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Chapter ix. Provincial Legislatures.

When Sir George Grey left New Zealand the government devolved upon Colonel Wynyard of the 58th regiment (the senior military officer) under the title of the officer administering the government. The departure of their old friend aroused a superstitious regret amongst the Maoris when they found that it was followed by an outbreak of measles which, introduced at Auckland by an American vessel, decimated tribe after tribe in the interior. It was deemed advisable that the Provincial Legislatures should meet before the summoning of the General Assembly. Mr. Weld and some others discovered afterwards that a contrary course should have been adopted, and that the powers of the Provincial Councils should have been defined by the General Legislature before the local parliaments were permitted to plume themselves upon their new honours. Sir George Grey, however, had called the Provincial Councils into existence, and on Colonel Wynyard fell the task of dealing with the larger body. The electors in the provinces chose their leading men as Superintendents. Mr. J. E. Fitzgerald was selected at Canterbury, Mr. E. W. Stafford at Nelson, Colonel Wynyard at Auckland, Dr. Featherston at Wellington, Mr. Brown at Taranaki, and Captain Cargill at Otago.

Mr. Swainson declared (1859) that the Provincial Legislatures ought to have been confined to mere municipal matters, and should have been made more dependent on the General Legislature. They plunged into what he called “a mischievous multiplicity and diversity of legislation.”In three years they passed more than two hundred Ordinances. Mr. Swainson was

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the chief adviser of the Acting Governor, and was not slow to put words in his mouth commending the General Assembly to enlarge and solidify the powers of the general government.

By a proclamation dated 18th January, 1854, the General Assembly was convened for despatch of business at Auckland on the Queen's Birthday, 24th May. Mr. Charles Clifford was made Speaker of the elected House. Mr. J. E. Fitzgerald and Mr. David Monro were put forward by their brother members as mover and seconder of the formal but friendly address in reply to the Governor's speech, which had pointed out the dangers which might spring from the Provincial Legislatures, the possible incoherence if not antagonism in their legislation, the duty which lay upon the General Assembly to determine whether New Zealand should “become one great nation or a collection of insignificant, divided, and powerless petty states.”

Mr. Weld and his friends complained that Mr. Swainson did nothing to remedy the dreaded evils. They professed the same apprehensions. But the Assembly burned to exercise their new powers. Their appetite grew by what it fed on. There were also men among them spurred by a noble ambition. The Constitution made no provision for the creation of a responsible ministry. Representatives in the Legislature were to be called into existence, but they had been active in New South Wales in 1843, and as yet responsible government had not been established in Australia. It was to come, but it was to be provided for by special enactment. There had been no preparation for it in New Zealand at the elections. The Royal Letters Patent which made the Executive Council consist of certain functionaries had not been modified. But Gibbon Wakefield sat amongst the representatives. He stirred their minds to demand responsible government; the boast of England, the recent boon to Canada. An address to Colonel Wynyard was carried, expressing a desire for ministerial responsibility without delay. A suggestion that a select committee should be appointed to report upon the subject, found but one supporter, and the senior military officer stood in the novel position of having to solve abstruse political problems. He laid the address before his Executive Councillors with an opinion from his Attorney-General that he might go so far as to add, under existing

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instructions, two or three members of the Assembly to the Executive Council, and that body unanimously advised him to do so. Mr. Swainson's opinion showed, by reference to the Constitution Act and to the Royal Instructions, that the Governor was not enabled to establish “ministerial responsibility in the conduct of legislative and executive proceedings by the Governor.”Colonel Wynyard placed in the Executive Council Mr. J. E. Fitzgerald, member for Lyttleton; Mr. F. A. Weld, member for Wairau; and Mr. H. Sewell, member for Christchurch. Mr. Sinclair the Colonial Secretary, and Mr. Shepherd the Treasurer, were willing to resign on receiving fit retiring allowances. Mr. Swainson, Attorney-General, was willing to retire, with or without compensation, if the representative of the Crown should think it advantageous for the public interests. The Legislative Council then deemed it essential that a responsible member of the Government should be chosen from that body, and Wynyard at once (29th June) appointed Mr. F. D. Bell. When Mr. Bell was called away by urgent affairs, Mr. F. H. Bartley, a lawyer, was appointed to the Legislative and Executive Councils. All the newly-appointed councillors undertook without salary to represent the Government in the Legislature, to perform such departmental work as became a concomitant of their legislative duties, and to hold office only so long as they might retain the confidence of the Assembly. Both Houses applauded the arrangement. These proceedings were reported to the Secretary of State for approval.

Such hurried changes produced friction in a machinery not constructed for them. The new men found a want of hearty co-operation on the part of the old, and the representatives began to show uneasy symptoms. Mr. Fitzgerald and his friends sought to smooth all obstacles by obtaining more power. They thought a military governor would yield to the arguments of civilians. To enable them to conduct the public business they recommended, in writing, that the existing office-holders should resign, and that the Government should be “reconstituted on the ordinary responsible basis.”Wynyard laid the document before the Executive Council, and said he was willing to accept the Secretary's resignation on suitable provisions for his retirement, and to appoint a member of Assembly in his room. The

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Secretary had been locally appointed, but the Attorney-General and the Treasurer held Crown appointments, and while Wynyard was only temporary administrator of the Government he was not prepared to accept their resignations unless authorized to do so by the Secretary of State. They themselves, though offering to resign if called upon, declined to advise as councillors that such a step should be taken. The ruling passion of duty in the soldier was proof against Mr. Fitzgerald, who, with his colleagues, on the 2nd August, quitted the Executive Council, Wynyard having on the 1st August declined to coerce his legitimate advisers without “being favoured with the views of the Crown.”“I am now called upon (he said) to form an entire new form of Government without even a reference to my Sovereign, thus throwing on me during my temporary administration a grave responsibility I am not prepared or disposed to bear.”If the Home Government should approve the proposition, not much time would be lost in obtaining its sanction; if it should not approve, it was the more necessary for him to await instructions. The suggestion by the retiring councillors that the Assembly might refuse supplies, Wynyard spoke of in a subsequent message to the two legislative bodies (5th August), but did not allow it to warp him from what he thought his duty. He urged that the establishment of responsible government should be provided for by law. He was ready to consider any such measure seriously and favourably. He also urged that some useful practical measures should be passed. Mr. Sewell read to the House of Representatives a narrative of the transactions which, substantially confirming that of Wynyard, caused him to remark to the Duke of Newcastle that it was shown “how necessary it was to make the stand I did.”The Legislative Council (of which Swainson the Attorney-General was Speaker) on the 10th August concurred with what Wynyard had done, and suggested that he should summon to the Executive Council some members of the General Assembly enjoying his confidence, and holding office only while they enjoyed also that of the Assembly.

It was not surprising that when brains were wanted Gibbon Wakefield was applied to. When Fitzgerald abandoned his post, Wynyard wrote: “I (with advice) requested an interview with Mr. E. G. Wakefield… that gentleman having

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been originally put forward by 29 out of 30 members in the House of Representatives as their leader in the movement for obtaining the establishment of ministerial responsibility, and having also been its prominent leader in the opposition to the late members of the Executive Council in the Legislature.”

Fitzgerald and his friends had a majority in the House of Representatives, and in reply to Wynyard's message of the 5th of August, they commented with asperity on the position which Gibbon Wakefield had been allowed to assume. He had assured the House that he had drawn up his Excellency's message.¹ Such a state of affairs compromised Wynyard, and it would be perilous to the colony if the Queen's representative should act without advice from the Attorney-General. Wynyard rejoiced at being able to assure them, that “throughout the emergency he had enjoyed the unqualified concurrence and support of his constitutional advisers.”He begged them (15th August) to consider his former message “with a view of turning the remainder of the already protracted and fruitless session to some good account for the people of New Zealand.”On the 16th, Fitzgerald and his friends, who adopted the style “We the Commons of New Zealand,”said that, dismissing all that was past, they required “the immediate establishment of the Executive Government on the basis of complete ministerial responsibility.”

Wynyard would not abandon his position, but (17th August) would earnestly request the Home Government to aid in establishing ministerial responsibility. He would, after a brief prorogation, assist in maturing a Bill (to be reserved for the Queen's pleasure) to bring about the required object. He transmitted on the same day a second message with a proclamation proroguing the Assembly till the 31st August. The bearer

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stood at the door while the first message was read to the House; and the majority determined to prevent the prorogation message from being received. The reading of the prorogation message was averted until, by irregularly suspending the standing orders, the majority might pass resolutions to stop supplies, and to denounce Gibbon Wakefield. Objecting members were forcibly detained, and when they attempted to escape by a gallery, Mr. Sewell thought it not unbecoming for an outgoing Executive Councillor to scramble over a railing and lock the door. Mr. Weld was silent. After a time, Mr. Mackay, a member from Nelson, obtained entrance into the Chamber, and threw a copy of the Governor's proclamation on the table. He was assaulted by Sewell and others for keeping his hat on, in which on the assumption that the House was prorogued he thought himself justified. There was a prospect of a rescue by strangers in the gallery; Mr. Mackay was ejected, and the Speaker at last read the messages. Colonel Wynyard magnanimously abstained from exposing the actors in a scene which made the New Zealand representatives a by-word for a time in Australia.

Two days after the struggle in the House Gibbon Wakefield found his position untenable. An adviser without responsibility, conscious that the Assembly would not subject itself to his guidance, he saw that the Acting Governor shrunk from committing himself to it. A Triton among minnows in one sense, he could unfortunately do nothing unless the minnows would accept him as pilot. He sought Swainson on the 19th August, and reasoned for two hours. He recorded the interview. He described Swainson's “masterly command of the conversation by means of the highest diplomatic ability.”Swainson approved of Fabian tactics until events might show in what way the Acting Governor should act. Meanwhile, though to this he did not pledge himself, Colonel Wynyard might govern under the old forms until the Home Government should instruct him. Throughout the long interview each felt that much in his thoughts must remain unspoken. Each watched the other. But Swainson's goal was duty, not ambition, and the light he walked by was not deceitful. It seemed to Wakefield that Swainson had “two distinct policies”in his thoughts. Mr. Weld said afterwards that he had but the one policy of “not committing

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himself.”Wakefield at once retired from his anomalous position. Swainson as well as others were relieved from irksome pressure. The doors of the Assembly were closed, but the keys of the Treasury had not been taken from the Government. The Assembly had passed no new law, and the existing law left the Government full power to apply the public revenues to the public service. Thus master of the situation, the Government ascertained that the Assembly, if convened for business on the day to which it had been prorogued, would devote itself to practical legislation and grant supplies.

A final attempt was made to introduce the responsible element so eagerly demanded. Mr. T. S. Forsaith of Auckland, Mr. E. J. Wakefield of Canterbury (Gibbon Wakefield's son), Mr. Travers of Nelson, and Mr. MacAndrew of Otago, were appointed Executive Councillors with the understanding that they would resign if they should “fail to carry with them the support and confidence of the Houses of Assembly, a new Governor be appointed, or any change take place in the Constitution.”They were also to identify themselves with the policy of an address to be sent down by Wynyard to the Houses. He proposed to introduce a Bill to establish ministerial responsibility, and to reserve it for the Queen's decision; to deal in like manner with Bills empowering the General Assembly to transfer to the Provincial Legislatures its own powers with regard to waste lands; and to bestow an elective character on the Legislative Council. Other measures were announced, and it was stated that until the fate of the Land Bill should be decided, Wynyard would use his authority in setting apart not less than one-third of the waste lands in each province to encourage bonâ fide occupation, allowing rebate of passage money to settlers, and giving time for payment, but holding back titles to land “for a reasonable time.”The Council, which had comported itself decorously during the session, accepted the address thankfully. The “Commons of New Zealand”no longer threatened to stop supplies if their desire for responsible government should not be gratified, but they carried an amendment on the address which compelled Mr. Forsaith and his friends to retire two days after accepting office. The address, passed by 22 votes against 11, condemned “a mixed Executive”as utterly bad.

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Many members wished to return to their southern homes, and all were willing to vote supplies to the existing Executive Government, trusting that Wynyard and the Home Government would enfranchise them speedily. They promised to devote themselves to work, and kept their promise. They adopted (2nd September) an address to the Queen, praying that the necessary law for establishing responsible Government might be assented to. A fortnight afterwards thirteen Bills had been passed. A Waste Lands Act confirmed existing regulations and enabled Superintendents and Provincial Councils to recommend to the Governor any regulations for sale, letting, disposal, and occupation of Crown lands, proclamation by the Governor being sufficient to give them effect. A provincial Waste Lands Act declared it expedient that in each province there should be local control over waste lands, and provided that, subject to the Constitution Act, it should be lawful for the General Assembly to empower Superintendents and Provincial Councils to make laws to regulate the lands. The administration of revenue from lands was relegated to the Superintendents and Provincial Councils. The Act was not to go into operation until the royal assent should be notified. By a despatch from the Secretary of State, 15th April, 1855, that assent was conveyed. Even the opponents of Gibbon Wakefield admitted that he had taught them parliamentary government. The failures of Fitzgerald and Forsaith did not teach their supporters modesty. They vaunted that no Australian legislature had equalled that of New Zealand in ability; and knew not that it was by the labour of years that Wentworth, the champion of another colony, had wrought out for them and others the constitutional changes which they so strangely abused. Mr. Fitzgerald's principal achievement had been styling himself Prime Minister for little more than two months; Mr. Sewell's title to distinction was a personal assault committed upon a representative member in the hall of deliberation.

A sense of duty to his Queen had preserved Wynyard from disgrace as it has preserved so many English soldiers who make no such high-flown pretensions as were made by the civilians gathered at Auckland in 1854. Swainson was wise enough to keep him from error, and was firm as a rock to duty, though

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ready to sacrifice his personal claims. Mere wisdom indeed the Governor could obtain from Gibbon Wakefield's promptings; but though all admitted that fact, no one proposed that Wake-field should be Minister himself; and an ambiguous position is never held in high regard. Mr. Weld, in an address to the electors of the Wairau (November, 1854), bitterly complained that Gibbon Wakefield had insidiously at first, and afterwards openly, devoted his “great fund of information and his activity and energy”to thwarting the “responsible-government party.”

A constitutional question between the two Houses was mooted but not discussed. The Appropriation Bill reached the Council on the 15th September. The Assembly was to be prorogued on the 16th. There was in the Constitution Act no restriction upon the Council as to the right to amend Money Bills, but it was understood that the Assembly would dispute it. The Council, to avert conflict, requested Wynyard to obtain an authoritative decision from England as to its constitutional rights. He applied for it, but the Duke of Newcastle did not answer his despatches. Overtasked by the care of the colonies and the anxieties of the Crimean war, he had handed over the Colonial Office to Sir George Grey,¹ who had in former years been Under-Secretary there. The new Secretary answered in one letter, on the 8th December, six of Wynyard's despatches, which contained the careful opinion of Mr. Swainson on the changes which Wynyard was asked to make. Appealed to by a senior military officer accidentally confronted by constitutional problems, Sir George Grey replied in a manner which proved that reference could not have been made to a more unworthy arbitrator. There was not one word in the Constitution to provide for the establishment of responsible government. Not one word on the subject had been said in debate on the Constitution Act of 1852. Speeches must not be called in to construe a statute, but silence in this case is amply confirmed by the silence of the statute. Responsible government not being contemplated, there was no provision for vacation of seats of placemen, so that their constituents might ratify or condemn

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their assumption of paid office. Moreover, the duties imposed by the Constitution upon the Governor with regard to Maori affairs were utterly incompatible with responsible government in the full sense of the term. It might have been difficult for the Secretary of State to induce Parliament to alter radically a Constitution so recently framed. Even if the House of Commons should, by want of care or by connivance, sanction changes tending to disorder or breach of faith, it was not probable that Earl Derby, the Rupert of debate, would fail to put lance in rest against any proposals which would remit the Maori race to the harsh injustice of the inheritors of that New Zealand Company which he smote so sorely in 1843, and many of whose former servants were prominent in the colony. The Secretary of State became the cutpurse of the Constitution which he could not hope to mutilate by law. Many of his supporters were tainted with the vice which shrunk abashed from Lord Stanley in 1843. The Ministry was in dire distress. It required votes. Parliament, prorogued in August, had been convened for a special session on the 12th December, 1854. Lord John Russell was at his wits' end, and anxious to flee from a sinking ship.¹ The country rang with complaints against the inefficiency of its rulers, who left an army to die of disease or starve before Sebastopol in a place more like a quagmire than a military camp. On the 8th December, having received Wynyard's despatches on the 5th, and (so far as can be traced) unrestrained by his colleagues (Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Earl Granville, the Duke of Newcastle, the Duke of Argyll, Mr. Gladstone, and Sir William Molesworth)—Sir George Grey penned a despatch which was the first step to the abandonment by the Crown of the duties solemnly undertaken in the treaty of Waitangi and renewed in the Constitution Act of 1852. He paid no heed to Swainson's wise opinion. He took “the earliest opportunity”to state that Her Majesty's Government had “no objection whatever to offer to the establishment of the system known as responsible government in New Zealand.”No legis-

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lation would be required. The Imperial Government had no “desire to propose terms or lay down restrictions… except that of which the necessity appeared to be fully recognized by the General Assembly, namely, the making provision for certain officers who have accepted offices on the equitable understanding of their permanence.”On this understanding there would be “no occasion for further reference to the Home Government,”before carrying into effect the proposed changes, and “satisfying the wishes of the community.”Rightly indeed did he desire to observe good faith in smaller things, but the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith, he discarded. He said not a word about the Maoris and their Queen, and his despatch was gloated over by those who had hardly dared to hope that the rapacity of the New Zealand Company's settlers would be glutted by command of the Imperial Government,¹ while Mr. Gladstone was a member of the Cabinet.

Sir George Grey furnished no advice to the soldier-governor as to the introduction of responsible government. It rested on no written law, he said, but on usage in England. Unless there were “local laws”(in New Zealand) “which would be repugnant to the new system, legislation seems uncalled for except for the very simple purpose of securing their pensions to retiring officers.”Nevertheless, he was glad that the “ordinary and most satisfactory course of referring the question of responsible government to Her Majesty for complete adjustment had been adopted.”He remarked that rendering the Legislative Council elective was beyond the power of the General Assembly, and condemned a plan suggested in Wynyard's message to the Houses on the 31st August, by which if the existing Superintendents and Provincial Councils should not represent the wish of their constituents on the land question, the people should

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“exercise their right of choosing afresh their representatives.”(If the majority should decide in any province against re-election, the transfer of powers over the land was to have been made to the existing Superintendent and Council.) By some strange misprision the Secretary of State called this plan “the foundation of a new federal convention (apart from the General Assembly) which would be an innovation irreconcilable with the existing fundamental law.”He appeared to think that the representatives “chosen afresh”would act while their dismissed predecessors were in being. A new Governor would shortly proceed to New Zealand armed with the wisdom of the Colonial Office; and meantime Wynyard was to “act on the present instructions.”In reply to the question about the constitutional right of the Legislative Council to alter Money Bills, Sir George Grey gave an opinion in 1855. Although the Constitution Act was silent on the point he thought the English analogy ought to prevail, the reason being that the Upper House was not elected by the people. Before he was superseded Wynyard displayed prudence of which his successor was found incapable. The rapacity of the settlers at Taranaki led the Maoris to form a league against sales of land to Europeans.

When Governor Fitzroy found it necessary to examine and to disallow Spain's award in 1844, he endeavoured vainly to purchase from a chief named Katatore two blocks, viz. the Mangoraka and Waiongona, and afterwards offered to some of the settlers (who had been improperly located by the company on native lands) allotments in other parts of the colony. The settlers, unwilling to believe that they would in the end fail to embroil their country, and wrest the coveted lands from the Maori owners, were loth to depart. Like their unprincipled representatives in London, they hoped that the eye of the law would not scrutinize their position. The treaty of Waitangi was by them no more regarded than by Mr. Somes. The Taranaki creed was as bold and false as his. The pretences of some were accepted as truth by others. In what purports to be a history it has been recorded that “there are strong grounds for believing that the company's claims ought never to have been brought into Mr. Spain's Court.”¹

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The company's local agent, Wicksteed, was in such pecuniary straits in 1844 that he was fain to accept terms which he represented to his principal as unjustifiable.

The block allotted by Fitzroy was occupied. Settlers were removed from all native lands except such as might be parted with fairly by their owners. Fitzroy arranged that the native reserves within the European block should be placed at the company's disposal; the Crown right of pre-emption was waived in favour of the company over a circumjacent tract of about 60,000 acres; and the Crown was pledged to advance funds from time to time (on security) to enable the company to buy lands therein. Wicksteed had no money, and Fitzroy accepted for the Government certain boats and stores for which he paid £382. The needy company only paid their own labourers by means of the Government dole. Some of the settlers remained on sufferance at the Puketapu block, but eventually retired, or were driven to the Fitzroy block.

To this state of affairs succeeded Sir George Grey's endeavour to supersede Fitzroy's decision, under Mr. Gladstone's instruction, that it was “hardly probable”that that decision was “just or wise.”How Donald McLean prevaricated with Te Rangitake in striving to please Governor Grey, who, in order to please others, prevaricated with justice, and violated the pledges of Fitzroy, has been told already. A letter from McLean in October, 1849, summed up his doings thus:—The existing conveyances were: No. 1, November, 1844, of the Fitzroy block; No. 2, May, 1848, of a block (about 4000 acres bought for less than £200) at Tataraimaka; No. 3, August, 1847, of the Omata block, of 12,000 acres; No. 4, October, 1847, of residents' rights in the Grey block, of 9770 acres; No. 5, April, 1848, of rights of certain absentee Ngatiawas at Wellington and Cook's Straits in the Fitzroy and Grey blocks respectively; No. 6, by certain Puketapu natives, conveying lands occupied by a settler near the Hua; No. 7, November, 1848, of 1500 acres by Puketapu natives.

All these deeds left untouched the coveted lands at the Waitara, the abode of Te Rangitake. The gradual extension of rights of Europeans sharpened their appetites, and led to what McLean called an anti-land-selling league. Archdeacon

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Hadfield, however, wrote (Oct. 1860) “There is no such league and there never has been any such league.”Kata-tore led the majority, who opposed sales. Rawiri headed the malcontent minority. Maori common rights of course forbade a sale while any dissentient remained; but evil seemed good in the eyes of the settlers. Yielding to the ethics of his neighbours, one Cooper, Land Commissioner of the Taranaki district, in 1854, in spite of Katatore's well-known opposition, accepted an offer made by Rawiri to sell land. The probable result was not more doubtful than the intention to produce it. Rawiri went with an armed force to mark the boundaries. Katatore warned him to stay his hand. To prove his determination he sent Rawiri a gun to defend himself with, saying he would fight to the death rather than part with his rights. Rawiri persisted. Katatore fired one shot in the air, and another into the ground as a final signal that he would fight. If Rawiri's men had then sat down there would have been peace; but they rushed to battle. Katatore shot Paora and Rawiri as they advanced. Six fell, and more were wounded. Katatore drew off his successful men. The settlers, considering that the wounded Rawiri was serving their cause when he fell, removed him to the hospital, but he died after three days. The Maoris prepared for further strife amongst themselves, and the settlers invited the Acting Governor, Wynyard, to “execute the law against the murderers.”¹

The narratives of the combatants agreed as to the facts stated, and Wynyard declined to proceed against Katatore in the manner required. Arama Karaka took Rawiri's place, and there was further homicide. The immediate provocation was an act of adultery. The aggrieved husband Ihaia, a friend of Rawiri, directed a young man to shoot the offender, and was obeyed. There was more fighting and loss of life. Strife threatened to become chronic; and, to guard the settlers, Wynyard sent troops and guns to Taranaki. The pah of Ihaia was captured, and the destruction of his friends was only averted by the arrival of Arama Karaka, and by friendly settlers who supplied him with ammunition. Thus early did the settlers make common cause with Ihaia and his friends, through

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whose agency they were to bring about the great war of 1860, and the greater war, its resultant, in 1863.¹

Wynyard visited Taranaki, and strove to make peace. He reported that there were several causes of quarrel: Rawiri's death at the hand of Katatore, the enemy of land-selling; the seduction of Ihaia's wife; the killing of the seducer, and insults offered by Ihaia to the bodies of men slain in fight. Ihaia had disinterred and fired shots at the dead. Arama Karaka plainly told Wynyard that he would persevere in fighting, and that as the quarrels had nothing to do with Europeans, they should be directed not to interfere. Wynyard wrote that the feud “must be watched with care, as the connection of the contending tribes extends far north and south, and may, if neglected, sooner or later lead to a state of things such as Sir G. Grey prognosticated when applying for pensioners to be located”at Taranaki. For himself he accepted the neutral position marked out by the Maoris. He wrote, however, to Te Rangitake, urging him to prevent molestation of the English. The chief responded: “Yes, our father, we will guard against all evil to the Pakeha… I will go into the midst of them, and the evil shall fall on me.”But Te Rangitake was to discover that amongst those whom he was prepared to protect there were intriguers against himself.

When Major Nugent, 58th Regiment, arrived at Taranaki with a detachment in August, 1855, the presence of a military force made writers in a Taranaki newspaper suggest that Te Rangitake should be driven from the Waitara. A Wesleyan missionary, Mr. Turton, sympathized with Rawiri's friends who were Wesleyans. Te Rangitake, as a member of the Church of England, was deemed a friend of the Bishop. Their chief pastors were united in preaching peace. The Waitara natives being disturbed by reports in August that the troops were about to attack them, Major Nugent went to the Waitara to disabuse their minds. He reported that the presence of the Bishop “had considerable influence in reassuring the natives.”One of the

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chiefs stated the rumours they had heard, and “Te Rangitake, the principal chief of the Waitara, spoke”thus: “A report was brought to us that the soldiers were about to capture myself and Katatore by lying in ambush for us. We began to be afraid, and decided to build a pah in the bush. I thought the Governor's letters were very kind. Why does he deceive me in this way? Does he want to seize me like Rauparaha, and enslave my children? If the Governor wishes to commence a war with us, he should do it honourably, and fight us by day and by night, that it may be a battle, and not murder.”… He was friendly to the Pakehas still, and would protect them; but if they tried to shed his blood he would stand in his own defence.… “The thoughts of the Superintendent and Provincial Council are bad towards us. It is the land; but they will not have it while this feud lasts. That subject must be discussed quietly when the Puketapus have settled their matter. At present no land will be sold. Bishop, when you go back to Auckland give my love to the Governor. Tell him that I will not deceive him.…”The chief had reason for suspicion. The Superintendent and Council at Taranaki were beseeching the Government (May, 1855) to send troops thither. They declared that the predominance of the Maori, which had stunted “the growth, was threatening the existence, of the settlement.”“The land question was the real basis of the native parties.”Rawiri and his followers were about to cut the boundary line of land he was offering “to Government, with the sanction of the resident Land Purchase Commissioner, when he was shot by Katatore, who claimed an interest in the land and opposed the sale.”… “Troops were necessary for the personal safety of the settlers.”When Wynyard brought before the General Assembly the need of military protection at Taranaki, the House of Representatives declined to appropriate money even for the erection of barracks, because “all power of exercising constitutional control over the Executive of Government has not yet been conceded to the Legislature.”Under these circumstances Wynyard applied to the military authorities, “in order that the charges already incurred might be as soon as possible transferred from the estimates of the colony.”

Bishop Selwyn's presence was occasioned by a special request

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of the Acting Governor, that influence might be exerted to stay bloodshed. Prompt as of old, the Bishop, with Archdeacon Abraham, and a Maori clergyman, Rota Waitoa, travelled overland on foot. The Archdeacon described their reception. “Te Rangitake's fine handsome face, and iron-grey hair, and his giant form of six feet three inches, with breadth in proportion, certainly gave one the idea of a warrior chieftain.”¹ At daylight he paid salutations at the Bishop's tent, and breakfasted with him. The Bishop proceeded afterwards to Katatore's pah, where about a hundred men sat down to hear the visitor. Katatore, a small “cunning-looking”man, told his story. When he described the shooting of Rawiri, the Bishop interjected, “So, then, you killed an unarmed man² in cold blood for the matter of land?”— “Yes.”“Then you repeated the act of Cain towards Abel, and, in the sight of God and man, are a murderer.”Katatore started up in wrath, but the Bishop repeated his words, and Katatore, muttering ominously, left the assemblage which appeared more attentive to the Bishop than to him. This was on the 15th August. Rangitake “did not wish to take part in the quarrel between Katatore and Arama Karaka,”but the latter had lately encroached and aroused suspicions as to his intention to “sell land to the Pakeha.”On the 31st, at a meeting where Major Nugent was present, an oration by the Bishop concluded by a quotation from a Maori poet seemed to win the Maori hearts, which had been already pacified by a letter from the Acting Governor to Te Rangitake, promising that the Government would not interfere in intertribal quarrels.

The Taranaki settlers were furious against the Bishop. A newspaper (22nd August) railed at him in these terms: “Bishop Selwyn is again lending his blighting influence to New Zealand —has again taken the murderer by the hand, as he did the perpetrators of the Wairau massacre—a murderer who is without the excuse of those at Wairau, viz. that of being first fired upon.… It is reserved for the Bishop to use his undoubted

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influence to shield notorious criminals from justice, when those criminals appeal to his sympathies through the medium of a dark skin.”

Such language was acceptable to readers amongst whom the Atkinsons and the Richmonds were about to become notorious by plunging the colony into unjust war. The Bishop did not answer these attacks directly; but, in a pastoral letter to the members of his church at Taranaki, he uttered solemn warnings. He had not spoken of the murder of Rawiri except “to condemn it in the strongest language, even in the presence of the murderer.… It is strange indeed that your advisers in the local newspapers, who dwell so much upon the sixth commandment, should forget altogether that the same law has said, ‘Thou shalt not covet.’ They may disguise it to their own consciences, but it is my duty, as a minister of the law and of the gospel, to lift up my voice against the publication of opinions which would lead on to the sin of murder as the direct consequence of the sin of covetousness. I offer to my countrymen my best assistance and influence with the native people in all their just and lawful desires, but I have no fellowship with covetousness, which Ahab found to be the first step to blood-guiltiness… I cannot remain silent while opinions are being expressed, which if you prove to be the stronger would destroy the New Zealanders, or if you be found the weaker, would destroy yourselves.”

The Maoris at Taranaki had sold 30,000 acres at tenpence an acre. “Nothing is more easy than to extinguish the native title; nothing will be more difficult than to extinguish a native war.”Te Rangitake, he was confident, had no ill-will to the English, and ought not to be “forced into a position of hostility by their suspicions and their threats.”He would urge the Maoris to sell land amicably, but he would resist by all lawful means every attempt to carry out any other interpretation of the treaty of Waitangi than that in which it was explained to the natives by Governor Hobson, and understood and accepted by them.”The Bishop's words were good; but so long as the Bishop might assert the claims of justice, so long would he have enemies among men quartered upon Taranaki by the frauds of the New Zealand Company and the folly of Lord John Russell,

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in defiance of the sagacity and resolution of Gipps, and the honesty of Hobson.

A new Governor, Colonel Gore Browne, assumed office in September, 1855, and he visited Taranaki forthwith: it is convenient to record the opinion he then formed. He had previously written from Auckland that the colony would sustain great loss if Major Nugent should be withdrawn with departing troops. That officer knew the Maori language, and to his conduct and discretion was due the satisfactory condition of Taranaki. Colonel Browne, like his predecessors, promptly pledged himself to act honourably towards the Maoris. He wrote (20th September, 1855) to Lord John Russell: “Different despatches will have satisfied your Lordship that I have given the strongest assurances of protection in all their rights to the Maoris, and that I have declared my determination neither to interfere in native questions, nor to permit the purchase of lands until the owners are united in desiring to sell them, and have agreed upon the terms.”He speedily visited Taranaki, where he held a levée in October, 1855, but neither Katatore nor Te Rangitake attended it. The native feud still raged, and neither of them cared to ask for safe-conduct to the levée, which was, nevertheless, well attended by Maoris and settlers. The Governor directed that militia should be embodied, but at the earnest request of the Provincial Superintendent and of the Land Commissioner did not reduce the military garrison. He told the Secretary of State that the warfare between the followers of Katatore and his opponents had been injudiciously aggravated by a Wesleyan missionary, a friend of Rawiri. He also “disapproved of the conduct of Cooper, the sub-commissioner, in commencing a survey of land before he was assured that all who had even a disputed title desired it should be sold.”It would have been well if he had continued in such a frame of mind. A careful letter from the Rev. J. F. Riemenschreider, a Wesleyan missionary, ought to have warned him of the thorns on which he stood. It proves that even in 1855 the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki tribes sagaciously forecast the course of events; and it is melancholy to think that their suspicions were confirmed by the conduct of Colonel Browne. Mr. Riemenschreider apprised him that the Taranaki natives as well as Te Rangitake's own

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tribe, the Ngatiawa, looked upon that chief as “the real and true chief of Waitara.”Neither the efforts of Mr. Riemenschreider, nor the joint labours of Major Nugent and Donald McLean, could allay the feud between Katatore and Arama Karaka. Old Waka Nene, the Ngapuhi chief, lent his advice in vain. He suggested that Katatore should cede land to the relatives of Rawiri as reparation for his loss. Old E Puni, from Wellington, who was also on the spot, failed similarly; although, as a powerful Ngatiawa chief, he might have been expected to exert some influence with Rangitake and his friends. The Wanganui chief, Hori Kingi te Anaua, wrote that his people would take no part in any quarrel at Taranaki. He was ever friendly to the English. Yet no dissuasions with the hostile chiefs prevailed. Colonel Browne wrote in November, 1855: “The native feud appears to me to be much in the same condition as before.”

Mr. Turton, the Wesleyan missionary (Browne wrote), had, by letters in newspapers and privately, not only “revived the old suspicion that the Europeans would not rest till they had slain and taken possession of that which the Maoris liken to Naboth's vineyard,”—but, emulous of an affray like that at the Wairau, had endeavoured to “bring Rawiri's widow to swear to the murder (of her husband) before the resident magistrate. This was prevented by Major Nugent, who inquired whether the magistrate intended issuing a warrant for the murderer, and if so, whether he had the means of enforcing it, adding that his own instructions forbade him acting in any manner not necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity within the European part of the province.”

Thus warned, Colonel Browne ought to have had no doubt about his duty. The significance of the opposition to landsales was undeniable, and adherents in distant places had joined it. Only by prudent avoidance of provocation could it be hoped that it would die a natural death. To play into the hands of those whose evil designs he understood in 1855 would have seemed to be the one course which could not be expected from Colonel Browne. Yet it was the course into which in less than four years he was seduced, when he had by his side as native minister, the man whom in 1855 he found clerk to the Provincial Council, and Provincial Attorney at

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Taranaki,—Mr. Christopher William Richmond. Eventually, in 1856, the native feud died out; but it was believed that sixty Maoris had been killed, and many more wounded, before a truce was made by Maori persuasion. The warfare incommoded, but did not include, the settlers. For months the Bell block and the Puketapu district were disturbed by bands of Maoris going gaily to shoot their enemies morning after morning. Bands of the Ngatiruanui, aided by Katatore and patronized by Te Rangitake, annoyed Arama Karaka, Ihaia, and their friends; and though no Englishmen were injured, skirmishes took place near their homesteads. It was a relief to all when the land had rest in 1856. The military officer in charge, the Governor, and Colonel Wynyard reported that the peace was definitive, and Mr. Labouchere at the Colonial Office congratulated Colonel Browne on the prudent measures adopted by the civil and military authorities, and on their satisfactory result. ¹9086

It is time to recur to the general condition of the colony. An earthquake early in 1855 added terrors to the difficulties of colonization. Felt even at Auckland and Otago, it was, like its predecessor of 1848, most severe on each side of Cook's Straits. White Island had a bad pre-eminence; a fresh cone rose from Tongariro; and some settlers doubted whether colonization was desirable at the risks surrounding it in New Zealand. But crowds cannot yield to impulses which require months to ripen them into action. The sale of landed property, the gathering of household chattels, the disruption of existing ties, are always painful, and to find purchasers would have been almost impossible if the necessity to sell were felt to arise from the dangers of residence. Wynyard summoned the General Assembly in August, 1855, but only the members from Auckland and Taranaki attended in strength. Two from Nelson, two from Wellington, and the notable Mr. Sewell from Canterbury, represented their constituents, and heard Wynyard declare that the Home Government offered no objection to the responsible government so hotly pursued in 1854. Pensions were to be provided for the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Treasurer, but Downing Street dispensed with legislation to introduce responsible government, and in anticipation of

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passing his estimates and a Pension Bill, Wynyard made known his intention to dissolve the elected House, so that from their successors, chosen for the purpose, a responsible ministry might be created. The members declined to advise on the disturbed state of Taranaki, pleading that constitutional control had not yet been conceded to them. It may seem strange that they selected Mr. Sewell as their leader, but it is by no means strange that under his guidance they declined to pass a Pensions Bill, on the ground that it was improper to pay a price before receiving what they wanted to buy. They passed only three Bills besides the Appropriation Bill, and the new Governor, Colonel Thomas Gore Browne, a soldier of the campaign in Affghanistan in 1842, arrived in September, in time to give the royal assent to the Bills and to dissolve the House on the 15th September, announcing that he, influenced like his predecessor, intended to govern through responsible advisers. He would also maintain inviolate the right of the Maoris to their land. He told the Secretary of State that a dissolution was recommended by his advisers as “almost imperative in consequence of the number of seats vacated—fifteen.”It was inconvenient for colonists to sail from southern homes to Auckland, and legislation was only possible by friendly compromise, for of the remaining members it was only necessary for a few to quit the Chamber in order to destroy a quorum. The Governor had interviews with Maori chiefs, and the aged Waka Nene told him that they wished New Zealand to remain under English laws. “These were my words to the first Governor, and they continue unchanged up to the present time.”¹ Colonel Browne reported that the Maoris did not view the General Assembly very favourably, partly because they did not understand its powers, and partly because they believed it to be less scrupulous than the Queen's representative in obtaining land. He required more military force. Wynyard, as commander of the troops, agreed with him. At least 1600

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soldiers were wanted, and a man-of-war must be attendant on the coast. After reporting his opinion, the Governor made a tour through the islands, and found signs of prosperity from the Bay of Islands to Otago. The general revenue was elastic; that derived from land sales was steady. Although the exceptionally large receipts in 1854, arising from Governor Grey's recent land regulations, were not maintained, there was evidently an increasing average demand.

On the 15th of April the Governor convened the General Assembly at Auckland. Some former members were not there. Gibbon Wakefield, being ill, was absent. The same Speaker was chosen (Clifford). Swainson being absent on leave, the obstacle to which Mr. Weld and his friends attributed their defeat in 1854 was removed. The Governor entrusted Mr. Sewell with the formation of a ministry. Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Weld were not at Auckland. Mr. Sewell associated with himself Messrs. F. Whitaker, F. D. Bell, and H. J. Tancred. They were formally to accept office on the passing of a Bill granting pensions to the former officials, Sinclair, Swainson, and Shepherd. On imperial subjects, including relations with the Maori race, the Governor was to hear his advisers; reserving power to act on his own opinions pending a reference to England. On all matters under control of the Assembly he would be guided by advice, whether agreeing with it or not. These terms, with certain interpretations, were agreed to. Mr. Sewell explained the position to the House, approving the reservation of Maori questions, because they involved peace or war. The Pensions Bill was vigorously debated. It was desired to limit the pensions to half the amount of the salaries, but the Governor announced that he would only give the royal assent if two-thirds of the salaries were settled as pensions. A remnant of the former opposition murmured that charges for malpractice as to land regulations and defalcation could be established against the retiring officials. The Governor declared, that if furnished with proof, he would at once recommend to the Secretary of State a summary dismissal without pension for an offender. Committees, after careful inquiry, entirely exonerated the several officers. The Pensions Bill was assented to on the 7th May, and on the same day Mr. Sewell became Colonial

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Secretary; Mr. F. Whitaker, Attorney-General; and Mr. F. D. Bell, Colonial Treasurer.

On the threshold of office the new minister met a difficulty which was to distract the colony for a generation. He was called a Centralist, or an advocate of united government. He was opposed by Provincialists, or champions of provincial liberties, amongst whom Dr. Featherston, the Provincial Superintendent of Wellington, was conspicuous. After an adverse vote, carried by Dr. Campbell of Auckland, early in May, Mr. Sewell tendered his resignation; and Dr. Campbell and Dr. Featherston, successively applied to by the Governor, declined to take office. Mr. Sewell was then encountered by Mr. Fox, who, after his unsuccessful mission to England, was ill-pleased to see Mr. F. D. Bell promoted to the office of Treasurer. Mr. Bell's success in disproving Mr. Fox's charges was undoubted. Mr. Fox based his antagonism on public grounds. He carried resolutions (14th May), long celebrated as “the compact of 1856.”

Each province was to retain not less than two-thirds of its net Customs revenues, and while so retaining them, should hand to the Central Treasury only half-a-crown for each acre of land sold within it. The control of the General Assembly over provincial legislation was neither to be “extended nor limited.”Mr. Sewell, after vainly opposing these and other propositions as usurpations by the provinces of the powers of the general government, resigned upon a vote of want of confidence carried by Mr. Fox, who mounted fairly into the saddle of responsibility on the 20th May, 1856, as Attorney-General. He was also Premier, and intended after a short session to prorogue, in order to mature his measures for the session of 1857. His associates were Messrs. Hall, Brown, and Daldy in one House, and Mr. Richardson in the other. But the House gave him short shrift.¹ Mr. Stafford moved a vote of want of confidence. Fresh members had appeared on the scene after Mr. Fox's resolutions defeated Mr. Sewell, and though only in a minority of one he was outvoted at once. The resolutions which he had carried

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before taking office were not destined to disappear with his fall. At last Governor Browne procured a Ministry, formed by Mr. E. W. Stafford, Superintendent at Nelson; Mr. Whitaker was Attorney-General, Mr. C. W. Richmond was Colonial Secretary. Mr. Stafford became an Executive Councillor, but did not accept an office of profit until the following November. The three members who held offices of profit were practising lawyers. Mr. Sewell became Treasurer, and the Ministry proposed through him a Loan Bill. Dr. Featherston vainly resisted the scheme by moving that the land fund ought to contribute to the general government, and that the fortunes of the provinces themselves ought not to depend on a revenue so uncertain as that derived from land. He was defeated by 24 votes against 10. By the Government scheme £500,000 were to be raised as a charge on the general revenue of New Zealand, to be applied as the Lords of the Treasury might direct. The objects were—with £200,000 to discharge the debt due to the New Zealand Company, and repay such sums as the province of Auckland had paid towards its liquidation; with £120,000 to pay any public debt due on the 1st January, 1858; and with £180,000 to extinguish the rights of the Maoris in the Northern Island. The lands were to be provincially managed, and in the spirit of “the compact of 1856,”the land fund was to be the provincial revenue.

There is something captivating to young legislators in contracting debt, and the Loan Bill (assented to on the 7th August) had the reputation of securing Mr. Stafford and Mr. Sewell in their positions. Thirty-five other Acts were passed. A Waste Lands Act was the most important. Superintendents and Provincial Councils might make land laws, the Bills being “reserved for the signification of the Governor's pleasure there-on.”The Governor might, nevertheless, fulfil all promises he had made, and could except from sale land required for military defence, roads, or public buildings; and no land acquired from the Maoris after the passing of the Act could be offered for sale till the Governor had proclaimed that the native title was extinguished. A Native Reserves Bill vexed the Governor and his advisers. As introduced it preserved his position of freedom. A clause (18th) added subsequently, provided that every act

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done under it should be “only with the advice and consent of the Executive Council.”Either the insidious astuteness of the Attorney-General and Mr. Richmond thus early developed itself in weaving nets to entrap the Governor and make him a co-agent in defrauding the Maoris, or the possession of power had warped the minds of the Ministry, and they cast behind them their pledge that on native questions the Governor should be free from their control. Reluctantly the Governor consented to the addition of the clause. When it reached the Legislative Council it was seen to be in danger. Major Richmond, who had been Superintendent of New Munster, was in the Council He and three others protested against the passing of the Bill. They forwarded their protest to the Governor with an address, declaring that they viewed with apprehension the future relations with the Maoris, “seeing that the first act of legislation presented to us upon native affairs is, in our opinion, a direct violation of the arrangement made with your Excellency and your responsible advisers upon your granting responsible government; in contravention of the Royal Instructions, and an infringement of the Constitution Act.”They pointed out that the obnoxious clause had only been carried in the Council by the Speaker's casting vote. The Ministry, through the Colonial Secretary, Mr. C. W. Richmond, adhered to their position. They averred, illogically, that “they had no desire to trespass on the rule”respecting native affairs. The House of Representatives was unanimous, and it was improper for a minority in the Council to arrest the measure. The Ministry “strongly advised”the Governor to “assent to the Bill, and not to reserve it for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure.”

In a weak moment, of which Sir George Grey might have been found incapable, and from which Wynyard's sense of duty had preserved him, the Governor offered to assent to the Bill, on the understanding that the protest, address, and the minute of his advisers should be forwarded to England with the Bill. The offer was “respectfully accepted”by his advisers. Mr. Labouchere, the Secretary of State, vied with the Governor in ineptitude. He said that the clause was certainly opposed to the principle on which it had been agreed that native affairs should be managed; but in the hope that the Governor would

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be able to make opposite principles harmonize, the assent given by the Governor would not be over-ruled. The danger invited by such a ruling was swift to come. The body which has made one unlawful stride to power will make another, not the less surely because in the first instance it protested that it “had no desire to trespass”on the rule of right. Mr. Swainson, in a work published in 1859, uttered forebodings as to the impolicy and injustice of leaving the Governor responsible for native affairs without providing him with means. He hinted that it might have been well to withhold responsible government, at least for a time. Another New Zealand legislator (Mr. Cracroft Wilson) bluntly declared that it was a mad thing to confer such a government on a country, where all the landed gentry were savages, and most of them cannibals. A friend of Mr. Stafford's government boasted that the Native Reserves Act was an important step to “extricate the Maoris from tribal barbarism.”It was, in fact, an impeachment of their guaranteed rights, and well known so to be by those who framed it. A Land Claims Settlement Act was passed after the subject had been reported upon by a select committee of the representatives. Without comment upon its principles, Colonel Browne sent the Act and the report of the committee to England, and the Secretary of State was as succinct in announcing the Queen's approval. Land Claims Commissioners were to be empowered to deal with all claims arising before or after the establishment of British sovereignty in the colony, under the limitation that any claim not notified to the Government before the passing of the Act should not be entertained. Claims already made were to lapse if not brought under the Act within two years. The undecided residues of old land claims (anterior to 1840), of pre-emption waiver claims, ten shillings an acre proclamation claims, and penny an acre claims, were to be finally settled by a Commission appointed by the Governor, which was to have the powers of a Court of Record, and to sit in public.

The remaining Acts of the session need not be expatiated upon. Nevertheless, as indications of the points which the first responsible Ministry thought it necessary to deal with, the subjects deserve brief mention. Much time was consumed in discussing the livery to be worn by the doorkeepers in the

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Chamber. Privilege of Parliament; increase of the Governor's salary; winding up of the New Zealand Bank of Issue; adoption of certain English statutes relating to evidence and to the law of debtor and creditor; Savings' Bank and Trust Acts; extension of powers of Provincial Councils, so that they might deal with cases not exceeding £20, and with penalties of £100 or six months imprisonment; Marriage; Customs laws; Supreme Court Procedure; division into counties; Friendly Societies; local postage; giving Scotch law practitioners power to practise in New Zealand Courts; giving validity to certain provincial laws, land orders and scrip, were the staple of the session's labours. The last Act defined the extent to which land orders issued in old time were to be available. An order of the defunct New Zealand Company for fifty acres at New Plymouth, gave priority to the holder over lands declared open for purchase, to extent of one acre of town, twelve and a half of suburban, and fifty acres of rural land, at the holder's option. There were undisposed of, in Auckland, 219,000 acres; Wellington, 3,000,000 acres; Taranaki (New Plymouth), 25,000 acres; Nelson, 14,000,000 acres; Canterbury, 9,000,000 acres; Otago, 15,000,000 acres.

The second reading of a Native Offenders Bill, introduced by Mr. Stafford in July, was carried by 13 votes against 7. It was referred, on the motion of Mr. Sewell, to a select committee, which reported that the unusual powers embodied in the Bill were not demanded by past events, but that in a modified form it might be expedient to arm the Governor with power, with the advice of his Council, to test the proposed plan of proscribing districts in which native offenders might be harboured. Donald McLean and many Maori chiefs gave evidence before the committee. Mr. Fenton, then Native Secretary, and Major Nugent, approved of the Bill, but the latter saw danger of retaliation by the natives. The law should be temporary, and only put in force “after mature consideration.”One witness thought the Bill “very objectionable.”It enabled the Governor not only to proscribe districts, but to seize vessels and property. It would cause open revolt, which would combine “friends, relations, and allies.”When Mr. Sewell moved the committal of the Bill, Mr. Fox

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endeavoured to postpone it for six months. Mr. Fox did not succeed, but eventually the Bill was dropped. Soon afterwards resolutions were carried which recommended that during the recess the Ministry should devise schemes for the government of the Maoris, and that all departments should be under the control of responsible Ministers, subject to the accepted rule that the Governor had the option of not acting on advice tendered upon Maori affairs. It would seem that the Governor had qualms with regard to native affairs when sanctioning the 18th clause of the Natives Reserves Bill. Within a week he issued circulars (31st July, 1856) to Colonel Wynyard, Major Richmond, Major Nugent (58th Regiment); Mr. Busby, the first British Resident; Baron de Thierry; to Mr. F. E. Maning;¹ to other old settlers; to the Bishop of New Zealand; to missionaries, many of whom had been on the spot more than twenty years; and to Mr. Donald McLean. He wished to quote their opinions to the Secretary of State. 1. Could the management of native affairs be entrusted to responsible advisers liable to be changed on political grounds; the Governor reserving a veto, and a recommendation in reference to expenditure? 2. “Would any ill effect result from the participated responsibility involved in such a change in the system of administering native affairs?”3. Ought the entire management to be vested in the Queen's representative? Colonel Wynyard, Major Richmond, Major Nugent, Busby, Clarke (the late Chief Protector), Baron de Thierry, and others, were emphatic in urging that the Governor should retain control. The Bishop of New Zealand; missionaries, whether of the Church of England or Wesleyan; the Roman Catholic Bishop of Auckland, gave the same advice. The Pakeha Maori, Mr. Maning, was distinct and positive in like manner; so was Mr. Donald McLean. Even Mr. Turton, the friend of Ihaia, was opposed to the project of weakening the Governor's hands. There were only two notes of approval, qualified by requirements that the natives must first be officially informed of their constitutional rights and become electors, and that the colonial exchequer should defray military expenditure if the troops should be employed against the Maoris. There was virtual unanimity against change.

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But Mr. Stafford and his colleagues were not idle. The wily Whitaker and the pervicacious Richmond worked by sap rather than by assault. On the 11th August the representatives resolved that, not seeking at present to disturb the existing “relations between the Governor and his advisers as to the management of native affairs (pending reference to the Home Government), “it would greatly conduce to peace and good government”if all departments were placed under control of the Governor's advisers, subject to the arrangement that the Governor on receiving advice might adhere to his own opinion till that of the Secretary of State might be received. When the session closed, the Ministry drew up a minute embodying the meaning of the resolution. They needed Imperial forces to support them in the quarrel they were about to provoke; and assuming that the maintenance of force by the Imperial Government was indefensible, they recognized that England should have a paramount authority in direction of native affairs. It was agreed that the Chief Commissioner for land purchases, Donald McLean, should become Native Secretary, should submit the business of the department to one of the Ministers; should be removable only with the Governor's sanction, and should have access to the Governor, with whom was to rest the final decision. It was not likely that the Maoris would remain ignorant of these arrangements. The chiefs, who were alert with regard to the House of Commons' report in 1844, watched attentively the machinations at their door.

The Governor relied much upon Donald McLean, who assured him that no doubt the Ministry would make provision for “carrying out measures for the amelioration of the native race.”But the Ministry thwarted rather than assisted. The Civil List in the Constitution guaranteed an annual provision of £7000 for native education. Mr. Fox during his short term of office wished to remove £5900 of this charge from the Civil List, but the Governor would not consent. Of the Customs revenue of £112,000 not less than £51,000 were estimated in 1856 by Mr. Fox as contributed by the Maoris, and the sale of lands by the Government yielded nearly £50,000 more. Without sanction from England the Governor would not rob the Maoris of the provision for education. Other sums were voted, but un-

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graciously. Messages from the Governor elicited no satisfactory reply from the representatives at a later date. They averred that they desired to respond with proper liberality; but recollecting that the Civil List provision for the Maoris “had been without the sanction of the House, and contrary to its wishes appropriated to objects over which it had no control,”and, larding their refusal with several sorts of reasons, they declared that the House would “fail in its duty to the country were it in the present state of the finances to place a further sum for native services upon the estimates for the year.”If they reasoned thus when panting for an Imperial guarantee for their loan,—when Mr. Sewell was about to proceed to England to urge their claims,—it was manifest that under favouring circumstances they would be transformed from beggars to dictators. They knew not at the time the views of the Home Government on control of native affairs. Mr. Labouchere, by a despatch dated 10th December, 1856, announced it thus: “Notwithstanding all the respect due to the principle of responsible government, the management of native affairs should remain for the present mainly in the hands of a Governor responsible for it to the Crown.”

While straining every nerve to bring the Maoris under the yoke of an elected House, there were not wanting proofs that leading colonists were jealous of any attempt on the part of the Maoris to share in the elections. The Superintendent at Wellington (Dr. Featherston) reported in November, 1856, that thirty-five Maoris were on the electoral roll, and that it was “solely owing to the prudence of the bearer”(of his letter) that forty-nine native claimants at Otaki had not been registered. The attempt of the Maoris (or, as was insinuated, of certain missionaries) to influence elections had excited considerable indignation throughout the province, and would occasion serious disturbance “if the plot be not at once crushed by the Government.”He suggested that the Government should so alter the electoral regulations as to defeat the scheme. It is due to Mr. Stafford to state that he deprecated any interference with registration of natives duly qualified to be electors. Suspicion engendered fear, and an attack on Auckland was dreaded. In September the matter was seriously taken up by the Govern-

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ment. Though the rumour was unfounded, the unguarded state of Auckland was admitted by all, and it was resolved that militia should be organized and 500 rifles should be imported, with 100,000 rounds of ammunition.

The Maoris were always informed as to passing events. Governor Browne, in November, visited the Rev. Robert Maunsell's school, seven miles from the mouth of the Waikato river. It was supported by a grant from the Civil List, and ninetyseven scholars of various ages were in the Governor's opinion well taught. Several chiefs told him that the Government ought not to withdraw aid from the school. They expressed unalterable attachment to the Queen, and to Browne as her representative; but “declared in the most emphatic terms that they would never recognize the Assembly in any way, speaking of it in contemptuous terms, and calling it the English Committee.”

A careful report drawn up by Dr. A. S. Thomson (58th Regiment), was transmitted by the Governor to the Secretary of State. Dr. Thomson plainly declared that in mapping out the electoral districts the Maoris had been ignored; that, unrepresented themselves, they were taxed by a Government responsible to the settlers; that Browne's reservation of native control would prove a fiction—for power would follow the purse, and injustice would be done. Either there should be Maori members in the General Assembly, or the Governor ought to have £25,000 at his disposal for Maori purposes. Dr. Thomson's ability was acknowledged, but he must have been too wise to expect that his counsel would be taken. He was a true prophet as to Governor Browne's weakness. He concluded his paper by saying that the amalgamation of the European and Maori races made it daily more probable that Gibbon's hope might be realized, and that, as a Hume had sprung from the northern savages of Caledonia, so a Maori might be the ancestor of an historian in the south. It was not surprising that suspicious Maori minds deemed self-defence necessary. Immediately after Grey's departure and the development of the pretensions of the General Assembly, or “Pakeha Committee,”which contained so many of the former enemies of their race, steps were taken to give consistency to Maori aspirations. A memorandum drawn

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up at Browne's request by his responsible advisers narrates that: “The first proposal for a separate native state under the Waikato chief Te Whero Whero, seems to have been made as far back as in 1854.”The objects of the Maori king party were various. Some of its supporters were loyal to the Queen, and desired to assist the Government in ameliorating the condition of the Maoris. Some were disloyal. Some were provoked by “a degraded portion of the newspaper press which teemed with menaces of the time when the whole Maori race would be reduced to a servile condition.”Some were prompted by doubts as to the good faith of the Europeans. Even the Stafford Government “at one time entertained a hope that the good elements in the Maori king movement might gain the ascendency, and become the means of raising the population in the social scale.”Who could blame a Maori patriot for the hope with which a grasping Ministry professed to sympathize? The selection of Te Whero Whero as king was a guarantee that the movement was not directly hostile, for the old man had been the constant friend of the English. His paramount position could be admitted without murmur, for the Waikato, though defeated by the firearms of the Ngapuhi, were perhaps the most powerful of all the tribes in the land. The league on the west coast to prohibit further land sales to Europeans, fell naturally under the protection of the Maori king, but the settlers, in their eagerness to govern, or through want of foresight, did not appreciate the importance of the Maori king or of his functions until long after the suggestion of his appointment. In one sense it might be said that the idea of a Maori kingdom preceded the English settlement. It was a project mooted in the days of Samuel Marsden to save the Maori race from degradation.

Early in 1856 the Governor appointed a Board to inquire into the land question, but neither he nor his advisers ascribed any importance to the king movement, or to the land sales prohibition league. He desired to know whether a Maori selling land “could not be made to a degree answerable for subsequent claims?”Of Major Nugent, who sat at the Board, Colonel Browne reported that “it is not easy to over-rate his ability and knowledge of native affairs.”Under these circumstances it was mischievous to make Mr. Ligar, the Surveyor-

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General, chairman of the Board, for he was conspicuous in no good sense. Evidence was taken from McLean, Bishop Selwyn, Mr. Whiteley, a Wesleyan missionary, and many others. Tamati Ngapora, the future counsellor of the Maori king, was examined. The report of the Board was that “generally there is no such thing as an individual claim, clear and independent of the tribal right,”that “each native has a right in common with the whole tribe over the disposal of the land of the tribe,”and that “the chiefs exercise an influence in the disposal of the land, but have only an individual claim like the rest of the people to particular portions.”On this head there was scarcely any difference or doubt among the witnesses, several of whom were Maoris. Rare instances to the contrary were mentioned by two or three persons. Mr. Brown, Superintendent at Taranaki, said: “I do not think that any native has a strictly individual claim to land.”Mr. Busby (formerly British Resident) emphatically stated that “the Government should decline purchasing disputed lands.”Strangest of all, considering the part he was to take at Taranaki, McLean said: “I do not think that any native has a clear individual title to land in the Northern Island.”Mr. Whiteley, after twenty-three years' residence, was equally positive. “No native has anything more than a right to individual occupation and cultivation, or locating a house on the land. If a sale is to be effected the sanction of the tribe is required.”Riwai-te-ahu said: “I consider there is no individual claim. They are all entangled or matted together—the children of our common ancestor claiming the land bequeathed to them.”The Board discovered also that as land was heritable in the female as well as in the male line, intermarriages between members of different tribes caused an involvement of titles in two tribes which it was highly dangerous to endeavour to dispose of by any rash purchase. The report was laid before the New Zealand representatives in July, 1856, and was sent to England. A chief, Hira Taiwhanga, made statements which ought to have made Browne's advisers pause if their intentions were honourable. A drunken American settler named Marsden had killed a native woman Kerara, in November, 1855. She was a Rotorua woman, but was murdered near Auckland. The man was tried and convicted, but not hanged until delay made the Maoris suspect that the woman's death

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was to be unavenged. They had demanded the surrender of the murderer as soon as his victim was buried. They asked if Englishmen thought them cattle to be slaughtered. Three hundred and seventy men went in their own vessels from Maketu to Auckland, intending to cut down the flagstaff if Marsden should not be hung. There had been meetings at Rotorua and elsewhere as well as at Auckland. Governor Browne's absence in the south delayed his decision upon the murderer's case. There were proposals to seize upon Auckland, or to retaliate by killing some European. A clergyman remonstrated against the sending to a magistrate of a violent Maori letter, threatening war against the Government. Moderate counsels prevailed, and it was determined to wait until the Governor should decide upon Marsden's case. Colonel Browne saw a letter from one chief to another, containing the ominous words: “I and my people were within a little of standing up and calling upon the whole island to join me in contending with the English for the independence of this island which has been trampled on; also on account of this murder.… Had this murderer been acquitted I should have given my voice for downright open war. As it is, the judge and the jury of twelve have consented that the man shall die, and that is satisfactory.”Chiefs with their retainers arrived in Auckland and demanded justice. Colonel Wynyard attended a conference. To the Maori mind even the trial of the murderer was a mockery, inasmuch as he had never denied his deed. On the 12th February, the man was executed: but the Governor was so impressed with the difficulties of the situation that he asssumed the responsibility of detaining the 58th Regiment, then under orders to leave New Zealand. Colonel Wynyard and the Executive Council concurred in the retention of the troops. The Stafford Ministry could only rely upon them for the coercion of the Maoris. Yet Browne, though he co-operated with his advisers, distrusted their motives. On the 14th February he wrote: “Political dissensions have been for some time and still are the bane of this colony”… “elements of discord between the races are in existence, and imprudent legislation or interference with the rights of the Maoris would fan them into a flame not easily extinguished.… I shall view with

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apprehension, and object to, any attempt to alter the provisions of the 73rd clause of the Constitution Act, or to bring the powers thereby entrusted to the Governor in any way under the control of the Assembly.”

But while the Governor was thus reasoning, his Ministry were intoxicated with power and thirsted to enlarge it. In March, 1856, he devoted a despatch to the subject. It came to his knowledge that different opinions were entertained about the 73rd clause. If his views were correct the chief Land Commissioner must take orders from the Governor alone. “If the power of interference with the natives is confided to gentlemen liable to the pressure of public opinion, and whose tenure of office is dependent on the confidence of a public assembly, it will be impossible to foresee the result.”He urgently referred the Secretary of State to Chief Justice Martin, who was returning to England, and was intimately acquainted with the subject. Mr. Labouchere scarcely rose to the necessity of the case. He dallied with it. The Palmerston Government comprised great names, although Gladstone, Graham, and Sydney Herbert had withdrawn because of the Crimean Inquiry Committee. Lord John Russell, after showing his incompetence at Vienna, had slunk from the Ministry to avoid censure; but Sir G. C. Lewis, Sir Charles Wood, Mr. Labouchere, Mr. Lowe, Sir Richard Bethell, Mr. Horsman, and others remained. The Crimean war was at an end. The Treaty of Paris was concluded before Governor Browne's despatch reached England. But other matters occupied the Ministry. Baron Rothschild and his fellow-Syrians were to be admitted into Parliament, and a new Abjuration Bill was in the Commons; Lord Granville was to go as ambassador-extraordinary to attend the coronation of the Emperor of Russia; public attention was more intent on the Rugely poisoning case and the Robson and Redpath frauds than on the fortunes of a rising colony or the fate of the Maori race; and if there was any superfluity of care for distant events it was to be expended in punishing the Chinese for seizing a piratical lorcha manned by Chinese but claiming to sail under English colours. Governor Browne was informed that “Her Majesty's Government consider that, notwithstanding all the respect due to the principle of responsible government, the

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management of native affairs should remain for the present mainly in the hands of a Governor responsible for it to the Crown.”“Until further instructions”he was to pursue his previous course. These qualifications as to scope and duration of his control were calculated to stir up the local Ministry to further encroachment on his functions. So little did Mr. Labouchere foresee the result that he did not lay the despatches on the table of the House of Commons. From April, 1854, till July, 1860, they slumbered in recesses, from which they were to be produced only when the nation was startled by a new crisis. Sir George Grey had in 1853 been deemed competent, and a listless public assumed that all must go well under Colonel Browne. For Mr. Labouchere, warned as he was by the Governor, there was no excuse.

Meanwhile the Governor, with the help of McLean, wound up some disputes (clinging to the land purchases, thought to have been finally made by Sir George Grey), and struggled for a time to resist the tendency of his advisers' opinions. What both he and they ought to have foreseen took place. In November, 1856, the District Commissioner apprised him that there was to be a great assembly of Maori chiefs at Taupo. The main object was to check the decline of the Maoris, and the principal weapon was to be an arrest of land sales to the Government. While the Commissioner wrote the Maoris worked. Te Heu Heu was the moving spirit, and he called the meeting at Taupo. A missionary at Taupo, Mr. Grace, was reported by McLean to be aiding and abetting the Maori schemes, and the Governor was moved to procure Mr. Grace's removal by the Church Missionary Society. Browne reported that Te Heu Heu's assembly separated without effecting much beyond “a declaration by certain tribes that they would not permit land to be sold to the Europeans.”But the Maori king movement may be said to have taken shape at Taupo. It was not then linked with the anti-land-selling league at Taranaki, nor did Te Rangitake ally himself with the king movement. But the object of both was the same. The “mana”of the Maori chiefs was to be carefully guarded. The collective title of the tribe was to be scrupulously respected. No sales of land by individual members of a tribe could be valid without sanction of the supreme tribal authority. That some “mana”

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existed and was recognized among the Maoris was not unknown to the English, for McLean declared before the House of Representatives, with regard to the Taranaki territory, that “on each occasion on which the Ngatiawa sold land there they sent a portion of the payment to Waikato as an acknowledgment of conquest, or of the right of ‘mana’ possessed by the Waikato chiefs as their conquerors.”The Ministry, however, were too much bent on their own aggrandisement to care for any of these things. But the Governor was ill at ease. It appeared that the more reflective Maoris were unsettled in their minds, and the impulsive could less and less be restrained. The labours of the English Committee and the Ministry were bearing fruit. Colonel Browne wrote (18th February, 1857) that it was difficult if not impossible to satisfy “views opposed to each other, as those who want land and are in no way responsible for the manner in which it is obtained, and those who, like Mr. Mantell, consider the colonial government bound to care for the interests of the natives.”

Early in 1857 the future Maori king-maker, Wiremu Tamihana Te Waharoa visited Auckland to lay the Maori grievances for the last time before the Governor. He it was who, as Tarapipipi, in 1844, peremptorily exacted restitution of property taken from settlers by Maoris returning to their homes from the great meeting at Remuera. His resolute character might have warned the Governor's advisers against lightly offending a chief so wise, so influential, and so friendly, at a time when the Maori mind was excited by suspicion and distrust. Yet Mr. Gorst distinctly records the fact that Te Waharoa was denied access to the Governor, and that McLean, the Native Secretary, refused him the common favour of a loan to enable him to erect a mill. A friend to whom he complained said that the chief must help himself. He went home, resolved to ask no more favours, and in February, 1857, sent a circular “to all Waikato,”declaring that his tribe, Ngatihaua, agreed that Potatau should be king of New Zealand. “Be speedy. You will write to the remote tribes that they may hear.”Potatau was loth to assume authority, and when he yielded claimed only the title “matua,”or father. When it was known that, thus stirred, the Maoris were to assemble at Rangiriri in May, 1857, the Governor's

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advisers were alarmed, and a valuable paper prepared by Mr. Fenton guided their action. Colonel Browne, Mr. C. W. Richmond, and Mr. McLean started for Rangiriri. The meeting had been postponed. They journeyed to Otawhao in the Upper Waikato territory. Mr. Fenton joined them. They met Te Heu Heu, the Taupo chief, who bitterly told them that the lowest Englishman was hospitably entertained by Maoris, but that a chief of high rank visiting Auckland was rudely neglected by the Pakehas. Moreover, the debased English who lived in Maori districts committed wrongs for which there was no redress. The Maoris would have a king and assemblies of their own. They would not interfere with English settlements, but for the English in native districts they would make laws. Commencing mildly he rose to Maori oratoric heat, and said that in what the Maoris were doing they were advised by a Pakeha. The Governor rode on to Rangiaohia, a district smiling with Maori cultivations. There he received loyal salutes and addresses, but found the new movement stirring the Maori mind everywhere. He returned to Rangiriri. Potatau met him at Paetai. Chiefs made speeches to him. They wished to have runangas (Maori assemblies), a resident magistrate, and law administered locally. Browne assented, and was cheered. Potatau approved. He oracularly said he was a dying man, but would be guided by the Governor, and would bequeath his people to his care. “Enough,”he said; “give the runanga, give the law, and the magistrate. It is ended.”¹ Mr. Richmond distrusted the chief's “apparent acquiescence.”He considered him “a profound diplomatist.”²

Browne returned to Auckland, fondly hoping that the king movement was annihilated. He mentioned in a despatch, 13th June, 1859, that the war-canoe in which he ascended belonged to Potatau, and “was steered by his son.”After the Governor's departure the real Maori meeting began. The Ngatihaua planted a new flag; white, with a red border and two red crosses as symbols of Christianity, and the words “Potatau, king of New Zealand.”Ceremonials occupied a few days. The Union Jack was hoisted near the new flag. Takirau tied the flags together, saying: “Our king will be friendly with the Queen,”

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and asking for the blessing of God on New Zealand. Wiremu Nera, an old warrior, second in importance only to Potatau, deprecated the new flag. “He was content with that of England. It is seen all over the world, and it belongs to me. I get some of its honour. What honour can I get from your flag? It is like a fountain without water.”The king-maker was sorry his “father had spoken so strongly.”He wanted order and laws, which a king could give better than a governor. But if the flag was not liked let Rewi pull it down. Without a word Rewi threw the flag at the foot of the Union Jack and sat down. The act of casting down the Maori flag was construed as intended to show the utter subjugation which Wiremu Nera seemed to court. Rewi, the Ngatimaniapoto chief, who thus acted was to become a moving spirit in the long wars which were to afflict his country, and the special appeal to him implied that his opinion was greatly regarded. He was then about fifty-four years old. Like the king-maker, he had not the statuesque and striking countenance so common amongst Maoris. Wiry in frame, he was more powerful than its proportions betokened. But his eyes, reflective and sagacious in repose, literally flashed with lightning glance when he spoke with fervour, and seemed to defy by their rapidity of movement the attempt to fasten upon his gaze. What he resolved upon it was believed he would grimly do. Tarahawhaiki angrily rehoisted the flag, saying he loved New Zealand. Te Oriori declared that his word was ever to keep the land, but he desired to reverence both the Maori king and Queen Victoria. Tarapuhi deprecated the making of a king. Untrodden paths were tangled. Such would be the new way. Let all adhere to the way of the first Governor, who gave friendship, love, and kindness, and had been imitated by his successors. Te Whero (to be known in after years as the ally of the English in the field of battle) followed in the same strain; as did Wiremu Nera. Waata Kukutai said: “Let the flag stand, but wash out the writing on it.”He would remain the Queen's subject. Again Tarahawhaiki rose; a ferment was beginning when Hoera called out: “Let us pray.”Silence ensued; he read prayers, and the meeting was closed. On the following day Potatau appeared with his friends and spoke enigmatically, recommending religion, love, and unity, and

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concluding with a song. Hoani Papita cried: “Fresh water is lost when it mingles with the salt.”He would set up the king. He sang a song, whose burden was that the land should be retained. Two thousand Maori voices joined in chorus. The violent Te Heu Heu then spoke of Maori wrongs until other chiefs restrained him. The king-maker said the work would not end soon. Heta Tarawhiti entreated his countrymen to cling to the good law and learning of England. Hemi Putini asked Potatau to declare his thoughts about the flags. Paora placed the new flag near the king's, and marked a ring round each which Rewi deepened. Kukena, uncle of Potatau, amid deep silence lowered the king's flag and tied it half-mast high to the English flagstaff. More speeches and songs followed. In the evening Mr. Fenton addressed the chiefs in their own tongue, and urged them to act in concert with the Government. On the following day the king-maker's friends despatched the flag to summon more chiefs to induce Potatau to become king or appoint some other chief. Again a runanga was held, but at this time at Ihumatao on the Manukau, within a few miles of Auckland. Bishop Selwyn and Mr. Buddle, a Wesleyan missionary, were there, and warned the chiefs of the danger of their project. At Ihumatao the speeches were like those at Rangiriri. Friendly chiefs visited the Governor at Auckland, but even they expressed jealousy of the Pakeha Assembly and desired one of their own.

From Rangiaohia, Hoani Papita and other chiefs wrote a long letter on the 10th June. “We are here gathered together to appoint a king to check the evils amongst us.”They quoted St. Paul to show that the king was the minister of God for good, and would execute wrath upon evil-doers. They had heard that the Europeans were opposed to their projects, but could not understand the justice of such opposition. “It will be better for the Pakeha to be friendly to the Maori, and let the love of God govern both; that is, the law of love.”They had heard that Mr. C. O. Davis was accused of inciting them to elect a king. That was utterly untrue. They had long ago thought of doing so. “It was commenced by Te Heu Heu, who proposed it to Potatau, afterwards by Hoani, and after that by Wiremu Tamihana Te Waharoa. If you disapprove of this act of God, take back your Gospel also. Let it not rest upon us, and let

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our island be a heap of dirt.”The Governor told the Secretary of State (12th June, 1857), that he apprehended “no sort of danger from the present movement,”which was “arrested”(he trusted), but was “too deeply rooted to be eradicated by argument or persuasion.”He considered the “time critical, and that much good or evil must result from the manner in which we now act or neglect to act.”A code of laws adapted to Maori needs should at once be prepared, and circulated in the Maori language. In the preparation of the code the services of Mr. Frederick Dart Fenton were enlisted. A solicitor by profession, he had arrived in New Zealand in 1850, and rented land from the Maoris on the south bank of the Waikato river. After a time Sir George Grey offered him a civil appointment (in the Deeds Office), which he accepted, and afterwards quitted in order to become resident magistrate at Kaipara. In March, 1856, he became temporarily Native Secretary to Governor Browne. Mr. McLean then became Native Secretary and Chief Land Commissioner, and in the latter part of the year Fenton was appointed resident magistrate at Whaingaroa. Thence he was summoned to act as magistrate at Waikato in order to redeem Colonel Browne's promise in April, 1857, at Rangiriri. He laboured at disadvantage. Donald McLean strove to obtain the appointment for another, and detracted from Fenton's ability so rashly as to tell a committee that Fenton had “little or no knowledge of Maori language.”

The aspersion was confuted sufficiently in 1860 by Archdeacon Maunsell, who in publishing a second edition of a Maori grammar expressed