasingly difficult to see the enemy, owing not only to low clouds northward of the after-glow but also to patches of funnel smoke. Course was altered at 10.13 p.m. to get the Admiral Graf Spee silhouetted against the lights of Montevideo. At 11.17 p.m. the Achilles received a signal from the Commodore to withdraw from shadowing and the Admiral Graf Spee anchored in Montevideo roads shortly after midnight.

Thus ended the day-long pursuit of the pocket battleship which, after putting the Exeter out of action and partly disabling the main armament of the Ajax during the early morning engagement, had avoided further close action and covered some 350 miles in sixteen hours to gain shelter in a neutral harbour, later referred to by her captain as ‘the trap of Montevideo’. Throughout the day and three hours of darkness, the shadowing action of the Ajax and Achilles had been entirely successful and they had foiled every effort of the Graf Spee to elude or drive them off. By their discipline, their fighting energy, their readiness to take risk and punishment, the competence and team-play of their captains, their self-assurance and confidence, the Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles had gained the day in one of the most brilliant cruiser actions in the long annals of the Royal Navy.

From the tactical point of view, one 8-inch and two 6-inch cruisers did not make an ideal force for dealing with a ship such as the Admiral Graf Spee, but the main principles of sea warfare hold good through all ages and the Royal Navy can find precedent or parallel for any situation that may arise. It was Admiral Kempenfelt who wrote to Admiral Charles Middleton (afterwards Lord Barham), Comptroller of the Navy, in July 1779: ‘Much, I may say almost all, depends upon this fleet; ‘tis an inferior against a superior fleet; therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to counter the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable opportunity for action…, to hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his attempting to execute anything but at risk and hazard, to command his attention and oblige him to think of nothing but being on his guard against your attack….’

The Barham Papers, I, p. 292.

Such was the manner in which the British cruisers fought the Battle of the River Plate. The result of the action was completely satisfactory in the final outcome, but, as was stressed in an Admiralty survey, ‘only a tactical blunder of the first magnitude by the enemy and the superiority of our personnel prevented the destruction of one of our ships and our being forced to abandon the action.’ The result of that tactical blunder was underlined in Commodore Harwood's despatch. The most salient point of the enemy's tactics, he said, was that the Admiral Graf Spee closed on sighting the British ships and split her main armament, firing one turret at the First Division (Ajax and Achilles) and the other at the Exeter. This initial closing of the range had the effect of bringing all three ships into effective gun range at once and so avoided for them the most difficult problem of gaining range in the face of 11-inch gunfire.

It appeared that the Admiral Graf Spee was heavily handled by the gunfire both of the First Division's concentration and that of the Exeter in the first phase, the culminating point perhaps being the firing of torpedoes by the latter ship. At this point the German ship turned away under smoke and ‘from then onwards her commanding officer displayed little offensive spirit and did not take advantage of the opportunity that was always present either to close the First Division or the Exeter, the latter – and he must have known it – only having one turret in action. Instead, the Graf Spee retired between the two and allowed herself to be fired at from both flanks. Only at one period, at 7.20 a.m., did she again concentrate on the First Division and she immediately abandoned this when the Ajax fired torpedoes.’ The Admiral Graf Spee's frequent alterations of course were, from an avoiding point of view, well carried out and undoubtedly threw out much of the gunfire of the British cruisers. She had an exceptionally high degree of manoeuvrability and apparently used full helm for her turns. On many occasions this gave her an apparent list ‘which raised our hopes’, but she always came upright again on steadying. At no time did she ‘steam’ at a higher speed than 24 knots, and generally her speed was between 19 and 22 knots.

Rear-Admiral Harwood's despatch to Admiralty, 30 December 1939.

The casualties in the British cruisers during the action were as follows:

Officers Ratings Killed Wounded Killed Wounded Exeter 5 3 56 20 Ajax 1 7 14 Achilles 2 4 7 — — — — TOTAL 5 6 67 41

CHAPTER 5 The Destruction of the Admiral Graf Spee

ONCE the Admiral Graf Spee had anchored in Montevideo roads the main preoccupation of Commodore Harwood was how long she intended to remain there. It was of prime importance that the Ajax and Achilles should keep to seaward of the enemy ship if she came out and at the same time avoid being caught by her against the dawn light. For this reason Harwood withdrew his ships from the River Plate channels to seaward for the remainder of the night and closed in towards Montevideo once the risk of being silhouetted against the dawn had passed.

For the time being the two small cruisers alone stood between the enemy and the open sea. Both were short of fuel after their hard and prolonged steaming the day before. The Ajax had expended more than 820 rounds and the Achilles 1240 rounds of their 6-inch ammunition. They could not hope to fight another successful action unless they were concentrated, and the geographical factors favoured the enemy rather than them. From the River Plate estuary, which is 120 miles wide between Lobos Island to the north-east and Cape San Antonio to the south-west, there emerge three widely separated deep-water channels. The northernmost runs between the English Bank lightship and Cumberland Shoal; the second, whose centre is nearly 30 miles further south, is between English Bank and Rouen Bank; the third is nearly 30 miles wide between the latter bank and Cape San Antonio.

Throughout Thursday, 14 December, the Ajax and Achilles kept constant watch over as wide an area of the River Plate estuary as possible. Commodore Harwood requested the British Minister at Montevideo to use every possible means of delaying the sailing of the Admiral Graf Spee in order to gain time for reinforcements to reach him. He suggested that the Minister should sail British merchant ships and invoke the twenty-four-hour rule to prevent the enemy's leaving harbour. The Naval Attaché, Buenos Aires, Captain H. W. U. McCall, RN, and the British naval intelligence officer kept him ‘most adequately supplied’ with the latest news of the Admiral Graf Spee. Harwood also learned that the Ark Royal, Renown, Neptune, Dorsetshire, Shropshire, and three destroyers were all on their way to the River Plate, but none could reach him for at least five days.

The arrival of the Cumberland at ten o'clock that night restored to its narrow balance a doubtful situation. She had made the passage of 1000 miles from the Falkland Islands in thirty-four hours. Now it was possible for all three deep-water channels to be patrolled. The Cumberland covered the sector between Rouen Bank and English Bank, with the Achilles to the north of her and the Ajax to the south. In a policy signal beginning ‘my object destruction’, Commodore Harwood ordered that should the Admiral Graf Spee come out she was to be shadowed, and the three cruisers were to concentrate sufficiently far to seaward to enable a concerted attack to be carried out. He also repeated to the Cumberland his signal of 12 December, substituting her name for the Exeter in the original. The Ajax took in 200 tons of fuel-oil from the tanker Olynthus in San Borombon Bay on 15 December in weather so bad that the securing hawsers parted.

It was reported to Commodore Harwood that the Admiral Graf Spee had landed a funeral party that morning to bury her thirty-six dead and, later, that she had been granted an extension of her stay up to seventy-two hours in order to make her seaworthy. The reports made it appear that she had been damaged far more extensively than had been thought likely and had been hit from sixty to seventy times during the action. The British merchant ship Ashworth was sailed from Montevideo at seven o'clock that evening and Harwood was informed that the Admiral Graf Spee had accepted the edict that she would not be allowed to sail for twenty-four hours after that time. Nevertheless, he could not be sure that she would not break out at any time that suited her.

In accordance with the Commodore's plan the Ajax, Achilles, and Cumberland assembled 15 miles east of Cape San Antonio at 12.30 a.m. on 16 December. The squadron closed the River Plate towards dawn and the Ajax flew off her aircraft for a reconnaissance of Montevideo harbour, with instructions not to fly over territorial waters. The aircraft returned at 8.30 a.m. and reported that it had been impossible to see anything owing to bad visibility. The aircraft had been fired at in the vicinity of the whistle buoy, which seemed to indicate that the Admiral Graf Spee was taking advantage of the morning mist to put to sea. The cruisers at once went to action stations, but shortly afterwards it was reported that the enemy was still in harbour. When the Commodore suggested that an inquiry into the firing on the aircraft might be a way of delaying her sailing, the British Minister at Montevideo replied that it was definitely not the Admiral Graf Spee that had fired, but possibly an Argentine guard gunboat.

That day the Admiralty informed Commodore Harwood that he was free to engage the Admiral Graf Spee anywhere outside the three-mile limit. He decided to move his patrol into the area north and east of English Bank, as he considered that an engagement in the very restricted water just outside the three-mile limit off Montevideo was impracticable owing to lack of sea room and the ‘possibility of “overs” landing in Uruguayan territory and causing international complications.’

It was reported during the day that the Admiral Graf Spee was still making good action damage with assistance from the shore and that she had taken in provisions. It was thought unlikely that she would sail that night, but Harwood was firm on taking no chances. Again with the prefatory ‘my object destruction’, he signalled to his ships an appreciation of the situation and the tactical dispositions to be made in the event of the Admiral Graf Spee sailing and being engaged. The British merchant ship Dunster Grange sailed from Montevideo at five o'clock in the afternoon and a further period of twenty-four hours' delay before the Admiral Graf Spee could sail was claimed. It was reported, however, that she had made rapid progress with her repairs and might leave harbour at any time.

Late that afternoon Commodore Harwood received the Admiralty's signal informing him of the honours bestowed by the King upon him (KCB) and the captains of the Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles (CB), and of his promotion to Rear-Admiral to date 13 December. ‘This was a most stimulating tonic to us all,’ he wrote in his despatch, ‘and I took steps to pass it on to H.M. ships under my command, emphasising the share of all concerned in the honours their senior officers had received.’

Describing the patrol off Montevideo, Captain Parry, wrote:

The next four days and nights, though uneventful, were full of anxiety. Fortunately, the American broadcast service kept our enemy in a blaze of publicity; but naturally we had to remain ready for immediate action for it was always possible that he might slink out unmolested. This entailed keeping all hands at their stations all night and very little sleep could be got by those of us who might be faced with a quick decision. The first twenty-four hours was perhaps the most critical, for it was not until the evening of 14 December that we were reinforced by the Cumberland and her welcome eight 8-inch guns. During this trying time the splendid spirit of the ship's company was most inspiring. If anyone's spirits had been inclined to droop they could not have failed to be revived by the strains of Maori music and songs, or the shouts of merriment which came from the various quarters. On the last evening the captain decided that the degree of readiness might be slightly relaxed to allow a proportion of the ship's company to sleep in their hammocks; but a few minutes later he received a unanimous request from all quarters that they would prefer to remain all night ready at their stations. Such a gesture is unforgettable.

The British cruisers spent Saturday night, 16 December, patrolling on a north and south line east of English Bank lightbuoy. The Achilles, whose oil was running low, refuelled next morning from the Olynthus off Rouen Bank, the Ajax and Cumberland acting as lookouts at visibility distance while the operation was in progress. The squadron afterwards cruised south-east of English Bank ready to take up the same patrol as on the previous night.

From the moment she sought shelter in harbour the Admiral Graf Spee became the subject of a world-wide flood of radio and press publicity which completely overwhelmed the spate of Nazi propaganda and falsities that made shift to gloss over the ignominy of her defeat and flight. Behind the scenes a considerable political and diplomatic struggle was proceeding. After the landing of her wounded and the release of the masters and fifty-four members of the crews of British ships sunk by her, discussions began over the restoration of the Admiral Graf Spee's seagoing efficiency. A German shipping surveyor from Buenos Aires and the ship's senior engineer officer assessed the period required for repairs as not less than fourteen days in view of the limited local repair facilities. The German Ambassador addressed a note to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister requesting permission for this length of stay.

During the afternoon of 15 December the German Ambassador was informed that the Admiral Graf Spee would be permitted a stay of seventy-two hours and that any extension was not acceptable. The Uruguayan technical commission had declared seventy-two hours adequate to make the ship seaworthy. The Foreign Minister agreed to recommend to his government that the period should be timed to commence from the return ashore of the technical commission. This would, in fact, allow the ship nearly ninety-six hours in harbour from the time of her arrival.

On receipt of this decision, Captain Langsdorff signalled to the German Naval High Command as follows:

(1) Renown and Ark Royal, as well as cruisers and destroyers off Montevideo.

At that time the Renown and Ark Royal and the Neptune and her destroyers were more than 1500 miles away to the northward and approaching Rio de Janeiro.

Close blockade at night. No prospect of breaking out into the open sea and getting through to Germany. (2) Intend to proceed to the limit of neutral waters. If I can fight my way through to Buenos Aires with ammunition still remaining I shall endeavour to do so. (3) As a break through might result in the destruction of Spee without the possibility of causing damage to the enemy, request instructions whether to scuttle the ship (in spite of the inadequate depth of water in the Plate estuary) or submit to internment.

The German Ambassador, in a telegram to the German Foreign Office, endorsed Langsdorff's appreciation and pointed out that a stay of fourteen days would not alter the situation and would merely assist the concentration of enemy forces. He regarded internment of the Admiral Graf Spee as the ‘worst possible solution in any circum- stancescircumstances.’ It would be preferable, in view of her shortage of ammunition, to blow her up in the shallow waters of the Plate and have her crew interned. The German Foreign Office replied ordering the Ambassador and Captain Langsdorff to seek to prolong the ship's stay and also sent the following telegram:

According to English press reports the Ark Royal is in the Plate area. As you know, we believe that the Ark Royal has already been sunk. By order of the Fuehrer you are to attempt to take photographs of the supposed Ark Royal. Signal results and forward the photographs.

The Germans in Montevideo noted that this order was impossible to fulfil since the ship had merely been allegedly sighted on the horizon and no aircraft could be got for reconnaissance.

Meanwhile, in Germany, Admiral Raeder was conferring with Hitler, who was opposed to internment ‘since there was a possibility that the Graf Spee might score a success against the British ships in a break-through’. The Fuehrer approved the instructions the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy sent to Captain Langsdorff, who was to ‘attempt by all methods to extend the time limit for your stay in neutral waters in order to retain freedom of action as long as possible’. Langsdorff's proposal to proceed to neutral limits and, if possible, fight through to Buenos Aires was approved. He was also told that the Admiral Graf Spee was not to be interned in Uruguay and that if the ship was scuttled he was to ‘ensure effective destruction.’

Late in the afternoon of 16 December Captain Langsdorff discussed his plans with his senior officers, while the German Ambassador was having an interview with the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, which at times was very heated. The Ambassador finally requested an audience with the President, but the Foreign Minister insisted that this could not be granted unless the Ambassador acknowledged the seventy-two hours' time limit. The Uruguayan government adhered to its decision that the Admiral Graf Spee must put to sea by 6.45 p.m. on 17 December or be interned. The Ambassador reported the result of his interview to Captain Langsdorff, who thereupon wrote protesting against the time limit imposed and intimating his decision to scuttle his ship.

This was defeat, naked and brutal, and to it was added the sting of a sense of disgrace. All through the midsummer day of 17 December preparations for the self-destruction of the German ship went forward. By mid-afternoon the most important secret equipment and documents had been destroyed. Most of her crew were transferred to the German merchant ship Tacoma, Captain Langsdorff with four officers and thirty-eight ratings remaining on board to take the ship out and scuttle her. The Tacoma was to follow her, and the whole crew were to be transhipped to Argentine tugs which were to take them to Buenos Aires for internment.

Out at sea the three British cruisers steamed to and fro south-east of English Bank. ‘We all expected that she would break out at any moment,’ wrote Rear-Admiral Harwood in his despatch. ‘. … At this stage the most cheerful optimism pervaded all ships in spite of the fact that this was the fifth night of waiting for the enemy.’ The instant that word was received that the German ship was weighing anchor, the squadron assumed the first degree of readiness for action, increased speed to 25 knots, and steamed towards the whistle buoy at the entrance to the five-mile dredged channel leading into Montevideo. The Ajax flew off her aircraft to observe and report the enemy's movements.

At 6.17 p.m. the Admiral Graf Spee hoisted a large ensign on her foremast, as well as one at the main, and left the harbour before the eyes of wondering crowds. She steered to the south-westward and stopped about eight miles from the entrance, the Tacoma, which had followed, anchoring about two miles north-east of her. By 7.40 p.m. the fuses of the scuttling charges had been set and Langsdorff and his demolition party left in the ship's boats for the Tacoma, while two tugs and a lighter from Buenos Aires neared the latter vessel.

The first explosion occurred exactly at sunset. All the crew of the Admiral Graf Spee paraded on the deck of the Tacoma, making the Nazi salute. A fierce jet of flame leaped up from the doomed ship, followed by a dense cloud of smoke and the loud rumble of an explosion. Then a gigantic ball of flame burst aft as a second great explosion took place. There ensued a long succession of explosions accompanied by leaping flames and a great pillar of brown smoke rising against the red evening sky. Fires continued to burn in the ship for six days. Her destruction in the shallow waters of the Plate estuary was watched by tens of thousands of awed spectators crowded on the roofs of Montevideo and along the seafront, while radio broadcasts and press cables flashed their graphic stories round the world.

Passing north of English Bank, the British cruisers were nearing Montevideo when at 8.45 p.m. the aircraft signalled: ‘Graf Spee has blown herself up.’ It was almost dark when the Ajax stopped to make an excellent recovery of her aircraft which had alighted on the water, and as the Achilles swept past her the ships' companies cheered each other. All three cruisers then switched on their navigation lights and steamed past the whistle buoy about four miles off the flaming wreck. ‘It was now dark,’ wrote Rear-Admiral Harwood, ‘and she was ablaze from end to end, flames reaching almost as high as the top of her control tower – a magnificent and most cheering sight.’

It was an ignominious end for a great ship which bore the name of the German admiral who twenty-five years before had fought his ships to the last against great odds and perished with both his sons in the Battle of the Falkland Islands. Speaking at the launching of the Admiral Graf Spee at Wilhelmshaven on 30 June 1934, Admiral Raeder had recalled that, off Coronel on 1 November 1914, a German admiral – he whose name she took – ‘for the first time in German history went into battle far from the German fatherland against an enemy of equal rank.’ The Admiral Graf Spee had been chosen to represent the German Navy at the Coronation naval review at Spithead on 20 May 1937 and had carried Hitler triumphantly to Memel.

The first official German announcement of the end of the ship was in the following terms: ‘The time necessary to make the Graf Spee seaworthy was refused by the Government of Uruguay. In the circumstances Captain Langsdorff decided to destroy his ship by blowing her up.’ At three o'clock in the morning of 18 December, according to Raeder's diary, the second sentence was altered to read: ‘Under the circumstances the Fuehrer ordered Captain Langsdorff to destroy his ship by blowing her up. This order was put into effect outside the territorial waters of Uruguay.’

Captain Langsdorff and his ship's company numbering 1039 officers and ratings arrived at Buenos Aires in the tugs in the afternoon of 18 December, after Uruguayan officials had tried unsuccessfully to get them back to Montevideo. The Tacoma was compelled by a Uruguayan warship to return to harbour. On the following day the Argentine Government decided to intern the crew of the Admiral Graf Spee, despite the German claim that they were shipwrecked seamen.

That night, after the German Ambassador had informed him of this decision, Langsdorff committed suicide by shooting himself in his room in a Buenos Aires hotel, the melodrama of this act being heightened by the fact that he lay on a German naval ensign. In a letter to the Ambassador, written shortly before he died, he recounted the reasons for his decision to scuttle the Admiral Graf Spee. ‘I am convinced,’ he wrote, ‘that under the circumstances, no other course was open to me, once I had taken my ship into the trap of Montevideo. For with the ammunition remaining, any attempt to fight my way back to open and deep water was bound to fail. … It was clear to me that this decision might be consciously or unwittingly misconstrued by persons ignorant of my motives, as being attributable entirely or partly to personal considerations. Therefore I decided from the beginning to accept the consequences involved in this decision. For a captain with a sense of honour, it goes without saying that his personal fate cannot be separated from that of his ship. … After to-day's decision of the Argentine Government, I can do no more for my ship's company. Neither shall I any longer be able to take an active part in the present struggle of my country. It only remains to prove by my death that the men of the fighting services of the Third Reich are ready to die for the honour of the flag. I alone bear the responsibility for scuttling the Graf Spee. I am happy to pay with my life for any reflection on the honour of the flag. I shall face my fate with firm faith in the cause and the future of the nation and of my Fuehrer. …’

The burial of Captain Langsdorff's body with full military honours took place in the German cemetery in Buenos Aires. The burnt-out wreck of the Graf Spee was sold some weeks later to a Senor Julio Vega of Montevideo, who employed divers and workmen to salvage fittings and other material as ‘scrap iron’.

However we regard his typically German sense of ‘honour’, it is impossible not to feel a good deal of sympathy for the unhappy man who wrote thus from the ‘jaws of measureless tribulation’. The British shipmasters who had been his prisoners spoke well of Captain Langsdorff; and in his official report Captain McCall, British Naval Attaché at Buenos Aires, paid him the tribute that he was ‘obviously a man of very high character and he was proud of the fact that he had not been the cause of a single death as the result of any of his various captures’ of merchant vessels.

Of the part played in the River Plate drama by the British cruisers, Rear-Admiral Harwood wrote in his despatch to the Admiralty: ‘I have the greatest pleasure in informing you of the very high standard of efficiency and courage that was displayed by all officers and men throughout the five days of the operation. … Within my own knowledge and from the reports of the commanding officers, there are many stories of bravery and devotion to duty, and of the utmost efficiency which shows that His Majesty's ships have been forcefully trained and made thoroughly ready to deal with the many and various exigencies of battle. … The main impression left on my mind is of the adequacy of our peace training. Little that had not been practised occurred, particularly among the repair parties. …’

In a message to the New Zealand Naval Board, as well as in his despatch to the Admiralty, the Rear-Admiral said he was ‘deeply conscious of the honour and pleasure of taking one of His Majesty's ships of the New Zealand Squadron into action. The Achilles was handled perfectly by her captain and fought magnificently by her captain, officers and ship's company.’ In his despatch he said he fully concurred with the remark of Captain Parry that ‘New Zealand has every reason to be proud of her seamen during their baptism of fire.’

During the time the cruisers of the South America Division were patrolling the River Plate estuary strong British naval forces were moving to their support, but after the destruction of the Admiral Graf Spee most of them were recalled for other duties. On Monday, 18 December, the Cumberland was left on patrol while the Ajax and Achilles went to San Borombon Bay, where they fuelled in turn from the tanker Olynthus. Rear-Admiral Harwood boarded the Achilles that evening and addressed the ship's company, praising them for their part in the recent action. Later, both ships got under way and shaped course for the Falkland Islands, where they arrived on 21 December.

The following morning the Achilles discharged her three seriously wounded ratings to the King Edward Memorial Hospital, to which a number of casualties from the Exeter and Ajax were also admitted for treatment. The Ajax and Achilles sent a number of men on board the Exeter to assist in the repair work. After fuelling from a tanker, the Ajax and Achilles sailed that evening.

Both cruisers returned to Port Stanley in the afternoon of 24 December and were joined about four hours later by the Cumberland and the Dorsetshire. The former had come down from the River Plate area and the latter arrived from Simonstown, whence she had sailed on 13 December. Christmas Day was observed by all five cruisers with traditional Navy custom. A strong south-west gale with violent hail and rain squalls was experienced from midnight of 26 December till the morning of the 29th, the Achilles riding with both anchors down and steam for slow speed. Despite the bad weather, the New Zealand cruiser managed to refuel from a tanker and to take in ammunition and stores from lighters. The three wounded ratings from the shore hospital were embarked on 29 December. The Ajax and Achilles sailed from Port Stanley in the early hours of 30 December for the River Plate.

At four o'clock in the morning of 3 January 1940 the Achilles parted company with the Ajax, which proceeded into Montevideo. The former embarked a pilot from the light vessel and steamed up the River Plate to Buenos Aires. A large crowd on the wharf gave the ship an ovation. The British Ambassador, Sir Esmond Ovey, paid the Achilles the great compliment of welcoming her personally and insisted on being the first person to board the ship on arrival. The Argentine authorities had agreed to waive all official calls, but the Minister of Marine and the Chief of the Naval Staff sent their ADCs to meet the Achilles.

In a report to the New Zealand Naval Board Captain Parry said that approximately thirty seriously wounded ratings from the Exeter and Ajax and three from the Achilles were landed at Port Stanley. The only hospital accommodation in the colony was a small cottage hospital of approximately twenty beds, of which five were reserved for maternity cases. The staff consisted of two doctors, a matron, and two trained nurses. This sufficed for the normal requirements of the colony, whose population was about 3000.

Captain Parry said that magnificent efforts were made to meet an unprecedented situation, and all difficulties were overcome so successfully that the patients could not have received better treatment and attention. They had complete confidence in the senior medical officer, Dr Kinnaird, and were full of admiration for the matron, Miss Gowans, and her staff of nurses and voluntary aids. The Governor of the Falkland Islands, Sir H. Henniker Heaton, KCMG, visited the hospital regularly.

No public recognition of their good work had been given to these people owing to the necessity of keeping secret the use made by the Royal Navy of the Falkland Islands, but Captain Parry suggested that a letter from the New Zealand naval authorities would be greatly appreciated. The Naval Secretary, therefore, on 5 March 1940 sent a letter to the Governor of the Falkland Islands, conveying the Naval Board's great appreciation of the efforts of the hospital staff.

Captain Parry also reported that, as soon as the first news of the River Plate action was received, the British Community Council in Buenos Aires provided at their own expense complete hospital equipment for 100 men and despatched it immediately to the Falkland Islands. A radiologist and fourteen trained nurses, all of whom gave up their own work at short notice, went with the equipment in the steamer Lafonia. Although this assistance did not arrive in time to help the Falkland Islanders during the first week, it relieved the situation enormously. The modern X-ray apparatus was particularly valuable.

During the visit of the Achilles to Buenos Aires from 3 to 5 January 1940, the hospitality received and the amount of presents given to the ship were incredible, said Captain Parry. The reception of the ship had been arranged by the British Community Council and the Australia and New Zealand Association of Buenos Aires. In addition, the following sums of money were presented to the Rear-Admiral, South America Division, as a contribution to the families of men killed or seriously wounded in action off the River Plate: British Community Council, Buenos Aires, £1000; British Community, Rosario Consular District, £93; British Patriotic Funds, Valparaiso and Santiago (Chile), £300. This money was divided among the three ships in proportion to the numbers of men. On 5 March 1940 the New Zealand Naval Board sent a letter to the British Ambassador, Buenos Aires, expressing its great appreciation of and thanks for the generosity and good work of the British communities concerned.

Though their attitude was generally friendly, the Argentinians took little part in the reception to the Achilles, probably in order to appear strictly neutral. Leave in Buenos Aires was given only to organised parties from the Achilles, who were the guests of the British Community Council and the Australia and New Zealand Association. German seamen from the Admiral Graf Spee were still in uniform in Buenos Aires at that time and appeared to have no restrictions on their movements. Such contacts as they made with the ship's company of the Achilles were of a friendly nature, drinks and cap ribbons being exchanged. Captain Parry was also informed that two German seamen who were on the pier at sunset saluted as the flag of the Achilles was hauled down.

HMS Ajax had a rousing reception in Montevideo. It was remarked that the most striking thing was the spontaneity of the welcome, which could hardly have been greater had Montevideo been a British community. The Anglo-Uruguayan Trade Association made a presentation of plate to Rear-Admiral Harwood for ‘his services in keeping the sea clear for Uruguayan trade.’

The Achilles left Buenos Aires on 5 January and rejoined the flagship that afternoon. The Dorsetshire and Shropshire were in company with the Ajax, the Shropshire having recently arrived from the Cape of Good Hope. Rear-Admiral Harwood then transferred his flag to the Achilles and the division proceeded to sea in single line ahead. That night the Ajax left on passage to England. After eight days on patrol, the Achilles arrived at the Falkland Islands on 14 January. It was at that time that Rear-Admiral Harwood proposed to the Admiralty that the Achilles, when relieved by HMS Hawkins, should proceed to New Zealand to refit at Auckland instead of Malta as had been previously intended.

After refuelling and taking in stores, the Achilles sailed from Port Stanley in the early hours of 16 January and patrolled as far north as the Rio de Janeiro area. In the afternoon of 26 January she arrived at Montevideo, where unstinted hospitality was accorded the ship's company during her stay of twenty-four hours. The German merchant ships Tacoma and Lahn were still lying in the harbour. The Achilles refuelled from the Admiralty tanker Olwen off Rouen Bank on 28 January and was at anchor there when the Hawkins arrived next morning. Rear-Admiral Harwood's flag was then struck in the Achilles and rehoisted in the Hawkins. The ship's company cheered him as he left the Achilles and farewelled him by singing ‘For He's a Jolly Good Fellow’ and the Maori goodbye song.

‘During the short time his flag was flying at our masthead, he endeared himself to us all,’ recorded Captain Parry. ‘It was, therefore, very gratifying that, when he left us, he signalled:

My best wishes to you all. I have enjoyed flying my flag in your very happy ship.

Besides the debt we all owe him for his unforgettable example and leadership in the Battle of the River Plate, we are also more than grateful to him for forwarding a proposal that we should refit at Auckland instead of an Imperial dockyard.’

In the afternoon of 29 January the Achilles steamed into Montevideo roads to embark mails. This enabled the ship's company to take a last look at the wreck of the Admiral Graf Spee. ‘The ship is now a pathetic sight,’ wrote Parry. ‘Her hull is no longer visible. Her upper works are rusting rapidly. Her funnel and mainmast lean heavily to starboard. Her fore-turret guns are just awash, while the after-turret, capsized by the explosion of the magazine underneath, lies on its back.’

Proceeding ‘in execution of previous orders’, the Achilles arrived in Stanley harbour for the last time in the afternoon of 1 February 1940 and sailed twenty-four hours later on her return to New Zealand. The transit of Magellan Strait was made on 4 February. The passage across the Pacific was entirely uneventful, and the Achilles arrived at Auckland on the morning of 23 February, thus ending a memorable and historic cruise.

During the six months since she left Auckland in August 1939, the Achilles had steamed 52,323 miles and spent 168 days at sea and only ten days in harbour. As she had already steamed 21,139 miles from the time she left England for New Zealand in February 1939, the total distance travelled during the twelve months was 73,462 miles.

Since 29 August 1939 leave had been given to the ship's company on nineteen occasions, including several brief periods when the ship was in harbour for only a few hours. Night leave had been granted fifteen times, on seven of which not more than twenty men had found accommodation on shore. Life on board had therefore been very strenuous, for sea time in war means continuous watchkeeping for everybody and the daily ordeal of going to full action stations at dawn. The strain bears particularly on the engine-room staff, who not only keep continuous watch at sea but have to seize every moment in harbour to carry out urgent repairs. That no breakdowns occurred during the cruise was evidence of the soundness of the machinery and the devotion to duty of the men who tended it.

‘One thing at least is certain,’ wrote Captain Parry in summing up his impressions of the cruise. ‘The continued enthusiasm and cheerfulness, both in dull moments and in more exciting ones, of a predominantly New Zealand ship's company has been a revelation, and for four anxious days an inspiration to one who was bred and born in the Old Country. Though many weary and anxious times lie ahead, he feels complete confidence that such men cannot fail to win the final victory.’

The sea instinct and the imagination of the people of New Zealand had been stirred by the Battle of the River Plate. The announcement that the Achilles was returning to the Dominion was therefore received with much gratification. With the active cooperation of the Government, the civic authorities of Auckland made elaborate preparations to give the cruiser and her ship's company a fitting welcome. Arrangements were also made for the near relatives of her men from many parts of the country to be present when she arrived. The Governor-General, Lord Galway, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon. P. Fraser (the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. M. J. Savage, being seriously ill), and four other Cabinet Ministers travelled to Auckland to take part in the proceedings. Interpreting the national feeling of thanksgiving and pride, the names of twenty-seven municipalities, ranging from the far north to the most southerly part of New Zealand, figured on the banners of welcome that were a prominent feature of the lavish decorations in Queen Street, Auckland.

As the Achilles steamed up Rangitoto Channel in the early morning of 23 February thousands of people watched her from every point of vantage. When she passed the Devonport Naval Base on her way to the city wharf at which she berthed, the Achilles cheered and was cheered by the Leander and the Philomel.

A vast crowd, estimated to number more than 100,000, assembled in Queen Street and its approaches to greet the ship's company, led by Captain Parry, as they marched from the wharf to attend the civic reception and luncheon at the Town Hall. Some 6000 officers and men of the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Force, and the Merchant Navy took part in the parade, the route being lined by Territorial troops and school cadets. At the civic reception Mr Fraser read a cable message received that morning by the Governor-General from the Secretary of State for the Dominions expressing the British Government's appreciation of the notable part played by the Achilles and her New Zealanders in the River Plate action. The message said it was particularly appropriate that the Achilles should arrive home in New Zealand on the day on which the officers and men of the Ajax and Exeter were being reviewed by the King. The Governor-General, in reply, said the Government and people of New Zealand wished to associate themselves with the welcome to those ships' companies, to whom their comrades in the Achilles sent cordial greetings.

While the Achilles was undergoing a long refit, a party of about 400 officers and ratings travelled by train to Wellington, where they were given an enthusiastic welcome as they marched through the city streets. The rest of the ship's company visited Wellington four days later. Requests from many part of the Dominion for similar visits could not be granted. The presence in their home towns of men on long leave from the Achilles proved of great value to recruiting for the armed forces.

CHAPTER 6 The Cruise of the Leander

ON 8 September 1939 the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, in a telegram to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, said that by placing the Achilles and two escort vessels, Leith and Wellington, under the orders of Admiralty, the New Zealand Government had ‘made the maximum possible strategic contribution at sea under present circumstances, since HMS Leander requires to be retained on the New Zealand Station to guard against the threat of attack on shipping by armed raiders.’ The message added that the previous suggestion that New Zealand should maintain a third cruiser could not be considered an immediate requirement.

After her tropical cruise to Fanning Island, whence she had returned on 13 September 1939, the Leander prepared for a visit to sub-Antarctic latitudes. She sailed from Auckland on 25 September for the uninhabited Auckland Islands and Campbell Island, which were regarded as likely bases for enemy commerce raiders and their supply ships. The cruiser arrived off Campbell Island in the morning of 28 September and made a careful examination of all bays and inlets, but no indications of recent human activity were found. Next morning the Leander anchored in Port Ross, or Sarah's Bosom-harbour, on the north-east coast of the Auckland Islands. After inspecting this locality she steamed along the east side of the main island and lay-to two miles to seaward of the entrance to Carnley harbour in a gale, with visibility of about six miles between the rain squalls. Nothing suspicious was seen in the eastern end of Carnley harbour or in the inlets further up the coast. The Leander returned to Wellington on 1 October and sailed three days later for Auckland, co-operating with reconnaissance aircraft which made sweeps over the Cook Strait, Cuvier Island, and Hauraki Gulf areas. The Leander made a second cruise to the Auckland Islands in November. On this occasion Carnley harbour was entered and examined, several inlets being visited by the cruiser's boats. The anchorage at Port Ross was also inspected and other bays and inlets were reconnoitred by the ship's aircraft. Nothing suspicious was seen in any of the places examined.

There is little doubt, however, that the German steamer Erlangen, 6100 tons, was lying in a remote anchorage in Carnley harbour at the time the Leander made her first visit to the Auckland Islands. This vessel, after loading at New Zealand ports for Europe, sailed from Dunedin on 28 August 1939, ostensibly for Port Kembla, New South Wales, where she was to have coaled for her homeward passage. It was reported that the Erlangen was sighted two days later ‘hove-to off Stewart Island in weather that did not necessitate that precaution.’ She was ordered by radio from Germany not to go to Australia, but she had insufficient coal to steam to the distant neutral waters of South America.

According to published German accounts, the Erlangen went to the Auckland Islands and lay concealed at the head of North Arm, the innermost inlet in Carnley harbour, for five weeks while her crew toiled at cutting rata wood, of which some 400 tons was loaded to eke out her meagre coal supply. A suit of sails was fashioned from hatch covers and spare canvas. The Erlangen put to sea again on 7 October 1939, and after a long passage of five weeks arrived at Puerto Montt, Southern Chile, on 11 November.

The Erlangen ultimately made her way into the Atlantic. She sailed from Mar del Plata, Argentine, on 24 July 1941 and was intercepted by HMS Newcastle. She was set on fire by her own crew. An unsuccessful effort was made to tow her into Uruguayan waters, but she sank.

In April 1941, when a coastwatching station was being established on the Auckland Islands, it was found that five or six acres of bush had been felled at the head of North Arm.

At about this time the Admiralty thought that the Leander could be more usefully employed elsewhere than in New Zealand waters and, subject to the concurrence of the New Zealand Government, proposed to replace her on the New Zealand Station by a ‘C’ class cruiser.

Fourteen ‘C’ class cruisers were built in 1916–18 — Capetown, Cardiff, etc., — 4180 to 4290 tons displacement; 29 knots; five 6-inch guns. Most of them were converted to anti-aircraft ships after 1939.

This proposal was mentioned by the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in a letter dated 29 October 1939 to the acting Prime Minister, in which it was pointed out that the change would greatly facilitate the naval dispositions contemplated by the Admiralty.

In a minute by the Staff Officer (Operations) to the Naval Board which was considered at a meeting of the Council of Defence on 31 October, it was pointed out that both cruisers had been placed voluntarily under the operational control of the Admiralty. There was therefore no reason to object to the terms of its request. The Admiralty was the best judge of the probable scale of attack to be expected in New Zealand waters and it seemed that a ‘C’ class cruiser, though much inferior to the Leander, would have to be accepted. An alternative would be to send out three destroyers. Attacks might come from a ‘pocket battleship’, modern 8-inch or 6-inch gun cruisers, armed raiders mounting 6-inch guns, or submarines.

A telegram was sent to the acting Prime Minister, who was then in London, stating that the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom had been informed that it was fully realised that the Admiralty was best able to estimate the probable scales of attack in various oceans. The Government readily acceded to the request for the transfer of the Leander and her replacement by another unit, but in view of the limited steaming radius and offensive capability of one ‘C’ class cruiser, it was suggested for Admiralty consideration that the Leander should be replaced by three destroyers, preferably modern, and fitted for anti-submarine operations. It was thought that three units would be of more value than one for patrolling the three focal areas of New Zealand trade and searching for raiders.

In a memorandum to the Minister of Defence, dated 2 November 1939, the Naval Secretary said it was assumed that, but for the outbreak of war, the Government would have considered whether to follow the recommendations of the Pacific Defence Conference and undertake responsibility for a third cruiser and two escort vessels. It would now appear, particularly in view of the war, that this policy should be implemented in principle. If New Zealand undertook responsibility for an armed merchant cruiser and three destroyers, in addition to the Leander and Achilles, the cost would be about £450,000 a year, or about £75,000 more than a third cruiser and two escort vessels.

When the matter was referred to the Minister of Finance, the Secretary of the Treasury said that ‘in view of the heavy expenditure necessary on account of increased Air Force and Army activities, it is considered that no further commitment in respect of naval services, over and above the present for the maintenance of the Leander and Achilles and the armed merchant cruiser be entered into at the present time, especially as no request in this connection has been received from the Imperial Government.’

This short-term view of the Treasury appeared to derive support from a telegram received by the Governor-General on 21 November from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, stating that ‘the Admiralty had had under consideration certain revised plans for the disposition of cruisers and it was not thought it would be necessary for HMS Leander to be moved from the New Zealand Station, at any rate for the present. The Admiralty were most appreciative of the readiness of New Zealand to fall in with their wishes.’ But the course of the war was yet to involve New Zealand in many further heavy commitments in respect to naval services.

At that time the Admiral Graf Spee was on her commerce raiding cruise. She had recently entered the Indian Ocean, where she had scant success, and by 21 November had returned to the South Atlantic. This was not known for some time and the possibility of her entering the Pacific had to be considered. On 29 November 1939 the Chief of the Naval Staff, in a message to Admiralty and the Australian Naval Board, said that in the event of the arrival of an enemy armoured ship in New Zealand waters the Commodore intended that the Leander would try to locate and shadow the ship. He would avoid action in conditions of high visibility and seek action if a favourable opportunity occurred at night or in low visibility with the intention to cripple the enemy. In deciding whether to attack, consideration would be given to the proximity of reinforcement. In the event, as we have seen, the fortune of war favoured the other New Zealand cruiser in South American waters.

During the month of December 1939 the Leander remained at Auckland at twelve hours' notice for steam and gave Christmas leave to her ship's company. By this time arrangements were well advanced for the embarkation and despatch overseas of the First Echelon of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force. It had been decided that the troopship convoy would be escorted from Wellington by HMS Ramillies, a battleship from the Mediterranean Fleet, HMAS Canberra (flagship of Rear-Admiral Commanding Australian Squadron), and the Leander (broad pendant of Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron). The first transport, the Empress of Canada, 21,517 tons, arrived at Wellington from Hong Kong on 23 December. She was followed by the Rangitata, 16,737 tons, Dunera, 11,162 tons, Orion, 23,371 tons, Strathaird, 22,281 tons, and the Polish motor-vessel Sobieski, 11,030 tons. The Dunera and Sobieski proceeded to Lyttelton to embark the South Island troops. When she arrived at Wellington on 31 December the Ramillies displayed between her masts a huge banner bearing the words: ‘Well done, the Achilles’ – the tribute of her ship's company to the part played by that ship in the River Plate action.

On 1 January 1940, before the Leander left Auckland, the broad pendant of Commodore J. W. Rivett-Carnac was transferred to HMS Philomel on his relief by Commodore H. E. Horan as Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron and Commanding Officer HMS Leander.

On 4 January the Leander left Wellington for Lyttelton to act as escort for the ships carrying the South Island troops. The Dunera went south in company with the cruiser, which anchored in Lyttelton harbour early the following morning. The Dunera embarked some 1350 troops and the Sobieski 1150, and both sailed in the afternoon with the Leander. During the forenoon of 6 January they made contact in Cook Strait with the four transports carrying the North Island troops, numbering some 4000, which had sailed from Wellington that morning. The convoy, which now consisted of the Orion, Strathaird, Empress of Canada, Rangitata, Dunera, and Sobieski, then proceeded, escorted by the Canberra, Leander, and Ramillies. The six transports, totalling 106,095 tons gross register, were carrying over 6500 troops. It is of interest to recall that the ten ships, totalling 82,300 tons gross register, which transported the Main Body of the 1st New Zealand Expeditionary Force to Egypt in 1914, carried 8499 troops and 3946 horses.

After an uneventful passage across the Tasman Sea, the New Zealand ships met the Australian transports Empress of Japan, Orcades, Otranto, Orford, and Strathnaver, escorted by HMAS Australia, off Sydney Heads on 10 January 1940. The combined convoy then sailed southward and the Leander went into Sydney.

After her return to New Zealand the Leander went up to the Bay of Islands and anchored off Russell to represent the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy at the celebration on 6 February of the centenary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi.

HMS Hector,

Hector, twin-screw passenger steamer of 11,198 tons gross register, owned by A. Holt and Company (Blue Funnel Line) of Liverpool. As an armed merchant cruiser, she was fitted with eight 6-inch guns. She was set on fire and sunk at Colombo in February 1942.

armed merchant cruiser, commanded by Captain R. Lloyd, RN (retd), allocated by the Admiralty to the New Zealand Station, arrived at Auckland from Bombay on 10 February 1940. The Naval Board informed the Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron that the Hector was to be regarded as a vessel of the squadron. She sailed from Auckland on 27 February with a relief for the garrison troops on Fanning Island, and called at Apia, Samoa, and Suva on her return passage to Auckland.

Arrangements were now in hand for the transport of the Second Echelon, New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and the second draft of Australian troops, and questions were raised by the New Zealand Government regarding the adequacy of the escorts proposed by the Admiralty. In order to effect urgent economy in shipping tonnage, the Admiralty stated, it was under consideration to include the Queen Mary, Aquitania, Mauretania, and Empress of Britain in Convoy US 2. As the speed of some of the transports was below that at which these fast liners could be handled it was necessary to divide the convoy into a fast group and a slow group whose seagoing speeds would be 20 knots and 13 knots respectively. Two escorting forces would therefore be required.

In order to minimise the period during which the Colombo area would be without the protection of a raider hunting group, it was proposed that the slow convoy of five transports should be escorted from Fremantle to Colombo and Aden by HM Ships Ramillies and Eagle (aircraft-carrier) and HMAS Sydney. The fast convoy of seven ships would be escorted from Fremantle to the vicinity of Cocos Island by HMA Ships Canberra and Australia and thence to Colombo and Aden by HMS Kent and the French cruiser Suffren. Through the Red Sea the slow group would be escorted by HMS Ramillies and the fast group by one 6-inch-gun cruiser.

The Australian Commonwealth Naval Board on 17 March proposed that, as the New Zealand transports would not be included in the slow group, the Ramillies should remain at Sydney until required for the onward escort of that group of Convoy US 2. In concurring with this proposal the Admiralty said it was regretted that the moral effect of the previously intended visit of the Ramillies to New Zealand would now be lost, but it would be realised that the change in plans was inevitable as the battleship had neither the speed nor the endurance to accompany the fast group. It was presumed that the Australian and New Zealand Naval Boards would arrange to escort the New Zealand transports across the Tasman Sea. In a message dated 19 March the Admiralty said the Eagle, owing to an accident, would not be able to join the slow group at Fremantle, but it was considered that the Ramillies and the Sydney would afford adequate protection.

On 18 March the Australian Naval Board proposed to the New Zealand Naval Board that the Canberra and Leander should escort the New Zealand troopships across the Tasman Sea to 160 degrees East (about two-thirds of the passage) and that the Australia should then relieve the Leander. While agreeing to this proposal, the New Zealand Naval Board informed the Admiralty and the Australian Naval Board that the Government was very uneasy as to whether this and the subsequent escorts were sufficiently strong and would be glad to have information of the Admiralty's intention regarding escorting forces for the whole voyage. The matter was clouded further when Admiralty messages announced that reports had been received that a pocket battleship accompanied by a tanker of the Altmark class had left Germany during the first week of March on a commerce-raiding cruise.

The German raider No. 16 (Atlantis) sailed from Kiel on 11 March 1940 on a cruise which included the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans. Raider No. 36 (Orion) sailed in April 1940 and arrived on the New Zealand coast in June. No pocket battleship was at sea on raiding operations during March 1940.

Replying to the New Zealand Naval Board, the Admiralty said the responsibility for providing adequate escorts rested with it. It was its considered opinion that the only raider likely to be encountered in the Tasman Sea was one of armed merchant ship type and, consequently, the escort arrangements proposed for that area were considered adequate. The question of the adequacy of escorts for all troop convoys was continually under consideration and arrangements would be modified if there was any reason for doing so.

The views of the Government were set out in a telegram dated 1 April 1940 from the Governor-General to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. The Government appreciated that the Admiralty was responsible for the adequacy of ocean escorts and did not, of course, dispute its judgment in such matters. But it felt bound to point out that it was also its responsibility to ensure that more than 7000 New Zealand troops did not depart from the Dominion unless and until the Government was fully satisfied that the voyage would be made in conditions providing a reasonable maximum of safety. In view of the Admiralty reports, which indicated at least a strong suspicion that a pocket battleship was at large, the Government could not disguise its uneasiness at the prospect of the convoy being protected by only two warships, both practically unarmoured. The Chief of Naval Staff had explained the technical and strategic factors involved, including the safety which the speed of the convoy afforded. Nevertheless, the Government felt that there was an element of risk because an action might well take place in circumstances highly unfavourable to the safety of the convoy. It could not dismiss from its mind the attraction this convoy, so valuable in men and ships, could have for the enemy. It might well be, the Government argued, that a pocket battleship had been sent out for this very purpose.

Having regard to these considerations, the Government proposed that the Leander should proceed the whole way with the convoy, thereafter being at the disposal of the Admiralty as already arranged. The Admiralty was aware that the Government did not consider it desirable that the Leander should leave New Zealand until the Achilles had completed her refit; but the Naval Board had reported that the latter ship could be at forty-eight hours' notice by the middle of May and the Hector would also be available.

Expressing appreciation of the Government's point of view, the Admiralty agreed that the Leander would be employed more usefully on escort duty than in the defence of New Zealand interests from attack by an armed merchant raider, against which, it was considered, the presence of the Hector and Achilles would afford adequate security. It welcomed the additional security to the convoy which the presence of the Leander would afford. On conclusion of escort duty, it was intended that the Leander should join the East Indies Station.

This discussion recalls the events of September–October 1914 when a difference of opinion between the Admiralty and the Governments concerned regarding the adequacy of escorts for troopship convoys resulted in considerable delay in the sailing of the first Australian and New Zealand troops for Egypt.

HMS Hector sailed from Auckland on 13 April and arrived on the 17th at the entrance to the Brisbane River, where she found the loaded Norwegian tankers Thorshov, 9955 tons, and Solor, 8262 tons, at anchor, each under a naval armed guard.

The German invasion of Norway and Denmark had started on 9 April 1940.

They sailed for Wellington on 19 April, escorted by the Hector. Four days later the Hector collided with the Thorshov. Considerable damage was done to both ships. The Hector spent three weeks in the floating dock undergoing repairs, after which she made a cruise to South Island ports.

The Leander arrived on 24 April at Wellington, where the ships assigned to transport the Second Echelon had assembled. The first to arrive was the new Royal Mail Line Andes, 25,689 tons; she went on to Lyttelton to embark the South Island troops. The Empress of Japan, 26,032 tons, arrived on 1 April, the Empress of Britain, 42,348 tons, on the 14th, and the Aquitania, 44,786 tons, on the 20th. The Canberra (flagship) and Australia arrived from Sydney as escorts, the former proceeding to Lyttelton on 29 April.

As from 1 May 1940 Captain Horan relinquished the rank of Commodore 2nd class but remained in command of the Leander. Captain Parry assumed the rank of Commodore 2nd class, and took over from Captain Horan the duties of First Naval Member of the New Zealand Naval Board, Chief of the Naval Staff, and Commodore Commanding New Zealand Squadron, continuing in command of the Achilles.

In addition to the troops numbering some 6800 officers and men, a naval draft of 28 officers and 356 ratings under the command of Commander Newman, RNZNVR,

Captain R. Newman, CBE, DSO and bar, VRD, RNZNVR, m.i.d.; born England, 28 Jul 1898; master mariner; company director.

embarked at Wellington in the Aquitania and Empress of Japan. The draft included 3 officers and 74 ratings from the Achilles who were reverting to the Royal Navy, 58 tradesmen ratings recruited in New Zealand, and 25 officers and 219 ratings of the New Zealand Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve who had been selected for service in the Royal Navy.

The Aquitania and the two Empresses, in company with the Leander and Australia, sailed from Wellington in the forenoon of 2 May 1940 and were joined in Cook Strait by the Canberra and the Andes, which had come up from Lyttelton. An interchange of farewell signals included one from the Achilles to the Leander expressing the wish that she might have ‘as good luck as we had’, to which the latter replied: ‘We will do our best.’

After an uneventful passage across the Tasman Sea, the Canberra and Leander went into Sydney harbour on the morning of 5 May and, having refuelled, sailed five hours later to rejoin the convoy. The transports Queen Mary, 81,255 tons, and Mauretania, 35,677 tons, carrying Australian troops, joined up at the same time, together with HMAS Perth. On the following afternoon the transport Empress of Canada, from Melbourne, joined the convoy in Bass Strait. The convoy, which now numbered seven magnificent liners, totalling 277,284 tons gross register, carried on for Fremantle, escorted by the Canberra, Australia, and Leander.

Track Chart of German Raider Orion

The New Zealand cruiser arrived at Fremantle ahead of the convoy in the forenoon of 10 May – the day on which Germany invaded the Low Countries. The disastrous change in the military situation in Europe had already foreshadowed an alteration in the movements of the convoy. On 28 April, in accordance with Admiralty instructions, the Australian Naval Board had directed that ‘with the exception of mail steamers, all British merchant ships bound through the Mediterranean and not working Mediterranean ports for cargo, were to be routed via the Cape of Good Hope.’ Two days later the Flag Officer Commanding Australian Squadron was informed that ‘in view of the Italian situation, Commonwealth Government has decided to postpone temporarily embarkation of Australian troops in U.S. 3 until further advice is received from U.K. Government. It has been proposed to New Zealand Government that they should take similar action regarding New Zealand troops.’ Early on 2 May, however, the Australian Naval Board informed the New Zealand Naval Board and the Flag Officer Commanding Australian Squadron that the Commonwealth Government had agreed to the embarkation of Australian troops and that Convoy US 3 should proceed as far as Fremantle pending a decision regarding their final destination. On 30 April the Admiralty made a signal to the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic Station at Freetown requesting him ‘on account of the probable diversion of Australian and New Zealand troop convoys to the Cape route’, to sail an 8-inch cruiser for the Cape of Good Hope with all convenient despatch. Early on 1 May HMS Shropshire was instructed to sail from Freetown by the shortest route in order to arrive at Simonstown on 7 May.

A further signal from the Admiralty to the Australian and New Zealand Naval Boards and others concerned detailed the intended escorts for Convoys US 2 and US 3 in the event of its being found necessary to divert them to the United Kingdom via the Cape of Good Hope. It appeared that the fuel endurance of the Leander would not allow her to make the passage from Fremantle to the Cape in company with US 3 at 20 knots. It was proposed, therefore, that her future employment should be reviewed. The Admiralty was satisfied that the measures outlined would afford full security to the convoys.

At midday on 12 May 1940 Convoy US 3 sailed from Gage Roads, Fremantle, the Leander leading the majestic procession through the swept channel. For the next three days the convoy proceeded on its course for Colombo. At 0.42 a.m. on 16 May instructions were received by FOCAS from the Admiralty for US 3 to ‘steer towards the Cape of Good Hope’. The Leander was ordered to proceed independently to Colombo and US 3 carried on for the Cape escorted by the Canberra and Australia, the former being relieved a few days later by the Shropshire.

The Leander called at Colombo on 19 May and arrived on the 26th at Alexandria, where she stayed for the rest of the month. It had been arranged that the Gloucester, Orion, Neptune, Leander, and Sydney were to form the Twentieth Cruiser Squadron in the Mediterranean Fleet, but this was altered and on 1 June the Leander left Alexandria for the Red Sea to join the Fourth Cruiser Squadron, East Indies Station. She passed through the Suez Canal next day and arrived at Port Sudan on 4 June.

From about the end of March 1940, owing to the attitude of Italy, the Admiralty had been moving naval forces from the China and East Indies Stations to the eastern Mediterranean. On 4 April the Admiralty announced its intention to form a Red Sea Force, and on the 19th Rear-Admiral A. J. L. Murray, DSO, OBE, commanding Fourth Cruiser Squadron, transferred his flag to HMS Liverpool as Senior Officer, Red Sea. On 20 May the Admiralty ordered the aircraft-carrier Eagle and the Liverpool, Gloucester, and Sydney to be transferred to the Mediterranean. Two days earlier information had been received of the general mobilisation of the Italian Navy and Army in East Africa, and on 24 May the Red Sea was closed to all Allied shipping. All northbound tankers west of Aden were allowed to proceed to Suez, but all other shipping was ordered to await the starting of convoys. Reinforcements for the Red Sea Force arrived in the shape of the anti-aircraft cruiser Carlisle, three sloops, and one division of destroyers from the Mediterranean. At that time the Red Sea was part of the East Indies Station.

Leander's cruise in Indian Ocean

Such was the situation when, on 4 June 1940, nine hours after the arrival of the Leander at Port Sudan, the Liverpool entered the harbour. No time was lost, and at sunset Rear-Admiral Murray's flag was struck in the Liverpool and hoisted in the New Zealand cruiser. The sudden advent of the Admiral and his six staff officers caused some difficulty regarding accommodation. The problem was arbitrarily solved by the transfer of three officers and several ratings from the Leander to the Liverpool, which left four hours later for the Mediterranean. The Leander sailed from Port Sudan on patrol in the evening of 7 June, and next morning made contact with HMS Grimsby

HMS Grimsby, escort vessel, 990 tons; two 4·7-inch guns, one 3-inch high-angle gun.

which was shadowing the Italian liner Umbria.

Umbria, twin-screw passenger steamer, 10,076 tons; owned by Lloyd Triestino, one of the principal Italian shipping lines.

On 10 June Mussolini announced Italy's declaration of war against Great Britain and France. In the early hours of the 11th the Leander received a signal from Admiralty ordering her to commence hostilities against Italy. During the afternoon the Umbria, which had been brought in from sea in charge of an armed guard from the Grimsby, scuttled herself in the anchorage outside Port Sudan harbour. Boats from the Leander were sent out and the Italian crew and the guard taken off the ship.

Late that night the Leander sailed from Port Sudan to commence the protection of Allied shipping in the Red Sea. She arrived at Aden in the afternoon of 13 June after her aircraft had made an unsuccessful search for a vessel reported as suspicious in the vicinity of Ras-al-Ara, a sandy cape on the Arabian coast. Aden had been attacked by Italian aircraft which made five raids during the twenty-four hours before the arrival of the Leander. Little damage was done and one aircraft was shot down.

Three days later the Norwegian tanker James Stove, 8215 tons, was torpedoed and sunk by an Italian submarine about 12 miles south of Aden. The Leander's aircraft carried out an unsuccessful search for the U-boat, a report by one of HM ships that a conning tower had been sighted failing to reach the Walrus. Anti-submarine patrols were made by the aircraft during the next two days but did not sight anything suspicious. His Majesty's trawler Moonstone

HMS Moonstone, anti-submarine and minesweeping trawler; 650 tons; speed 11 knots; one 4-inch gun and one Lewis machine gun.

was more fortunate. While on patrol she sighted the periscope of a submerged U-boat and promptly attacked with two depth-charges which forced it to surface. After a brief engagement the U-boat surrendered and was towed into Aden. It proved to be the Italian submarine Galileo Galilei.

Galileo Galilei, submarine of Archimede class; displacement 880-1230 tons; surface speed 17 knots; eight 21-inch torpedo-tubes; two 3·9-inch guns and two light AA guns.

Its casualties were twelve killed, including the commanding officer, and four wounded. There were no British casualties.

Early in the morning of 27 June the Leander met the destroyers Kandahar and Kingston and proceeded into the Red Sea, acting on a report that the destroyers and the escort ship Shoreham had made a probably successful attack on an Italian submarine close to the southern coast of Eritrea. After sweeping along the ten-fathom line for two hours, the destroyers sighted the submarine aground and were ordered to attack it with gunfire. An enemy aircraft was then sighted, but it disappeared when fire was opened on it. While the destroyers were firing, four bombs exploded nearby but wide of all ships.

The Leander's aircraft was then catapulted off and made an attack on the submarine. Two bombs fell ‘over’ and one abreast the conning tower, but the fourth bomb failed to leave its carrier. The aircraft was then ordered to keep clear and the Leander opened fire with 6-inch broadsides, obtaining four straddles. When the ship had ceased fire, the aircraft reported that the submarine was well holed and that an extensive oil patch extended for some distance. Two men were seen swimming and two others, one of whom appeared to be dead, were seen on the beach near a raft which had left the U-boat early in the operation. It was learned subsequently that the submarine was the Evangelista Torricelli, of the same class as the captured Galileo Galilei. She was the fifth Italian submarine accounted for in eight days. By the end of the month Italy had lost ten submarines.

Soon after leaving the wrecked submarine the Leander and her destroyers were attacked by enemy aircraft, not more than three of which were seen at any time. The attacks, which lasted about half an hour, were pressed home resolutely in face of heavy anti-aircraft fire. There were three near misses close to one destroyer. In the final attack by the one remaining aircraft, a bomb missed abreast the Leander's bridge by about twenty-five yards, the column of water and some splinters sweeping inboard. No material damage was done to the ship and there were no casualties. It was learned later from an Italian radio broadcast that two aircraft did not return from this operation; it was also claimed falsely that a cruiser and a destroyer were hit by bombs.

The flag of Rear-Admiral Murray, Senior Officer Red Sea Force, was transferred from the Leander to HMS Lucia on 29 June, his office being established on shore at Aden.

Control of the Mediterranean was a decisive factor in the Second World War, and Great Britain maintained that control by the effective use of sea power. For more than three years the main effort of British arms was exercised in the Mediterranean area, where sea, land, and air operations were sustained by the constant flow of ships carrying men and supplies through the narrow defile of the Red Sea which, from the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb connecting it with the Gulf of Aden, extends for a length of some 1200 miles to the isthmus of Suez. At its southern end, the Red Sea was flanked for more than 400 miles on its western side by the hostile coastline of Italian Eritrea, about midway along which was the defended port and naval base of Massawa.

The protection of shipping along this ancient seaway was the monotonous but important duty assigned to the New Zealand cruiser, which for nearly six months was senior ship of the Red Sea Force. Owing to the presence of Italian aircraft, destroyers, submarines, and other potential commerce raiders at Massawa, the Red Sea had been closed to merchant shipping since 24 May; but, after Italy's declaration of war, no time was lost in organising a convoy service which began operations during the last days of June 1940.

The Leander, which was generally accompanied by two destroyers and two or more escort vessels and from time to time by an antiaircraft cruiser, met the northbound convoys from Bombay well to the eastward of Aden and escorted them through the Gulf of Aden and up the Red Sea to an area about two days' steaming north of Port Sudan. The convoy from Suez was then picked up and taken south. Ships to or from Aden and Port Sudan joined or left the convoys in the vicinity of those ports. Three Australian ships, the cruiser Hobart and the escort vessels Yarra and Parramatta, took part in these operations.

It was monotonous and trying work. The Red Sea and its littoral are one of the hottest regions on earth. Day after day the temperatures recorded in the Leander's log varied little – from 85 to 90 degrees. Now and then the discomfort of the heat was added to by sandstorms of gale force from the land. Brief periods of shore leave were spent in the heat of Aden.

For the most part the passages of the Red Sea convoys were uneventful, but the monotony was broken from time to time by the cautious attacks of Italian aircraft. The enemy's submarines, doubtless because of their earlier losses, showed little enterprise, though one of them on 6 September torpedoed and sank the Greek tanker Atlas, 4000 tons, when it was straggling well astern of the northbound convoy, BN 4.

Shortly after daybreak that morning HMS Auckland reported an aircraft overhead, probably shadowing the convoy which was then due east of Massawa. At midday six bombs fell close to a small steamer straggling astern of the convoy. About three hours later four or five aircraft dropped from twelve to fifteen bombs which straddled the centre of the convoy, but no ship was damaged. A third attack was made an hour afterwards. Five aircraft were sighted by the Leander, which opened fire, the other ships of the escort joining in immediately. Fifteen bombs fell about the Leander, none nearer than 100 yards. The enemy formation was broken up by the ships' fire, the Leander expending 65 rounds from her 4-inch guns. One aircraft appeared to be out of control as it disappeared to the westward.

When he learned of these attacks the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean sailed the anti-aircraft cruiser Coventry from Alexandria and she joined the escort of the southbound convoy, BS 4, on 7 September. Just before sunset on 13 September, the convoy being then about 200 miles east of Aden, HMAS Parramatta reported an asdic contact indicating the possible presence of a submarine and dropped depth-charges. The convoy was dispersed shortly afterwards and the Leander shaped course for Aden. The Parramatta stayed in the vicinity of her contact for four hours, but no trace of a submarine was found.

A northbound convoy, BN 5, of twenty-five ships was attacked north of Perim on 20 September by two aircraft which dropped their bombs in the centre of the ships. A near miss damaged the motor-vessel Bhima, 5280 tons, which dropped astern out of control. The Leander stood by the damaged ship until she was taken in tow for Aden, where she was beached. One man was killed in the Bhima, two of whose after holds were flooded. A second attack took place in the afternoon when five aircraft at a great height dropped fifteen bombs which fell well ahead of the convoy. The enemy formation was broken up by the gunfire of the Leander and Auckland and one aircraft appeared to have been damaged. In the forenoon of 24 September two aircraft attacked the southbound convoy BS 5 and were fired on by the Leander and Parramatta. Six bombs fell between four ships but no damage was done. In his report Captain Horan said he was ‘agreeably surprised that the enemy, having located the convoy, failed to follow with further attacks next day when it was only some 130 miles from Massawa.’ The largest convoy escorted by the Leander was BN 6 of forty-four ships. It was twice bombed by aircraft after passing Massawa, but no damage was done.

The first attempt by Italian ships based on Massawa to interfere with a convoy was made during the passage of the northbound BN 7. This convoy of thirty ships, escorted by the Leander, a destroyer, two sloops and two minesweepers, was nearing Perim in the afternoon of 19 October when a single aircraft dropped four bombs close astern of a steamer. The Leander and Auckland opened fire on the enemy as he made off to the westward. As Captain Horan remarked in his report of proceedings, ‘it was unpleasant to realise that the enemy had spotted the convoy so early in its approach.’ Shortly before dark a landing wheel of an Italian aircraft was picked up 15 miles south of Perim. Another attack was made next morning when four bombs fell ahead of the convoy and two astern of the French liner Felix Roussel, which was carrying New Zealand troops, but no damage was reported. At dusk the Leander took station on the port beam of the convoy, so as to be between it and the enemy's base at Massawa which flanked the line of advance. The convoy steamed a zigzag course during the night.

The convoy was about 35 miles north-north-west of Jabal-at-Tair Island at 2.19 a.m. on 21 October when the Leander sighted two patches of smoke bearing north. Three minutes later gunfire was seen and heard and the Leander increased to maximum speed. When she received an enemy report of two destroyers from the Auckland, the Leander altered course to intercept the enemy on the expectation that he would run home by way of the South Massawa Channel. The Auckland had sighted the destroyers at a distance of four miles. When they failed to answer her challenge she opened fire, whereupon they separated and turned away at full speed, firing their after guns. The destroyers were broad on the port bow of HMAS Yarra when her challenge was answered by the flash of discharge of the torpedo-tubes of the leading destroyer. Two torpedoes were fired, which the Yarra avoided by turning towards them and ‘combing’ their tracks.

When the gunfire of this engagement ceased, the Leander altered course to north-west, deciding that the enemy was making for the Harmil Island passage, and at 2.45 a.m. she opened fire with 6-inch and star shell on a ship that was firing red and green tracer. The range was opening and the ship itself was lost to sight after the first salvoes. The New Zealand cruiser then altered course to about west to bring all her guns to bear, thinking that the enemy was now making for the South Massawa Channel. Her searchlights then picked up the second destroyer, on which she opened fire at an estimated range of 4600 yards. At 2.51 a.m. she lost the enemy in the haze and ceased fire. During the action the Leander had expended a total of 129 rounds of 6-inch shell.

At three o'clock the Leander sighted and challenged a destroyer which proved to be the Kimberley, also in pursuit of the enemy. Five minutes later the cruiser altered course to east to rejoin the convoy, appreciating that the enemy was drawing away from her at the rate of seven knots and that the convoy might be attacked.

The Kimberley carried on at top speed and at 3.50 a.m. sighted smoke ahead, believed to be from two ships which retired at full speed. At 5.50 a.m. she sighted one destroyer seven miles off, steaming hard towards Harmil Island. She opened fire on the enemy, who replied, and a quarter of an hour later a shore battery of three 4-inch guns joined in. Nevertheless, the Kimberley closed the range to 5000 yards and at 6.25 a.m. the enemy destroyer was stopped, on fire and listing. The Italians abandoned their ship, which was sunk by two torpedoes. The destroyer was identified as the Francesco Nullo.

Francesco Nullo, built 1925; 1058 tons displacement; four 4·7-inch guns; six 21-inch torpedo-tubes; speed 35 knots.

The Kimberley then engaged the shore battery at 10,000 yards until she received a hit in the engine-room. Two guns of the battery were silenced. The Kimberley's casualties were three men wounded.

When the Kimberley reported having been hit and that her speed was reduced to 12 knots, the New Zealand cruiser immediately left the convoy to go to her assistance. At 6.54 a.m. the Leander increased speed to 26 knots. A minute later the Kimberley reported that she was stopped for repairs under fire from the shore battery and that the enemy destroyer had been blown up. By 7.34 a.m. the Leander's engines were making revolutions for 28·7 knots – a good performance considering that the ship was seven months out of dock. Shortly afterwards, the Kimberley informed the Leander that she was steaming to the eastward at 15 knots on one engine.

At 8.25 a.m., when the Leander was about 16 miles east by north of Harmil South beacon, she eased to 10 knots and circled near the Kimberley. At that time Captain Horan expected that Italian bombers would shortly appear and he preferred to keep the Leander unfettered by towing. The destroyer informed the cruiser that she had lost water in her boilers and might be able to steam in about ten minutes. The Leander closed the destroyer and sent a boat across with three shipwrights and an engine-room artificer to assist in the repairs. One wounded rating was transferred to the cruiser for medical attention. About ten o'clock the Leander took the Kimberley in tow.

The expected air attack came soon afterwards. The Leander opened fire on three bombers at 13,000 feet. They dropped fifteen bombs which burst in a line about 200 yards ahead of the Leander and two others which did not explode. No damage was done. The Leander and Kimberley joined the convoy shortly after midday. As they passed the Felix Roussel they were loudly cheered by some 600 New Zealand soldiers of the Third Echelon who were taking passage in that ship from Bombay to Egypt. In the afternoon the Leander transferred the tow to the Kingston, both destroyers leaving the convoy next morning for Port Sudan. The southbound convoy BS 7 of twenty ships was met in the afternoon of the 23rd. Two stragglers were ordered by the Leander to turn back to Suez and four ships from Port Sudan joined next morning. After an uneventful passage the convoy was dispersed east of Aden on 28 October.

During November two northbound and two southbound convoys were escorted safely through the Red Sea by the Leander and her consorts. After taking BS 9 to the vicinity of Aden the New Zealand cruiser was relieved on 26 November by HMAS Hobart. On the following day Captain Bevan, RN,

Captain R. H. Bevan, RN (retd); born England, 26 May 1892; served World War I, 1914–18; captain HMNZS Leander, 1940–42; retired (ill-health) 1942; commanded HMS Collingwood (training establishment) 1943–45.

assumed command of the Leander at Aden in succession to Captain Horan.

In less than five months the Leander had steamed 30,874 miles and escorted eighteen slow convoys totalling 396 ships of some 2,500,000 tons, mostly British, but including many foreign vessels. The convoys accounted for about one-third of the troops and supplies carried through the Red Sea during the period. Only one ship, a small Greek tanker torpedoed after she had straggled far astern, was lost from the convoys. The feeble and ineffectual efforts of the Italian naval and air forces based at Massawa against the flow of shipping just over the horizon were the most remarkable feature of the British convoy operations in the Red Sea.

There were indications during November 1940 that, despite the shortage of patrol ships in the East Indies command, the British blockade was having effect on supplies for the enemy forces in Italian Somaliland and Eritrea. When information was received that a factory at Banda Alula

Banda Alula lies on the coast of Italian Somaliland, on the south side of the Gulf of Aden, about 32 miles from Cape Guardafui at the extremity of the Horn of Africa.

had completed the manufacture of 1000 cases of canned fish for Italian consumption, the Senior Naval Officer Red Sea Force instructed the Leander to carry out Operation canned to demolish the factory and a wireless direction-finding station without causing casualties among the workers or damage to the native village.

The Leander sailed from Aden on 28 November. When she was 22 miles from Banda Alula at 10.30 next morning, the Walrus aircraft was catapulted off and made two single-bomb dive attacks on the direction-finding huts. One bomb fell 100 yards over and the other missed a hut by ten-yards. Rifle fire was opened against the aircraft during its second dive. The Leander approached the village at high speed and fired two warning bursts of high-explosive shell. A wireless message to evacuate the factory was made to the shore station. When the aircraft reported no sign of life in the compound, the Leander opened fire on the factory at a mean range of 4000 yards. The Walrus dropped a stick of incendiary bombs while observing the cruiser's fire. On three runs the cruiser fired 98 rounds of 6-inch high-explosive shell and, having recovered her aircraft, retired at high speed. About two hours later the Walrus was catapulted off to make a second attack on the direction-finding station. Two 250-pound bombs made close misses between the huts. Aerial photographs showed considerable damage in the factory buildings and fierce fires. As no fewer than fifty shells exploded in the compound, internal damage was probably serious and no doubt was felt that the factory had been put out of operation.

Having recovered her aircraft, the Leander shaped course for Bombay, where she arrived on 2 December. Brief visits to Aden had been the only breaks in the five months of convoy operations, and a stay of twenty-five days at Bombay was the first real diversion for the ship's company since she left New Zealand at the beginning of May. While the cruiser was in dry-dock her company were mostly accommodated on shore, a welcome relief from routine on crowded mess decks. ‘An elaborate organisation of public and private hospitality was at our service,’ wrote one officer. ‘We were treated magnificently. There was also a good deal of hockey, and we played Rugby football against a team of the Welsh Regiment.’

The Leander sailed from Bombay on 27 December on escort duty with convoy BN 12 of twenty-nine ships. The passage to Aden and up the Red Sea was uneventful. Convoy BS 12 was taken over on 6 January 1941 and dispersed beyond Aden five days later. That ended the Leander's service with Red Sea convoys. She sailed from Aden on 14 January and arrived at Colombo on the 21st.

CHAPTER 7 Hunting Raiders in the Indian Ocean

AT that time anxiety was felt by the New Zealand Government concerning the safety of shipping in the South Pacific, and a request was made that the Leander should be returned to the New Zealand Station. In an appreciation of the situation prepared for the War Cabinet, the Chief of Naval Staff pointed out that, owing to the increased activity of enemy raiders in the South Pacific, special precautions had been taken to protect merchant shipping, particularly vessels carrying troops, valuable refrigerated cargo ships, and those loading phosphates at Nauru and Ocean Islands. The naval vessels available for the purpose were the Achilles and the Monowai. Valuable help was given by Australian warships, more or less on a quid pro quo basis. After detailing the commitments in the New Zealand Station area, Commodore Parry submitted that at least one more naval unit was urgently needed on the station and that, in view of the strength of the enemy raiders, it should be a ‘real warship’ and not an armed merchant cruiser. The Leander seemed to be the obvious solution.

A telegram from the Governor-General to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs dated 13 January 1941 embodied the appreciation of the Chief of the Naval Staff and stated that the New Zealand Government, while ‘fully appreciating the very heavy calls which were being made on the Royal Navy’, felt bound to ask that the serious situation outlined be given immediate consideration and hoped that arrangements would be made to strengthen the naval force in New Zealand waters. The Government considered that the minimum requirement as far as New Zealand was concerned, and to enable her to co-operate more effectively with Australia, was the addition of one 6-inch cruiser. Clearly, an armed merchant cruiser would be inadequate, and ‘they therefore felt obliged, but with great reluctance, to ask that H.M.S. Leander may return.’

On 5 February 1941 the High Commissioner reported to the Prime Minister that he had seen the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had stated that, owing to the loss of HMS Southampton

HMS Southampton, twelve 6-inch guns, sunk as a result of air attack on 11 January 1941 while on convoy operation east of Malta.

and the return of HMAS Sydney and the armed merchant cruiser Westralia to Australia, the Mediterranean defences had been greatly depleted. The invasion danger to Britain must be met and the position was difficult. The Leander was at present searching in the Indian Ocean. In these circumstances the First Lord had made a personal and urgent request that the Leander be allowed to remain for three to four months as at present there was no ship to relieve her. The High Commissioner added that, having regard to the situation which the First Lord had explained, he must support his request.

The Prime Minister replied that, in view of the request of the First Lord, the New Zealand Government was prepared to agree that the Leander should remain overseas for another three months. It still considered, however, that in the event of war with Japan, or if the raider situation deteriorated, it was essential that the Leander should return to New Zealand waters.

Events were soon to prove that the decision of the New Zealand Government was a sound one. As a matter of fact, though of course it was not known at that time, the immediate danger from enemy raiders in New Zealand waters was past. The Orion and Komet, which had been operating off the New Zealand coast during November 1940 and about Nauru Island in December, were quitting the South Pacific for the Indian Ocean where other raiders had been cruising with greater success for some time. In the coming months the cruiser from distant New Zealand was to take an active part in curbing their activities.

The Leander was in harbour at Colombo from 21 to 24 January, part of the time in company with HMAS Canberra, which sailed on the 23rd. While on a cross-country flight on 24 January, the cruiser's aircraft had to make a forced landing on a small lake and crashed in the jungle when taking off. It caught fire and became a total loss, fortunately with no casualties among the crew. Meanwhile, the ship had sailed, leaving them to procure a new aircraft. Early that afternoon the Leander had received orders to go to sea, and three hours later she cleared the harbour and proceeded at 25 knots to the southwest.

The cause of the Leander's sudden departure was the interception of part of a distress signal from the British steamer Mandasor, 5144 tons, reporting that she was being attacked by a raider in a position approximately 330 miles east from the Seychelles Islands. Actually, the raider was No. 16 (Atlantis) which had come north after refitting at Kerguelen Island, where she had been in company with raider No. 33 (Pinguin). The Atlantis, which had been operating in the Indian Ocean since May 1940, had laid a minefield off Cape Agulhas and captured or sunk thirteen merchant ships totalling 92,478 tons.

When word of the attack on the Mandasor was received the Commander-in-Chief East Indies made the following dispositions of his four available cruisers, known as Force ‘V’. The Sydney left Mahé in the Seychelles group at 27 knots to search within a radius of 300 miles on an arc from the raider's point of attack to north by west of the Seychelles. The Canberra and Leander were to cover contiguous areas extending over a wide arc from south-west to west of the Maldive Islands. The Colombo was to patrol along a line from a position about 300 miles west from those islands.

After leaving Colombo the Leander steamed to the south-westward at high speed during the night. At 7.45 next morning the smoke of a ship was sighted and course was altered to intercept the vessel, which was identified as a Dutch steamer on passage from Sabang, Sumatra, to Durban. Carrying on at 25 knots, the Leander passed through One and a Half Degree Channel and two hours later eased to 17 knots for the night. At 7 a.m. on 26 January the cruiser again increased speed to 25 knots and for the next twelve hours steamed at that speed on various courses, searching for the raider. She spoke a Greek steamer during the forenoon, but otherwise nothing was sighted throughout the day. The Leander continued on patrol at reduced speed until the evening of 27 January, when she shaped course to the south-eastward and proceeded at 23 knots for Addu Atoll, southernmost of the Maldive Islands. The Canberra was in the anchorage when the New Zealand cruiser arrived, and sailed about an hour later. After refuelling from the oiler Pearleaf, the Leander sailed at dusk for Colombo, where she arrived on the morning of 30 January.

The search for the raider was unsuccessful. In the evening of 24 January the Sydney and HMS Mauritius obtained wireless bearings of German frequencies, a combination of which indicated a possible position of the raider as about 300 miles south-east of the Seychelles. The Sydney searched that area and to the southward on 25 and 26 January, using her aircraft on both days, but nothing was sighted.

The raider had evaded the searching cruisers by proceeding to the north-westward after sinking the Mandasor. A few days later she captured the British motor-vessel Speybank, 5154 tons, about 350 miles north-east of the Seychelles. No distress signal was received from this ship. The raider then steamed to the south-westward and on 2 February captured the Norwegian tanker Ketty Brovig, 7031 tons, approximately 300 miles due west of the Seychelles.

Having refuelled and embarked a new aircraft, the Leander sailed from Colombo on 31 January. She spent ten days on patrol in the area to the southward of Ceylon, but sighted nothing other than four foreign merchant ships. When about 300 miles to the eastward of Ceylon she met HMS Dauntless, from whom she took over the escorting of the troopship Narkunda, 16,630 tons, and arrived at Colombo on 12 February. After a spell of five days the Leander resumed her patrol south of Ceylon. Numerous merchant ships were sighted and identified during the next two or three days, but nothing suspicious was seen.

At 9 a.m. on 20 February the Leander met the Canberra about 150 miles west of Ceylon and took over from her Convoy US 9, comprising the transports Aquitania and Mauretania, carrying Australian troops, and the Nieuw Amsterdam which had on board some 3700 troops of the third section of the 4th Reinforcements, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, from Wellington. The passage up the west coast of India was uneventful, and the convoy arrived at Bombay in the morning of 22 February. The Leander refuelled and sailed at dusk on patrol to the southward.

In January 1941 British forces had begun simultaneous advances from the Sudan and Kenya into Eritrea, Abyssinia, and Italian Somaliland. British warships co-operated by blockading and bombarding the enemy's harbours. The port of Kismayu in Italian Somaliland was occupied on 14 February 1941. All of the sixteen Italian and German ships which had been lying there were sunk or captured, with the exception of one German vessel. When Merka and Mogadishu were occupied on 25 February some hundreds of British and other seamen from merchant ships sunk by German raiders were released from prison camps. On 13 and 21 February aircraft from HMS Formidable attacked Massawa in the Red Sea, doing damage to ships and harbour works.

After sailing from Bombay on 22 February, the Leander passed down the west side of the Laccadive and Maldive Islands to a patrol area westward of One and a Half Degree Channel, as directed by the Commander-in-Chief East Indies. At seven o'clock in the morning of 27 February the cruiser, steaming to the eastward, was about 28 miles north of the Equator and 320 miles west of the Maldives. Captain Bevan then decided to make a cast to the northward in order to get his ship on the course from west to One and a Half Degree Channel. He gave as his reason for so doing that as a result of the capture of Mogadishu, of which news had been received by radio on the previous day, there was a possibility that Italian ships which had been lying there would have put to sea and might be making for the Far East along that route.

At 10.37 a.m. a ship was sighted right ahead, and the Leander increased speed to 23 knots. As the cruiser gradually neared her, suspicion was aroused. It could be seen that a gun was mounted on the ship's forecastle and her general silhouette resembled that of the Italian RAMB class of fruit carriers.

Four fast motor-vessels built in 1937–38 for the Italian Government (Ministry of Italian Africa, Regia Azienda Monopolio Banane). Ramb I was a twin-screw ship of 3667 tons with a speed of 17 knots. Ramb II, also fitted out as an auxiliary cruiser, escaped from Massawa to Japan. Ramb IV, a hospital ship, was intercepted off Aden after the fall of Massawa.

The Leander went to action stations at 11.15 a.m. Ten minutes later the cruiser ordered the vessel to hoist her colours and she responded by hoisting the British merchant ensign. When ordered to make her signal letters the stranger hoisted four letters which were not listed in British signal books. The Leander then made the secret challenge, but the ship did not reply and kept her course and speed. An armed boarding party had been standing by and ‘it was now decided to board.’ At 11.45 a.m. the ship was ordered to ‘stop instantly’. No reply was received, but a few minutes later she hoisted the Italian merchant ensign and trained her guns on the Leander.

The cruiser was now broad on the Italian ship's beam and, at a range of 3000 yards, was an excellent target for its guns and possible torpedo attack. It was fortunate for her that the ship was not a German raider.

In similar circumstances, HMAS Sydney was engaged at close range by the German raider Kormoran off the north-west coast of Australia on 19 November 1941. The Sydney sank with all hands, but not before she had damaged the raider, which also sank.

At 11.53 a.m. the enemy opened fire, and thirty seconds later the Leander fired her first broadside. The enemy's fire was erratic and short, and it was estimated that not more than three rounds were fired from each gun. A few shell splinters hit the Leander, which got off five salvoes in one minute and ‘then checked fire to observe results’, signalling by flags: ‘Do you surrender?’ It was then seen that the enemy was abandoning ship and that the Italian flag had been struck. A number of hits had been made, all in the forepart of the ship, and through a large hole in her side it was seen that a fire had broken out.

The Leander's boarding cutter was lowered with orders to board and, if possible, save the ship. Two lifeboats were leaving the vessel and men were jumping overboard or scrambling down her side. An Italian officer who was swimming hailed the boarding party and warned them not to approach the ship as she was burning fiercely and was heavily loaded with ammunition. The boat, therefore, lay off. As the fire spread aft there was a heavy explosion before the bridge, flames and smoke shooting high above the ship, which was lying head to wind and well down by the bows. At 12.43 p.m. there was a violent explosion, evidently of a magazine. Five minutes later the ship sank under a vast cloud of black smoke from the oil fuel burning on the water. Meanwhile the Leander had picked up her own and the Italian boats while opening out from the burning ship.

The Italian survivors comprised the captain, ten officers, and ninety-two ratings, of whom one was seriously wounded and four slightly injured. One man had been killed in the ship by shellfire. The seriously wounded rating died while undergoing surgical treatment during the afternoon and was buried with full naval honours at sunset. From interrogation of the captain and other prisoners it was learned that the ship was Ramb I which had left Suez on 10 June 1940 for Massawa, where her armament of 4·7-inch guns and eight anti-aircraft machine guns was fitted. Except for short cruises along the coast of Eritrea, the ship had been employed on anti-aircraft defence at Massawa.

The Ramb I had sailed from Massawa at short notice on 20 February and passed into the Gulf of Aden during the night of the 21st. She was under orders to raid merchant shipping on her passage towards the Dutch East Indies, pending further instructions as to her ultimate destination. Only one ship had been sighted before the Leander was encountered and that was in the vicinity of Socotra, an area considered too dangerous for an attack to be made.

In his report to the Admiralty the Commander-in-Chief East Indies, after referring to the lack of organisation and suitably trained personnel in the ship, said that, in justice to the Italians, he considered they acted gallantly in engaging the Leander. He also said that the Ramb I ‘might well have become a serious menace to our shipping and Leander is to be commended for ridding the seas of this potential raider before she had harmed us.’ The Leander received from the Commander-in-Chief a signal of congratulation on ‘getting a scalp’ and from the Admiralty a message of ‘congratulations on your success and hopes for something bigger next time.’

Leaving the scene of the action, the Leander shaped course to the eastward and arrived next morning at Addu Atoll. There she met the oiler Pearleaf, to whom the Italian prisoners were transhipped, accompanied by an armed guard of nineteen ratings under the command of Commander (A) B. E. W. Logan, RN. He was relieved as flying officer in the Leander by Lieutenant (A) H. A. I. Luard, RN, who had arrived in the tanker. The Leander proceeded to the southward on patrol and the Pearleaf carried on for Colombo.

Wireless direction-finding bearings of radio signals indicated that enemy ships were in the vicinity of Saya de Malha, a vast coralline bank situated some hundreds of miles to the south-east of the Seychelles Islands. This area was, in fact, much frequented by German raiders and supply ships. The pocket battleship Admiral Scheer met the raider Atlantis there about 16 February and fuelled from the captured tanker Ketty Brovig. The Atlantis was in company with the German ship Tannenfels (escaped from Kismayu), the Ketty Brovig and Speybank, and the tanker British Advocate (captured by the Admiral Scheer) at the same rendezvous position from 26 to 28 February.

The Commander-in-Chief East Indies therefore ordered the Leander and Canberra to search the Saya de Malha area. The New Zealand cruiser met the Canberra in the afternoon of 2 March about 100 miles to the eastward of Addu Atoll. The captain of the Australian cruiser, Captain H. B. Farncomb, RAN, boarded the Leander for a discussion with Captain Bevan (senior officer), after which both ships carried on to the south-west for Saya de Malha.

The two cruisers separated on 4 March, and during the afternoon catapulted off their aircraft on reconnaissance flights. At 5.42 p.m. the Canberra's aircraft reported having sighted a cargo vessel in company with a tanker off the northern end of Saya de Malha. When the Canberra ordered them to stop, the ships separated, the tanker steering south and the other vessel north, flying no colours. The latter was suspected of being a raider and the Canberra opened fire on her at 18,000 yards. She did not reply and was subsequently found to be the unarmed German motor-vessel Coburg, 7400 tons, which had left Massawa about 21 February. She was set on fire amidships and the cruiser then ceased fire. The tanker was the Ketty Brovig, 7031 tons, which had been captured by the German raider Atlantis on 2 February. When she was threatened with near-miss bombs dropped by the Canberra's aircraft, her prize crew took scuttling action. An armed party from the cruiser boarded the tanker in the hope of salvaging her, but was unable to stop the inflow of water, the engine-room being completely flooded to the upper deck. The Canberra fired a few rounds into the ship and left her sinking.

When she received the Canberra's enemy report, the Leander steamed at 28 knots to join her. She arrived on the scene at sunset and picked up from the boats fifteen German officers and thirty-three seamen belonging to the Coburg and five Norwegian officers from the tanker. The Canberra took on board three German officers and fourteen hands and thirty-three Chinese, the last belonging to the tanker. The Coburg, which was burning fiercely amidships, sank at 5.49 p.m. The Leander and Canberra then withdrew from the area owing to the proximity of shoal water dangerous to navigation at night.

The decision of the Commander-in-Chief East Indies to withhold the news for the time being was justified by the fact that the loss of the Ketty Brovig and Coburg was not known to the Operations Division of the German Naval Staff until after the sinking of the raider Pinguin on 8 May 1941, though it was probably suspected by the raiders operating in the Indian Ocean. In response to representations by the New Zealand Government through the Naval Board, the Admiralty authorised publication of a brief statement in New Zealand and Australia on 12 April.

The loss of the Ketty Brovig and her cargo of fuel-oil caused some derangement of the enemy's plans for the fuelling of his raiders in the Indian Ocean. There was, of course, always a possibility of the raiders' own supply ships being captured or sunk, and their occasional captures of loaded oil-tankers provided an additional and valuable source of supply.

After she had emptied the tanker Winnetou, which had supplied her with fuel on the voyage from Germany and during her cruise in the Pacific, the raider Orion was assigned the tanker Ole Jacob. This vessel, loaded with petrol, had been captured by the raider Atlantis in the Indian Ocean on 10 November 1940 and sent in charge of a prize crew to Kobe, where the Japanese naval authorities agreed to take over her cargo in exchange for an aircraft and a cargo of diesel oil. Accordingly, the Ole Jacob went to Lamotrek in the Caroline Islands, where she met the Orion and a Japanese tanker to which she transhipped her cargo of petrol. Three German ships from Kobe loaded the Ole Jacob with diesel oil and provisions, and for the next four months she acted as supply ship for the Orion and other raiders.

Admiralty NID 24, ‘Information on the German raider No. 36 (Orion)’: War Diary of Orion, with comment by Operations Division, German Naval Staff.

At the time of her capture by the Atlantis, the Ketty Brovig was loaded with 6000 tons of furnace oil and some 4000 tons of diesel oil. After refuelling her captor and the Admiral Scheer, she was sent to the north of Saya de Malha to meet and supply the Coburg. The Ketty Brovig was then to have met the Ole Jacob in order to take some 3000 tons of diesel oil in exchange for as large a quantity of her ‘excellent furnace oil’ as possible. It was planned that the Ketty Brovig was to be taken over by the raider Pinguin – a diesel-engined ship – as supply tanker and auxiliary mining ship.

In the meantime the raiders Orion and Komet had arrived in the Indian Ocean from the Pacific – the latter after a cruise to the Ross Sea in the Antarctic. After fuelling the Orion on 20–21 March 1941 and the Komet three days later, the Ole Jacob looked in vain for the Ketty Brovig. The raider Pinguin, in company with the Adjutant, a captured whale chaser, arrived at their appointed rendezvous on 2 April, but after taking 1340 tons of diesel oil from the Ole Jacob they were obliged to proceed, without the Ketty Brovig, to their operational area in the Arabian Sea. The Ole Jacob, without her expected furnace oil, left the rendezvous on 13 April to meet the Orion a week later.

From Saya de Malha Bank the Leander and Canberra proceeded southward for Mauritius, both ships launching their aircraft morning and afternoon to search for enemy raiders and supply ships. It was known from intelligence reports and from the German prisoners on board that the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer had been operating in the Seychelles-Saya de Malha area during February, and it was possible that she or other raiders or their supply ships might be encountered at any time.

TRACK CHART OF GERMAN RAIDER KOMET

On the morning of 22 February, about three hours after sinking a small Dutch steamer, the Admiral Scheer had been sighted by the aircraft of HMS Glasgow, steering to the south-eastward in a position about midway between the Seychelles and the north end of Madagascar. The German ship was between forty and sixty miles south-south-east from the Glasgow, which altered course to close the enemy, signalling that she would shadow by day and attack by night. Through having to refuel, the aircraft lost touch with the Admiral Scheer, who could not be found again. She returned to the South Atlantic but made no more captures and arrived at Kiel on 1 April 1941.

That the Admiral Scheer had left the Indian Ocean was, of course, not known at the time. Since the sinking of the Ketty Brovig and Coburg, there had been much speculation in the Leander regarding the chances of meeting the Admiral Scheer, and on the lower deck there had been much argument about the possibility of a ‘second River Plate’. Consequently, when at 2.59 p.m. on 5 March 1941 the Canberra's aircraft reported having sighted a ‘pocket battleship’ and the news was broadcast by Captain Bevan to the ship's company, there were ‘great expectations’. Action stations was sounded and at 3.10 p.m. the Leander increased speed to 25 knots.

In the event of contacting the Admiral Scheer it had been planned that she would be shadowed during daylight and that the Leander and Canberra would close her in the dark hours with the object of attacking with torpedoes and gunfire. But at 3.25 p.m. the expectation of action was ended by the announcement that the report was a false alarm. Apparently, in the tropical haze and at a distance, the Canberra's aircraft, which had been flying for three hours when it made its report, had mistaken the Leander with her single broad funnel for a ‘pocket battleship’.

The cruisers' aircraft carried out a search of Nazareth Bank and the Cargados Carajos group of atolls on 7 March, but nothing of a suspicious nature was sighted. The Leander and Canberra arrived at Mauritius at 9 a.m. on 8 March and refuelled from the Admiralty oiler Olcades. The German prisoners were landed and placed in the custody of the military authorities.

At that time the question of the Leander's remaining overseas was again raised in a series of telegrams between the New Zealand Government and the Admiralty, through the High Commissioner for New Zealand in London. The Australian cruisers Sydney and Hobart, which had been operating in the Middle East, had been ordered about the end of February to return to Australia. It seemed clear that the Admiral Scheer, which was last reported near Madagascar on 22 February, ‘must have moved to another area and the possibility of her appearing in the Tasman Sea cannot be ruled out’.

Admiralty message of 0128 GMT, 6 March 1941, to Australian and New Zealand Naval Boards and other addressees.

On 5 March the High Commissioner informed the Prime Minister that ‘to meet the danger of a probable raider in the Pacific, the Australia or the Canberra [both armed with 8-inch guns] was returning for service in Australia and New Zealand.’ The First Lord of the Admiralty had asked that the New Zealand Government should not object to the Leander's not returning. There would then be the Australia (or Canberra), Sydney, Hobart, and Achilles in Australasian waters. If the position necessitated it, the Leander would return.

The Prime Minister replied that, though the New Zealand Government was ‘not without apprehension as to the position that might develop in local waters in certain contingencies’, it was always happy to feel that New Zealand naval vessels were being used to the best advantage. In the present circumstances, it made no objection to the retention of the Leander abroad, ‘always provided, of course, that the matter could be raised for immediate consideration should the local situation deteriorate.’

The Leander and Canberra had barely arrived at Mauritius when a series of messages from the Commander-in-Chief East Indies indicated that an enemy supply ship, possibly with a submarine from Massawa in company, was making for a rendezvous in the southern Indian Ocean. Based on the general instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, Captain Bevan issued orders to the Leander, Canberra, and HMS City of Durban

HMS City of Durban, armed merchant cruiser; 5850 tons (Ellerman Lines Ltd.); eight 6-inch guns.

for what was designated Operation SUPPLY. This provided for patrols by the three ships based on a point ‘P’, the assumed rendezvous of the enemy ship, approximately 400 miles south-east of Cape St. Mary, at the southern end of Madagascar.

The City of Durban sailed from Mauritius at 8 p.m. on 9 March and the Leander and Canberra at six o'clock next morning, the last two ships entering the 80-mile circle from point ‘P’ at 5.30 a.m. on 12 March. The patrol was uneventful and nothing suspicious was sighted. In accordance with orders from the Commander-in-Chief East Indies, the Leander withdrew from the area in the early morning of 20 March, leaving the other ships to carry on the patrol until 23 March. The New Zealand cruiser arrived at Mauritius on 22 March and, after refuelling, sailed next morning at 20 knots to patrol an area between Mauritius and Madagascar.

Shortly before sunset on 23 March, a ship was sighted about nine miles off steering about south-east. As the cruiser neared her, the Vichy French markings (French tricolour with yellow surround) were seen on her bows and quarter and the tricolour on a large board aft. The appearance of the ship was not unlike that which might be assumed by the German raider Atlantis, which occasionally disguised herself. The Leander went into action stations and a boarding party was prepared.

The stranger made no reply to repeated flag and lamp signals asking her name and ordering her to stop. The Leander then fired two rounds of blank ammunition and, when these produced no effect, at a range of 9500 yards a 4-inch shell was fired across her bows, followed by another two minutes later. The ship, which was the French motor-vessel Charles L.D.,

Charles L.D., 5267 tons gross register; owned by Louis Dreyfus and Company, Paris.

then stopped.

The Leander sent away a boarding party commanded by Lieutenant J. H. Thompson, RN, accompanied by Lieutenant Saunders, RNZNR,

Lieutenant P. C. Saunders, RNZNR; born Peterborough, England, 8 Feb 1915; mercantile marine officer.

as witnessing officer and Lieutenant (E) K. Lee-Richards, RN, as engineer officer. The cruiser signalled the Charles L.D. not to use her radio, but a few minutes later she transmitted ‘Vive Angleterre!’ – presumably an outburst by her pro-British operator – and then sent a coded message to Majunga Radio, evidently reporting her position. On hearing the transmissions, the Leander made the signal in plain language ‘Defendu Radio’, and enforced this by a burst of machine-gun fire over the ship's masthead.

The master of the Charles L.D., who was supported by his first and second officers, declined to assist in the navigation of the ship and protested strongly against her detention. He said his orders were to sink the ship rather than allow her to be seized. By order of Lieutenant Thompson, the boarding party cut the falls of all the boats and the ship's company was assembled on deck. Lieutenant Lee-Richard's party, aided by the pro-British third officer and third engineer, searched the engine-room and in the propeller-shaft passage found a box of dynamite fitted with fuses which was to have been detonated by the chief engineer. Another scuttling charge which was to have been exploded by the master was found by Lieutenant Saunders and thrown overboard.

There were two passengers in the Charles L.D., one of whom was the senior naval officer at Diego Suarez, going on leave to France; the other, a Mauritian, was making his way home from France. The latter, who was most co-operative as an interpreter, said the ship was bound from Diego Suarez to Reunion to load coffee, cocoa, and sugar for France, of which the greatest part would have gone to Germany.

The Leander's boarding party was relieved by an armed guard under the command of Lieutenant Stevens, RNZNR,

Commander E. M. C. Stevens, VRD, RNZNR; born Auckland, 5 Nov 1910; master mariner; Lieutenant RNZNR, 1 Nov 1938; CO HMNZ Awatere 1943; Commander 30 Jun 1953.

with Lieutenant Saunders as second-in-command and Lieutenant Lee-Richards and two engine-room artificers for the general charge of the engine-room. With the exception of the master and his first and second officers, the ship's company were prepared to work her on condition that they would receive the agreed rates of pay accruing to them. The Charles L.D. then proceeded for Mauritius, where she arrived in the afternoon of 24 March.

For the next five days the Leander remained on patrol to the eastward of Madagascar, the search being extended daily by aircraft reconnaissance. Shortly before sunset on 27 March the aircraft reported having sighted a tanker about 150 miles east from Tamatave. The cruiser overtook the ship, which proved to be the British tanker Trocas, 7406 tons, on passage from Mauritius to the Persian Gulf. No other ship was sighted during the patrol.

After refuelling at Mauritius the Leander sailed to the north-eastward, her aircraft making a search of the main atolls in the Chagos Archipelago during the passage to Colombo, where she arrived on 3 April. The cruiser then proceeded to Madras, whence she sailed on 11 April escorting a convoy of four large transports carrying Indian troops for Singapore. Next day the Leander turned the convoy over to HMS Ceres and shaped course for Trincomalee, arriving there in the morning of 13 April to refuel. Nine hours later the New Zealand cruiser was ordered to raise steam and sail at once for Colombo, where she arrived the following afternoon.

A situation which for a time was very threatening to British interests in the Middle East developed when the Government of Iraq was overthrown on 3 April by a coup d'état engineered by Rashid Ali. It was this disturbance that dictated the movements of the Leander during the next fortnight. The Commander-in-Chief East Indies (Vice-Admiral R. Leatham, CB) embarked in the New Zealand cruiser on 14 April, and after fuelling she sailed that evening for the Persian Gulf. The flag of Admiral Leatham was hoisted next morning. Proceeding at from 26 to 27 knots, the Leander arrived at Bahrein at 3 a.m. on 18 April and, after fuelling, sailed six hours later. She anchored off the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab late that night, and at five o'clock next morning the Commander-in-Chief transferred to HMS Seabelle and proceeded to Basra. The Leander sailed soon afterwards and arrived at Kuwait about midday.

The British Government had accepted an offer by the Indian Government to send troops from Karachi by sea and to Shaibah by air. It was laid down that no offensive action was to be taken except in retaliation: if the landing of troops was resisted, force was to be used. HMS Emerald arrived at Basra on 13 April and the Leander on the 18th, a few hours after the troopships from India. The landing was unopposed and the official attitude friendly for the time being. The Leander returned to the Shatt-el-Arab in the evening of 22 April and embarked Admiral Leatham early next morning. She refuelled at Bahrein and then proceeded on her return passage to Colombo, whence, having landed the Commander-in-Chief, she put to sea again in the afternoon of 29 April.

Earlier in the month the Government had again raised the question of the retention of the Leander overseas. In a telegram dated 12 April to the High Commissioner in London, the Prime Minister said the Government would not, of course, press the matter unduly if the Admiralty, ‘on balancing their requirements in all theatres of war’, still felt that an extension of the New Zealand cruiser's period of overseas service was desirable. Nevertheless, the need for another cruiser for the protection of shipping in the New Zealand area was still greatly felt and the Leander ‘could very usefully be employed’ there.

Replying on 1 May, the High Commissioner reported that the First Lord of the Admiralty had informed him that the Leander was engaged in most important duties and that HMS Neptune would leave (for New Zealand) in late May or early June.

See Chapter 13.

Both the First Lord and the First Sea Lord were grateful for New Zealand's assistance by allowing the Leander to remain overseas and they hoped that the loan of the Neptune would be satisfactory. The Leander would be returned later if circumstances warranted.

The Government asked the High Commissioner to convey its thanks for the decision to send the Neptune to New Zealand and to raise for consideration by the Admiralty the exchange of the Achilles and Leander. It would be unacceptable to be without the services of a 6-inch gun cruiser on the New Zealand station, but the Government would agree to the Achilles leaving for the East Indies Station prior to the return of the Leander to New Zealand waters provided the period during which neither ship would be available for service on the New Zealand Station was a short one.

When the Leander sailed from Colombo on 29 April, she was operating as a unit of Force ‘V’, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief East Indies, in search of a German raider which had sunk the British steamer Clan Buchanan, 7266 tons, on the previous day, in a position about 600 miles west from the Maldive Islands. The Leander was assigned a patrol area to the westward of the Maldives; HMS Cornwall was to search to the northward of the Seychelles, and the aircraft-carrier Eagle and cruiser Hawkins were to patrol an area between those islands and the coast of East Africa. The ships were ordered in the first place to proceed to the western side of their respective areas, which were to be covered at 12 knots.

The ship they were seeking was the Pinguin, one of the most successful of the German raiders which, during her cruise of eleven months, sank or captured thirty-one vessels totalling 156,910 tons. On 7 October 1940 she captured the Norwegian tanker Storstad off the north-west coast of Australia. This ship, which was given the name of Passat, was used as an auxiliary minelayer and laid mines in Bass Strait and off Wilson's Promontory and Cape Otway, while the Pinguin herself laid mines between Newcastle and Sydney and in the approaches to Hobart and Spencer Gulf, South Australia. These minefields caused the loss of the coastal steamer Nimbin, 1052 tons, near Newcastle, the Federal Line steamer Cambridge, 10,855 tons, off Wilson's Promontory, the American steamer City of Rayville, 5883 tons, off Cape Otway, and serious damage to the Federal Line steamer Hertford, 11,785 tons, in Spencer Gulf.

Returning to the Indian Ocean with the tanker, the Pinguin during November 1940 sank four large refrigerated cargo ships – the Shaw Savill and Albion steamer Maimoa, 10,123 tons, the Port Line vessels Port Brisbane, 8739 tons, and Port Wellington, 10,065 tons, and the British India Company's steamer Nowshera, 7920 tons. The Pinguin then proceeded to the Southern Ocean, where, in January 1941, she captured the whaling ships Ole Wegger, 12,200 tons, Solglimt, 12,246 tons, and Pelagos, 12,383 tons, and eleven whale chasers. With the exception of one chaser which she retained under the name of Adjutant, all these vessels were sent to France in charge of prize crews. The Pinguin then spent about a fortnight at Kerguelen Island, where she refitted and took in water, stores, and an aircraft from the supply ship Alstertor.

About the middle of March 1941 the Pinguin refuelled from the tanker Ole Jacob which, in company with the raider Orion, had arrived in the Indian Ocean from the Pacific. The Pinguin then proceeded to the north-west area of the Indian Ocean where, on 25 April, she sank the Empire Light, 6950 tons. No distress message was picked up from this ship, whose radio-room was wrecked by gunfire. Three days later the Pinguin sank the Clan Buchanan, and it was a wireless message from that ship that started Force ‘V’ on the hunt for the raider.

The Cornwall sailed from Mombasa, Kenya, at midday on 28 April and proceeded at 25 knots for her search area. She was followed from that port by the Eagle and Hawkins. After leaving Colombo, the Leander proceeded at 25 knots and passed through Khardiva Channel in the Maldive Islands about seven o'clock in the morning of 30 April. She then eased to 20 knots on a westerly course for her search area. The Leander launched her aircraft on reconnaissance morning and afternoon during her patrol but nothing suspicious was sighted. The Pinguin had, in fact, made off to the north-west after sinking the Clan Buchanan and so, for the time being, evaded the searching ships of Force ‘V’.

On 1 May the Leander, then about 450 miles west of the Maldive Islands, turned and shaped course for Colombo, where she arrived in the afternoon of 3 May. Three days later she was called upon to escort a convoy of three big transports, two of which were carrying New Zealand troops to Egypt. The Mauretania and the Dutch Nieuw Amsterdam carrying the 5th Reinforcements, 2 NZEF, numbering about 5800, and a draft of 57 naval ratings (including six for the Leander), had sailed from Wellington on 7 April 1941 for Sydney, where 1240 Australian troops embarked in the Dutch ship. The two ships then joined up with the Queen Elizabeth, Queen Mary, and Île de France, carrying Australian troops, to form Convoy US 10, which sailed from Fremantle on 19 April. In the vicinity of Sunda Strait the Nieuw Amsterdam left the convoy and proceeded to Singapore, where she landed her Australian troops and transhipped the New Zealanders to the Aquitania. In the meantime the Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary had gone on to Trincomalee and the Mauretania and Île de France to Colombo, where they were joined by the Aquitania. The two Queens went on to Suez as Convoy US 10A, the three ships at Colombo being designated Convoy US 10B.

The Leander sailed from Colombo on 6 May 1941, escorting Convoy US 10B for Suez. Proceeding at nearly 25 knots, the ships shaped course for Nine Degree Channel between the Maldive and Laccadive Islands. Soon after clearing the channel next morning the Leander sighted the Canberra. Then, in accordance with wireless orders from the Commander-in-Chief East Indies, the Canberra took over the convoy, and at noon the Leander steamed independently at 25 knots to the westward. The hunt for the elusive German raider was on again.

After sinking the Clan Buchanan on 28 April, the Pinguin had proceeded to the north-westward. On 4 May she fuelled and provisioned the Adjutant, which was sent away to wait at a rendezvous, probably south of Saya de Malha Bank. Shortly after five o'clock in the morning of 7 May the Pinguin intercepted and sank the tanker British Emperor, 3663 tons, on passage from Durban in ballast for Abadan, in a position about 375 miles east-south-east from Cape Guardafui. The tanker was able to transmit a wireless distress message when she was attacked.

HMS Cornwall had just crossed the Equator on her way to refuel at the Seychelles Islands when she intercepted the British Emperor's message. She was then about 520 miles south of the indicated position. Altering course to north-north-west, the Cornwall increased speed to 20 knots. A plan for intercepting the raider with the aid of aircraft was worked out on the principle of closing the enemy's ‘furthest on’ line and then starting a search to cover the largest possible variations of the raider's speed and course. During the morning the Cornwall increased speed to 25 ½ knots and headed north to cover the gap between the Seychelles and the Chagos Archipelago.

In accordance with the dispositions made by the Commander-in-Chief East Indies, the Leander was steaming westward at 25 knots from Nine Degree Channel towards Socotra, while HMS Liverpool, from an early morning position due north of Cape Guardafui, proceeded towards Eight Degree Channel on her way to Colombo. HMS Glasgow, also from the Gulf of Aden, passed Cape Guardafui that morning at 23 knots to a position about 100 miles south-east from that headland, and then steamed south-west at 20 knots towards a position on the Equator about 300 miles from the African coast. Farther west, HMS Hector, armed merchant cruiser, covered shipping by patrolling from the Equator to a position 300 miles to the southwest.

During the afternoon of 7 May the Cornwall flew both her aircraft on reconnaissance for three hours and then shaped course to get on the line of the main Vignot search. This was plotted for a mean speed of 13 knots for one hour after the time of the raider report, on the assumption that the raider would take an hour to deal with the British Emperor and then proceed at full speed until dark. At 9.30 p.m. the Cornwall altered course to east-south-east and reduced speed to search on this line before the moon set. The direction of search was correct.

At daybreak the Cornwall launched both aircraft on a search to cover a variation of three knots on either side of the enemy's estimated speed. The cruiser herself altered course to east at 18 knots and was then steaming away from the raider. At 7.7 a.m. one of the aircraft sighted a ship of the suspected type going south-west at 13 knots, about 65 miles west from the Cornwall, but made no report before returning about eight o'clock. At 8.25 a.m. the cruiser altered course to about west by south and increased speed to 23 knots. The second aircraft was launched again at 10.15 a.m., and when it returned at 12.23 it reported that the unknown ship was steaming at 15 knots and had hoisted signal letters. These were identified as those of the Norwegian motor-vessel Tamerlane, which the raider closely resembled but which was not in the Cornwall's list of expected ships.

The cruiser accordingly increased speed to 26 knots and at one o'clock to 28 knots. At 1.45 p.m. she catapulted an aircraft to keep her informed by wireless of the bearing, course, and speed of the suspected ship, which was finally sighted from the bridge of the Cornwall at 4.7 p.m. The stranger then began sending wireless ‘raider reports’ stating that she was the Tamerlane. Notwithstanding frequent signals ordering her to heave-to and two warning shots from the cruiser, the ship kept her course and speed for more than an hour until the range was inside 12,000 yards. At 5.10 p.m. the Cornwall turned to port and the stranger, apparently convinced that the former was about to open fire in earnest, made a large alteration of course to port and got in first blow by opening fire with five guns just before 5.15 p.m.

Due to mechanical failures, the Cornwall was unable to reply for a minute or two and was frequently straddled by rapid and fairly accurate gunfire before getting off two salvoes from her forward 8-inch turrets. Her fore steering gear was disabled by a 5·9-inch shell hit, but the after steering gear was quickly brought into use and the ship was out of control for a matter of seconds only. By 5.18 p.m. all the Cornwall's turrets were firing, and at 5.26 a salvo hit the enemy ship, which blew up and sank in a position about 300 miles from where the British Emperor was sunk and about 500 miles north of the Seychelles. The ship, which was, in fact, the raider Pinguin, had a complement of about 350, as well as 180 prisoners from merchant ships sunk by her. The Cornwall picked up 58 German and 25 British survivors.

While the Cornwall was carrying on her search the Leander had been steaming at 25 knots for twenty-four hours on a course of west by north. At 8.30 a.m. on 8 May her aircraft was launched on a reconnaissance flight and, an hour later, the ‘hands prepared the ship for battle’, though at that time the raider had been sighted by the Cornwall's aircraft far to the south-westward. The Leander carried on to a position about 300 miles east from Cape Guardafui and then returned to Colombo, where she arrived on 14 May.

CHAPTER 8 Operations off the Coast of Syria

ON 23 May 1941 the Prime Minister, who was in Cairo on a visit to the Middle East, sent the following cable message to the acting Prime Minister, Mr W. Nash, at Wellington: ‘At the special request of First Lord of Admiralty, I have at once agreed in the circumstances to Leander being despatched to the Mediterranean. Help of Leander type of cruiser essential to support our men in Crete. …’

Having replenished ammunition, the New Zealand cruiser sailed from Trincomalee shortly after midday on 23 May and proceeded to Aden, where she arrived at 6 a.m. on the 29th. By that time she was already too late to afford any ‘support to our men in Crete’, which was securely in the hands of the Germans and from which New Zealand and other British troops were being evacuated by the Royal Navy in a series of desperate operations. Crete was captured after a bitter struggle from 20 May to 1 June, in which the Germans were able to exploit their superiority in aircraft and airborne troops to overwhelm the gallant defence.

The losses of the Mediterranean Fleet in the Battle of Crete were four cruisers, six destroyers, and thirty small craft. In addition, damage was done to three battleships, an aircraft-carrier, six cruisers, and seven destroyers. Some of these ships were out of service for months undergoing repairs.

The Leander was therefore a most welcome and useful addition to the Mediterranean Fleet. In a message to the New Zealand Naval Board reporting that she had joined his station, Admiral Cunningham said he was ‘very glad to have her.’ He also reported that, as a result of fitting her with additional anti-aircraft armament, it was necessary to draft more men to her to man those guns. The cruiser sailed from Aden on 1 June and five days later arrived at Alexandria, where she joined the Seventh Cruiser Squadron.

By this time hostilities in Iraq had ceased, but a dangerous situation had developed in Syria. Early in May, concurrently with the arrival in Syria of a German ‘economic mission’ and other signs of enemy infiltration, German aircraft began to make use of the Syrian airfields. Three arrived at Aleppo on 9 May and two were reported to have gone on to Mosul, Iraq, unhampered by the French authorities. On 11 May more aircraft painted in Iraq colours reached Damascus, intended for the use of the Iraq insurgents.

On 14 May the Chiefs of Staff in London informed the Commander-in-Chief Middle East that he was free to act against German aircraft in Syria, notwithstanding the possible effect of such action on British relations with Vichy and the Free French. Next day the Royal Air Force attacked enemy aircraft on the ground at Palmyra. The French authorities in Syria, in making a protest, said that fifteen German aircraft had made ‘forced landings’ on Syrian airfields and ‘in conformity with the Armistice terms’ had been assisted to leave. The situation had serious possibilities if the Germans, not yet cleared out of Iraq, should obtain complete possession of Syria. To prevent this it was necessary to occupy the country.

Preparations for naval co-operation were made on 3 June at a conference on board HMS Warspite, flagship of Admiral Cunningham, and on 6 June orders were issued for the campaign (Operation exporter) to begin two days later. The naval forces to support the advance of the army were commanded by Vice-Admiral E. L. S. King, Fifteenth Cruiser Squadron, in HMS Phoebe, and included the Ajax, Coventry (anti-aircraft cruiser), Glengyle (infantry landing ship), and eight destroyers constituting Force ‘B’.

The Phoebe, Ajax, and four destroyers sailed from Alexandria at noon on 7 June and were joined by the Coventry and two more destroyers at daybreak next morning when British and Free French troops invaded Syria. Some difficulty was experienced by the ships in making contact with the head of the advancing troops, but eventually it was learned that Tyre had been occupied and the only ship support required was a few salvoes against enemy positions about a bridge across the Leontes, three miles north of the city. Early in the morning of 9 June troops were landed from the Glengyle to seize the bridge, but it had been destroyed.

As the situation on shore during the morning was too confused to permit supporting fire, Admiral King stood out to sea with his cruisers, leaving one destroyer on inshore patrol, while three others carried out an anti-submarine sweep four miles from the coast. In the early afternoon one of the latter, HMS Janus,

HMS Janus, 1690 tons; six 4·7-inch guns; speed 36 knots.

sighted and engaged two large destroyers of the Guépard class.

French Guépard destroyers, 2436 tons; five 5·4-inch guns; speed 39 knots.

The Janus, hit five times, was badly damaged and stopped with severe casualties. She was saved from a most critical situation by the Jackal, Isis, and Hotspur, which screened her with smoke while they engaged the enemy ships, who retired at high speed to Beirut and were well out of the way when the cruisers came on the scene. The Janus was towed to Haifa by the Kimberley.

The Leander sailed from Alexandria in the evening of 12 June and next day relieved the Ajax in Admiral King's force, which was strengthened by six additional destroyers. An inshore squadron carried on a continual bombardment of enemy targets north of a line indicated by the army and assisted its advance to a position on the Zaharani River, about four miles south of Sidon. In the wooded areas thereabouts a number of batteries of 75-millimetre guns held up the advance for three days. Air reconnaissance eventually located the guns, which were silenced by the deliberate fire of the Jackal, Ilex, and Hero. The troops occupied Sidon on 15 June.

During the first six days of the campaign the ships had to contend with a few attacks by French aircraft. In the afternoon of 13 June, shortly after the Leander had joined the force, German aircraft made their first appearance offshore. Eight Ju88 bombers attacked the cruisers, but no damage was done to any ship. British fighters which were on their way out on a routine patrol shot down three enemy aircraft and damaged two others.

During the temporary absence of Admiral King while the Phoebe went to Haifa to refuel, Captain Bevan in the Leander was in command of Force ‘B’. The New Zealand cruiser and HMS Coventry, screened by four destroyers, were patrolling off Saida in the afternoon of 14 June when Vichy destroyers from Beirut made another effort to interfere with the inshore squadron. At 4.20 p.m. HMS Griffin reported two enemy destroyers 15 miles away in a position about six miles west of Beirut, and steaming south-south-west. The cruiser force was steering to the northward, and fifteen minutes later the Leander sighted the ships–two of the Guépard or Aigle class. Speed was worked up to 28 knots with the intention to close and engage the enemy. Two destroyers were ordered to concentrate ahead of the Leander and two to screen the Coventry, whose maximum speed at the time was 24 knots.

At 4.45 p.m., at a range of approximately 20,000 yards, the French ships altered course in succession to the northward, swinging to the westward shortly afterwards. During this movement one ship was seen to drop one and the other three large objects over their sterns. These were thought to be mines. Captain Bevan's intention was to open fire slightly outside the limit of the enemy's gun-range, but the Frenchman's course and speed and the desirability of keeping outside the range of the coastal batteries of Beirut prevented the Leander from closing to less than 20,000 yards. Force ‘B’ worked to the northward of Beirut, keeping the French destroyers under observation until it appeared that they had anchored close inshore. At six o'clock, when the British ships were returning to the south- wardsouthward, French aircraft carried out an attack, a stick of heavy bombs falling 500 yards astern of the destroyer Hero. Fighter cover had been called for and three Hurricane aircraft were later seen engaged with French fighters which presumably had escorted the bombers.

Vice-Admiral King in the Phoebe, with three destroyers, rejoined the Leander about midday on 15 June. He decided to keep the whole of Force ‘B’ at sea owing to the reported approach of a Cassard class destroyer north of Cyprus. Three destroyers formed the inshore squadron, the others screening the cruisers, who were informed that Sidon had surrendered. In the late afternoon a determined attack on Force ‘B’ was made by eight German bombers. The destroyer Isis was badly damaged by a near miss which caused flooding of her forward boiler-room. Three British fighters drove off half the bombers before they completed their attack, one bomber being shot down.

About an hour later another attack was made by from fourteen to eighteen French and German aircraft. A heavy bomb exploded close alongside the destroyer Ilex, blowing a hole in one of her boiler-rooms, which rapidly flooded. Though badly shaken, the Ilex was able to steam at 15 knots until her oil fuel became badly contaminated by sea-water. She was then towed to Haifa by the Hasty. Force ‘B’ patrolled north of Beirut during the night.

At 6.15 p.m. the French destroyer Chevalier Paul

Chevalier Paul, destroyer, 2441 tons; five 5·4-inch guns; seven torpedo-tubes; speed 36 ½ knots.

was sighted by air reconnaissance, steering east in a position off the Gulf of Adalia and about 60 miles north-west of Cyprus. As she was suspected to be carrying supplies and ammunition from France for Syria, No. 815 Squadron Fleet Air Arm, stationed at Nicosia, Cyprus, was ordered to attack her. Six Swordfish aircraft took off at 2.30 a.m. on 16 June and half an hour later sighted the destroyer, which had rounded Cyprus during the night, about 30 miles from the coast of Syria. A successful attack by the aircraft made one certain and two possible hits on the Chevalier Paul which was sunk. About an hour later the Kimberley and Jervis sighted the French destroyers Guépard and Valmy close inshore off Beirut. The British destroyers opened fire before they themselves were sighted and claimed to have hit one of the French ships, which retired under a smoke screen to the cover of shore batteries.

During the afternoon of 18 June the French destroyers Guépard and Valmy made a brief sortie from Beirut, but returned to harbour before they could be engaged. At dawn on 19 June the Jervis and Kingston bombarded enemy shore positions for forty minutes, the Naiad and several destroyers acting in support. That evening the Leander and four destroyers proceeded on a sweep north of Beirut, but nothing was sighted during the night. Three aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm bombed Beirut harbour, making four hits on a wharf and one on a suspected submarine. The night sweeps north of Beirut were made with the object of intercepting French destroyers known to be making for that port, but the only one that did arrive made the Syrian coast in daylight, escorted by about twenty aircraft.

Force ‘B’ had a brief encounter with the enemy in the course of a sweep during the night of 22–23 June. While four destroyers carried out an anti-submarine patrol to seaward, the Naiad

The Naiad had replaced the Phoebe as the flagship of Vice-Admiral King.

and Leander, screened by the destroyers Jaguar, Kingston, and Nizam, made an inshore search. At 1.48 a.m. on 23 June, when the force was steaming south about 10 miles north of Beirut, the Naiad sighted two French destroyers close inshore and on a northerly course at a range of about 5000 yards. The enemy turned away at high speed behind a smoke screen under cover of a coast-defence battery which opened fire. The French destroyers were engaged by Force ‘B’ for eleven minutes and several hits were claimed, but it was reported subsequently that the Guépard only was hit by a ‘blind’ 6-inch shell from the Leander. Four torpedoes fired by the New Zealand cruiser and two by the Jaguar ran ashore and probably exploded on grounding, since the Kingston, rear ship of the line, heard several explosions.

This was the last occasion on which the French destroyers were engaged by Force ‘B’. Vice-Admiral King asked for and obtained a submarine to patrol off Beirut to intercept the destroyers. At midday on 25 June HMS Parthian torpedoed and sank the French submarine Souffler. From time to time enemy aircraft made high-level bombing attacks on the British ships at Haifa. In one raid during the night of 24 June, one bomb fell fairly close by the Leander but did no damage.

On the following night the Leander, in company with the destroyers Decoy, Havock, and Nizam, carried out her final sweep to the northward of Beirut, but nothing was sighted. Returning south at dawn, the destroyers bombarded enemy positions for half an hour, the shore batteries replying. At 8 a.m. on 26 June the Leander and Coventry were relieved in Force ‘B’ by HMAS Perth and HMS Carlisle (anti-aircraft cruiser) and sailed from Haifa for Alexandria, where they arrived next morning. Hostilities in Syria ceased at mid-night on 11–12 July and the armistice agreement was signed at Acre on 14 July.

In his report to Admiralty the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, Admiral Cunningham, said the Syrian campaign had three main features from the naval point of view. Force ‘B’ provided vital assistance to the army in its advance along the coast. These operations were generally very satisfactory. On the other hand, the encounters with the enemy's ships were definitely not satisfactory and it must be conceded that the honours rested with the French destroyers. This comparatively petty campaign absorbed the entire effort of all reconnaissance aircraft available for naval co-operation in the eastern Mediterranean, with the exception of those based on Malta. All reconnaissance to the west of Alexandria had to be stopped and ‘Tobruk left wide open to surprise’. Even so, the available aircraft were insufficient for the Syrian operations.

Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to Admiralty, Med. 1497/00212/29 of 2 September 1941.

On 16 July the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean issued orders for Operation guillotine. This involved the movement from Port Said and Haifa to Cyprus of 50 Division and 259 Wing, Royal Air Force, and attached artillery, motor transport, and stores. The ships employed were the Leander, Neptune, Hobart, Parramatta, and Flamingo, units of the 14th Destroyer Flotilla, and a number of merchant ships.

The Leander and the destroyer Kingston sailed from Haifa on the night of 19 July and arrived at Port Said next morning. There the Leander embarked one naval officer and nine ratings as a mine-sweeping party, a heavy anti-aircraft battery, and six officers and 163 other ranks of the Royal Air Force. The Kingston embarked five officers and 152 other ranks. The ships sailed at midday and, proceeding at high speed, arrived at Famagusta, Cyprus, twelve hours later. After landing the troops, the Leander and Kingston proceeded at 24 knots to Haifa, arriving there in the morning of 21 July. Next day the Haifa Force, consisting of the Ajax (flag) and Leander, and destroyers Jaguar, Jervis, Kandahar, and Kingston, put to sea and next morning joined the Mediterranean Fleet for exercises. During the next two days the fleet carried out a sweep south of Crete.

The Leander left the fleet on 24 July and arrived next morning at Port Said. After embarking 43 officers and 830 other ranks she sailed at 26 knots in company with the destroyer Jaguar, which was carrying 380 troops. The fast minelayer Latona followed them with another detachment. The Jaguar went ahead at 31 knots for Famagusta, and when the Leander arrived there about midnight her troops were landed by the destroyer and towed lighters. She sailed an hour later and returned at high speed to Alexandria. This ended the Leander's service in the Mediterranean, orders having been received for her return to New Zealand.

After embarking her aircraft and a draft of RNZNVR officers and ratings from New Zealand, the Leander left Port Said on 31 July. She called at Aden for fuel and at Colombo, where she was docked for cleaning and painting, and then proceeded to Fremantle. She sailed thence in company with the Shaw Savill liner Ceramic, which she escorted to the vicinity of Adelaide, and arrived at Sydney on 28 August. The Leander left Sydney eight days later with the Aquitania which was proceeding to Wellington to embark troops for Egypt, and arrived on 8 September, thus completing an eventful cruise of sixteen months.

CHAPTER 9 Raider in New Zealand Waters

BY the beginning of June 1940 the Achilles had made good her action damage and completed an extensive refit. From 10 to 14 June she carried out a series of exercises and trials in the Hauraki Gulf. During the night of 11 June she anchored in Port Fitzroy, Great Barrier Island, but on the three following nights she returned to Auckland and anchored in the harbour.

It is tempting to think that, had she continued to use Port Fitzroy, the Achilles might have sighted and intercepted a powerful German raider which, during the night of 13–14 June, laid a minefield across the several approaches to Hauraki Gulf. The enemy had made his secret approach to New Zealand by taking a devious route from Cape Horn across the unfrequented South Pacific. Though ships were passing daily in and out of Hauraki Gulf, some days elapsed before the mines claimed their first victim, and by that time the raider was far away.

The operations of German raiders extended over a period of about three years and accounted for 182 merchant ships of 1,152,000 tons.

Total losses of British, Allied, and neutral shipping during World War II were 4786 vessels of 21,194,000 tons, of which U-boats sank 2775 ships of 14,573,000 tons, or approximately 69 per cent of the total tonnage. Losses due to German raiders represented slightly more than 5 per cent of the total tonnage.

The German aim was the ‘disruption and destruction of merchant shipping by all possible means’, and the orders to the raiders laid down that ‘frequent changes of position in the operational areas will create uncertainty and restrict enemy merchant shipping, even without tangible results.’ The German Naval Staff exercised a general control over the broad strategy and movements of the raiders but, as in the First World War, a large measure of freedom was left to their commanding officers.

The raider captains interpreted their orders with comprehending caution, but the Admiralty was on the whole fairly well informed about their general movements and, by the evasive routeing of ships and such cruiser patrols as were possible with a great shortage of that class of ship, kept the vital stream of merchant shipping moving steadily and with relatively small losses. The merchant seamen themselves did their part and sailed without hesitation in defiance of the U-boat and raider threat to their safety. The Royal Navy had been ‘cut to the bone’ during the ‘locust years’ from 1918 to 1939, and when war came again it had to perform enormous and innumerable duties with a woeful shortage of cruisers. The provision of adequate cruiser strength would have been a small insurance premium to pay in mitigation of losses of ships, cargoes, and seamen at the hands of German raiders.

‘The one and only possibility of bringing England to her knees with the forces of our Navy lies in attacking her sea communications,’ wrote Admiral Doenitz in a memorandum dated 1 September 1939. ‘It is clear what shipping means to the Anglo-Saxon – absolutely everything.’ The U-boat was the enemy's principal weapon at sea during the Second World War, but he did not hesitate, at first, to employ also his most powerful warships, whose forays in the Atlantic were supplemented by the world-wide activities of a number of merchant ships fitted out as auxiliary cruisers.

The cruises of the armed merchant raiders covered the period from April 1940 to February 1943, during which they sank or captured 124 ships totalling 840,000 tons. In all, ten ships were employed, one of them making two cruises. Five were destroyed at sea, one was destroyed by an explosion and fire in harbour at Yokohama, and another was damaged in the English Channel and returned to Germany. That they were efficient fighting ships of their type was shown by the fact that one raider in three separate actions outranged and damaged two British armed merchant cruisers and sank a third, HMS Voltaire. Another raider, the Kormoran, was responsible for the loss with all hands of HMAS Sydney, though she herself was sunk by that cruiser.

Three of the raiders were oil-burning steamships; one was a twinscrew, diesel-electric vessel; the others were motor-ships. The largest was of 9400 tons and the smallest of 3287 tons gross register. All were modern general cargo or fruit-carrying ships, with a large radius of action, a fair turn of speed, and a relatively low silhouette. They were officially known by numbers, but these were not allotted consecutively, so that the fact that there was a ship No. 45 did not indicate that there were forty-five raiders. They were also given what the Germans called ‘traditional’ names. The raiders were very well equipped and capable of remaining at sea for twelve months or more, with the assistance of fuel tankers and store ships, supplemented by oil and supplies taken from captured vessels. Great use was made of disguise. Dummy ventilators, samson posts, and other deck fittings, as well as false bulwarks and deck-houses, were often set up and repainting was done frequently to change the appearance of the ships. Special workshops and mechanics were carried to make and manipulate these disguises and also to carry out extensive repairs necessitated by long periods at sea.

‘Painting the world brown—will our turn come?’—from the cartoon by E. F. Hiscocks in 1904

The Calliope Dock at Devonport, Auckland, at its opening in February 1888. The warships are the corvettes Calliope and Diamond

Devonport in 1929. The New Zealand Squadron, as shown, was HMS Dunedin and HMS Diomede, with the two Imperial sloops Veronica and Laburnum astern. Philomel and Wakakura are at the training jetty, with the battle-practice target and the cable ship Recorder in the background

Naval ratings learning to make bends and hitches, HMS Philomel, 1934

Training in wireless telegraphy, HMS Philomel, 1940

HMS Achilles at Auckland

The Achilles in the Strait of Magellan on her way to the Falkland Islands

The Admiral Graf Spee, with six 11-inch guns in two triple turrets

The director control tower of the Achilles, showing splinter holes above the signal platform

The Ajax passing between the Achilles and the Admiral Graf Spee while turning to avoid a torpedo

Captain W. E. Parry of the Achilles dresses his leg wounds. Behind him is the navigating officer, Lieutenant G. G. Cowburn

Damaged woodwork on the starboard upper deck of the Achilles

‘A’ turret's crew relax during the shadowing of the Admiral Graf Spee

The Ajax (left), minus her main topmast, and the Achilles steam towards Montevideo at full speed

The after 6-inch guns of the Achilles showing the paint blistered by the heat of rapid firing

The end of the Admiral Graf Spee

HMS Leander at anchor at Alexandria in 1941