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CHAPTER 2
Greece

Early in March there were some indications, apart from the usual rumours, that the Division would soon be engaged in operations against the enemy. The culmination of the training programme, which seemed to have covered every phase, the checking of unit and personal equipment (including gas respirators), the issue of tommy guns, the sharpening of bayonets, and the assembly of the complete Division by the arrival from England of the Second Echelon were of considerable significance. Conjecture as to the probable theatre of operations was rife, with Greece perhaps the favourite though Libya ran it close.

The decision so far as the New Zealand Division was concerned, however, had been communicated to General Freyberg on 17 February when he was informed that British forces were to proceed to the assistance of Greece, already attacked by Italy and threatened by Germany. It was recognised that the forces available had little chance of success against a full-scale attack, but there were hopes and some prospects that British intervention might result in Yugoslavia and Turkey also coming in against the Axis powers.

The New Zealand Division commenced the move from Egypt to Greece on 6 March, the destination being kept secret, though the brigadiers had been informed and had had an opportunity of studying maps and military reports on Greece and the campaign there. The commanding officers of units had been told that the Division was moving to a theatre of war; otherwise no information was divulged.

On 3 March seven officers and 206 other ranks marched in to the battalion to bring the strength up to establishment plus 1st Reinforcements. Base kits were sent to Maadi for storage on the 4th. An advance party of one officer and nine other ranks left for Amiriya, 12 miles south-west of Alexandria, on the 5th, and 25 Battalion, in a column which included 24 and 26 Battalions, 4 Reserve MT Company and the Petrol Company, left Helwan at 10.30 a.m. on 6 March. Amiriya, 145 miles distant, was reached at 6.45 p.m.

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The movement was an impressive one. The column of 394 vehicles, divided into blocks of approximately thirty-five vehicles with five miles between blocks and eighty yards between vehicles, covered 60 miles of road. The sight of one of these columns emphasised the necessity for most accurate staff work (and punctuality) in the despatch of vehicles at the start and in their reception and disposal at the destination. The need for first-class road-discipline and close attention to orders by the drivers and others concerned in controlling the movement was evident, especially so as other columns and individual vehicles would probably be using and perhaps crossing the same roads, all working to a close timetable.

The possibility of air attack could not be disregarded and was met by the provision of two light machine guns in each block of vehicles, while each rifleman carried fifty rounds of ammunition. The main protection against any serious air attack was of course the presence of units of the RAF in the Western Desert and in the vicinity of Cairo and Alexandria.

Amiriya transit camp was a most unattractive area of desert with much fine, loose sand churned up by numerous vehicles; the men were accommodated in tents with none of the facilities and comforts to which they had become accustomed in the permanent camps of Maadi and Helwan. A very severe sandstorm or ‘khamseen’ on 14–15 March is still remembered with great displeasure by members of the battalion who experienced it. The Intelligence Officer of 25 Battalion at the time, Lieutenant Mason,¹ wrote a vivid description of it:

‘No one who was there will ever forget the khamseens at Amiriya,’ he wrote. ‘They were colossal—it didn't seem possible that the wind could pick up so much sand. They lasted on and off for three days and the fine yellow powder got in everything —in wrist watches, in gear-boxes and oil sumps of the trucks, in stomachs and in lungs of men, everywhere. You couldn't see more than a yard in front of you, even at noon, and men going from tent to cookhouse, a mere matter of ten yards, frequently became lost and finally got round to using compasses. The sand covered everything—before getting into your blankets you had to shake a couple of inches of dust off the top. The sandstorm at Helwan on 12th January, which at the time had seemed so tough, was by comparison a piffling puff of wind.

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The only compensation was swimming in the Mediterranean. The ocean was a short five miles away and the dip in the warm water was right out of the box. If only leave could have been granted to Alexandria, shimmering so invitingly there ten miles away ….’

The officers of the battalion on embarkation for Greece were:

• Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Wilder, Commanding Officer

• Major S. M. Satterthwaite, Second-in-Command

• Major C. D. A. George, OC A Coy

• Major C. J. Williams, OC C Coy (Seconded temporarily to Divisional Headquarters as embarkation officer, 5–23 March)

• Captain J. D. Armstrong, Adjutant

• Captain H. F. Smith, OC B Coy

• Captain A. J. R. Hastie, OC D Coy

• Captain H. G. Burton, OC HQ Coy

• Captain H. J. Dalzell, 2 i/c B Coy

• Captain W. H. Roberts, 2 i/c A Coy

• Captain R. Morrison, 2 i/c D Coy

• Lieutenant (T/Capt) S. M. Porter, 2 i/c C Coy (OC C Coy 5–23 March)

• Lieutenant W. L. Rutherford, 6 Platoon (Transport)

• Lieutenant M. J. Mason, Intelligence Officer

• Lieutenant W. J. Heslop, 17 Platoon

• Lieutenant H. G. Witters, 14 Platoon

• Lieutenant G. A. W. Possin, supernumerary on Bn HQ, later IO

• Lieutenant R. M. McLeay, 15 Platoon

• Lieutenant G. Colledge, 1 Platoon (Signals)

• Second-Lieutenant (T/Lieut) T. W. G. Rolfe, Quartermaster

• Second-Lieutenant H. H. Hollow, 5 Platoon (Pioneer)

• Second-Lieutenant G. J. B. Morris, 12 Platoon

• Second-Lieutenant J. P. Tredray, 11 Platoon

• Second-Lieutenant I. D. Reid, 3 Platoon (Mortars)

• Second-Lieutenant H. Macaskill, 7 Platoon

• Second-Lieutenant A. H. Armour, 8 Platoon

• Second-Lieutenant M. Handyside, 16 Platoon

• Second-Lieutenant W. M. Clarry, 2 Platoon (Anti-Aircraft)

• Second-Lieutenant S. G. L. Smythe, 18 Platoon

• Second-Lieutenant A. W. Clark, 10 Platoon

• Second-Lieutenant R. F. Sherlock, 4 Platoon (Carriers)

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• Second-Lieutenant I. C. Webster, 9 Platoon

• Second-Lieutenant F. C. Corlett, 13 Platoon

• Attached:

• Captain L. H. Cordery, NZMC, Medical Officer

• Rev. C. E. Willis, Chaplain

Except for small advance parties and the first-line transport, Bren carriers, and motor-cyclists, which embarked on 12 March and sailed in convoy for Piraeus at noon the next day, 25 Battalion remained at Amiriya until the 17th. It then embarked in the cruiser HMS Orion and in company with HM ships Ajax and Havock and HMAS Perth sailed at noon. The troops were given a warm welcome aboard the cruiser, receiving a good meal right away, and thoroughly enjoyed themselves. ‘The sailors were wonderful to us,’ wrote Wakeling² of the RAP, ‘and nothing was any trouble.’

This movement of 520 miles across the Mediterranean was not without considerable risk of air, surface, and submarine attack, including mines. But the troops seemed quite unconcerned, being content to leave their protection to the Royal Navy. Actually, few losses of shipping were incurred, a total of seven ships being sunk and four damaged during the whole movement of the British, Australian, and New Zealand forces to Greece. The naval battle of Matapan occurred during the passage of the forces, three Italian cruisers being sunk. Our shipping was affected only to the extent that the ships carrying the vehicles spent some twelve hours longer at sea through being turned back as a precaution for a short period during the battle.

Disembarking at Piraeus after a fast passage of twenty-five hours without incident, the battalion after three cheers for the crew, marched off for Hymettus Camp, ten miles away at the foot of the mountains at the south-eastern outskirts of Athens. ‘What a march and were we welcomed en route,’ commented Wakeling. ‘A thousand Iti prisoners passed down one side of the road as we marched up the other.’

Liberal leave was granted and the opportunity to explore the historic city was eagerly taken. The green countryside, the flowers, the general cleanliness, the almost complete absence of flies, and the warm-hearted welcome of the people were in strong contrast to the conditions experienced in Egypt; it seemed

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to be a different world. It was, however, very cold, with snow visible not far away, and winter woollens were much appreciated.

At this time the fighting front was some 270 air-miles north-west of Athens. There the Greeks with about thirteen divisions were holding the Italian invaders (who had been severely mauled) 30 miles inside Albanian territory. Nearly 300 miles to the north and north-east of Athens, on or near the frontier between Bulgaria and Greece, the Greeks had about four divisions disposed for delaying action and defence of selected areas, including Salonika. A further three Greek divisions were allotted for the Aliakmon line, with part of which 25 Battalion was shortly to become familiar. Naturally the best Greek troops and equipment were on the north-western front facing the Italians, the remainder of the Greek forces being in many cases hastily trained and poorly equipped. Their transport was more suited for mountain warfare than for a war of rapid movement over considerable distances, which in fact they were quite unable to undertake.

Marching through enthusiastic crowds in Athens en route to Rouf railway station, three miles away on the northern outskirts of the city, 25 Battalion at 4 p.m. on 21 March entrained for Katerini, a small town on the Gulf of Salonika, 35 miles south-west of the town of Salonika and 180 air-miles north of Athens. Katerini was reached after an interesting though somewhat tiring journey of twenty-three hours, many men being seated on the floor of cattle trucks. With the exception of A Company (which occupied a hall in the town) the battalion marched a couple of miles to an area on the outskirts where the men were accommodated in tents. The first-line transport and motor-cyclists, travelling by road from Athens, arrived the following day. Katerini was a somewhat picturesque and quaint little town, nestling at the foot of Mount Olympus, snow-clad and over 9500 feet high, 16 miles away to the south-west.

The next day, 24 March, a move was made to the village of Alonia, a march of 12 miles to the north of Katerini, and then two days later, to another bivouac area in a defensive position which was being prepared by units of 19 Greek Division three miles to the north. Sixth Brigade took over this position from the Greeks, 25 Battalion relieving 192 (Greek) Regiment on 28 March, though the defences were not actually manned until some days later.

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The defensive position was part of the Aliakmon line. The New Zealand Division had been allotted the coastal sector with its left or inland flank resting on high ground at, but exclusive of, the village of Elafina. Twelfth Greek Division was on the left, with another division extending the line north-west to the Yugoslav frontier. Nineteenth Greek Division, on completion of its relief by the New Zealand Division, had an anti-parachute role north of the Aliakmon River and also provided a reserve.

To the north-east of the Allied line the British 1 Armoured Brigade had the role of delaying the enemy by fighting and demolitions, the latter including all crossings of the Aliakmon River.

In the New Zealand sector 6 Brigade was on the right, 4 Brigade on the left, and 5 Brigade in reserve in a defensive position astride the Olympus Pass, 21 Battalion of 5 Brigade being detached to hold the railway tunnel and road at Platamon between Mount Olympus and the sea, 20 miles south of Katerini. The New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Regiment was to oppose the enemy on the Aliakmon River and fight a delaying action back by prescribed routes through the main New Zealand position. No. 3 NZ Machine Gun Company was allotted to 6 Brigade and 4 MG Company was in position south of the Tranos River, about two miles back, to deal with any enemy penetration; the remainder of 27 MG Battalion was with a mixed force (Mackay Force) at Vevi, 50 miles to the north-west, near the Yugoslav frontier.

The New Zealand Divisional Artillery supported the forward brigades, 4 and 5 Field Regiments covering 6 Brigade front; 32 and 33 Anti-Tank Batteries and one troop of the 31st came under command of 6 Brigade.

The brigade's frontage was 8000 yards, an excessive front completely beyond the power of a brigade to hold against serious attack. It was finally decided to hold the position with all three battalions forward and thus cover the anti-tank obstacle in front with a more-or-less reasonable amount of fire. This plan left Brigadier Barrowclough with no reserve, a serious matter, and before adopting it he sought and obtained the approval of General Freyberg, who had retained 22 Battalion of 5 Brigade as a divisional reserve.

In contrast with the wooded position of 4 Brigade on its left, 6 Brigade's area was open, undulating country with some steep ridges and valleys running generally east and west. It was very

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suitable for tanks and anti-tank obstacles were consequently of major importance. An anti-tank ditch was being prepared by the Greeks along a stream from Skala Elevtherokhorion, and thence along the forward slopes of a ridge to the Toponitsa River, which was a very good natural obstacle. The forward defended localities were sited to the south and covered the ditch, though in some places it could not be covered in this way and would have to be watched by snipers and observers by day and patrolled by night.

A system of concrete pillboxes was planned on the line of the forward defended localities and in positions in depth; SOS light signals were arranged to bring down artillery and machine-gun defensive fire in front of the foremost troops; seven main demolitions were prepared, for a bridge, railway and road embankments, two road culverts, and two tracks over the anti-tank ditch, all on the brigade front. An allotment of 2000 anti-tank mines and 100 anti-personnel mines had been made to 6 Brigade, and of these 750 and 75 respectively were to be issued to 25 Battalion. Passwords were arranged and a white armband was to be carried by each man, to be worn when ordered on either arm as notified from time to time, to distinguish between enemy and friendly troops. Such an arrangement has obvious dangers, the consequences of which could well be disastrous, and, perhaps fortunately, it was never carried out. For some special enterprise, such as a raid, it could serve a useful purpose, as in the trench raids in France in the 1914–18 war where it was frequently used.

Reserves of ammunition and rations were established at suitable points as well as a prisoner-of-war cage and a refugee-collecting centre. Wireless silence was imposed, traffic control carefully planned and put into effect, and the transport in the forward area reduced to a minimum by brigading the surplus vehicles near the village of Korinos, ten miles back.

This detailed description will give some indication of the study and work involved in the planning and preparation of a defensive position. Each position varies considerably and so has its own special problems, and frequently, conflicting requirements necessitate some compromise.

Brigadier Barrowclough placed 24 Battalion on the right of the position, 26 Battalion in the centre, and 25 Battalion on the left, the respective frontages being 1700, 3000, and 3300 yards. Colonel Wilder had three companies forward, D Company

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(Hastie³) on the right, B Company (Smith⁴ in the centre, and C Company (Williams⁵) on the left. A Company (George⁶) was in reserve at St. Elias, 2500 yards in rear of the forward defended localities. The positions were not occupied.

Since its arrival in the area on 26 March, 25 Battalion had been working with the Greek troops in preparing the defences and actively continued the work after the departure of the Greeks on the 28th. The plan for the holding of the divisional front, which has already been explained, did not reach finality till 1 April, when the frontage of 6 Brigade was extended to the left to include the hill of St. Elias which previously had been in 4 Brigade's sector.

On 6 April it was learnt that Germany had declared war on Greece and Yugoslavia at midnight 5 – 6 April and 25 Battalion made final preparations to occupy its defensive position at short notice. At dawn the explosion of pre-arranged demolitions in Salonika was heard and left no doubts that war was very near. Work on the defences was accelerated and next day (when, incidentally, a little rain fell and summer time was adopted, clocks being advanced one hour) the fire plan was completed, areas for mines selected, and all was more-or-less ready for an encounter with the enemy.

Fortunately for the comfort of the men and the progress of the defensive works, the weather, apart from a little wind and rain on the evening of the 25th and a dense morning fog a couple of days later, had been delightful. Spring had arrived with all the trees bursting into their new foliage and wild flowers starting to bloom. Judas trees dotted the landscape with their brilliant colour and Greek children selling eggs and figs to the men completed a peaceful and most attractive scene which war was on the eve of destroying.

General Freyberg had clearly stated to General Wilson, the commander of all British troops in Greece, his opinion that the Aliakmon position could not be held for more than a few days with the troops available, and a good deal of work had been

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done on the only practicable position, the precipitous Olympus Pass in rear, where 5 Brigade with supporting arms was in position. General Wilson had no illusions on the vulnerability of the Aliakmon position and intended to keep troops there only if the Yugoslavs delayed the enemy advance and prevented the Allied line being turned via the Monastir Pass.

Two days after the German declaration, when it was clear that Yugoslavia could impose little delay, 4 Brigade with attached troops moved from the defensive position on the left of 25 Battalion and, passing over the Olympus Pass, occupied a position on the Aliakmon River at the village of Servia, 30 air-miles south-west of Katerini. There it was under command of Australian Corps. At the same time 26 Battalion, on the right of 25 Battalion, marched back to Olympus Pass to prepare defensive positions there. These movements were of course a prelude to the abandonment of the forward position and the holding of the position in the pass.

In the meantime a detachment of one composite company of 24 Battalion, one platoon of 25 Battalion, and one platoon and a carrier platoon of 26 Battalion was organised to fill the gap between 24 and 25 Battalions. No. 4 MG Company was given a supporting role to the composite company, which was commanded by Major George, 25 Battalion. Sixth Brigade's front was thus generally covered, but the left flank to the west of 25 Battalion, completely uncovered by the withdrawal of 4 Brigade, was to be secured to some extent when the Divisional Cavalry, after vacating the line of the Aliakmon River, went into reserve in a position where it afforded some such protection.

During this day, 8 April, it was learnt that the Germans had penetrated 50 miles into Yugoslavia and that a Yugoslav division had surrendered. The Germans were also reported at Salonika and elements of the Greek Army were falling back through 6 Brigade's lines, together with increasing numbers of refugees from north of the Aliakmon. When darkness came, the sight of fires in Salonika, demolished oil installations, visible about 25 miles away from the higher ground in 25 Battalion's position, was most impressive. At 10.15 that night, on orders from General Freyberg, the Divisional Cavalry demolished the bridges over the Aliakmon and 6 Brigade was ordered to explode its demolition charges, other than those on the railway and road bridges.

The following day the flow of refugees and Greek Army stragglers had increased. Artillery fire and bombing was to be

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heard all that day and night, and aircraft, believed to be British, were passing overhead throughout the day. Late in the afternoon, after the battle positions were occupied, 6 Brigade was told that it would be withdrawn to the Olympus Pass position that night or the next day. At 10.30 p.m. 25 Battalion received a warning order to move and a few hours later, at 2 a.m., 10 April, the withdrawal commenced, Katerini being reached after a most arduous 17-mile march at 8.40 a.m. ‘It was one of the worst the Battalion had experienced,’ said one man, ‘rough roads and a fast pace and many fell out.’

Five hours later the journey was continued in first-line and RMT vehicles over the steep and tortuous Olympus Pass to the village of Dholikhi, on the plain at the foot of the mountains, about 30 miles by road from Katerini.

Back at the Aliakmon position a covering force had been left. This consisted of the three carrier platoons of the battalions, 3 Company 27 MG Battalion, and 34 Anti-Tank Battery, all under Lieutenant-Colonel Duff⁷ of 7 Anti-Tank Regiment. This force remained till all other troops had withdrawn from the defensive position when, at about 4 a.m., it also withdrew. The Divisional Cavalry Regiment, however, maintained its watch on the Aliakmon River. A few hours later, fifteen minutes after 25 Battalion had reached Katerini, the commander of the German 2 Panzer Division in the Salonika area received an order: ‘Send out a strong recce force immediately over the Vardar towards Edessa, Verria (main axis of advance) and Katerini’, and, when asked when the main body could advance, replied that all bridges over and west of the Vardar had been destroyed and that he could not advance until they were repaired. As it happened, the foremost German troops did not reach Katerini till 2 p.m., 14 April.

The first day at Dholikhi was dull and bitterly cold and the men had a welcome rest. A very cold night followed and the morning of the 12th revealed fresh snow on the ranges above the camp as the battalion moved back up the pass for work on road improvements near Kokkinoplos, on the north-west shoulder of Mount Olympus, behind the position held by 5 Brigade. The roads generally required much improvement and the Greek population, consisting almost entirely of old men, women

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of all ages, and boys and girls, earned the respect and indeed the commiseration of the troops as they carried out essential maintenance. The elevation above sea level was over 3000 feet, with Mount Olympus (9571 feet) seven miles to the south-east, and the climate was severe for men who had spent some time in Egypt. The road to Kokkinoplos, where 25 Battalion was working, was extremely perilous at any time and snow the previous day made it much more so, the transport drivers earning high praise for their expert handling in such conditions.

Each evening the battalion returned to Dholikhi, but on the 14th it moved forward to the Ay Dhimitrios locality and took over the position just vacated by 26 Battalion, which on the previous day (Easter Sunday) had moved at the shortest notice to fill a gap between 4 Brigade at Servia and 19 (Australian) Brigade on its left. Twenty-fourth Battalion had also been moved, over extremely difficult country, to fill another gap between the left of 5 Brigade and the right of 16 (Australian) Brigade, which had taken up a position on the right of 4 Brigade. These movements formed the new defensive line stretching from 21 Battalion (on the right at Platamon on the coast), along 5 Brigade's front at Olympus Pass and 24 Battalion's new position to 16 (Australian) Brigade. But it was a very temporary affair as after a few hours 24 Battalion was recalled and a general withdrawal was impending.

The enemy advance into Yugoslavia and the early collapse of that country enabled the Germans to turn the left of the Allied line, while his advance to Salonika and across the Axios River directly threatened the Olympus passes. There was a serious risk that the Germans would reach Larisa, the important road and rail centre 30 miles south of Mount Olympus and on the main road to Athens, by an outflanking movement from the north and west and, as it subsequently developed, from the east also through the pass held by 21 Battalion.

The enemy was in close contact with the British at various points. On the afternoon of 10 April an attack was made against Mackay Force in position south-east of Florina (about 50 miles north-west of Olympus Pass), where it was guarding the route southwards towards Kozani and Servia behind the Allied positions on the left of the Aliakmon line. On the 13th the enemy was attacking the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Regiment 25 miles north-east of the pass; the following day, on the withdrawal of the Divisional Cavalry, 21 Battalion was attacked at

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Platamon on the right, and on the same day an attack on 4 Brigade at Servia was repulsed with heavy enemy losses. Mackay Force had withdrawn a few hours earlier. It was obvious the enemy was pressing his advance with vigour, and that the British and Greeks had not sufficient force to hold it.

The New Zealand Division received orders to withdraw to Thermopylae, 100 air-miles to the south and about one-third more by road. Sixth Brigade with attached troops was to withdraw to Elasson, 25 miles to the south-west on the main road to Larisa, a further 25 miles to the south-east. The brigade was to hold a rearguard position at Elasson till the night 18–19

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April. Fifth Brigade from Olympus Pass and 4 Brigade from Servia were to withdraw through 6 Brigade when ordered by New Zealand Division and go in stages to Molos, ten miles east of the Brallos Pass, via Larisa, Almiros and Lamia. The Divisional Cavalry Regiment was to form a rearguard and hold a position east of the junction of the Olympus Pass and Servia- Larisa road until 5 Brigade had passed through and 4 Brigade had cleared the junction.

Orders for the withdrawal were received on the night of the 14th and at 4 a.m. next day 25 Battalion left Olympus Pass and returned to Dholikhi, where it remained till dark. It then proceeded by MT to the position allotted to it on a ridge three miles south-west of Elasson. Just south of Elasson the main road forked into two branches, which joined again 12 miles to the south at Tirnavos and then ran south-east to Larisa. For three miles south of Elasson the two roads traversed level ground. The eastern road then continued to the south over a high pass by a steep and tortuous route till it reached the level ground again six miles south of Elasson, thence it ran along the Larisa plain to Tirnavos, skirting the high ground.

The western road was an easier but much longer route. Between the two roads was some steep country with peaks from 2200 to 2600 feet high, much of it so steep as to be virtually tank-proof. The covering position selected was on the high ground just south of the Elasson plain and extended for six miles. At the moment 6 Brigade had only 24 and 25 Battalions, both without their carrier platoons which were on an anti-parachute role under Divisional Headquarters. Attached troops were to include a field battery (or regiment if available), an anti-tank battery, a machine-gun company, a section of engineers and a field ambulance.

Twenty-fourth Battalion (less one company) on the right covered the eastern road and 25 Battalion (plus one company of 24 Battalion) was astride the western road. There was a gap of three miles between the two battalions. The field artillery was to take up a position near the western road and from there cover the whole brigade front, its tasks being the defile and bridge in Elasson, the flat ground south of the town, and protection of the left flank of 25 Battalion. There was no effective anti-tank obstacle on the western road so all the anti-tank guns were sited to cover that road, although one section (two guns) had initially been allotted to the eastern road to assist 24 Battalion. With the exception of one section allotted to 24

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Battalion, 3 MG Company came under command of 25 Battalion, the forward slopes of the high ground in the gap between the two battalions being its main task. The engineers were given demolition tasks which included a culvert on the western road in front of 25 Battalion.

The situation on the flanks of the position was somewhat obscure. There were routes into Larisa both from the north-east and the west and the safety of 6 Brigade depended as much on the troops guarding those routes as upon the successful defence of its own position against attack from the north. Arrangements were therefore made for a troop of 25-pounders, covered by a carrier platoon when available, to guard the approach to Tirnavos from the north-east. Some safeguard against trouble from the west was to be provided by placing 26 Battalion in reserve at Dhomenikon behind the left of 25 Battalion when the former unit became available.

Next day, Wednesday, 16 April, 26 Battalion made its appearance after a particularly lengthy and very arduous march from an area west of 4 Brigade's position at Servia, 25 Battalion's transport meeting it en route to assist it back to Dhomenikon. Though it had not been in action against enemy ground forces it had experienced heavy air attacks and suffered considerable hardships. The carrier platoons of the battalions also returned the same day, rejoining their battalions with the exception of the platoon of 24 Battalion, which, leaving one section with its battalion, joined the troop of artillery at Tirnavos previously mentioned.

Another very welcome reinforcement was the artillery, the 2/3 Australian Field Regiment, 5 Field Regiment (less one troop), and one troop 64 Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery, taking up their allotted positions, though one battery (less one troop) of 5 Field Regiment was soon sent on to Larisa.

Heavy rain which fell nearly all day caused considerable discomfort but, on the other hand, greatly reduced enemy air activity which had been severe the previous day. In common with the other units, 25 Battalion concentrated on defensive works in its extensive position of 6000 to 7000 yards of front, which it held with all four rifle companies forward. These occupied company defensive localities on high ground overlooking the tiny villages of Stefanovounon (Tsinel Radosivia) and As (Kato) Ompa in front of D and C Companies and to the right front of B Company, while a similar village lay to the left front of B and A Companies. D Company (Hastie) was on

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the right with the hamlet of Velesnikon in its area; B Company (Smith) and A Company (George) were on a dominating hill west of the western road and overlooking, in addition to the villages referred to, a small stream in front of Koniste. C Company (Williams) was astride the road and B Company 24 Battalion, which was under command of 25 Battalion, was about a thousand yards behind with its left on the road. As stated, the battalion's front was a very wide one, but being a rearguard position it was required not for prolonged defence but to force the enemy to deploy against it and so cause delay. It was in this position that 25 Battalion at last was to undergo its baptism of fire.

All British forces (the term including United Kingdom, Australian, and New Zealand troops) from the forward areas had passed through the position by the night 17–18 April, with the exception of the Divisional Cavalry which, during the morning of the 18th, withdrew through Elasson and along the western road through 25 Battalion to take up a position covering the approaches from the west.

Following a dive-bomber attack on Elasson at 9 a.m. on 18 April, enemy tanks two hours later appeared in a defile just north of the village and were very effectively engaged by the medium artillery. Many enemy tanks and MT soon appeared and were heavily engaged by our artillery, one troop of Australian 25-pounders firing 2000 rounds (500 per gun) in the course of the afternoon. It was noticeable that even long-range fire from the 25-pounders had a strongly deterrent effect on the German tanks. During the afternoon, and especially as dusk approached, there was some apprehension of enemy movement from the east of 24 Battalion and to meet this possibility a troop of 25-pounders and the carriers of 26 Battalion were moved from the reserve position at Dhomenikon to guard the right flank of the brigade.

Throughout the afternoon the battalion's position had been fairly heavily shelled and enemy aircraft had joined in. ‘Heavy guns going off all round us,’ wrote Wakeling in his diary, ‘… not washed for 2 days and not shaved for 5 days. MGd from the air and 2 men brought in hit by MG from aircraft and knocked about considerably. A/c overhead all day and very disheartening not to have a plane of ours in the air for days while the Hun does as he likes. Heavy gunfire dropping all round us….’

The battalion had its first casualty when a man of A Company was hit on the arm by a rock hurled from a shell-burst, and

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its telephone line to Brigade Headquarters had been broken. Orders for the withdrawal had been issued, 24 Battalion moving first and 25 Battalion providing the rearguard, which consisted of C Company, carrier platoon, wireless van and the signal section, one troop of the Australian field regiment, one troop 7 Anti-Tank Regiment, and 7 MG Platoon, and was commanded by Major Williams. This rearguard covered the withdrawal of the battalion, 33 Anti-Tank Battery, and all the medium and field artillery, which withdrew in that order. In his report on the activities of the rearguard, Williams wrote:

‘1900 hours. Sent carrier platoon out to take over forward coy areas–one sec to D Coy area, one to B, and one to support C Coy astride the main road. Two troops of carriers from Div Cav reported to assist in covering C Coy during its march back to the MT—placed them on ridge previously held by reserve coy. Remainder of Div Cav (less one squadron) watching left rear south of Domenikon.

‘Ordered arty to maintain intermittent fire and carriers and forward platoons to fire flares and occasional bursts till times set down for their respective withdrawals. No determined attempt by enemy to come on by night though signs of movement on the other road, to the east…. 2230 hours. C Coy started to move back on foot to embussing area near Domenikon….’

Just after midnight (18–19 April) as the rearguard passed through Tirnavos, where it was joined by a section of carriers from 24 Battalion, the enemy was closing in on the village from the north-east. The bridge there was destroyed by our engineers and the rearguard, urged by Brigadier Barrowclough to make for Volos as quickly as possible, pressed on for Larisa. At 1.30 a.m. the rearguard passed through Larisa. ‘No sign of anyone,’ wrote Williams, ‘town burning. Enemy flares and desultory firing about 3 – 4 miles to NE—evidently from Peneios area where 21 Bn with two Aust Bns had been. 0430 hours. Very difficult driving along narrow swamp road towards Volos.’

The main body of 25 Battalion had embussed at 8.30 p.m. the previous evening, bound for a reserve position three miles south-east of Molos, via Tirnavos, Larisa, Volos, Lamia, and Molos, a journey of about 170 miles. South-east of Larisa the road became progressively worse. Recent rains had created a quagmire in several places and drivers and motor-cyclist despatch riders had a very trying journey until they reached a good tar-sealed surface some miles north of Molo.

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Volos was reached about dawn and so far the battalion had escaped the very severe air attacks experienced by those units which had made the journey by daylight, though aircraft occasionally passing overhead were a reminder of the danger daylight could bring.

Just prior to the withdrawal of 6 Brigade, Divisional Headquarters had arranged for the troops to occupy defensive positions in the vicinity of Volos for the day, to cover the withdrawal of the force from the Pinios Gorge. Accordingly 24 and 25 Battalions with their attached troops took up suitable positions, the former ten miles south-west of Volos and 25 Battalion about twelve miles to the north-west at Velestinon, where a secondary road turned southwards off the Larisa-Volos road and rejoined that road three miles south-west of 24 Battalion's position.

The head of the rearguard overtook the tail of the column north-west of Volos about dawn and occupied a rearguard position astride the road. There it collected stragglers from 21 Battalion and Australian battalions which had borne the brunt of heavy attacks by vastly superior enemy forces at Platamon and the Pinios Gorge north-east of Larisa. Trucks and other vehicles of 21 Battalion and the Australians, some guns of 5 Field Regiment, and a squadron of the Divisional Cavalry also appeared at the rearguard position and were directed towards Molos, still about 90 miles away, by a circuitous route skirting Oreoi Strait and Maliaic Gulf.

The enemy did not immediately follow the withdrawal and it was soon obvious that Williams's rearguard, with elements of the Divisional Cavalry, would be able to cover the remainder of the move. General Freyberg, who was present, therefore ordered 6 Brigade and attached troops to resume the march to Lamia and Molos as soon as practicable, to join the rest of the Division at the next defensive position.

Twenty-fifth Battalion accordingly moved off about noon, the rearguard continuing its protective role. About an hour and a half later, however, the rearguard came up with 24 Battalion, whose vehicles had gone on to Molos when that battalion had halted in the morning. While efforts were being made to get the vehicles back or secure others, 24 Battalion had started on foot. Major Williams therefore took up a perimeter position covering the battalion, with the Divisional Cavalry in position on hills to the north-west. Petrol was obtained from Lamia for a number of vehicles and at 6 p.m. Brigadier Barrowclough arrived with RMT vehicles. He directed

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Williams to take over the role of advanced guard ahead of 24 Battalion while the Divisional Cavalry would provide the rear-guard, and the column set off. Shortly afterwards it was machine-gunned from the air, losing two trucks and an anti-tank gun and suffering several casualties among anti-tank personnel. Darkness set in, making the drive to Lamia very trying. The advanced guard picketted the route near the Lamia junction with its carrier platoon, MMGs, and anti-tank guns, and, when the column had passed, followed across the Alamanas bridge and through 5 Brigade, then dispersing its sub-units. C Company and the carrier platoon rejoined 25 Battalion south-east of Molos just before dawn. The rearguard had performed an arduous duty with distinction.

Twenty-fifth Battalion had reached its bivouac area the previous evening. The creek bed in which it was situated was thickly covered with trees, providing excellent cover from air observation. There it rested until 21 April.

With the exception of a few stragglers and some remnants of 21 Battalion, the whole Division was now in the Molos area, preparing its defensive position on the right of the Thermopylae line. This extended along foothills from the village of Ay Trias, on the southern shore of the Maliaic Gulf, westward along the Molos-Lamia road to join the Australian right flank, which was astride the main Lamia-Athens road in the Brallos Pass. The Sperkhios River ran in front of the New Zealand position, the road from Molos to Lamia crossing it by a bridge, now demolished, in front of the left flank.

After several changes in plan, the position was organised with two brigades forward, 6 on the right and 5 on the left, 4 Brigade being in reserve near the right or eastern flank. The artillery of the Division had been reinforced by 2 Royal Horse Artillery Regiment (field artillery), 102 Anti-Tank Regiment, three troops of anti-aircraft guns, and 64 Medium Artillery Regiment.

Sixth Brigade's front extended for 6000 yards from the sea on the right to its junction with 5 Brigade, 24 Battalion being on the right, 25 on the left, and 26 in reserve immediately west of Molos. A secondary road from the Molos-Lamia road passed through Ay Trias and, crossing the Sperkhios River opposite the boundary between 24 and 25 Battalions, ran in a north-westerly direction towards Lamia. Behind the front of 25 Battalion south of the Molos-Lamia road the ground rose very steeply, about one in five, to the high range to the south.

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The battalion had a frontage of 4000 yards along the road and held the position with three companies forward, B right, A centre, and C left; D Company also was along the road and on the right of B Company but was behind the left of 24 Battalion opposite the bridge on the secondary road already

mentioned. A section post of 9 Platoon on a small spur was the only element of the battalion north of the road. The position had been taken over, on 21 April, from 22 Battalion of 5 Brigade, which on the 19th had temporarily manned the whole divisional front.

C Company (Williams) had first occupied a reserve position behind B Company but on the night of 22 – 23 April took over

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the position just vacated by 22 Battalion on the left of A Company. This change was due to the withdrawal of 5 Brigade, resulting from a decision, made known on 22 April, that the British forces were to evacuate Greece; meanwhile 6 Brigade was to hold the position. Some detachments of 5 Brigade were still holding their ground under command of 6 Brigade, three carrier platoons and two platoons of 23 Battalion covering the demolished Alamanas bridge on the left flank about 5000 yards north-west of 25 Battalion; two platoons of 22 Battalion occupied a flanking position a few hundred yards to the left-rear of C Company.

Within the position held by the battalion were numerous guns of the field regiments and the anti-tank regiment. One field regiment had an anti-tank role only and, together with neighbouring two-pounders, was to prove most effective. Also covering the brigade front and under command was 3 MG Company, the platoons being under the battalions, with 7 Platoon under 25 Battalion.

The Germans first made contact on the late afternoon of the 21st when two motor-cyclists rode up to the Alamanas bridge and were engaged by a carrier section there, one being killed and the other wounded. Maps and documents were secured indicating that the men belonged to a reconnaissance unit of 5 Panzer Division. Much enemy movement in the vicinity of Lamia was observed as the enemy built up his forces for an attack, and his air forces also were active. During the 22nd light enemy shelling fell on the New Zealand front and also on the Australians' sector where, in the early afternoon, German infantry were seen at the foot of the Brallos Pass. Although an immediate attack was expected, as had been experienced by 5 Brigade at Olympus and 4 Brigade at Servia, it did not occur, probably because of the delaying effect of the demolitions and traffic jams on the enemy supply system.

It had been anticipated, from General Freyberg downwards, that there would be no retreat from the Thermopylae position and the troops had in fact been so informed. Although 25 Battalion had been through only one minor action the men had been shelled, at Elasson, without being able to retaliate; they had had to leave two positions on which a good deal of hard work had been done; and above all, they had been threatened and harried from the air to their acute discomfort and resentment. Looking around them at Thermopylae they

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thought that here they had a strong position where they could meet the enemy on reasonably even terms, which was all they asked for. They had no fears as to the outcome.

It was with some astonishment and disappointment, therefore, that the men heard, in the mid-afternoon of 22 April, of the decision to leave Greece, but when they were told of the collapse of the Greek armies, which left the western road to Athens wide open to the Germans, they realised that no other course was possible.

During daylight on the 23rd, especially in the afternoon, enemy aircraft were busy machine-gunning the roads, and hostile artillery fire was directed at the battalion's area, chiefly at the gun positions. The German guns could not be located for some time and then they were found to be out of range of the New Zealand field artillery. Brigadier Miles⁸ (CRA) therefore had three medium guns brought forward to the vicinity of Molos and from there about nightfall engaged the enemy batteries. About four that afternoon enemy troops on cycles and motor-cycles appeared at the Alamanas bridge and about eighteen who had crossed the river were driven back by the detachments of 23 Battalion left there to watch the place.

During the afternoon it was decided that the 5 Brigade detachments on the left of 25 Battalion were to be withdrawn that night and that all field and anti-tank guns in front of the spur just east of the Thermopylae baths were to be brought back to positions in the vicinity of Ay Trias and Molos. As this left a troop of 25-pounders (which were in an anti-tank role) in front of the two-pounder anti-tank guns, four other two-pounders were brought up. As the withdrawals proceeded, 25 Battalion established a road block of disabled carriers and logs, covered by a two-pounder anti-tank gun, near a bridge about 1200 yards north of Battalion Headquarters. At dawn next day the block was removed.

In the late afternoon of the 23rd the battalion received orders to withdraw the following night. Early the next morning there was intermittent artillery fire by both sides and shortly after dawn a carrier patrol of 24 Battalion (the three battalions provided these patrols in turn) reported that the enemy had repaired a span of the Alamanas bridge and had a patrol south

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of the river. Accurate artillery fire was directed at the bridge and was continued throughout the morning on this and other targets, except during air attacks on the gun positions, which although frequently dive-bombed and machine-gunned, appeared to suffer no damage.

Artillery fire from both sides and enemy air attacks increased considerably during the morning, the latter causing the loss of one carrier. ‘It was during that morning,’ wrote Sherlock,⁹ the carrier officer, ‘that one of the carriers that had occasion to move down to the road was destroyed by aircraft machine-gun fire. Tracer bullets had hit the petrol tanks and the carrier burst into flames. The crew escaped injury.’

The general situation and the increased enemy activity made it evident that an attack would take place very shortly, and in fact it had been ordered for that day. The German orders for the 24th directed that an armoured force of 5 Panzer Division that morning ‘will attack astride the Lamia-Thebes road with the top of Thermopylae Pass¹⁰ as its first objective. After reaching this objective a force is to move on Molos along the northern edge of the mountains…. 8 Air Corps will support the attack from 0630 hours by attacks on known gun positions and enemy troop concentrations…. The main body of 6 Mm Div will advance via Lamia-Kutsia-Molos’, that is, along the road covered by 25 Battalion.

In a later description of the situation the Germans wrote: ‘The English were making use of their last chance for a real defence on the classical ground of Thermopylae. They had blocked and demolished the roads leading south, sited strong rearguards in this most favourable position, and held up the pursuing motorised troops of the Pz divisions since the morning of 21 April. On the right flank [i.e., west of 25 Battalion, up the main Lamia-Athens road through the Brallos Pass] … the main factor holding up the attack was the difficult terrain, but on the left, between the north slopes of Thermopylae and the Gulf of Lamia, the main factor was the great defensive fire power of the entrenched enemy.’

Most of the enemy effort in the morning was directed against the Australians holding the Brallos Pass, but with little success there. A troop of tanks was then diverted to push through alone to Molos, it ‘not being expected that the enemy will defend this

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road strongly’. The troop soon reported ‘Unexpected and extremely heavy opposition. Artillery firing like mad. Road block removed. Danger of mines.’

At 11 a.m. three tanks rounding a bluff two to three miles west of C Company were engaged by our artillery, one being disabled while the other two withdrew. These were the tanks diverted from the Brallos Pass attack and not a detachment, as was first suspected, that had crossed the Sperkhios by the Alamanas bridge or between there and the sea. Shortly after midday, when Colonel Wilder was visiting C Company headquarters, there was much air action up and down the road and against the gun positions for about an hour, followed by increased artillery fire by both sides and a good deal of area bombing and machine-gunning by aircraft.

At 2 p.m. tanks were reported on the eastern side of Salt Springs, 6000 yards away, one tank and possibly another being hit by our artillery fire and four retiring behind the aqueduct there. Half an hour later dive-bombing and machine-gun fire from the air became most intense. This was a prelude to an advance by enemy tanks and lorry-borne infantry, preceded by sixty to eighty motor-cyclists, down the straight road from the west towards C Company; a few minutes later a dozen ordinary cyclists near 14 Platoon of C Company were fired on. The attack did not come on but it was not long before enemy infantry on higher ground south-west of C Company were firing down the ridge on the company's positions. Two sections of 14 Platoon were withdrawn to the vicinity of Company Headquarters, where they took up a position in a gap between C and A Companies. About this time, a little after 3 p.m., Colonel Wilder was giving the company commanders their orders for disengaging and withdrawing that night, in accordance with the evacuation plan, though Major Williams could not attend on account of the threat to C Company.

The two forward platoons of C Company, 15 and 13, kept the enemy pinned down 200 yards away by rifle and Bren-gun fire while the 3-inch mortars maintained a steady fire on the scrub-covered area which sheltered them. The enemy continued to infiltrate on the high ground behind the left of C Company, ground which 7 MG Platoon could not engage because of an intervening ridge. About 4.30 Major Satterthwaite, after telephone discussions with Williams and George (A Company), instructed C Company to withdraw and report to Major George; it was to reorganise behind A Company headquarters and the

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two companies were then to hold a defensive position. Instructions were sent to 13 and 15 Platoons and the two forward sections of 14 Platoon by Private Common,¹¹ who volunteered to take a message. The citation for the Military Medal he was awarded explains the situation:

‘On the 24th April, 1941, at Molos, when the coy was almost surrounded and under intense fire, volunteers were called for to take an order for the withdrawal to the fwd pls. Pte Common immediately volunteered, and owing to his dash and daring, the withdrawal was accomplished. Pte Common subsequently did good work in rallying men under fire and volunteered again to wait behind to destroy a truck, a task which he also successfully accomplished.’

The two platoons were in a difficult position with continuous machine-gun fire forcing them to use the lower slopes near the road. Some of 14 Platoon's pits had been occupied by the enemy and fourteen tanks were on the road below A Company, resulting in some of the men being caught by the shortened artillery fire directed against the tanks and in a number of men being cut off. Casualties from enemy machine-gun and rifle fire also occurred. Many of the men were forced to take cover but later were able to get back.

The enemy continued to move along the high ground and soon A Company came under this flanking and reverse fire, its forward No. 9 Platoon also coming under the artillery fire directed at the tanks. No. 7 Section of the platoon fired on the tanks with its anti-tank rifle, only to receive overwhelming retaliation. The platoon was forced to withdraw and was fortunate to get back to a new position below A Company headquarters. To meet the threat from the high ground, 7 Platoon moved two Brens higher up the ridge and a little later Major George ordered a section of 8 Platoon to move higher up also to cover the flank and rear of his company. The absence of reserves on the high ground from which they could anticipate and prevent or delay enemy outflanking movements had created a dangerous situation.

The position at this stage and subsequently has been dealt with in detail in a battalion report:

‘By 1700 to 1715 hours C Coy had fallen back through A Coy positions, moving between Nos 7 & 9 Pls. Before withdrawing a number of C Coy men were seen to gather under a tree where

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they became a good target as they moved back in bunches and some men were seen to be hit. At 1710 hrs Sgt Winter¹² (No 9 PI) encountered Major Williams who was directed to A Coy HQ and then, on moving forward to make a recce, encountered some two secs of C Coy and endeavoured to indicate to them the best line of withdrawal to higher ground. Cpl Hale Williams¹³ (who was wounded in the leg) took his section up the spur and Cpl Connor's¹⁴ section moved towards the road, where, it is believed, they were fired on by the tanks. At 1715 hrs 14 tanks had passed along the road in front of A Coy's area…. Three lorries of enemy infantry debussed opposite No 9 pl's original positions at about 1730 hrs. At this time B Coy withdrew the left fwd pl (No 12) to higher ground in its rear to deal with the threat on the left flank and to protect the rear of the other two pls. At the same time the centre pl (No. 11) was ordered to place its centre section in a posn to watch the rear and the position vacated by the left platoon….in the meantime most of 13 and 15 pls crossed the creek and were working their way up ridge near A Coy's right pl (No 9). From 1710 to 1740 hrs remainder of coy (C) worked their way up through scrub under heavy MG fire and sustained heavy casualties.

‘Meanwhile several sections to avoid MG fire had gone down ridge to near road where they came under heavy fire from tanks. At this stage our Arty concentrated on road to right of A Coy and many of C Coy men were caught between Arty and enemy MG fire….A few men only found their way to A Coy HQ.

‘Tanks were seen by D Coy for the first time about 1715 hrs. There were four and a fifth one also appeared but only for a few minutes, in front of B Coy area. Of the four, two were hit. Later two more appeared, one getting well through before being stopped. The second tank, in the opinion of one of D Coy sgts., was stopped by A/TK rifle fire damaging the tracks. Shortly after 1700 hrs D Coy was subjected to MG fire from the high ground on their left. Also at this time, some of the men of the forward coys, presumably C, came through D Coy lines. Most of these men were wounded.

‘By 1800 hrs the two secs of No 9 pl, who had moved back earlier, fell further back and were then placed in position at

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A Coy HQ. Some of C Coy personnel had also been collected and placed in posn to cover the rear of the spur on which A Coy HQ was situated, where some enemy infantry, who had got out of the tanks, were endeavouring to get behind this position. At 1830 hrs B Coy were heavily shelled. Enemy MG fire was being directed on to occupied areas from the high ground to the rear. Capt Armstrong¹⁵ advised Bn HQ accordingly and it was agreed it would be wise to reform the coy front. This was done immediately by withdrawing the centre pl (No 11) to a posn about 200 yards south of the right pl (No 10) and withdrawing the left pl to a posn about 100 yds south of the centre pl. This gave B Coy a new line facing almost due west. (The Coy was previously facing almost due north.) At this stage B Coy HQ was moved back to a position immediately east of the junction between the centre and left pls. Wire was reeled and communication was re-established with Bn HQ. Enemy tanks were reported to be proceeding round the road and two were seen moving back towards the bridge near the track leading to Bn HQ. These tanks were heavily shelled and were stopped, both tanks burning fiercely.

‘1900 hrs. At this time No 5 sec of No 8 pl (A Coy) was moved still higher up the ridge into some ruins which the enemy were approaching and our artillery opened up on this area at the same time. The shelling was ceased on receipt of advice that A Coy were occupying the buildings. About 60/70 had been seen approaching the posn. Phone communication with the Bren carriers established that they had moved up also at this stage to cover left flank. Our artillery also opened up on the forward slope of the ridge previously held by C Coy and now in occupation by the enemy who had debussed from lorries in that vicinity…. Heavy fire from enemy MG positions was directed on to the left pl (No. 12, B Coy) and on account of the setting sun it was impossible to locate these positions. The right and centre pls (Nos. 10 and 11) of B Coy were being continuously shelled by what appeared to be mortars and 2-pounders, presumably by tanks further forward in front of area vacated by B Coy's left pl (No. 12). At 1930 hrs OC C Coy (Major Williams), Lieuts Witters¹⁶ and McLeay¹⁷ (both C Coy)

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and two or three men from C Coy came back to B Coy area. These two subalterns remained with the left pl of B Coy and assisted in re-organising C Coy men to help hold this posn. Shortly after this Sgt Brown¹⁸ of A Coy came in through the left pl of B Coy with about 30 men. 2/Lt Morris ¹⁹ who showed great coolness under fire, placed them in position on his (Morris's) left flank (of 10 pl). 2/Lt Morris reported that Sgt Brown showed both initiative and courage in controlling his men and getting them into position under fire and also that this NCO went forward again in an attempt to collect more of his Coy personnel….

‘A Coy reported that at about 2000 hrs … voices of enemy who had penetrated through the bush below their HQ were heard, and when they had advanced up to this position they were dealt with by hand grenades, rifle fire, and a brief but decisive bayonet sortie. The enemy's retirement provided A Coy with an opportunity to disengage and commence to withdraw and at approx 2000/2030 orders were given to that effect. A Coy moved back steadily and the three known wounded were brought back to the RAP. The withdrawal was covered by LMGs leap-frogging from ridge to ridge. On reaching B Coy area … the two coys joined forces and moved through D Coy at 2050 hrs. No. 7 pl withdrew through Bn HQ and was then given the task of covering the gully in which Bn HQ was situated.’

At 8.15 p.m. B Company (Armstrong²⁰ had reported that the enemy was working round its left flank and that it was under heavy machine-gun fire from that direction. The company was ordered to withdraw by platoons, at five to ten minutes' intervals, to a ridge farther back. Captain Armstrong with his headquarters withdrew to D Company headquarters, where about the same time Majors George (A Coy) and Williams (C Coy) with their men and the left platoon of B Company also arrived. The men were placed in a small valley under cover and