Problems of 2 NZEF

Front Cover

Spine

Back Cover

Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg (right) and Brigadier W. G. Stevens in the Senio River area just before the final offensive black and white photograph of army officers

Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45

The authors of the volumes in this series of histories prepared under the supervision of the War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs have been given full access to official documents. They and the Editor-in-Chief are responsible for the statements made and the views expressed by them.

Title page Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45 Problems of 2 NZEF Major-General W. G. STEVENS WAR HISTORY BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND 1958

Preface

THIS volume differs from other volumes covering the history of 2 NZEF in the Mediterranean. First it deals with general administration, with no reference to any individual formation, unit or corps. Secondly, the author was intimately concerned with the subject matter of the volume, and is thus to some degree under post-war review himself.

Unfortunately I never kept a diary; but during 1945 I jotted down notes on various difficult or controversial points that had arisen in 2 NZEF in the earlier years. These were then elaborated as a result of conversations with other members of 2 NZEF, in particular when it appeared likely that some of us might be helping to form an expeditionary force for operations against Japan. By the time I returned to New Zealand in 1946 I had collected sufficient material to form an extensive precis; and it is mainly on that precis that this volume is based.

The volume is thus largely a personal report, despite its apparent anonymity.

However, I owe a great deal to the War History Branch, and in particular to the late Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, who at all times kept me on an even keel. The Branch in general answered many queries, and hunted out a mass of old papers and files, including the War Diaries of HQ 2 NZEF. I found these last most helpful, particularly those dealing with the early period when Headquarters was establishing itself. The compiler at that time was Captain A. C. Highet, and to him retrospectively I owe a lot.

Many people, too many to mention in detail, willingly answered questions on odd points, and others made helpful criticisms on various parts of the draft volume. Major-General W. G. Gentry and Colonel A. S. Muir read the whole volume in draft and made extensive and helpful criticisms, so continuing into peace the invaluable advice and assistance they gave me during the war. To all I tender my grateful thanks.

The introductory chapter gives an outline of the volume, and explains the method followed.

On 22 November 1939 I was in the Savoy Hotel in London and was the first person to greet Major-General Freyberg when he came out of Mr Fraser's office, having just been offered and having just accepted the appointment of GOC. Six years later to the day I had the honour of proposing his health when he left us in Florence. It was a long association, and to say that it was an unforgettable one for me is an understatement. I could not have had a more considerate or lovable chief, one who was always so appreciative of what we tried to do for him, one who never said a harsh word. It was an honour and a privilege to serve him. This volume will show one aspect of the work of 2 NZEF—an aspect in which the GOC's influence was as marked as elsewhere.

The work of HQ 2 NZEF was intended, however indifferently, to make smooth the path of the field troops. For the ordinary New Zealand fighting soldiers I have an unbounded admiration. It was an honour to give them what assistance we could, even if only from the back rooms.

W. G. Stevens

Contents

page INTRODUCTION Part I 1 1 2 NZEF IS FORMED 9 2 THE FIRST YEAR OVERSEAS 18 3 THE FIRST THREE CAMPAIGNS 36 4 DEFEAT AND VICTORY 52 5 TOWARDS ROME 64 6 THE LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS 79 Part II 7 HEADQUARTERS 2 NZEF – COMMAND AND STAFF 93 8 HEADQUARTERS 2 NZEF – THE SERVICES 114 9 NON-DIVISIONAL, BASE AND LINE-OF-COMMUNICATION UNITS 132 10 RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND AND WITH ARMY HEADQUARTERS 152 11 RELATIONS WITH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS 166 12 FIELD AND BASE 181 13 MANPOWER 188 14 WOMANPOWER 207 15 ‘CRIMES, FOLLIES AND MISFORTUNES’ 213 16 WELFARE 235 17 SOME MISCELLANEOUS POINTS 256 18 CONCLUSIONS 270 APPENDICES Page I Order of Battle 2 NZEF, 17 April 1941 277 II Order of Battle 2 NZEF, 9 May 1945 283 III List of Non-divisional, Base and Line-of-Communication Units 288 IV Appreciation of Strength and Reinforcement Situation, March 1943 291 V 2 NZEF Casualty Statement, All Campaigns, June 1945 292 VI Joining Instructions for Third Echelon, September 1940 293 VII Scheme for Exchange of Personnel (Ruapehu Draft) – Instruction No. 9 297 VIII List of Standing Instructions 301 IX Standing Instruction – Compassionate Leave 302 X Standing Instruction – Compensation for Loss of Officers' Kit 306 XI Standing Instruction – Replacement of Casualties 310 XII Standing Instruction – Regimental Funds 315 XIII Standing Instruction – Disbandment of Units 320 XIV Appointments in 2 NZEF 322

List of Illustrations

Frontispiece Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg (right) and Brigadier W. G. Stevens in the Senio River area NZ Army (G. F. Kaye) Following page 118 Maadi Camp, looking towards the Citadel and Cairo NZ Army (G. R. Bull) Divisional Headquarters offices, Maadi Camp, 1940 NZ Army New Zealand Supply Depot NZ Army Egyptian laundry, Maadi NZ Army Divisional Headquarters mess, Maadi, 1940 NZ Army Inter-unit relay race, Maadi baths, 1940 2 Echelon Records Section, Maadi Camp, December 1943 NZ Army (G. R. Bull) Christmas parcel mail being sorted at the New Zealand Chief Post Office, Cairo, December 1943 NZ Army (G. R. Bull) The Minister of Defence visits the Middle East, April 1943 Hon. F. Jones collection Rev. J. W. McKenzie (Senior Chaplain) and Rt. Rev. G. V. Gerard at Maadi, June 1943 NZ Army (M. D. Elias) Brigadier K. MacCormick, Director of Medical Services, 2 NZEF, 1940–43 NZ Army Troops in the Western Desert receive Christmas parcels, January 1942 26 Battalion collection Colonel F. Waite, National Patriotic Fund Board Commissioner, hands over a mobile canteen to the YMCA NZ Army (G. R. Bull) 1 NZ General Hospital, Helwan, August 1943 NZ Army (G. R. Bull) New Zealand Broadcasting Unit, Maadi NZ Army (M. D. Elias) Suani Ben Adem NZ Army (W. Timmins) Following page 182 Lady Freyberg and Brig A. S. Falconer welcome members of the first WWSA party at Port Tewfik, October 1941 NZ Army Lt-Gen Sir Bernard Freyberg (with Matron Miss I. MacKinnon) says goodbye to members of the nursing staff of 6 NZ General Hospital, Florence NZ Army Main entrance to New Zealand Advanced Base, Taranto, March 1944 S-Sgt J. G. Brown Troops at Advanced Base wait for trucks to take them on the first stage of their journey to New Zealand NZ Army (C. Hayden) Lowry Hut at Advanced Base, Taranto, January 1944 NZ Army (M. D. Elias) New Zealand Field Bakery, Italy NZ Army (G. F. Kaye) Troops arrive for opening of New Zealand Forces Club, Cairo, February 1941 NZ Army In the Club library NZ Army (S. Wemyss) Hotel Danieli, Venice, a New Zealand Forces Club in 1945 NZ Army (J. J. Short) Education and Rehabilitation Service library in Italy NZ Army (J. Murphy) Headquarters 2 NZEF, Santo Spirito, May 1944 W. G. Stevens collection Headquarters 2 NZEF, Senigallia W. G. Stevens collection Rt. Hon. P. Fraser is greeted by Brigadier Stevens on arriving in Italy, May 1944 NZ Army (G. R. Bull) At Santo Spirito, May 1944 W. G. Stevens collection 2 NZEF Memorial, Maadi

List of Maps

Facing page The Mediterranean Theatre 17 Central and Eastern Mediterranean 51 Italy 69

Introduction

THE intention of this volume is to discuss the administration of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force while overseas in sufficient detail to set out our problems and record our lessons, and in the hope that the lessons may be of some value for the future.

There is no glory in this volume, nothing to stir the blood. It deals with administration only and not with battles in the field. There are no references to operations, except in so far as these influenced the layout of the Expeditionary Force, or modified the activities of the administrative headquarters and of the base and line-of-communication units. The volume is not a history of the force, nor yet a treatise on military administration. It is an attempt to record the many non-operational problems that arose in a small national army, to show the way in which these problems were handled, and in some cases to suggest that the solutions we found were either right or wrong. In many cases, however, the pros and cons are set out as we saw them at the time, and the solution is left for the reader to find.

In discussing our problems it is inevitable that there should be mention of our mistakes, for it would be impossible to maintain that everything we did was correct.

Although the distinction should become clear early in the volume, it is perhaps advisable to say at this stage that the text deals with the activities of the Expeditionary Force as a whole, and not with those of 2 New Zealand Division alone. The Division was of course part of the force, indeed the greater part; but there was a part outside the Division, and the problems discussed herein affected both parts equally. Moreover there were many problems, such as some of those arising from our relations with British General Headquarters, or with the Government in New Zealand, that were independent of the activities of the Division alone. The Division had many problems of its own; but in the main these were the result of operations and are not touched on here. The custom grew up, especially in New Zealand, of alluding to the force in the Mediterranean as ‘the Second Division’; but strictly speaking this was not correct. Its title was 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, or 2 NZEF for short.

It has been mentioned above that this is not a treatise on military administration. Neither is it an analysis of the soundness or otherwise of Field Service Regulations as they were from 1939 to 1945. On the whole the manuals stood the test of war, with such modifica- tionsmodifications as were made as the result of campaign lessons. The New Zealand Expeditionary Force was only one small part of the armies of the Commonwealth, and we accepted the basic principles of administration as decided in the War Office in London. We often made suggestions for improvement, sometimes were critical, and even frank in our criticism; but it was not within our powers to make changes in regulations that applied to all the armies that accepted British guidance.

The matters discussed here are those that came within the powers of New Zealand authorities to change or abolish at their will. Some came within the powers of the General Officer Commanding; others had to be referred to Army Headquarters or to the Government. All were New Zealand's business alone, and it rested with New Zealand to make such changes as were thought advisable.

The problems arose from the activities of a small national force – and here it should be remembered that the Expeditionary Force was only a temporary army, assembled for a special purpose. During the war it was hard to realise that militarily we had only an ephemeral existence, which would end with the end of the war. The force was a short-lived one, and its problems and their solutions must be considered in that light.

The problems and difficulties mentioned in this volume are those which in one way or another came to be dealt with by the headquarters of the Expeditionary Force. All units, all services, all controlling authorities in the force – medical, pay, chaplains, public relations and so on – had troubles of their own in abundance; but the majority of these were smoothed out on their own level, so to speak, and never became true ‘NZEF’ problems. To take one example out of many – it will be found that there is little reference here to rations. Once it had been agreed that New Zealand forces would accept the normal British ration – a decision that had to be taken on Governmental level – future troubles were on the level of the service concerned, in this case the Army Service Corps. The ration never became a problem for the headquarters of the force and so hardly figures in the volume.

We tried to settle our problems overseas and not refer them to New Zealand. Sometimes the New Zealand authorities were a little, or more than a little, aghast at what we had done on our own authority; but on the whole they accepted our action without cavilling at it. Naturally our judgment improved as time went on. If one is so inclined, it is possible to obtain some cynical amusement from the serious way with which in 1940 we handled ‘problems’ that by 1945 we would have considered trivialities.

Most of the problems discussed herein were long-term ones. They emerged gradually, fluctuated in intensity, and persisted for long periods, even for the whole of the war. The decisions we took were not ‘snap’ ones – in fact it often took us a long time, including a period of trial and error, before we arrived at an answer, which in the end would be only the best answer we could find and not necessarily the perfect one. In these circumstances exact dates are of little importance, which will serve to explain the frequent use of such expressions as ‘in early 1941’ or ‘towards the end of 1944’.

The word ‘problem’ will occur with monotonous frequency in this volume, leading readers to think that all our lives at the headquarters of the Expeditionary Force were spent in competing with such things, or wrestling with an unending series of difficulties. It is perhaps unfortunate after all that the volume is not a detailed history of the force; for if that were so it would be seen that most of our time was spent on day-to-day administration with no special difficulties, that everyone was carrying on steadily with normal work, and that there was from first to last between all concerned, whether in the force or outside it, what General Mark Clark calls ‘the routine of friendly collaboration’.

Calculated Risk, p. 405.

Perhaps the greatest lesson to be learnt from our experience is one that does not appear specifically elsewhere in the volume – that given a sense of unity and devotion to a common cause, there is no problem arising within a small national force that cannot be solved in amity.

The words ‘New Zealand’ are often used in the volume in a somewhat loose sense, not as referring to the geographical entity which is New Zealand, but to the authority in the country which at the moment was dealing with the problem under discussion and which might be either the Government or Army Headquarters.

It is realised that some of the points that are mentioned as creating problems have already been noted by the appropriate authorities, and have either been remedied in the years since the end of the war or have been marked down for future action; but this volume is a record of things as they were at the time and is unaffected by what has happened since.

In Appendix I will be found the Order of Battle of the Expeditionary Force as on 17 April 1941. At a later stage this will be analysed in some detail. At the moment attention must be drawn to the date of compilation, which was when the First Echelon had been overseas for a little over a year, and the Third Echelon for a little over six months. It will be seen that in addition to the units of the Division, shown in Serials 21 to 114, there were already a number of 2 NZEF units, shown in Serials 1 to 15, a number of non-divisional units, shown in Serials 123 to 147, and a number of base and training units, shown in Serials 151 to 205. During the war there were changes in all groups of units, as will be seen by referring to Appendix II, the Order of Battle as on 9 May 1945; but the separation into 2 NZEF, divisional, non-divisional, and base and training units persisted throughout the war.

It will thus be seen that to maintain the Division in the field as the spearhead of the Expeditionary Force required the services of many other units. One of the tendencies that will often be referred to in these pages will be the increasing desire of New Zealanders to be supported by other New Zealanders. As the war went on, so did more and more units spring up, all with the purpose of ‘servicing’ the fighting portion of the force. At the beginning we relied on the facilities provided by the United Kingdom. For a while in 1940, for instance, we did not even have a hospital of our own. At the end of the war we were nearly self-contained, and what is more, liked being self-contained. It has never been appreciated to what extent the fighting troops of the Division were maintained by their own countrymen in North Africa, and even more so in Italy.

There was a period, in late 1941, when there were as many troops outside the Division as inside it, i.e., the Division was only half the total force. For the greater part of the war, however, for every three men in the Division there were two outside it, i.e., the Division was three-fifths of the force. The Expeditionary Force as a whole reached a maximum in late 1941 with some 36,000 all ranks; but for most of the war it was about 32,000. A total of 76,000 all ranks passed through the force in its six years overseas.

To deal properly with the subject of this volume it is necessary to record a certain amount of history. In Part I therefore (Chapters 1 to 6) there will be found a brief narrative of the events from 1939 to 1946, including references to many problems. Part II (Chapters 7 to 17) sets out and discusses our main problems in more detail. There is inevitably some small amount of duplication, in that problems are often mentioned in Part I and later analysed in Part II.

The last chapter (18) attempts to summarise our lessons or conclusions.

As few abbreviations are used as is possible. Some names occur so often that it would be waste of space to spell them out in full every time. Such are ‘Headquarters 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force’ which figures as HQ 2 NZEF, and ‘Headquarters 2nd New Zealand Division’ which figures as HQ 2 NZ Division or Divisional Headquarters. A word of explanation may be given at this early point about the use of ‘GHQ’, meaning ‘General Headquarters’. While we were in North Africa and Syria the supreme command was exercised by General Headquarters, Middle East Forces. In Italy the supreme command was exercised by General Headquarters, Central Mediterranean Force. The abbreviation ‘GHQ’ is used for whichever headquarters was controlling us at the time. If a differentiation is required, the abbreviations ‘MEF’ or ‘CMF’ are used in addition.

The word ‘British’ is confusing. It is not proposed here to attempt to analyse its exact meaning, which varies with the context. In some ways New Zealanders like to think of themselves as ‘British’ and of the Expeditionary Force as forming part of the ‘British’ forces; but on the other hand the term ‘the British Army’ has a meaning which implies troops from the United Kingdom only, or these troops together with colonial troops which are the financial responsibility of the United Kingdom. In the eyes of most foreigners, including Americans, the term ‘British’ implies someone from the United Kingdom. While in fact the term was seldom used in official parlance, it is employed in this volume partly as a measure of convenience to imply troops from the United Kingdom, or a headquarters staffed in the main with United Kingdom officers. The government of the country, however, is referred to as the United Kingdom Government, and not the British Government.

Throughout the volume the word ‘we’ is used repeatedly. Generally it means HQ 2 NZEF, from the standpoint of which the volume is written. Sometimes, however, it means New Zealanders as a body. It is hoped that the context will make it clear which meaning should be taken.

Lastly, it would be pointless to ignore the fact that the author was associated with HQ 2 NZEF throughout the war. It is hoped, however, that his personal views have been subordinated to the views of the force as a whole or to the realities of the situation.

PART I

CHAPTER 1 2 NZEF is Formed

THE depression of 1931, as was only to be expected, produced a severe curtailment in defence expenditure in New Zealand. The years immediately preceding – 1924 to 1930 – had luckily been fruitful ones, and had been marked by the sending to England of a comparatively large number of regular officers to attend courses of every kind, both general and specialised. At one point 10 per cent of regular officers were training in England. The training thus received was disseminated throughout the forces and, combined with the patriotic self-sacrifice of Territorial officers, served to keep the army alive during the years from 1931 onwards, but only just alive. The abolition of the compulsory training scheme, the reductions in staff, and the disfavour into which all things military fell, meant that nothing productive could be done, and that the machinery to run an army almost ceased to exist.

This state of affairs lasted for three or four years. The principal loss was that there was little or no chance for any constructive thinking, and for the planning that is required if ever it is likely that an expeditionary force will be despatched overseas. It is surprisingly hard to convince a government that planning is a necessity, and that the visible mobilisation of units is only the culminating point of many years of invisible planning. The lack of opportunity for constructive work was the most regrettable feature of the lean years.

However, by 1934 the international outlook was becoming steadily darker and this produced a slight improvement in the way in which the army was regarded. The army staff was able to take the first elementary steps towards planning for mobilisation. A beginning was made with inter-departmental consultations on such subjects as manpower, internal security and censorship, and the first draft of regulations for mobilisation was put together. It soon became clear that with the ever-increasing complexity of modern war it would be impossible for the army to go far until there was some degree of planning on a national scale, and moreover that it would be impossible for the army to carry the whole load of preparing plans for the large number of government departments that would be involved. To start with there were not enough regular officers available; and, more important, the army was only one department among many and could not prescribe to other departments what they should do. Some slight degree of direction was received from the Government in late 1934. Army Headquarters was given a nebulous authority over other departments for war preparations, and consultation with other departments was increased; but it was still rather half-hearted.

In 1935 there was a change of government, the Labour Party coming into power. Expenditure on defence was against its past policy; but the Government showed considerable realism as the international situation deteriorated. During the years from 1936 onwards the air force was separated from the army and formed as a self-contained force under the guidance of an officer of the Royal Air Force. The army was given some small degree of encouragement and a little more money, although for the moment the air force was the favourite child; and, what was of importance to all arms and to the wider aspects of national readiness for war, an organisation was created similar to the Committee of Imperial Defence in Great Britain. In early 1937 the secretariat of this ‘Organisation for National Security’, as it was called, was set up in the Prime Minister's Department, where it was well placed to deal with the mass of departments whose activities in one way or another would concern the nation in time of war.

The activities of the Organisation for National Security are outside the scope of this volume; but among other work the formation of a strong inter-departmental Manpower Committee helped the army by devising a scheme whereby under compulsory service the calling-up procedure was the task of a civilian department, the army only receiving the men after such things as medical examinations and appeals were finished. There were other committees which not only helped the army directly but also served to impress on many departments that national war was not just the task of the armed forces, and that those forces would need a great deal of help and co-operation.

Despite all the work that was done at great speed from 1936 onwards, the army was not so ready for war in 1939 as it had been in 1914, always making allowances for changed circumstances. It is easy to destroy, and the lean years had almost destroyed the army; but it is a slow business to reconstruct, and the three or four years before the war were not enough.

Part of the work of the Organisation for National Security was to keep in touch with those branches of the United Kingdom Government that were concerned with planning for war, and in particular with the Dominions Office,

Now Commonwealth Relations Office.

through whose hands there passed the official communications between the governments of the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The New Zealand Government was kept informed as a matter of normal procedure of the proceedings of all international conferences, discussions and conversations, and of all events of interest, either by periodic (and frequent) printed bulletins, or by day-to-day cables. There was thus in principle nothing different in the procedure in 1938 and 1939 from that in previous years; but the frequency and urgency of the communications gradually intensified until in the weeks preceding 3 September 1939 cables were arriving throughout the twenty-four hours at intervals that became progressively shorter. Such information contained in these cables as was the concern of other government departments was duly passed to them by the Organisation for National Security.

All members of Cabinet were assembled in Wellington in the beginning of September, and Cabinet was in effect in permanent session from the 1st onwards. The period of waiting for fateful news was a strain, not eased on the morning of 3 September by an irritable argument concerning the exact New Zealand equivalent of 11 a.m. summer time in England. However, the right answer was discovered, and New Zealand entered the war at the same time as the United Kingdom, namely 9.30 p.m. local time.

Cabinet was in session from early on the evening of 3 September until dawn on the following day, passing emergency regulations to cover the action necessary in moving from peace to war, and among other messages informing the United Kingdom Government that New Zealand would be glad to receive suggestions regarding the methods by which she could best assist the common cause. The reply from the United Kingdom Government, received a few days later, while in some ways a diffident one, included the words, ‘We therefore hope that New Zealand will be able to exert her full national effort, including the preparation of her forces with a view to the despatch of an expeditionary force’.

Documents, Vol. I, p. 18.

The New Zealand Government then indicated to the United Kingdom that it proposed to enlist a vclunteer force for service in any part of the world, the First Echelon – so called – comprising about one-third of a division, plus certain additional units, to be taken into camp at an early date.

It will be noted that the term ‘echelon’ was used for this first portion of the Division, and was in due course applied to the other portions, which became known as the second and third echelons. The term, in its meaning of successive waves, had some background and appeared quite suitable. When the force went overseas, however, some confusion was caused by the fact that the extensive and important office concerned with all forms of record, including casualties, was known as ‘Second Echelon’. This unit was a permanency, the name was in accordance with normal British military procedure, and it was desirable that the name should be retained. Towards the middle of 1940, when preparations were being made in Egypt for the reception of the Second Echelon of the Expeditionary Force, i.e., the second contingent to sail, an attempt was made by headquarters overseas to abolish the term for the drafts coming from New Zealand and to use the term ‘contingent’ instead. However, the attempt was a failure, and we had to rely on context to make it clear which ‘second echelon’ we meant. Once all three contingents were overseas and welded into one force, the term as applied to contingents went into the background, and only came into the limelight again when the furlough scheme was being discussed in 1943. On occasion even today, as will be seen, it becomes necessary to say which ‘second echelon’ is meant.

It was on 6 September that Cabinet decided to mobilise a Special Force of 6600 men, to be organised as a brigade group, with staff for an overseas base and some elements of a divisional headquarters. Enlistments commenced on 12 September and on 3 October the men went into camp. Training was to be for three months; and if at the expiration of that time the force was not required, all ranks would be granted leave without pay until called up again. During September the Government decided to raise a full division for service overseas and the Special Force became the first of the three echelons in which the Division was to be raised and despatched. The public announcement that the Division was to go overseas was made by Mr Savage on 23 November.

Towards the end of September the United Kingdom Government proposed that each Dominion (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) should send a minister to London to consult on the war effort of their respective countries and on war matters generally. The Hon. P. Fraser therefore left New Zealand by air on 13 October, accompanied by a small staff, including a military adviser. The 13th was a Friday, the air route to England was in its infancy, and indeed the section between New Zealand and Australia was still in the stage of test flights only, so that perhaps it is not surprising that there was a large party to take farewell of the delegation in Auckland and to express the sincere hope that all would be well.

The delegation arrived in London on 27 October. During its visit it was arranged with the United Kingdom Government that the First Echelon should go to Egypt, which was to be the concentration area for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. There was no difficulty in agreeing to this; but a difficulty did arise over the dates of departure. Shortage of transports and shortage of escorts dictated that the three ‘groups’ constituting the first Australian contingent, and the one ‘group’ constituting the first New Zealand contingent, should travel in two convoys, each of two groups, and separated by an interval of two months. The strategical situation necessitated the first Australian troops leaving at the end of December so as to relieve United Kingdom troops in Palestine. New Zealand was offered the alternative of supplying one of the two groups in the first convoy, or of waiting until the second convoy, in which case the first convoy would consist of Australian troops only.

All planning so far had been based on the First Echelon leaving New Zealand at the end of January 1940, by which time the three months' training specified and the final leave would be over. To send the force by the first convoy meant that it would be sailing a month earlier than had been expected. The alternative before it was not conveyed to the New Zealand Government until the end of November 1939, so that the time in which to make a decision was short. Nevertheless the Government decided to send the force by the first convoy, one of the reasons – if not the compelling reason – leading it to this decision being the desirability that New Zealand's first contingent should sail at the same time as that of Australia.

There had also been a difference of opinion with the United Kingdom Government regarding the adequacy of the escorts to be provided, especially across the Tasman Sea. At one point Mr Fraser said firmly that the First Echelon would not sail until a stronger escort was provided. A conversation with that realist, Mr Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, produced the answer, and the battleship Ramillies duly appeared in Wellington in time to act as escort. The New Zealand Government of the day had shown concern about escorts in the First World War; and in the period between the wars the point had been recorded many times in state papers in England that escorts, probably stronger than normal, would be necessary for Dominion forces proceeding overseas. Nevertheless, when the occasion arose the point had either been lost sight of or had been minimised. It was not the only time during the Second World War that the New Zealand Government showed concern over sea escorts.

Concurrently with these matters Mr Fraser was in consultation with the United Kingdom Government over the question of a commander for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, no New Zealand officer being thought suitable for the post. Soon after the outbreak of war Major-General Freyberg, recalled from retirement, had offered his services to the New Zealand Government. He had been educated in New Zealand and had always kept up his connection with the country; but his military service had hitherto been with the British Army. Mr Fraser interviewed him soon after the delegation arrived in London, and after discussions with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and other persons who had a knowledge of General Freyberg, advised the New Zealand Government to offer the appointment of commander to him. The Government accepted this recommendation, and in turn General Freyberg accepted the appointment, the date being 22 November 1939.

From now on General Freyberg is referred to as ‘the GOC’, i.e., General Officer Commanding.

It was then hurriedly arranged that he should spend a short time in France with the British Expeditionary Force and should then fly to New Zealand, spending a few days in Egypt en route, and arriving in New Zealand before the First Echelon sailed.

During the course of discussions in London, which naturally ranged over a wide field, an incident took place that had unexpected consequences. At a conference at the War Office dealing with possible army contributions from the various Dominions, the War Office spokesman said that there was a shortage of technical engineer units, particularly those suitable for constructional work of any kind. The New Zealand military adviser remarked semi-jocularly that New Zealand had a forceful Minister of Public Works (the late Hon. R. Semple) who, he was sure, would just love to make some military use of all the wonderful mechanical equipment that he had been importing into New Zealand in the previous few years. No more was said at the time; but the remark must have been taken more seriously than it was meant, for in the course of the next twelve months New Zealand was asked to supply a number of non-divisional engineer units, and moreover complied with the request. We shall meet these units elsewhere in this volume.

Up to the end of November the one or two decisions referred to above had taken up the major part of the time of the delegation, and very few points of detail had been settled. At that point the military adviser left London on his way back to New Zealand, preceding Mr Fraser and the GOC by some ten days. His journey took him through Egypt, where he spent one night at Alexandria. He was somewhat embarrassed when he was met at the airport by senior staff officers of the British Army in Egypt and asked for decisions on a multitude of points – where we wanted to establish our training camp or camps, what equipment we would want, whether or not we would want special rations, whether we would want institutes to be provided by the British NAAFI – Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes – and so on. Even if the adviser had known the answers there was all too little time to settle the points, as he left on the next stage of his journey at 3 a.m. the following day; but in any case these points had not been settled at that stage, and all the adviser could do was to cable back to London to tell the GOC what points had been raised, so that if possible he should settle them when he in turn passed through Egypt. The intentions of the army authorities in Egypt were most praiseworthy. They were anxious to do their best for us and had little time to arrange accordingly.

Before leaving England in early December, the GOC was in fact empowered by the New Zealand Government to make the arrangements for the reception, training, and welfare of 2 NZEF in the initial stages. His main decision while in Egypt was to select sites at Maadi and Helwan for our base camps, Maadi being some six miles from Cairo and Helwan about fifteen. In making this decision he took into account the health of the troops and the suitability of the areas for training and recreation. Both sites were desert ones with a hard sandy surface, healthy and free from mosquitoes. In directions away from Cairo the desert was to all intents and purposes endless, with room to manoeuvre to one's heart's content with the satisfying knowledge that no one was being incommoded or dispossessed.

The GOC's selection was even better than he probably realised at the time, and both sites proved well chosen. As it happened, Helwan was little used by New Zealand troops, and after the middle of 1941 was handed over to the South African forces; but Maadi remained our base camp from first to last, a total period of over six years. By the end of that period, and indeed by the end of two or three years, it was as nearly the perfect base camp as is possible. However, in late 1939 and early 1940 it was merely an area in the desert, and everything remained to be done. During his visit, which lasted only four days, the GOC approved plans for water supply, sanitation, recreational buildings, hutting, and all the myriad items that go to the making of a large permanent camp. It was clear that not all this construction would be finished by the time the First Echelon arrived, so that a strict order of priority had to be drawn up, water supply and sanitation, for instance, being of greater importance than hutments, for which tents would provide an adequate temporary alternative.

Before leaving England the GOC had asked that a small advance party should be sent from New Zealand. A party numbering two officers and fifty other ranks for administrative duties duly arrived in Egypt in early January 1940, together with a party of some sixty all ranks for special courses in the various arms. At the same time some officers who had been posted to the force in England travelled to Egypt and joined the advance party.

Mr Fraser, accompanied by the GOC, arrived in New Zealand on Christmas Day 1939. In the period since Mr Fraser had left New Zealand in the middle of October, preparations for the despatch of the First Echelon had gone on apace. The change in sailing dates caused some slight curtailment of training, for it was still desired to give the troops their full final leave. It was hoped, however, that the loss of training time in New Zealand would be compensated for by better training facilities with more modern equipment in Egypt. In addition, the camps vacated would be immediately available for the Second Echelon, and the fact that one draft had actually sailed would be an undoubted stimulus to recruiting. It may be noted that the ‘more modern equipment’ proved not to be available in Egypt for many weary months. The slowness of arrival of this equipment was the cause of some restiveness in the New Zealand Government later in 1940.

The GOC stayed in New Zealand until the departure of the First Echelon on 5 January 1940. In that period he paid a hurried visit to the main mobilisation camps. In Wellington he had a few short discussions with the senior members of the divisional staff; but there was no time to settle anything, and the many points to be decided by a newly-assembled staff in control of a newly-assembled force had to be left until they would all be together in Egypt.

Above all, the GOC had a series of discussions with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and other members of Cabinet, and laid the foundations of an understanding with the Government, and a trust by it in its Expeditionary Force commander, that was of inestimable advantage in the years that followed. If his short visit had achieved nothing else it would have been worth while many times over.

On his way out to New Zealand the GOC had prepared a series of notes on certain policy and administrative matters. As a result of his discussions with the Government, the notes were embodied into two documents, one a charter given to him over the Prime Minister's signature, and the other a list of authorities granted to him, and signed by the Minister of Defence. These documents are analysed in Chapter 7. It will be sufficient to say at this stage that they gave the GOC comprehensive powers, including authority to form new units and reorganise and alter establishments as he thought advisable, and to set up such administrative headquarters as might be necessary. The powers so given were of the first importance in the subsequent history of the Expeditionary Force.

Among other points discussed between the Government and the GOC was whether or not New Zealand troops should draw a ration greater than the normal British ration. The GOC recommended that we should adhere to the British ration, and his advice was accepted. As a result New Zealand troops drew the British ration without augmentation throughout the war, except for a brief period in Maadi in early 1940. The GOC had no occasion at any later date to use the special powers given him by the Government and there is no ground for the common belief that we drew an extra large ration.

The Mediterranean Theatre map of Mediterranean and Black Sea areas

It was obvious to all that the sailing of the First Echelon a month sooner than had been expected meant that a number of points had either been settled hastily or had not been settled at all. Army Headquarters had done magnificent work in getting the echelon away in time; but there were many gaps. It was decided therefore that the AA & QMG

Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.

designate of the Division should stay in New Zealand for a further few weeks and should then fly to Egypt and join the force there.

During this period many small points were settled, one being that the registered cable address for the Expeditionary Force should be ‘Fernleaf Cairo’. At first it was thought that it might be necessary to have one for the Division also, and in this case the help of the Native Affairs Department (as it then was) was enlisted, in order that a suitable Maori word might be chosen. Its nomination was ‘Kokiri’, which the Maori dictionary defines as meaning ‘dart, rush forward, charge; a body of men rushing forward’. With such a meaning that now appears prophetic, it is perhaps unfortunate that the address was never used, as in the end all cable communications emanated from and were addressed to the headquarters of the Expeditionary Force and not to the headquarters of the Division.

The state of affairs, as it appeared to the AA & QMG, may be indicated by one incident which took place during January 1940. The Treasury had been pressing Army Headquarters to give some estimate of army expenditure for 1940 – a natural request, but difficult to answer. However, the Quartermaster-General at Army Headquarters drew up an estimate under various headings such as pay, equipment, transportation, and so on. He then brought the estimate to the AA & QMG and asked for his comments, which were given to the best of that officer's ability. The AA & QMG then added that an additional item should be included, namely ‘Cables, £1,000,000’, the reason being that so much had perforce been left unsettled when the First Echelon sailed that it was inevitable that there would be a flood of cables passing between Army Headquarters and headquarters overseas. The remark was meant humorously, but with a measure of seriousness. In years to come, when the GOC was a bit aghast at the length of some cable that had been despatched, the same officer used to say, ‘Never mind. Remember that there is always a million pounds on the estimates to cover this.’

However, despite haste, the first portion of the Expeditionary Force had sailed, and the scene changes to Egypt.

CHAPTER 2 The First Year Overseas

IN the middle of February 1940 the First Echelon arrived in Maadi Camp, and for the first time the troops, together with brigade and divisional staffs, were assembled in one spot and could take stock. It was the first time that the divisional staff had been together. The staff officers knew each other, as they were all drawn from the regular forces; but their peacetime training had never included divisional staff-work by an integrated staff. Moreover, as indicated in Chapter 1, it was only in the two or three years before the war that any life had come back into the army after the almost moribund period from 1931 onwards. The staff were thus inexperienced and had to learn their duties like anyone else, and that at the same time as the troops they were supposed to train.

Moreover, the staff did not know their commander nor he them. It is not unfair to say that at that time the GOC was still thinking of the British regular army, and despite the time that he had spent in New Zealand did not truly understand the New Zealand way of looking at things. For a month or so the routine prescribed was more that to be expected from British regular units. Commander and staff went through an awkward period of neither understanding the other. To some extent work suffered accordingly; but salvation lay in the common desire to work hard and give of one's best. By the middle of May commander and staff were coming to understand each other, and the influence of the GOC was beginning to produce that feeling of unity which, as much as anything, led to the triumphs of the years that followed; but it must be repeated that there was an awkward period at first.

Everyone took himself seriously, which was no doubt right and proper. The result was that a lot of effort went into things that in retrospect seem trivial – small points of dress and protocol, for instance. We had not learnt the judgment of what really matters that can only come with experience in the field.

Those first few months in Maadi can only be described as frenzied, certainly from the administrative standpoint. A group of partially-trained units was under the care of an inexperienced staff. Every form of administrative instruction had to be thought out and promulgated; every service had to disseminate a knowledge of its routine; every sort of deficiency had at least to be recorded; and while all the internal turmoil was going on in Maadi there was a steady series of cable discussions taking place with Army Headquarters in New Zealand. Divisional routine was new to both staff and units and had to be established by trial and error. Units had to learn the importance of such apparently dull things as Second Echelon records. The staff had to listen to an unending wail about the lack of this and that, and how the war was to all intents and purposes lost already unless some unit received some particular item of stores at once. There was a shortage of nearly everything. Transport deficiencies were for the moment the most important, for we now realised that there were really not going to be any horses as in the First World War, and that motor transport of some sort was the only way of getting about, even for individuals – which explains the appearance among units of odd vehicles purchased on the Cairo second-hand market.

At an early date Headquarters discovered one unexpected deficiency – shorthand-typists. We had not realised how much shorthand-typing had become a woman's job, and how few men are fully qualified. Even if suitable clerks could be found, it generally transpired that the one thing they did not want to do in the army was clerical work. To the headquarters staff this was more than a joke, for it meant that all memoranda and instructions had to be written out in longhand, and then took longer to type than normal because some of the clerks were only one-finger typists. At this stage in the formation of the force this was a real drag on progress. The clerks we had worked manfully, but were woefully few in number.

Maadi Camp was far from finished, alike in accommodation, water supply, lighting or roading, Luckily the weather was pleasant, and at that stage we were prepared to put up with anything, so great was our keenness.

To the civilian Egyptian contractor we were little lambs asking to be shorn. Even in one or two contracts affecting the whole camp, and effected with the assistance of the more experienced British authorities, we were badly sold, one example being the cinema contract for Maadi and Helwan camps, and another the laundry contract. One can understand the wails of administrative officers when confronted with so-called ‘contractors’ who had not the slightest intention of adhering to their side of the contract, and who were past masters at the art of getting things so mixed up that they won out in the end by the sheer exhaustion of the other side. There were cases of contractors who agreed to terms apparently favourable to us for the sole purpose of getting a foot in the camp, and thereafter living on the pickings – the odd bits and pieces that could be scavenged from around the camp, the odd deal in cigarettes or more harmful items on the sideline, the odd item stolen from stores and so on. The fact that the staff officers concerned were incorruptible was incomprehensible to the Egyptian contractor, who was prepared if pressed to ‘come across’ with anything up to a motor car.

In the original plans drawn up by British headquarters, accommodation for the headquarters of the NZEF had been earmarked either in Cairo or in Maadi, the ‘garden township’ located just on the Cairo side of Maadi Camp. To the surprise of the British headquarters, the GOC said that he intended to make his headquarters, both office space and living room, within Maadi Camp. The plans were therefore amended to include a number of office hutments, placed where there happened to be a slightly higher level in the camp. The site was soon known as ‘the hill’, generally with an epithet of some sort. Working conditions were not as good as they would have been outside the camp; but the GOC's decision was a wise one, and the first step had been taken to weld staff and troops together. The consciousness that ‘Div HQ’ was living in the same camp, with the same difficulties of indifferent accommodation and lighting, went far to stop the idea growing up of a gilded staff.

In the early stages the office hutments were merely four walls and a roof, with open spaces where windows should have been. Tables and chairs were few in number, and lighting came from pressure paraffin lamps, of which there were also too few. It is perhaps small wonder that an appeal was made by one or two offices whose work was mainly indoors, of which Second Echelon (i.e., Records) was an example, to be allowed to move into proper office accommodation in Maadi or Cairo. There they would find all the amenities of peacetime, including proper furniture and lighting. To refuse an application merely because it is thought that people should be uncomfortable in wartime would be silly; but in this case there was more in it than that, and supported by the GOC's decision about headquarters, we were firm that everyone should stay in the camp. With one exception all the administrative machinery of 2 NZEF in Egypt remained in Maadi Camp throughout, cheek by jowl with the troops they were maintaining. The only exception was the Chief Post Office, which after a year or so moved into warehouse accommodation in Cairo because it was clear that the handling of mails would be improved thereby.

Life in Cairo, including in this the life of the British troops in Egypt, was still very much on a peacetime basis, and it was often hard to realise that we were preparing to take our part in a great war. Everyone was kind to us, invitations came thick and fast, until the hospitality became embarrassing, and the more senior officers had to give serious thought to where they were heading. An unending round of parties was pleasant; but we had not come to Egypt for that.

With Maadi township our relations were inevitably close. It was controlled by the Maadi Land Company, a private company with a franchise from the Egyptian Government to develop what was basically a desert area, and very well it did it. The township was a garden city, thanks to water from the Nile – and it was here that our first contacts came, as Maadi-Camp drew its water initially through the company's pumping stations. We had other official contacts; but the best-known contact was an unofficial one coming from a welfare institute started by the residents within a few days of the arrival of our troops. This was the famous ‘Maadi Tent’ which started in that form on a site at the camp end of the township. It will be referred to again when we come to deal with welfare.

Our internal problems provided the greater part of our work during 1940; but at the same time we had to learn the British methods of command and administration, and to find our way through the mass of orders and instructions issued not only by Headquarters, British Troops in Egypt (HQ BTE), but also by the comparatively new authority, General Headquarters, Middle East Forces (GHQ MEF). We were in almost every way dependent on the help of what was already a sorely-tried British staff. That help was freely and generously given. Some of our officers took to the association with the British units a bit too kindly. Officers of more than one unit were found wearing the ‘caps, coloured’ that belonged to the corresponding British corps, instead of the peaked hat or cap that alone were the head-dress of 2 NZEF. One or two of our service heads became so closely linked up with their seniors in the British service as to allude to the latter as their ‘commanding officers’. We had to tell them that they had only one commanding officer, namely the GOC. Without realising it, we were in fact taking some halting steps towards making the Expeditionary Force an entity.

By the end of March 1940 we had taken stock and had some idea where we were – not that our whereabouts, so to speak, was entirely satisfactory, particularly in manpower. The First Echelon had consisted in the main of one-third of a division, organised into units or recognised fractions of units. The only items in the echelon not forming part of a division were a base pay office, base records, both small in numbers, a party of twelve nurses, three YMCA staff, and a unit entitled a ‘Base Depot’. The purpose of the first four of the above items was obvious. The Base Depot had been included by Army Headquarters because it was sure that we would in due course want some sort of base, and this particular unit was the only one with a suitable name that it could find in British war establishments. The idea was sound; but the unit numbered only 4 officers and 26 other ranks, and in itself was of little use. Further personnel for the unit were scheduled to travel with the Second and Third Echelons, due in May and September respectively; but it was soon clear that this one unit with the comprehensive title was not going to be the answer, and that we could not wait until September to form some stable base organisation. In the meantime the service units of the Division – signals, ASC, and medical – had to adapt themselves to the running of the camp, which meant that to some degree they were hampered in their proper training.

With each of the Second and Third Echelons it was intended to send a general hospital, and one or two other medical units were scheduled for future despatch; but with this exception the extent to which 2 NZEF would be self-contained behind the Division had never been thought out. We had to set to work and make some sort of a plan; but the trouble was that we had no spare men, and none were due to arrive for many months. Each unit at the moment had a party of extra men with it entitled ‘first reinforcements’; but sometimes it appeared that these had only a theoretical existence, as no one could separate them from the body of the unit. Even if they could be discovered, normal wastage in the unit soon absorbed them; and, in any case, they were intended as reinforcements to the unit and not as a pool for general purposes.

Even after only a month in Maadi it was clear that in due course we would want holding or training depots for reinforcements, unless we were to be dependent on British establishments. At this moment (March 1940) we were exactly in that position for we did not have even a hospital of our own, and our nurses worked in a British hospital. It would be waste of time to labour the point, for it was obvious that we would have to form our own depots, etc., even if only for the reason that New Zealanders would not be happy in British depots, and that our ideas of training did not necessarily coincide with those of the United Kingdom. We must also have a depot to look after men who were waiting to go back to New Zealand. Our pay, records, and postal units all needed setting up in a sound and substantial form in order to allow for expansion in the future.

The medical position was the immediate problem, as neither New Zealand staff nor New Zealand patients were happy in a British hospital. So we had to organise a hospital of our own from what can only be called bits and pieces. Our only field ambulance had to part with some of its personnel, and others were drawn from all over the echelon. So was formed our first hospital in the Grand Hotel in Helwan, a site that with some ups and downs and changes of title we retained to the last.

Negotiations to take over the hotel, discussions with the British authorities about costs, and the large amount of constructional work to be done took some months, and it was not until July that the hospital was ready to take patients. The question of costs was clouded for the reason that at the time we were not sure how the British authorities were to be reimbursed, always on the assumption that somehow or other New Zealand would bear the whole cost.

The first new unit to be formed officially by 2 NZEF overseas was ‘HQ 2 NZEF Base’, which appeared in orders on 4 April 1940. The ‘Base Depot’ was disbanded, and small separate sections were formed for Legal, Pay, Postal and other administrative duties, all to be the parents of some lusty children in the years to come. ‘HQ Base’ later became ‘HQ Maadi Camp’.

Already we had had cause to be thankful for the extensive powers granted to the GOC, for we were able to disband units and form new ones and establish fresh administrative machinery without having to refer to New Zealand. Not for the only time during the war, the various British headquarters were envious of us.

On 30 March there was held a memorial service for the late Prime Minister, Mr Savage. Owing to a misunderstanding on our part, the service was first arranged for the Anglican cathedral; and it was only after a hurried cable to New Zealand that a last-minute change was made, and the service transferred to a Roman Catholic church in Cairo.

During April we held a series of conferences with COs and heads of corps to wrestle with a few problems that had arisen and which seemed urgent. Examples are extra-duty pay, hat badges, shoulder titles, and patches and head-dress. With extra-duty pay we were trying to rationalise a regulation which gave the pay to several tradesmen who did not figure in the force at all, and denied it to many hundreds who did. The point is dealt with in detail in Chapter 8. Suffice it to say now that not only did we not find a good answer in 1940, but we never did at any stage.

The other items mentioned above concerned dress and engendered the outburst of emotion that always seems to arise over military insignia. The points are discussed further in Chapter 17; but it may be said that here we had greater success, and did find an answer, which with some grumbling was accepted. To be fair, some of the points had officially been settled in New Zealand before the echelon sailed, and the revival of them was due to naughtiness in some units – or in all, for all shared in it to some degree.

As an example of taking things too seriously there may be mentioned the case of secrecy of paybooks. Soon after our arrival there was published an order in British General Orders to the effect that in a man's paybook there was to appear no reference to his unit, i.e., to the name and number of his battalion, field regiment, etc., the idea being to prevent the enemy from finding out from captured paybooks what British formations were figuring in the order of battle. Our paybooks offended against this order to the extent that they disclosed that the holder was a member of a New Zealand unit. After discussions with British Headquarters we agreed that our paybooks would have to be altered, and, with the Government's approval, went to the trouble of having thousands of new books printed in Egypt omitting any offending reference to New Zealand. It was a case of an absurdly strict adherence to the letter of the order, for of course nothing could prevent a New Zealand soldier from acknowledging his nation if captured; and, moreover, the addresses of next-of-kin were retained in the books, most of course being in New Zealand. The attempts that were made later in the war to disguise New Zealanders were quite ineffective, for there was always something that differentiated them from English, Scotch, Welsh or Irish. The action we took was then without justification and arose from our keen desire at the time to do everything that was right. Had the same point arisen a year or more later we would have ignored it.

In April 1940 we had our first application to return to New Zealand for compassionate reasons. The cases were difficult to handle as we were dependent on the aspects as put forward by the men; but after inquiries from other officers who might know the men and their circumstances we made the decision ourselves. Compassionate leave is discussed further in Chapter 15.

The realisation that we were going to want men to form our base establishments, combined with the normal need for reinforcements – or ‘replacements’, which is a better word – for the Division, turned our attention to the size of future drafts from New Zealand. Strictly speaking, this was primarily the task of Army Headquarters and not ours; but naturally we were interested to know what we might receive, and there was a lot to be said for the two headquarters acting together. Reinforcement drafts are normally based on the losses to be expected among the troops in the theatre of war, and for this purpose there were compiled a series of ‘wastage tables’, which gave in the form of monthly percentages the losses that might be expected in the various arms of the service under varying conditions of combat. We took it on ourselves to obtain from the New Zealand Army Liaison Officer in London the latest War Office figures for the wastage tables, and then proceeded to work out what we thought we ought to get. At the same time Army Headquarters in New Zealand was working on the same task. At first the two sets of calculations did not agree. At one stage we were so confused ourselves that we had recourse to an actuary to do the calculations. In the end we came to agreement with New Zealand for the figures that were to apply to the first genuine reinforcement draft, the ‘Fourth Reinforcements’ so called, by which was meant the fourth contingent to leave New Zealand. The question of reinforcement drafts is dealt with further in Chapter 13.

At an early stage (March 1940) the proposal was made from Australia that in due course an Anzac Corps should be formed, comprising two Australian divisions and the New Zealand division. In principle the proposal was approved by New Zealand and there for the moment the matter rested. It served to make us give some thought to the supply of corps troops, in which we would undoubtedly have to share – another unknown quantity in the future expansion of 2 NZEF.

In the latter part of April, ending on Anzac Day, there was held the first full-scale exercise, in which the whole of the First Echelon took part. During the exercise the divisional staff, especially the administrative staff, found themselves in a dual role. On the one side were their duties as staff of the Division, necessitating their constant attention to movements in the field and to the immediate needs of the fighting troops. On the other side were all the general administrative matters piling up in Maadi, nothing to do with the exercise, but needing immediate attention. An example was the plan for the reception and location of the Second Echelon, an event which among other things would involve fresh construction at Helwan Camp and the transfer of part of the First Echelon from Maadi to Helwan. All the time there were arriving from New Zealand a stream of cables, many requiring a speedy answer. There were many knotty expeditionary force problems, for it must be said that we were in the process of establishing a body of ‘case law’ for domestic issues of a most varied nature. During the exercise some of the staff spent a lot of time tearing backwards and forwards between the exercise area and their offices in Maadi. It was not a very satisfactory situation.

By the end of April a mock embargo was placed on the use of the word ‘essential’ at Divisional Headquarters; for day after day commanding officers and service heads came into Headquarters and declared vigorously that their need of the moment was ‘absolutely essential’, and that their activities would come to a dead stop unless they received the item at once. We used to maintain that true essentials were surprisingly few. Many months later, when we were taking the first steps to form a mobile bath unit, the staff officer concerned, in a memorandum on the subject to the chief administrative officer, said: ‘In this case I think you will agree that for the proper functioning of the unit, a supply of water is highly desirable if not essential’. He had the last word.

So far welfare had not caused us any concern. The number of troops was not great and did not for the moment strain the amenities provided by various welfare organisations in Cairo and Maadi, and by the YMCA and NAAFI institutes in Maadi Camp. Egypt was a new land to the New Zealander, and its marked difference from anything most of the men had ever seen before generated a curiosity and interest which in themselves helped to pass the time when off duty. The equally marked irritations of Egypt arose later on.

The cinema contract in Maadi Camp has already been mentioned as one of the matters we had not handled too well. The troops showed their opinion on one occasion by pushing over the end of the building, not a difficult thing to do as it was flimsy. We tried to put pressure on the contractor to show better films, and while as time went on there was an improvement and a second contractor was allowed into the camp, the cinema arrangements were among our poorer efforts.

We were aware that there was in New Zealand a National Patriotic Fund, but up to this time (March and April 1940) we knew nothing about its administration, nor for what it could be used. We then discovered that a Commissioner would be leaving with the Second Echelon, and that in the meantime the senior YMCA secretary was acting in his place. In a first discussion with the secretary it transpired that his instructions left him a free hand to determine whether or not to spend money on any special welfare feature, and that in fact he had power to decide what was or was not desirable. There seemed to us to be dangers in this authority, which would take away from the GOC the right to make what he thought were the most suitable arrangements for the welfare of his troops. Our opinion was passed on to New Zealand; but the course of events eclipsed this particular problem for the time being. Our immediate needs, which were small, were met by a grant from the acting Commissioner.

By May 1940 certain weaknesses in officers had become apparent, in a few cases in comparatively senior ones. For the first time we heard the appeal that appointments should be found for these officers with units outside the Division – reasonable enough at first sight, but with some potential dangers, for which see Chapter 12.

In the middle of May Divisional Headquarters made an attempt to get some order into the mass of instructions that had been issued since we arrived. A series of what were called ‘special circulars’ were issued, containing in summarised form all the major matters that had formed the subject of any orders to date. In effect they formed Administrative Standing Orders while in Egypt. The circulars summarised orders on (inter alia) accounting for stores, pay and regimental funds, postal, records, relations with Egyptians, maintenance of mechanical transport, leave, dress and clothing, supplies, courts martial, and matters especially affecting officers – a mixed bag. The idea was a noble one, and the problem tackled in this way – the dissemination of orders in an easy way – was one of the most intractable throughout the war. It is discussed further in Chapter 17.

During May the course of the war had for the first time influenced the action taken by units. The collapse of France and the possible entry of Italy into the war brought us a bit closer to reality. We practised dispersal of tents and transport to minimise loss from bombing; and one or two units were under orders for internal security duties in Cairo, in particular in areas where Italian property existed. We were quite thrilled.

The Second Echelon sailed at the beginning of May; but on the 15th we were told by cable from London that the convoy including our contingent was being diverted to Capetown en route to the United Kingdom. Some degree of turmoil followed. Part of the First Echelon had already moved to Helwan Camp to make room for the Second in Maadi, and we were caught in mid-air. Any further moves were cancelled. Then for a while we waited to see what was going to happen to the Second Echelon, and in particular how long it was likely to remain in England.

At the beginning of June Italy entered the war, and such small operational moves as had been arranged for us were put into effect. Among other action, we had to adopt a blackout in Maadi Camp, arranged in hutments by a combination of shutters and exterior curtains. Many of the hutments were still without electric light and were using paraffin lamps. With all doors and windows shut, and in increasingly hot weather, the temperature inside became wellnigh insupportable. There was a second appeal from the Records staff to be allowed to move into Cairo; but we were adamant.

By the first week in June it became clear that the stay of the Second Echelon in England, after its arrival later in the month, would be longer than at first thought. The impending collapse of France would leave England open to invasion, and the echelon might well find itself engaged in active operations before its normal training could be completed. The GOC decided therefore first, that certain staff and service officers should go to England to assist the echelon, and then that he should go himself. The First Echelon had had over three months’ training in Egypt and could well be left with a reduced staff to control it, especially as the chance of active operations was then remote. The Second Echelon was comparatively untrained. It was in any case desirable that both echelons should come under the same guidance. In the long run, moreover, it was now by no means certain where the final concentration of 2 NZEF would take place. It was possible that the First Echelon would join the Second instead of the other way about, although it must be said that the United Kingdom Government was definite throughout that the Second Echelon would ultimately come to Egypt.

The GOC left for England on 17 June. During this month an Australian division was moved from Palestine and accommodated in Helwan Camp, and the First Echelon was again concentrated in Maadi. The difficulties of cable communication and the fact that the GOC was for some time immersed in detailed control in England meant that to some degree the First Echelon went its own way, and we found later on that the two echelons had amassed somewhat different volumes of ‘case law’. It was an example of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of running a force in two equal portions in two widely separated theatres of war. Headquarters in Egypt was still cabling New Zealand almost daily about some still-unsettled point. Once or twice we found that a similar cable had gone from England on the same point. Altogether it was a confusing time, only supportable because after a month or so the probability of the Second Echelon coming to Egypt increased and the separation was seen to be of limited duration.

In July 2 NZEF in Egypt helped to form what was first called the Long Range Patrol, but better known by its later name of Long Range Desert Group. In the beginning we were supposed merely to be lending men from the Divisional Cavalry, 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion and 7 Anti-Tank Regiment so that they could get experience and later come back to their units. It soon became obvious that the training of the patrol would take a long time, and that at the end of the training the men would be highly skilled in a specialised type of operation. A request later on for the return of the men created a minor crisis, as will appear later in this chapter.

We were asked in July to make some thousands of dummy tanks and lorries – or trucks, as we were beginning to call the vehicles. The dummies were to be made out of scrim and light battens, roughly painted with designs which would deceive observers from a distance and particularly from the air. They were to be placed in the front areas in the Western Desert, a term which now began to assume some importance. Our engineers who supervised the task gave a fine example of mass production. It took four days to make the plans, and thereafter gangs of men worked all round the clock and the job was finished within the time of seven days that had been prescribed.

By August the Government in New Zealand was becoming restive about the equipment of the force; but the fact was that we were doing better than United Kingdom units in the area, the British authorities concerned being, as always, most generous to the troops from the Commonwealth. At this time our issues of equipment had to be handled in a manner almost the same as in peacetime, i.e., they had to be checked and signed for, the arrangement with the United Kingdom Government being that our initial issues were to be paid for at actual value. The issues would have gone smoothly if the enemy had not intervened and started operations before we had finished. As it happened, units were moving away from Maadi while issues were still going on, and altogether it was not the nice, clean transaction we would have wished for.

During August and September most of the First Echelon moved out on to the lines of communication in the Western Desert from just outside Alexandria for two hundred miles westwards. Meanwhile, back at Maadi Camp we were preparing to receive the Third Echelon; and owing to signs of advance on the part of the Italian troops in North Africa, the balance of importance, as far as 2 NZEF was concerned, was swinging over from England and the Second Echelon to North Africa and the combined First and Third Echelons.

In September it was decided to form an Officer Cadet Training Unit (OCTU) of our own. A suitable officer was chosen as OC and a site arranged within Maadi Camp. At that point British Headquarters in Egypt heard of our proposals and put forward a plea that we should make use of its facilities, attaching some New Zealand staff if we wished. We accepted this offer; and thereafter for some years our cadets went to British OCTUs. The pros and cons of this action are discussed further in Chapter 13.

In the middle of September the GOC arrived back from England. Towards the end of the month the Third Echelon arrived from New Zealand and was accommodated in Maadi Camp, the First Echelon being away in the Western Desert. The Second Echelon was now scheduled to arrive in Egypt towards the end of the year, so that the concentration of the Division was becoming-something more than an academic point.

It was a matter for satisfaction that the GOC and his staff were again in one place instead of in two; but now a major problem had to be faced, namely the administrative control of the Expeditionary Force as a whole. The arrival with the Third Echelon of the first of a series of non-divisional units, the steady increase in base requirements if not in base units, the likelihood that before long the Division would move away into a theatre of war, and the need to have some one fixed point from which to keep in touch with New Zealand – all these indicated that the staff of the Division could not at the same time look after the administration of the whole force. Towards the end of September, therefore, the AA & QMG at the time removed himself with a small staff from Divisional Headquarters and formed a separate ‘Headquarters 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force’ which was so entitled. With effect from 1 October 1940 the separation became official. Head- quartersHeadquarters New Zealand Division remained responsible for all matters affecting operations of the Division and for the administration of the Division in the field. Headquarters 2 NZEF became responsible for the training and organisation of the force as a whole, for base establishments and line-of-communication units, including the non-divisional engineers, for the domestic administration of the force – promotions, pay, welfare, publicity, legal affairs and so on – and for communicating with New Zealand. Many heads of services became part of the new headquarters – medical, chaplains, legal, pay, among others. The administrative head was entitled ‘Officer in Charge of Administration’ or ‘OICA’ for short. The newly-formed ‘HQ Base’ became directly responsible for Maadi Camp.

The Third Echelon had been greeted with a flood of orders and circulars, embodying everything that the First Echelon had absorbed during its six months in Egypt. It had to be brought into the picture, and we did our best to cushion the stunning effect of such a mass of words by explanatory talks; but one way and another we probably overdid it, for when later on the Second Echelon arrived, there was no time to tell it anything before it went off to Greece, and it must be admitted that it seemed to get on very well. This question of the distribution of orders is mentioned again in Chapter 17.

With the Third Echelon arrived a Broadcasting Unit, the first ‘organ of publicity’ that we had received. So far we had no proper war correspondent and had been forced to make a temporary appointment from among our own personnel. The Government had decided to keep the appointment of correspondents under its own control, and not to allow direct representatives of the press. Naturally this decision had caused some heart-burning in New Zealand, one of the results being a long delay before any appointment was made at all. It will be seen later that it was the middle of 1941 before this was straightened out.

Towards the end of October HQ 2 NZEF moved into a new block of offices, which turned out to be over a hornet's nest. For some days the staff, including OICA, were slaying hornets, much to the delight of the troops at large. It was not a very auspicious start for the new headquarters, although it may have been prophetic.

The Division now started to concentrate at Helwan Camp, the Australians having moved out into the Western Desert. The Third Echelon was intact; but in recent months the First Echelon, as already mentioned, had been employed on duties that had absorbed it almost entirely. Quite naturally the GOC now wanted to concentrate the two echelons in preparation for the arrival of the Second Echelon from England. Advanced parties of this echelon were already arriving.

There were great troubles in getting back our detached units. At one stage it nearly became a matter between Governments, as the GOC felt compelled to inform our own Government of the troubles he was having, and to ask for its support. In the end GHQ released the troops; but the affair left some irritation in both British and New Zealand headquarters. It was not the last time that this sort of trouble was to occur. The problem is discussed at greater length in Chapter 11. It will be enough to say here that while one's sympathies must go to the sorely-tried British headquarters which was wrestling with problems of a magnitude that we did not perhaps appreciate, this concentration of our troops, the first we had had, was essential in the true meaning of the word.

By this time we had received a few real reinforcements and were able to go on with the formation of base units. We were also able to form the Long Range Patrol as a separate unit with its own establishment instead of looking on it as a detached part of the Divisional Cavalry. It was the first non-divisional unit we formed overseas, and in many ways the most notable.

At the end of October, partly as a result of the controversy over the return of our detached troops, the GOC issued an instruction that was to have far-reaching effects, namely that the primary role of our reinforcements must be to keep the Division up to full establishment, and that until this was done no troops would be available for duties outside the Expeditionary Force. It thus transpired that in the years to come the New Zealand Division was more often than not nearer to full establishment than any other Allied division, and its value as a fighting formation was much increased thereby. There were times when we did not have enough men to fill the gaps – late 1942 was an instance – and there were times also when we felt compelled to help GHQ to our own detriment; but on the whole the principle was adhered to throughout. British Headquarters had to find men for a myriad administrative duties – duties which were of advantage to the New Zealand Division among others – and many times it cast envious eyes on our pool of reinforcements at Maadi, especially as on occasion the men would be in depots for weeks or months at a time waiting to go forward when required. Further attention is given to this point in Chapter 11.

While the Australians were at Helwan our attention had been drawn to a photographic identity card which their troops carried in the back of their paybooks. We gave some thought to adopting this idea ourselves, particularly as there had already been many cases of theft of paybooks in Egypt, the suspicion being that they would later be used by spies as proof of their identity. The Australians were most co-operative, and even offered to lend us their personnel to carry out the work. However, we decided against it, one of our reasons being that we thought the war had already gone on for a long time, and that there would be too much work involved in making up the leeway. The decision may have been right, but the reason was weak. Our war diary says that various difficulties precluded the adoption of the system ‘at this late stage’ – November 1940!

In November the GOC felt it right to offer a word of caution to the Government about the increasing number of non-divisional engineer units, for we had just been advised of the formation of two additional companies. It appeared to us that the Government was overdoing it in this field, and that the manpower of the country would be unduly strained thereby. At the time, moreover, the Division had not been in action, and no one knew what the future would bring forth.

With the exception of some service troops, including signals and ASC, no New Zealanders took part in the first Libyan campaign in December 1940 and later; but the enemy was captured in such unexpectedly large numbers that the pre-campaign arrangements to guard prisoners broke down, and we had to come to the help of GHQ and supply men for guards. Some scores of reinforcements found themselves attached to prisoner-of-war camps at various points in the desert near Cairo. The duty lasted for a few months until the prisoners could be moved out of Egypt to England, Canada, and elsewhere. The incident is of no great importance in itself; but it serves to show that when it came to the point, despite brave words, we had to help in what may be called the communal duties of the army at large.

Following on the brief campaign in France in May–June 1940, a committee had been set up in England to report on the campaign and to make recommendations for alterations in tactics, arms, equipment, and organisation. In December the report came into our hands in Egypt, and the GOC decided that we should adopt some of the proposals. Headquarters had a short but intensive series of discussions with senior officers of the various arms and services in 2 NZEF, followed by calculations on manpower and the preparation of detailed proposals for New Zealand; for while the GOC had the powers to make what alterations he thought desirable, we had to get the men from the homeland and had to give New Zealand notice when it was proposed to make any marked changes in the numbers of the various arms. As it happened the work was abortive, for the Division moved to Greece before finality had been reached; and when the Greece and Crete campaigns were over the picture had changed and the GOC had his own ideas about the future. It was not to be the last time that planning for future reorganisation was to go for nothing.

Towards the end of 1940 and early in 1941 there were several small additions to the administrative machinery of 2 NZEF. An archivist was appointed in the hope that our historical records would be in good order at the end of the war, and in the hope also that regimental war diaries would be of more use than after the First World War. An official artist was provisionally appointed, pending further discussions with New Zealand. A concert party was formed, soon to be known as the ‘Kiwis’ and to achieve a notable reputation. A club with a comprehensive range of activities was opened in Cairo for the use of all ranks.

Throughout our time in Egypt, after what may be called the ‘honeymoon’ period of the first few months, there had been complaints from the troops about the service given by the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes (the NAAFI) which at that time were our only fully-stocked army canteens. The Australians ran their own canteen service, as had been seen during the time the Australian division had been in Helwan Camp in August and September 1940. Human nature being what it is, our troops decided at once that the Australian system was better than ours; but even without this belief, there were sufficient grounds for an inquiry into the two systems. A special committee was appointed, therefore, to investigate the Australian system. After a visit to the Australian camps in Palestine, the committee recommended that 2 NZEF should, with certain reservations, continue to use NAAFI, and should not set up its own organisation. This investigation is discussed further in Chapter 16; but it may be said here that the decision, while correct in principle, did not take enough account of the fondness of the New Zealander for his home products, and to that extent was short-sighted. As will be seen, in the end we did have our own organisation.

One somewhat thorny problem was finally settled in the beginning of 1941, namely the number and denominations of chaplains. The Senior Chaplain had travelled to England with the Second Echelon and did not arrive in Egypt until late in 1940, which will explain the delay. Both numbers and denominations of chaplains were settled without much difficulty; and while numbers increased as the war went on, the basic principle covering the denominations stood the test. Details are given in Chapter 8.

In December 1940 and January 1941 we received our first full reinforcement draft – the first and second sections of the 4th Reinforcements – and the manpower situation was good. The third and last section of the 4th Reinforcements did not arrive until March, and included several more non-divisional units. With it travelled the third of our hospitals, so completing our medical arrangements for the time being.

The steady stream of arrivals and departures at Suez led us at the end of 1940 to form a Port Detachment of our own there to speed up transit through the port, or at the least to act as a New Zealand liaison mission with the British movement staff.

In February the units of the Second Echelon started arriving in Egypt from England, having been delayed about two months beyond our earlier expectations. The echelon went to Helwan Camp, where now the whole Division was assembled. It appeared that before long great events would happen.

At this point attention is drawn to Appendix I, which gives the Order of Battle of 2 NZEF as at 17 April 1941, but in effect as it was in early March, when the Division was on its way to Greece.

Serial numbers 1 to 15 show the various ‘organs’ of 2 NZEF as a whole that existed at the time. The ‘2 Echelon’ is of course the expanded Records Office.

Serial numbers 21 to 114 call for no comment in this volume. They comprise the units of a normal division at the time, with one or two small additions.

Serial numbers 123 to 147 show the somewhat extensive number of non-divisional units. Most of these had been formed in New Zealand at the request of the United Kingdom Government. They included three forestry companies, which had gone to England, were still serving there, and were unlikely to have any closer association with 2 NZEF in the Mediterranean. The patrols of the Long Range Desert Group and the Mobile Surgical Unit and Mobile Dental Section had been formed overseas by 2 NZEF.

Serials 151 to 205 constituted our base organisation, most of the units being in Maadi Camp – obvious exceptions being the hospitals. It looks an impressive tail to have collected in a year, and like all similar tails must be prepared to stand up to criticism. Further attention is given to this in Chapter 9. For the present it will be enough to say that the general idea of our forming a self-contained base camp was never in any doubt. It met with the approval of all members of the force – a conscious approval from formation and unit commanders, and an unconscious one from junior officers and other ranks who, it is certain, would have been aghast if forced to make use of a camp staffed by other than New Zealanders.

Most of the units of the Division were organised according to British war establishments, although a number had small additions, perhaps only a man or two, to strengthen some aspect to which New Zealanders paid extra attention. The same applied to non-divisional units. All the rest, without exception, had war establishments drawn up by HQ 2 NZEF. After a brief attempt to make use of copies of the printed British war establishments in such cases where they were applicable, Headquarters decided that it would be just as easy to issue our own throughout, as in any case there were never enough copies of the British publication. The task of compiling and amending war establishments, and later reproducing and distributing them, was one of the most onerous in the work of Headquarters.

The organisation of the base layout had been the task of HQ 2 NZEF, which had thus justified its existence by leaving the divisional staff free to concentrate on matters affecting the operations of the Division.

And so by the middle of March 1941, 2 NZEF was already organised almost as a small separate army, and the Division was ready to take the field.

CHAPTER 3 The First Three Campaigns

DISCUSSIONS about the despatch of the Division to Greece commenced on the inter-governmental level towards the end of February 1941, and concurrently had formed the subject of many interviews and conferences between the GOC and GHQ. The strictest secrecy was imposed on all who were concerned in the proposals, a more stringent secrecy even than the normal to be expected prior to important operations. Such cables as passed between the GOC and the New Zealand Government were handled at Divisional Headquarters, and the contents were not made known to HQ 2 NZEF.

The Officer in Charge of Administration and heads of services were frequent visitors to Divisional Headquarters at Helwan and were aware that a move was in the air; but they were not given any details, and for quite a while were not aware of the destination. It must be remembered that this was the first operation to be undertaken by the Division, and was moreover an unusual one, involving the final stages of a concentration in Egypt, a sea journey, a landing, albeit an unopposed one and in a friendly country, and an advance through mountainous terrain to a defensive position. It is small wonder if neither the GOC nor the staff of Divisional Headquarters had time to think about what moves, if any, should take place among base and line-of-communication troops, although the obvious need for medical attention did lead to one hospital being included in the troops to move. The divisional staff was working at high pressure to complete arrangements for the move, not made any easier by the late arrival of units of the Second Echelon, many of which did not reach Helwan until the move to Greece had started.

On the part of HQ 2 NZEF, it must be said that OICA had not fully appreciated the position nor fully grasped his duties, and was content to be largely a passive onlooker. Headquarters had not realised that if the fighting portion of our little army took the field, there must be some effect on all portions of the force responsible in any way for maintenance in the broadest meaning of the term. The move had started before Headquarters woke up to its responsibilities and made some small administrative arrangements for moving certain advanced offices to Greece.

As it turned out the Greek campaign was over so quickly that the breakdown in support was not noticed. However, the lesson was learnt, and thereafter HQ 2 NZEF was alive to its responsibilities.

The details of the move to Greece included the move of Divisional Headquarters at an early stage. It was a difficult position for it. Obviously the sooner the staff were complete in the new theatre of operations the better, as reconnaissance in its broadest sense was urgently required; but behind them in Egypt the units of the Second Echelon would still be arriving, and the bulk of the Division would still be waiting to move. Normally the arrangement would be to divide headquarters into an advanced and a rear element, the latter remaining at the starting point or the despatching end; and this was done on many occasions in the future. In this case it was decided that Divisional Headquarters must move as a complete unit; and as a solution, or at least a partial solution, it was arranged for HQ 2 NZEF, such as it was at the time, to move to Helwan and act as Rear Divisional Headquarters. Unfortunately HQ 2 NZEF consisted only of OICA and one officer, Headquarters had no transport of its own, and OICA had not even a car. Moreover, Divisional Headquarters moved out lock, stock and barrel, leaving not so much as a sheet of paper. Orders for the move of units to Greece were coming in often at intervals of an hour or so; orders for the move from Suez to Helwan of Second Echelon units were arriving concurrently, and to cap it all part of the 4th Reinforcements arrived from New Zealand during the same period. All these moves were under the control of the British movement staff, that being one aspect of military administration over which 2 NZEF had at that time no control. The movement staff was unaffected by the confusion caused to 2 NZEF with all these moves going on at one time, and we had to sort it out as best we could. Luckily, Headquarters Maadi Camp was now functioning to some effect and was able to take over a lot of the burden; and somehow or other the various moves took place without a mix-up. It was a difficult period.

As soon as this turmoll was over, we began to think what would have to be done about the New Zealand line of communication. As a first measure, the Officer Commanding Maadi Camp, the Deputy Director (i.e., the head) of our Medical Services, and OICA went over to Greece by air under somewhat uncomfortable conditions. The air as a means of transport was still in its infancy, and the passage was arranged with some difficulty, partly due to the lack of understanding shown by GHQ of the separate identity of 2 NZEF. In Athens the party found a liaison officer, left there by Divisional Headquarters, and not far away a camp containing those personnel who had been ‘left out of battle’ as a reserve for eventualities. As soon as transport could be arranged – and this was difficult, for no one had any spare vehicles – the party went forward to Divisional Headquarters, which was then in front of Mount Olympus.

The arrival of the party coincided with the first warnings of the later collapse of the front farther to the west, and nobody from the GOC downwards was in a position to talk about what might or should happen in Athens or farther back; and, moreover, at that moment did not much care. Operations near at hand took precedence. After staying one night, it became clear that the best service the party could render was to get out of the road and go back again, at least as far as Athens. On the way back the party spent a day with our hospital, which appeared to be sited too far forward, even if the front was stable. It was fast getting into a dangerous position, and in the end had to be abandoned after all patients had been evacuated.

On return to Athens the party carried out a reconnaissance of the surrounding countryside, with a view to finding sites for hospitals, depots, etc. – in fact, for the camp that at later stages we called our Advanced Base – but the reconnaissance was conducted with the feeling, which became stronger almost hourly, that the fate of the Greek campaign was already decided, and that no more troops would be put into Greece. Then there came news of the enemy advance towards Egypt and the investment of Tobruk, and activities in North Africa began to take precedence over anything the party could do in Greece. Some experience had been gained for future campaigns, so with a few notes to show for its visit, the party went back to Egypt after a total stay of about a week.

Towards the end of April, the Greek campaign being over, 6 Infantry Brigade arrived back in Egypt together with other smaller units. The remainder of the Division moved from Greece to Crete. It was clear from the very first that for some time at least Crete was going to be no place for any line-of-communication units, even a hospital, and there was never any question of our setting up any sort of 2 NZEF establishment there.

Early in May the Adjutant-General arrived from New Zealand for discussions with HQ 2 NZEF. About the same time there arrived from England a small military mission, headed by General Sir Guy Williams, and entrusted with the task of visiting all Dominions and consulting with them on their war effort. On reaching Cairo the mission heard of the imminent arrival of the Prime Minister of New Zealand and so decided to wait and see him before going farther.

The Prime Minister arrived in the middle of May, at a moment when the German attack on Crete was imminent. He wished to go to Crete at once, but was dissuaded if not definitely stopped by a combination of the British Ambassador to Egypt, the Commander- in-Chiefcommanderin-chief, and the Air Officer Commanding. While waiting to see the outcome of the fighting, the Prime Minister started a series of talks with General Williams and with HQ 2 NZEF. There were many matters to discuss, and the presence of the Prime Minister, keyed up as he was by the intensity of the war situation, helped to settle on the spot many things that might otherwise have dragged on for months. The long delay about war correspondents was ended on the spot, the Prime Minister remarking that they did not appear to have been handling it at all well in New Zealand, and authorising certain appointments at once. Other points were referred to New Zealand, with his recommendation for immediate approval.

As a basis for discussion with the Dominions, General Williams had brought with him copies of an exhaustive long-term plan for the future organisation of the armies of the Commonwealth, known as Field Force Committee Organisation Plan 36 – short title FFC 36. Part 12 of this plan applied to the New Zealand Forces. It was most detailed; but it is sufficient to say that it proposed that New Zealand should form first an Army Tank Brigade and ancillaries (workshops, field ambulance, etc.), secondly a number of corps units, with the intention that the Division would join with the Australian divisions to form an Anzac Corps, and thirdly a number of line-of-communication and base units to help take some of the burden off the United Kingdom. In sum, it meant an addition to the strength of the Expeditionary Force of roughly 6000 men.

The Adjutant-General and OICA first examined the suggestions, which raised many problems, not least that of manpower. They were then discussed with the Prime Minister and General Williams. The evacuation from Crete was completed by the first days of June, and the GOC then joined in the discussions. The losses on Crete, and in Greece too, had been heavy, which complicated the long-term plans for manpower. While the discussions were going on, the Division concentrated again in Helwan.

In general the Prime Minister was favourable to the proposals; but in this case official approval had to wait until his return to New Zealand. His visit was both helpful and fruitful, coming as it did just after the two trying campaigns in Greece and Crete.

The campaigns had caused many internal problems. To start with, unit records had either been lost or were inadequate, which meant that it was some time before casualties could be given in exact detail. Second Echelon (i.e., Records) was powerless in itself, and had to depend on information given by units. The degree of reliance that could be placed on unit reports varied. Some units took great care, and even held what amounted to courts of inquiry before reporting a man as killed or prisoner of war. Others were not so careful; but it was impossible to be insistent with units that had just undergone a shattering experience and had possibly lost part or the whole of their administrative staff. Sometimes the reports showed such a degree of improbability that Second Echelon had to query them; and indeed as time went on Second Echelon waited for a double check before advising New Zealand. It was thus most unfortunate that the air mail to New Zealand made it possible for next-of-kin to receive letters of condolence from members of a unit before the cable from Second Echelon had even reached Base Records in Wellington. This was even more unfortunate in cases where it later transpired that the casualty was not as given in the letter. Men believed killed either turned up again or were found to be prisoners of war, and so on. The distress caused can be imagined, and led to criticism of Base Records and Second Echelon. The criticism was undeserved; but the problem was a difficult one to solve. We subsequently laid it down in orders that no one was to write a letter of condolence until fourteen days after the casualty had been reported to Second Echelon, and at a later date until the casualty had appeared in the NZEF Times; but it is doubtful if the order was ever observed. As it happened we never again had losses that caused such administrative disorganisation in units, so that the accuracy of unit reports to Second Echelon was higher. After the entry of Japan into the war the airmail service either stopped or was limited in volume for some time. The difficulty will always remain, however, now that air mails have come to stay.

The loss of unit records meant that it was some time before promotions could be satisfactorily arranged, which meant in turn that for some time pay could be given only for the ranks held before the campaigns.

Other ranks are clothed entirely from army issues and replacement of clothing and necessaries presented no difficulties, although sometimes there was a delay owing to shortage of stocks. Officers were almost entirely responsible for their own clothing, for which purpose they drew an annual upkeep grant in cash. Losses due to enemy action, however, were replaceable by special grants, and were considered as over and above normal wear and tear. In average circumstances, claims for losses in action were not numerous, as they arose from individual incidents. In the Greece and Crete campaigns, however, nearly all officers had lost something, and many had lost everything except what they were wearing. Human nature being what it is, we had to have some sort of itemised claim and had to be sure that the loss was due to enemy action and not to negligence. A small screening committee of three was set up, the president and one of the members being officers who had served in the campaigns. The investigations took some weeks; but interim payments were made at once, and were adjusted when the claim had been cleared by the committee. The Prime Minister had told us to be generous, and full replacement value was paid for losses. It is too much to claim that everyone was satisfied, but the task was handled as sympathetically as was possible.

Our pool of reinforcements was large enough to make units up to establishment again; but the numbers then remaining in depots were on the low side. However, the flow from New Zealand was steady, for one draft arrived in the middle of May and another in July. Provided our next casualties were delayed for a while, or were not as abnormal as the recent ones had been, all would be well.

The Commissioner of the National Patriotic Fund had arrived from England with the later units of the Second Echelon; but it was only in May, when the crisis in Crete was at its height, that the question of responsibility for welfare was tackled. The difference of opinion that arose, and the various aspects of the question, are discussed in Chapter 16. In the end an authoritative welfare committee was set up to advise the GOC, the Commissioner being a member; and while each side adhered to its own opinion, the committee was effective and the results were satisfactory to the troops, which after all is what really mattered. There were irritating incidents in the years that followed, but nothing that could not either be ignored or dealt with.

In June 1941 there was started a newspaper for 2 NZEF, entitled NZEF Times. It was issued free to the troops and continued until the very end of 1945. From the first it was a ‘news’ paper only and its columns were not open to correspondents, nor after a while were there any leading articles. While perhaps the results were not as ‘snappy’ as the contents of other army papers, we did avoid a lot of heart-burning and a lot of the difficult, semi-disciplinary problems that arose when papers published letters from contributors.

The campaigns in Greece and Crete established a sentimental attachment between Greece and New Zealand. The GOC therefore offered to find a team from 2 NZEF to train what Greek forces were still available in Egypt or the Levant. It was at first a welcome task to undertake to help a gallant ally; but owing to the Greek national pastime of politics, 2 NZEF lived to regret the action it had taken. The results were frustrating, and a political crisis always seemed to be just round the corner. We carried on with this task until late in 1943.

Towards the end of June 1941 the impersonal title of ‘HQ 2 NZEF Base’ was officially changed to ‘HQ Maadi Camp’. Then in August General Headquarters laid it down that in future all Dominion units were to carry an indication of their country as part of the unit title. It was understandable that with Australian, New Zealand, South African and Indian forces in the area in addition to United Kingdom forces, there was bound to be some duplication of unit and formation numbers, and there had in fact been cases of confusion over the identity of units. Thereafter, all New Zealand units had ‘NZ’ after the number if one existed, or in front of the title otherwise, e.g., 4 NZ Field Regiment, 18 NZ Battalion, NZ Maadi Camp. It should be remembered that at this time the Division was known as ‘the NZ Division’ without any number. The change to ‘2 NZ Division’ came in 1942, as will be recounted in its place.

In the year or more that had elapsed since our arrival in Egypt, certain weaknesses had emerged in the postal set-up. So important did we consider this service that we asked for a senior officer of the Post and Telegraph Department to be sent out from New Zealand to investigate and report. This officer arrived in the middle of August, spent two months in North Africa, and recommended certain changes, which were duly made.

In August and September 1941 official approval came from New Zealand for the formation of the Army Tank Brigade and most of the corps and line-of-communication units. Headquarters 2 NZEF had then to set to work, in constant cable communication with Army Headquarters, to settle war establishments, arrange who was to command the new units and what proportion of officers was to be found by New Zealand and by 2 NZEF, select officers to return to New Zealand to help in the formation of the units, establish in consultation with GHQ the order of priority of the corps and line-of-communication units, and discuss each unit with the appropriate head of the arm or service in 2 NZEF. Some of these aspects of the work conflicted with others. General Headquarters’ ideas on order of priority often did not coincide with the wishes of the 2 NZEF officers at the head of the branch affected, many of whom, being human, wanted their own particular unit or units raised in the order. There was a constant struggle to prevent the absurd position arising that all were equal and all should be formed at the same time. Once or twice all past work had to be scrapped and a fresh start made. Most senior officers in 2 NZEF wanted all the officers to come from the force; but quite rightly Army Headquarters maintained that with new units such as these, which were to be formed in New Zealand, Army Headquarters itself was the controlling authority and must leave some vacancies for officers in New Zealand who had not yet served overseas. Analysis of the United Kingdom war establishments led us to make some changes as the result of our own experience; and this in turn meant that fresh establishments had to be made out and promulgated. It was a busy time.

In mid-September the Division, after refitting and training at Helwan and up to establishment again, moved out into the Western Desert. This time close contact was maintained from the outset between the Division and base establishments, and between Divisional Headquarters and HQ 2 NZEF. In fact this contact was never lost again throughout the war. Admittedly this time the line of communication was by road, without the break of a sea journey, and contact was easy to maintain. Up to the beginning of the Libyan campaign in mid-November it took only some six to eight hours to travel by road from Maadi to Divisional Headquarters at Baggush.

During September and October 1941 the New Zealand Government showed considerable interest in the operations proposed for the near future, including in this considerable anxiety over the support, both mechanised and in the air, likely to be given to the Division. After all, the Division had just taken part in two reverses. The Government made inquiries from both the GOC and the United Kingdom Government. The position of the former, faced with a request to comment on the plan produced by his military superiors, was a difficult one; but before sending his reply to New Zealand, he submitted it to the Commander-in-Chief, and with good will on both sides a satisfactory wording was found – one which while answering the queries made from New Zealand did not violate secrecy. One of the cables from the United Kingdom Government on the subject, after giving figures of the strength of certain arms – aircraft, tanks, and guns – goes on to say: ‘All the above is of fateful secrecy. War Cabinet here have declined to be informed of the date of the offensive.’

The adjective ‘fateful’ carries the mark of a well-known hand. The intimation about the War Cabinet was a delicate way of stopping any insistence from the New Zealand Government.

We had been warned some months earlier that there would be a General Election in New Zealand during 1941, the existing parliament ending its statutory period towards the end of the year. In the middle of October two senior civil servants arrived from New Zealand to make the arrangements for voting among the troops; but two days after they arrived, advice was received from New Zealand that the election was postponed, as the life of parliament had been extended by arrangement between the parties. The civil servants went on to make some investigations and formulated plans which were of value two years later when the election did take place.

Towards the end of Chapter 2 above it was stated that three forestry companies were serving in the United Kingdom, and that their association with 2 NZEF in the Mediterranean could only be slight. In October 1941 official approval was given from New Zealand to a state of affairs already in existence, and the companies were removed from 2 NZEF and placed under the New Zealand Military Liaison Officer in London. The liaison officer was visiting 2 NZEF about this time, in company with the High Commissioner in London, and was able to settle personally the details of the change in control.

During October the first party of women's services arrived from New Zealand and was posted to the New Zealand Forces Club in Cairo for welfare duties.

About this time we had the first marriage between members of the Expeditionary Force, in this case an officer and a nurse. There followed a long discussion whether or not the lady should be sent back to New Zealand after the marriage. The GOC for once referred the problem to the Government. It then apparently caused much argument in New Zealand, and finally had to be taken to War Cabinet. In the end, but not until after many months, we were told that married nurses were to be allowed to continue with their service.

At the point when in late November the Division took the field again the replacement position was excellent. During the year we had received fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh reinforcements, some 28,000 all ranks. The net losses in Greece and Crete were some 5800. There had been, in addition, losses for sickness and compassionate leave amounting in the aggregate to many thousands; but the result was to leave us with sufficient reinforcements for a year's wastage at the rates prevailing at the time – always assuming that losses in prisoners of war would be normal and not as in Greece and Crete. We had been told that the 8th Reinforcements would be leaving New Zealand in December. We felt that we must play fair, and when the campaign started were seriously considering telling New Zealand that we could do without one draft, probably the 9th Reinforcements, the composition of which had already been settled between us. The men intended for the draft could then have been used for capital expenditure, i.e., could be used for some of the new units then being formed under FFC 36.

But the enemy – a new enemy this time – again played a part. Japan entered the war in December, and we received no more reinforcements until January 1943. Moreover, this alarming addition to our enemies stopped the formation of any corps and line-of-communication units; and while the formation of the Army Tank Brigade continued, the brigade was now intended very firmly for home defence and was retained in New Zealand. To all intents and purposes the work of the previous months on FFC 36 had gone for nothing. We could only shrug our shoulders and look on it as a pleasant exercise.

In the general collapse of plans there disappeared the last attempt to form an Anzac Corps. The idea had been alive all through 1941, and the corps had even existed for a brief period in Greece. In November we were only awaiting the release of one Australian division from Tobruk to go on with the integration of the formations. In early 1942, however, all except one Australian division went back to Australia, neither country could go on with the formation of corps troops, and the idea was dropped for good

As it happened, the Australian Government had decided against the proposal in August 1941.—Long, Greece, Crete and Syria (Australian war history), p. 542.

While we did not realise it at the time, mid-November 1941 was our high-water mark in strength. Our numbers were some 36,000, of whom half were outside the Division. We never reached that figure again, our maximum thereafter being some 34,000 and our average about 32,000.

During the year there had been a slow but steady addition to the number of base and line-of-communication units. We now had three rest homes (medical units), one each for officers, women's services, and other ranks. The medical position had been further improved by the formation of our own Casualty Clearing Station, a much-needed link between field ambulances and base hospitals, and by the formation of a depot for medical stores. We had thought it better to keep the punishment of our troops as much as possible under our own control and so had formed a Field Punishment Centre in Maadi Camp. The time had come when we felt we must play our part in the early care of burial places, and so we formed a Graves Registration and Inquiry Unit, the work of which was the first step in a chain that would end with the Imperial War Graves Commission. The unit worked within the general Allied framework, was allotted an area of country to work over, and looked after all Allied graves in the area. Also, to work within a GHQ pool we formed a New Zealand Censor Section; but in this case the section, while carrying out whatever duties were allotted to it by GHQ, did in fact censor all the New Zealand mails.

In October, in order to help GHQ with the forthcoming campaign, we formed a group of small line-of-communication and corps units – signals and ASC, and the staff for an ambulance train. They lasted until the campaign was finally over in the spring of 1942, after which they were disbanded for the time being. One or two were later re-formed.

The whole of the mass of administrative detail with which Headquarters had had to wrestle during the year had been handled by a quite insufficient number of shorthand-typists, of whom there was a continuing dearth. It was still difficult also to get good clerks; but this deficiency showed signs of easing with the increasing number of men unfit for service in the field.

During December 1941 we had to try to conduct the voting for a by-election in New Zealand. It was not our first nor, indeed, our last; but it came at a time when the Division was fighting in Cyrenaica. The Government had to be told that only about half of those entitled to vote could possibly do so.

Towards the end of the year we succeeded in coming to a satisfactory arrangement with Army Headquarters over the difficult problem of compassionate leave, and as a result issued the first of a series of instructions on the subject. The problem is discussed in Chapter 15.

From the purely administrative standpoint the campaign in Libya in November–December 1941 created no special problems for HQ 2 NZEF and was handled as normal routine. For one thing the campaign, as far as the Division was concerned, lasted only three weeks. For another the Division, less one brigade, came straight back to the area in the Western Desert from which it had moved out. While losses were regrettably and even tragically heavy, the disorganisation in units was not as great as in Greece or Crete, and our reinforcements were plentiful enough to replace losses at once. By this time, moreover, the various parts of HQ 2 NZEF knew their work much better.

Had the campaign continued, however, there might have been a brief crisis over the forward despatch of reinforcements, for an investigation made by HQ 2 NZEF on 24 November (a week after the campaign started) showed that the Army authorities had not made any allowance for New Zealand reinforcements to be sent after the Division. We would, of course, have made our own arrangements had the need arisen. It was another lesson for the future – that we would be better advised to look after ourselves.

The one unfortunate feature in the casualties was that the number of prisoners of war was still high – higher than in Greece, but not quite so high as in Crete. While over half the wounded return to duty in due course, prisoners of war are a total loss. Our reinforcement position had thus worsened somewhat compared with the estimate made before the campaign; and after units had been made up to establishment it appeared that we had enough reinforcements to keep the Division going only until August 1942. It had been intended that we should form one of the corps units overseas – a medium artillery regiment – but this idea was now abandoned, and GHQ was told that we could not form any more units, no matter how small.

In January 1942 we were told by Army Headquarters that we could expect no more reinforcements for an indefinite period.

Towards the end of 1941 we obtained authority from New Zealand to purchase a printing plant, as an alternative to having one sent out from there. Suitable plant was bought in Cairo, a Printing Unit formed, and the first issue of printed orders distributed in January 1942. The printed word is always easier to read than the cyclostyled one, and everyone welcomed the new departure.

The second group of women's services arrived in January, this time for work in the hospitals.

The situation about shoulder titles was finally settled in January 1942. For some little while we had been experimenting with a cloth strip bearing the words ‘New Zealand’ in white on a black background, and stitched on the point of the shoulder. This did not get over the problem of removal for washing, and subsequent re-stitching, but a sudden brainwave by one officer produced the idea of a looped title which could be slipped over the shoulder strap which formed a part of all types of uniform. The idea was a success; and after a first issue had been manufactured in Egypt, supplies were drawn from New Zealand.

After about a month in the Western Desert the Division moved to the Suez Canal near Ismailia, arriving there in the middle of January. The intention was that after training for a while in the Canal Zone the whole Division would move to Syria. One brigade group later went back to Libya for temporary duty in Army reserve.

At the beginning of February a party from the Division joined with other troops (British and South African) in internal security measures in Cairo, these including sealing off the Royal Palace while the King of Egypt was brought to see reason.

For the first time some care had to be taken over the morale of the force, not on account of any of its experiences overseas, but because there was a strong, and natural, feeling among the troops that their place was back in New Zealand defending the homeland. This feeling was accentuated when it became known that two-thirds of the Australian forces were going back to Australia, and still further accentuated when somehow or other it became known that United States troops were to be stationed in New Zealand. The GOC took special steps to explain to all ranks the strategical reasons that made it advisable that the Division should remain in the Middle East, and little by little the feeling died down. The most affected were the non-divisional units stationed in areas away from the rest of the force. The companies were always widely spread out and always felt more cut off from home affairs than the greater assemblage in the Division. In this case, as at intervals throughout their service, we thought it advisable to take some additional steps to impress on them that they were not forgotten, and were just as much part of the Expeditionary Force as anyone else.

The move of the Division to Syria in March 1942 was the cause of the first change of communications for 2 NZEF. For over six months we had looked westwards to the Western Desert, and during rest or training periods there had never been more than 250 miles between Maadi and the bulk of the Division. No intermediate link was necessary. In Syria, however, it was intended that the Division would be dispersed from front to rear over a distance of more than 150 miles, commencing at the north on the Turkish frontier. Divisional Headquarters at Baalbek would be some 500 miles from Maadi, the rest of the Division being farther away still. It appeared, moreover, that the Division was likely to be there for some time, as it was now in general reserve for a role in the future unspecified at the moment, but with the possibility of an advance to the north into Turkey. The view at the time was that the Libyan war would be finally won without our Division taking part.

That being the case, our attention had now to be directed to the east and north instead of to the west. Two hospitals were moved, one to Nazareth and one close to Beirut. The Convalescent Depot went to the sea-coast in Palestine near a village called Kfar Vitkin. For the first time we formed an ‘advanced base’ known under that title, and intended to be a Maadi Camp in miniature. It was located in Palestine in a one-time Australian camp on the coast near the Convalescent Depot at Kfar Vitkin. It was to be large enough to hold one month's reinforcements on the highest scale of wastage, about 900 all ranks. The Division was to draw its reinforcements from Advanced Base, which in turn would draw on Maadi. Moreover, men discharged from convalescent depot or hospital in Palestine or Syria would go to Advanced Base and not all the way back to Maadi. All this was intended to keep the maintenance machinery reasonably close to the Division, so that losses in men could be speedily made up. For similar reasons our postal corps formed an advanced post office in Beirut, and pay, records, and ordnance set up small branches in Advanced Base.

It was briefly considered whether or not we should close down in Maadi, and indeed in Egypt altogether, and concentrate in Palestine and Syria. Our communications to New Zealand still ran through Egypt, however, and the future moves of the Division were by no means firm, so that the idea was never given serious thought.

It is of interest at this stage to look at the locations of the non-divisional engineer units. The railway construction and railway operating groups had been working for some months in the Western Desert and Libya, where they had made their mark in the construction and operating of the extension of the railway towards Tobruk. One of the Army Troops companies was spread out all over the Western Desert with its headquarters in Alexandria. The other Army Troops company was away down on the Red Sea coast of Egypt, developing a small port called Safaga. The Mechanical Equipment Company was in bits and pieces from the Western Desert to Transjordan. All these units were for operational purposes under GHQ control, and HQ 2 NZEF had no part in deciding on their locations; but we did try to persuade GHQ to keep them more concentrated, for as New Zealanders they liked to be close to their fellow nationals. In early March 1942, entirely for their benefit, we formed a second Mobile Dental Unit; for it would supply a service that they could not get from the British medical establishments on which they were largely dependent.

In March the strayed brigade came back finally from Libya and in April went on to join the Division in Syria. The change in surroundings and climate was of great benefit to all ranks. Probably never before had the members of the Division appreciated the joy to be obtained from green fields and trees and running water.

Having taken note of our reinforcement position – not for the first time – GHQ asked us in March to form a parachute battalion, saying kindly that such work would be most suitable for the New Zealanders’ characteristics of initiative and dash. The request was refused, and GHQ was again told that we could form no more units of any kind, and would in fact be glad to have back the men from such few specially formed GHQ units as remained – mostly signals and ASC. To them our attitude must have seemed selfish; but we were determined to keep our pool of reinforcements at a substantial figure. By so doing we could continue to keep the Division up to full establishment and so, in our opinion, help the common cause as much as if we dissipated our effort in a number of oddments.

In early 1942 we received a plaintive wail from the head of the NAAFI in the Middle East. Our units drew their supplies of canteen stores from this source, and at intervals paid the outstanding accounts; but the disorganisation in Greece and Crete, and the losses in the recent Libyan campaign, meant either that records had been lost or that the officers who had made the purchases were either killed or prisoners. The correspondence between the NAAFI and units had dragged on for months. The blame was by no means all ours, as there had been disorganisation in NAAFI also, for it had shared in the catastrophes in Greece and Crete. The total sum involved ran into many thousands of pounds. In the end we appointed a special investigator, a lawyer, to examine the NAAFI claims, both sides agreeing to accept his arbitration; and after a few months he gave his decisions and the accounts were settled.

In April 1942 2 NZEF co-operated with Army Headquarters by sending back a party of 46 officers and 140 other ranks to help with the formation and training of the home defence forces and of the force intended for the Pacific. Their loss was felt by 2 NZEF; but for the moment the need of the home country was at least as great as ours. It should be borne in mind that the New Zealand Government was showing remarkable restraint in not insisting on the return of the force to New Zealand.

Advantage was taken of the lull in early 1942 to circulate all the more senior officers and obtain their views on the question – a long-term one – of the final repatriation to New Zealand. On the face of it such a thought at that time appeared premature; but the problem was not an easy one, and merited some attention. The opinions of the officers were collated and, together with some comments from the GOC, were sent back to New Zealand. As far as we were concerned the problem was then put into the back of our minds.

Our women's services were the cause of one or two problems about this time. The first was that they were finding it increasingly difficult to maintain themselves in clothing under the arrangements in force, which were in the main that they were given an initial issue and thereafter an annual monetary grant with which to maintain the issue. For the new auxiliary services the annual grant was quite insufficient; and for all the services, including the nurses, the usefulness of the grant was dependent on the availability of suitable army stores or civilian shops. While Cairo was near at hand goods were readily obtainable, although rising costs were playing their part; but it was not certain that a great city would be available indefinitely. In addition, the existing types of outdoor uniform worn by the nurses had not proved entirely satisfactory for the rough usage they were receiving. A series of discussions was held, and the decision was to increase army issues. In the long run the uniforms of the auxiliary services were almost completely issued from store. The nurses’ outdoor uniforms were gradually changed over from white to khaki.

A more difficult problem was that of marriages of members of the force to civilians, or to members of other armies. The real complication came from mixed marriages, i.e., marriages of men to Egyptians, Armenians, or other nationalities not purely European. The problem is discussed at length in Chapter 15. It is enough to say here that it began to give trouble about the end of 1941, and was the most irritating problem with which HQ 2 NZEF had to deal throughout the war.

During April 1942 steps were taken to reduce the strength of the training staffs and of the various depots in Maadi, the reason being that reinforcements had stopped and that depot staffs would in all likellhood be needed for duty in the field. Depots were either disbanded or were reduced in number by amalgamations.

Our gentle sparring with GHQ about the non-divisional engineer units took a new turn about this time, when to our slight dismay it emerged that some of the units were in part the financial responsibility of the United Kingdom, and thus were not a complete 100 percent New Zealand contribution. New Zealand was responsible for pay, uniform, and pensions; the United Kingdom was responsible for equipment and stores. Headquarters 2 NZEF had not been told of this by anyone in New Zealand; and indeed at this time we were still in the dark about the financial arrangements for the force itself.

Central and Eastern Mediterranean map of north African coast and Mediterranean Sea

In April and May we received our first draft of exchanged prisoners of war. Except for a number of permanently unfit men, the draft was in the main ‘protected personnel’, i.e., medical or chaplains. After much cabled communication with New Zealand, it was decided to send them back home. While legally there was no objection to their resuming service, the policy adopted by the United Kingdom was that it was undesirable that they should serve again on the same front as that on which they had been captured. With this we concurred.

The period from the beginning of March to the beginning of June was a pleasant one for the whole force. The area in which the Division was resting was a complete change from the desert and was packed full of interest. The rest and the freedom from casualties was a relief to all ranks. Stormy days lay ahead, with yet one more crisis and with heavy casualties; but the Division entered on the campaign in good heart and with renewed determination.

CHAPTER 4 Defeat and Victory

THE enemy attacked in Libya towards the end of May 1942 and by the middle of June showed signs of being victorious. In order to reinforce the Eighth Army the Division was warned on 14 June to prepare to move back to the Western Desert. The move started on the 15th and was spectacular in its speed, the whole Division being in its new position within ten days. It was at once obvious that a grim battle lay ahead, that defence of Egypt took precedence over any other plans, and that the Division was finished with Syria for at least some time to come.

In those circumstances, the decision was taken to close down Advanced Base and the other small administrative offices in Palestine and Lebanon and withdraw personnel to Maadi. Advanced Base closed officially before the end of June. There was no question of re-establishing it elsewhere, as by that time the Division was already fighting in an area closer to Egypt than ever before, and further withdrawals seemed likely. The medical establishments in the Levant were left where they were for the moment – one hospital in Nazareth and one in Beirut, and the Convalescent Depot at Kfar Vitkin – but after a short delay the Nazareth hospital was moved to the vicinity of the Suez Canal. The Convalescent Depot and the hospital in Beirut remained in their positions, partly because the areas were good ones and partly because, in the case of the hospital at least, the location fitted in with the general layout of all Allied hospitals. This point is mentioned here in view of later dissensions, to be narrated in their place.

The campaign started sensationally, not to say tragically, by the GOC being wounded and flown back to hospital at Helwan. Another officer was at once appointed to command the Division; but, as it happened, the GOC's wound was not severe enough for him to hand over what might be called ‘2 NZEF’ matters, and he continued in his capacity as commander of the force as a whole.

By the beginning of July the crisis had spread back from the Western Desert to Egypt itself, where hasty preparations had to be made for the worst, namely a failure of the Eighth Army to hold the enemy on the line then reached, stretching from the Qattara Depression to the sea and only 60 miles from Alexandria. The immediate crisis lasted for two or three days, until it was seen that the enemy was not going to storm the Delta; but bitter defensive battles still faced the Allied troops, with an uncertain outcome. It behoved base and line-of-communication headquarters to plan for an unfavourable outcome.

So, in common with other sedentary offices, HQ 2 NZEF and all the associated offices – medical, pay, records, etc. – had to prepare to move back either to the line of the Suez Canal, or even farther. General Headquarters had made plans to withdraw to southern Palestine and agreed that, if circumstances became bad enough to warrant this move, HQ 2 NZEF should move with it and be accommodated in the same area. A small reconnaissance party went off to Palestine and, pending its return, plans were drawn up for the move. Like all sedentary headquarters we had accumulated files. The first thing to do was to reduce the quantity, so there was a series of bonfires – and a splendid excuse was provided for failure in future years to trace some communication – ‘destroyed during the crisis in July 1942’. The move was planned to take place in two or three stages, the various parties being at so many hours’ notice.

At the same time preparations were made to defend Maadi Camp itself, and exercises were held to ensure that the mixed collection of troops were ready for the unexpected. There were rumours of the possibility of a parachute attack, or at least of a parachute raid, and this was taken into account.

Concurrently with these activities, a drastic comb-out was then started in Maadi in order to swell the numbers of reinforcements, every man of whom was going to be needed. Staffs were reduced all round, depots further amalgamated or disbanded, and a fine-tooth comb dragged through all our base establishments. We had to be firm with a much-harried GHQ and insist on the return of some small parties away on guard duties. One bright spot was the discovery that practically all the men then serving at Maadi had seen at least some amount of field service. The exceptions were nearly all due to medical unfitness. There was no ground for the common belief that there were hundreds of total embusqués in Maadi Camp. During July and August the total employed in Maadi was much reduced; and to set an example, part of the staffs of HQ 2 NZEF and HQ Maadi Camp were amalgamated, and then later on the two headquarters were integrated under one commander.

A trying problem during this period was what to do with our women's services and, even more difficult, what to do with the wives of members of 2 NZEF, of whom, of one sort and another, there were now some scores. Some behaved admirably; others were hysterical and wellnigh lived on the doorstep of Headquarters in Maadi. Plans were drawn up for the evacuation of all women, whether serving members or wives, to South Africa; and while the service women waited for the point when there would be real danger, the wives were put under pressure to accept evacuation without delay. A number, especially those with children, accepted the offer of immediate repatriation to New Zealand via the Union of South Africa – where, as it happened, they had to wait for some months, and created their own little crop of work for the conducting officer and the kindly people of the country. The New Zealand Government had agreed without hesitation to bear all the costs of this move.

As the month of July came to an end, it became progressively clearer that the danger of invasion of Egypt was passing. The period of notice under which Headquarters and the women's services had been placed was gradually extended until it became unnecessary to have any notice at all; but the plans were kept up to date for some months.

The losses during June and July had been tragic, especially in senior officers. They hit home to all at Maadi all the more vividly because the Division was now so close that it could be reached in two or three hours. It was gratifying that we were in a position to replace most of the casualties and keep the Division for the moment in fair strength even if not up to establishment. One infantry brigade had so many casualties that it was withdrawn to Maadi for reforming and refitting. This same brigade was later chosen for turning over to armour and was out of action for the rest of the fighting in North Africa.

At the earliest possible date parties were sent back from the Division on leave and were accommodated in Maadi Camp. Special arrangements were made to ensure that it was a real spell for the men. They were immediately given fresh clothes and placed in a remote area with no set routine at all, provided with messing facilities which gave them meals individually at any time they liked, and issued free with beer when they felt like it. The result was that they did have a rest, and in the main kept away from Cairo.

At one stage during the crisis GHQ planned to take the despatch of reinforcements for all formations into its own hands, for the quite good reason that congestion of the roads and tracks forward was becoming insupportable. This meant that if our Division wanted reinforcements, first Eighth Army and then GHQ would have to agree; and presumably if the moment in their opinion was not propitious, or if our demand came low in the order of priority, would not agree. We had to concur with the principle, but showed no enthusiasm for the scheme; and it was lucky that the front stabilised and the machinery was little used. It was just as well, as it is certain that if the Division had called for reinforcements, no excuse such as that GHQ would not agree would have been accepted by either the Divisional Commander or by formation and unit commanders.

Towards the end of May we had been asked by GHQ to take part in a scheme designed to make the enemy believe that there were more formed bodies of fighting troops in the Middle East than actually existed. Our part would be to give formation and unit numbers to the units in Maadi Camp and to rename the camp itself as a New Zealand division. The scheme, named cascade, had a certain fascination, and we agreed to play. We had to consult Army Headquarters to be provided with numbers for units, numbering throughout the war being a New Zealand responsibility. In the end Maadi Camp was entitled ‘Sixth New Zealand Division’ (6 NZ Division), the camp works section 25 NZ Field Company, the infantry training depot 9 NZ Infantry Brigade, the camp hospital 23 NZ Field Ambulance and so on. A fresh vehicle sign, a kiwi, was brought into use for the units of the new division. The scheme was effective by the end of June and continued with some modifications until late 1944. Our contribution was only a part of the whole, which applied to United Kingdom and South African units also. It was of some value, for an Allied order of battle captured from the enemy after Alamein showed many of the shadow units as in existence and overestimated the Allied strength by about a third.

The introduction of this scheme meant that a number would have to be allotted to our real division. In the Order of Battle of the country's forces kept at Army Headquarters it had always been known as the Second Division; but the number had never been used in the Middle East, where it was known simply as the New Zealand Division. Concurrently with cascade we adopted the title Second New Zealand Division (2 NZ Division). The change was effective as from 29 June and quickly became known and used by all concerned.

It is mentioned above that a vehicle sign of a kiwi was used by the so-called 6 NZ Division. The Second Division – the real division – had from the first used a fernleaf, having inherited it from the New Zealand Division of the 1914–18 war. Hitherto no special vehicle sign had been used by HQ 2 NZEF nor by the non-divisional units. For the latter we had experimented with a black fernleaf on a white background, the reverse of the normal; but this was not very clever, for optical illusion often made it difficult to appreciate the difference. So now we grasped the nettle, and after trying out on sample vehicles such things as mako sharks, tikis, and Mount Cook, settled on the Southern Cross for all NZEF and non-divisional units – the Cross as on the national flag, red stars with a narrow white edging on a dark-blue background.

By the middle of August the real strain was over, and we were beginning to think about future offensives, helped by the information from New Zealand that the Government would be prepared to send us a draft of reinforcements later in the year. There followed an exchange of cables with New Zealand about the constitution of the draft, the main point at issue being whether Army Headquarters should send out the Army Tank Brigade – or one or more of its battalions – as formed units, or whether the equivalent number of men should come as unorganised reinforcements. If the former alternative were adopted, one infantry brigade overseas would be broken up, and the proposed turnover of another to armour would be cancelled. The Army Tank Brigade had been approved as part of FFC 36 in the latter half of 1941. Since then the Division had had a lot of experience, both good and bad, with armour, and the GOC now had his own ideas about what was wanted – a more mobile, harder hitting ‘armoured brigade’ as opposed to the less aggressive ‘army tank brigade’. Authorities in New Zealand showed a natural desire to send the units out to us unbroken. Both parties to the discussion were careful not to tread on the other's corns; but in the end the GOC's views, put forward firmly but respectfully, carried the day. The draft came to us with one formed tank battalion only, the rest being individual men; and even this one unit was broken up soon after arrival and the men merged into the new armoured brigade. The arrival of the draft will be mentioned later.

The changeover of the infantry brigade to armour was only a minor problem to HQ 2 NZEF. It was in the main a case of new equipment and training, the equipment being drawn from United Kingdom depots when available and the training being handled by the brigade commander. After all, the whole formation was out of the line and engaged on this one task. Almost the only action taken by Headquarters was to form a new corps in the Expeditionary Force, the ‘Armoured Corps’, to transfer to this corps the Divisional Cavalry, which hitherto had been a corps on its own, and to turn the one-time battalions of the brigade into armoured regiments.

In September, despite the reinforcement position, we felt compelled to co-operate with GHQ to the extent of helping it out with staff for rear duties. Our agreement to this was dependent upon our running an organised area with our own staff, instead of lending officers and men as individuals for duties in odd posts. In the end we staffed an Area Headquarters in the Canal Zone. During the discussions GHQ pointed out that if we were to contribute to base and line-of-communications staff at the same rate as did the United Kingdom, we would have to find 502 officers and 2566 other ranks. There were some fallacies in this argument, which will be dealt with in Chapter 11; but it is probably true that we were not doing enough.

Supplying the personnel for this area staff meant that we were down to the bone as far as men were concerned. The Division was reasonably strong, but depots were to all intents and purposes empty. It was fortunate that the next draft to arrive promised to be exceptionally well trained, for the personnel had been under arms in New Zealand for most of the year.

During the period from August to October there was the usual crop of problems, big and little, irritating and amusing, but luckily not of the first order. It transpired, for instance, that it was doubtful if the members of our women's services were governed by the ordinary military law. We did not expect any disciplinary troubles, and our concern was more from the standpoint of their position vis-à-vis other troops; but it was advisable that all should be in order. The position was doubtful within New Zealand also. In the end, after an exchange of cables, special Emergency Regulations were passed in New Zealand and all was well.

The first six weeks of the campaign that started at Alamein on 23 October 1942 created no special work for HQ 2 NZEF. Admittedly the Division was getting steadily farther away, and this time it was clear that there was not going to be any more withdrawal, but that the advance was going to continue. The Division rested for some weeks after crossing the Libyan border, and this enabled administrative contact to be maintained and such reinforcements as we could find sent forward. From early December onwards, however, contact became more difficult. The Division was then beyond Benghazi, and was shortly to swing round far beyond El Agheila. Road transport for either men or stores from Maadi to the Division became an impossibility and we had to start making use of sea transport from Alexandria to Benghazi. To help in this we formed another port detachment to work at Benghazi, as again we found that a small party of our own was of advantage in speeding up the forward despatch of men or stores. From the middle of December to the end of January we were practically out of touch, as by that time the distance even from Benghazi to the Division was beyond the economic use of MT. In fact, at that stage the whole Eighth Army had cut itself adrift from contact with the rear and was depending on the early capture of Tripoli. Such road transport as did go forward from Benghazi was confined to carrying the barest essentials of rations and ammunition to tide over the period until Tripoli had been taken. It was captured in the last week in January.

At that point a new situation arose. The Division was continuing under the Eighth Army and so would be advancing still farther westwards, quite beyond any contact with depots in Egypt. For the second time, therefore, it was decided to form an Advanced Base, to be located near Tripoli, and to hold reinforcements sent from Egypt by sea. (By this time the 8th Reinforcements had arrived.) The port detachment from Benghazi moved to Tripoli; a site in a pleasantly rural area called Suani Ben Adem was found for Advanced Base; a wing of the Convalescent Depot was set up near by; and the GOC considered that it was time we had a hospital of our own behind the Division's line of advance. At this time our hospitals were still at Helwan, in the Suez Canal zone, and at Beirut. It was this last hospital that we wished to move.

General Headquarters objected strongly to the move and, owing to its control of rail and sea transport, was in a position to block it. The locations of our hospitals were governed by two factors: first, the wish of New Zealanders to be treated in their own hospitals (and therefore always to have one hospital readily accessible to men from the Division), and second, the general distribution of all Allied hospitals so as to meet the needs of the army at large. We attached the greater importance to the first of these factors, GHQ to the second; and in this case the two factors were in conflict, as GHQ had already moved a sufficient number of hospitals to suitable positions for the Eighth Army. General Headquarters maintained, moreover, that by the time the hospital was functioning in its new area (presumably near Tripoli) the campaign would be over. However, the GOC was firm and pointed out that we had not had a hospital of our own anywhere near the Division since the campaign started in October 1942. With very bad grace, GHQ agreed to the move. General Headquarters was right in its contention, as the hospital was not functioning fully until the latter half of April, the campaign ended in early May, and the Division left on its return to Egypt shortly afterwards.

At that point we were able to make the amende honorable and agree that both hospital and Convalescent Depot should stay in the area during the campaign in Sicily, in which the Division played no part. The hospital remained there until September, cut off from all other New Zealand units, so that in the end we did feel that we had played our part in the common cause.

To go back to the point after the capture of Tripoli – Advanced Base was established during February 1943 and, for the second time, intermediate offices were opened for such things as pay, records, and postal duties. Casualties in this campaign had been low, lower than our estimates, and much lower than in any previous fighting; but we continued to hold the equivalent of one month's wastage in the depot at Advanced Base. Reinforcements were sent forward from there in our own transport, but once or twice we helped GHQ by using reinforcement drafts to drive convoys of MT vehicles intended as replacements for losses. Even from Tripoli forward distances were great, and at its limit just short of Tunis the Division was some 500 miles from Advanced Base. The only comfort was that very soon the advance must stop.

For the moment a return must be made to the latter months of 1942. During this period we had further discussions with Army Headquarters about compassionate leave, a problem that was becoming increasingly acute with the years. Many little points were cleared up and in the end we were satisfied that the best possible was being done in New Zealand to investigate the cases and report on them. In February 1943 a fresh issue of the instructions on the subject was promulgated, a copy being in Appendix IX.

Towards the end of 1942 the British Army formed the new corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, taking away from the old Ordnance Corps that portion which dealt with such technicalities. After only slight hesitation we recommended to New Zealand that we should follow suit, and the recommendation was approved. The change became effective in December 1942.

As 1942 had gone on, the manpower position had become progressively more acute. At Maadi we did our best to maintain the comb-out and, what was more difficult, to resist the only too frequent requests for more men for this and that. The time for luxuries had for the moment ceased to be. It so happened that in December the GOC agreed to the formation of another unit within the Division, aimed at improving the amenities for the troops. It was only a field bakery section and the numbers were small, 37 all ranks; but to the careworn accountants of manpower at HQ 2 NZEF it resembled the famous last straw. For once the Officer in Charge of Administration had to warn the GOC that if this sort of thing went on there would shortly be no more troops to do the fighting. The unit, of course, did excellent service, but in principle its formation just at that time was questionable.

In January 1943 the problem of the marginally unfit man became acute. It is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 15. Here it will be enough to say that we had to set up a special standing committee to review cases, and at the same time appointed a full-time officer to do nothing else except look after affected cases and ensure that men had work that was productive and not merely time-filling.

In January the 8th Reinforcements arrived, some 5500 strong. Never was any draft more welcome throughout the war. The draft was well trained and could be handed over to active units with less training overseas than was usual. It was speedily absorbed, as our numbers were low.

In March 1943 the Eighth Army advancing from the south was joined to the Allied army coming from the west (Algeria) and control of the combined forces passed to General Eisenhower, who had his headquarters in Algiers. This meant that censorship of war correspondents’ despatches was done there instead of in Cairo. We sent one correspondent there as liaison officer. From the beginning we had difficulties, for the reason that the headquarters in Algiers had had no experience of Dominion troops and would not allow them a separate identity. There was some acerbity, and a degree of plain speaking, and in the end our despatches were cleared with reasonable speed. We had by this time established such a good understanding with General Headquarters, Middle East, that it was irritating to have to start all over again. It was, however, not the last time that we had to assert our separate identity.

As soon as the victory at Alamein was seen to be certain, i.e., in December 1942, the Australians withdrew their remaining division for service in the Pacific. Naturally there was a recrudescence of the uneasy feeling in 2 NZEF that our place was in New Zealand; but the troops were now advancing victoriously, the tide of the war had turned, even in the Pacific, and the feeling died down quickly.

After the withdrawal of the Australian forces HQ 2 NZEF offered to look after Australia's interests, so to speak. We had already made the Australians free of our clubs. Now we said that we would handle any parties of exchanged or escaped prisoners. There was always a sprinkling of Australians about, both in North Africa and in Italy, and it gave us pleasure to look after them.

March 1943 produced the beginning of an exchange of cables with New Zealand about a General Election, which now seemed likely to take place later in the year. It was agreed that in due course New Zealand would send out someone with the necessary instructions and authority to handle the voting; and then for the moment the matter was put aside.

Since Japan had entered the war in December 1941 the only mails to and from New Zealand had been carried by sea, a sad blow to those who had become accustomed to air mails. During 1942, however, postal authorities in the countries concerned – United States, United Kingdom, Egypt, and New Zealand – had arranged for the introduction of an airgraph service – microfilmed air letter-cards – and this was started to and from New Zealand in March 1943. At the outset, troops had to be rationed to only one card a week; but it was at least something, and meant that an answer to a letter could be received in a matter of weeks instead of months.

During March there were other discussions with New Zealand on manpower, which was now becoming a problem in New Zealand too. After careful examination, and taking a bit of a chance on the future, HQ 2 NZEF agreed to a delay of two months in the sailing of the next draft, the 9th Reinforcements. It had been intended to despatch it in March; but it did not sail until mid-May.

Advanced Base had its teething troubles, as was only to be expected. One arose out of our desire to be helpful to British Headquarters, in this case Rear Headquarters of the Eighth Army. With some hesitation Advanced Base had agreed to lend men for guard duties, the understanding being that the men were to be given back as soon as they were wanted for a draft to the Division; but it always seemed to happen that the moment when we wanted them was an awkward one for Army Headquarters, and there were appeals to be allowed to retain them for a further period. Then there would be an argument embarrassing to both sides; but we had to be firm and get the men back.

For some weeks before the beginning of March 1943 we had known that the Minister of Defence was proposing to visit the Expeditionary Force. The time first suggested for his visit was unsuitable for the Division, which was just beginning (mid-March) one of its outstanding operations, the outflanking of the Mareth line; but the Minister decided to adhere to his plans and arrive on the original date, but confine his activities to that portion of the Expeditionary Force not engaged in Tunisia. He would then go to England, engage in part of his business there, and later come back to see the Division at a more suitable time. He arrived initially on 16 March and stayed until 3 April, visiting all the camps and units in Egypt, together with some of the non-divisional units in the Western Desert and in Syria and Palestine.

From the start the policy was for the Minister to talk freely to the men and so get an opinion on their real feelings. At the end of each day he would tell Headquarters what questions he had been asked, and what matters appeared to be troubling the men. He would then be given an answer if one was known. Otherwise, Headquarters would engage to investigate the query. It was gratifying that there were few complaints, and even fewer real grievances, and that most of the matters raised with the Minister referred to happenings in New Zealand and not in the Expeditionary Force.

At this time (March–April 1943) our non-divisional units were spread out from Tunisia to Beirut. The Railway Construction Group had been moved complete to Palestine and Lebanon, where it was extending the railway line up the coast from Acre in Palestine to Beirut in Lebanon. The Railway Operating Group was again runing the trains as far as Tobruk. The artillery Survey Battery, after a spell in both Transjordan and Syria on ordinary survey work, had at last joined the Division and was carrying out artillery duties. One Army Troops company was in the Western Desert, mostly engaged on improving the water supply; one had moved from the small port of Safaga on the Red Sea to Benghazi, where it was helping to get the port back into full running order. The Mechanical Equipment Company was strewn out over a good part of Libya.

Even the opening up of Tripoli had not led to the abandonment of Benghazi, and we had to re-form the Port Detachment at the latter port.

It was not until April that we received the full details of the financial arrangements between the United Kingdom and New Zealand Governments under which the Expeditionary Force was operating. It was, in brief, that first a lump sum should be paid for initial equipment; second, a lump sum should be paid to cover maintenance up to 31 July 1942; and third, there should be a monthly payment of a fixed sum for maintenance after 1 August 1942. We now felt a bit surer of our ground when dealing with British authorities. Had it not been for the generosity and forbearance of these authorities, we might often have found ourselves in difficulties. This is further mentioned in Chapter 11.

The Minister of Defence arrived back in North Africa on 27 April, but this time went direct to the Division. It was now right up against the last mountain defences of Tunis and was not very active, so that the Minister was able to see most of the units. He stayed there about a week and then came back to Egypt, visiting one or two units in Libya en route. He left us finally on 14 May.

Towards the end of May the Division started on its long journey by road back to Maadi, some 1800 miles away. Advanced Base was closed on 23 May, and with the exception of the medical units mentioned on page 58, all our administrative units were withdrawn to Egypt. In preparation for the return of the Division, Maadi Camp was cleared of a number of the depots, which moved to Puttick Camp at Mena, some miles away near the Pyramids. Helwan was no longer available, having long ago become the main South African base. Maadi was so much the New Zealand home that the Division preferred to pack itself closely in there, rather than go to an area elsewhere in Egypt. For those who were badly in need of recuperation, a leave camp was started at Alexandria.

During the Minister's visit discussions had taken place on a scheme for furlough for long-service personnel, following on some cabled communications with New Zealand. The broad principles had been established, and the proposals had been further considered in the weeks following the Minister's departure. Any scheme was dependent on the Division being freed from an operational role, which was now the position. It had previously been made clear to GHQ that the Division would not be available for the next campaign, the invasion of Sicily, planning for which had been going on for some time.

The way was now clear, for the first time for over two years, for the Expeditionary Force to turn its attention to matters unconnected with fighting.

CHAPTER 5 Towards Rome

AS soon as the Division had settled down in Maadi, all concerned had to concentrate on the furlough scheme without delay. The broad idea was to release as many of the first three echelons as could be spared and for whom shipping was available; but the governing factor was to be the efficiency of the force. A certain degree of dislocation was inevitable, the permissible degree being comparatively high in view of the long battle experience of the Division and the consequent high standard of training. In the end it was possible for the GOC to agree to the release of some 6000 all ranks, the battle-worthiness of the Division still remaining at a good level.

The conferences and discussions that followed within the force, and the cables that passed between Headquarters and New Zealand, had all to be concentrated into a few days, everyone working at the greatest pressure. The New Zealand Government had already made preliminary arrangements with the United Kingdom Government about shipping, so that when a suitable vessel, the Nieuw Amsterdam, was offered it had to be accepted without hesitation, although its arrival was sooner than we had expected, and much sooner than we would have preferred. The arrangements for the selection of the men and, even more difficult, for the selection of those officers and NCOs who could be spared, meant round-the-clock working for the staff concerned.

The instructions for this scheme, the code-name for which was Ruapehu, were issued piecemeal as fast as some aspect or aspects could be determined, which made it a scrappy business. Had we waited, however, until all the points had been determined before issuing any instructions, the scheme would never have commenced at all. There were seventeen instructions altogether, one being given in Appendix VII.

The Division did not return to Maadi until the end of May, and the draft sailed for New Zealand on 15 June. The staff concerned with making the arrangements may be pardoned for following up the embarkation with a sigh of relief and a mild celebration.

The code-name for the first draft had been taken from a notable geographical feature in the North Island bearing a Maori name. For the next following draft we intended to turn to the South Island, and in fact the name chosen was Wakatipu. Thereafter we alternated between the two islands, Taupo, Kaikoura, Tongariro, and Hawea following in due course.

For some time past the New Zealand Government had been in consultation with the United Kingdom Government about the future movements of the Division, there being in New Zealand a feeling that it should now come back to join in the defence of the Pacific. Not for the first nor yet the last time, the Government, supported by parliament, took a broad view and decided that the Expeditionary Force should stay in the Mediterranean. The appreciation of this decision shown by the United Kingdom Government spread to the various headquarters in the area, and explained in part why in the long run they were always so forbearing of our requests and our, to them, unusual and irritating ways.

We were told of this decision towards the end of May; but at the same time were told of the manpower situation in New Zealand, which was causing some concern. It was beginning to be doubtful if men could be found to keep the force at its existing figure. This brought up the position of the non-divisional engineers, some units of which were in any case severely hit by the furlough scheme. Practically all the companies had come with the first three echelons, had had few casualties and now found that up to 90 per cent of their strength was due for relief. The Government decided the fate of the Railway Operating Group out of hand by directing that it should be returned complete, so that the personnel could be used for work on the railways in New Zealand. Of the remaining units, some would have to be broken up almost at once. The rest would continue working for the present, but would receive no more reinforcements and might later have to be ‘cannibalised’ to help the Division. Scant attention was paid in these decisions to the needs of GHQ, which had wryly to accept what we told it, and had no chance to make any plea for the full retention of the units. However, the North African campaign was over. What the future held no one knew for certain, but probably the arrival of United States troops would compensate for the withdrawal of ours.

In view of what the Government had said about manpower, we made an estimate of the degree to which we could dilute the strength of our force with women. Many of the tasks in Maadi Camp, for instance, could be undertaken by women, who for some duties would be better than men. Clerical work of all kinds was an obvious example. Our estimate was that we could take 900 women, so replacing 700 men, including almost the whole staff of Second Echelon.

Altogether the matters being discussed with New Zealand were so many and of such importance that it was decided that the GOC should make a hurried trip to New Zealand and carry on the dis- cussionsdiscussions on the spot. He left with one staff officer on 6 June, as soon as the broad outlines of the furlough scheme were settled, and before the draft sailed.

On 11 June, in the middle of the turmoil surrounding the assembly of the furlough draft, the 9th Reinforcements arrived – not a big draft but, as always, very welcome. They could not be accommodated initially in Maadi Camp owing to the Division being there, but went to Puttick Camp on the other side of Cairo.

In May on the way back from Tunisia some soldiers of the Division took part in a bad case of rape, one of the worst offences of any kind that occurred during the war. The place was in Tripolitania, many hundreds of miles from Maadi. The offence was not reported to us until the Division had arrived in Maadi, but it was too bad to ignore. The difficulties of the case were great, and will be mentioned in Chapter 15. It is sufficient to say here that we had to send a regular convoy of vehicles and troops all the way back to Tripolitania, not only once but two or three times. The offenders were found and duly punished by court martial.

The furlough scheme added to the complications of the everlasting marriage problem, in that many husbands wanted their wives to go back with them on the same vessel – an impossibility, as the vessel was in no way fitted to carry wives. We had to allow some husbands to contract out of the scheme so that they could stay with their wives. The number of married personnel was not great, but they caused troubles out of all proportion to their numbers.

Nothing daunted by the previous refusal earlier in the year, GHQ asked us again to form a parachute unit, but was told once and for all that we could form no more units unless for the immediate advantage of our own Division. As far as GHQ Middle East was concerned, that was its last request.

While the bulk of the men selected for furlough had gone back on the Nieuw Amsterdam, there were still odd parties whose release had been delayed one way or another, and whom we wished to get back at once. The New Zealand Government, during discussions about this, put some definite restrictions on the number of men who would be allowed to travel on unescorted vessels. If the vessel were under 15 knots in speed, the maximum draft was to be 25; if over 15 knots unescorted, then 100 could go. If a party was over these numbers, then the vessels must have an escort. The reasons were good, and we could not cavil at the decision; but it did slow up the return to New Zealand of small parties for the rest of the war.

At the end of June there was a marked lull in all our activities, for which everyone was thankful. It had been a strenuous thirty days.

During July the usual number of odd matters had to be dealt with. We had discussions with GHQ about what would happen if Italy were to surrender, so releasing large numbers of prisoners of war. We finally decided that practically all the clothing for nurses and other women's services would have to be issued. We asked Army Headquarters to take action directed towards introducing new punishments for officers, including reduction in rank or to the ranks. We were told that the airgraph service had been speeded up by going via Ceylon and Australia, a new long-distance flight having started from Colombo to Perth. On the whole, however, July was a month of suspended animation, while we awaited the return of the GOC. He arrived back on the 31st after a strenuous trip.

The decision was then taken to disband all the remaining non-divisional units, the men not qualified for furlough being absorbed into the Division. Of the officers, some volunteered to join divisional units, and some accepted appointments with British units in the area or in India. The disbandment started in August, but was not fully effective for three months thereafter.

The next furlough draft (Wakatipu), comprising in the main the balance of the first three echelons, started assembling in August. Hopes were high that it would be sailing soon; but as it happened, owing to shortage of shipping, it was January 1944 before it sailed, a delay of over four months. We had to take some special steps to keep up the morale of this party.

The 10th Reinforcements arrived on 18 August 1943, only two months after the ninths. The situation was now fully restored, the Division was up to establishment again, and satisfactory numbers of reinforcements were in the depots. With the 10th Reinforcements there arrived a number of men who had been officers in New Zealand and who had had to revert to the ranks when proceeding overseas to the Mediterranean. They caused complications. On the one hand the GOC wished to be fair to them and restore their rank as soon as was reasonable; but on the other hand the existing and likely vacancies were not numerous enough to make this possible for many months.

During September 1943 the Division moved out of Maadi into a training area in the desert not far west of Alexandria and all the depots came back to Maadi, which once more became our main base camp. The Division was soon placed under orders to move to Italy, the move to take place in November, but this was then speeded up to take place in October. Past experience had told us what steps to take this time. Divisional Headquarters established a special Administrative Post to stay in Egypt at the despatching end until the move was complete. Plans were prepared for an advanced base to be established in Italy as soon as the first elements of the Division arrived there. It appeared that the Division was moving to Europe permanently, a state of affairs that would of necessity cause some changes further back, of which the formation of an advanced base would be only the beginning. For the moment no further action was taken; but future possibilities were much in our minds.

During September voting took place throughout the force for the General Election in New Zealand. An officer to conduct the election had arrived with the 10th Reinforcements. There was some confusion over election manifestoes, but luckily the whole force was inactive and so available to vote.

As part of the reduction in New Zealand's overseas commitments the Forestry Group in the United Kingdom had been reduced from three companies to one. This company was moved to the Mediterranean and arrived in Algeria in September. As it had been arranged that it should join 2 NZEF and cease to be under the control of the military authorities in England, a staff officer from Headquarters visited it soon after its arrival, so as to establish a link between the company and its new controlling authority. Among other things it was arranged that the company should get its share at once of our various welfare activities.

The Division moved to Italy in the first half of October. We already had a port detachment at Alexandria, the port of embarkation, and now established one at Taranto, the port of disembarkation. Advanced Base moved about the same time and was functioning between Taranto and Bari before the end of the month. Advanced offices were opened there for postal, pay, records and so on. The hospital from Tripoli moved at once – this time with the approval of the British authorities – and was ready in Italy as soon as the first New Zealand casualties occurred.

At an early stage slight difficulties arose with the new GHQ under whose orders we came. We had left our old friends, General Headquarters, Middle East, and were now under General Headquarters, Central Mediterranean Force (CMF), which meant that we had to start afresh to assert our degree of self-containment as a small national army. The new GHQ had been prepared for a fighting division, but had not appreciated that the Division had quite an important tail. The various administrative staff officers of HQ 2 NZEF, including OICA, had to make several trips to advanced GHQ at Naples, and repeated visits to the local British area commander, before the position was satisfactory.

Concurrently with the move of the Division to Italy, we had co-operated with the new GHQ by setting up our own section of the general organisation formed to receive returned, or rather liberated, prisoners of war. Owing to the rapid reaction of the Germans to the Italian armistice, the numbers were not as great as had been hoped. Luckily, by the time we wanted our personnel for other duties the rush was over. The continuing problem of the steady trickle of escaped prisoners of war that reached the Allied lines in the next year or so was solved by our later forming a permanent Prisoner-of-War Repatriation Unit, which, while working within the Allied framework, handled our own escapees.

ITALY colour map of Italy

Gradually the outline of an administrative layout in Italy was emerging. The problem was what to do with all our installations and units in Egypt, headed by HQ 2 NZEF. It was accepted as definite that no matter what moves the Division might make, it would not be coming back to Egypt, so that a case could be made out for closing down in Egypt completely. Thought was given to this during September and October, and all the pros and cons set out; but it was then thought better to delay further action until the position in Italy was a little clearer. A decision would have to be made before long, for on it depended the degree of work to be carried out at Advanced Base.

Meanwhile, in New Zealand there had been difficulties over the return to the Mediterranean of the first furlough draft. The details are not the concern of this volume; but it appeared that there was a strong feeling in the country that the draft had done their bit, and that their places should be taken by younger and fresher men. At first it was only the married men who were deleted officially from the returning party; but little by little the numbers were further reduced, either by official action or by passive resistance. In the end only a small part of the draft ever did come back to us. Towards the end of the year (1943) many cables passed between the Government and the GOC on the question of future drafts, as the long-term calculations made while the COC was in New Zealand had now been nullified. The Government did its best to compensate for the deficiency by increasing later reinforcement drafts; but for the first time our reinforcement position became erratic, and we had to become accustomed to a sort of hand-to-mouth existence. It took some time for both the Government and the Expeditionary Force to admit that ‘furlough’ was a misnomer, and that once men returned to New Zealand on leave they were gone from the Expeditionary Force for good. The effect on the Division was not so great as might have been expected, for with few exceptions, and those for good reasons, all the officers came back to us, and a good part of the NCOs also.

In October and November there took place a small operation in the Dodecanese Islands in which the New Zealand portion of the Long Range Desert Group took part, landing on the island of Leros. The operations were failures, and as it happened attracted the attention of the press to an exceptional degree. From the New Zealand angle, it was unfortunate that the troops had been committed to the operation without the knowledge of either the New Zealand Government or the GOC. Previously the unit's activities had taken place in the same theatre of war as the Division's, and the Government was always conscious that at any one moment the unit might be in action; but now the Division had gone to Italy, and the Aegean islands were a new theatre of war. The news that New Zealand troops were there at all gave the country a shock, intensified and indeed embittered by the conduct of the operation, which was severely criticised in the British press. The New Zealand Government showed great annoyance and expressed its views forcibly to the United Kingdom Government. The outcome was that the troops who survived the operation were returned to 2 NZEF, the New Zealand portion of the Long Range Desert Group was disbanded and the troops were absorbed into the Division. They came back to us in December.

In one class of reinforcements, namely doctors and dentists, New Zealand was finding it most difficult to keep up the supply. There is no doubt that the service we received overseas from these two professional classes was exceptionally high, much higher than with any other British or Dominion troops; but the time had now come when we had to accept a slight reduction in the service. Incidentally, we were under long-sustained pressure from New Zealand to reduce the number of our hospitals, or at least of our hospital beds. While possibly on a pure statistical basis we erred slightly on the side of being over-hospitalised, the increasing length of our lines of communication, and the rule that New Zealanders must always have one of their own hospitals within reach, justified our retaining the full number.

By the end of November the decision had been made that HQ 2 NZEF would move to Italy, together with nearly all the NZEF ‘controls’ – medical, chaplains, pay, legal and so on. For reasons that will be explained in Chapter 7, it would have been impossible for HQ 2 NZEF to have carried on in Egypt.

About this move we were quite clear and firm. The position about Maadi Camp was not so clear. The pros and cons of moving it to Italy will be given in Chapter 9. Here it will be enough to say that we would always need a transit camp in Egypt, and that the facilities in Maadi for training and looking after large numbers of men were unrivalled and could never be equalled in Italy within reasonable time. So it was decided to retain Maadi and to keep to a minimum the organisation in Advanced Base, even though we could not avoid making the new camp a copy, albeit a small one, of the larger establishment in Egypt.

It remained to be decided where Headquarters was to be located. The ideal location for a headquarters such as this is discussed in Chapter 7; but it may be said now that when it proposes to move forward, Headquarters should go as far forward as it can, allowing for its not being a fighting headquarters. Otherwise the move may not be worth while. We had adhered to this rule in part by moving to Italy, but departed – or were forced to depart – from the rule as far as exact location in Italy was concerned. We had some trouble with the British authorities in finding a place at all, and it is true that the areas north-west of Bari were congested with Allied troops, especially the Allied Strategic Air Force. All the same, we should have been less hasty in accepting the site we did, which was just clear of Bari in a small and pleasant town on the coast called Santo Spirito. It was really too far back, as we were to find.

Concurrently with the arrival of the Division in Italy another club had been started in Bari, where the general amenities were poor. As it happened the Division itself never again came within reach of the club; but it was invaluable for convalescents from hospital in Bari and for the troops at Advanced Base. This last unit was at first in an entirely tented camp; but as time went on some hutments, both of wood and stone, were built. The camp was added to and improved during the time we were in Italy; but while it became comfortable enough, it was isolated and never approached the standards of Maadi. It was also too far back.

Our degree of self-containment was steadily increasing. By the time we reached Italy we had started our own ordnance depots, which dealt with the larger British depots and then distributed the stores to our own units.

In our early talks with GHQ CMF we made it clear that our reinforcements were solely for the support of 2 NZEF, and that we could not help by forming any GHQ units. Such an attitude may appear selfish, and probably was so viewed by GHQ; but we pointed out that we maintained a fighting formation stronger than any British equivalent, and, moreover, looked after ourselves and did not need to draw on the services of British depots to the same extent as did British divisions. At later stages we did form several new units to cope with new developments, and to support the claim that we looked after our own people. Such were units for the concentration of graves, for the reception and interrogation of escaped prisoners of war, and for the screening of claims made by Greeks and Italians for help given to Allied troops during the German occupation. Moreover, as our line of communications lengthened – ending at Trieste – we had to form additional intermediate links to help with such things as medical treatment and reinforcements. So one way and another we thought we were not doing so badly.

It must be said that the organisation and maintenance of the Allied armies in Italy was better than in North Africa – after all, we were all learning – and there never seemed to be the same call for special units.

When we first landed in Italy the main part of GHQ was still in Algiers, and we had to have a liaison officer there; but soon after our arrival GHQ moved completely to Caserta, near Naples.

We then ran into troubles over our communications with Egypt, the existing British signals link being too slow for our impatient methods. An application was made for a separate wireless channel for 2 NZEF purposes alone. There was strong resistance to this from GHQ for many obvious reasons; but in the end it gave in with as good a grace as possible, and we got our wavelength. We could then often get a reply from Maadi in an hour or so. There was by this time no doubt in anyone's mind – our own or GHQ's – that the administrative standards we expected were higher than those in the British service.

During January 1944 the long-delayed Wakatipu draft at last sailed for New Zealand. For the moment there was no word of any future draft; and the 4th Reinforcements, the members of which had seen as much fighting as had the first three echelons, were left in a somewhat unhappy state.

Headquarters 2 NZEF moved to Italy in late January and early February 1944. Even before it was settled in its new location the Division had moved across Italy from the east coast to an area in front of Cassino, lengthening its distance from Headquarters appreciably. The move had been secret. All vehicle signs had been painted out, cap and shoulder titles removed, and efforts made to conceal the fact that the New Zealand Division had moved. It was unfortunate, therefore, that a steady trickle of officers from rear 2 NZEF units – either from Headquarters or Advanced Base – came gaily driving up to the Division with vehicle signs and the words ‘New Zealand’ showing all over the place. The lesson was learnt, and when a move occurred again under similar conditions, rear echelons were warned and so shared in the attempt at concealment. The word ‘attempt’ is used advisedly, as it is doubtful if New Zealanders could be disguised merely by removing their badges and signs. There was always something about them that marked them out from other British troops.

This move meant that the distance from both Headquarters and Advanced Base to the Division was already too great for comfort. A reinforcement transit unit had to be formed and sited just behind the Cassino area. As the Division never again came any closer to Advanced Base, the Transit Unit became a permanency, a link which we had never had previously. Whereas in the summer of 1942 reinforcements had gone to units direct from Maadi Camp, they now went from Maadi to Advanced Base, thence to the Transit Unit, and only then to the Division. Distance made it necessary for troops to be brought under central control close behind the Division, before being sent on to units that might quite well have moved while the reinforcements were coming forward from Advanced Base.

In January 1944 we formed the Education and Rehabilitation Service (ERS), intended initially to help men who were on the New Zealand roll, i.e., who for any reason were going back to New Zealand. The majority on the roll were of course going back for medical reasons, and a good number were hospital cases. The ERS spent some time investigating the whole problem in 2 NZEF, and was not functioning to any degree until later in the year. It is discussed further in Chapter 16; but it is right to say here that we had been much criticised in New Zealand for not having had such a service before.

The eternal marriage question led to a minor crisis in January 1944, when the Government showed signs of weakening over a proposed marriage to an Armenian woman – a type of marriage to which previously it had been rigorously opposed. There was an exchange of cables almost heated in tone; and then the case collapsed when the intended bridegroom decided not to go on with his application.

During February 1944 the Forestry Company moved from Algeria to Italy. It worked there in areas remote from the rest of the Expeditionary Force, one of them being in Calabria in the toe of Italy.

About this time fresh instructions were sent to Maadi Camp regarding the procedure to be followed with men of low medical category, the intention being that unless a man could be usefully employed he was to be sent back to New Zealand. Perpetual cookhouse fatigue was not looked on as useful employment. It had already been agreed with New Zealand that men who had been primary producers in peacetime should be sent back as soon as they ceased to be fit for field service, and should not be retained for service at the base.

In March 1944 Headquarters agreed to the formation of a Graves Concentration Unit, to work within the general Allied framework. For over two years we had had a Registration and Inquiry Unit, the task of which was to locate and register definitely the graves of those who had been buried during fighting, more often than not in individual sites. The new Concentration Unit would now lift the bodies and concentrate them into approved cemetery sites, where wooden crosses or other temporary religious symbols would be erected also. At the end of the war further action would become the responsibility of the Imperial War Graves Commission. At the date we have now reached – March 1944 – the time had come to con- centrateconcentrate graves in the long desert area from Egypt to Tunis, and the new unit started work there.

The alleged sins of the Division caught up with us during April, when General Headquarters, Middle East, forwarded a claim for deficiencies in tentage and other stores in the training area occupied by the Division in the desert west of Alexandria in September 1943. The accusation was that the Division had walked off with the articles, instead of leaving them in situ. The accusation was probably true; but after an exchange of notes HQ 2 NZEF suggested that as the stores were in any case being used for the better prosecution of the war, and as the war was still going on, the matter might be allowed to drop – and dropped it was.

In late March the director of the ERS submitted his proposals for future action. A controlling committee was then formed, including representatives of such interested bodies as medical, chaplains and welfare, together with one or two officers selected for their special knowledge of the problem. The committee met for the first time at the end of March.

During March the Military Liaison Officer in London wrote to Headquarters about the provision of staff for prisoner-of-war repatriation units in England. One of the results of the invasion of Europe, whenever it took place, would be at some point the release of large numbers of prisoners of war, including many thousands of New Zealanders. The intention was that these men would be moved to England, where it was desirable that they should be met by special New Zealand units. Other than a small number of men to be drawn from New Zealand air force personnel in England, the liaison officer had no men available, and quite properly asked 2 NZEF what it could do to help – with the approval of the Government. Here was a case where we could not refuse, but we made it a condition that the personnel would only be supplied when the Division was out of the line in a rest area; for willing though we might be, our numbers were not as great as all that, and we did not want to disturb fighting units during an active period. The numbers asked for ran to over 800 all told, so were not negligible. In the months following the request we drew up suitable war establishments and began to select suitable officers and men.

Now that the Expeditionary Force was in the main on the continent of Europe, it began to dawn on a lot of people that England was only a thousand miles or so away. There began a steady trickle of applications to go to England either when furlough became due or at the end of hostilities. As time went on the trickle increased, until at the end of the war it was almost a flood. For the moment nothing could be done except to recognise that a new problem was looming up.

The lengthening of the line of communication meant that at any one time some member of the staff of HQ 2 NZEF was in the air on his way to or from Egypt, or in a car on his way up and down Italy. Visits from someone at Headquarters were always advisable to prevent the belief arising that any one part had been forgotten. Odd units, particularly, appreciated a visit from someone in authority.

The 21st April 1944 was a red-letter day in the life of HQ 2 NZEF, for on that day there arrived from New Zealand the first contingent of women clerical staff, all properly trained shorthand-typists. The number sent out from New Zealand was only 20, and Headquarters took the greater part, leaving a few at Maadi. Their arrival was a godsend. For the first time in four years correspondence could be dealt with smoothly; and to those officers concerned with matters of policy and so compelled to produce directives, the relief of having someone who could take down and quickly type drafts prior to production of the final text was immense. Their presence caused a breath of fresh air to blow through the corridors of Headquarters.

During the months from the end of January until May, the Division remained in the area in front of Cassino, and no changes in lines of communication were called for. Losses had been heavy, but not comparable to those of past campaigns. From the purely statistical standpoint, the reduction in the number of prisoners of war was all to the good, as over half the wounded came back to duty in due course, whereas a prisoner was a complete loss.

During May we appointed our own press censor, to work within the Allied framework but specifically for New Zealand messages. Prior to this appointment there had been many misunderstandings, often due to a simple thing like ignorance of New Zealand geography. The New Zealand censor was first and foremost a censor, and was not appointed to force messages through over the head of the Chief Censor; but he did prevent misunderstandings and helped our messages to pass more quickly.

About this time Headquarters had to take up with the New Zealand Government the question of advertising vacancies for civilian appointments in New Zealand. An increasing number of cables was reaching us from Army Headquarters saying that such and such a local body or business firm had a vacancy for some appointment and wished this to be made known to any interested persons within the force. Headquarters had to lay down that the exigencies of the service came first, and that an applicant could not be released prior to going on furlough in the normal course. The position otherwise would have become impossible, as there would have been a measure of disintegration in the force. In cases where personnel applied and were successful, it is believed that positions were kept open for them until they came back to take them up.

During early April there was an exchange of cables with the Government concerning the future of the Division, from which we were interested to see that the question was being considered on the highest levels, including the United States Government as well as the United Kingdom Government. An interim decision was taken to delay withdrawing the Division until after the fall of Rome, when the matter would be considered again. We were told also that the Prime Minister would be visiting us towards the end of May.

Censorship reports showed at almost any time a degree of cynical comment by the troops about the Government in New Zealand, and indeed about all activities in the homeland. At this point (May 1944) the comments were if anything more marked than normal, so that the imminent arrival of the Prime Minister became a cause for concern, for there seemed a likelihood that he might be involved in some unpleasantness. The GOC in the Division, and OICA for other units, had to speak discreetly to COs and ask them to explain to the men that Mr Fraser was after all the Prime Minister of the country and deserved a welcome and a courteous hearing, no matter what a man might think. During the visit there were one or two minor cases of discourtesy, but nothing in any way resembling concerted action.

The Prime Minister arrived at Naples on 26 May and went straight to the Division, which was in the line to the north of Cassino, a part of the front not as active as that farther south. He saw most of the units, his visit to the Maori Battalion just coinciding with the resumption of the offensive. From the Division the Prime Minister visited units in the south of Italy, including HQ 2 NZEF, and left for Egypt on 4 June. There he saw Maadi Camp again, together with odd units outside the camp. His original intention had been to go back to England from Egypt; but the Commander-in-Chief in Italy (General Sir Harold Alexander) had invited him to visit Rome if it should be captured at an early date. It was entered on 4 June; so the Prime Minister came back to Italy for twenty-four hours, arriving at Naples in the morning of 8 June and reaching Rome in the evening after a memorable drive along roads packed with advancing traffic. He left for England again on the morning of 9 June.

On this visit there were two subjects of the first order to discuss: the intentions about the furlough scheme and about the future of the Expeditionary Force. The two things were related, for if the force was to be withdrawn the furlough scheme did not matter; but if the force was to stay, or if there was going to be a delay in coming to a decision, the scheme must go on and the 4th Reinforce- mentsReinforcements must be relieved. It was in fact decided during the visit that the furlough scheme was to be taken this further stage; but the idea of ‘furlough’ was quietly abandoned and that of ‘permanent relief’ took its place. As soon as the Prime Minister had left, the machinery was set in motion to withdraw part of the 4th Reinforcements and to get them away to New Zealand. They left in the middle of September, followed by others in December, intervals which were longer than we would have liked, but which were governed by the availability of shipping.

During his visit the Prime Minister talked to a fair cross-section of the force, and so gathered an opinion on such things as their morale and their views about the future. The disposal of the force continued to be discussed among the Governments for some months after the Prime Minister's visit, and was not settled finally until the middle of September. Not for the first time the Government took a truly broad view and decided that the Division was to remain until the end of the war in Italy. The Division in the Pacific, the 3rd, was to be broken up to provide reinforcements for the Mediterranean.

June 1944 saw the opening of our third club in one of the larger hotels in Rome. Like all our clubs, it was open to all ranks. Unfortunately, for some time after its opening there was a strict order from Allied Headquarters against troops staying in Rome overnight, so that men had to live in a camp outside the city and come in during the day. This restriction was not lifted until December 1944. The club added to the natural amenities of Rome to a degree which the troops appreciated enormously.

The air link to New Zealand was further improved during June as the air letter service was restored.

Headgear during the war had gone through many phases. Now at last we reached the end with the general adoption of the beret. The New Zealand badge was worn on the beret against a background of a black diamond, this latter sign having been the one used by the Division to mark its axis of advance since the early days in North Africa.

Towards the end of July the advance of the Allied armies which had landed in France in June became faster and indeed spectacular, for the enemy's defences appeared to be cracking. There was even a chance that Germany would collapse before the end of the year. We ought not to have been surprised, therefore, when we received from the liaison officer in London an urgent request for the early despatch of the personnel for the prisoner-of-war reception camps. It was suggested that they should arrive in England at the latest by early September, which meant that we would have to start assembling them at once. Headquarters did point out rather plaint- ivelyplaintively that the conditions under which we had agreed to supply the personnel were not being fulfilled, in that the Division was very much in action; but of course the request was one that could not be refused, and steps were taken to release at least an advance party. In the end we did all that we were asked, including sending parties of welfare personnel, both women and men, to help start a club in London.

Advanced Base by now had become well established. So, despite previous decisions, one or two depots closed down in Maadi and reopened at Advanced Base. There was a saving in manpower thereby. In general, however, there was from now on a steady reduction in our training facilities, for drafts were becoming smaller and had in many cases already done long periods of training in New Zealand. In some cases men had had service in the Pacific too.

By this time the routine of administration throughout the long line of communications from Suez to the Division had settled down into a steady rhythm. It appeared to us that fresh problems were not occurring as frequently as in the past; but perhaps this was due to the fact that we were better at handling them.

CHAPTER 6 The Last Eighteen Months

DURING July and August 1944 the Division moved forwards steadily towards Florence. The GOC accompanied by OICA interviewed General Alexander during the latter part of July in order to get some idea about the future moves of the Division, and indeed of the Eighth Army in general; for on this depended certain moves in the 2 NZEF line of communication. It appeared that the main line of advance of the Eighth Army would be along the northeast coast of Italy and not up the centre, so that our own moves would have to follow suit. Headquarters 2 NZEF must in any case move soon, as we were fast getting out of touch with the Division. In further discussions with the staff at GHQ our attention was directed to Ancona, which, it appeared, was to be developed as a main advanced port, and through which, in common with the rest of the Eighth Army, our own Division would be maintained. It seemed that Headquarters could not do better than move to some place near this port. A first reconnaissance of the area was made almost at once, in fact as soon as Ancona was captured.

In August the Division made another of its secret moves, this time from Florence across to the north-east coast just in advance of Ancona. Our previous experience in January 1944 stopped the secrecy being compromised this time by undisguised vehicles or personnel coming forward from Headquarters or Advanced Base. Headquarters made a further reconnaissance of the area in early August, and was attracted to a small town called Senigallia, which appeared suitable for a headquarters; but the first reconnaissance was punctuated by some enemy shelling, so that we were a little premature. However, we did get in early this time, and staked out our claim beyond dispute.

Our last non-divisional engineer unit, the Forestry Company, went back to New Zealand complete during August, as practically all its personnel were due for relief.

The graves authorities were at this time looking ahead into the period following the end of the war, when concentration of graves would proceed vigorously. They asked us if we would be prepared to let our units continue to work in the post-war period. This was a question for the Government to decide, and it was referred to New Zealand at once. No decision was given at the time, nor indeed until the following year; but it may be said now that New Zealand units did continue to work in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the interior of Europe for nearly two years after the war.

In the middle of September, as has been mentioned in Chapter 5, we were at last told that the Division was to continue serving in the Italian theatre. While there had been little doubt about this for some time, it was a relief to know officially. Planning could now continue with some assurance.

Senigallia was duly chosen as the new location for HQ 2 NZEF and was occupied during September. It was a pleasant spot, a small port and seaside resort combined. The great advantage at the moment was that the Division was only a few miles away on the main road north, the front line being sufficiently close for laagers of tank units in reserve to park in the roads round Headquarters. One of our hospitals moved to the same township about the same time; and in due course other line-of-communication units followed suit– ordnance depot, reinforcement transit unit, and so on – until the area became almost an advanced ‘Advanced Base’. The distance from the real Advanced Base was now so great that we had to agree that our reinforcements and stores should travel from Bari to Ancona by sea. From Ancona onwards we took over in our own MT.

The proximity of the Division, and the presence of New Zealand women, both in the hospital and at Headquarters, combined to produce an epidemic of so-called sightseeing expeditions, in which young officers in jeeps took their girl friends away up the road into the divisional area, even into shelled areas. The excitement shown by both parties was perhaps understandable; but all the same the risks were a bit too great, and we had to issue instructions laying down a limit to this new forward advance. Probably no one took any notice of the instruction; but luckily the Division soon became active again and drew farther away, and the cruises stopped.

On 3 September the GOC was injured in an air crash and entered the hospital at Senigallia, being one of its first patients. Another officer took over command of the Division, but the GOC continued in command of the Expeditionary Force.

Our line of clubs was added to during August and September when we took over a large hotel in Florence. This made four clubs – Cairo, Bari, Rome, and Florence – and it was becoming apparent that some form of central control would soon be necessary.

During the year the 11th, 12th, and 13th Reinforcement drafts had arrived, the last-named in November; but it was doubtful if these drafts, together with later ones foreshadowed in New Zealand, would be enough to keep the Division up to its present establishment. It had become most desirable that long-service personnel should be released forthwith and returned to New Zealand without further delay. The objective was to release all men with three years' service overseas, i.e, up to and including the 6th Reinforcements. During October the GOC, now recovered from his injury, reviewed the state of the Division in detail, and came to the conclusion that certain units could be disbanded without detriment to fighting power, and that others could safely be reduced in size. As an example of the first class, the fact that the German Air Force had been driven out of the skies meant that the Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment could be dispensed with; as an example of the second, the small number of casualties meant that field ambulances could be reduced in size. The result was to reduce the establishment of the Division by some 2500 all ranks, a considerable saving in manpower. The Government welcomed these reductions, as the most recent review of manpower in New Zealand indicated that in the future only equivalent numbers for men sent back under the replacement scheme could be supplied. There would be very few, if any, reinforcements to take the place of casualties.

The scheme of reductions in establishment, combined with the relief of long-service personnel, formed the subject of cables between New Zealand and the GOC over a period of two months. From the point of view of 2 NZEF there were one or two complications. First, it was always difficult to withdraw men from the Division while it was in action. Second, it appeared likely that in the future we would have to embody future drafts from New Zealand into the Division as one body at some one fixed date, which again meant when the Division was out of the line. Carried back to the New Zealand end, the scheme meant that future drafts would have to leave there on certain fixed dates if the changeover was to be effected smoothly. The GOC arranged with GHQ and Eighth Army Headquarters for the Division to be withdrawn from action at two periods during the approaching winter, each of some weeks duration, in the hope that drafts from New Zealand would be available in those periods to be embodied. Long-service men could then be released at the same time. He informed New Zealand of this programme, and obtained their concurrence, including agreement with the dates suggested for the drafts to leave New Zealand. It was thus distressing that before long we were told that sailings from New Zealand would be delayed. Not for the first time an extra effort had to be made within 2 NZEF to keep faith with men who had been promised relief at a certain date. Sailings were in fact later than had been initially promised for both the 14th and 15th Reinforcements; and the reorganisation of the Division at the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945 was all the more difficult. For once the GOC had to voice some distress in his cables, and said (inter alia), ‘the result of delaying the departure of the 14th Reinforcements will have most adverse repercussions upon the smooth working of the replacement scheme’.

It should be made clear that the fault did not lie with the New Zealand Government, which was doing its best, but was due to the usual shortage of shipping. In the end the changeover took place without much upheaval, for by this time the standard of training and of staff-work throughout the force was high enough to cushion a large degree of complication.

In November 1944 the British scheme cascade referred to on page 55 was at last abandoned, 6 NZ Division ceased to exist, and Maadi Camp went back to its original name, together with all the depots, etc., that had been masquerading under fancy titles. The scheme had justified itself, which was the consolation for the occasional irritations it had caused.

Towards the end of October the Division came out of the line for the first of its breaks, and went back into a rest area in some pleasant hilly country south of Ancona. For the first time in the war, HQ 2 NZEF was really in front of the Division, which was the excuse for some harmless fun. Periodically Headquarters used to advise the Division that the Senigallia front was standing firm, and that the Division was in no danger.

A ‘General Manager’ was appointed during November for the dual role of managing the clubs and superintending the distribution of canteen stores. For during the war, despite our 1941 decision to keep NAAFI as our main source of canteen supplies, the Expeditionary Force had imported supplies of its own from New Zealand more and more, using NAAFI only to fill in the gaps. The control of these canteen stores, after a period when the YMCA was mixed up in them, had been transferred, still somewhat confusingly, to the clubs. Like Topsy it had just grown that way and now badly needed sorting out. The running of the clubs was a big business in itself, and could with justice be looked on as quite separate from the distribution of canteen stores.

The troops had now been long enough in Italy for one of the less attractive results of their sojourn to become apparent, to wit black-market activities. The situation was first brought to our notice when members of returning drafts produced to the pay staff large rolls of Italian lire, with the request that these should be credited to their pay accounts, by which means they hoped to obtain the advantage of an artificial exchange rate between the lira and the pound, and also the benefit of the current appreciation of the pound sterling compared with the pound New Zealand. During the war it had always been permissible for troops to ask the pay office to transfer credits in their pay accounts back to New Zealand; but the same claim could not be made for money which did not come from pay. On inquiries it became clear that a great deal of this money, if not all, had come from the sale to Italians of such things as blankets and boots, which commanded a price on the black market infinitely greater than the price demanded by the army for articles of lost kit. To sell the goods to the Italians and then pay the army the regulation price was a simple way of making money. However, the pay staff refused to handle the excess lire, and men had to dispose of it in other ways, of which buying jewellery was one.

In November and December the late commander of 3 NZ Division in the Pacific visited 2 NZEF, partly to discuss the absorption into 2 NZEF of the officers from 3 Division, and partly to talk over the situation that might arise if New Zealand forces had to be used against Japan at the end of the war in Europe.

In December 1944 2 NZEF formed its own officer cadet training unit (OCTU) for the first time in the war. Since the abortive attempt to start it in 1940, mentioned on page 29, we had made use of British facilities in the Middle East, in India, and in the United Kingdom; but even at this late stage it was easier to run our own. A small unit was set up not far from Advanced Base in southern Italy.

It has been mentioned above that during the year (1944) we had formed small units to receive escaped or recaptured prisoners of war, and to conduct their interrogation. In addition, we had provided a small staff to help the British body which was investigating war crimes; and now at the end of the year we provided our own section of the staff for the unit, known as the Allied Screening Commission, which was investigating and adjudicating on claims from Greeks and Italians for helping Allied soldiers who had escaped or had avoided capture. Greece had not long since been reoccupied by the Allies. In this country, particularly, the inhabitants had been helpful to New Zealanders and deserved reward.

Headquarters 2 NZEF finished the year in a blaze of glory by becoming operational for a few weeks. There were signs that enemy parties were coming down the coast in boats at night and then landing and damaging railways and roads. Senigallia was right on the coast and open to damage. So Headquarters had to organise itself into guards, parties to repel boarders and so on, and moreover was given control over a strip of coastline which included other units, among them United States installations. Nothing happened; but it was a change.

The winter of 1944–45 was a quiet one, but the weather was colder than twelve months previously.

It was mentioned on page 80 that we were using the sea route from Bari to Ancona for our reinforcements. We found, however, that sea transport for the mails was not so satisfactory, and that somehow or other there were delays in handling them; so during the winter we started our own MT postal service from Bari northwards. The number of vehicles employed was small, but the effect on the regularity of the mails was marked. We kept this service going until at a later date we made special arrangements to send the mail from Bari by air.

On a previous occasion, in 1941, New Zealand had sent us a small consignment of motor vehicles, to be additional to those issued to us from British depots. On another occasion New Zealand sent a consignment of MT, but for the use of Middle East Forces generally, and not specifically for 2 NZEF. In January 1945 we asked Army Headquarters to send us as many cars as it could spare. Luckily, the degree of demobilisation within New Zealand enabled Army Headquarters to help us by sending some dozens of cars.

During the winter watch was kept on the size of Maadi and Advanced Base, and from time to time adjustments were made towards reductions in personnel. Our main training area remained at Maadi, where, among other facilities, a mock Italian village had been built so that troops could be trained in village fighting.

Our selection of code-names for returning drafts caused some confusion about this time, when the name we were using, Tongariro, happened to be that of an existing vessel engaged in journeying to and from New Zealand. We had a mild protest from General Headquarters, Middle East, asking us to be careful in the future not to use names of vessels. Thereafter we used to inquire from the Military Liaison Officer in London if there was a vessel bearing the name we proposed to use. He in turn checked with Lloyd's register.

In the early months of 1945 we had rather a spate of important visitors – the Hon. Mr Sullivan, Minister of Supply in New Zealand, Mr Jordan, High Commissioner in London, Sir Patrick Duff, High Commissioner designate for the United Kingdom in New Zealand, and Messrs Holland and Doidge, leader and member of the Opposition. The last-named two visitors arrived in time to see the opening day of what turned out to be the last offensive – 9 April 1945.

Up to the start of this offensive Divisional Headquarters had never been more than three hours' drive from HQ 2 NZEF since the move of the latter to Senigallia in September – a great help to discussions with the GOC and to the administration of the force. On the other hand, it was a long journey to Advanced Base, a full day by car, with no convenient point at which to break the journey. To reach Egypt normally took two days, as the air service started from Bari, but on one or two occasions we were able to make special arrangements to travel by air from an airfield near Headquarters and then reached Egypt in one day.

Prior to the last offensive the Division had come out of the line for the second time. It went back to the same area as before, again for a few weeks.

The final advance of the Division from near Faenza in early April to Trieste in early May was speedy, and maintenance from the rear became difficult. Losses were low, however, and the demands of the Division for men or for medical attention were low also. Even at this late stage, however, Headquarters tried to keep contact in such things as were its concern, and set up further intermediate links in the line of communication – a reinforcement staging post, an advanced detachment of a hospital, and so on.

During the Division's rush past Venice, the GOC sent in a detachment of troops under a senior officer to make sure that New Zealand got the use of the Danieli Hotel, the best in Venice, as a club. The detachment went to ground there and was in Venice a day or so before the official occupation. In the end, after making a gesture of offering to give up the place and accept an official allocation, the GOC was allowed to keep the hotel. There we established the last of our long succession of clubs. Every effort was made in the weeks that followed to ensure that everyone in the Division had leave in Venice for a few days. It was a fine finish to our welfare organisation.

In Appendix II is the Order of Battle of 2 NZEF as at 9 May 1945, immediately after the end of the war in Europe. The most advanced unit was beyond Trieste, the rearmost one in Suez. Between these two points was a chain of New Zealand units, unbroken except for the sea gap between Alexandria and Bari. From the moment men came ashore at Suez they were handled by New Zealand units until they reached the Division. Had the war continued for another year or so, we might even have had our own vessel sailing across the Mediterranean! As it was the New Zealand hospital ships came all the way to Italy.

The end of the European war meant that our Education and Rehabilitation Service went into top gear. It was formed as a separate corps in order to emphasise its importance and to give its personnel some esprit de corps; and once it had called up the previously earmarked staff, it set to work to show results and to provide education up to the standard of New Zealand University degrees. Once the flurry with Yugoslavia over Trieste was finished, and there was no chance of further operations, ERS became of the first importance.

A few hours before the last offensive commenced, the GOC received from New Zealand a cable asking his views on certain proposals, then before the Government, for carrying on the war against Japan. From then until the middle of August the exchange of cables continued. The Government had every intention of supplying a force for the next stage of the war, but thought that the manpower situation would not permit of the force being above a certain size, too small in numbers to reach the size of the existing Division and its rear establishments. The theme underlying the exchange of cables was how best to organise the limited numbers, a subject on which the GOC held strong views. Naturally, the cables are now only of academic interest.

As soon as the war had ended, steps had been taken both by the Government and by 2 NZEF to arrange the return to New Zealand of the next group of men due for relief, comprising the balance of the 6th and the whole of the 7th Reinforcements. They were released from 2 NZEF in the course of the next two months. Thereafter the return of men to New Zealand became part of the general scheme of repatriation.

Until the middle of July the Division remained in the Trieste area. It was then released from all operational duties and withdrew to an area in central Italy around Lake Trasimene, where it spent a further two months awaiting the determination of its fate. Until the surrender of Japan, there was the chance that part at least of the Division would be taken to form the backbone of the new force, and calculations of numbers available in various categories were sent out to New Zealand. There was even the possibility that the whole force might move to Egypt and reorganise there. Luckily it all came to nothing on the surrender of Japan, leaving only one query – how speedy would the repatriation be? The broad outlines of the scheme for repatriation involved sending back at once the drafts which were next in order of service, giving leave to England for the drafts coming next but one in the order, and assembling an occupation force for Japan from the single members of the last three reinforcement drafts, the 13th, 14th, and 15th Reinforcements. All the cables to settle this took some time, and it was not until mid-September, for instance, that the leave scheme to England was started.

While, strictly speaking, it had nothing to do with 2 NZEF, it must be said that the firm decision of the New Zealand Government not to allow any troops to take part in occupation duties in Europe created a slight feeling of shame in the force, at least among those who had dealings with British headquarters; for it was so clear that while we were all packing up and gleefully going home, many tens of thousands of British troops would be staying on for months and even years. It seemed a pity that after contributing so nobly to the war effort, we should just fail to clinch it in the immediate post-war period. However, this was a matter for the Government, and not for us.

During these months after the end of the war in Europe Headquarters was involved in a number of small administrative matters – interrogation and repatriation of prisoners of war, selection of personnel to serve under the Colonial Office, preliminary handing in of gear, collecting wives from all over the Eastern Mediterranean, and trying to evolve some system out of the flood of applications to go to England, this last disclosing a remarkable capacity among New Zealanders for producing plausible reasons. The number of applications for early return to New Zealand for compassionate reasons sky-rocketed, but luckily by that time we had a well-tried system of dealing with them. There was an undoubted falling off in the general discipline of the force, combined with an amount of long-distance sightseeing (‘swanning’) that was truly amazing, even making full allowance for the initiative of the New Zealander.

The leave scheme to England was a triumph of organisation, as it involved sending men by relays of MT all the way from Italy to the Channel coast of France, and enlisting the help of both British and United States camps and depots to form staging posts en route. The arrangements reflected the greatest credit on the staff of Divisional Headquarters who were entrusted with the task. A rule was made at the outset that men could not delay their repatriation to take advantage of the scheme, which meant that those next for repatriation were excluded, and only those whose repatriation would not take place for some two months or more could be considered.

In order to get better accommodation for the coming winter months, and to facilitate the organisation of the force to go to Japan (called ‘Jayforce’), the Division moved into an area in and around Florence and Siena, settling down there in early October. At the same time the wheel turned full circle, and HQ 2 NZEF moved from Senigallia to Florence and combined with Divisional Headquarters to make one headquarters again, as had been the position away back in 1940. Control of repatriation and of the other problems still confronting us was the task of HQ 2 NZEF alone; but Divisional Headquarters remained as a unit, and one staff served for both.

The club in Venice was kept open for as long as the Division was in the Lake Trasimene area; but when we concentrated in Florence it was closed, as indeed were all the units to the north and east of the new divisional area. We were gradually drawing in our horns and concentrating the remains of 2 NZEF.

The position regarding some of our equipment was not clear. Some was ‘lend-lease’ and had to be handed in to British depots for subsequent return to United States depots. Some was in excess of the normal equipment for a British division and belonged to the British authorities. Some was in effect our initial equipment, brought up to date during the war, and paid for by the New Zealand Government. It was definitely our own. The New Zealand Government specified some items which were to be sent to New Zealand; but with this exception we handed everything over to British depots, leaving any adjustments in costs to be settled between the Governments of the United Kingdom and New Zealand at a later date. For a while the New Zealand Government was inclined to stand on the strict letter of the law about ownership of equipment; but we pointed out that throughout the war we had always had the best of it when it came to issuing equipment, that for all our new units the British authorities had always found the equipment without more than a brief delay, that when it came to a settlement we were sure that New Zealand would be treated with the greatest generosity, and altogether that it ill became us to haggle at this or any stage. The Government was faintly surprised at this outburst, but accepted it in good grace, and all was well.

Black-market activities became a real menace, and indeed a disgrace. It has already been recorded that men were selling their personal equipment to Italians and, when charged with being deficient, were handing to the army the low price given in the vocabulary of stores. Now they saw masses of unwanted equipment being handed in to depots, its future disposal being uncertain. To steal and sell items of this equipment, such as tyres or even whole vehicles, seemed to some men to be quite harmless, as the equipment was in such quantities that most of it must be superfluous to any military needs. In fact, they did not regard it as stealing at all. Putting guards on the dumps was useless, as in some instances the guards themselves quickly became involved in the racket; and sad to say, the only reliable protection in the last few months was that provided by German prisoners of war. In Maadi Camp also we used Germans to protect the camp against large-scale pilfering by Egyptians. There were plenty of prisoners who were only too pleased to be given something to do, and progressively they took over a lot of the domestic fatigues in both Maadi and Advanced Base.

All we could do about the black-market activities was to refuse to handle the large sums of money that so many troops accumulated. Altogether it was a regrettable state of affairs.

In October the New Zealand Government was asked by the United Kingdom Government to agree to a reduction in the ration, partly because of the reduction in effort now expected from the troops, and partly because of the world shortage of food. The Government referred the request to us, showing some concern about it; but we were able to assure it that the reduction could be accepted and that there would be no reactions. The reasons were explained to the troops, the memorandum including a comparative statement of their reduced ration as compared with the still lower ration of civilians in England. There was no trouble.

Between the leave scheme to England, the assembly of Jayforce, plentiful sporting activities, and the work of the ERS, the weeks passed not so badly, the only regrettable feature being a marked increase in the VD rate, a price we had to pay for release from tension combined with being billeted in large towns. Progressively units and depots throughout our long lines of communication were disbanded. Advanced Base was kept busy right up to the last, as drafts were now embarked at Taranto direct into vessels for home and had to be assembled nearly three weeks before vessels sailed. Sometimes there was considerable congestion in Advanced Base – when, for instance, ships were delayed beyond the expected dates – but the prospect of soon being on a homeward-bound vessel helped to soften any hardships.

On 22 November the GOC gave up his appointment, exactly six years to the day since he had been appointed in London. It was the end of an era. His successor had the easy task of getting what was left of the force back to New Zealand.

But perhaps not so easy! Towards the end of December we were very nearly caught. All our plans had been directed towards keeping men occupied for long periods while sufficient shipping could be found. We had never envisaged a situation where ships came so fast that we would have trouble in filling them; but that is what happened. We had to take energetic steps to collect men in numbers enough to fill the vessels, including cutting short the leave to England of many thousands. Men were assembled in Advanced Base over Christmas and New Year in such density that the camp was holding two or three times its normal numbers, and conditions were most unpleasant. By early January the bulk of 2 NZEF had vanished, and only a comparative handful was left. We owe a great debt to the British Government for providing shipping so speedily.

Following on this sweeping reduction in numbers, the remainder of the force in Italy was withdrawn to the area Bari-Taranto, leaving the newly-formed Jayforce in camp in Florence By mutual arrangement with the commander of Jayforce, the time had come when it was to stand on its own feet, so to speak, and cease to be a part of the old 2 NZEF. By that time it was fully self-contained, with its own small hospital, postal unit and so on. It embarked from Naples in February 1946.

The two graves units still remained as formed bodies, the Government having agreed that they should continue serving into the post-war period. Our few remaining medical units kept some cohesion until the last, as their services were called on until repatriation was practically complete. Otherwise, of the old 2 NZEF no formed units remained by the beginning of February 1946. Troops awaiting repatriation could then be numbered in hundreds, and their control passed to a small headquarters specially formed and headed by a senior officer located at GHQ near Naples. With the exception of rear parties, repatriation was complete by the end of February in both Italy and Egypt.

Towards the end of February, at a ceremony held in one of the midans (squares) in Maadi township, there was unveiled an obelisk bearing this inscription:

This pylon records the fact that between 1940 and 1946 76,000 members of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force trained in Maadi Camp; and expresses the gratitude of the Force for the kindness and hospitality received during those years from the residents of Maadi.

The ground had been given us by the Maadi Land Company with the approval of the Egyptian Government, and the obelisk had been paid for out of the central regimental funds of 2 NZEF. The day it was unveiled was exactly six years from the day the Maadi Tent had been opened to cater for the welfare of the newly-arrived New Zealand troops.

PART II

CHAPTER 7 Headquarters 2 NZEF – Command and Staff

ON his way out to New Zealand in December 1939 the GOC prepared a series of notes on certain policy and administrative matters. After his arrival in Wellington he consulted with Army Headquarters and other authorities, and as a result embodied some of his notes into two documents which were submitted to the Government. With slight alterations the documents were approved, and were then given to the GOC in the form, first, of a charter over the signature of the Prime Minister, and second, a schedule of authorities over the signature of the Minister of Defence – both dated 5 January 1940, the day the First Echelon embarked. They are of such importance that they are included here instead of in an appendix.

The first and more important was as follows:

Prime Minister's Office Wellington 5th January 1940

Memorandum for

The General Officer for the time being

Commanding the Second New Zealand

Expeditionary Force Overseas.

The General Officer Commanding will act in accordance with the instructions he receives from the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, subject only to the requirements of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. He will, in addition to powers appearing in any relevant statute or regulations, be vested with the following powers:

(a)

In case of sufficiently grave emergency or in special circumstances of which he must be the sole judge, to make decisions as to the employment of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and to communicate such decisions directly to the New Zealand Government, notwithstanding that in the absence of that extraordinary cause such communication would not be in accordance with the normal channels of communication indicated in the following paragraphs and which for greater clearness are also indicated in the attached diagram.

Not included in this volume.

(b)

To communicate directly with the New Zealand Government and with the Army Department concerning any matter connected with the training and administration of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force.

(c)

To communicate directly either with the New Zealand Government or with the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, in respect of all details leading up to and arising from policy decisions.

(d)

In all matters pertaining to equipment to communicate with the War Office through normal channels, and through the liaison officer of the High Commissioner's office in London, the former to be the official channel.

(e)

In matters of command to adhere to the normal military channels between the War Office and the General Officer Commanding the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force overseas.

(f)

To establish such administrative headquarters and base and line of communication units as are necessary for the functions of command, organisation, including training, and administration with which he has been invested.

(g)

To organise, train, vary or group units and formations in such manner as he considers expedient from time to time.

(h)

To fix and alter the establishment and composition of units and formations as the exigencies of the service may in his opinion require from time to time.

After the Third Echelon has left New Zealand no officer above the substantive rank of captain will be sent overseas without the concurrence of the General Officer Commanding.

(Sgd) M. J. Savage,

Prime Minister

The second paper is as follows:

5th January 1940

Major-General B. C. Freyberg,

General Officer Commanding,

2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force Overseas,

Wellington.

The General Officer Commanding is hereby vested with the following powers:

(1)

Authority to increase the scale of ration, if necessary.

(2)

Authority to procure equipment (shown on equipment tables) that cannot be supplied through official channels. Such equipment to be bought through Ordnance channels where possible.

(3)

Authority to incur expenditures which cannot be foreseen at present, and which the General Officer Commanding considers necessary for protection of the health of the Force.

(4)

Authority to incur expenditure not exceeding £500 for any one transaction for the recreation or other amenities of the Force.

(5)

Authority to disburse, at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding, from an entertainment fund which will be provided, to an amount not exceeding £1,000 per annum.

(Sgd) F. Jones

Minister of Defence

Following on a request from the GOC, a cabled authority was given from New Zealand, dated 18 April 1940, adding an additional paragraph to the above memorandum, to read:

(6)

Authority to incur expenditure not exceeding £100 sterling for any one transaction to cover items which cannot be foreseen at present, but which he considers essential for the better training or security of the Force.

In January 1940 there was also promulgated an issue of Expeditionary Force Emergency Regulations (made under a special act of Parliament), some of the paragraphs of which gave the GOC statutory powers to command, organise, and administer the force, appoint and promote officers, return personnel to New Zealand for a variety of reasons (of which sickness and duty were two), and appoint, promote, or reduce warrant officers and non-commissioned officers.

To return to the two documents given to the GOC, paragraph (a) of the first paper deals with operational matters, and so, although it is of the first importance, is not the concern of this volume. Paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) cover the procedure to be followed in communications passing between the GOC and various authorities, the only ones the concern of this volume being (b) and (c). The paragraphs to which special attention is drawn are (f), (g), and (h), for they constituted the authority under which HQ 2 NZEF came into being and functioned. The last (unlettered) paragraph is discussed in Chapter 10.

Paragraphs (f), (g), and (h) gave the GOC extensive powers, which were the envy of the staff of other Dominion forces and, indeed, of the staff of GHQ also. They meant that the GOC had full powers to modify the Expeditionary Force as he wished without having to obtain the prior approval of any authority in New Zealand. The one restriction on the full 100 per cent implementation of these powers was that men had to be found by New Zealand, and that it was no use forming new units unless the men were going to be available, not only for initial formation but for subsequent maintenance. In the vast majority of cases men could be found from our reinforcement pool; but on occasions when the reorganisation was extensive – the proposed changes in late 1940, the proposed additions under FFC 36, and the formation of the armoured brigade – the prior approval of New Zealand had to be obtained. It may be claimed that the GOC's powers were used with restraint and with a due sense of responsibility, the number of occasions when Army Headquarters – the New Zealand authority most affected – made any form of protest or comment being remarkably few. There was, in fact, no case of real difference of opinion. Occasionally we were aware of a gasp coming overseas from the homeland over some action we had taken; but that was about as far as they ever got to remonstrating with us.

Provided that the Government of a country is prepared to trust the commander of an expeditionary force, the grant of such extensive powers is all to the good, if for no other reason than that there is an enormous saving in correspondence. The only risk is that the powers will be misused; but if this occurs, then the commander has been unworthy of the trust and must be replaced. It has already been mentioned that as a result of his visit to New Zealand in 1939–40 the GOC established a remarkable confidence by the Government in their commander, from which 2 NZEF profited beyond measure. On his side the GOC fully justified the confidence.

The second paper is of less importance. As it happened, there was little or no need to invoke some of these authorities, as normal military administration was adequate. We drew the British ration throughout with no augmentation; expenditures under paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (6) were minor ones. The GOC made full use of paragraph (5), his custom being to allocate part of the amount to the officers holding the rank of brigadier.

It will be noted that in these charters the terminology used was ‘2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force’. There is no mention of the Division. At this stage the greater, the Expeditionary Force, included the lesser, the Division. The same form of words can be noticed in all the correspondence that took place in late 1939 while the appointment of GOC was being discussed by Mr Fraser with authorities in England. The point is not of sufficient importance to be analysed further, for it was always clear to all concerned that the GOC was being appointed to command the Division just as much as the Expeditionary Force; but in the early stages no one had considered how this dual role was to be exercised.

Nor had anyone any time to envisage the full layout of the Expeditionary Force overseas. The United Kingdom Government had been informed that New Zealand's contribution would be a division. In the telegram notifying the War Office of the constitution of the First Echelon, ‘Base Details’ appears as one item, and later on there is a request for recommendations for any corps or army troop units which should be provided in proportion. The War Office in its reply specified certain units as being most needed, but of these only one (a survey battery) was ever supplied, and in any case the units were for the benefit of the army at large and not specially for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. There was no mention on either side of any base or training units or any indication of the extent to which the force would be self-contained. Later on it was made clear that New Zealand would provide certain medical units, including three hospitals; but beyond this nothing was settled.

The war showed that the fighting formation overseas – the Division – was about three-fifths of the total force. Towards the end of 1941 there were as many troops outside the Division as inside it; but for most of the war the other ratio prevailed – for every three men in the Division there were two outside it. This portion outside the Division was made up partly of non-divisional units and of men in hospital, but mainly of reinforcement drafts and base and line-of-communication units. The excessive number outside the Division in late 1941 came from an accumulation of reinforcements at the time.

However, in 1940 we had not realised this in Maadi, and only came to full realisation as the year went on. At an early stage the need was felt for some sort of training establishment, and for a holding depot for men awaiting return to New Zealand. We could not wait for the arrival of our first hospital, but had to form one out of such bits and pieces as were available. By the late summer the outline of an extensive base training camp was emerging, necessitating the formation also of a number of service units to maintain it. The training depots envisaged were also to be the homes at the base of the various corps in the force, the place to which personnel from hospital or awaiting posting would be sent. At the time we did not have enough men to man all these new units, for beyond the first echelon of the Division we had nothing, so that improvisation was the order of the day.

The formation of a base organisation was the first link in a chain of events that led to development in our ideas about the command of the Expeditionary Force. A second link was formed by the fact that an army is really an example of complete state socialism, meaning that every aspect of life is the concern of the controlling authority – not only food, clothing, health, shelter, amusement, but also the domestic and personal problems that afflict mankind. Sooner or later, and indeed most of the time, all these or some of them are making work for the headquarters of the force. In our case, that of a small national army a long way from its homeland, most of these points meant communicating with New Zealand, in addition to the communications that must pass concerning the normal military administration of the force.

Neither of the two points mentioned above – the control of the base organisation and communications with New Zealand, especially on personal problems – had strictly speaking anything to do with the staff of the Division, the task of which was first to train a fighting machine, and later direct its operations in the field. These were full-time tasks in themselves.

In the latter half of 1940 we became aware of the imminent arrival of a number of non-divisional units, these being New Zealand's contribution to the common cause over and above the Division. These units by their very nature could have nothing to do with the Division.

It was thus becoming clear that the GOC was acting in two capacities: first as the commander of a division in the field, and second as commander of a military force consisting of a division plus an unspecified number of non-divisional, base and line-of-communication units, the whole creating a series of administrative problems, including domestic problems, which alone would necessitate a steady stream of communications to and from New Zealand. There was no thought in anyone's mind that the two roles to be filled by the GOC were incompatible one with the other, or that he should not continue to fill them; but it was agreed by all who were thinking about it that a divisional headquarters, engaged in conducting battles in the field, governed in its actions by operations against an enemy, and quite liable to be on the move for long periods, was not the place from which to control either non-divisional or base and line-of-communication units, or from which to engage in a mass of detailed correspondence with Army Headquarters in New Zealand.

The solution adopted was that a separate headquarters would be set up for ‘NZEF’ matters, that the GOC would always take the field with the Division, and that a senior staff officer would be appointed to the new headquarters to act for him when he was in the field. In September 1940 a memorandum was issued on the subject, the first two paragraphs reading as follows:

With effect from 5 Sep 40 it is proposed to separate to some extent the offices of HQ NZ Div and HQ 2 NZEF, the former being located as is best suited to the needs of the moment, the latter remaining at Maadi.

The subdivision of responsibilities will be:

HQ NZ Div – will deal with all matters affecting the operations and normal administration of the troops under its command in the field. By normal administration is meant supply, evacuation of sick and wounded, movement, etc.

HQ 2 NZEF – will deal with all matters affecting accommodation and arrival of further contingents, training of further contingents and reinforcement drafts, training and organisation of the NZEF as a whole, base establishments of all kinds, and domestic administration of the NZEF (e.g. special clothing, rates of pay, etc).

It is not pretended that the wording of this memorandum is entirely clear, the use of the fatal ‘etc.’ conveying some degree of hesitancy. At the time everyone concerned was sure that the two headquarters were necessary; but when it came to putting it down on paper the results were not so good.

On 8 October 1940 an official 2 NZEF Order was issued, reading as follows:

(1) HQ 2 NZEF is constituted as a unit of 2 NZEF to date 1 Oct 40.

(2) HQ 2 NZEF is responsible for all matters of NZEF policy, all matters affecting 2 NZEF as a whole, and for that portion of the administration of GHQ units that is the concern of 2 NZEF.

(3) The following will be responsible direct to HQ 2 NZEF on such matters as come within the scope of para (2) above:

Mil Sec

DDMS

Base Ordnance

Base Postal

SCF

ADDS

HQ Base

Paymaster

Auditor

DAG 2nd Ech

DJAG

Publicity

Commissioner National Patriotic Fund

YMCA.

Mil Sec - Military Secretary; DDMS - Deputy Director of Medical Services; SCF - Senior Chaplain to the Forces; ADDS - Assistant Director of Dental Services; DAG - Deputy Adjutant-General; DJAG - Deputy Judge Advocate-General.

This was a bit better, and did show some attempt to restore order to what had been a rather confused situation. The very jumbled list of 2 NZEF ‘authorities’ set out in paragraph (3) comprises all those that existed at the time or were expected to arrive in the near future.

Between the publication of this order and of the next one given below, Divisional Headquarters moved to Helwan Camp to superintend the concentration of the Division, so exemplifying the state of affairs envisaged in paragraph 1 of the memorandum on page 98.

At a still later stage (27 November) yet another order was issued, reading as follows:

The organisation of headquarters in 2 NZEF is now as follows:

HQ 2 NZEF – responsible for policy and general administration as affecting 2 NZEF as a whole, and for the administration of GHQ troops (in so far as concerns 2 NZEF). It has no operational responsibility.

HQ NZ Div – responsible for normal duties of a divisional headquarters. In the meantime will continue to handle all courses of instruction including staff school and OCTU.

HQ 2 NZEF Base –

(a)

Administration of base camps and of 1 and 2 Gen Hosps.

(b)

Training of reinforcements, through a series of depots.

(c)

Command of all Base Administrative depots and units.

(d)

Movements between ports and Maadi Camp.

The only new development in this order is the appearance of HQ 2 NZEF Base, which took over all the detailed day-to-day administration of Maadi Camp. It had been in the process of formation for some months, but had not previously had its duties defined in orders. While the above order is not clear on the point, it was intended that HQ Base should deal with HQ 2 NZEF and not with HQ NZ Division. The Base Commander, in common with the formation commanders in the Division, was entitled to approach the GOC direct; but OICA would be the staff officer with whom he would subsequently deal, and not any of the divisional staff. In the rather confused period from September 1940 until the Division went to Greece in March 1941, when both HQ 2 NZEF and HQ Base were feeling their feet, the Base Commander, a distinguished officer from the First World War, acted as the GOC's adviser on matters of policy in addition to his duties in Maadi Camp, and there was a duplication in the activities of this officer and those of OICA; but as the relationship between the Base Commander and OICA was excellent, no harm was done – indeed quite the reverse, for the Base Commander had really something to contribute of value for the future, and gave advice which was appreciated as much by OICA as by anyone.

Such an indeterminate position could not continue indefinitely, however, and later in 1941 the respective duties of these two officers were clarified. Further attention is given later in this chapter to the duties of HQ 2 NZEF as compared with those of HQ Maadi Camp, the title adopted in August 1941.

For the purposes of command in its broadest sense, the GOC thereafter worked with two headquarters, HQ 2 NZEF and HQ NZ Division. He lived normally with Divisional Headquarters even when the Division was out of action, and only occasionally spent a day or so with HQ 2 NZEF. While engaged in active operations, he had to leave HQ 2 NZEF to its own devices. A heavy responsibility lay on the senior officer there, in part to carry on with normal routine as the GOC would wish, and in part to maintain contact with the GOC, keep him advised, and take his instructions.

The title chosen for this officer was ‘Officer in Charge of Administration’, that being the title usually held by the senior administrative staff officer in a British military command. It was suitable enough; but perhaps could have been improved. Later in the war a title grew up in the British service of ‘Chief Administrative Officer’, and this would have been better in our case also; but by then the other title had become well established. It was abbreviated to OICA.

Before reviewing the adequacy or inadequacy of this method of command, some attention may be given to the question of the location of HQ 2 NZEF. The chief administrative officer in such cases has two functions, one as staff officer to his commander, and one as the overseer, even if not specifically the commander, of all the base and line-of-communication units. One view would place Headquarters at the rear of the line of communication, from which position it supervises the whole layout and sees the expeditionary force spread out in front of it. In such a location it is free to get on with its work, undisturbed by the ripples of war, but, for that very reason, out of touch with both commander and fighting formations. Another view looks on the Headquarters as part of the GOC's command organisation despite its separation from the fighting force; in which case it must be located where it can reach the GOC without too much delay, and moreover can keep in reasonable touch with the fighting troops. If the latter view is accepted, then Headquarters should be well forward in the line of communication, always bearing in mind that it is primarily an administrative office and should not get mixed up with operational movements. Moreover, when it moves, which should not be too frequently, it should go forward to the limits of reason. It is submitted that the second of the two views regarding location is the correct one.

From its formation in 1940 until the move to Italy in 1944, HQ 2 NZEF was in Maadi Camp. Had the campaign in Greece taken a different course, involving the Division in a permanent location in the Balkans, Headquarters would have had to move across the Mediterranean. But in both the Greece and Crete campaigns, and in the Libyan campaign of 1941, the Division moved out and back again so quickly that there was no question of a move for Headquarters. A fortnight after the beginning of the Libyan campaign, OICA and one or two other officers from Headquarters went forward to catch up with the Division and see what steps might have to be taken, only to meet the Division coming back to its starting point. Both before and after this Libyan campaign, the Division was in an area in the Western Desert not more than eight hours' car drive from Maadi.

When the Division moved to Syria in 1942 there was some talk of our moving, and indeed of closing down in Egypt altogether, for there was a vague idea that the Division would later be moving into Turkey or Persia; but again the Division remained in the area for a few months only. Nevertheless, HQ 2 NZEF was definitely too far away, for normally it took two days to go from Maadi to Divisional Headquarters at Baalbek.

During the Battle for Egypt in the summer of 1942 the Division was never more than two or three hours away from Headquarters. As the victorious advance from Alamein continued, the Division became farther and farther away, until in early 1943 it became necessary to use air travel if the journey from Maadi to Divisional Headquarters was to be completed in reasonable time. Sometimes we could get through in one day, but often it took two. Had it not been clear from geography that sooner or later the advance must come to an end, we would have had to move HQ 2 NZEF. Luckily for this purpose, the Division came back to Maadi very quickly at the end of the campaign, and for a while the two headquarters were together again.

It has been mentioned in Chapter 5 that when the Division moved to Italy much thought was given to the action to be taken by HQ 2 NZEF and by Maadi Camp. About the move of Headquarters there was really little doubt, at least as soon as it was known that the Division would be continuing in the Italian theatre and not, for instance, moving to France. To be separated from the GOC for an indefinite period by either a sea journey, or a mixture of air and land travel taking at least two days, would have been impossible for the proper administration of the force, especially as the greater part was in Italy. When Headquarters moved in January-February 1944, it was already a month or two behindhand.

In accordance with the principle set out on page 101, Headquarters should have been located just as far forward in Italy as was possible. Unfortunately, we ran into some opposition from the new GHQ, or at least some failure to appreciate the position of the headquarters of a small national army, and it took us a little time to persuade GHQ that we must be accepted and accommodated reasonably well. The area on the east coast of Italy in advance of Bari was already congested with troops, including large units from the United States Air Force, so that the tendency was to push us towards the rear; but there is no doubt that OICA was wrong in accepting the site finally allotted to us, namely Santo Spirito, immediately north-west of Bari. We should have tried to get a more advanced site. Santo Spirito was quite suitable in itself, but was too far from the Division for an initial location. The distance was all the more noticeable when the Division moved across to the Cassino area, which it did almost as soon as HQ 2 NZEF arrived in Italy. However, the Division then stayed in this area until the end of May 1944.

From then onwards the Division moved farther north up the centre of Italy, by August it was in the Florence area, and it was obviously going farther north still. It was high time for Headquarters to move. At first we thought of following up behind the Division along the central axis; but just at that point the future plans for offensives in Italy involved the Division's moving over to the east coast, and thereafter advancing along the coast to the north of the Apennines. Initially it was moving to near Ancona, which was to be the advanced port for the new advance. We were told by GHQ that somewhere in this area would be a suitable spot for Headquarters.

It was the only time in the war that we put into force the principles governing the location of Headquarters, i.e., not to move too often, but to move far ahead when the time does come. In the end we chose the township of Senigallia, which when we first looked at it was only a few thousand yards behind the front troops. Even when we moved there in September 1944 the front line was only a few miles away; and the Division, then awaiting its turn to go into the line, was less than half an hour away.

Senigallia turned out to be a great success, and as a location was ideal. Right up to the opening of the last battle in April 1945, Divisional Headquarters was never more than two or three hours away, and we were on the axis of advance.

By the time the Division reached Trieste in May, Headquarters was too far behind; but we put up with some inconvenience, as we knew that the Division would soon be moving back. Probably the most inconvenient period was while the Division was in the Lake Trasimene area in July and August 1945; for although the distance was less than when it had been in Trieste, the roads between the two headquarters were inconvenient, involving a roundabout journey across the Apennines.

When the Division moved into the Florence area in October 1945 the two headquarters were amalgamated, and we were back where we had been in 1940.

So much for the location of HQ 2 NZEF; but now we must consider whether the system of having two headquarters worked. That two headquarters were necessary is beyond doubt, for the staff of the Division in the field had to be left free for operational duties, and could not handle the mass of administrative matter which passed through HQ 2 NZEF.

Our experience showed that such a system could work, provided that there is a dividing line between the duties of the two headquarters, and that the two staffs have a good understanding and co-operate to the full. The only danger – or perhaps difficulty is the better word – was that work properly the province of one headquarters would be done at the other; and as it was impossible for HQ 2 NZEF to trespass into the operational field, the hard fact was that the only trouble that did arise came from work being done at Divisional Headquarters that was really the task of HQ 2 NZEF, the reason of course being that the GOC was at Divisional Headquarters most of the time. There were occasions when OICA had to point out that some problem or other was strictly speaking a 2 NZEF one and not a divisional one, and that before any action was taken the 2 NZEF aspects should be borne in mind. If instructions were issued, or cables sent, without the staff of HQ 2 NZEF having the opportunity to express their views, there was a good chance that the action had been taken without a full knowledge of the circumstances, and that some confusion would follow; and this did occur. It must be remembered that the very existence of a separate Expeditionary Force Headquarters implies that the GOC will more often than not be otherwise occupied with operational matters, and during such time as he has been actively engaged in the field cannot possibly know all that has been happening in the rest of the force or in general administration. Nothing said here is intended to deprive the commander of a force of any of his authority; but if confusion is to be avoided it is better to work through the appropriate staff. It was with this object in view that an attempt was made to keep HQ 2 NZEF reasonably close to the GOC.

All that ever did happen was confusion, and nothing more serious. After all, the matters at issue were only administrative, and often long-term, and there was no question of operations in any form.

The relations of OICA with the GOC may perhaps be illustrated on their humorous side by the account of one incident. In December 1943 OICA was visiting Divisional Headquarters. It so happened that during his visit the new Corps Commander called. The GOC sent for OICA, and as the latter approached said to the Corps Commander, ‘I particularly want you to meet this officer. This is the officer who tells me all the things I can't do.’

There were one or two occasions during the war when the 2 NZEF aspects of operational activities of the Division were forgotten. The outstanding one was the failure to realise the full implications of the move of the Division from Egypt to Greece, and for this Divisional Headquarters and HQ 2 NZEF were equally responsible. Another less important case was the failure to advise HQ 2 NZEF of the secrecy of the move from the Sangro to Cassino. On the whole, however, the liaison between the two headquarters was good, and the two staffs co-operated well. This became progressively more necessary, as in the latter stages of the war we were more self-contained than in the early ones, and the moves of the Division had a correspondingly greater effect on rear NZEF units and installations.

Obviously, the one commander working through two headquarters can only work when the whole force is in one theatre of war, and when the field formation is at least half the total force. Had half the Expeditionary Force been in England and half in the Mediterranean, one commander in charge of the whole force and, at the same time, commander of one portion would have been an impossibility. Our brief experience in 1940 when the Second Echelon was in England would support this view. Similarly, had the Division not been the greater part of the force, and indeed the reason why the force existed at all, it would have been difficult for the commander of the field force to be commander of the whole.

It was sometimes suggested during the war that there should be an ‘Expeditionary Force Commander’ separate from the Divisional Commander, to be a full-time appointment in itself. The Divisional Commander would then be free to concentrate on operational matters, and as far as concerned the support to be given by rear echelons, would be no worse off than the commander of any British division, where support is given by the Corps or the Army Headquarters and the Divisional Commander has no powers himself. At first sight there may be something tempting in this suggestion; but closer inspection indicates weaknesses. The Division in our case was the only one to be considered, whereas in an army corps or an army there are many divisions. Our Division was three-fifths of the total force and, even more important, was the reason why the force existed at all, for apart from the group of non-divisional units, the sole task of the rest of the force was to support the Division. There was thus in this sphere a unity of objective in our small army. It is an accepted principle in British organisation that the commander of the nucleus formation commands the whole force, the commonest example being that of the brigade group, where the commander of the infantry brigade commands all the ancillary units also. In some ways our Expeditionary Force could be looked on as a ‘Divisional Group’. An ‘Expeditionary Force Commander’ would not ‘command’ the Division as an operational formation, but would merely be responsible for its non-operational administration. His only true command would be the base and line-of-communication units, so that while there might be some justification for making him of the same rank as the Divisional Commander, there could be none for making him senior in rank. Conflicts between him and the Divisional Commander would inevitably arise; for if the latter wished to make any alterations in equipment, establishments, location of rear units, etc., he would have to apply to, and then convince, an officer who had no responsibilities for the operations he was being asked to help. A normal divisional commander, when applying to his corps or army commander for help, is at least dealing with an officer who, on a higher level, is just as much responsible for the operations of the division as he is himself.

An Expeditionary Force Commander in the circumstances of 2 NZEF would have been a fifth wheel to the coach and would have been a constant source of irritation to the Divisional Commander. The Expeditionary Force gained immensely in cohesion and flexibility by having one commander who could make adjustments if any were called for, without having to consult an independent authority.

Had the Expeditionary Force consisted of two or three parts with either the same or differing functions, and approximately equal in size, it would have been a different story, and a case could be made out for a separate non-operational Force Commander.

At a time in 1943 when it seemed likely that the GOC would be offered the appointment of Corps Commander as a permanency, the New Zealand Government was firm that it would wish him to continue as commander of the Expeditionary Force. The desire to retain in any capacity the services of an officer who had already rendered outstanding service can easily be understood, and the reverse of the picture, that the GOC should sever his connection with the force, would have given a shock to everyone concerned, both in New Zealand and outside it. Good will on all sides, together with memories of the past, would doubtless have made the scheme work; but the position of the new Divisional Commander would have been awkward. Sentiment would have been in conflict with efficiency. Luckily for the control of the force, nothing came of the proposal, as the GOC preferred to stay with the New Zealand Army.

The extra work placed on the commander from his dual role is eased by having a dual staff, and a senior staff officer for Expeditionary Force duties. In the future when any expeditionary force goes overseas as part of the country's commitments under some international agreement, it is probable that there will be some semi-diplomatic work, or at least inter-Allied discussions, separate from the operational activities of the force. While the principle that the commander of the nucleus field formation should also be the commander of the whole force should for choice be adhered to, it becomes even more important that the staff officer for Expeditionary Force duties should be of some standing, and fully qualified to speak for his commander.

It was a year before the commander and staff of 2 NZEF really knew each other and developed that mutual trust and understanding which is essential. From then on the position could not have been bettered, and both the Division and the Expeditionary Force profited thereby – which indicates that it would be desirable that commander and staff should have worked together in peacetime, if only for a few months, so as to smooth off the rough corners. The staff would then be in a position to take control from the outset instead of spending a period – as we did in 1940 – learning our own job at the same time as we were supposed to be teaching others theirs.

In the same degree of importance is the necessity from the outset of having a separate staff officer for Expeditionary Force duties. These duties will arise from the very beginning, and should be the task of a separate staff from the beginning. It is putting an unfair strain on the normal administrative staff of a division to expect them to carry the dual burden, and our experience shows that it cannot be done. The need for the separate Expeditionary Force staff is all the greater if, as will be recommended later in this volume, a large part of the base and line-of-communication troops goes overseas at the beginning.

It may be asked whether it would not have been possible for HQ 2 NZEF to be combined with HQ Maadi Camp instead of having two headquarters, each with a brigadier at the top. It can be pointed out with justice that for a year in 1942–43 the two headquarters were amalgamated; and it can be said now that when in 1941 the first commander of Maadi Camp left the force, and new arrangements were to be made, the intention was to have one headquarters only. A closer look at the position, however, caused this idea to be given up.

It is not difficult to draw the distinction between the roles of the two offices. Headquarters 2 NZEF was primarily a ‘staff’ office, and OICA was staff officer to the GOC for one side of the latter's work. It is true that OICA was ‘overseer’ of the lines of communication, and latterly even the commander of them by official appointment; but the command could only be exercised in a broad general way, for the units concerned were in part strewn all over Italy from the Po valley to Taranto, and in part away in Egypt. Headquarters 2 NZEF had to keep a broad view over 2 NZEF as a whole, and ensure continuity from rear to front. Its viewpoint overseas ran from Suez to the Turkish frontier, or to Tunis, or to Cassino, or to Trieste, depending upon where the Division was at the moment. And this was only part of the tale; for Headquarters was responsible for maintaining the vital link with New Zealand, a task of the first order in itself. Headquarters, moreover, was the co-ordinating authority for the large number of NZEF ‘controls’ or ‘authorities’, including Medical, Dental, Chaplains, Legal, Pay, Public Relations and so on – the full list appears in Chapter 8. The co-ordination might have been slight, almost impalpable, but it was nevertheless a necessity.

The work of HQ Maadi Camp bore the same relation to the work of HQ 2 NZEF as that of a commanding officer does to that of a formation commander. Headquarters Maadi Camp commanded directly many thousands of troops organised into a series of units, and was directly responsible for their training and administration, including their discipline – and it may be said that discipline in Cairo alone was a constant preoccupation. The work of HQ Maadi Camp was the detailed day-to-day work that always applies to direct command of troops.

Had the two headquarters been combined into one throughout there is no doubt that the detailed day-to-day work would have eclipsed the long-term work, a state of affairs that always happens if one office deals with both kinds of business. The head of the office would have had his hands full running Maadi Camp and would have had little time to travel round and keep personal touch with the GOC and the scattered parts of the force. When the Division moved to Italy, the position of OICA, tied to Maadi Camp, would have been an impossible one.

The explanation of the temporary amalgamation in 1942–43 is, in the first place, that it was an emergency measure to conserve manpower. The OC Maadi Camp at the beginning of the crisis was lent to GHQ for defence duties within Egypt, and no separate replacement was available; and throughout the camp officers and men were being released from administrative duties for employment as reinforcements, so that it was only proper that the two headquarters (HQ 2 NZEF and HQ Maadi Camp) should set an example of economy and exact harder work from those who remained. Moreover, the Division was nearer to Maadi than ever before during operations, so that the normal work of HQ 2 NZEF was reduced, the whole Expeditionary Force being in effect compulsorily concentrated. For the moment there was only one task in front of everyone, the defence of Egypt.

As soon as the advance started again after Alamein, and the canvas widened out, so did the work of HQ 2 NZEF change back again to what it had been before the crisis. The two headquarters remained amalgamated in appearance; but in fact the work was being done in two compartments, for a separate OC Troops was appointed for Maadi Camp, and another for the relief camp on the other side of Cairo. These officers, while subordinate to OICA, who continued to hold the dual role officially, were largely independent. The second role held by OICA was better expressed as ‘Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication’ than as ‘OC Maadi Camp’, i.e., he had supervisory powers over the real OC Maadi Camp without being actively engaged in the command himself. With the increasing dispersal of the Expeditionary Force, and the emergence of the furlough scheme, it would have been impossible for OICA to take an active or personal part in the running of the base camp.

Nevertheless, despite what has been said above, it is probably safe to say that while the Division was in North Africa and Syria the two headquarters could have been run as one, the strains that would have emerged being balanced by the saving in overheads. When the Division went to Italy the possibility of amalgamation vanished.

Inadvertently we had found the best answer of all in the period from Alamein onwards, namely that the Chief Administrative Officer should also be the commander of all base and line-of-communication units, including the base camp, so ensuring cohesion from rear to front. The base camp, in turn, would have its own commander and staff, as would any other camps. It was mentioned on page 107 that OICA was ‘overseer’ of the lines of communication, this being a natural result of his official duties; but otherwise than in Italy, and then only latterly, he was never appointed as commander. Had this position prevailed during the time that the Division was in North Africa, the combined headquarters (2 NZEF and Maadi Camp) would have included a separate branch, under a senior officer, for the detailed command of the camp.

When in May 1943 the Division came back to Maadi, all our headquarters – Division, NZEF, and Maadi Camp – were in the one spot, and we had a little difficulty in deciding just who commanded whom. Headquarters 2 NZEF, still amalgamated in appearance with HQ Maadi Camp, controlled the furlough scheme, which was the main task at the moment, while Divisional Headquarters controlled the camp. The position was not entirely clear, but good will among all concerned prevented either duplication or omission in daily routine.

To sum up – the roles of HQ 2 NZEF and of HQ Maadi Camp were distinct and the two headquarters could not be completely merged into one; but it would have been possible for them to be combined while the Division was in North Africa, provided that a separate OC Camp was appointed and OICA was not required to command the camp directly.

ORGANISATION OF HQ 2 NZEF

The term ‘HQ 2 NZEF’ was used somewhat loosely. In a broad sense it comprised all the group of NZEF ‘authorities’ which were concerned with the administration of the force as a whole, and which are set out in full in Chapter 8. They included the Officer in Charge of Administration, the Military Secretary, the Director of Medical Services, the Senior Chaplain, the Chief Paymaster, and so on. Some of the authorities, however, did not necessarily live in the same immediate area as the rest of Headquarters; and all the authorities had titles and addresses of their own, and to some extent had an existence separate from Headquarters as interpreted in a more limited connotation.

The term ‘HQ 2 NZEF’ was used also for the office of OICA alone, and correspondence bearing that address was delivered accordingly. In the layout of all the offices, that was the title placed outside OICA's office. He and his immediate assistants may be taken as the ‘staff’, while the others are the ‘services’.

Equally in Maadi, in Santo Spirito and in Senigallia, the offices were spread out, albeit in a limited area, and were never in one large building. In Maadi they were in hutments, and in the other two places in a series of small houses, a state of affairs to be preferred to being accommodated in a large office building. If it can be arranged, a semi-rural atmosphere is pleasant and does not detract from efficient office work – rather the reverse. The atmosphere of a large, grim office block is dampening before work has even started.

The office of the Officer in Charge of Administration, HQ 2 NZEF on the more limited connotation, varied its organisation during the war, depending on the requirements of the moment; but in general it had branches for the usual three divisions – General Staff, Adjutant-General, and Quartermaster-General. The terminology varied also. At one stage the three sub-divisions were known as A1, A2, and A3, the reason being that the greater part of the work at the time pertained to the Adjutant-General's branch. In the end the terminology settled down into (a) General Staff, Staff Duties (G-SD), (b) Assistant Adjutant-General (AAG), and Assistant Quartermaster-General (AQMG), three branches in all.

The detailed allocation of duties to these three branches varied also; but the following gives the allocation which we came to in the end, and which survived unchanged for the last three years of the war.

Officer in Charge of Administration All policy matters Military Secretary Senior Chaplain Medical and Dental – large questions

‘G’ Branch Organisation of 2 NZEF Training – with GSO I, 2 NZ Division Composition of reinforcement drafts Formation and disbandment of units Vehicle markings War diary, 2 NZEF War establishments Statistics and wastage tables Order of battle Location statements 2 NZEF orders and circulars Security and censorship Intelligence Ciphers and communications Office staff and procedure

‘A’ Branch Reinforcements to field Discharges Repatriation Marriages Furlough and replacement schemes Women's services Prisoners of war Leave Second Echelon Attachments and detachments Commanding officers' reports Courts martial Selection board – graded personnel Courts of Inquiry Honours and awards Discipline Personnel – miscellaneous Traffic accidents Promotions other ranks Compassionate leave and personal matters Service chevrons and wound stripes Transfers

‘Q’ Branch Finance and capitation Postal Compensation for losses Printing unit Shipping and movements Stationery depot Quartering and accommodation Base Kit Store Ordnance, clothing, and equipment Claims Stores, rations, and supplies ERS NAAFI Bands Transport Entertainment unit Employment of civilians Cinemas Contracts National Patriotic Fund Board Publicity YMCA Pay and audit Church Army Port detachments Welfare Committee Archives

OICA himself dealt with the Military Secretary – who had direct access to the GOC – and with the Senior Chaplain; the former because he handled confidential matters affecting officers and therefore better confined to the minimum number of staff, and the latter because the questions of spiritual welfare were sometimes of some delicacy and were better handled at the top. The DMS also had direct access to the GOC, and with the ADDS had matters to discuss from time to time affecting their relative duties.

It will be noticed under ‘G’ Branch that ‘Training’ is qualified with the words ‘with GSO I, 2 NZ Division’. In fact the ‘G’ staff of the Division were responsible for all training directives, but these were transmitted to HQ 2 NZEF and distributed by G(SD) Branch there. The ‘G’ staff of the Division was thus for certain duties the ‘G’ staff for 2 NZEF also, for there was no justification for having a senior ‘G’ officer at HQ 2 NZEF. Actually, a good deal of the correspondence on training passed direct between 2 NZ Division and Maadi Camp, a violation of the correct channel of communication that never caused any trouble. The biggest responsibility of the ‘G’ officer at Headquarters was Organisation, with a capital ‘O’, including keeping a watchful eye on manpower, establishments, and wastage. This officer was also personal assistant to OICA, who took a slightly greater degree of direct interest in this branch than in the other two.

Strictly speaking, some of the duties allotted to ‘Q’ Branch did not come within the normally accepted allocation, e.g., welfare, pay, and ERS, all of which would usually have gone to ‘A’ Branch; but the division was made this way in order to even up the duties between ‘Q’ and ‘A’ Branches. There was more ‘A’ work than ‘Q’, so that in dividing the work equally some ‘A’ work overflowed into the so-called ‘Q’.

Both in Egypt and Italy we had a liaison officer stationed at GHQ, but carried on the establishment of HQ 2 NZEF. We were far too modest about this. The officer was at first only a captain, and even at a later stage only occasionally a major. We would have been better advised to have expanded the office into a small mission, with a lieutenant-colonel at the head. We undoubtedly suffered a little through not having stronger representation at GHQ.

Just after the move to Italy HQ 2 NZEF, i.e., the office of OICA, numbered six officers and nineteen other ranks, together with eight WAAC personnel, including a WAAC subaltern who was in charge of all clerical WAACs in the force. Later it rose to a maximum of 45 all told, but including the Senior Chaplain and the General Manager of clubs and their staff.

It was mentioned in Chapter 4 that HQ 2 NZEF adopted a vehicle sign of a Southern Cross on a dark-blue background. At first officers used to wear an armband corresponding to that worn by the staff of an army corps, viz., red-white-red in equal horizontal bands. In 1942, however, GHQ in the Middle East ruled that any officers having direct access to GHQ – which we had – should wear the armband pertaining to an army, viz., red-black-red, so we adopted that and kept it for the rest of the war. It carried the inscription ‘2 NZEF’.

To keep touch with both divisional and base and line-of-communication units, the staff of Headquarters had to keep moving round. Reflection today makes it clear that despite good intentions neither OICA nor the staff of Headquarters moved about enough, and that as usual there was a tendency for the office work to prevail over the maintenance of personal liaison with the various parts of 2 NZEF. Later in this volume the value of personal liaison will be stressed in other aspects. It is to be regretted that Headquarters did not set the example it should have done. The answer was either one or two permanent mobile liaison officers, or the same number of officers added to the staff of Headquarters for office duties – preferably the latter so that the senior officers could have carried out the liaison duties themselves. The only excuse that can be made is that Headquarters was trying to set an example of economy of staff.

CHAPTER 8 Headquarters 2 NZEF – the Services

WE now come to what have been called the 2 NZEF ‘Controls’ or ‘Authorities’, i.e., those officers or units whose authority extended throughout the force. Some authorities, in fact the greater part, existed from the beginning of the force to the end; some did not appear until various later points in the life of the force; and one disappeared after the first two years. The list given below is the maximum. It does not appear that there was ever an official order of precedence of this miscellaneous group of offices, and the order given is adopted from various orders of battle.

List of Authorities

Military Secretary (MS)

Director of Medical Services (DMS)

Matron-in-Chief (later Principal Matron)

Assistant Director of Dental Services (ADDS)

Deputy Director of Ordnance Services (DDOS) – until 1942, then merged with ADOS 2 NZ Division.

Assistant Director of Mechanical Engineering (ADME) – representative of CREME 2 NZ Division after 1942.

Chief Paymaster (also Financial Adviser)

Senior Chaplain

Deputy Judge Advocate-General (DJAG)

Public Relations Officer (PRO)

Second Echelon (2 Ech)

Assistant Director of Education and Rehabilitation Services (ADERS)

Assistant Director of Postal Services (ADPS)

Auditor

Archivist

Commissioner National Patriotic Fund

Commissioner YMCA

Senior Secretary Church Army

Club Manager

Commissioner Red Cross

Printing and Stationery Unit

Ciphers

Censor Sections

WAACS – three divisions, welfare, hospital and clerical. Camp Commandant

At the risk of reiteration, it must be pointed out that part of the justification for the existence of HQ 2 NZEF was the need for some measure of co-ordination among all these varied offices.

Of the ‘corps’ in the army, the heads of medical, dental, chaplains, pay, postal, and educational were stationed at HQ 2 NZEF. In all other cases, the heads of corps were the senior officers of that corps in the Division. They all had a certain amount of ‘NZEF’ work to do, especially for promotion of officers, manpower and war establishments. The list is as follows:

Armoured Corps – Commander 4 Armoured Brigade (after 1942)

Cavalry – CO Divisional Cavalry (until 1942)

Artillery – CRA

Engineers – CRE after 1943 (see next paragraph)

Signals – CRSigs

Infantry (including MG and Maori) – GOC personally

ASC – CRASC

Ordnance – ADOS

EME – CREME

Provost – DAPM

Ciphers While not strictly speaking ‘corps’, the GSO I of the Division was looked on as the head.

Field Security While not strictly speaking ‘corps’, the GSO I of the Division was looked on as the head.

During 1941, 1942, and 1943, when we had a large number of non-divisional engineer units, we had no head of the corps of engineers in 2 NZEF. There were more non-divisional companies than divisional ones; and the work was so varied that it was impossible to appoint either the CRE or the head of any non-divisional group as the head of all engineer units. There was no justification for a separate officer as head of the corps. In the end a combination of OICA and the Military Secretary – the latter an engineer officer as it happened – kept a watchful eye on the interests of the corps of engineers as a whole. When in late 1943 the non-divisional engineers were disbanded, the CRE of the Division was appointed Chief Engineer for 2 NZEF, and all was well thereafter.

The list of authorities given on page 114 now merits some attention. As was stated in the Introduction, it is proposed to mention here only those things that caused problems to HQ 2 NZEF, i.e., to the office of OICA. Every authority had problems of his own within his particular sphere, some of them being mentioned in other volumes of our War History.

MILITARY SECRETARY

Some aspects of the Military Secretary's work are discussed in Chapter 13 under ‘Officers’.

DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES

It is not proposed to say more than a few words here about medical matters, as the work and difficulties of the DMS are being adequately covered in other volumes. At the beginning of the war his title was ADMS NZ Division; but when HQ 2 NZEF was organised as a separate authority, his title was changed to DDMS 2 NZEF and another officer was appointed to the Division. DDMS (Deputy Director of Medical Services) was the appropriate title in the circumstances, being next in the hierarchy above an Assistant Director; but the habit of British authorities of looking on a deputy as a subordinate, combined with the desire to improve the status of such an important authority, caused us in early 1942 to change the title to Director.

The greater part of the medical work in 2 NZEF was outside the Division, so that there was every justification for placing the medical head at HQ 2 NZEF. The DMS was the one adviser to the GOC whose advice of necessity nearly always prevailed, for matters of health and medical treatment are so specialised and the medical personnel so highly skilled that any commander must think long and deeply before overriding any advice given him. The responsibility remained that of the GOC nevertheless. In view of the importance of his work, the DMS dealt direct with the GOC on all matters of medical policy.

Officer ranks in the Medical Corps are on the high side at any time, so that it is perhaps not surprising that Headquarters was resistant to applications for an increase in senior ranks. The question was admittedly difficult, owing to the combination of administrative and specialist officers in any hospital, and to the shortage of the specialists. It often happened that when a specialist became due for promotion into one of the senior administrative vacancies available in a hospital, he could not be spared from his specialist work. In the end, to be fair to specialists, we had to agree to an additional number of senior ranks for hospital staffs.

It can be claimed with complete justification that our standards of medical treatment and administration were high, and indeed were the admiration of other Allied troops, including British. We were better served than were most national armies.

MATRON-IN-CHIEF - PRINCIPAL MATRON

The work of the Matron-in-Chief is covered in the Medical volumes of the War History. The title was changed from Matron-in-Chief to Principal Matron when the first holder of the appointment retired in November 1943, the true Matron-in-Chief being at Army Headquarters in New Zealand.

Throughout the war we arranged for the Matron-in-Chief or Principal Matron to live in quarters of her own, and not with any medical unit. Both in Egypt and in Italy she had either a flat or small house, where she not only lived but also had her meals. In Egypt, for obvious reasons, she lived outside Maadi Camp, but near at hand in Maadi village; but in Italy she was within the circle of HQ 2 NZEF accommodation. Right up to the end of the war, Headquarters was conservative to the extent that it did not embark on mixed messes, although by that time even the British Army had admitted WAAC officers to area messes. Once we moved to Italy the Principal Matron should have messed with Headquarters, despite any grumblings that might have been voiced by some of the older officers.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF DENTAL SERVICES

The ADDS was independent of the DMS, but naturally had to co-operate with him in matters of dental health in the broadest sense; and a similar position prevailed in a hospital between the dental officer and the heads of the surgical and medical divisions. At the beginning there was a certain amount of friction, and on occasion Headquarters was asked to lay down clearly where the division of duties came, a task which was a little invidious; and in any case this was difficult, for all the words that can be written to define dividing lines in such cases cannot take the place of cooperation and good will. If these relations do not exist, all the directives in the world will not replace them. The saving factor was that both sides were actuated by commendable motives, namely to find the best method of restoring patients quickly to complete health.

The work of the Dental Corps is being covered in another volume, but it must be said here that the standards it set overseas were much above those of the British service generally. Our mobile dental units were unique.

ORDNANCE - ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERS

For the first two years of the war the head of the Ordnance Corps was stationed at HQ 2 NZEF. Like the medical head, he was first appointed as head of the corps in the Division (ADOS) but very soon became DDOS of 2 NZEF, and another officer took up the divisional appointment. At the outset there was ample justification for a separate 2 NZEF head, for all our initial equipment had to be drawn and there were developments in the maintenance of mechanical transport, the Ordnance Corps at that time being responsible for mechanical work also. Once issues of equipment were governed by battle losses or by wear and tear, the work of the Ordnance Corps became more routine and there was not the same justification for keeping a senior officer at Headquarters. The DDOS at the time voiced this opinion himself. His services were then accepted in a senior appointment with the British Army, and the responsibility for all ordnance work in 2 NZEF passed to the ADOS of the Division. An assistant to this officer was stationed at HQ 2 NZEF. When the subdivision of the Ordnance Corps took place in late 1942 - see below - a separate ordnance officer did not stay with Headquarters, the duties being largely taken over by the officer in charge of our expanding base ordnance depot.

In 1942 the British Army split up the Ordnance Corps into two portions - one, retaining the name of Ordnance, to confine itself to provision, and the other, a new ‘Electrical and Mechanical Engineers’, to be responsible for technical maintenance. After some slight hesitation, we decided to follow suit, and the new corps of NZEME was formed in December 1942, its head being the senior officer with the Division, the CREME. An assistant to this officer was stationed at HQ 2 NZEF.

PAY

As far as Headquarters was concerned, the only real trouble we had with pay matters came from extra-duty pay. It was an intractable problem; but it was a complication created in New Zealand and was in no way the fault of anyone in 2 NZEF, certainly not of the Chief Paymaster.

When the first issue of Pay and Allowance Regulations was made late in 1939, one paragraph was as follows:

EXTRA DUTY PAY (a)

Cooks 2/6 per diem

(b)

Privates and lance-corporals whilst carrying out one of the duties stated below will be granted 1/- per diem extra duty pay: Armourer, baker, bootmaker, butcher, dental mechanic, farrier, fitter, engine-driver, motor mechanic, orderly-room clerk, saddler, shoeing-smith, tailor, wheeler.

Up to the time of the departure of the First Echelon, the text of Pay and Allowance Regulations had not been scrutinised by any appropriate member of the Expeditionary Force, and in fact the bulk issue of the regulations was only placed on board the transports while they were in Wellington harbour. It was not until we had been in Maadi for a few weeks that this paragraph struck home to units, and then the complaints came thick and heavy.

Sub-paragraph (a) was not in question. The trouble was with sub-paragraph (b). As far as is known, the paragraph had been lifted bodily from the regulations for the 1st New Zealand Expeditionary Force. There had been no time to examine it closely, nor to relate it to the new force, and it was allowed to stand. It would be unfair to blame anyone for this, for Army Headquarters was working under extreme pressure; but it was unfortunate to the highest degree. The paragraph as worded was largely inapplicable, and was in general unsuited to the force. It had been designed for a force whose transport was almost entirely horsed, and in which the amount of mechanical transport or mechanical appliances was so small as to be something exceptional. The new force had no horses, was entirely mechanised, and was equipped with a mass of complicated arms and machinery. There were no ‘farriers, saddlers or shoeing-smiths’, whereas there was an army of skilled tradesmen most inadequately covered by the terms ‘armourer, fitter, engine-driver, or motor mechanic’. Our war establishments included tradesmen under a profusion of titles; but what was even more important was that the skilled tradesman of the First World War had ceased to be exceptional in the Second, and was just an ordinary member of the force and a reflection of the mechanical age in which we live. To have given all these tradesmen and skilled personnel the extra shilling would have been absurd, for in some corps – the armoured corps for instance – tradesmen were between one-third and half of the unit on 1940 establishments.

Maadi Camp, looking towards the Citadel and Cairo black and white photograph of army camp in desert

Divisional Headquarters offices, Maadi Camp, 1940 black and white photograph of army camp buildings

New Zealand Supply Depot. Vegetables arrive from native gardens black and white photograph of market scene

Egyptian laundry, Maadi black and white photograph of washing clothes in the desert

Divisional Headquarters mess, Maadi, 1940. From left: Maj W. G. Gentry, Lt-Col W. G. Stevens, Maj-Gen B. C. Freyberg, Lt-Col K. L. Stewart and Rev. E. B. Moore (back to camera)

black and white photograph of army officers eating

Inter-unit relay race, Maadi baths, 1940 black and white photograph of swimming competition

2 Echelon Records Section, Maadi Camp, December 1943 black and white photograph of army administrators

Christmas parcel mail being sorted at the New Zealand Chief Post Office, Cairo, December 1943 black and white photograph of mail sorting office

The Minister of Defence visits the Middle East, April 1943. From left: Brig G. B. Parkinson, Brig H. K. Kippenberger, Hon. F. Jones, Lt-Gen Sir Bernard Freyberg, Brig W. G. Stevens, Col R. C. Queree, Brig C. E. Weir and Col B. Barrington

black and white photograph of army officers with minister

Rev. J. W. McKenzie (Senior Chaplain) and Rt. Rev. G. V. Gerard at Maadi, June 1943 black and white photograph of army pastor

Brigadier K. MacCormick, Director of Medical Services, 2 NZEF, 1940-43 black and white photograph of army officer

Troops in the Western Desert receive National Patriotic Fund Christmas parcels, January 1942 black and white photograph of parcel delivery

Colonel F. Waite, National Patriotic Fund Board Commissioner, hands over to the YMCA a mobile canteen, the gift of the New Zealand Returned Soldiers' Association

black and white photograph of mobile cafeteria

1 NZ General Hospital, Helwan, August 1943 black and white photograph of hospital buildings

New Zealand Broadcasting Unit, Maadi. Troops queue up to broadcast messages to New Zealand, May 1942 black and white photograph of radio communication for troops

Suani Ben Adem black and white photograph of avenue

Early in 1940 we held a conference to see what could be done and what recommendation we could make to New Zealand, for rates of pay and allowances were not within the powers of the GOC to alter. We tried to separate the sheep from the goats and decide out of the mass of tradesmen which ones really deserved an extra shilling, and in the end we did get the list slightly extended by including such trades as artificer, electrician, and instrument mechanic. The result was still unsatisfactory, however, and became more so as the war went on and equipment became even more technical. When the first non-divisional engineer units reached us from New Zealand, the issue became more complicated owing to some ill-considered promises made to the units by members of the Government, to wit that they would all get extra-duty pay. There was trouble with this paragraph repeatedly in the first few years, units asking from time to time that the list should be extended by such and such a trade; but the fact was that it was wellnigh impossible to draw a clear dividing line between what was truly exceptional, and what was just the normal duty to be expected from a trained soldier in a mechanical age. In the end we had to say firmly that complaints must cease and the position be accepted. It would have almost been better if in early 1940 we had asked that the paragraph be cancelled for future enlistments, for the number of men receiving the pay at the moment was not so great as all that, and would have diminished with the years. However, such action would have appeared to us at the time as too drastic, for we had not appreciated how bad the position was, and how much worse it would get. When at a much later stage we were told that the Government was considering a rise in pay, we suggested (somewhat half-heartedly) that the opportunity should be taken to abandon extra-duty pay; but by that time no one in New Zealand was prepared to take away an allowance that had existed for so long, and the original position continued to the end.

There was no doubt about the justice of the extra-duty pay for cooks. Many thought that it should be given also to clerks, because they were hard to find, and some inducement might have helped. Beyond that we were floundering in a morass and never found a way out. Probably it would have been better to give the allowance to no one, on account of the difficulty of determining who was carrying out exceptional work of a technical nature, and because no extra allowance was given to the poor infantryman for taking the great risks that were his daily share. The allowance could have been given to all tradesmen appearing in war establishments, but with the result that far too high a proportion of men would have been receiving it. Probably we did not grapple with this problem firmly enough; but there was no encouragement from the New Zealand end.

It has already been mentioned in Chapter 6 that in the last year or so there were many cases of men producing large rolls of Italian lire notes and asking that they should be credited to their accounts. There was a strong suspicion – indeed more than a suspicion – that the money had been gained illegally. The Pay Office, in any case, was under no obligation to handle moneys other than pay, nor was the Government under any obligation to grant the exchange concession except for pay. Men were sometimes embarrassed over the disposal of legitimate gains such as those coming from wins on the totalisators at the races; but the obligation was on the man to prove that the money was legitimate, and the Pay Office was within its rights in refusing to handle money that was believed to have come from Crown and Anchor winnings or from black-market activities.

The Chief Pay Office at its maximum was about 200 all ranks. The Chief Paymaster and the main office moved to Italy when Headquarters moved, and remained with Headquarters throughout. A rear office remained at Maadi.

The Chief Paymaster was also Financial Adviser to the GOC. It cannot be claimed that his work under this heading was extensive, but there were occasions when the GOC needed some guidance about the propriety of certain expenditure.

CHAPLAINS

The work of the Chaplains has already been covered in a separate volume. From the point of view of Headquarters their work went smoothly, and we had no form of crisis or major trouble. The first Senior Chaplain came from the Anglican church, the largest church body in New Zealand. When a replacement was called for, however, we turned to the next senior Protestant chaplain, who was in any case the next senior among the totality of chaplains. He happened to be a Presbyterian. This might have caused some trouble from the Anglican church, so we thought it advisable to ask Army Headquarters to sound out that church before making the appointment. There was, however, no objection from the Anglican church, and the appointment was made. When next a replacement was due, it happened again that the most suitable chaplain was a Presbyterian; but this time we went ahead and did not consult New Zealand.

Headquarters 2 NZEF was, of course, not concerned with the spiritual functions of the chaplains, but only with their administration. The earliest problem was the proportion to be maintained among the various churches and denominations. The basis for our calculations was the proportions as shown in the individual records held by Second Echelon, for which purpose a special count was taken in early 1941 and at one or two intervals thereafter. The percentages varied very slightly from count to count. In the beginning of 1943, for instance, they were:

Church of England 44 Presbyterian 29·4 Roman Catholic 14·5 Methodist 7 Other denominations 5·1

The total number of chaplains in the force varied also, in the direction of a steady increase as the war went on. At the period under consideration the total had been set at 50, of which 26 were with the Division and 24 with hospitals, depots, and scattered units. Applying the percentages to this figure of 50, we arrived at the following number of chaplains:

Church of England 22 Presbyterian 14·7 Roman Catholic 7·25 Methodist 3·5 Other denominations 2·55

Taking the figures to the nearest whole number they became:

Church of England 22 Presbyterian 15 Roman Catholic 7 Methodist 3 Other denominations 3

In view of certain difficulties in the work of the smaller denominations, in particular the Roman Catholics, it was agreed by the senior chaplains of the churches affected that the Church of England and the Presbyterian figures should each be reduced by one. In this case the Roman Catholics and the Methodists were each increased by one, the final figures being:

Church of England 21 Presbyterian 14 Roman Catholic 8 Methodist 4 Other denominations 3
The figures given above make some small correction of those on p. 16 of New Zealand Chaplains in the Second World War.

Similar calculations took place at other intervals. At a later stage, while the figures of chaplains in the Division and outside it remained the same, we carried three chaplains extra for emergencies – reinforcements in other words.

It was agreed from the first that Roman Catholic chaplains should serve the needs of their communion throughout the force, and that they should not be considered as unit chaplains in the usual sense. There were some difficulties with the units to which they were attached, and to clear up the position the following instruction was issued by Headquarters in November 1942:

Roman Catholic chaplains in 2 NZEF number seven. For various reasons it has been found advisable at the present stage to place them with medical units; at later stages they may be located elsewhere.

It must be made clear that in any circumstances they are placed in order to serve the needs of RC members of 2 NZEF as a whole. The RC community is scattered throughout the force. The unit to which an RC chaplain is attached is thus his base, from which he operates over an area of country.

He is not allocated to the unit as a unit chaplain; but on the other hand all RC chaplains have been instructed to take part in unit activities subject to their duties under para 2 above. Chaplains will also comply with the ordinary rules of reporting ‘marchings in and out’.

The vehicles with which RC chaplains are provided are authorised army vehicles and are entitled to normal servicing in every way, including supplies of petrol.

Thereafter there was no trouble.

Originally chaplains fourth class, ranking as captains, were promoted to third class, ranking as majors, after three years' service overseas, i.e., from date of embarkation. There was nothing sacred in this period, which had been the one used in the first war. In the middle of 1942, i.e., about two and a half years after the sailing of the First Echelon, we reviewed the position, and found that there was only one combatant or medical officer left who had sailed with the First Echelon as a captain, was fit for promotion, and had not yet received it. In other words, with this one exception, all captains had been promoted, a great number of the vacancies being due to casualties. Taking it all in all, we thought that chaplains should be promoted on the same scale, and so altered the qualifying period to two years and six months.

Towards the end of 1942 we had to take up with New Zealand the question of the medical standards to be applied to chaplains destined for service overseas. In the few months preceding our representations there had been a lamentable record of sickness among recently arrived chaplains, several having to be sent back without any service with the force. It seemed to us that there was an idea in New Zealand that because chaplains were non-combatants lower medical standards than the best would suffice, especially as many chaplains served with hospitals. This was a false argument. Hospital vacancies were reserved for chaplains who needed a spell from field service, or who had served an adequate period in the field; and field service was strenuous for anyone, chaplains and all. Their medical standards must be the same as for combatant officers. We asked that this should be watched in the future, and Army Headquarters agreed to take action accordingly. The position thereafter did show an improvement.

Early in 1940, one chaplain, speaking on behalf of a number, suggested to Headquarters that chaplains should be allowed to visit Palestine as a definite part of their military training, the implication being that all their expenses should be paid by the Government. Speaking with all reverence, it did appear to Headquarters to be slightly bizarre that a visit to the Holy Land should be equated with the training that was then going on all over Maadi Camp. At that time there was no military transport to Palestine, but only civilian trains, indiscriminate travel was frowned on, we thought that everyone should stick to his last in Maadi, and, so it must be said, were not sympathetic. As it happened, leave to Palestine became possible later on in 1940 at small cost; still later, there was such a mass of military transport passing between Egypt and Palestine that no one had any difficulty in getting a lift, and later still in 1942 the Division was in Syria and our line of communication ran through Palestine. Doubtless all chaplains, at least until we went to Italy, did manage to pay a visit there.

Our field chaplains were ultimately all self-contained with transport. It is an impossible position to ask a chaplain to carry on his work in modern, fast-moving war if he is to be dependent upon chance lifts in miscellaneous vehicles.

LEGAL

Some few remarks affecting the Deputy Judge Advocate-General's branch are contained in Chapter 15, under discipline.

PUBLICITY

If trials and troubles are any justification, then the various bodies that made up our Public Relations Service merit a chapter to themselves. The service comprised the Public Relations Officer, war correspondents, broadcasting unit, cinema units, still photographer, official artist, newspaper and archivist, all, except perhaps the last, ‘organs of publicity’.

It must be said at once that the trouble referred to, save in the very early period, had little or no effect upon the work of the various parts. We had every reason for thinking that the results were good. All parts of the force had their initial troubles, extending over a long or short period; but with Public Relations the period was longer than most.

Our difficulties in getting any war correspondents at all have been mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3 above. We never knew the exact reasons which led to the outcome that all correspondents were military personnel paid by the Government, and were not representatives of the New Zealand press; but discussions, not to say controversy, between the Government and the press, difficulties in selecting personnel, and basic suspicion in the Government of any outside publicity caused absurd delays before any proper appointments were made. We were forced to make one or two interim appointments ourselves; and it may be said now that after a few correspondents had come out from New Zealand, later appointments came from competent newspapermen from the Expeditionary Force itself.

A qualified war correspondent arrived from New Zealand in early 1941, the intention being that he should be our Public Relations Officer; but he was unlucky enough to be captured in Greece. A cinema and a broadcasting unit arrived about the same time, and meanwhile the GOC had appointed an official artist out of hand.

One way and another they were a difficult lot, all showing some degree of temperament, and cumulatively they caused more work at Headquarters than did any other branch of 2 NZEF services; but at the same time it must be said that Headquarters was not always very clever in the way it dealt with them. Figuratively speaking, the staff at Headquarters were always rubbing the bruises they had incurred through getting mixed up in the problems of the Public Relations Service. Sooner than have to deal with them all individually, we decided to go on with the idea of a Public Relations Officer, and to make him responsible for all the branches. The PRO was intended to keep his finger on the pulse of the force, have a full knowledge of what was happening, or going to happen, throughout the force, and decide where and when any of the units or individuals should go at any one time. The PRO was to ensure that all the activities of the Division and the other NZEF units were adequately covered and reported to New Zealand – and it has already been indicated that despite troubles this object was achieved.

Unfortunately we had difficulty in finding a suitable officer for the appointment of PRO, and most unfairly thrust it upon officers unskilled in publicity, who struggled manfully with a task that might wellnigh have driven them to distraction. It was not until the middle of 1943 that the service settled down into a steady routine. Part of the blame rested with Headquarters. We had not appreciated the degree of specialisation and technical training required in publicity, but had thought that conscientiousness and hard work would alone be sufficient. Good work was done, and some foundation established for the future; but a thorough knowledge of all the aspects of publicity was really an essential for the appointment.

Our public relations staff, being military personnel and paid accordingly, were prevented from having the free roving commissions, with apparently inexhaustible expense accounts, of the representatives of great British or American publicity agencies. Association with these men, some of them world famous, went to the heads of a few of the members, and we had to take firm steps to bring them down to earth again.

The broadcasting unit had an unfortunate start owing to differences of opinion among the members, and took a little time to get into its stride; but thereafter it did excellent work, including the much-appreciated scheme by which men could record short messages to their families to be broadcast later over the air in New Zealand. This unit had throughout a very good liaison with its parent department in New Zealand.

The cinema unit was sometimes accused, most unfairly, of being merely a recorder of travelogues. The force operated throughout the war in photogenic areas – Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Libya, Italy – and it was part of the duty of the unit to film scenes in these areas. It fulfilled its duty of taking scenes in the field also, and could not be accused of neglecting war for peace.

Probably it is in the nature of still photographers to be less obtrusive and more subdued than their more mobile brethren. This was one part of publicity which seemed to keep out of trouble and merely got on quietly with the job.

The status of war correspondents and of the personnel of the broadcasting and cinema units was not satisfactory. They were appointed ‘with the status of lieutenants or captains’. It would have been better to give them military ranks outright – better for their work, and better for them if they were captured. The same point will be made when speaking of our welfare staff.

The official artist was taken closely under the wing of the GOC personally. The results of his work were good, and met with the commendation of the troops, the highest praise of all, but sometimes he did get away from the control of the PRO.

The NZEF Times was started in 1941 and continued till the end of 1945. From the first it was a ‘news’ paper only, and did not open its columns to correspondence, nor did it express any views on the problems of 2 NZEF – other than humorously. It tried to include a lot of news from New Zealand, and published war correspondents' articles and other matter about the happenings within the force. It was subjected to some criticism from the troops for not publishing letters to the editor and other contributions; and it must be admitted that there was a difference of opinion about the policy adopted. There was no doubt that the paper lost a bit of life thereby and gave no opening to contributions that would have come from all over the force; but when we used to read about the turmoils that were stirred up from time to time by army papers, both British and American, we were thankful that we were well out of it. ‘Fair comment’ so easily merges into indiscipline, or is unsettling to morale. It is probable that the policy we adopted was too rigid, and that it was only the difficulty of framing satisfactory rules for an alternative that led to our taking the line of least resistance.

The Archivist is discussed below on page 129.

Headquarters never looked on its handling of publicity as one of its successes. The main requirement is a thoroughly qualified Public Relations Officer; and provided that care is taken to have a suitable officer ready to step into the post, a future Headquarters will be spared many worries.

Unfortunately, as will be mentioned again in Chapter 10, we never had a satisfactory liaison with the Director of Publicity in New Zealand. We had the greatest difficulty in obtaining material from New Zealand – film scenes of the old home town and so on – and such New Zealand news as was sent us was poorly chosen and did not keep us in touch with what was happening in the homeland. Moreover – and this was most disheartening – we could never find out what use was made in New Zealand of the press, cinema, and photographic material which we sent back. We knew that the broadcasting unit's messages to next-of-kin were put on the air; but this was only learnt through subsequent letters from the next-of-kin, and not because of official advice. Taking it all in all, it was a regrettable state of affairs.

SECOND ECHELON

It took a little time at the beginning to impress on units the importance of strength and casualty returns. There was a tendency, perhaps a natural one, to regard returns as just so much paper work which had to be done to propitiate an impersonal body at ‘the base’. It was soon realised that the returns governed such things as promotions, pay, and casualty returns, and they took their place as an essential element in military administration.

The war establishment of Second Echelon included an unusually large number of staff-sergeants and sergeants. Initially they came out from New Zealand with substantive ranks, so that when later on we thought it desirable that they should have some field service, it was difficult to force them on units. It was laid down at an early date that replacements for the personnel of Second Echelon must come from men who had had field service, and little by little the difficulty disappeared. It is a mistake to send a unit such as this overseas staffed with a lot of perfectly fit senior NCOs. It would be preferable, at least in the early stages, that this unit should be staffed either by personnel of a grading just below the highest, or by women, or by some of each.

Among the tasks of Second Echelon is the collecting of the effects of deceased personnel, and their despatch to Base Records in Wellington, a task requiring care and sympathy. It was important enough for us to issue a special instruction, which included the setting up of what was called, not very happily, the ‘Standing Committee of Adjustment’, to supervise the disposal of effects. The name came from the British regulations on the subject, and was a relic of the days of a purely regular army, when all sorts of military obligations and privately owned goods had to be taken into account – elaborate mess bills, gambling debts, polo ponies and so on. We should have introduced a name of our own. However, the essential part of the constitution of the committee, whatever its name, was and must be the inclusion of a representative of the deceased's unit. Tales regarding the alleged improper disposal of kits spring up easily and are readily believed. The more that can be done to make it all fair and above board the better.

When HQ 2 NZEF moved to Italy, the main part of Second Echelon remained in Maadi, as it was thought better not to disrupt the office. An advanced office was formed, however, and was established with Headquarters in each of the sites we occupied. The main office in Maadi at its maximum was something over 200 strong.

EDUCATION AND REHABILITATION AND POSTAL SERVICES

The work of these two services is covered in Chapter 16, Welfare.

AUDITOR

The auditor was appointed at the request of the GOC, who thought it desirable that any financial transactions in which we might be engaged should be open to review by a skilled inspector. The GOC had expected to get an auditor who would be responsible to him, or at the least to the army; but what we did get was an auditor who was a member of the staff of the Controller and Auditor-General, and responsible to that officer only – who, it will be realised, is in turn responsible to Parliament and the people of New Zealand only. This was slightly dampening, and meant that we would have to come to some arrangement with the auditor to obviate his comments going all the way out to New Zealand and later, through devious channels, coming back to us for a ‘please explain’. Such a roundabout procedure seemed foolish.

At an early point, therefore, we arranged with the auditor that if he had any adverse comments in his reports to his chief he would let Headquarters have a copy, so that if necessary – or if we thought it desirable – our own answer could go out to New Zealand at the same time. As it happened there were few comments of any moment; and after a while the auditor adopted the custom of coming to Headquarters first with his comments and discussing the matter before he ever made his report at all. This was most satisfactory and, after all, was the reasonable thing to do considering that New Zealand was so far away. Nothing was ever done on our part to interfere with the auditor's right to report to his own chief, but in effect he became the keeper of our conscience as well as the keeper of the public conscience.

In 1940 and 1941 there was an attempt made to conduct a stores audit. The moment appeared to be a suitable one, for at that stage our equipment was still being issued to us item by item, and was being checked and signed for. However, stores audit implies some fixed point round which to conduct it; and the course of events prevented anything like a fixed point being found. Before the initial issue was complete the First Echelon was scattered all over Egypt and the Desert; and when it came back to Helwan the Second and Third Echelons joined it, and soon afterwards the whole Division moved to Greece; and from then on enemy action and emergency replacements on the battlefield had complicated the tale beyond any clarification.

Stores audit in a combatant force in a theatre of war is an impossibility. Financial check is another matter, and the auditor was an insurance, welcomed by both staff and services, that our financial transactions, pay or otherwise, were in order.

The auditor also checked regimental funds accounts, a task which from time to time disclosed some surprising results, as will be mentioned in Chapter 16.

ARCHIVIST

After the First World War the war diaries and other records left by units had been of little help, so that historians had to start afresh to collect material. It is not suggested that war diaries provide all the material required in the compilation of a history, but they do at least provide, or should provide, some sort of foundation.

In an endeavour to improve on this situation for the future, an archivist was appointed early in 1941. Initially he was placed under the Public Relations Officer, largely for administrative reasons, but partly so that he could be put into the picture and know on what aspects of his work he should concentrate at any one time. Later in the war he was made an independent authority. His work was first to see that war diaries were kept in a proper manner, and then to collect material which might be of value to historians after the war. As part of this latter duty, he was the supervisor of unit historians; but as all we did was to exhort units to keep some sort of unit history, and as practice varied, his influence in this connection varied also. He subsequently produced a short series of provisional accounts – of the ‘popular’ variety – of the various campaigns, which had a good reception.

War History Branch has reported since the war that the Archives Branch unquestionably justified itself, but that it could with advantage have been expanded to become a proper Historical Section, with powers to collect battle narratives from units. It does seem that we were not firm enough about unit historians; but it will always be difficult to get units which are involved in the heat of battle to give any thought to possible advantages for historians in the future. The staff of a central historical section, carefully chosen as suitable for the interrogation of battle personnel who are probably very tired at the time, might have gone far to replace unit historians.

COMMISSIONER NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FUND COMMISSIONER YMCA SENIOR SECRETARY CHURCH ARMY CLUB MANAGER COMMISSIONER RED CROSS

These are all dealt with in Chapter 16.

PRINTING AND STATIONERY UNIT

The printing unit did not begin its work until January 1942, which was two years too late. It is a commonplace that the printed word is easier to read than the cyclostyled one, partly because of the variety of type available, and partly because of the greater contrast between the colour of the print and the colour of the paper. A less obvious advantage is that for the same number of copies of any document, printing uses less paper than cyclostyling. From the point of view of the recipient, there can be no two opinions about the advantages of printing; and in order to be merciful to recipients in the early stages of a specially formed force, the printing unit should be available from the first. It is not just a luxury.

The unit began by printing orders only, but soon blossomed out into printing standing instructions and army forms. It never lacked work. At a later stage it was expanded to handle stationery supplies also. It would have been better if the unit had been designed so as to be able to work on trucks without unloading. Its mobility would have been increased thereby, and the labour involved in loading and unloading the machinery and establishing it on a satisfactory firm base would have been eliminated.

CIPHERS

The cipher staff was recruited from suitable personnel of any arm of the service. There were cipher sections at HQ 2 NZEF, HQ 2 NZ Division, and HQ Maadi Camp, the first-named being concerned mainly with traffic to and from New Zealand. The GSO I of the Division was looked on as the controlling officer of the cipher service, and issued such instructions as were necessary. The number of men employed was not great, but the standard required was high.

CENSOR SECTIONS

Our first censor section was formed in December 1941 to work in Egypt, and the second after we went to Italy for work in that country. They were formed at the request of GHQ in both cases, the intention being to help the overworked British sections, which previously had carried out the work without any help from 2 NZEF; but it had already become clear that it would be better if our own people performed for us this necessary but invidious task. The sections worked within the British framework and were under the control of GHQ and not of 2 NZEF. It was by arrangement with GHQ that the greater part of their work should be the censoring of 2 NZEF mail.

Their reports were sent to GHQ, but with copies to the GOC and to OICA. They took the form of brief extracts from letters, the names and the units of the writers being omitted. The extracts were selected in order to give a fair summary of the morale and opinions of the force for the preceding month, each subject being prefaced by a brief paragraph giving the general impression gained by the censor staff of the views of the force on that particular subject. It must be repeated that no names appeared in the reports.

Other than by recording their conclusions, the censor staff took no action, any steps that might be necessary to improve morale or to obviate irritations being for the GOC to take; but the censor staff did make definite reports, including details of names and units, where there had been clear breaches of censorship regulations – locations of units, future activities, particulars of losses and so on. The implication in these cases was that disciplinary action was called for. However, the responsibility of the censor sections ended with bringing the breach to notice, and further action was for the CO of the unit.

The censorship reports were of interest to the limited number of officers who saw them; but it must said that there were very few cases where any explicit action was taken on a report. Morale fluctuated a little, which was only to be expected, but only once called for action throughout the force. The return of the Australian troops to their homeland in early 1942, combined with the knowledge that United States troops were in New Zealand, caused the greatest uneasiness of any incident in the war, and did impel the GOC to issue a personal message to all ranks. In other cases the most that would happen would be that the GOC or OICA would remember what had appeared in a report, and would perhaps speak to a few appropriate subordinates about it. Very often the opinions held throughout the force came to notice without the need for reading the reports.

WOMEN'S SERVICES

Some remarks on the above subject appear in Chapter 14.

CAMP COMMANDANT

In an agglomeration of headquarters offices such as has been described in this and the preceding chapter, some central administrative office was necessary to co-ordinate domestic routine. To control such a mixed collection was not easy, and called for patience and, on occasion, great tact. The Camp Commandant's staff included units for signals, field security, supply and transport, workshops, medical and dental, etc., much as in any camp organisation.

CHAPTER 9 Non-divisional, Base and Line-of-Communication Units

IN this chapter it is proposed to discuss all the non-divisional, line-of-communication and base units and services, the majority of which were intended to make a self-contained force of 2 NZEF. For most of them there will be a few words of comment, but it is not intended to enter into detailed explanations of their work. As was said at the beginning of this volume, this is not a treatise on military administration. Most of the units worked, and the services carried out their functions, in accordance with normal military custom and with the instructions in the various manuals. We did like to think, however, that we were a bit better at our work than most.

This chapter is concerned with units not forming part of the Division; but it must be recorded that the constitution of the Division itself changed from time to time, each change making added activities at Headquarters – adjustment of reinforcement drafts, publication of war establishments and so on. The greatest change was the turnover of 4 Infantry Brigade to an armoured brigade. There was a tendency to add to service units, especially those which would make the Division more mobile. In the last stages of the war, the strength of the infantry in the Division was increased at the expense of some supporting arms, and at the same time the striking power of the divisional engineers was strengthened. There were good tactical reasons for all the changes, the theme running through them all being to make the Division a self-contained, hard-hitting and mobile formation. At its peak in the middle of 1944 the Division was one-third as large again as in March 1941. It started the war something under 15,000 strong. Its peak was over 20,000.

To return to units outside the Division – it would be too complicated a task to analyse all the changes during the war. Many units lasted unchanged, others were added at later stages, many were disbanded or were reorganised or amalgamated with others, or had their functions changed. If one looks now at a series of orders of battle, published latterly almost every month and sometimes twice a month, the changes are readily apparent. Attention has already been drawn to Appendices I and II, where there appear the orders of battle of 2 NZEF as in April 1941 and May 1945. Partly on account of location – we were in two countries in 1945 – and partly for administrative reasons, the arrangement of these two papers is not identical, leaving on one side the variation in units between the two dates.

In Appendix III is an attempt to group all the units that were outside the Division. Not all these existed at any one time. Some disappeared at comparatively early dates, others did not come into being until late in the war; but all had some existence, short or long, and all had their trials and troubles.

The first group of units – Group A in the appendix – are those which were formed in New Zealand at the request of the United Kingdom Government. The units came out from New Zealand already formed, to work under the control of GHQ. One of the units, 36 Survey Battery, later joined the Division; another, 19 Army Troops Company, went to Greece with the Division in place of 8 Field Company, which had not at that time arrived; otherwise all the units remained non-divisional until disbanded. All units served in the field. Their operational control was exercised by General Headquarters, Middle East Forces, and was not the concern of HQ 2 NZEF. On the other hand it was not possible for Headquarters to wash its hands of the units, the members of which were New Zealanders and were the responsibility of New Zealand for pay, promotion, welfare, and general care. We found it difficult to keep in touch, for the units were moved under GHQ arrangements, and despite all sorts of understandings with GHQ it was rare for us to be given notice of any move. The difficulty was increased by the way in which the units were split up into small packets distributed all over the Middle East. This point is referred to again in Chapter 11.

Headquarters had to take special steps to maintain the morale of the units and make them feel that they were not forgotten. It was natural that the Division should receive all the fame and publicity, and that the existence of this group of units should almost be lost sight of, despite that in their several ways they did honour to the name of New Zealand. It is much to be regretted that the GOC's role as commander of the Division did in this instance definitely conflict with his role as commander of the whole force, in that he was never able to spare the time to pay adequate visits to the units.

Welfare caused some troubles on account of the fragmentation of units, and sometimes it was not easy to ensure that all members shared equally with the rest of the force in any little extra. A second mobile dental unit was formed for the explicit purpose of serving non-divisional units; for, as mentioned previously, dental treatment was one thing in which 2 NZEF standards were higher than British.

In some ways the units were like Solomon's baby in that they did not know to whom they belonged, GHQ or HQ 2 NZEF. At first they carried vehicle signs and unit serial numbers as laid down by GHQ for engineer and transportation units; but then HQ 2 NZEF stepped in and, after discussions with GHQ, arranged for the units to carry New Zealand signs and numbers – with the approval, it must be said, of the units themselves. After a short spell with a reversed fernleaf (black on white) they carried the same Southern Cross as did other NZEF units, including Headquarters.

There were a few occasions in the beginning where units showed signs of acting on British authority for promotions and alterations to establishments. We had to be firm and say that the GOC was the only person who could give promotion to officers, temporary or substantive, that Second Echelon was the approving authority for NCO promotions, and even then only within the establishment, and that HQ 2 NZEF was the approving authority for changes in establishment. We came to an arrangement with GHQ under which the GOC would approve temporary promotion for those officers and other ranks who were on occasion performing duties with United Kingdom units which carried higher rank. It was only fair that they should get the pay if the new task was one normally carried out by personnel of senior rank.

All these units except one (the Survey Battery) were engineers, although there was not much similarity between the railway operating personnel or the forestry personnel and the rest. The variety of unit gives support to the contention made in Chapter 8 that there was no justification for a ‘chief engineer’ to be in charge of them all. A staff officer for engineer duties might have been warranted, and in effect the Military Secretary filled this role.

The Forestry Company did not join 2 NZEF until late 1943, when it moved from Great Britain to Algeria. It went back to New Zealand in the middle of 1944.

The Survey Battery, after a period of over a year under GHQ, during which time it carried out ordinary surveying duties (i.e., not artillery survey), joined the Division, where it was amalgamated with the existing survey troop and thereafter was a divisional unit. It was disbanded late in 1944 and replaced by a second survey troop, a much smaller unit.

The rest of the units were all disbanded during the latter half of 1943, and the personnel not due for furlough were used to reinforce the Division. There was sufficient justification for this action; but it was carried out somewhat roughly, without paying enough attention to the feelings of officers and men who by that time had acquired a pride in their units and their work. Again it must be said that the prior claims of the Division overrode everything else, even consideration for unit feelings. The action left a touch of resentment in the remaining personnel for some time afterwards.

Reviewing the whole position, it is clear that New Zealand had overreached itself in sending overseas so many specialist units, and that the warning given to the Government by the GOC in late 1940

See p. 32.

was justified. It was a tribute to the desire of the Government that the country should do its utmost; but it should have held the balance better between forming new units and maintaining old ones.

To turn now to the next group in Appendix III – those units formed overseas by 2 NZEF for service under GHQ, either in the Middle East or in Italy, or both. As we had formed them ourselves, we were able to keep closer control over them, even to the point that we could if we wished withdraw them and disband them.

The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) started in 1940 as one patrol of a unit, the men being lent from the Divisional Cavalry, 7 Anti-Tank Regiment and 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion with the idea – or so we thought – that they would be returned to us after a spell of training; but it then transpired that GHQ wished to make the unit a permanency. As the Divisional Cavalry was clamouring to get its men back, we had to take the step – for the first time, incidentally – of forming a new operational unit of 2 NZEF and divorcing it from the Divisional Cavalry. The latter could then draw on reinforcements and make itself up to establishment again.

The numbers involved were never great. For a while our contribution consisted of two ‘patrols’; but later this was expanded to a complete squadron of four patrols numbering 7 officers and 86 other ranks. The unit was disbanded in the end as a result of the Leros operation in 1943, already mentioned in Chapter 5. After having had so much honour and glory during its career, it was a pity, even a tragedy, that its end should occur amidst failure and recrimination.

As a result of the operations in Greece and Crete there was formed a strong link between the Greek and New Zealand forces, so that it was understandable after the campaigns were over that the GOC should offer to provide the training staff for such Greek forces as remained in the Middle East. Never was a well-meant offer more regretted. Greeks are by nature politically minded to a degree unheard of among British communities. The Greek forces were riddled with politics, their natural tendency being reinforced by the dissensions among the politicians in exile. The patience of the training team was strained almost to breaking point, for it was difficult to get any continuity, beginning with the Greek commander, who seemed to change every full moon. We carried on with the task until we moved to Italy, and then handed over to GHQ.

The two graves units were New Zealand's contribution to a Commonwealth or, indeed, an inter-Allied task, that of first recording locations of graves, and then later lifting bodies and concentrating them into approved military cemeteries, which after the war would be handed over to the Imperial War Graves Commission. The units worked under GHQ control over an area of country, first in North Africa and then in Italy, and dealt with all graves in the area, not simply those of New Zealanders. Both units carried on for a period after the war with personnel who had volunteered for the duty.

The prisoner-of-war repatriation and interrogation units also worked within the GHQ framework but did concentrate on New Zealanders. Both were formed after we went to Italy.

The work of the censor sections has already been dealt with in Chapter 8.

The group of units shown under C in Appendix III had what may be called a spasmodic existence, in that some of them were formed, then disbanded, and later re-formed. The bulk of the group, in fact all except the prisoner-of-war camp, were first formed just before the Libyan campaign of November 1941 onwards, and lasted until the German advance in the middle of 1942. Some were re-formed after Alamein, and one or two in Italy for short periods.

We first supplied the staff for prisoner-of-war camps at the end of 1940, in order to help GHQ with the unexpected flood of Italian prisoners from the first Libyan campaign. The camps lasted until the prisoners were evacuated to various parts of the world. We helped again, in a rather informal fashion, when we first went to Italy.

We now come to Groups D, E, and F in Appendix III – units which were formed with the object of benefiting 2 NZEF, and which on the whole worked for 2 NZEF alone. No unit, however, certainly not those in Groups D and E, was exclusively for 2 NZEF. All played their part in the common cause, and on occasion deemed it an honour to serve other troops, the hospitals being notable examples. Many of the units – the first four in Group D for example – were formed in accordance with a scale that laid down that one or more should be found for each division in the field, their control normally being under the Corps; but the understanding was that primarily they should serve our own Division.

It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that there were many additions to the Division from time to time. Those units shown in Group D were in principle no different from some others, equally designed to help the Division on its way. Examples were the mule company organised both in Tunisia and Italy, and the jeep platoon used in Italy; but these units (and others) had only a short life, were often organised out of existing units, and sometimes never figured in the NZEF order of battle. The units in Group D were ones that were formally constituted and lasted for some months at least, extending to some years in a few cases.

Groups D and E shade off one into the other, probably the only distinction being the closeness in space of their support to the Division in the field. Any dividing line can only be a convenience for purposes of reference. In the order of battle for May 1945 (Appendix II), for instance, the following units from the groups figure as divisional units – from Group D the Field Surgical and Field Transfusion Units, and from Group E the Casualty Clearing Station, one VD Treatment unit, and the Optician Unit. The reason was that at that date the Division was so far away from the rest of the force that its supporting line-of-communication units had perforce followed it up, and for the time being had become part of it.

The Field Bakery Section could really be looked on as a divisional unit from its inception, as it was always close behind the Division. This was the famous ‘last straw’ unit of December 1942, i.e., the unit whose formation impelled OICA to point out to the GOC the shortage of manpower that would arise if more units of the sort were formed. It was intended – and in this it was successful – to bake bread near the fighting troops. Supplies sent forward from rear areas under the existing arrangements often reached the troops in a semi-stale condition.

The first three units in Group D were ancillaries of the Armoured Brigade. The Section Motor Ambulance Convoy was only a part of the unit as it appeared in British war establishments – a part large enough to serve one division. All these four units were intended to make us more self-contained.

The three medical units are dealt with in the medical history volumes. The Mobile Dental Unit was one of two, this one being for the divisional area. Its existence used to become known to British troops in the area, and sometimes it was almost swamped out by non-New Zealanders. It was almost a divisional unit.

The Advanced Ordnance Depot was inserted for a period into the lines of communication to improve the supply of ordnance stores to the Division. It was later merged in a normal divisional unit.

In Group E the medical units, the first seven in the list, call for few comments here for their work is being covered in other volumes. Strictly speaking, the Anti-Malaria Control Unit was not necessarily a medical one, but it was always so regarded in 2 NZEF.

The location of our hospitals was such that they often functioned unofficially as transit units for officers, and to a less degree for other ranks, on their way between the Division and Maadi Camp or Advanced Base. Hospitality was freely given by the staff of the hospitals; but, all the same, Headquarters on one or two occasions had gently to tell units that it was possible to have too much of a good thing, and that while an occasional visitor was all right, a flood of visitors, all wanting food and accommodation, was sometimes a bit too much, and might even interfere with the smooth running of the hospital. Visiting officers were expected to pay their mess bills in the normal way. It was a delicate situation, for the hospitals wanted to play their part, and certainly did not want to appear grasping.

The Convalescent Depot was a difficult unit to run, because when New Zealanders had reached this stage in their progress towards complete fitness they were inclined to think they were already fit and should be on their way back to their units. The depot is a medical one with a strong non-medical element to supervise such gentle training as is supposed to be done there. In the opinion of the staff of HQ 2 NZEF – the non-medical staff, it must be said – the position would have been better if reversed, i.e., that the unit should be a non-medical one with a strong medical element to watch convalescence. The point is that men want firmer control than when in hospital; but whether this is best achieved by looking on them as invalids carrying out limited exercise, or as normally fit men with temporary disabilities, is open to argument.

The rest homes were really leave hostels of a high standard and were great successes. Other ranks particularly had a real spell under as good conditions as are possible within a military framework. While medical units, they were often commanded by non-medical officers.

The mobile dental unit included here is the one formed for the service of the non-divisional units.

The rest camps, leave camps, or change-of-air camps were temporary units formed at various times when the Division came out of the line. They had nothing to do with the Medical Corps.

Our ordnance depots numbered two at their maximum, one being in Maadi and one in Italy, the latter having an advanced section also. They were formed for the same purpose as so many other units – to improve the service given to our troops by looking after ourselves.

To help in the despatch to the Division of both reinforcements and stores, we established port detachments of our own at every port in the line of communications. The detachment at Suez was the longest-lived, the first to be formed and the last to be disbanded. At intervals in the war we had detachments at Port Said, Alexandria, Benghazi, Tripoli, and then later at Taranto, Bari, Ancona, and Naples. The units were small, ranging from 18 to 30, and in effect were New Zealand ‘missions’ to the British movement authorities at each port. They supplied just that extra little bit of punch in the movement of our troops and stores. To operate efficiently, these detachments required a separate launch of their own. For Suez we had a special launch sent out from New Zealand – one that in peacetime had journeyed between Auckland City and Rangitoto. In other places we either hired launches or ‘acquired’ them by appropriate army methods.

The Reinforcement Transit Unit was established in Italy as an additional link between Advanced Base and the Division. When in the later months men moved from Bari to Ancona by sea, the unit met them at the latter port.

The clubs and the Entertainment Unit (the ‘Kiwis’) are mentioned in Chapter 16.

The last group in Appendix III (Group F) comprises Base Units – those units which were stationed in Maadi Camp or in Advanced Base, or sometimes in both. An Advanced Base had to be interposed between the Division and Maadi on three occasions – in Syria in early 1942, in Tripolitania in early 1943, and in Italy from the end of 1943 to the end of the war. Basically the Advanced Base was merely intended to hold reinforcements nearer the Division than Maadi, and in Syria and Tripolitania this is all it did. It Italy, however, Advanced Base became a Maadi Camp in miniature.

Our experience shows that there is a limit to the permissible distance between a fighting formation and its base facilities. If that distance becomes too great, it is necessary to interpose another link, which in effect becomes the base as far as the fighting formation is concerned. When in the middle of 1942 the Division was on the Alamein line and only some 100 miles from Maadi, it was possible to send men forward direct to the Division, and even direct to brigades and regiments. By the time the Division had reached Tunisia, and even more markedly, when it moved to Italy, men had to be sent forward in bulk, so to speak, sorted out at Advanced Base, and there held until the moment was propitious for sending them farther forward. Moreover, the comparative nearness of Advanced Base to the Division made it possible to fulfil demands for men more quickly than if the supply had been drawn from Maadi.

It is not proposed to examine the organisation of Advanced Base in Italy in detail, as it varied from month to month and, in any case, was largely a miniature edition of Maadi, with holding depots, reception depot, training depots at later stages, service units nearly identical in number with Maadi, and a varied collection of welfare units. To dismiss it so lightly, however, is really not fair to the staff which controlled it, for in its own way it had all the troubles that beset Maadi in its early years, and which always will arise when something is being created from the ground up.

One thing must be said, however. We made a mistake in Italy by siting Advanced Base so far back. Initially, when we were short of MT, the proximity to Taranto was an attraction; but when later we had more MT, and could send men forward in our own vehicles, it would have been better if the base had been well to the northwest of Bari instead of to the south-east. It has already been said in Chapter 7 that local circumstances led us to accept a location for HQ 2 NZEF that was too far back; and similarly there were local factors that influenced the siting of Advanced Base. Later on we considered moving; but by then the site was being steadily improved, and so we stayed until the end.

Headquarters Maadi Camp, formed in April 1940 under the title of HQ Base, was the first new unit officially formed in 2 NZEF overseas, a headquarters to command the miscellaneous lot of units that constitute a base being even by that time an obvious necessity. In June 1941 its title was changed to HQ Maadi Camp, and in August 1941 to HQ NZ Maadi Camp, this last change being the result of the instruction from GHQ that all Dominion units should carry letters indicating their country as part of their titles. As it happened, at a later stage GHQ took over portion of the camp, so that there was a ‘Maadi Camp’ separate from ‘NZ Maadi Camp’. In June 1942 the title was changed to ‘HQ 6 NZ Division’, that being one of the results of scheme cascade – for which see page 55. This scheme continued until late in 1944, when the title again became ‘HQ NZ Maadi Camp’.

Camp Headquarters had always been responsible for New Zealand troops in Cairo. When HQ 2 NZEF moved to Italy, it became responsible for all New Zealand troops in Egypt.

The training depots were the real reason for having Maadi Camp at all, and remained the hard core of the camp throughout. They showed a bewildering series of changes during the war, impossible of detailed analysis. They were formed, amalgamated, re-formed, disbanded, re-formed again, re-amalgamated, separated, expanded, reduced, and finally disbanded. When Advanced Base in Italy was formed it was at first intended not to have any training depots there, but to limit the organisation to ‘holding’ depots; but three or four advanced training depots were formed, then were expanded to become the main depots, which were closed down at Maadi, and then later on the depots were closed at Advanced Base and reopened at Maadi.

Some corps never had separate training depots at any stage, but trained their personnel, where training was called for, in the ‘service’ units in the area – the Postal Corps in the Chief Post Office, the Dental Corps in the Camp Dental Hospital, and the Pay Corps in the Chief Pay Office. ERS, which was a corps in the later years, never had any need for a training establishment.

Cavalry – later to become Armoured Corps – artillery, engineers, infantry, machine-gunners, and Maoris had depots of their own, or shares in a depot, for as long as training was called for, i.e., they never made use of base units to provide training facilities. Signals, ASC, ordnance, EME, and medical, after having had some form of depot for years, finally carried out their training in base units. The Provost Corps had a combined ‘Base Company and Training Depot’ throughout.

Armoured corps, artillery, and infantry were the only corps which had depots entirely their own from first to last, i.e., they never were part of composite depots. Other corps shared in composite or combined depots on many occasions. One of the first depots ever to be formed was ‘the Composite Depot’, so called, which served cavalry, engineers and signals, corps which were then considered to be too small to have depots of their own. This particular composite depot was later disbanded; but there were examples of combination at later dates – engineer and ordnance, machine-gun and Maori, and so on. There was a saving in overhead in having a common depot staff for these combined depots, but it is doubtful if the idea was a success.

Infantry for most of the war had separate depots for Northern, Central, and Southern groups, and also for most of the war had a superior headquarters over the three. Towards the end of the war there was one ‘Infantry Training Depot’ only.

As an example of the kind of adjustment that went on, the following were the steps taken in July 1944, at a time when the number of reinforcements was showing a decline. All available infantry and engineers were sent to Italy, to be held in Advanced Base until required. Two hundred artillery personnel were transferred to the Armoured Corps Training Depot for two months' training – this arising from reductions in artillery units in the field, combined with low casualties compared with those of the Armoured Corps. The artillery training depot was disbanded and all remaining fit men sent to Advanced Base. Engineer, infantry, and Maori training depots were to remain, but the machine-gun training depot was disbanded – this foreshadowing the changeover of 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion to infantry. The signal school was disbanded, and future training was to be done by Base Signals. The ASC training depot was disbanded and all 11th Reinforcement ASC personnel were transferred to infantry, this arising from a reduction in the number of ASC units with the Division. Future ASC reinforcements were to be trained by ASC base units. Similar steps were taken by the Medical Corps.

Adjustments like these, though not so general, took place at intervals throughout the war. The depot situation in Maadi was always sensitive to the reinforcement position in the force.

In a small army the practice of having separate depots for each arm cannot but be wasteful of personnel; but short of sharing in the facilities of British depots, which is undesirable, or sharing in combined depots, which is of doubtful advantage, or concentrating training common to all arms in one depot, which has promise, there is little that can be done to improve the position.

The School of Instruction and the Driving and Maintenance School did cater for all arms. The scope of the latter school will be obvious from its title; but the former was badly named, as its title conveyed nothing. It was in fact a small-arms school, with a curriculum of wide scope. The Signal School ran courses for regimental signallers in addition to the more technical work of its own corps. The Camouflage Training Unit, which had only a short life, also catered for all arms.

It has already been mentioned that we were late in having our own Officer Cadet Training Unit. In Chapter 13 it will be suggested that this was a mistake. Our own unit was not formed until the end of 1944, and had time to run only two or three courses before closing down. It was later briefly reopened to train officers for Jayforce.

The Reception Depot was designed to relieve training depots of as much administrative work as was possible. Men entering camp from hospital or from convalescent depot went first to the Reception Depot, where they were reclothed and re-equipped, tested for dental fitness and so on, and only then handed over to the appropriate training depot ready to go straight on with training. In theory the depot was a good one, and in the early stages it was warranted; but it was an impersonal unit with difficulties all its own in the maintenance of discipline, men did their best to dodge it, and with the best will in the world administration is never static, and the nice tidy position that existed when men joined their training depots soon became untidy again. The depot in Maadi was finally disbanded in late 1944. It is probable that we could always have done without it. Depots bearing a similar title were later formed both in Advanced Base and in Maadi, but their functions were those of an ordinary transit depot.

The Discharge Depot, on the other hand, was a necessity from first to last. It took over men when they were placed on the New Zealand roll (i.e., were awaiting return to New Zealand), on account of compassionate leave or unfitness not severe enough to take them to hospital. It saw to all the administrative detail preparatory to embarkation, and ensured that all those to be embarked were in one place instead of being scattered all over the camp. There were times when transportation was a long time coming, and special measures had to be taken to keep the men occupied – a good example being the long delay in the embarkation of some of the smaller furlough drafts. The depot could have been better equipped for this purpose, and deserved more attention than it received. Its name was not a good one, as men in the depot were awaiting not discharge but repatriation. The name was hurriedly applied in 1940 from recollections of the First World War. Repatriation Depot would have been a better title.

The Base Kit Section (or Store) looked after the superfluous gear that officers were not supposed to take into the field. To this extent it had official justification, and indeed figured as a necessary unit in pre-war manuals. Gradually, however, it became a general dump of extra and unwanted gear, official or otherwise. Other ranks are not supposed to have anything extra but, like the snail, to carry all their limited belongings with them. However, the men accumulated clothing, officially or privately, and in addition had a collection of souvenirs, trophies, musical instruments, sports gear and so on. Stringent orders would have been useless, so we bowed to the inevitable and took it all into store. When units went into the field in 1941, and at intervals thereafter, every unit dumped there its superfluous mess gear, including pianos. Towards the end of the war it was a fascinating experience to visit the store and see what it had in stock. We had to persuade a reluctant British construction authority to build us an outsize in stores to hold the contents. Periodically we tried to have a spring cleaning and to persuade units and individuals to get rid of the accumulation; but, on the whole, the position at the end of the war showed no improvement. Thereafter there was a clean-out. We considered the possibility once of moving the store to Italy, but this would have seemed like encouraging depositors in their bad ways.

The Base Bakery, later called Catering Depot, is referred to in Chapter 16, Welfare. It should be mentioned also that the Cookery School, also discussed in Chapter 16, was part of the ASC Training Depot until the depot was disbanded, when the school became independent.

Both the Medical Corps and the Red Cross felt the need of store depots outside the scope of the normal ordnance and other supply depots. The Red Cross store remained at Maadi throughout. The Medical store moved to Italy in 1944.

To administer all these depots – and sometimes the training depots alone held many thousands of men – required the help of a large number of ‘service’ units similar to those that existed in the field. Their duties are obvious from their titles.

It has been mentioned that Advanced Base in Italy became a Maadi Camp in miniature. This brings us to the question whether it might not have been better to have closed down in Maadi when the Division went to Italy, and when it became clear that the Division would be continuing on a line of advance through Italy and would not, for instance, be going to take part in the invasion of France. There was a brief period when there was a faint possibility of this latter move; but it does not appear that the idea was ever taken up by either the United Kingdom or the New Zealand Governments. The proposal was at least never officially made.

Our initial inclination was to move everything to Italy with the exception of a minimum of transit units and port detachments. The move was warranted if for no other reason than that there would be a saving in manpower in having as much of the force as possible in one place, not to mention that the work of Headquarters would be eased if most of the force was in Italy. These points at first sight seemed conclusive.

It then appeared that the sea transport authorities were not prepared to carry the troops beyond Egypt in the same vessels in which they had travelled from New Zealand, so that transhipment in Egypt was inevitable, followed by a rearrangement of the drafts to fit the smaller vessels which would carry them to Italy. The stay in Egypt might be one of weeks and our ‘minimum of transit units’ began to grow. It looked as if our transit facilities in Egypt would be much the same size as the proposed Advanced Base in Italy; and the alternative became either main base in Egypt and smaller one in Italy, or the reverse. By moving the main base to Italy we did not avoid having a smaller base in Egypt.

Then the more we looked at Maadi Camp the more we liked it. By this time it was as near perfect as any camp could be in the circumstances, for it had become a permanent camp with all the amenities that one could wish for. Within any reasonable period of time we could never organise a similar camp in Italy, putting aside the question whether at that stage of the war we were justified in asking the British authorities to embark on a mass of new construction. Moreover, training grounds in Egypt were unrivalled in the amount of room they offered and the weather was always good, though we realised that training in the desert was not entirely suitable for fighting in hilly and closely-settled country such as would be found in Italy. The real truth is that we were well dug in in Maadi and were reluctant to give it up.

The decision we had to take was a major one. As is known, it was to leave Maadi much as it was at the time and establish a glorified transit depot – Advanced Base – in southern Italy. Owing to the departure of HQ 2 NZEF and its associated NZEF authorities, the total number in Maadi Camp showed a reduction. There was also some reduction in training facilities and in the ‘service’ units maintaining the camp.

It is not possible on reflection to say categorically that we took the correct, or the incorrect, decision. Had we decided otherwise we would doubtless have settled down in Italy after the initial upheaval; and there would have been a saving in manpower, together with an easing of administration, if we had moved. Probably the balance was in favour of moving to Italy but not by much.

There has never been an army, either full size or, as with us, a miniature one, that has not been criticised for having too large a tail. At one point in the North African campaigns the United Kingdom Government sent out to the Middle East a specially appointed politician with a staff to investigate the size of the tail behind the Eighth Army, as there had been criticism in England about the number of personnel employed in rear areas. As far as we could see, nothing ever happened as a result of the investigations; but the accusation is a common one and merits a sober answer, so that a little time may be spent in debating whether or not the 2 NZEF tail was too big.

It is possible to imagine the Expeditionary Force consisting of a division and nothing else – or perhaps it would be better to say consisting of field troops and nothing else. Every service behind the field troops would have to be done by someone other than New Zealanders. Our reinforcements on arrival would go to (presumably) British camps, our mail would be delivered by British units, our sick and wounded go to British hospitals, our pay come from British pay offices and so on. It is not necessary to labour this point, as it was never disputed that we should have some sort of rear organisation. The point to be determined is how much rear organisation there was to be. Men have to be clothed and fed, given medical and dental attention, paid, promoted (or reduced in rank!), guarded spiritually, supplied with welfare both on and off duty; their letters have to be collected, censored, and delivered, their domestic woes cured if possible, their return to civil life made smooth, until we find every ill the flesh is heir to being handled by military authorities – for after all the army is only 100 per cent state socialism of a rigid type.

It is a challenge to go through the list of NZEF authorities given on page 114 and see which ones we might have dispensed with, remembering firmly that someone else might have to perform the duties itemised if New Zealanders did not. Which of them was unnecessary or a luxury? One or two of them were thinking about the future – the ERS and the archivist, for instance – and we might have done without them at the time. Our Public Relations Service was more for the benefit of the people of New Zealand than for the Expeditionary Force. Our welfare might have been carried out by one authority instead of four, although the saving would have been small. Perhaps the auditor was a luxury! – but again he was primarily working for the Government in New Zealand and not for us. The censor sections were a contribution to the common pool, apart from the fact that New Zealanders preferred that this invidious duty should be done by other New Zealanders, who would understand the mentality of the writers and references whose meaning would be obscure to British censors.

It is hoped that elsewhere in this volume the case has been made out for having a HQ 2 NZEF at all. It has been admitted that a saving could have been made by combining HQ 2 NZEF with HQ Maadi Camp for such time as the whole force was in North Africa; but that does not affect the contention that the divisional staff, plus the service heads in the Division, could not have administered the Expeditionary Force as a whole.

To return to the list of NZEF authorities – no answer is given here to the question how many could have been dispensed with; but readers, and especially critical readers, are asked to be honest with themselves when expressing an opinion. Probably the cock-shy has been set up only to be knocked down again, and too much has been made of the point; but criticism comes easily to troops, especially to New Zealanders. Let us accept in the meantime that all the authorities were justified. There now remains the more delicate point whether or not they were staffed too generously; but before deciding this let us turn back to the units that have been discussed on pages 137–44 and are listed in Appendix III, Groups E and F.

It would be dangerous to make any comment about the necessity for any of the medical units, and the dental units too, except to say that our standards were high, and we gave a service much better than the normal. Units like the port detachments, the clubs, the entertainment unit – these were not essentials and we could have got on without them, but our troops would not have been treated so well. And if the standard of service is to be high, then the number of men employed thereon will be high also.

We tried to keep the depot position in Maadi under control, and records have shown that depots were reduced or disbanded from time to time when the number of reinforcements or the state of the war did not justify their continuance. The reception depot probably went on too long; the other odd schools and stores performed necessary duties. The ‘service’ units were similar to those that worked in the field. Maadi Camp was nearly self-contained, and we drew on British facilities as little as possible.

The crux of the matter in this aspect of the possible excess of units at the base or on the lines of communication lies in the word ‘self-contained’. It is a fact that the smaller the truly self-contained force, the higher proportionately to the total will it be in overheads and maintenance units. It would have been more economical, for instance, if we had been content to have our depots as small sections of British ones, to send our students to British schools (even if we had supplied some of the staff too), to attach ‘service’ personnel to British units instead of running our own, and altogether if we had been content to have our base camp merely a section of the gigantic organisation that had been built up in the area from Tel el Kebir to the