The Pacific

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Spine

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Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 The Pacific By Authority: R. E. Owen, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand 1952

Heading for the shore of Vella Lavella. Kolombangara Island in the background. Black and white photograph of landing craft at sea with island in background

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 THE PACIFIC Oliver A. Gillespie WAR HISTORY BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND1952

Foreword

NOW that this record of New Zealand's contribution to the war in the Pacific is finished, I feel that it does, in a modest way, reveal achievements which have not yet been adequately appreciated by the great majority of the public. It is a tribute, also, to the men who fought in a campaign which was singularly lacking in spectacle and heroics, but nevertheless required high courage because of the fighting conditions and strong powers of endurance to withstand a climate as exhausting by day as it was by night.

Although comparatively close at hand, the islands of the Pacific, particularly those on which the actual fighting took place, were much less familiar than the historic and more romantic regions of the Old World, and the war on those islands was never fought in terms of European violence and ingenuity. But, whatever the circumstances, the death of young men is just as distressing whether it occurs in the jungle or the desert or in a cypress-studded landscape.

My task in writing this book was made easier because of my long association with the land forces which went into the Pacific, first to Fiji in 1940 and then to New Caledonia and on to the Solomons, so that I had first-hand knowledge of both conditions and territory and all the attendant misery of the acute physical discomfort. I was fortunate, also, that I afterwards spent some years on the headquarters of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, which enabled me to gather, from available sources, details of the Japanese account of the campaign.

A little of the material used here has been taken from two surveys I wrote for the New Zealand Army Board after I returned from the Solomons—Pacific Story and Guadalcanal to Nissan— and from the thirteen volumes of 3 Division unit histories which I edited before going to Japan in January 1946, but most of it has been extracted from official documents and files.

My sincere thanks are due to the staff of the War History Branch for the ready assistance given to me at all times during my search through files and documents. I should like also to express my gratitude to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who gave me permission to use any material I required from translated Japanese documents held by his headquarters in Tokyo; Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Robertson, Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, who permitted me to remain in Tokyo and freed me from all official duties while I searched Japanese documents; Major-General H. E. Barrowclough, who read my manuscript and spurred me with his enthusiasm; Colonel H. C. Parker, the Military Attache at the United States Embassy, Wellington, for checking some American details; Squadron Leader J. M. S. Ross, for information about the Royal New Zealand Air Force; Captain N. A. Fraser, for information about New Zealanders serving with the Fiji Military Forces; S. D. Waters, for some naval data; Miss P. M. Lissington, who wrote the official narrative on New Zealand's relations with Japan from 1900 to 1941; and to the narrative by M. B. McGlynn on New Zealand's manpower problems. The account of the activities of the Royal New Zealand Naval Squadron and Royal New Zealand Air Force in the Pacific is necessarily brief, as their histories will be told in separate volumes.

In order to keep this narrative in its proper perspective and make it as complete as possible, I have included the briefest practicable account of the part played by the American forces, Navy, Army and Air, of which the New Zealanders were a small part. It is inevitable, however, in works of this kind, that incidents of importance and acts of individual bravery should be overlooked. It was impossible also to record all changes of command; to do so would have cluttered the narrative with lists of names. For any such shortcomings in recording this not unworthy page of New Zealand history I apologize.

Oliver A. Gillespie

Wellington

June 1951

Contents

PAGE Foreward v Chapter 1: Japan—Rise And Conquest 1 Chapter 2: The Fiji Garrison— I: New Zealand's Responsibility 19 II: The First Force and Its Work 26 III: From Pearl Harbour to Relief 42 Chapter 3: Problems of Command and Employment— I: America Plans the Offensive 57 II: New Zealand Emerges in the Pacific Plan 65 Chapter 4: Back to The Pacific— I: The Third Division Emerges 71 II: Move to New Caledonia 87 III: Life Among the Niaoulis 98 IV: Negotiations—Political and Service 103 V: Training for Combat 116 Chapter 5: Three Island Actions— I: Vella Lavella 125 II: The Treasuries 142 III: The Waiting Period 159 IV: The Capture of Green Islands 168 Chapter 6: The End of A Division 195 Chapter 7: The Battle for The Solomons— I: Japanese Plans Defeated 204 II: The Turning Point 211 III: Crucial Action 216 IV: The Japanese Move Back 221 Chapter 8: The Coastwatchers 228 Chapter 9: Navy and Air Force— I: The Navy in the Solomons 240 II: The Air Force Story 245 Chapter 10: Fiji Units in Action— I: Training a Brigade Group 261 II: Guerrillas in the Jungle 264 III: Battalions Move to the Solomons 272 Chapter 11: The Smaller Garrisons— I: Fanning Island 288 II: Tonga 292 III: Norfolk Island 300 Chapter 12: Occupation in Japan 307 Chapter 13: Reflections 318 Appendices— I: Special Order by Major-General H. E. Barrowclough, 19 October 1944 327 II: Appeals for Assistance 328 III: Directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area 334 IV: Letter from General Barrowclough to General Puttick, 24 May 1943 337 V: Special Order by General Barrowclough, 1 July 1943 341 VI: Interview with Governor Laigret, 18 December 1943 342 VII: Statement by Rt. Hon. P. Fraser on role of New Zealand's Armed Forces, September 1944 344 VIII: Appreciation by Lieutenant-General E. Puttick on Withdrawal of 2nd or 3rd NZ Division, 19 February 1944 346 IX: Appreciation by General Puttick on Strength of New Zealand Army overseas, 4 August 1944 353 X: Telegram from Mr. Fraser to Mr. Churchill, 9 September 1944 359 XI: Letter from Hon. W. Nash, New Zealand Minister in Washington, to President Roosevelt, 24 January 1944 360 XII: Japanese Army daily ration 362 Bibliography 363

List of Illustrations

Heading for the shore of Vella Lavella United States Army Signal Corps Official Frontispice Following page 8 Brigade Group on Rangatira 16 30 Battalion of 8 Brigade Group arrives in Fiji 16 Petrol tank in Sealark Hill, Suva 16 8 NZ Infantry Brigade defences on Fiji 16 Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley arrives at Namaka Aerodrome, May 1942 16 Third Division manœuvres in the Kaimai Ranges The Weekly News 16 Sappers in the Kaimai Ranges The Weekly News 16 The Kiwi Club, Bourail Beach NZ Army Official 48 Training in New Caledonia NZ Army 48 Review of 8 NZ Infantry Brigade, New Caledonia NZ Army 48 Base Ordnance Depot, Bourail NZ Army 48 30 Battalion headquarters, New Caledonia NZ Army 48 37 Battalion cookhouse ovens, Taom, New Caledonia NZ Army 48 The camp site of 22 Field Ambulance at Tinipp NZ Army 48 Nurses' quarters, 4 NZ General Hospital, Boguen NZ Army 48 Club at Base Training Depot in Tene Valley, New Caledonia NZ Army 80 Embarkation Practice NZ Army 80 The move to Guadalcanal NZ Army 80 Boarding a Landing Craft (Mechanised), Noumea NZ Army 80 Third Division training exercise, Mele Beach, New Hebrides NZ Army 80 Gunners pulling a Bofors gun ashore at Mele Beach NZ Army 80 Troops board the USS transport, President Hayes, Noumea NZ Army 80 Following page 14 Brigade Group landing, Point Cruz, Guadalcanal NZ Army 80 Men of 36 Battalion on USS President Jackson NZ Army 112 Below deck on the way from New Hebrides to Guadalcanal NZ Army 112 Malaria Control Unit spraying 37 Field Park Company's camp, Guadalcanal NZ Army 112 Henderson Field, Guadalcanal 112 US Marines following a trail on Guadalcanal US Official 112 Ready for embarkation at Kukum Beach, Guadalcanal, before sailing for Vella Lavella NZ Army 112 Loading rations at Guadalcanal for Vella Lavella NZ Army 112 14 Brigade units landing at Vella Lavella US Army Signal Corps 112 On Vella Lavella NZ Army 144 A patrol from 35 Battalion at Pakoi Bay NZ Army 144 Interrogation of a Japanese prisoner of war, Vella Lavella NZ Army 144 35 Anti-Tank Battery at Maravari, Vella Lavella NZ Army 144 Umomo Island shelled by 12 Field Battery NZ Army 144 Carrier Platoon of 35 Battalion crosses Timbala Bay in a native canoe NZ Army 144 Muddy conditions, Tangalan Plantation area, Nissan Island NZ Army 144 20 Field Company's bridge over Joroveto River, Vella Lavella US Navy Official 144 Landing Craft (Infantry) of the invasion convoy at Guadalcanal A. E. Tilley 176 Landing Craft (Tank) beached at Mono Island NZ Army 176 A 25-pounder damaged by enemy mortar fire, Falamai A. E. Tilley 176 A Landing Ship (Tank) beached at Mono Island US Navy 176 Foxholes in a bivouac area at Malsi Village, Mono Island NZ Army 176 Unloading operations at Falamai NZ Army 176 Embarking on a Landing Craft (Infantry) at Juno Beach, Vella Lavella, for Nissan Island NZ Army 176 Landing craft entering the lagoon at Nissan Island US Official 176 Following page Raid by 30 Battalion on Nissan Island US Marine Corps Official 272 Wounded of 30 Battalion waiting to be taken off Nissan Island US Marine Corps 272 New Zealand engineers forming a road through the jungle of Nissan Island NZ Army 272 Tangalan Plantation US Official 272 RNZAF Fighter Squadrons land on the fighter strip at Nissan NZ Army 272 First Commando Fiji Guerrillas in the Solomons US Official 272 Fiji Commandos officers' mess, Teneru, Guadalcanal 272 Ready to leave Stirling Island for return to New Caledonia NZ Army 304 34 Battalion mess, Tonga A. H. Rendell 304 Major-General W. H. Cunningham, first Commander in Fiji 304 Brigadier R. A. Row, Commander of 8 Brigade, and Sir Cyril Newall, Governor-General of New Zealand, on an inspection tour in the Treasury Group 304 Lieutenant-Colonel F. C. Cornwall, Brigadier L. Potter, Commander of 14 Brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Moffatt on Nissan Island 304 Minister of Defence and senior officers on board a transport at Noumea 304 22 NZ Battalion controlling the Japanese repatriation center at Senzaki, Japan 304 New Zealanders watch Japanese farm labourers plant the new season's rice 304

List of Maps

Following page 3 NZ Division in the Solomons 208 Coastwatching Stations in the Pacific 240 Pacific War Tides 396

In Text Page Fiji 28 New Caledonia 92 Vella Lavella 128 Treasury Group 149 Nissan Island 175 Bougainville 275

The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The ranks are those held on discharge or at the date of death.

CHAPTER 1 Japan—Rise and Conquest

JAPAN'S role in the Pacific was not considered of any great importance, and certainly created no sense of insecurity, until after her defeat of Russia in 1905, which gave her control of Port Arthur and of Korea on the mainland of Asia. From comparative obscurity, Japan had risen to a second-class world power by her victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95, after which increasing world opinion was directed on her industrial activities and on a rising population which began to worry other countries. Until 1905, however, New Zealand's attitude was favourable, and any talk of a ‘Yellow peril’ referred only to the Chinese. A noticeable change came after the Russian defeat. Japan rose to the position of a first-class power, and her menacing birthrate drew warnings from such people as Sir Robert Stout, who publicly voiced the fear of her competition in industry and a possible demand for lands for emigration. Australia, with her ‘White Australia’ policy, had long been stridently conscious of the threat from Japan—a threat which was not completely allayed by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, into which Britain was forced by her fear of Russian expansion and possible supremacy in the Far East, for at that time Russia was attempting to obtain by diplomacy what she has obtained today by political influence and force of arms—a controlling interest in China.

By 1909 this Alliance was showing signs of deterioration as the power of the German Navy increased the alarm of Great Britain. New Zealand offered a battle cruiser, HMS New Zealand, to assist in strengthening the British Navy as well as removing a little of the load from the British taxpayer, and during Parliamentary debates which followed a proposal to borrow £2 million to pay for this gift, speakers displayed some concern for what they described as dangers north of the Equator. By that time Japanese infiltration into the Pacific was unmistakable. Apart from her increasing trade with Pacific countries, Japanese were being employed in mounting numbers in the rich chrome and nickel mines of New Caledonia, a French possession sitting astride most vulnerable sea lanes, and apprehension was displayed in 1911 that ultimately Japan might use that island as a base which would imperil both Australia and New Zealand. It all seemed like a pattern of things to come.

Her ultimate goal—supremacy in the Pacific—was the subject of newspaper articles pointing out such dangers. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance did nothing to stem a deepening mistrust of Japan, for in 1913 the Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand, considered that such an alliance was not sufficient protection for this Dominion; therefore she must do something for herself.

British colonies and dominions in the Pacific regarded Singapore as their protector; the might of the British Navy as their shield. Even until the fall of that great strategical base, the whole of British Pacific strategy was centred on and about it. The Imperial Conference held in London in 1909 urged the necessity for creating and maintaining a strong fleet based on Singapore for Pacific defence, but its establishment was delayed because of the rapidly increasing strength of the German navy and its menace in European waters. Massey at that time most forcefully advocated the creation of a strong Pacific naval force, and proposed that Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa should join together in forming a fighting navy in the Pacific which, he said, prophetically, ‘would yet become the battlefield of the nations’. Because of the German menace, however, and before Massey's proposal bore fruit, the war of 1914-18 had broken on the world. Britain's action in maintaining a stronger fleet in Home and Mediterranean waters was justified, but the progress of the First World War provided Japan with her long-desired opportunity to establish herself in such strength and secrecy in Pacific islands north of the Equator that her bases there became her springboard in 1941.

Britain showed no great enthusiasm for Japanese intervention in the 1914-18 conflict and wished for none unless her Far Eastern and Pacific possessions were jeopardised, but all diplomatic persuasion failed to keep Japan neutral. She declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914, and on 7 October seized all the German-held islands north of the Equator, occupying the Pelew, Marianne, Caroline, and Marshall Groups, with Truk as the hub. Australia was prepared to send a force into the Carolines and Marianas before the Japanese move, but her troops were required in other theatres of war. Japan's precipitate action alarmed Australia, but this alarm was to some extent pacified by the British Government's statement that it would be more convenient to allow Japan to remain in the territory she had occupied until the end of the war, when the future of the islands would be decided. Japan became an ally, and ships of her navy protected convoys from Australia and New Zealand in the Indian Ocean and also did convoy work in the Mediterranean.

The Japanese cruiser Ibuki helped to escort the Main Body of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force to Egypt.

The Japanese move to take advantage of British weakness in the Pacific in 1914 was so swift and determined that it suggested a preconceived plan of action. Moreover, the demanded a stern price for any military or naval assistance which was forthcoming. By 1917 Japan was firmly entrenched in the islands she had seized. Her possession of the Marianas and the Carolines was discussed at the Imperial War Conference in London in 1917, when Japan's retention of all former German islands north of the Equator was assumed, but she was not to move south of that line. At the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919, Australia and New Zealand, with extreme reluctance, yielded to those concessions already pledged to Japan. From the time of her occupation of the former German territory, Japan adopted a secretive attitude concerning her activities there. Every obstacle was placed in the way of traders and shipping until, finally, whole groups of islands became lost to the world's intelligence except on charts and maps. Those island bases were not captured and opened to the world again until 1944-45.

Japan used the 1914-18 War to her great advantage, both in the islands and in China, but it was a price the British Commonwealth had to pay for its inability to maintain a major fleet in the Pacific. Even before the war ended, Japanese newspapers, influenced by a pro-German section of her politicians, insisted that it was Japan's ‘duty and right’ to maintain peace in the East. Some of those same politicians demanded that the Allies withdraw the whole of their military and naval strength from China, Vladivostok, Mongolia, Manchuria, Siberia, and the South Seas and India, leaving Japan in control of the regions thus evacuated. Such statements were not rebuked by Ministers. In September 1918 the Mayor of Tokyo foresaw a possible war with Great Britain and the United States and prophetically stated: ‘Japan must bravely face the inevitable, even though she will ultimately be defeated.’

But he was not the only prophet, as Massey had been. When Admiral Lord Jellicoe toured the Pacific in 1919, he realised the relentless ambition of the Japanese and the beginning of fulfilment of their Pacific ambitions once they obtained mandate control of the Marshall and Caroline Islands. He realised then that the interests of Japan and Britain must inevitably clash. ‘In the event of war with Japan’ was Jellicoe's theme in suggesting Pacific defence and strategy for the future advice of the Lords of the Admiralty.

At the conclusion of his tour in HMS New Zealand, during which he visited Fiji and the Solomons, Lord Jellicoe reported: ‘It is impossible to consider the question of naval strategy in the Pacific without taking account of Suva Harbour. This harbour holds a position of great strategic importance with reference to New Zealand and Australia. It should accordingly be strongly fortified and held. At first guns to meet a scale of attack of unarmoured vessels should be established and then heavy guns to meet a scale of attack of armoured vessels.’ A high-power radio station was also recommended by Jellicoe, who regarded Fiji as a most vital centre in Pacific communications. Except for the radio station, a commercial undertaking, nothing could be done in Fiji because of commitments at the Washington Conference, which also nullified Jellicoe's proposals to develop the Tulagi-Gavutu Harbour in the Solomons into a major naval base. At the outbreak of war in 1939, Suva still remained the dolce far niente island outpost it was during Jellicoe's visit twenty years previously. Even by June 1941 the coast defences of Fiji consisted only of two 6-inch naval guns and two 4.7-inch guns covering the more vulnerable reef passages, and these had been emplaced after the outbreak of war. Jellicoe's report also made manifestly clear the weakness of both Singapore and Hong Kong, if they were attacked with determination by land and sea forces. Ships of the Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth class, he pointed out, could not dock at Singapore if they were fitted with bulge protection against submarines, and both bases were extremely vulnerable to attack by submarines and coastal motor boats. First-class fighting naval units were consequently unemployable for Pacific defence unless Singapore were greatly extended and improved.

Through the years following 1914 Japan built up her navy and extended her naval bases on the mainland, particularly at Kure, Yokosuka, and Sasebo. The Washington Conference of 1921, after which, as Churchill commented, ‘the British and American Governments proceeded to sink their battleships and break up their military establishments with great gusto’, really gave Japan command of the seas in the Pacific, a command she never lost until 1943. That conference enabled her to maintain in the north-west Pacific a fleet superior in strength to anything Great Britain or the United States could maintain. It also guaranteed that the United Kingdom and the United States would not develop bases in the status quo area, which included Hong Kong and the Philippines; the island base of Guam, on which a huge defence scheme was halted; Pago Pago, in American Samoa; Suva, in Fiji; and Tulagi in the Solomons. Even when the treaty lapsed, Congress rejected plans for the refortification of Guam. A product of the Washington Conference was the Four Power Pact, signed by Japan, France, Great Britain, and the United States in 1922, and under its guarantee the signatory powers were to respect each other's property in the Pacific area. However, it did little except strengthen Japan's hand.

Changing political situations in Great Britain gravely affected the Singapore naval base which, by diplomatic manœuvre at the Washington Conference, had been excluded from the status quo area and could therefore be fortified without restraint. Britain decided to embark on a scheme of expansion and extension, estimated to cost £21,000,000, but this was abandoned when the MacDonald Government came into power. Massey, during discussions at the Imperial Conference in London in 1923, strongly protested, pointing out that such action gravely exposed New Zealand and Australia to attack, but MacDonald, pinning his faith in the League of Nations, insisted that the building of the Singapore base would have a detrimental effect on the foreign policy of Great Britain, whose task before the world was to ‘allay international suspecions and anxieties’. The defeat of the MacDonald Government enabled the original plan to go ahead under Baldwin.

New Zealand's first contribution towards the cost of the base was an offer of £100,000 (half the sum recommended by the then naval adviser) made in 1923. The following year, when a Special Service Squadron which included HMS Hood visited Wellington, Massey stated that if the Singapore Base did not go ahead he thought the Admiralty would ask New Zealand to contribute another cruiser in the Pacific. In either case (Singapore or a cruiser) it would cost about £250,000. That would make New Zealand's defence expenditure total just more than £1,000,000. In Massey's opinion that was not too much, though it sounded a lot.

In 1927, under the Coates administration, New Zealand offered to contribute £1,000,000 towards the cost of the base, payable over a period of years at the rate of £125,000 a year. This brought a strong protest from Mr. H. E. Holland, leader of the Labour Party in New Zealand, but Mr. W. Nash, also a Labour leader, in an address to the Institute of Pacific Relations in Honolulu, told his audience that New Zealand public opinion supported the contribution because the British Fleet was one of the great securities for the peace of the world. The urge behind the New Zealand Government's offer was purely one of defence.

In 1929, however, MacDonald was returned to power in England and work on the base was slowed down, although the following year the Imperial Conference agreed to proceed with the dock and air base, but to postpone all other work for five years.

Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, on the question of the League's refusal to recognise the State of Manchukuo, increased British distrust of her intentions. By this time she had violated the Nine Power Pact of 1921 and the Paris Pact of 1928 by overrunning Chinese Manchuria. From then on she extended her territorial activities on the mainland of Asia in an undeclared war on China, during which she seized provinces in North China, bombed Shanghai, sank the United States ship Panay, and sacked Nanking. New Zealand, with the rest of the world, was deeply concerned by these continued hostilities and by the extension of Japanese trade as she sought to obtain raw materials, particularly wool and scrap metal, from abroad.

Prior to the 1914-18 War, Japanese-New Zealand trade interests were not extensive. New Zealand imports amounted on the average to £140,000 a year and her exports to £2000, rising to £60,000 in 1914. By 1928 the figures had increased considerably. In that year Japan purchased almost £600,000 worth of New Zealand wool, and New Zealand imports amounted to almost the same value. The figures declined until 1936, but by 1937 New Zealand exports rose to £3,132,000 (the highest ever reached) as against Japanese imports valued at £1,630,000. The Government restrictions imposed in 1938 caused a sharp decline in trade between the two countries; New Zealand exports fell away to £592,700 as against imports valued at £1,208,200. Wool was the commodity greatest in demand by Japan.

Mr. W. J. Jordan, New Zealand High Commissioner in London and the Dominion's representative to the League of Nations in 1937, protested on behalf of New Zealand against the bombing of Chinese towns, but his recommendation ‘that members of the League use their influence to deter Japan from continuing her present from of aggression’ was lost. That year he also addressed the Imperial Defence College on New Zealand's preparations for defence (they were not ambitious), and in a note to the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. M. J. Savage, said that after speaking of the proposals he would come back to the point that the best form of defence was the settlement of the country by contented and prosperous people. Savage attended the Imperial Conference of 1937, at which opinion still considered the British Fleet sufficiently strong to prevent any major Japanese operations against New Zealand or Australia. But events in Europe, and the growing truculence of Japan as she continued her undeclared war on China and moulded her policy on that of Germany, created uneasiness and misgiving in the South Pacific. Mr. J. A. Lyons, Prime Minister of Australia, suggested in London a regional pact in the Pacific. Savage supported him and asked for an assurance from the British Government that the British Fleet, even if it were engaged in European waters, would also be sufficient to contain the Japanese fleet in Eastern waters. Obviously Singapore was still regarded as an impregnable base, though even by September 1940 there were only 88 first-line aircraft in Malaya and nine battalions of troops, whereas the estimated requirements were 336 aircraft and eighteen battalions.

The first decisive move in an attempt to overcome weakness which daily grew more obvious, was initiated by Savage, who suggested that representatives of Great Britian, Australia, and New Zealand should meet to discuss the defence of the Pacific ‘in its widest aspects, sea, land, and air’. This conference opened in Wellington on 14 April 1939 and was attended by senior representatives of the three fighting services from each country. A month previously Czechoslovakia had been absorbed and Hitler was still thundering over the air that he had no more territorial ambitions in Europe. The conference considered the defence of certain Pacific islands, and selected a limited number of island bases from which to maintain observation over a chain of islands between Tonga and New Guinea, so that the approach of any raiding forces could be advised. It was agreed, also, that Fiji was the most important island in any defence scheme for Australia and New Zealand. Recommendations made to the Government were that a third cruiser should be manned and maintained and New Zealand merchant vessels ‘stiffened’; the Royal New Zealand Air Force to increase its output of trained pilots for the Royal Air Force; the regular and Territorial forces be increased, and detachments despatched to Fanning Island and Fiji as soon as war with Japan seemed inevitable. Questions of supply were also discussed, and it was recommended that liaison officers be appointed to the Defence Department in Australia and the War Office in London and that all reports be exchanged. Action was taken on some of those recommendations.

At the conclusion of the conference Major-General Mackesy, the British military delegate, was asked by the New Zealand Government to report on the Dominion's land forces. His report was depressing but inevitable in view of a policy which had shown little interest or enthusiasm in defence matters. His considered opinion was that the New Zealand Army had been allowed to become the Cinderella of the services and that New Zealand was incapable of repulsing any serious landing force. He recommended the immediate creation of a small regular land force of three infantry battalions and the expansion of the Territorial Force. Savage lost no time in appealing for men. On 22 May he asked for an increase in the peace establishment from 9500 to 16,000 men, another 250 for the coast defences, and for every able-bodied man from 20 to 55 years of age to register in the national defence reserve. Additional defence equipment, supplies of which were dangerously low, was ordered from overseas, but before that could be obtained or industry geared for its production, war had overwhelmed Europe.

Just as she fought for time in Europe, Great Britain fought for time in the Pacific, though Singapore was still regarded as the impregnable keystone of her defence. When the Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London in November 1939, Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, in a memorandum referring to the possibility of a Japanese attack against the base said, ‘it is not considered possible that the Japanese, who are a prudent people and reserve their strength for the command of the Yellow Seas and China, in which they are fully occupied, would embark on such a mad enterprise.’ Nor did the British Chiefs of Staff reveal any great apprehension. In a review of the strategical situation they reported: ‘We feel that the immediate danger to Australia and New Zeland is remote.’ Churchill considered that Singapore could be taken only after a siege by an army of 50,000; the Chiefs of Staff felt that the Japanese would direct their attack against the mainland of Asia. The policy outlined at the London conference stated that, in the event of conflict with Japan, the three main objectives of the United Kingdom would be:

(i)

The prevention of any major operations against Australia, New Zealand, or India.

(ii)

To keep open sea communications.

(iii)

To prevent the fall of Singapore.

Mr. Peter Fraser, Deputy Prime Minister, attended the conference and expressed his apprehension concerning defences in the Pacific. At least two flying boats, he urged, should be made available to New Zealand to carry out reconnaissance in the islands should the necessity arise. At that time Britain's diplomacy aimed at a policy which would do nothing to antagonise Japan. In July the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911 was terminated. Britain considered denouncing the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and New Zealand was prepared to break her trade agreement with Japan, but the British Government delayed action, fearing Japanese reprisals. After the outbreak of war with Germany on 3 September 1939, Britain endeavoured to prevent essential supplies of Malayan tin and rubber from reaching Germany via Russia, and Japan agreed. Even when Britain tightened the blockade against Germany in the Far East by intercepting and examining ships of all nations thought to be carrying cargo to Vladivostok, certain conditions were laid down so that Japan would not be offended. There was to be no interception of ships within sight of the Japanese coast or north of latitude 20° 21'; Japan was also requested to give an undertaking that certain specified war purpose commodities would not reach Germany via Japan or Japanese territory or by Japanese transport. The British Government, conscious of its weakness should the British Fleet be called on to fight in the Pacific, did its utmost, diplomatically, to keep Japan out of the war. The situation in Europe grew bleaker through 1940 as the German armies swept into Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France. In the grim days of May 1940 Churchill took over from Chamberlain, but all he could offer was his historical quartet, ‘blood, toil, sweat, and tears’. In France, three days after Churchill's leadership was assured in England, Reynaud took over from Daladier, but nothing could stem the German tide. Between 27 May and 4 June the British armies were saved from annihilation by the Dunkirk evacuation, and on 22 June France signed an armistice with Germany.

The fall of France shattered British Commonwealth defence in the Pacific, and Japan again quickly seized her opportunity, just as she had done in 1914. General Hata declared in Tokyo: ‘We must not miss this rare opportunity…. Japan must act drastically against the powers who obstruct her policy’. She demanded that Britain cease supplies to China and withdraw her garrison from Hong Kong. Demonstrations against British nationals in Japan became more frequent. The British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, endeavoured to prevent Japan from entering the war on the side of Germany and Italy, with whom she had become partners under the Pact of Berlin, a military alliance signed on 27 September 1940. He attempted to obtain some declaration from the United States on Anglo-American policy in the Far East and suggested certain lines of action, including joint assistance to Japan in bringing about peace with the Chinese Government. Japan was to undertake to remain neutral in the European war and to respect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands East Indies and British, French, and American possessions in the Pacific. The British Government decided to act on Craigie's suggestions and was supported by the New Zealand Government, which also wished for some clear indication of the Far Eastern policy of the United States. But none was forthcoming. The United States Government would not take any action which might commit her to war in the Far East, though she raised no objection to Great Britain's exploration of a possible settlement with Japan on terms acceptable to China, ‘consistent with principles for which the United States stands’. Public opinion in America was being carefully nursed and nourished by Roosevelt, though certain action had been taken to assist Great Britain. Fifty of her older destroyers had been exchanged for bases in British territory in the West Indies, Newfoundland, and Bermuda on a 99 years' lease and granted ‘freely and without consideration’. British and American war supplies were reaching China via the Burma Road, which the British refused to close when first requested to do so by Japan. New Zealand and Australia supported this action, but the outcry in Japan was such that Britain, hard-pressed by events in Europe and the Middle East, closed it to war supplies for three months on 18 July, opening the road again on 17 October. New Zealand protested against this concession, fearing the danger of a policy of appeasement, and that it might antagonise America. During those critical months, when the Battle of Britain was raging and the German submarine attack on British shipping was being intensified, there was a change of Government in Japan. Prince Konoye took over an administration which was more aggressive and pro-Axis than ever, basing its actions on the assumption that the British Empire was ‘effete and ripe for dissolution’.

There was no improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations through the first six months of 1941. An indication of New Zealand's attitude was revealed in February when Mr. Kakafuji, the Japanese consul, called on Mr. Fraser, now Prime Minister in succession to Mr. Savage. He was left in no doubt regarding this Dominion's action in the event of trouble. New Zealand, Fraser forcefully told his visitor, would play her part fully with other members of the Commonwealth. In London the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, made clear to the Japanese Ambassador that Britain could not agree that Japan alone was entitled to mediate in Far Eastern disputes or was entitled to dominate all the peoples of the Far East. The existing tension, he said, had been created by the unexplained movements of Japanese forces in Formosa, Hainan, Indo-China, and the South China Sea.

Early in 1939 Japan seized the island base of Hainan and later moved into the Spratley Islands, which were uncomfortably close to Borneo and the Philippines. Then, following the outbreak of was in Europe, she continued to creep along the Chinese coast in the Kwangtung Province (which menaced Hong Kong, particularly by an attack on Canton), and at Yamchow and Nanning, on the French Indo-China border. It was a policy she had adopted since 1931. Each time the Western powers were involved in a crisis in Europe, Japan took advantage of it in the East.

Although there was no public assurance from the United States of active armed support, the American Government did consider freezing Japanese credits. By June 1941 she had moved three battleships, four cruisers, nineteen destroyers, and one aircraft carrier from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, and by so doing possibly lessened the disaster of Pearl Harbour. This action was regarded favourably by both Australia and New Zealand, who welcomed it as a deterrent on Japan by the implication that the United States would enter the war to help Great Britain, but both countries wanted at least six American capital ships and two aircraft carriers to remain in the Pacific. The Lend-Lease Act,

The Lend-Lease Act gave the Government of the United States authority to furnish aid to nations whose defences were deemed by the President to be vital to the defence of the United States of America.

providing for much-needed assistance, was signed on 11 March 1941, and American naval vessels assisted British convoys in American waters. United States marines had also landed in Iceland. Though she did everything to avoid a conflict through 1941, Great Britain considered black-listing large Japanese firms and denouncing the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. New Zealand cautiously preferred the last-named action because ‘circumstances are now exceedingly delicate and any unnecessary irritation at this present juncture would be unwise.’

While diplomatic discussions were in progress Japan, whose troops were already in the country, demanded naval and air bases in Indo-China, to which the submissive Vichy Government agreed. On 26 July 1941 the British and United States Governments and the Netherlands East Indies Government issued orders freezing all Japanese credits. On the same day the British Government terminated the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. New Zealand took similar action on 27 July.

Japan was not deterred by such action, though her naval chiefs were gravely concerned about declining oil and petrol supplies after the imposition of an embargo by the United Kingdom and United States in July. By negotiation and intrigue she obtained a controlling interest in Thailand, thus directly menacing Malaya, gaining it in face of diplomatic moves by Great Britain and the United States and appeals from Thailand for assistance. On 13 April 1941 she signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR, using that as a weapon to exert pressure on the Netherlands East Indies Government for economic concessions—principally in rubber and oil—which the Dutch firmly opposed. New Zealand urged the necessity for guaranteeing the military security of the Dutch Indies, but Great Britain replied that she was in no position to do so without the necessary support of the United States Government, which was still non-committal.

Fearing Japanese reaction, the Dutch had declined to attend staff talks at Singapore when British, Australian, and New Zealand service chiefs met there in November 1940 and discussed Far Eastern defence problems. However, when Great Britain intimated her strategical interest in the Netherlands East Indies, Dutch officers did attend secret staff conversations but without political commitments on either side. New Zealand expressed disappointment that a full guarantee could not be given to the Dutch, but it was obvious that without definite public assurances of American aid Great Britain could not commit herself too deeply in the Netherlands East Indies. In the event of attack Great Britain was too weak, particularly in land- and carrier-based aircraft, to defend her long lines of communication. The penetration of German armies into Russia at this time was also disturbing the war planning in London.

Late in 1941 the United States took the lead in negotiations with Japan in order to try to avert a clash, though her attitude and assistance to China governed any definite concessions to Japan. Craigie, in Tokyo, was of the opinion that Prince Konoye wished to meet President Roosevelt to discuss a possible settlement of the United States-Japanese conflict. The United States rightly maintained that any settlement involving China must provide fully for the sovereignty and territorial security of that country, otherwise permanent peace in the Pacific would be impossible. Konoye seems to have been perfectly sincere in his desire to avoid a conflict, and Craigie pointed out that the Japanese Prime Minister could only retain support for his policy if the meeting with Roosevelt took place quickly. But it never did—Konoye's Government fell on the issue of the Washington conversations, and General Tojo and his extremists took over.

Early in November Mr. Saburo Kurusu was despatched to Washington by his Government to assist the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in his conversations towards a settlement, but it soon became evident to Mr. Cordell Hull, United States Secretary of State, that all Japan wanted was time and the speedy removal of economic pressure. Mobilisation orders to the Japanese Southern Army were issued secretly in Tokyo on 6 November, and the areas to be seized were decided on 20 November, while the Washington conversations were taking place. Had this been revealed, the plans of the Japanese High Command would have been wrecked. What Japan hoped to gain from the Washington talks was a restoration of commercial relations such as existed before her credit was frozen, a supply of oil, and pressure from the United States on the Netherlands Indies Government to force it to supply Japan with petroleum and other products. Great Britain agreed with the United States that all Japan sought was ‘the speedy removal of economic pressure but not the speedy settlement of anything else’. Hull put up counter proposals, which the Chinese regarded as ‘disastrous’ and Great Britain as none too satisfactory. New Zealand was kept fully acquainted with these negotiations and supported the British Government. Hull's suggestion included the Japanese withdrawal of the bulk of her troops from China, and in return referred to the possibility of the United States, Great Britain, and the Dutch Governments giving ‘some relief from economic pressure’. He considered this suggestion might lead to a wider settlement and gain valuable time. In view of Chinese opposition, which took the form of a direct appeal to Roosevelt by General Chiang Kai-shek, who considered that any relaxation of the embargoes would cause Chinese morale to collapse, Hull handed to the Japanese Ambassador a final plan, containing a proposal for a mutual declaration of the national policies of their two countries. This plan, ‘a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific’, was in two parts, the first of which contained the proposed mutual declaration of policy, affirming the desire of both countries for lasting peace, the sovereignty of all Pacific nations, principles of commercial equality and opportunity, and an agreement to support and apply certain principles in their economic relations with each other. The second part set out in ten paragraphs steps to be taken by both countries to give effect to this plan, the more important of which were:

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavour to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.

The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support militarily, politically, and economically any government or regime in China other than the national government of the Republic of China, with capital temporarily at Chungking.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will respectively remove freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

Both Governments will agree upon a plan for stabilisation of the dollar-yen rate and will allocate funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

After reading this document Kurusu intimated that his Government would be likely ‘to throw up its hands’, but he and the Ambassador asked to see the President and were received by him the following day.

The situation was then critical. The Japanese were reinforcing their troops in Indo-China, and reconnaissance planes of the Royal Air Force reported sighting Japanese transports off the Kra Isthmus. The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, asked permission to move into the isthmus if it could be proved that the Japanese were entering that territory, but the British military advisers were still afraid that any such action might involve Britain in war. Although time was running out, the British Government hastily sought the views of the United States, as well as the Commonwealth Governments. New Zealand suggested that the Thai Government should consider the possibility of inviting Britain to defend the isthmus, in collaboration with Thai forces, and, if American support were assured, an attempt should be made to forestall a Japanese occupation. Roosevelt assured Britain of support if Japan occupied the isthmus, and the British Government instructed Brooke-Popham to despatch troops if a landing was apparent or if the Japanese violated any part of Thailand. Instructions were also issued to Brooke-Popham to put into operation plans agreed on at the Singapore Conference if the Japanese attacked the Netherlands East Indies.

These plans were the outcome of American, Dutch, and British conversations (not made public at the time) held in Singapore from 21 to 27 April 1941, at which New Zealand was represented by Commodore W. E. Parry, RN,

Admiral Sir Edward Parry, KCB, RN; born 8 Apr 1893; commanded HMS Acbilles 27 Jan 1939–15 Oct 1940; Chief of NZ Naval Staff, First Naval Member of NZ Naval Board, and Commodore Commanding NZ Squadron, 1 May-15 Oct 1940; Chief of Naval Staff and First Naval Member, 15 Oct 1940–30 Jun 1942; commanded HMS Renown 1943; Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiralty, Jul 1946–May 1948; Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Indian Navy, Jul 1948–Oct 1951.

Air Commodore H. W. L. Saunders,

Air Chf Mshl Sir Hugh Saunders, KCB, KBE, MC, DFC, MM, Legion of Merit (US); Paris; born Johannesburg, 24 Aug 1894; Chief of Air Staff, RNZAF, 1939–41; AOC No. 11 Group, Fighter Command, 1942–44; commanded RAF, Burma, 1945–46; AOC-in-C Bomber Command, 1946–47; C-in-C Air Forces, Western Europe, 1950–51; Air Deputy to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1 Apr 1951–.

and Colonel A. E. Conway.

Brig A. E. Conway, CB, OBE, m. i. d., Legion of Merit (US); Whakatane; born Reefton, 7 Apr 1891; Regular soldier; Canterbury Regt, 1 NZEF, 1914–16; Adjutant-General, NZ Military Forces, 1940–46.

Their fulfilment would have altered greatly the course of the Pacific war, but they were shattered first by the attack on Pearl Harbour and then by the fall of Singapore. During the conversations agreement was reached, though without political commitment, on the employment and disposition of all forces in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and in Australian and New Zealand waters, but a subsidiary interest was the security of Luzon, in the northern Philippines, as it was envisaged that threats to Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies could be outflanked, providing submarines and air forces could still operate from Luzon bases. The plans also outlined British and American commands and the operations of the United States Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbour, against Japanese mandated islands and her sea communications, should an attack develop against the Netherlands East Indies. Should Luzon fall, American naval and air units were to fall back on Singapore. But Singapore fell first.

On 6 December information was despatched from Singapore that two Japanese convoys, consisting of 35 transports escorted by eight cruisers and ten destroyers, had been sighted off Cambodia Point, sailing north-west. Even then the British Government hesitated, presuming that another warning might have some effect. A draft note, in which all Commonwealth Governments and the Netherlands Government concurred, was accordingly despatched to Sir Robert Craigie in Tokyo. After referring to the deep concern of the British and American Governments at the rapidly growing concentration of Japanese forces in Indo-China and the failure of any satisfactory Japanese explanation, the note read:

There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China, and the concentration is only explicable on the assumption that the Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive move directed against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand. The relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands Government are too well known for the Japanese Government to be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on territories of the Netherlands. In the interests of peace His Majesty's Governments feel it incumbent upon them, however, to remove any uncertainty which may exist as regards their attitude in the event of an attack on Thailand. His Majesty's Governments have no designs on Thailand. On the contrary, the preservation of the full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is an important British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that independence or sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malaya, and His Majesty's Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel bound, therefore, to warn the Japanese Government in the most solemn manner that if Japan attempts to establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do so at her own peril, and His Majesty's Governments will at once take all appropriate measures. Should hostilities unfortunately result, the responsibility will rest with Japan.

President Roosevelt also informed the Thai Premier that the United States would regard the invasion of Thailand, Malaya, Burma, or the Netherlands East Indies by Japan as a hostile act. That same day he also addressed a message to the Emperor of Japan in a last-minute attempt to avoid conflict. Roosevelt stressed the danger of Japanese moves in Indo-China and the fears of other states in the South Pacific, finally assuring the Emperor of America's desire for peace.

At 7.50 a.m. on Sunday, 7 December 1941,

The timing of the attack given is Honolulu time. Eastern standard time would be 1.20 p.m. Because of the international date line which passes through the Pacific, the date on which the attack was made was 8 December in New Zealand.

all further negotiations ended with a surprise attack by Japanese submarines and carrier-based aircraft on Pearl Harbour, the United States naval base in the Hawaiian Islands and the only powerful base, British or American, east of Singapore in the Pacific. Nineteen ships were hit; the Arizona and the Oklahoma, both battleships, were lost—the first was wrecked, the second capsized; three other battleships sank in shallow water and three light cruisers were damaged but were later made seaworthy, as were three seriously damaged destroyers. Fortunately the three aircraft carriers based on Pearl Harbour were absent on manœuvres and survived to play a decisive role later in the Pacific war. Only 52 out of 202 navy aeroplanes were airworthy after the attack, which rendered the American Pacific Fleet impotent as an immediate fighting force. The Navy, Army, and Marine Corps lost 2335 officers and men killed, missing, and died of wounds, and 1143 wounded. The Japanese lost 29 pilots. Had the Japanese concentrated on the destruction of shore installations such as oil supplies, repair shops, and storage depots with the same intensity they reserved for ships of war, American recovery would have been delayed and the Pacific war consequently prolonged.

Several hours after the attack, the Emperor's reply, containing assurances of peace, was delivered to the United States Ambassador in Tokyo. At 2.05 p.m. on 7 December the Japanese envoys presented themselves at the State Department in Washington and fifteen minutes later handed to Mr. Hull their country's formal reply to the American proposals of 26 November. This document, though it contained declarations of Japan's desire to promote peace, accused the United States and Great Britain of obstructing a settlement in China and by so doing, the document alleged, ‘ignored Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself, and disparages its honour and prestige’. The document concluded that the Japanese Government could not accept the proposal as a basis for negotiation.

Hull knew that Pearl Harbour had been attacked an hour previously. He finished reading the document and then, in words almost as historical as Churchill's ‘blood and sweat’, forcefully told the envoys, ‘In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them’.

Documents produced during the war trials in Tokyo revealed that plans for the execution of the war were well in hand while American and British diplomats were attempting to keep Japan neutral. In an ‘Outline of Japanese Foreign Policy’ dated 28 September 1940, the day after Japan signed a military alliance with Germany, the establishment of ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ was defined as follows:

A brigade group on Rangatira leaving for Fiji on 28 October 1940Black and white photograph taken from shore of troops on large ship

30 New Zealand Batallion of 8 Brigade Group arrives in Fiji. The first troops to occupy Namaka Camp (Western area)Black and white photograph of troops marching

Face of petrol tank sunk in soapstone of Sealark Hill, SuvaBlack and white photograph of two soldiers standing at top of a cliff face

8 NZ Infantry Brigade defences on Fiji. Wiring at lowtide on Suva waterfrontBlack and white photograph of troops

Vice Admiral R.M Ghormley arriving at Namaka Aereodrome in May 1942. The group includes (from left to right) Squadron Leader G. R. White, Group Captain G. N. Roberts, Brigadier L. Potter, Admiral Ghormley, vice-admiral J.S. McCain, Major-General O. H. Mead, and Colonel E.T. Selzer.Black and white photograph of officers standing in front of a plane

Third Division Manoeuvres in New Zealand. Mud in the Kaimai RangeBlack and white photograph of troops in bush

Sappetts in the Kaimai Ranges building corduroy roads in bush Black and white photograph of troops lifting timber

In the regions including French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements, British Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines, British Borneo and Burma, with Japan, Manchukuo, and China as centre, we should construct a sphere in which the politics, economy, and culture of those countries and regions are combined.

(a)

French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies: We must, in the first place, endeavour to conclude a comprehensive economic agreement (including distribution of resources, trade adjustment in and out of the Co-prosperity Sphere, currency and exchange agreement, &c.), while planning such political coalitions as the recognition of independence, conclusion of mutual assistance pacts, &c.

(b)

Thailand: We should strive to strengthen mutual assistance and coalition in political, economic, and military affairs.

A further document dated 4 October 1940, by which time the Dutch had refused the economic concessions demanded by Japan, gave details of a ‘Tentative plan for policy towards the Southern Regions’, of which the first paragraph read:

Although the objective of Japan's penetration into the Southern Regions covers, in its first stage, the whole area to the west of Hawaii, excluding for the time being the Philippines and Guam, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, British Burma and the Straits Settlements are the areas which we should first control. Then we should gradually advance into the other areas. However, depending upon the attitude of the United States Government, the Philippines and Guam will be included.

French Indo-China:

(a)

We should manœuvre an uprising of an independence movement and should cause France to renounce her sovereign right. Should we manage to reach an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek, the Tonking area will be managed by his troops, if military power is needed…. According to circumstances, we should let the army of Thailand manage the affairs of Cambodia.

(b)

The foregoing measures must be executed immediately after a truce has been concluded with Chiang Kai-shek. If we do not succeed in our move with Chiang Kai-shek, these measures should be carried out upon the accomplishment of the adjustment of the battle line in China. However, in case the German military operations to land on the British mainland (which is to be mentioned later) takes place, it may be necessary to carry out our move towards French Indo-China and Thailand regardless of our plans for Chiang Kai-shek. (This is to be decided according to the liaison with Germany).

The United States, the Governments of the British Commonwealth, China, and the Netherlands declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941, New Zealand's actual declaration being made at eleven o'clock that morning. Japan's formal declaration of war on the United States was made after her attack on Pearl Harbour and simultaneous attack on Malaya, Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippines and Wake Islands. These attacks crumbled the weak defences of the Allied powers. Guam, where defences were being hastened, fell on 13 December. Thailand became a Japanese ally on 21 December. The Wake garrison held out against great odds until the 23rd. Hong Kong, with a garrison of 12,000, surrendered on 25 December—a crippling loss to the Allies in both power and prestige. Two British capital ships—the Prince of Wales, a new battleship, and the Repulse, a battle cruiser, were lost on 10 December in an attempt to destroy, without air cover, a Japanese convoy off the Malayan coast. It was probably the worst ending of an old year ever experienced in the history of the British Commonwealth. By 23 January 1942 the Japanese had occupied Borneo, Timor, the Celebes, and a part of New Guinea. Singapore surrendered on 15 February and her garrison of 60,000 was lost. Rangoon, Burma's chief city, fell on 10 March, and the retreat to India had begun. British, Dutch, American, and Australian naval units heroically attempted to stem the tide while the Japanese pressed their attack on the Netherlands East Indies, but their forces were destroyed in the Battle of Java Sea on 27 February and landings were almost unopposed. The remnants of the Dutch army were finally overthrown near Sourabaya.

By 9 March the Japanese were in full control almost to the coasts of Australia, and all the immense and vital stocks of tin, rubber, food, quinine, and oil had been lost to the Allies. Small garrisons of American troops held out until 6 May on Corregidor, the last remaining foothold to surrender in the Philippines. Bataan had been abandoned on 9 April. By that time General Douglas MacArthur had been evacuated to Australia, where he landed on 17 March. Resistance had been courageous but hopeless against overwhelming numbers and the organisation and unified command of the Japanese, whose infiltration tactics and air superiority overwhelmed every line of Allied defence. By the middle of 1942 the Allies were defending on a line which enabled them to retain only a corner of New Guinea beyond the immediate Australian mainland, with island garrisons in Fiji, New Caledonia, Tonga, and Samoa beyond New Zealand. While the United States Navy held off further attacks and repaired its strength, troops and equipment moved into the island bases in readiness for the deciding conflict of the Pacific war, the battle for Guadalcanal.

CHAPTER 2 The Fiji Garrison

I: New Zealand's Responsibility

INFLUENCED to some degree by the Jellicoe report of 1919, New Zealand acknowledged Fiji as her immediate outpost in the Pacific, but without specifying any particular or possible aggressor. This was reiterated in every appreciation of the defence situation and in every recommendation of her Chiefs of Staff through the pre-war years, though little was done except to commit those recommendations to paper. Any fortification of Fiji by Great Britain was hampered by the provisions of the Washington Conference of 1921, which applied equally to the American base of Pago Pago in Eastern Samoa, though before the outbreak of war in 1939 certain action had been planned to meet a situation which involved New Zealand in her first conflict in the Pacific.

In 1936, when the British Overseas Defence Committee considered schemes of defence in the Pacific, it was presumed that New Zealand would provide the necessary military force for Fiji, since that Crown Colony was obviously unable to defend itself. As the rising tide of German power became more ominous in Europe and the Japanese menace created apprehension in the East, more attention was devoted to Fiji and the possible aggressor was named. In their comment to the New Zealand Government on the deliberations of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1938, the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff—Major-General J. E. Duigan,

Maj-Gen Sir John Duigan, KBE, CB, DSO, m.i.d.; born NZ 30 Mar 1882; served South Africa, 1900–1; 1 NZEF 1915–18; Chief of General Staff, NZ Military Forces, 1937–41; died 9 Jan 1950.

Commodore H. E. Horan, RN,

Rear-Admiral H. E. Horan, CB, DSC; born Ireland, 12 Aug 1890; served First World War, 1914–18 (DSC, Aug 1914); Chief of NZ Naval Staff, 1938–40; captain HMS Leander, 1940; Combined Operations Headquaters, 1941–43; Rear-Admiral (retd.) commanding Combined Operations Bases (Western Approaches), 1943–46.

and Group Captain H. W. L. Saunders—expressed the opinion that Fiji, and not New Guinea or the Solomons, would be the more likely objective should the Japanese press an attack in the South Pacific. ‘We feel that in the past insufficient attention has been paid to these islands,’ they noted in a memorandum to the Organisation for National Security, outlining defence measures for Fiji and Tonga. An early precautionary measure was an air survey in November 1938 by a Royal New Zealand Air Force expedition which visited outlying island groups north of Fiji. Alighting areas for seaplanes were buoyed on the lagoons of Fanning, Christmas, Hull and Gardner Islands in the Line and Phœnix Groups, and airfield and building sites were pegged out on the last three islands. This was all part of a scheme in which a series of landing fields radiated from Fiji through the Pacific, so that aircraft could be flown to any desired area should the necessity arise, as it did later. Four routes were planned: A, through the Gilbert Group; B, through the Phœnix Group; C, to Samoa, the Northern Cook and the Line Groups; and D, through Tonga and the Cook Islands.

Concrete plans for the defence of Fiji were resolved at the Defence Conference held in Wellington in April 1939, when conditions in Europe were rapidly deteriorating. These followed the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff in 1938 and were approved by the New Zealand Government the following June. Heads of all three fighting services recognised Fiji as the key to the South West Pacific, as Jellicoe had visualised it earlier. They appreciated that an enemy force, strongly established in the group, could subdue and contain Auckland and most of the North Island by air, and that surface craft and submarines stationed at Suva could sever the Australian – New Zealand – American shipping lanes. Communication by submarine cable between the American continent and New Zealand and Australia would also be lost. As a result of this conference New Zealand undertook to maintain aerial reconnaissance along the line New Hebrides—Fiji—Tonga; establish and man an air base in Fiji; provide material and key men for the Fiji Defence Force; despatch an infantry brigade group to the colony when it was required and arrange for the construction of two landing fields—one at Nandi, on the west of the island of Viti Levu, and the other at Nandali, near Nausori, 15 miles from Suva on the Rewa River. The proposed capital expenditure for these projects suggests that New Zealand was acutely conscious of her responsibilities; future events confirmed it. Financial responsibility for the defences of Fiji was arranged on a pool basis—the Fiji administration contributing £500,000 a year, half of which was advanced on loan by the United Kingdom Government. New Zealand was to meet any expenditure over and above that amount.

Maintenance costs for the forces established in Fiji were met by the New Zealand Government, but a solution to financial questions concerning the defence of the Crown Colony was not reached without lenghty negotiations by Treasury officials and long despatches between the three governments concerned—the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Fiji. Separate agreements were reached on the cost of various works and installations—for example, the capital cost of the airfields was met equally by the New Zealand and United Kingdom Governments, whereas the cost of the marine airport at Lauthala Bay was met by New Zealand and Fiji. The preliminary estimates, drawn up as a result of the Wellington conference in 1939 but which afterwards required much adjustment between governments, provided for the following costs:

Navy £25,680—of which £20,000 was set aside for oil storage tanks.

Army £290,000—including £245,000 for buildings.

Air£692,000—including £400,000 for the purchase of new aircraft, if they could be procured.

The proposed annual expenditure was estimated at: Navy£8750—which included £3000 for pay and rations.Army£1,156,000—including £876,000 for pay and rations.Air£180,000—including £60,000 for pay and rations.

A meterological organisation costing £3300 was also recommended and later approved, New Zealand to pay 50 per cent of the cost, the United Kingdom and Fiji each 20 per cent, and the Western Pacific High Commission 10 per cent. These estimates also required adjustment as the scheme matured.

By the time the United States assumed command in Fiji in 1942, £805,237 had been spent on the defences of the Crown Colony. At the end of the war Fiji owed New Zealand a debt of £768,580 4s. 5d., but her debt of £2 millions owed to the United Kingdom Government was cancelled.

Fiji's small defence organisation, consisting of a headquarters, signal unit, and one weak Territorial battalion under the command of the Commissioner of Police, Colonel J. E. Workman, was little more than a token force, but it provided the framework for expansion on the outbreak of war in Europe when, like so many other Empire outposts, she began hurriedly to put her small military house in order. The size of it is indicated by the Governor's authority, signed in September 1939, raising the full-time officers from one to four. New Zealand began immediately to honour her commitments. Five hundred rifles and sets of web equipment were sent to arm the new recruits. At the end of September HMS Leander made a hurried dash to Suva with two heavy guns, which were unloaded and emplaced under cover of darkness. They were dummies, carried ashore by two sailors. It was part of the policy of deception forced on authority by circumstance in those first confused days of the war. Four instructors followed in November—Captain H. G. Wooller, WO I D. W. Stewart, WO I C. E. Burgess, and WO II C. Turner. Stewart and Burgess afterwards became captains with the Fijian forces, and served with them in the Solomons. Then, on 5 June 1940, New Zealand decided to raise and train an infantry brigade group for Fiji, the force to consist of 2908 all ranks, increased before departure to 3053. This scheme was originally envisaged as a combined garrison and advanced training ground for reinforcements for 2 NZ Division in the Middle East, the First Echelon of which had left New Zealand on 6 January. It provided for the relief of the men after six months’ service, after which they were to return to New Zealand to become reinforcements for the force in Egypt. Later events in the Pacific required drastic modification of this scheme.

Before the arrival of the brigade in Fiji a good deal of preliminary work had been either outlined or accomplished. Early in 1940 work began on the airfields at Nandi and Nandali by New Zealand construction units. Two modest 4.7-inch naval guns from the United Kingdom replaced the dummies and were sited on Mission Hill behind Suva by Lieutenant-Colonel F. N. Nurse, Royal Australian Artillery, and two New Zealand instructors, Battery Sergeant-Major A. Wainwright and Sergeant S. Wilce, who left New Zealand in October 1939 to organise and train staff and men for this coastal battery. When Major B. Wicksteed, RNZA,

Lt-Col B. Wicksteed; born Stratford, 29 May 1910; Regular soldier; commanded 33 Hy Regt, Sep 1942–Jul 1943; 17 Fd Regt, Nov 1943–1944; British Commonwealth Forces in Korea.

took over command of the battery in March 1940, the guns startled Suva residents in their trial shoots, the range of 10,500 yards enabling shells to fall beyond the reef which protected the harbour. Wicksteed took ten trained New Zealand gunners with him to hold key posts and mould the native Fijians who had been selected for training. General satisfaction was expressed by the townsfolk that some defence was at last obvious, even though these guns would have been about as useful as a catapult against the heavy armour of a modern warship.

Meanwhile, a desirable martial spirit had exercised the Territorial Force, which had been increased to 31 officers and 743 other ranks, who were guarding vital points in the Suva area when they were not training; 11 officers and 286 other ranks were similarly employed and disposed over the Lautoka-Mba-Vatukoula area. Major C. W. Free, MC,

Maj C. W. Free, MC; born Reefton, 6 Feb 1893: Indian Army; GSO 1, 8 Bde Gp (Fiji) 1940–41; died Johannesburg, 18 Apr 1944.

a New Zealand officer who had been in the Indian Army, joined the headquarters in August 1939 as staff officer G, and the number of instructors from New Zealand, both infantry and artillery, was increased to sixteen by 1940. When the Niagara was sunk outside Auckland on 19 June 1940, Captain G. T. Upton's

Lt-Col G. T. Upton, DSO, Bronze Star (US); Auckland; born Auckland, 8 Oct 1912; journalist; CO 1 Bn, Fiji Infantry Regt, Dec 1943–Feb 1945.

arrival at Suva was delayed, but only long enough to enable him to replace some to his kit. He took over command of the Suva Regular Company on 13 July 1940, and remained with the Fiji Defence Force until the end of the war, ultimately commanding a battalion. But Fiji was deplorably short of equipment at that time. Gunners practised their gun drill, with some degree of reality, on two ancient three-pounder guns discarded years previously and salvaged from a Public Works store; connecting rods from a captured 1914–18 German machine gun were brought out of the museum to enable a Vickers gun to operate.

Much the same state of affairs existed with a coast watching system which had been organised by the civil administration to cover the islands of the group and report the presence of hostile shipping. Natives maintained a twenty-four hour watch at the more important vantage points, relaying their information by a variety of methods to a central station at Suva, where it was examined and the more important facts sent on to New Zealand. Efficient wireless equipment was lacking, and weather played havoc with the two-way sets then in use on only a few of the more important outlying islands, such as Kandavu. The long-distance telephone system on Viti Levu was little better than wireless and so temperamental from a variety of reasons as to be useless quite often. On many distant island stations communication was by canoe or pre-arranged smoke signal, a system much at the mercy of unpredictable elements. Breakdowns in this primitive system were frequent and inevitable, but it was the only one possible at the time and until more efficient equipment became available. Natives, often without shelter, were wonderfully loyal. Though they were unaccustomed to long and boring hours of this voluntary work in all weathers, they performed a magnificent task, reporting the movements of ships and aircraft in a queer formula devised for their use. It is not surprising that they did not pick up the German raider Orion, which cruised off the group from 19 to 23 July 1940. Communications were not satisfactorily or efficiently organised until 1941, when Mr. L. H. Steel, of the New Zealand Post and Telegraph Department, took them in hand when he was appointed Controller of Pacific Communications, with headquarters in Suva.

Deterioration of relations with Japan, and events in Europe after the fall of France, hastened the Fiji defence preparations and the departure of a force to the Colony. At the end of July the three New Zealand Chiefs of Staff, General Duigan, Commodore W. E. Parry (who had replaced Horan as Chief of Naval Staff), and Air Commodore Saunders sailed for Fiji in HMS Achilles, accompanied by Colonel W. H. Cunningham, CBE, DSO,

Maj-Gen W. H. Cunningham, CBE, DSO, ED, m.i.d.; Wellington; born Wellington, 24 Sep 1883; barrister and solicitor; 1 NZEF 1914–19; commanded 8 Bde Gp, 1940–41; GOC Fiji, 1940–41; GOC Pacific Section, 2 NZEF, 1942; Crown Prosecutor, Wellington.

who had been called up from the reserve of officers to command the new brigade, and Major E. R. McKillop,

Col E. R. McKillop, CMG, OBE; Wellington; born Invercargill, 26 Jul 1895; civil engineer; 1 NZEF 1915–19; Staff Engineer, HQ B Force (Fiji) 1940–41; Deputy Commissioner, Defence Construction Council, 1941–45; Commissioner of Works, Ministry of Works, 1945–.

of the Engineers. They spent four days considering troop dispositions and defence measures and conferred with the Governor, Sir Harry Luke, KCMG, before returning to Wellington, where they recommended the immediate despatch of the brigade to garrison Viti Levu and certain assistance in men and material to the Kingdom of Tonga. Cunningham and McKillop remained in Fiji selecting camp sites and drafting preliminary details of a defence scheme before returning to New Zealand in August.

On 20 September, seven days before Japan signed a military alliance with Germany and Italy, Cunningham, promoted to the rank of Brigadier, opened his headquarters at Ngaruawahia Camp. Although his command was officially designated 8 Infantry Brigade Group, it became B Force for purposes of organisation and despatch. Meanwhile, McKillop returned to Fiji to supervise and push forward the construction of camps in which to house the brigade. He was followed in August by an engineer unit originally destined for the Middle East—18 Army Troops Company under Major L. A. Lincoln,

Lt-Col L. A. Lincoln, ED, m. i. d.; Auckland; born Auckland, 14 Sep 1902; civil engineer; OC 18 A Tps Coy (Fiji and Egypt) Jul 1940–Jan 1942; 7 Fd Coy NZE, Jan–Sep 1942; seconded to British Army Sep 1942; CRE No. 56 (Works) RE, Syria, Aug 1943–Nov 1944.

which also acted as advanced party for the main force. By the time the engineers arrived, McKillop's small army of 500 Fijian and Indian labourers was altering a landscape which had not suffered such mutilation for centuries, as they toiled from dawn to dusk seven days a week preparing camp sites. In a region where typhoid fever and dysentery were prevalent, hutted and mosquito-proof camps were essential. Major J. R. Wells, NZMC,

Lt-Col J. R. Wells; Ashburton; born Waihola, Otago, 28 May 1893; surgeon; Medical Officer, NZMC, 1917–19; 8 Bde Gp, Sep 1940-Mar 1941 (7 Fd Amb and OC Mil Hosp); Medical Officer 2 NZEF, Egypt, 1941–42; HS Manuganui, Dec 1942–May 1943; SMO Waiouru, Burnham, and Papakura Military Camps, 1943–45.

preceded the main force and prepared a voluminous report which recommended the chlorination of all drinking water, fly-proofing of food stores, mess huts, and kitchens, in addition to septic tanks and underground drainage for camp areas. These were necessary if the health of troops was to be maintained in a climate where broken skin turned to septic ulcers, and the continual bites of mosquitoes led to dengue fever and constant irritation. Because supplies of fresh meat, butter, and vegetables were almost unobtainable in Fiji and required by the civilians, most of these perishable stores were brought from New Zealand. It was some months, however, before the medical recommendations could be made fully effective.

There was much preliminary work to be done in great haste in both New Zealand and Fiji. Cunningham was unable to build up a fully trained staff, and the greater part of his brigade strength was retained from the Third Echelon, then being trained and equipped for service in the Middle East. Many of his headquarters staff and the battalion commanders had seen service in Egypt and France in 1914–18 and were referred to as ‘retreads’ by the younger generation. During organisation, also, components of the brigade were widely scattered. The 29th Battalion and 30 Battalion were trained and partly equipped at Ngaruawahia and Te Rapa. Two reinforcement companies, which by a process of evolution became the Reserve Battalion and then the 34th, 35 Field Battery, 20 Field Company, and 4 Composite Company, ASC, were all at Papakura. At Trentham 7 Field Ambulance and various details such as Pay, Records, Ordnance, Provost, and Signals were assembled for departure, so that units knew little of each other until they reached their destination. All of them were short of much essential equipment, and some of the men had been in camp only a few days before they sailed. They drew their equipment as it came to hand, some of the men visiting the quartermaster's stores as many as fifteen times. The fact that they were the first members of 2 NZEF to be issued with New Zealand made battle dress was little compensation for the long delays in obtaining equipment. Infantry units took turns in borrowing machine guns for training. Because of its distance from New Zealand and the task to which it was assigned, Cunningham's small force included units which normally were associated with a higher formation. It was equipped and maintained from New Zealand's own meagre supplies, which at that time were not sufficient even for her home defences.

Appointments to 8 Infantry Brigade Group on its arrival in Fiji in November 1940 were: Officer CommandingBrig W. H. Cunningham, CBE, DSOGSO 1Lt-Col C. W. Free, MCGSO 2Maj J. H. IrvingConstruction and WorksLt-Col E. R. McKillopAA and QMGMaj G. T. Kellaway, MCSupply OfficerCapt R. C. AleyIntelligence OfficerLt O. A. Gillespie, MMTransport OfficerLt C. A. VossSignals OfficerLt L. C. StephensPayCapt W. P. McGowanRecordsLt G. A. R. JohnstoneProvostLt A. L. DownesDental OfficerCapt H. A’C. Fitzgerald29 BattalionLt-Col H. J. Thompson, MC30 BattalionLt-Col J. B. Mawson, MCReserve Battalion (afterwards 34 Battalion)Maj F. W. Voelcker, MC35 Field BatteryMaj C. H. Loughnan, MC20 Field Company, EngineersMaj R. J. Black, MC4 Composite Company, ASCMaj A. Craig7 Field AmbulanceLt-Col P. C. Davie (also senior medical officer)

Early in 1941 several changes took place and the staff was slightly increased: Free returned to India and his place was taken by Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. C. Wales, MC; Lieutenant Noel Erridge arrived to become Ordnance Officer, and Matron G. L. Thwaites arrived with a small nursing service with which to staff the military hospital.

II: The First Force and its Work

When New Zealand troops of the brigade landed in Fiji on 1 November 1940 they made history. It was the first time a defence force from a self-governing dominion had been sent to garrison a Crown Colony of the Empire. The brigade moved there in three flights, the first leaving Wellington on 28 October in the Rangatira after the traditional speeches of farewell from the Governor-General, Lord Galway, the Prime Minister, the Hon. P. Fraser, and the Minister of Defence, the Hon. F. Jones. HMS Monowai,

In September 1941 the King approved the designation HMNZS for all ships of the Royal New Zealand Navy.

a converted cruiser, was both escort for the convoy and transport for the field artillery. After disembarking troops at Suva the Rangatira ran a shuttle service, transporting the remaining two flights, one of which went direct to Lautoka, in the west. By the end of November the brigade was established in Fiji and enduring all the initial discomforts which attend a military expedition organised and despatched in haste, particularly to a hot and exhausting climate. Fiji, 1100 miles north of New Zealand, was new and unknown territory to most members of the force who were making their first acquaintance with the tropics, and in circumstances which gravely disillusioned them as reality dispelled any romantic guide-book nonsense about tropical islands.

The Crown Colony of Fiji, consisting of 250 islands, was ceded to Great Britain in 1874. Thakambau, an influential chief, had previously offered the territory to Britain for the modest sum of £9000, and also to the United States. The British Government rejected the first offer; accepted a second. The United States Government did not even bother to reply. The group lies in the hurricane belt, 15 degrees south of the Equator. Temperatures range from an average of 91 degrees in summer to 62 degrees in winter. One feature of the group, like so many other Pacific islands, is that each island has its wet and dry side, with a vastly differing rainfall. In the eastern area, which has an exhausting, humid climate, the average is 120 inches a year and sometimes 200 inches; in the west 70 to 80 inches fall annually. Suva, port, capital, and seat of Government, spreads its homes and gardens over a peninsula on the eastern coast of Viti Levu, the largest and most populous island, with the shopping areas and Government buildings on the water-front. Vanua Levu, the second largest island, lies to the north but is sparsely inhabited. Smaller islands of varying size, some of them merely atolls and banks, dot the seas around the two large islands. Coral reefs act as a natural defence line, with openings only at mouths of rivers and freshwater streams. The group is so situated that all trans-Pacific shipping lines converge on Suva, a town of 13,000 inhabitants, mostly Indian and Fijian. In addition to a moderately good harbour inside the reef, there is a vast stretch of protected water known as Lauthala Bay where, on the outbreak of war, a seaplane base was being constructed. New Zealanders watched the arrival there of the first regular American clippers on the trans-Pacific service, which ceased with the attack on Pearl Harbour; but work on the base continued and it proved an invaluable asset during the war years.

Cunningham decided to defend the two most vital areas on Vitu Levu—the Suva Peninsula in the east, with its harbour facilities, communications, cable link, supply depots and stores, and the Nandali airfield, 15 miles away on the left bank of the Rewa River; and the Namaka area in the west which included the small town and port of Lautoka, the Nandi airfield (later to play a vital part in Pacific strategy), and the Navula Passage, the entrance to Nandi anchorage, which was overlooked by the barren, rolling hills of Momi. These two zones were 150 miles apart, linked by one circular coastal road and, when it was organised later, a modest air service, operating when weather permitted between the two airfields. The confusing jumble of densely wooded hills of Viti Levu made cross-country communication impossible. Cunningham's problem was to defend those two vital zones with the inadequate force at his disposal, and its solution was made more difficult by the lack of armament and transport and the necessity of dividing his engineers, medical, signal, and supply units to service each zone. There were problems on a Government level also, for accommodation and public utilities were lamentably short in a remote island catering for seasonal tourists and a small white population of only 4000 Europeans.

Cunnigham's plan of two defended zones on the island of Viti Levu in Fiji is indicated by the shade areas. They were joined by one narrow coastal road. Black and white military map of Viti Levu

Two principal camp sites were selected, one at Samambula, four miles from Suva, beside the golf links where undulating country met all reasonable requirements, and at Namaka, 17 miles from Lautoka, in the western coastal region of sugar-cane and pineapple plantations. Hutted camps were not ready when the force arrived, despite the sweating efforts of the engineers, and units went under canvas. Heavy rain, falling in warm grey torrents almost daily, hindered construction work in the Suva zone, and the immediate camp areas soon bred a profane familiarity with the adhesive qualities of Fiji mud. Earth-moving equipment, heavy or light, was not available, and picks and shovels were not wielded with any great degree of urgency by natives long accustomed to leisurely movement in the heat. Progress was faster in the dry Namaka area, where a camp of 400 Public Works type huts was constructed.

Force Headquarters opened in the basement of Government Buildings in Suva until suitable accommodation was constructed early in the New Year round Borron's House, a private residence crowning a hill overlooking the town and the long, creaming surf ceaselessly breaking along the reef beyond. The 29th and Reserve Battalions, with ancillary services, were stationed at Samambula in tents, gradually taking over the standard 84 ft by 21 ft huts as they were finished at McKillop's constant urging. Headquarters staff was housed in hotels in the town or at Nasese, a Fiji Defence Force camp some distance away, and from which they marched to duty each morning in a lather of perspiration until a transport truck was made available to them. The 30th Battalion went direct to Lautoka from New Zealand, travelling from ship's side to camp area in the Colonial Sugar Refining Company's unique railway, the only one in the Colony and used principally for hauling cane to the crushing mill. The immediate fortification of the area, with 50 miles of coastline, was put in hand by Mawson,

Lt-Col J. B. Mawson, MC, ED; born 26 Sep 1891; headmaster; Wellington Regt and NZ Machine Gun Corps, 1915–18; CO 30 Bn, 1940–41; died 20 Apr 1951.

who also became area commander. On 6 November Cunningham was appointed Commandant of the Fiji Defence Force, with operational control over all land forces in Fiji, Tonga, and Fanning Island. Fiji units were absorbed into his command, 1 Battalion remaining in the Suva area and 2 Battalion at Namaka under Mawson. However, the Fiji Defence Force retained an administrative headquarters, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Magrane, when Workman relinquished command after Cunningham's arrival.

At Cunningham's first unit conference on 4 November, areas were allotted and defence roles defined. The immediate task was the denial to a possible enemy of the beaches and harbours in both zones. Four of 35 Battery's 18-pounder guns were despatched to Momi to defend the Navula Passage between the mainland and Malolo Island; the remaining two guns were sited at Lami village to cover the entrance to Suva Harbour and assist the fixed guns sited on Mission Hill behind the town. Belts of barbed wire were erected inland along the waterfront at low-water level on the more vulnerable beaches. These were covered by machine-gun posts, gun emplacements, and systems of trenches designed as alternative positions in the defence scheme. Roads were constructed by the engineers through both zones to give the battalions greater tactical mobility. By and large the Colony derived benefit from these defence preparations, for they gave it a fulfilled public works programme unthinkable in years of peace. These new roads, to this day commemorating the names of the first commanders, Cunningham and Mead, enabled the ASC to site supply dumps at strategical points throughout the defended areas in accordance with Cunningham's policy of building up a three months’ reserve of oil and petrol and six months’ reserve of rations, slowly accumulated as they arrived from New Zealand. The influx of thousands of troops naturally strained the limited public amenities of Suva and created some difficulty, particularly in the supply of water and electric power to camps and barracks. Unaccustomed to the heat and constant sweating, each man used an average of 80 gallons of water a day which even a bountiful rainfall could not hope to replenish. Restrictions were ordered by Cunningham, who was required to satisfy both civil and military authorities.

Much had been accomplished by the turn of the year, mostly by hard labour and the vigorous use of pick and shovel. Major difficulties were overcome, and the men became hardened to heat, mosquitoes, rain, and improvisation. Those who were allergic to the tropics never became accustomed to any of these things and voiced their sentiments in long, outspoken letters home. Soon their bodies were burnished to the colour of mahogany as they toiled in shorts, hat, and boots securing the defence lines. Gunnery and air problems were discussed by the commander with Colonel A. B. Williams, DSO,

Brig A. B. Williams, DSO, m.i.d., Legion of Merit (US); Cambridge; born Rotorua, 4 Feb 1892; Regular soldier; NZ Fd Arty, 1915–19; CRNZA Army HQ, Dec 1939–Feb 1942; NZ Army representative, Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, Feb 1942–Oct 1943; Commandant, Central Military District, Oct 1943–Dec 1944; Northern Military District, Mar 1945–Apr 1947.

Director of Artillery at Army Headquarters, and Group Captain A. de T. Nevill,

AVM Sir Arthur Nevill, KBE, CB, Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Dunedin, 29 Apr 1899; RNZAF; AOC RNZAF HQ, London, and attached Coastal Command, RAF, 1942–43; Vice-Chief of Air Staff 1944–46; CAS 1946–51.

of Air Headquarters, who were among the first senior officers to arrive for consultations—Williams to advise on the siting of fixed guns; Nevill on air services. Two 6-inch naval guns intended for the defence of Lyttelton Harbour had been diverted to Fiji by the New Zealand Government to replace the 4.7-inch on Mission Hill. The smaller guns were then transferred to a site which also commanded the harbour entrance but from the opposite side. Engineers sealed off the defence zones with road blocks and arranged for the demolition of bridges on their boundaries. The Suva Girls’ Grammar School was taken over and transformed into a military hospital, with Matron Thwaities

Matron Miss G. L. Thwaites, RRC; born NZ 23 Jun 1899; Matron, Military Hospital, Suva, Nov 1940–Aug 1941; Waiouru and Trentham Camp Hospitals, 1942–43; HS Maunganui Dec 1944–Mar 1946.

in charge of a nursing staff which worked long hours to cope with ailments provoked by heat and a violent change of climate, and made worse by an epidemic of measles which coincided with the arrival of the force.

Shortages were the predominating worry, but these could not be met immediately by New Zealand, though appeals had been made overseas for additional equipment. Clothing was a problem which caused irritation among the men. Much of the tropical kit with which they had been issued—shorts and shirt suitable for the climate—was ill-fitting and bore the date of their manufacture in 1917. This was remedied later by the employment of Indian tailors, but in the intervening periods many of the men equipped themselves with more presentable garments made by local tailors. Increased issues of better fitting shirts, shorts, tunics, and long trousers stilled the complaints and pointed a moral for the equipment of similar expeditions. Tunics which buttoned closely to the chin were later discarded in favour of open-necked shirts.

During the early months of the Fiji expedition, complaints reached New Zealand from those who were returned unfit for further service and others who wrote petulantly about the unsuitability of both clothing and rations, the attitude of the white residents, the lack of recreational facilities, and the high prices of tobacco and drinks. Cunningham, in one of his replies to the Minister, pointed out that such complaints ‘put senior officers to unending trouble endeavouring to answer the unanswerable. Complaints of a general nature, incapable of exact answer, exasperate one beyond endurance, particularly in this climate’. Davie,

Lt-Col P. C. Davie, ED, m.i.d.; born NZ 6 Jul 1887; surgeon; Medical Officer RAMC 1915–18; CO 7 Fd Amb (Fiji) Oct 1940–Oct 1941; OC NZ Troops HS Orani 1941–42; CO 2 Fd Amb (NZ) 1942–43; died Dec 1949.

the senior medical officer, who had protested that many of the men sent to Fiji were unfit and that their ailments were aggravated by the heat and the prevailing conditions, reported very fully on a series of these complaints, stating that the few white residents of the Colony welcomed troops to their homes in a way unheard of in New Zealand. He concluded that the majority of the men were as happy as they could be without the stimulus of actual fighting. Investigation usually revealed that the complaints came from the usual small percentage of malcontents without which no armed force is complete. Generally speaking, the soldiers realised their responsibilities. When Brigadier F. T. Bowerbank,

Maj-Gen Sir Fred T. Bowerbank, KBE, ED, m.i.d., Grand Officer Order of Orange-Nassau (Netherlands); Wellington; born Penrith, England, 30 Apr 1880; NZMC 1915–20; DMS Army and PMO Air 1934–39; Director-General of Medical Services (Army and Air), Army HQ, Sep 1939–Mar 1947.

Director-General of Medical Services, visited the force early in 1941 he reported that the health of the troops was good.

The authorities did all they could to provide amenities, and the residents themselves responded with enthusiasm. Churches of all denominations opened clubs and organised dances and concerts; the small European colony of Government officials and business and professional men opened their hospitable doors as wide as they were able; trading companies organised weekend picnics, and golf and tennis clubs offered the use of their courses and courts. YMCA representatives began in a modest way in the camps and provided some relief from boredom in the evenings. Finally a New Zealand Club, erected on the Suva waterfront by the National Patriotic Fund Board, provided a rendezvous for all, day or evening, and here the women of Suva emulated their Trojan sisters in hours of work.

During weekends and holidays parties of soldiers visited the more distant villages, where they were received by the hospitable Fijians and initiated into traditional kava-drinking ceremonies. From time to time, also, representative Fijians, smart in spotless white sulus and coats of European cut, visited the military camps bearing gifts of fruit and vegetables which supplemented menus not overburdened with fresh foods, most of which came from New Zealand and much deteriorated on the way. Refrigerated space was at a premium during the first year, but large cool-stores finally overcame the food problem. The New Zealand soldier dislikes being deprived of his customary meat, potatoes, and butter in generous quanity, and he soon grew tired of native fruits like pawpaw and pineapple, and vegetables such as yam and dalo were not to his taste. An endeavour to provide fresh fruit and vegetables from Fijian sources cost £500 a month. These were only a few of the growing pains of garrison duty on which 8 Infantry Brigade embarked without adequate provision and little advance preparation.

Although training was hampered by the shortage of mortars, grenades, and sub-machine guns, a certain amount was accomplished and provided relief from the construction of defence works. The brigade was still short of 66 of its motor vehicles in December. Picks, shovels, and other digging implements were so short that units took turns in using those available, and other construction material was obtained from the Fiji Public Works Department on a ‘beg and borrow’ basis. However, through 1941, the force was built up and the defences improved as equipment slowly reached Fiji, but the distance from any active sphere of operations and the effects of the heat could be noticed in the attitude of the soldiers to service in the Colony. Digging and wiring, route-marching and guard duties, limited tactical exercises by day and night drained their enthusiasm and increased their desire for relief. In the sunbaked, waterless region of Momi, infested with flies and mosquitoes, and among the dry sugar plantations of Namaka, units of 30 Battalion and 35 Battery endured great physical hardship, relieved now and then by visits to lovely Sawani Beach, one of the few which really conformed to the standards of the tourist pamphlets. But it was a grim period for the men.

As soon as Force Headquarters was established at Borron's, with offices grouped round the main building on the hilltop, a combined operations centre was organised for the smoother and more efficient dissemination of all intelligence information pooled by representatives of the three services. Lieutenant-Commander P. Dearden, RN,

Lt-Cdr P. Dearden, RN (retd.); Waipukurau; born NZ 30 Nov 1897; sheep farmer; Resident Naval Officer, Fiji; HMNZS Philomel (executive officer).

whose service in the 1914–18 War had been summarily interrupted at the Battle of Jutland when his ship blew up, arrived in January to assume the duties of resident naval officer which, until then, were performed none too satisfactorily by Fiji Customs officials. The naval officer routed all shipping which passed through the group as part of the routine to avoid loss from enemy raiders, both surface craft and submarines, any knowledge of whose presence in and around the group was essential to naval intelligence in New Zealand. Coastwatching was also linked in with naval intelligence, and a workable system gradually emerged from the more primitive though useful original.

Reports from untrained but enthusiastic Fijian coastwatchers were responsible for much fruitless investigation but, however fantastic, they were never disregarded. Submarines invariably proved to be floating coconut logs, including one which was reported to have taken on fresh water and vegetables in an unfrequented bay, and another with the crew busily engaged in cleaning the hull on the beach. Suspicious lights were fishermen on the reefs, using flares at night as they have done for centuries; one aeroplane, complete with navigation lights, was a weather balloon released by Flight Lieutenant W. R. Dyer, of the meteorological staff; gunfire proved to be thunder, which it closely resembles in the tropics, and, on one occasion, a stranded whale threshing madly on a reef.

All such reports were investigated by air, if the weather was suitable. Squadron Leader D. W. Baird, RNZAF,

Gp Capt D. W. Baird, AFC; Wellington; born Bangor, Northern Ireland, 23 Dec 1910; RAF (1931–37) and RNZAF (1938–); commanded RNZAF, Fiji, 1940–41; 490 (NZ) Sqn, West Africa, 1943; Director of Flying Training 1945–46; Director of Operations and Flying Training 1950–51; Director of Reserves 1951–.

operated a small air force detachment consisting of two de Havilland 89s and two de Havilland 96s which had formerly served a civil air line in New Zealand, and a Moth for training. Two of these aircraft were stationed at Nandi under command of Squadron Leader G. R. White.

Wg Cdr G. R. White; Raupare, Hastings; born Wairoa, 11 Nov 1905; civil airways pilot.

In addition to identification of ships in waters round the group, Baird's aircraft maintained a regular service between the east and west zones and made reconnaissance flights to Tonga. The first of many alarms that German raiders were off the coast occurred on 25 November 1940, when a coastwatcher at Momi reported an unidentified armed merchant cruiser off the coast. Battle stations were occupied by 30 Battalion with commendable speed, and Flight Lieutenant E. N. Griffiths, who was afterwards killed while piloting an Airacobra, flew over the ship and identified her as HMS Monowai. When night operations began on a brigade scale in 1941, Baird, who was also air adviser to Cunningham, flew his training Moth over the defences, dropping dummy bombs of homely flour as the troops moved to their positions in the early hours of the morning.

During January and February of 1941 the men experienced their first real rainy season, when the warm, moisture laden atmosphere produces mildew overnight inside hats and boots and even on tin trunks. With it came persistent hurricane rumours but, as none had visited Fiji for some years, they were ignored. February opened with oppressive heat and torrential rainstorms, producing conditions which, in the tropics, breed short tempers and imaginary slights and a disposition to procrastinate—conditions rather difficult to control and collectively referred to as malua. On 19 February the meteorological section of the RNZAF issued a warning that a storm of some violence might be expected as the erratic course of a hurricane was plotted, zigzagging at sea between Fiji and Tonga. It broke the following morning—the worst hurricane experienced in Fiji for twenty-one years. Warnings were issued to all units as the day broke with leaden skies and an unusual gusty wind. All tents were struck in both areas, canopies were removed from motor vehicles, and buildings were hurriedly wired and strutted to withstand a gale.

By nine o’clock the wind increased to tremendous force, driving in from the sea a wall of warm grey rain which stung like hail. Two hours later the hurricane was raging at its height. Huge trees toppled and snapped; palms bent so that their crowns of fronds swept the earth like dusters; sheets of corrugated iron whisked through the air like postage stamps or were wrapped round tree trunks like paper. At 11.15 a.m. the wind reached 110 miles an hour, but as the recording instruments broke at that time no accurate record was ever established. Telephone and power lines went down under the weight of wind and wreckage. One military line survived until midday, and when it broke headquarters was isolated from all units except by a wireless link which maintained communication with Namaka only with extreme difficulty.

Late in the afternoon, when the hurricane dissolved in heavy rain, the landscape looked as though it had been stripped by locusts. Tangles of branches, wreckage, and wires blocked streets and roads. Three ships in the harbour, which had escaped from Nauru Island when their convoy was shelled on 6, 7 and 8 December by the German raiders Orion and Komet, were driven high on mudbanks. Two aeroplanes, exactly half the RNZAF's strength in the Pacific, were wrecked on the Nandali airfield, where they had been tied down. Six buildings were blown down in Samambula Camp, and others, including officers’ quarters at Borron's House and a motor transport workshops at Samambula, were leaning at crazy angles. Camps in the Namaka area escaped with heavy flooding, though the Nandi River rose 30 feet.

That evening the quartermaster's store at Samambula caught fire because of the faulty handling of petrol, destroying a quantity of equipment and ammunition. The day's damage was estimated at £1725 but no lives were lost, though escape from injury was miraculous. One supply convoy, returning by the northern coastal road from Namaka, was trapped by swiftly rising water and marooned for 36 hours, as were other parties moving along the south coast road, where bridges were washed away and slips prevented all traffic for several days. Calls for assistance were made on all units, and for a week gangs of infantrymen cleared debris from roads and streets, often with borrowed saws and axes. Engineers went to the aid of the Fiji Public Works Department, and men from Signals assisted the Post and Telegraph Department to restore and repair their grievously damaged services in both town and country. A special message from the Governor expressed the thanks of the Colony for military aid. Torrential rain continued through April, blocking roads and flooding coastal areas. Forty inches fell in twenty-three days, sometimes at the rate of two inches an hour, which hindered both work and training.

In an effort to give variety to garrison life, 29 and 30 Battalions periodically exchanged areas throughout the year. A tour of duty in the Suva area certainly broke the monotony of life at Momi and Namaka. Early in May full-scale manœuvres, made as realistic as possible despite shortages of equipment, began with alarms at midnight or the early hours of the morning. At the end of that month Cunningham submitted to New Zealand a list of equipment still vitally necessary for the efficient operation of his force. This included two 18-pounder guns to complete the establishment of 35 Battery; mechanical transport for both 35 Battery and 34 Battalion, which had now emerged from the chrysalis of the Reserve Battalion; fighting and training equipment, including twelve Lewis and four Vickers machine guns for 34 Battalion; trench mortars and Bren guns for all infantry units; medical supplies which were lamentably short; signals equipment; and tools for 20 Light Aid Detachment which, at the end of six months’ exacting work, kept the brigade's limited transport on the roads only with the greatest difficulty.

Manœuvres were interrupted by the first of the reliefs, two sections (1708 all ranks) of which arrived on 23 and 29 May in the Rangatira, escorted by HMS Achilles. The remaining 1500 members of the relief did not arrive until the following August. The first departing troops sang their way lustily out of Suva and enjoyed leave in New Zealand before going on to join 2 Division, which by then had been blooded in the Greek campaign and was ending the ill-fated but valiant attempt to hold Crete. Only senior and administrative officers and non-commissioned officers of the original brigade remained in Fiji when the relief was completed. The new arrivals, for the most part untrained, contributed little to the efficiency of the force, as training had to begin again at the individual, platoon, and company level. A shortage of efficient non-commissioned officers was relieved by the formation of a training school at Natambua, commanded by Major J. H. Irving, whose place on headquarters staff was taken by Major A. J. Moore.

The defence scheme was drastically modified after a visit from General Sir Guy Williams, KCB, CMG, DSO, military adviser to the New Zealand Government and a former area commander in England with considerable experience in preparing and devising anti-invasion measures. After spending a week inspecting the defences of both Fiji and Tonga in July, he returned to Wellington and advised that operational control of all defence measures in both groups should be undertaken by New Zealand. Such an agreement, in which the United Kingdom Government concurred, was signed in Suva on 18 November by the Hon. F. Jones, Minister of Defence, the Hon. J. G. Coates, Minister of the War Cabinet, and Sir Harry Luke, Governor of Fiji. From that date New Zealand assumed responsibility for the defence of British possessions in the South West Pacific, and was accorded the power to approve all defence works.

Before this agreement was signed, Cunningham was irked in the execution of his defence plans by long delays in obtaining approval for both works and expenditure from the New Zealand War Cabinet and the Governor of Fiji. The Chiefs of Staff, including Lieutenant-General E. Puttick,

Lt-Gen Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO and bar, m. i. d., MC (Greek), Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Timaru, 26 Jun 1890; Regular soldier; NZ Rifle Brigade 1914–19 (CO 3 Bn); commanded 4 Inf Bde, Jan 1940–Aug 1941; 2 NZ Div (Crete) 29 Apr–27 May 1941; CGS and GOC NZ Military Forces, Aug 1941–Dec 1945.

who had returned from the Middle East and replaced Duigan at Army Headquarters, and Mr. Foss Shanahan, secretary to the Organisation for National Security, accompanied the Ministerial party and inspected the island's defences. It was also the occasion for conferences with officials on costs, expenditure, and other subjects arising from New Zealand's participation in Pacific defence.

The Williams report went very thoroughly into the state of the brigade, listing its deficiencies but commending the work accomplished and the high morale of the troops. It also emphasised the unit shortages of light automatic weapons, first-line transport, and signal equipment; the army required at least 400 beds; the aeroplanes had an operational radius of only 250 miles; reinforcements had been sent to Fiji after only ten days’ training. His recommendations included a supply of 3-inch mortars and armoured vehicles; three months’ basic training for all men sent to Fiji, petrol supplies to go underground; the blocking of all subsidiary channels through the reefs; the development of Fiji as a naval and air base, and the establishment of wireless communication linking islands of the Pacific with a central station in Suva. Williams based his appreciation of any Japanese attack on Fiji at a strength of one infantry brigade with tanks, supported by carrier-based aircraft and naval vessles. His most important recommendation was an extension of the minimum tour of duty to one year, since the relief of the garrison every six months made efficient training impossible.

This report emphasised the difficulties under which Cunningham worked. New Zealand did its best to repair the deficiencies by putting the Williams recommendations into operation as quickly as possible, but 24 Bren guns, 12 Lewis guns, and some Thompson sub-machine guns did not arrive until September.

A list of the deficiencies as at 1 September 1941 included the following major items:

Motor cycles83Trucks, 15- or 20-cwt.33Water trucks, 15-cwt.3Trucks, 30-cwt.29Trucks, 3-ton72Bren guns192Grenades No 36 (25 per cent smoke)6000Mortar bombs, 3-inch1500Mortars, 3-inch18Bren carriers42Rifles400Carbons for searchlights, positive2000Carbons for searchlights, negative700

There were large quantities of other stores, including signal equipment, still required for Fiji, and Tonga was still short of 75 rifles and 24 Bren guns for its small garrison. Completion of defence works was pressed forward throughout the year.

Before the end of July twenty-two soldiers, selected volunteers from the brigade, were despatched as companions to fifteen wireless operators from the New Zealand Post and Telegraph Department to maintain stations scattered through the Gilbert and Ellice Groups, north of Fiji. This series of coral atolls extended almost to Japanese-held territory in the Marshall Islands, from which information was urgently desired by both War Office in London and the Army Department in Washington. These men were the first New Zealanders killed and taken prisoner by the Japanese, and their dauntless story is told later in this volume.

Japan's provocative attitude lent a spur to activity both above and below ground. Cunningham's plan of defended zones transformed twelve square miles of the Suva Peninsula into an area rather like a moated, mediaeval castle on the grand scale, but in this instance enclosing the whole town and the immediate countryside and villages. It was flanked by two rivers, the Lami on the right, the Samambula on the left, and between them anti-tank ditches linked such natural features as ravines, swamps, and hills, extending five and a half miles island to Prince's Road to include a new 300-bed military hospital erected at Tamavua, all supply and petrol depots and the water pumping stations, as well as deep and spacious underground quarters for the use of the Governor and his staff in an emergency. Along seven and a half miles of vulnerable beaches, a six-foot concrete wall, requiring 460 tons of cement, acted as a tank stop should the enemy enter over or through openings in the reef. Belts of barbed wire and trench systems provided alternative lines of defence behind the beaches.

Such a definitely enclosed area was not possible at Namaka and Momi, where an undulating plain ran back from sandy beaches to low hills, but the best use was made of natural features, belts of barbed wire, and demolitions to protect camp areas, the airfield, and a 50-bed hospital at Namaka. Momi became a separate area under the Namaka command, and the two 6-inch naval guns emplaced there in May were enclosed in a system of wire and trenches. Suva was regarded as the last line of defence for the Colony should an attack develop, and any force moving from Namaka to Suva's aid was ordered to take the northern coastal route because of the vulnerability of the southern road from the sea.

Any detailed account of the work accomplished in constructing these defences implies long hours of manual labour by all troops of all units, including the medical units, and it continued with deadly monotony for months. The achievements reveal the story—one of constant burrowing into the soapstone, a variety of soft rock found in Fiji, and removing the spoil in barrows; and wiring and digging and filling sandbags. In September 1941, before 30 Battalion returned to the western area to permit 29 Battalion's return to the more civilised region of Suva, the 30th had used ‘21½ miles of barbed wire, and made 330 knife-rests, erected 4200 stakes for wiring the beaches and mangrove swamps, cut 2500 feet of mangrove posts for roofing, and filled and used 25,500 sandbags’. Fifty-five defence posts with bullet-proof overhead cover had been constructed, fire lanes 950 yards long and nine yards wide had been cut through mangrove swamps, and twelve storage tunnels each 15 feet by seven by six had been gouged in the soapstone hillocks. Later, when it arrived, 35 Battalion erected 18,000 yards of barbed wire in a month. These figures indicate, in a modest way, the work done by units which at the same time continued with their training. They also indicate the extent of the fortifications in Fiji—fortifications which were never used but anticipated an enemy attack. Men frequently worked in the evil-smelling mud of the mangrove swamps, sometimes knee-deep in water. They assisted the engineers by removing spoil from underground excavations, where compressors chattered incessantly. One task of some magnitude was the completion, by the end of October, of ten tunnels, each measuring 100 feet long, 10 feet wide and 10 feet high, for the storage of 150,000 gallons of reserve petrol for the air force.

Until the New Zealanders left Fiji they continued these burrowing operations, which included the construction of a complete underground hospital with an air-conditioned operating theatre and wards opening off a central corridor; ammunition and food stores; and three giant petrol tanks in Sealark Hill, behind Suva Harbour, where men worked night and day in shifts to complete them. These bulk tanks were the biggest single excavation undertaking by the engineers, whose activities were directed by Major W. G. McKay

Maj W. G. McKay, OBE, m.i.d.; Apia, Western Samoa; born Hokitika, 3 Dec 1901; engineer; CRE Pacific Section, 2 NZEF, Dec 1941–Aug 1942; OC 20 Fd Coy NZE, Aug 1942–Mar 1944; British Forces in India, 1944–45; South-East Asia Command 1945–46.

when McKillop returned to New Zealand in 1941. They ranged from 50 to 70 feet deep, one with a diameter of 58 feet and two of 48 feet. An operational headquarters was also excavated in the hill on which Borron's House stood. It contained chambers for the accommodation of all staffs and signal equipment, and was used frequently during trial manœuvres. In the western area, which contained harder rock, the engineers could not penetrate so far underground, but their work was just as arduous as they built shelters for headquarters, air force, and hospitals. The duplication required by the two zones in Fiji weakened the force and increased administrative worries.

In the last months of 1941, visits of United States aircraft and ships of war indicated both the vital importance of Fiji and the trend of events, though it was impossible to convey to the men as they toiled and trained far from scenes of more obvious activity, any information concerning diplomatic talks and the mounting delicacy of the political situation with Japan. Such visits, pointers to coming events, were conducted without publicity. When the United States cruiser Chicago and five destroyers called at Suva on their return to Pearl Harbour after visiting New Zealand and Australia, few people were aware that they had made a secret test dash across the Pacific. Not until long afterwards was it revealed that a Tongan coastwatcher reported the ships. He was night-fishing far from the shore and was almost swamped by the wash as destroyers passed on either side of his frail canoe. Late in October two United States flying boats, carrying military and naval staff officers bound for the Philippines, called at Suva during a flight to investigate alternative air routes should hostilities cut the route to the Philippines via Wake and Midway Islands. An earlier air visitor was the old Empire flying boat ‘Calypso’, which, as A. 1811, was used by the Royal Australian Air Force to patrol from Port Moresby to Tulagi in the Solomons and Vila in the New Hebrides, and made one trip to Suva.

From these tours of investigation the importance of Fiji as a vital Pacific base was confirmed, and when, on 17 November 1941, certain sections of the American Neutrality Act were repealed by Congress a request was made to the New Zealand Government to construct three airfields in the Namaka area, capable of accommodating the largest service aircraft. Because of the urgency of the request, New Zealand acted swiftly, and by the end of November 440 men of the Public Works Department reached Namaka to begin work on extending the existing field to take the Liberators soon to arrive. They were the first of 1219 Public Works men to reach Fiji for employment on this project.

These Public Works men were organised into what was known as the Civil Construction Unit, directed by Mr. A. F. Downer, a civil engineer appointed by the Ministry of Works, to which he was responsible.

Following earlier discussions with General Puttick, all assistance, including rationing and quarters, was provided by Brigadier Cunningham's headquarters.

The successful completion of this project was one of New Zealand's most important achievements in the Pacific theatre of war. Three airfields, each with a runway measuring 7000 feet long by 500 feet wide, with revetments and servicing areas, were asked for, the first to be ready by 15 January 1942, the other two by 15 April. Their estimated cost was £750,000, repayable by the United States Government. They required one and a half millions yards of earth-works and 20,000 tons of cement, and the estimated time for completion was five months. The airfields were ready before that time. The first three Flying Fortresses landed at Nandi on 10 January; three Liberators followed on 23 January, and until the end of the war the Namaka area was a scene of intense air activity as fields were still further extended to cope with the demands of increasing traffic. Fiji had begun the vital role (which it still holds) as a staging centre for aircraft moving to and from New Zealand, New Caledonia, Samoa, Tonga, Australia, and America.

From the day the first New Zealand Public Works men arrived in November, construction went ahead without delay as bulldozers, carry-alls, tractors, and a fleet of trucks swiftly altered the landscape. For months the Namaka area lay under clouds of dust which mounted higher and higher in the hot air and tranished all green vegetation for miles around. Although a blackout was imposed in Suva after the Japanese entry into the war, such precautions were impossible in the west, where huge arc-lights illuminated the landscape as work continued through the night. Trouble was anticipated and the provost officer, Captain A. L. Downes, prepared for it, but the civilians and servicemen worked amicably side by side, despite vastly differing rates of pay, conditions, and privileges which provoked much discussion at the time. Some difficulties concerning rates of pay and conditions did arise among the civilian workers from New Zealand, but they were smoothed out by the timely arrival by air of the Prime Minister and the Hon. P. C. Webb, Minister of Labour. Peace reigned after three undesirables were returned to New Zealand. Not all these men desired to play a combatant role should the necessity arise, but 600 of them were armed with American rifles and Browning machine guns and trained for emergency operations. Authority for the construction of a flying boat base at Lauthala Bay, near Suva, had been given by 5 December 1941, and this work was also pressed forward with speed. The nucleus of an American Catalina squadron was operating there by March 1942.

III: From Pearl Harbour to Relief

There was not one anti-aircraft gun in the South West Pacific in November 1941 and the strength of the defences would not have deterred the most irresolute enemy. Pago Pago, the American naval base in Eastern Samoa, was as hamstrung by international agreement as were British bases. At the end of that month Cunningham's force, increased slightly during the year, totalled 4943 all ranks, made up of 8 Brigade Group and the Fiji Defence Force units, of which 945 were native troops. Artillery support consisted of six 18-pounder guns (some of which had been experimentally mounted on motor trucks in an effort to give them greater mobility) and fixed coastal defences of four 6-inch and two 4.7-inch naval guns. Air strength had been slowly increased under Group Captain G. N. Roberts, AFC,

Air Cdre G. N. Roberts, CBE, AFC, Legion of Merit (US); Auckland; born Inglewood, 8 Dec 1906; company representative; commanded RNZAF in Fiji and Tonga, 1941–42; Commander NZ Air Task Force, Solomons, 1944–45; General Manager, Tasman Empire Airways, Ltd., 1946–.

who relieved Baird in July, and consisted of six Vincents, two old Singapore flying boats of doubtful quality, three de Havilland multi-engine civil type machines, and one Moth trainer. The Fiji ship Viti, a small vessel which took the Governor round his scattered island domains, and five patrol launches constituted the naval strength based on Suva. In Tonga there were 462 native troops, commanded by nine New Zealand officers and warrant officers. These made up the defence force which had been organised by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Bagnall

Lt-Col R. Bangall; Lower Hutt; born England, 19 Jan 1884; Indian Army (retd); CO Tonga Defence Force, Feb–Jul 1941.

during his brief command. They were equipped with rifles and two Vickers machine guns and supported by two 18-pounder field guns. A detachment of 110 New Zealanders held Fanning Island, where one 6-inch naval gun had been emplaced to defend the vital cable station. In Samoa one New Zealand warrant officer had 150 native under his command. Rarotonga's force consisted of 100 natives and one European officer, Captain Gladney, a local resident, with two Vickers machine guns as their only armament.

Small detachments of Australians acted as coastwatchers and guarded vital points on Nauru and Ocean Islands. Australia had also sent a small cavalry detachment, No. 3 Independent Company, to roam the unfrequented coastal regions of New Caledonia, where the collective armament had been increased from one old mountain gun to four 65-millimetre guns carried on lorries, two 37-millimetre guns, four 3-inch mortars, and 32 machine guns. Three hundred men of doubtful fighting quality, armed with rifles and two machine guns, had been mobilised in Tahiti, where three old 47-millimetre and two old 65-millimetre guns had been resurrected for action. New Zealand coastwatchers maintained a lonely vigil throughout the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, and in the Phœnix, Tokelau, Samoa, Line, Cook and Tongan Islands, and farther south, in the Kermadecs and Chathams. Petrol supplies for both aircraft and army motor transport totalled 118,300 gallons held in Fiji and another 20,000 gallons held in Tonga.

There was little or no difference in this state of affairs when Japan ended all speculation of her intentions when she struck at Pearl Harbour. Plans for manœuvres on a brigade scale in Fiji had been outlined some time previously and worked out by Lieutenant-Colonel Wales, GSO 1,

Brig J. G. C. Wales, MC; Auckland; born London, 26 Aug 1886; Bursar, King's College; 1 NZEF 1914–19; GSO 1 B Force, Mar 1941–Jul 1942; Commandant, Fiji Defence Force, and Commander Pacific Section, 2 NZEF, Jul–Oct 1942; commanded Fiji Military Forces, Nov 1942-Sep 1943.

and troops moved into their defence positions in brilliant moonlight on the night of 7 December. As they prepared a soldierly breakfast of bully beef and smoky tea in their mosquito-infested trenches and splinter-proof machine-gun posts early the following morning, news of the attack was being broadcast to the world. Because of the international date line the attack on Pearl Harbour, which occurred at 7.50 a. m. on 7 December, Honolulu time, became 1.20 p. m. on 7 December in Washington, 3.20 a. m. on 8 December in Tokyo, and 6.20 a. m. in Suva and Wellington. One junior artillery officer who was fraternising with a short-wave enthusiast from Suva, was the first to receive the news. He lost no time in passing it on.

New Zealand's available forces at the outbreak of war with Japan consisted of HMNZS Leander, ready for sea at Auckland, HMNZS Monowai refitting at Auckland, and HMNZS Achilles, on her way to Singapore; 13,250 men were in camp, including reinforcements (600 of them intended for Fiji and others for 2 Division), the Army Tank Brigade, recruits and training cadres. Four thousand six hundred fortress troops were mobilised—1000 each for Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton, and Port Chalmers, and one company of 120 each for the Bay of Islands, Great Barrier Island, Waipapakauri, and Nelson, to protect aerodromes near the coast. Eleven thousand Territorials entered camp on 15 December and by the 28th 28,850 men were in camp, with preparations for an increase to 39,350 by 10 January. Forty-four converted machine guns, none too new, were issued to the Home Guard units. Navy reopened 24 coastwatching stations round New Zealand. The Air Department had 10,500 men in camp and in training, including 2155 despatched to air training centres in Canada, 2512 to the Royal Air Force, and 450 in Fiji. The only operational aircraft available were 36 Hudsons and 29 Vincents; all others, including 62 Harvards, 143 Oxfords, and 46 Hinds were used for training, though some of them could be used operationally in an emergency. In answer to immediate calls to the United Kingdom and United States Governments for urgent war materials to meet the needs of New Zealand forces both on the home front and in the Pacific, field guns were diverted from the Middle East, mortars from South Africa, rifles, ammunition, and signal equipment from America, Bren guns from Canada, and machine guns, tractors, rifles, and binoculars from the United Kingdom.

New Zealanders of 8 Brigade Group in Fiji were the only troops in the Pacific at their battle stations when war broke with Japan, and they remained there for three days, until the excitement wore off. There was little incident other than daily routine, but aircraft increased their dawn and dusk patrols with the machines still available.

Japanese resident in Fiji and Tonga at the outbreak of war were detained and sent to New Zealand for internment. Prisoners of war captured in the Pacific were interned in a camp at Featherston, 41 miles from Wellington. This camp, established in 1942 on the site of a military camp of the 1914–18 War, covered 60 acres and was controlled from Central Military District. Except for the inevitable restrictions of captivity, prisoners lived in a standard of comfort equal to and frequently exceeding that of New Zealand soldiers serving abroad. On the morning of 25 February 1943 certain ringleaders provoked a mutiny among the prisoners. They refused to work, adopted threatening attitudes, and finally attempted to stone the guards, who opened fire on them. Forty-eight Japanese were killed or died of wounds and 61 were wounded. One of seven New Zealand guards wounded by ricochets died of his injuries and eleven were injured by stones hurled by the mutinous Japanese.

The first shot was fired by a sentry at a motor patrol boat which, ignorant of the startling turn of events, quietly chugged to its moorings in the dawn of the following day and did not answer the challenge; the second when HMS Gale, a small coastal steamer commissioned for service, arrived from New Zealand on Christmas Day and had a shot put across her bows by the shore battery when she failed to give the correct recognition signal as she approached the harbour entrance.

The movement of Japanese naval craft in waters north of Fiji was confirmed by the coastwatches in the Gilberts on 9 December, when they reported the presence of enemy ships and aircraft from carriers round their islands, and from that date, until they were either killed or taken prisoner, information of vital importance came from the men of those remote stations. December the 9th was a memorable day. A flight of five Hudson aircraft, the first reinforcements despatched from New Zealand, circled Suva before going on to Nandi and coincided with the arrival there of two long awaited 18-pounder guns, to complete the complement of field guns for 35 Battery, and four 4.5-inch howitzers. But the 10th brought the dreary news that two British battleships, HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, had been sunk off the coast of Malaya, sealing the fate of Singapore and leaving the whole Pacific Ocean open to the Japanese navy, until the stricken United States naval forces could be reorganised, after Pearl Harbour, to oppose the threat. In the midst of those grave days New Zealand supplied the Fiji Treasury with £30,000 worth of £5 notes and £50,000 worth of £1 notes, all overprinted, to meet a temporary shortage of currency caused by the demands of the garrison forces.

New Zealand's declaration of war with Japan at eleven o’clock on the morning of 8 December was quickly followed by preparations to expand the force in Fiji to two brigades and to strengthen all artillery, both field and anti-aircraft. War Cabinet approved the despatch of a further 3500 men and considerable quantities of supplies. For the remainder of December and January, two exceedingly hot and busy months, men and materials arrived in the Colony.

Units of Cunningham's force were brought up to strength by reinforcements speedily despatched in two voyages of the Wahine. On Boxing Day, 27 Mixed Anti-Aircraft Battery, under Major J. A. Pym, MC, reached Suva with four anti-aircraft guns which had been dismantled from the harbour defences of Auckland and Wellington. They were the first to reach Fiji. Three battalions—the 35th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Murphy, MC,

Lt-Col W. Murphy, CBE, MC; Auckland; born NZ 16 Jan 1894; Regular soldier; Otago Regt 1914–19; CO 35 Bn, Jan 1942; GSO 1 3 NZ Div, 1942; AA & QMG Aug 1942-May 1943; Commandant, Papakura Military Camp, Jun 1944–Jun 1946; Area Commander, Auckland, Jun 1946–Mar 1948.

the 36th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Barry,

Lt-Col J. W. Barry, MBE; Wanganui; born England, 2 Apr 1893; Regular soldier; CO 36 Bn, Dec 1941–Jun 1943; Commander N Force (Norfolk Island) Sep 1942–Apr 1943; Area Commander, Wanganui, Sep 1943-Apr 1947.

and the 37th under Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. L. Sugden

Col A. H. L. Sugden, m. i. d.; Trentham; born Geraldine, 23 Mar 1901; Regualr soldier; Commandant Army School of Instruction, Trentham, 1940–41; CO 37 Bn, Dec 1941–Jul 1944; Commandant Army School of Instruction, Apr 1945–Jan 1947; Area Commander, Wellington, Jan–Mar 1947.

—formed at Burnham Camp from the 8th Reinforcements for the Middle East, were organised and despatched to Cunningham's force; and in Fiji itself 2 Territorial Battalion was called up for full-time service. The new units made the voyage in a convoy of four ships—the Matua and the Rangatira, which went to Lautoka, and the Wahine and the Monowai to Suva, all under the escort of the cruisers Australia, Perth, and Achilles. The ships reached their destinations on 6 January and returned to New Zealand for the second flight, which arrived in Fiji on 14 January, the Port Montreal replacing the Matua on the second trip.

The new brigade commanders and their staffs flew to Fiji on 2 January, in the same aircraft which took Brigadier K. L. Stewart,

Maj-Gen K. L. Stewart, CB, CBE, DSO, m. i. d., MC (Greek), Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Timaru, 30 Dec 1896; Regular soldier; 1 NZEF 1917–19; GSO 1 2 NZ Div, 1940–41; Deputy Chief of General Staff, Dec 1941–Jul 1943; commanded 5 Bde, Aug–Nov 1943, 4 Armd Bde, Nov 1943–Mar 1944, and 5 Bde, Mar–Aug 1944; p. w. 1 Aug 1944–Apr 1945; commanded 9 Bde (2 NZEF, Japan) Nov 1945–Jul 1946; Adjutant-General, NZ Military Forces, Aug 1946-Mar 1949; Chief of General Staff, Apr 1949-Mar 1952.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff, for consulation and inspection. On 6 January Cunningham relinquished command of 8 Brigade Group and two days later was promoted Major-General commanding the Pacific Section, 2 NZEF, the official title of the force, which was not given divisional status until later. By the end of the month reorganisation was almost complete, and the new defence areas allotted to the expanded force. Command of 8 Brigade, which remained in the Suva area, passed to Brigadier L. G. Goss

Brig L. G. Goss, CB, Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Geelong, Aust, 30 May 1895; Regular soldier; 1 NZEF 1917–19; GSO 1, Army HQ, 1939–41; commanded 8 Bde Gp Jan–Mar 1942; Assistant Chief of General Staff, Army HQ, May–Nov 1942; commanded 15 Bde, Nov 1942–Jul 1943; 8 Bde, Dec 1943–Sep 1944; Deputy Chief of General Staff, Sep 1944–Jul 1946.

until the arrival of Brigadier R. A. Row

Brig R. A. Row, DSO and bar, m. i. d., Legion of Merit (US); Upper Hutt; born Christchurch, 30 Jul 1888; Regular soldier; 1 NZEF 1914–19 (CO 3 (Res) Bn): commanded 8 Bde, Mar 1942–Dec 1943.

late in February, after which Goss became New Zealand liaison officer on MacArthur's headquarters in Melbourne. Brigadier L. Potter

Brig L. Potter, CBE, DSO, m. i. d.; Tauranga; born Auckland, 13 Sep 1894; Regular soldier; 1 NZEF 1916–19; commanded 14 Bde Gp and Western Area, Fiji, Jan–Jul 1942; commanded 14 Bde, 1942–44; Commandant, Central Military District, Dec 1944–Jun 1946; commanded 2 NZEF, Japan, 1946–48.

took over the newly formed 14 Brigade for the defence of the western area, and established his headquarters at Namaka. In strengthening Fiji, New Zealand denuded herself of much of her available artillery. ‘We have sent the only four heavy anti-aircraft guns and the only four Bofors guns we possess’, Fraser cabled to Churchill, then in Washington, on Christmas Eve 1941. He did not say that the New Zealand guns had been replaced temporarily by dummies.

Reorganisation in Fiji brought about many changes in appointments and an extension of the two defended zones so that battalions took over areas formerly held by companies and platoons, but basically the plan of defence remained the same, though the mobility of the force was increased by the arrival of motor transport, so long anticipated. Cunningham's headquarters remained at Borron's House, where the accommodation was proportionately increased. Eighth Brigade took over a private residence, Hedstrom's House, at Tamavua, as its headquarters and gouged itself an underground operations room in the soapstone nearby. Fourteenth Brigade's operational headquarters was excavated in a feature known as Black Rock, which commanded a vast sweep of country overlooking Namaka, the airfields, and the beaches of the Nandi anchorage, and was made reasonably secure by the use of 50 tons of cement. Potter became the area commander, with the responsibility for defending 1000 square miles of country, extending from Momi to a line north of Lautoka and taking in such vulnerable localities as Thuvu, near Singatoka, where the coral reef merged with the foreshore. It was indicative of the vast stretches of territory which were included in the Fiji defence scheme.

By the end of January the force had been stepped up to 7600 all ranks, with units disposed through the areas they were to hold until their relief later in the year. In a hot and exhausting introduction to the tropics, the men dug, excavated, and erected belts of barbed wire through days and weeks of unremitting toil. Like the earlier arrivals they suffered all the discomforts of mosquitoes, dhobie's itch, prickly heat, septic sores, and tinea which were to harass them during the whole of the Pacific campaign.

These extracts from the letter of an NCO give an idea of conditions as seen by a new arrival and a sense of humour which redeems all discomfort: ‘In early January I arrived at Suva. After a very early rising and a wait of about six hours on the deck of the Wahine, with full pack up, we disembarked and climbed into an 8-cwt truck which had been standing in the sun for hours. It was like an oven and we frizzled like pork chops in a casserole. I was given a job in the orderly room at headquarters. Soon the new arrivals were helping with the excavation of more tunnels in underground headquarters. It was back-breaking work pecking away at the soapstone in the tropic heat. At times we were all called on to do our share of digging. For one week when there were rumours of the approach of Japanese ships, the whole camp was mustered at battle stations in the early hours of the morning, while at night we were all engaged in digging pits and gun positions. But there were many amusing incidents to record, for instance when Gosney's mosquito net caught fire half an hour after midnight and Allen rang the general alarm instead of the fire alarm. There were the Saturday mornings when we went down to Death Gully, the hottest place in Suva, to do our rifle shooting. There was the morning of the full-scale invasion rehearsal when the noise of the planes drowned the newly-installed hooter and we all stood in the open watching the performance until one of the officers came lumbering down the hill, red in the face and very much annoyed, and ordered us to our battle stations. That was the day the Hindu dhobi lost all his workmen and we lost all our laundry. And those were the days when we were well fed. There were times when the mess tables, loaded with cucumber, tomatoes, spring onions, water-melon, bananas and pineapples, looked like a harvest festival.’

In the final reorganisation of the two brigades, in which unit commands were retained by some of the former officers, the 8th was made up of 1 Fiji Battalion (commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. K. Taylor, a New Zealander from the Fiji Civil Service), the 34th, the 36th, and two companies of 2 Fiji Battalion (under Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Forster), two fixed coastal batteries, 35 Field Battery (increased to four 18-pounders, four 25-pounders, and four 4.5-inch and four 3.7-inch howitzers), 7 Field Ambulance (now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. D. Stoney Johnston after the return to New Zealand of Davie), 20 Field Company Engineers (Captain S. E. Anderson), 4 Composite Company, ASC, and 36 Light Aid Detachment.

Potter's brigade group was made up of 30 Battalion (commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Irving, who took over when Mawson returned to New Zealand), 35 Battalion (command of which passed to Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Tomline, MC, when Murphy went almost immediately to headquarters as GSO 1), 37 Battalion, the remaining companies of 2 Fiji Battalion, one fixed coastal battery at Momi, 37 Field Battery (commanded by Major W. A. Bryden and made up of four 18-pounders and four 4.5-inch and four 3.7-inch howitzers), 27 Mixed Anti-Aircraft Battery, 23 Field Company Engineers, 16 Composite Company, ASC (Captain R. Gapes), 2 Field Ambulance (Major E. N. d’Arcy), Namaka Hospital (Major P. C. E. Brunette), and section of ordnance workshops. As divisional reserve, 29 Battalion was stationed at Nausori, beyond the Suva perimeter, to deny the use of the Rewa River bridge and to defined the Nandali aerodrome, where P.39s (Airacobras) of an American pursuit squadron of 60 officers and 600 men under Colonel Edgar T. Seltzer maintained some of their machines, the remainder being at Namaka. They were the first Americans to reach Fiji, where they arrived at the end of January 1942.

Artillery during the whole of the Pacific campaign was always an involved problem since the force had under its command fixed coastal batteries of naval guns and also defended base aerodromes, tasks not normally required of a division in the field, but island warfare demanded revolutionary changes in prescribed war establishments. The artillery organisation of the forces in Fiji, later repeated in New Caledonia, was perhaps the most involved of all the New Zealand island undertakings. The fixed coastal batteries of the Fiji artillery, sited in each zone to defend the ports, anchorages, and the more vital openings through the reefs leading to them, came under area commanders for operations but were administered from headquarters. At the time the force artillery was relieved by

The Kiwi Club, Bourail Beach, opened by the National Patriotic Fund Board as a rest centre for men of the 3rd division after they had returned from the Solomons. Black and white of buildings with hills in background

Training in New Caledonia. Mortar Platoon of 29 NZ Batallion carrying full equipment up Mount TontaBlack and white photograph of troops climbing mountain with valley in background

Review of 8 NZ Infantry Brigade. Dubois Memorial Field, Boulopari, New Caledonia.Black and white photograph of troops in formation in field

Base Ordnance Depot, Bourail, typical of New Zealand Camps in New CaledoniaBlack and white photograph of army tents

30 NZ Batallion Headquarter among niaouli trees, Koumac, in northern New Caledonia Black and white photograph of trees

The Cookhouse Ovens, 37 NZ Batllion, Taom, New CaledoniaBlack and White photograph of soldier cooking

The camp site of 22 NZ Field Ambulance at Tinipp. The hospital is in the centre.Black and White photograph of Hospital with Mountains in Background

Nurses' Hospital, 4 NZ General Hospital, Boguen.Black and White Photograph tents beside trees the Americans, it consisted of these fixed coastal batteries, heavy and light anti-aircraft batteries (both fixed and mobile), and field batteries. Circumstances also altered the functions of the infantry and other services. For example, in Fiji the ASC issued rations on seven different ration scales at one time and supplied not only the New Zealand force but also Americans, New Zealand civilians working on the airfields, Fijian soldiers and labourers, and Indians employed on camp staffs.

Alarms came frequently during the earlier months of 1942 as signals from Wellington and Washington warned of a possible attack. Reports from the coastwatchers in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands recorded any activity in those waters, and there were moments of excitement in Suva, as on the afternoon of 16 January when HMS Monowai, outward bound for New Zealand, reported an attack by enemy submarine soon after she passed beyond the protection of the reef. Shots were exchanged as the vessel zigzagged, and she reported that a conning tower broke the surface of the water. Although aircraft searched the area until darkness fell, no trace of the submarine was disclosed and no confirmation of the attack could be obtained from Japanese sources, though it must be added that several enemy submarines operating in the South Pacific at that time never returned to their base.

A fleet of these underwater craft kept headquarters at Truk, in the Caroline Islands, moderately well informed of Allied activities in the Pacific, and native coastwatchers were often correct with their quaintly expressed reports that they had seen strange aircraft and ships. Much of the information attributed to fifth columnists really came from Japanese submarines, which cruised about the Pacific and surfaced off the islands to launch their aircraft which made reconnaissance flights, usually just before dawn. On 19 March 1942 native coastwatchers on Kandavu, an island on the outer rim of the Fiji Group, reported that a large bird had settled on the water and entered a ship, which immediately sank. It was an aircraft from submarine I–25, which had also reconnoitred Auckland and Wellington some days previously. On 21 May an aircraft from submarine I–21, which patrolled the Pacific until it was sunk in the Marshalls in 1944, was chased into the clouds by American aircraft stationed at Nandi.

Until the arrival of radio direction-finding apparatus late in the days of the force, detection of these elusive craft was difficult. From February 1942 until September 1943, 23 Japanese submarines, of which 14 carried aircraft, operated round the Australian and New Zealand coasts as well as in waters round New Caledonia, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, and the New Hebrides. Even after enemy reverses in the Solomons they continued to patrol south, but in decreasing numbers. These submarines reported the arrival of the first big convey of American troops in Fiji on 10 June 1942, and they sighted the convoy 200 miles south of Suva carrying the first reinforcements to strengthen Cunningham's force earlier in the year.

All such information was passed by radio to Japanese naval headquarters in the Caroline Islands and transmitted to Tokyo. Moving to and from Truk to refuel and revictual, Japanese submarines made the following voyages: From February to March 1942 submarine I–25 reconnoitred the Auckland and Wellington Harbours, the east coast of Australia, Suva, and Pago Pago; in April I–25, I–27, and I–29 investigated Suva, Sydney, Auckland, and Noumea; in June and July I–22, with I–27 and I–29, again reconnoitred the New Zealand and Australian coasts, sinking one ship; throughout July and August I–11, I–175, I–174, I–169, and I–171 sailed round New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa, and the east coast of Australia, sinking five ships; in October I–15, I–17, I–19, and I–26 patrolled the New Caledonian coast; I–21 returned there in November and stayed until early December; in November I–31 and I–7 reconnoitred Suva, Pago Pago, and Espiritu Santo, in the New Hebrides. From July to the end of September 1943 five of these submarines returned and investigated waters round Fiji, New Caledonia, and the New Hebrides. I–17 was sunk in August 1943.

If men and materials were haphazard in reaching Fiji before Japan entered the war, they came in quantity afterwards, even if quality was lacking. Some of the motor transport impressed in New Zealand was despatched without reasonable inspection of either its cleanliness or its serviceability and was condemned on arrival. As evidence of the haste, animal droppings still covered the floors of many of the vehicles. By the end of January the first American supplies arrived, including 3900 rifles, 24 two-inch mortars, 98 Thompson sub-machine guns, and 118.30 machine guns, as well as field telephone cable, telephones, switchboards, 23 wireless sets, and 200 mines to block the openings through the reef. Two thousand of the rifles and the .30 machine guns were sent on to New Zealand. Blackouts, previously imposed but lifted at the request of the Governor when the citizens complained of the stifling discomfort, were again enforced. Tactical exercises by the brigades tested their own mobility and the state of the defences. One such exercise by 8 Brigade assumed all the elements of reality by coinciding with the arrival of an American convoy at Suva. The exercise began just before midnight of 8 March, when units occupied battle stations on receipt of information that an enemy convoy was approaching Fiji. Early next morning reports were circulated to units that the Nandi airfields were being bombed. This news, carried with the speed of gossip to the civilian population, produced a mild panic when aircraft of the force made low-level runs over camps, roads, and assembly points. Indians hastily loaded their belongings on trucks, cars, handcarts, and even bicycles and fled to the hills, blocking road traffic and indicating conditions which would attend a genuine attack. After that experience all orders concerning exercises were prefaced with the word ‘Practice’.

By the end of June there were 10,000 New Zealanders in Fiji. This in itself created an acute accommodation problem, happily overcome by building native style huts called bures, which had the added advantage of assisting the general scheme of camouflaging all camps and defences, because these bures were sited to resemble small native villages. Troops helped with this camouflage by making nets from vau bark to cover gunpits and supply depots, and by planting such creepers as ‘mile a minute’ which quickly covered any newly broken ground. This plant spread with astonishing speed. One excused duty soldier who had times to watch it verified that it grew at the rate of 14 inches a day.

Change was the very nature of the force as heat and conditions took toll of all ranks. In March, General Cunningham was in valided home and Major-General O. H. Mead, CBE, DSO,

Maj-Gen O. H. Mead, CBE, DSO, m. i. d.; born Dunedin, 24 Jan 1892; Regular soldier; 1 NZEF 1914–20 (commanded 1 Bn and 3 (Res) Bn); Commandant, Southern Military District, Oct 1940–Feb 1942; GOC Pacific Section, 2 NZEF, 25 Feb–25 Jul 1942; lost at sea in aircraft accident, 25 Jul 1942.

took over command on the 9th. Cunningham's health had been impaired by bouts of dysentery and the exhausting worries attending an expedition short of men and materials. Like so many other commanders forced to accept such circumstances, he shouldered out of the way many of the early difficulties and conditioned the situation for those who followed. His legal knowledge was of immense value in negotiations with the civil administration and in the tactful reduction of initial problems. Lack of unified command in Fiji meant that many questions of policy had to be referred to New Zealand for decision, often long delayed.

Although the air component was part of the Fiji defences and operationally under the commander of the forces, its control was retained by Air Headquarters in New Zealand. A desirable unity of control was not attained until the United States Forces Took over and their system of island commands came into operation.

Although reinforcements continued to arrive and strengthen the force after Mead took over, he asked for another brigade group and a divisional reserve of one armoured regiment, one motorised battalion, and one 25-pounder battery, none of which could be supplied by New Zealand. The air component was deplorably weak for the work it was called on to perform, and the navy still practically non-existent. But a large building and construction programme went ahead as materials became available, and in order that these should be satisfactorily distributed, a priorities committee consisting of army, air, and civilian engineer representatives was set up under the direction of Colonel F. W. Furkert,

Col F. W. Furkert, CMG; born Ross, 1876; consulting engineer; Engineer-in-Chief and Under-Secretary, Public Works Dept, 1920–32; died 26 Sep 1949.

former chief of the New Zealand Public Works Department, to apportion them for defences, aerodromes, roading, tunnelling, and building.

When additional ground units could not be made available to Mead, Fijian guerrilla units were formed. These developed from a suggestion made earlier by Major J. V. M. Cauty, MM,

Maj J. V. M. Cauty, MM; Suva; born Wellington, 24 Jul 1896; farmer; NZ Rifle Bde 1914–19; Commandant 3 NZ Div Jungle Training School, New Caledonia.

a company commander of 29 Battalion, and they gave a desirable mobility lacking in a force called on to defend long stretches of vulnerable beach. They came into being as news of the Battle of the Coral Sea and the fall of Corregidor reached the force, and from them emerged the Fijian commandos who fought later in the Solomons with distinction. Three groups were recruited and organized to work from established based in the interior, so that in the event of an enemy landing at any point on the coast, they could harass the invaders by destroying their lines of supply and communications. Cauty himself took the western zone, where the more open country permitted the use of horses, Captain P. G. Ellis

Maj P. G. Ellis; Christchurch; born Timaru, 26 Nov 1899; grain merchant; OC 2 Commando, Fiji Guerrillas, 1943–44.

the eastern zone, with headquarters on the Rewa River, near Nausori, and Lieutenant C. W. H. Tripp

Maj C. W. H. Tripp, DSO, Silver Star(US); Gore; born Timaru, 22 Feb 1902; farmer; OC 1 Commando, Fiji Guerrillas, 1943–44; wounded 12 Jyk 1943.

the 8 Brigade zone, with headquaters at Navua. Each unit consisted of about 200 Fijians and thirty New Zealand non-commissioned officers selected for their self-reliance and initiative. Formative difficulties developed as the units began the hard and intensive training required of them in this rugged country. At first the Fijians, a naturally happy and generous people, thought it a grand game with everything so lavishly provided, and the army's insistence on a ration scale was incomprehensible to them. A week's supply of food disappeared during a night's party with friends from neighbouring villages. They felt humiliated when admiring relatives watched them training with sticks instead of the more spectacular rifle. Their desire for uniforms could not be gratified immediately, and only time and infinite patience overcame these and other problems. Even before the force left Fiji, these guerrilla units proved the worth of their training and gave promise of their future usefulness. During manœuvres conducted by Brigadier F. L. Hunt,

Brig F. L. Hunt, OBE, m. i. d.; Wellington; born Leeston, 30 Nov 1890; Regular soldier; Otago Regt 1915–16; 2 NZEF, Egypt, 1940–41; commanded 8 Bde, 3 NZ Div, May–Jul 1942; 16 Bde Gp (Tonga) Feb 1943–Feb 1944; held appointments of Director of Military Tranining (1942), Adjutant-General (1946), and Quartermaster-General, Army HQ (1946–48).

who was temporarily commanding 8 Brigade during Row's absence in New Zealand from sickness, a band of these guerrillas effectively held up the advance of a battalion through rough, wooded country.

Meanwhile, by March 1942, American forces had begun to move into the Pacific in some strength to bases in Australia, New Caledonia, and Eastern Samoa. Increasing numbers of senior officers passing through Fiji examined the defences and the island's possibilities as a staging base. The port facilities of Suva were strained to their utmost when it became a revictualling base for the Anzac Naval Force

The Anzac Naval Force, established in February 1942 under the command of Vice-Admiral H. F. Leary, USN, operated during its brief existence in waters between Fiji and New Caledonia. It consisted of HMAS Australia, flagship of Rear-Admiral J. G. Crace, RN, HMAS Canberra, USS Chicago, HMNZS Achilles, HMNZS Leander and two US destroyers, Lamson and Perkins. With the exception of Canberra, these ships assembled at Suva on 12 February. The force was disbanded in April 1942.

and for American convoys carrying men and supplies to their newly created garrisons. On one occasion half a million pounds of fresh meat arrived from the United States and was stored until ships called to pick it up. There was no surplus space in the cool-stores of the town or the camps.

Official reports came, too, of the first American offensive action—hit-and-run raids on enemy strongholds in the Marshall Group, Wake and Marcus Islands, and a raid on Tokyo by aircraft from the American carrier Hornet on 18 April. Despite them, however, the Japanese continued to move south, and in June were constructing an airfield on the northern coast of Guadalcanal. Intelligence information to the force in Fiji suggested that any Japanese attack was based on the strength of one division with tanks, and that it would be supported by four aircraft carriers and strong naval units. Preparations to meet it were intensified and practice alarms were held. That demoralising edict known as ‘denial of resources to the enemy’ also went forth, and plans for the destruction of supplies, roads, bridges, and petrol were committed to paper. But it never came; the proposed Japanese attack ordered on 18 May 1942 was cancelled in July.

By that time American forces were moving into Fiji, as well as New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. On 12 May Mead was notified that the defence of the Crown Colony and other islands in the South Pacific area was under the command of Vice-Admiral R. L. Ghormley, US Navy, who had been appointed the month previously to the South Pacific command. four days later Ghormley passed through Fiji on his way to New Zealand, where he established his headquarters at Auckland. Mead flew to Namaka to meet him. These personal inspections of the defences of Fiji and of units already in New Caledonia, as well as staff talks with individual commanders, were invaluable to his future planning.

Although reinforcements and armament as approved by War Cabinet in April Continued to reach Fiji—900 men were sent in May and another 1700 at the end of June—the decision to relieve the force by the American 37 Division had already been taken. On 6 June the American advanced party arrived, followed on 10 June by Major-General R. S. Beightler and 5700 members of his Ohio division in the transports President Coolidge, which was afterwards lost in a minefield off the New Hebrides, and Santa Lucia. Another 3200 men of the division reached Suva from New Zealand before the end of June, after which the President Coolidge ran a shuttle service between Suva and Auckland, carrying New Zealanders home and bringing up the remainder of 37 Division. Beightler and Mead agreed that all New Zealand personnel with the Fiji Defence Force and the guerrilla units should remain in Fiji, and that 1035 New Zealanders manning the fixed coastal and anti-aircraft defences should remain until they were relieved by American units. The relief of the force coincided, ironically enough, with the emplacement of eight 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns from New Zealand, the first of which fired a trial shoot on 19 June.

At the time the force handed over to 37 American Division in 1942 the principal staff appointments and commands were:

Force Headquarters General Officer Commanding Maj-Gen O. H. Mead, CBE, DSO GSO 1 Lt-Col W. Murphy, MC GSO 2 Maj S. S. H. Berkeley GSO 3 (Operations) Capt J. G. Warrington GSO 3 (Intelligence) Capt O. A. Gillespie, MM AA and QMG Lt-Col J. G. C. Wales, MC DAQMG Maj R. C. Aley DAAG Capt S. F. Marshall Commander Royal Artillery Lt-Col J. P. Joyce, DCM Fixed Coastal Artillery Lt-Col B. Wicksteed ADMS Col A. C. McKillop, ED CRE Maj W. G. McKay CRASC Lt-Col. F. G. M. Jenkins, DCM ADDS Maj H. A’C. Fitzgerald DADOS Capt M. S. Myers Base Paymaster Capt W. P. McGowan Provost Marshal Capt A. L. Downes Divisional Signals Officer Capt. J. L. J. Gettins Camp Commandmant and Legal Staff Officer Capt D. A. Solomon Records Officer 2 Lt P. H. Robinson

8 Infantry Brigade Officer Commanding Brig F. L. Hunt Brigade Major Maj R. J. Eyre Staff Captain Capt I. H. MacArthur 1 Fijian Battalion Lt-Col J. B. K. Taylor 34 Battalion Lt-Col F. W. Voelcker, MC 36 Battalion Lt-Col J. W. Barry 35 Field Battery Maj C. H. Loughnan, MC

14 Infantry Brigade Officer Commanding Brig L. Potter Brigade Major Maj S. A. McNamara, DCM Staff Captain Maj P. L. Bennett, MC 30 Battalion Lt-Col H. A. Pattullo, MC 35 Battalion Lt-Col C. F. Seaward, MC 37 Battalion Lt-Col A. H. L. Sugden 37 Field Battery Maj W. A. Bryden

Divisional Reserve 29 Battalion Lt-Col A. J. Moore

The change-over was effected without incident and began an association with American forces which was to endure for some years. In Fiji, also, New Zealand military forces came under American command for the first time. While the relief took place, the works and defence programme continued without interruption. The incoming Americans brought with them such a quantity of equipment, from artillery to field furniture, that the New Zealanders were justified in wondering how they had achieved so much with so little. Potter returned to New Zealand with the second relief draft and opened an advanced headquarters in Quay Street, Auckland, pending the arrival of Mead. At six O'clock on the morning of 18 July operational command in Fiji passed to Beightler.

Mead remained in Suva to observe amphibious landing operations by United States navy, army, and air units on the beaches of Koro Island, which he had helped to select for this first and only rehearsal of the landing on Guadalcanal. He then left on the morning of 25 July to pay a farewell visit to Tonga, but the Hudson aircraft in which he and his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant J. C. Leslie, were travelling was lost in a tropical strom after reaching the island. An inquiry revealed that the aircraft, low in fuel after flying in torrential rain which made any observation impossible, had been accidentally directed south of the island by an American officer operating radio location, who mistook other aircraft from a carrier in the neighbourhood for the New Zealand Hudson. No trace of the aircraft or its occupants was ever found, though sea and air searches were maintained for some days afterwards. Flying Officer D. A. Anderson, Pilot Officer C. G. Ibbotson, Sergeant R. H. W. Wybourne, and Leading Aircraftsman A. N. Clayton went down with their machine.

When command in Fiji passed to the Americans, 58 New Zealand officers and 210 other ranks, nearly all specialists, remained with the Fiji Defence Force, for which New Zealand was also requested to provide a commandant. Wales was selected and appointed on 18 July with the rank of Colonel, with promotion to Brigadier the following November. He established his head-quarters in a separate camp off the main highway at Tamavua, from which he administered his triple command.

The majority of the men of what was now 3 Division were not sorry to leave Fiji. Some of them had been there since November 1940. What they had accomplished without the aid of heavy equipment, of which they had little enough until they inherited some left behind when the Civil Construction Unit returned to New Zealand in May, astonished the Americans as they examined the defence system. Work and climate had taken their toll but most of the men were remarkably fit, though in 1942 the DDMS had protested that too many Grade II men were being sent to Fiji, where heat and conditions aggravated minor weaknesses. The work of the force suffered from a curiously undeserved lack of publicity from any official correspondents and photographers, and no broadcasting unit sent home to New Zealand those singularly uninspired personal messages from men carrying out a task lacking in both glamour and spectacle. An occasitional amateurish photograph did appear in the New Zealand newspapers, but it only revealed a crowd of husky Fijians in snow-white sulus and European coats presenting gifts of fruit and vegetables to the soldiers. The Force received the unselfish co-operation of every Government department in Fiji, particularly from the Public Works Department, without whose aid still more work would have fallen on the sunburned shoulders of the New Zealanders, and the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, whose narrow-gauge railways saved miles of marching and haulage.

CHAPTER 3 Problems of Command and Employment

I: America Plans the Offensive

AN unbroken series of retreats and territorial losses of the greatest strategical importance and significance followed the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, as the Japanese thrust continued to the south and ultimately reached the Solomons in April. Although America was quick to act after the attack on Pearl Harbour, time and space dictated action and strategy in the Pacific—time to organise men, assemble materials, ships, aircraft, and naval support for a global war which meant fighting not only on two fronts but in several widely separated theatres; space because of the vast distances over which men and materials had to be carried before they were committed to action.

Time and space were also influenced by command. Soon after Japan's entry into the war a unified command was created in the South West Pacific under General Sir Archibald Wavell, who took over what was known as the ABDA area (American, British, Dutch, and Australian). His deputy commander was an American, and Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commanding the United States Asiatic Fleet, commanded all naval forces. Wavell's command included Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, Dutch New Guinea and, later, Northern Australia. Beyond this area, east of the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand, the defence of the Pacific became the responsibility of the United States Navy.

In January 1942 the Anzac area was created. This was an addition to the Pacific Ocean area to include East Australia, New Zealand, and part of New Guinea, and was still the responsibility of the US Navy, which assigned Vice-Admiral H. F. Leary to command the first Anzac naval force. When Singapore fell the ABDA command was dissolved, and a Dutch commander-in-chief took over for a brief period until the fall of Java.

These commands existed for only brief periods and were created in an attempt to meet a situation which changed radically almost from day to day. But they were soon dissolved, for they were never satisfactory in meeting a grave situation which not only involved the use of all three services of the contries concerned in stemming the Japanese advance, but also had to satisfy the demands and wishes of Governments and the most senior officers.

Once more the strategic boundaries were shuffled, this time into two spheres of responsibility—the Indian Ocean, including Burma, became the British sphere, and the Pacific Ocean, including Australia and New Zealand, fell to the United States.

An attack could not be mounted quickly in the Pacific, however urgent the necessity to stem the seemingly overwhelming Japanese tide. The main Allied bases, in Australia and New Zealand, were at the end of a long ocean haul of more than 6000 miles from United States ports, and only a slightly shorter haul to Fiji, New Caledonia, and the New Hebrides, some of the more important subsidiary forward bases. After transhipment at those bases, there was another 1000- to 2000-mile haul to the immediate battle area through submarine-infested waters. And at that time, particularly, there were not enough ships, landing craft, aircraft, men or supplies to mount an attack in any great force. Even when it came, the required strength to mount an offensive was dribbled across the Pacific under navy protection for assembly and final preparation at hastily organised and constructed advanced bases. Moreover, almost the whole of the Allied strength at that time had been committed—either in preparation for a resumption of the attack in Egypt, where in June the British had been forced back beyond the Egyptian frontier, or in preparation in the United Kingdom for the landing on the Normandy coast. Russia, too, was causing some concern. She was being hard pressed by the German thrusts to Stalingrad and Sevastopol, and the Allies were therefore sending her all the assistance they could afford in supplies and war materials. It was also the generally agreed Allied plan to defeat Germany first, because of the fear that she might first produce an atom bomb or develop other defensive weapons of equal destructive power, after which the full Allied strength could be turned against Japan.

Because of vital shortages, the first phase of the Pacific war was indecisive and unspectacular. From the attack on Pearl Harbour to the Battle of Midway was a defensive phase; it was followed by a holding phase and finally an offensive phase, which did not really begin until 1944, when the full force of armament and highly-trained fighting services had been assembled, and after lessons learned in early conflict had been absorbed by units not yet committed to battle. Nor was Pacific strategy fully developed until after the first foothold had been obtained in the Solomons. This evolved as a series of giant pincer movements to eliminate the bases of Rabaul and Truk in preparation for the thrust into the Philippines. As the Pacific offensive developed in 1943, three giant spearheads converged on the arsenals of Japan's inner defence line. MacArthur's force, which included Australians under General Sir Thomas Blamey and Americans under Lieutenant-General Walter Krueger, thrust through New Guinea and New Britain to Rabaul; and Americans, first under Ghormley and later under Halsey, and including New Zealanders under Major-General H. E. Barrowclough,

Maj-Gen H. E. Barrowclough, CB, DSO and bar, MC, ED, m. i. d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US), Croix de Guerre; Auckland; born Masterton, 23 Jun 1894; barrister and solicitor; NZ Rifle Bde 1915–19 (CO 4 Bn); commanded 7 NZ Inf Bde in UK, 1940; 6 Brigade, May 1940-Feb 1942; GOC 2 NZEF in Pacific and GOC 3 NZ Div Aug 1942-Oct 1944.

slowly fought through the Solomons to the same objective. Coming in on the right flank through the islands of the Gilbert and Marshall Groups, an amphibious American force struck at successive islands on the way to Truk, the key to the whole Japanese defence system and secured by a series of interlocking island bases. That was the early broad plan of the campaign.

Through all the phases of this campaign New Zealand played her part, which began before Pearl Harbour by garrisoning Fiji and other Pacific islands. Small though they were compared with America's vast resources in men and material, ground forces of 3 New Zealand Division, aircraft of the Royal New Zealand Air Force, and ships of the Royal New Zealand Navy lent their courage and strength to the long and arduous battle. New Zealand also provided bases and training grounds and supplied fresh foods in such quantity that, according to General Marshall, ‘In Australia and New Zealand American forces obtained almost all their food requirements locally’. New Zealand also despatched vast quantities of fresh foods to the forces in the Pacific.

By 31 Dec 1943, under reciprocal lend-lease aid, New Zealand had supplied 113,886 tons of food, including butter, meat, vegetables, eggs and milk, valued at £11,190,000, to the American forces, as well as vast quantities of stores and war materials.

Through early 1942 a series of mutually supporting island bases was built up through the Pacific, extending from the New Hebrides, where a huge naval base capable of undertaking heavy repair work on damaged ships was established at Havannah Harbour on Efate, to New Caledonia (the largest military and supply base), Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga. These rear islands were not regarded as impregnable bases, but they were sufficiently strong if an attack developed to enable their garrisons to hold out until help arrived. On 2 July the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the Allied forces to mount a limited offensive with the men and ships then available, but before that could be done the vexed question of command had still to be settled.

By the end of March 1942 the division of the Pacific into two commands had been agreed—the South West Pacific area, which included the Philippines, the South China Sea, the Netherlands East Indies (except Sumatra), the Solomon Islands, and Australia and waters to the south, under MacArthur, with headquarters in Australia, to which he had been ordered by his Government before Singapore fell; and the Pacific Ocean area under Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, with headquarters at Pearl Harbour.

Nimitz's area was again subdivided into three—the North, Central and South Pacific areas, which made the situation confusing to readers of the daily news. Most of the established Allied bases were in the South Pacific area, which lay south of the Equator and west of 110 degress West, joining MacArthur's command off the east coast of Australia. This area of more than one million square miles of water was dotted with groups of islands vital to future plans, and included New Zealand, New Caledonia, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, the Cook and Society Islands. Nimitz commanded all Allied forces, except the New Zealand land defences, in the Pacific Ocean areas, but Ghormley was appointed his subordinate commander in the South Pacific, with headquarters at Auckland in the early stages and later in Noumea, to which he transferred on 1 August 1942 and which became the principal United States base until the end of the campaign in the Solomons.

Both MacArthur and Nimitz were responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. There was some conflict of opinion between Navy and Army before the commands were finally settled, after weeks of negotiation during which both Australia and New Zealand vigorously protested against being placed in separate areas, since they regarded both countries as a strategical whole.

New Zealand at this time was represented in both Washington and London. Nash departed from Wellington in January to become New Zealand Minister in Washington, where Brigadier A. B. Williams became New Zealand's representative on the British Joint Staff Mission. Brigadier R. S. Park was appointed in London as New Zealand's representative on the joint planning staff. In Washington the Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey was Australian minister, and lent his support when both New Zealand and Australia pressed hard for the establishment of a Pacific War Council in Washington, urging their desire in long and extremely frank signals to Churchill. The rapidly changing war situation lent force to their argument, but London was at first hesitant to agree. A Far Eastern Council, on which Jordan represented New Zealand, had been established in London on 9 February, with a staff council in Washington, but New Zealand and Australia, supported by the Dutch Minister, maintained that the prosecution of the Pacific war would be more easily directed from Washington and that the United States was better situated to control it. They wished, also, for a unified command co-ordinating all land, sea, and air resources, realising that a multiplicity of commands would ultimately weaken and prolong the war effort. The Pacific War Council first suggested by New Zealand and Australia on 21 January 1942 was ultimately set up, though a Council still remained in London to advise on political matters.

Encouraged by their successes after the fall of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, the Japanese prepared to continue their advance south, and planned an attack on Port Moresby from the sea and to establish bases in New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa from which to sever the American supply lines across the Pacific to New Zealand and Australia. United States naval forces, weakened at Pearl Harbour, were no match for the still undamaged Japanese Grand Fleet, but Nimitz made the best use of his Task Force 3, consisting of eight 8-inch cruisers, three aircraft carriers, and a destroyer screen. This, with the later formation of the Anzac Striking Force, which included HMAS Australia, HMAS Perth, HMNZS Achilles and HMNZS Leander, was almost the whole Allied naval strength in the Pacific during the critical months of early 1942.

Estimates of the strength of any further attacking Japanese forces varied widely. On 11 December 1941 information from London contained in a singal from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, assumed that there would be ‘no immediate large-scale threat to the territory of Australia and much less to New Zealand’. Washington advised on 8 January 1942 that an attack on Fiji could be expected at any time after 10 January, and that the probable scale would be one division escorted by four aircraft carriers. In March, in view of the altered situation, the British Chiefs of Staff, who previously presumed that any attack on New Zealand would be at brigade strength, raised their figure to ‘ten or eleven divisions, accompanied by very large naval forces, including five aircraft carriers’, and added that the Japanese might employ one or two divisions for the initial purpose of seizing a base; but, despite this estimate, they did not suggest increasing the defence force of the Dominion, for which they considered seven brigade groups or formations were sufficient, supported by five air squadrons (only two of which were equipped with modern aircraft), augmented by four fighter squadrons, two general reconnaissance squadrons, two torpedo medium bomber squadrons, one bomber-reconnaissance or dive-bomber squadron, and four transport aircraft.

In the light of later knowledge from Japanese sources, the estimates of enemy strength were exaggerated; no attack on New Zealand was ever planned. Orders for a continuance of the attack south, issued on 12 May 1942 to the commander of the 17th Japanese Army, were delayed for two months after the Battle of the Coral Sea, when the force intended for Port Moresby was turned back, and were finally cancelled on 11 July after the disastrous defeat at the Battle of Midway.

MacArthur, from his headquarters in Australia, began planning for an offensive against the advancing Japanese early in May 1942, when he realised that the overwhelming enemy victories in the Philippines, Burma, and Malaya would release more forces to continue the move south. His presumption was correct, since orders to continue the advance south from the Solomons were issued by the Japanese High Command that same month. Airfields, which the Allies lacked, were being hastily constructed in the north of Australia, in the valleys inland from Port Moresby and at Milne Bay, New Guinea, but MacArthur wanted greatly increased numbers of aircraft carriers, aeroplanes, and ground troops before he could move. Nimitz was also contemplating an attack to destroy a seaplane base which the Japanese had constructed at Tulagi, the southern limit of their move in the Solomons, but the Marine raider battalion he proposed to use was rightly considered too small for such a task. MacArthur's desire was for an early attack to dislodge the enemy from his newly won bases in both the Solomons and New Britain before they were consolidated, but as only three partly trained and equipped divisions were then available, and the objectives in the New Britain-New Ireland area were beyond the range of Allied fighter support from Port Moresby and the Australian mainland, close fighter air support would have had to come from aircraft carriers, none of which had been assigned to the South West Pacific area. British attacks against Timor or the Nicobar and Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, which were on the outer rim of the Japanese penetration in that area, were planned to co-ordinate with the American attack, using units of the British Eastern Fleet, but they did not get beyond the stage of suggestion.

The mounting of a Pacific offensive entailed the appointment of an overall commander, and here negotiations were for a time halted. General Marshall favoured MacArthur, already the hero of the Philippines and a man of tried battle knowledge, and he believed that an attack could be mounted by July, using for the initial assault 1 US Marine Division, under Major-General A. A. Vandegrift, part of which was going to Wellington. Three Australian divisions were to take over after a bridgehead had been established. This force was to be assembled at Brisbane, the nearest available port to the battle area. Aircraft, many of them now pouring into Australia through Fiji, would be available for bombing, but fighter support would be required from aircraft carriers. The American War Department suggested a naval commander under MacArthur for the operation; the Navy Department, however, thought differently and suggested that Nimitz should command the offensive and that the attack towards the New Guinea-New Britain area should be pressed up through the Solomon Islands, the immediate objectives, using 1 Marine Division, two aircraft carriers with cruisers and destroyers, five Marine air squadrons and land-based aircraft from the South Pacific. Any captured islands were to be occupied under MacArthur with troops from Australia. The Navy planned to attack Tulagi first and, by progressive moves, ultimately to reach Rabaul, instead of attacking Rabaul directly from Australia, which would require a strong naval task force, an army garrison, and additional land-based aircraft from Australia and Port Moresby. The Japanese were already established along the northern coast of New Guinea at lae and Salamaua. Nothing could be done before August because of the time required to assemble shipping and supplies.

The American operations division at first supported a direct thrust at Rabaul, which had been rapidly developed into the key Japanese base south of Truk, and recommended that the Navy provide 1 Marine Division and twelve transports, two carriers and supporting vessels, under MacArthur's command. While discussing the plans, no agreement could be reached between Army and Navy on a commander. Army insisted that as the attack would be in MacArthur's area he should command it, with a naval officer directing the tactical attacking force. Navy thought that MacArthur might expose their precious carriers by placing them in range of Japanese land-based aircraft in the Solomons, where several airfields had already been established on islands through the group, therefore it was essential first to reduce Tulagi. Command should therefore go to Ghormley, under Nimitz. When he was informed of Navy opposition, MacArthur insisted that his long-range plan had been misinterpreted, and that he had envisaged a final assault on Rabaul only after progressive moves up through the Solomons.

By 26 June no decision had been reached by Marshall and King, as King was still insisting on a naval commander and that MacArthur should take control at the conclusion of the amphibious stage. King also suggested that Navy begin immediate operations and directed Nimitz to go ahead with plans for an offensive in the Solomons. Nimitz and Ghormley immediately began their preparations. First Marine Division, part of which had landed at Wellington and was training along the coast from Plimmerton to Waikanae, was ordered to prepare for the attack, and Nimitz requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to move eight army B. 17 and thirteen B. 26 aircraft from Hawaii to New Caledonia and the same number to Fiji, where the Nandi airfields could now accommodate them. He also asked for surface ships, submarines, and long-range aircraft from the South West Pacific area to support Ghormley. Marshall was perturbed by King's implication that the Army might not co-operate fully, and decided to negotiate personally with him, which he did from 29 June to 2 July. Finally, a compromise was reached. Ghormley was to command the offensive until the Tulagi operation was completed, after which MacArthur was to take over and control the advance to Rabaul. An alteration was made in the boundaries of the operational areas to allow the island of Guadalcanal to come into Ghormley's command.

On 2 July King and Marshall signed a ‘Joint Directive for offensive operations in the South West Pacific area agreed on by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff’. The operations were divided into three tasks:

(1)

The seizure and occupation of Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent positions, for which MacArthur was to attach naval reinforcements and land-based aircraft and immobilise enemy and air activity west of the combat area.

(2)

Seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomons, Lae, Salamaua, and the north-east coast of New Guinea, which would come under MacArthur's command.

(3)

Seizure and occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions, also under MacArthur's command.

The South West Pacific and South Pacific boundaries were moved so that Tulagi, Guadalcanal, Florida, the Russell Islands, Malaita, and San Cristobal came under Ghormley, leaving the rest of the Solomons to MacArthur. Curiously enough, Guadalcanal was not mentioned in the first task, but it was included when information reached the planners that the Japanese were constructing an airfield at Lunga Point. This had been revealed by reports from coastwatchers and by air reconnaissance.

Ghormley flew to Australia from Auckland on 7 July to confer with MacArthur and agree upon preliminary plans. They both were apprehensive because of the shortage of ships and aircraft and recommended a postponement until both the South and South West Pacific areas were strengthened, as all previous engagements with the enemy had demonstrated the value of air power in naval combat. This recommendation was rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, who controlled the broad strategic allocation, though the actual control of operations in the Pacific was retained by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Unity of direction stemmed from a British-United States War Council, formation of which was announced in Washington on 17 January 1942, but the United States-British Combined Chiefs of Staff organisation was not formed until 6 February ‘to ensure complete co-ordination of the war effort.’ Australian, New Zealand, the Netherlands and United Kingdom representatives on the Far Eastern Council acted in an advisory capacity in London, but as the war progressed almost the whole direction for the Pacific war came from Washington.

When MacArthur and Ghormley's request for postponement was rejected, plans went ahead. The first offensive of the war against Japan began when the Americans landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August, to begin the long, exhausting struggle for the Solomons. It did not end until the New Zealanders and American forces landed on the Green Islands on 15 February 1944.

New Zealand land and air forces were at first excluded from any Pacific command, but after lengthy negotiations with London and Washington, all except the land forces stationed in the Dominion, which remained under the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff, came under command of the South Pacific area. These included major units of the Army and Air Force located on Pacific islands beyond the Dominion's shores. Such naval units as were required were already under American operational command. This co-ordinated effort made for greater unity, though the approval of the New Zealand Government had first to be obtained before any of her services could be committed to action, and administrative command remained with the New Zealand commanders in the areas where the forces were stationed. This meant that Ghormley, and later Vice-Admiral W. F. Halsey, who succeeded him in the South Pacific Command in October 1942, could call on all New Zealand units in his area if he required them, but could commit them to action only through their own commanders.

II: New Zealand Emerges in the Pacific Plan

Urgent requests for men and equipment went from Wellington to the United States and the United Kingdom immediately following Japan's entry into the war. It seemed, at times, as though little heed was being taken of the requirements for other theatres where action was already in progress and decisions were vital, but New Zealand was deplorably short and unable to meet her own immediate defence needs, for little equipment had been imported into the Dominion in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities.

Both before and during negotiations for the mounting of an offensive in the Solomons, New Zealand was requesting help from London and Washington for the defence of her own shores and for Fiji. She persistently stressed the need for a full American division in Fiji and another for New Zealand and, because she considered Fiji her first line of defence, she wished to leave her own troops there when American troops ultimately reached the Crown Colony. Ghormley agreed to this proposal, but it was obvious from subsequent action that the American planners did not.

From the time of his arrival in Washington, Mr. Nash kept the New Zealand Government fully informed of all the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals and planning, which included that, if Fiji and New Caledonia were lost, it would be essential to hold the North Island of New Zealand, particularly its northern regions. The apprehension felt at that time in New Zealand, and the Dominion's vulnerability should Japan press towards her shores, had been fully set out on 24 December 1941 in a cable message from Fraser to Churchill, who was then in Washington. (See Appendix II.) He said that the crippling of the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbour, the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse off Malaya, the violent and successful attacks by the enemy in Malaya, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Wake, and Guam had increased the probability of attack on Fiji and its importance in the scheme of Allied defence to a degree which could not be exaggerated. Extensions to the Nandi aerodrome, which New Zealand was undertaking at the request of the United States Government, would become a liability if they were not adequately defended. New Zealand could supply an extra brigade for the western area of Fiji, but the Dominion could not equip these men. New Zealand had already denuded herself of arms to a degree which was causing the gravest concern. Fraser urged Churchill to impress on Roosevelt the importance of Fiji and the urgent need for equipment. On the following day the Prime Minister despatched a cable to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London regretting that New Zealand was unable to send a force to Malaya to assist in the defence of the naval base of Singapore, which had been suggested during an inter-Allied conference there. In the same message he again set out the situation in Fiji and appealed for urgent assistance, particularly in armoured fighting vehicles and anti-tank equipment. (See Appendix II.) The Secretary of State replied that the Government of the United Kingdom concurred in the decision to reinforce Fiji, and that early provision would be made to send equipment. Because of commitments elsewhere—to the Middle East and Russia particularly—this could not be despatched immediately, and calls on the United Kingdom were beginning to embarrass her. This was revealed when Fraser received a cable from the Secretary of State on 4 February, eleven days before Singapore fell, indicating Britain's mounting difficulties, which informed him that ‘the task of allocation is one of some difficulty at the moment with a rapidly changing situation in several parts of the world. We are already heading dangerously near the point where the spreading of our resources must lead to a general weakness. There is a point beyond which we cannot interfere with the flow to the Middle East, whence so many army and air force units, with their equipment, have already been withdrawn for the Pacific’. His inference in part was to the withdrawal of Australian forces, ground and air, which began their return to the Commonwealth from the Middle East in early 1942, as soon as the Japanese threat to Australia seemed imminent. Despite the uneasy position in the Mediterranean theatre, however, the fighter aircraft sent to New Zealand in the early days of the war were deducted from Royal Air Force allocations originally intended for the Middle East.

New Zealand was beginning to feel the strain on her manpower by March 1942, by which time 61, 368 men had gone overseas. The Army had absorbed 52,712, the remainder going to the Navy and the Air Force. Another 67,264 were in New Zealand camps, including 52,983 in the Army, and an additional 100,000 aged between sixteen and sixty were in the Home Guard. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff, reviewing the situation in the Pacific early in April 1942, considered that six divisions were required for the defence of the Dominion itself, though only three were available. In submitting their appreciation to War Cabinet, they said that additional forces, as requested by Mead, were still required for Fiji—two brigade groups and one battalion for Viti Levu, one brigade group and one battalion for Vanua Levu (the second largest island of the group, which remained completely defenceless), and eight air squadrons. They pointed out that the airfields, still inadequately defended, were being enlarged and three others were to be constructed outside defended areas. Additional forces could come only from New Zealand or the United States, but the Americans, who were then considering sending a division and strong air forces to New Zealand, did not wish to divide their strength between New Zealand and Fiji. The United States Joint Working Committee, at the end of April 1942, thought that in asking for six divisions for the defence of New Zealand, the Dominion was not fully aware of American intentions in the South Pacific. They considered New Zealand would be reasonably secure with four divisions—two New Zealand and two American—and suggested that any remaining divisions be moved to Fiji. This committee also recommended at the same time that the following aircraft be provided for Fiji: 50 fighters, 26 medium bombers, 13 observation, and 12 navy type seaplanes.

The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff recommended placing the situation before Ghormley while he was still in the United States and, if land forces could not be obtained immediately for Fiji, then the risk of sending the New Zealand army reserve brigade group should be taken, as the situation was then sufficiently serious to warrant such urgent action. Cabinet approved the recommendation and Nash was asked to put the situation to Ghormley. Nash replied on 29 April that the United States Chiefs of Staff refused to consider Fiji as a separate problem and insisted that in their Pacific plan it was only one of a series of mutually supporting islands, which it was. The security of the Pacific area and subsequent operations in it must be considered as whole. They proposed to have an air strength of 1000 personnel in Fiji before the end of 1942, and New Zealand was requested to supply 12,000 troops within that time.

Fraser replied that New Zealand was still of opinion that reinforcements for Fiji should come from the United States. ‘We have despatched to Fiji,’ he cabled, ‘greater forces than we can reasonably be expected to spare, amounting to approximately a quarter of our effective strength at that time.’ He added that to provide 12,000 men would cripple the defences of the Dominion. Besides, it would denude New Zealand of equipment. ‘Even if we were to withdraw our Division from the Middle East, a lengthy period must elapse before its return would enable us to release additional men for Fiji.’ He suggested either American or Canadian reinforcements.

The suggestion that New Zealand might withdraw her 2nd Division from the Middle East to reinforce the Pacific had first been mentioned in a cable to Churchill in February, in which Fraser had hinted that there was some public feeling ‘that the New Zealand Forces should be returned to the Pacific area to meet the danger nearer home’. During negotiations on Pacific manpower requirements, Churchill agreed that it would be preferable to send United States forces to New Zealand rather than withdraw 2 Division from the Middle East, as it would conserve shipping and overcome the needless movement of troops, and shipping was an embarrassing problem in 1942.

While the interchange of opinion proceeded through March and April, America was speeding her first trained forces into the Pacific as she built up her series of mutually supporting bases, in fulfilment of the Chiefs of Staff planning. Many of the garrisons were already in position. The occupation of New Caledonia was announced on 25 April, and by the end of that month the United States Joint Working Committee recommended that the following be completed by the end of December 1942:

Bora Bora, in the French Society Islands: 4000 men were in position Samoa and Wallis: 23,000—13,000 mobile and ready for operation in any sphere

Tonga: 7000, including air forces

New Caledonia: 24,000 already in position

Efate, New Hebrides: 7000

Fiji: 1000, including air forces; New Zealand to provide another 12,000.

By May there were 81,000 American troops, including air personnel, in Australia, and the total American strength in the Pacific south of Hawaii had risen to between 130,000 and 150,000 officers and men of the three arms of the service.

The first intimation that the United States resolved to accept full responsibility for the defence of Fiji and Tonga came on 6 May (the day that Corregidor fell) in a cable from Nash, who had conferred with King. While the Coral Sea battle raged, messages passed between Wellington and Washington stating that New Zealand agreed to the American proposal but expressing surprise at the rapidity of such developments. The Governor of Fiji raised no objection, his only proviso being that two divisions were necessary to ensure the safety of the Colony and that, on political grounds, the identity of both Fijian and Tongan forces should be preserved within the framework of the American command.

Nash continued negotiations with King, who stated that both he and Nimitz considered the urgent strengthening of the islands would result if the United States took them over. Precipitate action had been taken, he said, because troops were already on their way. Nash continued to stress the necessity for at least six divisions in New Zealand, the number recommended by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff, but King, who still very wisely regarded the whole of New Guinea, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa as vulnerable, explained that the number of American troops was limited and there were requests for them from many sources, particularly from Australia and Great Britain. Plans, outlined in Washington in January, were then in hand for the landing in North Africa later in the year.

Even after the arrival of American troops in Fiji, New Zealand still felt that her troops should remain there. It was still her first line of defence, but although Ghormley personally agreed to their retention, by 13 May King issued a joint Army-Navy Plan for the relief of the New Zealand forces and the assumption of United States responsibility for the defence of the Fijian Group. When a copy of the relief plan reached Wellington in June, Fraser cabled Nash to the effect that New Zealand was still in favour of leaving her troops to assist the Americans and that no conditions were attached to that offer. King's reply was that he and General Marshall had given further consideration to the New Zealand offer. ‘After discussing the pros and cons,’ he replied, ‘we are of opinion that a greater service to our combined effort in the Pacific would be served by carrying out the present plan for their relief. The New Zealand troops thus relieved, we hope, can be made available for amphibious training with our 1 Marine Division in anticipation of joint offensive action to the north-west.’ The signal also intimated that the United States would increase her ground and air force troops in Fiji to 23,000 by September 1942, but pending the arrival of reinforcements it might be desirable to supply some New Zealand troops to Fiji. Any decision on that point, however, could be made on the spot between Mead and Beightler. Finally, New Zealand accepted the American decision, but the Prime Minister's accepting cable said: ‘We must emphasise our view that 23,000 troops are inadequate to defend the Fiji Islands. It was because of our apprehension … that we made the offer to allow our troops to remain.’ America was to have 14,529 men in Fiji with an additional 6583 by August.

From the time the first troops of the relieving force, the American 37 Division from Ohio, reached the Colony to replace the New Zealand forces, Fiji fulfilled its destined role as a training ground for combat troops, a forward depot for supplies and reserves, and a staging centre for aircraft being ferried to the combat zones. The terms and conditions under which the United States forces occupied the group were, in so far as they were applicable, the same as those in operation for the leased bases set forth in the agreement for the use and operation of United States bases by Great Britain, signed in London on 27 March 1941. The Governor of Fiji remained the single authority responsible to the British Government, and he was also responsible for civilian rights and property. This similarly applied to Tonga and to all British territory in the Pacific zone where military security and defence were vested in the American forces. The system worked well and there was no friction on a high level. As the New Zealand forces remaining in Fiji and Tonga after the withdrawal of 3 Division were equipped with British types of arms, the responsibility for their maintenance remained with New Zealand.

CHAPTER 4 Back to the Pacific

I: The Third Division Emerges

ON its return to New Zealand the Fiji force was given the mobile role of army reserve, ready to operate in any part of the Dominion as required by the tactical situation but with particular attention to the Bay of Plenty, Auckland, and North Auckland districts and their vulnerable beaches. Headquarters closed in Fiji on 8 August, and the temporary headquarters which had been established by Potter in Quay Street, Auckland, to tide over the transition period, moved to Orford's House, Manurewa, which had been vacated by an American command. The two brigade headquarters were established at Papakura Camp, the 8th afterwards moving to Opaheke, with their battalions and services scattered widely over the surrounding countryside. The 29th Battalion was at Papakura, moving later to Hunua Falls, the 30th went to Karaka North, the 34th to Hilldene (Manurewa), the 35th to Paerata, the 36th took over buildings on the Avondale Racecourse, and the 37th went to Pukekohe. Some of these camps, temporarily erected to house American units while they trained for the Pacific campaign, were as bleak as the weather and ill-equipped, but all ranks went on leave, most of them suffering from colds and influenza induced by the sudden change from tropical heat to bitter spring wind and rain, against which battle dress and heavy woollens by day and five blankets and a greatcoat at night gave inadequate protection.

Although units were much below strength, commanders committed to paper their tactical plans for immediate movement and action, but it was generally assumed that the force would be built up to a full-strength division for service in the Pacific, in accordance with conversations between Admiral King and Mr. Nash in Washington earlier in the year in which it was stated that New Zealand troops, relieved from Fiji, could be trained for amphibious operations with United States forces if the essential equipment was provided. Such an assumption was also confirmation of General Puttick's conclusions, presented to the Minister of Defence on 3 August, that ‘the best course to pursue in furthering the security of New Zealand is to participate to the fullest in offensive operations against the Japanese and at the same time leave nothing undone which may serve to strengthen the forces for home defence’; but reorganisation for any immediate action to implement this conclusion was slow and involved, and further provoked by indecision regarding the use of the force.

Major-General H. E. Barrowclough, DSO, MC, was appointed to command 3 Division on 12 August and arrived that day to begin the exacting and prolonged task of reorganisation. He had commanded 6 Brigade of 2 Division from its formation in May 1940, and had taken it through the ill-fated campaign in Greece and later through bitter fighting at Sidi Rezegh in North Africa. When the Japanese drive in the Pacific threatened to reach striking distance of New Zealand, the need for war-experienced senior officers became urgent, and he was recalled on the assumption that he would take command of the forces then in Fiji. However, before he reached the Dominion, the Pacific situation had become critical and Mead had already been appointed. Barrowclough was therefore given command of 1 Division, with headquarters at Whangarei, where he remained until he took over 3 Division. His immediate task was beset by difficulties and recurring problems. The precise role of the division in the Pacific and its size were as ill-defined as its title, and its history, in the early months of reorganisation, was shrouded in ambiguity. The title ‘3 Division’ had been in use since 14 May 1942 after the appearance of Mead's operational order No. 3 in Fiji, and that date, for record purposes and convenience, was taken as the day on which the force achieved the status of a division, but throughout the whole course of its existence the force was never officially gazetted ‘3 Division’ but remained legally ‘Pacific Section, 2 NZEF’, the designation it was given on 25 February 1942 when the original title ‘8 Brigade Group’ was amended. The letters ‘IP’, indicating the theatre in which the division operated, were added on 10 November when Barrowclough's appointment from ’Commander 3 NZ Division’ was altered to ‘General Officer Commanding 2 NZEF in Pacific’.

In making its decision to employ a division in the Pacific theatre, the New Zealand Government considered at the time that such a risk in sending men out of the country was justified. Great quantities of war materials, including tanks and aircraft, had reached the country; her home defences were therefore stronger and better equipped than ever before, and the situation beyond her shores was more secure because of the increased strength of the United States navy and island garrisons as far north as New Caledonia. Five days before Barrowclough's appointment, American forces landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Gavutu, and although the Allied planners in London and Washington could not possibly be aware of the fact, Japanese orders for an attack on Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa had been cancelled in July, following the failure to capture Port Moresby and crushing losses of ships and aircraft in the Coral Sea and Midway naval battles. Political motives also contributed to the despatch of New Zealand forces to the Pacific theatre. The original intention of the American a command in asking for a New Zealand force was to use it for the relief of 1 Marine Division engaged in the Southern Solomons, but as the struggle for Guadalcanal developed critically by continued Japanese attempts to break the Americans on the Matanikau River line, any relief by other than American forces was not welcomed until the island was permanently secured. This was one of several contributing factors affecting the prolonged reorganisation of the division.

Delays in reaching a decision regarding the size of the force and the role it was to play in the Pacific campaign apparently stemmed from confusion over the expressed views of King and Ghormley, and were aggravated by manpower problems which had then begun to affect the supply of Grade I men for the three services as well as men for production at home. Although King agreed in June that New Zealand forces should take part in amphibious operations when the time came for offensive action then being planned, Ghormley, who had moved his headquarters from Auckland to Noumea, apparently had expressed other views. During discussions with Puttick at the end of July, he suggested that New Zealand might provide forces to follow up United States amphibious troops and hold captured areas, in order to release specially trained and equipped American forces for further operations, the size of the New Zealand force to depend on the scope and locality in which it would be engaged.

Four alternative forces were proposed by Ghormley to meet any emergency—Force A, built round one infantry brigade with attached anti-aircraft and coast defence artillery; Force B, the same with the addition of two heavy coast defence batteries; Force C, built round two infantry brigades; and Force D, increased to three infantry brigades, each with additional coast defence and anti-aircraft artillery. Any of these forces, the size of which was to be determined by the Government, was to be ready for embarkation at any time after 25 August, and the proposal was obviously based on the American belief that the battle for Guadalcanal would end sooner than it did, as all future negotiations hinged on its success.

Puttick communicated Ghormley's proposals to War Cabinet on 31 July and recommended the adoption of Force Das a target for reorganisation, using 3 Division as a basis and adding the necessary units and services from existing New Zealand formations, the bulk of them to come from Army Reserve Brigade. At the same time he recommended the reduction of the age limit for service overseas from 21 to 20 years.

Although the original intention, as interpreted by Ghormley, seems to have been the employment of the division in a garrison role, other ideas were seemingly held by the planners in Washington, for on 8 July Commodore Parry, while undertaking a mission there on his return to England, had cabled the result of conversations he had with the Navy staff which indicated that, in addition to a request for garrison troops, America would also require others for amphibious operations. Approval of an offensive role was confirmed by War Cabinet's minute of 11 August appointing Barrowclough ‘to take charge of the division that is to be formed and trained for offensive operations’, but this contained no formal decisions regarding the size of the force. The gravity of the situation in the Solomons at this time interrupted Fraser's mission to the United States, to which he had been invited by Roosevelt. His party included the Right Hon. J. G. Coates, Mr. Carl Berendsen and Mr. A. D. McIntosh, of the Prime Minister's Department, Mr. B. C. Ashwin, of the Treasury Department, Brigadier K. L. Stewart, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and Mr. Patrick Hurley, United States Minister in New Zealand. They reached Noumea and conferred with Ghormley a few hours after he had been advised of the outcome of the first naval battle off Guadalcanal on 9 August and the crippling loss of four cruisers. Ghormley was extremely agitated by these losses, which so gravely reduced his limited strength in heavier ships. He was so apprehensive of the future in the Pacific that Fraser and his party temporarily delayed their journey to the United States and returned immediately to Wellington, where the Prime Minister called a secret session of Parliament.

On 10 August, the day before Barrowclough's appointment by Cabinet, Ghormley's headquarters had been informed that New Zealand was planning to provide a division of approximately 20,000 men, as requested, and that it would be available from 25 August, which would have been impossible as the last units of 3 Division did not return from Fiji until 14 August and the force was not sufficiently trained for such immediate despatch. However, any urgent need for it was discouraged by the fluctuating battle situation on Guadalcanal. Meanwhile, Army Headquarters decided to proceed with the preparation of a force designated Kiwi A (a code name for the purposes of reorganisation), which was really Ghormley's Force A strengthened by artillery. It was to be built round units of 14 Brigade and to consist of:

Divisional headquarters on a reduced scale

One infantry brigade, with an anti-tank battery of 12 guns

One field regiment of sixteen 25-pounder guns

One heavy anti-aircraft regiment of sixteen 3.7-inch guns

One light anti-aircraft regiment of thirty-six 40-millimeter guns

One heavy battery of four 6-inch guns

Two companies of engineers

Signals, supply, and medical units and a small base organisation

This formation was given urgent priority, but the commander was also to proceed with the organisation of a force known as Kiwi C (based on Ghormley's Force C) consisting of 13,500 all ranks and made up of:

Divisional headquarters

Two infantry brigades, each with an anti-tank battery of twelve guns

One field regiment of twenty-four 25-pounder guns

One heavy anti-aircraft regiment of twenty-four 3.7-inch guns

One light anti-aircraft regiment of forty-eight 40-millimetre guns

One heavy regiment of four 6- inch or eight 155-millimetre guns

Three companies of engineers

Signals, supply, and medical units and a base organisation

Negotiations concerning the composition of these forces were in progress before Barrowclough's appointment and continued long afterwards. No New Zealand commander, faced with the responsibility of taking combat troops overseas, was ever so harassed by proposals, uncertainty, and indecision, all of which, despite his initiative and capacity for detailed planning, hindered him from reorganising his division and training to that desired state of efficiency required for an unusual campaign such as island warfare in the tropics. No details of the precise character of the operations were available to him, which was no fault of the New Zealand Army authorities, for even by 7 September the South Pacific commander had not received permission from the Dominion to use the Division. This was revealed when a signal from New Zealand requesting a supply of anti-malarial drugs brought a reply from Ghormley that he had not yet obtained the permission of the New Zealand Government to use its troops, nor did he intend to use them in a forward area while the situation there remained critical. Later, however, South Pacific Headquarters did indicate that the New Zealand force would not be required to carry out opposed landings, but that its role most probably would be to garrison small islands and take part in land attacks on large islands or the mainland and that, in such operations, the possibility of heavy counter-attacks required full-scale supporting weapons and a high percentage of anti-aircraft and coast defence guns.

This question of artillery support was one of the most pressing problems which exercised the attention of the commander during the reorganisation period, and his views on its tactical significance were set out in a long letter to Army Headquarters. His idea of combat teams outlined in his letter was fully developed in training the division:

‘For a long time I have been teaching that success in modern war against a resolute and well-equipped enemy can be achieved only by a much closer co-ordination between infantry and artillery (and tanks if you can get them). I think, and I have long been teaching, that it is altogether wrong to consider the tactical handling of infantry as such in any unit larger than a platoon. I submit it is unsound to contemplate the employment of a company of infantry. One should command a mixed team of infantry, mortars, and guns. In battle a company command should never be a mere command of infantry. He should command a mixed team—a “combat team” as it is sometimes called… One of the mistakes of our British system is the tendency to over-centralise our artillery, tanks, and aircraft. Few battalion commanders and still fewer company commanders have any real idea of how to command a mixed force.’

In the original reorganisation plan only one field regiment was contemplated, but at the same time an anti-aircraft brigade, as part of the division, was to be formed and trained. Barrowclough's comments during exchanges of correspondence concerning the formation of Force A—which he considered unbalanced because anti-aircraft and coast defence guns required adequate ground protection—and Force C brought about changes, though Army did not agree the Force A was unbalanced.

‘From the outset’, he wrote, ‘even with Force C, I am limited to one field regiment of 25-pounder guns. The normal allocation of 25-pounders is on the scale of one field regiment to an infantry brigade, and I submit that until the precise task is known Force A should be mobilised and got ready in New Zealand with a full field regiment and Force C with two such regiments. Should the task, when it is known, call for less, field artillery guns can be left behind. The 25-pounde seems to be the one piece of equipment in which we outstandingly surpass our enemies, and I submit that neither Force A nor Force C can be considered adequately equipped if it has less than the usual scale of these guns.’

The commander also stressed the restricted mobility of such heavy pieces as 3.7-inch howitzers and 155-millimetre guns because, in possible engagements in areas removed from the site of static defence guns, they could not possibly take the place of 25-pounders, and they could be moved only with difficulty.

Because of the unusual composition of the force, the first of its kind New Zealand ever assembled, and its ultimate role, artillery remained a problem and eventually produced an organisation unique in the history of British arms. The division needed to be sufficiently strong to fight with or without the Americans (though it never did), and the necessity for static coast defence and anti-aircraft units, as well as support for infantry, required its artillery to be stronger and quite unlike the normal requirements of a divisional formation in the field. Two staffs were therefore evolved for its efficient operation—one for field and anti-tank units and another for coast defence and anti-aircraft. Each had its brigade major, staff captain and liaison officers, sharing a common intelligence officer, and this system worked satisfactorily in New Caledonia, where a regiment of 6-inch guns assisted with the defence of Noumea Harbour and two anti-aircraft regiments defended several aerodromes. When the division moved north into the Solomons and the static units were disbanded and absorbed into other formations, the staff was proportionately reduced to the normal organisation.

The lengthy and complicated task of reorganisation no doubt provoked quite understandable impatience on the part of those most intimately concerned with it. Although in June orders had been issued that all available A grade men from ballots and garrison units were to be posted to divisions in order to have sufficient ready to meet the needs for overseas service, Army Headquarters, in calling for men for 3 Division, did not wish to weaken unduly the home defences by drawing off too many key personnel until the situation in the Solomons removed any threat of attack. There were delays, also, in hearing appeals of men balloted for overseas service and in medical boardings, and there was the provocative question of leave, made worse when many of the men taking the leave due to them after service in Fiji displayed no great haste in returning to their units.

Leave in New Zealand, approved by Army Headquarters, was arranged on a basis of seven days for every two months of service, with one-way travelling time and a free rail warrant, which meant that men from the southern districts stationed in the Auckland area spent almost a fornight away from their units. Bereavement and confinement leave were also allowed up to seven and fourteen days respectively. This embarrassed the transport services (at that time hampered by coal strikes) as much as any training programme and produced a routine order from the 14 Brigade Commander in which he said: ‘Our primary duty is preparation for war and leave cannot be allowed to prevent the army from attaining a proper standard of training. Training is not only an individual concern; it necessitates the presence of whole units and formations in the field together.’ During his inspection of both brigades, Barrowclough also emphasised that the war would not be won by staying in New Zealand and that sooner or later someone had to go overseas. In an attempt to reconcile to the best possible extent the conflict between a desire for leave, the need for training, and the difficulties of transport. Army Headquarters called a conference of all divisional and district commanders and, although War Cabinet approved its recommendations for certain modifications, leave was still generously granted.

Concentration on defence works by all ranks in Fiji had left little time for advanced training, and most of the units were unfamiliar with battle exercises on a large scale or the latest developments in jungle tactics, these last evolved from information reaching the training manuals from those who had been in contact with the Japanese. This was revealed when Barrowclough reported that ‘not one of the commanding officers was able to describe to me a single large-scale battalion exercise completely carried through’. For these reasons a six weeks’ programme of concentrated training was devised and on 1 September the South Pacific command informed that the force could not be ready for overseas operations before the middle of October. As the men returned from leave and reinforcements arrived to build up old and new units, brigades embarked on tactical exercises and battalions on manœuvres, both by day and night, rain or shine.

All these were made as practical and interesting as possible and involved all branches of training so that, in the event of any sudden move, some reasonable state of preparedness would be attained. Engineers staged field days instructing the infantry in the art of bridging streams and in demolition; aircraft flew over the training areas trailing drogues as targets to accustom the men in anti-aircraft defence; lectures were given on malaria and other tropical diseases by former officials from the Solomons, and particular attention was paid to jungle warfare. Tactical exercises without troops concerned the senior officers, who were no longer required to find men daily for digging and wiring and excavating, as they had done in Fiji. A field regiment and anti-tank batteries were reorganised from the existing units from Fiji and took part in combined attack and defence schemes, but elements of coast and anti-aircraft artillery formations, these last beginning at the recruit stage, were concentrated in camps at Judgeford and Pahautanui in the Wellington area under Colonel V. A. Young, RA, who was responsible for their organisation and training until they were ready to be absorbed into the division under the new CRA, Brigadier C. S. J. Duff, DSO.

Brig C. S. J. Duff, DSO m. i. d.; Wellington; born NZ 19 Nov 1898; Regular soldier; commanded 34 NZ A-Tk Bty, 1939–40; 7 A-Tk Regt, 1940–41; 4 Fd Regt, 1941–42; CRA 3 NZ Div, Aug 1942-Aug 1944; NZLO Melbourne, 1947-48.

When these units finally emerged from the cocoon of reorganisation, they moved north via Rotorua, holding, calibration shoots on the way, and joined the division in the Waikato.

In order to avoid any confusion and unnecessary duplication in training, organisation and equipment, which arose because of the idea that attention could be given to Force C after Force A had left the country, Barrowclough on 1 September asked for a definite ruling from Army Headquarters, at the same time expressing the opinion that reorganisation would be effected more smoothly if the force was considered as a division less one brigade. Some idea of the difficulties being faced at this time, when no definite answer was possible, are indicated in a paragraph from Army's reply to the commander:

‘I do not intend to bore you with the difficulties with which Army Headquarters and districts have to contend to produce personnel for your division, but I would ask you to accept them as very real…. Unfortunately a good deal of patience and restraint will require to be exercised by us all in many matters connected with this force.’

Carelessness by districts in selecting men for reinforcements for the division aggravated many of the delays in strengthening units, and a base reception depot established in Papakura Camp was hard pressed to cope with the constant stream of arrivals and departures. The figures for three months are eloquent evidence of the work required at this depot in detail and record: Sep/OctNovMarched in1763998Marched out880346

Among those marched out were the medically unfit or lower than Grade I, men with more than three dependent children, incorrigibles, men over or under age, all half-caste or full-blood Maoris, and from quarter- to half-caste Maoris if they so desired. A high percentage of those marched out as unfit were men sent forward as reinforcements.

Manpower governed to a great extent the assembly and training of all units and affected the fortunes of the division during its whole existence. By the end of 1942 New Zealand was already feeling the strain of supporting two active service divisions and in maintaining her commitments to the Air Force and the Navy, as well as her home defences and garrisons in Tonga, Fiji, and numerous smaller islands, including scattered groups of coastwatchers. Production on the home front, so essential to the war effort principally in the supply of food, wool, coal, and munitions, was being maintained but showed little signs of increasing. (See Chapter 3, page 59.) Through all the complex detail of reorganisation, therefore, manpower loomed up like a restraining hand, but by the end of September formation was reasonably complete. One of Barrowclough's most immediate tasks on assuming command was the selection of commands and staff, which he did throughly by personally interviewing those who returned from Fiji. Many of the senior officers exceeded the age limit and several of the staff appointments were vacant or held only temporarily. Their places were taken by younger and more vigorous men, selected preferably from those with staff college training or others who had returned after service with 2 Division in the Middle East. Though still far from complete in detail, by early October the framework of the division was as follows:

No attempt has been made in this volume to give a complete and acurate record of changes of unit commanders. Because of sickness, age, and other factors there were frequent changes, particularly in the battalions. Commanders are named only at specified dates such as this, though a change of command may have followed shortly afterwards.

Divisional Headquarters GOC Maj-Gen H. E. Barrowclough, DSO and bar, MC GSO 1 Lt-Col J. I. Brooke GSO 2 Maj S. S. H. Berkeley GSO 3 (Operations) Capt R. F. Wakefield GSO 3 (Intelligence) Capt J. Rutherford AA and QMG Col W. Murphy, MC DAQMG Maj P. L. Bennett, MC DAAG Maj S. F. Marshall Chief Legal Officer Maj D. A. Solomon

Artillery Commander Royal Artillery Col C. S. J. Duff, DSO Brigade Major (field) Maj N. W. M. Hawkins Staff Captain (field) Capt O. J. Cooke Brigade Major (A/A and coast) Maj C. D. B. Campling Staff Captain (A/A and coast) Capt J. A. Crawley

33 Heavy Coast Regiment: Commander Lt-Col B. Wicksteed 150 Battery Maj H. C. F. Peterson 151 Battery Maj J. G. Warrington 152 Battery Maj G. L. Falck

The Club (Erected by National Patriotic Fund Board) at Base Training Depot in Tene Valley, near Bourail, New Caledonia Black and white photograph of troops and building

Embarkation practice on HMS Niaouli Black and White Photograph of Troops scaling rope climbing wall

The Move to Guadalcanal. Equipment at the Nickel Docks, Noumea Area. Black and White Photograph of troops loading small craft at shoreline

Boarding a Landing Craft (Mechanised), Noumea. Black and White Photograph of troops boarding a landing craft with large ship in background

3rd Division Training Exercises. 36 Batallion at Mele Beach, Efate, New Hebrides Black and White photograph taken from shore of troops disembarking from a landing craft

Gunners pulling a Bofors gun ashore at Mele Beach, Efate Black and White Photograph of troops pulling gun ashore from small landing craft

Troops board the USS Transport President Hayes, Noumea Black and White Photograph of soldiers climbing ship

14 Brigade Group Landing, Point Cruz, Guadalcanal Black and White Photograph of Troops Landing

17 Field Regiment: Commander Lt-Col H. W. D. Blake 12 Battery Maj R. V. M. Wylde-Brown 35 Battery Maj A. G. Coulam 37 Battery Capt D. O. Watson

28 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment: Commander Lt-Col W. S. McKinnon 202 Battery Maj E. M. Luxford 203 Battery Maj H. G. St. V. Beechey 204 Battery Capt B. S. Cole

29 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment: Commander Lt-Col F. M. Yendell 207 Battery Capt H. L. G. Macindoe 208 Battery Capt B. L. Burns 209 Battery Capt G. H. Turner 214 Battery Capt G. F. T. Hall

144 Independent Battery: Commander Maj L. J. Fahey 53 Anti-Tank Battery Capt L. D. Lovelock 54 Anti-Tank Battery Capt R. M. Foreman

Engineers Commander Royal Engineers Lt-Col A. Murray 20 Field Company Maj W. G. McKay 23 Field Company Capt A. H. Johnston 37 Field Park Capt S. E. Anderson

Singals Chief Signals Officer Lt-Col D. McN. Burns Artillery Signals Capt G. W. Heatherwick No. 1 Company Capt K. H. Wilson Headquarters Company Capt R. M. South J Section (8 Brigade) Lt G. M. Parkhouse K Section (14 Brigade) Lt C. G. Murray

Army Service Corps Commander Lt-Col F. G. M. Jenkins, DCM Senior Supply Officer Maj A. Craig 4 ASC Company Capt R. Gapes 16 ASC Company Capt A. M. Lamont 10 Reserve Mechanical Transport Company Capt L. M. G. Grieves

Medical ADMS Col J. M. Twhigg, DSO 7 Field Ambulance Lt-Col S. Hunter 22 Field Ambulance Lt-Col W. F. Shirer 4 General Hospital Lt-Col A. A. Tennent

Dental ADDS Lt-Col O. E. L. Rout Base Dental Hospital Maj J. C. M. Simmers 10 Mobile Dental Section Maj A. I. McCowan

Ordnance DADOS Maj M. S. Myers Senior Mechanical Engineer (Armament) Maj J. W. Evers Senior Mechanical Engineer (MT) Maj G. C. Simmiss

Infantry 8 Infantry Brigade: Commander Brig R. A. Row Brigade Major Maj J. M. Reidy Staff Captain Capt I. H. MacArthur 29 Battalion Lt-Col A. J. Moore 34 Battalion Lt-Col R. J. Eyre 36 Battalion Lt-Col J. W. Barry 14 Infantry Brigade: Commander Brig L. Potter Brigade Major Maj C. W. H. Ronaldson Staff Captain Capt A. E. Muir 30 Battallion Lt-Col S. A. McNamara, DCM 35 Battalion Lt-Col C. F. Seaward 37 Battalion Lt-Col A. H. L. Sugden

Base Units Officer in Charge of Administration and Base Commandant Col W. W. Dove, MC DAG 2 Echelon Capt G. W. Foote Staff Captain Lt H. N. Johnson Base Reception Depot Capt A. R. Stowell Pay Capt W. P. McGowan Records Lt E. R. Newman Postal 2 Lt F. W. Purton

Many of the base units were not formed or were in process of formation and were completed only after long delay. Changes of appointment were frequent through the formative months, and many of the above appointments were altered by the end of the year.

Because of the unsuitability of some of the camps, and with a view to more comprehensive training and the use of troops for large-scale tactical exercises, a change of area was proposed, first to Warkworth, but finally to the Waikato. The division, however, seemed fated to periods of disintegration. New Zealand was asked to provide more garrisons for the Pacific, and this meant the withdrawal of units from 3 Division. On 7 October 36 Battalion, with supporting artillery—field, coast, and anti-aircraft—was detached for duty on pine-clad Norfolk Island to relieve Australian troops there, and later in the month the 34th was despatched to Queen Salote's island kingdom of Tonga to replace an American unit. Both battalions rejoined the division later in New Caledonia. They were replaced in 8 Brigade by 1 Scottish Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel K. B. McKenzie-Muirson, MC,

Lt-Col K. B. McKenzie-Muirson, Mc and bar, m. i. d.; Wellington; born Australia, 8 Dec 1894; inspector of factories; commanded 1 Scots Bn, Oct 1942-Jun 1943; 36 Bn, Jul–Dec 1943.

and 1 Ruahine Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel C. N. Devery, DCM,

Lt-Col C. N. Devery, DCM, ED; Auckland; born Gisborne, 10 Dec 1893; company manager; Wellington Regt 1914–19; commanded 1 Ruahine Bn, Oct 1942–Mar 1943; later Camp Commandant, Linton.

from 4 Division, though these two units did not join the division until it sailed for New Caledonia.

On 16 October, as the division was settling itself into the Waikato district, its role was to some extent clarified by a request from Ghormley's headquarters for a force equal to Force C to move to New Caledonia to replace American units committed to the battle, which was still undecided on Guadalcanal. The following day a cable despatched to Nash in Washington indicated its size: ‘War Cabinet have agreed to Ghormley's request for a New Zealand force of approximately two brigades to proceed to New Caledonia as soon as transport can be arranged.’ This was Force C of 13,500 all ranks, but a larger force, built round Force D, of three brigades, with increased artillery and services, was still evidently contemplated for the Pacific, as the following sentence appeared in a message from Puttick to the commander of the South Pacific area on 13 October: ‘Owing to manpower difficulties I cannot give estimated time when Kiwi D will be ready.’ Approval for the remaining third brigade was given by War Cabinet on 28 November, but it was not to be formed until after the division was concentrated overseas. Inclusion of an armoured regiment of 60 tanks and 900 all ranks was also approved by Cabinet on 5 November, and preparations for its assembly from units of 2 Army Tank Battalion began at Waiouru, but the main body did not go north until the division was on Guadalcanal the following year.

Few men regretted leaving for the Waikato during the first two weeks in October. Strengthening sunshine and lengthening days did little to compensate for the discomfort of cold hutted and tented camps, through which the wind whistled miserably, so that the more articulate expressed in no uncertain terms their longing for the tropical heat they had cursed so volubly only a few weeks previously. Isolated in a YMCA camp at Hunua Falls, where exercises had been held in country which would have tried even the ingenuity of a goat, 29 Battalion departed happily from an area inches deep in mus; for two months 35 Battalion at Paerata had been attending its sick in a four-man but without such rudimentary equipment as a sink, light, or running water, this last a growing problems in most of these temporary camps. The only compensating factor was their proximity to papakura, Pukekohe, and Auckland, which gave ample opportunity for evening and weekend leave, and in granting this Barrowclough departed from the orthodox military practice and insisted that if a soldier returned to camp in time and in a fit state to perform his duties the following morning, there was no necessity to crime him for not returning at any specified time the previous evening.

Units marched in stages to their new areas, bivouacking by night as part of the training scheme. Morale was good, esprit de corps asserted itself, and few fell by the wayside; if they did they were soon revived by the hospitality which was showered upon them. Reconnaissance parties had previously allotted areas over a vast triangle enclosed by Hamilton, Te Aroha and Tirau, and including Morrinsville, Cambridge, and Matamata. On 6 October, when the move began, Divisional Headquarters was established in buildings of the Claudelands Racecourse; 8 Brigade went to Cambridge and 14 Brigade to Te Aroha Showgrounds, with their units distributed around them. Artillery Headquarters, its units not yet fully assembled, was established at Tirau with its regiments in Okoroire and Matamata; Engineer units were housed on the Te Rapa Racecourse, ASC at Morrinsville, and Signals at Claudelands. Base units were installed at Rugby Park in Hamilton, where new units were still being added to the order of battle.

The Waikato, in the full flood of spring, was lush, warm, and beautiful. In every town and village occupied by troops, residents responded so generously with entertainment, both private and public, that the period spent there remained as warmly in the memory as the thermal springs within easy reach of Te Aroha, Okoroire, and Matamata. As soon as the move was completed, preparations began for large-scale tactical manœugers in the Kaimai Ranges which the commander had in mind when he selected the Waikato as a training area. These manœuvres, afterwards referred to facetiously as the ‘Battle of the Kaimais’, were the first in which the Division as a whole, or as whole as it was ever to be, was engaged, and one of the most valuable because of the lessons learned and not readily forgotten.

In selecting this tract of wooded country Barrowclough had in mind the situation then existing in New Guinea, where the Japanese, after their reverse in the Coral Sea, were attempting to invade Port Moresby overland by crossing the Owen Stanley Ranges from Lae and Salamaua. The locality was ideal as a testing and training ground in jungle warfare for both men and equipment—only the heat and the mosquitoes were missing. Dense, untracked bush clothes hills rising to 2000 feet, through which a trail had been blased as an axis of advance for the two opposing groups. For the purpose of the manœuvre, which lasted from 21 to 27 October, Tauranga became Buna and Matamata represented Port Moresby, with the high country dividing them as the Owen Stanley Ranges.

Row's 8 Brigade, made up of 29 Battalion, 23 Field Company Engineers, 4 Composite Company ASC, 7 Field Ambulance and two home defence units, 1 Auckland and a Home Guard battalion from the Tauranga area, represented a Japanese force advancing through Tauranga; potter's 14 Brigade consisting of 30, 35, and 37 Battalions, 20 Field Company Engineers, 16 Composite Company ASC, and 22 Field Ambulance moved into the ranges from Matamata to meet the enemy. Advanced Headquarters opened at Opal Springs, a bucolic spot near the foothills where trees enclosed a warm water pool, appointed umpires and watched results. The Japanese force was to advance through ‘Buna’, continue into the bush, construct a road and gain contact with the enemy; the defending force, after moving out of ‘Port Moresby’ was to take up a position astride the line of advance (the ‘Kokoda Trail’) and maintain itself there for a week. This exercise was made as realistic as possible, its object being to practise the protection of supply convoys, the movement of infantry patrols through bush, communications, the organisation of medical services and other problems of administration. Air co-operation and air support played an important part. Hostile aircraft, dropping flour bombs, were represented by Hudson bombers escorted by Kittyhawk fighters, with Hawker Hind reconnaissance planes playing for the defenders, all of them coming from aerodromes at Tauranga and Whenuapai during the hours of daylight to engage in mock dive-bombing raids and to reconnoitre the positions of the opposing forces. Propaganda leaflets dropped by the ‘enemy’ in the 14 Brigade area proved to be ‘cheap immoral publications’ in the estimation of the intelligence staff who examined them.

Heavy rain fell soon after the manœuvres began and continued in torrents, adding considerably to the realism of jungle warfare but without its enervating heat. Conditions in the bush rapidly deteriorated and were such that patrols from the two forces which evaded each other were so exhausted they made no show of resistance when captured but simply asked for food. The 1st Auckland (T) Battalion, less arduously trained than 3 Division, was withdrawn after the first day. No formed roads existed on either side in the immediate neighbourhood of engaged units, so that the task of creating them fell to the engineers, using bulldozers. When the weather halted all traffic except four-wheel-drive vehicles using chains, the roads were corduroyed for miles with trunks of tree ferns. Bren carriers and jeeps soon churned deep tracks through the emerald slopes leading up the bush line, when they replaced the ASC supply columns which were bogged down. In the bush itself, in the 14 Brigade area, a steep four-foot track was cut in steps up the hillside, and here, stripped to the waist and often knee-deep in mud, men of the ASC passed cases of supplies from hand to hand to ration the fatigued and sodden troops in the combat areas. The Kaimai adventure emphasised what was realised later, that much of the Solomons campaign was to be an engineer and supply problem. This test of organisation equally tried the physical efficiency of the individual and the reliability of unit equipment. Signals discovered that the existing wireless sets were useless in the rain-soaked bush, and relied on line communication; engineers, working from six o’clock in the morning until late into the night, soon realised that jungle warfare required a considerable increase in established equipment; the infantry, burdened with full pack and 24 hours rations, emphasised the necessity and value of slashers and waterproof capes; the ASC, using jeeps to transport supplies over the boggy routes, finally resorted to the use of 1000 sandbags for the final individual carrying parties.

At the conclusion of the manoeuvre its shortcomings were ruthlessly exposed at a conference of commanders, during which Barrowclough commented that many of the troops, who were not fully aware of its purpose, seemed to think ‘they were the Tararua Tramping Club making a road and packing in supplies’. Instead of improving occupied positions troops were too concerned with settling in and building shelters to turn the rain; making tracks took precedence over lanes of fire and fire plans; localities were revealed to aircraft by smoke from fires, and little attention had been paid to camouflage. Because of the dismal conditions, commanders were to concerned with the comfort of the men instead of with the ‘enemy’. But the lessons learned were invaluable. Shortages were revealed, and the necessity shown for traffic control and anti-aircraft protection measures in rear areas, as well as an increase in unit equipment or its replacement by better quality articles. Two factors emerged triumphantly—the jeep as a means of transport under the most desperate conditions and the morale of the men, for sick parades had fallen far below normal during the exercise. Even the medical units found they could use jeeps for the transport of casualties when their ambulances were bogged down in the mud. Though the New Zealand soldier does not play at manoeuvres with any great degree of enthusiasm, requiring rather the presence of the enemy and the stimulus of actual fighting conditions, those troops taking part in the Kaimai exercise achieved a realism which drew praise from a party of American officers who visited the scene of operations and saw them at work.

The division's impending departure for New Caledonia was revealed at the conclusion of the Kaimai manoeuvres, after which leave was granted before the final packing and medical examinations began with their usual bustle. Meanwhile, information was reaching headquarters about the new territory. Brooke

Col J. I. Brooke, OBE, m. i. d., Legion of Merit (US); Waiouru Military Camp; born Dunedin, 20 Nov 1897; Regular soldier; BM 6 Inf Bde, 1940–41; GSO 1 3 NZ Div, 1942–44; Camp Commandant, Waiouru, 1951–.

flew to Guadalcanal, returning with first-hand knowledge of conditions there during the height of the battle and some experience of the heavy bombardment of Henderson airfield by Japanese warships. Dove

Brig W. W. Dove, CBE, MC, Legion of Merit (US); Auckland; born Rockhampton, Queensland, 6 Sep 1895; Regular soldier; NZ Rifle Bde 1916–19; Officer i/c Administration and Base Commandant, 2 NZEF IP, 1942–44.

and Rutherford

Capt J. Rutherford; England; born Dunston-on-Tyne, 27 Jan 1906; university professor; GSO 3 (I) 3 NZ Div, 1942–43.

brought back a sheaf of information about New Caledonia, to which they had flown on 18 October to select temporary headquarters and reconnoitre the proposed divisional areas. They were followed by an advanced party of 150 all ranks, under Major W. A. Bryden,

Lt-Col W. A. Bryden; Wellington; born Dunedin, 2 May 1910; accountant; commanded 37 and 38 Fd Regts in Pacific; 2 i/c 5 and 4 Fd Regts in Italy, 1945.

which sailed in the Crescent City and reached Noumea on 2 November. Barrowclough and his principal staff officers arrived there by air five days later to await the assembly of the main body.

II: Move to New Caledonia

Through November, December, and January the division moved overseas, though not before its carefully planned departure schedules were upset by changes in shipping and escorts. The Maui, carrying 1960 all ranks, mostly artillery units urgently required by the American command, reached Noumea on Armistice Day, the commemoration ceremony for which was attended by representative New Zealanders. The Brastigi, with 917 men made up from Divisional Signals, 20 Field Company Engineers and 16 ASC Company, disembarked at the small coastal port of Nepoui on 30 November, and was the first ship to use it; the Weltevreden, with 25, and the President Monroe, carrying 1796, mostly artillery, 30 Battalion and Base units, reached Noumea together on 6 December; the West Point, taking the main body numbering 7158, reached Noumea on 31 December; the Mormacport, with 249 members of rear parties, berthed at Nepoui on 6 January, and the Talamanca, with 226 more rear details, reached Noumea on the 11th. By the end of February another 1052 details, including the usual collection of absentees without leave, had reached New Caledonia.

The movement of these 13,383 soldiers, together with a vast amount of stores and equipment, was made without mishap or excitement and was a lesson in American transport methods by which every available inch of space on large transport vessels was occupied. On large ships such as the West Point only two meals a day were served, which those returning from Fiji in the President Coolidge had already experienced and found the intervals between meals rather tiresome. Bunks, only two feet six inches apart, were in tiers four high in holds accommodating between 600 and 700 men. Meals and recreation periods on deck were taken in rotation, but the voyage was too short to be anything other than an interlude, pleasant or unpleasant according to individual preference. The President Monroe provided an interesting comment on war for the historically minded. Named after the president whose dominant motive was the prevention of European interference in American affairs, the ship was now transporting New Zealand soldiers to a French possession to assist in a war against Japan which had its origin in the German invasion of Poland. Monroe's portrait still adorned the ship's lounge.

New Caledonia, where during nine months of garrison duty 3 Division fitted itself for the Solomons campaign and established its base for those operations, lies 1000 miles north of New Zealand and 700 miles east of Australia, with its southern tip just over the Tropic of Capricorn. This French colonial possession, 248 miles long, never more than 31 miles wide, and shaped like a huge bread roll, is the world's richest island as a source of minerals. In 1938, with the exchange rate at 200 francs to the £, New Caledonia exported 19½ million francs worth of nickel, 21½ millions worth of chrome, and 12 millions worth of coffee, most of the minerals going to Germany and Japan, the only countries which wanted them. Until 1894 France made use of the island as a penal settlement, 40,000 prisoners passing through the convict barracks on Ile Nou, the largest island in Noumea Harbour, before such traffic ceased, after which various colonisation schemes were attempted with little success. Despite infrequent hurricanes, New Caledonia enjoys a magnificent climate for nine months of the year, half the annual 40 inches of rain falling in January, February, and March. Like most Pacific islands it has its wet and dry sides, but in both there is an abundance of freshwater streams, fed from a central chain of mountains.

Life moved indolently in picturesque Noumea, the principal town, port, and seat of Government, until war suddenly transformed it into the largest forward Allied base in the Pacific, where its magnificent land-locked harbour, the entrance to which is guarded by a coral reef and a lighthouse presented by Napoleon III, sheltered every type of warship and transport. As the division's convoys reached the harbour they found it massed with ships, ranging from destroyers and landing craft to imposing aircraft carriers and battleships, several of them being repaired after disastrous engagements in and around Guadalcanal. Little space was available at the inadequate wharves, so that troops disembarked in the stream and were ferried ashore. Transports waited for weeks before they could berth and unload stores and heavy equipment.

Worse congestion was evident ashore, where headquarters of the South Pacific Command was established with all the subsidiary naval, military, and air headquarters and their staffs required for the conduct of an involved and widely dispersed campaign. Every vacant hillside and open space in and around the town was covered with hutted and tented camps. Vast dumps of war materials dotted the landscape for miles; aeroplanes linking New Caledonia with the battle zone and the network of Pacific bases extending to New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and beyond, were never absent from the sky, and ceaseless streams of motor traffic moved in dusty procession to and from the camps and aerodromes far in the country. Relations between the American command and French administration were strained, mostly because of the peremptory demands of war, but from the influx of thousands of servicemen flushed with money the local tradesmen and shopkeepers reaped their traditional wartime harvest.

But the men of the division saw relatively little of Noumea, except on brief visits. Temporary Base Headquarters was established in Rue d’Alma, in the middle of the town, with staging camps at Dumbea, some miles away, to which troops were moved in an antiquated train only slightly better than the Colonial Sugar Refining Company's modest system in Fiji, and at Nepoui Valley, 160 miles north and a few miles inland from the port of that name, where clouds of choking red dust coated the scrubby trees in the neighbourhood and departing aircraft on the nearby aerodrome were followed by mountainous dust-storms of their own making. Troops for Nepoui disembarked in Noumea Harbour and were staged up the coast in smaller craft to avoid the long haul by motor transport, which was never sufficient to meet the demand. These camps served their purpose as the division moved in and assembled, after which a transit camp was established by Base in Noumea to handle all through traffic while the New Zealanders remained in New Caledonia.

Immediately on arrival the division occupied an area on the dry side of the island stretching for more than one hundred miles from Moindou, where its southern boundary joined 43 American Division's territory, to the far north and included the Plaine des Gaiacs aerodrome, other airfields in the north, and the port of Nepoui. It consisted of gently undulating country covered for the most part with niaouli trees and rank grasses, rolling down to the coast from the central mountain divide and watered by numerous streams and rivers, all of which were subject to swift flooding.

Only two main roads served the whole area. One, Route Colonial No. 1, coiled its way from north to south and was the main arterial route. Despite the lethargic efforts of a few workmen using barrows and shovels to fill in the holes with soil from nearby pits, this soon broke under a constant stream of cars, trucks, and jeeps, each leading its individual cloud of dust. Narrow bridges, none too secure, crossed the larger streams; concreted fords to prevent erosion served the smaller courses, and in the far north, at Tamala, all traffic crossed the river by ferry. The other road crossed the island from Bourail through the mountains to join an inferior route at Houailou serving the wet and more verdant east coast, where most of the rivers were crossed by old-fashioned ferries controlled by hand winches. All subsidiary roads were unmetalled and soon churned to mud after rain.

The whole of the public services and amenities of New Caledonia were little better than those existing in New Zealand in the pioneering days and were typical of a neglect born of isolation, but the dry rolling country was excellent for camp sites and manœuvres. There were few distractions. Villages were few and far between along the main roads and all of them rather blistered by time, with large cattle runs, bounded by rivers, coast and mountain, sub-dividing the rest of this sparsely populated country and supporting their independent and thrifty owners. Mosquitoes, of the non-malarial variety, were a constant source of irritation, particularly in the marshy country near the coast and in river valleys, where they were unspeakably bad, but there were areas comparatively free from these pestilential insects. The only ports of any size and all the aerodromes were in the western side of New Caledonia, and round them the principal defences were concentrated.

On arrival Barrowclough's force became a component of First Island Command, under Lieutenant-General Rush B. Lincoln, and, as such, a part of Vice-Admiral Halsey's South Pacific forces. Barrowclough assumed command of the northern sector of the island on 17 December, with the tactical role of defending the aerodromes, radar stations along the coast, and the beaches, several of which were vulnerable and widely separated. From temporary headquarters established on 23 November at Nemeara, on the Houailou road, he moved to a site among the niaoulis on terraces between the Moindah River and the main road and opened permanent headquarters there on 12 December. It was 160 miles north of Noumea and twelve miles from Poya, the nearest village, but the mosquitoes were few and space was unlimited.

Mobility was the key to the division's role in New Caledonia, where amphibious landings were possible almost anywhere along the coast, but the central mountain range could be crossed only by large formations, guns, and vehicles along the Houailou-Bourail road, so that the east coast required little attention. The southern route to Noumea was narrow and tortuous, allowing only one-way traffic where it ran through the hills from the division's southern boundary to Bouloupari. This problem could be solved by using Nepoui as a port and establishing dumps north of Moindou in the event of enemy action. Natives in the area round Hienghene, a village on the north-east coast, were suspected of Japanese sympathies, and unconfirmed reports of enemy submarines off reef passages there lent some support to this suspicion, but the majority of the natives were friendly and displayed the liveliest interest in the men of the Division.

Barrowclough decided that the most suitable plan to meet the situation was the provision of ample coastwatching detachments and the disposal of mobile formations capable of moving immediately to any threatened area, for which motor transport was now reasonably assured. The arrival of Goss with the skeleton headquarters of 15 Brigade gave the GOC three brigades of two battalions each, a most unsatisfactory organisation in the field, but the only one possible until New Zealand clarified the position regarding additional troops required to bring the division up to full strength and until his other two battalions returned from Norfolk and Tonga. As all the coast and most of the anti-aircraft artillery had, by mutual arrangement, been diverted for the defence of Noumea Harbour, one of the most vital in the Pacific at that time, and the aerodromes north of Noumea, which were equally vital in staging aircraft to Guadalcanal, the task of defending the sector was accomplished with only field, anti-tank, and two batteries of light anti-aircraft artillery. In disposing his division over vast stretches of country, the brigade group was developed and from it the battalion combat team, which is a self-contained force with an infantry battalion as a nucleus, supported by field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft artillery, and including sections of engineers, field ambulance, and ASC.

These were the final dispositions of 3 Division units in New Caledonia. The Division arrived in New Caledonia during November and December 1942 and January 1943 and departed the following August. The base organisation remained at Bourail. Black and White Military Map of New Caledonia

The northern sector was allotted to 14 Brigade, which established its headquarters on flat, tree-clumped country beside the Taom River near Ouaco, with 35 Battalion in the immediate vicinity and 30 Battalion some miles north at Koumac. Potter's group also included 35 Field Battery, 53 Anti-Tank Battery, 209 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, 20 Field Company Engineers, 22 Field Ambulance with a field surgical unit and a 50-bed field hospital, 16 Composite Company ASC, 37 Light Aid Detachment, and one section of the Reserve Mechanical Transport Company. His task was the defence of two airfields at Koumac, radar stations at Pam and Gomen, at that time manned by American technicians, and the beaches. All French and native home defence forces, not of any great consequence, came under his command.

Eight Brigade, with headquarters in the wooded Nepoui Valley, consisted of 29 Battalion, 1 Ruahine Battalion, the remaining units of 17 Field Regiment, 214 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, 54 Anti-Tank Battery, 37 Field Park, 7 Field Ambulance with a field surgical unit and a 50-bed hospital, 4 Composite Company ASC, 64 Light Aid Detachment, and the Divisional Mobile Workshops. Row's task was the defence of the Plaine des Gaiacs aerodrome and the port of Nepoui. The southern sector was occupied by the smaller 15 Brigade, with the task of defending the road through the mountains from Houailou. Headquarters was established at Nemeara, with 1 Scottish Battalion in the neighbouring valley and 37 Battalion on the eastern side of the mountains beside the picturesque Houailou River. Attached were 23 Field Company Engineers, 29 Composite Company ASC, one company of 7 Field Ambulance, and 144 Light (3.7-inch) Howitzer Battery.

Dove, who was both Base Commandant and Officer in Charge of Administration, established his headquarters and some smaller units in the town of Bourail, with his major concentration of Base units in Racecourse Camp, in Tene Valley, and Boguen Valley, some miles away. Sub-base remained at Noumea, 120 miles south over a dusty, pot-holed road. These dispositions were modified six weeks later when 8 Brigade moved south to Bouloupari to take over a sector vacated by 43 American Division: 14 Brigade then extended its southern boundary to include Nepoui and the Plaine des Gaiacs aerodrome. Units remained in these sectors until the division moved from New Caledonia, holding three-quarters of the island. With the exception of those anti-aircraft batteries allotted to brigades, the heavy artillery was disposed in areas outside the divisional sector. The 33rd Heavy Regiment, under American command, shared the task of defending Noumea Harbour with the 244 American Coast Artillery and a French battery. Its head-quarters were on Ile Nou, with one battery at Point Terre and its workshops in Vallee du Tir. The 28th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment had its headquarters and one battery and workshops at Oua Tom aerodrome and one troop of 204 Battery detached at Ile Nou; 29 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment was guarding the Plaine des Gaiacs aerodrome with the 208 Battery detached to 28 Regiment at Oua Tom.

In the mobile defence scheme brigades were given alternative roles for the mutual support of each other in the event of attack, and although more optimistic reports from the Solomons suggested that any danger to New Caledonia was becoming increasingly remote as the battle moved to New Georgia, alarm practices were regularly held on receipt of flash signals from Noumea. These tested the signals link throughout the whole island and kept the forces reasonably alert, for there was still the possibility of hit-and-run raids by Japanese submarines which waited along the sea lanes between the Allied Pacific bases.

From the time of arrival, tented camp sites were established and made comfortable by that fantastic atitude of the average New Zealander to make himself a home, providing he has a few boxes and nails with which to construct crazy but functional articals of furniture. Men lived in six-man Indian pattern tents, scattered irregularly among the trees and raised high off the ground by additional poles of the useful niaouli and bamboo to give plenty of head-room and air. The floors were sanded or metalled. Because of its usefulness the niaouli is worthy of mention. It covers vast areas of the dry side of New Caledonia and grows quickly. Its sparse, grey-green foliage resembles that of the Australian eucalypt, to which it is related, and its trunk is covered with thick bark made up of many layers each as fine and soft as tissue paper. The slender trunks are much used by the natives for constructing their huts, and the bark, which is dexterously stripped off without killing the tree, is used for roofing. The timber endures for long periods in the ground.

Despite the eloquent minority who found nothing attractive in New Caledonia until they left it behind them, the camps, though isolated, were excellent. Most of them were sited within easy reach of freshwater streams or rivers, so that bathing and laundering presented only those difficulties which could be overcome by the exercise of common sense. As the months went by mess rooms, offices, store-houses, YMCAs, and recreation centres were built in the fashion of large native bures to provide additional and more comfortable accommodation. These bures, also used by the French farmers, are constructed by roofing a skeleton framework of niaouli trunks with bark and reeds, held in place with strands of fibre from the aloe, plant, and covering the walls with sections of plaited coconut fronds. Native labourers, under engineer supervision, constructed the bures, and costs were met from unit funds. In each brigade area large recreational bures were erected and became the meeting place of all troops in the vicinity. Their most appreciative patrons were the transport drivers, who left the dusty roads for a few minutes to take a cup of tea during long journeys to and from the supply depots. By the time construction was finished some of the camps resembled native villages.

The rainy season brought problems such as the flooding of access roads, when they became bogs, and added to the worries of the engineers, who were so engulfed in maintenance work that units frequently went to their aid with their own transport. Rivers rose with astonishing rapidity, forcing the removal of some camps to higher ground and disrupting traffic on the main roads, but the mud soon gave way to dust as the year ebbed into the cooler season. Relations were never anything but cordial with the American forces, whose vocabulary, both official and unofficial, was adopted with limits. The French administrative officials, farmers, and store-keepers welcomed the New Zealanders, to whom they became a race of jolies garçons, with an enthusiasm which soon overcame all language difficulties. To the Americans they were never anything but ‘Kiwis’, since that bird had become the division's distinguishing mark and every vehicle carried one.

From the time of arrival in New Caledonia the division, by arrangement between governments, was maintained from American sources, with the exception of certain specified New Zealand supplies such as canteen stores, clothing, tentage and ammunition, though later American tropical clothing was also adopted. The men were paid in dollars, £2 worth of which had been changed during the voyage, but they also used French currency for local purchases and were soon busily engaged in attempting to reconcile the New Zealand pound at 6s. 1d. to the dollar with francs at 43 to the dollar. Some of the American food was regarded with disfavour and the New Zealanders never became accustomed to spam, chile con carne, and others equally spiced, though they appreciated the fruits and juices and the liberal ration of turkey for such traditional festivals as Christmas Day and Thanksgiving Day. Quantities of fresh fruit, particularly oranges, and smaller amounts of fresh vegetables were purchased from French farmers to supplement and add variety to the daily tinned ration, but fresh butter and meat in reasonable supply did not become available until refrigeration storage space was increased in Noumea. Refrigerated vans relieved the storage difficulties among units.

The pot-holed roads and the long distances over which supplies were hauled daily played havoc with transport, and many of the ASC trucks, which averaged 2000 miles a month, were soon bumped into the repair depots. Barrowclough, against the opinion of the Quartermaster-General, Brigadier H. E. Avery,

Brig H. E. Avery, CMG, CBE, DSO, m.i.d., Legion of Merit (US); Eastbourne; born Wellington, 3 Oct 1885; company manager; NZASC 1914–19 (AA & QMG NZ Div); QMG NZ Military Forces, 1940–45; General Manager War Assets Realisation Board, 1945–48.

requested full-scale transport of 3377 vehicles, which included 663 motor-cycles, 2016 cars, jeeps and trucks, and 507 tractors and carriers. By the end of June 2752 had been despatched from New Zealand. In an effort to make up the division's extensive deficiencies during its reorganisation, many of the trucks had been supplied from districts and were ill-conditioned for the harsh service required of them in New Caledonia. Thereafter Army ordered that only new vehicles be sent forward, some being obtained direct from American sources on the island. Because of pillaging, one of the nastier features of wartime shipping, all tools were removed from vehicles before they were shipped from New Zealand. Ultimately all transport reached New Caledonia, where much of it remained when the division moved into the forward area. Only one third of the division's transport was taken to Guadalcanal, and still less beyond that.

Barrowclough was continually worried by the deterioration of stores and equipment, which were inadequately housed, and by increasing problems of maintenance, which included the erection of reasonably permanent buildings and the upkeep of roads, now far beyond the limited resources and equipment of the French public works organisation. Although the division was better equipped than it had ever been in its history, shortages could not be met from American sources, which were often hard-pressed through losses at sea to meet their own requirements.

Some indication of the major difficulties was revealed in a report by Major L. C. Hardie, of Fortifications and Works Branch, Army Headquarters, who spent from 21 March to 8 April thoroughly investigating the state of the division's services. ‘At present everything is of the makeshift, inefficient, and temporary type’, he noted in a long, detailed report, which included the state of the roads and camp sites. He observed that the provision of barges for use in unloading ships was largely the result of personal relationships and friendships existing between New Zealand and American officers, rather than any definite rights to use equipment as and when required. Although engineer supplies, under an original agreement, were the responsibility of the South Pacific Command, they were not available because the command itself was short. Hardie reported that the roads in New Caledonia were bad and road maintenance had broken down, building supplies were unobtainable locally, Base details camps were in great need of prefabricated buildings, and there was a distressing shortage of timber, water, drain and culvert pipes, pumping plants, power generating plants, water heaters, chlorinating and filtering plants, general hardware and cement. If New Caledonia was to become a base, many buildings of a permanent type were required for storage. This report hastened supplies from New Zealand, particularly a quantity of prefabricated buildings for the housing of ordnance supplies.

Some of the General's administrative problems had been revealed in his letter to Army Headquarters, written on 2 February:

‘I have to decide what should be the size of my Base installations and what degree of permanence my building construction should take. This is naturally bound up with the possibilities of our returning here and the number of reinforcements which are likely to be retained at Base. At the present time these problems are almost overwhelming. We have large stocks of rations which are deteriorating through exposure to the weather. The same applies to ammunition, and in both cases our problem is accentuated by the fact that large supplies of ammunition and rations were landed here at a time when I had few troops to handle them. Even now my numerous commitments are leaving only the barest minimum of training opportunities and I am handicapped largely by shortage of engineer equipment. Some roadmaking equipment has just arrived, including some bulldozers, only one of which is a D4 tractor equipped with earth-moving plant. Another D4 tractor is without this plant, two D7 tractors have no roadmaking fittings, and my CRE advises me that even if the materials could be sent over the workshops could not fit suitable earth-moving appliances. These tractors are practically useless, and in order to keep open access to my brigades I have to employ large numbers of men roadmaking with nothing but picks and shovels.’

The delay in sending forward equipment for the division was partly caused by shortage of shipping, but this was aggravated by the method of storage in wharf sheds in New Zealand and by a system of loading which did not ensure that cargo was shipped in the order in which it was delivered. This prompted Dove, in a report on Base Headquarters organisation, to suggest that in any similar future operations a special ship should be provided so that shipments could be made in the desired order in which they were required. Any demand for shipping was made to the American authorities, but some confusion seems to have existed between the authorities, both American and New Zealand. The United States Navy, which was advised of 3 Division's requirements, had been shipping supplies only as space became available after its own requirements were satisfied. General Breene, of the South Pacific Command, considered that if he had been correctly informed of what had to be lifted both in reinforcements and supplies, he contemplated no difficulty, as he had other ships at his disposal which could be diverted. This ultimately solved the problem, though shipping space, during this period of the war, was always short in the Pacific, as elsewhere.

III: Life Among the Niaoulis

Everyone trained in New Caledonia. There was no option, since it was an instruction that all ranks of every branch and headquarters, even the less conspicuous elements such as cooks and batment, must undergo a fitness campaign and march certain distances. In a review of the state of training at the end of January, Barrowclough issued an instruction which included that: ‘It is essential that the whole division be trained in jungle warfare types of shooting. Artillery, signals, ASC, and ordnance must be trained with the rifle, Thompson sub-machine gun, and light machine gun to combat Japanese infiltration.’ He also suggested to Army Headquarters that the supply of grenades, which were ‘particularly suitable for jungle fighting because they did not locate the thrower’ be increased to 200,000. No time was lost in beginning a schedule of training for which the country is so perfectly suited, despite the mosquitoes, and where the soft warm nights are not attended with discomfort when sleeping out, though reconnaissance parties which explored tracks through the mountains rarely moved without their mosquito nets. These insects were at their worst in 8 Brigade areas in and around Bouloupari, where head-nets were often worn and office desks and signal equipments covered in an effort to overcome their agonising attentions.

Jungle training began on a platoon and company basis, using live ammunition, mortars and machine guns, over courses designed as a preliminary to manœuvres on a larger scale employing battalions and finally brigades. Small parties made four- and six-day trips through the mountains and along the beaches, investigating the state of routes, their availability for movement, checking supplies of food and water, and testing the value of certain specified rations over stated periods. Inaccurate maps gave little indication of the acutal state of the country, but this only stimulated interest and encouraged initiative, for training in New Caledonia was never monotonous, despite its tests of stamina and endurance. As training progressed, every form of exercise was undertaken by battalions, from beach landings, using Higgins boats, to attacks on objectives over specially prepared tracts of country, using concealed targets and supporting arms. This went on for months, always with an eye to combat in the Solomons.

Some of the more spectacular exploits involved operations with American forces, such as an 8 Brigade exercise in February using 29 and 1 Scottish Battalions, which co-operated with elements of 43 US Division and United States aircraft. Another 8 Brigade exercise in April stressed communication problems in close country, the use of four-wheeled vehicles over tracks through the bush, and the reduction of the load carried by the individual soldier. Throughout May and June this brigade embarked on its most strenuous exercises, the first of which, from 4 to 7 May, took place over rugged bush and mountain country in the Ouenghi-Tontouta region with units divided into New Zealand and enemy forces. This was followed on 14 May by a still more exhausting exercise designed for the capture of a high hill feature, culminating in a five-day manœuvre which involved carrying mortars and machine guns and other combat equipment up steep, bush-clad slopes and crossing rivers in assault boats and on floating rafts. Further exercises over long periods in June included attacks on La Foa and Moindou villages, for which sand models were used during discussions on problems and in lectures to the men to stimulate their interest, and for which they were invaluable. A recreational period at Thio, an attractive village on the east coast, was well earned by the whole brigade in the only respite it ever enjoyed from months of training.

In the dry, open country in the north, 14 Brigade had been equally busy, practising over an assault course, testing jungle rations during a beach landing on the Gomen Peninsula in April, and in defence and attack schemes which kept the units far from their camps. As a preliminary to the most thorough exercise undertaken by the brigade and involving all arms of the service, Divisional Headquarters held a tactical exercise without troops for brigade commanders, followed by another for unit commanders. Then, for three days and nights, all units of the brigade were employed in a night river crossing, followed by an attack on the village of Pouembout. For this exercise the opposite bank of the Pouembout River was presumed to be in enemy hands, a bridgehead had to be established in darkness, and a force with anti-tank guns pushed over in readiness for the main attack next morning. Engineers used assault boats and box girder bridging to cross the river, the ambulance set up its hospital and treated several accidental injuries, signals tested the efficiency of communications, both line and radio, supporting artillery played its role, and the ASC fed and maintained the force. There were several visitors to witness this most realistic and exacting exercise, including two senior American generals, Harmon and Lincoln.

Fifteenth Brigade, while carrying out its various exercise, proved the value of its training during a three-day manœuvre when not a man fell out. This brigade also tested the efficiency of various rations, and came to the conclusion that some of them would do little more than sustain men in action, leaving them no reserve for fighting. One of these was the American K ration, which was neatly enclosed in a cardboard package for easy carriage and contained ¼ lb. of cheese or meat in an airtight tin, eight small biscuits wrapped in cellophane, sixteen glucose tablets, three lumps of loaf sugar, powdered fruit juice for two drinks, one stick of chewing gum, and one carton of four cigarettes. Other similar rations contained soup cubes. These were all designed for use during assault landings, each man carrying three packages made up as three separate meals, and sufficient to last him for 24 hours. All of them were disliked after the novelty wore off, but they were efficient for their purpose.

Through May and June, also, the men were toughened by arduous marches, 8 Brigade beginning with 14 miles a day, increasing to 18 and finally to 40 miles over the last two days. Units of 14 Brigade marched 20 miles a day for three days, culminating in an ambitious military display in which every unit played a part, and ending during the weekend with a church parade and ceremonial march past. Later in July, 8 Brigade held a ceremonial parade and review during the visit of the Minister of Defence, the Hon. F. Jones, who inspected the men.

Although taking part in the various brigade exercises, other arms of the service continued their individual training, in spite of the distracting calls on their time for routine duty. When anti-aircraft artillery units could not obtain the assistance of aircraft for trail shoots, they improvised by using kites or balloons towed by jeeps; engineers experimented in floating jeeps across rivers, using kapok assault floats or tarpaulins, and in building bridges at night, using materials cut from the nearby bush; signals had practice enough in their work, which called for the erection and maintenance of miles of line through the roughest country, and the servicing of a radio net which extended from Noumea to Taom and a high-powered link sited at Base, which carried all traffic between the division and New Zealand.

Unlike other divisions in the field, 3 Division, the only formation other than American then in the South Pacific, was without the usual Army Corps organisation on which it ordinarily would have called. This meant that Army Headquarters and the South Pacific Command to some extent took the place of the larger formation. Its training, also, was entirely different from that laid down in the manuals, in which emphasis is placed on traditional methods used in open country such as the European mainland or the African desert.

New Zealanders of 3 Division, for the first time in history preparing for jungle and island warfare, were practically writing their own text books as their training progressed. All the months of works accomplished in New Caledonia were of immense value, and during that time the division experimented for future operations, adding to its ideas and euipment and discarding what was unnecessary. Long trousers and long-sleeved shirts were necessary because of mosquitoes; steel helmets were useless among trees and undergrowth because of the noise; gas respirators proved a hindrance in wooded country; canvas boots with barred rubber soles were superior to leather footwear in the jungle; some reduction in the amount of personal gear was essential. ‘Streamlining in the jungle is not merely a desirable appearance but is a military necessity,’ one unit reported. ‘A water-bottle and haversack hung on the sides of each soldier may well represent so many coffin nails.’ Tea proved to be the greatest stimulant for fatigued men and rice a popular food, though difficult to cook because water was often short. Troops soon tried of the American jungle rations, compact and efficient though they were.

Throughout the training period specially selected officers and men were despatched far and wide to gather the latest information on jungle fighting and amphibious warfare. Some went to amphibious training courses in the United States, returning rather too late to be of any assistance in the Solomons; others were sent to chemical warfare schools in Australia, Army School at Trentham, the AFV school of Waiouru, the tactical school at Wanganui, and staff college at Palmerston North.

Training culminated at the end of June with amphibious exercises using an American ship, the John Penn, off the beach of Ducos Peninsula in Noumea Harbour. Here a combat team of 1139 all ranks from 14 Brigade, made up of 37 Battalion and a machine-gun platoon, 35 Field Battery, 207 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, 20 Field Company, 22 Field Ambulance and 16 ASC Company, practised for some days all the complicated detail of embarkation drills, boat assignment tables, landing diagrams, beach organisation, loading and night landing, becoming so skilled in the routine that a landing craft could be filled in four minutes. Senior officers, both New Zealand and American, watched the operation, approving its speed and efficiency. So that other units might practise the essentials of embarkation and disembarkation, scaffolding was erected in some of the camps and here, on rope nets strung over the timber frames, men clambered up and down to familiarise themselves with the only method possible of going aboard or leaving a ship in shallow and unfamiliar waters.

In a summary of the strategical situation which went to every man in the division, Barrowclough, who believed in keeping his troops ‘in the picture’, emphasised the close co-operation between the three fighting services, particularly as exemplified by the battle for Guadalcanal. ‘We can see how dependent are the Navy, Army, and Air Force on one another,’ he concluded. ‘Only by the closest co-operation between all three services can island victories be won…. We shall be dependent on American sea and air forces, and we shall also rely a lot on the American divisions alongside us. With that great support we can go into action well trained and confident of victory.’

Recreation went hand in hand with training in New Caledonia and was almost as arduous. Apart from unit activities, which were given every encouragement, cricket, football, swimming, and athletics produced talent of high quality and a series of excellent contests, not the least of which was the Rugby final for the Barrowclough Cup presented to the captain of the triumphant 37 Battalion team, Private A. T. Long, by the General's wife, who flew from New Zealand for the occasion. The most spectacular recreational feature was the pride of 14 Brigade, units of which constructed a full-size racecourse at Taom where horses of doubtful pedigree, gathered from the surrounding countryside, competed at two meetings and attracted visitors from as far south as Noumea.

By the time 3 Division departed from New Caledonia it was as perfectly trained for jungle and island warfare as any force in the Pacific. Major-General C. D. Barrett, Commander of the First Marine Amphibious Corps, who was given the choice of 3 Division or any United States or Australian division for service in the Solomons, selected the New Zealanders, ‘of whose qualities he had the highest opinion’.

IV: Negotiations—Political and Service

From January 1943 to the following July, negotiations concerning the expansion of the division continued uncertainly as every means was explored in an effort to carry out the original proposal to put a three-brigade division in to the Pacific. There were also political motives behind the desire that New Zealand should be adequately represented in that sphere of operations. On several occasions tentative negotiations were opened for the return of 2 Division from the Middle East, but each time the New Zealand Government, acting on the advice of the Allied leaders as to where that division could most usefully be employed, agreed to its retention in the Mediterranean theatre. Both Churchill and Roosevelt pressed for this and were supported by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff. Any uneasiness on the part of the men in the Middle East that they should return were dispelled by Freyberg's assurance in March 1942 that the Dominion was adequately defended and that, by striking at the Germans in the Middle East, the New Zealanders were also indirectly striking at the Japanese as well. Moreover, he told his men, large quantities of armament had reached New Zealand from England and America and the American fleet had begun offensive operations in the Pacific.

On 19 November 1942, as 3 Division was moving into New Caledonia, Fraser expressed the opinion to Churchill that ‘Our own tried and well-trained troops [in the Mediterranean theatre] should be used for the defence of New Zealand in the Pacific’, and in emphasising that New Zealand should play her part in the Pacific offensive ‘to the fullest extent of our capacity’ he did not mean that 2 Division was to be returned and used only to defend the Dominion's shores. So that Nash could make this point perfectly clear to the Chiefs of Staff in Washington, he despatched a special message stating that if the division were returned it would not be used exclusively for home defence. During Parliamentary discussions in December Fraser criticised the ‘holding war’ in the Pacific, which he said he had always opposed, though a holding period was necessary in order to build up American strength of arms and was in accordance with the over-all strategy that Germany should first be defeated before the full strength of the Allies was turned against Japan. ‘Units of the New Zealand force have arrived in New Caledonia,’ he said in December. ‘It is only right that we should take part in the Pacific offensive which will keep the Japanese as far as possible from our shores.’

Although War Cabinet had approved the necessary increases for the division, Barrowclough still required a third infantry battalion for his 15 Brigade, as well as one field regiment of artillery, an ASC company, an engineer field company, an anti-tank battery, a light artillery regiment, less a battery already in New Caledonia, and the remaining units of 15 Brigade headquarters. Other units were required for the Base organisation. Puttick, in January, supported Barrowclough's request for these troops, most of which were being assembled in New Zealand, and commented on the urgent necessity for building up the division to full strength.

Early in February Major-General Peck, of Halsey's war plans staff, expressed concern at the strength of 3 Division and indicated that it would shortly be asked to undertake amphibious training, which 43 American Division had already started in readiness to move forward. Barrowclough was eager to get his remaining units to New Caledonia in order to acclimatise them. ‘There is a vast difference between the men from Fiji and those gathered later from all parts of New Zealand,’ he reported to Army Headquarters. Later in February Coates and Puttick visited New Caledonia and discussed with Halsey various problems concerning the division, including the relief by American units of the heavy coast and antiaircraft artillery to enable them to return to it.

On 6 March War Cabinet reluctantly agreed to the expansion of the division to 17,637 all ranks, with a first reinforcement of 1263, a docks operating unit of 90, and an engineer construction unit of 300, giving the force in New Caledonia a total strength of 19,290. One of the provisions was that 2211 coast and anti-aircraft personnel still in Fiji should join the division when they were relieved, as well as the battalions then in Tonga and Norfolk. But a third battalion still had to be found for 15 Brigade. The possibility of using a battalion of the Otago Regiment or a battalion of the Waikato Regiment had long been discarded, and when a suggestion to use 2 Maori Battalion, then in camp, was put forward Barrowclough replied that he welcomed the idea, but warned that some difficulty might arise through working Maori troops alongside American units which might subject them to some indignity.

Halsey and his staff, to whom the proposal was submitted, considered the inclusion of the Maoris would be both acceptable and desirable and discounted any suggestion of discrimination, but when the subject was referred to Colonel J. H. Nankivell, United States Military Attache in Wellington, he expressed the opinion that it would be unwise to send Maoris to serve alongside American formations. However, the Maori War Effort Parliamentary Committee gave no support to this suggestion; they desired to send their men to the Middle East, leaving no doubt of their intentions in a letter to the Prime Minister which concluded, ‘The Maori people of New Zealand are averse to their boys being sent to any other theatre of war where they could not be directly supporting their kinsmen. This feeling is paramount in the minds of the men of the 2 Maori Battalion’. This view was not supported by the Chief of the General Staff, who expressed the opinion that ‘every military and, as far as I can see, every economic consideration is in favour of the despatch of 2 Maori Battalion to 3 Division’.

When the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Stewart, toured Pacific formations the following month, he informed Barrowclough that 3 Maori Battalion, not yet formed, would be used to complete 15 Brigade. Although this was confirmed at a conference presided over by Coates and attended by the Maori members of Parliament and Army representatives on 21 April, the furlough scheme for men of 2 Division, which was influenced by strong public opinion, forced a drastic alteration of all previous decisions and required both 2 and 3 Maori Battalions to be diverted to support 1 Maori Battalion. It was obvious, also, that the Maoris did not wish their men to serve in the Pacific.

A suggestion to use the Fijians to complete 3 Division also ended in stalemate. The offer came from Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Fiji, to use the Fijian Brigade with the division, this force to include the Fijian Battalion and the commando units, led by New Zealanders, then employed with American forces in the Solomons, where they had established their reputation as jungle fighters. Barrowclough suggested, and Puttick agreed, that one battalion of Fijians could be usefully employed with each New Zealand brigade, thus making full use of their special qualifications as jungle fighters, but he insisted that they must be in addition to, and not in substitution for, New Zealand units still required.

When the suggestion was referred to the South Pacific Command it was received coldly, as the removal of the brigade from Fiji required the use of American troops to replace them in garrisoning the island and would also deprive the American forces of the use of the scouts and raiders in the Solomons campaign. For this reason South Pacific Command could not agree to the request, and a communication from Halsey's headquarters on 18 June made this clear. ‘In conference and correspondence concerning the reduction of home defences in New Zealand, it was our understanding that the 3rd Division would be brought up to full strength and that full strength would be such that the New Zealand division could be used interchangeably with American divisions in combat. Therefore, we prefer for the latter reason, and because of the reduction in strength of the Fiji garrison, that the expansion of New Zealand 3rd Division be not accomplished by the use of Fijian troops.’

Further negotiations, however, brought agreement to the employment of one battalion of Fijians with the division as scouts and raiders, and its replacement by a Grade II New Zealand battalion from Tonga, but this Mitchell refused to accept, stating that his brigade could not be broken up. There were language and domestic difficulties to be considered, he pointed out, as well as public opinion in the Colony, and he suggested that the brigade might be used later as a whole formation when the tactical situation permitted it to be released. Army Headquarters thought it unwise to risk irritating Halsey with any further propositions and Barrowclough, though regretting the decision not to employ the Fijians, expressed surprise at Mitchell's objection to breaking up the brigade, since part of it was already detached and working in the Solomons. (See also Appendix IV.)

While these protracted negotiations were in progress, other factors had decided the fate of the division's strength, the most influential being the adoption of a furlough scheme for long-service men of 2 Division. Both Major-General M. F. Harmon, commanding United States Armed Forces in the South Pacific, and Major-General R. G. Breene, commanding all Supply Services, had expressed concern over the slow movement of men and stores to New Caledonia, as the division, as it was then constituted, could not be used interchangeably with an American combat division of three brigades; but the manpower position in New Zealand again held up its restraining hand. Through April and May the whole position was thoroughly examined and discussed by Parliament. From those discussions stemmed a policy, approved by War Cabinet, that 2 Division remain in the Middle East and furlough be granted to 6000 long-service men, and that the Pacific force be reorganised on a reduced scale. This meant that the 5600 men who were in camp awaiting transport to New Caledonia to build up 3 Division were used to enable men of 2 Division to take their leave. Artillery units relieved from Fiji were also diverted to Middle East reinforcements. The pressure of public opinion for the return of 2 Division or that leave be granted to long-service men, no doubt influenced these decisions. During discussions at a secret session of Parliament before arriving at these decisions, Fraser emphasised the impossibility of providing, from existing sources of manpower, resources sufficient to meet furlough replacements for 2 Division, the expansions required by the Air Force, which were particularly heavy, and the completion of 3 Division. Both divisions, however, were to be maintained for as long as possible with smaller establishments until the position was again reviewed.

Apart from the vigorous requests from Churchill and Roosevelt to retain 2 Division in the Mediterranean sphere, one of the overriding factors affecting its return was the employment of shipping necessary for the movement of troops when transport was critically short and urgently required in getting men and materials to the operational fronts. There was also the question of using trained armoured units which could not be employed in a close island campaign, and which would require to undergo months of preparatory training for jungle and island operations. In May 1943, Mr. Jones, Minister of Defence, also tested the reaction of the men during his visit to the Middle East forces and found that they had little or no desire to fight in the Pacific because of the prevalence of malaria.

In May, also, the political aspect of the Pacific war, to which the Government attached considerable importance, was made perfectly clear in Fraser's communication to Freyberg when his division was under discussion for return to the Dominion. ‘You know, as I do, the very strong arguments in favour of the retention of the division in the European theatre,’ he wrote. ‘On the other hand, I believe it to be of the greatest political importance that, when the time comes to start offensive operations against Japan, the British elements in the United Nations’ forces in the Pacific should be as strong as possible. It is not only a question of the immediate security of our own shores and our island territories; we must also take the long view and ensure that when the future of the Pacific is being considered after the war we, in common with other portions of the British Commonwealth concerned, are in the most favourable possible political. Another factor which we cannot ignore is the relationship of this country with Australia.’

Through all negotiations affecting the war effort, Australia had been kept fully informed of New Zealand's actions and the Commonwealth had, on more than one occasion, expressed strong views on the use of forces in the Pacific. She had withdrawn most of her troops from the Middle East and thought that New Zealand should do the same, an attitude of which Churchill was fully aware. The Australian Prime Minister expressed the view that for every soldier kept out of the Pacific, either an American or an Australian had to take his place. In May 1943, when negotiations concerning manpower were under discussion, Curtin expressed himself rather violently to the New Zealand representative in Canberra, Mr. Berendsen, that in his opinion all New Zealand troops should be available for the Pacific theatre. When Curtin was informed that New Zealand had decided to leave her 2nd Division in the Middle East, his reactions were ‘very strong’ and relations between the Commonwealth and the Dominion reached a stage of some delicacy, overcome finally by both parties tactfully refraining from any further reference to the subject.

There was still some confusion in the South Pacific Command as to when and where the division would be used. On 3 June Rear-Admiral T. S. Wilkinson met War Cabinet in Wellington and during the ensuing discussions was fully acquainted with the Dominion's growing manpower difficulties. He informed Cabinet that 3 Division would not normally be required for active operations during 1943. However, on 11 June, Halsey raised with Barrowclough tentative plans to move the force into an operational theatre, and stated that the movement forward should be initiated by 15 August. Barrowclough then flew to New Zealand for further discussions with War Cabinet and produced a letter, dictated by Harmon, stating that the New Zealand division was required almost immediately for an active role and that delay in bringing it up to full strength would cause embarrassment, all of which conflicted with the two former views and suggested some lack of co-ordination in the American command. Barrowclough asked that his division, now well trained after six months in New Caledonia, should be employed for at least one campaign, extending over four or five months, otherwise morale would suffer, and he accepted without question the possibility that it would be reduced later to reinforce 2 Division, which was remaining in the Mediterranean theatre. Finally, on 27 June, War Cabinet approved the reduction of 3 Division to two brigades and to its employment in a forward area, subject to the commander's report that the force was suitably equipped and trained for action, which it undoubtedly was. The total strength of the reorganised division was to be 17,831 all ranks, including 2000 reinforcements.

Halsey reluctantly accepted the decision to provide only a two-brigade division, and in a letter to Fraser added, ‘I do feel that these two brigades should be maintained at full strength at all times,’ and, in reference to reinforcements, ‘I am counting on you to furnish such additional reinforcements as may be necessary to maintain these two brigades at full strength.’ New Zealand's position and her policy regarding the division were made clear to Halsey in the Prime Minister's reply:

The decision to retain our battle-trained division in the Mediterranean theatre was made by Parliament on the advice of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, after we had pointed out to them and their military advisers that it was not possible, at this state of the war, with its other commitments, for New Zealand to continue to maintain two divisions overseas. Unless there is a change of policy which would cause Parliament to vary its decision, the division in the Mediterranean will, when the reinforcement pool has been exhausted, require to be maintained by drawing eventually upon New Zealand troops in the Pacific.

In so far as our Pacific commitments are concerned, we have continued to work on the lines laid down and accepted by Admiral Wilkinson and the War Cabinet in June last, namely that Air came first, Navy second, production third, and Army fourth. We are making every effort to fulfil those commitments and to increase to the maximum the production of foodstuffs for which there is a continually increasing demand from your forces. I must point out to you, however, that it is not possible for a small country like New Zealand, after four years of war, to do more than we are doing, especially having regard to the fact that at the present time we have more than 68,000 overseas, that our casualties in dead, wounded, and missing have been extremely heavy, and that our reserves of grade A manpower are pratically exhausted.

We have for some months been particularly concerned that there should be no collapse of our war effort in any of its several directions, and that is why I have taken steps to inform you that there must come a time when one particular activity or another must be tapered off.

It is and always has been our intention to maintain the two brigades of the 3rd Division as long as circumstances permit.

By June 1943 a survey of New Zealand's manpower resources had revealed the disturbing fact that by the end of the year the total available for overseas service would be only 3700. During that month the home forces were reorganised and reduced by 20,000 to a minimum consistent with national security, and the Territorial Force reverted to part-time training. The greatest call for men came from the Air Force, which was expanding to twenty operational squadrons in the Pacific at the request of the American command. To assist in meeting the demand, men of 3 Division were permitted to volunteer for this army of the service and, following the arrival of selection boards of the RNZAF in July, a number of those selected departed before the force moved out of New Caledonia. The Hon. W. Perry, who had become head of the Armed Forces and War Co-ordination Committee after the death of Coates, accompanied by Puttick, Shanahan, secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Air Commodore R. B. Bannerman,

Air Cdre R. B. Bannerman, CBE, DFC and bar, ED; Gore; born Invercargill, 21 Sep 1890; barrister and solicitor; served in RFC in First World War; Air Member for Personnel, Nov 1942–Oct 1945.

Air Member for Personnel, visited New Caledonia to discuss manpower and other problems, including the release of men for the Air Force. During discussions with Halsey and Barrowclough, Perry intimated that there would be no extension of the reinforcements already approved for the division by War Cabinet, which had also decided that reinforcements would not be provided for either division during the remainder of 1943, but Barrowclough expressed the opinion that he would have sufficient to maintain his force, with normal expenditure, until December. Provision had been made by War Cabinet for men returning from the Middle East on furlough to be replaced until such time as these men rejoined their units, but the manpower situation was aggravated by the fact that of the 7000 men who did return to New Zealand under this scheme, only 1300 went back to 2 Division.

The distribution of New Zealand's manpower in the three services during 1943, including women but excluding the Home Guard and small detached missions in various Allied theatres, is indicated in this survey: Army1943Middle East and United KingdomPacific, including New Caledonia, Fiji, and TongaIn New Zealand excluding Home GuardJun28,48321,28040,518Sep33,60721,79233,453Dec32,79520,86427,494
Navy1943In New Zealand and PacificWith Royal NavyJun54322796Sep60292617Dec57453752
Air Force1943PacificIn New ZealandAttached RAFCanada, trainingJun284728,49549521506Sep346030,56750611621Dec453629,56954271503

Denied the larger formation for which he had planned so long, Barrowclough set about the reorganisation of his force with the strength available to him and with the unhappy responsibility of disbanding several highly trained units. The 34th Battalion had returned from Tonga, via Fiji, on 13 March and 36 Battalion from Norfolk on 7 April, both rejoining 8 Brigade after being relieved by Grade II battalions from New Zealand. In the reshuffle 37 Battalion returned to 14 Brigade and 1 Ruahine Battalion to 15 Brigade. During the long period of negotiation and training, Barrowclough had accomplished some reorganisation with a view to increasing the striking efficiency of his brigades. In June brigade machine-gun companies were formed by absorbing platoons from each battalion, Major G. W. Logan taking 8 Brigade company, and Captain S. R. Rice, succeeded shortly afterwards by Major L. A. S. Ross, that of 14 Brigade. Bren carrier platoons also came under brigade command to provide for their more flexible employment in island operations.

Additional engineers under Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Jones, as CRE Works, consisting of a works construction company under Captain W. P. Boyd, and a wharf operating company under Captain E. Blacker, arrived in May and relieved the field engineers of maintenance work, with which they could not keep pace. A third composite company ASC, the 29th, commanded by Captain D. R. Hopkins, was formed in February from existing units and attached to 15 Brigade. Units still waiting in New Zealand to go forward were 38 Field Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Bryden, 26 Field Company Engineers under Major W. L. Mynott, 24 Field Ambulance under Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Fea, a convalescent depot commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. H. Wood, a tank squadron under Major R. J. Rutherford, and various base details. The proposed third field regiment, the 37th, was disbanded in New Zealand when the division's strength was reduced.

There was some delay in approving the extra units required, but by 17 July War Cabinet finally consented to Barrowclough's request. This gave him a two-brigade division with three engineer companies and a field park, three ASC companies, three field ambulances and additional signals, who were urgently required to maintain long lines of communication not normally associated with a division, including the maintenance of an extended base organisation to ensure direct communication with New Zealand, and a forward station planned when the division reached Guadalcanal and moved into the combat zone. Harmon agreed that a force operating in territory such as the Solomons could not have too many engineers, as the American forces in action had confirmed, and he concurred that a third field ambulance was a wise arrangement. Barrowclough was still worried over his reinforcements because of a possible reduction in strength by malaria, and wrote to Army Headquarters pointing out that he could not ‘face a situation where no reinforcements are behind me without running the riks of being unable to fulfil the role allotted to me’. However, these were assured when War Cabinet on 16 July reaffirmed its decisions made on 27 June regarding the revised strength of the division and its reinforcements.

On 1 July the Commander issued a special order of the day (see Appendix V) disbanding 15 Brigade, the two battalions of which were absorbed into existing units to make up deficiencies, the remainder going into a reinforcement pool at Base. A second special order disbanded 33 Heavy Coast Regiment and 28 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, both of which were relieved by American formations. The 33rd ceased to exist on 26 July and was merged into a new Base unit, the Artillery Training Depot, and Wicksteed apointed commanding officer. Through succeeding weeks the heavy anti-aircraft units were also disbanded and concentrated either at the artillery depot or absorbed into the infantry and other arms. The 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns were returned to New Zealand but, under reverse lend-lease, the United States forces took over the 6-inch and 155-millimetre guns, the total cost of which was £56,881 (NZ) and transferred them to the French military authorities, with whom the New Zealand Government had no reciprocal aid arrangement.

This action was questioned by the New Zealand Treasury. The guns were issued on loan from the British Admiralty to the New Zealand Navy who lent them to the Army. When the Americans transferred them, Treasury noted, ‘From experience it appears that the French Military authorities would be unable to pay for them in cash’. In reporting on the transaction, Dove emphasised that in any similar situation in future (when a New Zealand force was operating with other than a British formation) the creation of a special accounting unit should be carefully considered. This unit would be responsible for drawing all classes of supplies and for the complete bulk accounting of them to Army Headquarters for the purpose of accurately determining New Zealand's liability for those stores. However, in the final adjustment of the Pacific balance sheet with France in 1950, the cost of the guns, decided by mutual arrangement between Governments, contributed partly to the cost of quarters for the New Zealand Legation in Paris.

There were many changes in staff and command during the division's sojourn in New Caledonia and following reorganisation before the forward move. Base units were also built up to a total strength of 2580 and contained those components which were previously lacking. Twhigg was promoted Brigadier and became Deputy Director of Medical Services, Colonel N. C. Speight replacing him as ADMS; Murphy became liaison officer at Army Headquarters, and Bennett was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel to take his place as AA and QMG, Major G. B. Gibbons replacing Bennett as deputy; Berkeley was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel and appointed Military Secretary, Major H. F. Allan replacing him as GSO 2; Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Blazey arrived from New Zealand to relieve Jenkins as CRASC. Command of 36 Battalion passed to McKenzie-Muirson when Barry returned to New Zealand, and Moore relinquished command of 29 Battalion which passed briefly to Major I. H. MacArthur, Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Reidy, and finally to Lieutenant-Colonel F. L. H. Davis when he arrived from New Zealand. McKinnon took over command of 29 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment from Yendell when artillery units were reorganised.

Personal contact with New Zealand had been maintained by visits from service and political chiefs. Mr. Coates paid two visits to the area. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Jones, visited several units when he passed through New Caledonia on his way to the Middle East, and Mr. Nash, New Zealand Minister in Washington, when on his way to Wellington. The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Puttick, and his deputy, Brigadier Stewart, both

Above Deck Men of 36 NZ Batallion on USS President JacksonBlack and White Photograph of troops on deck of ship

Below Deck on the way from New Hebrides to GuadalcanalBlack and White photgraph of troops playing cards below deck

Malaria Control Unit spraying 37 NZ Field Park Company's Camp, GuadalcanalBlack and White photograph of small truck and troops

Henderson Field, GuadalcanalBlack and White Photograph of Airfield

US Marines following a trail on GuadalcanalRidges covered with Native Grasses and Valleys filled with JungleBlack and White Photograph of troops marching up a hill

Ready for Embarkation at Kukum Beach, Guadalcanal before sailing for Vella Lavella. In the background is a Landing Ship(Tank)Black and White Photograph of troops on beach

Loading rations at Gudalcanal for Vella LavellaBlack and White Photograph of troops loading boxes onto trucks

14 Brigade units landing at Vella Lavella from Americanbarges manned by American CrewsBlack and White photograph of soldiers getting down from boats visited the division, and Lieutenant-General Freyberg, on his way to New Zealand to discuss manpower and furlough problems, met personally many of his former officers. Colonel Henri Montchamp, Governor of New Caledonia, attended a ceremonial parade in 8 Brigade area. Colonel C. W. Salmon,

Col C. W. Salmon, DCM, m. i. d., Legion of Merit (US); Wellington; born Blenheim, 15 Apr 1892; company director; 1 NZEF 1914-19; NZ Chiefs of Staff representative at South Pacific Command.

the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff representative on the South Pacific Command headquarters in Noumea, and Lieutenant-Colonel W. Bassett,

Col W. Bassett, Legion of Merit (US); Okato; born Wanganui, 18 Jul 1909; works clerk.

New Zealand Liaison Officer in Noumea, were also regular visitors to the Division.

The division's base organisation and the headquarters of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific remained at Bourail, 102 miles north of Noumea and 50 miles south of the secondary port of Nepoui, and was housed in a former commercial building taken over after some argument from a French trading firm whose demands for an exorbitant rental were not approved. Like so many other small towns in New Caledonia, Bourail was not without a certain neglected charm, but its population had dwindled and evidence of its former industrial and commercial activities remained only in deserted buildings, factories, a large monastery, and a fortified gendarmerie dominating a hilltop which overlooked the town and wooded valleys it once protected.

Areas of overgrown countryside provided sites for that multiplicity of units and services which are a part of any base organisation in the field and includes engineers, signals, pay and records, ordnance, medical and dental services, canteens, welfare, postal, base training depot, base reception depot, artillery training depot, movement control, field bakery and butchery, transport and supply services. There was also sufficient space to accommodate without congestion the stores which housed military supplies and equipment, most of them erected in New Caledonia either from prefabricated parts sent from New Zealand or built of native materials hewn from the forest. The various camps were spread among the niaouli trees of such localities as Le Clere's Farm, Nemeara, Boguen, the Racecourse, Tene Valley and the Kouri River valley, with other units and services occupying buildings in and around Bourail itself. No. 4 General Hospital was first established in the Bougen River Valley, eleven miles from Bourail in a mosquitoridden area, but later moved to Dumbea Valley, 15 miles from Noumea, where it was greatly enlarged and began operating towards the end of the division's active period in the Solomons.

Dove carried out the dual functions of Officer in Charge of Administration (OICA) and Base Commandant and, as senior New Zealand officer, also maintained liaison with South Pacific Headquarters in Noumea and with the French civil administration. On arrival in New Caledonia, he opened temporary quarters in Rue d’Alma, Noumea, but moved to Bourail on 1 February 1943. His Deputy Adjutant-General, 2nd Echelon, was Major G. W. Foote who was appointed while the base organisation was forming at Hamilton. Changes of his senior staff included Major H. F. Allan, who moved to Divisional Headquarters in January 1943 and was succeeded by Major D. E. Trevarthen. Stowell, promoted to the rank of Major, continued to command the Base Reception Depot. Because of distances from ports in New Caledonia, a sub-base remained in Noumea under Captain H. N. Johnson to handle troops and supplies passing through the ports and also the airfields some miles out at Tontouta and Oua Tom. This consisted of a transit camp, detachments of pay and records, movement control, field post office, and the base supply depot No. 1. When 4 General Hospital moved to Dumbea Valley at the end of 1943, further work fell to the sub-base in arranging transport to hospital of sick and wounded arriving by air from the Solomons.

Constant vigilance by the staff of the medical services was rewarded by complete freedom from any outbreak of disease which would have reduced the already limited manpower of 3 Division. A search of past records revealed that the usual collection of horrible diseases had been encountered in New Caledonian at some period or other of its history—leprosy, plague, typhoid fever and venereal disease—but almost without exception among the native tribes and peoples. Hookworm and dysentery were also known to exist there, and dengue fever, as in all other mosquito-infested islands where the inhabitants are continually bitten, was an annual visitation. But there was no malaria, since the island, like Fiji, lies outside the malarial zone, and septic sores, source of continual disability in Fiji, did not affect the men in the drier New Caledonian climate. Despite this excellent climate, however, stomach troubles, which the medical authorities class as entero-colitis and gastro-enteritis, were a worry during the acclimatisation period.

Despite the abundance of freshwater streams and rivers in New Caledonia, bacteriological examination of water taken from them disclosed, in almost every instance, some evidence of contamination. Strict measures were therfore imposed by the medical authorities for the purification of all drinking water from points established to serve unit areas. Men were also warned continually not to put their heads under water while they were bathing, either in the sea, because of minute particles of coral which caused an infection of the ear, or for the same reason, in fresh water, because of the decayed vegetable matter found there. Under the supervision of 6 Field Hygiene Section a constant war was waged against flies, and the standard of field sanitation kept to a high level.

Because units of the division were scattered over many hundreds of miles of badly-roaded country, field ambulances established dressing stations to serve their respective areas, and the main dressing station gave the fullest possible hospital treatment. Field ambulance reception hospitals did the work of a main hospital until 4 General Hospital was opened in March 1943, but by special arrangement with the Assistant Director of Medical Services, serious cases from 3 Division requiring urgent treatment were accepted by 109 American Station Hospital which had been established off the main highway south of Moindah.

The base organisation was built up over a period of months and did not achieve its full strength of 2580 all ranks until a new war establishment was issued well into 1943. Its problems were accentuated by the nature of the Pacific campaign and the extremely long lines of communication, particularly after 3 Division left Guadalcanal and scattered over the islands of the Solomons. The transport of stores and supplies from New Zealand to New Caledonia and their transhipment to the Field Maintenance Centre on Guadalcanal were all dictated by irregular shipping, which was never satisfactory. Commanding officers of units and services at Base were more fortunate when they