The Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa: 1845–1884
Chapter IV — The Awakening of New Zealand's Interests in Samoa
Chapter IV
The Awakening of New Zealand's Interests in Samoa
i
While the commercial activities of the German merchants were raising the intrinsic value of the islands, new discoveries were taking place that affected the Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa groups profoundly. The discovery of gold in America, New Zealand, and Australia produced an increase in trans-Pacific traffic which naturally raised the importance of the three groups on the main route.
1 To tackle the Nicaragua route. This was revived in 1872—the Panama route was attempted by de Lesseps in 1881. Ultimately the canal was not opened until 1914.
2 Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, p. 72, "The Inter-Oceanic Canal Problem."
3 Although the attempts to prosecute their original projects for a canal failed.
By 1869 the trans-Continental railway was completed. This was the culminating point in a series of events that combined to make America a Pacific Power.
The Australian gold discoveries came in 1851. In February Hargraves, a Californian gold miner, first found gold at Summerhill Creek, twenty miles north of Bathurst. By September the great gold fields of Ballarat and Bendigo were opened up. Two years later a new turn was given to affairs by the discovery of gold in Otago, New Zealand.
The importance of these discoveries upon the Pacific Islands is evident. By the increase of wealth of these Pacific countries, by the acceleration of their development, they became capable of a more ambitious policy than previously. America began to look west towards Japan and China. In 1851 the eastern Australian States and New Zealand were given constitutions. Thus at a time when growth was most rapid, a freedom was given which encouraged independence of action. Within the succeeding decades the United States, Australia, and New Zealand began to release themselves from internal problems and to join in the tussle for a share in the island world of the Western Pacific.
The immediate effect of the gold discoveries was the inter-communication between the three countries. Until then Australasian Colonies had communicated with Europe by Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope route. There was no north-east flow of ships.1 Now miners, prospectors, traders, poured from one country to another.
1 As has been mentioned, individual people travelled via the West Indies, Panama, and Callao, but it was a laborious and uncertain journey (e.g. Pritchard describes his journey by this route in 1845. F.O. 58/38).
2 Scholefield, The Pacific, p. 77.
3 F.O. 58/96. Williams to Earl Russell, May 14, 1862.
4 See N.S.W. Papers, Legislative Assembly, 1883–84, 3rd Session, vol. 9, "Proceedings of Inter-Colonial Convention of 1883." Australasian Colonies wanted islands from New Guinea to the New Hebrides. New Zealand wanted, especially, Samoa and Tonga.
1 In 1883 at the Sydney Convention (N.S.W. Papers, 1883–84, 3rd Session, vol. 9), all the Colonies consented to "bear such share of the cost" of annexing New Guinea "as may be deemed fair and reasonable." This was, however, only a part of the total sum annexation would involve, and New Guinea was only part of their total scheme, which included Samoa and Tonga. The British Government was, however, cautious after the refusal of the Colonies to contribute toward the cost of the government of Fiji (see infra, p. 103).
ii
While Australia was concerned chiefly with New Guinea and the islands in her vicinity, New Zealand's interest lay in Samoa, Tonga, and the Polynesian islands. As early as 1847 Sir George Grey, Governor of New Zealand, envisaged a Pacific peopled by British and governed from New Zealand. At the time New Zealand was too young a colony, and, faced by its own acute problems, could not support the dreams of its enterprising Governor. His idea of a Pacific Empire was first inspired by the appeals of King George Tabou of Tonga for annexation to Great Britain, and by the evident willingness of chiefs at Fiji to come under British protection. He was convinced that the desire was genuine, and he recommended the annexation of the islands by Great Britain.2 They would be a valuable defence for New Zealand and Australia in time of war. The wealth of the islands would make them self-supporting. The natives could augment the military resources of the Empire. The acquisitions would, in short, bristle with advantages.
2 CO. 209/59. Grey to Earl Grey (No. 1286), March 14, 1848.
1 That of Elliot.
2 Ibid.
3 Creighton, L., G. A. Selwyn—His Life, p. 8.
4 Selwyn, G. A., Letters on the Melanesian Mission, p. 14.
1 Selwyn, Letters on the Melanesian Mission, p. 37.
2 Scholefield, The Pacific, p. 52.
The indignation aroused by the publication of such facts, and the heavy toll of murders on the islands, led to a demand for the control of the labour traffic. It was therefore suggested by the New Zealand Government that the possession of a central point in the area of disorder would facilitate the task. Fiji, already for some years in the running for annexation to Great Britain, was of course proposed. This suggestion was particularly favoured by Australia, who had contributed more in settlers and capital to its development.2 New Zealand from the outset recommended the annexation of the Navigator Islands, inhabited by natives closely allied to the Maoris in race, language, appearance, and customs.
The first petition to the Queen by both Houses of the New Zealand Parliament to annex the Navigator Islands was made in November 1871, soon after the news of Bishop Patteson's death. It did not, however, originate in the Houses of Parliament.
1 The Daily Southern Cross, November 1, 1871, New Zealand. Also CO. 209/223. Bowen to Kimberley, November 1871.
2 There were altogether some 2,000 white settlers in Fiji, drawn chiefly from Australia between 1860–70. This immigration to Fiji was due to the cotton-planting boom during the American Civil War. The labour trade in the islands was conducted largely to feed the plantations of Queensland and Fiji with labourers, and to a smaller extent the German plantations in Samoa.
His very impetuosity defeated his ends. "Vogelism" became a byword for wild schemes. Robert Herbert, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, commented on his scheme2 for annexing Polynesia as "a foolish as well as an impudent composition,"3 and he refers to Vogel as "the most audacious adventurer that perhaps has ever held power in a British Colony."4
1 In 1872 he became Premier until 1876.
2 See infra, p. 96.
To him undoubtedly are due the Pacific schemes presented during the years 1871–76. The memoranda of the Ministers are his composition, and they fully express his views. At his departure from New Zealand in 1876, plans for political aggrandizement in the Pacific ceased, and on his return in 1884 there cropped up again an agitation in New Zealand for the annexation of Samoa, and in Samoa for incorporation into the Colony of New Zealand.3 But though the scheme in the main was that of an individual Minister, it was important because he was Prime Minister and carried his Ministers with him. The fact that for five years the New Zealand Government cherished a dream of a Pacific Empire influenced the lines on which her interest in Samoa developed. New Zealand came to regard herself as having a particular interest or right in the group.
1 His policy of abolishing the provinces in New Zealand roused considerable opposition and undermined his popularity.
3 Actually they began in 1883 before his return. They reached their height while he was Premier.
A third stimulus to Vogel's plea for urgency in annexation was the frequency of rumours at this time of the designs of other Great Powers upon the islands. The rapid growth of the Godeffroy firm, the secrecy with which all their business was conducted, the hint of the awakening of American interest in Captain Meade's treaty with the chief of Tutuila, and in the appointment of Colonel Steinberger as Commissioner to Samoa, were all actions which gave rise to alarm and suspicion.3 At such a distance from Europe it was often difficult to distinguish between the policy of a Home Government and the action of agents on the spot, and to realize that the two might be very different.
Vogel's proposals followed two main lines. They were in the first place petitions for the direct annexation of the islands. In the second place, as an alternative, he proposed an extensive scheme for the foundation of a trading company with certain privileges and with political as well as commercial aims.
2 Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of N.S.W., 1883–84, vol. 9, pp. 106–113.
3 C.O. 209/226. Bowen to Kimberley (No. 56). Encl. No. 2 from Webb, June 26, 1872.
1 C.O. 209/223 (No. 1174). Enclosed in Bowen to Kimberley, November 24, 1871.
2 Ibid.
Six months later Governor Sir George Bowen dispatched a second memorandum by Vogel.2 In February 1872, Captain Meade of the U.S. ship Narrangansett had concluded a treaty with the chief Mauga of Tutuila for the cession of Pago-Pago harbour to the United States as a coaling station for the United States' ships of war, and for the trans-Pacific mail line. In return, Captain Meade had promised the vague protection of the U.S. Government. Webb, the owner of the steamship line, wrote to Vogel of this and of the indignation it had caused in German circles, as, so he stated, the Germans had hoped to anticipate his action.3 Vogel considered that there were grave possibilities of danger in this treaty. The various island groups might some day unite4; it might be detrimental in case of war with the United States. He felt none the less that the treaty was not inspired by ill-feeling toward Great Britain, and that the United States would probably not object to Great Britain obtaining similar privileges. Kimberley was unwilling to interfere. "I don't see," he wrote in a minute to the memorandum, "how we are to interfere unless we are to lay down and enforce the doctrine that no European or American Power is to interfere in any part of the South Pacific but ourselves"5 (September 4, 1872).
1 CO. 209/223 (No. 1174). Proposal to place the Navigator Islands under British protection, November 24, 1871.
2 CO. 209/226 (No. 8805). Captain Meade's treaty. Bowen to Kimberley, June 26, 1872.
3 See supra, chap, iii, pp. 67–68.
4 The only tendency to union was in the 1880's when King Kalakana of Hawaii cherished the dream of a United Polynesia. One step toward its accomplishment was the Samoan Hawaiian Treaty of 1887. Scholefield, op. cit., p. 46.
5 CO. 209/226 (No. 8805/72), loc. cit.
6 CO. 209/228 (No. 9440/72).
In August 1873 Governor Sir James Fergusson was requested to forward another memorandum to the Colonial Office. The line of steamships had been discontinued, and therefore the United States cession was temporarily valueless. It was urged that Great Britain should step in before the United States took further action. Vogel added that "there is good reason to believe that the German Government have contemplated annexing these islands and would have done so but for Captain Meade's action."1 "It would occasion a profound disappointment," wrote Fergusson, "to the people of this Colony, were the present opportunity to be lost, and in spite of the preference manifested in our favour by their inhabitants were a port of great commercial and possibly great political importance … to fall into the hands of a foreign power."2
1 C.O. 209/230 (No. 10220). "New Zealand Ministers urge that the Navigator Islands should not fall into foreign hands." Fergusson to Kimberley, August 1, 1873.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, Minute.
3 Though, indeed, there was no indication that she had any such wish.
The minutes made in the Colonial Office leave no doubt as to the feelings of the Home Government. Herbert commented on it as "a foolish as well as an impudent composition," and recommended that the scheme should need at least to be passed by both Houses of the New Zealand Parliament before it should be sent back to London for reconsideration. Lord Kimberley remarked that "one would have supposed that the New Zealand Government would have thought it as well first to get possession of the whole of New Zealand before undertaking to govern other territories. They will have enough to do for years to come without embarking on these quixotic schemes. Amongst other things they might build or purchase two or three armed steamers to relieve the 'burdened Englishman'2 whom Mr. Vogel so much pities, from having to provide ships to patrol the New Zealand coast."
4 Not altogether a creditable venture.
1 By this time the reports of Sterndale and Seed were being compiled in a Blue Book, so his misinformation was probably deliberate.
Vogel's castles in the air were rudely shaken by a telegram to Fergusson that H.M. Government was not prepared to enter upon the consideration of the questions involved in this proposal.2 In a dispatch it was hinted that the "self-government which has been accorded to the Colonists does not extend to the power of legislating on subjects which may largely affect and compromise this country or foreign Powers, as well as the islands which are the more immediate objects of the scheme."
At this juncture the defeat of Gladstone's Ministry brought Lord Carnarvon to the Colonial Office. His comments were no more favourable.3 He considered the proposal was "crude and undigested," and he objected to the New Zealand monopoly and the risk of complications with foreign countries. Further, it was obvious that "this country cannot fairly resist, were it indeed for her interest to do so, the establishment within a reasonable distance of her own Colonies of other settlements which may hereafter become centres of foreign commerce, and the present circumstances of the South Pacific form no exception to this." He therefore recommended delay and that the draft of the proposed Bill should be sent to England.
2 Ibid, C.O. 209/230 (No. 942).
3 Ibid. Minute dated February 26, 1874.
July brought to Carnarvon a dispatch marked "Secret" answering his objections.4 The tone, whether intentionally or not, was a little threatening. "I trust," said Fergusson, "that I may not presume in representing that it would be a policy of doubtful expediency, in view of the relations of the Mother Country with a dependency so progressive and energetic as this, to check its efforts for the development of its external relations, because it may be more enterprising than others…. I submit that it would be a mistaken policy on the part of H.M. Government to throw obstacles in the way of Colonial commercial enterprise." Further came the illogical statement of the need to control the islands "when civilization be preceded by its questionable representatives, the overflowings of Colonial Society"!
3 Ibid.
The wearied Colonial Office, sceptical both of dangers of foreign aggression and of the extent of New Zealand interests, were not persuaded. Carnarvon did not consider his objections had been answered. Further, the cession of Fiji to Great Britain altered the whole situation. "It is obviously undesirable for the present to give a decision either in favour or against any particular scheme on so important a question."2
The matter was dropped for the time. Mr. Coleman Philips came to England and offered the Government his services and a little pamphlet on British Colonization and Commerce. The latter was "read with interest by Lord Carnarvon" and returned.3 Vogel presented another lengthy elaboration of his Pacific Island Commercial Company scheme in October,4 but with no more success than on previous occasions.
Although this somewhat lengthy correspondence had not the results hoped for by New Zealand, it is in itself significant, not merely of the policy of England, but also of a change in New Zealand's attitude.
1 C.O. 209/232 (No. 10167). Fergusson to Carnarvon, June 24, 1874. The arrangements were to be for shipping, customs, duties, use of ports, and "perhaps the admission of chiefs' sons to native schools in New Zealand."
3 C.O. 209/234 (Philips, No. 5953), May 27, 1875. It recommended concentration of the Empire round the Indian Ocean and the abandonment of Canada.
1 C.O. 209/228 (No. 9440). Thornton to F.O., September 20, 1872.
2 F.O. 244/283. Bülow to Lord Odo Russell, November 6, 1874.
3 C.O. 209/233 (No. 2025). Minute by Herbert to dispatch—Williams to F.O., October 11, 1873.
4 See chap. v., p. 115.
5 C.O. 209/228 (No. 9440/72).
The unwillingness of the Home Government to consider New Zealand's propositions for annexing the islands was bitterly resented by Vogel. Yet it was a characteristic caution that can be defended on several grounds. In the 1870's New Zealand had only just emerged from drawn-out and expensive Maori wars which had cost England men and money. In South Africa the native problem threatened expense and unrest. Her past experiences with black and brown races were no good augury for the assumption of further responsibilities of that nature. The feeling in the British Government was indeed put concisely by Derby when he affirmed in a speech that "the Queen has black subjects enough."1 Besides the question of military defence, an extended island empire would need an extended navy. It was the English taxpayer who suffered every time.
1 Scholefield, The Pacific, p. 113, quoted à propos of New Guinea, 1874.
2 C.O. 209/223 (No. 1174), dispatch No. 112. Bowen to Kimberley, November 24, 1871.
2 Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, New Zealand.
4 C.O. 209/235 (No. 7568). Normanby to Carnarvon, April 27, 1876.
5 Ibid.
There were no immediate results. In that year Vogel went to England as Agent-General, and in his absence the matter was dropped.
Although Vogel was the chief promoter at this time of a policy of the annexation of Samoa, yet it became a genuine desire of many in New Zealand. The feeling in the Colony in 1886 was sufficiently strong to deter Great Britain from consenting to German annexation. Similarly in 1899 the Colonial Office reminded the Foreign Office that the Samoa question was one that affected the Australasian Colonies very deeply.1 When in 1899 the group fell into foreign hands it became a terra irredenta to New Zealand, and in 1914 her first action in the Great War was to seize Western Samoa from Germany. This persistent interest was thus of no new growth, and its origin was in the remote dreams of Sir George Grey and the plans of Vogel in the 1870's.
1 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents on the Origin of the War, vol. i, p. 100. Samoa C.O. to F.O., January 24, 1899.