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CHAPTER 12
Defence by the People

ON 20 May 1940, amid the rising agitation, the government announced that the Territorials and the National Military Reserve would be trained more intensively. The latter would supplement Territorial fortress troops in defence of ports, while the Territorials themselves, 16 000 just before the war but depleted by enlistment into the Expeditionary Force, would be increased, though the numbers intended were not stated. The rate of training quickened, beginning with officers and NCOs who attended district schools of instruction while living at home,¹ and tented camps were rapidly prepared or extended, notably at Waiouru but also at Ngaruawahia and at several racecourses, where Territorials would train for three months in warmer weather. On 3 October, Jones, Minister of Defence, gave figures: by the end of March 1941 the Territorials, numbering 25 985, would have had three months' training in camp, so with 9572 men in additional units and 8491 in the National Military Reserve, there would be a ‘splendid Defence Force’ of just over 44 000;² on 3 April 1941 he claimed that this objective was nearing achievement.³

This was orderly expansion and, in view of the equipment required, all that could be managed while sending substantial reinforcements overseas.⁴ During 1940–1, fighting was in North Africa, Greece, Crete and Syria; Britain, not New Zealand, was threatened with invasion. But in the mood of mid-1940 the home defence programme then sketched by the government seemed insufficient and too slow. The general imprecise clamour for conscription included home defence, while the practical do-it-yourself traditions of many New Zealanders suggested immediate and active steps.

In England a few days after the invasion of the Low Countries on 10 May, a Home Guard was called for and sprang up literally

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overnight, with a quarter million volunteers in 24 hours, little previous planning, much zeal and a good deal of chaos at the start. Obviously there was no comparable urgency in New Zealand, but with France falling so fast, with invasion lowering at Britain, and Churchill saying that we would fight on, if necessary from the Dominions beyond the sea, attack suddenly seemed not impossible. Also it was soon clear that German victories had increased Japan's inclination towards the Axis; Japan was finding reasons for moving south, pressing against those valuable and vulnerable ex-colonies, French Indo–China and the Netherlands East Indies, and talking of her proper destiny in South-East Asia and the South Seas.

Pressure grew for a citizen army to defend hearth and home, for a rural militia to guard the coast. Writers to newspapers, singly and in batches, wanted to prepare for an emergency.⁵ Ex-Territorials and returned soldiers, farmers whose production responsibilities held them to the land, deer-stalkers and rifle clubs⁶ urged home defence much on the lines that were eventually taken: fit men of 18–55 years not eligible for overseas or Territorial service, unpaid, trained in weekends and evenings by returned men, armed and organised by the government, ready to repel any invasion, but probably deterring any such attempt by their very preparedness.

Some even proposed forces almost independent of the government. In Canterbury during May, a colonel offered to raise 1000 men as a special military reserve and to counter Fifth Column work⁷ and in June the Canterbury Territorial Association devised a scheme for training Class III men (those with no soldiering experience) without calling on the permanent staff.⁸ At least one local organisation, the New Plymouth National Service Corps, was formed ‘with the approval of the Government’ to raise a body of fit men available for any emergency or to further the war effort, with activities ranging from military drill and route marching to fund raising and gardening for soldiers' wives, until it should be absorbed into any wider government scheme.⁹ Earlier, in March 1940, a local home defence impulse at Tirau and Matamata, mainly among RSA members who

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began enrolments and training, had met assurances that the government would provide adequately against any possible enemy action; Tirau's desire to assist was greatly appreciated but the acceptance of all such offers would involve training, arming and equipping the greater portion of men between 17 and 60, some 500 000 in all, which was neither necessary nor practical; they would render most service by joining the Territorials or the National Military Reserve.¹⁰

Prominent in agitation was the Auckland Farmers' Union. Although assured in June by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence¹¹ that there were adequate plans for any possible hostility and that the government would increase its forces, if necessary, within the framework of the armed services, this body led the Dominion Farmers' Union Conference to send a deputation to the Prime Minister on 17 July, offering the services of the Union to the Defence Department. Local Farmers' Union branches, they proposed, would appoint officers and NCOs of experience, and consider methods of defending stretches of coast, guarding bridges, roads and so on. They recognised that it must be under military control, not be an independent Farmers' Union force, which would not be favoured by the public.¹² It was, commented the Hawke's Bay Daily Mail of 19 July, a splendid gesture by patriotic citizens with no suggestion of usurping the powers or duties of military authority.

Clearly, all this energy had to be directed into government-run channels. Already, one grass-roots defence movement had been accepted. On 4 July, when an Opposition member complained that hundreds of mounted men offering themselves for local defence had been refused, D. G. McMillan replied that they could not pick their own jobs; no government could run a war with ‘Portuguese armies’, letting every Tom, Dick and Harry form himself into a group and decide what he would do.¹³ But on 16 July the government, recognising the fervour to be up and doing, called for nine independent regional mounted rifle squadrons to assist the Territorials in hilly country, especially as snipers and mounted scouts. The training required was 40 days a year, which could be done mainly at weekends, and they need not attend camps like Territorials. At the end of August Army officers, on tour to select leaders and make arrangements, reported over-many volunteers in some districts.¹⁴

On 18 July the Prime Minister told the Farmers' Union deputation that the matter was in hand, that a committee was meeting

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that very evening to discuss how such abilities and zeal could be used.¹⁵ This committee, headed by National Service Department chiefs, decided that to satisfy the widespread desire to serve the country and to avoid setting up independent overlapping groups, there should be a voluntary, government-run, locally organised, non-military force, reasonably trained and fit, to do anything from coast-watching while at their daily work to assisting the police or serving with the Army in emergency. Organisation and scope of training were also outlined. These proposals went to War Cabinet on 23 July.¹⁶ Major-General Duigan,¹⁷ Chief of the General Staff, had explained to the committee on 18 July that the Army was fully occupied. Besides the Expeditionary Force it was training the Territorial Force, which at war establishment would number 29 000; also the nine new squadrons of mounted rifles and 5000 men in the National Reserve, guarding ports.¹⁸ Army headquarters on 31 July made it clear to the National Service Department that it expected only very limited assistance from the proposed body, and could do very little for it.

No uniforms, arms or ammunition would be issued unless or until any unit was taken over by the Army, and meanwhile, though the Army might train a few instructors and lend a few Territorial NCOs, the use of arms and range practice was opposed. ‘While the Army may and probably will be able to make considerable use of the organisation in an emergency, it is felt that any suggestion that it is wholly or principally a military organisation should be studiously avoided…. The Army has its hands full and further burdens are undesirable at the present time’.¹⁹

On 28 July the Minister of Defence broadcast that a new home defence force would be produced soon. It was outlined to the RSA, which was asked to nominate suitable men as district and area leaders.²⁰ War Cabinet finally approved the Home Guard on 2 August 1940, and on 17 August the Emergency Reserve Corps Regulations were gazetted, linking three organisations under the National Service Department, with Semple its Minister. The Women's War Service Auxiliary was to carry on;²¹ local authorities were required to prepare

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emergency precautions schemes to cope with natural disasters or with war, tasks which many had already done, or at least started, under earlier direction from the Department of Internal Affairs; the Home Guard was a new creation.

The Home Guard was to be a semi-military body, with a Dominion commander, three Military District commanders, and 16 area officers appointed by the government from those nominated by the RSA. Local authorities would organise details and foster growth through committees—existing EPS committees, it was thought, could be utilised, linking the two organisations; leaders below area commanders would be chosen by these committees. Individual units would be based on communities rather than geographical boundaries, with schools and public halls as the usual meeting places. The Home Guard would be voluntary, unpaid, open to all males over 16 not already in the armed forces, and it would work in the evenings and at weekends. It would give physical and military training based on Army manuals, and would provide pickets, patrols and sentries as needed. It would be trained to co-operate with the armed forces and in emergency could by proclamation be incorporated into these forces. Ultimately rifles and ammunition would be issued for training, and there would be uniforms, but at present there were only armbands and no rifles. Robert Semple, the Minister, and his lieutenant, David Wilson,²² with the newly appointed Dominion commander, Major-General Robert Young,²³ would tour the country to meet local authorities and explain details.²⁴

Generally newspapers approved, often with a better-late-than-never note; they also expressed wariness of overlapping by Home Guard and Emergency Precautions Services, and hoped that arms and military supervision would appear quickly—‘a weekly course of physical culture is not an essential contribution to national defence’, remarked the Southland Times on 19 August. There was widespread feeling that the energetic Semple had much to explain. Semple spoke of giving 300 000 men excluded from other military duty a useful part in defence, especially those in rural areas, over 46 years of age, who

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were wanting an immediate outlet for their feelings and energy— ‘frothing to do some hard useful work without thought of payment’—wanting only the satisfaction of making themselves ready to defend their country, of practising with their mates. They could train in their own communities, meeting once a week, with about 30 men making a unit, four units a company, and four companies a group. ‘Getting fit’ was the keynote of the idea, said Semple, and in fact physical exercises were the only activities that could be started at once without equipment and with minimum organisation. But succeeding stages were also indicated, leading through semaphore, signalling, rifle drill, patrol and picket work and camping out at night, to company drill, entrenchments, field exercises and the blocking and clearing of roads. ‘Ultimately’ there would be rifles and ammunition; the government would issue armbands, and units ‘might provide themselves with clothes or suits of one type for special occasions.’ He also mentioned the checking of rumours and taking the oath of allegiance.²⁵

Objectives were set before local authorities rather more succinctly. The Mayor of Timaru, candidly aiming to clear up misapprehension, published much of a circular he had received from the Director of National Service which set forth the Home Guard's purposes as: (1) to have the available manpower organised to deal with any national emergency such as earthquake, flood, invasion, air raid or attack, in conjunction with the EPS organisations; (2) to have a reasonably trained and fully organised body of men immediately available and ready to support the armed forces; (3) to provide an outlet for the latent energy and urge to do something physical and tangible in the war effort; (4) to exercise effective government control, and to avoid the growth of sporadic and irresponsible organisations; (5) to exercise an effective and wholesome restraint upon the starting or spreading of rumours or canards.²⁶

By the time Semple and Wilson had made their tour and the enrolment forms were ready in late September, the mood of excitement was beginning to ebb. The crisis in Britain was steadying, with invasion seeming less imminent. London, having withstood the massive daylight raids of August to mid-September, was solidly enduring its nightly bombings, and reports of RAF raids on Germany territory matched in exaggeration those of Luftwaffe losses. Although

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Japan on 27 September had signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, newspapers treated this quietly and there was no immediate widespread apprehension.

Pressure for the Home Guard had come largely from country areas, and generally early recruiting there was more enthusiastic than in the towns.²⁷ Farmers were aware of their open lonely coasts, and they did not have the comfortable sight, familiar in cities, of soldiers in uniform; the urge to defend their own acres was strong, and they felt that they themselves must come forward before they could expect men on wages to do so. Some, sensitive about the sneer that farms were ‘funk-holes’, welcomed the chance to be active in defence as well as in production. Enthusiasm depended a good deal on local leadership and varied widely; for instance, a Taranaki officer marvelled why Patea with a population of 1500 could parade 320 men, while Hawera, population 5 000, could muster only 180.²⁸

Cities were slower. By mid-October Wellington leaders were complaining of apathy, and their complaints continued for several months.²⁹ At Auckland, despite vigorous advertising³⁰ the Mayor spoke of poor response and inexplicable apathy when only 1400 had enrolled by 12 December. ‘Response by Dunedin men has been disappointing in the extreme’ reported the Otago Daily Times on 24 January; some keen units had been formed, but there were only 1200 enlistments from a population of 80 000. When, on a wet March night at a Hamilton suburb only 40 men, many already enrolled, turned up to form a unit, the Mayor spoke disgustedly of ‘a bomb or two’ being needed to waken people in the town to their obligations.³¹

Lack of accident insurance was an objection made frequently, and, although scornfully dismissed by Semple,³² this was amended by a new enrolment form early in November.³³ Another source of doubt was the rumour that the Home Guard might be used for strike-

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breaking. The suggestion came from the Communist party, and Semple complained of a subversive document distributed all over the country by persons sneaking about like thieves in the night³⁴ but it had more effect than most communist utterances.³⁵ For instance, the Christchurch enlistment sub-committee discussed workers having such fears and criticised the government for not making clear the objects of the Home Guard, thus weakening confidence; so did the Manawatu Trades Council, and the Mayor of Palmerston North remarked that the regulations spoke of its military use in an emergency but left the government to decide what was an emergency.³⁶

Certainly the opening clauses of the Regulations were wide: ‘For the purpose of assisting in preparation and operation of plans for securing the public safety, the defence of New Zealand and the prosecution of any war in which His Majesty may be engaged, and of plans for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community….’ The final clause also, which provided for calling up the Home Guard, or any section of it, as part of the Army, when considered necessary by the Governor-General against enemy action or the threat of it, could be viewed askance by the doubtful. Further, a formidable new Regulation (1940/259) on 30 September had given the Attorney-General power, in the interests of public safety, the war effort, or maintaining essential industries, to have anyone dismissed from employment or a union, not only for acts done but also for acts anticipated. With this in the immediate background, the possibility of Massey-like³⁷ handling of strikes could well seem far from remote.

Semple, as a Minister, did not speak openly of possible attack by Japan, though this was a theme favoured by less public advocates of enlistment such as trade union speakers, not reported in the papers, and factory workers were puzzled by the apparent conflict between

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these speeches³⁸ and Semple's utterances such as: ‘we can meet the external danger only if we are organised; and we can look after the internal traitor too, if we are organised’³⁹ or ‘I do not want to create a panic … I say definitely that this country is in danger. … It would not do if everyone was permitted to yell out what had happened. That might lead to panic. We cannot tell the people all that we know as it might be used against us. Every country has its Fifth Column and we have it here in New Zealand also.’⁴⁰ Indeed, Semple's fervour against the Fifth Column, and his tendency to see all pacifists and Communists as active agents of it, contributed both to alarm and to reluctance. Thus the Oamaru branch of the Labour party protested against his ‘outrageous utterances’, saying that while the term ‘Fifth Column’ remained vague, such incitements to summary violent actions were too like those a Fascist leader might give his storm troopers, and introduced trends quite foreign to democratic justice.⁴¹ That the Farmers' Union praised Semple's efforts in the Home Guard, while pointing out that its formation was first proposed by itself,⁴² did not increase working class faith in either Semple or the Home Guard. Some, particularly older men, found it hard to forget that Semple and other leaders now urging everyone to defend the country had opposed the last war, in gaol.⁴³

Many forces combatted apathy. Trade union organisers and employers tackled the workers;⁴⁴ in the Public Service every controlling officer was asked to act as a recruiting agent;⁴⁵ there were Home Guard parades and route marches through suburbs; local government officials spoke for it on every possible occasion. The government refrained as much as possible from talk of attack by Japan,⁴⁶ yet even Fraser in October 1940 spoke of the tide of war rolling up near New Zealand's own shores,⁴⁷ and Major-General Young on

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27 November said that whereas in the last war New Zealand did not have to worry about defence, now a power in the East had said that the British were going to lose the war and was backing the enemy.⁴⁸ In February 1941 War Cabinet member Gordon Coates spoke of Japan, armed to the teeth with the latest weapons, coming into the fray.⁴⁹ Plainly, if unofficially, the idea was about that Japan was the enemy likely to invade the beaches.

Truth attributed apathy to lack of information or training. Appeals about the urgency of the war situation were not enough, men wanted to know that they would learn something useful in modern mechanised warfare, not merely spend evenings at physical jerks and army drill, plus an occasional route march. It spoke of the British being trained to move without being seen, in street fighting, road-block making, of smoke-bombs made from cow-dung and anti-tank bombs from bottles, and called for publicity on what the Home Guard was actually doing.⁵⁰

This of course bore on the first difficulty. What could the Home Guard do, starting from scratch, with no immediate help from the Army? Despite a general instruction for co-operation, the Army declared itself unable to lend rifles, etc, or to provide instruction until about the end of March 1941.⁵¹ Early parades were often a nightmare to those responsible. With no equipment and few qualified instructors it was hard to keep the rank and file from standing about feeling bored and futile.⁵² Each unit had to work out its own salvation, using emergent leadership, acquiring instructors from the Territorials and the National Reserve, often with NCOs learning at mid-week classes what they taught their men in the weekend. Those who had rifles brought them to meetings for teaching purposes; some zealous units acquired poles of rifle weight for arms drill, while stoutly denying ‘broomstick army’ rumours.⁵³

In December 1940 the Physical Welfare Branch of Internal Affairs began training Home Guard leaders in non-military, recreation-type exercises,⁵⁴ but even this took time to spread. For instance, at the end of February the commander of the Wellington area remarked that arrangements were nearly complete for physical training on

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modern lines. However, by the end of April in three large districts (Auckland, central North Island and Wellington) there were only 400 trained instructors.⁵⁵

In November the tasks in which the Home Guard would assist the Army had been listed⁵⁶ and on 2 December Semple announced them. It would watch stretches of coast not covered by fortress troops or by independent squadrons, and prepare sketch maps of coastal areas not included in the Army mapping plan;⁵⁷ oppose enemy landings until the Army arrived; construct movable obstacles to delay the enemy; under Army direction, assist with demolition work and with permanent obstacles; provide guards for internment camps and for any vital points handed over by the Army (which on 14 February decided that docks, oil tanks, radio and cable stations should forthwith be in Home Guard care and in emergency, railway tunnels and bridges).⁵⁸ In January and February 1941 the Army made its first real contribution to Home Guard training, admitting unit commanders to week-long courses in Army schools on such topics as rifle drill, section leading, map-work, reconnaissance reports, camouflage and siting of trenches.⁵⁹

By December 1940 newspapers were peppered with modest but persistent reports of Home Guard units, in centres both large and small, though there were still complaints of apathy. The Dominion total rose from 16 667 men on 20 November to 37 701 on 7 December⁶⁰ to 65 927 on 31 January, 86 508 on 28 February and 98 656 on 31 March.⁶¹

A proposal in February 1941 by the Stratford Borough Council that it should be compulsory to join the Home Guard drew only modest support,⁶³ though it was also advanced by the Auckland Farmers' Union and the NZRSA.⁶⁴ Semple declared that there was no need for conscription⁶⁵ but the Minister of National Service could direct anyone to join the Home Guard and by an amendment in March such direction automatically made such a person a member.⁶⁶ It became usual for armed forces appeal boards, in granting exemptions or postponements of service, to direct these men to join the Home Guard, if not the Territorials.

Of course enrolment numbers were no indication of attendance at parades, and on a dirty night less than half the proper number might turn up.⁶⁷ This was one of the weaknesses discussed in some newspaper letters;⁶⁸ straggling attendances and too few parades meant that some units after training for several months had learnt little but the fringes of elementary parade drill; without uniforms and

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weapons they could not feel genuine. If the Home Guard really was a useful cog in the defence machine the Army would take some interest in it. There was need for guidance, by visiting officers or by an official syllabus, in successive steps of training. Home Guard committees were not representative of active guardsmen.

Other critics said that too much time was given to squad drill, not enough to practical improvisation. There should be on-the-beach training, with each unit practising on the area it would defend. Many units had men whom quarrying, road contracting, and other jobs had made expert with explosives, who could teach the use of gelignite, fuses and detonators as needed in road-blocks work; others skilled in fencing could devise barbed wire obstacles. Baden-Powell's Scouting for Boys and Tom Wintringham's New Ways of War would be more useful than infantry manuals. ‘The circumstances which would demand the service of the Home Guard would also demand improvising all along the line…. those shaping the Home Guard seem to be relying on squad drill and rifle exercises. Could futility go further?’⁶⁹ But squad drill also had its defenders, who held that it was the basis of discipline, without which a body of men might become a rabble.⁷⁰ Actually there was much improvisation and use of civilian skills, varying from place to place according to the people concerned; some districts were noticeably keener and more ingenious than others.

Engineering sections practised knots and lashings and trestle-bridge building, earthworks and obstacles, map and compass reading. Signals sections devised lamps, using camera tripods and reflectors from car and motor-cycle headlights, even treacle tins, and their hill-top blinkings roused a number of spy-scares; in May, Napier and Mohaka units exchanged messages over 31 miles, which was reckoned a long hop.⁷¹ There was a lack of large-scale maps showing details relevant to military purposes, for the Lands and Survey Department's mile/ inch series was just beginning. But county engineers, surveyors and draughtsmen mapped some areas very creditably.⁷² The lack of training manuals was met by some Hawke's Bay Territorial officers who in April 1941, with the approval of Home Guard headquarters, produced The New Zealand Home Guard Manual, which outlined training from squad drill to tank hunting, and included instructions

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for the use of automatic weapons that the Guard was yet very far from possessing.⁷³

Civilians skilled with explosives showed how to use gelignite and detonators for blowing trees across roads and for making other obstacles. They made grenades from jam tins filled with metal scraps and a central core of gelignite, or from lengths of iron piping segmented by filing and turning on a lathe and filled with explosive. They made booby traps of many sorts, often igniting fuses with .22 cartridges, the bullets being removed and the caps being struck by assorted springs such as from rat traps. ‘Molotov cocktails’, bottles filled with equal parts of tar, kerosene and petrol, with a wick soaked in kerosene at the neck, were thrown at rocks, etc, representing tanks, and were very popular.⁷⁴ The Waverley unit that practised throwing with smooth stones the weight of Mills bombs from a nearby river was praised by a headquarters officer.⁷⁵ Waipukurau men adapted shotgun cartridges to fire heavy lead slugs with accuracy over a limited range and demonstrated on the carcases of sheep.⁷⁶

Training in tactics could be attempted with little equipment if there was plenty of zest and imagination. Though some town areas were very lively in field training,⁷⁷ country areas obviously could come at it more readily. The comparable street fighting was not attempted: it would hold up traffic, alarm people, and no one was experienced in it. So, for instance, Taranaki units at a weekend had a route march plus field work combining instruction with actual procedure and covering more in ‘one full day than in six evening parades’; manoeuvred, with lupin-covered hats, in sandhills; worked through blackberry patches and swamp to attack occupied positions.⁷⁸ The Sheffield company ambushed a tank with Molotov cocktails, were out-flanked by an armoured column, and after lunch with other units rounded up the ‘parachutists’ of Glentunnel in hill country, ‘a “soldiers battle” in which the rank and file displayed particular enthusiasm and initiative.’⁷⁹

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A sense of reality emerges from some of the reports, as for example the problem posed to 60 company and platoon commanders and NCOs of a Taranaki battalion attending a two-day course at Pihama:

An invasion barge carrying a tank and 18 infantrymen—a laggard from a larger enemy force attempting a landing on the black sands at Opunake—comes churning into the cove at Papakaka, where the Puneheu Stream once entered the sea.

A quarter of an hour before it touches the shingle it is sighted, and a platoon of the Home Guard armed with rifles and gelignite, is ordered to prevent the landing or annihilate the invading unit as it leaves the water.

On Saturday these men were given rifle instruction and a talk by the county engineer on field sketching and reports, followed by practical work on a piece of coast. Sunday included a lecture on field craft, on taking cover from fire and on selecting positions for firing and for advance; another lecture on obstacles, road blocks and wiring, again by the engineer; it wound up with the landing problems set forth above.⁸⁰ On this occasion a women's committee was thanked for providing tea; one hopes that other women were thanked for milking the cows.

Various devices were used to give almost unarmed men a sense of battle. Sometimes an aeroplane would ‘bomb’ their trucks, or fly over ground on which they were taking cover. In an attack on golf-links near Christchurch, watched by Major-General Young, paper packets of flour were thrown as grenades and machine-gun sounds were contrived from tin rattles ‘in which the turning of a ratchet made an effective noise.’⁸¹

Rifles, though promised often, were slow to appear apart from those owned by an élite minority. In January 1941 some elderly rifles were issued for training purposes, though not certified fit for firing.⁸² A few weeks later the Prime Minister appealed for the loan of .303 rifles, promising to make good all deterioration or loss, but the response was slight: more than two weeks later only 30 had been handed in throughout the Auckland police district from Wellsford to Huntly, only two from Auckland city.⁸³ At the end of April an impressment order was gazetted, requiring all rifles or parts thereof to be handed in immediately, but this did not produce a flood, and shortage of rifles remained a sore point till well into 1942.

The more that guardsmen took to the hills, dug trenches or worked with wire, the more they wanted uniforms and boots. With the

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Depression not far behind, many had few serviceable old clothes, and costs of clothing and footwear were rising. They were promised the old style uniforms of the Territorials when these could be replaced with battledress, but the Territorials were constantly being increased, and all through 1941 the promises moved on. Meanwhile a few units acquired makeshift uniforms: those of the Otorohanga area decided as early as November 1940 to have grey shirts and trousers and glengarry caps;⁸⁴ those of Lower Hutt acquired 400 khaki boiler suits, at 15s each;⁸⁵ One Tree Hill men appeared in drill blouses and trousers with glengarry caps, cost £1.⁸⁶

The importance of maintaining communications in a war emergency produced, during 1941, several special Home Guard groups. In the Post and Telegraph Department, linesmen, technicians, exchange operators, telegraphists and other experts covered the whole country in a many-branched organisation totalling nearly 2000 at full strength. In the Railways about 600 men were set to maintain lines, signals, telephones and electricity for electric engines, and at the last to deny resources to the enemy. Both these groups did some ordinary Home Guard training, especially in the use of weapons, and their officers attended Army schools.⁸⁷ Within the carrying industry, a Home Guard motor transport organisation, spread over the country in 32 companies, was prepared to carry supplies, ammunition and petrol for the Army in a crisis. Each full company comprised 79 three-ton lorries, 4 cars, 8 motor-cycles and 155 men.⁸⁸ Petrol was stored all over the country, sealed in the spare tanks of retailers, tanks which because of petrol restrictions were not in trade use. From 11 February 1941 each of 1821 petrol stations had its guards, totalling 5548 in March 1943. They were usually older and less fit men, with the owner or manager in charge, under instructions from the Oil Fuel Controller.⁸⁹ Thus there were during 1941, outside the would-be fighting men, more than 7000 Guardsmen who had special tasks, linked with their normal work. Another such group was the Traffic Control Corps. Early in 1941, mindful of the tragic errors in France, the EPS organised emergency traffic police who would keep country roads clear if needed for military traffic, and control any civilian evacuation. The Transport Department's 61 traffic inspectors were the nucleus of this group, which numbered 2000 when Japan entered the war. It was then transferred to the Home

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Guard, and by March 1943 its members would total nearly 4500. Its head was the Oil Fuel Controller, also in charge of the petrol guards, and these two groups were further linked at roadside level.⁹⁰

Expenses of transport, hire of halls and so on were at first necessarily and reluctantly borne by local bodies, assisted by sums raised through street appeals, entertainments and raffles. In mid-March 1941 the government, pressed by these bodies, announced that it would pay administration costs down to and including area commands, plus a capitation grant of 2s a man up to 31 December and thereafter 1s a quarter for each man attending 80 per cent of parades.⁹¹ It was, of course, not enough, but it was felt by many that local fundraising efforts were part of the total community activity.

Despite enthusiasm and makeshift, as months passed dissatisfaction grew. Hill-scrambling was all very well in summer, but unit commanders wondered how to cope with winter evening parades without losing interest and men. Government apathy and lack of Army interest, it was said, were killing the Home Guard. Newspaper letters⁹² continued to call for equipment and positive direction, for a co-ordinated Dominion-wide training programme, instead of units doing various things, largely reflecting the views of their immediate officers, some seeing the Home Guard as a guerrilla force of freelance nuisances to the invader, others regarding it as an emergency reserve for the regular forces and therefore needing elementary orthodox training. Closer co-operation with the Army and maintenance by the government was urged by the Southland Times on 29 April and by the NZRSA on 30 May, while several local bodies and Home Guard committees made similar suggestions.⁹³ In mid-June a deputation of mayors from all the cities and big towns, asking Nash, as Acting Prime Minister, for a clear statement, said that if the Guard were indeed a front line of defence, as it had so often been told, it should be under military control.⁹⁴ Nash replied that Sir Guy Williams,⁹⁵ a home defence expert from Britain touring the country as military adviser to the government, would soon report; a comprehensive plan and more equipment would emerge shortly, and meanwhile 50 000 pairs of Home Guard boots were to be ordered.⁹⁶ From Auckland pressure came strongly. The New Zealand

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Herald on 1 July said that New Zealand was in the Gilbertian situation of having two separate land defence forces with War Cabinet as the only formal link between them and pointed out several administrative anomalies. Auckland city's Home Guard committee pressed for information on government intentions concerning training and equipment: there had been many promises but so far they had only armbands, and expenditure on the Home Guard in Auckland from its inception to the end of May totalled £686.⁹⁷ This was backed by a Herald editorial and letters next day, which Semple angrily described as ‘based on political prejudice and hate rather than on logical reasoning, tolerance and patience’.⁹⁸ On 23 July Goosman repeated these criticisms in the House.⁹⁹

Already during April and May War Cabinet, the National Service Department and Army had been considering what to do with the unwieldy Home Guard, now nominally more than 100 000 strong and of widely ranging ages and fitness. At the end of July, assisted by Williams's reports,¹⁰⁰ the Home Guard was transferred to Army control, with changes as slight as possible to existing machinery: the four District Commanders became District Directors with the rank of Colonel, the Area Commanders became Group Directors, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and a few clerical assistants were appointed to each of the 28 Group headquarters. But elsewhere it was considered important to preserve the voluntary spirit, and at battalion level permanent administrative and training staff would not be needed until there was equipment to handle and keep account of. The capitation grant was increased from 4s to 15s a year, though local fund-raising was still encouraged; those taking special courses of instruction would receive Territorial pay.

It was now established¹⁰¹ that the Home Guard's task was to provide static defence of localities, of vulnerable and key points such as beaches, bridges, defiles and centres of communication, and to give timely warning of enemy movement. Its value lay not with individual action but in proper co-ordination with the superior military forces. The Home Guardsman was defined as a part-time infantry soldier, armed with rifle, machine-gun and bombs, who having no government transport or supply must fight and feed near his own home, his chief asset being close knowledge of the neighbourhood. His task would be to impose loss and delay, defending localities with temporary road blocks, covered with small arms fire, with a

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reserve inside the locality ready to counter-attack; to acquire and deliver news of the enemy; to continue to harass an occupying force, under cover of darkness.¹⁰² A high standard of weapon training was to be aimed at, with physical training for reasonable fitness, foot and arms drill enough for pride of bearing and reasonably precise movement; knowledge of the district (assisted by sand tables and models), proficiency in observation, patrolling, message sending; general development of night sense, doing operational tasks in darkness and getting away from drill hall training as much as possible.¹⁰³

The force would have no fixed number, but be in two divisions. Division I, approximately 50 000, fit for combat duty, would be trained and equipped as quickly as possible; Division II, reasonably fit, would be a reserve for Division I, and have as much training as possible with the equipment available; the less fit would be politely invited to transfer to the EPS.¹⁰⁴

Little of this, however, reached the schools and local halls where a few men continued to turn up regularly and the majority much less regularly. Changes to the existing machinery were so slight that on 1 October Broadfoot was asking in the House why, since the announcement on 31 July that the Home Guard was to be taken over by the Army and put into two Divisions, Home Guardsmen had received no explanation of the arrangement, and when would the reorganisation of the Guard as a separate entity within the Army be complete? Fraser replied that preparatory work was under way, reorganisation, being wrapped up with the whole defence plan, proceeding as fast as circumstances would permit.¹⁰⁵

On 28 October an article in the New Zealand Herald said that compulsory parades seemed the only means towards efficiency; attendances were often so poor that there was widespread discouragement and despondency. These Cinderellas of the defence forces had trained almost blindfold, uncertain of their part in an emergency, ‘sparsely equipped and uniformed with promises’, so that ‘it was a common statement among officers that every time an official promise was made another half-dozen men failed to parade with their units’. The three-month-old announcement of transfer to Army control had roused hopes but progress in removing the long-standing complaints was slow, and parade attendances were the fundamental difficulty. Special courses had been held at district Army schools,

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improving officers and NCOs, but they often had to resume elementary training because so many members had missed so much; for instance, one platoon commander had one of his 36 men at one parade and none at the next. Also, the idea of the Home Guard as a guerrilla force had been replaced by the idea of static defence, close to homes. This seemed a condition more suitable to closely settled Britain than to New Zealand, with its widely separated towns, and was a further cause of uneasiness.¹⁰⁶

Within two days Army Order 261/1941 was issued to the press, and summaries appeared.¹⁰⁷ ‘Not a moment too soon’ hailed the New Zealand Herald's editorial, claiming that the Home Guard now had a definite place. But next day that paper printed a letter signed ‘Guardsman’ saying that this order had been read to all of them at least four weeks ago, but ‘from that day to this the Home Guard might have been in another world for all the interest taken in it by the army authorities’. So much had been said and promised, so little done, small wonder that attendances were poor. ‘Please do not take this as an indictment against the army authorities. The Home Guard was created in a wild burst of patriotic fervour by a political drummer boy, who having achieved a roll strength of 100 000, magnanimously hands this army over to the defence authorities with a sigh of relief at having wormed himself out of the very embarrassing position of having an army without an objective’.¹⁰⁸ Minus the almost Semple-like invective, this criticism was more or less echoed a few weeks later by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Bell, Group Director at Invercargill, who said that the Home Guard had started with a flourish of trumpets and large enrolments, but the numbers at parades had since fallen and he could not blame the older men for losing enthusiasm when so many younger ones were doing nothing; there should be conscription.¹⁰⁹

At the start of November, papers reported both activity and dissatisfaction from Home Guard units. Thus Timaru's battalion was zealously contriving to obtain sandbags needed for trench and field fortifications;¹¹⁰ the Onehunga battalion held a mock battle near Mangere airfield, with flour bag bombs from an aircraft;¹¹¹ the Kaikohe platoon's smouldering dissatisfaction over lack of organisation and equipment broke out in a decision to attend no more parades

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till the authorities placed the Home Guard on a satisfactory footing.¹¹² Then, about the middle of the month, reports of the arrival of rifles and other equipment, including Lewis and Thomson machine-guns, began to appear.¹¹³

However, it was not until the following month that the policy was really spelled out. Fraser on 11 December 1941 stated: The task of the Home Guard is defensive and I cannot overstate its importance. In the initial stages of an emergency it is intended that forward static positions will be held by Territorial and National Reserve units, with the Home Guard available to reinforce them if necessary, but as the gravity of the situation increases the Home Guard will take over this duty from the Territorials and the National Reserve who will then be withdrawn from their positions in readiness to meet the main thrust of the enemy. This plan is intended to provide the widest distribution of forces to meet an initial attack and at the same time to permit the concentration of the more highly trained and mobile units to deal with enemy concentrations wherever they may be found.¹¹⁴

In mid-December thousands of Territorials and National Military Reserve men were hurried into camps and fortress areas, their uniforms and equipment further delaying promised issues to the Home Guard. The unpaid, part-time defenders of hearth and home were not conspicuously called to duty. But on 31 December War Cabinet, by authorising the payment of mobilised Home Guardsmen, provided machinery for using them as required on regular defence work, a milestone on the road to recognition by the Army that for many had value far above 7s a day. Further, at the beginning of February, Army district officers were directed to use Home Guard volunteers where necessary to supplement Territorial forces. Without pay, they could do beach patrols, etc, on shifts of 24 hours or less, at weekends, which would not interfere with their normal work. They could also serve paid shifts of 24 hours or more, again mainly at weekends, coast watching, guarding vital points, relieving Territorial troops going on leave, or helping them with defence works. They could also be mobilised for a week or longer on such tasks, or to occupy positions if other home troops were not available.¹¹⁵

Although the Public Works Department and contractors with machinery were used as much as possible on defence construction, at the start much urgent spade work, wiring, etc, was needed on beaches and places chosen for defence. In the early months of 1942

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the Home Guard did a good deal of defence navvying, with the result that works were completed quickly and regular troops could concentrate on their training, while the Home Guard itself benefited from close association with serving units. Procedure differed from place to place, with little attendant publicity. At the end of January, groups of Canterbury Home Guardsmen in turn began going into camp for a week, and were photographed shouldering shovels, winding barbed wire and preparing brushwork for revetments.¹¹⁶ Similar work was mentioned at Dunedin, where a Home Guardsman devised a concertina style of wiring that produced a very tangled coil;¹¹⁷ the Defence Minister referred to weekend patrols by Home Guardsmen attached to Wellington fortress troops;¹¹⁸ at Auckland on 27 March the Mayor called for Home Guard volunteers needed for both fulltime and part-time duty; inland units worked on road blocks and dragged huge logs into position ready for dropping across roads.¹¹⁹ In short, the Home Guard helped to make possible landing beaches prickly with barbed wire and gun posts and to make strategic roads quickly defensible.

An article in the Listener in January, ‘Hawke's Bay has an Army’, described things not exclusive to Hawke's Bay, The Home Guard had been the starved younger child of the military forces, working without almost everything that it officially needed. It had survived being a hopeless idea, survived the stage of wooden rifles, survived being funny, being derided by a nation which still ‘did not fully realise that this is a shooting war.’ Few Home Guardsmen had uniforms and most of the lucky ones would not wear them until all were so provided, but some could make themselves invisible in homemade camouflage. Not all had rifles or shotguns but they had a fine collection of extemporised weapons, ranging from knives to homemade bombs. Some units had reconditioned machine-guns souvenired from the last war and partly remodelled by the Army armourers, and most had enough Tommy-guns to learn the use of them. They had their home-made bombs¹²⁰ and were experimenting with mortars to throw them. They had Molotov cocktails to hurl at tanks, trip wires and rat traps would ignite the charges of booby traps. A signalling system, with improvised gear, covered the province. Some units could bridge streams in less than half an hour, using oil drums soldered watertight, with boards and timber for bracing. In small

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units, ingenuity had achieved much that would be impossible for a big organisation.¹²¹

Army connections were strengthened by increased intake to Army schools of instruction, where Home Guardsmen took courses lasting for a week to a month, and would thereafter instruct their units on regular Army lines. By 31 March 1942, a total of 2118 officers and 2431 other ranks had been through such courses.¹²²

There was not a great rush of recruits to the Home Guard.¹²³ When, on 22 January 1942, enrolment in the EPS became compulsory for men 18 to 65 years inclusive not in the forces or in the Home Guard, the majority, possibly through misunderstanding, chose the less demanding EPS. This was probably no immediate disadvantage, for until more weapons appeared thronging recruits would have multiplied frustration. Existing numbers were thinned by successive ballots, taking the younger and stronger men, who often found that their Home Guard training hastened Army promotion. On the other hand, in February, when some of the National Reserve began to droop after being in camp for about six weeks, the more vigorous were transferred to the Territorials, while the less fit went to the Home Guard along with those of service age and fitness whom Manpower committees, for public interest or because of hardship, sent back to their civilian jobs.¹²⁴ A survey of age groups in March 1942 showed that 48 per cent of the Home Guard were less than 35 years old, 35 per cent were of 36 to 50 and 17 per cent were more than 50 years old.¹²⁵

Early 1942 saw a sharp increase in those earning capitation grants, that is, attending at least 75 per cent of parades. In the September quarter of 1941 they totalled 50 531, and were down to 48 343 in December, the busy farming season. They rose to 63 344 in March 1942, when the nominal roll was 110 000, and to 70 772 in the June quarter.¹²⁶ Differing figures were given for March in the report of 22 June 1942 signed by the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-General Puttick,¹²⁷ which stated that the roll strength of the Guard at the end of March was 96 000, of whom 62 890 had earned capitation grants in the past three months. The conflict of these March figures is less surprising when the many sub-divisions in the

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Home Guard are remembered, along with the variety of its record-keeping methods; nor is the difference, 454, in the effective number very significant.

In April 1942 it was decided that Home Guard numbers must be increased by compulsion. All civilian men between 35 and 50 years had to enrol despite already being in the EPS. There were certain exceptions: police, firemen, seamen, key members of EPS, doctors, chemists, Maoris, magistrates, judges, ministers of religion, also those disabled, blind, in hospital or in prison. Manpower officers then eliminated those whose commitment to essential work would make them poor Guardsmen, and the rest were interviewed by local selection committees, representing Home Guard, EPS, and Manpower, who transferred suitable men from EPS to the Home Guard. Division I, those over 18 years, physically fit, and in fighting units, plus youths 16 to 18 years, would have 24 hours training a month; Division II, those with non-operational roles such as petrol guard and traffic control, would train for eight hours a month. Absence from parades without leave could lead to prosecution in civil courts, with fines of up to £25, or three months in prison.¹²⁸ These steps produced 29 555 recruits.¹²⁹

Boots were now coming more quickly, 46 550 pairs by mid-February, 77 228 by the end of May,¹³⁰ though still not enough to go round: thus, at Foxton in February, 65 pairs were received for more than 100 men, and in November a Pongaroa man lamented that his company had received 12 pairs in all.¹³¹

Uniforms at last appeared, the Prime Minister stating early in March 1942 that 11 260 had been issued,¹³² and this number had risen to 43 782 by the end of May.¹³³ Some were ex-Territorial service uniforms cleaned and repaired, some were battle-dress style, new, but of woollen cloth not worsted.¹³⁴

By mid-February the Home Guard had received 12 106 Army rifles, plus 66 heavy and 34 light machine-guns, 800 Thompson sub-machine-guns and 2.5 million rounds of small arms ammunition,¹³⁵ though only a limited amount of this could be used for practice shooting. By May, 24 500 American .300 rifles had arrived and there was a re-shuffle. In the areas furthest from mobilised troops, such as Southland, Nelson, Coromandel and Hawke's Bay, all .303

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rifles were withdrawn and redistributed to Home Guard units more likely to be operating alongside the Territorials, the more remote districts then receiving the American rifles. Thus with the 16 000 either self-owned or impressed, plus those from American and the Army, the Home Guard mustered 52 648 rifles by the end of May.¹³⁶

After Singapore there was, especially in northern districts, some anxiety to avoid a similar situation of military inadequacy and over-optimism. Some worried about the Army, and, though Army shortcomings were less visible to the public than were those of the Home Guard, military silence led, wrote General Puttick, ‘to the obvious deficiencies in the equipment of the Home Guard being accepted by the public as an indication of the state of the Army as a whole’, which was far from being the case.¹³⁷ In February and March, a few public bodies voiced concern: the Rotorua, Mt Eden and Takapuna borough councils and the Auckland Chamber of Commerce urged that the Home Guard should be strengthened, having first choice of the men compulsorily enrolling for EPS, that it should be fully militarised, and its equipment improved by local manufacturing.¹³⁸

These ideas reached fullest and most forceful expression in the ‘Awake New Zealand’ campaign emanating from Major T. H. Melrose, commander of Hamilton's Home Guard.¹³⁹ This movement sought to kindle a widespread awareness of danger and the fighting spirit to meet it. It urged self-help and self-defence, without waiting for official steps, impatiently regarded as red tape. It thought that there was too much emphasis on EPS measures, it called for compulsory Home Guard membership and for Home Guard weapons, weapons for every man, to be improvised and produced by resourceful, handy men in every foundry and workshop.¹⁴⁰ The movement spread rapidly, its ideas also infecting other organisations: for instance, the Auckland Farmers' Union offered its services to the government to assist with the organisation of the Home Guard, the cultivation of an offensive spirit and the collection of scrap metal for local manufacture into grenades.¹⁴¹

In many centres, money was given for Home Guard weapons and equipment and handymen were called on to devise and produce weapons. Already there were home-made grenades;¹⁴² other devices

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were now produced, notably trench mortars, originating in an Otahuhu workshop.¹⁴³ The Army, however, was wary of most such improvisations, preferring local production of approved weapons¹⁴⁴ such as mortars made in the Hutt railway workshop. The Army's coolness to some proposals was probably judicious; as, for instance, land-mines claimed to be simple and safe in construction, deadly in action and capable of being made by the thousand and laid out in a few hours on beaches and in vital areas.¹⁴⁵

However, if the ‘Awake’ campaigners could not get very far with weapons, they usefully provided other equipment such as camping gear, ground sheets, steel helmets and haversacks.¹⁴⁶ At Whangarei, for instance, the campaign began on 1 May and closed four months later, having raised £705, of which £452 was spent on Home Guard equipment, including 400 ground sheets.¹⁴⁷

New urgency now beset Home Guardsmen as they defended and counter-attacked beaches and hills, rehearsed the blocking of roads and gorges, laid dummy mines and built emergency bridges. At Easter 1942 for instance many battalions, as at Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington and the Hutt, spent days preparing and defending posts and road blocks, inventing and destroying paratroops and beach invaders.¹⁴⁸ In both town and country, during weekends and some evenings, men practised handling their weapons, practised moving under cover, moving by night, on manoeuvres of defence and attack; they learnt their districts thoroughly by going over them again and again; some prepared maps that showed roads, trees, buildings, creeks, swamps and firm ground. As before, enthusiasm and effectiveness varied from unit to unit, depending on local leadership. Those who combined determination and energy with military imagination and skill in handling people achieved much, both in extracting the maximum from authority and in building up efficiency, co-operation and ésprit de corps. There were many pitfalls for Home Guard commanders, from reluctance in paper work to the adoption of an imagined ‘military’ authority.¹⁴⁹

Despite shortage of petrol and pressure of work, keenness was conspicuous among farmers, perhaps from the sense of threat to their

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own homes and acres, heightened by neighbourly regard and district pride: a Home Guard drop-out was more conspicuous in the country than in the comparative anonymity of towns. Transport included horses and bicycles, while money for petrol for shared cars and other minor expenses was still raised by such community efforts as dances and euchre-evenings.¹⁵⁰ Rural companies often mustered 30 strong out of a roll of 40, over a radius of 10 miles; each had its own area to defend, and knew it closely. They concentrated on guerrilla tactics, using ‘British commando methods plus a few that are home-made— and pretty tough.’¹⁵¹

There were some special commando units, the so-called guide platoons. In December, Army command considered that rugged terrains, often within striking distance of cities, and the rugged men available—farmers, musterers, deer cullers, bushmen and timber workers—favoured secret commando groups which in an invasion would retire to hide-outs in bush and hills, emerging to harass the enemy rear. After March, when weapons became available, more than 100 such units each of about 17 men were developed. They were specially devoted to night work and commando methods (to account for their long spells in bush and bivouac training it was given out that they were training to guide troops through unknown and difficult country, and to be scouts and snipers). Their carefully constructed lairs, equipped with radio, explosives, ammunition and hard rations for a month, were left quite alone, while the men, to mislead the curious, worked from dummy headquarters and caches.¹⁵²

Other Army-nurtured specialists, 344 in number, were in the Bomb Disposal Group, formed in April 1942. They had training at Trentham and received much information about enemy bombs. The only live bombs available were those dropped on several occasions by the RNZAF, but they had more work (in conjunction with the Navy) dealing with enemy and British mines which drifted on to the west coasts of both islands, the Coromandel Peninsula and the Bay of Islands. One such mine was bravely handled: it came ashore at New Plymouth near the railway shed and hospital, in a fairly heavy sea and could not be destroyed on the spot. Two men of the local bomb section attached a rope to it, swam with the rope to a launch and towed the mine to an empty beach.¹⁵³

Such groups knew they had specific tasks, as had the less adventurous technical communications sections, and the guardians of petrol stocks and of vital points. The ordinary infantryman's belief

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in his own usefulness was less certain. For some, both in the community and in the Home Guard, there was a strong sense of unreality, of playing at soldiers, scepticism that this semi-amateur effort would be effective in the face of trained, well-equipped, hard-driving attackers. Others, including the old soldiers, knew that a sense of unreality could persist into the midst of action. Nevertheless, it was better to prepare to do what one could than to wait inactive; the fighting attitude of mind was more robust, less fearful, than one of empty-handed default. Fathers as they farewelled sons going overseas knew that if the young men could not stop the Japanese, the old ones would not let the home places, the women and the children go without a fight.

In March, when the issue of guns and gear had but lately got under way amid organisational hitches, when the news was very bad and the ‘Awake’ movement was seething out from the Waikato, Sidney Holland after touring this area spoke of the Home Guard's ‘very considerable discontent and apprehension’ that they were not being properly treated or used to the best advantage, and asked for a full committee of inquiry. The Prime Minister, agreeing to this, said that Home Guard affairs had the anxious attention of War Cabinet, which had instructed the Army that its training and issue of equipment should be as speedy as circumstances would permit; difficulties were being overcome, and much creditable uneasiness came from not knowing fully what was being done.¹⁵⁴

The Auckland Star commented that recognition at this late date of the need for inquiry into the training, organisation and employment of the Home Guard would be an unpleasant shock to many. The press had repeatedly drawn attention to the Cinderella of the forces and how ‘the patriotic enthusiasm which infused its ranks upon its formation was allowed to ooze away through a sieve of broken promises’ of equipment, military clothing and adequately trained command, criticism which was rebuked as giving information to the enemy. The Star doubted that the inquiry would now achieve much. The equipping of the Home Guard had progressed so quickly in the last few weeks that enthusiasm had rekindled, and ‘if the committee is in the mood for it, it will have no difficulty in providing a report well camouflaged in whitewash’. Perhaps the most important avenue for inquiry at the moment would be the fitness of many of the leaders for their jobs: there were so many tales of

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one company receiving splendid training while its next door neighbour had done only ‘parade ground stuff’.¹⁵⁵

The military affairs committee of the War Council, W. Perry of the RSA, Major-General Andrew Russell¹⁵⁶ and two members of Parliament, L. G. Lowry¹⁵⁷ and E. T. Tirikatene,¹⁵⁸ inquired diligently into Home Guard complaints and circumstances. Their suggestions, plus the comments of Lieutenant-General Puttick and the Army Department were tabled in the House on 14 October 1942.¹⁵⁹ By this time many grievances had been eased. Since May, compulsory recruitment had filled in the ranks, and the majority were no longer empty-handed or in civilian garb. Battalions in the areas immediately essential for defence had been given priority: here the majority had rifles, and others formed sections with machine-guns, tommy-guns and mortars. The Home Guard's total strength in October 1942 was 109 226; 75 000 uniforms had been issued, and 83 127 pairs of boots, with more coming. Ammunition was still short, especially for the American rifles of which 40 000 now had been imported.¹⁶⁰ Home Guard units had to construct their own rifle ranges on approved sites, as heavy demands from the Services fully occupied the government work force. Proposals that the Guard should be permitted to make its own wireless sets and improvise weapons were not approved. Variety in wireless sets might imperil security it was said, and Army headquarters had to approve all specifications in advance. Several hundred sets had been ordered and the Army would give training in signals work. Puttick commented that many improvised weapons were inefficient and dangerous to the users; skilled men and explosives would be better used in regular production of approved types. Payment for attendance at parades was not favoured, and there was only a small increase for out-of-pocket expenses.¹⁶¹

Though no marked change resulted from the inquiry at this stage, it is probable that its existence had already helped to give Home Guard requirements some priority amid the heavy competition of 1942. But while the condition of the Home Guard was improving,

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its raison d'être was fading. On the day that the Parliamentary report was published, the headlines told of six Japanese warships sunk in the