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CHAPTER 5
Crete

Dawn disclosed the decks of the Glengyle covered with khaki forms and out of sight of land, though not beyond the range of enemy aircraft. The weight and accuracy of the ship's anti-aircraft armament so embarrassed the German pilots who were soon overhead that no material harm was done to the convoy. In spite of the matter-of-fact attitude of the sailors operating the multi-barrelled, quick-firing ‘Chicago Pianos’ and the appearance of miraculously produced meals, the troops were very pleased indeed when they were beyond the range of the German fighters and under the protection of the RAF now based on Crete.

Where the British planes came from and where the Glengyle was going to was not as important to the Maoris as the fact that Greece was somewhere behind the horizon. By mid-morning hills, unsubstantial in the distance, began to take shape and substance. Soon everybody knew that they were nearing the island of Crete and, later, that they were to land there while the Glengyle went back for another load.

Early afternoon and the Glengyle was in harbour—a small harbour, but at that moment a busy one and, judging by the sight of the cruiser York sitting on the bottom in the bay with her front turret awash, not very safe. It was, in fact, the main harbour for the forces in Crete, although its single quay could accommodate only two ships at a time. Suda Bay was crammed with shipping, dotted with Sunderland flying boats, and alive with small craft dashing from ship to shore.

The troops, still in possession of the majority of the battalion's weapons, were loaded into ferries and directed by the landing authorities, plainly embarrassed by the multitudes, to a road that led to Canea, the capital, some three miles west.

The 28th (Maori) Battalion, marching along a hot and dusty road, was halted at a refreshment point near Canea where hot tea, cigarettes, an orange, and some chocolate were handed to each man by troops of the Welch Regiment. Every man was very grateful to the Welch Regiment, not only for the refreshments its men were issuing but for the sense of stability and the sight of disciplined organisation it provided.

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Another hour or so on the road and the visitors were directed to an open field with scattered olive trees, a part of the Perivolia plantation near the village of that name; rations appeared but no blankets and the Maoris spent a chilly night under the bright Cretan stars. In the morning (26th) the battalion shifted to another bivouac in the same plantation; it should have gone there in the first place but had been misdirected.

The next day it moved again—somebody had to defend Crete until reinforcements could be brought from wherever they were coming to replace the New Zealanders, who would embark on the empty transports. In the meantime, 5 Brigade was to protect the Maleme airfield in western Crete and also take care of the beaches as far as the Platanias River, about five and a half miles to the east of the airfield. The 28th Battalion as brigade reserve moved inland near Aghya village, south-east of Platanias, where a front of two miles facing south-west was allotted to it with instructions first to get comfortable and then to take up a defensive position. There was a belt of hills between the battalion and the coast and the company areas were situated on the southern spurs of the ridge. Canea was approximately nine miles away and the cafés beckoned to the more adventurous; others roamed the area and ate oranges, the biggest and sweetest the Maoris had ever seen. The fruit was cheap and plentiful, and through strict orders were issued that nothing was to be taken without payment the men would have been more than human if the edict had been strictly obeyed. Rations were restricted; was there not a proverb—Ka ki te puku, ka manawanui?¹

After a few days spent in relaxation and settling in, Colonel Dittmer passed on very explicit instructions to his company commanders. These instructions included notice that platoon parades were to be held at intervals, stand-to morning and evening, and sentries posted by day and night.

The posting of sentries added complications not always the fault of leave parties returning from adjacent villages. There was, for instance, the night when the password was ‘St. George’ and the countersign ‘For England’. A sentry whose biblical knowledge was better than his mythology forgot the password and held up a party because they had no answer to his challenge of ‘St. John’. After some argument they were permitted to pass with the admonition that the countersign was ‘The Baptist’ and that they had better be more careful next time because some Maori sentries were quick on the trigger.

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Minor changes in the battalion dispositions were made to conform to the pattern of the defence that was emerging as more New Zealand troops became available.

By this time Captain Love and his party had reported in as well as Major Bertrand, RSM Wood, WO II Burke, and, most unexpectedly, Captain F. Baker, who had a very exciting time which included being captured by the enemy and getting away again. He had been detailed to Megara Beach on an evacuation job similar to that of Major Bertrand and consequently knew nothing of the Reinforcement Company or its fate. After the Megara embarkations had been completed the beach staff was to have moved across the Corinth Canal to another embarkation point, but paratroops had already seized the Corinth bridge. The result was that the truck carrying Lieutenant-Colonel Marnham, RA, and Captain Baker was halted by a German patrol and the pair were constrained to join a convoy already in enemy hands. Soon after the column moved off the pair escaped by turning up a side road and disappearing smartly into an olive grove. After a series of adventures, which included finding a seaplane which he couldn't fly, a speed launch which he couldn't start, and a horse which he couldn't catch, Captain Baker eventually got a lift in a Greek truck and finished up at Porto Rafti as a liaison officer on the staff of 4 Infantry Brigade and thence to Crete.

He was posted as second-in-command to Major Dyer (D Company) and Lieutenant Te Kuru took command of 18 Platoon vice Second-Lieutenant Gilroy, still thought to be missing but, through a set of fortuitous circumstances, actually in Egypt.

On the last day of April General Freyberg was given command of the forces in Crete and instructed that retention of the island was essential for the successful operation of the Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. There was no likelihood of ground reinforcement and no further air support, although the Navy would do everything possible. He had approximately a fortnight to prepare and could then expect an invasion by airborne troops, plus a possible seaborne attack; conversely, he might be left alone and the enemy attack; conversely, he might be left alone and the enemy attack delivered against Syria or Cyprus.

The problem was how to hold a mountainous island 150 miles long and 40 wide at its greatest width, whose topography favoured the attack inasmuch as the few inadequate harbours, roads, and airfields were all on the north or enemy side.

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General Freyberg had at his disposal 30,000 Imperial and 12,000 Greek troops, but a considerable portion of the former consisted of specialists such as gunners without their guns, cavalry minus vehicles, engineers lacking equipment, and line-of-communication troops, many unarmed. They certainly could not be called infantrymen, the role in which they were now required to function, but though some were sent away to Egypt before action started, many of the others did extraordinarily well as amateur infantry. The Greeks were newly conscripted, untrained, and practically unarmed except for rifles of differing makes and varying antiquity; nevertheless they fought creditably when the time came.

Brigadier Puttick,² now commanding the New Zealand Division, was given the task of defending Maleme airfield and the western end of Crete. He had the seven infantry battalions of 4 and 5 Brigades (6 Brigade had gone direct to Egypt) and a third brigade, the 10th, made up of a composite battalion of Divisional Cavalry, gunners—‘infantillery’ they called themselves—and ASC, 20 Battalion, detached from 4 Brigade, and two Greek regiments.

Final locations were decided upon as follows: 10 Brigade in the Galatas area, 5 Brigade between Platanias and Maleme, and two Greek battalions west of Maleme. Fourth Brigade was in Force Reserve, deployed between Galatas and Canea.

The vital area in 5 Brigade's sector was the Maleme airfield with, secondarily, the beaches from Maleme to Platanias if the enemy elected to come by sea. There was the Navy to make the second method a hazardous venture but very few planes to oppose an aerial attack. The RAF and Fleet Air Arm made a gallant effort to protect what they could of Crete until only one Hurricane was left. It was ordered back to Egypt.

The Maoris moved over to Platanias in the evening of 3 May, when the brigade dispositions were, facing the sea: 28 (Maori) Battalion on the right flank in and west of Platanias village; two detachments of engineers from 19 Army Troops Company and 7 Field Company in front of Modhion village; 23 Battalion around Dhaskaliana, with 21 Battalion (less than half strength after Greece) on high country to its south and facing west; 22 Battalion around the airfield, with its western flank on the wide

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and pebbly bed of the Tavronitis River. In addition, some miles to the west at Kastelli two Greek battalions were being organised and trained by a small group of New Zealand instructors. Finally, round Maleme airfield were fourteen coast and antiaircraft guns manned by Royal Artillery, Royal Australian Artillery, and Royal Marines, but not under the control of Brigadier Hargest, who was responsible for the defence of the area.

The road from Platanias to Maleme ran parallel with and about half a mile inland from the sea. Hamlets were scattered over the area and there were vineyards and olive groves and small cultivated fields criss-crossed by canals and irrigation ditches. Steep-sided riverbeds, dry for the greater part of summer, ran down from the hilly country only a mile inland.

The Platanias River, which was never dry, had its source high up in the White Mountains. The river itself was about a chain wide and varied in depth from a few inches to waist deep, while its valley was half a mile wide at the coastal strip. There were roads on each side of the river that deteriorated as they led back into the hills and into the Aghya valley.

Headquarters Company (Captain Love) was placed along the road and beach covering Platanias village, which was three quarters of a mile east of the river; D Company (Major Dyer) was further west holding an extensive area which included the mouth of the Platanias River and the road bridge. South of these two companies the country rose rapidly and was studded with 600-feet-high peaks. Battalion Headquaters was placed in a gully on the northern slopes of one of these features. C Company (Captain Scott) was north-west of Headquarters and in rear of the two forward companies; B Company (Captain Royal) was on a ridge to the west of Battalion Headquarters overlooking the Platanias River, while A Company (Captain Bell) was on the other flank, mainly facing east, but it could also operate to the south—that is, to the rear of Battalion Headquarters and towards the left of B Company.

On the western side of the river were the two detachments of engineers facing the sea, with an irrigation canal running through their lines and Modhion village behind them. Due south of the right flank of 7 Field Company and situated on a rise above the canal was C Troop 5 Field Regiment (Captain Snadden),³ and just south again was 5 Brigade Field Punish-

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ment Centre (Lieutenant Roach).⁴ The former was in a position to cover the beach to its front and to the west of 28 Battalion, while the guards and prisoners of the latter commanded the left rear of the battalion area.

In Major Dyer's sector, where most of the early fighting took place, the ground was flat to undulating with scattered clumps of bamboo and odd poplar trees in addition to the inevitable grape-vines, olives, and patches of crops. The area was also traversed by the river and by a bamboo-lined millrace which carried water to a story-and-a-half-high mill near the river bridge.

No. 18 Platoon (Lieutenant Te Kuru) was the link between D and Headquarters Companies; 16 Platoon (Lieutenant Ormond) covered the road bridge over the river and the flat between the engineers and the road; 17 Platoon (Lieutenant Logan) was on higher ground between and behind the forward platoons. The key to D Company's western front was a small plateau actually on the extreme right of the Engineers' (19 Army Troops Company) position. Fire could enfilade the whole front from there, and part of a section commanded by Sergeant George Te Hou⁵ with two Brens was dug in on its northern edge.

Brigade Headquarters called for a return showing the numbers of tools, automatics, and other equipment in the possession of the battalions. It was the first return that had been requested since Olympus and the Maori Battalion unsuspectingly disclosed untold wealth to a Brigadier almost bereft of military necessities. In spite of orders to dump everything except arms at Porto Rafti, and to leave their automatics on the quay at Suda Bay, the Maoris' return showed four wireless sets, twentyeight Bren guns, a three-inch mortar, and a goodly selection of picks and shovels. It was a bitter battalion that saw its wireless sets taken by Brigade, nine Bren guns distributed to other units, and most of its tools to the same destinations. The three-inch mortar, which had been picked up by B Company on the Olympus Pass road and had been smuggled on to the Glengyle and finally to Platanias, was left with the unit.

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With the prospect of action in the near future, Headquarters Company was reorganised as a rifle company with three rifle platoons commanded by Lieutenants W. Ngata,⁶ D. Urlich, and F. T. Bennett respectively. The signal platoon retained its identity and another mortar platoon, commanded by Lieutenant McKay, was formed and armed with three 3-inch mortars.

The battalion's officers at this date were:

• CO: Lt-Col Dittmer

• 2 i/c: Maj Bertrand

• Adjutant: Capt Te Punga

• IO: Lt C. M. Bennett

• MO: Capt Mules

• QM: Capt Weir

• Chaplain: Rev K. Harawira

HQ Company

• OC: Capt E. Te W. Love

• Signals: Lt H. M. McDonald

• Mortars: Lt W. H. McKay

• Lt D. Urlich

• Lt W. T. Ngata

• Lt F. T. Bennett

A Company

• OC: Capt L. J. Bell

• Capt H. W. Leaf

• Lt W. Porter

• Lt A. Te Puni

B Company

• OC: Capt R. Royal

• Lt H. R. Vercoe

• 2 Lt R. Pene

• Lt H. O. Stewart

C Company

• OC: Capt A. T. McL. Scott

• Capt P. Tureia

• Lt H. Te O. Reedy

• 2 Lt J. Tuhiwai

• Lt K. A. Keiha

D Company

• OC: Maj H. G. Dyer

• Capt F. Baker

• Lt A. G. Ormond

• 2 Lt F. R. Logan

• Lt G. A. Te Kuru

Two days after the move to Platanias, on the afternoon of 5 May, a truck drew up at Battalion Headquarters and deposited a pair of Maoris grinning through a week's growth of whiskers. They were greeted with yells of amazement for it was thought that they were behind the wires of a German prison cage. Corporal Hayward⁷ and Lance-Corporal Hakaraia⁸ brought the first news of the fate of the carrier platoon.

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While the battalion was sheltering at Marathon the carrier platoon had spent the daylight hours hidden in olive groves at Cape Knimis and passed the time shooting at every plane that came within range. It was good clean fun and, though nothing was brought down, it was not from want of trying. After the Glengyle sailed the platoon was sent back behind 4 Brigade and some time during the night of 25–26 April was again diverted, this time in company with C Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry, to a new job on the Corinth Canal as local protection to anti-aircraft guns in that locality.

Soon after daylight on the 26th it was in hull-down positions overlooking the canal near Corinth. Most of the crews were enjoying a much-needed rest after the all-night drive when a yell, ‘They're coming down in parachutes!’ sent the carriers into action. In Corporal Hayward's words: ‘By this time the parachutists were coming down in dozens and gradually encircling us. At the same time we were being continually and systematically strafed with a string of ME 110's laying down a curtain of fire across the only gap that still remained as a possible escape route towards the hills.’

The sight of the Divisional Cavalry armoured cars already half-way to the hills decided Hayward to make a break through the gap while there was still time. There or four other carriers followed and, after charging through vineyards and over stone walls, got safely away. By this time two carriers had lost their tracks and it was decided to push the others over a cliff and march to an embarkation beach.

The party met a group of dismounted Divisional Cavalry men who had a map and a compass and a course was set for Navplion, in the Gulf of Argos, some 35 miles distant. They were there by dark and joined the tail of the column being taken aboard destroyers—and missed embarkation by a hundred yards of column. There was to be another embarkation the following night at T Beach, 15 miles down the coast, and the Maoris, now about a dozen, set off again. They waited all night but no ships came for the 1500 or so men waiting under the olive trees. By this time the Maoris had met Major Harford⁹ of the Divisional Cavalry, who told them the Germans had already passed them on the main road.

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Corporal Hayward continues:

I asked Captain [sic] Harford what was intended and he stated that he understood that the British officer in command had decided to surrender. I then asked him if he intended to surrender also. After a short discussion it was decided that as many as wished should make a dash for the beach and try to get off in the small boats that we had previously noticed.

In the scramble that followed Corporal Hayward found himself in an 18-foot boat with Lance-Corporal Hakaraia, Major Harford, and ten others of his squadron, rowing hard for the open sea. They waited until dark in the lee of a small islet off shore, then rowed across the gulf and down the coast until the late afternoon, when they decided to risk landing on a point where there were a few houses. There they obtained half a goat, four gallons of water and some cheese, also the information that the Germans were rapidly taking over the country. The goat was grilled over an open fire, and after a meal and a rest they resolved to row to Crete, or North Africa if they missed the island.

For rations they had what was left of the goat and cheese, the water, some biscuits, and their emergency ration issue. There was only one pair of oars but by half-hourly changes and by rowing day and night they made another island off Crete four days later. A larger Greek caique loaded with refugees was sheltering there waiting for dark to make the last dash to Crete, and after some parleying the skipper agreed to take some aboard and tow the others at a price of £1 a head. The sea which had been clam until then got up and their chances of making the last 30 miles would have been slim had they tried to row; so heavily laden was their craft that it had less than a foot of freeboard.

Hayward and Hakaraia were closely followed by Privates Epiha¹⁰ and De La Croix,¹¹ whose adventures were much the same except that they rowed all the way and landed on the beach where the battalion was holding a bathing parade. These four were the only members of the carrier platoon to reach Crete.

Each company was given an offensive and a defensive role and training consisted of practice in repelling imaginary attacks by sea and land. Moves in support of D Company nearest the

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beach were carried out in turn by the other companies and times were reduced at each attempt. Night patrols made the men acquainted with the terrain around their areas, while officers and NCOs reconnoitred alternative routes forward to the Maleme airfield. An outbreak of dysentery at this time took fairly heavy toll of the battalion; first B Company's OC was evacuated, followed shortly after by OC C Company and the battalion second-in-command, leaving Colonel Dittmer short of experienced commanders. It was not all work, however. The weather was perfect and time passed pleasantly enough; there was a little leave to Canea, although it entailed thumbing a ride on infrequently passing vehicles or a nine-mile walk each way. Nearer home the YMCA established a small depot in Platanias village where Mr McIvor gave excellent service while his stocks lasted. The village also boasted a pleasnat wineshop with a very good radio, and the troops, especially Headquarters Company, thronged there nightly to sample the brew and listen to the BBC news bulletin. The Maoris rapidly acquired a little Greek and Lieutenant Wattie McKay, practising at every opportunity, became so proficient in the language that he acted as the battalion interpreter.

Bathing parades, a company at a time, were held frequently and had their moments of excitement, for on occasions a German plane would swoop out of the clouds and along the beach spraying bullets as it passed. There were numerous bombing raids on Suda Bay, but Suda was well away from the battalion area and in war you have enough troubles of your own without bothering much about those of others. This detached attitude altered somewhat after the CO's conference on the 13th. He told his hearers that the invasion threat was very real and that the attack could come in the next four or five days.¹² The procedure would probably be preliminary bombing and machine-gunning to clear areas for paratroopers to land, after which the planes would continue circling and firing to protect the enemy while they organised.

The battalion answer would be action by fire power only until it was certain that any attack was not a feint, whereupon the troops would leave their dug-in positions, deal with the situation, and return again to shelter; reserve platoons were to be concentrated and mobile while all other positions were to

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be sited for all-round defence; firing was to be controlled as long as possible and only low-flying planes were to be engaged by the troops; trench sentries were to be responsible for operating a system of alarms, as follows:

• A series of short whistle blasts—Slit trenches.

• Long and short blasts—Battle stations.

• White Very lights—Reinforce D and Headquarters Companies' area.

If the attack came from the beach, A Company would move behind and to the left of C Company. Facing west in rear of D Company, the formation would be B Company, left, C Company, right, A behind B, and the transport platoon behind C Company. If attacked from the east A Company would be on the right, C Company, left B in rear of A, and the transport platoon behind C Company.

Finally, in any advance, all tommy guns would go with the first wave so as to permit riflemen to get in with the bayonet.

Colonel Dittmer was even more explicit at his conference on the 16th. The invasion could be expected at any time within the next three days and would be carried out by a force estimated at 35,000, of whom 25,000 would be airborne and the balance by ship. Points likely to be attacked as far as the New Zealand Division was concerned were Maleme, Canea, and the Aghya valley. The attack would probably be preceded by a strafe from 500 bombers, which would come in waves of a hundred followed by 600 troop-carrying planes dropping successive waves of paratroops. The seaborne troops were to be escorted by the Italian Navy, Royal Navy permitting. Particular attention was to be paid by the Maoris to shelter from divebombers and to the screening of trenches, while company commanders were to have their battle headquarters in a pit near their company OP.

The CO closed the conference by ordering a full alter, every man to possess his quota of 100 rounds of ammunition and all to remain in their fighting pits during the day. Nothing unusual occurred in the Platanias area on the 17th or 18th although, judging by the noise and smoke, both Maleme and Suda Bay were being ‘done over’ at regular intervals. In actual fact, an oil tanker in the bay was burning and a dozen other ships were lying disabled in the harbour. The noise was more continuous the next day and planes in dozens could be seen diving down on Maleme.

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It was the opinion at stand-to on the dawn of 20 May that even more than the usual hate was being expended on the Maleme positions. The Maori are was again not generally included, although D Company was most annoyed at being machine-gunned at breakfast.

The men were sitting along the river bank when a group of yellow and black Messerschmitts swept down the Maleme road at tree-top height spraying the country with bullets. They were past with a rattle and a roar before the troops could dive for cover, but it was noticed that the bridge and miller's house were not molested. No doubt the bridge was needed for future operations.

At 8 a.m. Private ‘Monty’ Wikiriwhi, on duty in the ‘I’ section OP, reached for his pencil and wrote in the logbook:

0830 hrs.

It appears that the invasion is about to be launched. The area round the aerodrome is being most intensively bombed and machine-gunned by countless planes of all kinds. Clouds of dust are rising high into the sky turning the whole area into a real inferno of flying dust and metal and visibility was reduced almost to nil.

0830 hrs.

In the midst of all this pandemonium paratroops were dropped round the aerodrome.

0845 hrs.

Paratroops were dropped in the Agha [Aghya] valley area.

Some of these troops were dropped along the west bank of the Platanias River and beyond effective range but were optimistically fired on by A, B, and C Companies until they were hidden in the ground cover.

A parachute with a load that glistened in the sun floated down about half-way between the enemy and B Company and Private Tommy Duncan¹³ volunteered to go out and investigate. He stalked the ‘chute and found it contained a canister of weapons, field glasses, and grenades. He was dragging it back when he noticed a party of Germans also bent on retrieving his trophy, which he felt disinclined to part with. He shot two and the others disappeared. This and subsequent exploits won him the Military Medal.

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But to return to Monty Wikiriwhi in the battalion OP:

0900 hrs.

More paratroops were dropped round the aerodrome and also in the re-entrant behind the 'drome.

0915 hrs.

A further batch of paratroops disgorged in the aerodrome area. About 200 troop-carrying planes have now passed along the Agha valley and made their way out to sea flying about 10 ft off the water. We estimate that 800–1000 troops have been dropped round the aerodrome with about the same number dropped in the valley of Agha.

0940 hrs.

More troop planes have discharged their cargo in the reentrant behind the 'drome. Sound of heavy fighting coming from the aerodrome area.

1030 hrs.

One troop-carrying plane effected a landing on the beach opposite D Coy lines. It was immediately set on fire presumably by Bren gun fire.¹⁴ These enormous black troop-carrying planes are circling round and round the beach and above the aerodrome seeking landing places.

A glider landed on the beach about 200 yards ahead of the plane already on fire.

1130 hrs.

Enemy seen concentrating in a house near the beach.

Troops watching from the hills around Platanias saw with unbelieving eyes a new kind of plane hovering above the snarling, diving fighters. They were huge and without propellers and flapped backwards and forwards in an uncanny manner—troop-carrying gliders waiting their cue to crash-land their ten airborne troops.

Close behind the gliders came large, black, lumbering troop-carriers flying almost wing to wing, formation after formation stretching out beyond the horizon. Then the Maoris saw the sky filled with white, red, green, and brown parachutes to the east, west, and south of Platanias—paratroops and their equipment.

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No enemy dropped in the Maori area, but some glider-borne troops were noticed concerntrating at a house on the beach about half a mile west of D Company and Captain Tureia¹⁵ was instructed to send a platoon to assist another from D Company in removing them. A composite Ngatiporou platoon commanded by Lieutenant Reedy joined 17 Platoon (Lieutenant Logan) and both parties under the command of Captain Baker prepared for their first action in Crete.

By the time they had worked to within 500–600 yards of the objective they were closely attended by several planes circling and gunning as they came round, but the Maoris kept on with fire and movement as practised in England. Logan, on the left, swung his platoon in an arc and closed in. The Germans were in twos and threes around the house and, after seven or eight of their number had been killed, two officers and eight other ranks surrendered. The Maoris' casualties were two slightly wounded, so besides being very gratified at the sight of their captives disliking the attention of their own aircraft, the men felt that a reasonable amount of utu¹⁶ had been obtained for the men killed in Greece.

The battalion was not involved in the fierce fighting that went on during the first day of the invasion and the only airborne enemy that came within range were two strays who dropped behind D Company. RSM Ace Wood and Lieutenant C. M. Bennett happened to be in the battalion OP at the time and tried their marksmanship at 400 yards. The quarry disappeared and the pair decided to stalk them. One was found slightly wounded in a place that would have made sitting uncomfortable and both surrendered quitely. The prisoners were relieved of automatics, knives, maps and aerial photographs, and escorted to Battalion Headquarters. The tally for the day was twelve captured and eight or nine killed. From the Maori point of view it was a satisfactory day, but it must be remembered that Platanias was not a German objective and that the battalion had not received the punishment taken by the troops around Maleme.

Probably the only members of the battalion not feeling satisfied with the situation were those, including Major Bertrand and Captain Scott, in 7 General Hospital near Galatas.

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They were shot up, bombed, and finally captured by a wave of paratroops who, with shouts of ‘Hants oop!’, gathered all the walking cases together. The party, Major Bertrand estimates about 300, was marched towards Galatas, which town, according to the German timetable, was due to be in their hands—and wasn't.

Major Bertrand reported:

By about 1500 hrs we had moved about a mile or more from 7 GH [General Hospital] and were, as we found, in the vicinity of 19 Bn who were occupying a position just south of the road leading to Galatas. Our guards must have come into contact with 19 Bn as we were herded into as small a space as possible. Soon after this a patrol of one section could be seen through the olive trees moving down a ridge across our front about 100 yards away and separated from us by a slight scrub clad depression. I could hear the patrol talking as one of them said, ‘There are no bloody Huns down here.’ We dare not move to attract attention and in spite of a strenuous ‘mind over matter’ session the patrol slowly moved out of sound and sight…. About half an hour after their disappearance we heard them coming back and once more our hopes rose (one of the patrol fired a shot in the general direction of the prisoners and was answered by one of the guards). The patrol immediately swung into action, extended and moved across the depression under cover. The subsequent proceedings resulted in the killing of all our guards except one in our immediate vicinity…. He was severely wounded in the thigh. As he had been particularly good to us we took him along with us to 19 Bn for treatment.

The 22nd Battalion, hard-pressed at Maleme, had asked for help and Colonel Dittmer was instructed to send a company to Headquarters 23 Battalion, where guides would be provided for the rest of the journey to 22 Battalion. B Company was given the job but Captain Royal, who had returned from hospital two days earlier, did not know the suggested round-about route and decided to use the main road and fight if forced to. The Arawa Company left at 7 p.m. and was unmolested until close to 23 Battalion area, when 10 Platoon (Lieutenant Vercoe) encountered a few paratroops who were cleaned up without much trouble. Very soon afterwards a larger body was met and the platoon was held up until 11 Platoon (Lieutenant Pene) reinforced it. The Germans, who had concentrated around a

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tree, shouted ‘We surrender’ and at the same time a grenade was thrown which wounded two Maoris. That grenade was the signal for, as far as is known, the first use of the bayonet by New Zealand troops in the war, for with a yell of ‘Surrender be —’ the Maoris charged and killed twenty-four Germans. Those not actually engaged assisted with hakas. A pocket a little further on yielded another eight dead Germans, after which B Company reached 23 Battalion without further incident.

The firing and yelling had attracted the attention of Captain Moody,¹⁷ who with a section of 5 Field Ambulance was also under instructions to report to 22 Battalion, and he joined his party to B Company.

The guides arrived after some delay for Colonel Leckie,¹⁸ CO 23 Battalion, had also been instructed to send a company forward to 22 Battalion but had not been informed that the Maoris were likewise reinforcing.

Because of enemy in unknown numbers in the locality, the route was first south on to the ridge where 21 Battalion was dug in. Men could be seen moving about and, not wishing to be shot at in mistake for Germans, Captain Royal told his men to talk in Maori. The 21st Battalion was amazed at the clamour but amused at the explanation.

After traversing Vineyard Ridge, as 21 Battalion had named its area, the Maoris were led down a road that took them on to the main highway, where they turned left towards the airfield until they were halted by wire along its perimeter. Captain Royal asked a shadowy figure behind the wire if he belonged to 22 Battalion and was answered with a grenade which luckily did little damage, slightly wounding one man.

The company began to deploy for action but its destination, a low ridge where trees could be seen against the skyline, was clearly in enemy hands, and the troops, though reluctant to depart without a fight, were withdrawn. Their instructions were to report to Headquarters 22 Battalion which had evidently departed, so the guide then made for Pirgos village, where the 22nd's rear headquarters was thought to be located. It was

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actually the Headquarters Company area, but it had been isolated all day and the company there was preparing to move out under cover of darkness. The Maoris saw vague figures who, as far as they knew, were probably Germans, but neither party molested the other and both left Pirgos by different routes.

B Company was taken across country then back on to the road from Vineyard Ridge, where it finally met Colonel Andrew¹⁹ with part of 22 Battalion moving back to a new position. When Royal told him where they had been, Colonel Andrew said, ‘You are damn lucky to be alive’ and then instructed him to return to his unit. The company followed the same route back and reported in after eleven hours’ marching.

The position at the opening of the second day of the invasion was that, of the three airfields and the port of Suda Bay, Maleme was more than half lost and the others still holding; General Freyberg's communications, inadequate before the attack, were now extremely disorganised and the German commander had decided, preparatory to the landing of 5 Mountain Division, to throw everything into the capture of Maleme.

The programme of the previous day was repeated but the captured Bofors guns were used against the defenders. More men were dropped near Maleme. Some troop-carrying planes landed west of Maleme, and after 5 p.m. began landing on the airfield itself. C Troop of 27 Battery, the only guns with direct observation, engaged the planes, but with gunsights made from chewing-gum and matchsticks did not have the accuracy for really effective fire.

About 1 p.m. Captain Baker was again instructed to clear the beach of enemy who could be seen concentrating near a house about half a mile beyond the scene of the previous day's exploit. His patrol consisted of 17 Platoon less one section (Lieutenant Logan) and half of 18 Platoon (Sergeant Jerry Smith).²⁰ They reached the first house without incident, but just beyond it saw and shot three Germans. A few minutes later six more were captured and sent back to D Company under escort. Almost simultaneously with their departure another five were sighted, but while they were in the process of being put

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in the bag like the others a grenade was thrown which wounded a Maori, whereupon no prisoners were taken. By this time the patrol was within 200–300 yards of the house when it was fired on from points in and about the objective. The two platoons tried to close in under mutual supporting fire but were strafed from the air and forced to take cover. When it was possible to move, Baker found himself separated from his party except for his runner and two wounded. Thinking that his force had moved back by the way it had come, he was about to do likewise when one wounded man said he had seen between five and six hundred paratroops drop into D Company and the general battalion area.

Captain Baker's intention to return to his company was frustrated by enemy machine-gunners in the house and both he and his runner took shelter in a drain. The position was further complicated by six planes landing on the beach between him and his hoped-for destination. Captain Snadden's battery was right on to them and only twenty men left the burning wrecks to run almost over the top of their two observers and take shelter in the scrub.

The estimate of between five and six hundred paratroops being dropped on the battalion was rather wide of the mark, but in actual fact 5 and 6 Companies of 2 Parachute Regiment had jumped between Platanias and Pirgos. Of that number twelve plane-loads fell along the Platanias River and D Company had the job of disposing of them.

Either by accident or design a number landed on the plateau previously mentioned, and 19 Army Troops Company was forced to withdraw after losing some men. Two Maori Brengunners, Privates John Whare²¹ and Matt Bailey,²² climbed out of their covered pits and went for the parachutists. Both died standing.

Major Dyer, with almost half his company absent on the beach patrol, had his hands full. Fire was coming from his left rear, a most unexpected quarter, while the undulating country with its many bamboo clumps, olive and poplar trees, and grape-vines made ideal hiding places for any enemy not shot before landing. If left until darkness they could become a real menace.

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They were not allowed to joint forces, for the Maoris hunted them, not without loss but with considerable success. Corporal Kopu²³ put his Red Cross brassard in his pocket, teamed up with one of the company cooks, Private Curran,²⁴ and the pair went off together; Private George McDonald,²⁵ a signaller who also had no right to be away from the telephone, returned with a grin on his face and his shirt covered in blood. ‘They got me Sir but I can still mind the telephone’, he told Major Dyer. He lay down beside the phone and kept in touch with Battalion Headquarters until he fainted from loss of blood.

Lieutenant Te Kuru soon had his area under control and, seeing Germans on the plateau where the Bren-gunners had been killed, acted on his own initiative and led a section in that direction. It dealth with a few enemy en route and deployed to clear the plateau. Te Kuru was killed—the first officer casualty—others were wounded, and the rest took cover. Colonel Dittmer was also taking steps to deal with the situation in D Company area: Lieutenant Tuhiwai and his platoon were sent from C Company to reinforce and Sergeant-Major Ropata²⁶ brought a section along the road from Headquarters Company in case there were any strays between the two areas.

Lieutenant Ormond on the western side of the river was having difficulty in clearing the area 19 Army Troops Company had been forced to vacate, but when Lieutenant Tuhiwai reported, Major Dyer led a sortie that eased the position very considerably.

The CO's next move was to instruct the RSM to get his Battalion Headquarters defence platoon together and sweep down the valley towards D Company. The defence platoon was a shadow body made up of batmen, drivers, provosts, and the ‘I’ section, about twenty in all, organised into three sections commanded by Sergeant W. Vercoe, ‘I’ section, Sergeant Don Haronga,²⁷ provost section, and Sergeant Manawatu,²⁸ in charge of the stretcher-bearers.

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This platoon was, by the nature of its duties, weak in combat training but was strong in fighting spirit. It dropped down into the valley, formed up with two sections forward and one in support, and advanced unopposed until it reached the corner where the western road crossed the irrigation canal, at which point it was fired on. A brisk exchange of grenades and smallarms fire resulted in ten dead Germans on the road and others in the scrub with no loss to the makeshift platoon. After this successful action Wood carried on down to D Company and then back to Battalion Headquarters, passing en route a number of dead paratroops in front of C Company's lines. Ngatiporou had made the most of such opportunities as had come their way.

In addition, Lieutenant Keiha²⁹ was instructed to make a reconnaissance in the opposite direction to that taken by the Headquarters defence platoon, that is, south into the Aghya valley. The platoon rounded up ten stray enemy before returning by way of the plateau, where the German probably responsible for the death of Lieutenant Te Kuru was found in the canal near Te Kuru's body and killed.

Captain Bell and his Ngapuhis were throughly disgusted with the whole affair for they were situated on that side of the battalion area where nothing was happening. Their only job was to see that none of the enemy who had landed in the Aghya valley came in by the back door. If they had, A Company's task would have been difficult, but though the Maoris looked hopefully towards the south they found no employment.

The second day closed with 22 Battalion tied in partially with 21 Battalion and partially with 23 Battalion. The enemy held the airfield, though it was still covered by a dwindling amount of fire, but a substantial enemy force had concentrated west of Maleme airfield. The 21st Battalion, out of communication with Brigade Headquarters, was waiting instructions and wondering what was going on in the dust clouds below.

An all-in counter-attack at the earliest possible moment was essential if the vital airfield was to be recaptured, but poverty of communications and the impossibility of moving any body of men during the daylight made it imperative for Brigadier Hargest to wait until dark. The 28th Battalion was considered the sole unit in 5 Brigade fresh enough for the operation and Brigadier Puttick could spare only one battalion from his

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reserve; Colonel Kippenberger's³⁰ 10 Brigade was fully extended and might have to be reinforced, and intelligence reports predicted that the seaborne attack would come in that night.

The plan as finally worked out and sent to the forward battalion commanders after dark was: 20 and 28 Battalions were to carry out the counter-attack on Maleme; 20 Battalion would be relieved by an Australian unit and then taken by trucks to the assembly area immediately west of the Platanias River; the axis of advance would be the main road, with 20 Battalion on the seaward and 28 on the landward side, with three light tanks on the road itself. The task of 20 Battalion was to clear the airfield while 28 Battalion secured Point 107, where it would link up with 21 Battalion; after clearing the airfield 20 Battalion was to move back on to the ridge which dominated the airfield and also relieve the Maoris, who would return to Platanias before first light. The 20th Battalion would then hold the highest hilltop in the area—Point 107, the original position of A Company 22 Battalion and the key to Maleme. No planes could use the airfield while hostile troops held Point 107, nor could the New Zealand positions be readily outflanked while the left flank of 21 Battalion was in Xamoudhokhori.

The troops were to be ready to leave the start line at 1 a.m. on 22 May. Colonel Dittmer's plan was to advance on a two-company front, with D supported by Headquarters Company on the right and A leading C Company on the left. Although the first part of the advance to just short of Pirgos village was to be regarded as an approach march, the battalion had to be prepared to engage pockets of enemy en route. To this end the forward companies were instructed to put out a screen of scouts across the front.

There was also to be a preliminary bombing of the objective by planes fitted with extra fuel tanks so that they could fly from Egypt and return after their mission; but in the event they did not arrive. Finally, the three tanks moving up the road in support of the attack were to be given protection by Lieutenant Reedy's platoon from C Company.

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From this point a certain amount of what follows is conjecture and, owing to the death in action of some of the officers concerned, verification is impossible.³¹

Major Dyer, on the right of the battalion, had the road as the unit boundary. He was reinforced by two Headquarters Company platoons (Lieutenants W. Ngata and W. McKay) to compensate for the absence of Captain Baker's fighting patrol. The three-inch mortars were left at the Platanias bridge, where a team of mules that Lieutenant McKay had been deputed to obtain was to pick them up, plus some ammunition, and accompany Battalion Headquarters. The mules did not arrive and the mortars had to be left behind. Supporting D Company were two Headquarters platoons (Lieutenants D. Urlich and F. T. Bennett) in an infantry role.

On the left of the advance A Company was almost at full strength, but Captain Bell did not have Captain Leaf with him and when the advance began was not supported by C Company.

For some days Captain Tureia had been suffering severely from dysentery but, in the absence of Captain Scott, would not leave the company. He was unable to walk to the start line and Leaf undertook to lead the company in his stead. During the day Lieutenant Keiha had been detailed with a section of his platoon to guard a party of Divisional Signals repairing the line from Brigade Headquarters forward and he returned to Battalion Headquarters just as Colonel Dittmer was leaving for the start line. Keiha was told to get his men a meal and to remain behind. Captain Leaf therefore had a platoon commanded by Lieutenant Tuhiwai and the rest of Lieutenant Keiha's platoon under Sergeant Te Kawa. By some mischance Captain Leaf led C Company through the forward troops without knowing it and was killed at a bridge some distance in front of the start line. Lieutenant Tuhiwai then returned with C Company, again moved through the forward troops without contacting them, and returned to Battalion Headquarters where he reported to Lieutenant Keiha. According to the timetable the attack should by that time have been well on the way to Maleme, and it was decided by Keiha and Tuhiwai to await the unit's return at daylight.

Originally B Company was to have remained in the battalion area for Brigade Headquarters, located close by, required local

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protection, and there was also the possibility of enemy infiltration from the Aghya valley to be considered. This role was later altered, partly as a result of a request from Captain Anderson,³² commanding 19 Army Troops Company, for assistance in cleaning up its forward area, which was still infested with enemy who had taken possession of some of its weapon pits.

Captain Anderson explains:

Because of the position and because our engineers had no training in infantry work the Maori Battalion was asked to mop up our forward area—You can put it in the record that we were damned glad to have the Maoris clean up the frontage for us.

Captain Royal's revised instructions were to clean up any paratroops in front of 19 Army Troops' position and south of the Platanias-Maleme road, which was also the battalion forming-up area. When this was done he was to leave one platoon in B Company area as local protection for Brigade Headquarters and continue on the left of the advance as far as 23 Battalion.

B Company left on its mission at 10.30 p.m. Lieutenant Stewart was to patrol the forming-up area and then return to B Company lines, while the rest of the company re-established 19 Army Troops Company in its forward pits. This was accomplished by sending Private Timihou³³ with a section to draw fire while the others, with the enemy located, worked in behind them. The result was a dozen dead paratroops and one live glider pilot. Because he appeared to be very young and could speak a little English, he was taken along as a mascot, was lost sight of later, and probably rejoined his own people.

After some trouble with 7 Field Company, whose men were firing first and asking questions afterwards, B Company followed the route it had taken the previous night to 23 Battalion area, where it waited for the counter-attack force to come up.

During all this time Colonel Dittmer was waiting on the Platanias bridge with Brigadier Hargest for 20 Battalion to show up, for there was little enough time to recapture Point 107 and return before daylight robbed them of their only advantage—freedom of movement. With a screen in front, the

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troops at four paces' interval were lying on the ground. They passed the time speculating on the meaning of red glows and the flashes of distant searchlights at sea but did not know until later that they were watching the funeral pyres of the seaborne invasion. The Navy had given ‘all possible help’ as promised.

One o'clock—two o'clock—and no 20 Battalion. At 2.15 trucks clattered up with half that battalion. The 20th had had to wait until an Australian unit took over its position, but the Australians had been delayed by bombing. Lieutenant-Colonel Burrows³⁴ decided to start with his half-battalion and left instructions for the other companies to follow and move up behind him. About 3 a.m. the attack was ready to start; and although the Maori Battalion knew nothing about it at the time, Brigadier Hargest, knowing that the delay had made a night attack almost impossible, rang Divisional Headquarters and asked if the operation must go on. He was told that it must.

Before the operation commences we will return to Captain Baker and his patrol. Baker eventually, and with adventures that included the demise of two paratroops, made his way about midnight to 7 Field Company headquarters, where he learned that Lieutenant Logan and his platoon, and Sergeant Smith and his half-platoon, had been fitted into the engineers' forward positions. He was told of the proposed counter-attack on Maleme, but because of the indefinite position out in front the engineers were shooting on sight and he would have to wait until daylight before collecting his men and going about his affairs.

Lieutenant Logan had also seen the planes land on the beach and the survivors deplane and head inland. He led his platoon up a dry watercourse until he found a little hollow covered with grapes and olive trees and waited there until dark. When it was safe to move he led his platoon past a sleeping group of Germans and between two defended posts into the 7 Field Company area. The sergeant Logan met was not pleased to find that twenty Maoris had passed his listening post unseen. Logan, who reported to Brigade through 7 Field Company, was instructed to remain where he was, that his battalion would

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be advised, and further that the Brigade Major, Captain Dawson,³⁵ was on his way up to see him.

The approach march had not gone more than half a mile before both battalions met opposition. The 20th Battalion found a large number of enemy sheltering in a house and after some sharp fighting captured it. The men of 28 Battalion, threading their way through trees and around houses, met scattered Germans firing from windows and from behind stone walls. The tanks helped by shooting at flashes from the houses, and grenade and bayonet did the rest. Further delay was caused by 7 Field Company—which had not been advised of the delay in the start of the counter-attack—fulfilling its instructions to fire on any movement and inquire afterwards. There was a sharp exchange of fire between the engineers and A Company before the misunderstanding was cleared up. There were also some casualties in A Company from anti-personnel mines scattered in front of the engineers' position, but the battalion carried on.

Daybreak was not far away when D Company reported enemy dug in ahead of it and Major Dyer was ordered to assault the position. He was trampling through the wire at the head of his troops when the ‘enemy’ yelled that they were 17 Platoon and what the hell did he think he was up to?

A Company had been rather disorganised by the death of Captain Bell during the approach march and the casualties caused by the engineers' mines. Colonel Dittmer therefore instructed Captain Royal, who had now reported in, to thicken up the left flank. Dawn also disclosed that a few Cretans had joined the battalion and seemed to view the coming fight with satisfaction.

By the time the crossroads at Dhaskaliana were reached it was nearly full light; Pirgos, the first objective, was still half a mile away and the airfield another half mile; aircraft were arriving in a steady stream. The leading tank was put out of action by a captured Bofors, the second broke down, and the third also stopped. No tanks, no RAF, and the sky filling with enemy planes; but the attack pushed on.

It was now rising, wooded country on the Maori sector and flat, sandy country where 20 Battalion, over towards the beach, had drawn ahead somewhat.

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Heavy opposition was encountered on the outskirts of Pirgos, and if the fullest use had not been made of the stone walls, ditches, and hedges it is doubtful if any further progress could have been made. D Company fought its way from one piece of cover to the next, but the enemy had the advantage of observation from the village church spire to bring mortar fire to bear and finally halted the advance on the line of an irrigation canal. A Company, having by this time lost Captain Bell killed and Lieutenant Porter wounded, had Lieutenant Te Puni³⁶ as the only officer with it and was unable to move beyond the forward elements of 23 Battalion.

On the extreme left, B Company found itself on the bottom of Vineyard Ridge in a gap to the left of 23 Battalion. In front was a low ridge dominated by a stone house from which a spandau stopped any further movement. Private Tommy Duncan volunteered to silence the gun if the company would give him covering fire. This was arranged and he crept up from a flank and tossed a grenade into the house. No enemy emerged, but Duncan came out with the spandau and a lot of ammunition and there was no further trouble from that quarter.

The whole battalion was checked until Pirgos, which 20 Battalion had entered but had been unable to capture, was cleared. Colonel Dittmer appreciated that further head-on attacks by D Company would lead to heavy casualties without any advantage—Lieutenant McKay had already been mortally wounded trying to rush an enemy spandau post—and ordered Major Dyer to pull back slightly, veer to his left, and then try to get behind the village. While these movements were being carried out, the right flank company of 20 Battalion had reached the airfield but could not cross it in daylight against the mortar and machine-gun fire directed against it, nor could it stay where it was. Colonel Burrows ordered it to withdraw behind the Maoris and so get on to the high ground of Point 107, but a garbled version of the order suggested that the withdrawal was back to the start line. Parts of 20 Battalion's D and Headquarters Companies obeyed the mutilated order and the rest of the battalion gathered in 23 Battalion area. Vision was very restricted, and the result of the realignment was that Major Dyer brought D Company up on the right of B Company and Headquarters Company became mixed with A and the one platoon of C Company. Captain Love was reorganising when

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he was wounded, not seriously enough to be evacuated but too badly to move about. Fire was coming from a house and a vineyard above the position and men were falling fast. The fortunate arrival of the RSM saved a desperate situation.

‘Ace’ Wood writes:

All I remember was ordering a number of the boys up the track [shown on a rough sketch not reproduced] and jumping off into a bayonet charge in the direction of the stone house. I remember feeling an utter ass because, realising the seriousness of the position with our lads packed like sardines, I shot off yelling to the boys to follow and after going about thirty yards and hearing no yelling, I stopped and looked back—I was on my own. But they followed and we cleaned up what turned out to be a patrol of about Pl strength. Half the bods we speared and shot in the middle of the ridge, the other half, including the commander, in the vineyard.

Still with the intention of getting around the enemy flank at Pirgos, the battalion fought its way forward until it reached the top of a ridge that ran south towards 21 Battalion, where it was halted by fire from Point 107 and another ridge running up from that point across 21 Battalion's front.

By this time it was late afternoon and Colonel Dittmer ordered the battalion to consolidate. The position was then that the enemy was on the ridge above the road to Xamoudhokhori and the Maoris facing across the valley. Lieutenant MacDonald³⁷ of 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion was also there with two guns left out of his platoon, and was a great help until both guns were knocked out by mortar bombs. The front quietened down as the planes went home and the Maoris set about looking for some kai. They were supposed to have returned to Platanias before daylight nearly twelve hours earlier, and the Maori does not like fighting on an empty stomach. There were plenty of Germans whom 23 Battalion had killed lying around, and very soon the battalion was eating German rations and smoking German cigarettes. Colonel Dittmer considered that, with some help, it was still possible to drive the enemy off Point 107. He accordingly went back to find Headquarters 23 Battalion and conferred with the CO of that unit and also with the CO of 22 Battalion who was sharing the same headquarters. He learnt that what was left of the sub-units of 22 Battalion had been

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allotted to 21 and 23 Battalions, and the commander of the latter could not suggest any way in which he could help because of the task previously given him by Brigade. There was no direct contact with that headquarters whereby new instructions might be obtained.

Colonel Dittmer, feeling extremely disappointed that the Maoris had been unable to take their objective, returned to his command, where increasing fire and movement suggested that an attack on the right flank of the battalion was pending and arrangements were being made to meet it. The machine-gunners and Maoris pulled back but left two observers. The observers yelled ‘They're coming’ and the reception committee fixed bayonets. In Lieutenant MacDonald's words:

The attack began with a bursting mass of flame from the grenades the Huns threw on the top—shook us up a bit. Then they came over. There was no order but we stood up and charged forward…. The Gouns [Germans] let out a shriek or two and the rest bolted down the hill like rabbits, over stone walls, plunging through vines. Very soon the MGs opened up together with the mortars and we got back quickly.

This is how it sounded to Sergeant Sullivan³⁸ in 20 Battalion nearby:

Sounds of German attack. Heavy fire steadily approaching. Much tracer. Then blood curdling yells from the Maoris as they went over to counter attack. Immediate decrease in German fire. Confusion, pandemonium and war cries for a few minutes then silence.

The silence is accounted for by Captain Te Punga and Sergeant Eddie Morgan³⁹ who passed Captain Royal's headquarters out of breath and laughing heartily. Royal asked the reason for the mirth and they told him, ‘The bastards are still running like Hell.’

Firing slowed down with the coming of darkness, and a line of flares indicated that the enemy had also taken up a position for the night. Losses had not been light, but a withdrawal was not contemplated at any level from the rank and file to the commanding officer. It was therefore with doubt and incredulity that Dittmer heard just before dawn that 23 Battalion was getting ready to withdraw. He left post-haste for 23 Battalion

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headquarters about a thousand yards away, and from the CO of that unit learned that Captain Dawson had been up with instructions for the brigade to retire to Platanias and that 28 Battalion was to be the rearguard. A 23 Battalion runner had been sent to him with the message, but it was just one of those things that happen in war—the message never got to 28 Battalion—and it was a very disgusted commander who prepared to give away the ground so dearly won. The order had been to withdraw under cover of darkness, but it was then nearly daylight and Dittmer knew that if he did not move quickly the Maoris would have the battle all to themselves, not only from the front but from each flank. The withdrawing units—21, 22, and 23 Battalions—had to pass over a north-south ridge which was in view of the enemy, and it was certain that as soon as troops were seen moving over this ridge the enemy would do something about it. An operation considered impossible in the attack had to be carried out in the withdrawal—a daylight move by ground troops without air support.

Colonel Dittmer, who had arranged for company commanders to be at his headquarters when he returned, gave his orders: Lieutenant C. M. Bennett, the ‘I’ officer, would guide the battalion, less rear party, along the line Kondomari-Modhion; Captain Royal would lead the withdrawal with B Company and place a covering party with two automatics on the north-south ridge already mentioned, and which was about a mile behind them; Major Dyer would command the rearguard—an officer and ten men from each company—and would not leave the position until the main body was making good the north-south ridge.

The troops began to filter back and the German air-taxi service to Maleme began to operate though not with the usual number of ground-strafing machines. The battalion main body, although under fire, was also under cover and got away in reasonable order, taking with it some of the battalion walking wounded from the RAP. The CO and Adjutant, who had waited to see the troops off, followed at the rear of the battalion and Major Dyer was left with his small rearguard to restrain any over-eagerness on the part of the enemy to pursue.

When by good luck and the use of cover the main body of the battalion reached the ridge, two Bren-gun sections, commanded by Corporal Martin McRae⁴⁰ and Private Pine Timihou respectively, were placed on tactical points. The Platanias

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position was visible in the distance and, because of the situation, it was decided not to continue on to Modhion but to take a shorter route between the engineers and Modhion which would bring the battalion out on to the flat ground below B and C Companies' original areas.

Parties of 21 Battalion which had come down from Vineyard Ridge through Modhion were met, also Germans coming down the valley from Aghya. Covering fire from Lieutenant Stewart on B Company's hill kept the Germans back while the Maoris crossed the flat, waded the river, almost shoulder high, and climbed up to their old positions. The time was about 8 a.m., and from the sounds of firing there appeared to be a battle going on in D Company area. Captain Royal reported to Brigade Headquarters and was instructed to take command, with Lieutenant C. M. Bennett as adjutant, until Colonel Dittmer arrived.

The supposition that fighting was going on in D Company area was well founded. To return to the previous dawn. Captain Baker collected eight of his men who had been fitted into the Field Company defences (Lieutenant Logan had rejoined the battalion as already recorded) and was on the road to Maleme when parties of 20 Battalion men coming from that direction said that the attack was off and that they were returning to their own lines. An officer said that 28 Battalion was also withdrawing to Platanias by another route, whereupon Baker returned to his old company area at the Platanias River and awaited their arrival.

Noon came but no 28 Battalion. Troops did, however, appear in the river valley, but they were wearing the wrong uniform and the eight-man army swung into action. The appearance of some men of 19 Army Troops Company behind the enemy settled the question and sixty-odd prisoners, among whom were a number of walking wounded, were rounded up and sent back to Brigade. At dusk there was still no Maori Battalion—it was, of course, strung along its line at Pirgos.

The D Company garrison, augmented by one walking wounded, Private Kohere⁴¹ of C Company, passed an uneasy night bickering with enemy strays. At first light troops were seen returning from Maleme. ‘The Maori Battalion at last’—and Baker went to meet them. They turned out to be Captain

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Ferguson's⁴² 7 Field Company and, after reading the withdrawal orders which indicated that the whole of the flat area between Maleme and Platanias was to be vacated by New Zealand troops by 7.30 a.m. when the Navy was to shell the area, Baker set out for Brigade Headquarters, where he was instructed by Brigadier Hargest to move his men into C Company's position.

At that moment, although Brigadier Hargest apparently did not know it, Lieutenant Stewart was holding B Company lines with one platoon, Lieutenant Keiha had two platoons in C Company area, and Lieutenant Porter had brought back about a dozen walking wounded from 23 Battalion's RAP and manned some A Company weapon pits.

While moving his men, now totalling fourteen, into C Company area, Captain Baker was overtaken by a runner with new orders to take command of about sixty men from 20 Battalion who had collected in Platanias village, return to D Company area, and hold the bridge there for twenty-four hours. The 20th Battalion men were being organised into platoons when yet another message stated that about 200 Germans were already in the vicinity of the bridge.

A conference was held with the 20 Battalion officers present and it was decided to attack before the enemy got established. The opposition, using captured Bofors guns, was too strong and the attackers were pinned to the ground 500 yards east of the bridge. It would have been too costly to press the attack without the benefit of support or covering fire and Baker ordered a withdrawal to a prepared position covering the bridge—the original 18 Platoon area. The order, passed from section to section, was apparently mutilated for the detachment from 20 Battalion, instead of occupying 18 Platoon's weapon pits, carried on down the road through Platanias to Galatas. Some sections did not receive the message, and Lieutenant Markham⁴³ with one