Nothing can be plainer than the fact that the Powers cannot continue indefinitely to increase their naval armaments on the scale that their proposed expenditure for the next few years indicates. The limit of the annual drain for naval purposes must be reached at last, and the time when it will be reached cannot be far off. In 1904 the United Kingdom spent £41,000,000 on the navy, and the administration of naval affairs. In the same year, and for similar purposes, France spent £ 13,000 000; Russia, £ 12,000,000; Germany, £11,000,000; and America, £20,000,000. Since then the naval expenditure of each country has been somewhat increased, and the contemplated future expenditure is greater still. Germany, in particular in spite of her heavy military expenditure, has formulated an ambitious scheme of naval expansion. As the population of the United Kingdom is only two-thirds that of Germany, while her naval expenditure is four times as great, it is very evident that Germany should be able, for some time to come, to spend annually considerably larger sums in improving her navy than Great Britain can probably afford to do.

The German army, too, although a much larger and more efficient fighting force than Britain possesses, costs very little more than the British army does. In 1905-1906 the total cost of the British army, of less than 300,000 men, was about £30,000,000. The cost of the German army for the previous year, with a strength upon mobilisation of upwards of 3,000,000 men, was only £32,000.000. Thus, Germany, spending as she does little move on her Army than Great Britain does on hers, and with a much larger population, should be able to spend much more on her navy than the latter Power.

It must be remembered, too, that the total cost of our navy and army falls almost exclusively on the British taxpayer; for the colonial contribution to the navy, in proportion to its total cost, is so infinitesimally small as to be almost a negligible quantity. This seems hardly fair to the British taxpayer, whose interest in maintaining the sea-power of the Empire is at least not greater than that of the colonial taxpayer.

The principle underlying British naval expenditure is the maintenance of a navy of sufficient strength to be equal to that of a possible combination of any two other Powers. If, say, Germany and Russia were to commence to increase their naval strength more rapidly than they have been doing, it might be difficult for Great Britain to maintain the two-Power standard of superiority. The strain on her resources might be too great. What, then, can be done.

To Preserve the Supremacy of British Sea-Power?

The answer has already been partially, if indirectly, indicated page 12 during the course of this article. But it will perhaps he better to indicate more definitely, and in greater detail, the lines on which the solution of the problem seems to depend.

In the first place, it seems evident that the Empire should be defended by the Empire. This apparent parados means that all parts of the Empire—Canada, the Commonwealth, New Zealand, South Africa, and all the other colonies and possessions, whether self-governing or not—should contribute according to their means to the support and maintenance of the Imperial navy.

In the second place, Great Britain should endeavour to form a strong defensive alliance with the United States of America, as well as with Japan. France is at present a friendly naval power, and might possibly be included in the proposed alliance. She is highly antagonistic to Germany, and has a strong naval force. It should be Great Britain's policy, however, to avoid, as far as possible, all chances of becoming involved or entangled in European continental complications; and an alliance with France might render such an entanglement unavoidable. America and Japan, on the other hand, like Great Britain, are isolated sea powers; and a strong defensive alliance with them would be less likely to produce frictional complications with other countries.

Let us first discuss the question of

Colonial Contributions to the Imperial Navy.

If all iiritish colonies were to contribute to the support of the Imperial navy in proportion to their means, the present naval supremacy of the Empire would be considerably strengthened, and would therefore be more likely to be maintained. The present population of the United Kingdom is about 48,000,000. The annual cost of the navy, as we have seen, is about £41,000.000, or nearly £1 per head of the population, and almost the whole of this cost is borne by the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland. We can take it, therefore that, in the meantime, this cost is not as yet too burdensome to the British taxpayer; although, as has already been pointed out, the burden, if it goes on increasing, will necessarily, sooner or later, reach straining, if not breaking point.

Any contributions made by the colonies towards the support of the navy, might very well, therefore, be either an addition to this sum, or a proportionate part of it, or of whatever larger sum might be required. A satisfactory scheme of voluntary contributions can no doubt be formulated. The total white population of the great self-governing colonies of the Empire is roughly about 15,000.000, so that it can be readily seen that even a small per capita contribution from these would materially lighten the burden of Imperial naval defence; while at the same time it might materially increase the strength and efficiency of the navy. In any case, the principle itself, page 13 that each unit of the Empire should contribute in proportion to its means to the general defence, is certainly a sound one. At present we have an example of how the principle has been already applied in the case of

The Australasian Squadron.

The agreement entered into in 1887 between the Mother Country, Australia, and New Zealand, in regard to the Australasian Squadron, seems to suggest a basis upon which colonial contributions to the Imperial Navy may possibly be satisfactorily arranged. If not an actual basis, it is, at all events, suggestive of a means of settlement.

This agreement, which has been confirmed by Statute by all the Australasian Parliaments, provides for the payment by New Zealand Australia of a proportionate part of the cost of establishing and maintaining an additional naval force, to be employed for the protection of the floating trade in Australasian waters. Under it the [unclear: t] consists of five fast cruisers and two torpedo gunboats. Three cruisers and one gunboat are to be always kept in commission. The remainder are to be held in reserve in Australasian ports, ready for common when the occasion arises. In time of peace two ships are to be stationed in New Zealand waters as their headquarters.

The first cost of the ships is paid out of Imperial funds, and vessels are fully equipped and manned. The agreement also provides that the colonies already mentioned shall pay to the Imperial Government interest on the first and principal cost at the rate of five per cent annually up to a certain amount, and shall also bear the actual charges of the vessels from year to year. At present New Zealand pays yearly some £40,000, and Australia £200,000; but these payments could if necessary, as the late Mr. Seddon suggested, be considerably increased without over-burdening the contributory states.

The squadron is to be wholly at the disposal of the Imperial Government in time of war.

An Extension of the Contributory Principle required.

The principle involved in the establishment and maintenance of the Australasian Squadron seems to be a sound one; and the experiment is one that might with advantage be made in regard to the other over sea colonies of the Empire. At all events it recognises the expedience of, and makes provision for, the payment of a definite contribution by the Commonwealth and New Zealand towards the naval defence of the Empire. This being done, the arrangement made is necessarily applicable to the other British colonies and dependencies, or can be made so. The proposal to make the principle applicable to the parts of the Empire seems to be one that should be of ready application. The position would be that the separate portions of the Empire would each voluntarily consent to pay to the British page 14 Government a certain annual sum, proportionate to their means, for definite concessions in regard to the navy. The arrangement could easily he continued until the time was ripe for the establishment, say, of an

Advisory Council of Imperial Naval Defence,

in which all parts of the Empire were represented. At present there is in existence a British Committee of Imperial Defence, which included, last year, the British Premier, as Chairman, Lord Roberts, and the chief officers of the Admiralty and the War Office. Its functions are to consider all questions of Imperial Defence from the point of view of the Navy, the Military forces, India, and the Colonies; to obtain and collate information in regard to defence matters; and to furnish the British Government with such advice as may be necessary. The Committee is purely an advisory one, and has no executive functions whatever. This Committee is regarded by the British Governments as merely the beginning of what in time may develop into a wider and more comprehensive scheme. To the Colonies, certainly, the institution under discussion, limited as it is in its membership to the officials of the Admiralty and War Office, seems too narrow in scope to be able to efficiently advise on the defence matters of a vast empire.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that this limited committee will soon develop into some such general body as a representative Defence Council of the Empire. Such a representative body as this should be speedily in a position to advise, efficiently and effectively, on the best methods to be followed in order to ensure the maintenance of British Supremacy at Sea. It could also, without difficulty, formulate some satisfactory scheme of both representation and contribution to the defence fund.

In the next place, there can be little question that, in order to preserve her sea-sovereignty, and thus keep her empire safe from attack, and possible dismemberment, Great Britain should form such

Defensive Alliances

with foreign powers as would tend to preserve the peace of the world. For a long time her statesmen have pursued a policy of splendid isolation, but the time for that seems to have gone by. Indeed, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905 indicates the termination of the policy of isolation, and renders it more probable that British statesmen will see the advisability of maintaining the cohesion and solidarity of the Empire by forming other and stronger alliances on similar lines.

The objects of this Treaty, as set out in the preamble, are:—

(a)	The consolidation and maintenance of the General Peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India.
(b)	The preservation of the commercial interests of all Powers in China by ensuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese page 15 Empire, and the principle of equal opportunities foe the commerce and industries of all nations in China,
(c)	The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contacting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia, and of India, and the defence of their special interests in these regions.

The articles of the treaty specify how the carrying out of these objects may be achieved, and under what conditions the one Power may, when necessary, come to the armed assistance of the other.

It should not be difficult for Great Britain and Japan to arrange a defensive alliance with the United States of America on somewhat similar lines. Such a treaty might well deal with the propection of the commerce and sea-trade of the three countries, and the general preservation of peace at sea. All three nations are isolated sea-powers to whom the internal complications of Europe are not of [unclear: treme] importance. In alliance, they would be too strong for any possible naval combination that could be formed against them. They would then have supreme control of the sea, without the slightest possibility of having that supremacy wrested from them. Great Britain, with her stronger navy, would be the dominant partner of the alliance, and would, therefore, as at present, still maintain her sea-sovereignty.

America should be the natural ally of Great Britain and her colonies. The two nations are practically one in blood and speech. Combined they represent a white population of nearly 150,000,000, of [unclear: dred] aims and interests. Their resources are almost unlimited; their power of expansion almost equally so. Their common aim is the preservation of the peace of the world.

Japan, too, should come into the alliance. There is no practical reason why she should not. The little pin-prick of colour feeling, that is temporarily irritating the people of Japan and America, will soon disappear, and will not be likely to retard the solution of the great problem of the preservation of the general peace. Japan would be an almost necessary factor of the alliance, in order to balance in the East the preponderance of Britain and America in the West. It would be of the utmost importance to the colonies of Australasia, and the other British possessions in the Pacific, that Japan should be a member of the suggested alliance. Indeed, it is greatly to be desired, in the interests of Australasia, that Japan, with her 50 millions of population, and her great and growing military and naval strength, and her comparative nearness to the Pacific colonies of the Empire, should remain a friendly power in alliance with Great Britain.

Great Britain, America, and Japan, as we have stated, are isolated sea-powers, whose common interests are, first, the preservation of peace at sea, and, second, the continuance of the general peace of the world. Neither of them has much interest in the frictional differences that may arise between any of the countries of Europe in regard to their page 16 European territories, except is so far as the establishment of the military and territorial predominance in Europe of any one Power, such as Germany, might prejudicially affect their own interests from naval or military point of view.

The chief obstacle in the way of the formation of a triple alliance between the Powers mentioned, will be found to be in the unwillingness of American statesmen to depart from the traditionary implications of the Monroe doctrine. But an alliance, such as the one suggested, need not in the slightest degree interfere with the principle underlying Monroism. It would rather strengthen the doctrine, than otherwise, and give it additional international weight and importance. If the main objects of the alliance were the preservation of the existing rights of each member, and there was a joint determination to resist any attempts on the part of any other nation to encroach upon these rights, then, the combined navies of the three Powers would be a guarantee of a prolonged and perhaps a general peace.

Already some leading Americans advocate the establishment of a defensive union between Great Britain and America; and no doubt, if the attempt were strenuously made, it might soon become an accomplished fact.

An Anglo American-Japanese alliance, or defence purposes would tend to secure a long, if not a permanent peace. The longer the general peace of the world is maintained, the more does trade and commerce increase and prosper; the kindlier is the feeling engendered amongst the people of the world; and the more will militarism languish and tend to die away. National prosperity, the world's progress, depends on the preservation of the peace of the world. Militarism feeds on war, and without war would die of inanation. While war is possible, however, armaments must be kept up as a guarantee of peace and justice. As a guarantee, too, of the preservation of her Empire, Great Britain must maintain her sea supremacy; and the most feasible method by which she can do this, is, as we have pointed out, for each part of the Empire to contribute, in proportion to its means, to a general scheme of naval defence; and, secondly, the Empire, to enter into a defensive alliance with such combined Powers as America and Japan.