Supply Company
CHAPTER 7 — Advance into Libya
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CHAPTER 7
Advance into Libya
LONG trains, piping shrilly and jolting along with the unpredictable whim of the Egyptian railways, roared south from Alexandria in the closing days of May and early days of June 1941. Tired men lolled in their seats and watched the familiar yellow and green of the Delta flow by. The New Zealand Division, or what was left of it, was back from Greece and Crete and very ready to acknowledge—for the time being—Egypt as home.
For the men there were days of relaxation ahead; comfortable days on the Mediterranean shore and in Cairo bars. For the headquarters staffs there was a heartbreaking totting up of casualties and a complex sorting out of reinforcements. For the more seriously wounded there was the hospital ship Maunganui to take them home—right home.
The ASC normally suffers light casualties, but in Crete almost everyone was a front-line soldier, and now the ASC was short of 1100 men. Supply Column itself could account for little more than half of its strength, and less than half had returned to Egypt fit and ready to carry on. By 4 June the Column could compile a roll of nine officers and 196 other ranks who were classified as ‘in Egypt’. In addition there were fifty-one other ranks in the ‘X’ lists.1 One officer and seven other ranks were known to be dead. But some-where on the other side of the Mediterranean were six officers and 210 other ranks ‘not accounted for’.
Fifth Reinforcement quotas, calculated before these losses were incurred, were hopelessly inadequate for the ASC, and after absorbing 580 of its own reinforcements the corps was still looking around for more. Volunteers were called for from other arms, and as a last resort men were compulsorily transferred. Even then there was a shortage of skilled trades-
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men. The 6th Reinforcements, which reached Tewfik on 29 July, brought a meagre 249 men for the ASC in a total strength of 3808.
With the exception of 6 Brigade, which went to the Canal to set up a defence scheme at Moascar and Ismailia, the Division camped at Helwan while it built up its strength and gathered in new equipment. Still without trucks, the ASC, Supply Column included, had to put in the earlier days unhappily tramping the desert and filling in time with drill. To overcome the transport problem, trucks were pooled and 2 Armoured Division Troops Company RASC lent a hand with trucks and drivers.
Ships were already on their way up from the Cape, however, with brand-new American vehicles, and as these arrived the ASC regained its mobility. In Supply Column both new and old hands had much to learn. These new four-wheel-drive three-tonners had to be mastered, and before the Column could be ready to play its part again there was plenty to be done. As the weeks went by the men learned not only to drive in good and bad going, but to unditch, make good mechanical faults, carry out repairs, and generally keep their trucks on the move.
Though the men were not to know it, there was a desert campaign ahead, and all this training was to have an important bearing in giving the ‘service’ part of the ASC some significance. For ‘soft-skinned’ transport mobility is the only defence, and in the highly mobile campaign ahead of them ability to keep their vehicles moving, and when they broke down to get them rolling again as quickly as possible, was sometimes to mean the difference between a successful operation and the loss to the enemy of supplies, men, and, more important, trucks. If there is a suggestion of callousness in placing trucks before men, war has a habit of switching values. In the jargon of a ‘Confucius Say’ sign that appeared later in Tunisia, ‘Easy get new driver, difficult get new truck’.
So there were manoeuvres, exercises and general training programmes. The working part of Supply Column's activities was mainly the old general carrier role. Being close to a DID and base transport services, the Division did not use
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to full capacity its ASC vehicles, and Supply Column was called on to do a variety of jobs. A supply point was operated for 5 Brigade, which was digging defences at Alamein.
While the New Zealanders were fighting, resting and training, the world about them had been changing. On 22 June the Germans on the Continent turned east in a gigantic attack on Russia. In the Middle East the British and Australians had made Syria secure, but in Libya the arrival of General Rommel with German troops had completely changed the scene, and General Wavell's brilliant gains were swallowed up as the enemy surged forward again to the Egyptian frontier. Tobruk, the relief of which was to be one of the chief objectives of the New Zealanders' next action, was held against heavy German attacks and remained as an embarrassing thorn in the side of the enemy forces.
While over the weeks the various units developed their training, Supply Column took its trucks along the roads and out into the desert on full-scale exercises designed to give the men some idea of what went on when the unit became mobile. The results are reflected in a comment in a convoy report late in September: ‘Standard of driving by our drivers was uniformly high…. Driving in desert formation was of high standard.’
In September New Zealand Division went back to the desert. The brigades settled into a troglodyte existence in the Baggush Box, and with the rest of the ASC the Supply Column established itself at Fuka.
The journey back to the desert was full of interest, particularly for the old hands who had come this way so often in 1940. Where there had been open desert there were now army camps and airfields on which trim fighters and broad-winged bombers were to be seen. To men accustomed to a hostile sky, the air seemed almost crowded with friendly planes.
Of passing interest is the fact that the Column took from dawn to dusk to travel from Helwan to Amiriya. Nine months later, when the Division came down from Syria in very much of a hurry, the Column travelled from Suez to Amiriya, double the distance, in the same time.
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A freedom-loving soldier, the New Zealander was always glad to get away from base where, it seemed to him, senior officers, for lack of something better to do, were apt to pester him with too much ‘soldierliness’. It is a natural line of logic that the greater the opportunity to break away from this, the greater will be the transgressions, and Supply Column found a mobile life eminently suited to exploitation along these lines. Free of the restraints of an official frown, the men would strip off their shirts, boots and socks and enjoy the comfort of old clothing or practically none. Once away from Helwan on this particular journey back to the desert, they were not slow to dispense with their clothing. Major Pryde, who had left the camp at Helwan last to ensure that everything was left as it should be, found when he overtook the convoy that his men had already stripped for comfort. At Amiriya that night he told them just what he thought of the ‘circus procession’ they had staged through Cairo, and with some force complained that the men were even wearing ‘bloody football jerseys’. By a curious chance, the ‘bloody football jerseys’ caught on and echoed through the unit for years and is still heard at unit reunions.
But the men were not as free as they expected to be. Though Fuka was in the desert, there was still too much of the restrictive air of a base camp for the men to be altogether happy. An understandable nervousness over enemy aircraft—memories of Greece and Crete were still fresh—was reflected in various orders, and to make things worse, after there had been several drownings, even swimming became implicated in sternly worded ‘thou shalt nots’. The result was a curious eagerness to carry sea water needed by the cooks to lay the dust around the cookhouse.
There was justification for precautions against the trouble from the air, however. Fuka station and airfield were not far away and enemy aircraft gave their attention to both. Incendiaries intended for the aerodrome on one occasion fell in the Column area. Fuka station went up in spectacular pyrotechnics when an ammunition train was hit, and the railhead was temporarily shifted back to Daba.
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Supply Column was engaged in many jobs, but its primary task was to build up No. 2 Forward Base at Bir el Thalata, a dump of ammunition, petrol and supplies that formed part of over 33,000 tons stocked up in the forward areas for the coming attack. Loaded trucks went forward from Fuka in the afternoon and laagered a few miles from the dump, which was in view of the enemy, until dark. Then they moved forward again and unloaded. As the trucks turned away home, an Indian labour corps pulled across the camouflage and smeared away the wheel tracks.
In this work Supply Column saw something of the shocking waste of petrol that was the result of the use of the four-gallon petrol can, commonly known as the ‘flimsy’. And flimsy it was. As an expendable item, it served a good purpose in less rigorous civilian life, but in the Army its expendability began the moment it was moved, and all sorts of calculations have been made about the percentage of petrol that survived the long jolting journey into the desert by the Egyptian State Railways and ASC trucks. The flimsy even inspired a cartoon by Brian Robb, who in his series ‘Little Known Units of the Western Desert’, drew a three-tonner packed with flimsies and leaking a small Niagara of petrol through the tailboard. Its title: ‘Vehicle of the Petrol Dispersal Column’.
There was also the customary job of supplying the Division to be done; in fact, the point at Sidi Haneish fed not only the Division but British and South African troops and the RAF as well. Supply details opened shop here on 17 September in a depot about the size of a tennis court and ankle deep in dust. While British fighters and bombers roared low overhead they unloaded their equipment and got down to business. Supplies were drawn from 18 DID at the railhead twelve miles away. Dust and heat, and winds carrying both, made conditions unpleasant, particularly when it came to handling fresh meat and vegetables. Dull routine was occasionally broken by air raids on the nearby railway station, and on one occasion—on 14 October—the OC supply details, Captain Quirk, received an unwelcome souvenir, an unexploded bomb placed on his table. He called in the engineers to remove it.
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The following day a Supply Column man had an even more hair-raising experience when, while testing Captain Roberts's2 car, he collided with a Hurricane making a forced landing. The Hurricane sheared away the radiator and hood, and made a good landing on one wheel. The driver and a passenger in the car were unhurt.
By November the Division was ready and there were signs that something was in the wind. Supply Column received more three-tonners to bring its transport up to establishment, and a number of anti-aircraft trucks—mounting ineffectual Bren guns—were assigned to it. Trucks were loaded up. Although the intention may have been reasonably obvious, the Division's movements were concealed behind a pretence of manœuvres. On 10 November a Supply Column operation order said: ‘The NZ Div Sup Coln is carrying out supply of NZ Div during exercises No. 4.’
Pryde called a conference of officers on this day. Afterwards, he called Roberts aside and told him that during the ‘exercise’ the Division might undertake manœuvres as brigade groups. If this happened brigade composite companies would be formed, and the first would include a part of each of Supply, Petrol and Ammunition Companies under Roberts's command.
The happy thought of taking his echelon, No. 2, away from the Column in a detached role brought a smile to Roberts's face, and Pryde looked stern.
‘And listen, laddie,’ he added, ‘I'm not fooling.’
Roberts soon found that he wasn't.
Out from the hillocks and wadis of the Baggush Box streamed an unending line of vehicles. One by one they jolted on to the coastal highway, a black strip of bitumen across the dusty yellow desert, and turned west. First came the trucks of Headquarters 5 Brigade, and after them the hump-backed quads and guns of 5 Field Regiment, then the anti-tank portées and the long-barrelled Bofors. After these came trucks, miles of trucks, crowded with sappers and
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infantrymen of four battalions—21, 22, 23 and 28. A company of machine-gunners followed, and then an assortment of ASC units, 5 Field Ambulance, and at the tail, Supply Column (less four sections), which had driven up from Fuka during the morning.
The date was 11 November 1941, and the first part of the New Zealand Division was moving out for its first full-scale offensive action in a campaign with the code-name Crusader. At the Baggush turn-off New Zealand's High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, Mr. W. J. Jordan, a short, stocky figure in a grey suit, stood by the road and waved his black Homburg to the passing column.
Also on the ground to watch the spectacle was Major Pryde, who stood with Brigadier Hargest at a check point near Mersa Matruh. Pryde had reached this day with a feeling of complete confidence in the ability of the Column to carry out its task. Unlike the Supply Column that had gone to Greece, which had been thrown together barely hours before sailing, the unit now had been training as a team for months and was ready for the future. With justifiable pride Major Pryde watched his vehicles go by with almost perfect spacing, and with satisfaction listened to Brigadier Hargest's compliment.
To the bystander a passing convoy is an impressive spectacle: the slow-moving, winding line of vehicles and guns seems to glide forward with the inexorable power and weight of a battleship. But for the men, seeing little else beyond the road sliding away from the tailboard and under the nose of the next truck in line, there is little romance to relieve the tedious, crowded, uncomfortable hours on a whining three-tonner. In any case, the Army inures the most romantic soul to anything calculated to stir the emotions.
‘It was,’ a Supply Column man recalls, ‘like lining up for another job. I remember it took a long time to get started as there was so much traffic on the road.’
Column Headquarters, A, C, E, G and J Sections followed 5 Brigade group out on this day. At Matruh A and E Sections broke away and made off to Smugglers' Cove, where they
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would be in a handy position to draw from No. 1 Forward Base on the morning of 12 November.
The rest of the convoy turned down the Siwa Road and halted at Sidi Husein, 17 miles south-west of Matruh. During the move the Column broke bulk and issued 6700 rations. The headquarters of No. 1 Echelon and B and F Sections left Fuka next day, joined 4 Infantry Brigade group at Baggush, and drove forward with that formation to the divisional assembly area. Finally, the headquarters of No. 2 Echelon and D and H Sections joined 6 Infantry Brigade group on 13 November at Baggush and the whole group moved up the same day, thereby completing the Division's assembly in the new area.
Crusader was different from any previous campaign. True, the British had been this way before, but this time the principal enemy, in strength if not in numbers, was the German armoured group. And this was Eighth Army's first battle, and its aim was a resounding victory.
Across the Libyan border were 100,000 enemy troops—one third German and two thirds Italian—equipped with 357 tanks, of which 227 were German. Eighth Army was 118,000 strong and had more than 800 tanks, of which 500 were cruisers and 273 infantry tanks. General Cunningham's first aim was to destroy the German tank forces. The main attack was to be made by 30 Corps, under Lieutenant-General Willoughby Norrie. Thirteenth Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Godwin-Austen, was in the first place to contain the enemy troops holding the frontier positions. New Zealand Division was part of 13 Corps.
German and Italian positional troops manned the frontier posts and contained Tobruk. Two German and two Italian divisions were preparing to attack Tobruk and a German and an Italian armoured division, together with an Italian motorised division, formed a mobile force to meet any British threat.
In the desert south of Matruh the New Zealand Division prepared for its part. During 12 and 13 November the Division grew to full strength, and Supply Column began to learn what it was like catering for a full division in the field. On the 13th it broke bulk for the whole Division
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twice—35,000 rations—and next day issued hard rations. On the 15th the whole Division moved forward in daylight to Bir el Thalata, 55 miles to the west. There were vehicles as far as the eye could see, almost 3000 of them on a six-mile front, each with its trailing cloud of dust, rolling across broken, stony ground.
That night and all next day the Division remained stationary, but forty Supply Column vehicles went back to 29 FSD to draw four days' rations—74,000. There was a hitch at the depot; delivery was refused, and No. 2 Forward Base confirmed that issues would not be made here as the dump was being held until the battle commenced. After a tussle with colonels and majors, Quirk secured permission to draw, and at last, at 2.15 p.m., loading began. The dump was 15 miles square, and consequently the task was a long one, and as vehicles were feverishly loaded an anxious eye was kept on the time. It was 8.15 p.m. before the convoy pulled out, and the Division was already on its way west again. Despite a clear, starry sky, it was pitch black, and without the aid of a compass the convoy moved north until it found the green lights marking the divisional axis. During the march a solitary bomb burst about half a mile away, though no plane could be seen. The Division was overtaken in the early hours of the morning.
On 16–17 November was the first night move of the Division towards the frontier. By day vehicles were checked and repaired, and Supply Column went about its duties. At night the only lights were the track markers; the going was rough, the sand sometimes soft, and inevitably there was some confusion—‘Wrong guff, wrong areas, muck ups from HQ.’ It was tense and tiring, and it was shown quite clearly that the vital thing was to keep drivers awake so that not only they but the following vehicles should not be lost. There was a strong temptation to find solace in the forbidden cigarette. When Sergeant-Major Beer,3 a former Imperial Army man, found a Supply Column man smoking he bawled him out in a proper manner. A few minutes later the Sergeant-Major was back.
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‘You still got that cigarette going?’
‘Er, yes.’
‘Give me a light, will you.’
The night marches showed, too, that Workshops could depend on plenty of work after movement in darkness. Springs were broken, radiators stove in as drivers, unable to see what was happening ahead, charged halting vehicles, and differentials were dragged out of position when vehicles crashed through slit trenches. On movements such as this workshops men travelled all night then worked all day repairing the night's damage.
The breakdown truck itself—‘Flannagan II’, a Chevrolet, driven by Driver Hyland, with Sergeant Goulden4 in charge—was detached on the first night. On 19 November it overtook two three-tonners that had collided and become immobilised. One truck was got working and the other was towed, the vehicles joining up with the Column on the 21st.
As the Division moved forward on the night of 17–18 November, lightning was flickering in the north-west, and next day gunfire could be heard. At dawn 30 Corps crossed the border and advanced into Libya, meeting no resistance. The enemy was blissfully ignorant that a major attack was pending. The following night the New Zealand Division crossed the border also. Sappers tore out a 300-yard gap in the frontier wire and the vehicles streamed through.
During the 18th the Supply Column issues had given units rations for the 19th and 20th, plus three days' reserves—a contrast with the seven days' reserves that units were to carry a year later. The Column moved forward about 7 p.m. in the cold and starry darkness, with gunfire and bombing rumbling and flashing to the north. On arrival at the new area at El Beida the Column found itself in difficulties; some units in the line of march were out of position, and the Column had to settle down in a temporary area. On the afternoon of the 19th the unit moved to its correct area as Messerschmitts came down on a nearby RAF airfield.
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About five came skimming towards Supply Column ‘with a nasty screaming sound’, and as they began to spray the desert the vehicles scattered. The planes did no damage and left to chase a Tomahawk.
Pushing west on 19 November 30 Corps began to beat up trouble. The New Zealanders on the 21st began their encirclement of the frontier positions. While Supply Column remained anchored with the administration group at El Beida, the fighting units pushed north and then fanned out, 5 Brigade to Fort Capuzzo and Sollum Barracks, 4 Brigade to the escarpment west of Bardia, and 6 Brigade westwards along the Trigh Capuzzo to come under command of 30 Corps.
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Capuzzo fell to 5 Brigade on the 22nd, and 4 Indian Division captured part of the Omar forts, but a substantial pocket held out in Libyan Omar. Wherever the enemy was still holding out in the frontier area, he was cut off from his main forces in the west.
Back at El Beida there was at first little excitement but plenty of hard work. ‘Two uneventful days supplying our troops,’ is how Quirk summarised it. This entailed sending convoys back to 50 FSD5 and sending rations forward to a prearranged supply point. For this short period, at least, the Column was able to work to the book. It was one of the few occasions throughout the war that it did. ‘The book’ was still the system of echelons, in which certain vehicles were earmarked to carry rations for specified units. This was found to be clumsy and uneconomical for transport, and it meant that B echelon transport from the units had to find particular trucks at the supply point.
The rations in this campaign were not good. No ration scale had been discovered for this period, and the nearest battle ration scale, that for some time in 1942, may be slightly more generous. This provides for two ounces of bacon, nine ounces of biscuits, three-quarters of an ounce of cheese, three ounces of jam or marmalade, one ounce of
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margarine, two ounces of milk, nine ounces of M and V, three-sevenths of an ounce of salmon or herrings, four ounces of sugar, half an ounce of tea and half an ounce of salt each day, and finally 50 cigarettes a week. In the early part of Crusader corned beef was served more often than M and V, there was little bacon, and the salmon was labelled fifth-grade and, even so, rarely reached the fighting units of the New Zealand Division. The main meal of the day was generally bully and biscuits, although extras carried by the cooks' trucks and careful cooking helped make the food more palatable. When a comparison is made with later British ration scales and the current German rations, however, the Army at this stage was poorly catered for.
Orders to move north came to the Column at 1 p.m. on 21 November, while No. 2 Echelon was away at the supply point and No. 1 Echelon on its way back to 50 FSD. Column Headquarters and J Section went on alone and were overtaken by the echelons early in the evening at the new position south of the Trigh el Abd, previously occupied by Divisional Headquarters. Next morning a similar move, this time of 22 miles northwards, was executed to Abiar Nza Ferigh; Column Headquarters, J Section and the attached water section moved on, and Nos. 1 and 2 Echelons finished their tasks and followed up.
The 22-mile trip to Abiar Nza Ferigh taught another lesson. Before setting out a course was set by sun compass, but after the Headquarters convoy had been travelling for an hour or so the sky became overcast—nearer the coast it was raining—and a switch had to be made to navigation by magnetic compass. The change created an error that gave the unit a slight swing to the east, and shells that came droning in on to the right flank showed that it was too near the Omars for comfort.
The convoy sheered away to the north-west for three miles. This threw it across the front of another convoy moving up on its left, and the Column switched to the north again. In heavy rain the vehicles moved on. When the estimated mileage was up, it was found that because of the changes in direction the unit was seven miles too close
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to Capuzzo—no place to be near on the 22nd—and it moved to its correct area.
Above the harbour of Kea Island
The march across Kea Island
The village of Platanias (high on left) from Ay Marina. Maleme is in the right distance. The painting, by J. L. McIndoe, was carried with him when he was taken prisoner.
A transport section with new trucks prepared to move from Helwan
Headquarters area near Fuka
That night tracer could be seen cutting through the darkness, and the men went to sleep with the rumble of artillery in their ears.
While the New Zealanders had met with reasonable success at the frontier, further west in the Tobruk area the plan was coming unstuck. The British armour that had set out to smash the German panzers had come off second best, mainly because of superior German tactics, and 7 Support Group was now hard pressed.
Sixth Brigade was promptly ordered by 30 Corps to go to the aid of the support group on the Sidi Rezegh escarpment. The order came to Brigade Headquarters on the afternoon of the 22nd; the brigade travelled all that night and in the morning had a short, sharp and very satisfactory skirmish with an enemy group that was found to be part of Afrika Korps Headquarters. Valuable documents were captured.
The brigade then moved on and 25 Battalion went straight into an attack on Point 175. There was bitter fighting, but with the aid of 24 Battalion about half of the feature was captured and held. Meanwhile 26 Battalion had swung to the south-west to link up with 5 South African Infantry Brigade. This brigade, however, was overrun during the afternoon, and 26 Battalion, after fighting off enemy attacks, rejoined the rest of 6 Brigade that night. The latter brigade settled down under cover of darkness and prepared to meet tanks next day.
Unaware of 6 Brigade's situation, the Division made plans to send it supplies. On the afternoon of 22 November a 6 Brigade Company was formed consisting of C Section of Ammunition Company (Second-Lieutenant Butt6), D and H Sections of Supply Column (Second-Lieutenants Daniel7 and Lyon,8 with Second-Lieutenant Demouth9 as Supply
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Officer), B Section of Petrol Company (Second-Lieutenant Swarbrick10) and six vehicles from B Section 4 RMT to carry water. Headquarters of No. 2 Echelon Supply Column also went along, and the commander was Captain Roberts.
The 22nd November was the last day of comparative peace for Supply Column. Further west a hot little cauldron was bubbling to boiling point and was soon to boil over; whoever was abroad on the desert would have to move quickly or be scalded. On 23 November, when 6 Brigade Company began its operations, the pot was already simmering.
At 7 a.m. B Section (Petrol Company) and D Section (Supply Column) were sent off to 62 FMC to load. They were to join 6 Brigade Company at Bir el Chleta, where 6 Brigade Headquarters was thought to be. Two hours later the company itself set off from Abiar Nza Ferigh for Bir el Chleta. At 10.15 a.m. it met two officers also on their way to 6 Brigade Headquarters—Captain Hooper,11 6 Brigade liaison officer, and Captain Squires, who was leading B echelon transport of C Squadron 8 Royal Tanks, attached to 6 Brigade. Hooper warned that enemy tanks were on the Trigh Capuzzo at Gasr el Arid.
Roberts set a course to the west, proposing to turn north at a point west of the reported tank concentration. The convoy had not gone far, however, before enemy armoured fighting vehicles ahead prompted a quick turn around. The AFVs disappeared, and the convoy resumed its journey westwards.
It soon appeared that the desert in these parts was fairly crawling with the enemy. As the trucks swung north about 2 p.m., unidentified AFVs were seen about a mile to the west. They were travelling away to the west and were accompanied by several trucks. And while the New Zealanders were watching and wondering, their trucks ran among the slit trenches and weapon pits of a recently vacated Italian camp. Italian wine bottles and Italian food tins were littered about, and the dying embers of a fire were still smouldering.
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The convoy ran north across the almost table-flat desert. Soon after 3.30 p.m., when the Trigh Capuzzo was only five miles away, three armoured cars came in from the east, and to avoid being headed off, Roberts speeded up his convoy. But he had barely escaped from this danger when he encountered a fresh hazard.
Approaching Bir Nza er-Rifi, where the ground falls away to the Trigh Capuzzo, he saw a large concentration of transport spread across the slope on the far side of a wadi. Roberts halted his trucks half a mile to the south and Lyon went forward to see whether the transport was friend or foe. He was not left long in doubt. About fifteen minutes later machine guns began to crackle and long arcs of tracer came darting towards the New Zealand convoy. The fire was coming from three armoured cars, two light machine guns in prepared positions, and several small-calibre guns, probably anti-tank weapons.
As the convoy turned south and fled, large concentrations of trucks were seen to the east moving in a north-westerly direction. After covering eight miles the convoy changed direction east and set a course for Bir es Sufan, where it laagered for the night. During the night tanks and motor vehicles, not identified, passed close, travelling south-east and, unknown to Roberts, NZ Divisional Headquarters Group, with 20 and 21 Battalions and a squadron of I tanks, passed close by on its way to Bir el Chleta. In the morning the broad tracks of German tanks, as it was thought, were found on the ground.
At daybreak another column was observed approaching from the north-west, the general direction in which the hostile vehicles encountered the previous day had lain. As the convoy was about to set off for home—Abiar Nza Ferigh—a solitary vehicle approached from the west. In it were one officer and two near-dead soldiers of 5 South African Brigade. They were taken to Supply Column Headquarters, reached at 10 a.m. without loss of men or vehicles, and sent on to Divisional Headquarters.
The 6th Brigade Company was disbanded without having accomplished its mission. Daniel and Demouth, meanwhile, had run into trouble of their own. After loading up 4000
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rations at 62 FMC, the convoy, headed by Daniel's truck, set off for Bir el Chleta at 12.30 p.m. After an overnight halt the journey was resumed at first light, and about the time that Roberts was making for home, Daniel's trucks were rolling west along Trigh Capuzzo. The convoy was not running in blind ignorance, however, for that morning a warning had been received that there were enemy columns about, and Daniel went 600 to 700 yards ahead to act as scout.
All went well until 9 a.m., when the convoy was about three miles east of Gasr el Arid, where tanks had been reported the previous day by Captain Hooper. At this point the road dipped abruptly into a shallow wadi, and for a minute or two Daniel's truck disappeared from the sight of the following convoy. When it was seen again the truck was off the road and was heading north-west straight towards a large group of tanks and trucks. Machine guns spluttered to life and bullets came zipping around the laden trucks.
As the New Zealanders put about they saw Daniel's truck apparently still heading into what appeared to be a hail of explosive bullets and anti-tank shells. What happened to him no one waited to see. At that moment there were other things to think of.
Unexpectedly the Column adjutant, Second-Lieutenant Watt,12 appeared on the scene. His mission was to turn back both Roberts and Daniel. Learning that the 6 Brigade Company scheme had been cancelled and that these convoys had been sent into what was now believed to be enemy-held territory, Watt left Column Headquarters at 5.30 p.m. on 23 November and headed his Dodge ‘bug’ towards the setting sun. When darkness fell he halted and bunked down. Watt slept in the truck, his driver, Myers,13 underneath.
At dawn Watt woke with a feeling that everything was not quite right. ‘Crawling over the tailboard I gently woke Myers. Do you see what I see? A mashie shot away were some tanks, about eight of them. We climbed into the bug and prayed that the motor would start immediately. Thanks
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to our ever faithful Workshops Section, off she went after a couple of kicks.’
Away they went at top speed to the north-east. When they stopped for breakfast they were thoroughly lost. For a while they cruised around, and at last saw through the haze a convoy that looked familiar—Daniel's.
Several miles back down Trigh Capuzzo the now retreating convoy encountered a British headquarters. When Watt reported to ‘a thoroughly English colonel’ that there were tanks a few miles up the track he was laughed at. ‘Treated me as a case of wind up, I think. However, I insisted that I send a message to our own headquarters. He reluctantly introduced me to his adjutant, who was much more sympathetic. In fact, he almost believed me. Driver and I jogged along not knowing what to do about the other convoy until some time later (it was 25 November) we ran into our own Supply Column moving up with the rest of the Division.’
And Daniel? He now was a prisoner of war. Demouth reported that Daniel's truck had inexplicably driven on into a hail of bullets, but this was an illusion in the midst of a ‘flap’. As his truck had nosed down into the wadi, Daniel, seeing a concentration of tanks and armoured vehicles about half a mile to the right, decided he would drive over and verify his position as direction had been lost the previous night. His driver, Keppel,14 remarked that the vehicles did not look British, but Daniel, believing there were no enemy columns as far east as this, insisted on going over.
When about 200 or 300 yards from the group, Keppel again said he did not think the vehicles were British, and while he eased up, Daniel poked his head through the roof and put up his binoculars. Instantly tracer came darting towards them. Keppel swung hard on the wheel, but the motor, apparently hit, cut out, and the truck coasted to a stop. Bullets slashed through the radiator and hammered out holes in the cab and even in the water tank in the back. Flying glass cut Daniel's hand, but otherwise the two men were unharmed.
An armoured car came over and took them prisoner.
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Keppel, later released from Bardia, came through his adventure with one bright story. After the usual interrogation—what unit (no answer), where were they going (they were lost), why did they volunteer to leave a good country like New Zealand to fight in a country like this, and why did Churchill do this and that—the questioning officer, who did not press for an answer if one was refused, saw a medal Keppel had been awarded for winning the mile championship in the 1941 divisional athletic championships.
‘I see you are a good runner, but you didn't run fast enough this morning,’ said the officer.
Keppel agreed. The officer, who said he had got to know the New Zealand champion runner Jack Lovelock during the 1936 Olympic Games at Berlin, asked Keppel whether he knew him. Keppel replied that he did, and that he had in fact competed against him.
‘What a pity you could not run as fast as him,’ replied the German. ‘You would have been half-way to Cairo by now.’
Shot up, shelled and bombed as it went, this enemy group made its way to the Egyptian frontier and made the attack on Sidi Azeiz. Keppel, sent into Bardia, was searched by Italians and lost his medal, but he complained to a German guard, who retrieved it for him.
While all this was going on, Supply Column, back at Abiar Nza Ferigh, was carrying out, or attempting to carry out, normal supply duties, as well as trying to handle a small horde of prisoners that fighting units were sending for transport to the prisoner-of-war cages further back. With many men away on other tasks, the Column had a worrying time providing guards for the Germans—the Italians were no bother—and the situation was not improved when infantry escorts, contrary to orders, refused to remain with prisoners until the Column was able to release them. But this reluctance of infantrymen to remain, whatever difficulties it caused, hardly called for a reprimand; their keenness to return to their units typified the high morale of the Division in this campaign.
On 23 November No. 1 Echelon was sent back to 50 FSD, taking with it 150 German and Italian prisoners. No. 2
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Echelon broke bulk and at 2 p.m. was ordered forward to a supply point at Point 212 on Trigh Capuzzo.
Fourth Brigade was now on its way westward. On the morning of 23 November, with C Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry and 44 Royal Tanks (less one squadron), the brigade moved cautiously towards Gambut. Shelling halted it for a while in the morning, but by mid-afternoon it had secured the Gambut airfield.
After 4 Brigade came Captain Quirk with thirty No. 2 Echelon vehicles to set up his supply point at Point 212. But somewhere things went wrong. Along the Trigh Capuzzo there is first a Point 212, seven miles west a Point 213, which is at the map reference given in the war diary as the Point 212 where the supply point was fixed, and six miles further west again a second Point 212. In general, no one at the time seems to have been clear which was which. The outgoing supply convoy was given a wrong map reference and away it went. It overtook 4 Brigade on the move, and when the brigade stopped ‘moved up through artillery and odd parts of the division’. Watched no doubt by wondering infantrymen, it disappeared in the direction of the enemy to the supposed supply point. ‘We thought the place was not quite right,’ writes Quirk.
‘An officer came up very fast and told us that the blotches on the horizon were German tanks, that our general was preparing to engage them and that we were in the direct line of fire, would we please move our transport,’ he recalls. ‘We moved smartly to the rear of the division and sat there to see the outcome. However, darkness was coming on very fast and there was no engagement.’
That night a supply point was set up, but in the dark several units failed to arrive, and an instruction was given by the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General (Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell15) that supplies were to be taken forward to them.
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During the night a message was received that the trucks were in a dangerous area and that preparations were to be made in case of attack. Later tanks came clattering through the darkness, but they were friendly and parked nearby. They were a rear group of 13 Corps, lost and seeking its location. Quirk was able to assist.
The next day Quirk returned to the unit while Watt and Second-Lieutenant Latimer16 went on in search of the units that had not received rations. This was easier said than done. The convoy ran into a tank battle and was unable to move until dark, when it finally located the remainder of 4 Brigade B echelon.
On Monday, 24 November, the pot was boiling hard. On this day Rommel launched his counter-thrust to the Egyptian frontier. The New Zealand Division, meanwhile, was pressing forward to secure the vital ground outside Tobruk—Belhamed and the escarpment at Sidi Rezegh. For Supply Column there was now trouble wherever a convoy turned.
Point 175 was securely held by 24 and 25 Battalions. Fourth Brigade cleared Gambut and came up abreast of them. Early on 25 November 4 and 6 Brigades pushed on, 4 Brigade to take Zaafran, and 24 and 26 Battalions along the escarpment to seize the so-called Blockhouse and the Sidi Rezegh airfield. Ahead still lay Belhamed and the escarpment by the mosque of Sidi Rezegh.
Rommel's counter-stroke, meanwhile, was scattering Eighth Army supply transport in all directions. To save his invested frontier positions he despatched 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions and the Ariete Division, and as they struck eastward they inevitably created alarm and confusion in all directions.
To Supply Column, now busily weaving a web of supplies across the desert, all this was most disconcerting. In the course of 24 November the Column had no fewer than seven convoys in various parts of Libya: Quirk was bringing in the No. 2 Echelon group from supplying 4 Brigade, and
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part of this, under Watt and Latimer, was still chasing up the rest of the brigade; Roberts was returning with his unsuccessful 6 Brigade Company, and Demouth was bringing in his part of it; No. 1 Echelon returned from a routine visit to 50 FSD, and later in the day went out to victual the Division; and Second-Lieutenant Battersby17 set out for 50 FSD, only to find his way blocked by tanks.
After the mishaps of 23 November no convoy was sent to the supply point on the 24th until the Commander NZASC reported that the area chosen was clear of the enemy. Then, escorted by two Bren carriers and a Honey tank, Morris set out at 3 p.m. with No. 1 Echelon.
The trucks did not get far. Seven miles out they ran into a soft pan, and half a dozen of them sank to their axles and gear boxes. The Honey could make no headway with the floundering vehicles. More Bren carriers came into view some time later, and after the trucks had been unloaded, the carriers, three to each vehicle, dragged them clear. After that it was time to brew up.
It was now too late to continue, and the convoy laagered in square formation and Morris sent back to the unit for hot rations. The night was pitch black—fortunately. In the early hours of the morning the roar and clatter of trucks and tanks came across the desert from the north and steadily swelled into a tremendous clamour; armour moving at night sounds like a horde of racing cars belting along with long strings of old iron trailing behind. The armoured column, identified as German, rolled past the laagered trucks; only 500 yards away, the column was between Morris's convoy and Supply Column Headquarters. ‘If Jerry had chosen a course 500 yards west of the one he took he would have driven clean through us in the dark,’ reports Morris. By daylight the enemy had gone.
On the way to the supply point that morning the convoy was stopped by an armoured patrol and told to wait for instructions. Two miles due south British tanks attached to 13 Corps were engaging the enemy, and ‘anything was likely to happen’. After about half an hour's waiting around
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Morris was allowed to speak to Rear Divisional Headquarters on the radio of one of the AFVs and was given a new point at which to rejoin Column Headquarters.
Then down from the hazy sky came screaming Stukas, about eighteen of them, and bombs began erupting. ‘Still no casualties, but we were glad when things quietened down for a bit.’ At the supply rendezvous the Supply Column men found the Division engaged in an artillery duel. Vehicles were dispersed, supplies distributed to units who came for them, and a small quantity of 25-pounder ammunition was delivered to the guns. More enemy planes came down, but though there were casualties around about, the Supply Column came through ‘without more than a fright’.
But the job was still not completed. Hot spot though this might be, there were still troops somewhere to whom rations must be taken, and part of the convoy under Rawle went forward. The trucks went over the escarpment where 6 Brigade had only recently fought, and on to the road. Shellfire was splashing about, but no one was hit. The convoy went west along the road, through the artillery, and dispersed and halted while Rawle made a reconnaissance. Bombers swooped on the trucks and nearby 25-pounders and anti-tank guns, and while the Supply Column men flattened themselves against the ground, jagged holes appeared in their vehicles. Again no one was hit. The artillery kept hammering away.
When Rawle returned the trucks moved forward again and no time was wasted in unloading at the various cooks' trucks. Then they pulled back behind the artillery and camped for the night. Artillery officers asked if they had any ammunition as they were running short. That night the guns were busy, and counter-battery fire from the enemy kept things lively. When the convoy pulled back in the morning, the drivers could hear behind them the chatter of machine guns and the crack of mortars and artillery.
The other section of the convoy had also spent the night abroad in the desert. It camped between General Freyberg's headquarters and the enemy at Gambut, and a runner came out with the suggestion that it would be safer behind the
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tank screen. Morris preferred to stay where he was, however, and was granted permission ‘at his own peril’. Both sections rejoined the unit that day.
Back at Abiar Nza Ferigh all this time the rest of the Column was having trouble of its own. At 4 p.m. on 24 November the water section, under Battersby, set off for 50 FSD to replenish. The trucks carried wounded. At 8 p.m. Battersby was back with the information that he had met enemy AFVs 15 miles to the south, and as he was carrying wounded he could not risk an attempt to run around them. This was alarming news, for 50 FSD was the source of supplies, and that morning a No. 2 Echelon convoy under Second-Lieutenant Cottrell18 had set out for this depot to load up.
At 10 a.m. next day 13 Corps reported that the route to 50 FSD was open, and away went Battersby again. He returned at 1 p.m. with the news that the enemy was still astride the route and in fact had moved eight miles to the north. Nothing had been heard from Cottrell and all that was known of him was that he had been seen by a tank officer passing through the wire into Egypt at 5 p.m. the previous day. His non-return was presumed—rightly—to be due to the presence of enemy armour.
Here the lack of something was shown. ASC units were not equipped with radio and once abroad in the desert had no way of calling up their headquarters. ASC convoys, criss-crossing the desert on their various tasks, could have been useful as reconnaissance patrols, but whatever they saw on their travels and whatever trouble they encountered, they could do absolutely nothing except run. Had Cottrell had wireless, he could have told Column Headquarters the previous night that the enemy was closing in on 50 FSD and that it would be useless and dangerous to attempt to reach it.
But although the unit was not aware of this, it certainly knew all was not well in the south, and Pryde went across to Rear Division to say so. He was being assured—as the
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ASC was so often assured during Crusader—that there were no enemy tanks for miles and that Battersby was undoubtedly seeing things, when a despatch rider rode in from Supply Column Headquarters with a message that clouds of dust were approaching from the south-south-east and the indications were that they were hostile. It was about this time that news of the raiding of 50 FMC was received, and a prompt order was given to Supply Column to move west forthwith to Bir el Haleizin, detaching before it went a group to supply 5 Brigade, which was still at Sidi Azeiz. Nothing was known of what had become of Cottrell's convoy.
‘What a scatter to get going,’ and the Column's departure was given added urgency when an RASC driver pulled in and asked, ‘Have you any petrol?’ Certainly, he was assured. Would he like some. ‘No, chum, I don't want any petrol. You'll need it all yourselves. Jerry's about 20 minutes behind me.’
The effect on loading operations was marked. As twenty minutes ticked away, eyes anxiously watched the south, but no one was more perturbed than the remnants of the Italian prisoners of war still on hand. Few load-carrying trucks were available to carry them. Most of them were stowed away among various loads, but when everything was packed and the Column ready to move, a few prisoners of ‘little military value’ were still on the ground, and were to be left to be collected by the approaching enemy. The prospect did not appeal to them and they became highly excited. Finally, as the trucks began to move off at 3.30 p.m., their feet found wings, and they came pounding through the dust of the convoy and swung themselves aboard wherever they could. Some must have run at least a quarter of a mile and no doubt broke a few records.
When the dust had settled the group left behind to supply 5 Brigade had the desert to itself. This was another composite ASC group, again under Roberts, and it waited around for half an hour for a section of Ammunition Company to arrive. Lyon was sent out to patrol the eastern approaches.
While the group was waiting around it was decided to blow up a nearby German ammunition dump. Several
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attempts were made before the dump caught, just as the Ammunition Company detachment arrived. The whole group moved away to a pyrotechnic send-off.
There were two other absentees from Supply Column on its move west. At 10 a.m. Demouth had set out for the supply point, now located seven miles south of Trigh Capuzzo, and Latimer was away with a convoy carrying prisoners and about seventy British wounded.
Darkness closed down before Supply Column reached Bir el Haleizin, and behind the jolting trucks, flares, so beloved by the enemy—brilliant reds, greens and oranges—were sprouting. As the new area was approached artillery was whipping the night and machine guns were chattering. Not far away the infantry was getting ready for the final breakthrough to Tobruk. At 9 p.m. 18 and 20 Battalions advanced on Belhamed. Two hours later 21, 24, 25 and 26 Battalions thrust at the escarpment above the Sidi Rezegh mosque, intending to go through to Ed Duda. In the Tobruk salient the besieged garrison made a thrust outwards to Ed Duda. The fighting went on throughout 26 November and it was not until early on the morning of 27 November that 19 Battalion (and not 21 and 26 Battalions as had been planned) reached Ed Duda, gained by the Tobruk forces the previous afternoon. So on the morning of 27 November the New Zealanders held the way open to Tobruk and had possession of two of the three escarpments that formed terraces inland towards the Libyan plateau. Fourth Brigade held the high ground from Zaafran to Belhamed and Ed Duda. Sixth Brigade, on Point 175 and the escarpment above Sidi Rezegh, held the second escarpment. But the enemy was still on the third and southernmost escarpment and was making good use of his observation.
Throughout all this Supply Column was not very comfortably placed. If it had previously been too close to the fire for comfort, it was now in the centre of a thoroughly stirred-up pot, and it could be fairly sure that in whichever direction it turned it would meet trouble. With enemy tanks astride the supply lines, the supply situation became serious, and rations were cut by half and the water ration reduced to a quart a day a man for all purposes; not much
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is left when you have to cook and fill the radiator. Beards began to sprout.
From the time the Column halted at what was presumed to be Bir el Haleizin on the night of 25 November there were worries. The first was whether, in this lively part of the desert, the unit was in its correct location. After travelling by compass and speedometer, there could be no way of telling until daylight permitted a resection to be made. Morning showed that the unit was just short of where it should be.
There were plenty of other worries. A count showed that all that were present of Supply Column were three officers, Pryde, Quirk and McLaughlin,19 fifty-one other ranks and nine vehicles. Cottrell was still missing, and at 8.30 a.m. Latimer turned up with three vehicles to report that Demouth and seven other vehicles were missing and were probably captured. Latimer had spent the night with tanks on his heels and had come home with a splintered but still intact windshield and a broken pistol. An attempt to smash the windscreen to give better vision during the night flight had been a proving test for triplex glass.
Demouth, however, was not a prisoner and was himself wondering what had become of Latimer. Since he had left the unit the previous day Demouth's wanderings had taken him far. He located the supply point easily enough at midday on the 25th, only to find from Watt, who had arrived earlier, that it had been moved forward. They were searching for the new supply point when, at 2 p.m., Watt learned that Latimer was at the previous supply point, and as the divisional administration group was about to move west to its new area at Bir el Haleizin, Watt instructed Demouth to intercept Latimer and guide him there. But by the time Demouth reached the old supply point, Latimer had gone off to 13 Corps Headquarters. Demouth overtook him there at 6 p.m. It was now too late to return to Supply Column Headquarters that day, and Demouth decided to assist Latimer.
Latimer's convoy, which consisted of five Supply Column trucks and some 4 Brigade vehicles, had picked up wounded
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and prisoners from an advanced dressing station near Sidi Rezegh and, on instructions from Colonel Maxwell, had set out to take them to 30 Corps. En route Latimer encountered a British tank and was told that Bir Gubi had been overrun and that he should go to 13 Corps instead. Thirteenth Corps, however, declined to take over Latimer's load, and although flares were visible in the direction of Sidi Azeiz, a brigadier told Latimer to go to 5 NZ Field Ambulance.
The convoy set out, but when an enemy concentration was sighted ahead, put about and returned to 13 Corps. Latimer said he would attempt to get the wounded through but would not take the prisoners. The brigadier emphatically assured Latimer that the place was not surrounded—the old story—but agreed to take over the prisoners.
Away went the convoy again along Trigh Capuzzo, with Demouth at the head and Latimer at the tail. It was now dark, and about five miles to the east, when not far from Sidi Azeiz, the head of the convoy ran right into a panzer laager. Upon them before he was aware of their presence, Demouth ran through the tank lines and past Germans standing smoking by their vehicles, swung about and headed back towards the convoy again. As he emerged a green flare glowed up behind him, and the whole convoy put about and fled west. Somewhere in this scramble for safety the convoy split. Latimer, heading west along Trigh Capuzzo, came across an anti-tank screen about two miles along the road and warned them that tanks were nearby. He pushed on for three or four miles, and when he stopped to check his convoy, tanks fired on him from the rear.
Thinking these were the same tanks that had been encountered earlier and that Demouth and the others had been overrun, Latimer set off again. The following tanks put up flares, bronze and white, from which it seemed that there were half a dozen or so of them. The convoy left Trigh Capuzzo and made tracks for Gambut. Another group of tanks appeared from the south.
At dawn Latimer turned his convoy, and passing barely 200 yards from the nearest German tank, set a course for Bir el Haleizin.
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Demouth, meantime, had bivouacked for the night with the remainder of the vehicles. In the morning, of course, he could see no sign of the others, and started to think about what he was going to do with the wounded. G Branch 13 Corps Headquarters could not even tell him where he could get urgently needed petrol, water and rations. At last he came across 4 and 5 NZ Field Ambulances about four miles west of Sidi Azeiz, just as they were on the point of moving out. These units took over the wounded, and because of the strain this sudden influx placed upon their transport, Demouth put his vehicles at the disposal of 5 Field Ambulance until the hospital was shifted. He finished this task at 3 p.m. and reached Column Headquarters an hour later.
All except Cottrell were now either present or accounted for.
The Column now was casting about for fresh supplies. Since Cottrell had not returned and all supply lines were blocked, nothing had been received for two days. At 3 p.m. this day (26 November) Division advised Column Headquarters that Trigh Capuzzo was clear as far east as Sidi Azeiz and that a convoy was to be sent immediately to 51 FSD, a new depot, in 13 Corps' area.
No. 1 Echelon, under Morris, was selected for this task. When he received his instructions, Morris reported to Colonel Crump that the area concerned had been under fire the previous day. Crump showed him a situation report declaring the area clear. But Morris was not entirely convinced. Before starting he arranged with his second-in-command, Rawle, that if trouble was encountered Morris would give three long blasts on his car horn and signal a change of direction. Each vehicle was to turn and set off at full speed and in line.
‘This was the only time I ever lined up all the drivers and went through this preliminary drill to ensure perfection,’ says Morris. ‘Oddly enough it was the only occasion I was ever called upon to make this manœuvre.’
The trucks set off on the high ground above the escarpment south of Trigh Capuzzo. Trouble soon came—from an unexpected quarter. About forty Marylands came over and, presumably mistaking the trucks for a German convoy,
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let go their bombs. No one was hurt, and an explanation was forthcoming shortly afterwards. Three armoured cars halted Morris and told him he was in enemy-held territory. He explained what he was doing and was allowed to go on.
A few miles further on shellbursts blossomed to the left. At first it was thought they were overs from a tank battle near Gambut, but when shells began to fall among vehicles, there was no doubt about for whom they were intended. Morris ‘pounced’ on the horn and as he signalled the trucks swung south. ‘I was grateful the drivers were so cool,’ says Morris. As the vehicles turned south Rawle looked across to Morris, grinned, and gave the thumbs-up sign.
About two miles to the south the convoy swung left, halted to check course, and set off again. The journey was continued into the night. A few miles from where 51 FSD should have been, the convoy met another column of trucks heading west. This was 13 Corps Headquarters, which was leaving, Morris was told by Major Sanders,20 because things were getting a shade hot. The area where 51 FSD was to have been opened was still held by the enemy. Sanders advised Morris to fall in behind 13 Corps Headquarters, and he willingly complied.
In darkness, with enemy flares in the sky to every point of the compass, the group moved west along Trigh Capuzzo. When they reached what Morris, by dead reckoning, considered was the Gambut area, he decided to leave 13 Corps and head straight for home. Rawle demurred, but Morris had his way.
When the mileage ran out they stopped. There was neither sight nor sound of troops, but flares were still everywhere, and talking in cautious whispers the drivers crept around and prepared to settle down for the rest of the night. Suddenly, bright flame flared up: a driver trying to start a primus in his truck had set the vehicle alight. Sergeant Braimbridge21 donned a respirator, dived into the burning
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truck and soon had it out. At that moment he was the most popular man in the unit.
‘I shall never forget waking up and looking into the guns of an armoured troop camped alongside,’ Morris recalls. ‘It was in or out, now, so if we were to be captured let us get it over. I went over to the troop leader, and luck was with us—they were Tommy armoured cars who were waiting for dawn to shoot up what they imagined was a Hun convoy.’
About 500 yards away were the New Zealand lines. Morris returned to the unit to learn that after his departure the previous day information had come to hand that 51 FSD was ‘non est’.
So three days had gone by without fresh supplies. Further east Roberts and his 5 Brigade Company were in the thick of it. This company took much the same form as the earlier 6 Brigade Company; it consisted of C Section of Ammunition Company (Second-Lieutenant Butt), B and H Sections of Supply Column (Sergeant Baldwin22 and Second-Lieutenant Lyon) and six vehicles from B Section 4 RMT carrying water.
Clearing Abiar Nza Ferigh at 4 p.m. on 25 November, the company had moved north-east towards Sidi Azeiz, where 5 Brigade was located. Four miles south of Sidi Azeiz enemy AFVs were sighted and were reported by Roberts on his arrival at 5 Brigade Headquarters at 5.30 p.m. At 1 a.m. the company was ordered to go to 22 Battalion's area at Sghifet el Charruba, below the escarpment. This was reached at 6 a.m.
This battalion was now eating the first of three days' reserve ration, and on learning of the precarious supply position from Roberts, the battalion's second-in-command, Major Greville,23 placed the unit on half rations. Roberts took over a dump of German food consisting of a three-ton load of Trinkwasser (drinking water) in jerricans (the excellent German water or petrol containers), tins of hard
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biscuits and packets of cellophane-wrapped black bread. Unfortunately it was known that the Germans were suffering from gastric trouble, and for fear of contamination it was decided not to allow New Zealand units to use German rations or water.
The morning was uneventful, but about midday an enemy column of about 3000 vehicles—trucks and tanks—was seen moving between 22 Battalion's positions and 5 Brigade Headquarters. Drivers set to work concealing their trucks as well as they could.
Roberts and Lyon climbed to the top of the escarpment to watch the column stream by. The Bren carriers of the Divisional Cavalry and of 5 Brigade were having an exhilarating time. Concealed by the dust, they would rush in, shoot u


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