– 95 –

CHAPTER 5
Crete

After a sound sleep everyone was awakened at 8.30 a.m. (28 April) and told to be ready to disembark in half an hour. As the cruiser steamed slowly into Suda Bay the men crowded on to the decks for their first view of the island of Crete. The port contained the usual warehouse and administrative buildings, and its single quay appeared to be littered with military stores of every description. Beyond the town stretched rolling farmlands rising southwards to the snow-crested White Mountains. Many ships clustered in the bay, some afloat, others resting on the shallow bottom—further evidence of enemy air activity with which the men were already too familiar. However, there was a general feeling of relief at having eluded the enemy in Greece, and in the fresh morning sunshine the troops, though very weary, were in good spirits.

A tug drew alongside, moved HMS Ajax over to a tanker, and the troops disembarked by crossing over the tanker to the wharf. During this move air-raid sirens sounded and ack-ack guns opened fire, but none of the men seemed very concerned and, except for a short pause when the Ajax yawed away from the tanker, disembarkation proceeded smoothly: British and Aussies to the left, New Zealanders to the right. Counted through a gate, the troops were directed along a dusty road for an ‘army mile’ to an area in olive groves where each man could rest and take off his boots. From a British field kitchen the men received a welcome mug of tea, bread, cheese, an orange, chocolate, and a few cigarettes. The assembly points and bivouac area were about seven miles farther on, and the men went at their own speed (‘everyone had a holiday feeling’) and employed various ways of travelling, from staff trucks to Cretan donkeys. Sergeant Johnston¹ of Battalion Headquarters and the RSM, WO I Wilson, engaged a Cretan boy with a bicycle

– 96 –

to carry the typewriter, duplicator, and a kit containing the battalion secret documents, money, and pay records. The RSM had brought the Manual of Military Law, but whoever had been entrusted with King's Regulations either failed to arrive or thought them a non-essential.

Arriving at the battalion bivouac area, most of the troops found their company areas and then went to sleep. Waking greatly refreshed, they were able to wash in the deep pool of a nearby stream. After a light issue of rations in the evening everyone bedded down and most men slept well despite the lack of blankets. About 2 a.m. the MO, Captain Gilmour, was seen moving about among the olive trees. When asked by the CO what was wrong he replied, ‘I'm trying to find a warmer tree.’

The next day was spent quietly, resting, cleaning weapons, and taking cover from the Luftwaffe. Seven dive-bombers appeared in the afternoon but did not trouble the area. Later the CO held a parade in the trees and inspected the battalion with his usual care. Every man was armed, except one who paraded holding a hand grenade and with no other equipment or arms. Otherwise personal equipment was very nearly complete. Both 3-inch mortars, complete with base plates, had arrived, but there was very little signalling gear, and thirteen Bren guns had been left at Suda in response to orders from senior officers from other units. During the inspection of Headquarters Company Private Brennan² was asked where his bayonet was. ‘Sir,’ he replied, ‘my bayonet is an axe in the officers' mess.’

Shortly after the inspection orders were received for Colonel Kippenberger to assume command of 4 Brigade. Major Burrows then became CO with the acting rank of lieutenant-colonel. Major Paterson became second-in-command of the battalion, Captain Jefcoate³ took command of D Company, and Captain Garriock of Headquarters Company.

The Commander-in-Chief Middle East, General Wavell, had been instructed that the retention of Crete was of vital importance to British operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Major-General Freyberg was appointed commander of all forces on

– 97 –

the island and Brigadier Puttick, in consequence, assumed command of the New Zealand Division, less 6 Brigade and other troops evacuated to Egypt. Fifth Brigade, with 1 Greek Regiment, was responsible for the defence of Maleme aerodrome and the area from there to Platanias, while 4 Brigade was to cover Canea from attack from the west and destroy any hostile troops who landed in the Prison valley. On 30 April the brigade received orders to move to an area about Galatas with an anti-paratroop and coastwatching role. The troops were to take special care to conceal their positions from air observation and were to dig weapon pits for protection from dive-bombing attacks. Should paratroops land near these positions the battalions were to be prepared to counter-attack immediately.

Twentieth Battalion moved on the 30th to positions in olive groves south-east of Galatas, with Battalion Headquarters on Cemetery Hill, also called Searchlight Hill, and rifle companies on either side of the Prison valley road. The intelligence section had an OP on the hill and worked with the English crew manning the searchlight which gave the feature its name. B Company's signallers, on rising ground to the south, used the heliograph to communicate with Battalion Headquarters. As Divisional Reserve the battalion was on an hour's notice to move. Stand-to was observed from 5.30 a.m. to 7 a.m. and from 7 to 8.45 p.m. Shorts, shirts, and boots of the long, narrow, Indian pattern were issued, and by this time there was one blanket for each man. The greatest shortage was in entrenching tools. Most men, as ordered, had left their picks and shovels in Greece, and they found that digging trenches in the stiff clay was slow, hard work with bayonets, steel helmets, and clumsy Cretan implements. To make matters worse, a ship bringing tools was sunk in Suda Bay.

On 3 May officers and NCOs were addressed by General Freyberg, who indicated the probable nature of the expected attack on the island. His advice for dealing with paratroops was characteristic of him: ‘Just fix bayonets and go at them as hard as you can.’

There was no unit transport, the only truck in the brigade being used by battalions in turn. Rations had to be carried by companies to their areas, and as some of these areas were a

– 98 –

considerable distance from the quartermaster's store it was not long before carrying parties from B and A Companies, the latter near the Turkish fort at Pirgos, had commandeered donkeys to assist them.

In these days men lived in section groups, cooking in improvised utensils over fires of olive twigs or of furniture from deserted houses. Local supplies contributed little to the menu although oranges, eggs, a little bread, potatoes, and dried fruits could be bought. Wine was plentiful and fairly cheap; it had a characteristic resinous flavour for which a taste had to be cultivated, in most cases successfully. One of the greatest deprivations was the shortage of tobacco. In Galatas a branch of the YMCA opened in a building near the church, but its stocks were limited. In one wineshop the proprietor owned a radio set on which the troops could listen to the news. Most interest was taken in the German broadcasts, and Lord ‘Haw-Haw's’ sneer that ‘The Kiwis are now beneath the olive groves of Crete and beneath those trees will meet their doom’ was received with derision.

On Sunday, 4 May, the battalion, always particular in these matters, held a church parade. The following day a syllabus of training covering a period from 9 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. was begun. Bayonet practice and arms maintenance were the chief activities. Stand-to night and morning was strictly observed, and the area was patrolled at night, two men from each section being on picket. About this time Major Wilson marched out, attached to 8 Greek Regiment, and Lieutenant Fountaine took command of C Company. On 5 May the battalion came under direct command of Headquarters New Zealand Division, while the rest of 4 Brigade came under Creforce command as force reserve.

Evidence of the German intention to reduce the island was provided by the number of bombing attacks on the harbour and shipping at Suda Bay. Unloading was confined to night-time, and even then working parties were seldom able to operate without interruption.

On 14 May a Composite Brigade was formed consisting of 20 Battalion, 6 and 8 Greek Regiments, a Composite Battalion of ASC and gunners acting as infantry, and a Divisional Cavalry detachment of three squadrons armed with rifles and Bren guns; in addition, the brigade commanded a platoon and a half of

– 99 –

machine-gunners from 27 Battalion and a battery of 5 Field Regiment armed with three Italian 75-millimetre guns without sights and with little ammunition. Colonel Kippenberger assumed command of this formation, to be called 10 Infantry Brigade, and Brigadier A. S. Falconer temporarily took command of 4 Brigade.

Tenth Brigade's task was to defend Galatas. Twentieth Battalion was not to be employed without the sanction of Divisional Headquarters. The Composite Battalion took up positions from Wheat Hill, west of Galatas, to the beach. The Divisional Cavalry detachment was on the slopes north-west of Lake Aghya, 8 Greek Regiment on the slopes south of the lake, and 6 Greek Regiment south of Galatas and astride the Prison valley road.

On 13 May the battalion, acting on instructions received from Divisional Headquarters, handed over to 6 Greek Regiment its area south-east of Galatas and moved to an area west

– 100 –

of Canea to take over from 1 Battalion, The Welch Regiment. The battalion's new task included the defence of Divisional Headquarters near the Prison valley road and the keeping of a lookout on the coast as a precaution against an enemy seaborne landing. Companies occupied bivouac areas under the olive trees and manned positions along a ridge east of 7 General Hospital. Battalion Headquarters was situated in an olive grove on the north side of the Canea-Maleme road. A Company took up positions to the north of Battalion Headquarters on the land running down to the beach and at night patrolled the beach as far west as 7 General Hospital's area. B, C, and D Companies occupied positions to the south and east, manned listening posts by night and posted lookouts by day.

Battle positions dug by the Welch Regiment were occupied during stand-to periods and one post in each company area was manned during the day. The intelligence section's OP was on a flat-topped hill overlooking A Company and commanded an excellent view of the sea to the north, of Canea and Suda Bay to the east, and of the road leading to Galatas. The battalion was in communication with Divisional Headquarters on a ‘two-party’ line system, but other communications were by runner.

Just prior to the move back from Galatas, air raids increased in frequency and daring German pilots attacked calmly in broad daylight, diving through the ack-ack barrage. On 13 May there was a particularly heavy raid on Searchlight Hill. In a determined attempt to destroy the searchlight enemy fighters flew right down the beam with guns blazing, but damage and casualties were nil. Raids on Maleme aerodrome and the port of Suda at least gave food for thought, but one during a church parade on 18 May inspired prompt action. As Padre Spence and his congregation wisely took cover someone called out, ‘What about your faith now, Padre?’ As he joined in the general dispersal the Padre replied with customary calm, ‘As strong as ever, but it's just as well to take precautions.’

On 14 May the Kiwi Concert Party and 4 Brigade Band arrived to entertain the troops, and with them came a huge letter and parcel mail which had accumulated in Egypt during the Division's absence in Greece. As rations were still light, the distribution of parcels to the delighted troops was particularly

– 101 –

opportune. On 18 May Brigadier Inglis arrived to assume command of 4 Brigade and Brigadier Falconer returned to Egypt.

For several days a composite company drawn from C, D, and Headquarters Companies had carried out wiring for 6 Greek Regiment. For a time the news of Hess's flight to England supplanted the latest intelligence on the probable date of the German landing, but heavier raids on Maleme aerodrome, Canea, and Suda indicated that that event—‘Der Tag’ the troops called it—was drawing closer.

On the evening of the 19th an extremely heavy air attack was launched against Suda Bay and Maleme. Several British fighters took off in a vain attempt to intercept but were shot down. Ack-ack defences were ruthlessly silenced and not a ship was left afloat in Suda Bay.

Next morning at 7.50 a.m. the blitz began again with a thoroughness that seemed a preliminary to the expected invasion. From Maleme to Suda Bay flights of planes attacked with deliberate precision. For almost an hour all life and communication was paralysed by the roar of aircraft engines and the blast of bombs, cannon, and machine-gun fire. In C Company's area bombs dropped by a lone enemy plane fatally wounded Sergeant Selwyn Musson⁴ and wounded three others.

With dramatic suddenness the blitz ceased and in the uncanny silence that followed heads peeped out from slit trenches to see the result of this vicious attack. Suddenly a sonorous drone, gradually increasing in volume, was heard to the west. Into the vision of the spellbound troops, coming in increasing numbers from beyond the sea, swept a tremendous air armada, hundreds of planes steadily approaching through the clear morning sky. The invasion had begun. As the watchers realised the significance of this amazing sight the aircraft began to disgorge hundreds of paratroops, their olive-green, white, brown, and red parachutes swaying to earth in a gradually descending shower. At the same time groups of short-bodied, broad-winged planes of a different type were noticed moving noiselessly through the air. These were the gliders, towed in batches of six by three-engined Junkers which turned back at the coast.

The first paratroops seen were about nine miles away at

– 102 –

Maleme airfield. For a short period the sky in that area was full of them; no one who saw it is ever likely to forget the sight. Others were dropped south-west of Galatas. Some landed close to 7 General Hospital, which they captured, and advanced towards Galatas. Most of the landings were made outside the battalion perimeter although some supplies, including bicycles, landed towards the beach. A few enemy troops landed near Divisional Headquarters and holed up in an old Turkish fort. They were dealt with by engineers, and 15 Platoon under Lieutenant Upham was sent over to protect Divisional Headquarters. One German officer landed away from the rest near battalion battle headquarters and was shot by the brigade signals corporal. Some of the gliders swept low over the section posts and were engaged with small-arms fire. Private Paul Amos⁵ of D Company fired at one with an anti-tank rifle and it disappeared over the ridge to crash-land further on. About this time it was rumoured that Germans were wearing British battle dress and messages were sent by runner to each company to order the men to change into shorts. This rumour was later found to be incorrect, but one D Company man wearing battle dress was fired on by an English soldier about 400 yards away and had a hole drilled in his small pack.

The events of the day are well summarised in the diary of Sergeant Basil Borthwick⁶ of Battalion Headquarters staff:

– 103 –

Thus ended the first day. The paratroops who had landed in the New Zealand sector had suffered heavy casualties, but 22 Battalion had been forced off Maleme aerodrome and the enemy now had a field where he could land reinforcements. Months later it was learned that one of the first battalion casualties was Major Cliff Wilson, attached to 8 Greek Regiment. When their area had been surrounded by paratroops Major Wilson and the other New Zealanders had assembled at a pumping station on a hill south of the reservoir. The station consisted of a small concrete compartment dug into the hillside. It was locked by a narrow steel door, in front of which the clay excavated from the hole had been heaped on either side of the entrance, making a sort of alley leading up to the door— ‘a slit trench with one end open’. The party took shelter inside the tanks, standing thigh deep in water in the darkness while Germans moved around in the vicinity. Unable to break out, the party was forced to remain in hiding. The next afternoon Major Wilson went out to investigate the position. He moved along, looking over the left-hand parapet, and had just called to the others to follow him—‘Come down and have a go; there are about five of them down here’—when he was killed instantly. Shortly afterwards the rest of the party was captured.

On 21 May a severe blitz began at 6.25 a.m. and lasted for half an hour, after which a steady stream of enemy troop-carrying planes landed on Maleme aerodrome, disgorged their troops, and disappeared out to sea. Others dropped stores and equipment, including armed carriers and motor-cycles. Private Allison⁷ meticulously noted each arrival in the ‘I’ section log-

– 104 –

book; it was estimated that at one stage a troop-carrier landed every two and a half minutes. As a reserve unit 20 Battalion could do nothing but watch. Patients from 7 General Hospital, who had arrived the previous night, were still in the lines and were in an unhappy plight. They had already spent a night in the open; many had dysentery, there were no rations for them, and the extra numbers soon attracted enemy aircraft which gave the area a drubbing.

About 5.30 p.m. warning orders were received from 4 Brigade that the 20th was to come under 5 Brigade's command and be used to counter-attack the Maleme aerodrome. It was stressed that, as the enemy was expected to make a sea landing this night, no troops were to leave their positions until they had been relieved by 2/7 Australian Battalion. It was expected that the Australians would arrive about 8 p.m.; and after the relief had been carried out the 20th would use the Australian battalion's trucks to go on to 5 Brigade Headquarters near Platanias and about four miles from Maleme. About 6 p.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker of 2/7 Australian Battalion arrived from Georgeoupolis with his advance party.

At dusk guides from each platoon area assembled at Battalion Headquarters and at 8.45 companies were ordered to pack and be ready to move at 10 p.m. Information was rather sketchy, but at the orders group conference Lieutenant-Colonel Burrows stated that the battalion was going forward that night to take Maleme aerodrome. First the Navy would shell the 'drome; then the RAF would bomb it. After that the infantry would go in. The battalion would get its final orders from 5 Brigade at Platanias. There had been no time for reconnaissance. During the evening Colonel Kippenberger rang Colonel Burrows and wished him luck. He says: ‘The 20th was my Battalion, going into action seriously for the first time, and I felt heartbroken.’

As the hours passed and no relief arrived Colonel Burrows kept ringing 4 Brigade; each time he was told by Brigadier Inglis that the 20th must not go until relieved. In the meantime, starting about midnight, gunfire flickered out to sea north of Canea. Then came the long, far-reaching sweep of a searchlight and again quick flashes, followed by the slow glare of burning ships. The Navy was engaged in repulsing the German seaborne invasion.

– 105 –

By about I a.m. on 22 May, at which time the 20th was supposed to begin the attack with the Maoris, the leading elements of the Australian battalion had arrived, and half an hour later Colonel Burrows was told by Brigadier Inglis to get away to 5 Brigade Headquarters, send on the first two companies that were relieved, and get the others up as soon as he could.

C and D Companies, the first to be relieved, hurriedly embussed and followed the CO's party to Platanias. The Cypriot drivers had not been told that they were to take 20 Battalion forward and had to be restrained from attempting to return. Various reasons were given by the Australians for their late arrival. They had been unable to leave their positions till relieved, their relief was late, they ran into heavy air attack on the way and some vehicles lost contact with the guide who was to direct them through Suda.

At 5 Brigade Colonel Burrows received his orders from Brigadier Hargest. The battalion was to attack the aerodrome between the road and the coast from the east and was to capture it and the guns which had been doing so much damage to 5 Brigade. This done, the 20th was to move to the high ground south of the aerodrome (Point 107), which was the objective of the Maori Battalion attacking simultaneously with the 20th but on the south side of the road. There the 20th was to remain, overlooking the aerodrome, and prevent further enemy aircraft from landing; the Maoris were to return to Platanias by first light.

By 3.30 a.m. C and D Companies were on the start line just across the bridge over the Platanias River. The position was so desperate, in view of the time factor which required the troops to be on their objective before first light, that the CO, after waiting half an hour, began the advance with only these two companies. The promised air support had not bombed the aerodrome and the Navy had been fully occupied with the seaborne expedition.

Company commanders had been given verbal orders to drive through the aerodrome to the Tavronitis River beyond it, then to move to the high ground south of the aerodrome and take up positions to cover it with fire. Guides from 5 Brigade took the companies to the start line and were to show them where mines had been laid as part of the aerodrome defences; but they

– 106 –

– 107 –

were not seen after moving off the start line. C Company's area extended from the road half-way to the sea, and D Company extended from C Company's right flank to the beach. Battalion Headquarters moved along beside the road behind C Company so that it could be found easily. Captain Rice, OC B Company, had come on with the leading companies and the CO left instructions with him to be passed on to A, B, and HQ Companies when they arrived. They were to be guided to the start line and were to follow the two leading companies in a mopping-up role. The men fixed bayonets and the 20th moved off to its first attack.

Three light tanks from 3 Hussars under Lieutenant Roy Farran⁸ took part in the early stages of the advance, moving one behind the other along the road. At first the tanks were shooting over C Company towards the beach. Just before dawn they were engaged by a Bofors gun firing down the road. The leading tank, while turning, was hit, the guns of the second tank jammed, and the third had orders not to go on alone. Its commander, however, assured Colonel Burrows that he would follow as soon as he could. ‘We didn't see the tanks again,’ said the Colonel. Their absence was felt later when dawn broke.

C Company worked at first through olive groves and vineyards with short, low-growing vines and a few houses. D Company's advance was made through more open country, fairly level, but with some ditches and steep-banked stream beds. There were no olive trees but plenty of scrub and clumps of bamboo like shelter belts run wild, and more open country near the gravel beach.

Before long the leading companies were in among the German posts. From in front, on either side, and sometimes from behind came streaks of fire, but the tracer gave the enemy's positions away, enabling men to pick their way between the lines of fire and get close enough to throw grenades. It was a strange sensation for the attackers: the machine-gun fire seemed terrific, and tommy guns, pistols, grenades, and the shouts and screams of men combined in an unearthly din like nothing they had ever heard before. Through the darkness the troops pressed resolutely on, meeting resistance in depth—in ditches, behind

– 108 –

hedges, in the top and bottom stories of houses, in fields and gardens along the road. In some cases the Germans had bored holes through the walls of houses and used bales of hay as protection.

An eye-witness account by Private Melville Hill-Rennie⁹ gives a picture of the fighting encountered by C Company:

As extreme [left] flank man I walked in the ditch along the road and it was my responsibility to see that no Huns got through on the road behind us. Suddenly we ran into our first opposition. A Jerry machine-gun nest opened fire on us at a range of 50 yards and they got four of our boys before we could drop to the ground. The man just on my right gave a sharp yelp and I crawled over to see what was the matter. Two fingers of his right hand had been blown off by an explosive bullet. Jerry was using tracer and it was strange to lie there under the olive trees and see the bullets coming. I could see the explosive ones go off in a shower of flame and smoke as they hit the trees. We waited on the ground and finally the order came for my section to advance and wipe out the nest.

We edged forward on our stomachs until we were within 20 yards of the Nazis, who were tucked away behind a large tree, and then opened fire with our one Tommy gun, one Bren gun and eight rifles. As we kept up the fire the platoon officer [Lt Upham] cautiously crawled round to the side and slightly to the rear of the tree. Although it was still dark, we could tell by the way the Jerries were shouting to each other that they didn't like the look of the situation. When he got round behind the tree the platoon officer jumped to his feet and hurled three Mills bombs, one right after another, into the nest and then jumped forward with his revolver blazing. Single-handed he wiped out seven Jerries with their Tommy guns and another with a machine gun…. Two machine-gunners managed to hobble away in the darkness, but we got them later.

We reformed our lines and as we did so I could hear shouting from down along the beach, where the boys were dealing with more nests. We pushed on slowly for another 50 yards or so. By this time it was getting light and I could make out the shape of a house on the edge of the road just ahead. Just then Jerry opened up with machine guns from the windows of the house and from a small outhouse at the rear. We fell to the ground again and took cover.

I got a bead on one of the windows and as soon as one of the Nazis poked his head above the sill with his machine gun I let fly…. Our platoon officer dashed ahead again and came around from the back towards the door of the outhouse.

‘Come on out,’ he shouted. Jerry's answer was a burst of fire….

– 109 –

Taking a Mills bomb from his pocket he [Upham] calmly pulled the catch then carefully placed it into the hand of a dead Jerry whose arm was stretched out through the outhouse door.

‘Take that, you b—s,’ I heard him say; then he stepped back and waited for the explosion. As soon as the bomb went off he shouted, ‘Come on, boys, they're finished’ and we rushed forward.

There were about eight German wounded inside. Half a dozen more came running out of the house … with their hands held high and … yelling ‘Kamerad, kamerad’. The majority of them were well-built, strapping fellows who looked like picked men. Most of them knew a smattering of English. In neither nest had I seen any officers: those in charge were either corporals or sergeants.

We dumped their guns down the well and left their wounded under guard to wait for the upcoming stretcher bearers, and then moved on. Over on my left I could hear wild shouts coming from the Maori lines as they forged ahead. All along the line to the beach we ran into Jerry fire as the enemy retreated back on to the aerodrome …. at one point I saw a long bamboo fence neatly whittled down as the Germans raked their machine guns across the fields and groves.

It was broad daylight by this time. Our lines had strung out in a semicircle, on my right the boys on the beach strip had managed to fight their way through to the aerodrome … but we in the middle sector came up against Maleme village,¹⁰ where Jerry had taken up vantage points in the houses. We slowly blasted our way from house to house, wiping out one nest after another, while the snipers kept up a constant, deadly fire….

At one house the Nazis had mounted a captured British Bofors gun from the aerodrome behind a well and were turning it on our men with devastating results. We just had to wipe out that gun crew. With two Bren gunners I sneaked forward until I was in a position to cover my platoon officer who …. crawled forward on his stomach for 30 yards; then he tossed his Mills bomb smack on to a gunner crouched behind the wall. We rushed forward and carelessly stood up behind the battered gun and the dead Jerry. At that moment a Hun sniper opened up from the houses. The New Zealander on my right died instantly with a bullet in his head. The Maori on my other side fell to the ground with a bad wound in his stomach.

I flopped behind the well and waited for a chance to dash for cover…. A minute later I scrambled to my feet and dashed across the rough road. Right in the middle I … tripped and fell sprawling on my face. Instantly the sniper opened up on me. I decided the only thing to do was to lie doggo and make believe he had killed me.

– 110 –

For five agonizing minutes I lay still as a corpse. Then, for some reason, he took another shot at me. The bullet pinged into the road just under my knee…. for 20 more horrible minutes I lay dead still. Then, gathering myself for a spring, I jumped and ran for the ditch on the far side of the road where his bullets couldn't reach me. I wiggled back down the ditch and rejoined my outfit….

The troops in Pirgos village were under fire from snipers and several men were wounded. Upham and Lieutenant Bain¹¹ of Headquarters Company rallied the men to carry out the casualties when the battalion was ordered to withdraw left into the hills. While Bain and Hill-Rennie gave covering fire, Upham and a private carried Lieutenant George Brown,¹² badly wounded in a leg, out on a door. ‘While we waited by the roadside I ran through the special kit carried by all the Nazi parachutists,’ said Hill-Rennie. ‘It contained, among other things, some energine tablets and six bars of Cadbury's (English) chocolate. I ate one of the bars and I remember thinking that it was the best thing I had tasted in my life…. I managed to make my way up to the hilltop overlooking Maleme where my outfit was reforming some sort of line. By this time the German air activity was terrific.’

Meanwhile, on the right flank, D Company engaged enemy posts both in scattered houses and in clumps of canes. Half an hour after the start of the attack, while the men were awaiting the signal to attack a farmhouse and outbuildings, a deep-throated German officer broke the silence only a few yards ahead by shouting ‘Kompanie! kompanie!’ and rattling on with other orders. Enemy troops began to move about quickly and then opened fire. The men rushed the house and, after grenades had been thrown, the enemy surrendered. The company pushed on, houses on the way up to the aerodrome being taken in turn and machine-gun nests in the bushes being dealt with as they were discovered. Private Amos fired his anti-tank rifle at one of these posts, silencing the post and deafening those of his section in front of him. Towards daylight Lieutenant

– 111 –

Maxwell,¹³ who appeared to be the only officer left in the company, handed over to Sergeant Sutherland¹⁴ and went over to the road to contact Battalion Headquarters. The Adjutant, Captain Cameron,¹⁵ instructed him to continue the advance and Maxwell rejoined the company, which had kept going, near the edge of the aerodrome. Here 5 Brigade mines and barbed wire were encountered, which hindered progress. Groups of D Company reached the clear part of the aerodrome by the beach and saw scores of aircraft on the ground. Private Amos again used his anti-tank rifle with effect, this time on one of the aircraft.

By this time it was broad daylight and the forward troops had come under most intense mortar and machine-gun fire, with the clear ground of the aerodrome still to be crossed. Casualties were heavy: some sections had only one man left. Lieutenant Maxwell then pulled the survivors back about 100 yards to the cover of some bamboos where sections of B Company were found.

Half an hour after the leading companies had set off the supporting companies, A, B, and HQ, had reached Platanias and received brief directions from Captain Rice, who exhorted his men to the task ahead of them. The companies marched straight off to the sea, deployed, turned left and, at the signal blast of Rice's whistle, advanced. A Company extended from the road, inclusive, half-way to the coast, and B Company from there to the sea. Headquarters Company platoons moved as a second supporting line. After about 800 yards had been covered firing began in front, and some distance ahead A Company caught up with the rear of C Company, which was recognised by the voice of Lieutenant Upham. There were a few isolated shots at first and the odd German missed by the leading company had to be dealt with until the platoons reached Pirgos village just before first light. Here tracer became more common. Because of the rough ground, the patches of canes and low-growing vineyards, contact was not easily kept and sections

– 112 –

went forward to a large extent on their own. No. 8 Platoon, spiritedly led by Lieutenant Markham,¹⁶ caught up with D Company in front of the aerodrome and had some severe fighting. The platoon was almost cut off when the Germans later advanced on the right flank.

B Company, in extended formation ‘like a hare drive’, had had a busy time mopping up. A strongpoint in one house was engaged by throwing grenades through a window. There was a rush and a stream of Germans dashed out like sheep in a panic. Corporal Lockie¹⁷ got seven in a row with his tommy gun. Machine-gun fire was intense and there was a Bofors firing at the same time. At one stage the company was held up by fire that seemed to come from a burnt-out plane on the beach. After all Bren guns had been turned on it there was no more trouble from that quarter. In places enemy machine-gun positions were not deeply dug in and some gun crews surrendered when approached. Others hid by their guns, hoping not to be seen, and when stumbled upon came up like rabbits; but more often there was grenade and bayonet work as Germans hung on till the bitter end.

At first light B Company found itself close to D Company, which was a short distance ahead. The enemy appeared to have withdrawn to the far edge of the aerodrome and was covering the level ground with heavy machine-gun fire. Planes were now coming over at tree-top height, strafing up and down the lines, and the troops were fairly well pinned down.

When B Company went to ground near the airfield Lieutenant McPhail¹⁸ went back for orders to Captain Rice, who was well forward and moving about ‘as if he was on a parade ground’, completely ignoring the small-arms fire. The company's position, however, was not pleasant. There was no shelter under the olive trees and the scrub and vines were too low to permit anyone to stand up unobserved. The bamboo was close but too obvious a choice of cover, and some of the tracks through it were wired and booby-trapped. Rice decided to ask

– 113 –

the CO for instructions. The next few minutes are well described by Private Clarke,¹⁹ one of three brothers in the battalion:

By this time it was daylight and I could see Captain Rice ahead of me walking about. He called for a runner and as I was attached to B Company in that capacity I went over. He told me to go to Bn HQ and ask Col. Burrows what we should do. Earle Cuttriss,²⁰ the other runner, went with me. Captain Rice had said, ‘Two of you better go.’ We were shot at all the way as we cut straight across through the grape vines, the tops of which were being shot off. Reaching a house I was directed to a bridge near the road where I reported to Col. Burrows and gave him the message. He replied that B Company were to stay where they were. Cuttriss and I returned. The fire was worse than before. I delivered the message to Captain Rice who asked me to go back to say that things were a bit too hot and to ask whether we could withdraw. Cuttriss and I started off again but I lost him on the way. Later I found that he had been wounded in the back of the neck.

Reaching Bn HQ I gave Col. Burrows the message and he seemed rather upset…. The C.O. said ‘Yes. Withdraw and come up here.’ I ran back with this message to Captain Rice who was standing behind some canes. He called to McPhail, ‘Come on you chaps, you've got to get out of here.’ I was standing near him when an MG opened up, firing through the canes. I dropped down beside some Headquarters chaps who were already lying there and was about to suggest that Captain Rice do the same when he was hit and fell [About this time, also, Lieutenant Scoltock²¹ was mortally wounded as he shepherded the men across to the shelter of some trees.]

By this time McPhail and the rest had gone so I called to the others to follow me and set off for the road…. At the road I met Charlie Upham who asked me where B Company were. I pointed to the beach and said, ‘What's left of them are down there.’ I asked him where Bn HQ was and he said, ‘Up on that hill,’ pointing to a hill on the left of the road. I went up the creek bed and …. reported to Bn HQ and told the Adjutant that Captain Rice was killed.

By this time Colonel Burrows had appreciated that it would be impossible to carry the first stage of the original plan any further since it would mean crossing the open ground of the airfield in broad daylight under heavy fire from the ground and

– 114 –

attack from the air. He decided to carry out a modified form of the second stage of the plan and try to get what remained of his battalion in behind the Maoris and eventually, if the Maoris had taken their objective, on to the high ground overlooking the aerodrome. Runners were sent out to the companies with these orders, but by this time they were well scattered and the message did not reach them all. Part of D Company received the order to withdraw to the high ground, but Maxwell's group nearer the coast withdrew through B Company to the start line, accompanied by 8 Platoon of A Company.

On getting back to Platanias D Company was sent forward in the afternoon to a point 300 yards past a church situated beyond the bridge and on the right-hand side of the road leading to Maleme. The company was to hold a line until relieved. The advance met intense machine-gun and mortar fire and halted at a creek near the church, where the men took shelter under trees and in some canes. At dusk the advance was resumed but again the men could make little progress against small-arms and Bofors fire. The night was spent in a creek bed, and next morning 5 Brigade withdrew the party to Platanias as there was every likelihood of its being cut off.

In the meantime platoons of Headquarters Company had had a wide variety of experiences as third line in the attack. The anti-aircraft platoon was led with determination by Lieutenant Bain and actually caught up with C Company in Pirgos village, sharing in the heavy fighting there. The mortar platoon, which had arrived in Crete with all its weapons except the anti-tank rifle, had been halted at the Platanias bridge by machine-gun fire. Unable to move forward, Lieutenant Rhodes reported to 5 Brigade Headquarters and was ordered to come under command of the Maori Battalion. Rhodes then took command of the Maori Battalion mortar platoon—seven men, two mortars, and their ammunition.

On debussing and deploying on foot the carrier platoon, under Lieutenant Green, came under fire from a German machine gun firing across the road from the direction of the beach. After temporarily taking cover the platoon pushed on. At daylight it came under the heavy ground and aircraft fire that had halted the leading companies. Elements of D Com-

– 115 –

pany and 8 Platoon of A Company were met as they were withdrawing, and at the same time the platoon was fired at from the rear and from the hills south of the road. To deal with this fire Lieutenant Green and a section crossed the road and mopped up one enemy post, losing three men wounded. It rejoined D Company near 5 Brigade Headquarters. Later the platoon advanced again towards Maleme with D Company but was pinned down by strafing and by machine-gun and mortar fire. Progress across patches of open ground was practically impossible. Towards evening when the blitz eased, Captain Garriock led the platoon, together with men from the transport and pioneer platoons and the sanitary squad, forward with D Company to the creek bed, where positions were taken up and pickets posted. When dawn came it was seen that the area was open to attack from the air and the platoon was withdrawn by Lieutenant Coop²² of 23 Battalion to Platanias village.

In the meantime, far ahead on the Maleme road, the situation was critical. After receiving the second message from Captain Rice, Colonel Burrows realised that the attack could not be pushed any further. In fact, it was surprising that the forward companies had been able to advance as far as they did in the time. The only supporting arms were a few Italian 75-millimetre guns fired by the New Zealand gunners from the Platanias area at dawn. The range was too great and the shells fell near the attacking troops. Contact had been kept with the Maoris, on one or two occasions by the CO himself, but communication with the companies was by runner and most difficult to maintain. The Battalion Headquarters group had itself been forced to take cover near a bridge. Colonel Burrows had had a narrow escape when a burst of enemy fire ripped his pistol holster and tore his trousers on either side, disintegrating harmlessly a hand grenade which was in his pocket.

After B Company had been ordered to move up the gully near Pirgos village and take up position behind the Maoris, Private Sheppard²³ of A Company was sent towards the canes to collect

– 116 –

any troops in that area. He returned later to say that he had been shot at on all sides by Germans but could find no trace of 20th troops. When Lieutenant Upham was asked for two men to bring back D Company from the right flank, he went himself with Lance-Sergeant Kirk²⁴ and brought back some B Company men from round the aerodrome. The mortar and machine-gun fire on the open ground was heavy and they were lucky to get back alive. Planes were landing on the 'drome and troops were jumping out and getting straight into the battle, for the Germans were following up the withdrawal. To protect B Company's move up the creek bed the CO put A Company under Captain Washbourn to line the bank of a ravine, while Lieutenant Bain and the ack-ack platoon cheerfully held up the enemy as the wounded were carried away.

Gradually what remained of A, B, and C Companies and elements of D Company moved into the area on the hill behind the Maoris. They were actually in 23 Battalion's area, and Colonel Burrows at once got in touch with Lieutenant-Colonel Leckie,²⁵ CO of that unit, and Colonel Dittmer²⁶ of the Maori Battalion. All agreed that the best use that could be made of the 20th was to use it to strengthen weaknesses in the line.

By about midday the companies were in a defensive position with a distant view of Maleme aerodrome but unable to reach it with fire. They had no tools and could not dig in. Soon the German mortars began to shell them, inflicting casualties, and a captured Bofors gun added to their troubles. A Company, on a hill, could see enemy reinforcements arriving by air all day, well out of reach of the Brens. Battalion Headquarters saw an enemy gun section in operation beside a house near the aerodrome. Men loaded the gun, fired, and ran for cover again under the trees. B Company, in 23 Battalion's Headquarters

– 117 –

Company area, was located in and about a small group of houses like a country estate and had good slit trenches dug by 23 Battalion. The company overlooked the flat down which Germans were infiltrating, their helmets occasionally bobbing up above the scrub. The fire of four Bren guns was used with effect. Later in the morning ‘about twenty Germans as bold as brass’ came down the road from the aerodrome, apparently confident that they had air cover. They were pulling a gun that looked like a Bofors. Lieutenant McPhail directed the Bren-gunners to sight on the position into which the Germans were pulling the gun, and when they were in a close group a concentration of fire ended their activity.

C Company was well forward, and as the Germans pushed out patrols feeling for a gap in the line, Lieutenant Upham and his men repulsed them, on one occasion capturing a machine gun. Their area had three heavy mortar bombardments.

About dusk, after heavy strafing, the enemy attacked a ridge held by the Maoris slightly to the left of 20 Battalion. Colonel Burrows describes the action:

They [the Germans] gave the ridge all they had with MG and mortar fire and then attacked with rifle and bayonet. I was across a valley just behind the ridge attacked and had had sent me by Col. Leckie a group of oddments from his HQ and any other soldier he could collect. These, in addition to any I could gather up were waiting ready to counter-attack if the Germans were successful…. The Maori doesn't believe in waiting to be attacked if he is not dug in. When the Germans got to within 20 or 30 yards there came the usual Maori yelling and shouting and down the hill they all went to meet the Hun. I couldn't see but just had to wait after things had quietened to decide from speaking voices whether we'd won or lost. Not long afterwards I heard, ‘Don't waste any more bullets on the b—s,’ so I dispersed my group and we prepared to spend a long night where we were.

The position when night fell on 22 May was, therefore, that the survivors of A, B, and C Companies, less 8 Platoon, were in position on the high ground south of the road, while most of D Company, 8 Platoon, and elements of Headquarters Company were in the Platanias area near 5 Brigade Headquarters or in the muddy watercourse about half-way between Platanias and Pirgos.

– 118 –

The supplying of the forward troops presented a serious problem for the quartering staff. A convoy of three 7-ton lorries driven by Royal Marines and carrying Battalion Headquarters personnel, the ‘I’ section, rations, and mortar ammunition set out for Maleme early on the morning of the 22nd. The convoy was led by the battalion second-in-command, Major Paterson, in a 15-cwt Fordson, but became separated from its leader, lost its way, and eventually arrived back at the Canea bridge at daylight. The ammunition had to be off-loaded and the 15-cwt took over the job of taking supplies forward. During the day Private Don Caley²⁷ made several trips in the 15-cwt truck, and in the evening he set off again in advance of the 7-ton lorry which was to try to get through with ammunition. This small convoy encountered the famous ‘ambush’, here described by Private Morris²⁸:

The first part of the trip as far as the road block … [at the Composite Battalion] was uneventful, except that we passed a fairly large crowd of prisoners, under guard, moving down in the general direction of Canea…. From the road block on, the road continued round one or two bluffs and then the escarpment eased off to the left (the sea was on our right and not far away) so that we went out on to a narrow plain covered by either bushes or flax or cactus and long grass. We … passed several burning houses and then … [just before Ay Marina] the fireworks commenced with … a man jumping from behind cactus and shouting ‘Surrender’ several times. Following this, a stream of bullets … commenced to go past with tracer interspersed. On the 15-cwt, which took it all, there were I think, five, with Dvr Caley driving, RQMS Bolwell²⁹ passenger, myself on the toolbox in the centre and Corporal Spriggs³⁰ behind the RQMS…. At the cry of ‘Surrender’ I can remember pulling my trigger in the general direction of the shouter, unfortunately missing. This shot, it appears, caused the RQMS temporary stunning as it was only an inch or so away from his ear, and that will explain his late departure from the truck, … several seconds or minutes after us. Cpl Spriggs, I remember, went off the truck like a sack of spuds…. [He pitched forward over the bonnet (there was no windscreen) on to the road, falling at the feet of one of the enemy, who was forced to step aside to avoid him. Unhurt by his fall except for abrasions, Spriggs lay ‘doggo’ and awaited developments.] Apparently the rest had also decamped by different

– 119 –

routes when I took off via the driver's seat, rifle and all. On clearing the truck I acquired the prone position with much greater speed and skill than in Burnham or Maadi days and was in rather a dilemma as to whether to put my bayonet on or not. I eventually did, but it rattled so much (I must have been either very nervous or it was a badly fitting bayonet) I took it off again. My water bottle also caused me worry as I had to sling it on the kicking straps and it dragged and rattled.

Meanwhile the RQMS had come to, to find that a German officer standing within a few feet of him was again ordering him to surrender. Instead of complying he stared at the German for a moment and then quickly stepped down on to the road on the far side, hearing as he did so a fire order given in German. He slipped round the side of the truck and, according to Morris, ‘went past me like a Catherine wheel’, to the accompaniment of much tracer.

As it happened [Morris continues] I think that I was the only one with a hand grenade, they being scarce on the island (except for certain people who seemed to have boxes of them), so after a little thought to discern the Jerries' movements, I finally let them have it…. I must have got their GOC troops as the loudest voice closed down and …. except for some moaning, quiet reigned, and during that time I worked my way backwards through the odd undergrowth to a house that stood about 20 yards or so away from the truck. Here … I wondered what to do and, thinking that perhaps another crowd … might come through and get caught as we had, I decided to try and circumnavigate the ‘wily’ Jerry…. I finally decided to swim off from the beach and try and get ashore opposite the village…. I planned to watch the headland … and try to come ashore opposite it and get to 5 Bde HQ or 20 Bn HQ.

I worked my way to the beach past the house. One had to be careful as it was fairly open and they had a big searchlight playing up the coast from near Canea…. Stripping, except for Bombay bloomers and wrist watch and burying all, plus rifle, in the sand, I worked my way down and into the water and took off for ports indefinite. It was here that the RQMS told me afterwards that he had seen me and nearly let me have it, placing me as one of the Jerries.

Just how long that swim took I don't know but it was for at least 1 ½ hours, but as I was about done by the time I got ashore, it was probably more. The main trouble was that the water was so phosphorescent that overarm could not be used, only dog-paddle, as even breast-stroke caused sparks…. That Ay Marina bluff seemed to go backwards at times as there must have been a current. However, I finally made a spot opposite it and came in to land … nearly

– 120 –

opposite the village. Being very cold I tried to run along the beach … to get warm, and seeing a point of vegetation I decided to work my way across to it by degrees. This I started to do and immediately came under … fire, immediately going to earth. On quietness descending, forgetting our password ‘Salmon Trout’, I endeavoured to call ‘Friend’, only to find my throat out of action. However, I cleared a ‘No. I stoppage’ and managed to get the message away. This brought ‘Salmon Trout’ to which I gave ‘Blenheim’ and was told to come forward and be recognised, which I did with hands up and fingers well spread!

My captors told me that they were a 5 Brigade HQ patrol who, it appears, heard the noise of our ambush but did not move far enough down the road to recover the truck. I told my story and, not having glasses or boots, caused some noise on the way in over the thorny rough ground to deliver my message to those higher up and, under Padre Spence, to be shown a place to have a rest…. The following morning I recovered what clothing and equipment I had left in both the truck and under the sand and continued on back to our old area at Canea bridge.³¹

Battalion Headquarters, also, had had its problems. After its false start the night before the ‘I’ section went forward about 1 p.m. on 22 May with the RSM, who organised small parties near Platanias village while the section established a check post near a small white house on the road. German tommy-gun fire came from unpredictable directions and odd buildings, indicating that the enemy was infiltrating steadily. At dusk shots and tracer came closer and at one stage a wounded Bren-carrier driver from another unit staggered in, saying that he had been ambushed.

This ambush and that experienced by the quartering staff formed part of an enemy movement from south to north-west of Galatas in an attempt to cut the Canea-Maleme road behind 5 Brigade. The brigade had been severely attacked; its men were considerably exhausted and were not considered fit to make a further attack.

With the approval of General Freyberg, General Puttick decided that the Maori Battalion would withdraw on the night of 22–23 May to its former area which it had held when in brigade reserve; 23 and 21 Battalions were to occupy areas to the east of the Maoris, and the 20th was to return to its former

– 121 –

position near Canea in divisional reserve. Engineer detachments were to move to an area north of Galatas where they would come under command of 4 Brigade. Artillery and machine-gun personnel were to accompany the battalion in whose area they were then situated.

A warning order was accordingly despatched by wireless to Brigadier Hargest,³² Commander 5 Brigade, at 10.30 p.m. telling him to be prepared to withdraw during the night of 22–23 May. All other forms of communication with 5 Brigade Headquarters had been interrupted and it was necessary to send the written message—which followed three hours later—by Bren carrier because of enemy detachments threatening the road leading to Brigade Headquarters.

Meanwhile, the battalions on the hill were in a precarious position. As Colonel Burrows says:

I honestly didn't see how we could last another day. The Hun was sure to try another attack perhaps in a different position, and if he broke through anywhere we were for it. My HQ got an hour or two of sleep…. At 4.30 a.m. word came through to go to a conference with Col. Leckie and the other 5th Bde COs. I reached the spot in the dark after ten minutes and learned we were to withdraw at once to … Platanias…. The message should have been delivered at 10 p.m. the night before. We were lucky to get it at all. Here was a case where we suffered through lack of modern equipment. A battalion fully equipped should carry portable wireless sets. We had none. The Germans had swags of them.

Withdrawal began immediately…. As we knew we'd be caught in the light it was decided to keep to the high ground. This made the journey much longer and more difficult, but there was cover for the troops, especially from the air. The orders for the 20th Battalion were to go right through to Galatos and come again under 4th Bde command. Owing to lack of time I sent word to platoon commanders to move back with the 5th Bde units to which they were attached as far as Platanias where I intended to reform and send the companies independently to Galatos. In the event of any soldier being lost he was to go straight back to the Battalion's old bivvy area near Div HQ.

We moved to Platanias in small groups. Nothing much happened to my group and we arrived without casualties. Some groups were caught by MG fire and some by planes. We had to cross a deepish

– 122 –

river and our group got safely across a swing bridge. Jack Bain and his men, however, had to wade as a machine gun had ranged on to the bridge. They came in wet to the neck.

At Platanias I reported to Brigadier Hargest and learned from him that the mixed groups that had withdrawn the previous day had been sent forward again to hold a position on the coast strip, had been withdrawn from that, and were now put into positions to guard the bridge.

Lieutenant Markham of 8 Platoon A Company describes this action:

On the morning of 23 May 1941 … some 60 members of the 20th Battalion under the command of Capt Garriock were assembled at 5th Bde HQ after being withdrawn from a forward position between the road and the sea…. We remained in Bde HQ area at least an hour waiting for orders—during this time some rations were obtained and issued.

After this, a Capt Baker³³ [28 (Maori) Battalion] arrived who apparently had orders to put us in positions covering the road at the bridge some 400 yards from Bde HQ. We were told that we might have to stay there as long as twenty-four hours. We immediately set about organising into two platoons for there were representatives from three different companies there. However, we had to conceal the men owing to intense air activity overhead. About as soon as this was over—it lasted about 15 minutes—someone at Bde shouted that the enemy were already at the bridge.

Capt Baker assumed command and placed one platoon [under Captain Garriock] about half way between Bde and the bridge. He directed that the other platoon, of which I was put in command, should attack through the first platoon and establish itself in the dug positions about the bridge—with one section on the seaward side of the road and two on the other side. Capt Baker would lead these two sections—I was to lead the one on the seaward side.

Once having crossed the road I could not see what was happening on the other side, but pressed on to within 100 yards of the bridge where the enemy had a gun in the middle of the road and was holding our positions beside the bridge. The enemy had mortars and machine guns and made full use of them on both sides of the road.

My section had no dug positions and they brought very heavy mortar fire to bear on us. We were able to put the gun temporarily out of action by killing or disposing of the crew—and it was then that a runner crossed the road with a message from Capt Baker to cover his withdrawal. This I did to the best of my ability.

My section thinned out and withdrew by bounds to behind a

– 123 –

burning house—we sustained two casualties. When I got there I found that practically everyone from the other side of the road had proceeded on down the road. I and the two other officers waited for a while but no one else came out. I could not find out whether Capt Baker had gone on ahead—at all events I did not see him again.

Captain Garriock was wounded in this attack and Lieutenant Maxwell took over. His platoon went to ground and fired on the enemy gun crew but was engaged by enemy machine guns from a hillside which overlooked its positions. ‘… Jerry turned all his fury loose at us,’ said the carrier platoon's sergeant, Wally Kimber. ‘Mortars and MG, the Mortar fire was terrific. I think it was the hottest hour I had during the war. We were simply being blasted out of the place.’ Then the Stukas took a hand, and while the platoon lay low the enemy opened fire from the beach flank. Casualties increased and the platoon was withdrawn, subsequently holding a line to cover the withdrawal of the Maori Battalion before it itself withdrew farther back to the ‘old Welch positions’.

The counter-attack at the Platanias bridge had been a short sharp affair but it had held up the enemy long enough to allow the troops around Platanias to take up positions. The rearguard was reinforced at short notice by two companies of the 20th, who manned a hastily formed line between the road and the sea. Colonel Burrows describes their part in the day's fighting:

Platanias was to be held by 5th Bde. The difficulty was to get … into position before the place was attacked. The Germans are very quick at following up any opportunity and it's a bad lookout if there is confusion in a withdrawal.

However, the 20th had orders to get back to beyond Galatos, about another 7 miles. A Coy had left. D Coy with most of HQ Coy had already gone after a bit of scrapping along the beach. Then came a deuce of a blitz by German planes and I was waiting with what remained of C and B Coys, with some of HQ Coy, for the blitz to finish so that we could get away. Next I received a message from Brig Hargest to say a German attack was developing and I was to take charge of all troops in the sector where I was and organise them for defence. This was a hectic task to have thrown at one at short notice. I belted B and C Coys into position forming a line thin as tissue paper…. I had a platoon of Maoris on the beach and, I learned later, two tanks…. Our Intelligence Sergeant, Jack Sullivan,³⁴ went to the OP we decided on and stuck there till dark with a wound in his shoulder.

– 124 –

During heavy mortaring of 15 Platoon's position, Lieutenant Upham was wounded in the shoulder by a piece of shrapnel. His platoon sergeant, Dave Kirk, tells how Upham ‘… handed me his pocket knife and insisted that I extract the offending shrapnel. After carrying out what I thought was rather a neat bit of surgery, though it must have been rather painful for the patient, I tried to persuade him to go and have it