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Chapter x.
Colonial Office Requires Information.

Materials for forming an opinion of the gravity of the situation were gradually supplied to the English Government. The Duke of Newcastle, until July, 1860, seemed unconscious. Parliament slumbered. Not since April, 1854, had New Zealand papers been presented. In July, 1860, they were again laid on the table. The Duke wrote that he could not “hold out any hope that it would be possible to increase permanently the present military force;” sent out four silver-headed sticks “to be given by the Governor to chiefs,”¹ and started on a tour with the Prince of Wales to the United States, leaving Sir G.Cornewall Lewis and Mr. Chichester Fortescue to sign documents until his return. The former of the two brought a judgment to bear which the Duke had wanted. He saw danger. Mr Richmond's celebrated but (as he called it) able and interesting memorandum shocked him as it had shocked Sir W. Denison. Her Majesty's Government had very carefully considered the case, and were not prepared to meet Mr. Richmond's wishes. “A policy which requires the continual presence of a large force carries, in most cases, its condemnation on its face.”

Mr. Richmond did not even hint at the propriety of investing the Home Government with larger powers for dealing with the

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native question, nor at sharing the expenses of war. Sir G. C. Lewis alluded “to these circumstances, not of course as relieving the Home Government from the duty of supporting the colony against a pressing danger, but because they must materially affect the disposition of the British Government and people to undertake that indefinite expenditure of blood and treasure to which Mr. Richmond invites them.” On the 27th August, Mr. Fortescue referred to the complimentary addresses from provincial bodies to the Governor, and to Bishop Selwyn's protest against the address from Hawke's Bay, and while seeing no reason to question the justice of the proceedings towards Te Rangitake, asked for information upon the important question now brought forward, “namely, of an alleged right, distinct from one of property, existing in the chief of the tribe to assent to or forbid the sale of any land belonging to members of the tribe, in cases where all the owners are willing to sell, and how far such a right has been or ought to be recognized by the Crown.” The reader has already been informed that the right of Te Rangitake and his followers did not depend only on his “mana,” but included, besides the common tribal heritage and occupation of domiciles, special occupation, by tribal arrangement, of separate portions of the Waitara block. Many facts, however, were not officially reported to England for several years, and the legal significance of occupation by tribal arrangement was not laid down by the Courts until 1869, in the Rangitikei-Manawati case; but it is possible that if Governor Browne had made it known the Government in England would have forbidden the prosecution of the war. Some occupation was known to Mr. Richmond, but he denounced it as an encroachment on the proper owners. Mr. Fortescue declared that it was the desire of the Government to observe faithfully the letter and the spirit of the Waitangi treaty, and asked for full information whether —apart from the treaty there were reasons in favour of recognizing Te Rangitake's alleged rights, and whether, as appeared “to be the truth, they do not justify the claims of Te Rangitake upon the present occasion.”

In reply to this query, Colonel Browne sent (4th December, 1860) a despatch compiled for him by Mr. F. D. Bell on seignorial right. With its enclosures it occupied nearly a

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hundred pages of a Parliamentary blue-book. It very erroneously declared that in the course he was pursuing, the Governor was adhering to the policy of Hobson, Fitzroy, and Grey. Fitzroy had distinctly recognized those Ngatiawa rights which Browne was denying to Te Rangitake; and Fitzroy was reviled for so doing by the very men who now applauded Colonel Browne for using force to compel land sales. He made many false deductions. Mr. Richmond supplied a characteristic minute, which was appended to the despatch, as the opinion of the Ministers. As to Maori land it contended “it would be foolish to seek precedents for the regulation of dealings with Europeans in the usages of a period when there were no Europeans in the country.” The inquiry must be whether the right of veto had been recognized or asserted since the settlement. “If not, no such right can be supposed to exist.” Yet by the treaty of Waitangi, in 1840, the Queen “confirms and guarantees to the chiefs and tribes of New Zealand, and to the respective families and individuals thereof, the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and other properties which they may individually or collectively possess, so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession.” In their own generation the Ministry were indeed wise to refuse to look back so far. But whatever they might refuse to do, the Secretary of State should have remembered, or ascertained, that Mr. Spain had recorded the fact that Rauparaha had power to forbid a sale of land near Otaki.¹ Mr. Richmond concluded with his usual formula. To have admitted Te Rangitake's claim would have been “the dereliction of a plain duty, and an act of weakness unattended by any advantage beyond the postponement of a difficulty, which must soon have recurred in an aggravated form.” With singular contortion of reasoning power, he declared that recognition of Rangitake's claims would have been “unjust to the native proprietors,” and that “it would have been an abandonment of the principles laid down and acted upon by successive Governors for the settlement of the Ngatiawa claims in Taranaki.” If the Secretary of State had referred to Captain Fitzroy's despatches in 1844, he would have found that an

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entirely contrary course was then adopted; that justice was done and peace was maintained. There was a settler who made an earnest appeal to the Governor before the troops were marched into the field. He asked for a complete public and impartial investigation of the title. “Over the whole block rides the tribal or public interest… were the whole tribe consenting the title would of course be clear… but Teira, so far from having the whole tribe, has only an inconsiderable fraction in his favour, while against him is arrayed the great majority with the principal chief at their head.” We learn from Mr. Swainson¹ that it was “not until nearly a year after the war commenced that it was publicly known that such an appeal had been addressed to the Governor.” Such were the arts by which the Ministerial position was maintained.

War was meanwhile proceeding at Taranaki. On the 6th July the Governor wrote that though his injunction against attacking Te Rangitake's bush pah had reference to the probable effect of combining the Maoris against British authority, he was “well convinced that any attempt to destroy the pah (which was almost inaccessible) would prove abortive.” Meanwhile, a band of the Waikatos went as volunteers to join their countrymen. A pah, Puketakauere, was built within a mile of the English camp at Waitara. There was a skirmish on the 23rd June. Colonel Gold having employed Mr. Whiteley the missionary to spy the state of the pah (as a guest on the previous Sunday), authorized Major Nelson with 348 men of all ranks to attack it on the 27th June. Browne reported: “After a severe and gallant conflict he was obliged to retire with a loss of 30 killed and 34 wounded.… This reverse is likely to have a prejudicial effect upon our relations with the Maori race generally, and it is not easy to foretell the consequences.” The Governor sent more troops-almost denuding Auckland— and wrote to England for reinforcements. He warned Colonel Gold to deal effectively with the enemy, “as the Maoris invariably construe even escape into victory.” Colonel Gold's strength at the time was composed of 1188 of regular forces, and 573

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militia and volunteers; but he found them insufficient. There must be immediate reinforcements. Every available soldier throughout Australia was required. Heavy guns were indispensable,-the artillery in hand being quite ineffective against the Maori fortifications. Puketakauere was indeed a notable discouragement to those who believed, with Busby, in 1837, that a hundred soldiers would be more than a match for the combined forces of all New Zealand. The pah was on a ridge between two fern-covered gullies. Major Nelson's forces were in three divisions, one of which was to cut off the retreat of the Maoris towards the Waitara river. The artillery opened fire from the north-west about 400 yards from the pah, but no breach was made which justified an assault. Suddenly, from the fern, unseen Maoris poured a fire on the main body of the troops. Major Nelson ordered an advance towards a ditch and bank, from whence, in extended order, the natives were firing. The advance was made “in a most continued and gallant manner until the men reached a deep ravine with an entrenchment behind which they found it impossible to pass, it being defended by two if not more large bodies of Maoris, who were almost entirely concealed behind it, and another entrenchment in rear, as well as the very high fern. Here a desperate and destructive fire was opened upon us and gallantly returned. Our skirmishers being far fewer in number and exposed in a much greater degree than the enemy, I deemed it desirable to direct them to join the main body; and our ammunition being nearly expended I withdrew the whole of the men and returned to camp in regular order.” A civilian wrote:¹ “So much pressed were the British at last, that it was only by a timely discharge of canister shot that a retreat was effected.… So hasty was the retreat that many of the dead and wounded were left on the field, and quantities of ammunition were shot out of the carts into the fern to facilitate the flight.”

The troops returned to their camp an hour before noon. The Maoris were believed to have been far more numerous than the English. It was said that those who were deployed in rear of the troops were Ngatiawa, brought by Te Rangitake to aid the men

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of Waikato in the pah. The latter also sallied forth, and from the fern and rifle-pits poured their fire upon the soldiers. After an interval of a day the Maoris went forward and buried the English dead within a mile of the English camp, and the soldiery began to entertain more respect for their foes than was felt by the settlers who lusted for the land. Two days before the attack on Puketakauere, the Maori king died. One of his last acts was to write to his old friend Sir William Martin, and beg him to be kind to the Maoris. Colonel Browne, as if uncon scious that his own views had become of no significance, reported that he knew not the intention of the king party, but if they would abandon their movement, he was prepared to meet their wishes.

The son of Potatau, called at the time Matutaera, but who subsequently took the name Tawhiao, was chosen king. Colonel Browne had in April written to Bishop Selwyn, Sir William Martin, and Mr. Swainson, asking their opinions as to the measures to be proposed to the Maori chiefs at the meeting he had convened. They sent him a joint paper on the points on which they agreed, with separate papers on other points. One passage in the Bishop's paper declaring that “rights of ownership of land whether in one or many joint proprietors were not alienable without the consent of the tribe” -must have been wormwood to Colonel Browne. One of the joint recommendations was that there should be a council of advice, appointed by and responsible only to the Crown, in native affairs. When the meeting of tribes, convened by the Governor, took place, he told the chiefs that the treaty of Waitangi would be inviolately maintained by himself and all his successors; but in order to rouse the suspicions of the powerful Ngapuhi and others, he affirmed that the king natives desired to “assume authority” over other New Zealand tribes, and contemplated” the forcible subjection of those tribes who refuse to recognize their authority.” Nevertheless much of the address was kindly. The Governor desired to obtain the views of the tribes as to the king movement-and to govern wisely. His speech was long. But having sent reinforcements to Taranaki and received satisfactory assurances from the chiefs at Kohimarama, he wrote on the 14th July to Colonel Gold: “You will

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now have upwards of 2000 men of all ranks and a large force of artillery under your command, and you will, I trust, be able to strike a vigorous and effective blow on the rebel forces, either on the north or south of New Plymouth.”

The ill-success of the campaign had meanwhile induced Major-General Pratt, Commander of the Forces in Australia, to take the field, and Colonel Browne (27th July) wrote to him that the Maoris were brave and formidable, and “boasted with some truth that since our first arrival in the colony the British troops have gained no decided advantage over them, though our arms have always been immeasurably superior, and our numbers often in excess of theirs.… Finally, I beg the favour of your protection and kindness to the friendly natives, more particularly for the chiefs Mahau, Aperahama, Ihaia (the murderer), and Teira, and their men… faithful allies.… It is, however, quite true that all Maoris will communicate intelligence to the enemy; so far from considering such conduct shameful, they look upon it as right and chivalrous.”… Mr. Parris possessed his confidence and that of the Government, and he begged the General to consult him.

The great meeting at Kohimārama (on the Melanesian mission grounds) commenced on the 10th July, 1860. Two hundred and fifty chiefs had been invited from all quarters. About half that number attended. The Governor read his address in English. McLean read a translation in Maori. There was deep attention. The chiefs were then presented to his Excellency by McLean; the Governor departed; the chiefs returned to the conference. The districts most fully represented were the Bay of Islands, Kaipara, Auckland, the Bay of Plenty, Wairarapa, and the west coast from Wellington to Wanganui. There were some members of the Ngatiawa tribe, but the Thames, Waikato, Taupo, Upper Wanganui, and Taranaki tribes were barely represented. For a few days the orators generally advocated loyalty and peace. The haste with which the Governor had made war was animadverted on by all except the Ngapuhi. It was resolved to send written replies to the Governor's speech. They may be seen in the Parliamentary blue-books. Many of them expressed regret that the Maoris did not see Colonel Browne as they used to see

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his predecessor. Some did not allude to the Taranaki war. The Ngapuhi addresses, two in number, breathed thorough loyalty to the Queen, and hostility to the Maori king movement and Te Rangitake. The Ngatiawa were less devoted. England had failed in duty in many respects. Land Commissioners believed three witnesses, but would not listen to a host who contradicted them. Maoris were not permitted to lease land to Pakehas; which was unjust. The Governor ought not to have sent abroad for soldiers to attack Te Rangitake, who only sought help from the Waikatos in New Zealand. The two first Governors had done no good; Governor Grey did much good; of the fourth Governor they did not know the thoughts except that he was in haste to fight Te Rangitake, which was alarming. The majority of the tribes expressed staunch loyalty, and some at the same time urged that peace should be made with Te Rangitake.

In the second week of the conference, the Governor sent several messages. One (16th July) was accompanied by “rules for the proper administration of justice,” which he said had been carefully prepared by the friend of the Maoris, the late Chief Justice. Another (18th July) asked the opinion of the chiefs as to “the difficulties and complications of the ownership of land,” and promised co-operation “in any system they might recommend, provided it would really attain the desired end.” A third (19th July) declared that McLean was instructed to explain the Taranaki events to the chiefs, in accordance with their wish. The administration of justice, and land questions, were discussed, but relegated to deliberation by the tribes at their homes. McLean spoke for four hours, detailing the Government view of Te Rangitake's claim, to an intent auditory. Still the chiefs seemed to hope that peace would be made. In the third week the Governor sent a message suggesting juries de medietate linguæ, and asked for the views of the chiefs. Some received the suggestion favourably, but no resolution was arrived at. The Governor and his wife dined with the chiefs in the hall at Kohimarama in the third week, and gained popularity by doing so. After an adjournment of a few days, the chiefs, on reassembling, prayed that the native conference might be held periodically. Some said that if it had been thought of sooner,

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there would have been no Maori king,-no Taranaki war. Again they discussed the latter question, and finally decided that Hohepa Tamaihengia should visit Te Rangitake and explain the feelings of the conference. On the 10th August, resolutions were formally carried-disapproving the Maori king movement, justifying the Governor, condemning Te Rangitake and his allies; highly praising the idea of holding the conference (or Runanga), and complimenting Mr. McLean. Three chiefs recorded their protest against the condemnation of Te Rangitake. On the 11th August, the Governor closed the conference with a complimentary speech, promising to convene them in the following year. He did not tell them of the urgency with which he had pressed upon General Pratt that military success must be at once obtained. Mr. Smith, Assistant Native Secretary, reported that the experiment had been so far successful, and might be made effective, under judicious management, for removing most of the difficulties attending native affairs. He called special attention to the conspicuous abilities of Tamihana Te Rauparaha and another Otaki chieftain, as well as to the important declarations of Waka Nene and Wiremu Nera, that they were ready to prove by deeds their loyalty to the Queen. Mr. Smith thought such announcements would have a good effect throughout the island.

To complete the papers to be presented to the General Assembly, the Governor on the 20th July had asked Mr. McLean whether the sellers of the Waitara block were justified in selling to the Government, and whether Rangitake had any right to interfere. McLean answered the first question affirmatively, and the second in the negative. When this statement was made public, Archdeacon Hadfield wrote in a newspaper that Mr. McLean had himself informed the Archdeacon that he (McLean) had not investigated Te Rangitake's title, and that a chief, Matene Te Whiwhi, averred that McLean expressed his regret that the Governor had been so hasty as to eject Te Rangitake by force without further investigation. McLean's defence was equivocal. He had initiated the investigation, though it was completed by an officer of the department, under McLean's instructions. He had told the Bishop of Wellington that he was “impressed with the belief that Te Rangitake's claim was

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unfounded.” “It is quite possible that I may have said that I had not personally instituted an inquiry on the spot immediately previous to the breaking out of hostilities.” “I may have said that the cession by Te Teira would not be sufficient alone, unless he were joined, as he has been, by other influential claimants.” It was the chief Matene who complained of the hastiness of the Government, and McLean had only admitted that such was the general opinion among the natives, which McLean combated in his conversation. His state of health had “made it impossible” for McLean to make personal inquiry as to Teira's title. On the 30th July, the Governor opened the General Assembly at Auckland. He arraigned Te Rangitake for forbidding a sale of land “to which he neither asserted nor possessed any title;” a daring untruth which his more astute advisers must have propounded with misgiving, and which must have been heard with astonishment. The speech alluded to the conference at Kohimarama, from which the Governor expected good results. The two Houses cordially echoed the speech, and the Taranaki war formed the subject of protracted debates. On the 30th August, by eleven votes against three, the Governor's proceedings were approved by the Council; but one of the dissentients was Mr. Swainson. On the 16th August, the representatives resolved, after various proposed amendments, and nights' and days' debates: “That in the opinion of this House, the interference of Te Rangitake at Waitara, and his resort to force to prevent the survey of land there, rendered the measures adopted by his Excellency the Governor indispensable for the due maintenance of Her Majesty's sovereignty, and that the welfare of both races of Her Majesty's subjects peremptorily requires a vigorous prosecution of the war to a successful termination.”

Little did Colonel Browne and his advisers expect that in three short years the Government of New Zealand would be forced to confess that Bishop Selwyn and the Archdeacon were wise, and that the claim of Te Rangitake was righteous. But Governor Browne, in reporting the resolution of the 16th August, did scant justice to the representatives. He stated that some leaders of the Opposition were absent from the division, being unwilling to commit themselves definitely against

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the war, but he did not state that there had been divisions in which the Government majority was less than on the final vote. The Opposition waited to see what the Ministry would do. Mr. Richmond, on the 3rd August, moved for leave to bring in a “Native Offenders Bill,” and in doing so treated of the Taranaki war. He would, in future, move for a Committee to report upon the expediency of a change in the existing mode of extinguishing the native title, and would afterwards make proposals for the civil government of the natives. His own arguments and those of Mr. Forsaith, Dr. Featherston, and others who opposed or supported him, have been quoted already, so far as it is necessary to cite them. The eloquent appeal of Dr. Featherston on behalf of the Maori people, unrepresented in the House, provoked applause, but did not persuade the representatives to mete out the justice demanded. Yet Dr. Featherston, believing the war to be unjust and unholy, saw that retreat was dangerous, while success was shocking. Mr. Carleton moved for a Committee of Inquiry into the causes which led to the war. He was one of those who opposed the Native Offenders Bill. He laughed at Mr. Richmond's idea that the District Commissioner was himself a Court capable of determining the Waitara dispute:—”a Court that was at once judge, jury, and plaintiff.”… “A District Commissioner (to borrow Mr. Richmond's words) to have power to declare a native claim ‘a bag of wind !’ He (Mr. Carleton) knew more of classics than of law, and remembered what happened to those who were entrusted by Æolus with the bags of wind. They let the wind out and raised a storm that wrecked them. We too were in a storm, and had yet to weather it.” Mr. Carleton, in moving (August, 1860) for a Committee of Inquiry, declared that “the Government case had completely broken down.” Te Rangitake's eloquent and forcible letter completely cut away the plea that he had no right to the Waitara land. The Government professed a willingness for inquiry, but they and their supporters thwarted it. Amendments were moved, and finally inquiry was forbidden. Amongst Mr. Carleton's supporters were Mr. Fitzherbert, Mr. Forsaith, Dr. Featherston, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Fox. The amendment (carried by Mr. Sewell) was that Archdeacon Hadfield and Donald McLean should be examined at the bar

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of the House. Their opinions differed as to Te Rangitake's rights. The Governor triumphantly reported that the justice of his measures was asserted in the last division by 19 votes against 4; but it was impossible to gather from his despatch that in preliminary debates the majority was narrower, and that some members confessed with what reluctance they sanctioned an unjust war which, when entered upon, they felt it dangerous to the reputation of the Government to abandon. Of the discussions, at the close of which the New Zealand members virtually followed the Governor in submitting to the Ministry, it is just to furnish a short narrative.

Mr. Forsaith sadly admitted that no retreat could be made, but affirmed that the Ministry had “completely failed in disproving the assertion that in advising the course that led to the war they had been over-hasty and inconsiderate.” Mr. Fitzherbert “contended for justice to the Maoris.” He deprecated the “offensive and hostile expressions used by the Native Minister” (Mr.C. W. Richmond). There had not been sufficient investigation before the purchase was concluded. Mr. Williamson (Superintendent of the Auckland Province), while declaring his intention to oppose Mr. Carleton's motion, “could not acquit the honourable gentlemen at the head of affairs of having imprudently and too hastily advised the steps which led to active hostilities.”…” He thought they ought not to have given the advice which it appears they did.” Yet Mr. Williamson, while of opinion that the purchase from Teira was valid, hoped that the war would not be prosecuted to the bitter end, but that by the aid of friendly chiefs it might be brought to a close. Mr. J. C. Richmond denied that the war was “for a plot of land,” but admitted that the “case of Ihaia was not a nice one for the Governor to take up, for Ihaia's hands were deep in blood.” But the war must be prosecuted, and he charged the Commander of the Forces with “signal and unprecedented incapability.” Mr. Fitzgerald, objecting to the appointment of a Select Committee, moved that evidence be taken at the bar of the House.” He thought the Ministry had exercised every necessary “precaution before advising his Excellency.” Mr. Fox, who had pro formâ seconded Mr. Carleton's motion, supported Mr. Fitzgerald's amendment. He arraigned Governor Fitzroy's vacillating

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policy, and charged Governor Grey with feebleness and an injurious desire to govern the Maoris by means of “personal influence.” Governor Browne had “taken too little pains to ingratiate himself with the natives.” He had given way to “pressure from without.” When he remembered that the Native Minister was member for Taranaki, and the petition from the Taranaki Provincial Council urging the Governor to obtain land by coercion, on the ground that the natives were too weak to resist, he thought such sentiments “unworthy of a British community—only worthy those whom his Excellency's advisers had styled ‘hoary cannibals living in a state of beastly communism.’… All compulsion was contrary to the treaty of Waitangi.… The dispute should have been disposed of by other means before an appeal was made to arms.… If the purchase was completed why were not the title-deeds laid on the table?”… Mr.C. W. Richmond interjected that “the purchase-deed was not usually made out till after the money had been paid. In this case it had been thought prudent to make it out sooner… because in the state of disorder it was quite possible that some of the claimants might have been killed.” Then, said Mr. Fox, “the deed was executed before the purchase was completed.” “No,” replied Mr. Richmond; “it had been completed since the beginning of the war.” But, retorted Fox, “the honourable member has told us that one of the boundaries was not yet drawn.… The interruptions made the case worse.”… “With an incomplete purchase, hurriedly effected, and without any foresight of the consequences, the colony had been plunged into war. He felt bound as a member of the House, as a man and as a citizen, to vote for an inquiry.” Dr. Monro taunted Mr. Fox for his new-born zeal for the treaty of Waitangi. Did he, when a servant of the New Zealand Company, abandon his employers because they termed the treaty a “device to amuse naked savages” ? Dr. Monro wished to see “the subjugation of the rebels accomplished in the first instance.” They could think afterwards of schemes for dealing with native questions. Mr. Brown advocated inquiry.

Mr. Sewell (who had ceased to be a Minister in 1859) thought a general inquiry useless, but as Archdeacon Hadfield's name had been made use of, considered that he and Mr. McLean might

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be examined. Mr. J. C. Richmond violently assailed Te Rangitake. In coupling the name of Parris with that of Ihaia, Te Rangitake proved that, as he recklessly murdered character, he would “not scruple at anything to attain his ends.” As to Mr. Fox's attack on the petition of the Taranaki Council, though Mr. J. C. Richmond had no hand in framing it, he was “willing to adopt its opinions.”… The “petition has no humbug about it; it plainly states all the wishes of the petitioners.” As for the treaty of Waitangi, “it was at an end as far as these tribes were concerned by their act,” when they marched in armed parties at Taranaki, in defiance of the Governor's proclamation, when the natives were quarrelling. Mr. Daldy, a member of Mr. Fox's brief administration in 1856, advocated inquiry. Mr.C. W. Richmond declared that the Ministry assumed a neutral position as to the motion for inquiry, but asked the House in “common justice “to consider the position of the Governor in guiding “the great machine of representative government.” The line taken by some members raised in his “mind some serious reflections as to the fitness of Parliamentary Government for a country in the position of New Zealand.” Mr. Dillon Bell deprecated animadversions upon the Governor; Mr. Brandon supported the motion for inquiry; and Colonel Haultain regretted the attack which had been made by Mr. J. C. Richmond on the Commander of the Forces, who had received special instructions (not to attack Te Rangitake on his own ground). Mr. Sewell, when the result of the debate seemed doubtful, (as a friend of his recent colleagues) moved that Archdeacon Hadield and Mr. Donald McLean be heard at the bar of the House. Mr. Forsaith traversed the allegation that the Government had been forced into the war. They had taken a position that forced it. He thought a Committee of Inquiry should be chosen by ballot. It was pitiable to watch the impotent attempts of the Native Minister to extricate himself from the dilemma he was placed in by Mr. Fox as to the purchase-deed. Mr. King (one of the Provincial Council at Taranaki which petitioned the Assembly to permit Maoris to sell, whether they formed “a majority or only a large minority of claimants,” and asked the Government to compel “an equitable division of the Maori common land,”) stepped forward to take his share of responsibility for the

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petition. Mr. Clark, confessing his ignorance of Maori language and usages, looked upon the “war, however we may grieve over it, as one of necessity.” Mr. Fitzgerald's amendment was lost by 15 votes against 18. Mr. Carleton's motion was lost by 14 votes against 19. Mr. Sewell's amendment was carried by 18 votes against 12. The Archdeacon, examined by Mr. Fitzherbert, was cross-examined by Mr.C. W. Richmond and others. Mr. McLean, examined by Messrs C. W. and J. C. Richmond, was cross-examined by Mr. Fox. Their opinions have been sufficiently set forth in these pages. Afterwards Mr. Stafford carried, by 19 votes against 4, the resolution already quoted, which supported “the measures adopted by his Excellency” at Taranaki. The division was taken on a proposition made by Mr. Carleton to omit the words declaring those measures indispensable, and to retain those which asserted that “a vigorous prosecution of the war” was required.

Mr. Dillon Bell's speech showed how grinding was the pressure of events upon men's minds. He voted for Mr. Stafford's motion, but “thought it extremely probable we should find some of those now in arms against us could show a good title to some of Teira's block.” He had thought so before, and the evidence of the Archdeacon and Mr. McLean confirmed the opinion. Yet Mr. Bell (not ignorant of the Maori character) would decline to hear their claims unless “they choose to come in as peaceful citizens.” Had he been entitled to advise the Governor in March, 1859, he would have warned him that he was “getting into an almost insuperable difficulty” at Waitara; but he was indignant with Te Rangitake for “rejecting with contumacious insolence” the Governor's offer of a safe-conduct. Though the resolution ought to have stated that the steps taken were justifiable, not “indispensable,” Mr. Bell would vote for it. He had many friends amongst the Maoris, but it was true mercy to teach them to submit to law by a war which he viewed “with most real grief.”

Dr. Featherston inveighed, not against the Governor, but against the Ministry “who had so wantonly, so recklessly provoked “war. If with 3000 soldiers the position at Taranaki was barely tenable, how many would be required if the tribes in

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general should rise against injustice? “I cannot help saying, that unless some unlooked-for success be shortly achieved, the question which this House will have to consider will be (if indeed it is not its duty at once to decide it), whether you are prepared to sacrifice the whole colony, or to sacrifice those who have plunged us into this wretched, this miserable war.”

Mr.C. W. Richmond denied that he had brought pressure to bear upon the Governor. He thought only “two or three Europeans in Taranaki knew” beforehand that Teira intended to offer the Waitara block to the Governor, and his own “presence was accidental.” Forgetting his urgent note to Mr. Parris,¹ or drawing a distinction between letters to him and to ordinary persons, Mr. Richmond declared: “After the offer was made and accepted, I never corresponded with any New Plymouth settlers upon the subject.… Could the Governor recede from the engagement he had made? His Excellency thought not, and we agreed with him. And I now declare, in view of all the calamities we are witnessing, that I should under the like circumstances give the same advice again.… We believed, and I still believe, that the force at command was, if properly handled, quite sufficient to overawe, or, if need were, to strike a decided blow at Te Rangitake, which would have terminated the war.”

Mr. Fox hoped that the Native Minister would be able to show that “he and some of his constituents were not the authors of the war.”² “It was the general desire of the honourable member and his constituents at Taranaki, to which he pointed as the key to this war.”

Mr. Weld, who had become a member of the Government in July, recurred to the argument that a Maori ought not to be allowed to prefer “a claim with arms in his hands.” He defended Mr.C. W. Richmond against Mr. Fox's imputations.

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Mr. Fitzherbert defended Te Rangitake, and averred that the marked contrast between the conduct of the Government at Taranaki and elsewhere showed “sinister influence exerted when it was hoped to be likely to favour the constituents and immediate dependents of the Native Minister.” Subsequent speakers declined to relieve the Ministry of the burden which was sought to be placed upon the Governor. Mr. Carter said: “The Ministry entered on this war on their own responsibility, and unprepared for it.” Mr. Stafford, confident of a majority, did not repudiate the imputation. “The time had come (he said), if ever, when in mercy to the natives the law must be upheld; this was the influence by which his Excellency and his advisers had been actuated.” By the passing of Stafford's resolution war to the knife was declared; and it has been necessary to describe fully the proceedings which sanctioned it. Colonel Browne accounted for the small number of members who voted, by saying that perhaps some Opposition leaders did not wish “to commit themselves too definitely against the war;” that some Government supporters “did not take the trouble to attend;” and some members “recognized the justice of the war, but objected to a portion of the words of the resolution.” Thus it came to pass that less than a majority of the House committed it to war;¹ and that the votes of representatives from the Middle Island overbore those of members from the north. A double curse followed. The dwellers in the north suffered for the crimes of the southern members. Unconscious of the common tenure of Maori land, or incapable of comprehending it, Colonel Browne reiterated his assertion that Te Rangitake had no claim on the Waitara block—” that the title of the vendors had been carefully investigated and proved good,”—and that “other claimants cited by Archdeacon Hadfield had been stimulated to put forward groundless claims by the agitation carried on by Europeans.” His advisers were at his side² when, he

– 18 –

added, that Te Rangitake's letters to Archdeacon Hadfield “set forth no definite claim,” and that the Archdeacon would “better

– 19 –

have fulfilled the duty of a loyal subject of the Queen if he had communicated them to me as the writer desired, instead of reserving them for use when he could appear in the character of an accuser.” But those eloquent letters produced no generous feeling towards their writer, though their non-production was made a ground of complaint against the Archdeacon. Neither had Colonel Browne heeded the earnest letter which Te Rangitake wrote to him before the rape of the Waitara. Recently he had described Hadfield as “more thoroughly acquainted with the Maoris than any European in the country,” and had urged that a council on advice on native affairs, which contained Bishop Selwyn and Sir W. Martin, would be so strong that calumny could not injure it. In reporting the debate he was so swayed by Mr. Richmond that half of his despatch (which, “to secure accuracy,” was “shown to his advisers”) was an indictment of the Archdeacon. Mr. Richmond, denying that the Governor had been influenced by him, rejoiced in the advice he had given, and boasted that if the thing were again to be done he would gladly give the word for war.

The Governor and his advisers relied upon their Kohimarama conference. They intended to hold another in 1861, and to obtain its deliberate opinion whether such conferences should be permanent institutions. The questions of “tribal title, ultimate individualization of native title, and the constitution of tribunals to determine Maori disputes amongst themselves about territorial rights,” were, as Mr. Richmond informed the House, to be referred to the conference of 1861. But other members were less sanguine than he in expecting that by such means the king movement could be extinguished. He introduced a Native Offenders Bill, giving enormous powers to the Governor in proclaiming districts within which it should be unlawful to hold communication with the Maoris. There was excitement in Waikato while the Assembly discussed the Bill. Though the second reading was passed, the measure was afterwards shelved.

Bishop Selwyn, Hadfield, Maunsell, and others protested against the power of outlawing districts. It seemed to them that the Bill enabled the Governor to determine what was law, to decide who had offended, to ban any combination of natives, and to construe into an unlawful purpose any proceeding of the

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natives not specially described in the Bill. They asked that no British subject should be subject to penalty or disability “without being brought to answer by due process of law.” Stafford angrily accused the Bishop of leading his name to inflame passions and retard peace. The correspondence, perhaps, strengthened the Opposition in strangling Mr. Richmond's Bill.

A Bill to create a Council to assist in managing native affairs was reserved by the Governor for the Royal pleasure. The Council was to be appointed by the Crown. But its functions were to advise on all matters on which the Government might consult it, to assist in drafting laws, and to “act in special cases in an administrative capacity at the instance of the Governor in Council.” Mr. Fox moved resolutions expressing regret that the Imperial Government had brought in a Bill removing native affairs from control of the New Zealand Legislature, and a Joint Committee of both Houses recommended that there should be a Council of advice on native affairs, appointed by the Crown, and consulted on all occasions by the local government, which should nevertheless exercise discretion as to accepting the advice of the Council. The Bill framed on this recommendation was amended at a Free Conference between the Houses; and on the motion of Mr. Sewell it was resolved to defer passing the Bill until the precise views of the Governor were ascertained, the House being desirous that the ordinary control of native affairs should be placed under responsible Ministers, “subject to the provisions of the Bill, and to the proper constitutional action of the Supreme Head of the Executive.”

Thus challenged, the Governor accepted the resolution, with the proviso that the “constitutional action” should “have the same interpretation as regarded native affairs as in reference to other Imperial subjects.”

The Bill introduced in the Imperial Parliament came to an untimely end. Mr. Fitzgerald, the rhapsodist of Godley, and editor of a Canterbury newspaper, at once assailed the Bill as curtailing colonial privileges. It contained every vice, and was called for by no necessity. It would make matters worse instead of better during the war. He denied that there had ever been a disposition to starve the native department, or to exhibit any narrow jealousy of the natives.

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Mr. Fortescue, in August, 1860, told the Governor that the Bill had been withdrawn. Influential colonists opposed it as an invasion of their privileges, and other persons were hostile because they feared that English interference might imply correlative responsibility in war. Mr. Fortescue added that the Ministry considered it “their duty not merely to maintain the nominal authority of the Governor in native affairs, but as far as they properly can (under the New Zealand Constitution Act) to furnish him with the means of effectively exercising that authority.” Mr. Fortescue had (perhaps unconsciously) truthfully defined the authority which remained with the Governor. That gentleman himself incidentally described his wavering and weaponless condition. His local Native Council Bill suffered so much change in the House that it was only at his earnest entreaty that Donald McLean consented to sit in the Council if the Bill should receive the Royal assent in England. Mr. F. Dillon Bell was to be Secretary, and Lieutenant Nugent, 58th Regiment, was to be member of the Council. To the Governor's “great regret” Sir W. Martin declined a seat on the Council proposed to be constituted. In sending the mangled Bill to England the Governor admitted that the relations between himself and his responsible advisers were unsatisfactory. “I believe,” he said, “there has been little or no difference of opinion between myself and Mr. Richmond; but the responsibility has rested on me, while, with the exception of £7000 a-year (the appropriation of which I cannot alter without the consent of my advisers), the power of the purse, which is all but absolute, has been altogether in the hands of Ministers. This has been an unequal and unsatisfactory division.” His conversion to Mr. Richmond's ideas, which he had once so sternly condemned, was too sincere to allow him to perceive whither he was being led. He lost no opportunity of praising his tempter. He sent copies of Richmond's speeches, with high commendations, to England. The Ministry was in danger during the session, but it was on the burning question of provincial finances. In committee on resolutions (moved by Mr. Richmond on native policy) the disposal of proceeds of land sales was involved. Forthwith a more vigorous sense possessed the members than when justice to Maoris was in question. Mr.

– 22 –

Fox protested against “any tampering with the compact of 1856.” The Ministerial phalanx lost a few members. The division was 17 against 17. The chairman voted against the Government. On another occasion they were in danger: and even on the war they had advised, their position was insecure.

It was during the session of 1860 that the House of Representatives appointed a Select Committee to inquire into the circumstances under which Mr. Fenton's mission in 1857 was undertaken, “to introduce institutions of civil government” in the Waikato district. So far as their labours elicited facts occurring in 1857 and 1858, and distributed doubtful blame between the Native Secretary, Mr.C. W. Richmond and others, it has been convenient to state the results in preceding pages. But they sat often and long. They gave an Arawa chief, Wiremu Maihe Rangikaheke (a clever debater, of eager manner, and with an European cast of countenance), a message inviting the attendance of Te Waharoa the king-maker. McLean, who had in 1857 jealously rebuffed that chief when on a visit to Auckland, disapproved of the invitation, and induced Rangikaheke to disregard the Committee. Before doing so, he told Sewell, the chairman of the Committee, that he did not approve of summoning Waharoa; but, on being examined, he declared that when he intercepted Rangikaheke he was not aware that the chief was the bearer of a letter from the Committee. He professed to be anxious for Te Waharoa's presence, and undertook to procure it, if possible, by other messengers. He failed. But the king-maker wrote thus (24th January, 1861) in reply to the chairman's invitation. The deeds done at Taranaki repelled him; and perhaps he remembered the stealthy capture of Rauparaha. “Salutations to you, the chairman of the Governor's Runanga. I have received your letter which was written in October, inviting me to Auckland. Here is a waiata (song):—

‘Continue to strive in vain;
By you I will not be rent in sunder:
Like the tree of the forest
I will maintain a bold front.
'Twas I that loosed you from this belt,
And now—behold the boundary which divides us:
I am the centre of Raukawa.’

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Friend, what is the use of our talking after the evil has taken place? Had you, indeed, written when the evil was small, it would have been well, and I would have gone; but now that the evil has grown to the height, what is the good? Behold the kindling of a fire. When it is small it can be put out; but when it has spread it cannot be extinguished. So, when the tide is low the creek can be crossed, but not when the tide has swollen to the full. So with the night; by day men travel, but they go not about by night. Witness the words of our Lord Jesus Christ (John ii. 9, 10). You ask me to make my thoughts known. Hearken; if any chief goes before the Governor, and supports the ‘mana’ of the Maori, and our right to hold our land,—such are my thoughts. These are the causes of the setting up of the king. If you see a chief whose words seem hard when he visits the Governor, or is present at Pakeha or Maori inquiries—he is my friend. Or if you see a chief who declares that his own ‘mana’ is over his own piece of land, know that such is my thought. I have heard that Rangikaheke and Waata Kukutai have been before the Pakeha Runanga, and told their opinions. Lo! that is it; hearken to them. It was one of those thoughts that set up the Maori king. I cannot, however, tell you all the causes. They are many. Let the portion I communicate be small. One thing I will tell you: the Governor's words are as wool, but within, at his heart, he is a ravening wolf.—From your slave, W. T. W. T. te Waharoa.”

Knowing well how the Governor's mild professions were outraged by the forcible seizure of the tribal lands; and perhaps (in the undoubting conviction of a mind to which tribal tenure had been familiar from youth), incapable of believing that any one could be ignorant that the rape of the Waitara was lawless and wrong, Waharoa used plain language. It alarmed the Governor's advisers. They began to find that brave language in the House would not carry on the war. By appealing to excited passions, and perverting the case so as to make it seem that the honour of the Queen was pledged to do dishonourable deeds, they had secured majorities, in which members from the undistracted Middle Island were prominent. But majorities without means were worthless. British blood and British treasure were demanded. General Pratt, in August, 1860, reported that the

– 24 –

military position was difficult. The Maoris crept up in small parties, inflicted damage, and escaped with impunity. “With the assistance of my advisers,” the Governor wrote, “I have been able to comply with all General Pratt's demands, and to assure him that this Government will spare nothing to enable him to carry on the war vigorously, and bring it to a successful conclusion.” At the same time, he wrote: “I sent Mr. McLean to aid in reassuring the friendly natives, who appear to have lost confidence in us.” General Pratt was urged to remove the women and children from the settlement; and, when relieved from impediments, to inflict severe punishment on the enemy, who always “construed escape into victory,” and who generally escaped. Friendly natives, including Ihaia, were to be paid.

Thus instructed, the General returned to Taranaki, where Major Nelson had obtained sixty-eight pounders, with which he could, from the Waitara camp, breach the Puketakauere pah, and avenge his repulse. In a few days General Pratt reported that the Maoris at the south suddenly retired from their entrenchments, and abandoned the Puketakauere pah. Neither Mr. McLean nor the friendly natives could explain these movements. The General was anxious to fight, but could find no enemy. Yet the settlers were all crowded in a space of thirty acres at Taranaki; and McLean reported that only two persons, the Rev. Mr. Brown and a Maori disciple, could go as far south as Omata without being shot. In September the General advanced upon empty pahs; but when approaching the forest the troops were fired upon from an ambuscade. Colonel Browne lamented (18th September) that no serious impression had been made, and urged the General to harass the enemy by guerilla attacks in their planting season, then beginning. The difficulty would be great; but unless the war could be put an end to at once it might be continued indefinitely.

It was much easier to give such advice than to act upon it. Gliding through the forest which enclosed the open country near the sea, the Maori had the advantage of the encumbered soldier. Silence was golden in such a case, and the mute Maori heard with pleasure the rattle of the Pakeha accoutrements, or the angry exclamation of the soldier as he struggled through the tangled thicket. The General was not content to receive such advice

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silently. He described the situation which he had found on the 3rd August. Settlers were driven in, cattle seized, property and houses destroyed. An attack on the town was threatened. The troops were divided. Outposts threatened by the enemy could not be abandoned; and their garrisons reduced the number of men available for general action. The enemy passing through the forest could at any time unite his forces. The inhabitants would not be deported as the General wished. He had only prevailed on 112 women and 282 children to go, and he could not resort to actual force. He had hoped to make an example at Puketakauere, by cutting off the retreat of the rebels before taking the pah, and regretted its evacuation. He found it impossible to prevent the retreat of the Maoris from any place they did not wish to defend. During a few weeks he had destroyed between twenty and thirty undefended pahs, large numbers of “whāarĕ,” or habitations, and much provisions. The plan proposed to him by Colonel Browne, of harassing the Maoris by constant attacks, was impracticable. He did not dread an increase of the numbers of the Maoris. If they would defend an accessible position, or accept battle in the open country, he was satisfied that he could obtain good results. Colonel Browne did not press his views on the General, but wished the Secretary of State to observe that, when he flung down the gage of battle in March, he had every reason to suppose that the available force (more numerous than the Maoris) was more than sufficient to put down opposition. He was beset with reports that Auckland would be attacked. A chief at the Thames was said to have planned an expedition against it. Friendly natives warned him, and Tamati Ngapora told him (27th September, 1860) that the out-numbered Maoris laughed at the idea of being beaten by the soldiers, who fought bravely in Pakeha fashion, marching so close together that one bullet would kill two of them, and suffering at the hands of a few enemies in consequence. Colonel Browne complained of “insufficient funds, circumscribed powers, and inadequate assistance.” “Reinforcements from England were anxiously looked for.”

A terrible alarm came upon Auckland in October. Eriata, a Maori, was found dead at Patamahoe, about thirty miles from Auckland. The natives thought he had been shot by an

– 26 –

Englishman. A meeting was called, and it was ascertained (the Governor wrote) that at a given signal all the Europeans present were to be murdered. Archdeacon Maunsell was in the neighbourhood, and McLean went to the meeting. After the Archdeacon had spoken, McLean was able to allay the excitement. Ihaka was conspicuous for his friendliness. He was the chief of the dead man's tribe. But another meeting was held a few days later. A war-party of 100 Maoris went thither. Ihaka with two followers met them, in a peculiar attitude, interpreted to mean—”Here we are, what do you want with us? We are prepared.” A war dance ensued; fierce speeches were made; the production of the supposed murderer was demanded, then an examination, and, in case of proven guilt, the surrender of the culprit to the Maoris. Ihaka and Mohi replied that the previous inquiry was sufficient. Mohi, at the end of his oration, broke a stick, throwing one piece on the ground, in token that the matter had been concluded. “Let there be no evil” (he said) was old Potatau's advice. Tamati Ngapora (uncle of the king) pacified the war-party, and invited them to a feast, which ended the proceedings.

A few days afterwards two Europeans assaulted Ihaka, as he was labouring for peace, and the chief assured the Governor that if his blood had been shed his followers could not have been restrained. Two days later Browne held conference with Tamati Ngapora and Takerei, who had become an adviser of the Maori king. The former alleged that a Maori, who had fought at Taranaki, had been sought for by the police at Auckland. His arrest would have been a sufficient cause of war. (Parenthetically, the Governor told the Secretary of State, “the man was not arrested because I feared reprisals on our out settlers, and a magistrate who declared his intention to arrest him was fortunately unable to put it into force.”) After four hours the conference broke up with little result.

Two days later (31st October) came tidings that the kingmaker was on his way to the scene of the supposed murder with 400 men. Alarm ran like wildfire through Auckland. Europeans at Otahuhu, nine miles from Auckland, hurriedly at night implored protection. Browne instructed Colonel Kenny to call out the militia, and do what he could. Later, at

– 27 –

midnight, Ihaka visited Browne, to say that the king-maker had informed him and Tamati Ngapora that no aggression of which they might disapprove should be committed. Browne countermanded the order for sending soldiers to Otahuhu. But all was not over. The Maori-king natives mustered at Ngaruawahia. The resolute Rewi, the Ngatimaniapoto chief, was, fortunately, absent at Taranaki. From Ngaruawahia more than 300 warriors went down the Waikato river in their war-canoes, under the young king Matutaera and Te Waharoa the king-maker. At Paetai they had a war-dance. A letter from Ihaka, to say that the death of Eriata had been duly considered, did not restrain the young men of the party. They disregarded Matutaera, who returned homewards with his mother. The king-maker remained with them to prevent mischief, but could not induce them to abandon their journey. At Tuakau, about thirty-five miles from Auckland, Bishop Selwyn and Archdeacon Maunsell met them. Though his advice was reviled by Mr. Richmond and his colleagues, the Bishop was ever daring to do good and to make peace. Long conference took place. Some wild spirits brooked no delay, and with two canoes pursued their journey. The Archdeacon told the king-maker, who sent a letter after them in haste: “Come back, and come back in peace.” Whakapaukai obeyed the missive; and Mr. Gorst remarks that the Europeans owed their salvation on this occasion to Te Waharoa, the Waikato rebel. It was known afterwards, that by journeying on foot, the Bishop had carried a message to friendly chiefs, who undertook to bar the war-party from passing through their territory. When the Bishop died, the settler, at whose house the Bishop arrived soon after sunrise, dripping from the fording of a creek, told the story. Pirimona was the name of a gallant Maori who shared the Bishop's troubles. The Bishop himself recorded the fact that the brother of the Maori supposed to have been murdered, when convinced that the supposition was untrue, mounted guard at the house of a settler to defend him from attack.¹

In reporting the alarms caused by the death of Eriata, the Governor called attention to the fact that peace and life depended

– 28 –

on the exertions of a few chiefs, of whom only one received a stipend of £50 a year. “This brings prominently to light what I have so often stated, that it is only by means of employing the chiefs, giving them Crown grants, and attaching them to the Government, that we can hope to keep the country tranquil. The means placed at Sir George Grey's disposal enabled him to do this without difficulty, and I perceive that he is following the same plan at the Cape of Good Hope.” The Duke of Newcastle (Jan. 1861) entirely concurred with the Governor that “the government of the natives should be carried on through the chiefs, and that it would be a wise policy to secure to the British Government their services by grants of land or money, or of such other advantages as are calculated to retain their attachment.” The contradictions in human nature were never more exemplified than by such an interchange of sentiment between a Governor fresh from the pillage of Rangitake, and a Secretary of State who sanctioned the robbery, and thus caused a war which cost thousands of lives and millions of treasure. Sir William Martin prepared a thoughtful pamphlet on the Taranaki question. Maori land tenure, the facts connected with and the dispute about the Waitara block, the proceedings of the Government and their probable consequences, were handled with judicial gravity and humane earnestness. The injustice of the Native Offenders Bill was touched upon, and the writer declared that simple justice only was needed in dealing with the Maoris.¹ Those who are curious as to details

– 29 –

may read the pamphlet in the New Zealand blue-books of 1861. The Governor's advisers determined to reply to it. “Notes by the Governor on Sir William Martin's pamphlet” were officially promulgated. The public knew that Richmond and his colleagues prepared them, and from a revised edition the Governor's name was withdrawn. As the ‘Notes’ contained critical disquisitions on the Maori language, Colonel Browne must have been glad to be relieved from the imputation of authorship. There were higher grounds on which the Ministry sinned grievously in thus abusing his name, for the ‘Notes’ teemed with daring assumptions capable of disproof. Mr. Richmond's eagerness in the cause removed all doubt as to the moving spirit in the ‘Notes,’ for he wrote a separate ‘Memorandum,’ in which whole sentences were word by word the same as in the ‘Notes.’ His education, costly as it was to the State, was rapidly proceeding. In August, 1860, he told the House of Representatives: “I know nothing about ‘mana,’ and I don't care to know anything.” In December he crossed swords with Sir W. Martin about the true meaning of the “tino rangatiratanga” guaranteed by the treaty of Waitangi. “Rangatiratanga” must be held to mean “ownership,” and not full “chiefship,” as Sir W. Martin had contended.¹ The special spleen nursed against Te Rangitake by Mr. Richmond found vent in a sentence which called him “an essential savage varnished over with the thinnest coating of Scripture phrases.”

The Native Offenders Bill, which had been undefended in the ‘Notes,’ was lauded by its author in the ‘Memorandum,’ but Sir W. Martin's strictures upon it were unrefuted. Mr. Richmond averred that its “penalties were more for Europeans than for natives.” He was compelled to admit that Sir W. Martin's pamphlet was “the fullest, the calmest, and most able exposition of the views” of friends of the Maoris; but, warming with controversy, he concluded that the late Chief Justice “had allowed the blind spirit of controversy to master a naturally impartial mind.” Some natural sparks resulted from the conflict of truth with error. The Governor and his prompters had asserted that Teira's claim to the land he professed to sell had been “carefully investigated,” and found good. The ‘Notes’ of the Governor and the ‘Revised Copy’ were constrained to confess to a very

– 30 –

different condition of affairs. “The title of the sellers (Teira, &c.) to part of the block is certain. The Government contends that their title to the whole is probable.”

Sir William Martin rent this sophistry to shreds by declaring that military force was not placed in the hands of a Governor to enable him to seize by force that to which as a land-buyer he had not acquired a title. “It is not lawful for the Executive Government to use force in a purely civil question without the authority of a competent judicial tribunal. In this case no such authority has been obtained; no such tribunal has been resorted to. If there was no existing tribunal, the duty of the Government was to establish one.… To acquire the Waitara land immediately was not a necessity. To do justice to the Queen's subjects was a necessity.”

The ‘Notes’ and ‘Revised Copy’ dolefully complained that it was “one of the most serious embarrassments against which the Government have to contend, that publications such as those which the Bishop of New Zealand, the Bishop of Wellington, Archdeacon Hadfield, and now Sir William Martin, have put forth, lead the natives to believe that the Governor has initiated a new course of policy which will end in wresting their lands from them, and subverting the rights they possess under the treaty of Waitangi.” Mr. Richmond's ‘Revised Notes’¹¹ added that such publications were embarrassing, “even when circulated by persons whom it may not be worth while to notice. Sanctioned by the high authority of Sir W. Martin they really become a public danger.” It was not the deed but the shame of exposure which confounded Mr. Richmond. (When one of the Governor's despatches declared, 29th March, 1859)—Should the purchase be completed, “it will probably lead to the acquisition of all the land south of the Waitara river, which is essentially necessary for the consolidation of the province as well as for the settlers”—Mr. Richmond might well fear that unless Sir William Martin could be silenced, the wrong-doing of the Ministry would be made clear; and he fought with desperate wildness. He had written with regard to the pahs on the block at Waitara

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that Te Rangitake had been joined by natives who had “encroached with their cultivations upon the proper owners.” (At a later date he wrote: “Everybody knew there were pahs.… Bell and I wrote an explanation showing that Te Rangitake's small pah was put up by consent of the selling party.”) Nevertheless the case put by Sir William Martin compelled him to urge in the ‘Revised Notes:’ “As regards the cultivations of Te Rangitake himself, neither he nor any of his people had cultivations on the block. No pah was burnt by the soldiers.” Yet, in 1863, an English officer, Lieutenant Bates, 65th Regiment, found a witness to the burning of the pah in the person of Mr. Carrington, who was for twenty-two years surveyor at Taranaki; and another officer, Bulkeley, and a private, Houltham, both of the 65th Regiment, testified in writing that they were present at the destruction of the pahs in March, 1860. It would be tedious to trace all the tortuous windings of Mr. Richmond. How he dreaded the practised lance of the judicial knight was shown when the ‘Revised Notes’ were published by the Government. The Governor immediately promulgated a notice which, while “recognizing the right of free discussion,” declared that there were occasions when its exercise was dangerous, and he felt it his duty to state that “such an occasion now exists in this colony.” A copy of the notice was sent to Sir W. Martin. His ‘Remarks’ on the ‘Notes’ and on Mr. Richmond's ‘Memorandum’ were privately printed; but, in deference to the Governor's wish, Sir W. Martin wrote that he “abstained for the present from giving publicity within the colony to the following pages.” In the ‘Remarks’ he refuted the assertion that Te Rangitake had broken faith with the Government by settling on the south bank of the Waitara. How little the statement, if true, would have assisted the contention of the Government, Sir W. Martin proved by pointing out that Teira, who was among those who re-migrated in 1848 under Te Rangitake, was recognized by the Government as having purchaseable claims where all rights were denied to his leader. With bitter truth Sir W. Martin pointed out that Governor Browne himself in 1855 described Fitzroy's recognition at Taranaki of all absentee Ngatiawas, as a “just decision.”

Richmond denied that in law or in fact the law had anything to do with Maori territorial rights. They stood on treaty of

– 32 –

which the Crown was “the sole interpreter,” and the Governor was “justified in enforcing his jurisdiction in the only practical mode, viz. by military occupation.”

Sir W. Martin cuttingly answered: “I have argued that the people of Waitara, being subjects of the Crown, have not been dealt with as subjects of the Crown. Mr. Richmond answers by saying they are not subjects of the Crown; they have had all they are entitled to.” Martin quoted the Waitangi treaty which guaranteed to them “all the rights and privileges of British subjects,” and said those rights” must mean at any rate the opposite of despotism.” Mr. Richmond had overlooked the fact that if the treaty were, as his argument implied, “a treaty in the ordinary sense, then the right of interpreting and enforcing it must belong not to one party but to both equally; that the natives are at liberty to resort to force in support of their view as much as the Governor in support of his; and that they cannot be charged with rebellion if they do so. However little the theoretical value of Mr. Richmond's doctrine may be, it is a significant and remarkable fact that such a doctrine has been put forth. It is remarkable as bearing on the position which I have maintained, that the natives at the Waitara, being British subjects, have not been treated as British subjects.” What was it that Mr. Richmond “called by the name of the Crown” in the Waitara land-purchase? “The Governor judging in this particular case is simply and in fact Mr. Parris.… The majesty of the Royal word and the largeness of the national undertaking issue in the decision of an Assistant Land Purchase Commissioner.” It must be conceded that in their own generation the Government were wise in endeavouring, by an ad misericordiam appeal, to silence the eloquence which they had no power to control, and against which they were unable to contend.

The Duke of Newcastle dared not to rebuke the wisdom by which he refused to be guided. In March, 1861, he told the Governor: “It is an advantage to me to be in the possession of the views of so eminent a person as Sir W. Martin, accompanied by your own comments and criticisms, and those of your Ministers where you or they feel compelled to differ with him.” But the advantage on which he congratulated himself bore no fruit. Sir W. Martin could prove that all Governors had solemnly

– 33 –

pledged themselves to obey the treaty of Waitangi; that Fitzroy had in the Queen's name recognized in all their integrity the admitted rights of Te Rangitake at Waitara; that as a chief, as a member of the tribe, and as an occupier, those rights were irrefragably concentred in him;—but the proofs were lost on the barren intelligence of the Secretary of State, who equalled the Governor in folly. He approved of the “proclamation issued (by the Governor) for the purpose of inducing loyal subjects to refrain from publishing opinions which may tend to impugn the justice and legality of the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government during the present juncture of affairs in New Zealand.” Yet a lurking homage was paid to Sir W. Martin. With regard to the letter in which Sir W. Martin consented to withhold his ‘Remarks’ from publicity in the colony, the Duke wrote (27th May, 1861): “Although I should much regret that anything should be published by so high an authority as Sir W. Martin, which might tend still further to disturb the minds of the New Zealanders, I feel satisfied that he has only been influenced in the matter by a sincere desire to take that course which would prove for the ultimate benefit of the colony.”

When Colonel Browne notified to England Martin's consent to withhold the publication of his ‘Remarks,’ he deplored the effect of such arguments as Martin's. Disaffection was spreading; there was a “sad prospect before us of that struggle of races which it has been the constant and earnest aim of every Government in New Zealand to avert. (He did not wish to accuse Sir W. Martin.) I and my advisers have ever endeavoured to do justice to his motives.” With wonderful folly he referred to the protests of Selwyn and Martin against Earl Grey's iniquitous Instructions (of 1846) as a similar error; although in 1859 he had extolled Sir W. Martin as holding “the enviable distinction of being universally respected by all parties and both races,” and being the man whose character and wisdom would silence calumny if his advice were accepted on Maori affairs. Nor did the Governor's mental contortions end here. He informed the Duke of Newcastle (January, 1861), that Mr. C. O. Davis, the Interpreter, who resigned office when he found it untenable under the growing interference of the Governor's advisers, had published “at Maori expense” portions of Sir W.

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Martin's pamphlet; that “those most competent to form an opinion consider the publication likely to do an incalculable amount of mischief; (and) under these circumstances I have issued the public notification (restraining the exercise of ‘the right of free discussion’).” Soon afterwards (March, 1861) he wrote: “I have always wished to communicate with Waharoa (the king-maker), but owing to the conduct of Mr. C. O. Davis, as described by himself to Mr. Clarke, I have never been able to do so.” Yet when Waharoa sought in 1857 to lay the Maori grievances before the Governor he was not allowed to see him; and not till then did that chief call upon the Maoris to elect their king; and even in 1860, Donald McLean, then high in the Governor's confidence, intrigued to prevent Waharoa from appearing before the Select Committee on Waikato affairs.

Colonel Browne's first martial success was to comfort him soon after he had piteously entreated the Secretary of State to send more men from England. In October, 1860, General Pratt marched beyond Tataraimaka; and, after sap and steady firing with howitzers and mortars, took three pahs near the Kaihihi river, with casualties of only five wounded, amongst whom was Captain Pasley, R.E., serving on the staff and acting as engineer in the trenches.¹ The losses of the enemy were unknown. The advance of a large body of Waikatos to aid Te Rangitake was reported. A friendly native went to the camp of the latter. A Waikato chief asked if he had come for safety or as a spy. He replied that he had come of his own accord. He heard warlike and confident speeches, and returned with news that the plan of the Waikatos was to occupy different positions round the settlement and on the north of the Waitara river. On the 1st November, two Waikato chiefs wrote boastfully to Mr. Parris: “Friend, I have heard your word. Come to fight me—that is very good. Come inland that we may meet. Fish fight at sea. Come inland, and let us stand on our feet. Make haste, make haste; do not prolong it. That is all I have to say to you—make haste.— From Wetini Taiporutu. From Porokoru. From the chiefs of

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Ngatihaua and Waikato.” On the 5th November, the General was apprised that a body of Waikatos were to be at Mahoetahi (eight miles from Taranaki on the Devon Road to Waitara) early on the 6th. Communication by signals from Waitara to Taranaki enabled the General to arrange that troops should start from both places so as to arrive simultaneously at Mahoetahi. He led 683 troops from Taranaki at 4 a.m., and at 8 a.m. found the Waikatos in possession of the pah, then in a dilapidated state. From their post, as well as from the fern and a swamp, the Waikatos fired. Guns were brought into position, bayonets were fixed, and the pah was stormed—”the enemy still retaining for a short time hold of a portion of the pah, and keeping up a most galling fire from the fern and swamp.” Colonel Mould arrived with a column of 300 men from Waitara, in the rear of the Maoris, at this juncture, and threw rounds of spherical case from a howitzer, to dislodge the Maoris from the swamp, to which when almost surrounded they resorted. “The enemy finding himself thus hemmed in, and under a most murderous cross-fire, after an action that lasted two hours, turned and fled with much loss.” Shot and shell burst over and amongst the fugitives. The retreat was rapid and the rout complete. The General thought the Maori loss from 80 to 100. “I never saw,” he wrote, “a more powerful or gigantic set of men than these tribes, whilst their power of concealment was most marvellous; indeed, when close upon them, we only knew of their whereabouts by the smoke from their guns.” Of the English four were killed, and 15 wounded. The General reported that 27 Maoris were found dead. They were buried by the English; the friendly natives rendering no assistance. The boastful Wetini was among the slain, and the General thought Porokoru was killed also, but he lived to fight in after years at Waikato. Wetini was honourably buried at Taranaki. The number of the Waikatos engaged was unknown, but it was supposed to be about a sixth of that of the English. Very few were unwounded. Wetini's brother carried off a bayonet sticking in his body, and preserved it as a trophy. For two miles the road was stained with blood, and dead bodies were found by the pursuers. The General loudly commended the troops, and the Governor declared that such a timely success was matter for sincere

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congratulation. A Taranaki newspaper was jubilant. The day was a red-letter day in the annals of the province. “A shell had a most beautiful effect. The natives rose out of the swamp like birds, and were shot down and bayoneted, as they would not surrender.” Great was the grief of the Waikato and the Ngatihaua. The king-maker had vainly endeavoured to dissuade his kinsman, Wetini, from the expedition. When a letter from Te Rangitake asked what was the use of sending him “a disembodied flag,” and why no men went to support him, the dashing Wetini could abstain no longer but rushed to the fray. The king-maker prophetically said to him at last, almost in anger, “Then go and stop there.” For months the “tangi,” or wailing for the dead, was repeated at Tamahere by the Ngatihaua. Rewi, the Ngatimaniapoto chief, was accused of failure to support the popular chief. He declared that Wetini would not listen to advice; that he had sent messenger after messenger to keep Wetini back from the snare; that his last messenger was killed in the trap at Mahoetahi, and that no more could have been done. But the Ngatihaua refused to be comforted. They urged the king-maker to vengeance.

Reprisals at Auckland were apprehended, and additional troops were collected there; but it was to Waitara that the Maori war-parties were sent. Colonel Browne was not ignorant of the feeling which was spreading among the tribes. Two months after the battle of Mahoetahi he found that sympathy with the Waitara chief was extending in the province of Wellington. In an intercepted letter was found a boast that of the Ngatiruanui, Taranaki, Ngatiawa, and Waikato only 63 had fallen (of whom 36 died at Mahoetahi), while 1500 Pakehas had been killed,— showing that bulletins of all countries are untrustworthy. At Hawke's Bay there was in November, 1860, a great Runanga or assembly of the Ngatikahungunu; and a chief, Renata, made an oration of which the Governor sent a translation to England. The burden of the complaint was that the Governor plunged into war, and would not let the law decide whether Te Rangitake or Teira was wrong. “I indeed,” said Renata, “will not be as the lick-platter Assembly of the Governor; my words are proper and plain, forasmuch as that Runanga has done wrong.” He declared that the murder of

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Katatore was of the darkest kind, and that the Governor, who was friendly to Ihaia, was become his accomplice. He denounced the statement that Ihaia was a chief of importance. He was of low rank at Waitara. Te Rangitake alone was their great man, and known by all tribes. Governor Browne contemned Renata's speech as “evidently the result of European advice.” Renata in a published letter (February, 1861) justified his position, and replied to arguments of the Superintendent of Hawke's Bay.

In the end of December, General Pratt marched to attack the Waikato posted near Kairau at Matarikoriko. He had about 1000 men, two 24-pounder howitzers, one 12-pounder, and two mortars. He proceeded at half-past six in the morning to throw up an entrenched camp about 900 yards from the pah. Unmolested till nine o'clock, at that hour the troops were fired upon from a line of Maori rifle-pits, running along a deep ravine between the pah and the camp, and extending over 600 yards. From rifle-pits and high fern heavy firing continued till six in the evening, and was returned by the English. No firing took place on the following day (30th December), and when the General was about to resume operations on the 31st the Maoris had evacuated the pah. A Maori letter was found there in which a Waikato chief urged the combatants, Rewi and others, to spare the women and children. The English casualties were three men killed and 22 wounded. As usual the loss of the Maoris was unknown. The General considered it must have been great to induce the abandonment of so strong a position situate in a dense forest. Pleased with this success over “the vaunting Waikatos,” as he called them in his despatch, General Pratt pushed forward redoubts in the face of an innocuous fire from rifle-pits. A letter from one of his allies had been found (in the pah captured on the 31st December), warning the Waikato of the intended attack, and the General thought of trying the writer by martial law, but the Governor dissuaded him. He could not afford to make enemies, and it was well known that a species of Maori honour caused men to warn an enemy of an intended attack. Some of the Taranaki militia and volunteers failed to attend parade when called on to accompany the troops, and the General wrote, that to command success he must have 5000 men exclusive of garrisons, and be

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empowered to invade the Waikato country before moving southwards to Taranaki. He had no great confidence in the militia, and wished the senior officer of the regular troops to take command in all cases of mixed service. The Governor could not agree to under-rate the local forces, but offered to give brevet rank in the militia to officers of the army when required. With fire and sword at their doors and their throats, the Taranaki settlers were resolved to keep the terms of their honour precise. Meantime the gallantry of his foes worked upon the General's consciousness. They made vain diversions at the south of Taranaki. At the north, pushing forward in front of Huirangi, which had been Te Rangitake's head-quarters in November, the English found their Redoubt No. 3 daringly assaulted on the 23rd January. At half-past three a.m. a storming party crept up through the fern, and in the darkness made a lodgment in the ditch of the redoubt. They had a support in rear, and skirmishers were around. Colonel Leslie of the 40th Regiment thus described the attack: “The plan appeared to be to keep down the fire of our men on the parapets by their support and skirmishers, while the storming party scaled the left face of the redoubt. The force under my command was under arms previous to the attack, and quickly replied to the fire of the enemy, who in the most determined and desperate manner rushed up the sides of the parapet, and in some instances seized hold of the men's bayonets, while others crept round to the rear of the redoubt, and fired through the gabions which had been placed to fill up the entrances to the work, and one of the Royal Engineers was in this manner killed while coming out of his tent. A perfect storm of bullets was poured on us from all sides for a considerable time, and I called for assistance from Colonel Wyatt, 65th Regiment, commanding No. 1 Redoubt (at Kairau), for the purpose of dislodging the enemy from our ditch, as I had no hand-grenades.” Two companies of the 65th and one of the 12th arrived. Charged by the new arrivals in gallant manner, the Maoris retired under heavy fire from the parapets and from the guns of the Royal and Naval Artillery. Thirty-four were found dead, and six wounded were left behind. Of the English, twelve were wounded and four killed. The bodies of the chiefs were taken to Taranaki for interment.

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Many were so mangled by the grenades that they could not be identified. General Pratt wrote: “I trust that the severe losses this manly and high-spirited people are continually receiving will teach them how unavailing are their efforts against Her Majesty's supremacy, and will lead soon to a termination of this unhappy internecine war.”

The wild spirits of youthful Ngatihaua, Ngatiraukawa, and other tribes had inspired respect in their foes; but their wiser elders desired an honourable peace. Tamati Ngapora and Patara were vainly discussing its terms with the Assistant Native Secretary on the day on which the English bayonets were grasped by the Maori storming party. Soon afterwards (2nd February, 1861) Tamati Ngapora and Aihipene, with other chiefs of the north, conferred at Government House with the Governor, the Attorney-General (Whitaker), the Native Secre tary (McLean), the Assistant Native Secretary (Smith), and the Land Claims Commissioner, Mr. Dillon Bell. The burly and good-humoured Aihipene presented the terms proposed. If they were accepted, the chief, Mokena, would be sent at once to bring back the Waikato from the seat of war. “1st. The piece of land at Waitara, let it be left aside or set apart, to be afterwards arranged or settled by a Court or Whakawhakanga. 2nd. Do not hold to, or bear in remembrance, the causes of evil, whether as regards men, the land, or killing, or property; let these be all unloosened, all forgiven.” Browne said such terms were inadmissible. Aihipene said they were the Maori idea. Would the Governor state what he wished? English law must be recognized in future; compensation must be given for the waste of Taranaki; punishment inflicted for the murders at Omata in 1860. Aihipene replied that these must be questions for settlement, but he would not presume to anticipate the mode. The proper course was to make peace first, and settle differences afterwards. This the Governor would not agree to, and the chiefs said they had nothing else to offer. The Governor said the chiefs must understand that he did not confuse the murders at Omata with the conduct of Te Rangitake or of the Waikato. Aihipene said the Waikato must be consulted about Te Rangitake and the Ngatiawa. Colonel Browne asked if the chiefs could bind the Waikato or Ngatiawa.

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They had no authority, and he pointed out that it was absurd to ask him to cease from war when they could not bind their tribes. Tamati Ngapora spoke. The work was that of the Governor and Te Rangitake, though others suffered. Let them put an end to it. The Governor was anxious for peace, but asked what was the use of a short rest, after which war might again break out? Tamati Ngapora put the Governor's stick on the table, struck the end, and said, “Where will the vibration stop? Not at the first six inches, not till it reached the other end.” (Meaning that it was inevitable that other tribes would sympathize with Te Rangitake.) The Governor rejoiced that the vibration had crossed the ocean to England. The chiefs remained silent. The Governor said he was going to consult the Ngapuhi, and would gladly consider terms of peace on his return from the north. Old Patuone (Waka Nene's brother) said the insurrection was like an abscess, and could not be healed till the core was taken out. As to the Omata murders, Paratene ti Kopara was the actual murderer; and as he had been killed since, according to Maori usage atonement was already made. McLean said others were accused. Taraia (a Thames chief) asked who were the Governor's friends whom he desired to consult? Tamati Ngapora represented Waikato, Patuone the Ngapuhi, Ngatitoa was represented by Hohepa Tamaihengia, the Thames people by himself. Why not make terms at once? The chiefs approved, and Aihipene said if the Governor agreed that there should be peace, the word would go forth and the insurrection would not spread. The Governor said that the paper which had just been read would give no security for peace. War must be continued till more reasonable proposals reached him. He was answered by Ihaka (Waikato), that points of difference could not be arranged while blood was flowing. He retorted, let Waikato return from Taranaki, and the blood of Waikato would cease to flow. While he was in the north, “let the chiefs work again at their own thoughts and those which he had indicated.”

Colonel Browne told the Duke of Newcastle that it was with great regret he was obliged to refuse such an appeal as that made by the Waikato chief, Tamati Ngapora, “whose desire for peace was undoubted.” He visited the Bay of Islands and

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Mongonui, accompanied by Patuone, Ihaka, and Taraia. The Ngapuhi and Rarawa tribes received him loyally. On his return to Auckland he received a letter from the resident magistrate at the Bay of Plenty, narrating an interview, at Tauranga, with the king-maker, who justified the Maoris. Maoris sold their land blindfold for nominal sums; it was then cut up and sold for full value. “Have we not a better right to this advanced price than the Pakeha?” A Pakeha had told him that the Queen would claim all the waste lands as demesne lands of the Crown, and confine the Maoris to their cultivations. “This statement was confirmed by a Roman Catholic priest. I reasoned with myself: ‘This land was given to my ancestors by Providence. We have retained it from generation to generation. Surely because it is unoccupied now, it is no reason why it should always remain so. I hope the day will yet come when our descendants will not have more than they really require. If I have been correctly informed, even a few years ago there were in England large tracts of unoccupied lands. No other nation on that account attempted to seize them. Why then should they attempt to claim our unoccupied lands?’” Thence arose opposition to land-sales. The Pakehas would not assist in creating a native council and native magistrates to settle Maori disputes. He visited Auckland, but was not allowed to see the Governor on the subject. “I determined to take at my own risk what my Pakeha friends denied me?” (Mr. Fenton afterwards did mischief: he widened the breach by setting up assessors without reference to the wishes of the tribes. But the king-maker did not approve of the Waikato war-party.) “I did all in my power to dissuade Wetini from going to Taranaki. Our contention was great. He cursed me, went to Taranaki, and has fallen.” The magistrate could obtain no hint from the king-maker as to future movements. “All his conversation related to the past.” With this narrative the Governor sent to England the king-maker's letter (declining to attend a Committee as a witness) which has already been quoted.

At Taranaki it was reported that Mr. King, who had so recently in the Assembly at Auckland justified the position of the Government and the demands of the settlers, fell a

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victim in February. The rebels, it was said, had murdered him. The volunteers who sallied forth were too late to save him, but they saw his murderers at a distance. General Pratt pushed the war into the forest in February, only to find that the enemy retired to another line of defence. From rifle-pits and fern, when least expected, the advancing troops were fired at. After one of these skirmishes, in which two English were killed and ten wounded, General Pratt found the Maori position formidable, and that mortars were indispensable. On the 6th March the Governor transmitted to England a statement by McLean, that “The great mass of the native population of the Northern Island may be considered to be in a state of disaffection.” They were unabashed by reverses, and confident that they could restrain the growth of the English settlements. They even hoped for assistance from the French. Their skill in selecting their points of attack and defence in their ferns and forests counterbalanced, in their opinion, the English larger resources and better equipment. The threats, curses, and opprobrious epithets used by Europeans, confirmed (McLean said) the worst suspicions of the natives. The evil genius of the time had ceased to hold office as Native Minister.¹ Mr. Richmond had given place (November, 1860) to Mr. Weld, who concurred with McLean's remarks—the ominous conclusion of which (5th February, 1861) was “that the English settlements in New Zealand are at present in a more dangerous and precarious state than they have been at any period since the foundation of the colony.” To such a pass had Colonel Browne, under advice, reduced the colony in the short space of one year. When this statement reached the Duke of Newcastle (13th May, 1861), he briefly acknowledged it; and immediately appointed Sir George Grey to relieve Governor Browne. Meantime, the loyalty still left among the Maoris was encouraged. Old Waka Nene wrote to the Queen that his love continued firm, and Colonel Browne transmitted the letter with a hope than an answer and a present might be sent to the “excellent chief.” On the 26th June, Her Majesty “most graciously” acknowledged the letter, and sent a silver cup to be presented to Waka Nene “as a mark of her

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friendship,” and in recognition of his valuable services. But after the futile conference between the chiefs and the Governor on the 2nd February, warfare continued at Taranaki. Ever planning ambuscades in the abundant fern, and ever forced to retire, the Maoris refused to afford the General the comfort of a general action in which rifles, howitzers, and shells were to be opposed to muskets and fowling-pieces. The Maori forces were entrenched at Te Arei close to the historic Pukerangiora, where the Waikato had, nearly thirty years previously, warred against the Ngatiawa, whom in 1860 they befriended. From block house to block-house the General advanced from Kairau to Huirangi, and thence towards Te Arei. With help of friendly natives he constructed 1200 yards of sap and three redoubts in a fortnight. At night on more than one occasion, in spite of sentinels, the Maoris removed the sap-roller, until an explosion blew one of them to atoms. The General was astounded at hearing that the money he paid to friendly natives for cutting materials for his gabions and sap-rollers was shared by them with the enemy, who assisted in the work partly to obtain money, but partly because in this way, and by carrying off the sap-rollers at night, the wily Rewi and his friends scrutinized the English devices. As the sap was pushed through the forest it was found that, to countervail inferiority of weapons, the Maoris skilfully availed themselves of every vantage-ground. Their rifle-pits curved in front of Te Arei, from the Waitara river to a thick forest on the right of the advancing troops. “They had also dug trenches around their pah, and the whole ridge of hill