Renewed Vigilance.

At this period a particularly active patrolling of No Man's Land was being maintained, and the number of patrols operating was unlimited. The enemy was evidently more or less alive to this activity, and as ours were fighting patrols, as distinct from reconnoitring parties, there were frequent clashes. In some instances large numbers of the enemy were observed or encountered and engaged by our patrols with varying degrees of success. It was not always possible to establish the results of these bombing encounters, but it was at least clear that the enemy did not escape damage. But there was also the danger of our own patrols clashing, and in the darkness mistaking each other for the enemy, and there was pretty conclusive evidence that this did occur on more than one occasion.

On July 21st Major J. A. Mackenzie left the 2nd Battalion and proceeded to England to take over command of the New Zealand Details Camp established at Codford, whereupon Major G. S. Smith, D.S.O., succeeded to the position of Second-in-Command of the Battalion.

The appearance in the line of parties of the Royal West Kents (122nd Brigade of the 41st Division), led to conjectures of possible relief and a move to a new locality. These anticipations, however, were not realised, and all that the visit of troops of another unit, ever a prolific source of conjecture and rumour, meant on this occasion was the possibility of the 122nd Brigade taking over the left sector, then held by the 1st Infantry Brigade. But before the time arrived for this order to become operative it was cancelled.

On July 9th the order by which all troops forming the garrison of the front line were to remain awake throughout the hours of darkness was cancelled, and to each group of page 106 two or more bays there were to be eight men on duty, two furnishing double sentry, two awake and sitting on the fire-step within immediate call, and the remainder asleep in the trench but fully equipped and ready to man the fire trench on an alarm being given. It was also laid down that an officer was to be constantly on trench duty, in the same manner as an officer was on watch on board ship. It was further ordered that the garrison of the front line system, except those furnishing the day sentry groups, carried out at least four hours manual labour in improving the defences.

The hours of darkness were still very brief indeed; but on July 28th the times of standing-to were readjusted so as to extend from 9.30 p.m. to 10.30 p.m., and from 3.30 a.m. to 4.30 a.m. By this alteration the intervening night hours of extreme vigilance were lengthened; but the disappearance of the long summer days was still some distance ahead. The routine of stand-to and stand-down was that at the time appointed in the evening the whole of the garrison took up a definite position in the fire-bays, fully armed and equipped, and remained at their posts for a period of approximately one hour, when the order to stand-down was sent along. The regular watches were then set and maintained throughout the night, and all members of the garrison whose presence was not immediately required in this direction or who were detailed for other duties of routine, retired from the fire-bays. At the appointed time in the morning the order to stand-to was again sent along the line, and once more all arms turned out fully equipped and took up their stations, remaining there until the order to stand-down was received. The reduced day watches were then set and carried on. The general idea of this scheme originated in the almost uniform experience that approaching dusk and approaching dawn were the two most likely moments of enemy attack, and that at these times the garrison should accordingly be fully prepared for any such emergency. And so the system was maintained until the termination of trench warfare in the closing days of 1918. At times the observance of this custom could only have been regarded as more or less formal, yet it continued to provide the opportunity for ensuring that every man knew his correct battle station and that he was possessed of his full fighting equipment, while it also served page 107 to accustom everyone to turning out rapidly and effectively. If, of course, the morning and the outlook were foggy, stand-down was not given as usual, and very often it was on this account unavoidably prolonged.

There was no order more welcome to men in the line, and none more cheerfully passed along, than the morning "stand-down," for it implied that the majority of the night sentries could retire to their shelters for that long-deferred sleep; while in winter time it was immediately followed by the platoon commander or sergeant on his rounds with the ever-welcome rum. The rum issue was unquestionably a great institution, for it assured an exhilaration and warmth of body which lasted until steep caught the chilled and weary soldier. Where, it might be asked, is the war-worn veteran of a winter campaign who has not confessed that the morning's tot of rum has "saved his life" after a night's vigil in the merciless cold and pelting rain, perchance after standing knee-deep in mud, or after crawling about in the filth and uncertainties of No Man's Land, or lying exposed in the slime of a listening or advanced post out beyond the cornparative friendliness of the parapet?

A Divisional Order issued at this period served to reveal something of only one of the many methods employed to determine pending enemy activities. For some time, it was stated, a listening apparatus had been installed within the New Zealand area and close to the front line trenches. Taking into consideration the position both of the instrument and the signal offices from which messages were intercepted, and the proximity of the German trenches, it was quite certain that the enemy, if in possession of a similar apparatus in the vicinity, was overhearing our messages. Events had happened on the Divisional front which must lead to the conclusion that in many cases the enemy had intercepted our telephone and buzzer messages, and thereby obtained important military information. There was good reason to believe that in this manner the enemy had obtained previous warning concerning two raids carried out by the Division, the result being that he was prepared to meet them, and we in consequence suffered heavy casualties and were unsuccessful. It was therefore laid down that the use of telephones and buzzers was forbidden in advance of the subsidiary line page 108 except in cases of extreme urgency, and in all other cases was to be confined to the signal service and artillery forward observing officers. The greatest care was also to be exercised in the transmission of all messages, and no map locations were to be mentioned over the telephone or buzzer.

It was a long cry from Armentieres to the Somme, but during the month of July it was decided that special vigilance was to be observed along the whole of the Second Army Front in order to prevent the enemy withdrawing troops from opposite our front to the region of the Somme, where the great British offensive was then in full swing. In keeping with this important order and to give effect to its purpose, the Division was to be prepared to face greater risks and greater casualties. In other words, the enemy was to be engaged so actively that he would regard it as unwise or unsafe to move any troops away to the south. No Man's Land was to be our land; our artrllery was to be more active; the enemy's wire was to be cut; his parapets demolished; billets bombarded; frequent raids were to be carried out and others threatened, and counter-battery work actively engaged in. The supply of ammunition for 18-pounder guns in particular was to be unlimited, and no-restrictions were to be placed on the amount of shooting to be done by light guns and trench mortars because of retaliation. To what extent the Regiment was intended to participate in this programme of organised fury was never fully realised, for very soon it was to be much more vitally concerned in this same Somme offensive.

It was not until August 6th that the 1st Battalion of the Regiment moved out of the line at L'Epinette after completing a memorable tour, the commencement of which dated back to July 5th. Four days later a warning order was issued to the effect that the New Zealand Division was to be relieved in the Armentieres sector by the 51st Division. On August 15th, the day after the relief of the Division commenced, officers of the 6th Battalion of the Black Watch visited the sector in view of their taking over from the 2nd Battalion of Otago, which was then in line. Relief was accomplished on the 17th, and Otago marched back to billets.