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Episodes & Studies Volume 2

Opposing the Japanese Landings

page 3

Opposing the Japanese Landings

IN NOVEMBER 1941 there were over 400 Royal New Zealand Air Force personnel serving in Malaya and Burma. The pilots of three fighter squadrons—Nos. 67, 243, and 488—belonged almost entirely to the RNZAF, while apart from representatives of the other aircrew categories who were dispersed amongst the bomber and flying boat squadrons, New Zealanders were also engaged on such duties as aerodrome construction, medical, signals, equipment, administration, radar and balloons, and as engineers, armourers and chaplains. Throughout 1941 the threat of war in the Far East increased, until towards the end of the year it had become evident that the Japanese were bent on the expansion of their empire. On I December 1941 General Headquarters Malaya ordered ‘second-degree readiness’, with all forces warned for operations at short notice.

About half past eleven on the morning of 6 December, the routine reconnaissance flown by Hudsons of No. 1 (General Reconnaissance) Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force (Far East Command), watching the approaches to the Gulf of Thailand, reported having sighted two Japanese convoys, consisting of warships and transports, steaming westward approximately eighty miles south-east of Cape Cambodia, the southerly tip of Indo-China. Two Hudsons were despatched at 4 p.m. to shadow the convoys until relieved by a Catalina flying boat which, with the aid of radar, was to maintain contact throughout the night. The Japanese were favoured with ideal weather to cover their approach, and in conditions of low cloud, rain and restricted visibility, succeeded in escaping further detection by both Hudsons and the Catalina. For a time it was thought that the convoys had turned north into the Gulf of Thailand, but early on 7 December a second Catalina was ordered to search the area in which, from the last-known bearings, the convoys could be expected. No reports were received from this flying boat and it was subsequently learned to have been shot down by the Japanese—the first act of war in the Far East.

On 7–8 December 1941 the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbour and, nine hours later, at Manila. Landings were made in Thailand without more than token resistance being offered, and in the early hours of 8 December Japanese troops landed at Kota Bharu and commenced the invasion of Malaya. Apart from two RAAF Hudson squadrons and three Blenheim squadrons (one of which was caught on the ground by Japanese bombers while refuelling), the only striking force available to oppose the enemy landings consisted of two Royal Air Force squadrons, Nos. 36 and 100, both equipped with obsolete Vickers Vildebeeste aircraft and trained for torpedo- bombing. In these two squadrons, which from the outbreak of hostilities usually operated together, were some twenty-five RNZAF pilots. The Vildebeeste, with a top speed of 100 miles per hour, was a cumbersome machine with which to attack modern warships with heavy anti-aircraft defensive armament. Throughout the campaign, however, these two squadrons carried out some most gallant and hazardous operations.

The Japanese advance down the Malay Peninsula was supported by a number of seaborne landings on both the east and west coasts. On the morning of 26 January a patrolling Hudson sighted two transports and a number of barges, escorted by two cruisers and eleven destroyers, approaching Endau, on the east coast some eighty miles north of Singapore. The Japanese were supporting the landing with land-based fighters operating from Kuantan. A striking force (in which was a strong New Zealand representation) consisting of nine Hudsons of Nos. 1 and 8 (GR) page 4 Squadrons, RAAF, together with twenty-one Vildebeestes and three Albacores of Nos. 36 and 100 Squadrons, escorted by nineteen Buffaloes and sixteen Hurricanes, was despatched to dispute the landing. The attack was organised in two waves, but unfortunately, as both Vildebeeste squadrons had been operating throughout the whole of the previous night, the first wave could not be launched until the early afternoon.

The first wave attacked in rather cloudy conditions, but with the arrival of the second wave comprising the Vildebeestes of No. 36 Squadron, the weather suddenly cleared and enemy fighters intercepted the attacking aircraft before they could reach their target. Nevertheless they continued on their course with great determination, and as a result of the whole operation one cruiser and two destroyers were sunk and two transports set on fire. In addition, twelve Zeros were shot down for the loss of two Hurricanes and one Buffalo.

As was to be expected, however, the slow Vildebeestes suffered badly, eleven being shot down, together with two of the three Albacores, the loss including both squadron commanders. Two New Zealand pilots, Sergeants T. S. Tanner1 A. M. H. Fleming,2 were killed on this raid. Pilot Officer R. C. Barclay,3 although shot up by enemy fighters and with his gunner killed, flew through to the target in the face of an intense anti-aircraft barrage put up by the ships. After delivering his attack he was shot down into the sea but, together with his observer, managed to swim ashore. They walked down the coast for two days, when they fell in with the survivors from a sunken destroyer. The whole party then continued on their journey and reached Singapore a week later. For his gallantry on this and previous operations Barclay was awarded an immediate DFC.

After their heavy losses at Endau neither No. 36 nor No. 100 Squadron was employed in Malaya again, both being withdrawn to Java to reorganise. They were amalgamated under the title of No. 36 Squadron and based at Tjikampek. They did not have long to wait before being in action again.

During the early part of February the Japanese were observed to be building up shipping concentrations at Balik Papan, and on the 26th a convoy of fifty ships was sighted steaming south towards Sourabaya. The Vildebeestes were immediately moved to Madioen, near Sourabaya, to co-operate with a squadron of American Flying Fortresses.

The moon was one day past the full and the wind off shore. All was evidently set for simultaneous landings—one at the eastern end of Java, probably just west of Sourabaya, and two at the western end in the vicinity of Batavia. No. 36 Squadron attacked the convoy north of Rembang, some 100 miles west of Sourabaya. Most of the pilots claimed hits on transports and execution amongst the barges; in all, eight ships were claimed by the Vildebeestes and a further seven by Fortresses. Once more the squadron suffered heavily and three Vildebeestes, again including that flown by the squadron commander, failed to return. Each air crew of this squadron, operating from a strange airfield, carried out two night attacks in twenty-four hours, involving over fifteen hours' flying in open cockpits—a very fine performance judged by any standards. Throughout the next few days the squadron operated almost without respite, until by 4 March it was reduced to five aircraft, of which four were only just serviceable. Nevertheless, they continued to carry out two sorties every night.

Following attacks on Kalidjati during the nights of 5 and 6 March, in which large fires were started and considerable damage inflicted on the enemy, only two aircraft remained serviceable. page 5 Orders were given for these to be flown north in an endeavour to reach Burma. They left on 7 March. Both crashed in Sumatra, and the crews were either killed or captured. No. 36 Squadron had literally fought to a finish. Of the New Zealanders, six fell into the hands of the enemy, but the remainder got away to Australia before Java surrendered.

No. 62 (Bomber) Squadron

During December eighteen Hudsons and crews, amongst whom were six New Zealanders, had been despatched from Britain to reinforce No. 62 (Bomber) Squadron, whose Blenheim aircraft had suffered heavily in the Malaya fighting. This flight, under the command of Squadron Leader L. G. W. Lilly,4 RNZAF, arrived in Singapore early in January and immediately began operations. Japanese attacks, however, were now becoming so frequent that the squadron was moved to Sumatra, where operations were carried out from a strip near Palembang, known as P2. For a while these consisted mainly of sea reconnaissance missions, but as the situation deteriorated the Hudsons were employed as a bombing force.

On 4 February an attack by Hudsons and Blenheims, with top cover supplied by Hurricanes, was directed against the aerodrome at Kluang, on the mainland of Malaya, from which Japanese fighters were operating. The Hudsons flew to Sembawang on Singapore Island, where the final briefing took place. Enemy snipers were active around the perimeter, and the locality was under artillery fire from the mainland. All six New Zealanders took part in the raid. Led by Lilly, the Hudson formation arrived over the target and observed enemy fighters taking off to intercept. Lilly fired two Very lights, and all bombs were dropped in a pattern as the second signal was given. The target area was well covered and the Japanese, apparently taken by surprise, failed to bring their anti-aircraft guns into action in time. On the way out from the target, however, the Hudsons were attacked by Zeros, and one New Zealand pilot, Sergeant D. Hunter,5 who was last seen lagging slightly behind the formation, failed to return. The Blenheims and Hurricanes did not appear at the rendezvous point, as just before take-off it was discovered that the breech blocks had been removed from the Hurricanes' guns, and the Blenheims, finding they had no top cover, dropped their bombs on a railway line and returned to base.

In the evening of Friday, 13 February, five aircraft of No. 62 Squadron were sent to attack a Japanese invasion fleet approaching Sumatra. On this occasion the squadron was led by Flying Officer E. J. Henry,6 who provides the following account:

‘Nobody was very keen to have a go this day, because in the first place the only bombs we had were “GPs”* while in addition the weather report was very poor, and a night landing would be inevitable. We were all much more keen to make an attack in daylight as it appeared we wouldn't make contact until last light. However, straws were drawn and it was decided that those who didn't go on this show would be airborne at first light the next morning to carry out an attack if contact was made. Airborne at 4 p.m., course was set for Banka Island, and from there a sweep was commenced over the estimated course that the convoy was steering. Before long smoke was sighted on the horizon and the formation dived to sea level, altering course to bring us in for a beam attack. We had been briefed to make a low-level attack, singling out the transports as priority targets.

“There was no cloud to speak of and visibility was good. The time was about 5.30 p.m., which left about half an hour until dusk, which was followed very quickly by complete darkness. When we were about five miles away the enemy ships opened up with a very accurate barrage page 6 from heavy-calibre guns. Their object appeared to be to put up a barrage a short distance in front of us, hoping that we would be caught in the ensuing spouts of water and explosions. Evasive action was taken and course altered towards the head of the convoy in order to make an attack from the east and obtain benefit from the failing light. The ack-ack was very accurate at this period, and although we were “right down on the deck” and doing about 145 knots, one salvo actually landed in the middle of the formation, which fortunately at this moment was in a very broad “vic”. My turret gunner reported that the other aircraft completely disappeared in a cloud of spray, but they all came through untouched, although one side gunner received a wetting. The formation then pulled up and attacked in a shallow dive. Each aircraft singled out a ship, and I attacked three transports which appeared to be hove to in the form of a triangle. Other aircraft attacked the naval ships, consisting of three cruisers and three destroyers. Very little flak came up, and hits were observed on one cruiser and one destroyer, while the transports received near misses. After delivering their attack, the aircraft broke up formation and returned to base independently. On reaching the coast, however, we ran into the usual evening storm with heavy thunder, forked lightning, and a terrific downpour of rain. Radios became useless, beacons were non-existent, and the visibility was nil. Under such conditions it says much for the navigators that four aircraft got into Palembang aerodrome, while the fifth made P2, all without mishap. At Palembang a searchlight in the form of several Aldis lamps was put up as a guide, while the flare path consisted of 44-gallon drums of petrol, lit up and going full bore, fanned by a light breeze.’

The Hudsons were away again next morning with a mixed force of Australian Hudsons and RAF Blenheims to attack the enemy invasion fleet. From this sortie seven aircraft, including four from No. 62 Squadron, failed to return.

After a Japanese parachute attack on Palembang and P2, the aircraft were withdrawn to Java, whence they continued to operate until the island was overrun by the Japanese. Among the RNZAF personnel who served in Sumatra and Java during this period were seven pilots in No. 232 Hurricane Squadron, which had been sent out from England by aircraft carrier to reinforce Singapore. Flight-Lieutenants I. Julian7 and E. C. Gartrell8 were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for gallantry and leadership throughout these bitter actions. Julian, who led the final flight to operate from Java, destroyed at least four enemy aircraft in the air and one on the ground, while Gartrell also had four definite kills to his credit as well as numerous ‘probables’. No. 232 Squadron fought on until the surrender, when its gallant personnel passed into captivity.

* General purpose