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Private J. D. Caves: The Long Journey Home

Excerpt from Early Battles of the Eighth Army

Excerpt from Early Battles of the Eighth Army

This passage provides an overview of the second battle of Ruweisat Ridge.

In July 1942 there were six battles fought around the Alamein line, followed ultimately by the November 1942 Battle of El Alamein under Montgomery after which the Eighth Army never lost another battle.

Auchinleck's third offensive had failed - and failed disgracefully. "There is nothing in the whole record of the Afrika Korps" states Ronald Lewin bluntly, "to compare with the abandonment of the New Zealanders naked before an armoured attack in the opening stages of the first Ruweisat battle."

This remark refers to other New Zealand brigades, and not Denis' 6th Brigade, which would be called into action for the Second Battle of Ruweisat Ridge.

There would be even greater waste in Auchinleck's fourth offensive, the Second Battle of the Ruweisat Ridge, which began in the evening of 21 July. Its objective was declared to be "cutting Rommel's battle front in two parts."

The main assault was again to be carried out by XIII Corps. 6th New Zealand Brigade would attack from the south against the El Mreir Depression lying to the south-west of the Ruweisat Ridge, while 161st Indian Motor Brigade from the 5th Indian Division attacked from the east. The infantry would be assisted by 1st Armoured Division. The armoured brigades were not, however, intended to advance before first light on 22 July. Much criticism has been levelled against their commanders for being unwilling to move at night when the Germans had no compunction about doing so, but there was the important difference that the British tanks would have to make their way through enemy minefields.

In addition to their other tasks, 6th New Zealand and 161st Indian Motor Brigades were to clear a gap in those minefields.

Such was the plan, but not the realization. During the night of 21-22 July, 161st Brigade seized Deir el Shein, only to be driven out by counter-attack; it failed to capture Point 62. 6th New Zealand Brigade, after ferocious fighting which cost it 200 casualties, secured the eastern part of El Mreir, but the tanks did not move up to support it in time. In consequence at 0515 on 22 July, Nehring fell on the New Zealanders with both 15th and 21st Panzer and shattered them. Some 700 men were killed, wounded or captured, and twenty-three guns were lost.

This is where Denis was captured, in the El Mreir Depression, where New Zealand infantry, after a successful night attack, were yet again unsupported by British armour when counter-attacked by Panzer divisions.

There was some excuse for the ineffectiveness of the British armour. On 18 July another successful Luftwaffe attack had wounded both Lumsden and Briggs. Command of 1st Armoured Division was therefore given to Gatehouse, now a major general, but he only arrived at the front from the Nile Delta on the evening of the 20th and he also was wounded at about 0900 on the 22nd, his place being taken by Brigadier Fisher. Yet it is hardly surprising that, in the bitter words of Major General Howard Kippenberger, commander of 5
Eighth Army Infantry 'dug' in the desert.

Eighth Army Infantry 'dug' in the desert.

page 58Brigade: "At this time there was intense distrust, almost hatred, of our armour. Everywhere one heard tales of the other arms being let down; it was regarded as axiomatic that tanks would not be where they were wanted on time."

So ended "Second Ruweisat", which Auchinleck had code-named Operation Splendour. The Eighth Army Commander had no doubt who was responsible for its failure. In a report to Brooke on 25 July, he would complain that: "The 23rd Armoured Brigade, though gallant enough, lost control and missed direction. The infantry too, seem to have made some avoidable mistakes. Perhaps I asked too much of them."

Others took a different view. "My opinion" declares Kippenberger, "was that we would never get anywhere until the armour was placed under command of infantry brigadiers and advanced on the same axis as the infantry. We fought one more unsuccessful battle on the old lines and then the principle for which I argued was adopted."

Auchinleck's fifth offensive, the Battle of the Miteirya Ridge began at midnight on 26-27 July, and unbelievably it repeated all the errors made in the two previous disasters.