Battle of the Somme.

The formidable assault which was launched by German arms in the middle of February, 1916, against the great Fortress of Verdun, and which had been maintained at an enormous cost in lives and material, had by the month of June reached what was considered to be its highest point of intensity. Up to that stage the valiant French Armies had withstood the most desperate German efforts to reach their objective; but it was nevertheless seriously felt that the time had arrived when some great counter-stroke should be launched in order to relieve the French of this continuous and must exhausting pressure. It was, indeed, not long before this feeling was to find formidable expression; for preparations were at once begun for the opening of a great British Offensive on the Somme front. The projected offensive had really a two-fold purpose, as in addition to the fact that it was calculated primarily to divert German reserves from Verdun to the north, it would also represent a great endeavour to break through the vaunted German lines of defence which had been built up there during two years or more of incessant labour and engineering skill.

On the morning of July 1st, 1916, the first burst of the British attack swept like a hurricane over the enemy lines, extending from the terrible salient of Gommecourt in the north to Frise in the south. How the terrific succession of British assaults on that memorable opening day broke with such murderous results against the formidable walls of the defences of Gommecourt in the north, and how at the close of the day the enemy line had been smashed between Fricourt and Frise in the south, and of the ebb and flow of victory during succeeding days and weeks, must remain among the most memorable and most sanguinary events in the history of the War.

It was into the vortex of this Somme Offensive, or rather series of distinct Somme Battles, that the Regiment, as part of the New Zealand Division, was thrown during the month of September. Though it had not up to that date been identified with any major operations on the Western Front, the Regiment had conclusively proved its worth during several months of active trench-to-trench warfare. But its participation in the Somme Battle was to earn for it a newer and wider fame and reveal its higher qualities as a fighting force, with initiative and extraordinary determination and intensity of purpose as its outstanding characteristics. Thus, along with the several units of the New Zealand Division the Otago Regiment entered the Somme with that dominant fighting spirit ever the fruitful parent of valorous deeds, and also with a lively anticipation of desperate adventure on hand. And in the whole series of operations in which it was engaged, its best fighting reputation was more than maintained. The sacrifices demanded were exceedingly heavy, but when in the early part of October the Regiment, woefully thinned arid weakened, marched out of the Somme, it had made for itself a new and a greater name and worthily merited its share of the splendid tributes bestowed on the New Zealand Division by the Higher Commands.

It would be well to preface the account of the Regiment's participation in the Somme Battle by a description of the country over which the general operations extended. The enemy's main position was sited on high undulating ground which, rising to more than 500 feet above sea-level, formed the watershed between the Some on the one side and the rivers of south-western Belgium on the other. On the southern face of this watershed, which ran generally from east-south-east to west-north-west, the ground fell in a series of long irregular spurs and deep depressions to the valley of the Somme. Along the forward slopes of this face the enemy's first system of defence, starting from the Somme near Curlu, extended first northwards for 3,000 yards and then westwards for 7,000 yards to near Fricourt, where it turned nearly due north, forming a great salient angle in the enemy's lines. Approximately 10,000 yards north of Fricourt the trenches crossed the River Ancre, a tributary of the Somme, and continuing northwards passed over the summit of the watershed, page break

Major-General SirA. H. Russell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., (d.), [f.]
General Officer Commanding New Zealand Division.

page break page 113 about Hebuterne and Gommecourt, and down its northern spurs to Arras. Between the Somme and the Ancre, on a frontage of about 20,000 yards, the enemy had a second strong system of defences, established generally on the southern crest of the highest part of the watershed, at an average distance of from 3,000 to 5,000 yards behind the first system of trenches.

The whole of these defences, as a result of about two years' preparations, had been rendered very formidable indeed. The first and second systems comprised several lines of deep trenches, protected by great belts of wire entanglements. The woods and villages between these systems had been converted into fortresses, and the existing cellars and chalk-pits supplemented by elaborately constructed dugouts. The enemy salients were particularly well defended, and every provision made for bringing enfilade machine gun fire across the front. Spacious dug-outs afforded shelter to the garrisoning troops during periods of heavy bombardment, and concrete machine gun emplacements were so arranged as to enable the trenches to be swept in the event of their capture. The whole system was one of extraordinary strength and depth. The enemy had other prepared lines of defence behind his second system of trenches. Between the Somme and the Ancre our trenches ran parallel and dose to those of the enemy, but below them; and while good direct observation was afforded over the German front system and also over the defences on the slopes between the first and second systems, the latter in many places could not be observed from the ground held by us. North of the Ancre the opposing trenches ran transversely across the main ridge, and there the enemy defences were equally formidable. At that point the enemy enjoyed no material advantage in the matter of command of ground; though mainly owing to the nature of the country our direct observation over the enemy country was not as good as it was further south.

The 11th September found the Regiment within close call of battle. The two Battalions were resting, the 1st at Fricourt, and the 2nd outside Mametz Wood, and at both places the final preparations and finishing touches were being effected prior to going into action. During the succeedingpage 114 few days officers of both Battalions availed themselves of every opportunity of becoming acquainted as far as possible with the ground over which the impending attack was to take place; lengthy conferences were held, maps were closely studied, and everything possible done by exhaustive preliminary preparation to ensure the success of operations.

In leaving the Armentieres area and moving to the area of the Some, the New Zealand Division had passed from the Second Army, under General Plumer, to the Fourth Army, under General Rawlinson, and was now incorporated in the XV. Corps.

On September 12th it was announced that the Fourth Army and the Reserve Army, together with the French, who were on our right, were to attack the enemy simultaneously on September 15th. The Fourth Army was confronted with an ambitious programme. It was to attack the enemy's defences with a view to the capture of Morval-le-Boeufs, Gueudecourt and Flers, and at the same time break through the strong enemy defences in the areas of those villages. The attack was to be pushed home with the utmost vigour until the most distant objectives had been reached. For the preceding two and a half months, it was pointed out, we had been unceasingly wearing down the enemy until his morale was badly shaken; and it was therefore confidently . hoped that a combined and determined effort, such as that about to be made, would result in decisive victory. It is true that British strength and British valour had been employed against the iron walls of the great German defensive system for two and a half months; that artillery beyond anything previously used or thought of had been brought to bear against him; but fortified as he was behind those terrible barriers of wire and other ramifications of almost impenetrable defence, it is doubtful if his morale was as severely shaken as might reasonably have been supposed. The desperate and sustained nature of his resistance certainly did not justify this conclusion.

The participation of the XV. Corps in the attack included the New Zealand, the 14th, and the 41st Divisions; and in line of battle the New Zealand Division was placed on the Corps left, while the 47th Division, of the 111. Corps, was in turn on our left.

The objective assigned to the New Zealand Division was to be attacked by the 2nd Infantry Brigade and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, with the 1st Infantry Brigade in Divisional reserve. The 2nd Infantry Brigade was selected to attack and capture the first objective, with a limit of two battalions for that purpose, and with the remaining two battalions intact and not to be used without reference to the G.O.C. Division.

The various lines of the Corps objective will serve more clearly to illustrate the scope and nature of the task in which the New Zcalanders were to be employed. Enumerated in order, they were briefly as follows:—1st—The line of Switch Trench. 2nd—The line of Flers and Fat Trenches, extending along the front of Flers village and running practically parallel to Switch Trench. On the left there was a divergence from Flers Trench in the direction of and along the high ground of Fat Trench and thence back to the point of the cross-roads junctioned by Flag Lane in order to straighten out the general line. 3rd—The village of Flers, and a line extending from Flers support on the left up to Abbey Road, and thence across the tear of the village and along Bulls Road to the right. 4th—The final objective, which was to embrace the village of Gueudecourt and its northern outskirts, and the intervening country and trench systems. The 2nd Brigade attacking troops were to assemble forward of Worcester and Tea Trenches (two battalions), and in Savoy and Carlton Trenches (two battalions); and the 3rd Brigade troops just forward of the two 2nd Brigade rear battalions and to the left of Longueval; while two battalions of the 1st Infantry Brigade were to assemble in Mametz Wood, and two battalions (including the 1st Battalion of Otago) in Fricourt Wood, ready to move at 15 minutes' notice in the event of being required.

The 1st and 2nd New Zealand Field Artillery Brigades, and the artillery of the 14th Division, were immediately supporting the New Zealand Division's share in the general attack. A heavy and devastating bombardment of the hostile defences over the area we ace concerned with had commenced on the 12th September, and the sullen roar and rumble of hundreds of guns of many calibres pounding at and endeavouring to destroy the extensive German defence system already augured well for the 15th.

In not a few respects the impending attack had new and strange features for the Regiment. The weight of concentrated artillery employed was infinitely greater than anything hitherto experienced; the attack was to be carried out behind what might be described as the protective screen of advancing walls of steel—technically known as the creeping barrage; there were to be in the air contact aeroplanes which would keep in constant touch with the infantry and register for the information of those concerned the line or points which had been reached, determined by spotting the ground flares lit by the infantry when on their objective, or by personal observation; and, of more moment and interest than all else, the occasion was the first on which tanks, those monstrous and fantastic creations of the mechanical mind, were to make their appearance. How much the tanks actually fulfilled of all that had been predicted of them, on this occasion at least, is a matter that invites some argument. The number employed with the New Zealand Division was four, and in view of the fact that at least three of them were quickly out of action owing either to mechanical troubles or inability to cope with the great craters and shell-holes and upheavals which they encountered, it might perhaps have been wiser to have delayed their appearance until such time as they could have been assembled in greater numbers. One of the four tanks allotted to the Division did actually perform extraordinarily effective work, reaching and passing beyond the village of Flers, breathing death and destruction as it lumbered along its track and instilling fear of a kind hitherto unknown into those of the enemy who encountered it; for, gazing at it for a second, in terror they fled precipitately.

In keeping with the policy of attack laid down for September 15th, no pause was to be made on the line of Coffee-Crest Trenches, which were to be dealt with by "mopping-up" parties specially detailed, On reaching the first objective no further advance was to be made until one hour after zero—which, clearly expressed, is the time the attack opens—after which the artillery barrage was to begin creeping forward towards the line of the second objective. Two hours after zero the infantry were to advance for the capture of the third objective; and four and a half hours after zero they were to move forward to the assault and capture of the page 117 final objective and the formation of a defensive flank facing west. It will be agreed that an attack must be laid down on specific and express lines of procedure; in other words, on the basis of a time-table, in order to produce unanimity and co-ordination of action at all points and to work out a definite and accurately timed programme of artillery cooperation. This is what is aimed at, and normally what would be achieved; but there are incidents and various checks and fluctuations in the tide of battle which at times rather seriously interfere with the execution of this prearranged programme, and it is then that initiative and quick decision translated into rapid action on the part of those in command of the situation are of priceless value.

To resume the narrative of the Regiment's operations, on September 12th the 2nd Battalion, at fighting strength, marched up to the right front of High Wood and took up a position, handed over by the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, in Wood Lane, Worcester Trench, and Seaforth Trench, Battalion Headquarters establishing itself in an old German dug-out. During the night patrols went out towards Crest Trench, which was then part of the German front line, while digging parties connected Farm Trench with Wood Lane. The following day the Battalion commenced an important work in the construction of a new line, to be named Otago Trench, which extended to the west and connected Tea Trench with the Apex near High Wood. This work was taken over next day by one company of Wellington Battalion and one company of Canterbury Battalion and completed. At this stage the 1st Battalion of Otago had reached Fricourt Wood, arriving there about 11 o'clock at night and bivouacking. This brings us to the evening preceding the attack. The 2nd Battalion was in position and ready for the serious events of the morning. To make assurance doubly sure Lieut.-Colonel Smith had a long conference with his Company Commanders on the task that lay before them, and with a feeling that everything was in order, there was no reason to doubt that on the following morning the Battalion would acquit itself gallantly and well in this new phase of fighting. Much useful information had been gained by Sergt. R. Travis as a result of an exhaustive night reconnaissance of the area of Switch Trenches.