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Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939–45: Volume III

The Defeat of Japan

page 497

The Defeat of Japan

466
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the acting Prime Minister of New Zealand1

6 May 1945

Following for the information of the acting Prime Minister is a summary of the broad conclusions of an appreciation by our military advisers, dated 28 April 1945, on the Japanese strategy and capacity to resist:

‘1. The conclusions have taken into account approved and probable Allied operations, have assumed that Germany is defeated by 1 July 1945, and that Russia does not declare war on Japan before 1 October 1945.

‘2. The fall of the Koiso Government and its replacement by the Suzuki Government is not in itself significant.2 The constitution of the new Cabinet and the evidence available of its intentions suggest that, while Japan may be prepared to limit her ambitions in China and attempt to buy off Russia, she has no immediate intention of trying to negotiate a compromise peace with Great Britain and America, as the Japanese Government do not believe such a peace could at present be obtained.

‘3. The possibility cannot be excluded that, under the impact of the defeat of Germany and the intervention of Russia, the Japanese, rather than see the entire country laid waste, might later, under a new Government, be prepared to accept peace tantamount to unconditional surrender, though not necessarily so described to the Japanese people.

‘4. The Japanese Government have no illusions about the seriousness of the situation. The dominant features in Japanese eyes are the threat of imminent invasion, the likelihood of Russian intervention, the mounting Allied bombing offensive, the severance of the inner from the outer zone, acute Japanese logistic difficulties, and the hopeless inadequacy of Japanese forces and war production.

‘5. The Japanese strategy in the inner zone is to try to build up as quickly as possible the defence of the islands of Japan and Manchuria, page 498 Korea and northern China. Japan appreciates that the invasion of Japan by Anglo-American forces is more imminent than the invasion of Manchuria by the Russians.

‘6. Japan's strategy in the outer zone, where her forces have little prospect of further reinforcement, or even replacement, from the inner zone, is to prolong her defence of Burma while concentrating small land forces in defence of key areas of Malaya, Siam and Indo-China, where they can best hope to pin down the maximum Allied forces and prevent the British in the Indian Ocean linking up with the Americans in the Pacific and so becoming available for the final battle of Japan. At the same time they are apprehensive of Allied attacks from the north-east on Borneo, and thereafter on the coast of French Indo-China.

‘7. Japan's war production, hampered by inadequate transport within the inner zone and subject to ever-increasing destruction by Allied bombers, will continue to decline.

‘8. For the defence of the inner zone Japan may deploy by 1 October 1945 some ninety-six divisions with a total strength of some 3,100,000 men, but these forces are still widely scattered and an acute shortage of shipping will prevent the rapid transfer of uncommitted forces to the battle area. The bulk of the Japanese air force and navy are already concentrated in the inner zone. These forces will be increasingly used in a suicide role.

‘9. In the outer zone Japan's land forces are already small and likely to be subjected to further serious losses by operations in Burma, by further Allied operations in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific, and by normal wastage. By April 1946 they will be incapable of anything save purely delaying actions. Japanese air and naval forces in this zone already have nothing but a small nuisance value.’

1 Repeated to the United Kingdom delegation at San Francisco.

2 General Kuniaki Koiso succeeded General Tojo on 19 Jul 1944 as Prime Minister; he resigned on 5 Apr 1945 and was succeeded by Admiral Baron Suzuki.

467
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

11 July 1945

My telegram of 6 May. Following for the Prime Minister is a summary of a recent appreciation by our military advisers on Japanese dispositions, strength and intentions in South-East Asia:

‘1. Territories still occupied by the Japanese in the South-East Asia area have now lost most of their economic importance to Japan, but as continued possession of these territories denies their economic resources to the Allies and pins down large Allied forces which would page 499 otherwise be available for attacks on Japan itself, these outer territories are still of strategic value.

‘2. Japan's strategy in this area is designed to impose the greatest possible delay upon the Allies and prevent the linking up of the British and United States forces.

‘3. The Japanese seem to have decided not to keep open the overland route through south China to South-East Asia, and with the sea routes virtually cut, no withdrawals or reinforcements of men or munitions are likely to or from Japan or her territories in the north. Her forces in this outer zone are inadequate for the defence of all the areas she now holds, and she will continue to regroup them as best she can so as to concentrate the greatest possible strength for the defence of Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, and the sea approaches to the South China Sea via the Malacca and Sunda Straits. To this end she is trying to thin out her forces in the less strategically important islands and territories, though this process of concentration is being made increasingly laborious, slow and costly by Allied operations.

468
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

31 July 1945

I send you herewith for your personal information a summary of the major operational decisions reached in Anglo-American military discussions at Berlin.

General Policy:

2. It was agreed that the invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith should be the supreme operations in the war against Japan. Forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of or delay these main operations.

Strategic Direction of the War:

3. It was agreed—

(a)

Control of operational strategy in the Pacific theatre will remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff, who will provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information on future plans and intentions.

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(b)

The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy, on the understanding that in the event of disagreement the final decisions on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff.

(c)

Should the British Chiefs of Staff decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in (b) above, they will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit the latter to make timely rearrangements.

(d)

If the USSR enters the war against Japan the strategy to be pursued will be discussed between the parties concerned.

Operations in the Pacific:

4. The plan for operations in the Pacific is first to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favourable to an assault on Kyushu. Thereafter the blockade and air bombardment will be intensified in order to establish a tactical condition favourable to the decisive invasion of Honshu.

5. Planning is premised on the belief that the defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands.

British Commonwealth Participation in Operations in the Pacific Theatre:

6. The British Pacific Fleet will participate as at present planned. A British VLR1 bomber force of ten squadrons, increasing to twenty squadrons when more airfields become available, will participate. It was agreed in principle that a Commonwealth land force and, if possible, a small tactical air force should take part in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of logistical and other problems.

7. The participation of this Commonwealth land force is the subject of separate communications to the Dominion Governments concerned.2

Operations in South-East Asia Command:

8. A directive has been approved for issue to Admiral Mountbatten. His primary task is to open the Straits of Malacca at the earliest possible moment. Thereafter operations are to continue in the outer

1 Very Long Range.

2 See Proposals for Participation in Operations against Japan, No. 458. Replying to an inquiry from the New Zealand Government, the Dominions Secretary on 1 August explained that the reference in paragraph 7 above was to Mr Churchill's earlier telegram (No. 458) and not to any future communication.

page 501 zone to the extent that forces and resources permit. The order of priority for these operations has been laid down as:
(a)

The completion of the liberation of Malaya.

(b)

The maintenance of pressure on the Japanese across the Burma-Siam frontier.

(c)

The capture of key areas in Siam.

(d)

The establishment of bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course.

9. It has been agreed that the eastern boundary of South-East Asia Command will be extended to include Borneo, Java and the Celebes. This extension of command and rearrangement in the South-West Pacific is the subject of separate communications to the Australian and New Zealand Governments.1 When agreement has been reached with them agreement with the Dutch Government will be sought.

10. A proposal is to be put to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that that part of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16 degrees north should be transferred to the area of South-East Asia Command.

French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan:

11. While it is at present impracticable on account of logistical difficulties for French or Dutch armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance as may be synchronised with the operations is to be taken into account. The use of French or Dutch forces will depend solely on military considerations, and the French and Dutch representatives will be given timely information of intentions affecting their territories or armed forces in the Far East. The French have offered a corps of two infantry divisions to serve in the Pacific war. This offer has been accepted in principle, but it will not be possible to commit the corps to operations prior to the spring of 1946. The place where the corps will operate will be determined later.

Planning Date for the End of Organised Resistance by Japan:

12. Subject to periodical adjustment, 15 November 1946 has been adopted as the planning date for the end of organised resistance by Japan. This is for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.

Cargo Shipping:

13. Present estimates indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the

1 Not published.

page 502 British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for other essential programmes.

469
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs1 to the Prime Minister of New Zealand2

7 August 1945

Text of Three-Power Proclamation to Japan:3

‘1. We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end the war.

‘2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

‘3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and, just as inevitably, the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

‘4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

‘5. The following are our terms. We shall not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

1 Viscount Addison succeeded Viscount Cranborne on 3 Aug 1945.

2 Repeated to the Prime Minister of Australia.

3 This was the ultimatum to Japan demanding unconditional surrender, issued from Potsdam on 26 Jul 1945. New Zealand and Australia protested that the ultimatum had been issued and published without their prior knowledge or concurrence. On 7 August the Dominions Secretary expressed regret that the proclamation ‘should have been issued without previous communication with Dominion Governments.’

page 503

‘6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

‘7. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

‘8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration1 shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

‘9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

‘10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.

‘11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those industries which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

‘12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible Government.

‘13. We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.’2

1 The chief of these terms stated the Allies' determination to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan and to expel her from all territories seized or occupied.

2 At 8.15 a.m. Japanese time on 6 August an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima; a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki at 11.02 a.m. on 9 August.

page 504

470
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

10 August 1945

Cabinet this afternoon considered today's Japanese broadcast, which is the only intimation we have so far received of Japan's desire to surrender.1 Cabinet felt that further consideration must be given to the precise meaning of the Japanese reservation regarding the position of the Emperor. They accordingly decided to issue an announcement to the effect that we are in consultation with our Allies as to the position, and that in the meantime all concerned should carry on. The text will be telegraphed to you when finally settled. We are also telegraphing to the Governments of the United States, Russia2 and China asking for their views. We would be grateful if you would telegraph at once any observations which you may wish to make.

1 A broadcast from Tokyo on 10 August announced that the Japanese Government had sent a message through the Swiss and Swedish Governments to the British, American, Chinese and Russian Governments saying that they were prepared to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July, ‘with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty [the Emperor] as a sovereign ruler.’

2 Russia declared war on Japan as from midnight on 8–9 August.

471
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

10 August 1945

His Majesty's representative at Stockholm3 reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister4 asked him and his Soviet colleague to call on him urgently today to receive the text of a communication received today from the Japanese Minister. The original telegram from Tokyo is in Japanese and promises that the official English text will follow. An interim English text has been made locally in the Japanese Legation in Stockholm and may therefore differ from the text handed at the request of the Japanese Government to the United States Minister5 and the Chinese Minister in Berne. M. Undén asked them to preserve the utmost secrecy, but agreed to their telling United States and Chinese colleagues in confidence.

page 505

2. The interim text, dated 10 August, is as follows:

‘In accordance with the desire of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan to bring peace as soon as possible in order to prevent humanity from further disasters of war, the Japanese Government had asked the Soviet Government, who were maintaining neutral relations with Japan with regard to the war of Greater East Asia, to use their good offices. Unfortunately, however, the above efforts of the Japanese Government to bring peace did not bear fruit. Hereupon the Japanese Government, based upon the above-mentioned desire for peace of His Majesty the Emperor, earnestly wishing to remove immediately further disasters of war and to bring peace, have made the following decision. The Japanese Government accept the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan with the clear understanding that the terms of the Joint Proclamation to Japan, which was decided upon and published jointly by the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and China on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and to which the Soviet Government participated later, do not contain in any way a request for change of sovereignty of His Majesty the Emperor.1 The Japanese Government earnestly hope the above understanding of the Japanese Government is correct, and that the intention of your Government on this point will be made clear at the earliest moment. The Japanese Government have the honour to request the Swedish Government to convey the above to the British Government and to the Soviet Government respectively without delay.’

3 Sir Bertrand Jerram, KCMG (then Mr C. B. Jerram); Minister in Stockholm, 1945–47; Ambassador, 1947–48.

4 M. B. O. Undén, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

5 Mr Leland Harrison, United States Minister to Switzerland, 1937–47.

1 The official English text of this Note reads: ‘… does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.’

472
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

11 August 1945

My telegram of 10 August [No. 471]

The following message from the United States Secretary of State2 was delivered tonight by the United States Ambassador:3

‘1. This Government proposes that a reply as quoted in paragraph 3 be made to the Japanese Government's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation.

‘2. In order that hostilities may be terminated and further loss of life be prevented, this Government hopes that the British Government will associate itself with this Government in making an early reply as quoted in paragraph 3.

page 506

‘3. With regard to the Japanese Government's message accepting the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation but containing the statement, “with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler”, our position is as follows:

“From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers,1 who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. The Emperor and the Japanese High Command will be required to sign the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, to issue orders to all the armed forces of Japan to cease hostilities and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms. Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports. The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. The armed forces of the Allied powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved.”’

The following reply has been given to the United States Ambassador:

‘We have examined your draft. While agreeing in principle, we desire to make certain amendments on the ground that we doubt if it is wise to ask the Emperor personally to sign the surrender terms, and therefore we would suggest the following:

“The Emperor shall authorise and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval and air authorities and to all the forces under their control, wherever located, to cease active operations and to surrender their arms, etc. (as in your draft).”

‘This is in keeping with Clause 13 of the Potsdam Declaration. This, we believe, also will secure the immediate surrender of Japanese in all outlying areas and thereby save American, British and Allied lives. We presume that if we are in accord on these terms we should get the agreement of Generalissimo Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. We trust you will agree.’

2 Mr James F. Byrnes succeeded Mr E. R. Stettinius as Secretary of State on 1 July.

3 Mr J. G. Winant.

1 General MacArthur.

page 507

473
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

11 August 1945

If the Japanese surrender is accepted during the next few days, we assume that the United States will take the lead on all general matters such as the draft armistice terms, arrangements to meet plenipotentiaries and so forth, and we are awaiting their proposals. Meanwhile we ourselves are giving urgent consideration to plans and preparations for taking surrenders and occupying various areas in South-East Asia Command.

2. We shall of course keep you currently informed of developments here.

3. In view of the urgency of the situation we are also arranging for our Joint Staff Mission in Washington to keep in closest touch with their Dominion colleagues as regards military plans and developments. We suggest, therefore, that you should keep both us and your representatives at Washington informed of your views and comments.

474
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

11 August 1945

Following is the text of the Note sent by the United States Government to the Swiss Government for the Japanese Government:

‘I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of 10 August1 and in reply to inform you that the President of the United States has directed me to send to you for transmission by your Government to the Japanese Government the following message on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China:

“With regard to the Japanese Government's message accepting the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation but containing the statement, ‘with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler’, our position is as follows:

“From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

page 508

“The Emperor will be required to authorise and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval and air authorities and to all the forces under their control, wherever located, to cease active operations and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

“Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports.

“The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

“The armed forces of the Allied powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved.”

‘Accept, sir, etc.’

1 See No. 471.

475
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

15 August 1945

Victory in Europe has been speedily followed by the surrender of the last of our foes.1 On behalf of the Government and people of this country I send this message of congratulation to our kinsfolk in New Zealand. Our hearts have gone out to the people of the Dominion in the anxieties which have so long beset them and today we join with them in rejoicing and thanksgiving for victory. New Zealand was with us from the moment when, nearly six years ago, war was loosed upon the world, and in many widely separated theatres of war her sons have added lustre to her name. Their feats of arms, whether on distant seas, on the European and African continents, or in the air warfare, are the admiration of the world and worthily compare with those of the earlier generation when, in the furnace of conflict, New Zealand proved her title to nationhood. We hail also the work of all those who in field or workshop have contributed to the material resources without which human effort would be powerless to conquer. page 509 Through long years of toil New Zealand has never failed to provide of her best in all that lay within her power. We are now called to finish the work so well begun, to build a new world whence the scourge of war and the fear of aggression have been removed, to repair the devastation which these years have brought in their train and to open up the prospect of hope to all those who still sit in darkness. In all these efforts we know that we can count on the willing partnership and unfailing help of New Zealand. From all our hearts we thank you.

1 An announcement by President Truman and Mr Attlee that Japan had accepted the Allied demand for unconditional surrender was made at midnight on 14 August. The instrument of surrender was signed on behalf of the New Zealand Government by Air Vice-Marshal L. M. Isitt, Chief of the New Zealand Air Staff, on 2 September. The surrender took place on board Admiral Halsey's flagship, USS Missouri, in Tokyo Bay.