CHAPTER 7 — The Crusader Campaign

Previous Section | Table of Contents | Up | Next Section

– 196 –

CHAPTER 7
The Crusader Campaign

The last New Zealand engineer unit evacuated from Crete, 5 Field Park Company, arrived at Alexandria on 1 June and went to Helwan, where new clothing and other essential items were drawn. Half the Company then departed on seven days' ‘survivors' leave’, and were followed in due course by the other half; meanwhile, between parades for the issue of stores and equipment, reorganisation was carried out and reinforcements marched in.

The end of the month saw the sappers at El Kirsh on the Canal, where they trained and worked until the middle of September, when they returned to the Western Desert and took over their old duties at Sidi Haneish in what was now called the Baggush Box or Baggush Fortress.

General Rommel chose the same day as the Company moved from the Canal (14 September) to stage a reconnaissance in force. Its code-name was the German for Midsummer Night's Dream, but by and large it turned out to be something of a nightmare to the German tank crews, some of whose vehicles were battered into urgent need of tank recovery unit services.

The action was fought a long way from Baggush and did not concern 5 Field Park Company;1 Field Stores Section again operated the Divisional RE Stores Dump, and Workshop Section found plenty of employment offering; Bridging Section spent its time on water pipeline renovations, alterations and extensions.

Since its near miss in accompanying the Division to Greece, 8 Field Company had been kept from brooding by employment on the Cairo Defence Scheme. This, for the sappers, involved the construction of pillboxes and rifle and machine-gun emplacements over the several square miles of country bounded by the Nile on the east, the desert on the west, the Mohammed Ali Barrage on the north, and a line some miles beyond the Mena Road on the south. Other measures about which it did not seem necessary to advise the Egyptian Government included

– 197 –

the drawing up of plans for the demolition of every bridge in the area, including those over the Nile in Cairo and the Mohammed Ali Barrage. During this period the sappers' chief relaxation was looking for Trixie.

‘It was at Mena that Trixie, a fox terrier bitch, disappeared. Trixie came into the unit at Trentham camp as a very small puppy and travelled with the men around New Zealand, when they were on leave, and overseas with them. It was suggested that she was stolen by the Wogs, though of this I am not sure. Anyway constant reports were brought in that a dog like her was seen in various parts of the Egyptian Delta, and for a while I was prevailed on to let parties go in search. I think I was being imposed upon!2

It was also at Mena that 8 Field Company Transport Section had an illustration of South African duplicity. An abandoned 12-cwt Commercial Ford with South African markings was brought in from one of the canal roads and repaired with the idea of presenting it to the CO as his own private PU.3 A complete overhaul, including new tyres and wheels, had been completed and the unit identification signs were being painted on when a South African officer called and asked if a truck for which he quoted the chassis and engine number had inadvertently been included in the Company transport. It was discovered later that the Springboks had known all the time where their truck was, had watched its repair, and had only waited for the work to be completed before claiming it.

The Company was, however, more fortunate in other vehicle deals. The sappers were not satisfied with their water cart and at Amiriya had made friends with a Polish unit guarding a vehicle park. The guard did not have a key to the park gates, but at the price of a few cakes of chocolate obligingly lifted the gates off the hinges. Two water carts were taken for a trial run but neither was satisfactory. One had a poor engine and the other a broken chassis. At Mena an English well-boring company camped alongside the Company—and they possessed a welding plant. A patrol suitably provided with cakes of chocolate returned to Amiriya. The upshot was that, with the help of the Tommy welding outfit, 8 Field Company possessed a good water cart plus an extra 15-cwt truck which was not shown on the Vehicle Returns.

On 18 August the Company handed over to 19 Army Troops

– 198 –

Company and joined 5 Field Park Company at Ismailia, where they camped on what was known as ‘The Island’—a small, shady, tree-covered island joined to the mainland by a bridge. There they were employed in building a leave camp and a jetty. Piles were driven by a Heath Robinson style pile-driver of Kiwi design wherein the motive power was provided by five sappers hauling on a rope. Incidentally, there was a big derailment a mile or so from the camp and some fast work by predatory sappers enabled the Company to supplement the ration scale by several sacks of flour and other scarce liquid commodities before guards were posted to prevent further such activities.

In the middle of September 8 Field Company left the Canal area under orders to join 6 Brigade at Mena before travelling by the desert road to Baggush. The newcomers still had something to learn, for the leading trucks got mixed up with a 6 Field Regiment convoy leaving Mena. By the time the mistake was straightened out everybody knew the difference between a regiment of artillery and a brigade of infantry. On arrival at Baggush the Company camped first in the Burbeita oasis which, it will be remembered, was 5 Field Park's home the previous September, and later at Kilo 60, halfway between Mersa Matruh and Sidi Barrani.

Engineering work on water points and reservoirs both elevated and on the ground was mixed with minelaying exercises with 4 Indian Division and field exercises with the infantry battalions. The sappers consoled themselves for the loss of Trixie by adopting a baby camel that had fallen into a disused well. It was hard work finding food for the new pet and it made horrible noises at them. When they moved on the camel was left behind.

Sixth and 7th Field Companies followed much the same pattern of activities; the 6th at Garawi and the 7th at Helwan went on survivors' leave, staged reunions with recovered wounded, sick and others who had escaped from Greece and Crete by divers means, absorbed reinforcements and began to feel like engineer units again.

Both left for the Ismailia area in the last week of July. Sixth Field Company had acquired a new commander (Major Woolcott) and the 7th was soon to do likewise (Major Thomas).4

– 199 –

The sappers underwent a course of combined training—landings on defended beaches, pontoon bridging, underwater demolitions, building floating pierheads and suchlike activities peculiar to engineers.

In early September 7 Field left for the desert, with 6 Field and Headquarters NZ Engineers (Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton) following a day or so later, en route for Baggush. The engineering component of the Division was again ready for battle.

Seventh Field Company's destination was the already mentioned partly constructed box near Alamein known as Fortress A, or more generally as Kaponga. It was situated halfway between the sea and the swampy Qattara Depression—the corridor through which the enemy would have to pass to reach Cairo.

The sappers worked for a month with the infantry of 5 Brigade Group on the excavation of posts and anti-tank obstacles. They also helped 5 Field Regiment with gunpits and 5 Field Ambulance with a dressing station. To use a few figures so dear to the heart of an engineer, approximately 30,000 feet of holes were drilled and 100,000 feet of primer cord used on 800 detonations of 9250 Ib of ammonal and 2900 Ib of monobel.

Another ‘miracle while you wait’ job, like the assignment given the Mechanical Equipment sappers at Aqaba to dredge a harbour without a dredge, was asked of 7 Field Company during this period.

There was need of a road from Alamein to Kaponga and Major Hanson was instructed to supervise the work with his Company. As mentioned in the previous chapter, South African engineers were already constructing the road from Alamein southwards, but at the rate of progress, a few chains a day, it would take months to finish—and it was wanted within weeks. At the Kaponga end there were no quarries, stone crushers, graders or bulldozers and no possibility of getting them, at least for several weeks.

‘We were set a really first class problem to which none of the Chief Engineers of Army, Corps or Line of Communication had an answer. It just happened that in pre-war days I had made some study of what is called soil stabilisation and the actions of chemicals such as gypsum, calcium chloride and various salts in binding certain gradings of soils into a tightly compacted mass.

‘“Laboratory” tests of desert soils appearing to contain a

– 200 –

concentration of hygroscopic salts were made by moulding small briquettes of different soil mixtures and drying them by a primus. They were then tested for stiffness or toughness and a mixture worked out for roadmaking. A trial patch was put down, a car run backwards and forwards over it, and, as hoped, a tight compaction was achieved without the addition of water.’5

Kiwi ingenuity had found an answer to the Alamein roading problem; all that remained to be done, with the help of infantry working parties, was to mix the soils in the right proportions, spread the mixture and compact it by running lorries over it. Thousands of tons of stores and materials were carried over that road into Kaponga during the months that followed.

On 6 October 7 Field Company returned to the Division, now concentrated at Baggush. The journey was made in the new ‘desert formation’, whereby every vehicle in a gigantic draughtboard pattern had a fixed place in relation to every other vehicle in the unit and was spaced 200 yards in every direction from its neighbour. At dusk they closed to visibility distance.

In the Base Post Office Captain Shelker6 had been placed on the New Zealand Roll and Lieutenant A. V. Knapp appointed Assistant Director of Postal Services. The Divisional Postal Unit, now commanded by Lieutenant Coupland,7 was operating post offices at each brigade headquarters and at the supply point.

Sixth Field Company, camped at Ras Hawala in Baggush, worked on reservoirs at Sidi Haneish. Two 500-gallon tanks had been excavated by South African sappers and the job was to finish them with a bitumen lining and fill with water.

The importance of anti-tank obstacles in a campaign where fast-moving armoured vehicles had taken the place of cavalry was beginning to be realised. In this branch of their trade the New Zealand sappers were as advanced as any, for their training included a thorough knowledge of mines, enemy and friendly, what made them go off and how to stop them going off.

It could hardly be otherwise when it is remembered that the Field Companies had served under a CRE who had smuggled naval depth-charges into Greece in lieu of other missing supplies. Further, they were now serving under a CRE who as a

– 201 –

company commander had smuggled anti-tank mines out of England, in and out of Egypt and finally into Greece—the only anti-tank mines available in the New Zealand sector.

Every section of the New Zealand Field Companies spent a week with 4 Indian Division to further its education, for the CRE of that division had introduced a novel and fast method of minelaying. This method was known as ‘The Indian Rope Trick’ and was officially adopted throughout the Middle East. Its essence was to define a datum line with long pickets and to mark points along this line with short pickets driven flush with the surface of the ground. Tapes knotted at intervals were looped over the short pickets, stretched in the required direction and mines buried under each knot. The distance between the lines varied but the density aimed at was one mine per yard of front. Knowing the combination it was possible to locate the mines quickly if necessary.

The corollary, of course, for no wars are won by armies on the defensive, was training in methods of breaking through minefields. A piece of equipment developed by each side from the necessity of having to locate mines was the magnetic detector. Essentially, a magnetic mine detector is a piece of radio apparatus connected to a pair of earphones and to a looped aerial or search coil. The set, complete with batteries fitted into a small box, was carried on the back of the mine-detecting sapper who, with earphones fastened, carried the search coil on a shielded rod and waved it from side to side as he advanced. When switched on the set went into a state of oscillation which could be heard on the earphones. If the search coil passed close to a metal object the oscillation was damped down or stopped altogether. The early detectors,8 made locally and urgently, were inferior in design and construction to the German sample, which incidentally was branded 1940 and which suggests that the enemy had at least twelve months lead in this respect.

During October and early November sections trained in rotation with the infantry battalions in assaults on defended areas. The exercise usually consisted of an assembly and night march to a forming-up place, followed by an attack on an enemy position. The sappers were required to clear lanes

– 202 –

through the protecting minefield and, when the operation was successfully concluded, to lay another minefield for defence against enemy AFVs.

This tactic of clearing lanes to, and then erecting a barrier in front of a position resulted in the Engineers, as an arm, forsaking the rear of a battlefield and working ahead of the infantry. It also resulted in the sappers' active-service life being very considerably shortened.

The drill for clearing a passage through a minefield, as practised by the New Zealand Field Companies at that period, was as follows:

The first sapper of the team inserted a Bangalore torpedo under the outer line of wire and blew a gap, and the next man went through the field clearing trip-wires or booby traps. Two sappers followed with mine detectors, sweeping a 10 foot lane while another cleared the mines as located. The demolition party ran out a line of cordtex detonating fuse across the field and over the tops of each mine in the lane. A stick of gelignite, already split open, was gripped to the cordtex and laid on top of each mine. The detonation of the cordtex fired all mines simultaneously, thus clearing a lane and enabling the tanks to pass through after the limits of the track had been taped.

On 11 November the Division began to leave Baggush for ‘Exercise No. 4’, an ‘exercise’ that ended in the relief of Tobruk and the second clearance of the enemy out of Cyrenaica.

The Engineer command in the Crusader campaign was as follows:

Headquarters New Zealand Engineers

5 Field Park Company

6 Field Company

7 Field Company

8 Field Company

Preparations for an offensive have been glimpsed in the employment given 18 Army Troops Company and the Railway Operating and Construction Groups. Each did vital work and was commended by Authority for doing, without fuss and up to time, everything asked of them.

A brief glance backwards and forwards in order to bring the Middle East situation into perspective is appropriate at this point.

Campaigns fought almost simultaneously and with an exiguity of force that is breathtaking had been successful in Libya, Eritrea, Abyssinia, Iraq, Syria: unsuccessful in Greece and Crete. New Zealand sappers had taken some part on all fronts excepting Abyssinia and Iraq. The enemy had regained the initiative in North Africa and, in spite of attempts in May and June to dissuade him, was preparing to reduce the beseiged port of Tobruk and present Egypt, with due and appropriate ceremony, to Der Fuehrer and Il Duce.

– 204 –

The Eighth Army had been created.10 Headquarters Middle East Forces, devoutly thankful for the lull while General Rommel took thought about Tobruk, completed its plans for yet another offensive and considered that ‘The time was blessedly lost wherein such preparation was gained.’ When the Division was concentrating for ‘Exercise No. 4’ the enemy was making finally ready for the fall of Tobruk. It was thought that we might be preparing a diversionary attack, but as it was estimated that we would need three days to deploy and that the Tobruk affair would take only two days, everything, Teutonically, was just fine.

It is not in the character of an Engineer history to probe deeply into relative strengths of fighting formations; it is sufficient to say that the infantry was considered adequate, the Royal Air Force had a plentiful supply of planes and forward landing grounds, and that the Royal Navy was taking an interest. Our tank gun was inferior in penetrating power but it had better control and rate of fire—an Achilles and Graf Spee set-up, in a situation that had many of the characteristics of an ocean: no flanks, few landmarks and a wide choice of routes.

The Eighth Army plan may also be briefly summarised. Thirtieth Corps, containing most of the armoured units, was to destroy the enemy tank formations wherever they might be. Thirteenth Corps, consisting of the New Zealand Division, 4 Indian Division and 1 Army Tank Brigade, was to isolate and later destroy the strongpoints along the frontier. A third force, the Oasis Group, had the minor role of creating diversions in southern Cyrenaica, while the Tobruk garrison at the appropriate moment was to break out of the surrounding ring, consisting mostly of Italian formations.

In 13 Corps, 4 Indian Division had the task of engaging enemy attention from the coast to the Omars, and of covering the New Zealand right flank as it wheeled and advanced northwards to isolate the enemy in the Bardia-Sollum-Halfaya-Sidi Omar areas. The Army Tank Brigade was to come under New Zealand command.

The nature of the terrain was not unknown to the senior officers, for the CRE had had a scale plaster model made of the whole area from Sidi Barrani to Tobruk. This was the first of many topographical models built by Headquarters Divisional

– 205 –

Engineers for General Freyberg. Although it served the purpose well enough it was too heavy to be readily moved and later models were made in sections of convenient size and weight. They were bolted together, and when the General moved the whole thing was dismantled and slipped into a cabinet and moved with him.

The transfer of the Division to the assembly area, about 30 miles south-west of Matruh, took three days, with one brigade moving each day. Seventh Field Company was under command 5 Brigade, 6 Field Company with 4 Brigade, Headquarters NZE and Divisional Postal Unit with Divisional Headquarters Group, and both 8 Field Company and 5 Field Park Company11 with 6 Brigade.

When the sun rose on 14 November the radiators of nearly 3000 vehicles, all at 200 yards' interval, were pointing to the west, with the wheels of the rearmost just off the Siwa track. For the first time in its history the New Zealand Division was about to move as a single body. It covered almost one hundred square miles. Far to the south other hundreds in the tens of thousands of square miles of desert were occupied by formations in 30 Corps.

Officers attended conferences and returned with the news that was no news—we were going to chase Jerry right out of North Africa. In actual fact preparations for battle had already begun, for the RAF was taking care that as few as possible enemy planes saw as little as possible of what was going on below. Remember Greece and Crete where a man was scared to look up in case a German pilot saw the whites of his eyes?

The first stage in the New Zealand approach march was made by day and ended near Misheifa, where the Kiwi railway sappers had built the railhead. Two night marches, ending south of Buq Buq and Sollum respectively and about 20 miles in length, brought the Division close to the frontier, where a barbed-wire barricade separated the sands of Egypt from those of Libya.

How did thousands of vehicles move by night across the desert without the benefit of tail or head lights? They snarled along in low gear on an axis already surveyed by Headquarters Divisional Engineers. The drivers develop a sixth sense and the whole mass moves as inexorably as a plague of locusts— with internal variations. Fifth Field Park Company was carrying its small box girder set (SBG) on large Albion lorries which

– 206 –

were not designed for moving in soft sand. There were few four-wheel-drive vehicles in those early days, and the only way to avoid bogging in such patches was to open the throttle, surge forward and risk a collision.

Lieutenant Bowes12 of Headquarters Divisional Engineers surveyed the axis of advance by sun-compass and mileage meter and then checked on known points by oil compass. He travelled with a section of the Provost Company which marked the route with blue flags at half-mile intervals. For night marches the flags were replaced with shaded lights sited to give the maximum range of visibility.

‘On Monday 17 Nov,’ Lieutenant Brady,13 7 Field Company, wrote, ‘we were lying somewhere south of Sofafi when I was informed that I was to move west that night with No. 1 Section, and to meet the Div. Cav. at 0800 hrs the following morning, and if necessary put a patrol out ahead of us. Our job was to cut a 300 yd gap in the Border wire at a given map reference and without fail at that exact point. This was for the Division to pass through later that day…. The wire presented quite a problem to remove, being of very heavy gauge and with steel standards set in concrete. Quite a problem to climb through it, but who was keeping who out of where we had no idea. However with the aid of our trucks we were able to pull out the standards and drag the tangle of wires to either side. The main excitement came when a couple of vicious looking snakes were discovered at the base of one of the standards.’

The Division passed into Libya through the gap in the wire (18-19 November); farther south 30 Corps was making a gigantic right wheel; General Rommel, convinced that the movement reported in the south was only a ‘recce’ in force, gave orders to exert sufficient strength to take care of the situation while he dealt with the really important job of reducing Tobruk.

The Division did not move on the 19th. The only events of sapper note were that 5 Field Park Company left 6 Brigade and reverted to the command of the CRE; more gaps were cut in the wire. Captain Pemberton, with twenty men from Bridging Section and a few trucks of wire, departed to erect a cage on the Egyptian side of the border for the accommodation of pros-

– 207 –

pective prisoners of war. They built one, as suggested, 100 yards square, then having some wire left over erected a smaller one for luck just in case business was brisk. They rejoined the Company the following day.

A short move nearer the desert track Trigh el Abd was made before nightfall. The Indians were closing in on the Omars and there was a rumble of distant gunfire. Advanced armoured elements were already in contact, but to the German commander it was still only a reconnaissance in force, though maybe too great a force for comfort.

Panzer Group Africa issued the instruction: ‘Afrikakorps will destroy the enemy battle groups in the area between Bardia, Tobruk and Sidi Omar before they can offer a serious threat to [the assault on] Tobruk.’

For two more days the Division teetered around on its toes like a keyed-up runner waiting the starter's signal. Inconclusive battles were fought elsewhere and inaccurate appreciations were made of enemy tank losses. They were very like the estimates made in early infantry actions before it was realised that an enemy who dives for cover is not necessarily a casualty; neither is a tank commander who moves back on his reserves fleeing the field. The armoured fighting had moved to the west and so given 13 Corps some elbow room. The Division began to move on 21 November towards Sidi Azeiz, a spot where several important desert tracks converged on the Trigh Capuzzo, itself the inland main highway, a series of rutted tracks wandering across the desert. It had not moved far, however, when the code-words MARS, JUPITER, TAURUS were received. Their purport was to begin immediately the tasks originally allocated to the brigades, which were, shortly:

5 Brigade to advance to the Trigh Capuzzo and contain the enemy forces in the Bardia-Sollum area;

4 Brigade to cut the Bardia-Tobruk road;

6 Brigade to be ready to move to the assistance of 30 Corps in the Gambut area.

General Rommel, finally convinced that his opposite number was engaged in no diversionary thrust but on a large-scale offensive, shelved his plans for Tobruk and began considering how best to destroy the British forces now in the Sidi Rezegh area and uncomfortably close to Tobruk.

The immediate tasks of 5 Brigade were: 21 Battalion Group,

– 208 –

which included 3 Section (Lieutenant Foster14) 7 Field Company, was to reconnoitre Hafid Ridge15 and Bir Ghirba in the rear of the enemy fortress line; 22 Battalion Group (no engineers) was to capture and dig in at the Sidi Azeiz road junction; a patrol from 23 Battalion was to ‘recce’ a route to Fort Capuzzo; 5 Brigade, less detachments, was to take up an all-round defensive position three miles south of Sidi Azeiz.

Twenty-second Battalion met no opposition at Sidi Azeiz. A section of Divisional Cavalry had already swept the area and scooped up the few resident Italians.

Twenty-first Battalion moved on to Hafid Ridge without trouble but had a very different reception at Bir Ghirba. That is always liable to happen when information is not accurate and a battalion is unwittingly sent upon a brigade-sized job. The attack was called off at dusk (22nd) and the sapper section returned without being employed.

The 23 Battalion patrol, which included No. 1 Section, 7 Field Company, took the honours in 5 Brigade.

‘… during the afternoon (21st) Major Thomas told me to prepare for a move with a detachment of 23 Bn, our job being to cut the water pipeline from Bardia to Halfaya. I was supplied with an aerial photograph of Capuzzo which clearly showed the trench in which the pipeline was laid. After tea we joined up with 23 Bn and set off for Capuzzo, the navigating being done by the Bn. All went well until some of the leading trucks became stuck; this created a considerable noise which must have been heard for miles around. After getting mobile again we carried on and finally came out on a tar sealed road running from Bardia to Capuzzo, and just north of the actual fort itself. We formed up and moved down the edge of the road straight into the fort.’16

It was the noise of getting the trucks unbogged that helped the patrol commander in his audacious capture of Fort Capuzzo and 200 very surprised Italians. Nobody, they thought, except their own people, would make such a hellish noise in the middle of the night.

The sappers left the infantry to do whatever they do when they help themselves to an enemy fort without so much as a

– 209 –

by-your-leave and set about locating the pipeline. It proved to be a six-inch main and was cut by the simple process of removing a length of pipe.

At dawn sappers early on the scrounge found some empty tents with beds obviously vacated in a hurry. Further investigation led them to an underground tank in which were found about twenty very cold Italians, the engineers' first prisoners of the campaign. The officer with them appeared not so much concerned about his prospects of passing the war in a PW camp as with the disappearance of his ornate shaving gear from his tent.

Fourth Brigade, with the task of cutting the Bardia-Tobruk road, navigated through a dark and stormy night to Menastir, about 15 miles north of Sidi Azeiz. The brigade halted near the edge of an escarpment that overlooked what was variously called the Coast Road, the Bardia-Tobruk road or the Via Balbia.17

Sixth Field Company continued an unpleasant experience by camping in a nest of thermos bombs, one of which advertised its presence by exploding under Lieutenant McFarlane's18 truck. ‘We walked on tip-toe all night, marked off 20-odd more without further explosion, then moved out and set them off with rifle-fire. McFarlane wasn't hurt, but the truck was very battered underneath.’19

The sappers had a grandstand view of 20 Battalion negotiating a track down the escarpment and having a fine time playing foxes in the hen run with bewildered line-of-communication troops. The surprise was complete, but later armoured cars and self-propelled guns arrived and a squadron of tanks was sent to answer them. Small battles were fought throughout the day and by nightfall over 400 prisoners had been collected.

It was a satisfying spectacle for 6 Field Company, which had opened its campaign in Greece with the loss of forty sappers in the ambush at Elevtherokhorion and closed it with a hundred killed, wounded and missing at Corinth.

Orders were expected for an attack on Bardia, but instead 4 Brigade was instructed to leave 20 Battalion Group, with 6 Field Company less No. 2 Section (Lieutenant Wheeler) under

– 210 –

command, at Menastir, until relieved by 22 Battalion, while the balance of the brigade occupied the landing ground at Gambut.

The reader is invited to study the map. South of the main road between Bardia and Tobruk an escarpment divides into

– 211 –

two branches, the northern one fading out past Gambut landing ground (now the objective of 4 Brigade). The southern branch flattens out near Bir el Chleta, then builds up again and carries on through Zaafran to Belhamed, then to Ed Duda and farther west.

map of rail construction

sollum - tobruk, showing routes up escarpments

Another escarpment begins south of Bir el Chleta and follows the Trigh Capuzzo to Sidi Rezegh. At two-thirds of its length stands Point 175. South again from Point 175 is the start of yet another escarpment which fades out west of El Adem.

It will be noticed that a by-pass road that had been built from the Via Balbia around Tobruk passes through a defile between Belhamed and Ed Duda, while the Trigh Capuzzo goes past the little tomb popularly called ‘the Mosque’ that gives the Sidi Rezegh escarpment its name. The Ed Duda-Belhamed-Sidi Rezegh triangle dominates the south-eastern approaches to Tobruk.

The Gambut landing ground was approached by 4 Brigade by way of a shallow three-mile-wide valley between the forks of the escarpment south of the Via Balbia. The column was fired on and there were halts while the gunners retaliated, but there was no trouble for the infantry on arrival. The attached tanks had done all that was necessary.

Sixth Brigade had left the Divisional area on the afternoon of the 21st under instructions to move west on the axis of the Trigh Capuzzo as far as Bir el Chleta. The journey was resumed on the 22nd but, on account of an inaccurate situation report, without any sense of urgency. The situation was viewed in a different light when an LO from 30 Corps arrived with urgent instructions for the support tanks to move on Sidi Rezegh at their best speed.

A signal from General Freyberg amplified these disturbing orders: ‘Have received orders from 30 Corps that you are to take your Bde Gp with all haste to relieve Support Group of Armd Corps who are surrounded at Sidi Rezegh 428405. You will receive no further orders but you will start fighting and get in touch with Gen GOTT comd 7 Armd Div who is surrounded there. Recognition signal is two red verey lights. Leave your 2nd line [transport] at present location or send back eastwards. You must decide quickly whether you go by rd or part on escarpment.’

The brigade got on to the Trigh Capuzzo before dark and found that it did not belie its name—‘the Capuzzo track’—a mere line of wheel ruts very like the old Tokaanu-Waiouru

– 212 –

desert road in the coaching era. A halt was made for breakfast before dawn, but the first glimmers of light revealed that some of the columns were mixed among German vehicles whose occupants were similarly engaged. Eighth Field Company heard the firing and was told later that 200 prisoners were taken before the parties disengaged and finished their breakfasts at a safer distance from each other.

The intention was to occupy Point 175 before going to the assistance of 5 South African Brigade, whose position was reported to be insecure. What was expected to be a routine operation resulted in a bloody battle, with 25 Battalion losing over 300 in killed, wounded and missing. Part of 24 Battalion was thrown in and even then a line had to be consolidated short of the trig point. The sappers were positioned in what was thought to be a safe spot near Brigade Headquarters in Wadi esc Sciomar, about three miles east of Point 175.

Eighth Field Company's first day in action had been very full; it had heard a confused mêlée before breakfast and seen the results of a partially successful attack against a heavily defended position before tea. In the interval three enemy tanks had been sighted and chased away by guns, but not before a few trucks had mildly panicked at the sight. Then a party of infantry had been seen and fired on at extreme range and with probably little effect, but they had obligingly disappeared from view. However, the Company had laid no mines to protect the infantry nor had they been asked to lift any.

The infantry completed the capture of Point 175 the next day but the Field Company took no part. The position was then that the western slopes of the feature could still be made uncomfortable, the South African brigade had been overrun and apparently there were enemy in all directions. Sixth Brigade could, in fact, have been very easily erased, but it did not happen and this is the way of it—in the light of after knowledge.

General Rommel, under the impression that he had accounted for the armour of 30 Corps, was engaged in a venture that has been described variously as a brilliant operation and a piece of military foolishness; instead of completing the destruction of his scattered adversary, the German and Italian armour had been ordered to relieve the Omar forts. Certainly Headquarters 30 Corps was chased into Egypt, supplies disrupted and havoc caused in the rear areas. The Omars, however, were a disappoint-

– 213 –

ment as they were largely occupied by Indians and determinedly hostile, but the New Zealand Division, thought to be facing Sollum, was marked for early capture.

There were in fact only three battalions and 5 Brigade Headquarters in the Sollum area. The position there was:

Brigade Headquarters had taken over the defence of a landing ground at Sidi Azeiz.

Twenty-eighth (Maori) Battalion Group, which included No. 2 Section, 7 Field Company (Lieutenant Ross20), had captured the barracks on the edge of the escarpment at Upper Sollum without much trouble and were looking down on the pier where 19 Army Troops Company barges had been bombed the previous December.

Twenty-second Battalion Group (No. 3 Section, Lieutenant Foster) was covering the Bardia-Tobruk road west of Bardia. It had taken over from 20 Battalion, which had left by way of the Trigh Capuzzo, where it was to rendezvous with 21 Battalion (now detached from 5 Brigade) and Divisional Headquarters which, with 5 Field Park, was en route to Bir el Chleta.

Twenty-third Battalion Group (No. 1 Section, Lieutenant Brady) had moved in to Fort Capuzzo; three battalions were thus doing the job originally entrusted to seven and there was no more talk for the moment of attacking Bardia. Water was now a problem at Capuzzo for the three tanks originally supplying the fort were in various stages of disrepair, and the enemy, after losing the services of a truckload of men sent to repair an inexplicable leak in the line to Halfaya, discontinued pumping water to the fort.

Lieutenant Brady illustrates one of those arrangements that just happen through force of circumstances and without the consent of Authority. He wrote:

‘Water was now one of our problems. We discovered an underground supply about a mile North of Capuzzo where the track branched off to Sidi Aziz. As this was outside the Bn's perimeter we used our water cart and all available cans to transport water into one of the large tanks in Capuzzo and succeeded in shifting a considerable quantity in this manner. This daily water cart parade really provided one of the highlights of our stay in Capuzzo. Each morning we set off after breakfast accompanied by a Bren Carrier who was to give us warning of any enemy activity.

– 214 –

‘After one morning we got word that an enemy party was approaching from Bardia, so we packed up our pumping gear and departed back to our area and discovered to our amazement that the Germans were also using this water point, presumably to augment their supply. It then became a daily practice for us to have the mornings at the water point and the Germans the afternoons, both sides doing their best to get as much as possible. We eventually shifted about 10,000 gls.

‘We also turned one of the underground tanks into an emergency hospital and this proved to be very useful later on.’

Meanwhile at Bir el Chleta, Headquarters NZ Division, 20 and 21 Battalions, 5 Field Park and 6 Field Companies dispersed at daybreak and stood-to under scattered shellfire. The sappers breakfasted and later had a grandstand view of 20 Battalion with some tanks turning on an enemy group and chasing it away in the general direction of Gambut where, unless it was very careful, it would collide with 4 Brigade. The group then split, with 21 Battalion, under orders to report to 6 Brigade, moving towards Sidi Rezegh, 20 Battalion rejoining 4 Brigade now west of the Gambut area, and Divisional Headquarters (with 5 Field Park and 6 Field Company less one section) moving another seven miles along the Trigh Capuzzo and establishing themselves under the lee of Point 175.

Sixth Brigade attacked again before dawn (25th) and carried its line about two miles past what was called the Blockhouse, actually a rest post for travellers. During the night 8 Field Company was ordered to take up a position near Point 175. It was the Company's first night manoeuvre in battle and Major Currie remembers it very well:

‘We moved in close formation, my PU in front of the centre to lead the way. We went South-West to avoid WADI ESC SCIOMAR and then directly North to the centre of our position. It was pitch dark, no lights, and I was travelling on dead reckoning worked off the map. We travelled at a very slow speed. Suddenly the texture of the darkness changed, and I stopped and everybody else did. I then found that we were on the edge of the escarpment where we were supposed to be. The escarpment was too steep to drive down in the dark and in that part it would require careful driving in full light. We camped for the rest of the night and dispersed at first light.’

The Company was shelled at daybreak and suffered its first casualties, one fatal.21 The 18-pounder troop of 33 Anti-Tank

– 215 –

– 216 –

Battery came up and silenced the enemy guns, for which the sappers were very grateful as it was their first experience of shellfire and it taught them much of the nerve control that carries a man through such an ordeal. In the years to come many a night in the NAAFI was brightened by descriptions of sappers taking cover behind their unloaded boxes of ammunition and grenades.

map of military maneuver

the advance to tobruk, 23–27 november 1941

When there was sufficient light to see the country ahead, 4 Brigade again drew level by advancing as far as Zaafran, where there was a good passage down the escarpment. No. 2 Section, 6 Field Company, was joined there by the rest of the Company and it was agreed by all that even though they had been given no jobs there was no lack of movement. The Company was lucky to have left the Divisional Headquarters area in time to miss an attack by twenty-eight dive-bombers, one of the few times the enemy air force had been able to intervene. A number of bombs fell among the Headquarters Divisional Engineers and 5 Field Park vehicles. Four trucks and Lieutenant-Colonel Hanson's car were damaged beyond repair. Captain Lindell was wounded and Lieutenant Wildey took his place as Adjutant. The only fatal casualty among the engineers was the 5 Field Park dog mascot, Captain Box Girder.

Major Anderson was instructed to build a temporary prisoner-of-war cage in a wadi where an MDS had been established a little eastward of Trig 175.

‘We jacked up a cage using the Fd Park Bridging trucks and some barbed wire. And prisoners came thick and fast. By 28th we had over a thousand. There was no shelter, no conveniences, no grub. It was getting a bit grim. We had a German Colonel for whom we provided a tent but that was the only convenience. He asked for a smoke and I offered him some cigarettes but apparently he only smoked cigars which weren't on the menu.’

Major Currie was called up on the phone that had been laid to Brigade Headquarters (Engineer companies had no wireless at that stage) and instructed to investigate a suspected minefield reported in a wadi between Point 175 and the Blockhouse, where three trucks had been blown up during the night operations. He went to investigate his first enemy minefield and found a number of hastily laid ‘Teller’ mines,22 conspicuous by

– 217 –

being only partly buried and covered with sand. No. 3 Section (Lieutenant ‘Mit’ Page23) was given the job of lifting them and found about fifty altogether. The place had been used as an artillery headquarters and the sappers left the area staggering under the weight of loot they had acquired. Another minefield found at Point 175 was lifted by No. 2 Section (Lieutenant ‘Monty’ Craven24). The Company felt that it was justifying its existence.

General Rommel, besides other diversions, was getting on with his arrangements for liquidating the New Zealand Division which he still supposed to be in the Sollum area. And General Freyberg was making his preparations for the relief of Tobruk. It was to be a night attack with bayonet and grenade, and if all went well daylight would find 4 Brigade on Belhamed ridge and 6 Brigade with two battalions on the Sidi Rezegh escarpment and two on the high ground at Ed Duda. Then 70 Division from the Tobruk garrison, when ordered, would break through the enemy ring around Tobruk and join the Kiwis.

Eighth Field Company had no active part to play in the 6 Brigade operations beyond moving up as far as the Blockhouse area, but 2 Section, 6 Field Company, spent a very busy and unprofitable night with 4 Brigade.

Belhamed was to be taken by two assaulting battalions (18 and 20) with Colonel Kippenberger of 20 Battalion in charge of the operation. No. 2 Section (Lieutenant Morgan25), with two trucks and 500 anti-tank mines, accompanied the attack with the mission of laying a protective minefield in front of the position when won. Morgan says:

‘We moved off in the dark following Bn. H.Q. After some time we started moving down hill along what appeared to be a wadi, which I later realised led down the escarpment. We had difficulty in guiding the two trucks as the going was very rough. When we reached the bottom of the escarpment Kip realised that he was off course and we must have moved too far to the right. After doing some map reading under a ground sheet he decided to move back up the escarpment and change direction left from our recent course.’

– 218 –

The sudden rattle of small-arms fire, the yells of charging men and the uprush of German rockets was the first intimation that Headquarters Group was not where it ought to be. A cautious return was being made when a party of enemy was encountered and the result was approximately seventy prisoners. Except for wounded men calling for help and stretcher bearers stumbling around in the darkness, everything was then quiet on Belhamed. No. 2 Section and Battalion Headquarters formed a defensive perimeter while Colonel Kippenberger went off to find the battalions. This took a long time and in the end the infantry consolidated on Belhamed without the benefit of protective mines. Had things not gone wrong in the darkness those 500 anti-tank mines might have made all the difference later. It is to be noted that the tactical advantages of minefields were not thoroughly appreciated at that period, for though other opportunities presented themselves during the battle, none of the engineer units were called on to protect the FDLs with anti-tank mines.

To resume.

‘Just before dawn Kip sent me back to Bde. with my Sec. and two trucks as these were too conspicuous on the flat plain,’ Morgan continues. ‘We also took back a batch of prisoners…. We arrived back at Bde about an hour (?) after daybreak out of the morning fog. I believe Bde was rather puzzled by our appearance at first. Two trucks with prisoners between them and my blokes in single file on each side escorting both. That morning haze played tricks on the eyes.’

Support arms were to move up to Belhamed behind the infantry and Sergeant Tom Hanger26 and fifteen sappers of 3 Section were detailed to accompany some tanks which were under command of 4 Brigade. Their job was to lift anti-tank mines, for which task they carried mine detectors. Again something went wrong for the tanks did not find the infantry and went too far forward. The result was a fierce fight with enemy armour which cost seven tanks, and from which the sappers were lucky to return without casualties.

The 6 Brigade attack along Sidi Rezegh was only partly successful for it got no farther than the little mosque that gave the place its name, whereas two battalions should have pressed on from there to Ed Duda. Fourth Brigade, securely in possession of Belhamed, brought 19 Battalion from reserve and

– 219 –

sent it against Ed Duda. Sixth Field Company was then ordered to occupy part of the position vacated by the 19th along the edge of a low escarpment at Zaafran. They were joined there by some 200 survivors of the South African brigade mentioned earlier and a South African officer, Major C. Cochrane, was given command of the Kiwi-Springbok combination. The line was thickened up with the balance of 5 Field Park under Captain Pemberton. Beyond the shortage of water, which was rationed down to half a bottle per man plus three half mugs of tea provided by the cooks, memorable events in the next few days on the Kiwi-Springbok front were the guarding of some tanks in laager while maintenance was carried out and the shooting down of an enemy ‘recce’ plane.

Who shot the plane down is an open question but it fell in the 6 Field Company area. No. 3 Section captured the wounded pilot and observer and were rapidly dismantling the machine when Authority put it under guard until an IO came from Divisional Headquarters.

The Divisional programme for the night 26th–27th was for 6 Brigade to secure the rest of the Sidi Rezegh escarpment while 4 Brigade tied in with 70 Division, which had meantime reached Ed Duda. The Italian forces investing Tobruk had been rather roughly handled by 70 Division in the breakout, and messages to Rommel imploring him to return and save a threatening situation failed to reach him, or if they did he took no apparent notice. He was still in the rear of the force he supposed he had trapped between 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions. And the scattered but not annihilated 30 Corps armour had been given time to reassemble, repair, and replenish.

Both brigades now took all their objectives and junction was made with 70 Division on Ed Duda. Tobruk was in effect relieved and a corridor cleared in the terrain commanded by the New Zealand Division. But General Rommel was now concentrating on the problem of how to disperse the enemy containing his frontier posts, and how with expedition to get back to Tobruk. His resulting actions brought disaster to 5 Brigade Headquarters Group.

Seventh Field Company's dispositions at dawn on 27 November were:

No. 1 Section on water duties at Fort Capuzzo.

No. 2 Section at Sidi Azeiz with Company Headquarters in the 5 Brigade HQ Group.

– 220 –

No. 3 Section on water duties with 22 Battalion on the escarpment above the Bardia-Tobruk road.

Company Headquarters' cook's burner was belching flames and breakfast was near. Over near the horizon was an approaching cloud of dust, a cloud that hid a line of tanks—enemy tanks. Shells began to explode in the area and everybody dived for slit trenches—everybody except the cook, who had no trench and had to lie down near his burner and watch the breakfast burn to cinders. Soon the engineer trucks were on fire and detonating anti-tank mines added to the smoke and noise.

Major Thomas describes his last battle:

‘Much of the ground in our area was rock and when a shell burst on this hard ground near a slit trench the ground was made to ring and slit trenches certainly felt comforting. The gunners had a bad time manning their few guns as they did not have the same protection as other personnel close to the ground.

‘Some infantry groups changed their position among the black smoke of burning gear, ammo and other stores, and the bursting shells but their game effort could not affect the outcome.

‘After a period of heavy shelling the tanks rode into our position with their machine guns shooting at anything above the ground. The tanks halted among and over us and we furtively looked for the German Infantry who we understood always followed up their tanks. Fortunately for the German Infantry and possibly fortunately for us, no German Infantry arrived. The tanks with their armour plate overawed us and Brigadier Hargest decided to cease fire…. The Brigadier was not interested in mines for protection of his wide open position. Admittedly, all of us assumed that it was merely a halt on our advance on Tobruk and Major Nicholl,27 O.C. Div Cav was horrified when it was suggested that mines would give some protection.’28

The survivors of 5 Brigade Headquarters Group, breakfastless, were marched 19 miles to Bardia and a PW cage. Streams of enemy vehicles were on the move, some towards Tobruk, others to Bardia and replenishment. Elements of 23 and 28

– 221 –

Battalions situated in the path of these columns as they lapped around Fort Capuzzo were involved, but the sappers were not engaged in any of the fighting. The situation that night was not reassuring according to Lieutenant Brady:

‘By nightfall Capuzzo was completely surrounded and in every direction German flares were to be seen, giving a grim picture for the following morning as it was known that large forces of enemy were in the vicinity and our reply was one tank minus track which was manoeuvred into position and there it stayed. However by next morning the enemy had completely disappeared.’

Twenty-second Battalion was in the unhappy state of not knowing much of what was going on but being quite certain that its position was dangerous: gunfire and smoke in the direction of Sidi Azeiz, a message to the effect that Brigade Headquarters was being attacked, then no more messages. Large heavily armed convoys, too strong for the battalion to do much about, streamed westwards from Bardia and a threatening infantry deployment, which did not however develop into an attack, preceded an uneasy night.

While the Division consolidated its new areas on Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda (27th) 23 Battalion Group fought off another attack. From the sapper's view at the water point:

‘Next day the 27th, at about 1100 hrs the shelling began in earnest and we had several hours of it during which we suffered six engineer casualties, including Sapper Tate,29 killed in action and Sapper Davidson,30 died of wounds. My pickup, an 8 cwt Dodge, received a direct hit but fortunately Arthur Warburton,31 the driver, was not in it…. This truck “Audrey” was to become a familiar sight, as over the next couple of years the riddled cab was to