Nos. 243 and 488 Squadrons

Meanwhile in the aerial battle for Singapore the New Zealanders were playing a major role. With Royal Air Force resources heavily committed in the European and North African theatres, it was decided to reinforce the Far Eastern Air Force with New Zealand pilots straight from RNZAF Flying Training Schools. Nos. 67 and 243 (Fighter) Squadrons, formed at Singapore in April 1941, were brought up to establishment by the inclusion of RNZAF personnel, the former squadron being transferred to Burma shortly after it had been passed as operationally efficient.

In September 1941 No. 488 Squadron, classed officially as an RNZAF ‘infiltration’ squadron, was formed at Rongotai as a complete unit. Comprising 155 officers and airmen, it was the first fighter squadron to be formed in the Royal New Zealand Air Force. The Commanding Officer, page 7 Squadron Leader W. G. Clouston, DFC,⁹ and the two Flight Commanders, Flight Lieutenants J. N. MacKenzie, DFC,¹⁰ and J. R. Hutcheson,¹¹ were New Zealanders already serving in the RAF and were sent out from England to meet the squadron at Singapore. The first party from New Zealand, consisting of ninety-six officers and men, arrived at Singapore in October and the remainder in November.

Based at Kallang, the squadron settled down to an intensive training programme. The pilots, who had had no experience of operational aircraft, were first sent to a training school at Kluang, where they carried out refresher flying on Wirraway aircraft—an Australian version of the Harvard Trainer. After ten days they returned to Kallang to convert to American-built Brewster Buffalo fighters and begin operational training in earnest. Flying was carried out under extreme difficulty, as the aircraft allotted to the squadron were ‘left-overs’ from No. 67 Squadron and were found to be in a bad state of repair. Engines, airframes, instruments, guns, radio equipment, all had to be cleaned, inspected and checked, repairs made, and worn-out parts discarded and replaced. To make matters worse the outgoing squadron had taken with it all tools, spare parts, and accessories.

However, largely through the personal initiative of Flying Officer C. W. Franks,¹² the squadron Equipment Officer, shortages were made up, and after hard work by all hands the aircraft were made serviceable. The weather provided another handicap to the flying programme. At this time of the year frequent heavy tropical thunder showers, which reduced visibility almost to zero, interrupted training and grounded the aircraft.

When war broke out on 7 December, No. 488 Squadron was not yet fully operational, so the initial burden of defending Singapore devolved upon No. 243 Squadron, in which twenty-six RNZAF pilots were serving. At 4 a.m. on 8 December Japanese bombers raided Singapore. They came over high in the clear moonlit sky and were immediately picked up by searchlights. The anti-aircraft defences opened up, but the bombers came on unperturbed to drop their loads on the city and the aerodromes at Tengah and Seletar.

As soon as the sirens went the ground staff and pilots at Kallang dashed to the aircraft dispersal bays and warmed up the engines ready for an emergency take-off. At daybreak four members of No. 488 Squadron, led by Hutcheson, took off and carried out the first defensive patrol over Singapore. Other pilots continued to patrol throughout the day, but no enemy aircraft appeared. Meanwhile No. 243 Squadron, now fully operational though based at Kallang, maintained a detached flight in northern Malaya at Kota Bharu.

On the first day of the war Pilot Officer R. S. Shields,¹³ in company with an RAF pilot, strafed enemy barges on the Kelantan River, and later in the day, while patrolling to intercept a formation of nine bombers, had the first aerial engagement. Shields' sortie report illustrates the difficulties that were to be experienced so frequently with Buffalo aircraft:

‘While at 9000 feet in pursuit of nine enemy bombers, I observed a bomb burst approximately three miles ahead at one o'clock. I immediately turned sharply to port, through 180 degrees, and saw a Japanese aircraft about 1000 feet below me. As a result of my turn I was coming up on the bomber from astern. I saw it to be a twin-engined aircraft with a single rudder. Its shapely nose was oval and transparent; its body well streamlined although it had no transparent structure above the fuselage just aft the wing. I am unable to identify this aircraft by reference to any silhouette with which I am familiar. The camouflage of the bomber was a single shade of dark green above; a dirty grey-blue colour below. The markings were normal, with the addition of a vertical band of red towards the rear of the rudder. I overhauled the enemy at about 25 m.p.h. As my windshield was covered with oil, I was able to get only occasional glimpses of him. At page 8 350 yards, as near as I could judge in these circumstances, I opened fire. After one burst three of my guns stopped; the remaining gun stopped after two further short bursts. I was unable to see whether, despite his rear gun, the enemy returned my fire. Indeed, I am of the impression that the rear gun was not manned, because the enemy took no evasive action as I approached. Breaking away downwards I returned to the aerodrome, while the enemy aircraft continued on its course to the NE, presumably to Saigon. The combat was broken off ten miles out to sea.’

Also serving with the detached flight at Kota Bharu was another New Zealand pilot, Sergeant C.B. Wareham,¹⁴ who in these early stages of the war began a career as a photographic reconnaissance pilot which was carried on with distinction throughout the later campaign in India and Burma. In Malaya the Photographic Reconnaissance Flight of Buffaloes carried out over a hundred sorties, most of which ranged as far north as Singora, an important aerodrome in Thailand from which the enemy launched all his earlier air attacks. Throughout their operations these Buffaloes carried no armour or guns, and although intercepted and hit by Japanese fighters on numerous occasions, the pilots relied solely on evasive action to get through.

Back in Singapore it fell to a Maori, Sergeant B. S. Wipiti,¹⁵ also of No. 243 Squadron, to achieve the honour of shooting down the first Japanese aircraft. During December there was not much daylight activity by the enemy, who confined most of his aerial efforts over Singapore to reconnaissance. Night bombing raids, however, became more frequent, but apart from being uncomfortable and inconvenient caused little damage. No. 488 Squadron, which was not yet considered fully operational, took advantage of the respite to continue its training, and by Christmas nearly all the pilots had been passed as fit for combat flying, although opportunities for aerial gunnery training were scarce. During this period the more experienced pilots were called upon for operational duties, and on 10 December MacKenzie and Sergeant W. J. N. Macintosh¹⁶ were ordered to locate and protect the Prince of Wales and Repulse, which were being attacked by Japanese high-level and torpedo bombers 170 miles away. By the time they arrived, however, both ships had been sunk, but the Buffaloes provided escort to a destroyer which had rescued survivors and was heading south at full speed. Following up, other members of the squadron, flying in pairs, maintained until dusk a continuous patrol over the oil patches where survivors were still being picked up.

Several times during the month pilots were ordered off the ground in pairs to intercept Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, but the enemy, flying high, always escaped before the Buffaloes could reach them.

On 3 January 1942 No. 488 Squadron flew five patrols, totalling over sixty-four hours, providing cover for a convoy bringing reinforcements into Singapore. The weather was bad all the time, with low cloud and periodical rainstorms, which while having the advantage of hiding the convoy from the enemy, at the same time added to the difficulties of locating and escorting the ships. The aircraft had to fly at 1000 feet or less to keep below the cloud. This restricted their range of vision and gave them very little height for manoeuvre.

Although there were no attacks by the enemy, this was the first major operation in which No. 488 Squadron took part. By their excellent flying under most adverse conditions, the pilots proved the value of their training, while on the aerodrome at Kallang the ground crews maintained their reputation for hard work and efficiency as they toiled all day checking the aircraft as they came in, refuelling them, and making them ready for the next patrol.

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A second convoy arrived on 13 January bringing, among other forces, fifty-one Hurricane aircraft and twenty fighter pilots. The effect of these reinforcements on morale in Singapore was terrific. The continued advance of the Japanese down the Malayan Peninsula, the apparent ease with which they had disposed of two of Britain's strongest warships, and their superiority in the air had had a most depressing effect. Now, it was thought, the enemy would at least be halted, and the Hurricanes would sweep his air force from the skies. The situation was indeed sufficiently grim. On land the British forces had fallen back to the northern boundary of Johore, barely 100 miles from Singapore. In the air the Japanese had extended their daylight bombing raids to Singapore itself, concentrating on the aerodromes.

Tengah was the first attacked, in the first week of the New Year, and Kallang had its first major raid on 9 January. No. 488 Squadron's offices and equipment store and the oil and ammunition stores were hit and practically demolished. As soon as it was over, as much as possible of the stores and equipment was salvaged from the damaged buildings, and when the Japanese returned next day on another raid a great deal had been dispersed and stored in evacuated houses near the aerodrome.

The squadron's first fight occurred on 12 January. Eight aircraft, which were standing by at readiness, were ordered to take off to intercept a raid coming south. Led by MacKenzie, they climbed as quickly as possible to the north-west. When they were at 12,000 feet, over Johore, they sighted the enemy force, consisting of twenty-seven fighters, 3000 feet above them. MacKenzie, seeing that he was heavily outnumbered and at a serious disadvantage in height, ordered his pilots to fly into the sun and take evasive action. The enemy spotted them, however, and dived on them en masse.

Two New Zealanders, Sergeants T. W. Honan¹⁷ and R. W. MacMillan,¹⁸ were shot down in a few seconds. Both baled out and landed safely fifteen miles from Johore, Honan with a bullet wound in his arm. Five other machines were damaged and two other pilots wounded, but all managed to return to Singapore. MacKenzie and Sergeant P. E. E. Killick¹⁹ attempted to press home attacks on enemy fighters, but failed to score decisive hits before they were in turn attacked and forced to break off the engagements.

A second formation, consisting of six aircraft led by Hutcheson, took off twenty minutes after MacKenzie. Hutcheson was the only one to make contact with the enemy. He was attacked by a Zero, but after being outmanoeuvred broke off the action. Another member of the squadron, who was flying on patrol with two Dutch pilots, was attacked by six Zeros but escaped into cloud.

Later in the morning MacKenzie and four other pilots flew a further patrol over Singapore, and at midday Clouston led all the squadron's remaining serviceable aircraft on another patrol. In the afternoon both flights took off again to intercept enemy raiders, but could not gain enough height to make contact. One aircraft was lost when it crash-landed in a swamp after engine failure, but the pilot, Sergeant V. E. Meaclem,²⁰ escaped uninjured.

Generally speaking, the Buffalo proved a disappointing aircraft. It did not stand up well to sustained climbing at full throttle, and frequently suffered from loss of power due to a drop in oil pressure and overheating. It could not operate above 25,000 feet, took thirty minutes to get there, and its speed was less than had been expected of it. This, combined with the unexpectedly high performance of the Japanese aircraft, particularly the Zero fighter, was to put the New Zealand squadron at a grave disadvantage during the campaign.

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The next day's operations were equally severe, and are well described in the squadron's diary:

At 0630 hours Pilot Officer Hesketh led four aircraft of A Flight on a security patrol, but no contact was made with the enemy. At 1100 hours Flight Lieutenant Hutcheson took off with eight aircraft, some being from a Dutch squadron, to intercept 30 Type 96 bombers, making contact with them and attacking from astern. The speed of the bombers was such that the Buffalo aircraft could only just overhaul them but could not get into position for beam or overhead attacks. Flight Lieutenant Hutcheson was shot up by rear-gun fire and crash-landed at base. Pilot Officer Greenhalgh attacked an Army 96 bomber. Although only two guns fired, he managed to get smoke from one engine. Pilot Officer Oakden was shot down into the sea by rear-gun fire from a bomber, and was rescued by a Chinese sampan, sustaining slight injuries to his face. Sergeant Clow was shot down in the sea, swam 400 yards to a small island, and was picked up by some Chinese in a sampan and returned to Kallang two days later. Pilot Officer Hesketh and Pilot Officer Gifford were unable to get sufficient height to attack. Pilot Officer McAneny had to break off his attack through gun failure. Sergeant de Maus was hit before he got within range. The Dutch pilot went missing. Casualties: five aircraft written off and one damaged with no loss to the enemy.

Today, although we did not meet up with the fighters because we did not attack from above, we were badly shot up from rear-gun fire. The Japanese bomber formations of 27 packed aircraft throw out such an accurate and heavy rear-gun barrage that they are very difficult to attack. Some way must be found to break up these mass formations and attack bombers independently. No doubt there was fighter escort in the near vicinity, but it did not pick up our fighters owing to cloudy conditions and also because we attacked from astern.

In the last two days 488 Squadron has lost seven aircraft and had many others damaged, with no loss to the enemy. No blame can be attached to the pilots, who have done their best with Buffaloes. Until we fly as Wings of 36 aircraft we will be unable to inflict heavy damage on the enemy.

The squadron's aircraft strength was now down to fourteen, most of which were damaged. In addition to normal servicing and maintenance work, the ground staffs had to repair machines after every engagement to enable them to fly again. From now on the Japanese were over Singapore every day, and as long as they had aircraft to fly, the defending forces went up to meet them.

First Combat Success and Casualty

No. 488 Squadron had its first combat success, and suffered its first battle casualty, on 15 January. Led by Pilot Officer G. L. Hesketh,²¹ the readiness section took off to intercept a raid and was attacked by a swarm of Japanese fighters. Hesketh was shot down and killed by a Japanese fighter, and most of the other pilots had their machines more or less badly damaged. Sergeant E. E. G. Kuhn²² scored the unit's first victory when he attacked a Type 97 fighter and sent it crashing to the ground.

On 18 January Hutcheson led a successful patrol of pilots from No. 488 Squadron and No. 243 Squadron, RAF, which was also stationed at Kallang. During a battle with nine Zeros they shot down two, and probably destroyed three more, with no loss to themselves. Pilot Officer N. C. Sharp²³ and Sergeant Killick both sent their opponents down in flames, and Hutcheson and Sergeants Meaclem and Macintosh claimed the probables. A second patrol the same day, also led by Hutcheson, resulted in Sergeant Kuhn shooting down another Zero into the sea and in Hutcheson and Pilot Officer E. W. Cox²⁴ being shot down. Hutcheson crashed in jungle but was unhurt. Cox was killed.

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The next day offensive patrols were flown over the mainland of Malaya. MacKenzie and Sergeant H. J. Meharry²⁵ made a reconnaissance of Kuala Lumpur, 200 miles to the north of Singapore and 100 miles inside enemy territory. Taking advantage of cloud cover and forest camouflage, they reached Ramang, fifteen miles north of their objective, unobserved. Then they turned south and flew over Kuala Lumpur. The aerodrome was packed with Japanese fighters and appeared to be the base from which the enemy was attacking Singapore. The New Zealanders made two complete circuits before the anti-aircraft guns opened up on them, and then they retired behind the sheltering hills to the westward and returned to Singapore. As a result of their reconnaissance Kuala Lumpur was raided that night by a force of Flying Fortresses from Sumatra.

From the middle of January until the end of the campaign, Nos. 488 and 243 Squadrons shared between them practically the whole responsibility for the fighter defence of Singapore. A Dutch squadron which had been stationed at Kallang for a month was withdrawn to Sumatra, and the only other fighter units in Malaya, Nos. 21 and 453 RAAF Squadrons at Sembawang, were needed for Army co-operation work and bomber escorts.

As a result of continuous losses, the total British air strength by 19 January was only seventy-four serviceable bombers and twenty-eight serviceable fighters. Against these the Japanese were using an estimated 250 bombers and 150 fighters. No serviceable aerodromes remained in British hands on the mainland, and to relieve congestion on Singapore all bombers were sent to Sumatra or Java, leaving only the fighters for local defence.

With such odds against them, the obsolescent, overworked Buffaloes could do little to ward off the ever-increasing weight of Japanese attacks. Kallang was heavily raided on 22 January, just as four aircraft were about to take off. Three of them got away safely, amid a cloud of dust and smoke, but the fourth was destroyed by a bomb landing close by and the pilot (Pilot Officer L. R. Farr²⁶) was fatally wounded. Two airmen who had been helping to get the aircraft off were killed, and the squadron's headquarters was wrecked. Five airmen distinguished themselves immediately after the raid when, disregarding exploding ammunition, they succeeded in putting out a fire which had started in the armament filling room.

On 23 January Clouston was posted to Headquarters Operations Room, and the command of the squadron passed to MacKenzie, who was shortly afterwards promoted Squadron Leader.

Very few of the original twenty-one Buffaloes were left. The number available for operations varied from day to day between one and four, as the ground staff succeeded in making them serviceable. Too few to operate effectively by themselves, they flew with what was left of No. 243 Squadron. Even when combined the formations were pitifully weak in comparison with the enemy, but they went up to attack whenever the occasion demanded. The pilots, having learned their experience the hard way, were now fully seasoned fighters and could give an excellent account of themselves.

During the next few days No. 488 Squadron was re-equipped with nine Hurricanes from the shipment which had arrived earlier in the month. Changing to a new type of aircraft in the prevailing conditions was not a simple matter. The pilots, in between operations, had to learn to fly them and become acquainted with their characteristics; and the fitters, riggers, and armourers had to familiarise themselves with new equipment, new tools, and new techniques. The ever-present threat of air raids did nothing to help matters. But the change-over was made, and spirits rose all round at the thought of what the pilots could do with modern planes.

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They were to have little chance of operating in them. At ten o'clock on the morning of 27 January, when all the machines were on the ground refuelling, twenty-seven bombers appeared over the aerodrome with very little warning and everybody had to dive for cover. The bombers dropped their entire load on Kallang, destroying two of the new Hurricanes and damaging six others. Eight pilots sheltering in a sandbagged gun emplacement were buried when a bomb burst close by, but were dragged out unhurt. When the raid was over a party of airmen rushed to the hangar to put out a fire, which they got under control with extinguishers and buckets of water. Another party, working among exploding ammunition, carried a quantity of explosives to safety. A third party hurried to give help to No. 243 Squadron which had had most of its Buffaloes destroyed or damaged. Two Blenheims on the aerodrome were completely burnt out, three petrol tankers set on fire, and much motor transport badly damaged. Forty minutes after the first raid, a second wave of twenty-seven bombers came over and again dropped everything they had on Kallang. They destroyed two more of No. 243 Squadron's Buffaloes and pitted the aerodrome with craters, making it completely unserviceable.

In the next few days the men of the squadron worked feverishly repairing the least damaged of the aircraft and filling in the bomb craters. On 30 January they were able to put three Hurricanes into the air, operating from a single strip which had been cleared. Meanwhile, the situation on the mainland had become rapidly worse. More convoys of reinforcements arrived, but they had come too late to stem the Japanese advance and the British forces were obliged to withdraw to the island of Singapore. The causeway between the island and the mainland was blown up soon after dawn on the 31st, after the Army's rearguard had withdrawn across it.

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With the enemy in possession of the northern shore of the Strait of Johore, three of Singapore's four aerodromes, Tengah, Seletar and Sembawang, became untenable. They were on the north side of the island and were exposed to Japanese artillery fire from a range of less than 2000 yards. Kallang, the fourth, was practically unserviceable after repeated bombings, so it was decided to send most of the remaining fighters to Java and Sumatra, keeping at Singapore only eight Hurricanes and the few Buffaloes which were left.

At nine o'clock on the evening of 31 January MacKenzie was told that No. 488 Squadron must be ready to move immediately. Throughout the night, interrupted by frequent air raids, the men prepared for the move. They packed all the Hurricanes' equipment and spares, and their personal clothing, into cases and loaded it on lorries ready to be taken to the docks. Then they dispersed the lorries in the rubber plantations round the aerodrome and awaited the order to go. The next day they were told they were not to go but were to stay and service the aircraft of No. 232 RAF Squadron which had recently arrived from England. The ground staffs of all other squadrons were being evacuated, and that of No. 488 was the last to remain on the island.

February opened with increasing bombing raids by the Japanese, who were able to attack the aerodromes and the harbour at will. Oil tanks near the Naval Base were hit and blazed furiously, covering the island with a dense pall of black smoke. The few fighters left at Singapore and in Sumatra could do little more than harass the enemy. They flew almost continuously during the daylight hours, but because of the short warning they received they could rarely catch the bombers before they had dropped their loads. That they were able to operate at all was due to the superhuman efforts of the servicing staffs and the men who repaired the runways after every raid. No. 488 Squadron managed to make four of its Hurricanes serviceable and they were flown out to Sumatra on 2 February. In the next few days more machines were repaired and flown out.

On 4 February Pilot Officer P. D. Gifford²⁷ and Flight Sergeant J. Rees²⁸ took a party of men to Sembawang to service the aircraft of No. 232 Squadron. They arrived just as the Japanese started shelling the aerodrome from across the Strait. They worked on the aircraft that night, and next morning the pilots took off in a hail of shells and flew all the serviceable ones to Kallang. One was hit while taxi-ing out, but the pilot leapt out and dashed to another which he flew off. Later in the day the same party went to Tengah and succeeded in flying all the aircraft there, mostly Hurricanes and Buffaloes, to Kallang.

On the evening of 6 February the pilots of the squadron left by ship for Batavia, where it was hoped they would be re-equipped with new machines. The ground staff remained to look after No. 232 Squadron, now at Kallang. Raids on the aerodrome were a daily occurrence, but somehow Kallang managed to put planes into the air. On 8 February the defending fighters turned back three waves of enemy bombers, and the next day, the last on which operations were flown from Singapore, they totalled sixty-four hours on interceptions and patrols.

The Japanese landed on Singapore Island on the night of 8–9 February, and two days later they were well across the island. No. 232 Squadron flew all its serviceable aircraft, which were badly in need of repair, to Sumatra, intending to return with new ones. On the morning of 11 February the ground staff went down to the aerodrome as usual, expecting to see them back. They did not appear, so the men returned to their barracks. Reports were received of parties of Japanese infiltrating close to the station, and patrols were sent out. The men were issued with rifles and told page 14 to dig in among the rubber trees surrounding the aerodrome. At midday these instructions were cancelled and the squadron was told it would be evacuated by sea that afternoon. The men retired to the docks, taking with them only what personal gear they could carry, and at four o'clock, with bombs falling all around them, went on board the Empire Star. At half past six the ship pulled out into the stream and anchored.

After a night of suspense she sailed at half past six next morning for Batavia. Two hours out from Singapore she was attacked by waves of dive-bombers, which scored three direct hits. Men from No. 488 Squadron manned Lewis guns and others blazed away with rifles, and as a result of their fire one enemy plane was shot down and another damaged. More waves of bombers continued to come over until after midday, but they remained high and scored no more hits. Eventually the battered ship reached Batavia, and the men went ashore on 14 February.

The squadron's pilots had arrived in Java on the 9th, and most of them had been sent to a rest camp at Buitenzorg, forty miles from Batavia. Squadron Leader MacKenzie was put in charge of Hurricane deliveries at Tjililitan aerodrome, ten miles out of the city. He established a temporary base and organised ground crews from among RAF personnel there to check new Hurricanes and harmonise their guns before they were flown to Palembang. After two days' rest at Buitenzorg the rest of the pilots joined him and assisted in ferrying aircraft from Batavia civil airport, where they had been unpacked from their cases and erected, to Tjililitan.

The ground staff, after reaching Batavia, were to have gone to Buitenzorg for a few days, but the situation in Java was so serious that they were recalled when on the point of leaving and reported to Tjililitan instead. The aerodrome was now occupied by Nos. 232 and 488 Squadrons, which had twelve Hurricanes between them. No. 232 had been stationed at Palembang for a few days after leaving Singapore; but the Japanese had landed there on 14 February, and to escape being overrun all air units on Sumatra were withdrawn to Java next day. On the same day, Sunday 15 February, Singapore surrendered.

Until 22 February the two squadrons carried out patrols over Java but made no contact with the enemy. The maintenance of twelve aircraft amid the prevailing chaos and disorganisation was, in itself, an achievement. No equipment had been brought from Singapore, and tools and spares had to be provided from somewhere. By hunting in the docks and warehouses of Batavia, the equipment staff found quantities of goods originally destined for Malaya, and so were able to supply what was necessary to the servicing crews.

It was now clear that the Japanese would probably overrun the whole of the Netherlands East Indies, for there was very little to stop them. The Dutch had only five bomber, three fighter, and two observation squadrons in Java, and in addition there were a few American aircraft and the British squadrons which had been evacuated from Singapore and Sumatra. All units were depleted after weeks of continuous operations, the serviceability of their aircraft was low, spares and equipment were scarce, and the whole force was disorganised. To avoid their inevitable capture, those units which through lack of equipment could not be profitably employed were as far as possible withdrawn. No. 488 Squadron was instructed to leave. On 23 February the men went aboard the MV Deucalion and sailed for Australia the same afternoon.

From the time it left New Zealand in September 1941 until it returned at the end of March 1942, the squadron set a record of hard work, resourcefulness, and cheerfulness in the face of

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Heavy Odds

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danger which it would be hard to surpass. At the beginning of the Malayan campaign it was a half-trained, untried unit. At the end Air Vice-Marshal P. C. Maltby, Air Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force in Java, said of it, ‘I consider 488 Squadron as the squadron which has done the best job in Singapore.’

A paragraph in the despatch of the GOC Malaya, Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival, reads as follows:

I wish here to pay tribute to the gallant air crews who throughout the later stages of the Malayan campaign went unflinchingly to almost certain death in obsolete aircraft which should have been replaced several years before….