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CHAPTER 4
Longer-range Attacks

Now it was late summer. Dusk came earlier to the airfields in eastern England and, with the longer hours of darkness, Royal Air Force bombers began to penetrate farther into enemy territory. The first of the more distant targets that were heavily attacked during the second half of 1943 was the city of Hamburg. ‘The total destruction of this city,’ declared the Commander-in-Chief in his operational order on the eve of the attack, ‘would achieve immeasurable results in reducing the industrial capacity of the enemy's war machine. But the battle of Hamburg cannot be won in a single night. It is estimated that at least 10,000 tons of bombs will have to be dropped to achieve the maximum effect. On the first raid a large number of incendiaries are to be carried in order to saturate the fire services ….’

Hamburg was the second largest city of Germany and the greatest port in continental Europe. Within its boundaries lay U-boat building yards, aircraft factories, and oil installations of the first importance, as well as many other major war industries. Before the war the town, whose main built-up area was on the north of the River Elbe, had a population of over one and a half million. This important centre of the German economy was one of the most heavily guarded areas in Germany outside the Ruhr and hundreds of guns and searchlights co-operated with squadrons of night fighters in its defence.

Hamburg had already been attacked by Bomber Command on various occasions earlier in the war with considerable loss and comparatively little effect, but the brief series of raids now directed against the city at the end of July 1943 was to provide a remarkable contrast. Within the space of just over one week, four night raids, each by more than seven hundred aircraft, were launched by Bomber Command, and over 8500 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped. Two daylight attacks by American bombers on the port area of Hamburg added a further 254 tons. There were also harassing attacks by small forces of Mosquito bombers in the intervals between the major raids so that the effect on the Germans was one of almost continuous assault. By the beginning of August Hamburg was without water, gas, and electricity supplies, large areas

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of the town lay in smoking ruins, and between 40,000 and 50,000 people had lost their lives. Economically the great city was for the time being knocked out, since the undamaged parts had to stop work on account of the destruction or lack of essential services.

The second RAF attack on the night of 27 July produced a unique and dreadful phenomenon in Hamburg. The bombing was well concentrated and its main weight fell upon the closely built-up area to the east of the Alster Lake. Within a short time this region was enveloped in a veritable sea of flames which were intensified by firestorms of almost hurricane strength. The overheated air stormed through the streets with immense force, taking along not only sparks but burning timber and roof beams, so spreading the fire farther and farther. According to a German observer, ‘it developed in a short time into a fire typhoon as such was never before witnessed, against which every human resistance was quite useless.’ Another report said that the firestorms were so violent and the suction so strong that trees were uprooted and the roofs of houses carried away. To judge from the many German descriptions of what happened it must have been almost as terrible as the bursting of the two atom bombs over the Japanese cities at the end of the war. Certainly these fire raids at the end of July 1943 were always referred to by the inhabitants of Hamburg as ‘The Catastrophe’.

On each of the big RAF raids the plan of attack was similar. Pathfinders led the way dropping route markers at a given point off the mouth of the Elbe. Since Hamburg was outside Oboe range, aircraft equipped with H2S marked the target and there was a large force of backers-up to maintain this marking throughout the raids. Among them were experts whose duty it was to re-centre the attack when necessary so as to avoid the usual creeping back of the bomb- ing. Except in the last raid, when the bombers met severe thunder- storms and most of the markers were hidden by clouds, these tactics proved highly successful.

But the outstanding feature of the Hamburg raids which contributed in large measure to the success achieved was the employment for the first time of a new method of countering the very efficient German defence organisation. During each raid British bombers dropped innumerable small strips of metallised paper which caused echoes similar to those produced by aircraft to appear on the enemy radar screens. The effect was remarkable. In the German ground-control stations instruments behaved as though the sky was filled with thousands of hostile aircraft and the controllers had to tell their night-fighter pilots they were unable to help them. Indeed, the whole system upon which the enemy relied for the control of his night fighters and the accuracy of his gunfire was thrown into hopeless confusion. Searchlights waved aimlessly in all directions,

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predicted gunfire gave way to a heavy barrage, and the German night fighters frequently seemed unaware of the presence of bombers in their vicinity. As a result the RAF casualties in the four attacks on Hamburg were relatively light, 87 bombers being lost from the 3095 sorties despatched.

The lack of direction from the ground and the consequent frustration of the efforts of the German night-fighter pilots may have accounted for a somewhat unusual incident which befell one of the Stirlings from No. 75 Squadron in the raid on 24 July. Just after bombs had been released the captain reported a night fighter approaching from ahead. A second or two later there was a terrific bump as the fighter collided with the starboard wing, tearing away several feet of the wing and damaging the aileron controls. But apparently the German machine got the worst of the collision for it was seen to turn over on its back and go down. The Stirling had meanwhile dropped on its starboard side and began to lose height, but with help from his bomb aimer the pilot managed to pull the aircraft level and then hold it on course throughout the long return flight.

The New Zealand Squadron took part in each of the four major attacks on Hamburg, despatching a total of seventy-nine sorties. This was in addition to the attacks on Essen and Remscheid during the last weeks of July which marked the final stage of the Ruhr battle. ‘It has been a terrific week for everybody – for ground crews as well as for the flying men,’ declared Wing Commander Wyatt. ‘The fitters, mechanics and the riggers have worked without stint to get the bombers ready for the next operation. As a result we have put up more aircraft in the last week than ever before.’

In the first three raids on Hamburg No. 75 Squadron was fortu- nate, all but one of the Stirlings returning safely. In the last attack, however, two of the seventeen bombers which took off failed to return. One was shot down over Germany and the other crashed into the North Sea. All the members of both crews were lost. The last raid was made in very bad weather. One New Zealander with a Lancaster squadron, whose motto appropriately enough was ‘Despite the Elements’, told how his bomber finally reached the vicinity of Hamburg after flying through cloud, rain and electrical storms. ‘The clouds were very dense and miles high and so thick that we had to come down very low before getting under them. A violent thunderstorm was raging and brilliant flashes of lightning lit up the ground. Suddenly we saw the twisting outline of the River Elbe and were then able to fix our position.’ Another crew reported that they flew over the target area six times before they could find a way through the cloud.

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Many of the New Zealanders who flew to Hamburg with RAF squadrons also had eventful flights. Pilot Officer Elder¹ of No. 76 Squadron brought back a crippled Halifax with one member of his crew dead and two wounded after one of the raids. German fighters had attacked the Halifax shortly after the bomb load was released, killing the mid-upper gunner and putting the port engine out of action. Other members of the crew fought off the fighters while the bomb aimer took an axe and cut away burning pieces of the fuselage. On reaching the first lighted airfield in England after a difficult flight, Elder ordered the unwounded members of his crew to bale out because he feared a dangerous crash-landing. The navigator, bomb aimer, and wireless operator all left the aircraft and came down safely. After strapping the badly injured rear gunner in the rest position the engineer, who had himself been wounded in the legs, helped Elder to bring the bomber down on the grass outside the runway. The Halifax skidded along to the end of the airfield, jumped a ditch, went through a fence, and finished up by tearing the port engines out on some tree stumps before it finally came to rest.

The raids on Hamburg caused considerable alarm among the German war leaders. ‘We were of the opinion,’ said Herr Speer, Minister of Production, during his interrogation after the war, ‘that rapid repetition of this type of attack upon another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to sustain armament manufacture and war production. I reported to the Fuehrer at the time that a continuation of these attacks might bring about a rapid end to the war.’ It was indeed a critical moment for Germany since it was clear that, for the time being at least, the Luftwaffe was unable either to prevent the raids or to launch heavy reprisals against Britain. Goebbels was ‘sunk in gloom’ and anxiously watching for signs of collapse on the home front which had been the undoing of Germany in 1918. However, the British raids were not repeated with the same weight and frequency, the crisis passed, and the German defence organisation was able to adapt itself to further air attacks as a result of the experience gained at Hamburg.

It was, in fact, a physical impossibility for Bomber Command at this stage of its expansion and equipment to do what in Speer's opinion might have brought the war quickly to an end. Even with the greatest possible luck it would not have been possible to attack in a brief space of time six more great cities as effectively as Hamburg. To find new targets even half or a third of its size the bombers would have to go much farther afield. Hamburg had been

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more accessible and, because of its position near the coast, more easily located and subjected to concentrated attack. Weather, the size of the force, and lack of experience with the new radar aids prohibited for the time being similar sustained onslaught. To have destroyed Berlin would have been a severe blow, but it was the most difficult target of all to attack. Nevertheless at the earliest oppor- tunity, as soon as the nights were long enough, a series of raids was directed against the German capital. In the meantime there were many other tasks for the bombers.

By the middle of 1943 Italy had become the focus of the Allied attack in the Mediterranean, and Bomber Command was directed to support the efforts being made to drive Hitler's wavering ally out of the war. Therefore, between the middle of July and the end of August there were frequent raids on the industrial cities of northern Italy. In July the nights were too short for the slower types of aircraft and even the Lancasters had to be routed home through the Bay of Biscay. Nevertheless, as early as the night of 12 July, 295 Lancasters delivered a successful attack against Turin.

There were also a number of raids by smaller forces of Lancasters against the transformer and switching stations upon which the electrified railways of Italy depended. After these attacks the Lancasters would often fly on to land in North Africa and then make another bombing raid during their return flight to the United Kingdom. On the night of 15 July when twenty-four Lancasters were despatched in four groups to attack such targets, Flight Lieutenant Stewart¹ led the six aircraft from No. 61 Squadron whose objective was the grid and transformer station at Bologna. Stewart went in first and, after dropping sighter bombs, scored hits in a second low-level attack. His gunners then concentrated on the enemy flak posts while the remaining aircraft made their bombing runs. Stewart, who had been with his squadron since 1941 and was on his second tour of operations, was taken prisoner a few weeks later in the famous raid on the German experimental station at Peenemunde.

Flying Officer Head,² who flew a Lancaster of No. 9 Squadron to Reggio the same night, had a remarkable series of adventures. Over the target his machine was involved in a collision and sustained such damage that the crew was forced to bale out. Shortly after reaching the ground Head was captured. A week later he escaped

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from a north-bound train through a ventilator only to fall into the hands of a German patrol. A second attempt to escape a few weeks later was successful when, along with two army officers, he leapt out of a train in the gathering dusk – the latch outside the door had previously been released while the train was passing through a tunnel. After eight days in the mountains the party moved towards the Allied lines in southern Italy. In a brush with a German patrol one man was captured; Head's left arm was hit and broken but he and a companion got through safely.

Within the space of ten days in mid-August 1380 sorties were flown by Bomber Command against Turin, Genoa and Milan. The great weight of bombs – some 2200 tons which included over five hundred two-ton ‘block-busters’ - fell on Milan in three raids within four nights. Four hundred and eighty Lancasters, Halifaxes, and Stirlings made the first attack; 134 Lancasters the second, and nearly 200 Lancasters were sent on the third raid. The long and difficult flight over the Alps was the chief hazard in these raids on Italy, but there were occasional encounters with enemy fighters usually during the flight across France. On their second flight to Milan, Flight Lieutenant Barley¹ and his crew of No. 44 Rhodesian Squadron were attacked in the neighbourhood of Lake Bourget, to the east of Lyons. After a running fight lasting several minutes in which the Lancaster suffered considerable damage, Barley found one engine out of action and a second giving very little power. A strong north-west wind made him decide that the best chance of saving his aircraft and crew was to make for North Africa. By skilful flying he was able to maintain sufficient height to cross the Mediterranean and reach Blida airfield near Algiers.

The last stages in the bombing of Italy were very successful both in causing material damage and in finally destroying what little inclination remained in that country to continue the war. Italy surrendered unconditionally on 3 September 1943 but the German reaction was too quick for the Allies to take advantage of the surrender. German troops were rushed into the country and the Allies faced a long and bitter campaign.

During the following months several attempts were made by Bomber Command to hinder the flow of German supplies and reinforcements to Italy by cutting the railways on the Brenner and Riviera routes. The most successful attack was that delivered by a force of just over three hundred Lancasters in full moonlight on the night of 10 November against the rail centre at Modane near the French border. Tracks were torn up, buildings, including the engine

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shed were destroyed, and a German goods train standing in the station was completely wrecked. ‘The whole area,’ says a contemporary report, ‘had the appearance of the front line in the First World War.’ On the other hand, three gallant attempts by small forces of Lancasters from No. 617 Squadron to wreck the Antheor viaduct were unsuccessful. By this time, however, Bomber Command was heavily engaged over Germany and air support in the Italian campaign was taken over by the Allied squadrons now well established at airfields in southern Italy.

* * * * *

During the summer months of 1943, apart from several interesting but relatively small raids – notably against the Schneider Works at Le Creusot, the aircraft factory at Friedrichshafen, and the Peugeot Works at Montbelliard – the British bombers had concentrated upon the dislocation and destruction of industries in the Ruhr and Rhineland and in Hamburg. But with the approach of longer nights Bomber Command had begun to extend its efforts against the enemy's industrial system and at the same time make a contribution to the reduction of German air strength. In August Nuremberg, which contained ball-bearing plants, was twice attacked by heavy forces of over six hundred aircraft Leverkusen, which contained one of the vast I. G. Farben chemical and rubber plants, was also attacked. In addition, there were raids on Berlin and the Ruhr. September targets included Montlucon, the site of the French Dunlop works, and Hanover, whose principal importance to the aircraft industry lay in its production of aircraft tires. Kassel was attacked twice during October and there were heavy raids on Stuttgart, Leipzig and Hanover. In Stuttgart there was an important ball-bearing factory as well as numerous small plants manufacturing aircraft components, while Leipzig contained the big Erla group factories which made and assembled Messerschmitt fighters. In November Ludwigshaven and Leverkusen, both of which contained plants of the Farben combine, were attacked; Stuttgart was also raided again.

During the second half of 1943 seventeen attacks, six of them in July and five in October, were delivered by American bombers against specific targets in the German aircraft industry, the main weight of the assault falling upon fighter assembly plants. The centre of the German ball-bearing industry at Schweinfurt – high in the list of primary objectives for the Allied bombers – was also twice raided by the United States 8th Air Force. But in the second attack against this target on 14 October 1943 very heavy casualties were incurred – sixty of the 228 bombers being lost – and it became

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clear that daylight raids involving deep penetration would have to be adequately protected by fighter escort in order to retain the strength required for continuous operations.¹ As such escort was not yet available the 8th Air Force made no more deep penetrations in clear weather into Germany for the rest of the year. For the time being the daylight assault on long-range targets was left to the 15th USAAF operating from Italy, with the 8th confining itself to the German ports and the Ruhr.

The attacks on Schweinfurt are of more than passing interest for they illustrate both the difficulties and the weakness of the Allied bombing offensive at this stage. The two American raids caused damage in critical departments of the industry, and the testimony of Speer and others acquainted with the situation leaves no doubt that the enemy took a grave view of the matter. In the autumn of 1943 the German ball-bearing industry was concentrated in a few places, all of them known to Allied intelligence, and the machinery was as yet largely unprotected. In the opinion of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, had these two 1943 attacks been followed up the German bearing situation might have become critical indeed. As it was, Bomber Command - owing to Harris's strong aversion to what he termed ‘panacea’ targets - did not take part in this first assault on the Schweinfurt plants at all and no further attempt was made to bomb them by either British or American aircraft for another four months. During that time the Germans were able to reorganise and disperse the industry so thoroughly that any further effort to destroy it was doomed to failure.

However, in spite of the inability to press on immediately with heavy daylight attack and some lack of co-ordination between British and American operations, the 1943 assault on the German aircraft industry had several important results. In particular, it delayed the planned programme for fighter production by approximately three months and the timing of this delay contributed to the victory in the critical air battles of the following winter. The Allied offensive also brought about a heavier wastage of German fighters in action, which led in turn to the adoption by the Germans of new programmes for greatly increased aircraft production, particularly of fighter types. And this growing emphasis by the enemy on fighters was perhaps the best indication of the progress of the battle for air supremacy in Europe.

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Of the night area attacks delivered by Bomber Command during the last months of 1943 those which fell on Leipzig, Kassel, and Hanover caused particularly widespread devastation. In the raid against Hanover on the night of 8 October, which followed two heavy raids in the previous eighteen days, the main weight of bombs fell on the central area round the main railway station and the industrial region of Linden to the south-west of the town centre. This attack was considered far more effective than all the previous attacks on Hanover. In the two October raids on Kassel, which had a substantial aircraft industry producing aero-engines and various components, as well as assembling aircraft, a large part of the built-up area was devastated. All three Henschel factories were damaged, the main factory suffering the most, the majority of its smaller buildings being destroyed and the larger workshops damaged. After the second raid against Leipzig early in December the damage covered a wide strip running right across the city from north to south and spreading from the centre into the most densely built-up districts on either side. Much of the area to the south-west of the main station, where lay the old town, was destroyed. Industrial damage was particularly severe in the south where buildings designed to house the Leipzig World Fair had been converted to the aircraft industry and were engaged on the repair of Junkers aero-engines and the assembly of fuselages.

New Zealanders flew with many of the RAF bomber squadrons in the raids on these longer-range targets as captains, navigators, wireless operators, bomb aimers and gunners. Some men survived remarkable experiences. Squadron Leader J. B. Starky was captain of a Lancaster from No. 115 Squadron which took off for Mannheim one evening early in September. It was his forty-seventh trip. Six hours later, with the starboard elevator almost completely shot away, the navigator and wireless operator missing and two more of the crew wounded, the Lancaster force-landed at an airfield in England. Some twenty miles short of the target a night fighter had dived on the Lancaster in a head-on attack. The bomber was badly hit, the cockpit filled with smoke, and the machine went into a violent spiral. Unable to regain control Starky gave the order to abandon by parachute. But on hearing that his rear gunner was trapped in his turret he made a last desperate effort to regain control. Suddenly the stick became a little easier owing to the dinghy, which had become jammed in the tail unit, blowing free. Then as the Lancaster levelled out the German fighter attacked again. But the gunners held their fire until it came close and sent it down in flames. Starky then found that both his wireless operator and

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navigator had baled out, his engineer had been wounded in the shoulder, and his bomb aimer badly hit in the arm and head. An approximate course was set for England, and with his bomb aimer doing the navigation – the navigator's log had gone and he had no plan to work on – Starky brought the Lancaster back to the coast and across the North Sea.

Shot down over the German-Belgian border, Flight Sergeant Pond¹ of No. 97 Squadron was back in England in just over a fort- night. Pond captained a Lancaster in the attack on Nuremberg towards the end of August. Just after leaving the target the bomber was attacked by a night fighter and badly damaged. Flying low near the Belgian frontier, Pond turned his machine into cloud to avoid another fighter and a few moments later the aircraft struck high ground, bounced off, and finally finished up in a cornfield, where it caught fire. The rear gunner had been killed in the fighter attack and the bomb aimer in the crash. The surviving members of the crew, believing themselves to be in Germany, split up at once. Actually they were in Belgium, as Pond found out the next after- noon. While hiding in a field a horse ran so near him that he had to stand up. A farmer approached and, recognising him as English, shook hands and warned him that there were Germans in the village and gave him directions. Pond was thus able to evade capture and he soon received help which enabled him, after an adventurous journey, to return to England sixteen days later.

Flying Officer N. J. Matich, who captained a Halifax of No. 35 Pathfinder Squadron during 1943, also owed his escape to assistance received from various underground organisations on the Continent. It was during one of the raids against Hanover that Matich's Halifax was shot down. All the crew baled out safely but the Australian mid-upper gunner, who had been severely injured in the fighter attack, later died of wounds and exposure. The others were taken prisoner, and only Matich got clear. Moving by night he headed for Holland, which was the nearest and most likely place to obtain assistance. He took nine nights to cover the hundred miles to the German-Dutch border. Through taking cover by day, usually in woods and once in a haystack, he had a fairly safe journey, although the day he spent in the haystack was nearly his undoing. The farmer came to cut fodder for his animals and his large knife or saw passed about six inches from the fugitive's head during the process of cutting. Matich reached the Dortmund-Ems canal on the seventh night only to find it guarded. Sentry boxes were at each end of the bridge and a sentry patrolled the area. Creeping into one box, Matich overpowered the guard and got across. Two nights

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later he reached Holland and made contact with the ‘Organisation’. After spending six weeks hiding in a cellar in a wood, he was taken by train and escorted across the frontier into Belgium. From Brussels he travelled in company with another British pilot to France and eventually reached Paris. After several days there the two men were guided by a French girl - apparently known as ‘the girl with a thousand lovers’ - to Bordeaux. Here Matich's companion nearly ‘gave the show away’ when he spied his rear gunner on the railway station. Eventually came the gruelling walk across the Pyrenees into Spain, which took three days and nights, and finally the men reached Gibraltar from where they were flown back to England.

Flight Sergeant B. Williams,¹ who flew as air gunner with a Canadian squadron, was less fortunate. When his crippled Wellington bomber came down in the North Sea, he and his crew spent over eighty hours in their dinghy only to be picked up by the Germans. This was Williams's second crash within a few months. On this occasion the Wellington was returning from a raid on Hanover. Hits from anti-aircraft fire over the target had caused damage and loss of fuel, but the crew had decided to attempt the crossing of the North Sea and at least get as close as possible to England. But before they had got half-way across the sea the engines spluttered out and the pilot was compelled to ditch.

‘The force of the crash,’ writes Williams, ‘had made the escape opening very small and it took considerable exertion to squeeze through and scramble out on to the tail plane. It was as black as pitch, the sea was just covering the fuselage and there was a large swell. In between the rise and fall of the waves I slid down, using a sheath knife to dig into the canvas, missed out on the swell twice, got lifted off the fuselage and was only holding on by the knife handle. By the time I got down the wing was slowly sinking and we were up to our necks. Then a whistle blew from behind us; this turned out to be the pilot who had got the dinghy and brought it up close. He stayed on one side to balance while I pulled the navigator in; was just going to haul in the bomb aimer when the pilot told us Johnny the W'op was going down. He had hit the tail plane and was in a bad way, so {1} turned round and pulled him in while the others acted as ballast on the other side of the dinghy. This left the bomb aimer, who was six feet and a dead weight, but finally we managed to get him in. We baled the dinghy out as much as possible and then slipped into the sleep of the exhausted. Have a vague recollection of waking up twice to bale out and shift around before passing out again. We were soaked to the skin. The next day the sea was rough and we had to be very careful we did not get overturned. During the afternoon when we came up on a crest of a wave we saw a Beaufighter but we had just come up too late. However, it gave us fresh heart. The next night was calmer and although pretty well exhausted we took turns to watch but we got cramp with the cold and had to untangle our legs using our hands to move. We had a mouthful of water the first day, the second day

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we had two mouthfuls until we were rescued. We remained hopeful of drifting to England and took turns at paddling but night always caught up on us before we sighted land. We began to dread the nights as they brought a succession of horrible dreams, cramped legs and aching bones, and the approach of dawn made us glad. Shortly after dawn on the fourth morning we were sighted by a Junkers 88 and soon afterwards a German Flying Boat flew over and dropped markers. Then about an hour later a German gun boat came and picked us up.’

One further episode, typical of what happened all too often in Bomber Command, must be recorded. It concerns a gunner, Pilot Officer Moon¹ of No. 156 Pathfinder Squadron who, after being wounded a second time, was the only member of his crew to survive the war. On the night of 20 December 1943 his Lancaster flew in the attack on Frankfurt and, after bombing the target and passing through its defences, was attacked by a German fighter. Through the commentary and directions given by Moon to his pilot this attack was successfully evaded. About twenty minutes later another fighter made a surprise attack. The bomber was badly hit, an engine set on fire and the mid-upper turret shattered. Moon was badly wounded; a bullet entered his back and passed out through his chest, paralysing his left arm and side. However, he remained at his post, trying as best he could with his right hand to make his guns fire. When the enemy fighter finally broke away, Moon tried to reach the rest position and only when unable to do so did he seek help. Twelve nights later when Moon lay in hospital all the other members of his crew were killed when their Lancaster was shot down on its way back from Berlin.

* * * * *

No. 75 New Zealand Squadron had continued to take a prominent part in the bomber offensive during the late summer and autumn of 1943. In August a total of 169 sorties was reached, which was a record for the squadron up to this time and also the highest number flown by any squadron of No. 3 Bomber Group during that month. In the following weeks the effort was so well maintained that, by the end of September, 313 aircraft had operated on thirty missions in which 538 tons of bombs had been dropped and 132 mines laid in enemy waters. But this excellent contribution was not made without heavy cost in men and machines. On many operations during these two months the Stirlings had to fight their way to and from their targets in the face of bitter and sustained opposition, particularly from the enemy night fighters. Thirteen Stirlings were missing in August; a further six failed to return in September, while others were badly damaged and just managed to limp back to base. How-

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ever, these heavy losses did not go unavenged. Crews who experienced combat displayed skill and great fighting spirit and claimed fifteen fighters as destroyed or probably destroyed, with at least six more damaged; others were driven off before they could press home their attacks.

In mid-August Wing Commander Max¹ became the first New Zealander to command the squadron for over a year. Max had joined the Royal Air Force in August 1938 and at the outbreak of war was serving with No. 103 Bomber Squadron. He was among the small group of New Zealanders who flew with the Battle squadrons in France during 1940 and on one occasion was shot down near Amiens after bombing a concentration of German tanks. On return to the United Kingdom he continued to operate with his squadron and flew Wellingtons until early in 1941, when he was released to fly on the Atlantic Ferry. Before assuming command of No. 75 Squadron, Max did valuable work as an instructor at an operational training unit. Squadron Leaders F. A. Andrews, R. Broadbent, and J. Joll continued as flight commanders with this squadron during the second half of 1943.

The first attack by No. 75 Squadron after the Battle of Hamburg came on the night of 10 August when eighteen aircraft bombed Nuremberg. The squadron's operation record book states that: ‘Large fires were seen glowing below the clouds and some heavy explosions occurred indicating that the attack was a success. Moderate anti-aircraft fire co-operating with searchlights was encountered but gave little trouble. Some enemy aircraft were seen but no combats took place. Weather at the target was poor with thick cloud which prevented identification of detail.’ One crew were fortunate to get back when their navigational aids failed during the return journey and they went off track and ran short of fuel. The crew prepared to abandon the aircraft but eventually reached Manston, where they landed after being airborne for over nine hours.

There was a second attack against Nuremberg on 27 August when eighteen Stirlings reported successful bombing; one aircraft captained by Flight Sergeant Higham² failed to return. Meanwhile the squadron had contributed to the final stages of the offensive against Italy with two attacks on Turin in which twenty-nine sorties were flown without loss.

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Two episodes connected with these missions across the Alps indicate the fine spirit which existed in No. 75 Squadron at this time. In the raid against Turin on 12 August, one Stirling was intercepted near Paris on its outward flight by a German fighter. One engine was hit and became useless, but the crew carried on to their target nearly 400 miles away, dropped their bombs and returned safely. After the second raid, four nights later, crews returned to find fog covering their base at Mepal and they were diverted to other airfields, so that they could not return to their home airfield until later the next morning. Consequently servicing, refuelling, and bombing-up were delayed, but through the enthusiastic and high-speed work of the ground crews the Stirlings were prepared for operations that same night against Peenemunde. And although the men did not know it at the time, this attack on Peenemunde was to prove one of the most important bombing missions of the year.

Peenemunde, on the shores of the Baltic, was the principal German experimental station engaged in the development of secret weapons such as the flying bomb and the rocket-bomb for a renewal of the attack on Britain. Bomber Command's raid on 17 August 1943 was launched to retard this development. In order to preserve secrecy and avoid needless alarm, crews were not told what was really going on at Peenemunde; instead they were briefed that the enemy was developing a new radar counter measure against night bombers. The operation was given the code name HYDRA, not altogether a happy thought, since this was the name of the fabled monster who grew new heads whenever one was cut off.

A force of 600 bombers took off for the attack in bright moon- light. Normally a force of this size would only have been sent against such a distant target on a dark or cloudy night, and the danger from night fighters, even after the disruption of the enemy's defence system by the dropping of metallised strips in the recent attacks on Hamburg, was considerable. Therefore, in an effort to deceive the Germans the whole force this night was routed as if Berlin were the target and a small diversionary force of Mosquitos did actually go on to Berlin. The attack was carefully planned and for the first time in a major raid on Germany a ‘master of ceremonies’, circling high above the target, assessed the accuracy of the placing of the target markers and then gave instructions to the whole force by radio telephone. His task was not easy for there were some clouds and a protective smoke screen which shrouded much of the target area. Nevertheless, the bombing appears to have been fairly well concentrated. At first the Germans were deceived by the feint attack towards Berlin but the ruse was detected before the raid on Peenemunde had finished. Night fighters were hastily despatched to intercept the bombers on their return flight to England

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and the last squadrons to attack suffered heavy casualties. Altogether forty aircraft failed to return. No. 75 Squadron was fortunate in that all the twelve Stirlings despatched returned safely. A few enemy aircraft were sighted but no combats took place. Crews reported that they could see the glow of fires over one hundred miles from the target on their return flight.

Bomber Command's attack on Peenemunde caused considerable destruction of both manufacturing buildings and living quarters, where casualties were heavy and included several important scientists and leading members of the staff of the experimental establishment. The actual delay caused to the opening of the German V-weapon offensive is uncertain but it is significant that after this attack by Bomber Command the German threats of retaliation against the United Kingdom by secret weapons became much less specific as regards dates.¹

No. 75 Squadron also took part in two of the three major attacks against Berlin during August 1943. On the night of the 23rd when twenty-three New Zealand Stirlings flew to Berlin they met stiff opposition and three aircraft failed to return. Most crews reported sighting enemy aircraft and there were several sustained combats. Flight Sergeant Jamieson,² who flew as rear gunner in the bomber captained by Flight Sergeant W. D. Whitehead, claimed two night fighters over Berlin. One was seen to burst into flames and go down and the other to explode and disintegrate in the air. That same night Flight Sergeant White³ and his crew had a particularly hazardous flight. Approaching Berlin their Stirling was coned by searchlights and then repeatedly hit by flak. One shellburst shattered the rear turret and killed the rear gunner. There was also damage to the fuselage and controls. Suddenly the anti-aircraft fire died away and a Junkers 88 came in to attack. White began to make evasive turns but the damaged elevators caused his machine to dive out of control in steep turns. He thereupon ordered his crew to ‘Prepare to abandon aircraft.’ Unfortunately, three members of the crew, including the navigator, apparently mistook the order and baled out. Meanwhile White had jettisoned his bomb load while still in the dive and eventually he managed to regain a measure of control. Then, although still engaged by searchlights and anti-aircraft guns, he succeeded in

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getting clear of the target area. White and the two remaining members of his crew thereupon took stock of the damage and decided that they would attempt the long flight back – no mean feat without a navigator. Fortunately White had been a keen yachtsman in New Zealand and had some knowledge of navigation. He flew northwards and then across Denmark, where he succeeded in pinpointing the Stirling's position and set course across the North Sea. The crippled bomber finally reached the English coast, but on arrival over his home airfield White found that the radio equipment, undercarriage and flap gear were useless. Despite this he achieved a safe crash-landing clear of the runway.

Altogether nineteen New Zealanders were among the crews of the seven Stirlings lost by No. 75 Squadron in these two August raids on Berlin. One of them, Sergeant Grant,¹ who survived by a miracle when his Stirling was shot down, has given a vivid description of his experiences.

On reaching the target area we found plenty of enemy action. The whole sky was alive with searchlights and anti-aircraft fire and fighters. Cruising in on our bombing run at 15,000 feet, we had to pass through a heavy barrage of flak and a screen of night fighters. With the bomb doors open and on a straight and level course, we were slowed by a shell which hit the port inner engine and we made a sitting target for the fighters. Just as we were about to drop our bombs a Ju. 88 began to tail us and when the bombs had gone closed in with guns blazing. I returned the fire but was unable to give instructions for evasion as I was having trouble with the intercomm. Meanwhile the mid-upper gunner was firing at another enemy aircraft to starboard and managed to drive it off. But another attacked from the port beam and succeeded in putting his turret out of action. The Junkers at our rear scored many hits on the fin and tail plane and knocked out my two right-hand guns, wounding me in the right arm and shoulder, while my face was peppered with shrapnel. Before I could get my remaining guns to bear this fighter closed in on our slow moving aircraft for the kill. I again opened fire and the enemy machine belched forth a cloud of smoke and flame and disappeared. We were further attacked and one fighter came up from below and raked us with fire from stem to stern, completely crippling our aircraft and putting my turret out of action. I had again been wounded and was cut off from the rest of the crew. My intercomm was by this time completely useless but managed to repair it enough to hear what was going on. The crew thought I had been killed during the attacks but after I had signalled by flashing the lights the wireless operator freed me from my turret. We had been flying for about an hour when we ran short of fuel and were ordered to abandon aircraft. On taking my parachute out of its stowage found it had been shot to pieces so I was forced to watch the rest of the crew bale out and sat waiting for the crash which came on the top of some high hills. I managed to scramble out of the burning machine and crawled away and went to sleep, only to be awakened some six hours later by a German search party.

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Hanover, centre of the German aircraft industry, and the French town of Montlucon, where there was a large Dunlop factory, were among the many targets attacked by No. 75 Squadron during September. Of the attack on Montlucon on the night of the 15th, the squadron's operations book records that: ‘Sixteen aircraft dropped their bombs in the target area. This was a concentrated attack, large fires and heavy explosions being observed. Smoke from the fires was afterwards seen rising to a height of 12,000 feet. Inaccurate flak from a few guns was the only opposition and no enemy aircraft were encountered.’ There were two raids on Hanover, in the first of which, on 22 September, twenty New Zealand Stirlings took part, again without loss. But from the second attack five nights later two of the thirteen bombers despatched were missing. Bomber Command's losses in these two raids on Hanover were sixty-four aircraft from the 1389 sorties despatched.

Other September targets for the New Zealand Squadron were the important industrial town of Mannheim in southern Germany and the Modane railway centre on the Mont-Cenis route into Italy. It was during the raid on Mannheim on 5 September that Flight Sergeant Batger¹ and his crew reported their second success against enemy night fighters within six nights. On this same raid the Stirling captained by Flight Sergeant Whitmore² was twice attacked within a few minutes. After concerted fire from his gunners the first fighter was seen to turn over, catch fire, and spin down towards the ground. Attack by a second fighter followed almost immediately but further accurate fire from the gunners caused it to break away. Shortly afterwards the Stirling took over the role of hunter when a German fighter was seen firing on a Lancaster which was burning furiously. Unfortunately, although the enemy machine was driven off, the Stirling's intervention was too late to save the Lancaster, which was seen to break up in mid-air. Pilot Officer Wilkinson³ and his crew, who had twice been successful in combat during the previous month, failed to return from this raid on Mannheim.

When the squadron went to Mannheim again towards the end of the month three more aircraft were lost. Many fighters were up in defence of this important target, the crew of one Stirling reporting no fewer than three separate attacks during their sortie. In other encounters New Zealand aircraft claimed two enemy fighters and a further three as damaged.

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Eighteen Stirlings from No. 75 Squadron bombed the marshalling yards at Modane on 16 September as part of the force of almost 350 aircraft. Crews reported that flak was largely ineffective although one aircraft which was hit had to bomb and complete its sortie on three engines. A Junkers 88 was claimed by the gunners of the Stirling captained by Pilot Officer G. K. Williams¹ which was one of two squadron aircraft attacked by fighters on this night.

Both ground and air crews of No. 75 Squadron had worked hard during these months to achieve the maximum effort with their Stirling bombers. But the Stirling, never a really satisfactory machine, was now obsolescent and the men still servicing and flying them could not help but envy their more fortunate comrades in the Lancaster squadrons. Indeed, during the second half of 1943 the superiority of the Lancaster, with its greater bomb load, better performance and lower loss rate, had become even more apparent, and efforts were being made to hasten the re-equipment of as many squadrons as possible with Lancasters. Meanwhile, the rising loss rate among the Stirlings and Halifaxes brought a decision to restrict the operations of these aircraft to the less difficult targets.

Thus there came a change of emphasis in No. 75 Squadron's operations and during October, although attacks were made on targets connected with the German aircraft industry at Kassel, Frankfurt and Bremen, most of the effort was devoted to mine- laying. Mannheim, Leverkusen, and Berlin were the only targets in Germany during November. Then the Stirlings were finally restricted to minelaying and bombing attacks on the sites the Germans were building for launching their ‘secret weapons’ against the United Kingdom. In December and January No. 75 Squadron's effort was divided between these two tasks, with minelaying taking by far the larger proportion, while in February it took the squadron's entire commitment.

After the intense activity of the first three-quarters of 1943, in which the squadron had taken part in many of the most important bombing raids, the enforced restriction of operations against Germany was a keen disappointment for the aircrews. However, in March 1944 the squadron began converting to Lancasters and was ready in time to take a prominent part in preparatory operations for the invasion of the Continent.

While operating over Germany towards the close of 1943, squadron crews had continued to meet heavy fighter attacks during which one Me109 was reported destroyed and two others damaged,

(1)	The Me. has taken off and is gaining height
(2)	First strikes from the Typhoon have hit the fuselage and port wing
(3)	Cannon strikes on the port wing near the port cannon magazine
(4)	The Me. dives, with its engine on fire and cannon magazine about to explode
(5)	The Me. rapidly loses height and speed
(6)	With its engine and port wing burning, the Me. dives in smoke before exploding

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but the squadron lost four aircraft. Flight Sergeant Hyde¹ was navigator in a Stirling which failed to return from Leverkusen on the night of 19 November. Although hit by flak when crossing the enemy coast, the bomber was able to continue to the target. On turning for home it was attacked by two Me210s. In the running battle which followed the Stirling was subjected to five attacks before the fighters were finally driven off. Ten minutes later the starboard wing caught fire and the crew was ordered to bale out. Just as Hyde left the aircraft there was an explosion and he lost consciousness. ‘The next thing I remember I was floating down thinking myself very high up. I was enjoying the drop when suddenly I hit the ground. How high I was when my parachute opened is a mystery, so I owe my life to providence.’ Hyde had been injured on landing but managed to crawl to a hedge, where he waited until two Belgians came along and carried him to a nearby house. They were members of the Resistance Movement, but a doctor who examined him decided that he should be taken to hospital and they were forced to call in the Germans against their will. Hyde was first taken to a military hospital and later removed to St. Giles' Hospital in Brussels. Here he received excellent treatment from the Germans which was in direct contrast to that received after he was well enough to be removed to a prisoner-of-war camp.

* * * * *

For RAF Bomber Command the last quarter of 1943 had seen the most difficult phase of operations yet carried out, for it was during these wintry months that very large forces first operated against important but distant objectives in central Germany, including Berlin. This was a different proposition from attacking targets in the Ruhr and western Germany since it involved many more hours' flying over heavily defended regions. Nevertheless, in most of the long-range attacks the bomb load had been well concentrated around the selected aiming point and the rate of loss kept at an economic level. The first essential was achieved in the main by constant improvements in the new radar aids, better navigation by crews, and a clearer understanding of methods involved in marking the target. At the same time crippling losses were avoided by such tactics as diversionary and ‘spoof’ raids together with carefully planned routing which kept the enemy guessing until the last minute as to the real target for the night. The diversionary attacks were usually made by small forces of Mosquitos which took the same route as the main force for most of the way to the target. The main force then

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suddenly altered course and attacked the real target. As a result of such tactics the Germans were often unable to bring their full strength of night fighters into action. The ground controller either divided his forces or else concentrated them at the wrong place. Goering himself took charge one night and made the wrong guess, sending his night fighters to one end of Germany while the main British bomber force went to the other. Renewed efforts were also made to interfere with the system of communications upon which the German defences relied for successful interception, and towards the end of 1943 a separate group was formed in Bomber Command charged solely with this duty. Its aircraft included both heavy bombers and night fighters with crews drawn from among the most experienced men in the Command. The heavy bombers carried special apparatus which enabled them to jam or interfere with the German radar and radio signals and with the ground controllers' radio-telephone instructions, while the Mosquito fighters had equipment for homing on to the radar carried by the German night fighters and on to the beacons over which they circled whilst assembling. Simultaneously the efforts of these aircraft of No. 100 Group were supplemented from ground stations in Britain, so that altogether there was an intensification of the strange ‘war in the ether’ that had been waged by the scientists, technicians, and airmen from the outset.

These various counter measures were very necessary, for the Germans had soon recovered from the shock produced by the dropping of metallised strips by British bombers and the sudden fall in the efficiency of their early-warning radar. Indeed, after the Battle of Hamburg the Germans had reacted with remarkable energy and promptness. A fighter defence system on altogether new lines had been quickly improvised in which greater use was made of the Observer Corps to plot the course of the British bombers. Until the bombers' target had been guessed, the fighters were kept circling round a number of beacons. Then, when the German defence organisation had made up its mind about the target, fighters were sent there to intercept the British aircraft or to follow and attack them during the return flight. Orders were broadcast along with a running commentary giving the height, direction, and whereabouts of the bomber stream and of the probable target for which it was making or the actual target it was attacking.

The German night-fighter pilots were now more dependent on visual interception, and to help them greater numbers of searchlights were deployed in target areas either to catch the bombers in their cones or to light up the cloud base so that the bombers could be seen from above, silhouetted against the clouds. Some of the enemy fighters were also detailed to drop large numbers of flares

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high over the targets or to lay these in lanes along the bombers' probable route as they approached or left their objective. In addition, a considerable number of single-engined fighters were thrown into the battle and used to intercept the bombers over the target.

Such tactics brought increasing success to the Germans and, in spite of jamming and interference with the instructions broadcast to their fighters and although routes were worked out to cause maximum deception, British losses began to rise sharply towards the end of 1943. By that time fighter opposition was no longer being met only over the target and during the return flight but also on the outward journey. For the enemy had now given up directing his fighters to any particular area. Instead they were sent directly from the beacons they were circling into the bomber stream as it flew across Germany or even when it was still on its way across the North Sea. These tactics were not always successful, but when the German fighters did get into the bomber stream and the weather was reasonably favourable for interception heavy losses were suffered by Bomber Command. On 19 February 1944, for example, of the 820 bombers despatched to attack Leipzig, no fewer than 78 failed to return.

Continued changes and a wide variety of tactics were therefore necessary for Bomber Command to restrict its casualties. Early in the New Year it was discovered that the route markers dropped by the Pathfinders as landmarks and turning points were being used by the Germans as a guide to the movements and whereabouts of the bomber stream. To counter this Mosquitos were despatched to drop misleading markers and fighter flares similar to those used by the enemy. But before long it was found necessary to abandon the use of route markers. Fortunately these were no longer indispensable for by this time the main force was largely equipped with H2S and the general standard of navigation much improved. In February 1944, when the diversionary attacks by Mosquitos were having little effect in deceiving the enemy, it was decided to divide the striking force into two parts and either send the two forces to different targets or to the same target by different routes. The two shorter bomber streams were more difficult to plot and also split and confused the enemy's defence. Again, two separate attacks were sometimes made on the same target on the same night, with long enough intervals in between to ensure that the fighter force which had gone up to intercept the first raid would have landed and dispersed when the second bomber force arrived. Minelaying aircraft were frequently despatched in considerable numbers by routes which would suggest to the enemy that they were coming to attack a city. Forces of several hundred aircraft from the operational training and conversion units were also sent across the North Sea

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until they would be plotted by the enemy radar. Then they turned back home. A southern route across France into Germany was often used as the enemy's defences were less efficiently organised there than in the north and west. Altogether, the essence of Bomber Command's tactics was variety and as many different methods of confusing the enemy as possible were employed, no one method being used too frequently or for too long a time. Even so, it was a hard struggle to keep down the losses.

* * * * *

Throughout the winter months there was no relaxation of the effort by RAF Bomber Command, and the massive night raids continued in their familiar routine. Night after night, after darkness fell over the airfields in eastern England, the bombers would taxi out one after another, like long strings of ducks, to line up on the runway. Soon the air resounded with the roar of engines as heavily laden aircraft lumbered down the mile-long flare path and took off into the darkness. In many a neighbouring town, village and hamlet, folk paused to watch and listen as, with navigation lights on at their various heights, the bombers flew towards the rendezvous point. Then, with the assembly complete, the lights went out simultaneously and the whole vast armada, like a huge swarm of angry wasps, set course over the North Sea. The gunners cocked their guns, the bomb aimers fused the bombs and they were on their way, a concentrated mass of machines, stretching upwards for several thousand feet and filling the sky in a broad stream for twenty miles along. Soon the Dutch coast loomed up ahead - incredibly soon it seemed.

Until this moment all was quiet at the German searchlight and flak batteries. Yet the flak gunners were ready and the searchlight crews prepared by the movement of a switch to send powerful beams up into the night sky to greet the raiders. And now as they crossed the Dutch coast the warning went out to the German defence posts all over the Continent. Night-fighter units in Holland had already taken off to intercept the i