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CHAPTER 2
Early Operations over Many Fronts

NO clash of opposing armies, no sudden invasion with hard-fought border battles followed the declaration of war in the Middle East. For the Italians, not altogether prepared for total war, were in no hurry to begin their much-heralded campaign; over a month passed in which their armies did little more than concentrate with extreme deliberation on the borders of Egypt, the Sudan and British Somaliland. Meanwhile British patrols fenced adroitly along the various frontiers.

But if events on the ground moved slowly, there was lively activity in the air from the outset—at least on the part of one participant. Within a few hours of Mussolini's bombastic broadcast, Blenheims from Egypt were over the Italian airfield at El Adem where their bombs, bursting among hangars and closely parked aircraft, caused consternation among its occupants, who seem to have overlooked even the most elementary precautions against unfriendly visitors. The RAF followed up with further raids on the enemy's forward airfields in Cyrenaica and on oil tanks and shipping at Tobruk. Simultaneously Wellesleys from the Sudan struck at the Italian aerodromes of Asmara, Gura and Massawa while Blenheims from Aden bombed Assab and Diredawa, causing considerable damage to aircraft, hangars and sup plies. At Massawa about 800 tons of petrol went up in flames.

This was the start of a spirited and, for those days, quite remarkable offensive against enemy airfields, bases and ports, against troop concentrations in camps and convoys and any supply dumps within reach. For Longmore had decided that, in the circumstances, bold attack was the sole alternative to extinction and surprise the best method of attack. Yet it was only by appearing in unexpected strength and in unexpected places that he could hope to produce an illusion of air superiority since his forces were pitifully small; it was also doubtful whether he would receive either replacements or reinforcements for some time to come. Accordingly the RAF's watchword became ‘We'll fox them’, as lumbering Bombay transports were turned into long-range bombers and outdated Lysanders were sent on impudent and dangerous spotting missions for the Army. A single Hurricane fighter which arrived in

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August was made to operate from several landing grounds in the desert on the same day, achieving an astonishing effect on the Italians, who had nothing to match its performance. This versatile machine was soon nicknamed ‘Collie's Battleship’, after Air Commodore R. Collishaw,¹ who was in charge of air operations over the Western Desert.

Collishaw, a cheerful Canadian who had emerged from the First World War with the second highest total of kills credited to any British fighter pilot, soon brought the business of outwitting the Italians to a fine art. With great skill he introduced a comprehensive system of deception, using dummy aircraft and operating small groups of fighters from widely spaced bases. At the same time, by frequent patrols and by continual attacks on their troops, bases and airfields, he kept the Italians in such a state of apprehension that they were led to fritter away their greater air strength upon innumerable defensive patrols. Similar tactics and adventurous operations on the other fronts produced the same reaction. Indeed, continual standing patrols soon became the normal routine of an Italian fighter pilot's day as air umbrellas were unfurled over bases, ports, lines of communication and over ground units unwilling to move without such protection.

This feeble reply to the initial British attacks undoubtedly laid the foundations of the eventual breakdown of the Italian fighter force. For as its defensive patrols increased, so engine hours mounted up and the serviceability rate fell. Then, the more aircraft to be serviced the less able was their maintenance organisation to deal with what was already on hand and the longer it took to get aircraft back to the front–line squadrons. The more aircraft being treated for one fault or another the more unwieldy the system became, so that later when advance and retreat swayed the army back and forth across the desert the Regia Aeronautica was unable to keep in step. Then still more aircraft were lost either by capture or by damage from RAF raids.

Yet in view of the superior numbers they possessed at the beginning, the enemy's timidity was astonishing. Although at times the Italians made things uncomfortable at our forward positions and airfields, their pilots showed no particular keenness to join issue with the Gladiators and in strategic operations farther afield they showed quite extraordinary lack of enterprise. A few sorties were made against Alexandria but these were promptly deterred by our fighters and naval guns. Throughout the whole of July the enemy's only real success was a raid on Haifa which set fire to three oil tanks. Strangest of all, the

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Italian bombers almost entirely neglected our great repair depot at Aboukir and its subsidiary units, the destruction of which might well have crippled the Middle East Air Force. Instead, weak Italian air policy allowed the RAF to seize the initiative and by aggressive tactics establish a defensive mentality among its opponents.

This was undoubtedly the main achievement of Longmore's small force in the early months but it could also record more tangible results. In operations from Egypt, for example, the old Italian cruiser San Giorgio was hit and crippled as she lay in Tobruk harbour; early in August a large ammunition dump near Bardia was bombed and blown up in a spectacular explosion; that same month Gladiators supporting a naval bombardment of Bardia shot down eight Italian bombers without loss to themselves. The enemy's main supply port of Benghazi was also raided on several occasions.

Elsewhere the RAF also continued to hold the initiative. A slender force operating from Aden and Perim, supplemented by patrols from Port Sudan, succeeded in keeping open the vital Red Sea route; between June and December 1940, when fifty–four convoys were escorted by air, only on two occasions were ships damaged, which spoke well for the unceasing vigilance of the Blenheim crews, especially as the temperature inside their aircraft sometimes rose to 130 degrees while they were patrolling down the Red Sea.

In the Sudan the three Wellesley squadrons continued to raid Italian airfields, ports, railways and supply dumps and give close support to the British forces operating in that area. ‘Day after day,’ writes one observer, ‘the large ungainly machines, with their single engine and vast wing spread, took off to make their way over some of the most dangerous flying country in the world—country where for hours you could not make a landing and where the natives were unfriendly to the point of murder. They had been coming back often with their great wings slashed and torn by flying shrapnel; sometimes they just managed to struggle home with controls shot away and the undercarriage would collapse bringing the machines lurching down on the sand on one wing like some great stricken bird. But always they seemed to get back somehow.’

In East Africa units of the South African Air Force, together with RAF Blenheim squadrons, were active in reconnaissance, scouring the coastal waters of Italian Somaliland; they also operated successfully against Italian airfields, vehicle concentrations and wireless stations, notably in the area of Kismayu. Typical of the spirit these squadrons brought to the offensive was the action of a Valentia pilot who grew tired of communication flying, filled a forty gallon oil drum with gelignite and scrap iron, wedged it on the sill of his cabin door and heaved

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it overboard to effect impressive slaughter among the defenders of a fort.

Only at Malta did the Italians appear to have the advantage in the air, but even here the RAF was soon to render their attacks on the island less rewarding. How this was achieved is an epic story presently to be related.

Throughout these early months New Zealanders played their part in patrol and attack over widely separated regions of the Middle East. In Egypt Squadron Leader Shannon¹ led a squadron of Blenheim fighters in defence of Alexandria and the Canal Zone, in protection of naval units and on escort to bomber aircraft; he had previously commanded this squadron when it was based in Iraq. Pilot Officers Ferguson,² Nicolson³ and Walker⁴ captained Blenheim bombers of No. 55 Squadron on many notable missions, including the successful raid on the airfield at El Adem, the main Italian air base in Cyrenaica, on the very first day of hostilities. Other prominent Blenheim bomber captains were Pilot Officers Buchanan⁵ and Campbell,⁶ who flew with No. 211 Squadron in attacks on enemy airfields and shipping.

In mid–August when RAF Blenheims made a spectacular and highly successful raid on Italian flying–boats in Menelaio Bay, New Zealanders captained five of the attacking aircraft. Squadron Leader Shannon and Pilot Officer Blackmore⁷ flew fighter Blenheims of No. 30 Squadron while Pilot Officers Walker, Ferguson and Nicolson captained bombers of No. 55 Squadron. The force flew overland to Sidi Barrani, where it turned out to sea and then continued to the target along the coast. Complete surprise was thus achieved and there was little opposition as No. 55 Squadron bombed from as low as 600 feet and machine-gunned targets on water and land; then as the bombers turned for home Shannon led his Blenheims down in low–flying attacks with front and rear machine guns. Altogether twelve enemy seaplanes were crippled or sunk; a fuel dump near the jetty was also set on fire and the flames spread to a nearby equipment store.

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Flying Bombays with No. 216 Squadron in Egypt, Pilot Officers Bagnall¹ and Chisholm² were among the pioneer transport pilots who carried VIPs and moved stores and personnel to various landing grounds; they also bombed Tobruk. Flying Officer Holdsworth,³ a Lysander pilot with No. 208 Army Co–operation Squadron, flew reconnaissance sorties for 7 Armoured Division and made many flights on photographic reconnaissances, artillery spotting and for counter-battery shoots.

From Alexandria Flying Officers Hughes⁴ and Milligan⁵ captained Sunderland flying boats of No. 230 Squadron on anti–submarine, reconnaissance and convoy escort patrols over the eastern Mediterranean. Towards the end of June, one crew from their squadron attacked and sank two Italian submarines, one of them in the Ionian Sea and the other between Crete and Sicily; on the latter occasion the pilot landed alongside the wreckage in a rough sea and picked up four survivors. About the same time another Sunderland on reconnaissance near Tobruk was attacked by four Italian fighters. It shot down one of them and drove off the others after a fifteen minutes' engagement. The flying-boat's fuel tanks were extensively holed but the leaks were plugged with plasticine. ‘I had to warn these enterprising captains,’ writes Longmore, ‘against trailing their coats too close to Italian fighter bases. Though the Sunderland's armament of ten machine guns was quite formidable we could not really afford the loss of even one Sunderland if it could be avoided nor could we afford, from the maintenance point of view, having them return after a self–sought encounter looking like pepper pots.’

From the Sudan Flight Lieutenant Magill,⁶ Pilot Officers Joel⁷ and Mackenzie⁸ flew Wellesley bombers in the most difficult operations against enemy airfields, camps and towns in Eritrea and Abyssinia. Magill, who flew with No. 47 Squadron from Erkowit, was later to be

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outstanding as a squadron commander and then in planning air operations with the Second Tactical Air Force in Europe. Joel, with No. 223 Squadron based at Summit, was to complete three operational tours in the Middle East and to command the well–known No. 55 Bomber Squadron. Mackenzie, who was with No. 14 Squadron at Port Sudan, did valuable work in convoy escort duties and anti–submarine patrols in the Red Sea in addition to his part in bombing operations.

From Aden, Flying Officer Young¹ captained Blenheims on bombing missions to Eritrea and was particularly prominent during the Italian offensive against British Somaliland in August 1940. Flying Officers Barnitt,² Hutton³ and Nelson⁴ also captained aircraft operating from Aden on convoy escort and reconnaissance over the Red Sea and its southern approaches. Barnitt several times fought off attacks by enemy bombers on ships in the approaches to Aden. During an early October patrol when three Italian aircraft approached the convoy, he sent one of them crashing into the sea and another limping away, belching clouds of smoke, in what the admiring and enthusiastic crew of an escort ship described as ‘a very gallant action’. A few days later, after a long patrol which included combat with an enemy bomber, he landed at Kamaran Island to refuel; whilst taking off again an engine failed and he was killed when his Blenheim crashed into a corner of a mosque. Barnitt had already been recommended for the award of the Distinguished Flying Cross and this was confirmed shortly after his death. He was the first New Zealander in the Middle East to be decorated for war service.

New Zealanders also held a variety of ground posts at this time. Wing Commander Mitchell⁵ was Senior Air Staff Officer at Aden; Squadron Leader Richmond⁶ was on the signals staff of No. 252 Wing in Egypt; Squadron Leader Bennett⁷ was an armament officer with No. 202 Group at Maaten Baggush, Squadron Leader J. S. Smith⁸ was

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in the operations room at Headquarters RAF, Middle East, and Squadron Leaders A. H.¹ and D. H. Marsack² were doing valuable work as intelligence officers. A small group of men from the Dominion were also serving in Iraq, notably at the important Flying Training School at Habbaniya; here Squadron Leader Nedwill³ and Flying Officer Murdoch⁴ were among the flying instructors.

* * * * *

After three months of war the only major success the Italians could claim was the capture of British Somaliland.⁵ But on the ground they still held the advantage even though they had been slow to make use of it; and when at last, in mid–September, Graziani began his advance into Egypt, Wavell was forced to withdraw his troops from the frontier to prepared positions at Mersa Matruh. For about a week the Italian columns, constantly harassed by our ground and air forces, moved slowly forward until they reached Sidi Barrani, where they ground to a halt. They were still some sixty miles short of the main British defences but at the moment Graziani had no desire to advance further until he had built up supplies. A bold offensive a few weeks earlier might conceivably have overrun Egypt, but Italian strategy had succumbed to over–caution and the great opportunity was allowed to slip away.

For British reinforcements had now begun to reach the Middle East. Despite the German invasion threat to Britain, Churchill and his Cabinet had taken the bold decision to send some of their most precious material and reinforcements to the Mediterranean. With the arrival of an armoured brigade towards the end of September, Wavell was not only able to consolidate the defence of Egypt but also to contemplate a limited offensive. And as the weeks passed with Graziani still lingering over his preparations for further advance, Wavell went ahead with plans for a surprise attack. This, however, had to be delayed until the middle of December because the RAF, whose support he regarded as essential to success, had to send some of its best squadrons to help the Greeks in Albania. In the meantime ground operations were mainly

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confined to patrol activity by both sides. But even here the initiative now passed to the British.

Throughout the autumn the small RAF force in Egypt continued to strike at the enemy. Supply ports, lines of communication, landing grounds, military camps and dumps—all came under attack. British fighter pilots continued to keep their opponents on the defensive and when the Italians did attempt to retaliate they enjoyed singularly little success. One day at the end of October when fifteen S79s, escorted by eighteen Cr42s, made a determined effort to bomb our forward positions, they were intercepted by twelve Hurricanes and ten Gladiators and returned at least eight short. Again, in mid–November, when a Lysander and a Blenheim escorted by nine Hurricanes and six Gladiators were sent to photograph the Italian positions south of Sidi Barrani, a swarm of Cr42s rose to give combat; for over half an hour the British formation fought a lively engagement and then returned intact with seven enemy aircraft to its credit and all the required photographs— including some excellent pictures of the Italian anti–tank defences.

But these were difficult days for Middle East Air Command and Longmore had to keep juggling his small resources between the Western Desert, East Africa, the Red Sea and the Sudan, so that the Italians might not secure those advantages to which their vast numerical superiority entitled them. After Mussolini's attack on Greece in October, Longmore was obliged to draw upon his small force in Egypt to the extent of three squadrons of Blenheims and one of Gladiators. These units were to do splendid work in support of the hard–pressed Greeks¹ and their despatch was considered politically necessary at the time, but they could ill be spared if effective assistance was to be given to Wavell's forthcoming offensive from Egypt. Indeed, to keep his promise, Longmore had to strip Alexandria and the Canal of their defending squadrons and bring up a few others from Aden and the Sudan. Even these moves provided a British fighter force of only sixty–five aircraft when the offensive began.

A thin trickle of reinforcement aircraft—Blenheims, Hurricanes and the first Wellington bombers—had begun to arrive from Britain but it was months before the loss occasioned by the transfers to Greece was offset. For after the fall of France the strengthening of British air resources in the Middle East was no easy matter. Only the longer range

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machines could be flown out by way of Gibraltar and Malta, on which route their newly trained crews faced the hazards of the long night-flight south from Britain, the unpleasantly short runway at Gibraltar and the night landing and take–off from Malta. Aircraft of shorter range had to be shipped by sea, which involved the long time–consuming journey round the Cape. Fortunately, however, the possibility of shipping aircraft to West Africa and then flying them across to Egypt had already been explored and during the latter part of September 1940 a first flight of five Hurricanes, led and guided by a Blenheim, completed the 4000–mile journey from Takoradi, on the Gold Coast, via Kano and Khartoum, to Egypt.

The opening of this new reinforcement route held great promise which was to be amply fulfilled. But at first many months' work were needed before it was properly organised. Considerable workshops and accommodation had to be built at Takoradi and various refuelling and other facilities provided for along the way. The climate and the local malaria harassed the men erecting the crated aircraft. There was heavy wear on engines during the long flight over barren and sandy spaces. Weather and other troubles also hampered the air convoys. Early in December 1940, when the first six Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron were on the fifth lap of their flight, the wireless of the guiding Blenheim failed, its crew lost their bearings and in the gathering darkness all seven machines were forced to land in the desert. Two Hurricanes crashed beyond repair, one of the pilots was killed, and the other four Hurricanes were all badly damaged. With such misadventures the number of aircraft unserviceable awaiting spares along the route soon piled up.

There were other inevitable causes of delay. When the Hurricanes reached Egypt they had to be stripped of their long–range tanks, overhauled and fitted with guns. Furthermore, when squadrons were moved to the Middle East their ground staffs and equipment had to travel by sea around the Cape, and on more than one occasion it was found that stores had been packed in cases which bore no distinctive marking. Because of all these various difficulties none of the aircraft supplied via Takoradi became available in 1940. Yet as Churchill remarks: ‘if the scheme had not been begun in good time the Army of the Nile and all its ventures could not have lived through the tragic events of 1941.’

New Zealand airmen took their share in blazing this air trail over four thousand miles of swamps, dense jungle, barren desert and varying climates. The pioneer flight to which the route owed its foundation had, in fact, been made by Sir Arthur Coningham fifteen years earlier, when as a young squadron leader he led three De Havilland aircraft on the double journey between Cairo and Kano, in Nigeria. Among

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the pilots who flew some of the first reinforcement aircraft from Takoradi to Egypt were Flying Officers Milne,¹ Daniell² and Cotterill,³ while Pilot Officers Reid⁴ and Williams⁵ did good work as navigators in the leading Blenheims. No small contribution to the maintenance of the Takoradi route in its early days was made by Flying Officers Bagnall, Chisholm and Allcock⁶ of No. 216 Squadron, who flew Bombay transports along the route carrying stores and spare parts for the various staging posts.

Experienced pilots were soon chosen to lead formations and Flying Officer Milne in particular frequently performed this duty. These leaders were entirely responsible for the convoy and their difficulties were manifold. Aircraft frequently disappeared from formation and the leader, mindful of the slight margin of petrol they carried, had to decide whether to search for the missing machine or to continue. Radio-telephony, on which so much depended once a formation took to the air, often proved unserviceable and at staging posts the leader was often called upon to decide whether aircraft which had developed some defect should carry on or stay behind for repairs. Not the least of his problems in this period was that of accommodation at the various posts, where facilities for the weary crews left much to be desired; men often had to spend the night in billets with bug-infested beds and inadequate protection against mosquitoes.

Here is a description of the daily stages between Takoradi and Cairo provided by one of the pilots:

On the first day we left Takoradi with its red cliffs and steaming Gold Coast bush for Lagos, the first staging post in Nigeria, about 380 miles away. The formation coast-crawled to Accra, past steamy swamplands, native fishing villages and the 17th and 18th century Portuguese castles of the old slave traders. From Accra, we flew along about ten miles out to sea to avoid Vichy-French Dahomey and then inland again along the mangrove swamps to put down at Apapa, the airport of Lagos, built on what had once been swampland.

The second day the formation flew on to Kano, a distance of 525 miles. On leaving the lakes the track turned north-east and inland over threatening

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dense jungle which began to thin north of the river Niger. At last the red dust of Kano appeared, an antique walled city and a centuries old staging post for land traffic between the Sahara and the Congo.

The journey between Kano and El Geneina in the Sudan, a total of some 960 miles, was made in two stages on the third day. From Kano a heartening patch of advanced cultivation for some 30 miles was quickly succeeded by scrub and arid country until a convenient road from Kano could be followed into Maiduguri where the flight would put down for refuelling. Leaving Nigeria, course was set across French Equatorial Africa but here the Colonial Troops, unlike their compatriates of the Dahomey, had declared for the Free French and the airfield at Fort Lamy offered a valuable refuelling point and an emergency landing ground. On this stage Lake Fitri was a valuable pinpoint for navigators but could be somewhat disturbing in that, being mainly a mass of swamps, the outline shifted up to thirty miles between the wet and dry seasons. Now in the heart of Africa, the country became progressively more barren, more gruelling with only outcrops of rock to relieve the monotony. Finally Geneina was reached. Although situated on a large wadi crossing the route its sandy surface made it somewhat difficult to pick out from the air.

On the fourth day aircraft flew from Geneina to Khartoum in two stages, a short one of 190 miles and the other of 560 miles. From Geneina the country retained its desert characteristics with occasional patches of scrub and trees over the short hop to El Fasher where aircraft refuelled. Here in the Sudanese desert aircraft which made forced landings were extremely difficult to locate and the almost inevitable result for the crews was death from thirst. Accordingly the direct route was soon diverted for fighter aircraft to El Obeid where a temporary area of cultivation was found. Sandstorms were prevalent over the remaining 250 miles to Khartoum with consequent low visibility so that the aircraft's track was deflected to starboard until the Nile could be located and used as a leading line into Khartoum.

From Khartoum aircraft flew to Abu Sueir by covering 520 miles on the fifth day and some 500 miles on the sixth and last day. From Khartoum the route was comparatively easy. With a convenient refuelling point at Wadi Halfa crews had little to do but follow the magnificent course of the Nile above the Cataracts, Luxor, the Valley of Kings, until finally the great pyramids and the sprawling mass of Cairo, topped by the Citadel, came into sight.

As the Takoradi air route became firmly established, New Zealanders in company with their comrades from other parts of the Empire and from Allied nations continued the exacting task of ferrying aircraft across Africa. Unfortunately the hazards of flight across long stretches of inhospitable country, the vagaries of weather, the inexperience of some airmen and the difficulties of aircraft maintenance under extremely trying conditions all took their toll in lives. The causes of many accidents were never known–typical was the loss of Flying Officer Pettit¹ in late August 1941 when his aircraft was unable to maintain height and fell into the sea off Lagos. However, the fore-

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sight of the route's originators, the devotion of its aircrews and the hard work of the ground staffs were to be amply repaid. By May 1943 over 5300 British and American aircraft of many types, including fighters, light bombers and transports, had been flown from Takoradi to the Middle East Command.

* * * * *

At dawn on 9 December 1940 Wavell struck at the Italian Army in the Western Desert. The attack took the enemy completely by surprise and within a few days not only Sidi Barrani but Sollum and Capuzzo were in our hands and the erstwhile invaders of Egypt were streaming back across its frontier. This success exceeded all expectations for Wavell had planned only a limited advance beyond Sidi Barrani. But the opportunities for exploitation which now presented themselves were seized with vigour. Sweeping forward into Cyrenaica, British forces under Lieutenant–General O'Connor proceeded to invest Bardia which, although strongly fortified and well placed for defence, was captured early in January with 40,000 prisoners. Then came further rapid advance to Tobruk, an Italian naval base and a main supply port. Here also there were good perimeter defences, but after a short delay caused by sandstorms these were speedily penetrated and the town fell on 21 January with something like 25,000 prisoners.

At this point further progress was gravely threatened by the British Cabinet's offer of troops and armoured forces to the Greeks. But fortunately the Greek Government was satisfied for the moment to face the Italians with its own meagre forces and such aid as could be given by the RAF. Wavell's army was thus left free to complete its rout of the Italians and this it proceeded to do in one of the most remarkable operations of the war. While 6 Australian and 7 Armoured Divisions thrust forward along the coastal road to seize Derna, Mechili and Benghazi, a small force cut directly across rocky and waterless country to reach the main highway to the south. The Italian force retreating from Benghazi, still 25,000 strong, was thus trapped, and after a brief but desperate effort to break out it surrendered. The British advance finally came to a halt on 6 February 1941 when its advanced guards reached the region of El Agheila

Months of disappointment and disaster were soon to follow and all that had been won in Cyrenaica was to be cast away in the vain effort to sustain Greece, but nothing can obscure the brilliance of this early campaign. Within two months a force never exceeding two divisions had advanced 600 miles over desert territory, utterly routed an Italian army of no fewer than ten divisions, and captured 130,000 prisoners, 1290 guns and 400 tanks at a cost to itself of barely 3000 casualties.

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But this was not the only achievement of Wavell's Middle East Command during the early months of 1941. Simultaneously with the advance into Cyrenaica, attacks had been launched against the Italians in East Africa. From the Sudan British forces pushed into Eritrea where, after bitter fighting, they captured the great natural stronghold of Keren and swept on to Asmara and Massawa. Troops from Kenya also advanced into Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia, rapidly capturing enemy bases and airfields despite the difficult country over which they had to fight. So successful was the conduct of the whole campaign that within a few short months the Italians were to lose the whole of their East African possessions and most of Abyssinia. The menace of large enemy air and ground forces in the rear of Egypt was thus removed and British troops and air squadrons could be moved north, where they were urgently needed.

The RAF contributed much to the success of both these victories. In the Western Desert Collishaw's squadrons, by dispersing and subduing the opposing Italian air force, enabled Wavell's initial attack to achieve all the advantages of surprise. They then gave most valuable help in the opening stages of the battle by their reconnaissance, bombing and fighter patrols; highly effective attacks on enemy transport and airfields were made by low–flying Hurricanes, some of which made as many as four sorties a day.

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Throughout the hectic weeks that followed both fighters and bombers constantly harassed the retreating enemy columns, preparing the way for and covering the advance of our ground forces at every stage. How greatly this air support helped to speed the Army's advance is shown by what happened at Tobruk. Here reconnaissance planes secured valuable photographs of enemy positions and minefields and the main air effort was then applied within a defended perimeter around the town. Combined air and naval bombardment during the two nights immediately before the ground assault softened the defences and in the final hours protracted bombing by Wellingtons covered the assembly of our tanks. At dawn on 21 January British tanks and Australian infantry moved forward under fighter cover and a creeping barrage. At the same time Blenheims, Lysanders and Hurricanes operated ahead of the troops to keep the threatened area clear of reinforcements. Quickly piercing the outer defences our forces poured through, and with the help of incessant air attacks the bulk of the artillery was soon established inside the perimeter. The intensity of the effort in the air may be judged from the fact that one squadron with only eight serviceable Blenheims flew thirty–two sorties during the day. By the evening the Australians had captured the escarpment which dominates the harbour and the next morning they entered the town.

The RAF also won a notable victory over the numerically superior Italian Air Force, with the important result that British troops were

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never seriously held up by enemy aircraft during their victorious sweep through Cyrenaica. From the outset the Italians were driven almost completely on the defensive by the aggressiveness of the small British fighter force, whose only really modern machines were some thirty-odd Hurricanes. Numerous attacks on airfields and landing grounds added to the enemy's difficulties and led to the virtual collapse of his air force in the later stages. When the airfields at El Adem, Gazala and Benina were captured they were found littered with the wreckage of Italian machines. Altogether 1100 enemy planes were counted shattered and abandoned all over the desert. Along with the aircraft wreckage were hundreds of enemy lorries smashed by air attack, while in Cyrenaican harbours lay thirty–five ships that had been destroyed or disabled from the air.

After the capture of Benghazi Lieutenant–General O'Connor addressed this special Order of the Day to Air Commodore Collishaw:

‘I wish,’ he wrote, ‘to record my very great appreciation of the wonderful work of the R.A.F. units under your command, whose determination and fine fighting qualities have made this campaign possible.

'Since the war began you have consistently attacked without intermission an enemy Air Force between five and ten times your strength dealing him blow after blow until finally he was driven out of the sky and out of Libya leaving hundreds of derelict aircraft on his aerodromes. In his recent retreat from Tobruk you gave his ground troops no rest, bombing their concentrations and carrying out low flying attacks on their transport columns.’

‘In addition you have co–operated to the full in carrying out our many requests for special bombardments, reconnaissances and protection against enemy air action and I should like to say how much all this has contributed to our success.’

Support for the campaign in East Africa followed a similar pattern. The country was difficult and most of the flying had to be done over hostile territory or against well–defended positions in single–engined aircraft. Nevertheless the British squadrons, with what General Platt politely terms ‘their variety of machines’, soon gained air superiority. ‘By a continuous forward policy they drove their opponents from the air and destroyed their machines on the ground; the army was indeed grateful for the immunity from hostile air attack thus gained.’ The RAF also did much to reduce enemy resistance on the ground by its frequent attacks on gun positions, forward defended localities and supply lines. ‘During the battle for Keren,’ says Platt, ‘determined enemy counter–attacks were broken up by the help of close support from the R.A.F.’ Meanwhile, ‘our long columns of transport continually on the road between Keren and Kassala, were never interfered with from the air.’ And so it continued as the East African campaign moved to its triumphant conclusion.

* * * * *

But the British run of success in North Africa was short–lived. For

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Hitler had decided that Germany must now intervene in the Middle East and this decision was to have an immediate and far–reaching effect on the course of events. Early in January 1941, in order to bolster his shaky ally, Hitler sent a strong contingent of the Luftwaffe to Sicily, and a few weeks later further air squadrons, together with the leading elements of an armoured corps under a young and able commander, Erwin Rommel, reached Tripoli.

Fearful for the safety of the Rumanian oilfields from air attack Hitler also ordered the preparation of plans for the occupation of the Balkans and the Aegean coast, including the Greek mainland. This new threat to their country thoroughly alarmed the Greeks and they now decided to accept the offer of help from the British Army which they had previously refused. Complicated discussions followed but it was finally decided in London that four British divisions, including two Australian and one New Zealand as agreed by their Governments, should be sent to Greece from Egypt. It was a decision fraught with grave consequences. For it meant that at the very moment when German forces were arriving in North Africa to reinforce the Italians, Wavell had to deplete his army in order to send the required help. Indeed it will long be a matter for controversy whether from the strategic point of view a serious error was not made in sending British forces to Greece and thus gravely weakening the Army in the Western Desert. But it was a higher strategy decision made primarily in the hope of building up a Balkan front and on the additional ground that if Britain had left Greece unsupported in her extremity she would have been shamed before the world.¹

Events now moved swiftly. At the end of March 1941 the Germans and Italians counter–attacked in Cyrenaica. The weak British forces covering Benghazi were taken more or less by surprise and forced to retreat. Rommel followed up with a series of rapid outflanking movements during which the single British armoured division was overrun and two British generals, Neame and O'Connor, fell into enemy hands. Within a fortnight the remnants of the British forces were back at Sollum. Tobruk was still held, however, for Wavell took the bold decision to leave a force there and keep it supplied by sea. Rommel's failure to capture Tobruk was to cost him a year of bitter fighting; meanwhile the ever–increasing difficulties of supply and the ceaseless toll of the desert robbed his advance of its momentum and the German and Italian columns came to rest on the borders of Egypt.

But this was only the beginning. On 6 April the Germans invaded Greece, where their strong armoured forces, with powerful air support, quickly broke through the vital Monastir Gap and were soon advancing rapidly southwards. The British Expeditionary Force, of which only

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about one half had arrived, did its best to support the Greeks in their heroic resistance but all was in vain. Within three weeks the Greeks were compelled to capitulate and the British troops had no alternative but to withdraw. Some two–thirds of the original force were skilfully evacuated during the last week of April, but 14,000 prisoners were taken by the Germans and the total loss was over 16,000 with all the heavy equipment.

The final scene of the Greek tragedy was played out in Crete where the part of the New Zealand Division evacuated to the island provided its principal defence. Here on 20 May, after heavy bombing attacks, the Germans began their airborne invasion, employing parachutists and great numbers of troop–carrying gliders. The defenders fought bravely and doggedly but the enemy, by determined and, at times, reckless employment of his forces in the air and on the ground, soon gained a firm foothold. His fighters and bombers subdued the anti-aircraft opposition and reinforcements began to arrive in strength. The loss of Maleme airfield on the first day proved fatal to the defence and within a week it was clear that Crete could no longer be held. Once again the evacuation proved more successful than could have been expected but the proportion saved was smaller than on the mainland.

German superiority in the air was largely responsible for their rapid success in each of these campaigns. In Greece and Crete it was indeed decisive. The Luftwaffe was now at the height of its power with a well-developed technique of co–operation with its ground forces and a highly efficient organisation for supply and replacement. Royal Air Force, Middle East, could match neither its strength nor its efficiency, for during these early months of 1941 British air power in this theatre reached its lowest ebb. Reinforcements were not yet arriving in sufficient quantity even to replace losses, while the earlier campaigns in North and East Africa had seriously reduced the number of operational aircraft with squadrons. Nor was it proving easy to keep serviceable the machines they had. This indeed was only possible by incorporating parts of damaged aircraft in other invalids whose cases were less advanced, a form of cannibalism which no air force can long survive. But such desperate expedients were imposed on Middle East Air Command by a situation in which there was far more to be done than aircraft with which to do it. And in these circumstances there was no hope of maintaining that degree of air superiority which had been largely attained against the Italians; in its absence our land forces were bound to suffer.

When the Germans and Italians launched their attack in Cyrenaica the RAF had only four squadrons left in the Western Desert—two of Hurricanes, one of Blenheim bombers and one with Lysanders for

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army reconnaissance—while the opposing air force included no fewer than 90 German Messerschmitts and 80 Stuka and Heinkel bombers. In Greece the disparity was much greater for the enemy had massed over 1000 aircraft, half of them fighters, whereas the RAF could muster barely 200, of which only about a third were fighters. Moreover when, after the successful winter campaign against the Italians in Greece and Albania, the RAF moved up to meet the German attack, it found the airfields it had to occupy were small and ill–equipped; there were no engineers to enlarge them or to provide dispersal or protection; there was no effective warning organisation and virtually no anti–aircraft defence.

Skill and gallantry could and did inflict heavy casualties on superior numbers in the air but were of little avail when the bases were defenceless. Over Crete the Germans, operating in large numbers at short range and from secure bases, had complete air supremacy in their hands, virtually without having to fight for it. For there were only three airfields on the island and the few British aircraft that occupied them were soon destroyed; the airfields in Cyrenaica from which fighters might have operated across the sea to Crete had been captured in Rommel's advance to the Egyptian frontier.

Altogether, in the face of the enemy's marked operational advantages and his great numerical superiority, the RAF could not possibly redress the adverse situation which quickly developed on the ground in each of these campaigns. Nevertheless its pilots and aircrews made most strenuous exertions to help our troops in their unequal struggle. During the retreat from Cyrenaica the four British squadrons were constantly in the air providing reconnaissance and cover for the Army. They also did their best to hamper the enemy's forward movement by attacking his supplies and concentrations of vehicles; the few Wellingtons based in Egypt also helped by bombing similar targets and, refuelling at Tobruk, they struck at Tripoli, the enemy's main supply port.

In Greece both fighter and bomber squadrons fought valiantly. In one early encounter twelve Hurricanes challenged thirty Messerschmitts and claimed five of them without loss. Again, during intensive air activity in the second week, Nos. 33 and 80 Squadrons reported the destruction of twenty–nine enemy machines. The bombers also took their toll of German armour and vehicles, as well as attacking targets behind his lines; but they were no match for the German fighters by day and on more than one occasion the whole of a small formation was wiped out.

A most gallant action was fought over Athens on 23 April 1941. That day the Germans came through the clear sky in mass formation of dive–bombers with a great ring of fighters circling over them. Watchers on the ground saw the whole British fighter force go up to

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meet them. It included fifteen Hurricanes in varying stages of disrepair assembled from three broken squadrons. In one long day of fighting these tattered aircraft and their weary pilots charged again and again into six times their number. Five of them were lost; but they brought down twenty–two, with eight more ‘probables’. It was a brave gesture. The few surviving fighters with their pilots then continued defiant to the end and they were able to give some cover to the evacuation before they left for Crete.

On Crete a handful of weary men and worn–out aircraft that had served their time in six months of hard fighting farther north faced odds of more than ten to one. Yet in the first six days of the German bombing they and the few reinforcements which reached them clawed down more than twenty of their opponents before they were overwhelmed. A brave effort was then made to provide some fighter cover over Crete from landing grounds some 300 miles away in the Western Desert. Blenheims and long–range Hurricanes carrying external fuel tanks operated at this extreme range and did succeed in destroying a number of German aircraft, especially at Maleme; but it was a costly endeavour for fighter after fighter was either destroyed on the ground at Crete, lost over the sea or else, with petrol exhausted, came down in the desert. Meanwhile RAF bombers were busy attacking the airfields in Greece and the Dodecanese from which the German fighters and troop–carriers were operating; they also dropped supplies to our troops fighting on Crete. But the number of fighter and bomber sorties that could be flown from distant bases was far too small to affect the issue.

The loss of Crete following on that of Cyrenaica and Greece led to much bitterness and the RAF was accused of having ‘let down’ the Army. In the streets of Cairo and in the prison camps of Germany and Italy RAF men were regarded with distinct disfavour, if not openly insulted. But their critics were ignorant of the circumstances of the time. The few squadrons of Middle East Air Command could not be everywhere at once; their bases had been unprotected and insecure and frequently lacked even the most elementary facilities. There was also ignorance of the fact, which even in the later years of the war some soldiers and sailors found difficult to grasp, that air operations were often in t