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CHAPTER 9
Prelude to Invasion

‘We shall be back,’ Winston Churchill had told the French in June 1940 just after Dunkirk, and now, after long years of doubt, disappointment, and prolonged debate at many conferences, the fulfilment of that promise was at hand. An invasion of Western Europe was to be ‘the supreme operation for 1944’. It would be launched during May of that year. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander on 6 December 1943, and a few weeks later a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff defined his task in these words: ‘You will enter the Continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.’

Eisenhower had already achieved notable success as Commander- in-Chief in North Africa, where he had proved it was possible to create a closely knit Anglo-American command organisation inspired by a spirit of unity and common purpose which would override international prejudices and inter-service rivalries. This welding together of the Allied armies in the field was, in fact, Eisenhower's unique contribution to victory, but he was also a great man, peculiarly fitted for the role of Allied Supreme Commander. Universally trusted, he evoked spontaneous affection, respect, and loyalty from political and military leaders alike, from the people of America and Britain and from their troops in the field.

Eisenhower was fortunate in obtaining for his staff men whose ability had already been demonstrated in previous campaigns, notably Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, who was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander. Tedder had exactly the qualities and the experience for this role. In Africa and the Mediterranean he had directed the Allied Air Forces with a brilliant hand. The Americans liked and respected him and he understood what the Army needed. Moreover, by character and experience he was well fitted to resolve the inter-service and inter-Allied difficulties that were bound to arise. Eisenhower's immediate subordinates were Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, in charge of naval operations, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, in command of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces. There was no corresponding appointment of a Commander-in-Chief Allied Land Forces, but General Sir

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Bernard Montgomery was given operational control over all land forces in the assault phase, after which it was understood that Eisenhower would assume direct control of land operations himself.

The early planning for operation overlord, as the invasion was known, had been in the capable hands of Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Morgan. He had begun work in London during the dark days of 1941 and had laboured steadily until March 1943, when a bigger Anglo-American Planning Staff was formed under his direction and given the code-name COSSAC - an abbreviation for Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander, at that time still to be appointed. The tremendous task of detailed planning and preparation for operations by land, sea, and air with all their various ramifications was continued and in January 1944, when Eisenhower took over, COSSAC became SHAEF - Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Specially erected buildings in Bushey Park, near historic Hampton Court on the outskirts of London, were now provided for a large part of the general staff of SHAEF.

The original COSSAC plan for overlord envisaged an initial assault by three divisions on the Caen-Bayeux sector of the Normandy coast, to take place at the beginning of May 1944. Then would come the seizure of Cherbourg and the Brittany ports and, after sufficient build-up of forces, the capture of Paris and the Seine ports. The Normandy coast had been selected as the most suitable area for the landing only after careful consideration of all the difficulties involved. An attack on the Pas de Calais would have offered the shortest sea crossing and maximum opportunities for exploiting Allied air capabilities, particularly where the short-range fighters were concerned. But the Pas de Calais was the best-defended region precisely because it was the most vulnerable. Moreover, the Allied ground forces would find it difficult to expand from the beaches to ports as distant as Antwerp and Le Havre. The region near Caen was second best from the air point of view but far more promising for the ground forces. This was the least-defended area within Allied range, the surface was suitable for quick airfield development, and it was near the excellent port of Cherbourg. Thus the invasion planners had early come to regard the Normandy beaches as the most suitable point for the assault, notwithstanding their considerable distance from English bases. There was little reason afterwards to regret this choice.

Important changes in the general plan for overlord were, however, made early in February 1944. Eisenhower, strongly supported by Montgomery and other top leaders, thought that the three-division assault was insufficient and the initial landing on too narrow

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a front; Morgan thought so, too, but he had been compelled to plan on the basis of a fixed number of ships, landing craft and other resources.¹ Eisenhower now refused to accept these limitations and insisted on employing five divisions in the initial landing with some extension of the front.

This enlarged assault scheme underlined a war-long problem of the Western Allies – the shortage of landing craft – and in order to allow more time for their arrival from British and American ship- yards, it became necessary to postpone D Day until the beginning of June. Another factor which made a later date desirable was, as Eisenhower records,‘the high degree of dependence we were placing on the preparatory effort of the air force.’ Plans for the bombing of critical transportation centres in France were still under discussion, and an early invasion would provide only a minimum opportunity for such attack, whereas the improved weather expected for the month of May would give the Allied Air Forces much more time and better opportunity to impede the movement of German reserves and demolish German defences along the coastline.

Nevertheless, acceptance of the later date was disappointing for the Allied armies needed all the summer weather they could get for the European campaign. Moreover, it now became necessary to delay the complementary attack against southern France – Operation anvil – which had been planned to take place simultaneously with the invasion across the Channel. Even with the June date now fixed for the landing in Normandy, it was found that there were not enough landing craft and other facilities available to mount both the cross-Channel and the Mediterranean attacks in the required strength at the same time.

With overlord established on a broader basis and the date for its launching more firmly fixed, Eisenhower and the various commanders with their staffs went ahead with the involved and intricate planning and preparation. Truly formidable was the amount of detailed work required for the whole gigantic undertaking. There were all the complicated arrangements for the moving of large armies and vast quantities of material into the southern half of England, the setting up of camps, airfields, dumps and transport centres, the provision and assembly of many ships, the embarkation at congested ports according to a strict schedule, and the safe conduct of the whole expedition across the Channel. Then, above all, there was the planning in all their various aspects of the difficult and hazardous landing on an exposed coast, the establishment of a bridge-

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head and the subsequent attack inland, with all the consequent problems of maintenance, supply and reinforcement. The special tactical problems anticipated in the initial assault were many and some proved most difficult of solution. The actual composition of the naval assault forces was not settled until relatively late in the period and this laid an additional burden upon the planning staffs. Many other difficulties arose, some of them out of the complex nature of the Anglo-American planning organisation itself, yet in the end all was worked out in the greatest detail – for the actual operations of the land, sea and air forces, for meeting their requirements in men and machines, equipment, ammunition, stores and rations, and for the replacements that would be needed. Altogether, the military preparations that were completed in Britain during the spring of 1944 were the most elaborate in the history of warfare.

One particularly interesting feature of the operational planning was the attention given to devising means of deceiving the Germans as to the point and timing of the actual landings. The main problem was to convince them that the intention was to strike directly across the Channel at its narrowest point, against the stronghold of Calais. Because of the obvious advantages that would accrue from a successful assault in this region, the Germans kept strong forces there and fortified that section of the coast more strongly than any other. The defences were, in fact, so strong that none of the Allied leaders believed they would be breached except at terrific cost. A wide variety of measures was therefore necessary to persuade the enemy that the Allies would be tempted into this operation. Among the more obvious methods employed were simulated concentrations of troops in Kent and Sussex, fleets of dummy ships in the south-eastern ports, landing exercises on the nearby beaches, increased wireless activity and the judicious release of misleading information. In addition, there were certain important air operations presently to be described. The result exceeded expectations. Extraordinary credence was given by the enemy Intelligence division to the evidence put at its disposal and the whole German High Command, including Field Marshal von Runstedt, Commander-in-Chief on the Western Front, became more or less certain that the Pas de Calais was the Allied objective.

It is well to remember, however, that at this time the Germans were denied effective air reconnaissance of the United Kingdom and its adjacent waters. Had this not obtained, the deception might have been much more difficult.

* * * * *

Throughout these months of military planning and preparation the Allied Air Forces were in action, paving the way for this greatest

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venture of the war. In the broad strategic sense, the air had already made a notable contribution. The winning of the Battle of the Atlantic had ensured the passage to the battlefront of a vast mass of troops and supplies from the United States and Canada, while the bomber offensive against Germany had undoubtedly weakened the enemy war potential. By March 1944, however, large numbers of bomber, fighter-bomber, fighter and reconnaissance aircraft were operating from Britain on a wide range of missions more directly connected with the actual landings in Normandy. The principal Allied forces thus engaged were RAF Bomber and Coastal Com- mands; the United States 8th Air Force with its component bomber and fighter commands; and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force which contained the RAF Second Tactical Air Force, the United States 9th Air Force, and the Air Defence of Great Britain.¹

Control and co-ordination of the operations of these various formations proved a difficult and delicate problem. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory had been appointed to command the Allied Expeditionary Air Force at the end of 1943, and he had planned in anticipation that he would eventually be responsible for all air operations in connection with the invasion. Unfortunately, however, Leigh-Mallory had not won the confidence of the Americans, nor had he always been successful in his dealings with the other services. A resolute and aggressive commander of fighters in the earlier years, he lacked the diplomatic touch. While holding strong opinions about the use of air power, many of which were to be proved correct by events, his method and manner of presenting his views tended to arouse resentment. Admittedly, amidst the clash of personalities and strong feelings regarding the control and direction of operations, his position was a difficult one. But there was now some reluctance to place the United States Strategic Air Forces and RAF Bomber Command under his jurisdiction.

The employment and control of the heavy bomber forces were, in fact, settled only after considerable controversy. At the beginning of 1944 both Bomber Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces were still directly responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and their commanders, Air Marshal Harris and General Carl Spaatz respectively, were reluctant to be diverted from their appointed task of crippling German industry just when they believed they were about to achieve decisive success. Both men were convinced that Germany could be bombed into impotence, if not submission,

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provided that heavy bombing attacks were maintained without respite; any slackening or pause would give the enemy opportunity to patch up existing damage and carry through his programme of dispersal. In addition to these operational considerations, there was substantial political opposition to any change of control.

Eisenhower, however, insisted that all air resources be employed to ensure the success of the main Allied effort, overlord. His view prevailed, and on 17 April 1944 the Combined Chiefs of Staff placed the Strategic Air Forces under his ‘operational control’. Eisenhower then delegated to Tedder the intricate task of co-ordinating the efforts of the British and American heavy bombers and of Leigh- Mallory's Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Thus, in the end, it was Tedder who exercised the final authority of the Supreme Commander in respect of air operations.

Tedder's appointment, however, did not entirely eradicate the weakness of the air command. He had no staff and there was no supreme air headquarters. Tedder had to co-ordinate as best he could the efforts of three separate air forces, each with its own Commander- in-Chief and each jealous of its own position. Nevertheless, out of this complex and unwieldy arrangement he managed, by deft direction, to ensure that the air forces achieved their tasks in the combined operations with outstanding success.

During April Tedder decided that air operations could be best planned and ordered from the Headquarters of AEAF, already situated at the former Fighter Command Headquarters at Stanmore, a pleasant suburb to the north of London. There, the commanders of all strategic and tactical air forces subsequently met at daily conferences and from there operational orders were co-ordinated. An Advanced AEAF was created at the beginning of May in the former No. 11 Fighter Group Headquarters at Uxbridge, and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, the distinguished New Zealand airman who had already achieved outstanding success in charge of the Tactical Air Force in the Middle East, was appointed to com- mand. It was a key post, for Coningham handled direct all units of the British and American air forces allotted to him and became the air commander with whom Montgomery worked while Commander-in-Chief of all the land forces during the initial land operations.

At Coningham's headquarters was a Combined Operations Room, staffed by men from RAF Second Tactical Air Force and the United States 9th Air Force, which controlled the fighter-bombers and light and medium bombers of the two air forces. Also under Coningham's command was the adjacent Combined Control Centre set up in the

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famous 11 Group Operations Room from which Sir Keith Park¹ had directed his squadrons in the Battle of Britain. There, using the existing well-tried and efficient signal systems with expanded com- munications, an Anglo-American staff controlled the initial fighter operations and issued executive orders to the fighter-bombers. Coningham also commanded a Combined Reconnaissance Centre to handle the visual and photographic needs of both British and American forces during the initial phases of overlord.

Coningham was the outstanding New Zealand personality in the vast organisation now established for the planning of air operations, but there were many men from the Dominion – veterans of earlier campaigns – who held senior posts. Group Captain D. H. F. Barnett and Wing Commander Player² were prominent members of Leigh- Mallory's staff; Group Captain P. G. Jameson and Wing Commander R. W. Baker were in charge of planning at No. 11 Fighter Group; Group Captain S. C. Elworthy was at Bomber Command Headquarters and Group Captain Faville³ on the operational staff at Coastal Command; Group Captain R. L. Kippenberger and Wing Commander G. R. Magill on the operations staff of No. 2 Bomber Group. Wing Commander Bagnall⁴ was with a group of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, while Group Captain Richmond,⁵ Group Captain Smythe,⁶ Group Captain A. Wall,⁷ and Wing Commander Dawson⁸ were engaged on various staff duties during this period.

The whole chain of command and the administrative organisation for the various British and American air forces to be employed

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was extremely complicated. However, in practice it functioned well, not so much because of its structure or in spite of it, but rather because of the good sense and fine spirit of British and American commanders, particularly when working together in the field of operations, and the intense conviction all down the line that the invasion had to succeed. ‘It will, I think, be a considerable time,’ General Morgan has observed, ‘before anybody will be able to set down in the form of a diagram the channels through which General Eisenhower's orders reached his aircraft.’ But reach them they did and to good purpose.

* * * * *

Air superiority was the principal prerequisite for a successful assault of Europe from the west and the winning of air superiority had long been a cardinal point of the air planning. Operations to ensure the necessary ascendancy over the Luftwaffe were already in progress and Tedder was confident that this would be gained before the assault was launched. The long-term strategic bombing plan, originated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in June 1943 and directed against enemy aircraft production and assembly by the US Strategic Air Forces¹ and RAF Bomber Command, had already inflicted severe blows on the supply and maintenance organisation of the Luftwaffe. Moreover, the heavy daylight raids were achieving a steady attrition of the German fighter forces. Indeed, largely as a result of the Allied day and night bombing attack the Luftwaffe, which had been used with exceptional efficiency to blast a path across Europe for the German armies in 1940, was now hopelessly unbalanced and incapable of sustained offensive action.

Parallel with these attacks by the strategic air forces, a campaign of day and night intruding against enemy airfields designed to hamper German training schedules as well as to destroy enemy machines in the air was now being waged by aircraft of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force with very great success. Raids on operational airfields in the west were also causing considerable destruction of buildings and facilities.

The attacks on forward German air bases were to be intensified as D Day approached in order to neutralise the considerable number of airfields within 150 miles of Caen. Bomber bases located in France, Belgium, Holland, and western Germany within range of the assault area and of ports of embarkation in the United Kingdom were also selected as targets. But to avoid giving any indication of the area selected for the Allied landings, the forward airfields in a long

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stretch of enemy territory were to be attacked. In the event thirty-four of the more important air bases received 6717 tons of bombs from 3915 sorties between 11 May and D Day. The result was impressive. ‘… we were afforded immunity from enemy air reconnaissance during the vital period,’ writes General Montgomery. ‘… moreover, not one single attack was carried out by the German Air Force on the assault forces during the sea passage or at any time on the beaches during D-day.’¹

Next to the winning of air superiority, the disruption of German communications and channels of reinforcement and supply was the most important task set the Allied Air Forces, and to this end plans had been prepared for crippling the French and Belgian railways. From experience in Italy it had been discovered that a whole railway system could be paralysed if attacks were concentrated on centres of maintenance and repair. Primary targets, therefore, were railway workshops and locomotive sheds, the destruction of which would cause long-term and widespread dislocation which the enemy could not rapidly make good. Since most of these centres were alongside major junctions and marshalling yards, it was possible to strike simultaneously at both the current traffic and capital equipment of the railways. When this process of attrition was well advanced the main attack would be switched to locomotives, lines and bridges, paying special attention in the final week to the road and rail bridges over the Seine, inflicting, it was hoped, damage so severe that the already weakened repair services would be unable to cope with it. Enemy forces moving towards Normandy would then have to take to the roads at a considerable distance from the battle area and so provide excellent targets for the fighters and fighter-bombers.

While the primary purpose of the rail offensive was to reduce the enemy's capacity for moving troops and supplies, it was important that it should also contribute to the deception plan. By a fortunate accident of geography a single bombardment programme could achieve both objectives. The chief German supply routes to western Normandy were either extensions of, or overshoots from, lines which served the Pas de Calais or the Le Havre–Amiens area. They ran either through Paris or across the Seine, west of the capital. Thus the bombing of repair depots and junctions between the Seine and the Meuse could disrupt German communications with Normandy almost as effectively as attacks directed at the region between the Seine and Loire. Moreover, the general paralysis of the railway system could best be achieved by attacks on targets in the Region Nord, for it was here that the principal maintenance facilities were located. Nor would the bombing of the Seine bridges

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betray the Allied intention since this would appear as a last act in an attempt to isolate the Pas de Calais.

For the execution of this plan a team of railway experts chose eighty key targets in northern France and Belgium, thirty-nine of which were to be dealt with by RAF Bomber Command, twenty-three by US 8th Air Force, and eighteen by AEAF aircraft. Attacks by heavy and medium bombers on these centres were to be maintained up to and after D Day and supplemented by fighter and fighter-bomber attacks designed to cut lines and halt or destroy traffic on the move. This would be the first stage of a campaign which, as it spread eastward, would ultimately affect the whole of the German war effort.

But it was only after an exhaustive examination of other possibilities that these proposals were accepted and finally implemented. Indeed, the whole idea of drastically reducing the rail capacity of western Europe by bombing had brought about a protracted contro- versy. There were fears lest this ambitious scheme should jeopardise the attainment of air supremacy before D Day. It would also delay the opening of the oil campaign which certain air leaders felt – and events were to prove them right – would prove well-nigh decisive in the defeat of Germany. Moreover many people, among them Winston Churchill and members of the British Cabinet, were appalled at the estimates of French and Belgian civilian casualties likely to result when the rail centres were bombed. The various differences of opinion were not along national or service lines but rather criss-cross between them. However, convinced by Tedder of the importance of carrying out the plan, Eisenhower gradually overcame the various doubts and hesitations by insisting resolutely on its sober military necessity. On 5 April 1944 he wrote to the British Prime Minister:

We must never forget that one of the fundamental factors leading to the decision for undertaking ‘Overlord’ was the conviction that our overpowering Air Force would make feasible an operation which might otherwise be considered extremely hazardous, if not foolhardy …. The weight of the argument that has been brought against the bombing of transportation centres in occupied territories is heavy indeed; but I and my military advisers have become convinced that the bombing of these centres will increase our chances for success in the critical battle …. I personally believe that estimates of probable casualties have been grossly exaggerated.¹

Finally it was agreed that the attacks had to be executed as laid down, with the hope that the measures adopted for warning the population would be effective in minimising casualties. In the outcome the efficacy of the rail bombing plan as preparation for the ground attack was clearly proved. Moreover, not only were the

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civilian casualties a small fraction of those originally estimated, but the French nation as a whole accepted their necessity and developed no antagonism toward the Allied forces as a result.

Throughout the months before D Day the air forces also had to deal with the threatened German assault on the United Kingdom with flying bombs and rockets. Attacks on the launching sites – known as ‘Crossbow’ operations – had begun in December 1943, and they continued to demand a considerable diversion of effort. However, the bombing, although it did not of itself succeed in eliminating the menace, was to be fully justified, for not only did the original scheme have to be abandoned by the Germans but their subsequent attempts were also delayed. And there is little doubt that it was this considerable delay in the inauguration of the enemy's offensive that robbed it of any major military effect.

Particularly valuable work was to be done during this period by the Allied reconnaissance squadrons. Previously, the selection of the actual invasion area had only been made after prolonged air reconnaissance of the whole of the West European coast. Now, after the decision to land in Normandy, innumerable sorties were flown so that detailed information and complete photographic cover could be secured. In February nearly a hundred small areas in Normandy were surveyed from the air to select suitable airfield sites for use when the air forces moved on to the Continent. In March beaches, ports, and coastal batteries and other defences, airfield facilities, V-weapon sites, dumps and other military installations, radar posts and countless other targets were subjected to the scrutiny of air reconnaissance. By May the whole of the European coastline from Brest to Den Helder had been photographed, elaborate target dossiers compiled, and a mass of information provided for the land and sea forces.

The principal task allotted to RAF Coastal Command during these months of final preparations was the protection of shipping in the Atlantic sea lanes along which large numbers of troops and vast quantities of equipment were now reaching the United Kingdom. This duty was to be faithfully carried out, and Allied shipping losses in the areas swept by air patrols were to be negligible. The attack on German sea communications in European waters was also maintained with marked success. In addition, Coastal Command continued to provide efficient photographic, meteorological, and air-sea rescue services.

Such, in brief, were the military plans and the assigned role of the air forces in preparation for the invasion of Western Europe. It is now necessary to describe in more detail some of the many opera-

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tions in which New Zealanders serving with the various RAF Commands played their part.

* * * * *

Royal Air Force Bomber Command made a major contribution to the preparations for overlord. First there was the campaign against German industry and air power; then came a series of devastating attacks on key railway centres, and finally a number of effective raids on coastal defences, supply bases, and airfields.

The long campaign against German cities and industrial areas had reached a climax during the winter months in the Battle of Berlin, and then, in conjunction with the United States Air Force, Bomber Command had turned its attention primarily to the enemy's aircraft industry. The operations of February 1944, which included the ‘Big Week’ towards the end of the month, have already been described in a previous chapter. They were followed in March by raids on the aircraft production centres of Frankfurt, Nuremberg and Stuttgart. Frankfurt was attacked twice by a total of 1680 aircraft; the raids on Nuremberg and Stuttgart, by 860 and 750 bombers respectively, were also heavy. Berlin, Essen, and the important communications centre of Aachen were further targets for severe attacks. In the following month British bombers flew in force to the German cities of Brunswick, Friedrichshafen, Munich and Schweinfurt - all of which were closely associated with German aircraft production. Targets in the Ruhr and Rhineland were also heavily bombed on several nights and there were attacks against aircraft factories and repair centres in France, Belgium, and Norway.

In many of these raids the bombers wrought widespread destruc- tion. Photographs taken after the heavy March raids on Frankfurt enabled the Air Ministry to report ‘severe devastation in the administrative and commercial centre of the city which for all practical purposes has been destroyed. From there the devastation spreads to the west and east and is particularly marked in the western area where there were numerous factories and warehouses. Grain silos and warehouses along the river front have gone. One huge ware- house, with a capacity of some 20,000 tons burnt for five days. There were direct hits on the main railway station, large numbers of goods sheds have been destroyed and repair shops gutted ….’

The attack by 320 Lancasters against Friedrichshafen towards the end of April was described as particularly effective, ‘all six factories of importance within this small town being almost completely devastated.’ At Munich the damage was regarded as being ‘on a scale seldom achieved in relation to the size of the force employed.’ The

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pilot of a Mosquito who flew over the town just after the last of the 265 bombers had left saw ‘an enormous pall of smoke nearly four miles high.’ Diving through the dense clouds of smoke, he found ‘huge fires in the city and whole blocks of buildings ablaze.’ The heavy raids on the bomb-scarred cities of Cologne, Dortmund, Duisburg, Dusseldorf, and Essen also caused further widespread destruction.

Occasionally, however, difficulties which had long dogged the night-bomber crews intervened to upset the concentration of attack. The force of six hundred bombers which flew to Karlsruhe on the night of 24 April had to battle against strong winds and fly through electric storms and clouds heavy with ice. ‘Large chunks of ice broke off the mainplanes and crashed against the sides of the aircraft while St. Elmo's fire streaked off every odd point,’ reads a typical report. Over the target, too, there was considerable cloud and the bombing was scattered. Two nights later, when a strong force of Lancasters and Halifaxes attacked Schweinfurt, rough weather and high winds caused a considerable displacement of the bombing. The first markers fell south of the target and were followed by others still further from the aiming point.

But even if the bombing was not always precise, the weight of attack against Germany was certainly heavy. In one period of eight nights during April Bomber Command flew a total of 5757 sorties and dropped 17,610 tons of bombs, and on five nights forces of over one thousand bombers were despatched. Moreover, the RAF raids were now opposed by a steadily increasing force of German night fighters, and this driving of the Luftwaffe more and more on to the defensive was a direct contribution to the achievement of Allied air superiority.

Bomber Command opened its campaign against enemy rail communications with an attack by 260 bombers on the marshalling yards at Trappes, 20 miles west of Paris, on the night of 6 March. Reconnaissance photographs, taken shortly after the attack, showed extremely heavy damage throughout the yards with a particularly large concentration of craters in the main reception sidings. Wreckage and derailed trucks lay in confusion on all sides. All the tracks of the main electrified line between Paris and Chartres were cut and there was widespread damage to installations and depots. Two months later the marshalling yard was still under repair.

Of other attacks in March and early April, some of the most successful were those on Paris-la Chappelle, Charleroi-St. Martin, Paris-Juvisy, Laon and Aachen; at each of these centres the locomotive servicing and maintenance facilities were rendered almost, if not completely, useless and great havoc was wrought in the

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marshalling yards. At Paris-Noisy le Sec, the whole railway complex was almost annihilated. After the raid on Vaires, also in the Paris area, photographs showed ‘over two hundred craters on one railway siding while in another siding two long depressions in the ground alone remained to show where two ammunition trains had previously stood.’ Other damaging attacks in this early period were made on Ottignies, Rouen, Namur, Lens and Tergnier.

These first raids on rail centres were almost unopposed by fighters, but the vital nature of the targets being attacked soon caused the Germans to make radical changes in their defensive system. The network of visual and radar beacons used for the assembly of night fighters was extended into France and Belgium, with a corresponding redistribution of the night-fighter force to bases as far west as the mouth of the Seine. Eventually, as a result of this redeployment and the introduction of improved airborne radar, the enemy was able to intercept bomber forces making quite shallow penetrations over the Continent. In May, when the light summer nights made interception easier, the casualty rate rose sharply. However, by employing smaller forces simultaneously on a number of targets and by making the attacks of short duration, losses were kept within reasonable bounds.

Bomber Command's initial attacks on the marshalling yards and railway centres were made without any special changes in tactics. Markers were laid by Oboe-equipped Mosquitos of the Pathfinder Force which flew over at great height just as in the attacks on German cities; then the main force flew in to drop its high explosives. The only difference was that in order to avoid casualties among French civilians, crews were told not to bomb unless they could see the markers clearly. However, before long a Master Bomber, with a deputy in case of accident or casualty, was sent to direct each attack. It was his task to check the position of the markers dropped by pathfinder aircraft and then direct the main force to bomb the most accurately placed of these markers. In addition, ‘offset marking’ was introduced. This was a technique developed by Lancaster crews of No. 5 Bomber Group to overcome the problem of target markers being obscured by smoke - a difficulty which frequently occurred in the later stages of a raid. Some well-defined point near the target was chosen and clearly marked; then from this point crews made a timed run over the target and released their bombs. As a result of these improvements, much greater economy and precision of attack were achieved.

Since most of the railway centres in France were defended by few anti-aircraft guns the bombers were able to attack at low level, which also made for increased accuracy in bombing. Indeed, the majority of the subsequent raids on marshalling yards proved to be

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extremely accurate, with such concentration that the bomb craters often overlapped each other in the target area which was churned up into a landscape of fantastic desolation similar to the well-remembered ‘No Man's Land’ of the First World War.

At the end of March the bombed railway lines were often repaired within a few days, but before the end of April it was taking more than a week to get them restored and by the middle of May the accumulation of wreckage was often so vast and extensive that even important routes were closed for weeks after an attack. By that time many of the major marshalling yards and large depots for the servicing and maintenance had been wrecked and little could be done to restore them owing to the serious shortage of cranes. A growing paralysis spread over the rail networks of the Region Nord, west of a line Paris-Amiens-Boulogne and south Belgium, and in this area all the principal routes were at one time or another interrupted.

During the last days of April and throughout May, Bomber Command maintained a heavy scale of attack. In the last week of April Aulnoye, Villeneuve St. George, Acheres, Montzen, St. Ghislain, Arras and Bethune were all attacked. During May the heaviest attacks were made on Mantes-Gassicourt, Liege, Ghent, Courtrai, Lille, Hasselt, Louvain, Boulogne, Orleans, Tours, Le Mans, Metz, Mulhouse, Rheims, Troyes and Charleroi. Photographic interpretation continued to show the devastating effect on the centres attacked, and other intelligence sources confirmed this evidence as well as supplying indications of damage to signals and ancillary services, damage which did not always appear in photographs.

In order to extend the paralysis inflicted on the regions north and west of Paris, attacks were made in the period immediately before D Day on the eastern routes to Paris and the important alternative routes round the south of that city. Attacks on these centres were, however, considerably restricted by the necessity of avoiding heavy civilian casualties or damage to historic buildings. A typical example of this restriction was furnished by the important junction of Le Bourget which, because of the strong probability of bombing causing heavy civilian casualties, was not attacked at all. Nevertheless, the destruction and dislocation caused by the bombing raids in this final stage proved extremely effective, as subsequent events were to demonstrate.

Altogether, in the three months before D Day, only four of the eighty special targets escaped serious damage and traffic over the whole of France declined by 70 per cent. Of the thirty-seven special targets assigned to Bomber Command all were assessed as ‘very seriously damaged’, and in almost every case ‘to such an extent that no further attacks were necessary until vital repairs had been

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affected.’ Interesting evidence of the success of the whole rail campaign was discovered after the war at the headquarters of Region Nord in Brussels. There the Germans had kept an elaborate chart showing the weekly state of traffic lines and rolling stock, and on this chart from the end of March the graphs went steadily down until at last, towards the end of May, the Germans had abandoned the attempt to keep account of the damage and destruction.

Simultaneously with the last attacks on rail targets, Bomber Command had begun attacking coastal fortifications. Here again the main problem was to keep the enemy guessing where the actual landings were to be made, and the only way of doing this was by the rather extravagant method of bombing at least two coastal batteries or defence works elsewhere for every one that was attacked on the actual invasion coast of Normandy. The guns were very small targets and many were enclosed in thick concrete casemates, but the casemates for some were still under construction. It was considered that where the building of casemates was completed aerial bombing could do very little harm, but in one attack at least this opinion proved wrong. On the night of 28 May sixty-four Lancasters guided by seven Pathfinder Mosquitos attacked the coastal battery at St. Martin de Varreville, and a captured German report said that after several direct hits on one of the casemates there it ‘apparently burst open and then collapsed.’ In other attacks, even when the casemate itself was undamaged, the guns were often thrown out of alignment or their field of fire restricted by mounds of earth thrown up during the bombing, while command posts, fire director gear, and signal equipment were smashed and the batteries rendered ineffective. By D Day Bomber Command had dropped over 9200 tons of bombs on coastal batteries between Boulogne and Cherbourg.

In addition to these raids on fortifications and railways British bomber crews attacked a number of other military objectives. During May the military depots at Bourg Leopold in Belgium and at Mailly le Camp near Rheims were wrecked. An impressive account of the attack on Mailly le Camp, which was a large tank training school as well as the Headquarters of 21 Panzer Division, is contained in the report of the officer commanding this depot. ‘The main concen- tration,’ he writes, ‘was accurately aimed at the most important building …. In that part of the camp which was destroyed the concentration of bombs was so great that not only did the splinter proof trenches receive direct hits but even the bombs that missed choked them up and made the sides cave in.’ Five large ammunition dumps in France used by the German Army and Air Force were also attacked during May, and in April Bomber Command destroyed the large explosive works at St. Medard-en-Jalles, near Bordeaux.

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There were also attacks on wireless and radar stations. Four of these small and difficult targets were allotted to Bomber Command and the raids which were carried out towards the end of May were indeed triumphs of precision bombing. At Boulogne-Mt. Couple at least seventy heavy bombs fell on the target area, which was only some 300 yards long and 150 yards wide. Few of the transmitters on this site survived the attack and only three were subsequently identified in operation. At another station near Dieppe the aerial masts were all demolished and most of the buildings received direct hits. At Cherbourg–Urville the centre of a very neat bomb pattern coincided almost exactly with the centre of the target area, and the destruction of this particular station, which was the headquarters of the German Air Force signals intelligence service in north-west France, may well have been an important contributory factor to the lack of enemy air reaction to the assault. Enemy airfields attacked by Bomber Command during May included those at Montdidier, Tours, Rennes, Nantes and Brest.

Typical of many eventful flights during this period was the experience of Flight Sergeant Gibson¹ and his crew during their sortie to Mailly le Camp in Lancaster ‘K for King’ of No. 166 Squadron. Shortly after bombs had been dropped, the bomber was attacked by a Messerschmitt 110; the upper turret was smashed, the controls damaged, petrol tanks punctured, and an engine put out of action. Return fire drove the fighter off but it continued to shadow at a distance, taking ‘pot shots’ at the Lancaster as opportunity offered. Eventually the German came in again, only to meet accurate fire from the bomber's rear turret. There was a sudden explosion, and the gunner saw the Messerschmitt burst into flames, dive, and explode on the ground. The Lancaster then began its flight home with Gibson struggling to maintain control and conserve fuel whilst his flight engineer worked frantically to link up the tanks. At last the English coast came in sight but, with the petrol almost gone, it seemed unlikely they would be able to make a safe landing so Gibson ordered his crew to crash positions. Then followed that agonising period of suspense so well known to many crews. All listened intently to the drone of the engines, waiting against hope for them to falter as the tanks ran dry. A parachute which had opened during the combat lay strewn on the floor of the aircraft. Within a minute or two all three engines spluttered and stopped. But the lights of an airfield now appeared in the distance and Gibson began a glide approach. To watchers on the ground it seemed that the Lancaster was bound to crash into the control tower – its

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occupants hastily took shelter – but at the last minute the bomber cleared the tower, crossed the runway, and came to rest on the airfield without harm.

Gibson was one of the relatively large contingent of New Zealand pilots, navigators, bomb aimers, wireless operators, and air gunners who flew with Bomber Command in this pre-D Day period. There was also a representative group of men from the Dominion working on the ground who gave faithful service in support of the air operations. Among senior officers, Air Vice-Marshal C. R. Carr continued in command of No. 4 Bomber Group, while Air Commodore A. McKee was now in charge of the large bomber base at Mildenhall, Suffolk, which controlled four bomber stations with five operational squadrons and various other units. Group Captain L. E. Jarman commanded the Pathfinder Station at Wyton, Huntingdon, and Group Captain G. J. Grindell the airfield at Fiskerton, near Nottingham, from which Lancasters operated. Early in April 1944 Group Captain Elworthy took charge of the large base at Wadding- ton, Lincolnshire, with four bomber stations and five operational squadrons under his control.

With the Pathfinder squadrons, New Zealand airmen continued to play a prominent part. Wing Commander J. F. Barron, who had already achieved a fine record of service as captain of pathfinder aircraft, was now leading a Lancaster squadron. He also acted as Master Bomber on several raids. In one such raid early in May, says an official report, ‘his determination and courage in directing the attack were largely responsible for the success achieved. Disregarding the defences he flew below five thousand feet and directed the bombing from a very low level in order to obtain maximum precision.’ It was while acting as Master Bomber in a late May attack on Le Mans marshalling yards that Barron lost his life. It was his seventy-eighth operation with Bomber Command and his thirty-second with the Pathfinders. Another outstanding leader with the Pathfinder Force was Wing Commander Watts,¹ who now led a Mosquito squadron with conspicuous success. In a long and distinguished career with Bomber Command, Watts survived many hazardous missions only to lose his life early in July 1944 when his Mosquito was shot down during a raid on Berlin.

Among senior captains with the Pathfinder Force, Squadron Leader Heney² was prominent in operations with No. 582 Lancaster Squadron. On one sortie to the Ruhr his bomber was set on fire over

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the target by a shower of incendiaries dropped from an aircraft above; then, after a long and difficult return flight, came attack by a German fighter intruding over England, and finally a long wait over base while an obstructed runway was cleared. Heney, described by a senior officer as ‘an outstanding member of a gallant squadron’ was lost with his crew in a raid on the German airfield at Rennes towards the end of May 1944.

Squadron Leader McMillan,¹ with a long and successful career in India and Burma, and Flight Lieutenant Cochrane,² who had earlier completed a tour of operations with a Wellington squadron, now captained Lancasters. Both men were subsequently to act as Master Bomber on many raids and gain further distinction. Other outstanding pathfinder captains were Squadron Leader Horton,³ who continued with No. 105 Mosquito Squadron, Flight Lieutenant V. S. Moore and Flight Lieutenant Holdaway,⁴ both of whom also flew Mosquitos. Flight Lieutenant Breckon⁵ and Flight Lieutenant Hartley⁶ of No. 109 Mosquito Squadron, and Flying Officer J. M. Smith,⁷ who captained a Lancaster of No. 97 Squadron, also achieved a fine record of service. Another prominent Lancaster captain was Flight Lieutenant Verran⁸ of No. 83 Squadron, who had operated in France and over Germany during the first year of war.

Among experienced navigators now with the Pathfinder squadrons were Flight Lieutenant Dill,⁹ who had previously flown with the New Zealand bomber squadron, Flight Lieutenant Galbraith,¹⁰ who had a long period of service with Wellingtons, and Flying Officer Matheson,¹¹ who had been with No. 218 Stirling Squadron. Matheson was lost in July 1944 when flying as navigator to Wing Commander Watts.

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In the main bomber force Wing Commanders Maling,¹ Nelson,² and St. John were now in charge of RAF squadrons. Maling had seen long service with the air arm, much of it in India where he had been posted shortly after joining the RAF. In India he flew with a bomber squadron; then he spent over three years as a test pilot and became well known for his efficiency and wide technical knowledge. He also commanded a bomber squadron for a long period and served as a flying instructor before returning to the United Kingdom, where he held several appointments before taking control of No. 619 Lancaster Squadron. Nelson, a Cranwell cadet, had served with a bomber squadron in Aden before the war; then he specialised in armament duties and went to Canada to assist in the Empire Air Training Scheme. He assumed command of his old squadron, now equipped with Lancasters, early in March 1944. St. John, who had already distinguished himself in bomber operations, was now in charge of No. 103 Lancaster Squadron. He remained in this post for almost a year and by the end of the war had completed a third tour of operations.

A Halifax squadron engaged on what were known as ‘special duties’ – the dropping of agents and supplies to the resistance movements in Europe – was now led by Wing Commander A. H. C. Boxer, who had been engaged in these duties over a long period. Boxer directed the diverse activities of his unit, which included many Polish crews, with exceptional ability, and took part himself in many long and hazardous flights over enemy-occupied territories.

Squadron Leaders Calvert,³ Hegman,⁴ Hogg,⁵ Lamason,⁶ and Miller⁷ were prominent during this period as senior captains and flight commanders. Calvert for example, continued a notable career with No. 630 Squadron, while Hogg, who had been with the New Zealand Bomber Squadron in the early days of the war, now completed a third tour of operations with No. 90 Squadron. Hegman, after a successful period with No. 7 Squadron, lost his life in a raid on Berlin.

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With No. 617 Lancaster Squadron, which often operated independently on particularly hazardous missions, Squadron Leader J. L. Munro and Flight Lieutenant R. S. D. Kearns won distinction as captains of aircraft and Flight Lieutenant W. J. M. Barclay as navigator. All three men were veterans of the Pathfinder Force. Their squadron, which had become famous overnight with the raid on the Ruhr dams in 1943, was now led by Wing Commander Cheshire who, like his predecessor Guy Gibson, was a magnificent pilot and courageous leader. On completion of his fourth operational tour in July 1944, Cheshire was awarded the Victoria Cross. He was one of the few outstanding British bomber pilots to survive the war.

Throughout this period New Zealand aircrews with Bomber Command maintained their reputation for skill and determination in operations. Typically, Flight Lieutenant Sparks,¹ a Lancaster captain with No. 15 Squadron, had with his crew fought off attacks by enemy fighters on five occasions. Flight Lieutenant Johnston² was another captain with a fine record in No. 15 Squadron. While approaching Friedrichshafen on one raid his Lancaster was damaged almost simultaneously by fire from a night fighter and flak. Un- deterred, he had continued to the target and dropped his bombs. Pilot Officer Nicklin,³ who captained a Lancaster of No. 57 Squadron, had a particularly difficult sortie when sent to attack Schweinfurt. He was circling the target waiting instructions to bomb when his aircraft was subjected to a furious onslaught by a fighter, during which his rear gunner was seriously wounded and the mid-upper gunner baled out. With both turrets out of action, intercommunication useless and controls damaged, the bomber was in a precarious position. Nevertheless, Nicklin remained in the target area until ordered to bomb, when, despite attack by a second fighter, he succeeded in making a good attack. He then flew the crippled bomber back to England and made a safe landing at a strange airfield.

In an attack on Frankfurt during March, Flight Sergeant Marriott⁴ of No. 626 Squadron was on the final approach to the target when his Lancaster was extensively damaged by a Junkers 88. The enemy machine returned for the ‘kill’. The bomber received further hits but, following skilful evasive tactics by Marriott and spirited return

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fire from his rear gunner, the Junkers was finally driven off. Marriott pressed home his attack and then set course for base but petrol shortage forced him to land at an advanced airfield.

Flight Lieutenant Fabian¹ had a notable career as navigation leader of No. 15 Squadron. On one sortie to Dusseldorf during April his Lancaster was badly damaged by a Messerschmitt 109 when a flak shell exploded underneath. The bomb aimer and wireless operator were mortally wounded and fire broke out in the fuse- lage. Fabian extinguished the flames and rendered first aid and administered morphia to the injured men. Ordering a slightly wounded man to take over the wireless set, he then helped his captain navigate the bomber back to England.

A bomb aimer with a remarkable record was Flight Sergeant K. Smith,² of No. 158 Halifax Squadron, who in a series of seventeen operations was to return with no fewer than thirteen photographs of his aiming points.

Two captains of Lancaster bombers, Pilot Officer Speirs³ of No. 7 Squadron and Flight Sergeant Brown⁴ of No. 620 Squadron, survived remarkable experiences at this time. Sent to bomb the marshalling yards at Chambly, north of Paris, one night early in May, Speirs was just turning away from the target when his aircraft received a direct hit. ‘The stick flew out of my hand and both the starboard engines and the starboard wing tank caught fire. The Lancaster went into a steep dive out of control so I gave the order to jump. Then I was thrown against the side of the fuselage and knocked unconscious. When I came to I had fallen through the perspex roof and was hanging on my harness upside down ….’ Speirs landed near a forest and at dawn set off towards Paris. He soon found friends who helped him to make his way out of France, and after a series of adventures he returned to England fourteen weeks after he had been shot down.

Brown's Lancaster was hit by flak over France and forced down in a remote district. His navigator was killed in the crash and, of the rest of the crew, only Brown and his bomb aimer evaded capture. After making their way across country, sleeping in woods and obtaining intermittent help from French farms, the two men joined up with the Maquis. During one expedition to cut a railway line the party was ambushed and Brown's companion captured. A week later the Maquis headquarters was attacked in force by the Germans